UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE

MEMORANDUM

DATE: October 22, 2002

SUBJECT: COMMENTS
TERA SEPTEMBER 2002 PEER REVIEW DRAFT
World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment

FROM: Cate Jenkins, Ph.D.1

jenkins.cate@epamail.gov
Waste Identification Branch (Mail Code 5304 W)
Hazardous Waste Identification Division

TO: TERA COPC Committee, Responsible Officials and Affected Parties

The following are limited comments on the EPA-sponsored draft peer review document of
September, 2002 titled “World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting Contaminants of
Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks.” This peer review draft TERA
document may be found at the following website: http://www.tera.org/peer/wtc/Documents.htm .

These comments are not extensive and do not cover the full range of problems with the TERA
document which will affect the health of many residents and workers in Lower Manhattan. They
represent limited issues I can efficiently address during this short time period. Many other
scientists who are interested in protecting the health of those exposed to WTC fallout are also
reviewing this TERA document and are aware of its flaws.

The meeting of the official members of the peer review committee for the TERA document was
October 21 and 22. Note that the regulations under 40 CFR Part 300 under the National
Contingency Plan require an open process for risk assessments such as contained in the TERA
document. EPA is not adhering to the law in this respect by not first soliciting and then
responding directly to all comments on the risk assessment from the public, which should have
been authored by EPA itself.

1
The conclusions and opinions in this memorandum are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. This memorand um is the result of the personal concerns of the
author over the handling of the WT C cleanup .
False claim that Superfund guidance document allows 10-4 Risk Level
if analytical methods at 10-6 risk level are “difficult”

The TERA document justified the less protective 10-4 risk level for asbestos and other
carcinogens based on the claim that it was difficult to test for the 10-6 risk level. Note that by
blaming laboratory analytical method problems for this decision, the TERA document and EPA
acknowledge that the 10-6 risk level was the proper level for protection, but that only alleged
laboratory analytical methods prevented it.

The following are the claims in the TERA document justifying the 10-4 risk level, linking it to
levels which could be tested easily by common laboratory method:

TERA p. 10

Practica l Quantita tion Lim its (PQ Ls, the lowest level that c an be relia bly achieved with in
specified limits of precision and accuracy during routine laboratory operating procedures
[EPA, 1992]) and anticipated background levels [ATSDR, 1995] dictated the selection of
the risk level at 1x 10-4. A m ore deta iled discuss ion of this subje ct c an be fou nd in
Appendix C.

TERA Appendix C:

All protoc ols chosen are designed to rea ch the lowest level of de tec tion that is reasonable
for the established methods. For Dioxin, Asbestos and PAHs, the sampling and analytical
protocols are designed to reach detection limits that represent risk estimate levels of 1 E-
04. To reach risk estimates of 1E-06, extraordinary modifications would have to be
employed.

The TERA document intentionally misrepresents this 1992 EPA Superfund guidance document
as a justification for allowing higher exposure levels at the10-4 risk level. Below are relevant
abstracts of this 1992 EPA document, the Superfund Guidance for Data Usability in Risk
Assessment (Part A).

This Superfund guidance document states many times that if routine laboratory analyses cannot
achieve the necessary detection limits, then laboratory methods need to be modified, such as by
increasing the amount of the sample taken, in direct contradiction of the claim of the TERA
document. This Superfund guidance document is also very clear that the PQL (practical
quantitation limit) should not be used as a justification not not obtaining better quality data for
risk assessments, while incredibly the TERA document claims just the opposite. I believe that
the assumption of the committee putting together the TERA document was that nobody would
take the trouble to read the Superfund guidance document itself.

EPA (1992) Guidance for Data Usability in Risk Assessment, (Part A)

http://www.epa .gov/sup erfund/p rogram s/risk /datause /parta .htm

p. 26:

The m eth od chosen m ust tes t for the chem ical of c oncern at a detec tion lim it tha t will
meet the concentration levels of concern in applicable matrices. Samples may have to be
reanalyzed at a lower detection limit if the detection limit is not low enough to confirm the
pres enc e an d am oun t of co ntam ination.

