Heirs Of Federico C. Delgado And Annalisa Pesico - Versus - Luisito Q.

Gonzalez And Antonio

T. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009

Gonzalez and Buenaflor were charged with the murder of Delgado and frustrated murder of Pesico. The
investigating Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation and thereafter dismissed the complaint
for lack of probable cause. The acting secretary of Justice reversed the finding of the Investigating
Prosecutor. The CA affirmed the existence of probable cause. In a motion for reconsideration, it ordered
that the Informations charging the accused with murder and less serious physical injuries be quashed
and dismissed. The Solicitor General did not appeal the appellate courts Amended Decision which
reversed her Resolutions when she was Acting Secretary of Justice. Thus, the Court declared the case
closed and terminated.

Does the non-filing of the Solgen of a petition within the reglementary period before this Court rendered
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals final and executory?

Yes. Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the Office
of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers.

The law clearly requires the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the Supreme
Court in all criminal proceedings before this Court We have ruled in a number of cases that only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

However, jurisprudence lays down two exceptions where a private complainant or offended party in a
criminal case may file a petition directly with this Court. The two exceptions are: (1) when there is
denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case
to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party,[70] and (2) when the private offended party
questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court. These two exceptions do not apply in this
case. We reiterate that it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf
of the State in all criminal proceedings before the appellate courts. Hence, the Solicitor Generals
non-filing of a petition within the reglementary period before this Court rendered the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals final and executory with respect to the criminal aspect of the case. The Solicitor
General cannot trifle with court proceedings by refusing to file a petition for review only to subsequently,
after the lapse of the reglementary period and finality of the Amended Decision, file a comment.
 ASUTILLA VS PNB 225 Phil. 40

The question of law certified to this instance by the then Court of Appeals revolves around the
propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the former Court of First Instance of Bohol,
Branch III (the trial Court).

On March 1, 1971, a Toyota jeep belonging to the Philippine National Bank, Tagbilaran & Tubigon
Branches (PNB), and a Volkswagen Kombi, registered in the name of the Nazareno and/or Bohol Poly
Clinic and apparently owned by Dr. Domiciano Nazareno and Dr. & Mrs. Manuel Relampagos,
collided in Tubigon, Bohol. At the time of the accident, the regular driver of the PNB jeep was Rene
ARCAYA, but it was actually being driven by Emmanuel CEBALLOS, both employees of PNB. The
KOMBI was then driven by petitioner Wilfredo ASUTILLA.

On April 20, 1971 Virgilio DIZON, then the Acting Chief of Police of Tubigon, filed a Complaint with the
former Municipal Court of Tubigon against ASUTILLA for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1396.

On April 27, 1971, Chief of Police Bagolor filed a Complaint against ARCAYA and CEBALLOS for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property and Physical Injuries with the same Municipal
Court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1397.

On May 15, 1971, ASUTILLA filed the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with the trial Court to
restrain the Municipal Court of Tubigon from proceeding with its prosecution of Criminal Case No.
1396. Made respondents were the PNB, DIZON, BAGOLOR, and the Municipal Judge of
Tubigon. The Petition described how the collision between the jeep and the Kombi happened,
ascribing the fault to the jeep; alleged that because there were overtures of amicable settlement, the
Kombi owners desisted from filing criminal charges against CEBALLOS and ARCAYA; and that
"jumping the gun" on the Kombi owners, PNB caused the filing of Criminal Case No. 1396. The
Petition further alleged that the criminal case was "utterly baseless" and "purely motivated by malice",
and that the filing thereof was intended solely "to use the strong arm of the law in order to oppress,
harass and coerce the petitioner and his employer to submit and agree to an amicable settlement of
the cases."

On the same date, May 15, 1971, the trial Court issued a Restraining Order, and a hearing was set on
May 29, 1971 to determine whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction should issue.

Answers were filed by respondents traversing the allegations of the Petition and contending that
petitioner's remedy was to appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, if convicted, and not the
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus; and that the latter petition was "merely a prelude by the
petitioner to file possible countercharges if and when respondents might make some unguarded
statements in the answer."

On July 27, 1971, the trial Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 1396. Reconsideration sought by respondents was denied.

Hearing on the merits was set on September 24, 1971. However, on September 3, 1971, ASUTILLA
filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The case was not called on September 24, 1971, respondents having previously asked for
postponement. The record does not contain Minutes for that date.

On September 25, 1971, the trial Court rendered a Decision upholding the Petition, directing the
Municipal Court immediately to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1396, and declaring permanent the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The Decision, in effect, granted ASUTILLA's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

Respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 53186-R with the following
Assignments of Error:

The lower Court erred in holding that the Answers of the respondents failed to tender an issue or
otherwise admit the material allegations of the petition in the case at bar.

II

The lower Court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings without a hearing.

It strikes us that the case should be resolved on a more vital consideration than the matter of
judgment on the pleadings. The Petition was filed primarily to enjoin the prosecution of criminal
proceedings. It is a longstanding doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution for
the reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted
for the protection of society except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights.

