qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyui opasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfgh jklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvb nmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwer START to STOP: Strategic Arms Reduction in the 21st Century tyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopas

dfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzx cvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmq wertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuio pasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghj klzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbn mqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwerty uiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdf ghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxc vbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrty uiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdf ghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxc
Strategic Arms Reduction in the 21st Century
8/31/2010 By Craig S. Byrnes

Introduction Even though the Cold War has ended the threat posed by nuclear weapons has not. Over the last decade the world has seen an increase in nuclear proliferation, and an erosion of the international bodies--and mutual agreements--designed to impart a semblance of order on the anarchic system. New concerns have materialized--like nuclear terrorism for instance--which underscore the need for a shift in nuclear policies.1 As a result, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States lists, "reversing the spread of nuclear weapons," as a top priority of the Obama Administration, citing that, "success depends upon broad consensus and concerted action."2 This success can only be realized, according to the NSS, by pursuing "the goal of a world without nuclear weapons." In keeping with this strategy, the US and Russia--in the interest of mutual security--have made an effort to produce predictability, credibility and stability by cultivating a strategic alliance based on trust by signing a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on April 8, 2010.3 The implications of an agreement of this magnitude require that a study be done to assess how the global security environment will be affected.4 By increasing security and verification protocols on existing nuclear warheads and fissile materials the opportunity for terrorists--or rogue states--to acquire nuclear technologies via theft or the black market will be drastically reduced. However, measurable success can only be achieved if transparent verification protocols

"Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their potential use by states or terrorists is the most urgent challenge facing the national security, and therefore the intelligence community in the post Cold War world," (Deutch 1996). 2 The NSS also intends to extend a "negative security assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those non-nuclear nations that are in compliance with the NPT and their nuclear nonproliferation obligations," as well as, "investing in the modernization of a safe, secure, and effective stockpile without the production of new nuclear weapons." 3 A central purpose of New START is to, "reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons," (DOS 2010). Text of the New START treaty signals the commitment, "to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat," (DOS 2010). 4 Furthermore, it is necessary to determine if ratification of new START will increase or decrease the level of national security enjoyed by the US.


are put in place. Consequently, the feasibility of a bilateral verification regime must be investigated, requiring an analysis of existing and proposed transparent verification regimes to uncover patterns of success--past studies have not offered practical solutions (Berry 2009). Components of any successful verification regime intended to determine whether or not the parties are in fact living up to the force reduction requirements of a new START treaty will necessitate the need for transparent state behavior.5 This will facilitate an analysis from a realist/neorealist standpoint by using international regime theory to provide a framework for measuring to what extent the verification structures will be affected by the surrender of national sovereignty required by transparency. The purpose of this concurrent mixed methods study will be to determine if the ratification of a new START treaty with Russia will enhance global security. A greater understanding can be gained by combining expansive statistical trends obtained through quantitative research with comprehensive qualitative research. Therefore, the hypothesis--that verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals will enhance global security--will be tested using quantitative methods--such as linear regression--to measure and predict the relationship between the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the US and Russia and multiple indicators of global security levels. At the same time, the idea of strategic arms reduction--and verification--will be explored by examining scholarly studies and government documents that focus on nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and nuclear terrorism.6 Literature Review


For the purpose of this study transparent state behavior will be defined as employing a transparent verification regime capable of demonstrating tangible weapon reduction. 6 For the purposes of this study strategic arms will be defined as deliverable nuclear warheads and the fissile material present in their creation and destruction.


A thorough review of literature available on the topic of nuclear arms control will show a large number of studies conducted in direct support of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to the ultimate goal of zero, but there is a lack of effort within these cases to determine whether the security situation will actually benefit beyond the obvious fact that verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals will enhance global security. Literature focusing on the idea of nuclear disarmament is readily available, however it is noted that any particular emphasis on costing or assessing the security situation, should this occur, is lacking. Alger and Findlay perform an informative study for the Nuclear Energy Futures Project centering on research concerning the costs of dismantling and destroying nuclear arsenals and delivery systems (Alger and Findlay 2009). They claim, "the cost of dismantling and destroying nuclear weapons is more accurately attributed to being a normal part of weapon life cycles rather than to nuclear disarmament," (Alger and Findlay 2009). Additionally, their study asserts that, "a multilateral verification regime will be a bargain given the benefits of a world free of nuclear weapons," an idea that may uncover Russian motivations for signing new START (Alger and Findlay 2009). Existing studies regarding non-proliferation are widespread and mainly highlight the tumultuous state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).7 Considering the implied point of the new START treaty is to ultimately eliminate nuclear arms it is important to note studies which investigate why states choose to proliferate or to disarm. Procida offers a unique and compelling perspective on the way the international community views nuclear proliferation. Referring to the nuclear domino theory, he claims, "virtually all practitioners agree that either security concerns or a desire for status are the primary causes of proliferation, accompanied by