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 p. 30

The detec tion lim it of the m eth od dire ctly affe cts the usability of data because chem icals
reported near the detection limit have a greater possibility of false negatives and false
positives. The risk assessor or RPM must consult a chemist for assistance in choosing
an analytical method when those available have detention limits near the required action
level. W henever po ssible, method s should not be u sed if the detection lim its are above
the relevant concentrations of concern.

p. 46:

If lower quantitation limits are required for risk assessment purposes, a larger initial
sample size may be processed, or the sample extract may be concentrated to a smaller
final volume.

p. 49:

The use of PQL [practical quantitation limits] should be avoided wherever possible in risk
ass ess m ent.

p. 87:

If routine m etho ds a re no t availab le to su it the param eters of interest, it is ofte n du e to

one or m ore of the fo llowing fac tors: - The detec tion lim it of com m only available
instrumentation has been reached, and a lower detection limit is required for the risk
assessment ... Consult an analytical chemist for specific guidance on the potential
limitations of alternative approaches. These may include adaptation of a routine method
or use of a non-routine method.

Cost is not a factor in the cleanup of the WTC, both because of statements by elected officials,
and also because the cost of any cleanup and evaluation for the needs of a cleanup of
contaminants in buildings in Lower Manhattan are very small compared to the costs already
spent for the removal of debris from Ground Zero and the search for human remains at the
Ground Zero site. The living victims deserve as much respect and care as the dead.

Falsification of ATSDR findings of background levels of asbestos in

indoor air

The TERA document also falsifies the ATSDR conclusions on typical interior levels of asbestos
in order to justify its proposed high, unsafe clearance level for asbestos in residences in
Manhattan:

TERA Appendix C, p. 2:

Using unit conversion factors recommended by the National Research Council in 1984,
ATSDR [1995] reports that the arithmetic mean concentrations of monitoring data from a
variety of indoor locations ranged from .00003 - .006 f/cc (PCM). The proposed clearance
level fo r W TC-im pacte d re sidential dwe llings (.00 09 PC M equivalents ) [9 x is with in this
background range.

[Note that the TERA document erroneously gave a 1995 date to the ATSDR Toxicological
Profile for Asbes tos. The actual date for the latest, final ATSDR profile is Septem ber,
200 1, and is the profile at the w eb s ite linked to the T ER A do cum ent.]

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Below is what the ATSDR 2001 Toxicological Profile for Asbestos actually states about studies
on asbestos in interior spaces. Many, many studies were cited by ATSDR. But the TERA
document chose only one, an earlier 1987 review study by Nicholson, and ignored all the later,
better quality studies with more comprehensive data.

The ATSDR evaluated all these studies and came to the conclusion that the typical concentration
of indoor air was only 0.000003 f/cc (PCM)!!! This is over 1000 times lower than the highest
level found in the 1987 Nicholson study. This typical level found by ATSDR is also over 100
times lower than the proposed clearance level of 0.0009 f/cc (PCM) in the TERA document.

The ATSDR obviously gave greater weight to such higher quality, more recent and
comprehensive studies as the 1991 Health Effects Institute study, commissioned by EPA itself.
But the TERA document ignored this HEI/EPA study entirely.

AT SD R, 2001 Toxicological Profile

http://www.atsdr.cdc .gov/toxprofiles/tp61.htm l

p. 169:

