WikiLeaks US Embassy Cables 15 Files For Burma

စစ္အာဏာရွင္စနစ္ခ်ဴပ္ျငိမ္းေရးသည္ျမန္မာနိုင္ငံသားအားလံုး၏တာ၀န္ျဖစ္သည္။
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/burma
15 file on 8/9 December 2010
US embassy cables: Revealed - what China

really thinks about Burma
• guardian.co.uk, Thursday 9 December 2010 21.30 GMT
• Article history
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA'S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the
boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and
SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current
"standstill" in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will
draw China's attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct
talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China
Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang
Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC
professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
"Bold Measures" Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like
to see the Burmese Government take "bold measures" to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people
and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy
supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the
Burmese regime's so-called "roadmap" to democracy as the best route to democracy and national
reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society
only on the surface and the potential for "lots of trouble" persists. Zhai said the regime's inept handling
of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a
healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a
number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN
Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is
"close to the core" of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of
detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi's November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared
with senior Burmese leaders China's analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the
Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that,
based on the regime's positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would
succeed. In light of the current "standstill" in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps
now to take with the regime.
China's "Extraordinary" Efforts
-------------------------------
5. (C) Yang recounted China's efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and
Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor
Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold "extraordinary" discussions with the regime's
senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve
Burma's domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to
approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China's approach to Than Shwe.
6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is
making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference.
Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the
need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao's November 19 speech at the
National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen's speech included the following: "Only an open and
inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.")
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the
United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in
Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June
meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a "bilateral confidence
building measure," Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari's mission, though she
noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they
followed Gambari's suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang
said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN "Group of Friends" on Burma. While China is open to
multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma's acceptance of these
means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role,
Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such
as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members,
such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
9. (C) MFA's Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will
not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for
hard-line polices. Despite China's opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and
China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China
and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma.
CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to
see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions
may only bring further civil unrest.
China's attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
10. (C) CICIR's Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because
domestic events in China, including the National People's Congress in March and the Olympics in
August, are increasingly consuming China's attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the
South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China's and international attention away
from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap
to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that "if Senior General Than
Shwe is rational," he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current
regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
12. (C) CICIR's Zhang said that the United States should "play two hands" with the Burmese
Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should
send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security
would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the
current military leadership is the key to "unlocking the deadlock."
13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
BEIJING 00000125 003 OF 003
RANDT
US embassy cables: US seeks replacement of UN
special envoy to Burma
• Article history
Tuesday, 07 October 2008, 19:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 107438
SIPDIS
USUN FOR JEFF DELAURENTIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS PREL, KPAO, PHUM, BM
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: REPLACEMENT OF SRSG GAMBARI FOR
BURMA MISSION
Classified By: IO">IO">IO PDAS James Warlick. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request. See para. 4.
2. (C) Department views the "good offices" mission of the UN Secretary General's Special
Representative (SRSG) to Burma as an important vehicle for encouraging democratic progress in
Burma. Consequently, Department has viewed with growing concern the lack of progress on core
political steps that the UNSC called on Burma to take such as the immediate release of political
prisoners and the opening of a meaningful, time-bound political dialogue with democratic and ethnic
minority leaders, in particular, with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), over the course of SRSG Gambari's
four missions to Rangoon. Indeed, it appears that Gambari's access to regime officials and ability to
secure results has only contracted over the course of these missions. His access to democratic leaders
has been constrained by both the regime and more recently a loss of confidence in Gambari among
leaders of the democracy movement.
3. (C) Gambari appears unrealistically upbeat, pursuing and reporting progress on peripheral matters
(e.g., a possible economic forum, the possible placement of a UN staff member in Rangoon) that are a
distraction from what the Security Council has articulated as critical goals and identified as Gambari's
mandate.
4. (C) Considering the key role of the good offices mission and Gambari's inability to secure significant
progress from the Burmese regime, USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek
Gambari's dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as soon as practical.
5. (C) Taking into account Gambari's usefulness in his concurrent role as UN advisor on the
International Compact with Iraq, as well as SYG Ban's likely sensitivities in regard to a possible
dismissal, Department provides the following talking points (not/not to be left as a non- paper) for use
by USUN in this demarche:
6. (C/rel to UN) Begin points:
-- Over time, the United States has become increasingly concerned that the UN good offices mission in
regard to Burma is in dire jeopardy.
-- Special Representative Gambari's fourth and latest trip to Burma continued a disturbing pattern of
regime-managed itineraries; restricted access to key regime officials and activists; and complete lack of
progress on the critical issues that form the core of Mr. Gambari's mandate: the opening of a
meaningful and time-bound dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority leaders, including Aung San
Suu Kyi, toward democratization and national reconciliation, and the immediate and unconditional
release of all political prisoners.
-- While the main responsibility for this lack of progress should be attributed to regime intransigence,
Mr. Gambari has not been willing to acknowledge it. This lack of progress, Mr. Gambari's
inappropriate claims of success regarding peripheral issues, and his unwillingness to press the regime
more forcefully for progress have caused us to conclude that his continued involvement undermines the
good offices mission and should therefore be ended.
-- We have no wish to embarrass Mr. Gambari and have no intent to link any removal with a lack of
progress in Burma, but we would ask that you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation in
this particular mission. In particular, we cannot support further travel to Burma for discussions with
regime leadership by Mr. Gambari as part of the good offices mission.
-- We urge you not to rush to name a replacement. There have been a series of Special Representatives,
none of whom have succeeded due to regime intransigence. Absent some sign that the regime is willing
to engage seriously, we fear appointment of a new envoy could actually encourage the regime and
some of its friends to continue to emphasize process over substance. As you requested, however, we are
willing to share ideas of possible candidates as you consider next steps.
-- There is talk of your ramping up your personal involvement on Burma, or perhaps even visiting. We
think you could play an important role but understand you will have to consider carefully how you
would engage. Although a trip by you could be useful, we believe it's critical that the groundwork be
laid so you can be confident that your visit will result in tangible progress.
-- We understand that the Burmese are unlikely to make major concessions as a condition for your visit.
However, we do not believe you should go without a strong indication ahead of time that your visit
would coincide with some tangible, positive steps. Steps that we recommend you insist upon are: the
release of high-profile political prisoners; the release of Aung San Suu Kyi or at least the easing of her
house arrest; insistence that you and any subsequent Special Representative will be able to determine
your own schedules, including meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, political prisoners, activists, and
whomever else you wish; and that you will have access to the senior most leadership of the Burmese
regime; agreement on specific steps to begin a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic
and ethnic leaders; and a guarantee that any Special Representative will be granted a multiple entry
visa.
End points. RICE
US embassy cables: Burmese official reports

Burma and North Korea's 'peaceful nuclear
cooperation'
• Article history
Friday, 07 August 2009, 10:51
S E C R E T RANGOON 000502
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP,
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BM
SUBJECT: (S) BURMESE OFFICIAL CONFIRMS BURMA-DPRK
"PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (S) Australian Ambassador to Burma Michelle Chan informed CDA that XXXXXXXXXXXX told
her the Burma-DPRK connection is not just about conventional weapons. There is a peaceful nuclear
component intended to address Burma's chronic lack of electrical power generation. When Chan cited
reports of a Burma-Russia agreement for development of a peaceful nuclear reactor,
XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that the agreement with Russia is currently just for "software,
training." The DPRK agreement is for "hardware." XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed reports Burma's
Army Chief of Staff (third highest ranking) General Thura Shwe Mann visited the DPRK last
November. Asked why Thura Shwe Mann, XXXXXXXXXXXX responded, "Because he is in charge
of all military activities." XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly seemed surprised that the West might be
concerned by a Burma-DPRK "peaceful" nuclear relationship. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that,
after all, given sanctions, Burma really has "no other options" but to develop the relationship wi th
North Korea.
Comment
-------
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX DINGER
US embassy cables: China losing patience with

Burma
•
• Article history
Friday, 18 January 2008, 10:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000044
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO">IO">IO
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, BM
SUBJECT: CHINESE LOSING PATIENCE WITH BURMA
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (C) Summary: Charge hosted the Chinese Ambassador for lunch on January 17. We discussed the
lack of political dialogue and the need for all countries to speak with one voice to persuade the generals
to start talking and quit dragging their feet. The Chinese Ambassador no longer tried to defend the
regime, and acknowledged that the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used
their access to the generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain interested
in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador indicated that fear of losing power and
economic interests may be the key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table. End
Summary.
Chinese Fed Up
--------------
2. (C) Ambassador Guan Mu no longer tries to defend the regime as making any progress on political
dialogue. He admitted that he did not know why the dialogue apparently stopped last November,
although he added that some in the senior leadership understand that they must open up to the outside
world. He acknowledged that accurate information about the current situation does not get passed up to
the senior levels. Although claiming that it was un-Buddhist for monks to become involved in politics,
Guan agreed that the monks' involvement indicated how bad the situation had become in Burma. He
pointed out the designated liaison officer met with Aung San Suu Kyi last week after a two-month
hiatus, but quickly admitted that this gap was "too long." Charge pointed to Senior General Than Shwe
as the main obstacle to moving forward. The Ambassador responded that he believed that Than Shwe
would be ready to open up in a few more years. The Burmese people can't wait that long, the Charge
warned, stressing that further delays would only increase the possibility of further turmoil.
3. (C) Ambassador Guan stated the various Chinese officials traveling to Burma have counseled the
senior generals to speed up the political dialogue and warned them that the international community
would not accept any backtracking. He agreed that the various parties just needed to start talking, and
urged us to offer positive, constructive comments. Charge said "start talking now" was very
constructive advice, and real dialogue would be welcomed by the whole world. If the generals were
serious about a dialogue, they should be meeting everyday, not just with Aung San Suu Kyi, but with
ethnic leaders, and other interested citizens as well. A one hour meeting with one person after two
months was just for show, claimed the Charge, not serious. In addition, she continued, the regime has
not permitted ASSK to meet with anyone else. The regime should be easing the restrictions on her, so
she can get advice and counsel from a wide variety of people.
Control vs. Turmoil
-------------------
4. (C) Guan cited two concerns that might be hindering the political dialogue from getting started:
losing power and economic interests. Guan suggested, if the senior leaders could be offered assurances
that they would not "lose their lives" and could keep their economic interests, they might be more
amenable to ceding power gradually. He implied that the economic interests were of higher priority for
the generals and their families. Charge replied that this could all be negotiated, reiterating the need to
get started now. If turmoil breaks out as people's frustration continues to grow, there might be nothing
left to negotiate, she added.
5. (C) The generals want to stick to their roadmap, stated Guan. Charge suggested that they could still
call it a roadmap while increasing participation at each of the remaining steps, including the current
constitution drafting. Even though this might slow the roadmap process, she said it could produce more
broadly accepted results in the end, which would be better for all. The roadmap process as it is will
RANGOON 00000044 002 OF 003
not deliver the stability that everyone wants to see, the Charge said, because it does not incorporate
provisions the pro-democracy supporters and ethnic minorities want to see. Instead of taking credit for
speeding up the roadmap as he has in previous meetings, Guan nodded in agreement. He repeated the
Chinese interest in stability. Charge said more demonstrations were likely in the coming months if the
people saw no signs a genuine dialogue was underway. She expressed confidence that many issues
could be easily resolved, if the various parties just started talking and kept talking.
6. (C) Guan acknowledged that the regime has done nothing to improve the lives of the Burmese
people, even though they recieved increased oil and gas revenues. He recognized that the huge increase
in satellite fees will further turn the public against the military. Charge characterized the latter as an
attempt to keep people from the news, but also effectively blocking them from some of their few
escapes--soccer and Korean soap operas. Guan mentioned that China had learned that when the
government tried to press down too hard, it increased the likelihood of an eruption; he understood the
risks of more turmoil in Burma.
7. (C) Guan questioned whether democracy could work in Burma citing the experience of their first
decade of independence and Ne Win's efforts to promote a democratic transition in 1988. Charge
explained that many nations went through the same struggles after independence, and reminded Guan
that it was the current generals who blocked a transition in 1988. The Burmese have learned from the
past, according to the Charge, if they have a voice in deciding their political future then they will have
an interest in maintaining stability. Guan said there were some issues that were inappropriate for
outsiders to decide, like sexual problems in a family. Charge agreed saying the role of the outsiders
should be in persuading the parties to talk; what they talked about and the decisions they came to was
up to them. Charge urged China to join with the U.S. in urging genuine talks get started now and keep
going until a more broadly acceptable way forward can be agreed upon by all the relevant parties of
Burma.
Meet the USDA, not the NLD
US embassy cables: Are Burma and North

Korea cooperating on nuclear weapons?
• Article history
Tuesday, 10 November 2009, 09:35
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: ANOTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT BURMA-DPRK
NUCLEAR ISSUE
REF: RANGOON 502
Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (S) [NAME REMOVED] , who on [DETAILS REMOVED] informed Australian Ambassador Chan in
Rangoon that Burma and the DPRK were engaged in "peaceful nuclear cooperation" (reftel), has
changed [DETAILS REMOVED] story. In a November 9 conversation with Ambassador Chan, [NAME
REMOVED] said there had been a "misunderstanding." After Chan's "blunt" response to the August
revelation (Chan had responded with incredulity to the thought that the GOB might consider nuclear
cooperation of any sort with the DPRK to be acceptable), [NAME REMOVED] had checked around
Nay Pyi Taw. [DETAILS REMOVED] now says GOB-DPRK conversations were merely "exploratory."
[NAME REMOVED] cannot confirm any direct nuclear cooperation. [DETAILS REMOVED] added
that, in any case, the Kang Nam 1 affair and Secretary Clinton's remarks in Phuket in July "put
everything on hold."
2. (S)[NAME REMOVED] observed that Russia is the key GOB partner for a nuclear reactor, but
[DETAILS REMOVED] said there has been no progress. Russia has proposed a commercial deal, and
the GOB cannot afford it. [NAME REMOVED] added that many countries have relations with the
DPRK, including Australia, "so why worry?!"
Comment
-------
3. (S) As with many issues in Burma, the truth behind and possible motivations for [NAME
REMOVED] first version and the recent revision are difficult to ascertain. Ambassador Chan now
believes [DETAILS REMOVED] was simply speculating in August and has corrected the record. We
were not in the actual conversations, but to us [DETAILS REMOVED] revision sounds more like an
effort to cover a lapse in judgment than to deny the earlier story outright. The comment about the Kang
Nam 1 and the Secretary's remarks having "put everything on hold" leave room for concern. That
noted, other of [NAME REMOVED] comments have caused us to question just how well plugged in
[NAME REMOVED] is on the "nuclear" issue. Bottom line: GOB-DPRK cooperation remains opaque.
Something is certainly happening; whether that something includes "nukes" is a very open question
which remains a very high priority for Embassy reporting. DINGER
US embassy cables: Burma's democracy
movement being held back by 'uncles'
• Article history
Monday, 14 July 2008, 06:56
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO">IO">IO
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BM
SUBJECT: CONTINUING THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
RANGOON 00000557 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (SBU) Embassy Rangoon pol/econ chief departs Post this week after ending a two-year tour that saw
the largest political uprising in Burma in twenty years, the arrest and imprisonment of the pro-
democracy opposition's most talented leaders, and the worst natural disaster in Burma's recorded
history. We asked her to share her candid observations on the current political situation, and her
recommendations on how best to advance our democratic goals.
-------------------
The Senior Generals
-------------------
2. (C) The Burma army remains firmly in control throughout most of the country, with Senior General
Than Shwe retaining almost absolute power. He has the final word on all significant political and
economic decisions. While outsiders may portray him as an uneducated, crass, and blundering man, he
has successfully consolidated and held onto power for several years, while at the same time building
lucrative relationships with his energy hungry neighbors that undermine Western efforts to cripple his
regime.
3. (C) The generals keep their power through a vast system of economic patronage, not unlike a
Western style Mafia. Military-owned enterprises control every profit-making natural resource and
industry in the country. Economic prosperity can only be enjoyed by rising thorough the ranks of the
Army, or having extremely close ties to the senior generals. This is why China's urging to the generals
to begin reforming Burma's economy falls on deaf ears. Economic liberalization and reform would
require the generals to dismantle the very system that ensures their power. Dismantling this system will
be one of the biggest challenges for any future democratic leader of Burma.
4. (C) Rumors of splits at the top of the regime are the result of uninformed analysis and wishful
thinking of the exiles and outside observers. While the senior generals may disagree from time-to-time
amongst themselves (as witnessed after Nargis), they follow the orders of Than Shwe. The senior
generals are keenly aware that if they do not stand together, they will fall together. True democratic
change will not likely happen until the top two generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, are off the scene.
Both are extremely concerned for the safety and financial security of themselves and their families.
Third-ranking general Thura Shwe Mann is rumored to be Than Shwe's pick for Burma's President in
2010, but if Than Shwe and Maung Aye are still alive, they will likely pull his strings from behind the
scenes. Sources close to Thura Shwe Mann tell us he is smart, sophisticated, and well-aware of Burma's
problems. Some talented Burmese intellectuals and political dissidents tell us they pass him policy
papers that are reportedly solicited on his behalf. However, he is intimately involved in Burma's
corruption, primarily through his sons' business interests.
5. (C) Several of our sources close to high and mid-ranking military officers tell us that some of the
regional commanders are reform-minded and aware of the need for political and economic reform.
However, most of the military believe that working within Burma's current military system is the only
way to bring about this change while maintaining stability. While some officers begrudgingly respect
Aung San Suu Kyi, they do not sympathize with the pro-democracy opposition in general. We should
not expect an imminent coup to save us from the hard-line senior generals.
--------------------------------------------- --
Aung San Suu Kyi and the Pro-Democracy Movement
--------------------------------------------- --
6. (C) Since the September protests, the most dynamic and talented leaders of Burma's pro-democracy
movement have been jailed, left the country, or remain in hiding. Tellingly, the NLD remain free. While
many outside Burma perpetuate the
RANGOON 00000557 002.2 OF 004
impression of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party as a large movement
with massive support waiting to take the Parliamentary seats they won in the 1990 election, the reality
is quite different. Without a doubt, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a popular and beloved figure of the
Burman majority, but this status is not enjoyed by her party. Already frustrated with the sclerotic
leadership of the elderly NLD "Uncles", the party lost even more credibility within the pro-democracy
movement when its leaders refused to support the demonstrators last September, and even publicly
criticized them.
7. (C) Many of the younger political activists are turning away from the NLD and preparing to run in
the 2010 parliamentary elections, to effect political change any way they can. This includes members of
88 Generation. There is reportedly an ongoing, heated debate among the 88 Generation leaders in
Insein prison on whether or not the groups' members should contest the election, with Ko Ko Gyi
advocating members do so, and Min Ko Naing opting for a boycott. Those who want to run tell us they
do not agree with the new constitution and despise the regime's roadmap to democracy. However, with
the absence of any alternative, they see the new Parliament as a possible mechanism for dialogue
between the military, the pro-democracy opposition, and the ethnic cease-fire groups.
8. (C) The way the Uncles run the NLD indicates the party is not the last great hope for democracy and
Burma. The Party is strictly hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouraged from younger
members, and the Uncles regularly expel members they believe are "too active." NLD youth repeatedly
complain to us they are frustrated with the party leaders. Repeated overtures from and "summits" with
the leaders of the 88 Generation in 2007 failed to result in any significant cooperation between the
factions. Indeed, lack of unity among the pro-democracy opposition remains one of the biggest
obstacles to democratic change in Burma.
9. (C) The "Uncles" have repeatedly rebuffed the most dynamic and creative members of the pro-
democracy opposition, who reinvigorated the pro-democracy movement throughout 2006 and 2007 by
strategically working to promote change through grass-roots human rights and political awareness and
highlighting the regime's economic mismanagement. Nor has the party made any effort to join forces
with the technically sophisticated bloggers and young, internet-savvy activists, who have been so
clever at getting out the images which repeatedly damaged the regime and undermined its
international credibility. Instead, the Uncles spend endless hours discussing their entitlements from the
1990 elections and abstract policy which they are in no position to enact. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Additionally, most MPs-elect show little concern for the social and economic plight of most Burmese,
and therefore, most Burmese regard them as irrelevant.
----------------------------
The Ethnic Cease-Fire Groups
----------------------------
10. (C) The cease-fire groups remain an important component of Burma's future political stability and it
is noteworthy that none have chosen to support Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Instead, they have
entered dialogue with the regime, at the same time cutting lucrative concession deals for many of
groups' leaders. However, many leaders of the cease-fire groups have told us they would cast their lot
with whomever best looked out for their interests. However badly the regime does this, the NLD has
repeatedly missed opportunities to reach out to the cease-fire groups to demonstrate that they would.
Instead, it has consistently issued statements calling for a dialogue between the NLD and regime first,
before the ethnic cease-fire groups are brought into the mix. They have also continually feuded with
ethnic MPs-elect on the Committee to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP).
RANGOON 00000557 003.2 OF 004
11. (C) It is these long-held ethnic tensions that has kept the cease-fire groups from defecting from their
dialogue with the regime to form an alliance with the NLD. Many of Burma's neighbors, including
China, are aware of the tension between the NLD and the ethnic nationalities. The NLD's continuing
alienation of the ethnic minority groups gives credence to the regime's most effective argument with its
neighbors and ASEAN: that the military is the only force capable of guaranteeing stability in Burma.
12. (C) The recent statement Aung San Suu Kyi released through UN Special Envoy Gambari indicated
she is aware of this problem and wants to rectify it. The overture she offered to the ethnic nationalities
was welcomed by the cease-fire group leaders with whom we spoke. But her party failed to follow up
on her initiative and issued only a half-hearted invitation for the ethnic leaders to visit them at NLD
headquarters in Rangoon. Once again, they reduced the role of the ethnics to second-class supplicants.
The timing of ASSK's statement was strategic: just before the referendum on a constitution, which
many of the cease-fire groups were unhappy with because the regime had failed to include key
compromises promised by former PM Khin Nyunt before his ouster. A genuine overture from the NLD
offered the best chance yet to split the cease-fire groups from the regime and undermine its credibility
with its regional supporters. The Uncles failed to use this opportunity, so the cease-fire groups continue
their relationship with the regime.
-------------------------
Where do We Go From Here?
-------------------------
13. (C) Throughout the country, there is still widespread and growing frustration with the regime for its
brutal and incompetent rule. Though most Burmese do not believe the NLD will be able to bring about
democratic change, at least while ASSK is under house arrest, they have not given up on working for
democracy. Instead, they are taking matters into their own hands and creatively working in what space
is available to improve the lives of their communities.
14. (C) Like the many community-based organizations (CBOs), religious organizations, and civil
society groups that responded to Cyclone Nargis while the international community was shut out, many
dissidents and ordinary Burmese are creatively trying to incorporate democratic principles into their
civil society programs, including private-tuition schools, environmental programs, health education,
and religious organizations. Through this process, change will come about more slowly than most want,
but it is a channel that functions where most other options were shut down by the regime after the
September 2007 demonstrations. It is also a method that promotes change from the grass roots,
teaching community responsibility at the local level, rather than a top-down movement by the urban,
intellectual elite. A strong civil society is something we should seek and encourage in Burma. It will
make any democratic transition in Burma more likely to succeed.
15. (C) Ending Burma's isolation will also be integral to any successful long-term change in the
country. No matter how democratic transition comes about in Burma, the military will be involved
given its vast control over the political and economic structures of the country. We should make an
effort to seek out and speak with the more progressive military officers and to those who have access to
the senior generals. Their hostility to democratic change is motivated by paranoia and distrust of the
West, and a belief that we seek to punish them and obliterate a significant role for them in Burma's
future. If we want to counter this, we should pursue dialogue directly with them rather than through
intermediaries who can sometimes garble messages.
16. (C) If we do decide to speak with the generals again, we should do it strategically. Dialogue could
be used as a tool to bring the generals into the twenty-first century.
RANGOON 00000557 004.2 OF 004
Discussions could take place on the margins of international fora, exposing them to the outside world
and its diplomatic norms, juxtaposing Burma's backwardness against the modern world, which could
cause greater realization among the generals about their country's lack of development. Careful
preparation could be made before such events to make sure Burma's neighbors send the same messages
to the generals during their bilateral meetings. Such unity of message was extremely effective in
persuading the regime to open up to international assistance after Cyclone Nargis.
---------------------------
Give a Little, Get a Little
---------------------------
17. (C) While our economic sanctions give us the moral high-ground, they are largely ineffective
because they are not comprehensive. Burma's biggest client states refuse to participate in them.
However, the generals despise the sanctions and want them removed because they challenge the
regime's legitimacy. If we really want to see the generals make progress, we need to show them what
they will get in return. This means being willing to gradually remove sanctions in exchange for true
steps toward dialogue and political change.
18. (C) We should start small and hold them to real action (unlike the sham dialogue they purported to
initiate with Aung San Suu Kyi last November). If they do make concrete progress, we should be ready
to offer them something. For instance, removing them from Tier 3 on the Trafficking in Persons
rankings, or taking them off the Narcotics Majors list, areas where the regime has actually made some
progress. This should be a gradual process that would be based only on the condition of concrete
results. Large rewards should come only with large compromises, such as lifting the visa ban if they
release Aung San Suu Kyi. We may also want to consider putting security guarantees on the table for
the most senior generals and their families if we are serious about removing them from the scene. As
we move toward the 2010 parliamentary elections, it may be a strategic time to begin talks with them
about such an agreement. Allowing international election monitors, lifting laws that restrict free and
fair debate, and freeing key political prisoners could be tied to lifting specific sanctions.
19. (C) While talking to the generals may be unpalatable, their firm control over Burma and the
weakness of the pro-democracy opposition are a reality we must consider when working to promote
change in Burma. The prospect for democratic change in the near future is low, but despite the setbacks
after the September demonstrations, there is hope change may eventually come. After many years of
waiting for the outside world to help free them from the generals' despotic rule, many Burmese are
finding creative ways to take control of their country through community-based organizations and
building the capacity of civil society. Through these organizations, leaders may emerge who will run in
the 2010 elections and work for democratic change.
20. (C) We should seek every opportunity to support and increase the capacity of Burma's nascent civil
society by expanding humanitarian assistance inside the country that promotes self-reliance, conflict
resolution, and respect for human rights. Such a policy will have the added benefit of expanding our
influence and increasing our access throughout the country. Not only will this approach increase our
knowledge of the subtle changes occurring inside Burma, but it will strengthen our position and
influence inside when change does come, so we can assist the Burmese to reform their political and
economic systems in a manner that best promotes U.S. economic and strategic interests. Above all, our
Burma policy should be focused on helping those Burmese who are working to bring about democratic
change themselves, for that is the only way it can realistically come. VILLAROSA
WikiLeaks cables: China 'fed up' with Burma's

