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Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No.
3, 2010
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00764.x
Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and

Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis pops_764 421..452
Shalom H. Schwartz
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Gian Vittorio Caprara

University of Rome “La Sapienza”
Michele Vecchione
University of Rome “La Sapienza”
We theorize that political values express basic personal values in the domain of politics. We
test a set of hypotheses that specify how the motivational structure of basic values con-
strains and gives coherence to core political values. We also test the hypothesis that core
political values mediate relations of basic personal values to voting demonstrated in
previous research. We measured the basic personal values, core political values, and vote
of Italian adults both before (n = 1699) and after (n = 1030) the 2006 national election.
Basic values explained substantial variance in each of eight political values (22% to 53%)
and predicted voting significantly. Correlations and an MDS projection of relations among
basic values and political values supported the hypothesized coherent structuring of core
political values by basic values. Core political values fully mediated relations of basic
values to voting, supporting a basic values—political values—voting causal hierarchy.
KEY WORDS: Personal Values, Political Values, Political Thought, Voting
Many studies in recent decades have examined the political attitudes of the
general public and how these attitudes relate to one another (e.g., Feldman, 1988;
Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Zaller, 1992). A left-right or liberal-
conservative ideological dimension has been proposed to structure political
thought and reduce the complexity of political information (Conover & Feldman,
1981; Jacoby, 1995). However, the structure of political thought transcends the
left-right or liberal-conservative divide (Converse, 1964; Feldman, 1988). No
421
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422 Schwartz et al.
single ideological dimension is likely to organize political attitudes (Kinder,

1998). A multidimensional conception of ideology is needed for this purpose
(Ashton et al., 2005; Heath, Evans, & Martin, 1994).
There have been few systematic attempts to investigate what underlies the
varied political attitudes of the electorate (Ashton et al., 2005; Peffley & Hurwitz,
1985). Feldman (2003) noted that “one potentially valuable approach to the atti-
tude organization problem that has not received sufficient attention . . . is based on
the value construct” (p. 479). Many have assigned a central role to values as
organizers of political evaluations (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Gunther & Kuan, 2007;
Knutsen, 1995a; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994). Empirical studies are few in
number, however, and have largely focused on a single or limited set of values.
They have failed to consider how political attitudes systematically relate to the
whole system of basic value priorities (Feldman, 2003). The validation of a theory
that identifies a comprehensive set of basic personal values and the near universal
structure of relations among them (Schwartz, 1992, 2006) makes it possible to do
this. This is the first objective of the current study.
One reason for the absence of investigations of the possible organization of
political attitudes by basic personal values may be the different intellectual and
disciplinary origins of studies of political attitudes and of basic personal values,
political science and social psychology, respectively. Scholars in these two disci-
plines have had quite different types of values in mind.
Political scientists largely focus on attitudes in the political domain which
they call “core political values” such as egalitarianism, civil liberties, ethnocen-
trism, and limited government (e.g., Converse, 1964; Goren, 2005; Hurwitz &
Peffley, 1987). They typically infer people’s core political values from agreement
with prescriptions for how government or society should function. Most attempts
to identify broad ideological principles that might constrain and organize these
political values focus on liberalism-conservatism. Starting with Converse’s
seminal study (1964), however, there is little support for this single source of
constraint (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Kinder, 1983). Researchers recognize that
core political values are interdependent (e.g., Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Knutsen,
1995b). Yet progress toward identifying a coherent set of principles that constrain
and structure them has been limited. We seek to fill this gap.
Social psychologists focus on basic personal values, defined as cognitive
representations of desirable, transsituational goals (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz,
1992). Basic personal values are measured in terms of their importance as guiding
principles in people’s own lives. Individuals have a relatively stable hierarchal
system of value priorities (e.g., security > power = hedonism > conformity). Basic
personal values serve as standards for judging all kinds of behavior, events, and
people. They find expression in all domains of life and therefore underlie all
attitudes and opinions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006).
Basic personal values are more abstract and fundamental than core political
values. Schwartz (1994) argued that sets of basic personal values underlie politi-
Basic Personal Values, Political Values and Voting 423
cal ideologies and attitudes.1 Our first hypothesis is that basic personal values
organize and give coherence to core political values. The pursuit of basic values
leads people to favor the ideologies or policies that can promote them in a given
societal context. People who attribute high priority to security and power values,
for example, tend to favor nationalist policies because nationalism seemingly
promises greater security and because it expresses power goals.
We reason that basic personal values influence political choice through their
influence on core political values. We therefore hypothesize that core political
values mediate relations of basic personal values to voting. Earlier studies exam-
ined hierarchical models in which general political beliefs mediate relations of
core political values to policy preferences (e.g., Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987). To
our knowledge, this is the first study to examine a hierarchical model in which
core political values mediate relations of basic personal values to political
behavior.
To test our hypotheses, we adopt the Schwartz (1992, 2006) theory of basic
values. The theory identifies 10 basic personal values and specifies an integrated
structure of motivationally compatible and conflicting relations among these
values. This structure enables us to hypothesize how basic personal values orga-
nize and constrain core political values in an integrated manner. Before explicating
the hypotheses, we briefly present conceptualizations of core political values and
of basic personal values and describe pertinent findings that relate basic values to
voting.
Core Political Values
Core political values are overarching normative principles and belief

assumptions about government, citizenship, and society (McCann, 1997). They
serve as focal points for taking positions in an otherwise confusing political
environment. Converse (1964) viewed them as “a sort of glue to bind together
many more specific attitudes and beliefs” (p. 211). They underlie specific atti-
tudes, preferences, and evaluations in the sphere of politics, thereby giving them
some degree of coherence and consistency (Feldman, 1988; Hurwitz & Peffley,
1987).
There is no clear consensus regarding the number and content of core political
values in modern democracies, nor is there a theory to help identify the universe
of political values. Feldman (1988) identified three core political values: equality
of opportunity, economic individualism, and free enterprise. McCann (1997)
specified two (egalitarianism and moral traditionalism); Heath, Jowell, and Curtice
(1985) two (libertarian/authoritarian and socialist/laissez-faire); Goren (2005) four
(traditional family values, equal opportunity, moral tolerance, and limited govern-
1
This corresponds to Converse’s (1964) contention that specific attitudes and beliefs in the political
domain derive from more abstract and fundamental “superordinate value”(s) that constrain them.
424 Schwartz et al.
ment); Jacoby (2006) four (liberty, equality, economic security, and social order);
and Ashton et al. (2005) two (moral regulation/individual freedom, compassion/
competition). Blind patriotism has not been labeled as a core political value, but it
also fits the McCann (1997) definition above.
To test our hypotheses, we selected items to measure the following six con-
structs that encompass those listed above and can be considered core political
values.
Law and order: enforcement and obedience to law, protection against

threats to the social order.
Traditional morality: traditional religious and family values versus

newer, permissive lifestyles.
Equality: egalitarian distribution of opportunities and resources.
Free enterprise: minimal government involvement in the economy, eco-

nomic individualism.
Civil liberties: freedom for everyone to act and think as they consider
most appropriate.
Blind patriotism: unquestioning attachment to and intolerance of criti-
cism of one’s country.
Basic Personal Values
The Schwartz (1992) value theory identifies ten broad personal values that
derive from universal requirements of human existence. These values may encom-
pass the full range of motivationally distinct values recognized across cultures
(Schwartz, 2006). The values, each defined in terms of the distinct motivational
goals that it expresses, are listed below.
Power: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and
resources.
Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence

according to social standards.
Hedonism: pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
Self-direction: independent thought and action—choosing, creating,

exploring.
Figure 1. The motivational continuum of 10 basic personal values with exemplary items and two
summary dimensions.
Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for

the welfare of all people and for nature.
Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people

with whom one is in frequent personal contact.
Tradition: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas
that traditional culture or religion provide the self.
Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset

or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of
self.
The theory further specifies a structure of dynamic relations among the 10

values. Figure 1 depicts this structure as a circular motivational continuum. This
motivational continuum reflects the compatibility and conflict among different
values. The closer any two values around the circle, the more compatible their
motivations and therefore the more likely that they can be attained through the
same action or expressed through the same attitude. The more distant any two
values, the more conflicting their motivations and hence the less possible to attain
426 Schwartz et al.
them through the same action or express them in the same attitude. This integrated
structure of values means that any behavior or attitude that is especially con-
gruent with one basic value (e.g., free enterprise with power) should also be
congruent with the adjacent values in the circle (security and achievement) but in
conflict with the opposing values (universalism, benevolence, and self-direction).
Thus, the whole integrated structure of values relates systematically to other
variables.
In addition to the motivational compatibility and conflict among values, the
circular structure of basic personal values reflects other differences among values
that are also relevant to the way basic values constrain core political values. Thus,
Schwartz (2006, 2009) brings evidence that the values in the bottom half of the
circle (Figure 1) are based in the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to
protect the self. Values on the bottom right emphasize avoiding conflict, unpre-
dictability, and change by submission and passive acceptance of the status quo.
Those on the bottom left emphasize overcoming possible sources of anxiety by
gaining dominance or admiration. In contrast, values in the top half of the circle
are relatively anxiety free, expressing growth and self-expansion. Those on the top
right emphasize promoting the welfare of others. Those on the top left emphasize
autonomous, self-expressive experience.
To simplify thinking about the circle of basic personal values, Schwartz
described the values as arrayed on the two dimensions also shown in Figure 1. On
one dimension, openness to change values (self-direction, stimulation) oppose
conservation values (security, conformity, tradition). The former encourage inde-
pendent thought, feeling, and action, and receptiveness to change, whereas the
latter call for submissive self-restriction, preserving traditional practices, and
protecting stability. On a second dimension, self-transcendence values (universal-
ism, benevolence) oppose self-enhancement values (power, achievement). The
former emphasize accepting others as equals and concern for their welfare,
whereas the latter encourage pursuing one’s own success and dominance over
others. Hedonism values fall between openness to change and self-enhancement
values because they share elements of both.
Tests of the theory of basic personal values in more than 220 samples from 74
countries largely support both the content of the 10 values and the structure of
relations among them (Schwartz, 2006). This motivational structure of basic
personal values is the key to understanding the structure of individuals’ core
political values.2 This is the first study to examine relations of core political values
to basic personal values.
2
To simplify, we will sometimes refer to the two descriptive dimensions rather than to specific basic
personal values. However, the values that constitute the poles of these dimensions are not equally
relevant to politics. Moreover, alternative pairs of dimensions, derived by rotating the axes of the
circle, provide equally valid descriptions of the motivational continuum. A dimension that opposes
universalism and self-direction to power and security, for example, captures a motivational opposition
particularly relevant to politics.
Research Relating Basic Personal Values to Political Choice
Basic personal values have predicted political choice across cultural contexts
and political systems (Barnea, 2003; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara,
Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006). Barnea (2003) found that
personal values discriminated among supporters of different political parties in
every one of 14 democratic countries. The specific values that discriminated party
supporters depended on the issues at stake between the country’s parties. In all
cases, the values that discriminated came from opposing sides of the motivational
circle of values. In Hungary in the 1990s, for example, the central issue concerned
preserving traditional morality and life styles versus rapid modernization (Swain,
1992). Accordingly, the basic personal values that discriminated most strongly
were tradition and conformity versus stimulation, hedonism, and self-direction (cf.
Figure 1). In Australia, where the parties differed strongly on economic egalitari-
anism versus free enterprise (Hughes, 1998), the key personal values were uni-
versalism versus power. Every one of the 10 values discriminated significantly in
at least four countries. This underlines the importance of considering the entire
range of human values when trying to understand political attitudes (cf. Feldman,
2003).
In the 2001 Italian elections, for example, voters for the center-left attributed
higher priority to universalism and benevolence values; voters for the center-right
gave higher priority to power, achievement, security, and conformity values
(Caprara et al., 2006; Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2008). These
differences are congruent with the emphasis in left and liberal ideologies on
equality, solidarity, and social justice, and with the emphasis in right and conser-
vative ideologies on individual success and social order. Basic values accounted
for a substantial proportion of variance in voting, whereas the Big Five personality
variables and socio-demographic characteristics of gender, age, and educational
level made marginal contributions.
These studies used past or intended future vote to measure political choice.
This weakens inferences about basic values as causal influences on voting. Past
vote is problematic because voting itself may influence core political values
(McCann, 1997). Intended vote is problematic because it may differ from actual
vote, especially if the political situation changes (Jowell, Hedges, Lynn, Farrant, &
Heath, 1993). The current study extends past research by measuring basic values
ahead of an election and vote shortly following the election. Thus, we predict
subsequent vote with earlier values.
Core Political Values Mediate Relations of Basic Personal Values to Voting
To explain the finding that basic personal values predict voting, researchers
argue that people tend to vote for parties or coalitions whose leaders and policies
428 Schwartz et al.
they perceive as likely to promote or protect their own personal values. This
explanation assumes that people can discern consistent implications for their
personal values in the rhetoric and actions of party leaders and platforms. Many
people may be unable to discern such implications, however. Both their own
cognitive limitations and the value-relevant information available to them make
this difficult.
The value implications of given policies are often far from clear. What, for
example, are the value implications of cutting taxes? Would this increase or
decrease security or justice? Further, competing candidates may appeal to the
same basic value to justify contradictory ideas and actions (e.g., invoking “peace”
to justify or to oppose military action). Moreover, to infer the implications of the
political discourse in the media for one’s basic values requires substantial attention
to and analysis of many complex, confusing, and even intentionally obscure
messages. People may lack the perseverance to attend carefully to the messages or
the analytic capacity to discern their implications for basic values (Gordon &
Segura, 1997; Zaller, 1992).
An alternative way to understand the link between basic values and voting is
to see basic personal values as mediated by core political values and more specific
political attitudes. Basic personal values are abstract beliefs about desirable goals
that transcend specific situations (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). They underlie
the norms and attitudes that apply in concrete situations (Feather, 1995; Schwartz,
1977). Norms and attitudes express multiple basic values from opposite sides of
the circular motivational structure. Both the congruent and opposing basic values
shape and constrain the norms and attitudes. For example, universalism, self-
direction, stimulation, and hedonism values underlie willingness to accept immi-
grants, whereas security, tradition, and conformity values underlie opposition to
this political attitude (Schwartz, 2006).
Because norms, attitudes, and core political values are more specific than
basic personal values, it is easier to perceive the implications of political rhetoric
and policies for them than for basic values. As we have argued, the norms,
attitudes, and core political values that appeal to individuals are largely con-
strained by the more abstract, fundamental, and stable basic personal values that
underlie them. Hence, they can mediate relations of basic values to political
choice.
The idea that attitudes and norms mediate the relations of basic values to
behavior has been around for a long time (e.g. Kahle, 1983; Rokeach, 1973;
Schwartz, 1977). It is labeled the value-attitude-behavior hierarchy. The few
studies to test it were limited to the environmental and consumer domains. The
three studies of behavior measured self-reports of behavior and values in the same
questionnaire (Homer & Kahle, 1988; Jayawardhena, 2004; Shim & Eastlick,
1998). The current research is the first test of the values—attitudes—behavior
hierarchy that measures behavior at a later time. It is also the first test in the
domain of politics.
The Current Research
The current research tests three broad hypotheses:
1) The circular motivational structure that organizes relations among basic per-
sonal values also organizes and gives coherence to core political values.
2) Both basic personal values and core political values predict voting choice
systematically.
3) Core political values mediate the effect of basic personal values on voting
choice.
To test these hypotheses, we developed a scale to measure core political

values. To the six defined above, we added two political attitudes prominent in the
2006 Italian election, the context of this study: foreign military intervention and
accepting immigrants. The former was largely understood as referring to the war
in Iraq and the latter as referring to ethnically different immigrants (ITANES,
2006; Ricolfi, 2002). Adding these attitudes to the study enabled us to examine
whether the structure of basic personal values also organizes relations of context
specific political attitudes to core political values. To simplify our narrative, we
refer to eight core political values even though the two we added are more specific
political attitudes.
The first hypothesis is based on the assumption that core political values
express basic values in the political domain. Hence, associations of core political
values with one another and with basic values should reflect the motivational
oppositions and compatibilities among the basic values. Thus, the motivational
structure of basic personal values provides a coherent structure to core political
values. Each political value should relate positively to a set of basic values on one
side of the motivational circle of basic values and negatively to a set of basic values
on the opposite side (see Figure 1).
To generate hypotheses specifying the basic personal values that underlie each
political value, we asked whether the political value expresses or promotes attain-
ment of the defining goals of each basic value or whether it conflicts with the
expression and preservation of these goals. The conceptual analyses lead to the
following hypotheses regarding the motivationally opposed values that relate
positively and negatively to each political value.3
(1.1) Traditional morality: positive—tradition, conformity, and security
because preserving traditional norms, beliefs, and modes of behavior provides
certainty and avoids change; negative—hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, and
3
To supplement the brief rationales we provide for each hypothesis, consider the congruence of the
core political values with the definitions of the basic personal values and with their dynamic
underpinnings described above.
430 Schwartz et al.
universalism because it opposes free, individual choice of how to think and behave
and is intolerant of what is new and different.
(1.2) Blind patriotism: positive—security, conformity, tradition, and power
because uncritical attachment to and identification with one’s country provide a
sense of certainty and superiority; negative—universalism, self-direction, stimu-
lation, and hedonism because blind patriotism is intolerant of outgroups and
conflicts with free, individual self-expression.
(1.3) Law and order: positive—security, conformity, and tradition because
law and order protect against threatening, anxiety-arousing disruption of the social
order; negative—self-direction, universalism, stimulation, and hedonism because
emphasizing law and order restricts individual freedom and discourages tolerance
of differences.
(1.4) Foreign military intervention: positive—security, conformity, tradition,
and power because such military action protects against external sources of danger
and change and does so through dominating power; negative—universalism and
benevolence because they favor finding nonaggressive ways to handle problems
and oppose actions that may harm others.
(1.5) Free enterprise: positive—achievement and power because economic
individualism allows unfettered pursuit of own success and wealth; negative—
universalism and benevolence because it allows exploitation of others and removes
governmental regulation that can protect the weak.
(1.6) Equality: positive—universalism and benevolence because equality
expresses concern for others’ welfare; negative—power and achievement because
equality conflicts with enabling individuals to pursue their own interests even at
the expense of others.
(1.7) Civil liberties: positive—universalism and self-direction because favor-
ing individuals’ freedom of thought and action requires high tolerance and low
anxiety regarding all ideas; negative—power, security, and tradition because
freedom for everyone to act and think as they deem appropriate risks unexpected
threatening ideas and behavior that violate traditions.
(1.8) Accepting immigrants: positive—universalism, benevolence, self-
direction, and stimulation because accepting immigrants expresses concern for
their welfare and may expose people to new and exciting ideas and behavior;
negative—security, tradition, and conformity because this may increase physical
insecurity and challenge traditional ideas, norms, and practices.
All the hypothesized correlations between the basic personal values and core
political values fit the motivational structure of basic values. Confirming them
would support the claim that the coherent motivation structure that organizes basic
values also organizes the relations among core political values. The hypotheses
imply substantial positive relations among law and order, blind patriotism, and
traditional morality: Their shared grounding in the three conservation values
versus universalism and the three openness-to-change values should link them
together. The hypotheses also imply substantial negative relations of these core
political values with accepting immigrants because the same basic values underlie
the latter in the opposite direction.
The hypotheses suggest that the opposition between universalism and power
values, in particular, underlies and unites the core political values of equality and
civil liberties and relates them negatively to free enterprise. This implies that the
primary motivational conflict that guides these political values is self-interest
versus concern for others’ interests. Military intervention relates positively with
law and order, blind patriotism, and traditional morality and negatively with
accepting immigrants because, like them, it is grounded in the three conservation
values. Its grounding in power versus universalism and benevolence values links it
to free enterprise.
This set of hypotheses suggests that no single, overarching ideological dimen-
sion such as left-right organizes this varied set of core political values (Fuchs &
Klingemann, 1990). Rather, the circular structure of the 10 basic values structures
the core political attitudes. We therefore expect basic personal values to account
for more variance in each of the core political values than left-right self-placement
does.
We tested the hierarchical, mediating hypotheses of “basic personal values–
core political values–voting” in the context of the April 2006 Italian national
election. In that election, the center-right coalition, headed by Silvio Berlusconi,
emphasized individual freedom, the market economy, and entrepreneurship as
ways to generate wealth and provide people with the resources to protect their
security (e.g., Caciagli & Corbetta, 2002). It also emphasized national security,
limited government, and traditional family values. In contrast, the center-left
coalition, headed by Romano Prodi, emphasized social justice, equality, and tol-
erance for diversity and advocated a welfare state. Given these policies of the
Italian coalitions we hypothesized regarding values:
(2a) Attributing importance to security, tradition, conformity, power, and
achievement values leads to voting for the center-right. Policies that promise a
strong national government committed to security, traditional family values, and a
competitive market economy are likely to promote the goals of these basic values,
especially of security, tradition, and power.
(2b) Attributing importance to universalism, benevolence, and self-direction
values leads to voting for the center-left. Policies that emphasize justice, equality,
tolerance, and concern for others’ welfare are likely to promote the goals of these
basic values, especially of universalism.
Past research on Italians’ intended future and past votes in other elections
supported similar hypotheses (Caprara et al., 2006; 2008).
Regarding core political values, we hypothesized:
(2c) Valuing free enterprise, law and order, traditional morality, blind patrio-
tism, and military intervention lead to voting for the center-right. This follows
from center-right policies encouraging a free market economy with minimal
government intervention, favoring law and order over free expression and
432 Schwartz et al.
diversity, emphasizing traditional family values, building on Italian nationalism,

and favoring demonstration of military might (Caciagli & Corbetta, 2002).
(2d) Valuing equality, civil liberties, and accepting immigrants lead to voting
for the center-left. The center-left’s policy emphases on tolerance of diversity,
equality, and justice promote these core values. Moreover, the center-left proposed
revoking a law passed by the right-wing government that had made immigration
more difficult.
Underlying the third hypothesis, that core political values mediate the effects
of basic values on voting, is the view that political discourse typically revolves
around issues captured by core political values. From party positions on these
issues, voters can infer the possible impact of choosing a particular party on their
core political values. Assuming that core political values are expressions of basic
personal values, political values serve as a link between basic values and voting.
Voters who consciously recognize the implications of party positions for their core
political values may also implicitly (usually not consciously) sense the implica-
tions of party choice for attaining or protecting the basic values that underlie these
core political values.
Past research has demonstrated that basic personal values largely mediate the
effects of demographic variables on voting (e.g., Caprara et al., 2006, 2008). If
core political values mediate the effects of basic values, these two together should
fully mediate the effects of demographic variables. We test this expectation in the
current research.
Method
Respondents and Procedures
Data were gathered in two waves. About one month prior to the Italian
national election of April 2006 (T1), 1,699 respondents completed a questionnaire
that measured basic values, core political values, left-right ideology, demographic
variables, and intended vote. About one month after the election (T2), 1,030 of
these respondents (61% of the T1 sample) completed the same questionnaire and
reported their vote. Psychology students at a University in Rome collected the
data. Each student collected data from six people equally distributed by gender and
age. Students were briefed on the general aims of the study and instructed how to
administer the instruments.4
4
We assessed effects of clustering respondents within interviewers by calculating design effects for
each of the items. For 78 of the 80 basic value and political value items, design effects were small
(<2), suggesting no need to take clustering in the data into account during estimation (Muthén &
Sartorra, 1995). As a further check, we replicated the analyses of relations between basic values and
political values using the pooled within covariance matrix that is not affected by the clustering of the
data. Results were virtually the same as those reported below.
Following are the sociodemographic characteristics of this convenience

sample. The first figure is for T1, the second for T2: Gender 45%/44% male; mean
age 44.8/44.1 years (SD = 17.6/17.8); annual income “<5,000 euro” (3.4/3.0%),
“>80,000 euro” (8.0/7.1%), modal income “15,000 to 29,000 euro” (24.0/24.4%);
education—elementary school 7.3/6.5%, junior high 10.4/9.7%, senior high 44.1/
46.2%, college 38.2/37.5%. All dropouts at T2 were because some students did not
continue the research or failed to contact their respondents a second time. Drop-
outs did not differ significantly from T2 respondents on any socio-demographic
variable.
Measures
Basic Personal Values. The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz,

2006) measured basic values. The PVQ includes 40 short verbal portraits of
different people matched to the respondents’ gender, each describing a person’s
goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For
example, “It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him.
Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them” describes a
person who holds universalism values important. Three to six items measure each
value. For each portrait, respondents indicate how similar the person is to them-
selves on a scale ranging from “very much like me—6” to “not like me at all—1.”
Respondents’ own values are inferred from the implicit values of the people they
describe as similar to themselves.
Multimethod-multitrait analyses of the 10 values measured with the PVQ and
with the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992) confirm the convergent and
discriminant validity of the PVQ indexes (Schwartz, 2006). Internal reliabilities of
the basic personal values are necessarily low because the few items that measure
each one are intended to cover the conceptual breadth of the value rather than a
core idea (e.g., universalism includes tolerance and concern for nature and for the
weak, tradition includes both self-restriction and faith). The alpha reliability coef-
ficients at T1 in the current study ranged from .58 (tradition) to .83 (achievement).
Despite some low reliabilities, there is substantial evidence that the PVQ indexes
are valid.5 Test-retest correlations ranged from .65 (benevolence) to .75 (achieve-
ment and hedonism).
Core Political Values. We drew upon items proposed by Feldman (1988),
McCann (1997), Jacoby (2006), Gunther and Kuan (2007), and Schatz, Staub, and
5
For example, in studies across different countries, basic values, measured with the PVQ, related as
hypothesized with human rights behavior, interpersonal violence, attitudes toward war, the Big Five
personality variables, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, age, gender, and
education (Burr, 2006; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, &
Kielmann, 2007; Knafo, Daniel, & Khoury-Kassabri, 2008; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; Wach &
Hammer, 2003). Even tradition, the value with the lowest reliability, correlated with several of these
variables as hypothesized.
434 Schwartz et al.
Lavine (1999) to measure the core political values of equality, free enterprise,
traditional morality, law and order, blind patriotism, and civil liberties. We wrote
new items for accepting immigrants and military intervention, using language that
reflected the terms of debate in the Italian political discourse. Table 1 lists the 34
items retained for use in this study. Responses were completely disagree-1, agree
a little-2, agree somewhat-3, agree a great deal-4, and completely agree-5.
To assess whether the 40 items in the initial scale yielded distinct factors for
each of the eight political values, we split the T1 sample randomly into two
subsamples (N = 849 and 850). We first performed exploratory factor analyses in
both subsamples, employing principal axis factoring as the extraction method. We
used the oblique Promax rotation because we assumed that core political values
are correlated. To determine how many factors to retain, we considered the repli-
cability and interpretability of the factor structure. Following Everett (1983), we
used correlations between factor scores computed from the factor score coeffi-
cients in each random subsample to serve as coefficients of factor comparability.
The factor comparability coefficients exceeded the .90 criterion for replicability
(Everett, 1983) for the first eight factors (all >.97). Extracting nine factors yielded
nonreplicable factors. The interpretability of the eight-factor solution (see below)
also supported retaining eight factors.
To cross-validate the results, we estimated an exploratory model on the first
sub-sample and a confirmatory factor model on the second subsample. The explor-
atory analysis suggested dropping six items.6 The eight factor solution accounted
for 50.4% of the total variance in the remaining 34 items. Table 1 presents the
eigenvalues of the extracted factors and the loadings of the items after rotation.
The loadings suggest that Factor I measures law and order (9.8% of the total
variance), Factor II traditional morality (7.5%), Factor III equality (5.8%), Factor
IV military intervention (6.8%), Factor V free enterprise (5.2%), Factor VI civil
liberties (5.2%), Factor VII blind patriotism (5.7%), and Factor VIII accepting
immigrants (4.5%).
We then performed a confirmatory factor analysis on the second subsample
(n = 850), using maximum-likelihood estimation in the MPLUS program (Muthén
& Muthén, 1998). The measurement model assigned the 34 items to the eight
latent factors identified in the exploratory factor analysis. This model yielded a
good fit: c2 (499) = 1714.83, p < .001; RMSEA = .054 (.051, .056); SRMR = .059.
The significant chi-square reflected the large number of respondents. All items
loaded significantly and substantially (>.40) on their intended latent factor, sup-
porting the convergent validity of the scales. The same model also fit the data
for the T2 sample, c2 (499) = 2100.78, p < 001; RMSEA = .056 (.053, .058);
SRMR = .058. Table 2 presents the intercorrelations, alpha reliability coefficients,
and test-retest reliabilities for the eight scales.
6
Details available from the authors.
Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Core Political Values
Factors
I II III IV V VI VII VIII

Law and Order
32. Political measures to increase security .55 .02 -.02 .24 .07 -.01 -.07 .06
should be promoted at this time, even if it
could mean sacrificing the freedom of
citizens
33. The police should have more powers so .50 .08 .00 .06 .01 .08 .05 -.12
they can protect us better against crime
34. There should be limits on the freedom of .59 .03 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.09 .06 -.06
speech of people who threaten society
35. The most important thing for our country .44 .10 .00 .08 -.03 .19 .13 -.10
is to maintain law and order
36. It’s right for the government to take .88 -.05 -.01 -.04 -.05 .00 -.05 -.02
restrictive measures on civil liberties to
guarantee the security of citizens
37. Order has to be preserved at any cost, .76 -.03 -.02 -.10 -.03 .01 .02 .13
even if this could reduce civil liberties
38. It would be a good idea to limit the liberty .82 .00 -.01 -.08 .04 -.10 -.06 .04
of expression if this can guarantee more
order
Traditional Morality
7. This country would have many fewer .05 .74 .08 -.05 .10 -.08 .04 .07
problems if there were more emphasis on
traditional family ties
8. It is extremely important to defend our -.03 .83 -.02 .00 -.01 -.01 .07 .05
traditional religious and moral values
9. Homosexual couples should have the same .04 -.51 .14 -.13 .15 .09 .06 .16
rights as married couples
10. The right to life has to be guaranteed by -.05 .72 -.03 -.15 .10 .06 -.03 -.03
law from the moment of conception
11. Newer lifestyles are contributing to the .11 .54 .09 -.01 .01 -.10 -.04 -.06
breakdown of our society
Equality
12. If people were treated more equally in .02 .03 .74 -.05 .06 .02 -.01 .06
this country, we would have many
fewer problems
13. Our society should do whatever is -.04 -.01 .70 .08 .07 .14 -.11 -.05
necessary to make sure that everyone has
an equal opportunity to succeed
16. The government should do more to -.01 -.05 .73 -.06 -.05 -.11 .05 .04
guarantee an equal distribution of
resources between rich and poor
17. The government should take responsibility -.04 .07 .43 .02 -.17 .09 .00 -.08
to provide free health care to all citizens
Foreign Military Intervention
27. Going to war is sometimes the only .02 -.14 -.05 .68 .13 -.07 .00 .03
solution to international problems
436 Schwartz et al.
Table 1. (cont.)
Factors
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
28. War is never justified .08 .08 .09 -.65 .07 -.06 .10 .02
29. Italy should contribute forces to .01 .08 .09 .58 .01 -.06 .04 .02
international peace-keeping efforts
30. Italy should join other democratic nations .03 .01 .07 .79 -.04 -.08 .02 .03
in sending troops to fight dangerous
regimes
31. Any act is justified to fight terrorism .23 .01 .01 .50 .06 .13 .04 -.05
Free Enterprise
2. It would be a good idea to privatize all of -.03 .13 -.10 .04 .68 .12 -.02 .10
the public enterprises
3. The less government gets involved with -.01 .03 .09 -.07 .57 -.01 -.06 -.03
business and the economy, the better off
this country will be
4. There should be more incentives for .05 .04 -.03 -.02 .62 .09 -.05 -.13
individual initiative even if this reduces
equality in the distribution of wealth
5. All high school and university education -.06 -.07 -.02 .05 .67 -.14 .09 .04
should be made private rather than
controlled and supported by the
government
Civil Liberties
24. It is extremely important to respect the .08 -.05 -.02 -.16 .03 .72 -.04 -.01
freedom of individuals to be and believe
whatever they want
25. The most important thing for our country .03 .01 .07 .06 -.05 .68 -.03 .11
is to defend civil liberties
26. The right to individual freedom is -.13 -.06 .06 .06 .06 .67 .14 -.11
inviolable and has to be maintained at
all cost
Blind Patriotism
21. It is unpatriotic to criticize this country -.01 -.05 -.01 -.10 .04 -.05 .82 -.06
22. It’s a duty of all citizens to honor the -.01 .19 .05 .06 -.06 .11 .64 .06
country
23. I would support my country right or .03 .04 -.08 .00 -.06 .06 .82 .08
wrong
Accepting Immigrants
18. People who come to live here from other .04 -.02 -.01 .04 .00 -.09 .11 .90
countries generally make Italy a better
place to live
19. People who come to live here from other .13 -.12 .09 -.12 .14 -.18 .22 -.43
countries generally take jobs away from
Italian workers
20. People who come to live here from other .08 -.06 .07 -.12 .03 .06 -.05 .59
countries make Italy’s cultural life richer
Note. The eigenvalues of the unrotated factors were: 9.04, 3.40, 2.14, 1.59, 1.47, 1.20, 1.14, 1.04.
Table 2. Correlations among Factors, Cronbach Alpha, and Test-Retest Reliabilities

of the Core Political Values
TM BP LO MI FE EQ CL AI Test-Retest
Coefficients
Traditional morality 1.00 .65 .66 .43 .34 -.05 -.14 -.48 .81
Blind patriotism .76 1.00 .70 .66 .46 -.10 -.07 -.47 .78
Law and order .63 .65 1.00 .69 .43 -.14 -.24 -.49 .72
Military intervention .55 .55 .77 1.00 .63 -.38 -.29 -.48 .76
Free enterprise .29 .36 .55 .49 1.00 -.38 -.26 -.25 .68
Equality -.02 -.05 -.18 -.34 -.43 1.00 .58 .35 .63
Civil liberties -.13 .05 -.25 -.22 -.28 .61 1.00 .33 .59
Accepting immigrants -.54 -.30 -.45 -.43 -.24 .39 .34 1.00 .74
Cronbach alphas .80 .80 .85 .78 .74 .77 .78 .68
Note. Coefficients below the diagonal are from the exploratory model (n = 849), those above the
diagonal are from the confirmatory model (n = 850). The Cronbach alpha coefficients of reliability
are based on the T1 sample (n = 1699), the test-retest reliabilities on the T1-T2 sample (n = 1030).
Left-Right Ideology. We used a standard item to measure this ideology

(Knutsen, 1997): “Considering your political ideas, would you define yourself as
extreme left-1, left-2, left-center-3, center-4, right-center-5, right-6, extreme right-
7.” The mean was 3.72 (SD = 1.49) for the 91% of participants who responded.
Voting. We measured political choice at T2 by asking participants which
party they voted for in the April 2006 election: 35.9% (n = 370) voted for center-
right parties and 50.4% (n = 519) for center-left parties. We excluded from the
analyses 42 respondents (4.1%) who voted for other parties, 65 (6.4%) who did not
vote, and 34 (3.3%) who did not report their vote.
Results
Basic Personal Values as Organizers of Core Political Values
Hypothesis 1 proposed that the circular motivational structure that organizes

basic personal values also organizes and gives coherence to core political values.
The hypothesis for each political value specified one set of basic values expected
to relate positively to the political value and another, motivationally opposed set,
expected to relate negatively. Confirmation of the specific hypotheses would
support the view that the motivational circle that organizes basic values organizes
relations among core political values.
Table 3 reports Pearson (zero-order) correlations between basic personal
values and core political values. We centered basic values on each person’s own
mean value ratings to correct for individual differences in scale use as commonly
done (see Schwartz, 2006). Of 48 hypothesized associations, 47 were significant
(all p < .01). The one exception was that power values did not correlate with blind
438
Table 3. Core Political Values: Correlations with Basic Personal Values and Variance Explained by Various Predictors
Basic Values Core Political Values

Traditional Blind Law & Military Free Equality Civil Accepting
Morality Patriotism Order Intervention Enterprise Liberties Immigrants
Security .48** .43** .39** .30** .15** -.02 -.08* -.37**
Conformity .45** .35** .30** .21** .12** -.03 -.08* -.27**
Tradition .53** .37** .32** .20** .14** -.05 -.21** -.26**
Benevolence -.04 -.12** -.20** -.24** -.20** .23** .18** .20**
Universalism -.19** -.27** -.33** -.40** -.39** .43** .32** .36**
Self-Direction -.38** -.34** -.30** -.21** -.17** .06 .19** .25**
Stimulation -.40** -.28** -.23** -.14** -.03 -.07* .03 .23**
Hedonism -.36** -.25** -.21** -.11** -.06 -.08* .03 .09**
Achievement -.15** -.04 .02 .11** .14** -.19** -.11** -.06
Power -.07* .04 .12** .23** .27** -.33** -.26** -.08*
Variance Explained by: 53% 42% 36% 30% 22% 30% 27% 30%
Basic Values
Age/Gender/Education/ 15% 14% 13% 8% 4% 1% 1% 6%
Income (not mediated by (1%) (2%) (2%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (0%) (0%)
basic values)
Left-Right Ideology 9% 8% 12% 14% 13% 9% 5% 16%
Note. Pairwise n = 1668–72 due to missing data. *p < .01; **p < .001.
Schwartz et al.
patriotism. These correlations strongly support the idea that the motivational
structure that organizes basic values also organizes relations among core political
values.
In order to display the comprehensive structure of relations among the core
political and basic personal values graphically, we performed a multidimensional
scaling analysis (MDS). As input, we used a matrix of Pearson correlations among
the 10 basic personal values and the eight core political values. The PROXSCAL
program in SPSS 15.0 created proximities from the data and then performed an
ordinal MDS on the z-transformed values, using Euclidean distances.
Figure 2 presents the MDS analysis. Dashed lines encircle the core political
values; the basic personal values are outside. It is first important to note that the 10
basic personal values retain their theorized motivational order going clockwise
around the circle from benevolence to tradition. Inclusion of the core political
values in the analysis does not change the motivational structure of basic personal
values.7 This suggests that relations of core political values to one another and to
basic personal values are compatible with the motivational structure that organizes
basic values. The locations of the eight core political values in the space reveal
their relations both to one another and to the basic values. We next note what these
locations reveal about the structuring of the core political values.
Traditional morality, blind patriotism, and law and order correlated substan-
tially with one another (Table 2) and were predicted by much the same basic
values (Table 3). They cluster together on the left of Figure 2. Their correlations
with basic values suggest that the opposition between the three conservation
values that predict these three core political values positively and three openness
to change values (including hedonism) that predict them negatively structures
these political values. Their shared negative association with universalism values
also points to a common underlying motivation. The location of accepting immi-
gration on the right in Figure 2 reveals that its motivational underpinnings are
opposite to those of these three core political values. It correlates most positively
with universalism, self-direction, and stimulation and most negatively with the
three conservation values.
The locations of the core political values of equality, civil liberties, and—in
reverse direction—free enterprise in Figure 2 indicate that concern for others is the
main motivational basis of the former two and self-interest the main motivational
basis of the latter. The relative importance of universalism versus power values
largely shapes individuals’ stances on these three core political values. Civil
liberties correlates more positively with self-direction values and more negatively
with tradition values than equality does, as reflected in Figure 2. This points to
autonomy and freedom from conventions as added motivational bases of civil
liberties.
7
Compared with the orientation of the motivational circle in Figure 1, its orientation in Figure 2 is
flipped over to the left and rotated 90 degrees clockwise. The order of relations among the basic
personal values is the same.
440 Schwartz et al.
1.0
Self-Transcendence
Benev
Univer
Equality
0.5
Conservation
Tradit
Conform CivlLibr
Secur
AccpImg
TrdnMor
Openness to Change
0.0
BlndPatr
SelfDir
LawOrd
MilInt
FreeEnt
Stimul
-0.5
Hedon
Power Achiev
Self-Enhancement
-1.0
-0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6
Figure 2. Multidimensional analysis of eight core political values and ten basic personal values
(Stress 1 = .063).
Core Political Values: TrdnMor = Traditional Morality, BlndPatr = Blind Patriotism, LawOrd = Law
and Order, MilInt = Foreign Military Intervention, FreeEnt = Free Enterprise, AccpImg = Accepting
Immigrants, CivlLibr = Civil Liberties, Equality = Equality
Basic Personal Values: Tradit = Tradition, Conform = Conformity, Secur = Security, Power = Power,
Achiev = Achievement, Hedon = Hedonism, Stimul = Stimulation, SelfDir = Self-Direction,
Univer = Universalism, Benev = Benevolence
Finally, the correlations of foreign military intervention (Tables 2 and 3) and

its location in Figure 2 suggest that, like law and order, blind patriotism, and
traditional morality, it is grounded in the three self-protective conservation values.
Like them, and in contrast to accepting immigrants and civil liberties, it too
conflicts with universalism and self-direction values that foster tolerance for others
who are different. In addition, military intervention is linked to free enterprise by

their shared motivation to control and dominate versus to promote others’ welfare,
reflected in their positive correlations with power and negative correlations with
universalism.
The fourth from last row of Table 3 gives the proportion of variance that the
10 basic personal values jointly explain in separate regressions for each core
political value. The variance explained ranges from 22% (free enterprise) to 53%
(traditional morality). The third from last row gives the variance explained by the
four sociodemographic variables—age, gender, income, and education—alone. In
parentheses in the next row is the variance explained by these variables that is not
mediated by the basic personal values (i.e., the incremental R2 when adding the
sociodemographic variables to regressions after the basic values). Evidently, basic
values mediated almost all the variance in core political values explained by the
sociodemographic variables.
Basic Personal Values versus Left-Right Ideology
Comparing the fourth from last and the last rows of Table 3 reveals that basic
personal values accounted for substantially more variance than left-right ideology
in every one of the core political values—from almost two to more than five times
as much variance. To further assess the relative predictive power of left-right
ideology and basic values, we regressed each core political value on both, once
entering ideology in a first block followed by basic values in a second block and
once in the reverse order. The mean added variance accounted for by basic values
after entering left-right ideology was 21% (range 13%-free enterprise to 38%-
traditional morality). The mean added variance accounted for by ideology after
entering basic values was 4% (range 1%-civil liberties to 6%-accepting immi-
grants). In sum, the ideological dimension did less well than basic personal values
in explaining core political values.
A reviewer suggested that the left-right dimension might be more relevant to
the political values of sophisticates. To assess this possibility, we repeated the
above analyses within separate subsamples of respondents with some college
education (N = 640) and less education (N = 1,035). Both left-right ideology and
basic values explained more variance in core political values among those with
more education. Left-right explained 15–23% of the variance in the eight politi-
cal values in the more educated subsample (M = 17%) and 3–11% in the less
educated subsample (M = 7%). However, basic personal values were better pre-
dictors in both subsamples. Basic values explained an average of 30% of the
variance in political values in the more educated subsample when entered first
(range 25–41%). Left-right added an average of only 5% when entered second
(range 1–9%). In the less educated subsample, basic values explained an average
of 26% (range 17–42%) and left-right added an average of only 3% (range
1–6%).
442 Schwartz et al.
Basic Personal Values and Core Political Values as Predictors

of Voting Behavior
Basic Values. We computed point biserial correlations between centered T1

basic values and T2 vote (coded 0 for center-right and 1 for center-left), controlling
gender, age, income, and education. The findings for vote replicated the associa-
tions found in research that measured past vote or intended future vote. As
hypothesized, the more importance individuals attributed to universalism (.31,
p < .001), benevolence (.12, p < .001), and self-direction (.11, p < .001) values, the
more likely they were to vote for the center-left. The more importance they
attributed to security (-.19, p < .001), tradition (-.17, p < .001), conformity (-.12,
p < .001), power (-.12, p < .001), and achievement (-.08, p < .05) values, the more
likely they were to vote for the center-right.
To estimate the total effect of basic values on voting, we computed a binary
logistic regression for dichotomous vote. Entered in a first block, age, gender,
education, and income did not predict voting (Nagelkerke R2 = .01 p > .10).
Adding basic values (uncentered) substantially improved explanation (D
Nagelkerke R2 = .19 p < .001).8 Three values contributed significantly (p < .001):
universalism, tradition, and security. We also performed separate analyses for
those with some college education (N = 302) and less education (N = 529). As
expected, assuming that inferring the implications of policies for one’s basic
values requires considerable analytic ability, values had higher predictive validity
in the more educated group (D R2 = .28 vs. .17).
Core Political Values. Point-biserial correlations between T1 core political
values and T2 vote, controlling for gender, age, income, and education, were all
significant (p < .001). As hypothesized, voting for the center-left correlated with
equality (.38), civil liberties (.21), and accepting immigrants (.45). Voting for the
center-right correlated with law and order (-.41), traditional morality (-.42), free
enterprise (-.47), military intervention (-.51), and blind patriotism (-40). To
estimate the total effect of core political values on voting, we entered them in a
second block after the demographic variables in a binary logistic regression. Core
political values added significantly to demographic variables in predicting voting
(D Nagelkerke R2 = .54 p < .001). Thus, core political values predicted substan-
tially more strongly than basic personal values.
Core Political Values as Mediators of the Effect of

Basic Personal Values on Voting
As a first test of hypothesis 3, we entered basic personal values into the

regression following core political values. They did not add to the prediction (D
8
Nagelkerke R2 is scaled in the same manner as R2 from OLS regression, but it is not, strictly speaking,
a measure of variance explained (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).
Nagelkerke R2 = .002 p > .95). We also performed this analysis without the two
political attitudes specific to the context of the Italian election (military interven-
tion and accepting immigrants). Basic personal values still did not add to the
prediction (D Nagelkerke R2 = .002 p > .95). Thus, core political values fully
mediated effects of basic personal values on voting.
The above analyses used multiple regression. A structural equation model
(SEM, Bollen, 1989) provides an overall test of the basic values—political
values—voting causal hierarchy.9 Core political values, basic values, and political
choice were included as manifest variables. The factor scores from the exploratory
factor model served as measures of the core political values. The mean uncentered
ratings of the items that index each basic personal value served to measure it.
Because political choice was dichotomous, we derived adequate parameter esti-
mates with weighted least square estimators with robust standard errors and mean
and variance adjusted chi-square test statistics (Muthén, 1978). In the hypoth-
esized model, each basic value affected the eight core political values, which in
turn contributed directly to political choice, mediating the influence of basic
values. The direct effects of basic values on political choice were fixed to zero. The
ten basic values were allowed to correlate, as were the eight core political values.
The appendix presents the full parameter estimates and a matrix of correla-
tions among all variables in the SEM analysis. The structural model yielded a good
fit to the data: c2 (8df) = 4.15; p = .84; CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, WRMR = .15.
The eight core political values explained 62% of the variance in voting and
completely mediated effects of basic values. As shown in the last row of the
appendix, six political values contributed independently to explaining voting:
Equality and accepting immigrants predicted voting for the center-left; free enter-
prise, traditional morality, military intervention, and civil liberties predicted voting
for the center-right.
The finding for civil liberties (b = -.14) reversed its zero-order correlation
(r = .21) and contradicted the political stances of the two coalitions. Civil liberties
correlated highly with equality (r = .63). Because equality is in the model, the b
for civil liberties refers to the aspect of civil liberties unrelated to equality. That
aspect is an emphasis on freedom from government intrusion into individuals’
lives and from imposition of constraints to accommodate interests of other groups.
The center-right coalition championed this view of freedom. This may explain
the unexpected finding for civil liberties. Supporting this interpretation, when
equality is dropped as a predictor, civil liberties no longer predicts voting for the
center-right.
Findings from the structural analysis in the Appendix reveal that the pro-
portions of variance in the eight core political values explained by basic personal
9
We preferred SEM to the regression approach to detect mediation because regression would require
specifying a series of separate steps for each core political value, whereas SEM allows a simultaneous
test of the hypothesized paths and provides both formal significance tests of indirect (mediated)
effects and direct estimates of their size.
444 Schwartz et al.
values were similar to the proportions in the regression analyses. The pattern of
betas relating basic values to political values was similar to the pattern of cor-
relations from the regressions (cf. Table 3). Where two basic values adjacent in
the motivational circle both correlated with a political value, however, only
one of them showed a substantial beta due to their motivational redundancy.
We examined direct effects of basic personal values on voting and indirect
effects mediated through core political values using Sobel’s approximate sig-
nificance test (Sobel, 1982). These tests revealed no direct effects but significant
indirect effects for five basic values (all p < .001): universalism, power, security,
conformity, and tradition. Thus, the SEM analysis also indicates that core politi-
cal values fully mediated the influence of basic personal values on political
choice.10
Discussion
Structuring of Core Political Values by Basic Personal Values
Eight political values, drawn from the political science literature and from the
political discourse in Italy, accounted for substantial variance in voting. These
political values, in turn, were explained by basic personal values. Moreover, the
circular motivational structure that organizes basic personal values appears to give
motivational coherence to the core political values that basic values constrain and
through which they are expressed in the political domain.
Before discussing how basic values structure political values, consider the
possibility that their associations may be due to measuring both by self-report in
the same T1 session. Perhaps, respondents’ desire to report consistent political and
basic values inflated intercorrelations? If so, we would expect weaker correlations
between T1 basic values and T2 core political values. However, these correlations
were almost identical to those with the two T1 measures. Of the 48 hypothesized
associations, 47 were significant (p < .01). Moreover, the average correlation
across the T1-T2 time span was only .01 weaker than at T1 alone. It is therefore
doubtful that the T1 correlations of core political values with basic personal values
are much inflated, if at all.
The MDS graphic projection (Figure 2) of relations among basic values and
core political values and the pattern of correlations between them reveal their
shared motivational structure. These findings suggest that the coherent structure
of motivations that organizes basic values also structures core political values.
The motivational opposition of security, conformity, and tradition values to self-
direction, stimulation, and hedonism values also underlies the core political
10
We also ran an SEM model excluding the two political attitudes specific to the Italian political
context (military intervention and accepting immigrants). Model fit was: Chi square (8) = 3.85,
p = .87, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, WRMR = .17. The six core political values explained 57% of the
variance in voting and completely mediated effects of basic values.
values of law and order, blind patriotism, and traditional morality, producing
coherence among them. Giving low priority to universalism values also underlies
these political values and leads to their mutually positive associations. Accepting
immigrants expresses the opposite set of priorities on these seven basic personal
values. Thus, it is grounded in motivations opposite to law and order, blind
patriotism, and traditional morality and correlates strongly negatively with them.
Structuring by the three conservation versus three openness values implies
that law and order, blind patriotism, and traditional morality are based motivation-
ally in anxiety and fear of uncertainty, threat, and change, concern for protecting
the self and preventing loss (Schwartz, 2006). The negative association of these
political values with universalism values implies lack of concern for the welfare of
those outside the ingroup. The contents of these political values express just such
motivations. They refer to protecting oneself and one’s extended ingroup from
disorder and danger due to crime, disruptive and unconventional minorities, and
new lifestyles and beliefs, and to believing one’s country that protects against
threats can do no wrong.
As noted, accepting immigrants expresses, in the reverse direction, the same
set of basic personal values as the three political values with which it correlates
negatively. Its motivational underpinnings imply that accepting immigrants
reflects low anxiety, low fear of uncertainty, and a view of change and diversity as
potential sources of gain, growth, and self-expansion, and that it entails concern
for the welfare of others, even those quite different from oneself (Schwartz, 2006).
The items that measure accepting immigrants clearly express its value-based
motivations. They assert that immigrants (implicitly, people whose different life
styles and unpredictable behavior may introduce change) are a source of benefit
rather than threat to society.
The findings suggest that the political values of equality, civil liberties,
and—in reverse direction—free enterprise express the motivational opposition of
universalism and benevolence versus power and achievement values. This implies
that the primary motivational issue relevant to these political values is concern for
others’ interests versus self-interest. The especially strong associations with uni-
versalism suggest that the interests of others outside one’s ingroup are most
pertinent. The associations with power values indicate that these political values
contrast readiness to exploit others for one’s own benefit with sacrifice of own
interests to benefit others.
The equality items express their underlying motivations by referring to giving
benefits to “everyone,” “rich and poor,” “all citizens,” although this may reduce
own benefits. The free enterprise items express an opposing ideal, reducing gov-
ernment restraints on pursuing individual self-interest even if some suffer. In
addition to concern for others, the civil liberties items express the opposition
between self-direction and tradition values by emphasizing respect for and pro-
tection of individual uniqueness, implicitly including those with nontraditional
beliefs and life-styles.
446 Schwartz et al.
The analyses indicate that foreign military intervention expresses a combina-

tion of the motivations of security and power values versus universalism values.
This suggests that support for foreign military intervention is anxiety-based and
focused on self-protection and prevention of loss. It further suggests that the
pursuit of self-interest serves to justify undertaking military action even if it may
disregard or harm others’ well-being.
Basic Personal Values and the Left-Right Ideological Dimension
Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) described the left-right schema as an overarch-

ing, efficient taxonomic system for understanding, ordering, and storing political
information, used both by elites and the masses. We therefore compared how well
basic personal values versus the left-right ideological dimension structure the eight
core political values. Basic values explained substantially more variance in every
one of the political values than left-right self-placement did. This held for both
more and less educated subsamples. However, this comparison of basic values and
ideology may not be fair. We compared eight values, each indexed by a scale, with
a single left-right item. Perhaps a more reliable multi-item indicator of ideology
would have performed better. On the other hand, this one item indicator is com-
monly used in research, and everyday discourse in Italy refers to parties of the
“left” versus the “right.”
Our findings do not mean that people consciously use their basic personal
values to think about politics the way they use left-right. Basic values may provide
the unconscious motivational grounding that constrains and organizes core politi-
cal values. In contrast, left-right self-placement may summarize individuals’ and
party’s stances on political issues descriptively.
Basic Personal Value—Core Political Values—Political Behavior

Causal Hierarchy
Several past studies demonstrated that basic personal values relate systemati-
cally to voting. None, however, could test causality, because they measured values
and past or intended future vote in the same session. The current study, by
measuring values at T1 and voting at T2, provides the first clear evidence that basic
personal values may have a causal impact on voting. The causal link between basic
values and voting was indirect. Core political values completely mediated the
effects of basic values on voting. This finding supports the idea that voters can
more easily infer the impact of political choice on their core political values than
on their basic personal values. Age, gender, education, and income accounted for
no additional variance in voting and almost none in political values. This rein-
forces the view that people’s values rather than their social locations are now more
critical determinants of political choice.
Limitations and Future Research
The extent to which political values mediate effects of basic values on voting
may depend on the elapsed time before the vote. Here, the interval was only about
a month. At longer intervals, and especially if circumstances change, political
values may be less adequate mediators of the effects of basic personal values.
Basic values are less vulnerable to situational variation than are political values.
Hence, as the interval increases or circumstances change, the political values that
influence voting are more likely to have changed by the time of voting. If so,
political values may mediate effects of basic personal values on voting less fully
than they did here. Indeed, over longer intervals, basic personal values might even
predict voting more effectively than political values. Research to assess these
possibilities has practical significance for predicting voting behavior over
extended time periods.
This research studied only one national election. The generalizability of the
associations among basic personal values and core political values is unknown.
Our reasoning suggests that basic values structure and give coherence to
political values in all political contexts. Moreover, particular political values
should express the same basic values across contexts. What are likely to
vary across political contexts are the particular political values that are most
relevant (cf. Barnea, 2003). A current cross-national study is investigating these
assumptions.
The core political values in this study were among the most prominent core
values in the political science literature. Other important political values are
economic security, postmaterialism, humanitarianism, and social welfare.
Research should study how the motivational structure of basic personal values
constrains and gives coherence to these and other political values. Research should
also study political attitudes uniquely relevant to the discourse in different coun-
tries. Attitudes relevant in the Italian context, toward accepting immigrants and
toward foreign military intervention, added substantially to the prediction of
voting by more abstract core political values. Linking such attitudes to basic
personal values will help to clarify their motivational significance and their rela-
tions to core political values.
Ideally, one would address the issues of this study with representative national
samples rather than the convenience sample used here. Our sample was more
educated, wealthier, and urban than the Italian population. It is therefore encour-
aging that the findings regarding the central question of the structuring of core
political values by the motivational structure of basic personal values replicated in
both more and less educated subsamples. It is also noteworthy that gender, age,
and educational level influenced voting only marginally in the general population
in the 2006 Italian election (Maraffi, 2007). Hence the lack of representativeness
in our sample may not have seriously distorted this study’s inferences about effects
on voting.
448 Schwartz et al.
Conclusion
This research contributes to the understanding of political choice. Basic

personal values serve as anchors for core political values and, through them,
indirectly influence voting behavior. When basic values and political values were
taken into account, various sociodemographic variables that reflect people’s social
locations had no additional impact on voting. This reinforces the view that indi-
vidual differences are crucial for understanding political choices. Studying indi-
viduals’ basic personal values can yield an additional advantage for understanding
politics. Basic value priorities are more stable and less vulnerable to the impact of
current events than political attitudes, values, and opinions. Consequently, change
in basic personal values can track more fundamental, long-term changes in the
political atmosphere.
Most importantly, this research provided insight into the organization of
political thought. Diverse political values are grounded in an overarching motiva-
tional structure. The coherent structure of compatible and opposing motivations
that organizes basic personal values into a circular motivational continuum appears
to structure relations among core political values as well. This can explain how and
why political values relate to one another as they do.
By recognizing the motivational bases that support and oppose each core
political value, political leaders might communicate more effectively with their
supporters and the public at large. Most people are probably unaware of the links
of their political views to their basic personal values because people are rarely
aware of how their motivations influence them. Nonetheless, the findings support
the claim that basic personal values provide a crucial grounding for political
ideologies (Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, 1994).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Professor

Shalom H. Schwartz, Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. E-mail: msshasch@
mscc.huji.ac.il or gianvittorio.caprara@uniroma1.it
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452
Appendix
Parameter Estimates from the SEM Analysis for Relations of Core Political Values to Basic Personal
Values and Voting
Core Political Values
Basic Personal Traditional Blind Law & Military Free Equality Civil Accepting
Values Morality Patriotism Order Intervention Enterprise Liberties Immigrants
Security .26** .34** .34** .23** .08 .01 .01 -.28**
Conformity .06 .10* .05 .02 .09 -.05 .06 -.09
Tradition .49** .32** .31** .13* .21** .04 -.16** -.09
Benevolence .04 .00 -.09 -.06 .02 .05 -.09 .07
Universalism -.22** -.17** -.25** -.27** -.26** .49** .36** .37**
Self-Direction .01 -.03 .00 .01 .02 -.02 .12* .01
Stimulation .02 .11* .07 .01 .14* .01 -.04 .09
Hedonism -.14** -.11* -.10* -.07 -.12* .03 .04 -.04
Achievement .04 -.06 .03 .02 .01 .03 .06 -.10
Power -.03 .05 .03 .15** .17** -.13** -.07 .09
Variance Explained by 52% 41% 35% 20% 18% 31% 24% 27%
Basic Personal Values
Path to Voting -.28** .06 -.07 -.20** -.25** .33** -.14* .20**
Note. Listwise n = 877 due to missing data. All parameters come from the standardized solution. *p < .01; **p < .001.
Schwartz et al.
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Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No.

Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and

Gian Vittorio Caprara

single ideological dimension is likely to organize political attitudes (Kinder,

Core Political Values

Core political values are overarching normative principles and belief

Law and order: enforcement and obedience to law, protection against

Traditional morality: traditional religious and family values versus

Free enterprise: minimal government involvement in the economy, eco-

Basic Personal Values

Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence

Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.

Self-direction: independent thought and action—choosing, creating,

Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for

Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people

Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset

The theory further specifies a structure of dynamic relations among the 10

Research Relating Basic Personal Values to Political Choice

Core Political Values Mediate Relations of Basic Personal Values to Voting

The Current Research

The current research tests three broad hypotheses:

To test these hypotheses, we developed a scale to measure core political

diversity, emphasizing traditional family values, building on Italian nationalism,

Respondents and Procedures

Following are the sociodemographic characteristics of this convenience

Basic Personal Values. The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz,

Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Core Political Values

I II III IV V VI VII VIII

Table 2. Correlations among Factors, Cronbach Alpha, and Test-Retest Reliabilities

Left-Right Ideology. We used a standard item to measure this ideology

Basic Personal Values as Organizers of Core Political Values

Hypothesis 1 proposed that the circular motivational structure that organizes

Basic Values Core Political Values

Finally, the correlations of foreign military intervention (Tables 2 and 3) and

who are different. In addition, military intervention is linked to free enterprise by

Basic Personal Values versus Left-Right Ideology

Basic Personal Values and Core Political Values as Predictors

Basic Values. We computed point biserial correlations between centered T1

Core Political Values as Mediators of the Effect of

As a first test of hypothesis 3, we entered basic personal values into the

Structuring of Core Political Values by Basic Personal Values

The analyses indicate that foreign military intervention expresses a combina-

Basic Personal Values and the Left-Right Ideological Dimension

Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) described the left-right schema as an overarch-

Basic Personal Value—Core Political Values—Political Behavior

Limitations and Future Research

This research contributes to the understanding of political choice. Basic

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Professor

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