Ta ble 6 -4. Su mmary o f Typica l Ge neral Po pu lation an d O ccu pation al Ex po sures ...
General population ... Indoor air ------- 3 x 10-6 PCM f/mL [same as 0.000003 f/cc
(PCM )]

pp. 161-163

Measured indoor air values range widely, depending on the amount, type, and condition
(friability) of as besto s-conta ining m ate rials used in the building. F or exam ple, as besto s in
floor tile is less friable than that in insulation or sprayed coatings. The release of asbestos
fibers from asb esto s-conta ining m aterials (AC M) is spo radic and episo dic. H um an a ctivity
and traffic m ay facilitate releas e of a sbe stos fibers and stir up a sbe stos -containing du st.
Therefore, monitoring performed at night or on weekends may underestimate human
exposure to asbestos in buildings. In addition, asbestos levels are apt to b e higher in
some areas of a building (e.g., boiler room) than in others and these areas may not be
acc ess ible to m ost peop le using the building . In a review o f indoor air m onitoring da ta
from a variety of locations, Nicholson (1987) reported that arithmetic mean concentrations
rang ed from 1 to 20 0 ng /m 3 (3x10-5 to 6x10-3 PCM f/mL). In a survey performed by EPA
(1988c), levels of asbestos in 94 public buildings that contained asbestos ranged from not
detected (ND) to 0.2 TEM f/mL (ND – 3x10 -3 PCM f/mL), with an arithmetic mean
concentration of 0.006 TEM f/mL (10 -4 PC M f/m L) (Spen gler et al. 1989). An alysis of data
based on air sa m ples from 198 buildings w ith A CM indicated m ean asbestos levels
ranging from 4x10 -5 to 2.43x10 -3 TEM f/mL (7x10 -7– 4x10 -5 P CM f/m L) (HEI 1991).

Asbes tos c onc entra tions in 41 scho ols tha t contained asbesto s ran ged from ND to 0.1
TEM f/mL (ND–2x10 -3 PCM f/mL), with an arithmetic mean of 0.03 TEM f/mL (5x10 -4 PCM
f/mL) (EPA 1988c; Spengler et al. 1989). Another study reported average concentrations
of airborne asbestos fibers $5 :m in length of 8.0x10 -5 and 2.2x10 -5 TEM f/mL in 43
nonschool buildings and 73 school buildings, respectively (Chesson et al. 1990; HEI 1992;
Speng ler et al. 19 89). T he a vera ge o utdo or leve l in these studies were c om para ble to
thos e m eas ured indoo rs (S pen gler et al. 1989). Bu ilding su rvey an d air sam pling, both
inside and outside the building was conducted on 315 buildings nationwide over a 5-year
period. The study was undertaken by consultants for defendants for litigation from
building s in which asb esto s rem oval was alleged to be ne ces sary becaus e of risk to
occupants from exposure to asbestos-containing materials (Lee et al. 1992). In the study

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 a total of 2,892 air sa m ples w ere obta ined and analyze d by TEM . Pu blic, co m m ercial,
residential, school and u niversity buildings we re included in the study, all of which were
occupied. The airborne asbestos concentrations from this study (see Table 6-3) include
all chrysotile and amphibole particles having a length:width ratio $3, concentrations of
fibers $5 :m long, and the conce ntration of structures with lengths of $5 :m and widths of
at least 0.25 :m. The latter category is referred to as “optically equivalent” structures and
represent those structures that would have been identified by PCM. The average
concentration of all asbestos structures was 0.025 f/mL. The average concentration of
asbestos fibers $5 :m was 1.3x10 -4 f/mL, while for those that could be detected by optical
methods, it was 8.0x10 -5 f/mL. In 48% of indoor samples and 75% of outdoor samples, no
asbestos fibers $5 :m were found. There are significant differences in the concentration
of total asbestos structures among building types, but not for fibers $5 :m . Ad ditionally,
there was no difference in the indoor and outdoor levels of asbestos fibers $5 :m for
comm ercial, public, or university buildings, although a higher level indoors was found for
sc hool buildings. O utd oor levels were consiste ntly lowe r than indoor levels when all
asbestos structures were considered. Most of the chrysotile fibers were very thin (97%
less than 0.2 :m in diameter [and would have been missed by PCM]) and short (85% less
than 1 :m long). Only 2% of the fibe rs were am phiboles and these fib ers w ere generally
longer and thicker than the chrysotile fibers.

