Sie sind auf Seite 1von 10

special article

1948: The Crucial Year in the History of

Jammu and Kashmir

Rakesh Ankit

The involvement of the British in Kashmir even after 1
India’s and Pakistan’s independence, British realpolitik, 948 was a fatal year for Jammu and Kashmir. Containing
partisan politics, a year-long war, diplomatic deliberations
crystallisation of Cold War politics and an “idealist” infant
and nationalistic public space, 1948 set Kashmir on the path
United Nations – all had major roles to play in the to where it is today. It saw India’s military capabilities being
imbroglio between India and Pakistan over the state. A e­xhibited in spring (March-June) and winter (October-December),
historical overview of the events in 1948 that “sealed the Pakistan’s moral position being undermined by the involvement
of its army in summer (May) and its admission in autumn
fate of Jammu and Kashmir” is presented here after
(­August), and, British interests being achieved by its nationals
perusing papers of the British government of that time, present in warring military-bureaucratic machines. The year
which have been released after 60 years. which saw the exit of Mahatma Gandhi, Mohammad Ali Jinnah
and Louis Mountbatten from the political scene of the sub-­continent
began with the Kashmir crisis reaching the United Nations and
ended with the agreement on the ceasefire which was proclaimed
on 1 January, to come into effect from 5 January 1949.
If 1948 had the realpolitik of the British interests in south Asia,
central Asia and west Asia affecting the evolution of the Kashmir
conflict and shaping the international response to it, it also saw
the idealism of the United Nations Commission on India and
P­akistan (UNCIP) set up by an infant United Nations. Over and
above all, 1948 showed the continuity of the British involvement
and its very definite perceptions about the origin, evolution and
the impact of the Kashmir crisis on the Imperial/Commonwealth
defence strategy – best personified by the elevation of generals
Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey to the post of the commander-in-
chief of the Indian and Pakistani armies, succeeding generals
Rob Lockhart and Frank Messervy, respectively.
This essay is a political history of Kashmir in 1948 which has
been overshadowed by the Indian independence and Partition of
1947. It shows that 1948 is, in many ways, more important in the
subsequent history of India-Pakistan relations over Kashmir as
well as the international involvement in the subcontinent. It was
in 1948 that the combustion of 1947, in Kashmir, assumed matu-
rity and fulfilment. The tragedy of 1947 was essentially commu-
nal while 1948 saw disparate issues – British interests, Indian
outrage and Pakistani resentment competing over Kashmir.
The spontaneity of the differences in Kashmir (Poonch and
Gilgit) in August-September 1947 as well as the raid of October
gave way to greater planning and organisation in 1948. Gone
were the hasty calls to communalism or nationalism; the
­whimsical decisions and decision-makers of 1947-48 saw dis­
putants digging heels. Interests were entrenched, ideologies
­clarified and intents established.
Rakesh Ankit ( studied history at Delhi Most importantly, 1948 saw the crystallisation of the Cold War
and Oxford.
politics on the “internationalisation” of the Kashmir crisis.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11 49
speciAl article

E­specially, of the overwhelming British (and by the end of the with the increasingly autonomous and assertive American
year American as well) attempt to safeguard its vital interests in i­nvolvement there “without due regard to British interests”,4
the region with respect to the simultaneously emerging Cold War a­nxious about Egypt and Iraq and arguing for “…a pan-Islamic
[political and geostrategic (aimed at the former communist federation/Arab league…to thwart Russia”.5 Against this back-
S­oviet Union in central Asia) and economic and religious (aimed drop, the Kashmir conflict made them concerned about losing
at the “Islamic” west Asia)]. control of Pakistan as well.
At a time when weak and fragile India and Pakistan had just Losing Pakistan was not an option for London. The British
begun to recreate themselves, they jostled with each other for the chief of staff (COS) had underlined this five times between May
control of Kashmir for different reasons. While they knew what 1945 – when Pakistan was but an idea of a few – and July 1947,
they wanted they were not allowed to pursue it the way they when it was about to be a reality for all. They had first reported to
wanted by the considerable presence of British individuals and W­inston Churchill that Britain must retain its military connec-
geostrategic interests. The undeclared, limited war of 1948 was tion with India in view of the “Soviet menace” for India was a
fought between groups, not properly led and armies, not even led valuable base for force deployment, a transit point for air and sea
by their own nationals. communications, a large reserve of manpower, and, had air bases
in the north-west from which Britain could threaten Soviet mili-
International Geopolitics tary installations,6 then repeated to Clement Attlee the impor-
Avoiding the existing, essentially domestic, historiography, this tance of these north-west airfields.7 In July 1946, they identified
paper focuses on the international geopolitics of 1948 and Kash- the crucial arc from Turkey to Pakistan, in view of essential oil sup-
mir’s role in it due to its location, the deeper significance of its plies, defence and communications requirements, with the R­ussian
impact on British relationship with the Arab-Muslim world as threat.8 In November 1946, they summed up that “Western India”
well as the former communist Soviet world due to its dominant (post-1947 Pakistan) – with Karachi and Peshawar – was strategi-
Muslim composition and political accession to India and the cally and ideologically crucial for British Commonwealth inter-
h­istorical continuity of British concerns on the north-west of the ests.9 Five weeks before Partition, the COS concluded:
Indian subcontinent. It argues that throughout 1948, the British The area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in the conti-
contained the actual fighting in Kashmir and dominated, not un- nent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements could be
naturally given their familiarity, the discussions at the UN. They met by an agreement with Pakistan alone. We do not therefore con-
attempted to bring in the US as an influential mediator between sider that failure to obtain the [defence] agreement with India would
cause us to modify any of our requirements.10
India and Pakistan, with the result that by the mid-1950s the US
involvement in the subcontinent was set in stone. It was 1948 It was with this mindset that the British COS observed the out-
which saw the transformation of a regional conflict to a national break of hostilities in Kashmir in October 1947. One of its civilian
question and then an international concern. The domestic dis­ counterparts, the Commonwealth Relations Office (hereafter
abilities of 1947 gave way to international involvement in 1948 as CRO), saw a weak Pakistan facing a materially stronger and
the dominating feature of the Kashmir conflict. a­ggressive India and envisaged the possible downfall of Pakistan
The year 1948 shocked the British imperatives, the Indian with the probable participation of the frontier tribes, Afghans
­innocence and the Pakistani insecurities. For the former, it set in and Soviet Russia. It foresaw either the emergence of another
stone the strategic necessity to confront the former Soviet Union Palestine situation on a greater scale or the disappearance of
in the e­ntire volatile and difficult region from Turkey to Tibet P­akistan with considerable effects, in both cases, on west Asia.11
thus providing the ultimate prism through which Britain per- Consequently, it advised help to Pakistan to prevent its collapse
ceived events in this arc. For the latter two, it so drilled the re- which would be “understood as Her Majesty’s Government’s
spective sets of nationalist passions, emotions of bitterness and (HMG) failure as Partition plan was sponsored as a British Act of
distrust and p­olitical imperatives that anything about the other Parliament” and to prevent “collapse and chaos along the NWFP
became fundamental to everything about the self. Having mined – North West Frontier Province – (which) will profoundly affect
the archives and observed the prejudices therein, I think that the imperial strategy…even at the risk of ruining our present entirely
various p­ositions in 1948 were more subjective than each realised friendly relations with the ­Indian government”.12
but less so than the others charged. Since 1948, “too many truths The CRO believed that “powerful forces in India, which bitterly
have been buried”.1 resented Partition, were determined to bring about the collapse
of Pakistan…by the method of economic pressure” and would
2 e­xploit the Kashmir conflict “as an additional factor” to this end.13
As 1948 opened, the Kashmir conflict was the last thing Britain This belief was strengthened by such reports as Claude Auchin-
needed – for two reasons. First, the British military minds held leck’s (Supreme Commander, India-Pakistan, 1947) sent six weeks
that they needed both India and Pakistan to secure “the peace, into Partition:
welfare and security…from the Mediterranean to the China Sea”2
I have no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present India
and to confront the “intrigue from Sinkiang and intervention
Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent
from north” with “implications far beyond Kashmir”3 but was the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this,
now forced to choose one. Second, they had been worried about I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers, and
the weakening strategic hold in Palestine and Greece, unhappy indeed, by all responsible British officers cognisant of the situation.14

50 march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
special article
The Russia Angle On 24 October, New Delhi received the first formal appeal
Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, too, shared this axiomatic concern from Hari Singh as well as an informal tip-off which George
that India did not play fair in the division of military and eco- Cunningham (governor of the NWFP, 1937-46 and August
nomic assets leaving Pakistan in a difficult situation which would 1947-48) sent to Rob ­Lockhart, the commander-in-chief (C-in-C),
be worsened by India’s control over Kashmir.15 The CRO further August-December 1947. Events of the next three days are still a
cautioned that Russia was bound to be interested “in what is hap- topic of controversy.
pening next to the Soviet border”16 and felt that Kashmir ought to On 25 October, Hari Singh left Srinagar for Jammu. The Times
go to Pakistan, otherwise it would be “overrun from the north- reported that Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan had entered
west and lost to the British Commonwealth”.17 The overarching ­Kashmir and cut the road from Rawalpindi to Srinagar. Lockhart
conviction in 1947 was “to back Pakistan (over K­ashmir) in the started preparing military plans and officers were sent to Srina-
interests of Imperial Defence”18 to avoid repercussions elsewhere gar to assess the situation along with V P Menon. Nehru outlined
given its “huge Islamic aspect”.19 In 1948, it became imperative to the Indian attitude to Attlee. The next day, Attlee wrote to both
stop a desperate Pakistan from making overtures to Russia20 and Nehru and Liaquat urging them to “restore order in Kashmir”.
this was shared with the Americans to cooperate on policy at the Indian military plans were being finalised as the officers and
United Nations.21 M­enon reported back from Srinagar. On the morning of 27,
The Foreign Office (hereafter FO) too viewed the Kashmir con- V P Menon left for Jammu and got M M Batra (Hari Singh’s d­eputy
flict as a religious war which “might be used by Russia as a pretext prime minister) to sign the Instrument of Accession and the
for intervening”.22 It felt that the “Russians tend to favour India as I­ndian troops landed in Srinagar.
against Pakistan”.23 Moreover, any initiatives had to keep in mind Lawrence Graffety-Smith, the UK High Commissioner in Paki-
“the present difficult position over Palestine” which made any stan (1947-51), spoke for many when he sent this report to London
“talks about HMG being unfair to Pakistan (over K­ashmir) undesir- two days after Kashmir’s accession to India:
able”.24 It reminded the Muslim countries via its embassies: Indian government’s acceptance of accession of Kashmir [was] the
HMG might easily have handed over the whole of India to the Hindu heaviest blow yet sustained by Pakistan in her struggle for existence.
majority. But they loyally protected the Muslim minority, even to the Strategically, Pakistan’s frontiers have been greatly extended as a hos-
point of facilitating the creation of a separate independent Muslim state tile India gains access to NWFP. This will lead to a redefinition of the
by going out of their way. This is what the Muslims themselves demand- Afghan policy for worse. Second, Russian interests will be aroused in
ed. We have recognised Pakistan as a Dominion and have supported its Gilgit and NWFP which creates a new international situation which
admission to UNO. We would always come to Pakistan’s help.25 HMG and the US government cannot overlook. Third, there is a serious
threat to Pakistan’s irrigation systems; hydroelectric projects from the
As Pakistan’s political existence was not considered by the FO accession [all five rivers draining the Pakistani Punjab flow from I­ndia,
“as a good risk”,26 there was to be no question of “throwing the three through Kashmir] and finally, two-three million Kashmiri
­Muslims will worsen the already massive refugee problem with five-
Muslim lamb to the Hindu wolf over Kashmir”27 where events
and-a-half million Muslims having been driven out of East Punjab.28
were rapidly deteriorating. On 9 August 1947, the Muslim Poonch
started to stir against the Hindu Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh On 31 October, the CRO emphasised Kashmir’s “unnatural
responded by getting rid of his Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak a­ccession to India”, given its Muslim population, transport and
two days later. On 14 August, Kashmir signed a “standstill agree- communication links and the trade relations with Pakistan estab-
ment” with Pakistan which was violated by the latter from 9 Sep- lished by the 1870 customs agreement. It also noted that Pakistan
tember onwards when it cut off the supplies of sugar and petrol to had been heavily weakened by the refugee problem and it had
Kashmir. There then followed a whirlwind of changes in key considerable difficulty in imposing its authority over local offi-
personnel(s). On 29 September, brigadier Henry Scott (chief of cials. Finally, India had been unnecessarily provocative by
staff, J&K State Forces, 1936-47) left Kashmir and was succeeded a­ccepting the provisional accession of Kashmir and sending Sikh
by brigadier Rajinder Singh. On 6 October, Sheikh Abdullah was troops with no prior consultation with Pakistan.29 The CRO had
released in Srinagar whereupon he travelled to Delhi to meet been kept aware of the events in Kashmir in 1947 by W F Webb
J­awaharlal Nehru. On 11 October Mehr Chand Mahajan took over (the British resident in Srinagar, till February) and major
as the new prime minister from brigadier Janak Singh who had W P Cranson (formerly of the Indian Political Service, but
been holding the temporary charge since Kak’s ouster. Four days a­ttached after independence to the UK High Commission in
later, Mahajan complained to Clement Attlee and Liaquat Ali I­ndia), in addition to Henry Scott, in particular the threats made
Khan against the violation of Standstill Agreement by Pakistan; by the Pir of Manki Sharif, the economic blockade imposed on
on 18 October, he repeated his complaints to Jinnah. Liaquat and Kashmir by Pakistan and the intent of invasion on behalf of the
Jinnah denied these charges and invited Mahajan to Karachi for tribesmen in Hunza, Dir and Chitral.30 It had anticipated the pos-
parleys on 19 and 20 October, respectively. sibility of Pakistan moving beyond threats of invasion, border
raids and the economic blockade31 but opted against “intervening
Hari Singh’s Appeal with the government of Pakistan for obvious reasons”.32
While these communications were producing little results, from George Cunningham’s diary entries from 6 October 1947 on-
20 October onwards the events on grounds moved with discon- wards establish the involvement of Rawalpindi and knowledge/
certing speed. On that day the first raiders started for Poonch, approval of Karachi in the entry of tribesmen into Kashmir.33
Domel and Baramulla entering Muzaffarabad two days later. In his correspondences with E F L Wood (Lord Halifax) and
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11 51
speciAl article

Louis Mountbatten, he confirmed that “official eyes have been raise a conflagration on the whole frontier. These c­onsiderations, how-
closed to make the facilities for the tribesmen available”.34 Twenty ever, do not condone the apparently tacit acceptance of tribal incursions
by the Pakistan Government and so there r­emains a handle for the Indi-
years later, an embittered Iskander Mirza in exile in London re- an Government to point to Pakistan as aggressor.42
membered “all those dishonourable intrigues so very rampant
since the very i­nception of Pakistan” in a letter to Olaf Caroe (Gov- While the permanent representative of England (“His ­Majesty’s
ernor of the NWFP until August 1947), “…what did the politicians Government” (HMG)) at the UN – since its inception – had been
do to Sir George. Behind his back they pushed tribesmen into the redoubtable Alexander Cadogan, for the deliberations on
Kashmir...”35 Cunningham – along with Caroe – believed that the Kashmir, Attlee appointed Philip Noel-Baker who also headed
Kashmir crisis lay intertwined with the imperatives of Pakistan’s the CRO (1947-50). He too was worried that
and, by extension, Asian subcontinent’s defence against Russia in Incursions now taking place in Kashmir constitute an “armed attack”
the NWFP and against Afghanistan and Iran in Baluchistan.36 They upon Indian territory in view of their scale and of the fact that Kashmir
were strongly supported by Robert Francis Mudie (governor of has acceded to the Indian Union. This is so irrespective of whether f­orces
West Punjab, 1947-49), who looked upon Pakistan as “the barrier in question are organised or disorganised or whether they are control-
led by, or enjoy the convenience of, Government of Pakistan. India is
which prevents Communism spreading south of the Himalayas”
therefore entitled to take measures which she may deem necessary for
and “should be preserved intact”.37 self-defence pending definitive action by Security Council to restore
peace – prima facie – repelling invaders but possibly pursuit of invaders
Split in London into Pakistan territory. Security Council could not decide out of hand
The views of Cunningham, Caroe and Mudie did not go unchal- that India was not justified in so doing in the case envisaged.43
lenged. By the end of 1947, London was well and truly split. Thus, given its importance, Pakistan’s physical survival was
S­tafford Cripps and Pug Ismay (with powerful support from the first “most important consideration” for which Noel-Baker
Mountbatten) were pro-India whereas Bevin and Philip Noel-Baker was to dissuade India from invading Pakistan from East Punjab
were pro-Pakistan. The two British high commissioners meanwhile by invoking Article 51 of the UN charter.44
were engaged in their own “telegraphic war”.38 Prime Minister At-
tlee – who had old links with Nehru which were never the same In the United Nations
after 1948 – tended to look at “Pakistan as the more valuable ally The first hint of the diplomatic line that Britain was going to adopt
and India as the more valuable partner”; an equivocation which in the UN came at the end of the first week of 1948 when Graffety-
general Frank Messervy (C-in-C Pakistan, 1947-48) interpreted as Smith made it clear to the CRO that there is no use in taking into
being pro-Pakistan.39 While the former camp wanted the prime account the Indian claim to a legal obligation to d­efend Kashmir
minister to pressurise Jinnah “to stop fighting” – in effect charging as it was unlikely to command acceptance in P­akistan.45 Three
him with major responsibility for the raid,40 the latter group ex- days later, the CRO – while spelling out the “­important considera-
pressed doubts “whether Jinnah could a­ctually have stopped the tions affecting our attitude in the Security Council” – cautioned
movement of tribesmen however ardently he  had desired” and Noel-Baker to be “particularly careful to avoid giving Pakistan the
successfully counselled against sending such a message.41 impression that we are siding with ­India. In view of the Palestine
By the end of 1947, “the movement of tribesmen” and the war it situation this would carry the risk of aligning the whole of Islam
caused were already two months old. In November – the first against us”. Bevin at the FO, too, invoked the “Palestine parallel”.46
month of the battle – raiders occupied Bhimber, Rajouri, Rawalkot Noel-Baker was, however, also warned to be careful in his ­handling
and threatened Kotli, Poonch and Naoshera. Indian troops res­ of the Indians “on account of their emotional condition [and] their
ponded by freeing Baramulla and then entered Uri – 65 miles respect for legal processes”.47
west from Srinagar – driving back the raiders. On 17 November, On 12 January 1948, the CRO wrote to its high commissions in
Jhangar was relieved and the following day the raiders were Washington, Delhi, and Karachi and to its UN delegation in New
pushed out of Naoshera. In the last week of November, raiders York to ensure that “any action taken by the Security Council
and Indian troops exchanged Mirpur and Kotli, respectively. In should not prejudice our strategic requirements in India and
December, Indian military plans for winter were finalised – relief P­akistan”.48 Attlee himself listed these in a message to Cadogan:
of Poonch, advance on Bhimber and control of Jhelum valley “as “check hostile Afghanistan, discourage ‘Pathanistan’ and inde-
far west as possible” even as the raiders reoccupied Jhangar. pendent Kashmir (otherwise) Russia would cause mischief”.49
Simultaneously, British missions in Australia, New Zealand and
3 South Africa were cautioned that, “in view of the Palestine situa-
On the first day of 1948, India took the Kashmir issue to the UN tion, we must avoid giving Pakistan impression that we are siding
acting on the advice Mountbatten had given to Nehru almost a with India against her (as) this would carry the risk of aligning
month ago (9 December). On the same day, the CRO appraised the whole of Islam against us”.50
the UK delegation in New York that: It was clear that the CRO did not see “how Pakistan govern-
Pakistan cannot be held blameless regarding the entry of tribesmen into ment could be expected to get tribesmen out of Kashmir without
Kashmir in that encouragement and assistance were given by l­ocal gov- first putting their own force in”.51 While it agreed that
ernment officials in the NWFP and no authoritative disapproval of tribal
action has been uttered by any high official of the Pakistan Government. There is evidence to show that transit facilities, the use of Pakistan
On the other hand, the Pakistan Government is not militarily strong t­erritory as a base for operations, the active participation of
enough to control the tribes by force and any attempt to do so might Pakistan nationals, the provision of equipment from Pakistan – and

52 march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
special article
later on – active help by Pakistan officers, including training and guid- resolution (47) of 21 April. Given that Bevin did not want the UNSC
ance were given by Pakistan [It complicated this straightforward as- to be involved in Kashmir for the fear of the Soviet Union or a
sertion by distinguishing between] toleration of, or inability to pre-
Soviet satellite,59 it is not surprising that Britain was willing to go
vent, aid from being given and active giving of aid. Secondly, distinction
must be drawn between the actions of the Pakistan government and of to such lengths and put at stake its relationship with India. Noel-
Provincial governments on the one hand and those of certain of their Baker believed that “it seems…worthwhile to accept risk of un-
officials and nationals on the other. Finally, the timing of any ­established popularity and possible subsequent difficulty (with India)…since
aid must be seen in relation to the general course of events.52 war (between India and Pakistan)…would make strategic re-
Even as Gopalaswami Ayengar presented the Indian case at quirements unattainable”.60 He was convinced that “Pakistan’s
the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 15 January, the CRO moved to separate identity r­emained a challenge to Hindu ideology and ac-
express sympathy with the difficult situation faced by Pakistan: tion and India was determined to prevent any progress in con-
Because of the resentment amongst the tribes of the NWFP, the attacks struction and consolidation of Pakistan”.61 The FO was sympa-
on Muslims in East Punjab, Poonch and Jammu and the decision to thetic about Pakistan’s “inherited responsibility for [the] NWFP”,62
send Sikh troops by India into Kashmir. Second, any attempt to stop more so because the Afghan government which was “critical of
the movement of the tribesmen would probably have involved P­akistan Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir” might “encourage tribes to make
in a major frontier war which they were in no state to undertake.
difficulties for Pakistan”.63 While all these manipulations were
Third, the establishment of the Dominion of India in Kashmir was a
substantial blow to their prestige. Fourth, it gave India access to the taking place the hostilities were resumed on the battlefield. On
NWFP tribal areas with all the scope for mischief-making which this 23 January – after a lull of four weeks – Indian troops attacked
involved. Fifth, it reduced Pakistan’s hopes of pruning their defence and captured Kot. In the first week of February, Naoshera saw
budget by a friendly accommodation with the tribal elements. Sixth, it battle; in mid-March, Jhangar was freed again by Indian forces
placed India in a position to control some of the headworks of
and a month later, I­ndian troops entered Rajouri.
P­akistan’s irrigation systems and hydroelectric projects. Finally, there
was also the fear that there might occur in Kashmir a repetition of the
events in the East Punjab whereby Sikhs and Dogras carried out large- Indian Angst
scale massacres of Muslims designed to change the entire composition The bewilderment that emerged in India, quickly giving way to
of the population.53 resentment and hatred, was best presented by Mountbatten’s
The fact that the Pakistan’s government was involved with the complaint to Attlee:
raiders, repeatedly denied by Zafrulla Khan (foreign minister of
India’s complaint was passed over at the request of Zafrullah Khan,
Pakistan, 1947-54), was revealed to Noel-Baker as early as 16 Jan-
backed by Noel-Baker on 31 January to the extent that the cart was put
uary by Graffety-Smith who wrote: before the horse, i e, the plebiscite has become the first issue…I am at
Undoubtedly, staging camps [have been] occupied by tribesmen…­ a loss to understand why India who has been brought to her present
appreciable leakage of Pakistani equipment [has occurred] through predominant position in Asia largely through British efforts in the past
junior army and police officials…undoubtedly petrol-transport-food and which is the only country which is now likely to give a lead in the
[has been] provided. [There is an] embarrassing great gap between Far East, is being treated this way. The policy which you initiated and
proclaimed theory by Pakistan leaders and actions of their which I have endeavoured to carry out during the past year is now
s­ubordinates.54 b­eing compromised by the leaning towards Pakistan’s cause and Noel-
Baker’s obvious antagonism to India.64 Similarly, the other ‘very pro-
Noel-Baker chose to not merely ignore but bury this in the Indian’,65 Cripps pointed out to Attlee that ‘the issue [is] whether the
face of Pakistan’s strategic utility against “Russian aggres- action of Pakistan in permitting and encouraging the passage of
tribesmen across their territory to attack Kashmir was an act of
sion”.55 He was convinced that “Russia’s game is to prevent a
a­ggression against India?’66
settlement (on Kashmir) and then to bring about anarchy and
chaos”.56 Further, he held that even if Pakistan closed its A word about Noel-Baker’s “obvious antagonism” would not be
K­ashmir frontiers, there would still be heavy bloodshed before out of place here. Condemning the Indian view on Kashmir as
the Muslim resistance in Kashmir was overcome and that “unrealistic”, the “anti-Indian”67 Noel-Baker wrote that
I­ndia’s plan for the preparation of the plebiscite was unfair as the UNSC will not condemn Pakistan as aggressor because it will not
opposed to Pakistan’s “practical plan for stopping the fighting rule out events before the accession of Kashmir to India [and] the
and securing a fair plebiscite – similar to almost every point to s­ingle point of Pakistan’s complicity in the alleged aggression against
the British brief”.57 Kashmir cannot be the end-all of the task of the Council.68
Britain used its position as the country with unrivalled influ- Noel-Baker doubted India’s legal case, dismissed its political
ence in, and knowledge of, the subcontinent to manipulate the case, held Hari Singh responsible for all that was wrong with
UNSC. Exactly who was pulling the strings behind the scenes Kashmir, drew parallel with the Junagadh situation and argued
throughout these negotiations is shown by a telegram sent by the for Pakistan’s equal interest in Kashmir on security grounds.69
UK delegation to the CRO three weeks into 1948. It refers to the What – apart from Noel-Baker’s “obvious antagonism” – con-
resolution of 17 January 1948 moved by Van Langenhove, the sumed the UK delegation to UN was “power politics” and “strate-
­Belgian chairman of the UNSC, and assures London that “the fact gic consequences of the creation of the exposed situation of Kash-
that he is largely guided by us is not known…and we take every mir”.70 And similarly the widely held view at London was that it
precaution to ensure that it is not known…”58 Three days later, was “morally and practically binding on us that the maximum
the UNSC passed a resolution (39) establishing a three-member pressure should be exerted on India to bring them out of the
UNCIP, the membership of which was later enlarged to five by the n­arrow legalism of their case”.71
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11 53
speciAl article

However, “the narrow legalism” of India saw the establishment The CRO finally informed Washington about the “indisputable
of Sheikh Abdullah’s government on 5 March. In April 1948, the presence” of Pakistan troops in Kashmir on 26 May 1948.80 The
US offered Pakistan free training courses for officers72 even as Americans accepted their view that “it will be better not to probe
Britain became very concerned about the situation regarding this matter further with Pakistan (this is probably because the
military supplies in Pakistan. Graffety-Smith repeatedly made it Americans want to remain on friendly terms with Pakistan in
plain that banning the supply of military equipment by Britain spite of the tension over Palestine and the embargo on the sale of
“would cause grave and dangerous resentment in Pakistan”.73 arms)…”81 The FO considered the Muslim world as a whole and
Cunningham wrote to the CRO, on 18 April 1948 that “it is enor- any deterioration in Pakistan’s situation in Kashmir was not con-
mously important to help [Pakistan] on the two matters of Kash- sidered in British interests there,82 more so, since the creation of
mir and munitions supply [and] officer’s training”, else “Pakistan Israel. The Palestine imbroglio was thorny not only because of the
might easily slip out of the Commonwealth”.74 On 4 May 1948, al- misunderstandings it had created in the Anglo-American special
most a 100 days before Pakistan publicly admitted the presence relationship but also because it, along with the upcoming Presi-
of its troops in Kashmir, Graffety-Smith unambiguously con- dential election, made the Americans unwilling to take a lead
firmed to the CRO that not only Pakistan troops, but also two r­egarding Kashmir.83 Accordingly, the UK delegation was directed
B­ritish officers (Lt Col Milne and Captain Skellon), were in on 8 June 1948 to “avoid, if possible, any discussion in the Security
K­ashmir looking into the refugee problem and that General Council of the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir…”84
Gracey “is certainly aware of all that goes on”.75 However, it was Letters exchanged between Noel-Baker and the Defence Min-
swiftly decided that no useful action could be taken with the ister A V Alexander in June 1948 admitted the presence of “three
P­akistan government on the matter at that stage, not only be- battalions of Pakistan troops in Kashmir for some weeks” and
cause it could be disclosed that General Douglas Gracey (C-in-C agreed to “not press any enquiries about these…”85 The presence
Pakistan, 1948-51) was the source of information, but because the of the troops, it was argued, was necessary “to bolster the local
refugee problem and potential collapse of Pakistan’s economy Muslim morale (and) to prevent a great disruptive flow of refu-
and administration weighed heavily in British concerns such that gees into Pakistan territory” and it was agreed to “not indicate
it condoned the presence of troops and sought to justify it by whether we regard it as true or not”.86 As the summer of 1948
c­iting “defensive purposes”.76 General Roy Bucher (C-in-C India, began, the British “official mind” was plagued by the fears sur-
1948-49) and Gracey, in regular touch, had met between 26 and rounding “stand down”, “mass migration”, “strategic advantage”,
28 March 1948 to apprise each other of the military strategies of “the cry of Islam in danger” and “the communist menace”.87
the two dominions and formulate defensive positions on both The fact that the FO and the CRO “knew in advance about the
sides so as to prevent the outbreak of an all-out war. decision to send regular Pakistan troops into the state [Kashmir]”
is also confirmed by Bucher who shared it with A C B Symon
British Leanings (deputy high commissioner India, 1946-49) and Terence Shone
Against this backdrop it is remarkable that throughout May 1948, (high commissioner India, 1946-48) in July 1948. While Symon
Bucher refused to believe the existence of Pakistan regular bat- wanted to “let the matter rest so that no ill-feeling is generated”,
talions in Kashmir, even when, on 19 May, Gracey had admitted Bucher “did not know what to do”!88 Shone revealed the extent to
to the presence of two mountain guns, three to four battalions which Bucher exercised influence on the Indian cabinet to the
and even a couple of British officers in Kashmir for “defensive CRO by claiming that the prolonged Indian silence on the pres-
purposes” to stop the Indian advance beyond Mirpur, Poonch, ence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir was due to the service chiefs,
Uri.77 The reason though was best summed up by Bevin in sepa- “particularly Bucher counselling them to keep quiet. He has a lot
rate letters to Attlee and Noel-Baker to whom he stressed that he of influence with the PM, Sardar Patel and the Defence Minister
was “most anxious not to lose the confidence of the government and is a very restraining influence on the Cabinet”.89
and people of Pakistan” given “the trend of feeling” there for two Meanwhile, on 16 June 1948, the UNCIP began its first formal
all-important reasons: “serious consequences to the already diffi- session at Geneva. Its members were Czechoslovakia (Josef Kor-
cult relations with the Muslim world” and “Russian penetration”.78 bel – selected by India on 10 February), Argentina (Ricardo J Siri
Further, it was feared that any action would lead to a certain col- – selected by Pakistan on 7 May), Belgium (Egbert Graeffe – nom-
lapse of Pakistan because Britain would have to issue “stand down” inated by the UNSC on 23 April), Columbia (Afredo Lozano –
instructions to its officers serving in the Indian and the Pakistani nominated by the UNSC on 23 April) and USA (J Klahr Huddle –
armies. For the latter this would mean the crippling loss of 460 nominated by the UNSC on 7 May). On 7 July, it reached India and
British officers including those serving in the important posts of met Girija Shankar Bajpai on 13 July. On 4 August Zafrulla Khan
the C-in-C, COS, quarter-master general of forces, etc.79 in Karachi met the UNCIP and dropped the “bombshell” (as later
And so the regular troops of the two dominions finally faced called by Josef Korbel) of the presence of 3 brigades of Pakistani
each other from May onwards. India launched its spring offen- regular troops in Kashmir. On 13 August, for the first time, it pro-
sive along the Uri-Domel road up to the Pakistan border on 18 posed a ceasefire resolution. While Pakistan responded inconclu-
May. Early success came in the form of Tithwal but the advance sively to the resolution in a memorandum on 19 August, the fol-
was halted a week later. In June, Indian moves towards Muzaf- lowing day India accepted the resolution “in view of clarifica-
farabad and Chinari-Chakothi were halted, as well. Indian army tions”. On 25 August, the UNCIP endorsed Indian interpretation
found success at Kargil and Drass, instead. and acceptance of the resolution and answered the Pakistani
54 march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
special article

memorandum two days later. Expectedly, Pakistan rejected the Nonetheless, given India’s size and significance, it was always a
resolution on 6 September. dilemma to
Gracey’s detailed presentation in front of the UNCIP in August whether…take more active steps to save Pakistan, thereby risking
1948 is the best elaboration of the British concerns about the mili- I­ndia’s secession from the Commonwealth or risk Pakistan’s collapse,
tary engagements of the year: the northern territories of Gilgit and thus losing an incalculable amount of prestige and influence in the
Muslim countries.
Hunza, along the Afghan, Soviet and Chinese frontiers and the
western territories of Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, along the border By October 1948, the FO seems to have made up its mind that:
with Pakistani Punjab. Gracey sought to i­mpress upon the mem- With the darkening world situation, that corner of the world repre-
bers of the UNCIP that if India gained an upper hand in the above- sented by Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India is bound to be one
mentioned areas then it would mean facing of the danger spots in Soviet schemes for expansion. The main bar to
unity in this region is the Kashmir dispute, and we cannot help feeling
the Indian army on the long Pakistan border within 30 miles of strate-
that this dispute should be viewed in the light of the wider considera-
gic railway leading from Peshawar through West Punjab to Lahore…
tions mentioned above.100
Occupation of Bhimber and Mirpur will give India the strategic advan-
tage of…sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum bridge
By November 1948, Britain had also intensified its efforts to
which is so vital for us. It will also give them control of the Mangla
headworks placing the irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their
contextualise the Kashmir issue in Cold War terms in order to
mercy…Furthermore, loss of Muzaffarabad-Kohala would have the persuade the US to take a greater interest. Cadogan personally
most far-reaching effect on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the requested George Marshall (US Secretary of State),
Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which it can
to secure the services of General Eisenhower in view of the signifi-
march in any time it wishes…It will encourage subversive elements such
cance of the Kashmir issue in the wider setting of recent developments
as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan... If Pakistan is not to face another
in South-east Asia and Far East, viz, spread of communism; Soviet
serious refugee problem…if civilian and military morale is not to be af-
military threat in NWFP and recent Communist successes in China.101
fected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to
be ­encouraged and let loose in Pakistan itself it is imperative that the In the same month Marshall visited the subcontinent and, after
­Indian army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line meeting the Pakistan premier Liaquat Ali Khan, was impressed
by the latter’s appreciation of the need for the restoration of sta-
While Gracey also believed that apart from Kashmir on ble conditions in both the Indian subcontinent and west Asia “at
H­yderabad too, India was “putting Pakistan into an impossible this time of tension with the Soviets”.102 The FO knew that
position”91 and communicated as much to Bucher, the latter M­arshall was unenthusiastic about playing a leading role in
h­imself was sympathetic that K­ashmir partly because of his own unhappy and unsuccessful
Pakistan is unable for political reasons to stop the movement of tribes- personal experience of playing peacemaker between Mao and
men from the NWFP, or of inhabitants of the Western Punjab into Kash- Chiang in 1946 and partly because he, not unnaturally, saw
mir. There is considerable enthusiasm in Pakistan for the liberation of K­ashmir – as a Commonwealth dispute – a British headache.
Kashmir.92 Bevin, therefore, personally warned Marshall:
Bucher felt it “well-nigh be impossible for Pakistan” to resist Kashmir was on the Soviet frontier. Russia might well intervene as she
this religious enthusiasm.93 He moderated general Carriappa’s had in Greece and China, playing on the tribes and on communal
proposal in June 1948 of air attacks on Jhelum bridges at f­eeling. Whoever controlled the valley of Kashmir controlled the
K­ohala and Lachhman Pattan; Mirpur and Gilgit because of s­trategic and commercial communications between India, Pakistan
and C­entral Asia.103
political consequences as well as his belief that Kashmir
affair weakens both India and Pakistan thus making the “rapid Also, there was always a sense that “if we give the Americans
spread of Communism all over Asia all the more likely”.94 He was the impression that we are trying to get them to pull one of our
to later a­cknowledge that “a friendly Kashmir is very vital to chestnuts out of the fire, we are unlikely to obtain their full
­Pakistan in terms of defence, water supplies and the n­ecessity to c­o-operation”104 as “[we have] many favours to ask of them and it
keep the NWFP quiet, in view of Pakistan’s lack of power”.95 would not do to exhaust our credit by being too persistent over
So whereas domestically the British generals were working Kashmir”.105
over time to calibrate the conflagration according to their needs,
internationally Josef Korbel, a member of the UNCIP, felt that A ‘Commonwealth Problem’
Kashmir had become the “plaything of Power Politics”.96 The In August 1948, there had been 300 British officers and 43 other
CRO, for its part, kept cautioning the delegation to bear in mind ranks in the Indian Army. The numbers for Pakistan were 460
that “the Indians should not attribute any initiative to us”.97 and 340, respectively. By November 1948, the figures were 230
L­ondon had a lot to feel unhappy about. India did not appreciate (India) and 440 (Pakistan).106 No surprise then that the Ameri-
either “the practical difficulties of getting the tribesmen out of cans maintained that Kashmir was a “Commonwealth problem”
Kashmir” or “the anxiety in NWFP and West Punjab for the fate of and were content to provide only sympathy and support to
Muslims in Kashmir” – issues important enough for the FO “to B­ritain, owing to its “little interest and knowledge” as well as
justify incurring some degree of ill-will from India”.98 India as a­lready having “too many international commitments”. More­
“the bigger partner” had committed the “original fundamental over in the beginning the US was not totally convinced about the
error” over Kashmir. As if this was not enough, India’s foreign British approach to the Kashmir problem. In early 1948 it had
policy made “no sense in the present conditions of the world”.99 some key objections. The legality of the instrument of accession,
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11 55
speciAl article

for one, was not in dispute for the US nor was Indian sovereignty probably on the advice and certainly with the concurrence of
over Kashmir. Consequently, it was not willing to endorse either s­enior British officers”.114 Nehru twice sought the withdrawal of
the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir or a UN takeover of the these “senior British officers”, in August and December 1948. On
administration of the region.107 The fact that by late 1948 these both occasions, Attlee demurred and gave the following reasons.
objections were overcome in the light of Cold War politics108 shows First, enforcement of a stand down might drive Pakistan to des-
the relentless and “dutiful” advocacy done by Britain for Pakistan perate measures. Second, some of the retired officers now serv-
– more so in the light of J F Walker’s report which came out in ing in Pakistan might defy the orders and stay on as volunteers.
­November – to prevent any anti-British feeling in Pakistan.109 Third, popular feeling against Europeans might be roused in
In Delhi, with the winter offensive of the Indian army about to ­Pakistan such that their evacuation might become necessary at a
start, Bucher, anxious to avoid a clash with Pakistan, was advo- time when the aircraft required could probably be found only by
cating a defensive stance and was trying to avoid any “precipitate d­iverting them from Berlin. Fourth, Pakistan might leave the
action on the part of… Carriappa” to the extent that he promised Commonwealth. Fifth, the hostility of the world’s Muslim popu-
to send general McCay (COS Pakistan, 1948) a personal signal lation towards the UK might be increased. And, finally, an inter-
should the Indian government “double-cross” him over the res­ nal collapse in Pakistan might result, producing chaos from
triction of advance during winter months into Mirpur-Kotli- which the communists would profit.115
Bhimbar-Domel-Muzaffarabad.110 With his “relative detach-
ment”,111 Bucher had, according to Shone, Debate in UN
Not only been ready to receive advice, he has constantly sought it and Accordingly, the debate in the UNSC concerned not so much
his influence – which has been considerable – has undoubtedly been ­India’s complaint against Pakistan as Pakistan’s demand that the
an accommodating force. With Carriappa’s appointment (announced future of Kashmir be considered in view of its own vulnerability
on 5 December 1948) our influence in military circles will therefore with respect to its unstable northwest frontier, an area that was
diminish and may disappear altogether.112
of great strategic importance for the retreating empire, the
In this last phase of the conflict, hostilities intensified as Indian emerging Commonwealth and the anti-communist block. On
troops captured Pir Badesa, after advancing west from Naoshera 22 Novem­ber, the first Interim Report was prepared by the UNSC
from 15 October. The famed “tank battle” at the Zoji la pass which was tabled at the Security Council and debate on Kashmir
(16,000 feet above sea-level) was fought on 1 November. Drass resumed three days later. Ceasefire proposals were laid out on 11
which had gone back to the raiders in August was recaptured in December which India accepted on 23 and Pakistan on 25 Decem-
mid-November as were Pir Kalwa and Mendhar which linked ber. As 1948 ended, Britain was engaged in persuading India not to
Jammu and Poonch garrisons. Kargil was reoccupied on 24 No- take any step which would force Pakistan to commit its air force
vember but then general Bucher stopped the Indian advance to- which would have given India the leverage to force the reluctant
wards Kotli, Bhimber and Mirpur. The respective air forces saw Britain to issue “stand down” orders. The “refugee” issue, the So-
action in the last month of the war when the Indian Air Force viet “threat”, the tribal problem and the “Muslim Block” cards were
bombed Palak, behind Kotli in the direction of Mirpur and the relentlessly played by the CRO and the FO throughout 1948.116
Pakistani Air Force responded by attacking Naoshera-Beri Pattan
area damaging the strategic Beri Pattan bridge. When India 4
a­ccepted the ceasefire proposal on 23 December, its army was From the first resolution introduced in the Security Council on
launched in a final advance to Kotli. 21 April 1948, rejected by both India and Pakistan, to the UNCIP
Bucher’s opposite number came in for even higher praise from r­esolution of 13 August 1948, which India accepted and Pakistan
Shone’s opposite number. Graffety-Smith reported to the CRO rejected and finally, the ceasefire proposals of 11 December 1948,
when the ceasefire was less than a fortnight away: which both accepted, the two issues of Kashmir’s accession to
I­ndia and India’s original complaint of aggression against Paki-
I am very well aware that General Gracey’s impulsive behaviour tem-
perament leads him to consider the situation less frigidly than General stan were slowly overshadowed by the question of the terms and
Bucher. But I believe this to be more or less irrelevant, for any British conditions for a plebiscite. Noel-Baker’s delegation to the UN
officer commanding the Pakistan army must consider present opera- oversaw this crucial shift of emphasis. British behaviour was
tions in Kashmir as more immediately critical and dangerous than dominated for British purposes for which a secure and strength-
they may appear in Delhi. Pakistan’s political and certainly her eco-
ened Pakistan was a necessity and for that Kashmir, or at any rate
nomic existence will be in the gravest jeopardy if West Kashmir falls
into unfriendly hands. [There is no doubt; I take it, in the mind of territories west to a certain line, was a necessity. Pakistan was
HMG] Fighting is now going on in areas peculiarly vital to Pakistan’s clearly the more valuable ally and its position was given “maxi-
survival. There seems to me a great difference in the relative urgency mum latitude in interpretation” to prevent disadvantageous mili-
of these considerations as they affect each Dominion and I doubt tary and/or diplomatic positions. The focus remained on avoid-
whether an attitude of detachment, however possible in Delhi is
ing a full-scale inter-dominion war as well to ensure for Pakistan
p­ossible or indeed permissible in the Pakistan C-in-C.113
a comparable diplomatic position to that of India. While Kashmir
This partisanship on the part of the British was privately can be called a “Commonwealth issue” in 1947, in 1948 it played
a­cknowledged in India. Shone admitted to Girija Shankar Bajpai itself out against complex and dynamic international conditions
(secretary-general, Ministry of External Affairs India, 1947-52) which made Britain keen to, first, ensure that India did not strike
that, “the Pakistan military operations must have been done, back at Pakistan in accordance with Article 51 of the UN charter;
56 march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
special article

second, overcome the problem posed by Kashmir’s legal acces- the Government of India, had been waiting for an opportunity to bring
sion to India which brought the matter of state sovereignty to the about this accession.119
forefront; third, underplay Pakistan’s multifarious involvement Then there was the Indian prime minister’s prickly personality
in the tribal invasion; and finally, ensure that the focus of the and “moralistic” foreign policy – highly unsatisfactory for Lon-
UNSC firmly remained on the question of a ceasefire linked with don and Washington in the face of “advancement of Communism
arrangements for a plebiscite. Britain had made up its mind that in Asia”.120 Archibald Nye (high commissioner to India, 1948-52)
“the point at issue is how to stop the fighting and bring about was unimpressed by the “unrealistic Indian thinking on foreign
conditions under which a fair plebiscite can be held rather than affairs”.121 Nye had,
arbitration between India and Pakistan”117 within five days of the No doubt that India has sinned more than Pakistan. Nehru is very
crisis reaching the UN. This meant steering the discussions emotional – not disposed to see reason. The problem is a psychological
t­owards a ceasefire and plebiscite plan away from India’s original one – what tactics to adopt with this particular man in these special
circumstances to achieve our objects’. [The answer for Nye was to]
formal complaint of aggression against Pakistan and from ‘put aside the merits of the case – its legalities and technicalities’ as
P­akistan’s involvement in the invasion. This worked well in the ‘this is no time to think of rights and wrongs’ and ‘[the] details of [the]
January-April negotiations but became difficult with the entry of debate must be risen over to give a broad view.122
Pakistan’s regular army into Kashmir from May 1948, informa- In March 1947, the Truman doctrine had been announced; in
tion which was publicly shared only in August 1948 when Z­afrulla June 1947 the Marshall Plan and Britain was naturally keen to
Khan admitted to it in front of the UNCIP whereupon it was extend this increasing US involvement in west Asia, central Asia,
a­ccepted as a fait accompli. the Indian subcontinent and east Asia, in view as much of her
London knew that India’s case was built largely on the “accept- own declining abilities as of the consolidation of communist
ance of the Maharaja’s accession” which it dismissed within a day forces in China and Indo-China.
so as to treat the two dominions as “equal parties in dispute”.118 The thrust of the British policy during 1948 was to “adjust our
As the Attlee administration summed up a year later: relations with India [and] avoid infuriating Pakistan”.123 To that
What in retrospect seems questionable about India’s action was not extent they left India in no doubt that a political settlement was
the despatch of troops to Srinagar, but the failure to seek the coopera- necessary in Kashmir, as opposed to a juridical consideration.124
tion of the Pakistan Government and propose the despatch also of a
The preferred policy – acknowledged as “extremely unfortunate”
Pakistan c­ ontingent and also their acceptance of the Maharaja’s acces-
sion. This was highly provocative to Pakistan, particularly as there – then was, to force the issue with India “in view of the grave
were good grounds for thinking that the Maharaja, and possibly also consequences to our relations with Pakistan”.125

notes 19 1.12.47, Scoones on Kashmir, MSS Eur D 714/84, (ref No8/1498); also see MSS Eur D 670/6, Cun-
1 Mark Kurlansky, 1968 (London: Vintage, 2005), IOR. ningham Papers, IOR.
p xviii. 20 13.5.48 and 14.5.48, F 6983/6/85 G and PM/48/52 37 11.11.48, Mudie to Maurice Hallett, MSS Eur D
2 26.11.47, F 15639/8800/85, FO 371/63574, The (Bevin to Attlee), FO 371/69717; TNA. 714/84, Mudie Papers, IOR.
National Archives (here after TNA), Kew. 21 11.5.48 and 14.5.48, London to New York and 38 P Patrick, DO 142/524, TNA.
3 November 1948, Tedder to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1, Washington, F 7041/6/85 and F 1377/6/85/G, FO 39 See MSS Eur D 670/6, Cunningham Papers and
Elmhirst Papers, Churchill Archives Centre (here- 371/69717, TNA. R Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon-Walker: Political
after, CAC), Churchill College, University of Cam- 22 6.11.47, F 146/86, FO 371/63570, TNA. Diaries 1932-1971 (London, 1991), p 22, 169, 172,
bridge. 23 23.10.47 and 5.11.47, F 14218/8966/85 and F 174; also see, 11.11.48, Noel-Baker to Gordon-
4 11.3.47, Middle East Strategy Security Assess- 14722/8800/85, FO 371/63574 and 63571, TNA. Walker, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
ment, 7/2/1, Pyman Papers, Kings College London 24 20.11.47 and 1.12.47, F 15381/8800/85 and F 15821, 40 31.10.47, Ismay to Noel-Baker, No 1142 and Shone
(hereafter KCL). FO 371/63568, TNA. to Noel-Baker, No 1144, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.
5 6.8.47 and 22.6.48, Middle East Strategy Security 25 4.12.47 and 6.12.47, Telegram Nos F 16039/8845/47 41 31.10.47, Noel-Baker to Ismay, 374/36 and Attlee
Assessment, 7/2/2 and 7/2/3, Pyman Papers, and 752, FO 371/63568 and 63571, TNA. to Ismay, Pol 1486/47, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR.
KCL. 26 27.11.47, Inverchapel to FO, F 15700/8966/85, FO 42 31.12.47, London to New York, No 4459, L/
6 19.5.45, PHP (45) 15 (0) Final, L/WS/1/983-988, 371/63574, TNA. WS/1/1148, IOR.
India Office Records (here after IOR), British Li- 27 20.11.47, 1.12.47, 16.12.47; F 15381/8800/85, F 43 1.1.48, New York to London, No 2, L/WS/1/1148,
brary. 15821, F 16424/8966/85, FO 371/63574, TNA. IOR.
7 18.4.46, Chief Of Staff (COS) Report No (46) 19 (0), 28 29.10.47, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, No 158, 44 3.1.48 and 6.1.48, London to New York, Nos 30
TNA. L/PS/13/1845 b; Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR; and 66, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.
8 10.7.46, Cabinet Papers (46) 267, CAB 129/11, FO also see 17.12.47, Cunningham to Halifax, MSS 45 7.1.48, Karachi to London, No 23, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.
371/52563, TNA. Eur D670/9, Cunningham Papers, IOR. 46 6.1.48, Sargent to Attlee about Bevin’s views, FO
9 29.11.46, COS (46-47) L/WS/1/1030, Tp (46), TNA. 29 31.10.47, No 1158, L/PS/13/1845b; also see 11.12.47, 800/470 IND/48/1, TNA.
10 7.7.47, COS Tp (47) 90, TNA. Cunningham Diary, MSS Eur D670/6, Cunning- 47 10.1.48, London to New York, No 131, L/
11 14.10.47, F200/102, Mountbatten Papers, IOR. ham Papers, IOR. WS/1/1148, IOR.
12 22.10.47, F200/103, Mountbatten Papers, IOR. 30 16.10.47, Scott’s report, Pol 1401/47, IOR. 48 12.1.48, Nos 85 and 110, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.
13 25.11.47, CRO to its missions worldwide, DO 31 16.10.47, Rumbold’s note on Scott’s report, Pol 49 21.1.48, F 1099/42, Attlee to Cadogan, FO
35/3178, TNA. 1401/47, IOR. 371/69706, TNA.
14 28.9.47, Auchinleck to London, MUL 1262, 32 16.10.47, Rumbold’s note on Mahajan’s request for 50 12.1.48, Nos 13, 14 and 23, L/WS/1/1140, IOR.
Auchinleck Papers, John Rylands Library (here restraining Pakistan to Attlee and 25.10.47, Rum- 51 14.1.48, London to New York, No 196, L/
after JRL), University of Manchester. bold’s note to Attlee summarising the above de- WS/1/1148, IOR.
15 3/6/9.1.48, F 452/6/85/G, FO 371/69705 and velopments, L/PS/13/1845b, IOR. 52 16.1.48, Pol 133/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.
24.12.47, Bevin to Mountbatten, F 16771/8800/85, 33 See MSS Eur D 670/6, Cunningham Papers, IOR. 53 16.1.48, Pol 134/48, L/WS/1/1148, IOR.
FO 371/63574, TNA. 34 See MSS Eur D 670/6 and 670/9, Cunningham 54 16.1.48, Graffety-Smith to Noel-Baker, No 22
16 26.2.48, CRO to its missions worldwide, DO Papers, IOR. (339), L/WS/1/1141, IOR.
133/73, TNA. 35 26.7.68, Mirza to Caroe, F 203/2, Caroe Papers, IOR. 55 20.1.48, Noel-Baker to CRO, No 135, L/WS/1/1141,
17 10.11.47, Carter’s minutes, DO 142/493, TNA. 36 13.6.46, speech by Cunningham at the RIIA (ref. IOR.
18 29.12.47, Scoones to Gordon-Walker, GNWR 1/6, No8/1244); 4.2.48, speech by Caroe at the Royal 56 9.2.48, T No 470, Noel-Baker to Shone, FO
Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC. Institute of International Affairs ( here after RIIA) 371/69710, TNA.

Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11 57
speciAl article
57 20.1.48, Noel-Baker to CRO, No 140, L/WS/1/1141, 82 20.4.48, Denning to Bevin, F 11800/6/85 G, FO Ind/48/33, FO 800/470 and T. No 12938, DO
IOR. 371/69721, TNA. 142/522, TNA.
58 21.1.48, New York to London, No 158, L/WS/1/1141, 83 28.5.48/4.6.48, F 7595/6/85 G and F 7931/6/85, 104 11/12.11.48, F 15818/6/85 G and Sargent to Attlee,
IOR. FO 371/69718, TNA. PM/OGS/94, FO 371/69723, TNA.
59 14.2.48, F 2383/6/85, FO 371/69709 and 15.4.48, 84 8.6.48, London to New York, No 2569, L/ 105 17.11.48, F 16051 G, FO 371/69723, TNA.
F 5514/6/85, FO 371/69715, TNA. WS/1/1152, IOR. 106 20.11.48, Karachi to London, No 540, L/
60 28.1.48, Noel-Baker to FO, No 189, L/WS/1/1141, 85 15.6.48 and 19.6.48, No G 2275/30, Y. No 20, L/ WS/1/1153, IOR.
IOR. WS/1/1142, IOR. 107 16.2.48, G. F. Curson (New York) to CRO, L/P and
61 10.2.48, Pol 6632/48, L/WS/1/1599, IOR. 86 18.6.48, London to New York, L/WS/1/1142, S/13/1939, IOR.
62 27.1.48, Cadogan to FO, T. No 357, FO 371/69707, IOR. 108 26.11.48, New York to London, No 127, L/
TNA. 87 23.6.48 and 29.7.48, Pol. 8869/48 and No 2535, WS/1/1153, IOR.
63 12.1.48, G. Squire to FO, F 488/6/85, FO 371/69705 L/WS/1/1599 and L/WS/1/1143, IOR; 25.6.48, 109 18.11.48, Karachi to London, No 1395, L/
and 29.1.48, F 1472/6/85, FO 371/69708, TNA. speech by Messervy at the RIIA (ref. No8/1558) WS/1/1187, IOR.
64 24.2.48, Mountbatten to Attlee, No 459, L/ and 21.6.48, Gracey to Elmhirst, ELMT 3/1, Elm- 110 27/29.11.48, Karachi and Delhi to London, Nos
WS/1/1141, IOR. hirst Papers, CAC. 1458 and 1461 L/WS/1153, IOR.
65 4.4.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC. 88 28.7.48, Delhi to London, No 2519, L/WS/1/1143, 111 24.12.48, Graffety-Smith to Nye, S/24, DO
66 26.2.48, Cripps to Attlee, PREM 8/1455/2, TNA. IOR. 142/524, TNA.
67 4.4.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC. 89 4.9.48, Delhi to London, No 1844, L/WS/1/1142, 112 6.12.48, Delhi to London, No 4193, L/WS/1/1217,
68 27.12.47, Noel-Baker to Shone, T. No 1590, DO IOR. IOR.
142/543, TNA. 90 Quoted in Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princ- 113 19.12.48, Karachi to London, No 1550, L/
69 See NBKR 4/419 and 420, Noel-Baker Papers, CAC. eton: PUP, 1954), pp 138-39. WS/1/1144, IOR.
70 17.3.48, New York to London, No 910, L/ 91 30.8.48, Gracey to Bucher (DO No 008/4/C-in-C), 114 20.12.48, Delhi to London, No 4359, L/WS/1/1144,
WS/1/1141, IOR. Bucher Papers, Templer Study Centre, National IOR.
71 18.3.48, Karachi to London, No 265, L/WS/1/1148, Army Museum (here after NAM). 115 23.12.48, Attlee to Nehru, No 4390, L/WS/1/1144,
IOR. 92 File No 8310-154-105, Bucher Papers, NAM. IOR.
72 12.4.48, Washington to London, L/WS/1/1187, 93 17.11.47, Bucher to Baldev Singh, No 6/C-in-C; 116 10.12.48, Karachi to London, No 80, L/WS/1/1144,
IOR. 24.9.48, Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File IOR.
73 23.4.48, Karachi to London, No 412, L/WS/1/1141, No 7901-87-6-1, Bucher Papers, NAM. 117 5.1.48, Outward telegram from the CRO to its
IOR. 94 24.6.48, Bucher to Patel and Elmhirst; 13.12.48, missions worldwide, L/P and S/13/1948, IOR.
74 18.4.1948, Cunningham to Carter, MSS Eur Bucher to Elizabeth Bucher, File No 7901-87-6-1, 118 28.10.47, Shone to CRO, L/PS/13/1845b; 29.10.47,
D670/9, Cunningham Papers, IOR. Bucher Papers, NAM. Noel-Baker to CRO, 8/47, L/PS/13/1845b; 29.10.47,
75 4.5.48, Karachi to London, No 465, L/WS/1/1142, 95 January 1951, 7901-87-6-3, Bucher Papers, NAM. Graffety-Smith to CRO, No 158, L/PS/13/1845b;
IOR. 96 13.9.48, Delhi to London, No 3194, L/WS/1/1145, 30.10.47, Noel-Baker to Ismay, 374/36, L/
76 8.5.48, Delhi to London, No 1303, L/WS/1/1142, IOR. PS/13/1845b; ‘appreciation of the Kashmir situa-
IOR. 97 2.10.48, London to New York, No 125, L/ tion’, L/PS/13/1845b and Pol 134/48, L/
WS/1/1145, IOR. WS/1/1148, CRO, IOR.
77 12/19/29.5.48, Karachi to London, Nos 1393, 1499
and 1657, L/WS/1/1142, IOR. 98 11.6.48 and 6.9.48, FO to CRO, F 8230/6/85, FO 119 Document No Pol 134/48, File No L/WS/1/1148,
371/69719 and 12711/6/85 S/24, FO 371/69721, IOR.
78 13.5.48, Bevin to Attlee, Ind/48/24, FO 800/470
and 9/10.8.48, Bevin to Noel-Baker, F 11799, TNA. 120 2.5.49, Noel-Baker to Attlee, DO 142/529, TNA.
11800/85/G, FO 371/69721, TNA. 99 28.9.48, Grey to Cadogan, F 13613/6/85, FO 121 21.6.49, Nye to Percival Liesching, DO 121/71,
79 14.5.48, Karachi to London, Pol. 8144/48, L/ 371/69721, TNA. TNA.
WS/1/1599 and 9.6.48, Delhi to London, No 1804, 100 21.10.48, DO 142/521, TNA. 122 28.12.48, Nye to Noel-Baker, DO 121/71, TNA.
L/WS/1/1153, IOR. 101 9.11.48, London to Washington, No 11995, L/ 123 5.3.48, GNWR 1/6, Gordon-Walker Papers, CAC.
80 26.5.48, London to Washington, No 2566, L/ WS/1/1153, IOR. 124 24.1.48 and 27.1.48, From New York to London,
WS/1/1152, IOR. 102 10.11.48, Karachi to London, No 366, L/ T Nos 195 and 223, FO 371/69707, TNA.
81 2.6.48, Washington to London, L/WS/1/1143, WS/1/1153, IOR. 125 10/20.9.49, Gordon-Walker to Liesching, DO
IOR. 103 27.10.48 and 6.12.48, Bevin to Marshall, 142/537, TNA.


Global Economic & Financial Crisis

Essays from Economic and Political Weekly
In this volume economists and policymakers from across the world address a number of aspects of the global economic crisis. One set of articles discusses
the structural causes of the financial crisis. A second focuses on banking and offers solutions for the future. A third examines the role of the US dollar in
the unfolding of the crisis. A fourth area of study is the impact on global income distribution. A fifth set of essays takes a long-term view of policy choices
confronting the governments of the world.
A separate section assesses the downturn in India, the state of the domestic financial sector, the impact on the informal economy and the reforms
necessary to prevent another crisis.
This is a collection of essays on a number of aspects of the global economic and financial crisis that were first published in the Economic & Political
Weekly in early 2009.

Pp viii + 368         2009         Rs 350

Available from
Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltd
Mumbai  Chennai  New Delhi  Kolkata  Bangalore  Bhubaneshwar  Ernakulam  Guwahati  Jaipur  Lucknow
Patna  Chandigarh  Hyderabad

58 march 13, 2010  vol xlv no 11  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly