Saving Nature, Feeding People and Ethics

Author(s): ROBIN ATTFIELD

Source: Environmental Values, Vol. 7, No. 3 (August 1998), pp. 291-304
Published by: White Horse Press
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Saving Nature, Feeding People and Ethics

ROBIN ATTFIELD

SchoolofEnglish,Communication
and Philosophy
of
University WalesCardiff
CF1 3XBtUK
PO Box 94, Cardiff

ABSTRACT: HolmesRolston's case forholdingthatitis sometimes right tolet

people starve in orderto save natureis argued tobe inconclusiveat best;some
alternativeresponsestopopulation growth arealso presented.Theveryconcept
ofdevelopment impliesthatauthentic development, beingsociallyandecologi-
callysustainable, will seldom conflict with savingnature(sections1 and 2).
WhileRolston's argument aboutexcessivecaptureof netprimary productis
fallacious,his view should be endorsed about the of
wrongness 'development'
in areas wheresustainabledevelopment is impossible, butnotunqualifiedly
endorsed aboutthoseareaswhereitis feasible(section3). Important as policies
promoting sustainablelevels ofpopulation are,representing population growth
as a canceris misguided, andcouldengender indifferencetosuffering(sections
4 and 5). The neo-Malthusian paradigm(whichmakespopulationgrowththe
causeofbothpoverty andenvironmental degradation) appearstoconflict with
a considerable of
body empirical evidence; the kind ofpoliciesneeded in Third
Worldcountries areoneswhichenlistpeople'senergiesforproducing foodand
preserving nature alike (section6).

KEYWORDS: nature, value,ethics,population

development,

1. INTRODUCTION

'Giventhefactthatrhinoshavebeenso precipitously reduced,giventhatthe

Zimbabwean is
population escalating (theaveragemarried womantheredesires
tohavesix children), one oughttoputtheblackrhinoas a speciesfirst, evenif
thiscosts humanlives'.1Thus Holmes Rolstonabout the black rhinosof
Zimbabwe.Rolstongoes on toarguethatfeedingthehungry is notalwaysour
first
obligation,2 andthat it may sometimes be righttoallow justpoachersto
not
be shot(as is authorisedby thelaw ofZimbabwe) but evenordinary inoffensive
malnourished to
people starve, that
granted they have otheroptionswhichcould
fendoffstarvation, rather thanallowwithin naturereservesthekindof develop-
mentwhichmightalleviatethepoverty of peoplealreadylivingthere.3This
paperdiscussesethicalandrelatedissuesarisingfromproblemsaboutconser-

Values7 (1998):291-304
Environmental
© 1998TheWhite UK.
HorsePress,Cambridge,

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292
ROBIN ATTFIELD

vation,populationgrowthand feedingpeople,as raisedin Rolston's paper,

togetherwithsomealternative responsestotheseissues.
Those of Rolston's readerswho rejectcapitalpunishment or favourdue
processare likelyto be unenthusiastic about any policy;but
shoot-to-kill
resortingtoviolenceagainstpoachers(including violencedesignedtoincapaci-
tate)mightstillbe approved.Approving it,however, neednotinvolveendorse-
mentofRolston's grounds;andthesameapplies to hisgroundsforprohibiting
development in naturereserves.The issue is nota straightforwardconflictof
ofthehumanpopulation
interests ofZimbabweversusZimbabwean rhinos.For
thegrounds forconservationincludetheinterests offutureZimbabweans (some
ofwhommaybe savedfromstarvation thereby) andalso,to somedegree,the
offuture
interests Theseinterests
rhinos. showthatthesharpdeclineintherhino
population hasmoralrelevance;butitis muchlessclearthatthegrowth ofthe
humanpopulationof Zimbabweconstitutes a reasonforlettingsome of its
citizensdie,anymorethanthegrowth ofWestern affluencedoes,andmuchless
stillthatthesupposeddesiresof Zimbabweanmothers supplysucha reason.
Somerather responsestopopulation
different growth laterin
willbe presented
thisessay.