"The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join," (Schultz et al 2008).


the widespread consensus that a state's decision to go nuclear inevitably prompts others to follow," (Procida 2010). In essence Procida believes this is a defective way of thinking that warps, "policy debates on the risks and costs of nuclear disarmament and further proliferation," (Procida 2010). Procida’s argument directly supports ideas advanced in the 2010 NSS when he claims, "massive cuts in the arsenals of the major nuclear powers, a prohibition once and for all on nuclear tests, and even a global convention outlawing nuclear weapons," will, "embolden the fight to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction, as the United States regains the moral high ground," (Procida 2010). Tagma offers an analysis of nuclear disarmament from the realist perspective. He details both the defensive and offensive schools of thought, and points out the importance of viewing the realist school through these distinctions (Tagma 2010). "This article advances two defensive realist hypotheses on state behavior to explain nuclear rollback," (Tagma 2010).8 In particular it argues, "that in certain strategic environments the insecurity caused by possessing nuclear weapons outweighs the security provided by nuclear weapons against rivals in an uncertain future," (Tagma 2010). Kartchner et. al., "explore the advantages and disadvantages of several approaches to arms control agreements, including formal treaties that are legally binding on their state parties, non-binding political agreements, and parallel or reciprocated initiatives," (Kartchner et. al. 2002). The study claims, "it is possible that the US and its prospective arms control partners in the future will find that hybrid approaches combining some elements of formal agreement with


"The absence of an existential threat is a necessary condition of nuclear disarmament, and the absence of a secure second-strike capability is a necessary condition of nuclear disarmament as well," (Tagma 2010).


some informal arrangements will best meet their respective national security objectives," (Kartchner et. al. 2002).9 Cooper--a former Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy at the Department of Defense--submits a valuable analysis of new START during the negotiation phase, and delivers an assessment of Russian motivations, calling into question the wisdom of ratifying the new START treaty.10 Cooper says it is too soon to tell whether the treaty will improve the international situation, but explains, "a simplistic perspective might be that any reduction in existing nuclear arsenals intrinsically helps to lessen the panoply of dangers that these weapons pose; that fewer weapons anywhere equals less danger everywhere," (Cooper 2009). 11 Discussions on the topic of nuclear terrorism generally address the danger posed by nonstate actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).12 Van De Velde highlights the issue of nuclear terrorism and attempts to provide conceivable deterrence scenarios. Arguing that, "the most important strategic objective of any president's strategy to protect the United States is to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction," Van De Velde determines no true deterrence is possible (Velde 2010). As a solution he believes it necessary to label the individuals who are "irredeemably committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon as irrational, apocalyptic, and dangerous," (Velde 2010).


"This view is reinforced by the widely held conviction that Russia's nuclear arsenal will continue to decline regardless of whether new formal arms control agreements are reached or not," (Kartchner et. al. 2002) 10 "Russia will likely push for an outcome that, while reciprocal on its face, would in reality provide a net nuclear forces advantage over the United States. . . Putting it mildly, it is difficult to imagine how any outcome that even approaches this presumed Kremlin blueprint would contribute to U.S. national security interests," (Cooper 2009). 11 Cooper's tone generally leans towards a, "framework for analysis based on a clear hierarchy of nuclear dangers," (Cooper 2009). He places the Russian threat at the bottom when he claims Russia does not have the means to, "maintain its strategic force levels over time," (Cooper 2009). According to Cooper, Russia "needs deeper reciprocal reductions, particularly in delivery vehicles, to maintain any semblance of strategic equivalency with the United States." 12 "Observers have noted that U.S.-Russian cooperation to counter nuclear terrorism is facilitated by a partial convergence of views in Washington and Moscow about the nuclear threats posed by non-state actors," (Parrish et al 2005).