The Order of the trial Court of July 27, 1971 and its Decision of September 25, 1971 enjoined the
further prosecution of criminal proceedings without clear and convincing evidence showing that the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 1396 was false, malicious and unfounded and was filed merely to
oppress petitioner, or, that it was filed by the Acting Chief of Police out of political and personal
considerations, or that petitioner had been deprived of his constitutional rights. There is nothing in the
records to show that the Acting Chief of Police had usurped any authority not belonging to him when
he filed the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 1396. The filing of said criminal case was by no means
intended to coerce the Kombi owners into submitting to an amicable settlement. There is indication in
the records that the amicable settlement may have failed because of the huge sum of around
P200,000.00 which the Kombi owners were trying to recover from the PNB. What is more, the
unjustness of petitioner's stance is emphasized by the fact that Criminal Case No. 1397 arising from
the same incident with the Kombi owners as the offended parties, and CEBALLOS and ARCAYA as
the accused, was proceeding on its normal course. It would be more in the interest of justice if the
two cases were to take their course and the party responsible for the accident judicially
determined. If, as petitioner alleges, he was merely being oppressed or subjected to harassment or
that the complaint against him was filed with malice aforethought, or that the circumstances of the
accident show that he did not commit the act charged, then the chances of his acquittal would have
been great. If convicted, he would have had the adequate remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of
law. But it should be up to a judicial body to determine the party criminally responsible for the
vehicular accident after evaluating the evidence presented during trial on the merits.

In fine, even without ruling on the question of propriety of the judgment on the pleadings, it is clear
that the trial Court had committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining permanently the prosecution
of Criminal Case No. 1396. In doing so it had blocked the smooth and efficient functioning of the
machinery of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued by the lower Court hereby dissolved; and Criminal Case No. 1396
hereby ordered reinstated and heard on the merits together with Criminal Case No. 1397 if still
pending. No costs.

People vs. Grey Case

The personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The
necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Facts:
Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey, and two others were charge
of the crime of murder for the death of Rolando Diocton. Judge Bandal denied the motion for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional
evidence but later, she inhibited. Judge Navidad continued the proceedings of the case.
After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record, he issued warrants of
arrest against respondents.

The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to personally
determine the existence of probable cause. According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did
Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him and the personal
justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively quoted from the Joint
Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then
adopted these to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause.
The CA held that the Constitution commands the judge to personally determine the existence of
probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest.

Issue:
Did Judge Navidad fail to personally determine the existence of probable cause?

Held:
No. The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest is mandated by
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution. In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely
on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the
parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.

The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence
of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the
same. Judge Navidads Order reads:

In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted for the purpose of

determining the sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to justify the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest, the Court perforce, made a very careful and meticulous and (sic) review not only of
the records but also the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the sworn
statements/affidavits of Mario Abella, Uriendo Moloboco and Edgar Pellina.

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could have led Judge
Navidad to determine that the accused were given the widest latitude and ample opportunity to
challenge the charge of Murder which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of
Perjury. Likewise, his personal determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the
prosecution and no circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Thus, he concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion for
the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct. These statements sufficiently establish the fact
that Judge Navidad complied with the constitutional mandate for personal determination of probable
cause before issuing the warrants of arrest. (People vs. Grey, G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010)

Borlongan vs Pena G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages
and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to
dismiss, including several documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified.
He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor.

The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest
were issued for the petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban.
On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court a
quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for them. The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of
arrest. However, the trial court ruled that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail? YES

HELD:

The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during
trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be
argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that
the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable
cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.

Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a
stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of
their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality
of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for
them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of
Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their
incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.

JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA GR.no. 170672

Facts:
Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez. Petitioner
alleged that while he and his family are on their way home, these two officers requested them to proceed
to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken
and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and he was
arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. The trial
court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court
ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds,
that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense
was in his possession. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless
seizure of the firearms were valid and legal,
thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;

Ruling:
No. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender
has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the
alleged shooting incident. SPO3Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that
petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle,
prompting the police authorities to give chase.

Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough
to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause. The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the
chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting
incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent
to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified in seizing
the firearms.

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO REYES G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009 581 SCRA 691

Rights of an Accused, Evidence, Extra-judicial Confessions

FACTS:

On July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, accused-appellant, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray
Cayaban, Federico Pataray Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes Acejo, who are still at large, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms,
carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew
Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent
on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with
intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the
damage and prejudice of their heirs.

Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at
Camp Crame. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written
extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified
appellants Reyes and Flores. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed
a written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellants of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family ₱150,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings.

ISSUES:

1. Were th eextra-judicial confessions (Pasubali) of the accused admissible in evidence?

2. Was he afforded the right to counsel of his own choice?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Pasubali of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows
that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that
the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family.

Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of
appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees,
these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption
that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted
by truth and conscience. Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used
to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.

We have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have
been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
2. Yes. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the
course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement
before the swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty.
Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Appellants
Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous,
respectively.