In studies from a Health Effects Institute-Asbestos Research Study, mean concentrations

of fibers $5 :m ranged from 0 to 2.5x10 -4 f/mL in public and comm ercial buildings and
from 1.0x10-5 to 1.11x10 -3 f/mL in schools and universities (Lee et al. 1992). Average
concentrations in the United States are 10–100 times less than those found in Britain,
Germ any, and Canada. The structures found in buildings are much sm aller and coarser
than those fou nd in o ccu pation al setting s. Corn (199 4) reporte d the m ean , 90th
percentile, and maximum asbestos levels in 231 buildings, including schools, universities,
and public, comm ercial, and residential buildings as 1.0x10 -4, 5.1x10 -4, and 2.06x10 -3
PCM f/mL, respectively; outdoor levels were 6.0x10-5 f/mL.

A study of 49 buildings in the United States reported mean asbestos fiber levels of 9.9x10 -
4
PCM f/mL in buildings with no ACM, 5.9x10-4 PCM f/mL in buildings with ACM in good
condition, and 7.3x10 -4 PC M f/m L in bu ildings w ith dam age d AC M (W HO 199 8). In
general, direct comparison of levels inside and outside ACM buildings indicates that
typic al (n ondisturbed) indoor levels are usually low, but m ay be higher than outs ide levels
(Chesson et al. 1990). Buffing asbestos-containing floor tile in a comm ercial building led
to a small increase in asbestos bodies <5 :m long, but no increase in those >5 :m in
length (Dem yanek et al. 1994).

The strategy of falsifying background levels of asbestos in order to justify higher exposures to
asbestos after cleanup (“benchmarks” or “clearance standards”) is not a new game for EPA. See
my June 9, 2002 memorandum (posted at www.NYenviroLAW.org) which describes how EPA
Region 1 used this gamut to justify higher exposures in the Brookfield, CT school system.

10-6 risk level not difficult to measure for settled dust, so any K-factors
related to dust levels should be based on 10-6 risk levels

The TERA document utilizes “K-factors” as a way of estimating air inhalation risks by
measuring the amount of settled asbestos dust on a surface:

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 TERA p. 14:

W ith th e exc eption of a sbestos , the extrem ely lim ited air s am pling data for specific
building constituents in indoor air dictated that an assessment approach had to be based
on historical data relating the concentration of fibers in air (fibers per cubic centimeters or
f/cc) to th e load in settle d dust (fib ers per square centim ete rs or f/cm 2) [Millette and H ays
199 4]. Altho ugh the em pirical relationships (called K factors ) are not rigo rous eno ugh to
rely on for a firm health decision, they are used in this report to define what might
constitute elevated building m aterial counts that would need to be addre ssed on a near-
term basis. This approach m ay overestim ate poten tial exposures but, as such, is
protective.

TERA p. 20:

It sh ould be note d that th e airborne Tier I level of 0.028 f/cc PC M equivalents rou ghly
equates to the AHERA TEM standard of 70 f/mm 2 (0.022 f/cc) in total fiber counts. Based
on empirical information from the W TC am bient air monitoring program [EPA, 2002c] that
recorded less than20% of total AHERA TEM fiber counts to be >5 um in length, the
AHE RA T EM standard of 70 f/mm 2 (0.022 f/cc) and the alternate AH ERA PCM standard
of 0.01 f/cc both m eet the risk based criteria estab lished for the Tier I screening level.
TERA p. 19:

Tier Action Asbes tos (S ettled D ust)

Level Ba sis

I Ag gressive cleaning. If levels > 30,000 f/cm2 Millette’s K factor to

pers ist, take ad ditional action to estimate airborne
redu ce e xpo sure. Evaluate levels for different
conditions in the area, including activities (see
representativeness of air narrative below).
samples, asbestos settled dust
levels, and loading.