2. PRIORITIES, PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

What,then,is to be said aboutpriorities betweensavingnatureand feeding

people?Comparedwithmany American Rolstonisrelatively
environmentalists,
moderate inthesematters. Thushedoesnotwriteofpopulation growth as a kind
ofpollution,oradvocatetheremovalofindigenous peoplesfromtheirforests.
However,he is prepared to arguefromtheactualmoralassumptions ofpeople
intheactualworldthatmeeting people's needsdoesnot always take
priority. For
example, he is to
prepared argue from to
people's willingness deploysurplus
resourceson Christmas gifts,collegeeducationor symphony concertsrather
thanon relievingpoverty, and fromothersuchlikeexistingpriorities, forthe
conclusionthatmorality does not alwaysrequireus to feedpeople first.
To suchreasoning, we neednotobjectthatitmovesfromsociologicalfacts
tovaluejudgements. ForRolstonis awarethatheis relianton theacceptability
ofthemoralassumptions ofexisting agentsandcommunities, andthatwithout
sucha premisehispremisesaboutChristmas presentsand theresthavelittle
relevance.Hen^e he couldnotobjectto thispremisebeingmadeexplicit:the
moralassumptions of existingagentsand communities Western
(particularly
ones)areacceptable, atleasttosomedegree,hesupposes.Yetthissamepremise
still warrantscriticism;the assumptionsunderlying Christmasexpenditure
could easily be morallyindefensible. Indeedthe annualspendingspreeof
nominally Christian societiesis frequently formoralcriticism,
a target whether
fromutilitarians,Kantiansor religiousbelievers.More generally, themoral

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SAVING NATURE,FEEDING PEOPLE AND ETHICS

assumptions ofbehaviour inthecontemporary worldcannotbe allowedtoform

thebasisofcriticalnormative ethics;foronthisbasisitwouldmakenosenseto
urgethatthestatusquo warrants criticism and oughtto change.Yet thisis
something which environmental ethicists usuallybothwantand needto urge.
To be fairtoRolston,he is notin generala supporter ofthestatusquo, he
the
recognises general moral of
importance satisfying human needs,4and he
allowsthatinmanycases therewillbe noconflict betweenfeeding peopleand
upholding the interests of nature.5 Indeed his is that
argument partly feeding
peoplefirst cannotalwaysbe giventhehighest priority, orprioritising anything
else wouldalwaysbe wrong- which(I agree)is implausible. He also holdsthat
mostdevelopment (agricultural development included)isofa kindwherenature
Whileitis undeniable
is sacrificed. thatsomeso-called'development' is ofthis
kind, thelimited scope of such conflicts is worthy of a few moments' reflection.
Conflictsbetweennatureand development wouldbe frequent ifdevelop-
menthappenswhenever a changeis generated by human beings which someone
regards as an improvement (and thisseems to be the sense in which Rolston is
the
using term). For ifthe concept of nature not
applies only to wilderness but
also towhatever existswithout significant modification fromhumanpurposive
activityorcontrivance, then most building projects will constitute development
inthissense,andwillalsosubvert a larger orsmallersegment ofnature. Conflicts
will,however, be less frequent wheretheconceptof development is givenits
moreusual sense,and relatesto social and/oreconomicchangewhichis^
genuinely forthebetter,6 andnotjustchangebelievedbysomeonetobe such;for
therelevant criteriawillplausiblynowincludethoseofsocialjustice,andwill
excludemuchwhichwouldotherwise countas 'development'.
Nowa further defensible criterion ofdevelopment as genuineimprovement
is sustainability;fordevelopment whichis unsustainable will seldomifever
an
comprise improvement. Thus we alreadyknow, once we knowthatit is
unsustainable, that either itwill undermine itself,or that itwillbe undermined
by otherpredictable processes; and this already casts considerable doubton
whether animprovement ispresent atall.Evenif,withregardtohumaninterests,
therewill be temporary gains(even fora thousandyears),an unsustainable
changescarcely counts as development ifthereis an alternative changewhich
wouldbe bothbeneficialandsustainable.
Sustainable changes,however, willtypically allowaffected tractsofnature
toremainself-renewing andsustainable. Forwhereaffected tractsofnature are
subverted orceasetobesustainable, theprocessesofproduction, whether offood
or shelteror of otherservices,will moreoftenthannot be unsustainable
themselves, because naturalsystemshave ceased to be self-renewing and
sustainable, and cannotsustainthemindefinitely. (Rolstonhas suggestedthat
processeswhichlastforseveralcenturies arethereby sustainable, butmight also
sacrificemuchbiodiversity;7 inmyview,ifecosystems aredisrupted orunder-
minedforthesake ofprocesseswhichcannotbe sustainedindefinitely, these

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ROBIN ATTFIELD

processesarenotsustainable.
) Accordingly,
development willseldombeworthy
ofthenamewhereitis notsustainable,andsustainable notonlyin theformof
stablesystemsofproductionbutalso withrespecttothestabilityofthenatural
world.Andifso,thenitwillnotbe thecase thatmostdevelopment is ofa kind
Wherenatureis sacrificed,
wherenatureis sacrificed. whatis goingon will
usuallyfallshortofbeingdevelopment,atleastin themoreusualsenseofthat
term.

3. GROUNDS FOR PRESERVATION

Thisis,however, a somewhat a prioridefenceofdevelopment; andinanycase

theimpression I
shouldnotbe giventhat wouldseektoargueagainstRolston's
conclusionsaboutsavingnatureat all points.Specifically, thearguments for
preserving wildspeciesshouldbe recognised, andrequirethepreservation of
somewildhabitats (as RolstonargueswithregardtoblackrhinosinZimbabwe).
Thesearguments derivefromtheinterests bothoffuture humansandalso from
thoseofthefuture wildlifewhoseexistencewe can eitherfacilitate orprevent,
plusobviouslytheinterests of current wildlifeand thosecurrent humanswho
derivebenefit fromtheexistenceofwildlife.
Further, as Rolstonconcludes,thismeansthatthereare someareaswhich
couldbecolonisedbyhungry humans, ifonlytemporarily thansustainably
rather ,
whomightthereby temporarilysatisfytheirneedsforfood,fuelandshelter, but
whichshouldbe deniedtotheminordertosavethewildcreatures (suchas black
rhinos)whichdependon thesesameareas.The hungry humanswouldnotbe
requiredto starve,beingfree,forexample,to moveto areasof development
elsewhere.Norwouldtheindigenous peoplewhoalreadyinhabit suchreserves
be requiredto leave, as long as theirlifestyles are compatiblewithnature
preservation. The onlykindof prohibited actionswouldbe ones whichmeet
humaninterests through thekindofso-called'development' whichdestroys the
reserve,because of thevalue of thethriving of wild nature,becauseof the
importance of thisforfuturehumans,and becauseof theimportance of the
intactness ofhabitatsnecessary ifthethrivingofwildnatureis tobe facilitated.
Now one of Rolstort'sbackgroundassumptionsshouldbe challenged.
RolstoncitesPeterM. Vitousekandothersas havingshownthat40 percentof
theplanet'sland-basednetprimary product(i.e. basicplantgrowth)has been
capturedby humanbeings,and claimsthatif thehumanpopulationand its
economicdemanddoubles,thiscapturecouldriseas highas 80 percent,leaving
littlefor'naturalformsof lifethatcannotbe accommodated afterwe haveput
people first'.8But MarkSagoffhas pointedout thatthisargument wrongly
assumesthatincreasesinthesizeoftheeconomyrequirea proportional increase
inthepercentage ofnetprimary product calculatedbythismethod as havingbeen
'captured'.

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SAVING NATURE,FEEDING PEOPLE AND ETHICS

Vitoasekand hiscolleaguesonlyreachedtheir40 percentbyincluding all

thematerial usedinhuman-dominated ecosystems bycommunities oforganisms
different fromthoseincorresponding naturalsystems, orinotherwordsall the
plantsindirectly affected through human-caused changesinlanduse,including
all theplantsofareasofcountryside whicharenotstrictly wilderness. Otherwise
theirfigureforhumanuse wouldhavebeenaround5 percent.Sagoffproceeds
to arguethatvirtually the wholeof NorthAmericahad alreadybeen thus
'captured'(in theVitousek sense)by 1492,andcertainly byone hundred years
ago,andthatsincetherehasbeenlarge-scaleeconomicgrowth sincethen,the
proportionality assumption mustbe rejected,as itimpliesthatintheabsenceof
increased capture ofnetprimary productnoeconomicgrowth inNorthAmerica
sincethencouldpossiblyhaveoccurred.
Obviouslytherewas an increasein theactualexploitation of netprimary
product between1492anda century ago,butthisdoesnotdetract fromSagoffs
replytoVitousek. Waryas we shouldoftenbe ofeconomicgrowth, suchgrowth
turnsout to be partiallyindependent of captureof netprimary product,9a
proposition assumedby Rolstonhimselfwhenhe remarksthatagricultural
production in manydevelopingcountriescould be boostedwithoutfurther
encroachment on naturalhabitats.10
But as thislast pointexhibits,the unacceptability of Rolston's use of
Vitousek's claimsaboutnetprimary productdoes notentirely undermine his
argument againsttljedevelopment ofsuchhabitats. Fornatural ecosystems and
thevaluablewildcreatures whichpopulatethemcontinue tobe underthreat, not
leastthrough in
landhunger areasofhumanpopulation growth. Evenifgrowth
neednotbe at theexpenseof naturalvegetation, itoftenis, andthisis trueof
population growth as wellas ofeconomicgrowth.
A keyaspectofRolston's argument, however, is thattheareasinquestion^
couldnotsupport humancoloniserssustainably. Neither themoralphilosopher
I
nor, suggest, the consistent environmentalistcan rest content withtheconclu-
sionthatsomesuchareasshouldbe forbidden topeoplealtogether (and,tohis
credit,Rolston does notfavour Besides
this11). (althoughhereRolstonmight
disagree),iftheneedsofstarving peoplecouldbe satisfied sustainably froma
givenarea, there is a strongcase infavour oflettingthem colonise itand thereby
meettheirneeds,unlesstheseneedsbothcouldbe metelsewhere, andprobably
wouldbe metifthiswereattempted. Iftheneedsoffuture peoplecount,so do
theneedsofcurrent people.
Thequalification aboutstarving peoplemayseemtosuggestthatmyviewis
thatpriority shouldalwaysgo tohumaninterests overnonhuman In
interests.
fact,thisisa stancewhichI shouldreject.Often, forexample,thehumaninterests
atstakewillnotbebasicneeds,whilethenonhuman interests willcomprise basic
needsforthenonhuman creatures concerned.Besides,althoughI differ from
Rolstonin holdingthatsomecolonisingof wildhabitatsis allowable,I still
favourmostcurrent reservesremaining such,and morebeingcreated,in full

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ROBIN ATTFIELD

recognitionofthefactthatthisinvolvesoneoranother kindofzoning,andthe
designatingoftheseareasas prohibited to useswhichwouldharmeitherother
peopleorwildnature. Thedifference betweenusconcernsthepermissibility of
sustainabledevelopment in some areas whichare predominantly naturalat
present(suchas thesitingofsolarenergy plantindesertsclosetoareasneeding
In
an enhancedenergysupply). cases wheresuchdevelopment couldbe and
wouldbe so plannedandorganised as toinvolvea sustainablerelationbetween
thehumanparticipants andnature,itshouldinmyviewbepermitted forthesake
ofhumanneeds.
Evenso, itwouldhavetobe limitedforthesakeofspeciespreservation. In
previouscenturies,poorpeoplehavebeenable tocolonisewildareas,andthis
shouldnotbe whollyprohibited tothepoorpeopleofthepresent. Yettheethical
case forpreservationmeansthatthisprocessmusthaveitslimits.Preserving the
lastmembers ofa wildspeciescan makea muchgreater difference tothetotal
ofvalueintheworldthanpreserving thesamenumber ofmembers ofa currently
plentifulspecieswould.For it preservesnotonlycurrent lives butalso the
ofcountlessfuture
possibility members ofthespeciescomingintobeinginthe
future.Thisjustifiespreservingtheterritorial
nichesnecessary forsuchpreser-
vation.Whilethecase forsuchpreservation could conflictwithsustainable
colonisation,in practicesuchconflictswouldbe rare,grantedtheargument
alreadyput forward concerning theway in whichsustainabledevelopment
allowsofthesustaining ofwildspeciesandsystems.

4. POPULATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

Certainly,populationpoliciesareimportant, so thatwedo notgetintodilemmas

suchas choosingbetweenexterminating wild speciesand/orallowingtheir
extinction,and failingto makeprovisionforan increasedhumanpopulation.
Populationpolicies(ifvoluntary,andintegrated withpoliciesofdevelopment)
have thepotentialforeventually limiting the incidenceof conflicts
between
preservationand human needs.
For manyreasonsincludingthisone, populationpolicies shouldaim at
a sustainable
attaining levelofpopulation. Evenifthelevelatwhichtheglobal
humanpopulation eventuallystabilisesis substantially
greaterthanthecurrent
populationof the planet,a sustainablepopulationcould mean an end to
encroachments on theremaining areas of countryside and of wilderness.
Or
it could meanthisas longas thelevel is notso highthatnextto no
rather,
wilderness bythenremaifis, andalso as longas theintroduction ofsustainable
processesofproduction andoffood-supply bythenprevents theneedtoextract
resourcesfromyetmoreandmorewildplaces.
Even beforethehumanpopulationstabilises,therewillbe a tendency for
conflicts
between humancolonisation ofwildplacesandthepreservation ofsuch

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SAVING NATURE,FEEDING PEOPLE AND ETHICS

placestobecomefewer,as longas thetrendis inthedirection ofstabilisation;

forthedemandforadditional willsteadily
territory reduce.Naturally
thereasons
foraimingatpopulation areunlikely
stability tobeconfined tothedesiretoavoid
suchconflicts;
theinterestsof thehumanbeingsof thatday are likelyto be
central.Nonethelesstheeventualattainment of zeropopulationgrowthon a
sustainable
basisremainslikelytocontributestronglytowardsthepreservation
ofwildlifeandwilderness.

5. ARE PEOPLE A CANCER?

Rolston,however,is notalone in representing muchof thecurrent human

population ofthe world as resembling a cancer (glossed on his previouspageas
'an explosionofunregulated growth' and
12), many of itsindividuals as 'another
cellofcancerous growth'. 'Fora couple to havetwo he
children', concedes,'may
be a blessing'.Butthetenthchild,he claims,is 'a tragedy'.'Whenthechild
comes,onehastobeas humaneas possible,butonewillonlybe makingthebest
ofa tragicsituation,andifthetenth childis reared,andhastenchildren inturn,
thatwillonlymultiply thetragedy.'Suchtragicgrowth, he maintains, leadsto
a deterioratingqualityof lifeand to deteriorating naturalresources, declining
ecosystem healthand disappearing integrity.And in thesecircumstances, itis a
to he
fallacy claim, suggests, that we oughtalways to feed the poor first.13
WhileI agreethattherearesomemeasureswhichshouldnotbe takentofeed
the poor because theyare unsustainable methodsand would destroywild
habitats,much of what Rolston here says is unacceptable.Admittedly my
agreement thatsome means towards the feeding ofthepoorwouldbe misguided
commits metotheviewthatfeedingthepoorshouldnotalwaysbe everyone's
highestpriority. ButRolston's argument would,ifvalid,provetoomuch,and
wouldsuggestthatwithregardtocertain humans, ortoall humansabovecertain
vague numerical ceilings for certain territories, is no obligationto feed
there
thesepeopleat all.
First,itshouldbe pointedoutthatiftheconception andbirthofanyoneis a*
blessingand has positivevalue, then this should be true oftheconception and
birthofeveryone, exceptperhaps those whose quality of lifeis going to be nil
or negative.The intrinsic value of thelifeof a givenpersoncannotsimply
disappearthrough thefactthatthisis thetenthchildof theirparents.Atmost,
theremight, alongsidethepositiveintrinsic valueattaching to suchlives,be a
negativeinstrumental value in the simultaneous existence of all tenchildren plus
theotherhumaninhabitants oftheplanet.Whether thereactuallywouldbe such
negativeinstrumental value mightdependon factorssuch as the possible
overcrowding whichmightsometimes resultfromtheadditionofextrapeople,
the possible strainforthose involvedin supporting extrapeople through
childhood, or thepossibleindirect effects ofextrapeopleon ecosystems.

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ROBIN ATTFIELD

Yet theseveryfactors couldeasilybe exaggerated. Overcrowding ofdwell-

if
ing-placesis avoidable enough are builtto prevent houses beingexcessively
crowded,and overcrowding of streetsand squaresif people refrainfrom
gathering in excessivecrowds.Attaining thiswouldofteninvolvefewextra
resources.As forstrainforexistingpeople,theadditionof childrento poor
familiesin theThirdWorldinvolvesless strainthanWesterners mightexpect,
as suchchildren soonbecomeeconomically active,andthususuallysupplypairs
of handswhichcan assist in the workof providingforthe familyor the
community. As forstrainon ecosystems,sometimesno extrafuelwill be
involved(as thenewcomers maysharethesame hearthas theirelders),and
whether theirneedsforfoodandforsanitation causeecosystems todegenerate
ismuchmorea function ofsocialarrangements thanoftheseextrapeople's mere
existence.
A littlemoreshouldbe saidabouttheproperty oftenthness (orofordinality
in general)notundermining theintrinsic value of lives of positivequality.
Rolstonseemstobe sayingthatadditional children after somethreshold number
haveno suchvalue.Butimaginethatafterthebirthofsuchan additional child,
oneormoresiblingsdie,andthetotalnumber fallsbelowthethreshold number.
His viewseemstoimplythatthelifeofthischildnowacquirestheintrinsic value
itwouldhavehadifher/his birthhadoccurred beforethethreshold wasreached.
Butsuchmiraculous changestointrinsic valueareincredible, particularlysince
noqualitative changemayhavebefallenthechildinquestion;forthechildmay
be tooyoungtobe affected bythedeathsofthesiblings.Besides,ifthischild's
lifehasintrinsic valueafterthesiblings'death,itis difficult tosee howitcould
havelackeditpreviously. What is much more credible is that overalldisvalue
arises(as I have suggested) because of the adverse effects of thesimultaneous
existenceofso manypeopleinmuchthesameplaceon theflourishing bothof
theparents andofthechildren themselves.Ifthetenth child's arrivalisa tragedy,
itis notintrinsically a tragedy,butat mosta tragedy in thecircumstances, all-
things-considered.14
WhileRolston,whois a believerinintrinsic value,couldscarcelyclaimthat
thislanguageis inapplicable tosuchmatters, someofhisreadersmight preferto
interpret hislanguageaboutblessingsandtragedies ina relational manner, and
thusresisttheaboveintroduction oftalkofintrinsic value.TheycouldendQrse
histalkoftheblessingcomprised bythefirst twochildren becausethesechildren
blesstheunionoftheparents withfertility
andfruitfulness; andtheycouldclaim
thatthearrivalofthetenth childcomprises a tragedy becausetheentirefamily
is nowoverburdened, something theparents havereasontoregret. Butmypoint
can be re-expressed in thelanguageof relationships and blessings.For once
againthedeathsofsiblingscoulddepletethenumber ofchildren tobelowthe
samethreshold, andtheexistenceoftheadditional childwouldnowcountas a
blessingon thebasisjustmentioned. Thusthereis nothing intrinsicallytragic
aboutthearrivaloftheadditional child;onceagain,thetragedy derivesfromthe

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SAVING NATURE,FEEDING PEOPLE AND ETHICS

effectsoftheoverallfamilysituation. Ifall thechildren stayalive,buthalfthe

children areadoptedbya childlessauntanduncle,theremaybe no tragedy for
thefamily, although theenvironment might stillbe affected.
My suggestion is thatwe retainboththelanguageofblessingsandtragedy,
whichcouldservetoconveyhowinmanycasestheparents wouldperceiveand
understand theirpredicament, and also the language of intrinsic andinstrumental
value and disvalue,whichavoids the need foreveryoneto endorsesuch
perceptions, and whichconveysinterpersonal reasonsforour welcomingor
regretting, or
encouraging discouraging the events to whichitis applied.The
language of value has the further advantage that,since itdoes notdependon
intensional contexts,likecasesmustbej udgedalike,andthatthustenthness (and
ordinality ingeneral)willonlycorrespond to a difference in valuewhereitis
showntobe relevant.
The nextquestionto be consideredconcernswhatis meantwhenRolston
says'Whenthechildcomes,one hastobe as humaneas possible,butone will
onlybe makingthebestofa tragicsituation, andifthetenth childis reared,and
hastenchildren inturn,thatwillonlymultiply thetragedy' . Who,precisely, must
beas humaneas possible,butmight stillconsidernotrearing thetenth child?The
possibilitiesincludepoor parentsin a ThirdWorldcountry, thatcountry's
government, and Western aid charitiesand theirindividual donors. ThirdWorld
governments often lack the resources to supply the material needs of their
citizens,andtherewouldbe something extremely patronising about the sugges-
tionthatitis Westerners, alreadyon averagetakinga disproportionate shareof
theearth's resorces,whoaretodecidehumanely whether thechildistobereared,
eventhough Westerners arethepeoplemostobviouslyable tochoosebetween
savingnature andfeedingthepoor.Severalfeatures ofthecontextsuggestthat
thedecision-makers arepoorparents, whomaydo 'whathumanshavealways
done,makinga resourceful use ofnaturetomeettheirownneeds'.15 Butcould
itreallybe theywhomayinstead'trytosavenature'andletthechildgo hungry?
In mostcultures, parents areheldtohavea specialresponsibility toprovide
fortheirchildren, whichtakesprecedence overotherresponsibilities. Thismay
notbe thelast wordon whattheall-things-considered responsibility of the
parentste;butinmostcountries thelaw requiresparentsorguardians tomake
thisprovision,on pain of considerablepenalties.Thus,even if a reflective
morality wouldnotinvariably support localexpectations aboutparental duties,
itwouldbeunreasonable iftheparents weretobeexpectedtodefytheir '
country s
law (andusuallylocal customtoo) inordertocomplywithreflective morality,
evenifreflective morality weresomehowtourgeinfanticide. Thustheparents
mustbe heldto be justifiedin rearingthetenthchild.And sincetheymight
themselves betenthchildren oftheir parents, thisjudgement alreadysupports the
rearing of thetenthchildofa tenth child.
Thiscouldstillbe a tragedy, all things considered. In myownview,itoften
wouldbe. On theotherhand,we havenotyetheardenoughaboutthesituation

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ROBIN ATTFIELD

ofthepoorparents toknowthis.Forexample,insomesocieties,largenumbers
of thepopulationare childlessmonks;in sucha context, ifsomeadultshave
children atmorethanthereplacement rate,thatmaybe noproblem. Thiswould
alsobetrueofsocietiesinwhichfewpeoplearecelibatebutfertility ratesarelow.
Nevertheless, inmanysocietieslargefamilieswilloftenbe a tragedy, all things
considered, andshouldbe discouraged, bothbygovernments andaid agencies.
Butdoes this(oranything else) makepopulation growth a cancer?
No. A canceris notjust4anexplosionofunregulated growth' . Ifitwere,then
speciessuchas mushrooms, rabbitsand locustswouldoftenbe cancerous.A
canceris also a growth bearingno positiveintrinsic valueitselfwhichis also
potentiallyfataltoa livingcreature capableofhealth, andwhoisthus,as hasbeen
arguedmorefujlyelsewhere16 a potential bearerofintrinsic value.
Butthesuggestion thatthecurrent humanpopulation oftheEarthis a cancer
is deeplyat variancewithall this.On theone hand,unlikea cancer,this
population consistsofpotential bearersofintrinsic value;andtorepresent such
individuals (whennumerous) as cancerousis todisregard thisvalue,andtotreat
themas meansonly,and as nothing butdysfunctional ones too.On theother
hand,whatthecollectionoftheseintrinsically valuableindividuals is supposed
tobe fataltois thebiosphere, whichin theviewofmanyincluding myselfhas
noindependent intrinsic
value.Thebiosphere is still,ofcourse,highly valuable,
butthisis becauseitis capableofgenerating bearersofintrinsic valuesuchas
individualhumansandothercreatures. Besides,ifthesuggestion is reallythat
humanbeingsmightbe a cancerbecausetheycouldthreaten eachother,itis a
fantastic hyperbole whichservestodistract attention fromwaysinwhichthese
samehumanbeings,inthesamenumbers, couldavoidposinganysuchthreats
eitherto humanity ortootherspecies.
I haveno wishto denythathumannumbers andactivitiesare imperilling
numerous otherspecies,andthathumannumbers couldeasilygrowtoa levelat
whichfarmorespecieswouldbe threatened. Butthepossibility ofextinctions
has long been known,withoutusuallyincliningthoseaware of it to the
vocabularyof pathology. Grantedthestronggroundsforpreserving species,
agentsshouldcertainly adoptconcertedpreservationist policies(and,where
relevant, population policiestoprevent unsustainable population growth too17),
butneednotsimultaneously regardtheir ownexistence andagencyas somekind
ofcosmiccurse.
The discourseofhumanpopulation as canceris also dangerous. If,beyond
certainnumbers, humanscomprise a cancer,thenthemotivations tosavehuman
life,tohealinjuryandto cureillnessarelikelyto lapse.Forifeach individual
existence beyonda certain numerical levelis anevil,then(whatever humanitari-
anismmaydictate)theremustbe virtueinletting suchindividuals die,ifnotin
speedingthe process.This discoursethusgeneratesa reluctanceto show
solidarity withvulnerable humans, andcan predisposethosewhoendorseitto
misanthropy. Morality is thus wrenched fromitsspringsinsympathy, benevo-

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SAVING NATURE,FEEDING PEOPLE AND ETHICS

lenceandmercy, andis evenliabletobe divertedfromitsconcernforjustice,in

favourof somekindof global hygiene.The possibilities forracistor fascist
outcomesare all too clear.Besides,ifhumannumbers beyonda certainlevel
comprisea cancer,thenthecanceris ourselves,thethinkers who thinkthis
thought,as muchas otherfamilies orotherpeoples.Attheveryleast,we should
stophavingchildren, evenifwe wouldbejustifiedinremaining aliveatall.
Thusthepurportedly factualclaimthatpopulationgrowthis cancerousturns
outtocarryunacceptable conceptual andnormative implications.Rapidpopu-
lationgrowth is a realproblem, butlackstheseimplications.
Thusthedepiction
ofpopulation growth as cancercannotbe regardedas contributingtothecase for
withholding priority fromfeedingpeople.

6. THE DELUSION OF THE NEO-MALTHUSIANENVIRONMENTAL

PARADIGM

Besides,thebeliefthatpopulationgrowth(sometimessupposedlycombined
withfecklessness)amongruralpeople in the ThirdWorldis fatalto the
environment andtosustainable development isoftentreatedas anunchallengeable
axiomamongadvisersofWestern aidagenciesinthegripofa preconceived neo-
Malthusian environmentalist paradigm, and with total for
disregard empirical
evidencetothecontrary. AllanHobenhasablydemonstrated this,andhowthe
beliefjustmentioned hasbedevilledthefindings bothofsupposedly empirical
researchandofpolicyadvisers.
Hoben's centralcase studyconcernstheAkambaofKenya,whoselandhas
become bothgreenerand moreproductivethroughthe same periodas a
continuation of humanpopulationgrowthwhichexpertshad claimedto be
generating irreversibleandhopelessdesertification.18 He also presents parallel
case studiesfrom Kordofan in the Sudan19 and KissidougouPrefecture in
Guinea;20 in both cases experts'claims about demographic pressures allegedly
producing overgrazing, environmental degradation, deforestationand (in the
Sudanesecase) encroachment by theSaharaturnout to be constructions of
outsiderswhoforcedthephenomena tocomplywithan entrenched paradigm.
I am unableto claimthatpopulationgrowthnevercauses environmental
degradation; thustheevidencewhichRolstoncitesfrom Madagascarcouldwell
thatitcan,21
attest in
unlesspossiblyitis vitiated parallelways.Besides,Hoben's
evidenceofareasofAfricabecoming greener relates(atleastforhisKenyanand
Guineanexamples)to tree-planting on thepartof local people,rather thanto
preservation ofnatural habitat.Yetthissameevidence,combinedwithHoben's
accountofhowpeoplessuchas theAkambahavebeendeprived ofthebestland
duringandsincethecolonialperiod,22 raisesdoubtsaboutclaimsofwidespread
poorland-use,23 andaboutpopulation growth driving peopletocoloniseremain-
ingareasofwilderness. Hencewe shouldbe cautiousbeforesupporting policies

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ROBIN ATTFIELD

whichmightprohibit peopleintroducing improved methodsof agriculture, or

beforeurgingdonoragenciestopressure African to
governments require such
oftenquestionable policiesas conditions ofreceiving aid packages.
Inanycase,theworldpopulation is goingtoincreasebeforeitstabilises;and
ifthis
itwouldbe unfortunate larger population ofthemiddle ofthe nextcentury
is toldby itsphilosophers andbytheirpredecessors oftodaythatmanyof its
members oughtnottohaveexisted.Evenifthisis true,noneofthemwillhave
beenable toavoidexisting; andsuicideon thepartoftheconscientious onesis
to
unlikely improve matters.
Rather wehavetoplanfora planetwithtenthousand millionpeople(ormore)
livingsustainably(eventhough a lower maximum would andwith
be desirable),
sustainablewild habitatstoo. This requiresbothpopulationpolicies (as in
China),preservation policies(as in KenyaandZimbabwe),and development
policieswhichharness theenergies ofexisting peopleand(induecourse)oftheir
descendants bothfordevelopment andforpreservation.24
In thelongrun,theethicalissueofwhether we shouldevergivepriority to
savingnatureoverfeedingpeople (to whichtheanswerprobablyremainsa
heavilyconditional 'yes') losesitssignificance.Agonising aboutthistheoretical
questionshouldbe replacedbydevisingpoliciesofdevelopment andofpreser-
vationin whichlocal people,includingruralpeople,can participate, policies
whichencouragepeoplebothto save wildlifeandto feedthemselves.

NOTES

I amgratefultotheeditor
ofEnvironmentalValues,toseveralrefereesandtoHolmes
Rolstonforcomments onandcriticisms
ofthisessay,whiletaking
fullresponsibility
for
itsfinalformandcontent I amalsograteful
myself. to theparticipants
in theThird
International
Jacobsen Conference,
Philosophy heldat Harare,Zimbabwe in March
1996,andtoparticipants
ina SeminaroftheDepartment ofPhilosophy,Universityof
Salzburg,heldinMay1996,fortheircomments ona related soontobepublished
paper,
inBarnabas Dickson(ed.),WhenOurBelliesareFull,ElephantsareBeautiful: Philo-
sophicalDebatesontheEnvironment,Harare: ofZimbabwe
University Publications.
A
German translation
ofthatpaperhasappeared: RobinAttfield,'Naturerhalten oder
Menschen Ernahren?',
Conceptus:
Zeitschrift
furPhilosophie,XXIX.74,1996,27-45.
1Rolston 1996,pp.257-258.
2Rolston 1996,pp.260-261.
3Rolston 1996,p. 259.
4Rolston 1996,p. 246.
5Rolston 1996,p. 245.
6Clarificatory
note(supplied
attheproofsstage):thiscouldbebetter as 4social
expressed
andeconomic change which
genuinely satisfies
human needs',thesensewidelyusedin,
forexample,developmentethics circles.
(I didnotintend theviewthat'development'
carries
a prescriptive
meaning.)
'Development' inthesensejustspecifiedcouldstillfail

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SAVING NATURE,FEEDING PEOPLE AND ETHICS

on occasionto be changeforthebetter, all things considered; butmuchso-called

'development' would(importantly) bedeniedtheaccoladeofcomprising development
inthissense.Atthesametime, thecriteria
ofdevelopment inthissensecohere wellwith
thoseofsocialjustice.
Further,developmentinthissensetypically involves
sustainabil-
ity,forthereasonsgiveninthepenultimate paragraph ofthissection.
7Rolston,privatecommunication ofApril11,1996.
8Rolston 1996,p. 256;heherecitesVitousek etal. 1986.
9Sagoff 1995.
10Rolston1996,p. 256.
11Rolston1996,p. 259.
12Rolston1996,p. 254.
13Rolston1996,p. 255.
14Rolstonconsiders thatthiswashissenseof'tragedy' too(private communicationof
April11,1996).Therelation between andflourishing
population isdiscussed inAttfield
1995a,chapter 10,'Population andtheTotalView'.
15Rolston1996,p. 255(previous paragraph).
16Attfield
1995b.
171amindebted toRolston communication
(private of11April1996)forpointing outthe
of
bearing my earlierremarksabout unsustainable on
developmentpopulation processes.
18Hoben,1995,pp. 19-21.HobenherecitesTiffen andMortimore 1992,andTiffen,
Mortimore andGichuki 1994.
19Hellden1988.Thecurrent famine inSudanis largely duetocivilwar.
20Fairhead,Leachetal. 1992.
21Rolston 1996,p. 256,where hecitesWilson1992,p. 267,andJolly1980.Contrary
evidencefrom Nigeriaandelsewhere inWestAfrica is availableinLockwood 1995.
22Hoben1995,p. 17.
23Hoben1995,pp.18-19.
241haverevisitedtheseissuesinTheEthics oftheGlobalEnvironment, 1999.

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