Overall the literature addresses the general components required to foster an environment within which disarmament and verification is within reach. Alternatively it makes it clear that States with limited conventional forces--including Russia--will continue to feel threatened by the United States despite the number of nuclear weapons it possesses because of a large gap in conventional force abilities. The resulting security imbalance may lead weaker countries to seek nuclear weapons in order to counter the perceived conventional threat, thus negating any symbolic gesture strategic arms reduction may be intended to project. The following section discusses the theoretical framework chosen for the purposes of this study. Theoretical Framework An analysis based on the realist school of thought will provide for valuable insight into the formation, implementation, and verification of a new START treaty.13 This study will facilitate pointed impartial analysis by applying two theories--International Regime Theory and Balance-of-Power Theory. Post-Cold War nuclear policy has shifted from a policy of proliferation to one of disarmament where most states--including the US and Russia--seek strategic alliances that will ensure their survival in the face of implicit threats posed by nuclear weapons.14 As a result, international regimes--such as the START treaty--are put in place to allow for, "transparent state behavior and a degree of stability under conditions of anarchy in the international system," (IR Theory Knowldege Base 2010).15

13 14

Additionally, any potential threats to global security are more likely to be exposed. "In a world of anarchy, the only currency that matters is power -- the material capability to ward off pressure or coercion, while being able to influence others. The anarchic global structure also makes it impossible for governments to fully trust each other, forcing states to be guided solely by their own national interests," (Drezner 2010). 15 International regime theory is, "a perspective that focuses on cooperation among actors in a given area of international relations,"(IR Theory Knowldege Base 2010).


International regime theory will be used to determine how the forefiture of some level of national sovereignty will affect the durability of any verification regime put in place to verify reductions.16 It is appropriate for the issue of new START because it, "taps into something important," (Brahm 2005). "In essence, the study of regimes is an effort to understand the means and conditions under which states cooperate with one another," (Brahm 2005). Any bilateral verification regime will be vulnerable due to the parties sensitivity to relative gains.17 Krasner explains that, "one way to show that institutions, as opposed to simply the power and interests of actors, matter is to demonstrate that they endure even though the interests and capabilities of specific actors differ," (Krasner 1999).18 According to Krasner, "once an institution is in place, regarless of how it got there in the first place, it can generate shared expectations that become a force for stability," (Krasner 1999). This an example of how International regime theory provides a favorable environment within which to test the hypothesis that verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals will enhance global security. The Balance of Power Theory is the second theoretical foundation the study will operationalize.19 It allows for an analysis of potential exploitations of strategic alliances to determine if their existence will be a force for stability or a catalyst for utter annihilation.20 A majority of available data concerning nuclear arms control , disarmament, or non-proliferation is


Durability can be defined as, "the extent to which principles and norms endure in the face of changing circumstances," (Krasner 1999). 17 The realist school views relative gains and relative losses as a threat to international regimes. "States fear being the sucker and suffering relative losses," (Brahm 2005). 18 "Rules or norms can, however, endure but have only a limited impact on actual behavior. Actors can say one thing and do another. They may pick and choose among different, and mutually incompatible, norms. They may adopt institutional arrangements that are inappropriate for their own material circumstances. Their identity, and the identity that they present to others, may be influenced by abiding principles and norms, but their actual behavior may be driven by a logic of consequences that is detached from principle," (Krasner 1999). 19 Balance of Power is "an international system in which states enjoy relatively equal power," states form alliances to counteract the amount of power enjoyed by others in the international system (Mingst 2004). 20 When looking at this issue from a realist perspective one must consider that the exploitation of the threat could be used to settle old scores by any party involved (Drezner 2010).


viewed from a liberal perspective. While this study does not address the liberal school of thought in much detail it would not be unreasonable to believe policymakers could be potentially blinded to flaws in the new START treaty as a result of the, "belief that cooperation is still possible in a world of anarchy," (Drezner 2010).21 Research Design and Methods This study will be a concurrent mixed methods study. Incorporating both quantitative research and qualitative research will allow for a higher level of understanding, but at the same time it will pose some challenges. One such challenge will be the time consuming nature of analyzing numerical data and textual data. On a quantitative level the hypothesis that verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals will enhance global security will be tested by exploring the relationship between the quantity of nuclear warheads and global security levels. Multiple security indicators have been chosen in order to reduce the chance for unintended variations. In turn this will allow for statistically significant conclusions and sound statistical inferences. The global security level will be exemplified by the Global Peace Index (GPI) , factors of political stability, Corruption Index, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Minutes to Midnight," and the Political Terror Scale (PTS).22 Preliminary quantitative analysis was performed compiling data from the PTS. Linear regression analysis shows a reasonably strong negative linear correlation between average global human insecurity levels and the number of existing nuclear warheads. In fact, as the number of nuclear