II Maintain recomm ended cleaning 30,0 00 f/c m 2 to —

methods. Consider additional background
monitoring. Evaluate conditions
in the area including
representativeness of air
samples, fibrous glass settled
dust levels and loading. No
further action

First, the use in the TERA document of the units “f/cm2" may not be a typo, and may instead
represent, as it is written, only those asbestos fibers having a certain minimum length and width-
to-diameter ratio defined as “PCM-equivalent.” If true, then it is a travesty on the Millette study
upon which the K-factors are supposedly based. The K-factors from the Millette study apply to
all asbestos structures and bundles, and do not apply to a certain fraction which would have
highly different measured resuspension factors (K-factors).

Assuming that 30,000 f/cm2 actually means 30,000 s/cm2 in the TERA document, the level
triggering rigorous cleanup, then it is not protective at the 10-6 risk level. The TERA excuse that

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air concentrations for asbestos could not be measured at the 10-6 level does not apply here. There
is no difficulty in measuring much, much lower concentrations of asbestos in settled dusts using
either the ASTM microvacuum or wipe methods.

The 10-6 risk level for asbestos in settled dust would be 30 structures per square centimeter (30
s/cm2). Using a reasonable K-factor from the Millette study, this would correspond to an air
level of 0.000005 PCM-equivalent fibers/milliliter. This is about the 10-6 risk level for PCM-
equivalent asbestos in air of 0.000004 f/ml (PCM). The calculations for this level are given in
more detail below:

Although the TERA document did not give the specific Millette K-factor that it was assuming
should be used to calculate air concentrations of asbestos from settled dust levels, the 10-5 K-
factor of Millette should be used as a conservative approach, which corresponds to broom
sweeping, gym activities, or pulling cable through a suspended ceiling. The Millette study has
both higher and lower K-factors, ranging from 10-3 to 10-6. Without extensive analytical data to
the contrary, a lower K-factor than 10-5 should not be used.

EPA’s 10-6 risk level for asbestos in air, based on PCM-equivalent asbestos fibers, is 0.000004
fibers (PCM) per milliliter. (See EPA IRIS at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0371.htm ) The
National Research Council provides a conversion factor of 1 to 60 for the ratio of PCM-
equivalent fibers to all asbestos fibers and structures. (See p. 142 of the ATSDR Toxicological
Profile for Asbestos at www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp61.html )

The following table gives a range of dust level to air level calculations based on the 10-5 K-factor:

DUST LEVEL K-FACTOR CA LC ULAT ED AIR CALCULATED AIR LEVEL (PCM

(s/cm 2) LEVEL, all asbestos equivalent fraction of asbestos
structures (s/cc) fibers f/cc, using NRC conversion
of 1 to 60)
30000 1.00E-05 0.3 0.005
3000 1.00E-05 0.03 0.0005
300 1.00E-05 0.003 0.00005
30 1.00E-05 0.0003 0.000005

EPA regulations require quantification of multiple carcinogens at 10-6

risk level or much lower so that aggregate carcinogenic risk can be
calculated

The NCP regulations require quantifying risks at the 10-6 risk level or lower for multiple
carcinogens so that the aggregate carcinogenic risk can be calculated using the methodology in
the Hazard Ranking System. See Appendix A of 40 CFR §300, section 2.5.2, “Comparison to
benchmarks” which contains a formula which sums the concentrations of individual carcinogens
divided by their 10-6 risk level concentration. If the result of this formula for multiple
carcinogens is greater than one, then the Level I response action under the NCP is required. This
formula is also included as an attachment at the end of my comments.

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Even if it is subsequently decided that a cleanup action will only be to the 10-4 risk level, the
concentrations of multiple contaminants still must be quantified at the 10-6 level or lower to
support any contention that the 10-4 risk level is not exceeded by all the carcinogens. This is
because multiple carcinogens may each individually be in concentrations lower than the
aggregate risk level, but additively (in the aggregate), their total carcinogenic risk exceeds the 10-
4
risk level or other risk level that is chosen.

The following is an analogy to explain why multiple carcinogens must be quantified analytically
at concentrations below any level of concern:

A person is allergic to chocolate, but it takes at least one whole chocolate chip to trigger
the allergy. For chocolate chip cookies, the analytical method (comm on eyesight) can
only detect whole chocolate chips that protrude outside the surface of the cookie. The
allergic person eats 15 cookies, each having a small fragment of a chocolate chip that he
could not see. The person goes into anaphylactic shock. The aggregate amount of
chocolate chip fragments added up to more than one whole chocolate chip. The method
of detecting chocolate chips needs to be more sensitive (detection limit) than one
chocolate chip, even though it takes a whole chocolate chip to trigger a reaction.

False claim that analytical sensitivity not achievable at 10-6 risk level

TERA Appendix C:

All protoc ols chosen are designed to rea ch the lowest level of de tec tion that is
reasonable for the established methods. For Dioxin, Asbestos and PAHs, the sampling
and ana lytical protocols are d esigned to reach d etec tion lim its that re pres ent risk estim ate
levels of 1 E-04. To reac h risk estima tes of 1E-06, extraordinary m odifications wo uld have
to be employed. These modifications would either have to be incorporated into the
analytical protocols to increase the sensitivity of the required instrumentation,
incorporated into the sampling protocols to achieve a larger sample, or a combination of
both. For the Chem ical of Potential Concern (COPC) list, the analytical protocols chosen
are already incorporating the maximum sensitivity of the instrumentation. Therefore, the
only legitimate m echanism to lower the overall limits of detection is to modify the sampling
protocol. The two means of achieving this goal are to either run the sampling equipment
(pumps) at a higher flow rate, or for longer periods of time. For the COPC list modifying
flow rates would involve operating the equipment to achieve flow rates on the order of 500
to 1000 liters per minute. The only equipmen t available to operate at such flow rates are
large units that can not be brought inside a residence. Rates this high also present
problems with creating excessive negative pressure for indoor environments, plus flow
rates this high have not been tested using the sampling protocols, and there is high
likelihood of having analyte breakthrough on the collection filters. Therefore, this is not
practical. The other option is to run the equipment for long periods of time. Again with the
list of Chem icals of Potential Concern, sampling periods of up to 800 hours (33 days of
continuous operation) would be needed to reach the E-06 risk detection levels.

The TERA document is again misrepresenting sampling and laboratory capabilitiues.

First, increased sensitivity for asbestos can be achieved by reading additional grids on the filter
used to collect the asbestos, in addition to increasing sample volume or sampling time. There are
other techniques for increasing asbestos detection limits as well.

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For the Libby investigation, various methods were used to avoid the problem of low sensitivity
and filter overload, which could prevent the reading of filter grid areas. A low flow rate (e.g., 0.5
L/min) pump was used in conjunction with collecting sequential samples to avoid filter overload.
Sampling time was increased to several days if necessary in Libby, using a video monitor to
insure that the sampling equipment was not tampered with, and checking the equipment every 4
hours to insure that the battery pack did not run out, etc. For some of the Libby air tests, 80,000
liters of air was sampled. (See Peronard, P. and C. Weis, US EPA (March 2001) Phase 2
Sampling and quality assurance project Plan, Revision 0 for Libby, Montana, Environmental
monitoring for asbestos.)

There are other methods to increase asbestos air analytical sensitivity. The HP Environmental
study used indirect transfer for heavily loaded samples to overcome the problem of filter
overloading which could occur with high volume samples. The AHERA TEM sampling and
analytical methodology includes both indirect and direct methods for air measurements, and the
HP Environmental study demonstrated that the indirect method did not break up any asbestos
structure to yield abnormally high readings for the already highly pulverized WTC fallout. (See
Granger, R. H., McKee, T. R., Millette, J. R., Chmielinski, P., and Pineda, G. (October 2, 2001)
Preliminary Health Hazard Assessment: World Trade Center, HP Environmental, Inc., 104 Elden
St., Herndon, VA 20170. Paper submitted to the American Industrial Hygiene Association. See
Figures 7 and 8 for the fiber widths of asbestos from the WTC. Posted at
www.NYenviroLAW.org )

The same methods for increasing asbestos sensitivity can also be used for the other toxic
constituents of concern. As discussed earlier, the Superfund guidance document suggests
increased sample size and/or sampling time to increase sensitivity to the 10-6 risk level.

The TERA document makes false claims regarding the potential for negative air pressure at
increased air sampling rates of 500 to 1000 liters per minute. This is not an inordinate amount of
air. 1000 liters per minute is only 35 cubic feet of air per minute. This is the same amount as the
lowest volume exhaust fan for bathrooms sold on the market, and we all know that these low
volume exhaust fans are grossly inadequate for removing even steam build-up during a hot
shower. Even if this did result in negative air pressure (meaning that air from outside the
apartment would also get tested), it would be representative of real-world asbestos exposures.
EPA should seal the windows, but not the HVAC systems, during testing. In this way, the
sampling would reflect what is in any HVAC system as well.

Note again that for the Libby investigation, some air sampling was done at volumes of 80,000
liters of air, which TERA claims is impossible. (See Peronard, P. and C. Weis, US EPA (March
2001) Phase 2 Sampling and quality assurance project Plan, Revision 0 for Libby, Montana,
Environmental monitoring for asbestos.)

Officials from EPA Region 2 traveled to Libby, MT and met with Region 8 staff on October 15,
2002, to attempt to learn how Region 8 both characterized the contamination in Libby and is
conducting the cleanup in Libby. (See 10/18/02 story in http://www.thewesternnews.com/ )
Attending from Region 2 were EPA deputy regional administrator Cathy Callahan, regional
toxicologist Mark Maddaloni, and onsite coordinators Joe Ingaldi and Eric Johnson. This recent
interest by Region 2 in the superior analytical methods and cleanup finally being offered to the

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residents of Libby is in contradiction to the planned testing and cleanup levels already on paper
in the TERA document for residents of Manhattan. This sudden interest by Region 2 in what is
being done in Libby is also in marked contrast to Region 2's refusal of assistance from Region 8
personnel on September 12, 2001, one day after the WTC collapse. On that day, Region 8
personnel were told by the Region 2 administrator: “We don’t want you fucking cowboys here.
The best thing they could do is transfer you to Alaska.”

Incorrect exposure assumptions

The TERA document used incorrect exposure assumptions as well which also resulted in
justifying allowing higher exposures to carcinogens:

TERA p. 11:

Fo r carcinogenic com pounds, the benchm arks were set so that a local res ident’s lifetim e
risk of developing cancer from exposure to W TC-related contaminants would not exceed
-4
a one-in-ten thousand probability (1x 10 ) above the resident’s background risk without
this ex pos ure. T he m oun t of tim e that residents and office workers were e xpo sed to
W TC-related contaminants is unknown. To be conservative, the Tier I screening level was
chosen to be protective of a resident who may have been exposed to W TC-related
contam inants for one year. The T ier III clearance level was chos en to be protective of a
resident who is expo sed to W TC -related contam inants for 30 years, which is the upper-
bou nd e stim ate fo r residency in one dw elling [EP A, 19 89].

These assumptions do not take into account the following additional exposures above
background, due to the WTC collapse:

1. Residents were exposed at above background levels for more than a year before any cleanup
(which has yet to occur in most cases). Thus, any calculations of 30-year “safe” levels must take
into account and add in the amounts of persistent bioaccumulative carcinogens to which residents
were already exposed. In other words, it is invalid to set a long-term benchmark at the 10-4 or
even 10-6 risk level without adding in the total amount of intensive exposure over the year or
more before cleanup.

2. Residents are also being exposed to asbestos above background levels due to the WTC
collapse in their workplace, the subways and other transportation, restaurants, parks, streets,
public buildings, etc. These additional exposures above background must be calculated in, as
they were in the risk assessment for Libby, Montana.

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ATTACHMENT:

Appendix A of 40 CFR §300, section 2.5.2, “Comparison to benchmarks”

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