COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. CTA, GR Nos.
L-48886-88, The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the
1993-07-21
Facts:
This refers to a petition for review of the decision dated July 28, 1978
of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Cases No. 2785, 2831 and 2832
which was promulgated prior to the issuance on February 27, 1991, of
Circular No. 1-91 to the effect that appeals from a final order or...
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals shall be to the Court of Appeals.
The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan
were constructed and improved and are operated and maintained
solely by and at the expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a private
corporation.
The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS "Messinia",
MS "Pavel Rybin", MS "Caledonia", and MS "Leonidas" are vessels
engaged in foreign trade and represented in the Philippines by private
respondent Litonjua Shipping Company with Granexport Corporation
as its... sub-agent.
On various dates, the berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay Express
Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan City were used by the above vessels
and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which
were paid by private respondent under protest, to wit:
Issues:
Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately
owned wharf or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge
under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, which, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed and
respondent Commissioner of Customs is ordered to refund to
petitioner the amount of P40,551.00. No costs. (p. 51, Rollo)
Port of Kiwalan, which was constructed, operated, and continues to
be maintained by private respondent Iligan Express Corporation, are
not subject to berthing charges, and petitioner should refund the...
berthing fees paid by private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals AFFIRMED.
Principles:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule
is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unjus est exclusio
alterius. Where a statute,... by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to... restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed., 1990,
pp. 160-161, and the cases therein cited). The port of Kiwalan not
being included in the list of national ports appended to Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor in Executive Order No. 72, it
follows inevitably as a matter of law and legal principle that this Court
may not properly consider said port as a national port. To do
otherwise would be to legislate on our part and to arrogate unto
ourselves... powers not conferred on us by the Constitution.
People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr.
(G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th
Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO
OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO, respondents.
constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by
the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem
generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to
when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Ponente: AQUINO

FACTS:

Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against
sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned,
respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order
dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1)
that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth
and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected
“with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of
ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a
grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this
Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar
acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

HELD:

NO. Appeal was devoid of merit. Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.

RATIO:

[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to
apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal
G.R. No. L-42134 October 21, 1936
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
ISIDORO ABAJA, ET AL., claimants. 
ROMAN DE ARRUZA and MARIO LUZURIAGA, appellants.
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9.
An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state
one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of
the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is
in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or lawlessness or
public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows
that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities
and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons
of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative
measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to
inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found
among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate
the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and
the stiff sanctions stated therein.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987
Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of
Zamboanga and a candidate for re-election in 1971 local elections.
The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints with the city
fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law)
and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner filed petitions for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but
they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and alleged
that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the
provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how complainants
charging the government officials and employees with the commission
of irregularities should be guided.

Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to

administrative charges and not to criminal complaints

Held: Petition dismissed.

Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It

speaks of commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had
the order intended to make it applicable thereto, it could have been
referred to the more specific terms like “accused,” “convicted,” and the
like.
G.R. No. L-27761 December 6, 1927
PHILIPPINE SUGAR CENTRALS AGENCY, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio
INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November
13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the
Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961,
Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following
grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita
Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the
reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2)
the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees
of the land, they have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside
the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June
20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper
Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels
of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial
Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the
Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of
judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding
the approval of this act.”  If the title is to be followed, November 13,
1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the
institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the
petition would be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and
what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or
remedied by its title.
CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007
FACTS:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC) has two principal stockholders
UCHC with shares amounting to 60.51%, and petitioner Cemco with
17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were owned by BCI with 21.31%
and ACC with 29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of
UCHC stocks. BCI informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that
it and its subsidiary ACC had passed resolutions to sell to Cemco the
BCIs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks in
UCHC equivalent to 29.69%. as a result of petitioner Cemcos
acquisition of BCI and ACCs shares in UCHC, petitioners total
beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC has increased by
36% and amounted to at least 53% of the shares of UCC.
As a consequence the PSE, inquired to SEC as to whether the
Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the Implementing Rules of the
Securities Regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by
petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC.The SECs Corporate
Finance Department responded to the query of the PSE that while it
was the stance of the department that the tender offer rule was not
applicable, the matter must still have to be confirmed by the SEC en
banc. Thereafter, SEC confirmed that the SEC en banc had resolved
that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the tender offer rule.
Feeling aggrieved by the transaction, respondent National Life
Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc., a minority stockholder of
UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the
rule on mandatory tender offer. Cemco, however, refused.
Respondent filed a complaint with the SEC asking it to reverse its
Resolution and to declare the purchase agreement of Cemco void and
praying that the mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its UCC
shares.
In a Decision the SEC ruled in favor of the respondent by reversing
and setting aside its Resolution and directed petitioner Cemco to
make a tender offer for UCC shares to respondent and other holders
of UCC shares similar to the class held by UCHC in accordance with
Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the Securities Regulation Code.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the
SECs jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents complaint and its
authority to require Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares,
and arguing that the tender offer rule does not apply. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the SEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint.

HELD:
Yes, The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. SEC was acting
pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code
Another provision of the statute, which provides the basis of Rule
19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Securities Regulation Code, is Section 5.1(n), viz:
[T]he Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and
functions: x x x (n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by
law as well as those which may be implied from, or which are
necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers
granted the Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of
these laws.
The foregoing provision bestows upon the SEC the general
adjudicative power which is implied from the express powers of the
Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably necessary to
carry out, the performance of the administrative duties entrusted to it.
As a regulatory agency, it has the incidental power to conduct
hearings and render decisions fixing the rights and obligations of the
parties.
And as held by the Court of Appeals:
We must bear in mind in interpreting the powers and functions of the
SEC that the law has made the SEC primarily a regulatory body with
the incidental power to conduct administrative hearings and make
decisions. A regulatory body like the SEC may conduct hearings in
the exercise of its regulatory powers, and if the case involves
violations or conflicts in connection with the performance of its
regulatory functions, it will have the duty and authority to resolve the
dispute for the best interests of the public
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING G.R. No. 169080
EXPLORATION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
- versus -
MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION),
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING
CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta
Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining
Lease Contract V-1050.
Infanta’s corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings
Corporation and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia
Corporation.
After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining
lease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those
covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of
the DENR.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of
Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining
rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation
(Lebach), in mining areas in Brooke’s Point.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas
contiguous to Infanta’s (now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial
also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835
hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brooke’s Point, Palawan and two
pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay
Mainit also in Brooke’s Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts.
Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by
Celestial.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field
investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the
Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the
others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right
to Macroasia’s mining areas.1 It upheld Blue Ridge’s petition, but only
as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach, and the said
leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It gave Blue
Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining claims.
Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required
memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above
resolution became final and executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to
cancel the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.
However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its
previous decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the
power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR
Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a
mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.
The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which
upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve,
cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also denied
Celestial’s Motion for Reconsideration.
While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridge’s petition;
reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the
cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942,
explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the
greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining
agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the
jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?
1
HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to

cancel mining contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA

7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances,
and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the
jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral
agreements based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements

emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management,
and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book
IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and

regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the
country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands
of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from
said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our
natural resources which include mineral resources. Derived from the
broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the
Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral
agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said
agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR

Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of
mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR
Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral
agreements.

The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreements

through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of
DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
CIR V AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
(Phil. Branch)
GR 152609 | June 29, 2005 | J. Panganiban
Facts:
Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA
and was tasked with servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch and
facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card
members situated in the Philippines and payment to service
establishments in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input
taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held
that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or
to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be
refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to
the provisions of Section 112.”
In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read,
“In Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose
service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted
inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines, your
service income is automatically zero rated xxx”
Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be
construed strictly against the claimant as they partake of the nature of
tax exemption.
CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its
services are subject to zero-rate. CA affirmed this decision and further
held that respondent’s services were “services other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing
business outside the Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of BSP.
Issue:
W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund
Held:
Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. Section 102B particularly
provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate:
(1)    Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons
doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the BSP;
(2)    Services other than those mentioned in the preceding
subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and other service
establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable
foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the BSP
Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered
persons in the Philippines (other than the processing, manufacturing
or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the
Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted
for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zero-rated. Respondent
renders service falling under the category of zero rating.
As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as
a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are
taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are
zero-rated, while imports are taxed.
In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is
different from the utilization of consumption of the outcome of such
service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the
consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are
performed upon its sending to its foreign client the drafts and bulls it
has gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore,
services also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination
principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT.
However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination
principle; that is 0% VAT rate for services that are performed in the
Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for
in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the
following requirements for exemption, and thus should be zero-rated:
(1)    Service be performed in the Philippines
(2)    The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of
the Tax Code
(3)    It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in
accordance with BSP R&R.
Republic v. MERALCO (G.R. No. 141314)
Date: July 24, 2016
Facts:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of
its rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its distribution
charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition
that should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to
a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s
customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly
credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is
entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting
of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB
decision. MRs were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of
MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
 The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded
upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for
the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise
thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is
affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and
becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the
common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the
owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the
public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the
efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to
regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates
which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return
on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one
that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the
property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the
public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable
rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.
G.R. No. 137571  September 21, 2000
TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, 
vs.
RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration; and the
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, respondents.
G.R. No. 131012 of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in
their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS  would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling
them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their
FACTS
suspension was unjustified.
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still
public school teachers. Sometime in September and October 1990, reprimanded.
during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this
reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct;
2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4)
refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were
placed under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before
the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the
service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to
the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence
their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back
wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal
(before the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE

Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period

pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.

HELD

YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal.

To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be
exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust.
Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is
actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should
be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47
(4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be
considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is
affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty
Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier

Case No. 40

G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)

Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141

FACTS:

The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the

Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an
order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were
employees of the national center for mental health. The Respondent
argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under
Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the
1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman
can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office.

ISSUE:

W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend

government officials working in other offices other than that of the
Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints.

HELD:

Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of

the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec.
13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense,
as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec.
24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges.
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy
and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A
preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation.
Nestle Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86738, November 13, 1991
Corporation Law Case Digest by John Paul C. Ladiao (15 March
2016)
(Topic: Consideration for Stocks and Transfer)
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of petitioner
Nestle Philippines Inc. ("Nestle") was increased from P300 million
divided into 3 million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share, to
P600 million divided into 6 million shares with a par value of P100.00
per share. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures involving
Board and stockholders approvals and effected the necessary filings
to secure the approval of the increase of authorized capital stock by
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which
approval was in fact granted.
Nestle has only two (2) principal stockholders: San Miguel
Corporation and Nestle S.A
On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and stockholders of
Nestle approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500
shares out of the previously authorized but unissued capital stock of
Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A. San
Miguel Corporation subscribed to and completely paid up 168,800
shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed to and paid up the balance of
175,700 shares of stock.
On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter signed by its
Corporate Secretary, M.L. Antonio, with the SEC seeking exemption
of its proposed issuance of additional shares to its existing principal
shareholders, from the registration requirement of Section 4 of the
Revised Securities Act and from payment of the fee referred to in
Section 6(c) of the same Act.
The Commission then advised petitioner to file the appropriate
request for exemption and to pay the fee required under Section 6 (c)
of the statute, which provides:
(c) A fee equivalent to one-tenth of one per centum of the maximum
aggregate price or issued value of the securities shall be collected by
the Commission for granting a general or particular exemption from
the registration requirements of this Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that there is a need to file a petition for exemption
under Section 6(b) of the Revised Securities Act with respect to the
issuance of the said 344,600 additional shares to their existing
stockholders out of their unissued capital stock?
RULING:
Yes.
The reading by the SEC of the scope of application of Section 6(a) (4)
permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory
objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed
issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial
conditions and prospects of the corporation.
When capital stock is issued in the course of and in compliance with
the requirements of increasing its authorized capital stock under
Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the SEC as a matter of course
examines the financial condition of the corporation, and hence there is
no real need for exercise of SEC authority under the Revised
Securities Act.
In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of
previously authorized but still unissued capital stock may, in a
particular instance, be held to be an exempt transaction by the SEC
under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of
registration under the Revised Securities Act are "not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of the investors" by reason, inter
alia, of the small amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or
because the potential buyers are very limited in number and are in a
position to protect themselves
The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the executive officers of the government, whose duty is to execute it,
is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it.
People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962] neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason
15AUG for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
Ponente: REGALA, J. change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has
FACTS: been erroneously applied.
[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section
54 of the Revised Election Code in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower
court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense
counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius,
est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information
against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited
by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD:
YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set
aside and this case was remanded for trial on the merits.
RATIO:
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from
the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for
reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There
has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public
policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace are
not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To
accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically
laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court applied the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in
arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended
to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54,
Salaysay vs. Castro 98 Phil. 364; January 31, 1956. arrive at the real meaning and spirit of a statute intended and
breathed into it by the law-making body. Falsa demonstratio non
Facts: Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San nocet, cum de corpora constat which means false description does
Juan del Monte, Rizal, and the Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is the not preclude construction: vitiate the meaning of the statute. The
duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of September, 1955 and for intention of the amendment by the President Roxas was to give and
some time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office extend privilege to the appointees and elected official for continuity in
due to administrative charges filed against him and so Petitioner their office. This was not applicable for the official who assumed the
Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the Revised office by succession because of incapacitated of his predecessor.
Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability of
the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-Mayor. On September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor
as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice Mayor,
consequently, forfeiting the office he was holding as acting Mayor.
Salaysay refused to turn over the office of Mayor and brought this
action of prohibition with preliminaryinjunction against Executive
Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto.Domingo to declare
invalid.

Issue: Whether elected municipal official was considered resigned

when he filed his certificate of candidacy for an office other than the
one he was elected or actually holding.

Ruling: No, elected municipal official was considered resigned when

he filed his certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one he
was elected or actually holding.It is urged that the phrase “actually
holding”, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was meant to refer
only to “permanent” incumbents and does not apply to those holding
office in a temporary character. The law is plain, simple and clear. The
resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any elective local official
who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature
of said possession, as long as, it is “actual”. It is irrelevant, therefore,
whether the office is held temporarily or permanently. All this goes to
show that we should not and cannot always be bound by the
phraseology or literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may
interpret, nay, even disregard loose or inaccurate wording in order to
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
and CTA September 30, 1969
CASTRO, J.
Facts: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling
of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known
as jute bags. In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from
customs duties and special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-
exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon the exportation of
the jute bags within one year from the date of importation. However, out of
the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only
25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second
shipment. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only
33,647 bags were exported within one year after their importation. The
remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year
period but within three years from their importation. Petitioner requested the
Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing
reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of
one year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner. Due to
the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of
86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the Petitioner was
required to pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties
and special import tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest
and later on demanded the refund of the amount it had paid.
Issues: a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with
discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the
Philippine Tariff Act of 1909. b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction
of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other
Administrative Agencies be given consideration?
In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs. Held: a.) Section 23 of the
Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff
and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the
containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the
said period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of
Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion
and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to
make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in
the law as non-extendible. b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in
question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of
the Tariff and Customs Code)have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for
administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of Customs issued
Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide
as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially
known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
extendible., " would, initially, be in order. Only where the court of last resort
has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will
give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments
of the state. The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of
an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or
other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to
consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded
appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when
the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the
enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency. Considering that
the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing
the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it
thereon should be given controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or
principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts
often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the
principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight
in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors
are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration,
their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the
fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the
agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the
practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering
deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
[ GR No. 42134, Oct 21, 1936 ] and Arnalot  vs. Johnson  [1912], 21 Phil., 308, 331; affd in 231 U. S.,  106; 34 Sup.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. ISIDORO ABAJA ET AL. Ct., 27; 58 Law,  ed., 142; United States vs. Katz  [1925], 271 U. S., 354; 46 Sup. Ct.,
LAUREL, J.: 513; 72 Law. ed., 986).
Act No. 4043 was not the only Act passed by the Philippine Legislature to  enable
This  is an appeal  from an order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros 
persons whose  lands had been declared public lands by virtue of the operation of the
denying the motion of the appellants to set aside  the  decision  of that court in 
cadastral  system to recover said lands after  complying with certain prescribed
Cadastral  Case No. 22,  G. L. R. O. Record No. 174,  declaring lot  No.  712 public
conditions.
land, and to reopen the case as to said lot  in accordance with the provisions of  Act
In 1923, the Legislature enacted Act No. 3059 (declared in force by Executive
No. 4043 of the Philippine Legislature.
Proclamation No. 57, dated September 25, 1923); in 1930, it approved Act No. 3672
The facts of this case are undisputed.  On June 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of
(declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 299,  dated February 28, 1930), and
Lands filed  in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros a petition  praying that
more recently in 1934, it  passed Act No, 4195 (declared in force by Executive
the titles with  respect to  a  tract  of land  containing  about 23,443,355 square
Proclamation No.  767, dated February 7, 1935).  A cursory scrutiny of these four
meters, divided into lots and situated in the municipality of Hog,  Occidental Negros,
Acts will show that while the titles of Acts Nos. 4043  and 4195  refer to "parcels of
be settled and adjudicated in accordance with  the provisions of Act No. 2259,
land  that  have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
otherwise known  as the  Cadastral  Act.  After due hearing, the lower court, in a
etc.", those of the earlier Acts Nos. 3059 and  3672 fail to make any such allusion.
decision dated August 15, 1925, declared lot No. 712, comprising about 1,322 square
The title of Act No. 3059 is as follows:
meters,  public land because no  one appeared to  claim  it. On  January 25, 1934, a
"An Act to provide that  certain claims to parcels of land that have been declared
motion  was filed in the same court by the herein appellants, Roman de Arruza and
public land  may be  filed in the proper court within the  period  of one year, under 
Mario Luzuriaga, through their  attorney, praying that the aforesaid decision  of  the
certain conditions."  The title of Act  No. 3672 is as follows:
lower court be set aside  in so far as lot No. 712 was concerned, that a new trial be
"An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain 
granted and that they be allowed to present their claim under the provisions of Act
claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, within the period
No. 4043.  On February 2,  1934, the provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros, on behalf
of one year from the date of the promulgation of this Act." The title of Act No. 4043  is
of the government, filed an opposition to the appellants' motion contending that the
as follows:
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros had  no jurisdiction to  reopen  the case
"An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain  conditions, of certain
with respect  to lot No. 712 because the motion was not filed within the time limit
claims of title  to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue
prescribed by Act No. 4043.  On April 20, 1934, the judge of the said court  denied 
of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the  approval of
the motion of  the appellants  in  an order the dispositive part of which is  as follows.:
this Act."  (Underscoring ours.)   And the title of Act  No. 4195 reads:
"Interpretando las disposiciones de la Ley arriba acotada, el Juzgado es de opinion
"An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain  conditions, of certain
que la oposici6n del  Fiscal Provincial esta bien fundada.   Los  procedimientos
claims of title  to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue
judiciales  en cuanto  al expediente catastral  arriba especificado se han iniciado en
of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the approval of
junio 12 de  1919, en virtud de  una solicitud presentada  por el Director de  Terrenos,
this Act." (Underscoring ours.)   Upon the other hand,  the bodies  of all the four Acts
bajo la Ley No. 2259, pidiendo  que se  fije y declare el dominio y titulo  de los lotes
just mentioned speak in clear and, unmistakable terms of parcels of land that "have
de terreno comprendidos en el referido expediente catastral, entre los cuales estaba
been, or are  about to be,  declared land of public domain, by virtue of judicial
el Lote No. 712 objeto de esta moci6n.  Desde junio 12 de 1919 hasta febrero 18  de
proceedings instituted etc,"
1933, en que la Ley  No. 4043 entro  en vigor, han transcurrido trece anos,  ocho
The discrepancy between the titles and the bodies of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 may
meses y seis  dias y, por tanto, todas aquellas personas que pretendan tener 
be explained.   Act No. 4043 was originally House Bill No.  949 (First Session, Ninth
derecho de propiedad sobre los terrenos comprendidos dentro del expediente
Philippine Legislature).  The  said bill as presented referred in both its title and body
catastral arriba titulado ya no tienen derecho de  acogerse a  los beneficios de la Ley 
solely to the rendition  of judicial decisions.   The first paragraph of the explanatory
No. 4043 para pedir la  reapertura  de dicho expediente."
note prepared by the authors of the bill reads:
The appellants assign three errors  alleged to have been committed by the court
"The  attached bill is  practically the same as Act  No. 3672 approved by the Eighth
below all of  which raise but one legal  question,  namely, whether the ten-year period
Legislature with  the exception that it authorizes the filing of claims to lots that have
mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the date the decision was
been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered during  the last  ten 
rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in a  cadastral case.
years,  whereas by Act  3672 no such claims may be authorized if the judicial
In  determining the  intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior laws
proceedings were instituted more  than ten  years ago."
on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents or the  legislative history  of
It is obvious that the intention of the framers of House Bill No. 949 was to alter the
the statute involved (Loewenstein vs. Page [1910], 16 Phil., 84, 92; U. & vs. De
language and the meaning of the previous  Acts of the Legislature on the same
Guzman  [1915], 30  Phil., 416, 419; Tamayo vs. Gsell [1916], 35 Phil., 953, 963;
subject. The Legislature, however, thought it proper not to make such alteration and
Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs. Hongkong  and Shanghai Banking Corporation [1917], 36
as finally approved, Act No. 4043 adopts the language used in  Acts Nos.  3059 and
Phil., 27, 36;  Go Chioco vs. Martinez  [1923], 45  Phil.,  256, 270,  276;  Portillo vs*. 
3672 and refers to the  institution of  judicial proceedings instead of the rendition of
Salvani [1930], 54 Phil., 543, 546.  See also Kepner vs. United States  [1904], 195 U.
judicial decision as proposed by the authors of the bill.   In enacting the bill into law,
S., 100; 24 Sup.Ct, 797; 49 Law. ed., 114; 11 Phil., 669, 692; Serra  vs. Mortiga 
however, the corresponding change in  the title was not made.  It is pertinent to
[1907],  204 U. S.,  470; 27 Sup. Ct, 343; 51 Law. ed,, 571; 11 Phil.,  762, 766; Alzua
observe in this connection that the title of Act No. 4043, herein before quoted, is
a verbatim  copy of the title of House Bill No. 949.  When Act No. 4195 was passed,
the title of Act No. 4043 was almost  literally retained.
The fact that in all the four Acts so far passed by the Philippine Legislature  on the
subject there has been a repeated and consistent reference to the institution of
judicial proceedings has the starting point in the computation of the period of ten
years (or  fifteen years  as  regards Act No. 4195) therein laid down  is, in our opinion,
significant.  It shows beyond question the desire of the Legislature to adhere to the
one and only method of computation consistently followed by it since the beginning.
Whether the statute is in this respect wise  and expedient is not for us to determine
(U. S. vs. Ten Yu  [1912], 24 Phil., 1,  10;  U. S. vs. Estapia [1917], 37 Phil., 17,26;
Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234, 238).   Courts must administer the law, not
as they "think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences."
(Velasco vs. Lopez [1903], 1 Phil., 720, 723, 724.)
It will also be observed that the body of Act  No. 4043, like those of  Acts Nos. 3059,
3672 and 4195, employ the phrase "are about  to be, declared land  of public
domain".   This phrase would be  meaningless if  we construe the Act to refer to the
rendition of judicial decisions in cadastral cases. A judicial decision may declare lands
to be  of the public domain but to say that  a decision is about  to  declare it so would
be absurd.  The fact that the  construction placed upon the statute by the appellants
would lead to an absurdity  is  another argument for rejecting it  (In  re Allen [1903], 2
Phil., 630, 643; Marin vs. Nacianceno [1911], 19 Phil., 238, 240; Rivera vs. Campbell
[1916], 34 Phil., 348, 353; Chartered Bank of  India, Australia and  China  vs. Imperial
and  National Bank [1921],  48 Phil.,  931, 948; City of Manila vs. Lyric Music House
[1930], 62 Phil., 125; 25 R. C. L., 1019).
The contention  of the appellants that the reference made in Executive Proclamation
No. 549 to the rendition of judicial  decisions  as  the starting point in the computation
of the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 amounts to a contemporaneous 
construction placed upon the statute by the Executive Department of the Government
and, therefore, is entitled to  great weight and respect, is devoid of foundation.  All
that the proclamation did was to copy the title of the statute  to which it referred.   At
any rate, the intention of the Legislature, as disclosed by a uniform trend of
legislation,  is  clearly expressed in the body of Act No. 4043, and it is our duty to give
effect to that intention in the case before us  (sec. 288, Code of  Civil Procedure).
The more recent Act No. 4195 repeals  Act No. 4043. But  the provisions of said Act
No. 4195 can not be availed of by the claimants and appellants herein, because the
cadastral proceedings in question were instituted on June 12, 1919, or more  than 
fifteen years before the approval of that Act.  It appearing, however, that the other
provisions of the Act have  been  complied with, that is to say, (1) that at the time of
the survey, the claimants were in actual possession of the  parcel of land involved, (2)
that for some justifiable reason, they were unable to file their claim in. the proper
court  during the period established by law, (3) that the land  has not yet been
alienated, reserved, teased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently
disposed of by the Government, and (4) that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof
have  been paid,  the claimants  and appellants herein may bring the matter to the
attention of the proper administrative authorities for  such action as they might deem
proper and equitable.
In view of the conclusion reached by us on the principal question raised in the case at
bar,  we do not  deem it  necessary to pass upon the other questions  raised by
counsel for both parties in their briefs.

The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with- out costs.  So ordered.