footdragging on reforms
Cables show that China's stance on Burma echoes that on North Korea: publicly supportive while
privately despairing
• Ewen MacAskill in Washington

• Article history
WikiLeaks cables reveal that while Aung San Suu Kyi remains popular, there is frustration in the
country with the 'sclerotic leadership' of her National League for Democracy. Photograph: Nyein Chan
Naing/EPA
The Chinese government, Burma's closest ally, is losing patience with the military regime over its
failure to implement political and other reforms, according to leaked US diplomatic cables.
A Beijing diplomat complained China is "fed up with the footdragging" of Burma's strongman, General
Than Shwe, and his inner circle, one of the cables, released by WikiLeaks, reported.
China, in spite of its closeness to the Burmese dictatorship, shares the same concerns as the US about
the country's instability and is keen to work with Washington in promoting change, according to
American diplomats.
The Chinese stance on Burma echoes that towards North Korea revealed in other cables: publicly
supportive while privately despairing.
Burma has for decades been treated by the US and others in the west as an international pariah, a
military dictatorship castigated for brutal crackdowns on pro-democracy activists. Although the
Burmese government held elections on 7 November, these were denounced by the west as a fraud and
were boycotted by the National League for Democracy (NLD), the biggest opposition party, headed by
the recently-released Aung San Suu Kyi.
In a 2008 cable marked "China Losing Patience With Burma", the senior US diplomat in Burma at the
time, Shari Villarosa, described a lunch with the Chinese ambassador, Guan Mu, and said the Chinese
were worried about political turmoil that could affect their business interests.
Villarosa said: "The Chinese ambassador no longer tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that
the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the generals to push
for change, without much observable result, but remain interested in working with us to promote
change."
She added: "The Chinese can no longer rely on the generals to protect their interests here, and
recognise the need to broker some solution that keeps the peace, including bringing in the pro-
democracy supporters."
Guan said that if senior leaders in Burma could be offered assurances they would not lose their lives
and keep their economic interests, they might be more amenable to ceding power gradually.
US diplomats in Beijing in 2008 found similar sentiments expressed by the Chinese foreign affairs
ministry.
Although the US champions the Burmese opposition, its diplomats in Burma are scathing of the leading
group, the NLD, fronted by Aung San Suu Kyi. A US cable said that while she remains popular, there is
frustration in the country with "the sclerotic leadership of elderly NLD 'uncles'."
The cable adds that the way the leadership runs the NLD "indicates the party is not the last great hope
for democracy and Burma. The party is strictly hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouraged
from younger members, and the 'uncles' regularly expel members they believe are 'too active'."
The cable adds that lack of unity among the pro-democracy opposition is one of the biggest obstacles to
change in Burma.
The party has not made any effort "to join forces with the technically sophisticated bloggers and young,
internet-savvy activists, who have been so clever at getting out the images which repeatedly damaged
the regime and undermined its international credibility."
The US was also disappointed with the UN special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari and the cables
reveal how the then US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, ordered the US mission at the UN to work
for his removal. In a 2008 cable that reflects the way the US seeks to exert control over the UN, Rice
wrote: "Considering the key role of the good offices mission and Gambari's inability to secure
significant progress from the Burmese regime, USUN (the US mission at the UN) is asked to demarche
SYG (UN secretary general) Ban or Ambassador Kim (Ban's chief of staff) to seek Gambari's dismissal
as SRSG (special representatives of the secretary general) for Burma. This demarche should occur as
soon as practical."
Rice, noting Ban's "likely sensitivities in regard to a possible dismissal", suggested several talking
points, among them that Gambari was failing to acknowledge the intransigence of the Burmese
government.
"We have no wish to embarrass Mr Gambari and have no intent to link any removal with a lack of
progress in Burma, but we would ask that you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation in
this particular mission," Rice wrote.
Gambari was moved by Ban last year.
The Obama administration approach to Burma is not markedly different from that of the Bush
administration, basically trying to nudge the regime towards reform through a mixture of sanctions and
offers of sweeteners.
The present US charge d'affaires, Larry Dinger, in a cable in April last year, proposed various ways of
improving ties with Burma, including aid, which he cynically suggested could undermine the regime.
"If properly designed, such assistance builds the basic capacity of people at the grassroots to survive
and to think beyond mere subsistence to political goals. Such aid is subversive more directly as well:
recipients understand who helps them (international donors) and who doesn't (the regime)," Dinger
said.
WikiLeaks cables suggest Burma is building
secret nuclear sites
Fears of bomb plan as witnesses tell US embassy that North Koreans are involved with underground
facility in jungle
• Ewen MacAskill in Washington

• Article history
Burma's military regime has said it wants a nuclear power plant but denied any plans for atomic
weapons. Photograph: Khin Maung Win/AFP/Getty Images
Witnesses in Burma claim to have seen evidence of secret nuclear and missile sites being built in
remote jungle, according to secret US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, heightening concerns
that the military regime is seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
A Burmese officer quoted in a cable from the US embassy in Burma said he had witnessed North
Korean technicians helping to construct an underground facility in foothills more than 300 miles
(480km) north-west of Rangoon.
"The North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced underground
facility that is '500ft from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above'," according to the cable. The
man is quoted as saying the North Koreans were "blowing concrete" into the excavation.
An expatriate businessman told the embassy in Rangoon he had seen a large barge carrying reinforced
steel bar of a diameter that suggested a project larger than a factory. Other informants included
dockworkers, who reported suspicious cargo.
The reports add rare detail to rumours that have circulated since 2002, most recently from a military
defector this year, that Burma is covertly seeking a nuclear bomb with the help of North Korea. Both
countries have strenuously denied this in the past and Burma insists there are no North Koreans in the
country.
The cables will compound existing international concern over Iranian and North Korean nuclear
programmes, and show why Barack Obama has made nuclear non-proliferation one of the central
planks of his foreign policy.
According to the witness accounts, pieced together by US embassy staff, the work is at an early stage
and haphazard. But they regard it as a troubling development, with the risk that Burma could join
Pakistan, North Korea and possibly Iran in having a nuclear bomb.
In a cable dated August 2004 titled "Alleged North Korean involvement in missile assembly and
underground facility construction in Burma", one of the embassy staff wheedled information from an
officer during a visit to Rangoon. The officer was in an engineering unit working at the site, where
surface-to-air missiles were allegedly being assembled. The site is the Irrawaddy river town of Minbu
in Magwe division, west-central Burma.
The officer said 300 North Koreans were working at the site, though the embassy, in its cable back to
Washington, described this as improbably high. The officer "claims he has personally seen some of
them, although he also reported they are forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and
other 'outsiders' are prohibited from entering".
Burma has made no secret of wanting a civilian nuclear reactor, in part because of severe electricity
shortages, and has signed a deal with Russia to build one. The project has so far failed to start because
of lack of funds. A secret deal with North Korea would be in breach of international rules on nuclear
proliferation.
According to a 2009 cable, a well-placed source within the Burmese government last year made an
apparently indiscreet remark to the Australian ambassador that the agreement with Russia was just for
"software, training" and the North Korea agreement was for "hardware".
The source said General Thura Shwe Mann, who had overall command of military activity, visited
North Korea in 2008. The source backtracked six months later, insisting that the talks with North Korea
were only exploratory.
In February 2009 the Burmese deputy foreign minister, Khin Maung Win, called a US diplomat to deny
there was collusion between his country and North Korea over missiles, missile technology or nuclear
technology.
Alarmingly, there is a report of a businessman offering uranium to the US embassy in Rangoon. The
embassy bought it.
"The individual provided a small bottle half-filled with metallic powder and a photocopied certificate
of testing from a Chinese university dated 1992 as verification of the radioactive nature of the powder."
He said that "if the US was not interested in purchasing the uranium, he and his associates would try to
sell it to other countries, beginning with Thailand".
US embassy cables: Burmese civilian offers to
sell uranium to US diplomats
• Article history
Tuesday, 23 September 2008, 08:59
SIPDIS
FOR STATE ISN/CTR AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPT OF ENERGY
EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS KNNP, MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE CIVILIAN OFFERS TO SELL PURPORTED URANIUM
238 TO U.S. EMBASSY RANGOON, BURMA
REF: A. 2007 STATE 162091 B. USDAO RANGOON IIR 6 812 0131 08
Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. Summary Burmese civilian provides US embassy in Rangoon with a half-bottle alleged to
contain radioactive material, and says he has access to large quantities. Cable highlights dangers
of nuclear proliferation. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
1. (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Per Ref A, Post is alerting the Department and Washington agencies that
on XXXXXXXXXXXX after USDAO Rangoon received guidance from DIA, a Burmese civilian met
with members of USDAO Rangoon and offered to sell Uranium-238. The individual had initially
contacted the USDAO eight days prior with the offer. The individual provided a small bottle half-filled
with metallic powder and a photocopied certificate of testing from a Chinese university dated 1992 as
verification of the radioactive nature of the powder. During XXXXXXXXXXXX interview, the individual
claimed to be able to provide up to 2000 kg of uranium-bearing rock from a location in Kayah State
XXXXXXXXXXXX , and further stated if the U.S. was not interested in purchasing the uranium, he and
his associates would try to sell it to other countries, beginning with Thailand. See Ref B for further
information.
2. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Details of the incident follow, keyed to questions in Ref A:
A) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Current location of the material: Sample bottle is in transit via classified
Diplomatic Pouch to Aberdeen Proving Grounds via DIA.
B) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Transportation status of material: sample bottle in transit through
diplomatic courier service. The sample was wrapped in several layers and placed inside multiple
containers, including glass, lead, and wooden boxes/crates. Following instructions from DIA
headquarters, USDAO has sent the package via Diplomatic Pouch to Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
through DIA, 3100 Clarendon, Arlington, VA. The box is marked "Secret." Dimensions are 16 X 16 X
8 inches. Embassy Rangoon assesses that the host nation is currently unaware of USDAO receipt and
shipment of the material. However, the possibility cannot be dismissed that rather than a sale for profit,
the seller is attempting to assist in executing a government entrapment scheme.
C) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) As noted, Post assesses that the Burmese government is currently unaware
of USDAO receipt and shipment of the sample. Burmese authorities would likely seize any additional
samples or stocks of the material if aware of their existence.
D) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Sample is in transit by commercial air via Diplomatic Pouch.
E) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Intended destination of material: The subject indicated his first choice for
a possible buyer of the alleged uranium is the United States, via the Embassy in Rangoon. Other stated
options include the Thai and Chinese Embassies. His intent appears to be to sell the material in
Rangoon. Subject made no mention of intent to move material across borders.
F) Unknown.
G - J) (S//NF) Subject identified himself as XXXXXXXXXXXX .
(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The subject brought with him a small bottle weighing 1.8 ounces and
measuring 70 mm long by 26 mm in diameter, which was half-filled with a grey metallic powder. He
claimed the material in question was Uranium-238 in powder form. The subject claims to represent a
small group that wants to sell uranium to the U.S. Embassy. According to the subject, he has 50
kilograms of uranium-containing rock or ore at an undisclosed location in Rangoon, which is stored in
a barrel that prevents the radioactivity from being toxic XXXXXXXXXXXX . He estimates there are
at least 2000 more kilograms that could be dug up from the
site in Kayah State. The uranium was only recently brought to Rangoon (subject would not give a
specific time frame). The subject claimed the uranium was discovered in Kayah state in 1992.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The subject claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX know about the uranium.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
K) N/A.
L) N/A.
M) (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Interview occurred in a consular interview room (used for walk-ins) at
the U.S. Embassy Rangoon.
N) Additional details: Ref B contains all other available information related to this incident.
3. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX
DINGER
US embassy cables: Businessman fuels

suspicions over secret Burmese nuclear
reactor
• Article history
Tuesday, 20 January 2004, 09:44
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/09/2014
TAGS PGOV, PARM, PREL, BM, RS">RS, KS, KNPP
SUBJECT: BURMA: RUMORS OF CONSTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR REACTOR
NEAR MINBU
REF: STATE 297614 AND PREVIOUS 03 RANGOON 1427
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)
1. Summary Expatriate businessman reports large-scale construction work in Minbu, location of
recurring rumours of secret nuclear reactor being built by Burma with North Korean help. Key
passage highlighted in yellow.
1. (S/NF) An expatriate businessmanXXXXXXXXXXXX recently volunteered to an Embassy Officer
that he had heard rumors that a nuclear reactor was being built near Minbu, in central Magway Division
on the Irawaddy River. The businessman added that he personally had seen a "massive" barge
containing large-sized rebar being unloaded on a trip to the area. After asking local residents about the
rebar's purpose, he was told that similar size barge shipments were arriving almost weekly and that the
rebar was to be used in the construction of unnamed/unidentified factories. In the opinion of the
businessman, the quantities involved as well as the diameter of the rebar suggested a project larger than
"factories." Along these lines, the businessman noted that there was a new airport near Minbu with a
landing strip that, based on its length and thickness, seemed excessive, adding that "you could land the
space shuttle on it."
2. (S/NF) Comment: Rumors of construction of a nuclear facility in/near Magway Division date back to
2002 and generally refer to alleged Goverment of Burma (GOB) and Russian cooperation on a nuclear
research reactor project. Similar rumors, sans the "Russia" angle, have been circulating with greater
frequency within diplomatic and expatriate circles since a November 2003 Far Eastern Economic
Review (FEER) article which described signs of growing military ties between North Korea and
Burma. While we have no direct evidence of this alleged cooperation, rumors of ongoing construction
of a nuclear reactor are surprisingly consistent and observations of activity such as that described
above appear to be increasing, as are alleged sightings of North Korean "technicians" inside Burma.
Martinez
US embassy cables: Suspicion at Burmese docks

over shipment
•
• Article history
Tuesday, 30 January 2007, 10:23
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, BM, CH
SUBJECT: BURMA XXXXXXXXXXXX REPORT SENSITIVE SHIPMENT
Classified By: Econoff TLManlowe for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. Summary Burmese sources help US embassy monitor shipments from Rangoon. Although
there is no evidence the shipment is anything other than what is on the manifest, it shows both
how the US gathers intelligence and its concerns about possible uranium shipments. Key
1. (S) Summary: Embassy contacts XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us on XXXXXXXXXXXX
documents for 112 metric tons of "mixed ore" shipped on January 25 from Burma to China via
Singapore. XXXXXXXXXXXX noticed that authorities treated the shipment as highly sensitive, and
suspect it may have included uranium. Our contact had no direct evidence to support this claim. End
summary.
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told emboffs that XXXXXXXXXXXX informed him they were
suspicious about the behavior of authorities when handling a January 25 shipment of mixed ore from
Rangoon. According XXXXXXXXXXXX, security was tighter than usual, surveillance was heavier,
and officials paid closer attention to the movement of the shipment and activity at the port.
XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that metals are usually exported in blocks, whereas the bags in this
shipment were filled with loose earth and mud. The source of the mixed ore, Maw Chi, is also a source
for uranium, they claimed. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the destination in China, Fang Chen, and the
shipping line, Advance Container Lines, were unusual for routine ore shipments. Shipments normally
go to other ports in China via Myanmar Five Star Line, the government-owned shipping line, according
to them. The shipper, Myanmar Ruby Enterprise, is a joint venture, 30% owned by the Ministry of
Mines. XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S) Key information contained in the documents we have seen includes: Carrier: Advance Container
Lines Co., Ltd. Shipper: Myanmar Ruby Enterprise Address: No. 24/26 Sule Pagoda Road, Kyauktada
Township, Rangoon Shipped from Rangoon: January 25, 2007 Vessel: Kota Teraju to Singapore
Destination: Fang Chen, China Port of Discharge: Fang Chen, Guang Xi, China Consignee: Yunnan
Minmetals Trading Co., Ltd. Address: F/8 No. (408) Beijing Road, Kuming, PR China Shipment: Six
containers holding 3080 bags, 112.0049 net metric tons of Mawchi Mixed Ore: (tin, tungsten, scheelite
mixed concentrate) Value: 534,263.37 euros.
4. (S) We have no further information about the shipment or the reliability of the documents. We would
be pleased to forward copies of the documents received to anyone interested. VILLAROSA
US embassy cables: North Koreans alleged to be
building secret underground missile site in
Burma
• Article history
Friday, 27 August 2004, 08:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/26/2014
TAGS PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, BM, KN
SUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE
ASSEMBLY AND UNDERGROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN BURMA
Classified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN FOR REASON 1.5 (A/C).
1. Summary The report is one of many about alleged covert North Korean co-operation with
Burma, which has repeatedly denied there are any North Koreans in the country. Key passage
highlighted in yellow.
1. (S) SUMMARY: North Korean workers are reportedly assembling "SAM missiles" and constructing
an underground facility at a Burmese military site in Magway Division, about 315 miles NNW of
Rangoon, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX . This unsolicited account should not be taken as
authoritative, but it tracks with other information garnered and reported via XXXXXXXXXXXX. End
Summary.
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX some 300 North Koreans are working at a secret construction site west of
Mimbu, Magway Division, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains. (Comment: the number of
North Koreans supposedly working at this site strikes us as improbably high. End comment.) The
XXXXXXXXXXXX claims he has personally seen some of them, although he also reported they are
forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and other "outsiders" are prohibited from
entering. The XXXXXXXXXXXX was confident that XXXXXXXXXXXX had the ability to
distinguish North Koreans from others, such as Chinese, who might be working in the area. The exact
coordinates of the camouflaged site are not known, but it is reportedly in the vicinity of 20,00 N, 94,25
E.
4. (S) The North Koreans are said to be assembling "SAM missiles" of unknown origin.
XXXXXXXXXXXX the North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-
reinforced underground facility that is "500 feet from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above."
He added that the North Koreans are "blowing concrete" into the excavated underground facility.
5. (S) The XXXXXXXXXXXX is supposedly engaged in constructing buildings for 20 Burmese army
battalions that will be posted near the site. Of these, two battalions are to be infantry; the other 18 will
be "artillery," according to this account.
6. (S) [XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (S) COMMENT: The [XXXXXXXXXXXX second-hand account of North Korean involvement
with missile assembly and military construction in Magway Division generally tracks with other
information Embassy Rangoon and others have reported in various channels. Again, the number 300 is
much higher than our best estimates of North Koreans in Burma, and exactly how the
XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly came to see some of them personally remains unclear. Many details
provided XXXXXXXXXXXX match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated, sources.
8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: We cannot, and readers should not, consider this report alone to be
definitive proof or evidence of sizable North Korean military involvement with the Burmese regime.
The XXXXXXXXXXXX description made no reference at all to nuclear weapons or technology, or to
surface-to-surface missiles, ballistic or otherwise. XXXXXXXXXXXX This account is perhaps best
considered alongside other information of various origins indicating the Burmese and North Koreans
are up to something ) something of a covert military or military-industrial nature. Exactly what, and on
what scale, remains to be determined. Post will continue to monitor these developments and report as
warranted. McMullen
WikiLeaks cables: Burma general considered

Manchester United buyout
Junta leader Than Shwe thought about spending $1bn on football club despite country being devastated
by cyclone Nargis
• Robert Booth
• guardian.co.uk, Monday 6 December 2010 14.31 GMT
• Article history
Burmese ruler Than Shwe was urged to make a takeover bid for Manchester United by his grandson,
according to the US embassy in Rangoon Photograph: David Longstreath/AP
The leader of Burma's military junta considered making a $1bn (£634m) bid to buy Manchester United
football club around the time it was facing rising anger from the United Nations over its "unacceptably
slow" response to cyclone Nargis.Than Shwe, commander in chief of the armed forces and a fan of
United, was urged to mount a takeover bid by his grandson, according to a cable from the US embassy
in Rangoon. It details how the regime was thought to be using football to distract its population from
ongoing political and economic problems.
The proposal was made prior to January 2009; only months earlier, in May 2008, the Burmese junta
had been accused of blocking vital international aid supplies after Nargis struck, killing 140,000
people.
Than Shwe reportedly concluded that making a bid for United might "look bad" at the time, but the
revelation that the proposal was even considered is likely to fuel criticism of the regime's cruelty. The
senior general instead ordered the creation of a new multimillion dollar national football league at the
same time as aid agencies were reporting that one year on, many survivors of the cyclone still lacked
permanent housing, access to clean water, and tools for fishing and agriculture.
The mooted price tag for Manchester United was exactly the same as the aid bill to cover the most
urgent food, agriculture and housing for the three years after the cyclone, as estimated by international
agencies including the UN. The proposal revealed that the regime, which is increasingly exploiting its
oil and gas reserves, felt confident of finding such a sum. According to Forbes magazine's valuation of
the club at the time, $1bn would have been enough to acquire a 56% controlling stake.
"One well-connected source reports that the grandson wanted Than Shwe to offer $1bn for Manchester
United," said the June 2009 cable to Washington. "The senior general thought that sort of expenditure
could look bad, so he opted to create for Burma a league of its own."
Than Shwe then reportedly coerced and bribed eight leading business and political figures to establish
teams and ordered them to spend large sums on imported players and new stadiums.
The cable revealed that in January 2009, selected Burmese business people were told "that Than Shwe
had 'chosen' them to be the owners of the new professional soccer teams. [The informant, a top
executive at one of the sponsor companies] said the owners are responsible for paying all costs,
including team salaries, housing and transportation, uniform costs, and advertising for the new league.
In addition, owners must build new stadiums in their respective regions by 2011, at an estimated cost of
$1m per stadium."
The Magway team was spending $155,000 a month on salaries while the Kanbawza team, linked to a
bank, had budgeted $2m for the 2009 season. Rangoon United hired five players from Africa and Delta
United recruited several Argentinians.
"When asked why the owners would participate in such an expensive endeavour, [an executive with
one company sponsor] observed that they had little choice," the embassy reported. "'When the senior
general asks someone to do something, you do it with no complaints,' he stated."
He added that several of the business people expected to receive incentives from the regime, such as
construction contracts, new gem and jade mines, and import permits, which would more than offset
their costs. The owners of the clubs in the Burma national football league, which launched on 16 May
2009, include "regime crony" Zaw Zaw, who also chairs Burma's football federation and drew up plans
for the league with the senior general's grandson.
"Zaw Zaw hired Senior General Than Shwe's grandson to play on the team," a separate cable adds.
But according to the dispatch, "many Burmese businessmen speculate the regime is using it as a way to
distract the populace from ongoing political and economic problems or to divert their attention from
criticism of the upcoming 2010 elections".
Political football
From Sierra Leone to Iran, football is more than a sport for many governments.
Cables in June 2009 reveal Iran's fear that public unrest over a national football team loss "could add
fire to the increasingly volatile political demonstrations" during the presidential election.
Such was President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political investment in Team Melli that spies were said to
keep tabs on key players. He loaned the squad his presidential plane to travel to North Korea for a
match after personally firing the coach Ali Daei when they lost to regional rivals, Saudi Arabia. But
fans have rebelled, chanting "we don't want political soccer" at one game.
In Jordan, hooliganism at a match in July 2009 between Al-Wahdat (Palestinian fans) and Al-Faysali
(Jordanian fans) revealed the "ugly side of Jordanian ultranationalism" as the Palestinian origins of
both the queen and the crown prince were denigrated. One contact warned US diplomats that such
extremism "would be difficult to contain now that it was publicly expressed".
Even in Azerbaijan, football clubs mean status for regime figures. The son of Kamaladdin Heydarov,
the oil-rich nation's minister for emergency situations, owns Gabala football club: "a small-scale effort
to replicate the Chelsea antics of Russia's Roman Abramovich".
"The Gabala squad is a virtual United Nations team, with players from across Europe, Latin America
and Africa – the best team money can buy, at least for central Azerbaijan."
Meanwhile the US embassy in Sierra Leone believes the country's football manager, Mohamed Ahmed
Sesay, may have used the job "to facilitate narcotics trafficking", after he was arrested during a cocaine
trafficking investigation.
US embassy cables: Burma regime crony picks
general's grandson for football team
•
• Article history
Friday, 19 June 2009, 05:24
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFS
PACOM FOR FPA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019
TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: UPDATE ON CRONY ZAW ZAW'S ACTIVITIES
REF: A. 07 RANGOON 1107 B. RANGOON 298 C. RANGOON 355 D. RANGOON 330
RANGOON 00000378 001.4 OF 004
Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
Summary
1. Zaw Zaw, a businessman and "up and coming crony", picked General Than Shwe's grandson to
play for Delta United in the 2009-established national league. He is attempting to curry favor
with the regime and to use his government ties to expand his commercial enterprises. Key
2. Read related article
Summary
-------
1. (C) Regime crony Zaw Zaw continues to expand his businesses in Burma. In addition to Max
Myanmar Group of Companies, Zaw Zaw owns a beverage bottling company, a cement plant, a trading
company, a jade mine in Phakhant, a rubber plantation in Mon State, and a professional soccer team.
Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC add Zaw Zaw's additional companies and key management
personnel (listed in paragraph 5) to the targeted sanctions list. End Summary.
Additional Business Ventures
----------------------------
2. (C) Zaw Zaw, one of Burma's up-and-coming cronies, continues to expand his businesses. His Max
Myanmar Group of Companies, which overseas his construction and tourism operations, is already
designated on the Department of the Treasury's sanctions list (Ref A). We have confirmed Zaw Zaw
also owns Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which produces beverages including Max Cola for the local
market. Pinya Manufacturing began operating in 1998 with an initial investment of 12.5 million kyat
(approximately USD 41,000 in 1998) and currently employs more than 70 workers. Pinya
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. has 13 distribution branches throughout Burma.
3. (C) Embassy business contact XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Zaw Zaw is expanding his
business ventures under the Max Myanmar umbrella, including construction of a cement factory in Nay
Pyi Taw, which allegedly will provide cement to Steven Law for Asia World's airport project (Ref B), a
concrete block factory in Nay Pyi Taw, a jade mine in Phakhant, and a rubber plantation in Mon State.
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Zaw Zaw operates the Lone Khin jade mine in conjunction with
the Ministry of Mines and recently received an additional 50 acres of land in Phakhant for jade mine
development. Zaw Zaw allegedly sold several lots of jade at the March 2009 government jade and gem
auction, [name removed] noted.
4. (C) Zaw Zaw is currently Chairman of the Myanmar Football Federation, and he owns Delta United,
one of the professional soccer teams in the new Myanmar Football National League (Ref C). Contacts
confirm that Zaw Zaw hired Senior General Than Shwe's grandson to play on the team (Ref D). Zaw
Zaw has also begun to develop plans for the construction of a new soccer stadium in Pathein,
Irrawaddy Division, the future home of the Delta United team,XXXXXXXXXXXX .
XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated the stadium construction cost will be more than USD 1 million, and
should be completed by 2011.
5. (SBU) Below is information on additional companies owned by Zaw Zaw.
RANGOON 00000378 002.8 OF 004
-- Delta United Football Club; Pathein, Irrawaddy Division. Listed owner and partner: U Zaw Win
Shaine, owner of Ayeyar Hinta Co., Ltd.
-- Lone Khin Jade Mine; Phakhant, Kachin State.
-- Max Myanmar Cement Factory; near Taung Phila Limestone Deposit, Leiway Township, Nay Pyi
Taw.
-- Max Myanmar Concrete Block Factory; Nay Pyi Taw.
-- Max Myanmar Rubber Plantation, Belin, Mon State.
-- Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd.; 37/38 Baw Maw An Twin Wun Street, Industrial Zone 3, Hlainthaya,
Rangoon; phone: 95-1-681-745, 95-1-685-75, 95-1-685-15; fax: 95-1-680-669. Managing Director: U
Kyi Lwin, a.k.a. U Kyan Khinn.
Embassy Recommendation
----------------------
6. (C) Zaw Zaw is one of several mid-level cronies actively attempting to curry favor with the regime
and to use his government ties to expand his commercial enterprises. He, his family, and many of his
companies are already listed on OFAC's targeted sanctions list. Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC
also designate the above-mentioned companies and senior management under the JADE Act.
DINGER
RANGOON 00000378 003.2 OF 004
6. (SBU) The Burmese government usually releases a supplementary budget later in the fiscal year
reflecting higher expenditures; its total annual deficits are thus greater than in the initial official
budgets. For example, the FY08-09 supplementary appropriation added an additional 743.9 billion kyat
(approximately USD 743 billion at current rates) to that year's budget, raising expenditures by more
than 15 percent over projected totals.
7. (SBU) As in previous years, "Government" received the largest allocation of additional funding
(USD 282 million), approximately half of FY08-09's supplemental appropriation. Businessmen
explained that money likely funded ongoing construction costs in Nay Pyi Taw, as well as other
government infrastructure projects. SOEs received the second largest amount - 185 billion kyat (USD
185 million), a 65 percent budget increase. The Ministry of Defense received an additional 9 billion
kyat (USD 9 million) and the Ministry of Finance received 53 billion kyat (US 53 million). In response
to Cyclone Nargis, the GOB allocated an additional 77 billion kyat (USD 77 million) to the Ministry of
Agriculture while the Ministry of Social Welfare received 44 billion kyat (USD 44 million).
Weak Revenue Generation
-----------------------
8. (SBU) During last year's IMF Article IV consultations, IMF representatives highlighted the need for
the Burmese Government to improve its tax administration and modify its widespread discretionary tax
exemptions. According to IMF officials, the GOB replied that one of its goals is to reduce the budget
deficit by addressing the main causes: weak revenue collection, losses from inefficient SOEs and SEEs,
unrestrained government spending, and budget expenditures for non-productive uses, such as defense
and construction. However, business contacts reported that the GOB did little to modify its tax structure
in 2008, leading them to question the government's prediction of a 27 percent increase in tax revenues
in FY09-10.
9. (SBU) Over the past few years, authorities have attempted to increase revenues through stricter
enforcement of income taxation and through an informal 2007 Customs valuation rate hike from 450
kyat/$1 to between 800 and 1200 kyat/$1, depending on the product and its origin. While GOB
officials privately argue that this rate hike indicates an effort to reconcile the various exchange rates, it
instead complicates Burma's already complex informal exchange rate system.
10. (SBU) According to the FY09-10 budget data, most SOEs will operate at a loss. Even with
extractive industries presumably posting sizable profits, the net SOE loss is predicted to be roughly 484
billion kyat (USD 484 million) -- though this estimate could be too low. State-Owned Enterprises
registered a loss of 601 million kyat in FY08-09, substantially more than GOB initial estimates of 450
billion kyat. According to budget publications, SOEs lost 800 billion kyat in FY07-08, 436 billion kyat
in FY06-07, and 549 billion kyat in FY05-06.
11. (SBU) Corruption at all levels remains a problem in Burma, which affects the GOB's ability to
collect revenue.
RANGOON 00000378 004.2 OF 004
While the government cracked down on crooked Customs officials in 2006, the payment of bribes on
the borders continues, according to business contacts. Corruption is also rife in other GOB agencies,
including the Internal Revenue Department, Immigration, and the Yangon Central Development
Committee.
Comment
-------
12. (SBU) While the published budget provides a general guideline of how the GOB will allocate its
funds, the lack of details in the document -- and the general unreliability of GOB statistics -- make it
impossible to obtain an accurate picture of Burma's fiscal situation. This problem is compounded by the
lack of spending discipline by senior leaders, who will likely continue allocating money for pet projects
with little oversight or regard for planned appropriations. Despite the GOB's stated intention to reduce
the budget deficit, another increase is far more likely due to uncontrolled spending, SOE losses, and the
lack of tax reform. Burma's economic future remains troubled.
DINGER
US embassy cables: Burma general urged to bid

$1bn for Manchester United
• Article history
Friday, 12 June 2009, 04:47
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFS
PACOM FOR FPA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: CRONIES LAUNCH NEW SOCCER LEAGUE
REF: RANGOON 330
RANGOON 00000355 001.6 OF 003
Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
Summary
1. General Than Shwe ordered Burmese businessmen to build stadiums and buy foreign players to
create a national football league after deciding that a bid for the then Premier League champions
"could look bad". The league, costing around $16m a year to run, was launched in the wake of
the devastating cyclone Nargis in which thousands died and the government faced criticisism
that its slow response increased fatalities. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
Summary
-------
1. (C) On the alleged order of Senior General Than Shwe, regime cronies and businessmen launched
the new Myanmar National Football League (MNL) on May 16, 2009. To date, the MNL has been a
huge success, with high attendance and wide national TV and radio coverage. It is unclear if there is
any political motivation behind the MNL, although many Burmese businessmen speculate the regime is
using it as a way to distract the populace from ongoing political and economic problems. End
Summary.
Let the Games Begin
-------------------
2. (C) The Myanmar Football Federation (MFF), chaired by regime crony Zaw Zaw, launched the
Myanmar National Football League on May 16, 2009. The league, the first of its kind, has eight
professional teams representing different states and divisions. During the May-July season, teams
compete for the National Cup and title of Myanmar National League Champion. The teams are
sponsored by regime cronies and businessmen (listed below). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Zaw
Zaw and Than Shwe's grandson created the idea of a professional soccer league more than a year ago
but had to obtain the Senior General's support first. One well-connected source reports that the
grandson wanted Than Shwe to offer USD 1 billion for Manchester United. The Senior General
thought that sort of expenditure could look bad, so he opted to create for Burma a league of its own. In
January, Secretary-1 reportedly told select Burmese businessmen that Than Shwe had "chosen" them to
be the owners of the new professional soccer teams. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the owners are
responsible for paying all costs, including team salaries, housing and transportation, uniform costs, and
advertising for the new league. In addition, owners must build new stadiums in their respective regions
by 2011, at an estimated cost of USD one million per stadium.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Myanmar National League 2009 Teams
--------------------------------------------- ------
Team Owner and Company Sanctions Subject
--------------------------------------------- ------
Kanbawza Aung Ko Win/Kanbawza Bank No
Delta United Zaw Win Shaine/Ayeyar Hintha No (financially backed by Zaw Zaw, owner of Max
Myanmar Yes
Magway Steven Law/Asia World Co. Yes
Okkthar United Aung Kyaw Moe/Intl Brewery No Trading Co.
RANGOON 00000355 002.2 OF 003
Zayar Shwe Myay Win Myint/Chair, Myanmar No Chamber Of Commerce
Yangon United Tay Za/Htoo Trading Yes
Southern Myanmar Htay Myint/Yuzana Co. Yes
Yadanarbon Sai Sam Htun/Loi Hein Co. No (sole distributor of soft drinks produced by SOEs)
--------------------------------------------- ------
3. (C) The eight teams currently practice and play in Rangoon; by 2011, the MNL should have a
nationwide presence, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. The teams have an average of 40 players and
salaries range from between USD 500-2000 a month, depending on the caliber of the players.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Steven Law's Magway team pays the highest salaries, spending USD
155,000 a month, while Win Myint's Zayar Shwe Myay team only spends USD 52,200 a month on
salaries. Tay Za, Aung Ko Win, and Steven Law also pay their players high signing bonuses,
XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Aung Ko Win, owner of the
Kanbawza team, has budgeted USD 2 million for the 2009 season. Other owners will spend
approximately the same amount, he noted.
4. (C) Several of the team owners have taken their obligations seriously, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated.
For example, Tay Za has hired five players from Africa; and Zaw Zaw, who financially backs the Delta
United team despite being Chair of the MFF, recruited several Argentinean players.
XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Aung Kyaw Moe, owner of Okkthar United Team and the
International Brewery Trade Co. (which produces Myanmar Beer and Grand Royal Whiskey), is
currently sponsoring the July 2009 National Cup. Tay Za's Air Bagan allegedly plans to host the next
cup, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated.
So What's In it for The Owners?
-------------------------------
5. (C) When asked why the owners would participate in such an expensive endeavor, XXXXXXXXXXXX
observed that they had little choice. "When the Senior General asks someone to do something, you do it
with no complaints," he stated. He then added that several of the businessmen will receive incentives
from the regime, such as construction contracts, new gem and jade mines, and import permits, which
will more than offset their costs. Sponsorship may also bring its own benefits. XXXXXXXXXXXX
explained that due to advertising associated with the MNL, several owners, including Sai Sam Htun
who owns Alpine Water, have seen an immediate increase in business revenue. Several owners have
plans to sell team merchandise. As the league expands, business should boom, although it will take a
few years, he concluded.
Early Success
-------------
6. (C) The MNL to date has been quite successful. Tickets are relatively expensive by Burmese
standards, ranging from USD .50 to USD 1, which can be as much as half a day's salary for the average
Burmese. Nevertheless, there has been heavy attendance at most of the games, with several games sold
out. Reportedly though, owners paid up to USD 3 per head to entice fans to the first games, when it
looked like ticket
RANGOON 00000355 003.2 OF 003
sales were lagging. Proceeds from the MNL are used to support the MFF. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted
that for the more popular teams, such as Yadanarbon and Magway, scalpers are able to sell tickets for
up to USD 1.50. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that given the continued political and economic
repression of the people, he understands why they want to spend their money on something enjoyable.
For those who cannot afford to attend the games, MRTV (the GOB's television network) shows the
games live. During Saturdays and Sundays at 4pm, local teashops are filled with Burmese watching the
games. Additionally, the matches are broadcast on the radio.
MNL: A Distraction or Just Good Fun?
-------------------------------------
7. (C) While admitting that the MNL is "just good fun," a number of our contacts question the regime's
motivation behind creating the league. Several have commented that it may be a way for the regime to
distract the people from ongoing political and economic problems, or to divert their attention from
criticism of the upcoming 2010 elections. Many speculate that the regime will suspend the 2010 MNL
cup, should it fall close to the election date, as the government may not want large crowds of people to
gather. That remains to be seen. Whatever the reason, the MNL is proving an early success, and
something for the Burmese to talk about without threatening the regime.
DINGER
US embassy cables: Washington calls for
intelligence on top UN officials
• guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 18.13 GMT
• Article history
Friday, 31 July 2009, 20:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KPKO, KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
NATIONS
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
Summary
1. The state department asks US diplomats around the world and at UN heaquarters to provide
detailed technical information, including passwords and personal encryption keys for
communications networks used by UN officials. It also wants to know about potential links
between UN organisations and terrorists, and any corruption in the UN. Key passage
highlighted in yellow.
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD)
on the United Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of
biographic information relating to the United Nations (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and reflects the results of a recent
Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations. The review
produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs
(paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans
to collect information on the United Nations. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the
Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which
was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further
background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-
issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose
agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and
State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage
relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical
information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to
the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination
to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when
they have information relating to persons linked to : office and
STATE 00080163 002 OF 024
organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of
telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone
directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet
"handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers;
frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
A. Key Near-Term Issues 1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1) 2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1) 3) Somalia
(FPOL-1) 4) Iran (FPOL-1) 5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
B. Key Continuing Issues 1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1) 2) Iraq (FPOL-1) 3) Middle East
Peace Process (FPOL-1) 4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3) 5) UN Humanitarian and
Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3) 6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-
5H) 7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H) 8) Burma (FPOL-1)
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations 1) Africa (FPOL-1) 2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1) 3) Policy
Issues (FPOL-1)
D. UN Security Council 1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
E. UN Management 1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Budget and Management Reform
(FPOL-1)
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
G. Other Substantive Issues 1) Food Security (FOOD-3) 2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment
(ENVR-4) 3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H) 4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring
(ACTM-4) 5) Health Issues (HLTH-4) 6) Terrorism (TERR-5H) 7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's
Issues (DEPS-5H)
STATE 00080163 003 OF 024
H. Intelligence and Security Topics 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) GRPO can provide text
of this issue. 3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1) 4) Telecommunications
Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is the Department of Commerce; DHS is the
Department of Homeland Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense HUMINT;
Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the Open Source Center of the Director of National
Intelligence; FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the Department of Health and Human
Services; Navy is the Navy HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service; OSC/MSC is
the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation)
collects information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's requirements; Treasury is the
Department of Treasury; USAID is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the U.S.
Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative; WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence,
Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center.)
A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1). -- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing troops and
air transportation equipment, such as helicopters, to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the
African Union (AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). -- Details of deployments of troop
contributor countries to UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed
in UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of UNMIS/UNAMID. --
Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in
New York, and UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between
UNMIS/UNAMID Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the Sudanese
government or Darfur rebel groups. -- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan (including
Darfur). -- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments of the situation on the
ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia,
Japan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
STATE 00080163 004 OF 024
Vietnam International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states
regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including
force protection in Afghanistan. -- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or member
states affecting elections in Afghanistan. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at
the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance. -- Plans and intentions of key
member states and Secretariat leadership concerning Afghan political and economic reconstruction,
including efforts to combat warlords and drug trafficking. -- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or
reluctance to secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel
(international as well as locally-hired staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: Taliban International
Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1). -- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace the UN Political Office
for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). -- Plans and intentions
of UN leadership, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led
maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia. -- Willingness of member states to pledge
troops or air transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia. -- Views of Somali
population on the deployment of a UN or multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia. -- Details of
diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and Somali government or Somali opposition officials. --
Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia. -- Details of UN Development Program
(UNDP)-Somalia training Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance for the
Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
STATE 00080163 005 OF 024
Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear
weapons. -- Positions and responses of member states to future International Atomic Energy
Association (IAEA) Director General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and relevant
provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. -- Specific plans and activities of the UK,
France, Germany (EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran. -- Plans and intentions
of key UN leaders and member states, especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran,
sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership
positions. -- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key
Secretariat officials concerning sanctions against Iran. -- Member support/opposition/subversion of US
positions regarding Iranian sanctions. -- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member
states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective implementation of existing sanctions, as
well as its efforts to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by returning Iran's nuclear file to
the IAEA. -- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and within the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC). -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in Iran; details
about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Iranian officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan,
Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5, to consider
additional resolutions against North Korea and/or sanctions under existing resolutions. -- Information
on the plans and actions of UNSC members to address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or
proliferate nuclear weapons. -- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a nation in
famine, and misuse of aid. -- North Korean delegation views and activities; instructions/plans of
delegation officials on North Korean WMD-related issues. -- Development and democratization
activities of the UNDP in North Korea. -- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship
with North Korean officials. -- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean
diplomats.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
North Korea, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1). -- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states
on UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. -- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member
states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC procedures or limitation of Perm 5
privileges. -- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among key groups of countries:
self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (the
Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group (especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that
opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the EU, as well as key UN officials
within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency. -- Willingness of member
states to implement proposed reforms. -- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member
recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU,
EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners,
and key Secretariat officials concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the UN Assistance
Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi boundaries. -- Plans and intentions of the International
Organization for Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees.
-- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US positions regarding Iraqi objectives,
including reconstruction efforts. -- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG, Secretariat staff, or
member states affecting elections in Iraq. -- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission. --
Iraqi attitudes toward the UN. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or
aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants International Organizations: EU, UN, World
Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1). -- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat
decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and coalitions on UN engagement and role in the
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap. -- Indications that a
UNGA special session on the Middle East might be reconvened. -- Developments within the UN
system that would further the Arab-Israeli peace process. -- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and
Russia) MEPP plans and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals and envoy negotiating
strategies. -- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US positions, Quartet plans, and other
(EU, Russia, UK) special envoys. -- Indications member states or donor countries might scale back UN
peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the Middle East. -- Plans of the SYG or member states to
pressure the US on the MEPP. -- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority, including its
representative to the UN, to gain support in the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council
(UNHRC) for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues, including from Russia and EU
countries, especially France, Germany, and UK. -- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and
UNSC on possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include Syria/Lebanon border
demarcation. -- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of the Middle East Peace
Process, including domestic and regional competition for allocation. -- Quartet views on Syria's
policies and approach toward Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and efforts to
subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. -- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on
territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and right of return. -- Views, plans and tactics
of HAMAS to gain support in the UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on HAMAS-Israeli
issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU
countries, especially France, Germany, and the UK. -- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, and its relations with
HAMAS/Hizballah. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US priority to reduce
the number of Middle East resolutions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain,
Syria, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International
Organizations: EU, UN Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3). -- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and
foreign NGOs to promote human rights. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward the
International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and other UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights issues. -- Plans and
intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNHRC. -- Views of UNSC
and other member states on Zimbabwe,s government policies on human rights, humanitarian
assistance, democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions. -- Views and intentions of
UNSC, UN human rights entities, and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human
rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. -- Plans
and perceptions of member states toward establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human rights abuses. -- Plans and intentions of
member states toward proposals and resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states, including
those advancing democracy; women's rights, particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325
and 1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or those condemning human rights abuses in
individual countries. -- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions designed to promote
democracy, human rights and reforms in the Muslim world. -- Perceived success or failure of abilities
and priorities of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and efforts by
member states to undermine OHCHR independence. -- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC
members regarding reform and the role of the US. -- Member state support for/opposition to objectives
of human rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies. -- Plans and intentions of
member states or UN Special Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into US
counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo. -- Degree of
coordination by and among human rights agencies, especially between the UN Human Rights Council,
the OHCHR,
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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor
Organization. -- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and UNHRC sessions and
world human rights conferences, particularly plans by developing countries to stymie criticism of their
human rights records through procedural motions or influencing votes. -- Plans of the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) to sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting freedom of
speech under the rubric of criminalizing "defamation of religion." -- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR
budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia,
Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities and War
Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3). -- Information on the planning and
execution of responses to humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat; indications
US assistance may be requested. -- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), UN Development
Program (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and other UN
entities to respond to and to coordinate activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including
environmental disasters. -- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member states on
UNRWA. -- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership. -- Information on ability of UN
to gain/not gain humanitarian access to troubled areas, especially in light of security concerns. --
Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS coordinates, and number of personnel. -- Details of
friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security Coordinator Headquarters and field offices. --
Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid
programs. -- Interoperability and willingness to work with US coalitions in humanitarian assistance
operations; willingness to provide support despite security threats. -- Indications of donor fatigue. --
Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by UNHCR to refocus organization's work and
to redistribute programs to other agencies. -- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls. -- Perceived ability
of the UNDP to coordinate an effective UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
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governance. -- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally displaced persons. -- Communications
and logistics problems.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities, Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member
states to address threats to international security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
-- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects of resolutions pertaining to missile
proliferation, missile defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear program. --
Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA Secretariat staff, member states, or
influential blocs or groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or the Group of 77 (G-
77), on the role of the UN on nuclear proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to
produce or use weapons of mass destruction.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control
Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H). -- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member
states to respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or state sponsors of terrorism threatening
the safety or security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities, protectees, or installations. --
Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel and/or missions and terrorist organizations.
-- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies (subcommittees), UN agencies and among
member states about measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas facilities,
operations, and personnel. -- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO personnel.
-- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or
domestic and overseas UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York. -- Details of UN
efforts to acquire, collect, assess and disseminate threat information within the US and overseas. --
Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1). -- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and actions on human
rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and attempts to play a larger UN role. -- Plans and
intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction
with Burma and engagement with UN member states. -- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma;
level of trust in his Special Adviser. -- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special Adviser
on Burma, and on key countries in the UN. -- Role of the UN in Burmese elections. -- Development
and democratization activities of UNDP in Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Burmese officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding peace
operations, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African
Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia. -- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding
military operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. --
Early warning information available to the Secretariat on potential threats to peace and security. -- UN
views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict resolution and post-conflict capacity building. -- UN
expectations of US military involvement in African peacekeeping missions and how this may influence
UN willingness to establish, curb, or end missions. -- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa
are straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact of current operations on future
operations and readiness. -- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to expand the UN
role in African conflict zones, either in the form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission
mandates or in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and timely UN-led multilateral
intervention. -- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the UN and its member states to build capacity
in Africa, including by working with the AU or other regional organizations and NGOs. -- Efforts by
China, France, Iran, and others to gain influence in Africa via UN peace operations. -- Information on
extent of support and capabilities for peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS). -- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and actual
practice. -- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches unofficial communications of
events; views on those discrepancies. -- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding UN
peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries. -- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda
concerning UN peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative ability to contribute to such
efforts. -- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China,
Congo, Cote d,Ivoire, Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan,
Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding
ongoing peace operations outside Africa. -- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support
UN peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in areas of potential conflict. -- Views of
member states on and plans to respond to the US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations
capabilities. -- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat toward proposed resolutions,
mandates, peacekeeping issues, and US-sponsored initiatives. -- Information on whether member states
will utilize references to the ICC to condition support for peace operations. -- Information on
deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace
operations. -- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military forces, including surge capabilities.
-- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states on Haiti,s government policies and
actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states regarding the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1). -- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the capability of the
UN to organize, lead, and carry out new, complex military operations and civilian police operations. --
Information on Secretariat or member views on or initiatives for peace operations reform. --
Information on the appointment of SYG special representatives for new peace or political operations. --
Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of engagement, and threat environment for proposed
peacekeeping activities, including transportation and communications infrastructures and any available
maps. -- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and materiel that countries are willing to
contribute. -- Information on interoperability of equipment and material available for logistic support.
-- Information on turf battles between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of
Field Support, and Department of Political Affairs over control of peace operations. -- Information on
turf battles between logistic and military sides of peace operations. -- UN member views on reform of
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. -- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency
to follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders vice UN field commanders. --
Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee concerns within
peace operations mandates. -- Host government views and concerns about UN policies toward that
country. -- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational planning; field personnel reaction to
UN security directives. -- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)
deployments. -- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children; national and UN responses. --
Changes in ability of member states, especially member states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute
troops to peace operations, including for economic, social, and operational reasons. -- Details on
contributions of member states (in kind,
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personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana,
India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and
Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially voting intentions of UNSC members and
priorities or frictions among the Perm 5. -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or
oppose US policies in the UNSC. -- Specific views and positions of key member states on US-
sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for the US, and other proposed resolutions and
mandates. -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or
coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly the
Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin
America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). -- Differences in the positions of member states,
differences between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures for determining voting
instructions, and voting instructions to delegations. -- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member
states joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues
before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio
Group, Arab League, and the OIC). -- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups
regarding UNSC candidacy. -- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent
Representatives, information on their relationships with their capitals.
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1). -- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions issues,
especially during negotiations of sanctions resolutions. -- Willingness of and efforts by UN member
states to violate sanctions. -- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil population. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of
UNSC sanctions committee members. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
expert groups and their ability to support sanctions monitoring. -- Pressure to limit scope and length of
new sanctions, especially from coalitions and regional groups. -- Views and actions of the Secretariat or
member states with regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to support sanctions
implementation and to address violations. -- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.
Sierra Leone, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his
influence on the Secretariat. -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and subordinates on
US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Role and influence of Secretariat and
other key officials with SYG and other UN system agencies. -- Views of and brokering by key officials
on major issues. -- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key officials of Secretariat,
specialized agency, committee, commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and
other UN system cities, to include special assistants and chiefs of staff. -- Personalities, biographic and
biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key UN officials, to
include under secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides, heads
of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders. -- Relations between key
UN officials and member states. -- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include preferred
candidates and candidates lacking UN member support. -- Views of UNSC members and other member
states on Cuban, Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1). -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG
and
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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Perceptions of
member states of the effectiveness of the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint
Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement, and corruption. -- Effectiveness of the
OIOS, in light of the review of the OIOS mandate. -- Plans and moves to implement OIOS
recommendations. -- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS. -- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence
of corruption in UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement measures to reduce
corruption. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the Secretariat to address corruption issues
at the UN and UN agencies. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to push for or
block management reform proposals. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or
senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of corruption or mismanagement by field
missions, including efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse. -- Internal complaints by UNDP staff
about waste, fraud, or abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them. -- Plans and
intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their
own countries or those of their friends. -- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP
Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under
the "One UN" Program. -- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group platforms,
especially on budget and management reform issues. -- Developments in the implementation of the
performance based personnel system and contractor reform. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN
specialized agency executive committees. -- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on
the UN reform process. -- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending a common
whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds and programs. -- Indications of pressure by member
states or groups to increase or control growth in the budget. -- Secretariat and member attitudes towards
changes in the scale of assessments. -- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems. --
SYG views on and plans for responding to Government Accountability Office reports calling on the
UN to more effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make further progress on management
reform. -- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the UN budget process. -- Status and
use of advanced information systems to
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streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France,
Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International
Organizations: UN
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, views, positions,
lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the General Assembly,
especially those that do not include the US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC. -- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts
to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions or policy initiatives. -- Information on
the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth
Committees. -- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to secure additional voting
rights in the UN and its specialized agencies. -- Lobbying by member states for committee membership
assignments or vice presidencies. -- Information on current and likely future leadership of regional
groups, blocs, and coalitions. -- Differences over positions between UN missions and their respective
capitals. -- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of
key committee chairs; member views of issues that come before these committees. -- Efforts of Third
World countries to moderate, via NAM and G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation
of religion, or human rights issues. -- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working
groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy. -- Perceptions of member states of the viability and
potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus. -- Biographical and biometric information on
key NAM/G-77/OIC Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their
relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan,
Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda,
Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3). -- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis. -- WFP activities and proposals related to
reforming donor food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund to address regularly
occurring food crises. -- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on food prices and
food security of the growing use of ethanol and biofuels. -- Internal UN responses to international calls
for reform of FAO and WFP.
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti,
Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda,
Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization Non-
State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4). -- Country preparations for the December
2009 Copenhagen UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting. --
Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and discussions on a successor agreement to the
Kyoto Protocol. -- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in environmental negotiations. --
Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs). -- Indications that member states working through the UN and its specialized agencies are/are
not fostering environmental cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and among
member states and regional and sub-regional organizations. -- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-
sponsored environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention. -- Information on adherence to
member states' own national environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and cleanup
efforts. -- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty negotiations or compliance. -- Information on
the Convention on Biological Diversity, particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety. --
Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including potential efforts to modify or
amend its provisions. -- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those relating to ridges. --
Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add chemicals to the list of persistent organic
pollutants. -- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to international chemicals
management, especially efforts of the EU's management program. -- Information on participation in
and compliance with the UN Basel Convention. -- Status of efforts to set standards to promote
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environmental protection, including protection of forests, desertification, and invasive or endangered
species. -- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to promote development of alternative
sources of energy.
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H). -- Information on efforts by UN member states or
organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform, including banking and financial reforms,
transparency, international law, trade, development, and foreign direct investment to reflect the
Monterrey anti-poverty consensus and the Millennium Development Goals. -- Plans, intentions, and
tactics of the UNGA President regarding international financial problems; views of member states
regarding these plans. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support US priorities related to
economic freedom and promotion of democracy. -- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral
economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US interests. -- Efforts by member states
and the Secretariat to reconcile international differences over globalization, especially the perceived
impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and environmental issues. -- Member positions on UN
decisions, plans, and activities concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth through
market economies, free trade, private investment, and efficient multilateral development assistance. --
Efforts to expand the global compact involving corporations committed to observing human rights,
environmental, and labor standards. -- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to
influence future World Trade Organization rounds. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states that
may impact freedom of navigation. -- Information on international taxation initiatives.
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, International Financial Institutions
and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank, World Trade Organization
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4). -- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for
the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), and especially
STATE 00080163 020 OF 024
information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone initiative, from interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New
Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden). --
Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT; whether or under what conditions states
would consider withdrawing from the NPT. -- Member views on and responses to US plans and
policies on missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, particularly those of
Russia, China, and Pakistan. -- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international fuel banks, or
other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA. --
Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country
ratifications and entry into force. -- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. -- Readiness of member states to
reform the agenda of the UN General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by member
states for the First Committee. -- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines. -- Tactical
and substantive information regarding periodic arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna
and elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles, and meetings
on conventional arms. -- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new arms control or
proliferation prevention measures or make significant changes to existing agreements. - Member or
Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation, safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other
threat reduction efforts. -- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control negotiations. -- Biographic
and biometric data on, and positions of key UN arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the
position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of other international institutions.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia,
Iran, Ireland, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations,
NATO, OSCE, UN
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4). -- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
STATE 00080163 021 OF 024
forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies, and reactions to major health crises and other
health-related issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving health standards and access to
care and medicine, and programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks and
other disasters or emergencies. -- Information on deliberations in the UN and other international health
organizations on health issues and the policy positions and objectives of member states and key figures,
including compromises, insertions, and items omitted in published declarations and studies. --
Information on international health organizations, relationships and interactions with countries and
other organizations, including relationships with regional offices or subsidiaries. -- Details on limits
and restrictions placed on international organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an
international threat, including restrictions placed on the nationality of members of investigation teams.
-- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to
appropriate international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO- and FAO-affiliated
laboratories, and including discussions or agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of
diseases. -- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs
or ARVs). -- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and regulation of health care, particularly
medications, vaccines, and counterfeits. -- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox
stocks. -- Information on global counterfeit medications to include surveillance, countermeasures, and
research and development issues. -- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium
Development Goals. -- Details on corruption in international health organizations or the corrupt use of
goods and services provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral donors and international
health organizations, including WHO, UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. -- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising, spending, and
treatment of whistle blowers. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles,
effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key health officials, to include the Director General
of the WHO, head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under Secretaries, heads of
specialized agencies and their chief advisers, and top aides.
Turkey,
STATE 00080163 022 OF 024
Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization,
WHO
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H). -- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and member states to
respond to or address within UN fora the worldwide terrorist threat. -- Structure, plans and key figures
of UN counterterrorism strategy. -- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four
counterterrorism sub-bodies. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism by
implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for under resolutions, particularly as they relate to
tracking financial transactions. -- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism. -- Efforts of
member states to support or oppose activities undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the
International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve
maritime and airline security. -- Information on UN support for technical assistance to member states to
combat terrorism, particularly in Africa. -- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of
terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and definition of terrorism. -- (For further
requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to
support or oppose US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men, women, and children. --
Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through
on strategies to support women and children through UN specialized bodies. -- Information on member
efforts to combat organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons. -- Plans and
intentions of member states to address reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis the
US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations. -- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to
reconcile religious differences worldwide. -- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and future plans of the organization. --
Member views on education initiatives.
STATE 00080163 023 OF 024
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1). -- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs
on UN decision-making. -- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives. -- Foreign
NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN policies and activities on globalization, justice,
human rights, the environment, and family/women/children/reproductive issues. -- Ability and capacity
of foreign NGOs to assist refugees, displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR
and WFP. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN Environmental Program or
national efforts with environmental protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Contacts
between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that could involve sharing of confidential data. -- Foreign
efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN
affiliation. -- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba, Israel, Russia, and Islamic
countries*-to obtain NGO affiliation for organizations supporting their policies. -- Efforts by
organizations affiliated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain NGO
affiliation with the UN. -- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place NGOs on UN
bureaus; reactions of member states to those efforts. -- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of the UNGA.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). -- Current technical
specifications, physical layout, and planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
STATE 00080163 024 OF 024
information systems, networks, and technologies used by top officials and their support staffs. -- Details
on commercial and private VIP networks used for official communications, to include upgrades,
security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V P N versions used. --
Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials, as well as limited distribution telephone
numbers/directories and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories; dialing numbers for
voice, datalink, video teleconferencing, wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal
communications systems, and wireless facsimiles. -- Information on hacking or other security incidents
involving UN networks. -- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN
communications and computer networks. -- Indications of IO">IO">IO/IW operations directed against
the UN. -- Information about current and future use of communications systems and technologies by
officials or organizations, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small
aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls,
encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol
(VoIP), Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and fiber networks.
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN CLINTON
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WikiLeaks US Embassy Cables 15 Files For Burma

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စစ္အာဏာရွင္စနစ္ခ်ဴပ္ျငိမ္းေရးသည္ျမန္မာနိုင္ငံသားအားလံုး၏တာ၀န္ျဖစ္သည္။

US embassy cables: Revealed - what China

US embassy cables: Burmese official reports

US embassy cables: China losing patience with

US embassy cables: Are Burma and North

WikiLeaks cables: China 'fed up' with Burma's

• Ewen MacAskill in Washington

• Ewen MacAskill in Washington

US embassy cables: Businessman fuels

US embassy cables: Suspicion at Burmese docks

WikiLeaks cables: Burma general considered

US embassy cables: Burma general urged to bid

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