21 22

Certain elements of new START are vulnerable to exploitations by both the US and Russia. GPI is compiled and calculated by Vision of Humanity. The corruption index (CPI 2009) is compiled by Transparency International.


warheads decrease, global human insecurity increases.23 Further study is warranted in order to determine if this trend will continue across other measures of global security.24 Nuclear warhead totals can also be compared to various global conflict trends--compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace--to assess any potential relationships. For instance, preliminary distributional analysis of nuclear warheads from 1945 to 2010, and global trends in armed conflict from 1946-2009, shows a positive linear relationship between variables.25 Qualitative data can be obtained through many different avenues. A number of intensive interviews would contribute useful data to the study by providing insight into the thoughts and opinions of experts on the subject of nuclear arms control, disarmament and proliferation. It would benefit the study to be able to quantify these thoughts and opinions because it seems everyone has one and not one is the same. The population would consist of non-governmental organizations, such as the Center for Arms Control, Counter Proliferation Institute, and include US government policymakers, past and present. A truly random sample of the population would be difficult to obtain. The best way to attempt one would be to acquire a list of NGO experts,


Considering Human Insecurity levels were measured on a scale of one to five, levels for 185 countries were averaged by year from 1978 to 2006 and statistical computations were performed using Statistical Data Analysis and Graphics Software. The equation of the straight line relating human insecurity levels and number of nuclear warheads is estimated as: Y = 2.6618 using the 29 observations in this dataset. The y-intercept, the estimated value of human insecurity levels when nuclear warheads equal zero, is 2.6618 with a standard error of 0.1032. The slope, the estimated change in human insecurity levels per unit change in nuclear warheads, is 0.0000 with a standard error of 0.0000. The value of R-Squared, the proportion of the variation in human insecurity levels that can be accounted for by variation in nuclear warheads, is 0.2553. The correlation between human insecurity levels and the number of nuclear warheads is -0.5052. A significance test that the slope is zero resulted in a t-value of -3.0420. The significance level of this t-test is 0.0052. Since 0.0052 < 0.0500, the hypothesis that insecurity levels are not affected by the number of nuclear warheads is rejected. The estimated slope is 0.0000. The lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the slope is 0.0000 and the upper limit is 0.0000. The estimated intercept is 2.6618. The lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the intercept is 2.4501 and the upper limit is 2.8735. 24 PTS is, "a yearly report measuring physical integrity rights violations world-wide," (Gibney et. al. 2010). " The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," (Gibney et. al. 2010). 25 This indicates support for the hypothesis that verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals will enhance global security if you equate a reduction in armed conflict with increased global security. Graphics can be found in the appendix section of the proposal.


assign them arbitrary numbers, and then pull a sample from that list large enough to be a representative sample.26 Another method benefiting the study would be conducting multiple focus groups. Focus groups would contribute a great deal of valuable data to be utilized. It would provide many different scenarios for approaching the issue of strategic arms reduction. Groups would include scholars, policymakers, and people with a great deal of experience in the subject area. However, it would also include people of minimal education who have had no experience only general knowledge on the subject. A second group would consist of people with mediocre levels of education who are in support of total disarmament, and a group of highly educated people who believe these weapons are necessary. As a result differing opinions could be matched against one another allowing for new and interesting approaches. Additionally, data to be gained from all levels of education and knowledge meshing together could provide for unique solutions and bring about a new perspective that could not be obtained by viewing the opinions and information in isolation. Another useful data collection technique would be conducting a survey. A survey could provide generalized information from a population based on a sample so inferences can be made in regards to nuclear disarmament and global security. Surveying the population of US college students would provide useful insight. According to the US Department of Education as of 2007 there were 18,248,128 college students in the US. A sample size of 2,401 would be required in order to achieve a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence interval of two. The survey would be tailored for rapid turnaround and all data would be collected at one time. Because of the size of the sample an online survey would be designed and then implemented by selected US

A random sample of past and present policymakers would be difficult to acquire and counterproductive in my opinion. In order to have substance in the responses it may be necessary to seek out certain individuals who have had a stake in policy/decision making on the subject.


universities. As a result all data would return in electronic form making it much easier to analyze. The hypothesis will also be tested by viewing other instances of international regimes and gauging their successes. Alternatively the actual ideas championed within the new START treaty and nonproliferation circles will be closely examined. Other case studies have been chosen because of their contributions to the field of study. Since this study will employ a concurrent triangulation strategy, all data collected will be placed into two separate databases with the intention of converging them. This will allow for a confirmation that the two variables do in fact have some level of correlation. There will be significant discussion on the areas of similarity. The use of statistical software suites will be required in order to provide detailed analysis and charts and graphs confirming or disconfirming correlations.27 Summary This study will explore the utility of strategic arms reduction from a realist standpoint, applying International Regime Theory and Balance of Power Theory with the intention of determining if the global security environment will benefit from reductions of nuclear warheads. The amount of literature available concerning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is substantial, however an assessment of the security situation and an analysis of resulting costs has not been completed on a widespread or in-depth level. Initial analysis highlights the need to perform a comprehensive study which isolates and ranks indicators of global security and compares them to nuclear warhead totals from 1945 to the present. Any resulting trends can then be investigated so a realistic path to a stable and secure world can be mapped.


Some problems may arise in the collection process because of the limited amount of declassified data pertaining to this issue.


Reference List Alger, Justin and Findlay, Trevor. 2009. "The Costs of Disarmament". Nuclear Energy Futures Project. www.icnnd.org/research/alger_findlay_cost_of_Disarmament.pdf (accessed July 20, 2010). Berry, Ken. Review of Recent Literature on Nuclear Issues. Literature Review, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009. Brahm, Eric. "International Regimes." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2005 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/>. Bukharin, O. “U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU”, Science & Global Security, Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, September 2002. http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/sgs10bukharin.pdf Central Intelligence Agency. 1991. Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Year 2000. National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments. Copy 47. Central Intelligence Agency. 2000. Proliferation Digest. CIA DI PD2000-02JX. February/March 2000. Copy 0406. Cooper, David A. " Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?. Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University Press. No 244. 2009:1-8. Deutch, Dr. John M. "Conference on Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism." Central Intelligence Agency. May 23, 1996. https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/speeches-testimony/1996/dci_speech_052396.html (accessed July 22, 2010). Drezner, Daniel W. 2010. "Night of the Living Wonks: Toward an International Relations Theory of Zombies". Foreign Policy. Vol. 180. July/August 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/night_of_the_living_wonks?page=full (Accessed August 30, 2010). Gibney, M., Cornett L., Wood, R.. "Political Terror Scale 1976-2008." Political Terror Scale. 2010. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (accessed August 10, 2010). International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict. High Stakes Distributional Conflicts. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado. 1998. accessed August 16, 2010 http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/histake.htm


IR Theory Knowldege Base. 2010. http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm (accessed July 20, 2010). Procida, Frank. "Nuclear Dominoes: Real or Imagined?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence , 2010: 461-473. Kartchner, Kerry M., and Pitman, George R. “Alternative Approaches to Arms Control in a Changing World”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 62, February 2002. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd62/62op1.htm Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton University Press. 1999. p44-63. accessed August 16, 2010 http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/lib/apus/Doc?id=10031906 Mingst, Karen A.. 2004. Essentials of International Relations. New York, NY. W.W. Norton Co. Parrish, Scott, and Potter, William C. “Nuclear Threat Perceptions and Nonproliferation Responses: A Comparative Analysis”, Paper commissioned for WMD Commission, August 2005. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No36.pdf Russian Academy of Sciences, “Reducing Nuclear Tensions: How Russia and the United States Can Go Beyond Mutual Assured Destruction”, Moscow, 19 January 2005. http://nti.org/c_press/analysis_mad_011905.pdf Schultz, George P., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam. “Toward a NuclearFree World”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries Tagma, Halit Mustafa Emin. "Realsim at the Limits: Post-Cold War Realism and Nuclear Rollback." Contemporary Security Policy 31:1, 2010: 165-188. The Stanley Foundation. Realizing Nuclear Disarmament . Policy Memo, Muscatine: The Stanley Foundation, 2009. U.S. Department of State. 2010. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. April 8, 2010. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. Velde, James R. Van De. "The Impossible Challenge of Deterring "Nuclear Terrorism" by Al Qaeda." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2010: 682-699.


Appendix A--Political Terror Scale (Preliminary Data)
Average Global Insecurity Levels vs. Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)

YEAR 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Insecurity Index(C2) 1.79 2.1 2.14 2.11 2.15 2.24 2.27 2.29 2.37 2.41 2.35 2.3 2.39 2.41 2.48 2.52 2.57 2.43 2.29 2.41 2.47 2.49 2.33 2.42 2.58 2.52 2.52 2.55 2.56

Nuclear Warheads(C3) 51024 53360 55246 56467 58629 60882 62753 64519 70481 68479 65726 62525 59239 53562 49022 45336 42715 40344 37159 36060 34981 33859 32632 31477 30425 29371 29308 28245 26854

http://www.politicalterrorscale.org and http://www.thebulletin.org http://thebulletin.metapress.com/home/main.mpx

Global Insecurity Data taken from Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on US State Department reports. Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES


Average Global Human Insecurity Levels (1978-2006)
3 lowest to highest human insecurity 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Insecurity Index


Data supplied by Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on US State Department reports

Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)
80000 70000 Number of Nuclear Warheads 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Nuclear Warheads





Average Global Insecurity Levels vs. US/Russian Warheads
YEAR 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 USSR/RUSSIA 25393 27935 30062 32049 33952 35804 37431 39197 45000 43000 41000 39000 37000 35000 33000 31000 29000 27000 25000 24000 23000 22000 21000 20000 19000 18000 18000 17000 16000 USA 24826 24605 24304 23464 23708 24099 24357 24237 24401 24344 23586 22380 21004 17287 14747 13076 12555 12144 11009 10950 10871 10824 10577 10527 10475 10421 10358 10295 10104 Insecurity Index 1.79 2.1 2.14 2.11 2.15 2.24 2.27 2.29 2.37 2.41 2.35 2.3 2.39 2.41 2.48 2.52 2.57 2.43 2.29 2.41 2.47 2.49 2.33 2.42 2.58 2.52 2.52 2.55 2.56 TOTAL

50219 52540 54366 55513 57660 59903 61788 63434 69401 67344 64586 61380 58004 52287 47747 44076 41555 39144 36009 34950 33871 32824 31577 30527 29475 28421 28358 27295 26104

http://www.politicalterrorscale.org and http://www.thebulletin.org http://thebulletin.metapress.com/home/main.mpx

Global Insecurity Data taken from Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on US State Department reports. Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES


30000 20000 10000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 USA

50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 USSR/RUSSIA

80000 60000 40000 20000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 TOTAL

Insecurity Index
3 2 1 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Insecurity Index


Average Global Insecurity Levels vs. Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)
Insecurity Index(C2) 3.04 2.816667 2.963636 2.981818 2.875 2.852459 2.765625 2.825397 2.691176 2.638889 2.814286 2.555556 2.608108 2.621622 2.698795 2.62963 2.802469 2.714286 2.6125 2.811594 2.844156 2.777778 2.75 2.728395 2.682927 2.654762 2.62963 2.594937 2.675

YEAR 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Nuclear Warheads(C3) 51024 53360 55246 56467 58629 60882 62753 64519 70481 68479 65726 62525 59239 53562 49022 45336 42715 40344 37159 36060 34981 33859 32632 31477 30425 29371 29308 28245 26854

http://www.politicalterrorscale.org and http://www.thebulletin.org http://thebulletin.metapress.com/home/main.mpx

Global Insecurity Data taken from Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on Amnesty International reports. Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES


Average Global Human Insecurity Levels (1978-2006)
lowest to highest human insecurity 3.1 3 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Insecurity Index(C2)


Data supplied by Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on Amnesty International reports

Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)
80000 Number of Nuclear Warheads 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Nuclear Warheads(C3)




Appendix B--Center for Systemic Peace Data (Preliminary Data)

SRC: http://www.systemicpeace.org/CTfig03.htm

Nuclear Warheads (1945-2010)
80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020



Appendix C--"Minutes to Midnight" (Preliminary Data) Global Security Levels and Nuclear Warhead Quantities
YEAR 1947 1949 1953 1960 1963 1968 1969 1972 1974 1980 1981 1984 1988 1990 1991 1995 1998 2002 2010 Minutes to Midnight 7 3 2 7 12 7 10 12 9 7 4 3 6 10 17 14 9 7 6 Nuclear Warheads 32 236 1557 22069 33977 38974 38274 42810 46990 55246 56467 62753 65726 59239 53562 40344 34981 30425 23188


Nuclear Warheads
100000 50000 Nuclear Warheads 0 1940 -50000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Minutes to Midnight
20 15 10 5 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Minutes to Midnight


Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful