An Exchange Between Durkheim and Tonnies on the Nature of Social Relations, with an

Introduction by Joan Aldous

Author(s): Joan Aldous, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies
Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 6 (May, 1972), pp. 1191-1200
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776225
Accessed: 04/12/2010 12:34

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org
An ExchangebetweenDurkheimand Tonnieson the
Natureof Social Relatioiis,withan Introductionby
Joan Aldous'

INTRODUCTION
FerdinandTonnieswas alreadywell establishedat the University of Kiel
and workingon his Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaftin 1885 whenJtmile
Durkheim'sfirstcontributions to sociologicalliteraturebegan appearing
in the publicationRevue philosophique. This journal,editedby Theodule
Ribot,one of the fathersof Frenchpsychology, founda place forarticles
on psychology and psychopathology as well as sociology,disciplinesat the
time only recentlyseparatedfromphilosophy.The analyses Durkheim
supplied of various contemporary sociologicalworks went beyond the
shortbook summaryand reviewer'sjudgmentwe are accustomedto read-
ing today.These critiques,whichinitiatedhis own seriesof publications,
not onlysuppliedthe readerwiththe importantideas of the author,but
also providedDurkheimwithan opportunity to displayhis own thoughts
on the subject in question.When Tonnies's classic appeared in 1887,
Durkheimhad alreadyreviewedworksby Spencer,Schaffle, and Gumplo-
wicz (Alpert1939), as well as othersociologistswhosenames have now
largely been forgotten.The assignmentto review Gemeinsckaftund
Gesellschaft, however,came at a particularly opportunetime.
The year 1887 markedDurkheim'sappointment to the Universityof
Bordeaux,his firstuniversity position.More important, his doctoraldis-
whichwouldappear in 1893 as De la divisiondu travailsocial:
sertation,
ttude sur l'organisationdes societe's,was alreadytakingshape. The re-
view (Durkheim 1889), while presentingTdnnies's views, gave Durk-
heimthe opportunity to examinethemin relationto the thesishe was in
the process of developing.It is Durkheim'scritique that catches the
sociologist'sattention.Here he outlinesthe thoughtswhich,as he notes,
would requirea book to explainfully.And, of course,what we knowas
The Divisionof Labor in Societybecamethatbook.
In the reviewitself,Durkheimexpresseshis convictionthat,contrary
to Tonnies's argument,Gesellschaftsocieties are no less natural than
Gemeinschaft communities.In his own work,as Sorokin(1928, p. 491)
remarks,Durkheimseems to have labeled his own two societaltypesop-

1 Without Lerke Gravenhorst'ssearch of the German literature,we would not have

Tonnies's reply to Durkheim. I am also gratefulto her and to Vera Cerny for their
skillfultranslationof T6nnies. Mrs. Cerny and Reuben Hill checked my translation
of Durkheim and made it more readable, which I and my readers appreciate.

AJS Volume 77 Number6 1191

AmericanJournalof Sociology

positethoseof T6nnies.By labelingthe integration existingin the highly

urbanizedgreatsocietiesof his own day as "organic,"Durkheimnot only
could use the organismanalogybut could also pointup his own convic-
tion that grouplife therewas as naturalas in precommercial societies.
Those like-minded communities he characterizedas possessingmechanical
solidarity.
T6nniesread Durkheim'sreviewand apparentlyhad some livelyreac-
tions.These did not appear in printuntil 1896, whenhe took the occa-
sion offeredby the appearanceof The Division of Labor to defendhis
positionin a shortcommentary on Durkheim'sbook (Tonnies 1896).
The commentary appearedin an annual reviewof the developments in
sociologywhichhe preparedfortheArchivfursystematische Philosophie.
This journal,like the Revue philosophique,servedas a bridgebetween
philosophyand thesocial sciences,publishingarticlesby Husserl,Rickert;
and Simmel'sonly doctoralstudent,Salomon.T6nniesmakes apt use of
Durkheim'sown wordsof criticismof Tonnies's argumentto document
his "surprise" that Durkheim,too, should analyze societal develop-
mentin termsof a dichotomysimilarto his own. It is clear,however,
that the issue of the similarityor difference
betweenDurkheim'sdichot-
omyand his ownis of secondaryimportance to Tonnies.His concern,one
he believeddistinctive to himself,
had to do withpeople'sattitudestoward
society.He does presentan answerto Durkheim'scriticismof the un-
naturalcharacterof his Gesellschafttype by pointingto possiblesimi-
laritiesin attitudestowardsocietyof personsin both small villagesand
largecities.But thepossibleorganicnatureof Gesellschaft is a side issue
to him.One difference betweenhimselfand Durkheimthat Tonnieswas
willingto emphasizewas his morepessimisticview of life in complex
societies.
Posterity,however,unfamiliarwithTonnies's rejoinderto Durkheim,
tendsto remember theGemeinschaft-Gesellschaft divisionand his critiques
of thegreatsociety.Perhapsthepublicationof thisexchangebetweenthe
two menwill serveto recallthe similarities underlying the societaltypes
T6nniesdelineated,as well as the problemwithsocietaldichotomies that
Durkheimrecognizedbut did not entirelysolve (Parsons 1947)-the
problemof how one typecan be said to have evolvedfromthe other.
The exchangeshouldcertainlyserveto remindthe presentgeneration
of sociologiststhat intellectualcontroversyhas always accompaniedthe
sociologicalendeavor.Whetherit is criticismof the other'swritingstyle,
or notingthat the other'sworksstems fromthat of earlier thinkers,
Durkheimand T6nniesare intenton developingtheirown theses.Thus,
in the 1890s,as in the 1970s,somesociologistsare able to use discussion

1192
 An ExchangebetweenDurkheimand Tonnies

with theirown fellowsas occasions to demonstratetheircreativityas

wellas theircommitmentto thediscipline.
JOAN ALDOUS
University
of Minnesota

A REVIEW OF FERDINAND TONNIES'S GEMEINSCHAFT UND

GESELLSCHAFT: ABHANDLUNG DES COMMUNISMUS UND
DES SOCIALISMUS ALS EMPIRISCHER CULTURFORMEN2

Althoughthisworkis firstof all a social sciencestudy,somediverseviews

of natureare intermingled in it. At the same time that one will find
a completesociology,one willalso finda completephilosophyand a com-
plete psychology.Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Kant, SumnerMaine, the
evolutionists, in turn,or simultaneously, inspiretheauthor.Such an eclec-
tic synthesisnaturallymakes the readingof the book very laborious,
and it is a pity,forone findsinteresting ideas therethatwe willtryto dis-
entangle.We will set aside everything that deals withgeneralphilosophy
in orderto examinewhatparticularly intereststhesociologist.
As the title indicates,the authorproposesto analyze two concepts,
whichhe labels Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. These are the two group
forms,the two formsof social life, that one observesamong men. To
characterizeeach one and to determinetheirrelationis the object of
thisstudy.
Gemeinschaft is the community. It constitutes an absoluteunitywhich
is incompatible withthe distinction of parts.To meritthe name commu-
nity even if it is organized,a group is not a collectionof individuals
differing fromone another;it is a mass, undifferentiated and compact,
whichis onlycapable of movementtogether, and is directedby the mass
itself,or by one of its partsentrusted withdirecting it. It is an aggregate
of mindsso strongly cohesivethatno one is able to stirindependently of
the others.In a word,it is a community where,if you wish,communism
is carriedto the highestpoint of perfection. The whole alone exists; it
alone has an actionspherepeculiarto itself.The partsdo nothave one.
What keeps individualsunifiedand intermingled in this case is what
the authorcalls Verstindniss("consensus"). It is the silent and spon-
taneousaccord of several mindswhichthinkand feel alike, whichare
open to one another,whichexperiencein commonall theirimpressions,
theirjoys like theirsorrows,which,in a word,resonatein unison.This
harmonyis not producedas the resultof a preliminary agreementor of
2 (Leipzig, 1887), pp. xxx+294.

