CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PUP College of Law

Atty. Albertson S. Cajayon

A. General matters

1. Jurisdiction in general, criminal jurisdiction

2. Requisites for exercise of criminal jurisdiction
Case: People vs. Valenzuela, G.R. NO. 178266 July 21, 2008

The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are (1) the court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the
offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is
conferred by law.

Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction.

Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily
submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve

3. Distinguish jurisdiction over subject matter from jurisdiction over person of the accused
4. Jurisdiction of criminal courts
5. When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution
Case: Brocka vs. Enrile. G.R. No. 69863-65 December 10, 1990

GENERAL RULE:

Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

EXN:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused.

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions.
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice.

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority.

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation.
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent.

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense.

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution.
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied.

6. Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional

Isip v. People, G.R. No.. 170298, June 26, 2007

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
 court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction

Union Bank v. People, February 28, 2012

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis
ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from
its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Hector Trenas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited
territory. In Isip v. People,[18] this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may
validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.)

7. Jurisdiction to Issue Hold Departure Orders

1. Mondejar v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second
level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of
respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.

8. Jurisdiction to issue precautionary hold departure order

1. A.M. 18-07-05 SC

9. Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the Complaint

1. Foz v. People, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 167764

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 22 Considering that the Information
failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of
Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.

10. Jurisdiction over criminal offenses under RA 6657

Case: LBP vs Belista G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and
exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials’
original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of
adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by
private respondent is valid.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA
6657 is a power vested in the courts. Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure
provides that the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such
rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the
SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation in accordance with the said
Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the
case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on
courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.

11. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

1. People v. Sandiganbayan, August 25, 2009, G.R. No. 167304

In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein,
took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he
committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged
petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter
had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official
functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
 held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech.
It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would
not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary
Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.

2. Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition
fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most,
it is merely incidental to the public office.

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public makes one a public officer

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP
performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.

3. Esquivel v. Ombudsman, September 17, 2002, G.R. 137237

Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,32 Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,33 and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan,34 we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal
mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,35 provides
that it is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." 37 Note
that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of
27.38 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose
position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence,
the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.
 First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise
of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. 39 As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.

Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual
remedies provided by law are adequate and available. 40 Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is
available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law,
through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ. 41 In
this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion
to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only themselves to blame for this
procedural lapse as they have not shown any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make
a belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the informations, during their much delayed
arraignment,42 but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an
interlocutory order.43

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.44 The
foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of
preventing unnecessary litigation;45 it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not properly rule on a
jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it.46 The records show that petitioners only raised the
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.1âwphi1.nêt

4. Esteban v. Sandiganbayan March 11, 2005, G.R. No.146646

In People v. Montejo, we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense
is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the
facts in the complaint or information.13Hence, where the information is wanting in specific factual averments to show
the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.

Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987, petitioner, as presiding judge of MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan
City, is vested with the power to recommend the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As alleged in the
Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to approach petitioner on June 25, 1997
as she needed his recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such recommendation - she should be
his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner used his
official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is true, as petitioner argues, that public office is not an
element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to recommend the appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In
other words, the crimes allegedly committed are intimately connected with his office.

5. Ambil v. Sandiganbayan, July 6, 2011, G.R. No. 175482

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person"
to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term
"party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance 46 as distinguished from "person"
which, in general usage, refers to a human being. 47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who
is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private
person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained
him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity
as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of
 Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.

Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
"Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.

intimaracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in executing
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner
Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring
a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even
petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power
to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the
violation charged, makes them equally responsible as conspirators.

6. People v. Go, March 25, 2014

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered
into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal
court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed
by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy
with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have
been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that
the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer
be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the
alleged offenders.

12. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

1. Department of Justice v. Liwag, February 11, 2005, G.R. No. 149311

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdictionover cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayanand authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the
investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All this
means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with
other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim
equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the
executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, 19 the settled rule is that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this
concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as
a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman
before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation
to the exclusion of the DOJ.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies and
no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against
respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted on
by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same
complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed
against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation
is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 27 When one is hailed before an investigative body
on specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the
respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively
before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where
the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause
or defense.

2. Lazatin v. Desierto, June 5, 2009, G.R. No. 147097

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not
to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are
supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of public
service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three branches of
government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence. 21

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly
prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the
Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control and supervision
over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

3. Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee v. Desierto, July 24, 2007

It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss
a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary
investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he
may recommend its outright dismissal.The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary investigation
is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would
the Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office
from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude
of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This court
consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence
inherent in the Ombudsman who, ‘beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the
integrity of the public service.

As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers,
as provided in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.21The basis for this rule was
provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman where the Court held as follows:

4. Castro v. Deloria, January 27, 2009, G.R. No. 163586

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law
defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise
by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed,it
must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office
of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its
power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision
and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

13. Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman

1. Antonino v. Desierto, December 18, 2008, G.R. No. 144492

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)22 provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion
for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.

14. Procedure before the Ombudsman

1. Sesbreno v. Aglugub, February 28, 2005, A.M. No. MTJ 05-1581

This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing
the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since
the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the primary
jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.

This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 820 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman, which provides "that all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover,
"[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases21 against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistant
prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the
Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy
Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court
or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not more
than ₱6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be
forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman."

Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law when she forwarded the case
for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead
of forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another matter.
In any event, respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in
the disposition of the case.

15. Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors

1. Punzalan v. de la Pena, July 21, 2004, G.R. No. 158543
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6,
2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and control" includes
the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct
the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units. 24

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the other respondents other than
Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the
settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of
the occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses
and determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the hearing distance of
third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his
Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of
Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in
a Resolution dated June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the charge of
attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making him a party to
the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein
respondent Dencio Dela Peña should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted
in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan.

In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of
the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not interfere
in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to
have been made with grave abuse.

16. Role of the Office of the Solicitor General in Criminal Cases

1. People v. Duca, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 171175

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested
in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides, viz.:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis supplied)

Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De Castro, 9 it was held:

In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People
is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of
the OSG was to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. 10

Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for
review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a
copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. 21The
service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the
reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and
the Supreme Court. The respondent’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing
respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General’s
comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed decision.

17. Liberal Interpretation of the Rules

a. Cariaga vs. People, 626 SCRA 231

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural
lapse militates against the Court’s dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioner’s plea for a relaxation of the
Rules.1avvphi1

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict
application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. 9

B. Prosecution of offenses

1. Barangay Conciliation
A. Coverage, exceptions
B. Venue
C. Cases:
a. Valencides Vercide vs. Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez. A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265. April 6, 2000
b. Leticia B. Agbayani vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 183623 June 25, 2012

2. Criminal actions, how instituted

3. Effect of filing of complaint or information with regard to prescription

a. Sanrio Company Ltd. vs. Lim. G.R. No. 168662 February 19, 2008
b. Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ. G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
c. SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation. G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
d. People vs. Pangilinan. G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
e. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua. G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

4. Who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de officio

a. People vs. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11 (1983)
b. People vs. Sangil, 208 SCRA 696 (1992)

5. Control of prosecution
a. Pinote vs. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409
b. Salvador vs. Chua, 15 July 2015
c. Malayan Insurance vs. Piccio, 06 August 2014
d. People vs. Go, 24 September 2014

6. Sufficiency of complaint or information

a. People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647
b. Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138
c. Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360

7. Designation of offense
a. Malto v. People, September 21, 2007
b. Licyayo v. People, March 4, 2008
c. Briones v. People, June 5, 2009
d. People v Mendoza, June 6, 2002
e. Buebos v. People, March 28, 2008
f. People v. Oso, 62 Phil 271 (Variance Doctrine)
8. Cause of the accusation
a. Senador vs. People, 06 March 2013
b. Rule on Qualifying and Aggravating circumstances

9. Duplicity of the offense; exception

10. Amendment or substitution of complaint or information
A. Kinds of Amendments:
1. Formal;
2. and substantial
B. When is leave of court required?
C. When is an amendment formal or substantial?
D. How to determine whether it is amendment or substitution?
a. Mendez vs. People, G.R. No. 179962 June 11, 2014
b. Matalam vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 165751. April 12, 2005
c. Pacoy v. Judge Cajigal, Sept. 28, 2007

11. Venue of criminal actions

a. Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
b. b. Cabral vs. Bracamonte. G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019

12. Intervention of offended party

C. Prosecution of civil action

1. Rule on implied institution of civil action with criminal action

2. When civil action may proceed independently
3. When separate civil action is suspended
4. Effect of the death of accused or convict on civil action
a. People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, Sep. 2, 1994

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape

5. Prejudicial question
a. Jose v. Suarez – 2008

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
 behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

b. Pimentel v. Pimentel (Sept. 13, 2010)

Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 6 provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.

c. Yap v. Cabales (June 5, 2009)

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing
debt - is malum prohibitum

d. Omictin v. CA (January 22, 2007)

Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. The court cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the
same, where the question demands
 the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining
technical and intricate matters of fact.

While the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the circumstances in
the instant case do not proscribe the application of the doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such as the
SEC in determining technical and intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by specially designated
RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending
has the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the domestic corporation,
Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation,
the determination of which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in place of the SEC,
the regular courts now have the legal competence to decide intra-corporate disputes

e. Ras v. Rasul

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal 1 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2

For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action
pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal pro. prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be
necessary determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 3

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing
concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering
that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged
prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is
based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as
accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no
double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were
allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the
civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery andspurious.

6. Prejudicial Question in Marriages

a. Landicho v. Relova

To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice
Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
.................................................................................................The prejudicial question — we further said —
must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another
court............................. These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for
annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground
that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's
guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy ..................................................................... "

The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then
on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in
the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of
respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity o
the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party
complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could
have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial
question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge
abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

b. Wiegel v. Sempio Diy (Aug 18, 1968)

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.

c. Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (July 31, 2000)

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot
be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

d. Mercado v. Tan (August 1, 2000)

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission
believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if
such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowedto marry again. x x x."
 In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages
delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.

e. Morigo v. People (Feb 6, 2004)

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is
no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void
ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once,
but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his
defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic

f. People v. Odtuhan, July 17, 2013.

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after
the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the
facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither
may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established
rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence

7. Rule on filing fees in civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action

D. Preliminary investigation

1. Nature of right
2. Purposes of preliminary investigation
3. What is probable cause. What are the instances when there is a need for determination of probable cause?
4. Difference between Probable Cause determined by the Prosecutor (Preliminary Investigation) and by a Judge
(Preliminary Examination)

Case: Mendoza vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.

The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or
not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause
in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is
enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting: Judges and Prosecutors
alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should
be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by
the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.(Emphasis supplied)

5. Who may conduct determination of existence of probable cause in PI?

6. Resolution of investigation prosecutor, Review
7. When warrant of arrest may issue.
8. When it is not necessary:
9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation
10. Remedies of accused if there was no preliminary investigation
11. Inquest
a. Purpose: determine whether or not the person detained should remain under custody and then charged
in court.
b. Initial duty of the inquest prosecutor is to determine whether the detained person has been lawfully
arrested in accordance with Sec. 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113.

12. Action of the Judge upon Filing of the Information

a. Crespo v. Mogul, June 30, 1987

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

CASES:
a. Community Rural Bank v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34
b. Serag v. Court of Appeals, 473 SCRA 590
c. Soriano v. People, G.R. No.162336, February 1, 2010
d. Samuel Lee v. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010
e. Okabe v. Gutierrez, May 27, 2004, G.R.No. 150185
f. Estrada v. Ombudsman (21 January 2015)
g. Quisay v. People (13 January 2016)
h. Cajipe v. People (23 April 2014)
i. People v. Dela Torre-Yadao (13 November 2012)
j. Artillero vs Casimiro (25 April 2012)