1193
AmericanJournalof Sociology
a contractpreviouslydebated and bearingon determined points.But it
is a necessaryproductof the characterof things,of the state of minds.
Whentheconditions are favorableand whentheseed fromwhichharmony
is bornis given,it growsand developsby a kind of spontaneousvegeta-
tionprocess.
In orderforthe mindsat thispoint to be intermingled, in orderthat
theythereby participatein thelifeof one another,it is necessarythatthey
be of the same character,or that theyat least have amongthemgreat
resemblances, and thatis whythe consanguineal community is the source
par excellenceof all kindsof community. In otherwords,the mostper-
fectexampleof the kind of groupwe are analyzingis the family.More-
over,the familyis at the same timeits sourceand origin.It is fromthe
familythatall typesof community are born.And sincethe familyhas its
sourcein the physiologicalconstitution of man, it is also the sourceof
Gemeinschaft. The latter,therefore, is of absolutenaturalorigin.It is an
organicgroup,and as we will see, it is by thischaracterthatit is funda-
mentallydistinguished fromGesellschaft.
If the familyis the mostperfectformof Gemeinschaft, it is not the
only one. Besides, the familyalready containsin itselfproperties,ele-
ments,and diversemodesof combination whichgive birthto a diversity
ofgroups.Organicresemblance is nottheonlybondwhichtiesmembersof
the familyone to the other.Organic resemblanceis often completely
lackingbetweenthe spouses.It does not always exist betweenbrothers
and sisters.What assures the cohesionof the domesticsociety,besides
consanguinity, is the factof livingtogetherin the same space; it is also
the community of memories,a necessaryconsequenceof a commonex-
istence.These two social bonds are able to develop even if the bond
of consanguinity is weakenedand may be substitutedforit. In such an
event,thesetiesmayeach givebirthto a particularkindof Gemeinschaft.
It happens,forexample,that by the sole fact of beingin the neighbor-
hood and of the relationsthat derivefromit, families,until theninde-
pendent,aggregatetogether;thenone sees producedwhatSumnerMaine
has called the "Village Community." Althoughthat kind of community
is morefullyrealizedin the villagethan elsewhere,it can still be found
in the town,on the conditionthat the town does not surpass certain
dimensions and does not becomethe greatcityof today.As forthe com-
munityof memoriesand occupations,it is this community whichgives
birthto colleagues,to associations,political,economic,or religious,in
whichare foundunitedall thosewho give themselvesto the same func-
tion,have the same beliefs,and feel the same needs.
But underthesediverseforms,Gemeinschaft alwayspresentsthe same

1194
 An ExchangebetweenDurkheimand Tonnies
generalproperties. We have indicatedthemostessential;othersflowfrom
them.
In Gemeinschaft-type societies where the individualsare not dis-
tinguishable one fromanother,propertytendsto be communal.All mem-
bersof the groupworkat commontasks and deriveenjoymentfromthis
communality (p. 32). Propertyin the modernsenseof the worddoes not
exist; possession(Besitz) is collectivepossession.Consequently,thereis
no phenomenon of exchange.Exchangebetweentwo or moreindependent
familiesis conceivable,to be sure,but not betweenthe membersof the
same family.Things possessedin commondo not circulatebut remain
immovable,attachedto the group.Thus, land is the essentialformof
property. The laborsof privatepersonsare not forwages,that is to say,
sold accordingto a discussedprice. Each worksnot for compensation,
but becauseit is his naturalfunction. He receivesin returna shareof the
commonpossessionsdeterminednot by the law of supplyand demand
but by tradition,the sentiment of the groupas represented generallyby
the will of the head.
Since thereis no exchange,therecan be no questionof a contract.A
contractpresupposestwo individualspresentof whomeach has his own
will,his interests, and his sphereof action,on the one hand,and, on the
other,an object whichpasses fromthe hands of one into those of the
other.Now we have just seen that these conditionsare not realizedin
pure Gemeinschaft. Withinthe group,thereis no interchange, no move-
mentin the arrangement of the parts,since thereare not, so to speak,
separableparts. The life of the groupis not a workof individualwills
but is completely directedby grouphabits,customs,and traditions.Con-
trastingthe word"status" withthe term"contract,"and in generalwith
all relationswhichresultfromnegotiatedagreements, the authorchooses
the firstof these expressions, namely,"status" to characterizeGemein-
schaft.
But thereis anothermode of grouping;this is what we are able to
observein the largecitiesof contemporary societies.It is in such metro-
politan centersthat one can observein almost its purest formwhat
Tonniescalls Gesellschaft.
Gesellschaft implies"a circleof menwho,as in Gemeinschaft, live and
dwellin peace, the one beside the other,but insteadof beingessentially
joined are on the contraryessentiallyseparated.While in Gemeinschaft
they remainlinked in spite of distinctions, here they remaindistinct
despiteall the links.As a consequence,activitiescannotbe foundwhich
are able to be inferredfroma unityexistinga prioriand necessarily,
which expresses the will and the mind of that unity.... But each is here

1195
AmericanJournalof Sociology

forhimselfand in a state of hostilityvis-a-visthe others.The various

fieldsof activitiesand of powerare stronglyfixed,the one in regardto
theothers,so thateach prohibitsall contactand all mingling.... Nobody
is able to makeanythingforanotherunlessit is in exchangefora similar
service,or fora compensation, that he judges to be equivalentto that
whichhe has given.. . . Only the prospectof a profitwouldlead one to
give up a propertythathe possesses"(pp. 46-47).
This is obviouslythe veryoppositeof Gemeinschaft. Individualminds,
farfrommerging withinGesellschaft, are differentiatedand even opposed
to the other.While the firstformof societyis that whichHegel, for
example,prefersto describe,one recognizesin the second the theoryof
Bentham.Accordingto the author,thesetwo typesof social lifethatone
contrastshabituallyand that one presentedas excludingone another,
have both existedand have been successivelydevelopedin the courseof
history.The secondis bornof the first:GesellschaftfromGemeinschaft.
How is this connectionmade? The interpenetration of mindswhichthe
community assumesis possibleonly in small groups.For it is in that
conditiononly thatpeople are able to knoweach otherquite intimately.
As social aggregateshave becomelarger,societyweighsless heavilyon
the individual.He findshimself,therefore, quite naturallyfreedfrom
social ties. Indeed, this is the spectacle that we are witnessingtoday.
Moreover,emancipationis progressive;the beginningsof it go back to
the distantpast and it has not yet reachedits apogee.
Thus, while in Gemeinschaft the whole had primacyover the parts,
now underGesellschaftthe parts are givenprecedenceover the whole.
The latter is formedonly by the juxtapositionof the separate parts.
That is why,whilethe compositionof Gemeinschaft is organic,that of
Gesellschaft is mechanical.Such is the essentialdifferencefromwhichthe
othersare derived.
To deduce the main characteristics of Gesellschaftwould be a useless
exerciseif it wereonlyto communicate the conceptto readers.It is very
similarto Spencer'sindustrialsociety.It is seen in the reignof individ-
ualismin thesensein whichthiswordis generallyunderstood. The regime
of statusis, underGesellschaft, replacedby the regimeof contracts.Since
individualwillsare no longerabsorbedin thecollectivewillbut are placed,
so to speak,oppositeone anotherin the fullsense of theirindependence,
the only thingthat could put an end to this state of war is a treatyof
peace consciouslysigned,that is to say, a signedagreementor contract.
The immanent and unconsciouslaw of Gemeinschaft is now replacedby a
deliberatelaw, a contractuallaw. Opinionsfreelyreflected upon, that is,
science,succeedbeliefsthat reignedby the forceof tradition.Property
also individualizedbecomesmobileand moneyappears. It is the era of

1196
 An ExchangebetweenDurkheimand Tonnies

commerce, of industry,especiallyof large-scaleindustry,of great cities,

of freeexchange,and of cosmopolitanism. In sum,one sees that the so-
cietywhichTonniespaints at this momentis the capitalisticsocietyof
the socialists; and, in fact,the authoroftenborrowsthe sombercolors
withwhichhe presentsthis type of societyfromKarl Marx and from
Lassalle.
As withthesewriters, such a societyappearsimpossibleto himwithout
greatpowerbeingaccordedthe state.The stateis necessaryto insurethe
executionof individualagreements, to sanctioncontractuallaw, to put
obstaclesin the way of all that could be harmfulto the generalinterest
of society.It is necessarythat this state be strongto containall the in-
dividualwills,all the individualintereststhatare no longerboundto one
another,all the unchainedlusts. One understandsnow the sense of the
subtitleof the book,Abhandlungdes Communismus und Socialismusals
empirischer Culturformen [Studyof communism and socialismconsidered
as empirical(historical?)formsof civilization].Communism is the regime
of Gemeinschaft, as socialismis that of Gesellschaft.The one and the
otherare not,therefore, ideologicalconceptionsdestinedto be realizedin
the future,but real factswhichare producedin historyaccordingto a
determined order.As Gesellschaftis born of Gemeinschaft, socialismis
bornof communism and replacesit.
But, whilethesocialistshail Gesellschaft, the regimeof theirpreference
as the ideal end of progress,Tonniessees in it only an inevitableconse-
quence of social evolutionand even suggestsit may be the forerunner of
society'sfinaldissolution.He speaks of Gesellschaft, therefore, without
enthusiasm but withimpartiality, as a naturaland necessaryphenomenon.
It is indispensablethat the state formand developin orderthat Gesell-
schaftbe able to endure; but on the otherhand, it is able to exercise
on the membersof societyonly a mechanicalaction whichcannotlast
indefinitely. By completelyartificialcoercion,it is able to restrainfor
a timeall the internalcontradictions, all the discordsthat workwithin
the society,but sooneror later theywill end by breakingout. There is
truepoweronlyin the extentto whichit represents commonideas, com-
mon interests.For as Gemeinschaft declines,the numbersof thesecom-
mon ideas and the importanceof these commoninterestsalso become
progressively fewer.The state of internalwar that the societydiscloses
cannotfail,sooneror later,to produce,as naturalconsequences,the rup-
turingof all social bonds and the decomposition of the social organism.
Thus, the life of societycomprisestwo great phases, communismand
socialism,but the latteris the beginningof an end moreor less close. It
was thusthat the Greco-Romansocietydied, and in thismomentwe see
again the same processunrollingbeforeour eyes.

1197
 AmericanJournalof Sociology
Such is the conclusionof the T6nniesbook. The materialthat it con-
tains,even thoughin a small volume,is in realitytoo vast to be able to
discusstheauthor'stheoriesin depth.I wishonlyto disentangle thepoints
on whichit wouldbe profitable to have a discussion.
Like the author,I believethat thereare two major typesof societies,
and the wordswhichhe uses to designatethemindicatequite well their
nature:it is regrettable that theyare not translatable.Like him,I admit
that Gemeinschaft is the firstto developand that Gesellschaft is the de-
rived end. Finally,I accept his generalguidelinesof analysis and the
descriptionthathe makesforus of Gemeinschaft.
But the point whereI part companyfromhim is withhis theoryof
Gesellschaft.If I have understoodhis thinking,Gesellschaftwould be
characterizedby a progressivedevelopmentof individualismthat the
statecould forestallonlyfora timeand by artificial procedures. It would
be essentiallya mechanicalaggregate;all that would still remainof the
trulycollectivelifewouldresultnot frominternalspontaneity, but from
the impetusof the state. In a word,as I have said above, it is society
as Benthamhas imaginedit. Now I believethat all the life of greatso-
cial agglomerationsis as naturalas thatof smallaggregations. It is neither
less organicnor less internallyactivated.Beyond purelyindividualac-
tionsthereis in our contemporary societiesa type of collectiveactivity
whichis just as naturalas that of the less extendedsocietiesof former
days. It constitutesa different type,but betweenthe two species from
the same genus,as diverseas theyare, thereis not a difference in their
basic natures.In orderto proveit, a book is necessary;I can onlyformu-
late the proposition.Is it, moreover,likelythat in the evolutionof the
same phenomenon, a societywouldbeginas an organicunityand end as
a puremechanism? Thereis so littlecontinuity betweenthesetwotypesof
societythat it is impossibleto conceivehow theycould be part of the
same development. To reconcilein that mannerthe [organic] theoryof
Aristotleand [the mechanistic]view of Benthamis simplyto juxtapose
opposites.It is necessaryto choose: if thesocietyis a factof naturein its
origin,it remainsso untilthe end of its career.
But, in what does the collectivelife of Gesellschaftconsist? The
methodthat the author followsdoes not permitme to reply to this
question,forit is completelyideological.In the secondpart of his work
especially,Tbnnieselaboratesconceptsmore than he observesthe facts
about the phenomenon delineatedby his concepts.He proceedsdialecti-
cally, makingthose distinctions and those symmetrical classificationsof
conceptsso dear to the Germanlogician.A betterway to reachhis goal
wouldhave beento proceedinductively, thatis to say, to studytheGesell-
schaftphenomenon throughthe laws and the moresthat are appropriate

1198
 An ExchangebetweenDurkheimand T6nnies
to it and whichwouldrevealits structure.
But, whateverreservations
have
been made here,one cannotfail to recognizein this book trulyforceful
thinking and an uncommonpowerof organization.
RMILE DURKHEIM

A REVIEW OF 1MILE DURKHEIM'S DE LA DIVISION

DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL3
For detailed data on the contentof this work,I referthe reader to
Schmoller'sreview(in Jahrbuch18:286 ff.) and Barth (in Vierteljahrs-
schriftfur wissenschaftliche Philosophie1895, pp. 101 ff.). Durkheim
wrotesome years ago referring to my theories(in Revue philosophique
27:421), "Like the authorI thinkthat there are two major types of
social structures.
The wordshe uses fortheirspecification are well chosen
to showtheirnature;unfortunately, theyare untranslatable.Like him,I
admit that Gemeinschaft is the primaryfact,Geselischaftis its derived
end. Finally,I also acceptin its generalformhis analysisand description
of Gemeinschaft." Furtheron, he objected to my (not properlyunder-
stood) termof Gesellschaft:"There is so littlecontinuity betweenthese
two typesof society [the organicand the mechanical]that it is impos-
sible to conceivehow theycould be part of the same development."
Afterthisstatement, it is mostsurprisingto findin Durkheim'sbook a
differentiation
of a primitiveand a derived"solidarity,"one of whichis
based eitheron an analogousway of thinkingor on commonideas and
tendencies(p. 138), while the otheris based on individualdifferences
and on the consequentdivisionof labor. It is further surprisingthat the
firsthas been named mechanical,because the mutual relationsof the
individualsare said to be similarto those of moleculesin an inorganic
body,and the otheris named organic,because the differentiation of its
partsis similarto that of organsin higheranimals (p. 140).
If, afterthis statement,Barth (1895, p. 105) says that my presenta-
tion of this relationis completelythe reverse,that I considerprimitive
social structuresas organismsand the later evolved formsas mecha-
nisms,I cannotaccepthis presentation as beingtrue.What I referred to
werethe possiblekindsof positiveattitudesof people towardeach other,
hencethoseof the individualtowardthe social entirety. My typesare as
follows:the entiretyis perceivedand consideredas goal, that is, as a
naturalwhole; or the entirety is perceivedand consideredas a meansfor
individualgoals and consequently as an intentionally
devisedtool.
I understandboth kindsof structuresin a sense completelydifferent
3 (Paris 1893). I have divided Tonnies's review into paragraphs; in its originalform,
there were none.

1199
AmericanJournalof Sociology
fromthat of Durkheim,Barth,and all othersociologistsknownto me.
I understandthemin the firstrangeaccordingto their(expressedin the
old technicallanguage) esse objectivumn, and I am delineatingthe pro-
gressiverationalization of theserelationswhichderive
and externalization
fromtheseesse objectivumand reach theirclimaxin the conceptionsof
the universalsocietyand the universalstate. This doctrineof mine is
basicallyindifferent towardthe theorythat the esse formaleof the social
lifeor thatof Gesellschaft is organic.I have neverhad any doubt about
the possibilityof comparingthe mutualeffectsin the developedpolitical
economywithorganicmutualeffects.My conceptionsdo not excludein
any way the factthat rulingand otheractivecorporations or individuals
in a big nationas well as in a villageor towncommunity take an atti-
tude towardtheirentiretyas organsdo towardan organism.However,I
do not findveryinstructive the way in which Mr. Durkheimpresents
the social typesand theirmutual relations.He deals with the division
of labor pedanticallywithoutthe criticalanalysiswhichmanytimeswas
praisedin Biicher'sworks.In addition,I objected several timesto his
failurealso to considerthe negativeside of the entireevolution.
The essentialsubjectof Durkheim'sworkis the moralvalue of the di-
visionof labor; he expectspublicopinionincreasingly to turntowardthe
goal of makingthe divisionof labor an object of obligation.Thus be-
longingto positiveand currentmorals,it unfoldsits real (natural) moral
value. The authoris defendingthe divisionof labor againstthe reproach
of diminishing humanpersonality.The entiresociologyof Durkheimis
a modification of Spencer'ssociology.In the way thisperspective is criti-
cized as well as in severalothercommentaries, I foundsome thoughtsI
agree with.
FERDINAND TONNIES

REFERENCES

Alpert,Harry. 1939. Emile Durkheim and His Sociology. New York: Columbia Uni-
versityPress.
Durkheim,Itmile. 1889. "An Analysisof Ferdinand T6nnies, Gemeinschaftund Gesell-
schaft: Abhandlungdes Communismusund des Socialismus als empirischerCultur-
formen."Revue philosophique27:416-22.
Parsons, Talcott. 1947. The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory
with Special Referenceto a Group of Recent European Writers.Glencoe, Ill.: Free
Press.
Sorokin,Pitirim. 1928. ContemporarySociological Theories.New York: Harper.
T6nnies, Ferdinand. "Review of Emile Durkheim,De la division du travail social."
Archiv fur systematischePhilosophie 2 (1896): 497-99.

1200