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DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
NYAYPRASTHA, SABBAVARAM.
PROJECT NAME : JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN
NAME OF THE FACULTY: Mr. R. BHARATH KUMAR
NAME OF THE SUBJECT: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
NAME OF THE STUDENT: P.B.S.SAI PAVITHRA
ROLL NO : 2016069
SEMESTER : VI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would sincerely like to put forward my heartfelt appreciation towards our respected
faculty of Interpretation of Statutes, Mr. R. Bharat Kumar for giving me a golden
opportunity to take up project regarding “Justice V. Ramasubramanian”. I have tried my
level best to collect information about the project in various possible ways to depict clear
picture about the given project topic.
ABSTRACT
Justice V ramasubramanian, of Madras High Court, Known for his wit, wisdom and
scholarly treatment of complex legal issues, is scheduled to take oath as Judge of Telangana
High Court of Judicature. Ramasubramanian is the fifth senior most judge in the Madras
High Court.
Born on June 30,1958, Justice Ramasubramaian studied B.Sc at Vivekananda

College in Chennai. He was enrolled as a Bar He was enrolled as a member of the Bar on
February 10, 1983 and practiced under senior advocates K.Sarvabhaumam and T.R.Mani. He
was appointed as additional judge of the Madras High Court on July 31st,2006.
Subject: Tax Law
1. Associated cement companies ltd vs. The Assistant Commissioner (CT) FAC
and ors.(21.04 2009 – MADHC)
2. Vijaya Mining and Infra Corporation Private Ltd vs. The Commercial Tax
Officer-1, Kadapa and ors. (24.01.2018 – HYHC)
3. Transocean offshore, International Ventures Ltd vs. Union of India and ors.
(06.04.2017- HYHC)
4. Manidhari Stainless wire Private Ltd vs. Union of India (31.10.2017- HYHC)
5. Dream castle and Ors Vs. Union of India (18.04.2016- MADHC)
6. Paradise Food Court vs. Union of India(18.04.2017-HYHC)
7. Venkateswara Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh(07.02.2017- HYHC)
8. A.V. Thomas Leather and Allied Products Private Limited vs. The Assistant
Commissioner (CT) (09.10.2015 – MADHC)
9. SSS Traders vs. The Commercial Tax Officer (29.09.2015 – MADHC)
10. V.V.V. and Sons Edible Oil Limited vs. Commercial Tax Officer-1 (FAC),
Virudhunagam (18.12.2015 – MADHC)
11. Syed Irfan Mohammed and Ors. Vs. The Union of India and Ors. (13.12.2016 –
HYHC)
12. AMR India Limited vs. The Union of India and Ors. (22.08.2017 – HYHC)
13. Hyundai Motors India Ltd. Vs. Union of India, Ministry of Finance and Ors.
(12.12.2014 – MADHC)
14. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. The State
Bank of India and Ors. (12.04.2017 – HYHC)
15. Sudhir Kothari vs. Commr. Of C. Ex. And S.T., Hyderabad-IV (01.05.2018 –
HYHC)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Objective of the study
Research methodology
Body of the Project
 About the judge

 Area of Interest
 Case Laws
Outcomes of the project
Bibliography
Objective of the study:
The main objective of the study is to analyse the interpretation of judgments dealt by the
Justice V. Ramasubramanian.
Research Methodology:
The research is purely doctrinal and based on the primary and secondary sources such as
websites,books, articles and internet resources. The referencing style used in the project is
OSCOLA(The Oxford University Standard for Citation of Legal Authorities) format of
citation. The research design is purely descriptive.
BODY OF THE PROJECT:
 About the judge:
Justice V ramasubramanian, of Madras High Court, Known for his wit, wisdom and
scholarly treatment of complex legal issues, is scheduled to take oath as Judge of
Telangana High Court of Judicature. Ramasubramanian is the fifth senior most judge in
the Madras High Court.
Born on June 30,1958, Justice Ramasubramaian studied B.Sc at Vivekananda

College in Chennai. He was enrolled as a Bar He was enrolled as a member of the Bar on
February 10, 1983 and practiced under senior advocates K.Sarvabhaumam and T.R.Mani.
He was appointed as additional judge of the Madras High Court on July 31st,2006.
 Area of Interest:
The area of interest chosen by the researcher based on the judgments given by the
Justice V. Ramasubramanian. The subject matters taken by the researcher is tax law,
Jurisdiction and service
Case Laws:
1. NAME OF THE CASE: Associated Cement companies ltd V. the Assistant

Commissioner of Customs
NAME OF THE COURT: Madras High Court
BENCH COMPOSITION: MR. JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN
CASE CITATION:21.04.2009 MADHC
SUBJECT: Tax law
FACTS:
Writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issue of
Writs of Certiorari, calling for the records on the files of the first respondent herein in
respectively and to quash them.
The petitioner has come up with the present writ petitions, challenging the orders of
assessment passed by the first respondent in all these writ petitions, under the Central Sales
Tax Act, 1956.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned Special Government Pleader
(Taxes). Since the petitioner bracketed a portion of the turnover as branch transfer and
claimed to have paid tax in other States, but the same was disallowed by the first respondent,
the petitioner has also impleaded the States of Kerala and Karnataka apart from the Union
Territory of Pondicherry and the Union of India, as parties to the writ petitions. However,
notices to them have been dispensed with, in view of the nature of the disposal that I propose
to give to the writ petitions.
Admittedly, the petitioner is a registered dealer, manufacturing cement and effecting both
local sales as well as inter-State sales. They have a factory at Madukkarai in Coimbatore
District. The petitioner claims that the cement manufactured at Madukkarai is despatched, by
way of stock transfer, to their warehouses and depots located in the States of Kerala and
Karnataka and also in the Union Territory of Pondicherry and that thereafter, it is sold in the
respective States and Union Territory, after paying local sales tax in the respective States.
On the basis that the cement manufactured in Tamil Nadu is despatched to their warehouses
and depots in other States and sold only thereafter, the petitioner made a claim for exemption
on the turnover relating to branch/stock transfer. But suspecting the claim of the petitioner to
be untrue and claiming that the petitioner was moving goods to other State buyers from the
factory site itself to reach the ultimate buyers in other States, the first respondent started
issuing pre-assessment notices. Though the petitioner filed Form "F" declarations, together
with proof of payment of taxes in other States, Aggrieved by these assessment orders, the
petitioner has come up with the present writ petitions, by-passing the alternative remedy of
appeal.
Though several issues are raised in the writ petitions, it is not necessary or proper to go either
into factual details or into the merits of the claim made on either side, in view of the admitted
position that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner. If the petitioner is found to be not justified in by-passing the alternative
remedy, then they should be directed to avail the same. If the petitioner is found to be
justified in directly approaching this Court, the only remedy that could be granted to them is
to send the matter back to the Assessing Officer. In either case, I need not go into the merits
of the claim. Therefore, the only question that I propose to decide is as to whether there was
sufficient justification for the petitioner to invoke Article 226 and if so, to what remedy, the
petitioner would be entitled.
ISSUES:
The petitioner seeks to justify the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of this Court, by-passing
the alternative remedy, primarily on two grounds viz., (i) that there was violation of the
principles of natural justice and (ii) that there was a failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of Section 6-A(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
REASONING:
There is no quarrel with the proposition that the writ jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked
without exhausting the alternative remedy, if there was a violation of the principles of natural
justice.
In Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation {2003 (2) SCC 107}, the Supreme Court
held as follows:-
"The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of
discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the
alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three
contingencies:
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or
(iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an
Act is challenged."
The grievance of the petitioner is that without providing sufficient opportunity to produce the
statements and records and without even an opportunity to show cause against the proposed
penalty, the first respondent passed the impugned orders of assessment and that therefore
there was violation of the principles of natural justice
Apart from the allegation of violation of the principles of natural justice, the petitioner also
alleges violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 6A of The Central Sales Tax Act,
1956. The contention of the petitioner is that once an assessee has produced Form-F
declarations, the Assessing Authority is duty bound to conduct an enquiry in accordance with
Section 6A(2). But the first respondent obviously did not hold any such enquiry. Therefore,
according to the petitioner, the impugned orders of assessment suffer from a serious error of
jurisdiction, in the light of the law declared by the Division Bench of this court in A.
Dhandapani's case and the Apex Court in Ashok Leyland case.
A plain reading of sub section (2) of Section 6A shows that the Assessing Authority is bound
to reach a satisfaction, after making such inquiry that the particulars contained in Form-F
declarations are true. This satisfaction may be arrived either at the time of or at any time
before the assessment. Once the Assessing Authority is satisfied, the second limb of sub
section (2) requires him to make an order to that effect. Though sub section (2) uses the
expression "he may", it appears that (i) the scrutiny of the declaration, (ii) conduct of an
enquiry, (iii) arriving at a satisfaction and (iv) then making an order, are all essential
requirements, to be satisfied before the assessee can be held to have failed to discharge the
burden of proof cast upon him under sub section (1) of section 6-A.
CONCLUSION:
The beneficial rule of construction is applied. The writ petitions are allowed, the impugned
orders of assessment are set aside and the matters remitted back to the first respondent for an
enquiry under section 6-A(2) of the CST Act. The first respondent shall issue a notice to the
petitioner within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, specifically fixing 2
alternative dates for the enquiry under section 6-A(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The
notice shall contain proposals both in respect of tax and in respect of penalty and also call
upon the petitioner to substantiate their claim regarding branch transfer. The notice shall
specify 2 alternative dates for the hearing fixed by the first respondent and the notice shall be
served at the office of the petitioner at- 96, Kamaraj Road, Redfields, Coimbatore, at least 7
days in advance of the first date of hearing, so as to avoid any technical objection by the
petitioner at a later point of time. The petitioner shall participate in the enquiry on the date
fixed in the notice without fail and co-operate in the completion of the assessments as well as
in the finalisation of the enquiry under section 6-A(2) of the Act, failing which it will be open
to the first respondent to pass orders on the basis of available records. The first respondent
shall remember to pass orders of assessment as well as orders under section 6-A(2). The first
respondent shall complete the assessment and pass an order both covering Section 6-A(2) and
also complete the assessment within a total period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order. The writ petitions are allowed on the above terms. No costs. Consequently
connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
2. NAME OF THE CASE: Dream Castle and Others V. Union Of India
NAME OF THE COURT : Madras High Court
BENCH COMPOSITION : V.Ramasubramanian and T.Mathivanan.
CASE CITATION:18.04.2016- MADHC
SUBJECT: Excise
Facts:
The Commissioner of Service Tax is the appellant in this writ appeal. The
respondent/assessee is engaged in the business of sourcing of Indian Garments for Foreign
Buyers. The assessee obtained service tax registration under the category "Business Auxiliary
Services".
By a show cause notice dated 5.6.2013, the assessee was called upon to show cause as to why
service tax to the tune of Rs.1,74,04,550/- should not be demanded along with interest and
penalty for the period commencing from October 2011 to September 2012.. By an Order-in-
Original, the Commissioner overruled the objections and confirmed the proposal.
Challenging the said Order-in-Original, the assessee filed a writ petition. Though the assessee
contended that the Order-in-Original was a non-speaking order and that it was also without
jurisdiction, the assessee appears to have submitted before the learned single Judge that he
was also prepared to go before the Appellate Authority namely CESTAT. The assessee
claimed that the amendment introduced to Section 35F of the Act with effect from 6.8.2014,
requiring the appellants in all appeals to make a uniform pre-deposit of 7.5% of the tax
demanded, would not apply to proceedings initiated before the date of coming into force of
the amendment.
Accepting the above contentions of the assessee, the learned Judge disposed of the writ
petition, permitting the assessee to file a statutory appeal before CESTAT along with an
application for stay without making a pre-deposit of 7.5% of the tax demanded. Aggrieved by
the interpretation given by the learned Judge to the date of coming into force of the
amendment, the Commissioner of Service Tax has come up with the above appeal.
The petitioner in this writ petition is in the business of real estate agency and consultancy.
The petitioner has registered itself with the Department of Service Tax, under the category
"Real Estate Agency Services".
Issues:
Though the writ appeal and the writ petition arise out of independent proceedings, against
different assessees, they were clubbed together in view of the fact that the issue raised in both
these proceedings revolve around the question as to whether the amendment to Section 35F
could be prospective or retrospective in nature.
(i) The first contention of, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner is that
inasmuch as the right of appeal available to a person is a vested right, which accrues on and
from the date on which the list commences, the date on which such right of appeal accrues
should be the date on which the original cause itself arose. Therefore, the right so vested
cannot be taken away retrospectively by an amendment.
(ii) His second contention is that the second proviso to the amended Section 35F cannot be
taken to have excluded all other possible alternatives, that could arise out of the amendment
of a proviso.
(iii) The third contention of the learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner is that High
Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana and Kerala have already taken a view that the
amendment is prospective in nature and that it would apply only to proceedings initiated
Reasoning:
We have carefully considered the above submissions. As we have pointed out earlier, the
effect of the amendment is actually two fold, namely (a) the concession granted to those
whose goods are in the custody of the Central Excise authorities, not to make any pre-deposit
has been taken away, and (b) that in so far as other cases are concerned, the discretion that
was vested with the Appellate Authority has now been taken away, removing thereby the
glorious uncertainties of the exercise of discretion by quasi judicial authorities.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court elicited the following principles in paragraph 28 of its
decision:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps
in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one
legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then
in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court
accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and
although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such
right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or
proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of
the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so
provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."
Conclusion:
Therefore, we are of the considered view that the writ petition seeking a declaration that
the amended Section 35-F of the Central Excise Act 1944, is applicable only to show
cause proceedings initiated on or after the effective date is liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
In so far as the writ appeal is concerned, the Order in Original was passed and the
assessee challenged it before this Court without exhausting the alternative remedy of
appeal. But in the course of the hearing of the writ petition, the assessee seems to have
agreed to go before the Appellate Authority and sought a clarification that the amendment
would not apply to his case. The learned Judge agreed with the said contention and
allowed the assessee to file an appeal along with an application for waiver without
making a pre-deposit of 7.5% as per the amendment. The interpretation given by the
learned Judge to the amendment, is not correct. Hence, the appeal of the Commissioner of
Service Tax is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, is allowed, the order of the learned
Judge is set aside. It is open to the respondent to canvass the appeal on all grounds except
the effect of the amendment. There will be no order as to costs.
3. Case Name: S.V.R. Nagesh Vs. The High Court of A.P. and Ors.
Name of the Court: Hyderbad High Court
Bench Composition: V. Ramasubramanian and K. Vijaya Lakshmi,
Case Citation:
Subject: Service
Facts: The petitioner was initially appointed as an Examiner in the year 1993 and was
promoted as Junior Assistant in the year 1998. When he was working as Junior Assistant in
the First Additional Junior Civil Judge's Court, Bhimavaram, he was issued with a show
cause notice, alleging that he had created four fake orders by forging the initials of the
Presiding Officer, on the withdrawal petitions arising under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
The incident referred to in the show cause notice allegedly happened when the petitioner was
working in Eluru. Not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner to the show cause
notice, a charge memo was issued under Rule 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991. The petitioner submitted explanation to the
charge memo . But an enquiry followed and the petitioner made a request to permit him to
engage an Advocate to defend himself and also to permit him to peruse the records. While
rejecting his request for permission to engage a counsel, the petitioner was permitted to take
the assistance of any Government servant and he was also directed to approach the First
Additional District Judge for permission to scrutinise the records. Penality being removal of
service by compulsory retirement.
Issues: Removal of service by compulsory retirement valid or not?

Reasoning: any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating
such facet may not make the final orders altogether void. Hence, we find no reason to
interfere with the impugned orders. As a matter of fact, the Appellate Authority has been kind
enough to modify the order of removal from service into one of compulsory retirement. The
petitioner was appointed in 1993 and the order of removal from service was passed
Conclusion: This is not a case where our interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India is warranted. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed
4. NAME OF THE CASE : Vijaya Mining Private Limited V. Commercial Tax Officer
Kadapa
NAME OF THE COURT: The High Court of AP and Telangana
BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and Abhinand Kumar Shavili
CASE CITATON: (24.01.2018 - HYHC)
SUBJECT: Sales Tax/ VAT
Facts:
The petitioner is carrying on the business of execution of civil works contracts, both
within and outside the State of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner is registered as a dealer
in the office of the 1st respondent.The petitioner filed monthly returns during the year
2012-13 and had reported exempted purchases to the tune of Rs.56,03,70,515/- and
exempted sales to the tune of Rs.294,03,22,541/- in the returns filed in Form-200.
Pursuant to an audit conducted by the 2nd respondent and on the strength of the
authorization granted by the Joint Commissioner, Enforcement, a notice dated
13.11.2014 was issued in Form VAT-305A proposing to assess the petitioner and levy
tax to the tune of Rs.9,58,20,937/-. Out of the proposed tax, the 2nd Respondent
treated an amount of Rs.5,12,88,948/- as liability under Section 4(8), treating the
works contract receipts, as receipts towards hire charges for transfer of right to use
goods in respect of the works executed for two companies by name AMR
Constructions and Sushee Infratech Private Limited. The balance amount of
Rs.4,45,31,989/- was treated as liability under Section 4(7) not covered by
documentary evidence.
Issues:
We have carefully considered the rival submissions. Since the controversy raised in this
writ petition revolves around the decision of a Bench of this Court in Ankamma Trading
Company, it is necessary to have a look at it first. In Ankamma Trading company, what was
under challenge before the Bench of this Court was the orders passed by the Appellate
Deputy Commissioners, rejecting the appeals for non-compliance with the statutory
requirement of deposit of 12.5% of the disputed tax. The questions that the Bench of this
Court framed for its consideration included among others, the following:
1. Does the second proviso to Section 19(1) and Section 31 of the APGST and APVAT Acts
permit payment of admitted tax and 12.5% of the disputed tax and production of its proof,
within a reasonable time beyond sixty days?
2. Is the defect in payment of the tax stipulated in the second proviso, curable?
3. Is the time limit for the payment of admitted tax and 12.5% of the disputed tax is
mandatory or directory?
Reasoning:
After analyzing the statutory provisions and the entire case law on the point, the Division
Bench came to the conclusion in Ankamma Trading Company that even the payment of
admitted tax and 12.5% of the disputed tax beyond the period of 60 days, from the date of
receipt of a copy of the order of assessment, would disable the appellate authority from
admitting the appeal and that the prescription was mandatory and not directory. The decision
in Ankamma Trading Company, appears to have been taken on appeal to the Supreme Court
and it is claimed across the bar that an interim suspension on the said decision has been
granted.
The above conclusion of ours would dispose of the challenge of the petitioner to the order of
the Appellate Deputy Commissioner. But the petitioner has also challenged the original order
of assessment dated. Therefore, the next question that arises for consideration is as to whether
it will be open to an assessee to challenge the original order of assessment, after getting their
statutory appeal rejected for failure to comply with the statutory prescription
Generally an order of the original authority merges with the order passed on an appeal. Once
the appeal is disposed of, there is no original order available in the eye of law, to enable the
assessee to challenge the original order.
But in cases where a statutory appeal is rejected for non- compliance with the statutory
prescription or on account of delay in filing the appeal beyond the condonable period, merger
does not take place. The reason for this is that if an appeal is filed beyond the period of
limitation and beyond the period up to which the appellate authority is competent to condone
the delay, there is virtually no appeal in the eye of law. Similarly, if an appeal is filed without
complying with the condition for making a pre-deposit, then there is no appeal in the eye of
law. Where appeals of this nature are rejected, the orders of rejection do not become the
orders passed on the appeal and hence no merger takes place.
Conclusion:
In the case on hand, the show cause notice was issued. The date on which the show cause
notice was received by the petitioner is not known. However, the dealer was issued VAT 310
on calling upon them to furnish pending agreement copies. The petitioner sought time of one
month. Though time was granted, they failed to submit pending agreement copies. It was
only thereafter that the show cause notice was issued.
Therefore, we do not agree that the failure to grant time to produce the records that amounted
to violation of the principles of natural justice.
The second objection to the original order of assessment is that in respect of the works carried
out outside the State, the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction. But in support of this contention
the petitioner ought to have produced pending agreement copies. The other contention that
the works executed by the petitioner for AMR Constructions and Sushee Infratech Private
Limited are in the nature of civil contracts for removal of overburden and that therefore the
receipts cannot be considered as hire charges, is an argument that does not go to the root of
the issue of jurisdiction.
Therefore, this is not a case where we would have entertained a writ petition as against the
original order of assessment, even if the petitioner had come up before the filing of a
statutory appeal. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. As a sequel,
the miscellaneous petitions pending in this writ petition, if any, shall stand closed. There shall
be no order as to costs.
5. NAME OF THE CASE: Manidhari Stainless Steel(P) Ltd V. Union of India
NAME OF THE COURT: THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE TO AP AND

TELANGANA
BENCH COMPOSITION : V. Ramasubramanian And Abhinand Kumar Shavili
CASE CITATION : (31.10.2017 - HYHC)
SUBJECT: Tax
Facts:
The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of various stainless steel items, such as S.S.
Wire, S.S. Flat, S.S. Wire Rod, S.S. Angle etc.classifiable under Ch. 72 of the Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Search operations were conducted at the factory premises of
the petitioner, the residential premises of its Directors and other related premises, on the
ground that the officers of the Directorate of Central Excise Intelligence had specific
information that the petitioner was irregularly availing CENVAT Credit of duty paid on
certain goods claiming them as inputs without actually using the same in or in relation to the
manufacture of their dutiable finished goods.
After the search and after recording the statements of a few persons including a consultant of
the petitioner, a show cause notice was issued, calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to
why CENVAT Credit amounting to Rs. 4,50,52,629, for the period from should not be
demanded and recovered under Section 11A(1). This show cause notice resulted in an ex
parte Order-in-Original being passed.
As against the Order-in-Original, the petitioner filed an appeal before the CESTAT. The
CESTAT allowed the appeal by an order and remanded the matter back to the Adjudicating
Authority.
In the de novo proceedings, held on, the authorised representative of the petitioner seems to
have requested for cross-examination of some persons. The petitioner also requested
permission to inspect the documents.
But the request was rejected and hence the petitioner filed a reply to the show cause notice.
Thereafter, a personal hearing took place. It appears that the petitioner reiterated their
demand for cross-examination. However, by the order impugned in the writ petition, which
was later modified by a corrigendum, the 3rd respondent confirmed the demand. Therefore,
aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has come up with the above writ petition.
Admittedly, the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy of appeal as against the
impugned order. But the petitioner seeks to bypass the alternative remedy on two grounds
viz., (a) that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice, in as much as the
request of the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements were relied upon,
was turned down arbitrarily and (b) that the rejection of the request for cross-examination
was also contrary to the order of remand passed by the CESTAT.
For the purpose of convenience, let us take up the second ground for consideration first. It is
the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the refusal of the Adjudicating
Authority to permit the petitioner to cross-examine those persons whose statements were
relied upon, was contrary to the order of remand passed by the CESTAT in the first round.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at the order passed by the CESTAT in the first round of
litigation.
Issues:
The petitioner has come up with the above writ petition challenging an Order-in-Original
passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax (the 3rd respondent herein),
in terms of Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules; 2004 read with Section 11A(4) of the
Central Excise Act, 1944, confirming a demand of Rs. 4,52,24,794 towards CENVAT/CVD,
of Rs. 67,03,377 towards Additional duty of import, of Rs. 9,04,283 towards Education Cess,
of Rs. 4,21,568 towards Secondary and Higher Education Cess, in all totalling to Rs.
5,32,54,022, purportedly towards recovery of the CENVAT Credit improperly availed. We
have heard Mr. Madhava Sham Murthy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.
B. Narayana Reddy, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents.
Reasoning:
In any case if the petitioner thinks that the Adjudicating Authority failed to comply with the
order of the CESTAT, they should have gone again before the CESTAT. After all, the order
impugned in the writ petition is liable to be appealed against, to the very same CESTAT.
Without going to the Tribunal and complaining that its order of remand was violated, the
petitioner has chosen to come to this Court to complain that the order of the CESTAT was
violated. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the second contention.
The first contention revolves around the refusal of the adjudicating authority to permit cross-
examination. In order to understand and appreciate the scope and reach of this contention, it
is necessary to look into the nature of the allegations against the petitioner, which lead to the
adjudication. The allegations against the petitioner are
(a) that they availed CENVAT Credit of duty paid on the consignments of S.S. Sheet/S.S.
Coils as detailed in the annexure, without actually using the same in or in relation to the
manufacture of dutiable finished goods,
(b) that they showed certain portions of S.S. Sheets/S.S. Coils to have been sent to job
workers, for the conversion of the same into S.S. Billets, without actually sending them
(c) that the petitioner declared the description of goods on the job work challans as
Scrap/Steel Scrap/S.S. Scrap even in cases where S.S. Sheet/Coil was shown as sent for job
work in their Raw Material Stock Register and
(d) that the petitioner had procured unaccounted S.S. Scrap from the market and supplied the
same to job workers.
The persons whom the petitioner wanted to summon for cross-examination and the reasons
for making such a request were given by the petitioner in a letter dated 03-11-2015 sent by
the counsel for the petitioner to the Commissioner. For the purpose of easy appreciation, we
present in a tabular form, the names, their identities and the reasons given by the petitioner
for making a request for cross-examining them:
Conclusion:
We do not find in this case, the presence of any of those or similar reasons. Therefore, we are
not convinced that the impugned order could be set aside solely on the ground of denial of
permission to cross-examine the witnesses. In view of the above, the writ petition is
dismissed. However, it will be open to the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy of appeal
before the appropriate authority. The order impugned in the writ petition was passed and a
corrigendum was issued. The petitioner field the above writ petition. Therefore, if the
petitioner files an appeal as against the impugned orders, the date of issue of the copy of this
order shall be excluded for computing either the period of limitation or the period of delay.
The Registry shall return the original impugned order to enable the petitioner to file an
appeal. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed.
No costs.
6. NAME OF THE CASE: Hyundai Motors Limited vs. Union of India, Ministry of
Finance and others
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Rama Subramanian
CASE CITATION:12.12.2014, MADHC
SUBJECT: Tax Law
Facts:
The 3rd respondent herein, namely Synergies Castings Limited, which is involved in the
manufacture of Cast aluminium alloy wheels, lodged a complaint with the Designated
Authority under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 that some of the importers such as the writ
petitioner herein are importing into India, Cast Aluminium Alloy Wheels at less than its
normal value and that therefore, they have incurred a liability to pay anti-dumping duty. On
the said complaint, the Designated Authority initiated an investigation. Since the
investigation was initiated, the Designated Authority was obliged to complete the
investigation and record final findings on or before, by virtue of the relevant rule. However,
in exercise of the power conferred by the first proviso to the said rule namely Rule 17(1), the
Central Government passed an order extending the period by three months, namely.
Thereafter, the Designated Authority recorded a preliminary finding in terms of Rule 12(1),
recommending to the Government, the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duty.
Accepting the recommendation of the Designated Authority, the Government of India issued
a notification imposing provisional duty.
Issues:
(i) Whether, after the expiry of the period, the Government of India was entitled to
extend the period, by a notification dated 30.4.2014 retroactively, and
(ii) Whether the action of the Designated Authority in granting less than 24 hour's
notice to the parties to appear for a personal hearing and in rejecting their request
for adjournment and proceeding to pass orders on the basis of written arguments,
was in violation of the principles of natural justice.
Reasoning:
In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object
which the provision of law in question is to sub serve and its design and the context in which
it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be
regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public
duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious
prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control
over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one."
Conclusion:
The above interpretation is also fortified by the fact that all the information collected by the
Designated Authority in the course of investigation, cannot and need not be shared with all
the parties to the investigation. Whenever a party to an investigation claims confidentiality,
the Designated Authority is obliged to accede to the same. The other parties cannot claim that
there was violation of natural justice. Therefore, the dosage of the medicine of natural justice,
to be administered to different patients, vary from case to case. In the case on hand, the
dosage was adequate and the petitioner cannot ask for more. Hence the second contention of
the petitioner is also liable to be rejected.
7. Case Name: T. R. Nanniar and Ors vs Commissioner of customs, Tiruchirapalli
Name of the Court: Madras High Court
Bench Composition: V. Ramasubramanian and N. Kirubakaran

Case Citation:
Subject: Customs
Facts: The officers attached to the Customs Preventive Unit conducted a search on 16.6.1992
in the business premises of the assessee by name T.R. Nanniar (who is now no more) and
seized 6 silver ingots weighing 19.165 kilograms, on a reasonable believe that the same was
smuggled. A statement was recorded from T.R. Nanniar, under section 108 of the Customs
Act, 1962. Subsequently, Nanniar retracted his statement . In the meantime, the silver bars
were assayed and found to be of purity ranging from 99.42 to 99.51. A show cause notice was
issued , proposing confiscation and imposition of penalty. After a reply was sent, an order in
original was passed confiscating the silver bars and imposing a penalty. The said order was
confirmed by the Commissioner .
Issues:
1) Whether the Tribunal erred in relying upon the statement of one Sundaram when the said
statement was not made available to the appellants either through the show cause notice or
during the proceedings before the learned Collector?
2) Whether the decision of the Tribunal that because no cross-examination was asked for,
therefore, the non-supply of the said statement of Sundaram to the appellants during the
course of proceedings before the learned Collector does not violate the principles of natural
justice is correct in law?
Reasoning: He has pleaded that purity alone could not be a factor for confiscation of the
silver. In the alternative, he has pleaded for release of the silver on payment of redemption
fine. The seizure took place about 24 years ago. The reference itself was of the year 2000.
Today, even if we uphold the contention that Sundaram ought to have been produced for
cross-examination, we may have to remit the matter back, but, it is impossible to produce
Sundaram for cross-examination.
Conclusion: Therefore, taking into account the developments and also taking into account
the admission made by Nanniar, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal did not
commit any mistake in relying upon the statement. Therefore, the questions of law are
answered against the applicants and in favour of the Department
8. NAME OF THE CASE: A. V. Thomas Leather and Allied Products Private Limited
Vs The Assistant Commissioner
BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and T. Mathivanan
SUBJECT: Sales Tax/VAT
Facts: The appellant is a manufacturer of finished leather, leather products and shoes. In the
course of business, the appellant effected local and inter-State purchases of raw materials and
other materials for use in the manufacture of finished product. They also purchased tools and
accessories for use in repairing the machineries available in the factory. Naturally they also
purchased packing materials for use. On the basis of an inspection carried out by the
enforcement wing officials of the Department of Commercial Taxes, , the assessing officer
issued seven notices, all dated, for the assessment years 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11,
2011-12, 2012-13 & 2013-14, holding that the appellant purchased packing materials, tools &
spares etc., from inter-State dealers, without those articles being included in the certificate of
registration. However, the appellant issued 'C' forms to the sellers, enabling them to avail the
concessional rate of tax. The appellant submitted separate replies in respect of each
assessment year, contending that insofar as the exports are concerned, they made purchases
against the issue of Form-H and that insofar as the other items are concerned, such as packing
materials, they were included in the certificate of registration. However, rejecting the reply
made by the appellant, the assessing officer passed separate orders, , confirming the proposals
for the levy of penalty under Section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act.
Issues:
(i) that the exports were covered by Form-H and

(ii) The purchase of packing materials, tools, spares etc., were covered by the
certificate of registration issued to them?
Reasoning: the learned Judge agreed with the contention of the appellant that the issue is
covered by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court. The assessing officer, instead of
following the decision of the Full Bench of this Court, has chosen to follow the decision of
the Guwahati High Court. It is a fundamental principle that the assessing officers are bound
by the rulings of the jurisdictional Courts. Since the assessing officer chose to follow the
decision of the Guwahati High Court, but chose to ignore the decision of the Full Bench of
this Court which is binding on her, this is a case which calls for interference.Even the exports
covered by Form-H, have not been taken note of by the assessing officer. They are also
packing materials, which were covered against Form-H. Therefore we are of the considered
view that the orders passed, are clearly erroneous. It is not required of an appellate authority
to find out that they are erroneous.
Conclusion: Therefore the writ appeals are allowed, the common order of the learned Judge
is set aside and the orders imposing penalty are also set aside
9. NAME OF THE CASE: K. Kathiresan vs. The Registrar, Central Administrative

Tribunal and Ors.
NAME OF THE COURT: High Court of Madras
BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and P.R. Shivakumar
CASE CITATION: (16.02.2015 - MADHC)
SUBJECT: service
Facts: The petitioner was issued with a charge memo on , by the Chief General Manager, in
terms of Rule 36 of the BSNL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 2006. An enquiry
followed, which ultimately resulted in a penalty of compulsory retirement by proceedings
imposed by the Chief General Manager.
Issues: Weather manager is competent to impose or initiate a major penalty of compulsory

retirement upon him?
Reasoning: As per the above rule, even an Authority competent to impose minor penalties,
can initiate major penalty proceedings. However, if such an authority does so, it should be
forwarded to the Disciplinary Authority, as can be found in the detailed procedure laid down
in Sub-Rule (19) of Rule 36. Sub-Rule (19) of Rule 36 reads as follows: "(19)(a). Where a
Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Clause (a) to (e)
of Rule 33 (but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Clause (f) to (j) of
Rule 33), has itself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the articles of any charge and
that authority, having regard to its own findings or having regard to its decision on any of the
findings of any Inquiring Authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that penalties specified
in Clause (f) to (j) of Rule 33 should be imposed on the employee, that authority shall
forward the records of the inquiry to such Disciplinary Authority as is competent to impose
the last mentioned penalties. The Disciplinary Authority to which the records are so
forwarded may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further
examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interests of justice, recall the witness
and examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witness and may impose on the employee
such penalty as it may deem fit in accordance with these rules." It is clear that the
competence of the Chief General Manager to initiate departmental enquiry even for the
imposition of major penalties, cannot be questioned.
Conclusion: the writ petition is dismissed
10. NAME OF THE CASE: Toleti Rama Mangayya Naidu and Ors. vs. The High
Court of Judicature and Ors.
NAME OF THE COURT: Hyderabad High Court
BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and J. Uma Devi
CASE CITATION: 24.03.2017 - HYHC
SUBJECT: Service
Facts: Aggrieved by the cancellation of a selection made to 69 posts of Office Subordinates

(Attenders) in the unit of the District Judge, West Godavari District at Eluru, the petitioners,
who were successful in the selection, have come up with the above writ petitions. Heard M/s.
K. Satyanarayana Murthy and Mr. S. Sridhar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
and Mr. Posani Venkateswarlu, learned standing counsel appearing for the High Court. By a
notification, the Principal District Judge, West Godavari District at Eluru invited applications
from eligible candidates for selection to the 69 posts of Office Subordinates (Attenders) in his
Unit. The selection was to be based only upon oral interview, as per the clauses contained in
the notification. It appears that about 14,959 candidates applied, out of whom the applications
of about 13,740 candidates were accepted. When all of them were invited for oral interview,
10,727 candidates appeared. After conclusion of the interviews, the Principal District Judge,
prepared a merit list in the ratio of 1:3. The said list, along with a consolidated merit list of
207 candidates in the descending order of merit was sent to the High Court. By the
proceedings, the Registrar (Recruitment) communicated to the Principal District Judge, the
approval of the High Court for the appointment of 69 candidates from out of the said list and
the District Judge was also directed to issue appointment orders to all the candidates.
However, before the issue of actual appointment orders, the High Court took a decision to
direct the cancellation of the selection. Accordingly, the Principal District Judge issued a
cancellation notification.
Issues: Is the cancellation order valid?

Reasoning: The only method of selection was by oral interview. Though the post for which
recruitment was sought to be made was only the post of Office Subordinate, the attempt to
shortlist candidates only on the basis of oral interview, can sometimes come under the cloud
of suspicion. The selection of 69 candidates from out 13,000 candidates only on the basis of
performance in oral interview, may not really be considered to be the best method of
selection. Therefore, if a policy decision had been taken by the Court to cancel the selection
so that a scientific method of selection could be evolved, the same cannot be said to be
arbitrary. More over as rightly pointed out by the respondents, a mere inclusion in the select
list does not confer any right upon a candidate to seek appointment.
Conclusion: writ petitions are dismissed.
11. NAME OF THE CASE: Transocean Offshore, International Ventures Ltd. vs. Union
of India and Ors.
NAME OF THE COURT: Hyderabad High Court
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V.Ramasubramanian and J umadevi
CASE CITATION:06.04.2017-HYHC
SUBJECT: Service Tax
FACTS:The petitioner is engaged in the business of carrying on offshore drilling operations
for petroleum exploration and production company. The petitioner was awarded various
contracts by the contractor of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), for
carrying out offshore drilling activities. According to the petitioner, these contracts were
entered into at Mumbai on various dates. For the purpose of carrying out the due execution of
the contracts, the petitioner imported various drilling rigs. These rigs were mobilised both at
the east-coast and west-coast. It is claimed by the petitioner that these rigs were used
exclusively in the western coast for drilling operations. However, the petitioner set up a
temporary base at Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh, purportedly for logistical purposes, in order
to enable them to carry out maintenance of the rigs. This base at Kakinada was also used for
temporarily storing the equipment as well as spares. To avoid any dispute with regard to the
movement of the rigs along the borders of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the petitioner also
registered itself as a dealer under the A.P. VAT Act, 2005 and obtained a TIN number.
Pursuant to an authorisation issued by the Joint Commissioner (Enforcement), the 3rd
respondent conducted an audit of the books of accounts of the petitioner for the period 2012-
13 to 2013-14. Thereafter, a show-cause notice was issued in Form VAT 305A, proposing to
levy tax on operator hire charges on the rigs of the petitioner at the rate of 14.5% under
Section 4(8) of the A.P. VAT Act, 2005, on the ground that there was a transfer of the right to
use.
ISSUES:
(i) whether the contracts entered into by the petitioner with the contractor of ONGC,
could be taken to have been either entered into or executed/performed within the
State of Andhra Pradesh, so as to confer jurisdiction upon the authorities under the
A.P. VAT Act, 2005, to proceed against the petitioner and
(ii) whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be deemed that there
was a transfer of the right to use the rigs.
REASONING:
The contracting parties, namely, Transocean Drilling Services (India) Private Limited or the
petitioner herein have been described in the agreement either to have a registered office or to
have a principal office or to have a sub-office within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The non-
judicial stamp paper on which the agreement was executed was admittedly purchased in the
State of Maharashtra.
The contracting parties, namely, Transocean Drilling Services (India) Private Limited or the
petitioner herein have been described in the agreement either to have a registered office or to
have a principal office or to have a sub-office within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The non-
judicial stamp paper on which the agreement was executed was admittedly purchased in the
State of Maharashtra. The Assessing Officer rejected the location of the rigs as having no
relevance, but at the same time found fault in Paragraph 0.2 of his order that the contracts
were neither notarised nor registered under the Registration Act and Stamp Act, 1899. This
processing of reasoning shows that there was an element of pre-determination in the mind of
the Assessing Officer.
The 2nd reasoning given by the Assessing Officer is that the petitioner is registered as a
dealer only in the State of Andhra Pradesh and that therefore he had jurisdiction. But this
logic is lopsided. A person who is a registered dealer in the State, is liable to pay tax only on
the sales made by him or on the contracts executed by him within the State of Andhra
Pradesh. Merely because a person is registered as a dealer in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the
3rd respondent cannot assume jurisdiction to tax all events that happen beyond the territorial
limits of the State. Hence, the 2nd reasoning given by the 3rd respondent is also untenable.
The 3rd reasoning mentioned by the Assessing Officer is that there was a conscious omission
on the part of the contracting parties to mention the place where the agreement was entered
into. But we do not know how the mere absence of the words "executed at Mumbai", will
deprive the petitioner of their right to point out how the contract was executed at Mumbai. A
dealer entrusted with the task of carrying out drilling operations in the west coast on the
Arabian Sea, when subjected to service tax liability by the concerned authorities, cannot be
said to have wrongfully deprived the State of its revenue under the A.P. VAT Act, 2005.
Therefore, all the reasons contained in the impugned order, assuming jurisdiction on the
ground that the agreements should be presumed to have been entered into in the State of
Andhra Pradesh, are wholly unsustainable in law and are completely perverse. Hence, the
issue of jurisdiction has to be answered in favour of the writ petitioner.
The 2nd question that arises for consideration is as to whether under the agreements in
question, there was a transfer of the right to use in terms of Section 4(8) of the A.P. VAT Act,
2005.
An answer to this question would depend upon the nature of the contract and the mutual
rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Therefore, it may be necessary again to go
back to the agreement between Transocean Drilling Services (India) Pvt. Ltd., who was the
contractor and the petitioner herein, who was the subcontractor. As we have pointed out
earlier, the sub-contract was for deploying on charter hire basis, a jack up drilling rig and the
requisite personnel for operating the drilling unit and for carrying out offshore drilling
operations. The preamble which we have extracted earlier shows that the petitioner was the
owner of the drilling unit and that they also had adequate and necessary personnel for
performing the offshore drilling operations that would include the deployment of drilling unit
and personnel as per Annexure-III.
The provisions:
Article 9.0 of the agreement also vests the entire responsibility for the performance of the
work only upon the petitioner herein. Article 9.2 of the agreement is of significance and
hence it is extracted as follows:"9.2 Representatives
(a) The actual performance and superintendence of all works hereunder shall be by
Subcontractor.
(b) Operator through Contractor shall designate in writing representative or representatives

who shall at all times have complete access to the Drilling Unit for the purpose of observing
inspection or supervising the work performed by Sub-contractor in order to judge whether in
Operator's opinion, Drilling Services are being conducted by Sub-contractor in compliance
with the provisions of the Contract. Operator through Contractor shall notify Sub-contractor
in writing of the name(s) and authority of its representative or representatives. Such
representative or representatives shall be empowered to act for Operator in all matters
relating to Sub-contractor's performance of the work herein undertaken. Sub-contractor
agrees at all times to cooperate with and extend assistance to employees of Operator or
employees of Operator's contractors performing any function under this Agreement.
(c) Sub-contractor shall designate an Area Manager in-charge of Sub-contractor's Drilling

Unit. Sub-contractor shall notify Contractor for further notification to the Operator in writing
of the name(s) and authority of its representative or representatives. Such representative or
representatives shall be fully capable and empowered to act for Sub-contractor in all matters
relating to Sub-contractor's performance of the work in accordance with this Agreement and
the Contract."
From the above, it is clear that the petitioner was obliged to provide on charter hire basis (i)
drilling rig and (ii) operating personnel and also take up the responsibility of carrying out the
operations. Therefore, there was never any transfer of the right to use, either in favour of the
contractor (Transocean Drilling Services (India) Private Limited) or in favour of the operator
(ONGC).
CONCLUSION:
The equipment and technical personnel provided by the petitioner to the main contractor are
on charter hire, where the complete control was retained by the petitioner. All responsibilities
were placed only upon the petitioner by the main contractor himself. On applying the literal
rule of interpretation it can be seen the petitioner is entitled to succeed on both counts,
namely, (i) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the 3rd respondent and (ii) the absence of a
transfer of the right to use. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is
set aside.
12. NAME OF THE CASE: Vuppalamritha Magnetic Components Ltd. vs. DRI (Zonal
Unit), Chennai
NAME OF THE COURT: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD

FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian, and Justice Aniis.
CASE CITATION: 26.10.2016-HYHC
SUBJECT : Customs
FACTS:
The petitioner was issued with a show cause notice , calling upon them to show cause as to
why the blank CDs imported by them under three bills of entry dated 7-1-2009, classifying
them under should not be classified under and the benefit of exemption claimed under
Notification, dated 1-3-2016 should not be denied and for various consequential actions such
as provisional assessment, imposition of duty and penalty, etc., should not be taken. The
petitioner submitted their reply after which an Order-in-Original was passed by the
Commissioner of Customs, confirming the proposals. Aggrieved by the said order, the
petitioner filed an appeal before CESTAT, but the same was dismissed, for non-compliance
with the conditional order for pre-deposit.
As against the orders passed by the CESTAT, refusing to grant a total waiver of pre-deposit
condition, but granting only an extension of time for making the deposit, the petitioner filed
further appeals before this Court. Those appeals were dismissed by this Court by an order and
so the petitioner then filed Special Leave Petitions in S.L.P but those SLPs were also
dismissed. The result is that the show cause notice has already worked itself out and the
Order-in-Original passed by the Commissioner confirming the proposals has already attained
finality.
ISSUES:
It was held in the said decision that unless a person has been specifically assigned the
functions of a proper officer, he could not invoke the powers conferred upon proper officers
and the question as to whether Section 28(11) inserted by the Validation Act, 2011 was
constitutionally valid or not was the issue.
REASONING:
The provision: Section 28(11) interpreted in the above terms would not suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. Else, it would grant wide powers of assessment and enforcement to a
wide range of officers, not limited to customs officers, without any limits as to territorial and
subject matter jurisdiction and in such event the provision would be vulnerable to being
declared unconstitutional. The contention that all proceedings founded upon a show cause
notice that was inherently lacking in jurisdiction, would be non-est., null and void, is perhaps
right as a simple statement of a proposition of law. But it is not without exceptions. If this
theory of nullity and validity is accepted, all proceedings initiated before, which have already
culminated in orders of adjudication and pursuant to which recoveries have been made, are
also to be deemed as non est. Therefore, the Commission rates of Excise throughout the
country can today be flooded with applications for refund of the duty paid in pursuance of the
orders of adjudication passed on the basis of such show cause notices. The theory of nullity
and validity cannot be extended to such an extent as to lead to such disastrous consequences.
CONCLUSION:
The petitioner who had challenged the show cause notice initially and the order of
adjudication on other grounds, stand rejected up to Supreme Court on the grounds of the
applicability of literal rule of interpretation and hence therefore, the principle of finality to
litigation would put a seal on the present attempt on the part of the petitioner to reopen the
issue all over again. In view of the above, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is
dismissed.
13. NAME OF THE CASE: Sudhir Kothari vs. Commr. of C. Ex. and S.T., Hyderabad-
IV
FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V. Ramasubramanian and Uma Devi
CASE CITATION:01.05.2018-HYHC
SUBJECT: Excise
FACTS:
A company by name Somakanth Multi Tech. Private Limited is registered with the
Department of Central Excise as a manufacturer of copper tubes. Investigation revealed that
the said company manufactured and cleared copper tubes without accounting and without
payment of excise duty. The investigation also revealed that three individuals by name Sudhir
Kothari, Dilip Kothari and Ajay Vyas colluded with the assessee company for the clandestine
clearance of the goods.
Therefore, show cause notices were issued to the company, its Managing Director and the
three persons named. Though all the six noticees received notices, they did not give a reply,
but sought permission to cross-examine the witnesses. After granting permission for cross-
examination of necessary witnesses, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise passed
an order-in-original, confirming the demand of excise duty, confirming the demand of
CENVAT credit and imposing penalties upon the company. A penalty of Rs. 50,00,000/- was
imposed upon the Managing Director of the company and a penalty of Rs. 20,00,000/- each
was imposed upon the three above individuals namely Dilip Kothari, Sudhir Kothari and
Ajay Vyas. Separate penalties were also imposed upon two firms by name M/s. Dhiran
Transport Corporation and M/s. India Extrusion.
ISSUES:
Whether the impugned order of the Tribunal to the extent of confirmation of penalty under
Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 is correct and proper when the appellants had not
dealt with the goods physically in any manner and when there was no proposal for
confiscation of the goods in the show cause notice and when no goods are held liable for
confiscation.
REASONING:
Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 reads as follows:

26. Penalty for certain offences.-(1) Any person who acquires possession of, or is in any way
concerned in transporting, removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing,
or in any other manner deals with, any excisable goods which he knows or has reason to
believe are liable to confiscation under the Act or these rules, shall be liable to a penalty not
exceeding the duty on such goods or rupees two thousand rupees, whichever is greater.
Provided that where any proceeding for the person liable to pay duty have been concluded
under clause (a) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 11AC of the Act in respect of
duty, interest and penalty, all proceedings in respect of penalty against other persons, if any,
in the said proceedings shall also be deemed to be concluded.
(2) Any person, who issues-
(i) an excise duty invoice without delivery of the goods specified therein or abets in making
such invoice; or
(ii) any other document or abets in making such document, on the basis of which the user of
said invoice or document is likely to take or has taken any ineligible benefit under the Act or
the rules made there under like claiming of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004 or refund, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding the amount of such benefit or
five thousand rupees, whichever is greater.
It is seen from Rule 26(1) extracted above, that the liability to penalty is fastened upon a
person (i) who acquires possession of any excisable goods, (ii) who is in any way concerned
in transporting, removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing; or (iii) who
in any other manner deals with the goods.
The above contention does not hold water in the light of the fact that Rule 26 uses the
expression "in any other manner deals with any excisable goods". The words "deals with"
need not necessarily mean the physical dealing with the goods. In paragraph 6 of its order, the
CESTAT recorded a finding, on the basis of the records that the appellants herein had
admitted the issue of blank challans/invoices to the company Somakanth Multi Tech. Pvt.
Ltd., and that the said company used these blank challans/invoices for the clandestine
removal of the manufactured goods, under the guise of trading activity. If providing blank
challans/invoices to a company to enable them to remove the manufactured goods
clandestinely, will not fall under the category "in any manner dealing with the goods", we do
not know what these words "deals with" would mean. Therefore, the contention based upon
Rule 26 does not hold water.
CONCLUSION:
The application of beneficial rule of interpretation was used and so even though the
appellants were ordered to pay the penalty the quantum was reduced and accordingly the
petitions stand closed.
14. CASE NAME: Venkateswara Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
NAME OF THE COURT: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT

HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian and J.Uma Devi
SUBJECT: Sales tax/VAT
FACTS:
On an audit of the firm of the petitioner/dealer was conducted by the Assistant Commissioner
(CT). Though in the course of audit, it was found that what was reflected in the books of
accounts tallied with what was indicated in the returns, for the periods 2014-15 and 2015-16,
both in relation to purchase and in relation to sales, the audit found that the petitioner was
storing their goods in the A.P. State Warehousing Corporation go down. Therefore,
presuming that the stock stored in the said go down, had not been included in the purchase or
sales, a show cause notice was issued. Though, the petitioner filed their objections and
appeared in person and contended that the stock held in the go down of the Warehousing
Corporation was a tax paid stock already included in the turn over, the Assessing Officer
rejected the same and passed an order demanding tax to the tune of Rs. 1,40,760/-.
Subsequently, the Assessing Officer also issued a notice for imposition of penalty under
Section 53(3) of the Act and passed an order dated 15.03.2016 demanding a penalty to the
tune of 100% of the tax. Challenging the order of assessment as well as order of penalty, the
petitioner is before us.
ISSUES:
The petitioner came up with 2 writ petitions and under each there was an issue that arose.
The tax has been paid and the petitioner came up first with a writ petition challenging only
the penalty. It is only subsequently that he came up with the second writ petition challenging
the order of assessment.
REASONING:
In so far as the first writ petition is concerned, the challenge lies in a very narrow compass.
100% penalty is demanded under Section 53(3) of the Act. Either of the two conditions
prescribed under Section 53(3) of the Act should have been satisfied for levy of 100%
penalty. The petitioner should either be guilty of fraud or guilty of willful neglect. In the case
on hand, storage of goods of the petitioner was with a State owned Warehousing Corporation.
It is not with any private go down, which could not come to light to the competent
authorities. The positive claim of the petitioner is that the stock register maintained by the
Warehousing Corporation, contained the details of the stock. Therefore, merely because the
petitioner has not properly maintained the stock register, the same cannot lead to a
presumption that the turnover was not included.
CONCLUSION:
The first writ petition was allowed on the basis of applicability of the literal rule of
interpretation and the order of penalty is set aside.
15. NAME OF THE CASE: SSS Traders vs. The Commercial Tax Officer
NAME OF THE COURT: IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
BENCH COMPOSITON: Justice V ramasubramanian and T. Mathivannan
CASE CITATION: 29.09.2015,MADHC
FACTS:
The appellant is a registered dealer in respect of Maize and other products, both under the
TNVAT Act, 2006 and under the CST Act, 2006. Maize is a product that is granted
exemption under Entry No. 19 of Part-B of the IV Schedule to TNVAT Act, 2006. Therefore,
the appellant reported a taxable turnover of Nil in the return filed every month.
However, they were issued with a notice under Section 22(4) of the TNVAT Act, proposing
to disallow their claim for exemption. It was on the ground that the appellant was selling
Maize to a customer who was using it as a Maize waste for poultry feeding. The appellant
gave a reply pointing out that the Entry as such does not distinguish between Maize and
Maize waste and that the grant of exemption cannot depend upon the purpose for which the
product is used, especially by a person who buys it from a registered dealer.
ISSUES:
Whether the maize and maize waste and that the grant of exemption cannot depend upon the
purpose for which the product is used, especially by a person who buys it from a registered
dealer or not.
REASONING:
In the case on hand, there is no dispute about the fact that Maize is granted exemption, by
virtue of being included in Entry No. 19 of Part-B of IV Schedule to the Act. The circular
issued by the Department reads as follows:
"Maize and Jowar: Maize and Jowar are exempted from tax vide entry No. 14(i) of Part-B to
Schedule III under the TNGST Act 1959 with effect from 27.3.2002 and the exemption
continues to be in force under Section 88(3)(i) of the TNVAT Act 2006 with effect from
01.01.2007."
Yet another circular issued in letter No. VAT Cell/22840/2007 (VCC No. 606) dated
31.5.2007 reads as follows:
"Maize: Maize are exempted from tax vide entry No. 19 of Part-B to IV Schedule to TNVAT
Act 2006 with effect from 01.01.2007."
CONCLUSION:
There is nothing either in the Act or in the circulars to indicate that the eligibility of a product
for exemption depended upon its usage. The exemption was a product based exemption and
not user based exemption or an assessee based exemption. Therefore, this is a case where the
Assessing Officer committed a jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court and
by the application of the literal rule accordingly the writ appeal is allowed, and the order of
assessment is set aside.
16. NAME OF THE CASE: Syed Irfan Mohammed and Ors. vs. The Union of India and
Ors.

FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH.
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian and G.Shyam Prasad.
CASE CITATION:13.12.2016- HYHC
SUBJECT: Customs
FACTS:
The case of the petitioners is that both of them were taken to the office of the Directorate of
Revenue Intelligence on two different dates and that on the basis of the statements allegedly
given by them, show cause notices were issued to them. Under the show cause notices, issued
not only to the petitioners herein but also to two other partnership firms by name M/s. Star
Impex and M/s. VRPL Overseas, all of them were called upon to show cause as to why a
certain quantity of cigarettes imported under different bills of entry and available in 2 live
containers should not be confiscated and duty, interest and penalty should not be levied not
only against the live containers but also against the imports made in the past. These show
cause notices were issued under Section 28 (4) of the Customs Act, 1962.
The petitioners sent replies, almost on identical lines, claiming that they did not import any
material including baby diapers and cigarettes. Thereafter, the petitioners were called upon to
attend a personal hearing.
ISSUES:
The question of lack of jurisdiction is raised on the ground that what were seized by the
Department of Revenue Intelligence were two containers bearing Therefore, at the most the
entire adjudication could only be in respect of cargo de stuffed from both these containers.
Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962 prescribes the procedure for clearance of goods for
home consumption. Two conditions are to be satisfied for the Proper Officer to pass an order
under Section 47(1) permitting clearance of the goods for home consumption. They are: (1)
that the goods are not prohibited goods and (2) that the importer has paid import duty
assessed thereon along with any charges payable in respect of the same. Therefore, once
goods are cleared under Section 47, there is a presumption in law that the procedure
prescribed under Section 47 has been followed.
The power under Section 28(4) cannot be invoked in cases where a claim is made that what
was imported was completely different from what was indicated in the Bills of Entry. In a
case where the Bills of Entry declared the goods to be Baby Diapers and the Proper Officer
also cleared the goods for home consumption under Section 47(1), it may not be possible for
the Department later on to contend that cigarettes concealed in Baby Diapers could have been
imported and taken into the market. In other words, what could be found out from the records
alone could be the subject matter of proceedings under Section 28(4). What cannot be
established merely by the records cannot form the basis of the proceedings under Section
28(4).
CONCLUSION:
On applying the rules of interpretation the Orders-in-Original impugned in these writ

petitions are liable to be set aside only insofar as they impose a duty, interest and penalty in
respect of the past 13 containers. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed to the
limited extent of setting aside paragraph 186.II(2) and 186.III(2). Insofar as all other matters
are concerned, the petitioners will have to avail the alternative remedies available to them in
law.
17. CASE NAME:V.V.V. and Sons Edible Oil Limited vs. Commercial Tax Officer-1
(FAC), Virudhunagam
NAME OF THE COURT: IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI
BENCH)
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian and Kirumbakaan
CASE CITATION:18.12.2015-MADHC
FACTS:
The appellant-assessee was issued with pre-revision notices in respect of the assessment years
2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14, on the basis of surprise inspection conducted by the officials
of enforcement wing. The pre-revision notices were challenged by the appellant in a batch of
three writ petitions in on the file of this court. The grievance of the appellant in those writ
petitions was that they were issued on the basis of audit report and that the mandate of law
under rule 10(11) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Rules, 2007, for calling for the
records for a detailed scrutiny, was not followed. The said three writ petitions were disposed
of by the learned judge, by an order dated February 26, 2015, directing the appellant to give a
reply to the pre-revision notice within fifteen days and also produce the books of account.
The assessing officer was directed to look into all the materials and give an opportunity of
hearing and thereafter to pass fresh orders.
ISSUES:
The objections, speaks volumes about the mala fide intention on the part of the assessing
officer.
REASONING:
The alternative remedy of appeal could be by-passed only under three contingencies, namely,
(i) violation of principles of natural justice; (ii) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the assessing
officer; and (iii) lack of competence or power to initiate proceedings. All these are obviously
absent in this case.
However it is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the orders of
assessment passed by the respondent, are completely bereft of any application of mind and
the manner in which he had dealt with the objections, speaks volumes about the mala fide
intention on the part of the assessing officer. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to
some of the observations made by the assessing officer in the orders of assessment.
CONCLUSION:
Despite the fact that we are unable to approve the manner in which the assessing officer dealt
with the objections, we do not wish to entertain the writ appeals. But it appears from the
orders of assessment that the total liability towards tax slapped upon the appellant for all the
three assessment years works out to about Rs. 75,00,00,000 (rupees seventy five crores only).
Therefore the appellant may have to make a pre-deposit of 25 per cent of the entire demand if
an appeal is to be entertained. Normally another 25 per cent will be demanded for the grant of
stay. Since that may completely ruin the running industry, we are of the view that some
reprieve can be given to the appellant. Therefore the writ appeals are disposed of to the
following effect:
(i) The appellant shall file statutory appeals within a period of four weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this judgment, along with 25 per cent of the tax demanded under the
impugned assessment orders;
(ii) Upon filing of such appeals, together with 25 per cent of the tax demanded, the appellate
authority shall deal with the appeals independently with reference to the facts as well as law
and dispose of them within further period of three months; and
(iii) Till then, the appellant shall have the benefit of an order of interim stay of the demand in
respect of the remaining portions. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are
closed. No costs.
18. NAME OF THE CASE: Arockia JeyabalanVs. The Regional Passport Officer
NAME OF THE COURT: The High Court of Madras
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian
CASE CITATION: 15.09.2014- MADHC
SUBJECT : Jurisdiction
FACTS:
The petitioner, who holds an Indian passport, but who works in Singapore for the past about
ten years, has come up with the first writ petition, seeking the issue of a Writ of Mandamus to
direct the third respondent to return his passport bearing No. J3497386 seized from him by
the Inspector of Police. He has come up with the second writ petition, challenging a Look Out
Notice issued by the Police to the Chief Immigration Officer of the Bureau of Immigration.
The petitioner married the fourth respondent at Paramakkudi . Thereafter, both of them left
for Singapore where the petitioner is employed. The petitioner's wife returned to India, for
the delivery of her baby in August 2010. It appears that differences and disputes arose
between the petitioner and his wife leading to the petitioner filing of a petition on the file of
the Family Court at Ramanathapuram, seeking divorce on the ground of desertion and
cruelty.
It appears that the petitioner's wife filed a transfer petition on the file of the Madurai Bench of
this Court for the transfer of the said petition. She also lodged a complaint with the
Paramakkudi Police.
Subsequently, the petitioner's wife again lodged a complaint with the All Women Police
Station, Thousand Lights, Chennai in for alleged offences under Sections 494, 498A and
506(i) of the Indian Penal Code. When the petitioner was about to leave for Singapore, he
was detained by the Immigration Authorities at the Bangalore Airport, on the basis of a Look
Out Notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Triplicane. The petitioner was also
arrested and his passport was seized by the respondent Police.
Issues: whether the respondents can seek monetary benefits from the divorce from the
petitioner ?
Reasoning:
In cases of this nature, the Court has to balance equities between both parties. On high moral
grounds, I can even dismiss the writ petition, as the remedy under Article 226 is equitable and
the allegation of the wife is that the petitioner got married to another lady ditching her and a
small girl child. But, if it is done, the petitioner, who has not gone to Singapore for the past
seven months, will lose his job. Once he loses his job, the fourth respondent-wife and the
only child, cannot even seek a monetary support that would she would be able to seek now
from the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner is earning more than a lakh of rupees per
month in Singapore. If he is made to lose the job, the quantum of compensation that the wife
and the child would get, will be poor. It seems from the nature of the allegations made and
from what was told to me in open court that reconciliation between the petitioner and the
fourth respondent is not possible now. Therefore, not allowing the petitioner to go out of
India, will at the most bring poetic justice in the form of a punishment to the petitioner for the
alleged crime that he committed against the fourth respondent. This will virtually amount to
punishing the petitioner before trial.
While I have no sympathy for the petitioner, in the light of the serious allegations made
against him, I cannot lose sight of the fact that ultimately, if the petitioner is rendered jobless,
the consequence of the same will automatically fall upon the fourth respondent and the child.
In other words, it is not even in the interests of the fourth respondent to prevent the petitioner
from joining duty in his employment.
Conclusion:
The Beneficial Rule of Construction is made by the judge because if the court grant the
divorce, the wife and child will face the consequences in relating to monetary benefits. As the
petitioner is staying outside of India, if the passport of the petitioner is impounded then the
claimants cannot even seek the maintenance charges if the jurisdiction changes
19. NAME OF THE CASE:4G Identity Solutions Pvt Ltd. Vs. Bloom Solutions Pvt. Ltd
NAME OF THE COURT: High Court of State of AP and State of Telangana
BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and T. Amarnath Goud
SUBJECT: Jurisdiction
Facts: It appears that the petitioner and the 1st respondent entered into two Memoranda of
Understanding and they contained a clause for arbitration. A dispute arose after the
termination of the Memoranda of Understanding with effect from 31-12-2001. Therefore, the
1st respondent herein issued a notice to the petitioner invoking the arbitration clause and
calling upon them to have discussions with their General Manager for the appointment of an
Arbitrator by consent and also cautioning that if the petitioner failed to respond, they would
proceed to appoint an Arbitrator by themselves. On the ground that the petitioner did not
respond, the 1st respondent appointed the 2nd respondent as the Arbitrator and he entered
reference.
It appears that the counsel for the petitioner thereafter never appeared before the Arbitrator.
Therefore, the petitioner was set ex parte and an Arbitration Award came to be passed
Issues: Whether the order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 25(a) terminating the
proceeding is amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India?
Reasoning: "It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order
passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under
Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach.
Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the
aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any
in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section
16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of
appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This
appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract
between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even through if the occasion arises, the Chief
Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter
the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement.
We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order
passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article
226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not
permissible.
Conclusion:
Literal rule is interpreted by the judge in this case. Section 5 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Sections 34 and 35 provide a complete answer. Once a
judicial remedy is provided as against an arbitral award and such remedy is either
extinguished or exhausted, no party can take recourse to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
Articles 226 or 227 are not the panacea for all diseases.
20. NAME OF THE CASE: B. Dileep kumar vs. The Secretary to the Government
NAME OF THE COURT: High Court of Madras
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V. Ramasubramanian
CASE CITATION: 11.11.2014-MADHC
Facts:
The petitioner, who belongs to the scheduled caste community and whose marriage with a
girl, belonging to the most backward community, has led to his whole world turning upside
down within a short span of time, eventually leading to the death of the girl, has come up
with the above writ petition, seeking the issue of a Writ of Mandamus primarily to transfer
the investigation relating to the death of the girl and to grant various other reliefs.
The petitioner claims that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste Community and was a
permanent resident of Polipatti village, Usilampatti Taluk. According to the petitioner, all
hell broke loose after he married a girl belonging to the Piranmalai Kallar caste, classified as
a Most Backward community. The case of the petitioner is that the couple was forcibly
separated and the girl was killed. Therefore, claiming that his life is in danger at the hands of
his wife's (late C. Vimaladevi) parents and their community people as well as by the local
police, the petitioner has now taken shelter at the Tamil Nadu Untouchability Eradication
Front, having headquarters at Chennai. Thereafter, he has come up with the above writ
petition, for the reliefs stated supra. Hence, in these special circumstances, the writ petition
was entertained at the Principal Bench, as the petitioner, who stays at Chennai, apprehends
danger to his life at his native place and cannot go there even for filing a case.
Issues:
In the light of the rival pleadings, it has to be first ascertained as to whether the petitioners
prayer for transferring the investigation to the C.B.I. is legally justified?
Reasoning:
A direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed
within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the
federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall
be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High
Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the
fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution
in particular, zealously and vigilantly
Conclusion:
Mischief rule is interpreted by the judge in this case. The 2nd respondent is directed to accord
police protection to the petitioner until the completion of the investigation and until further
orders from this court. The petitioner is at liberty to renew the claim for compensation on
account of the death of Vimala devi at the appropriate stage. The 1st and 2nd respondents are
hereby directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- towards costs to the petitioner within a period of four
weeks from the date of receipt of this order.
21. NAME OF THE CASE: C.Raghunatha Reddy vs. S. Rajasekharan

NAME OF THE COURT: the High Court of Madras
BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V. Ramasubramanian
CASE CITATION: 2011(5)CTC837
Facts:
The Petitioner in these Civil Revision Petitions is a Tenant in respect of the house and
premises bearing old Door No. 8, new Door No. 13, Plot No. 303, 3rd Cross Street,
West CIT Nagar, Chennai-35, measuring an extent of 4,050 sq.ft. The contractual rent
for the premises was `1,100/- per month. The Petitioner is an Advocate practising in
this Court. The Landlord of the premises filed a Petition on the file of the Rent
Controller, Chennai, seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for own
use and occupation. But it was dismissed by an order. During the pendency of the said
Eviction Petition, the Landlord also filed a Petition for fixation of fair rent under
Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. By an
order, the Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at ` 7,565/-per month as against the
contractual rate of rent of ` 1,100/- per month. The Landlord filed two Appeals, one
for enhancement of the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller and another against the
dismissal of his Eviction Petition. By an order , the Appeal arising out of the fair rent
order was allowed, enhancing the fair rent to `9,688/- per month. By another order of
the same date the Appeal arising out of the dismissal of the Eviction Petition was
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether Revision filed against Orders fixing fair rent and tenant also sought stay of Orders
of lower Court for grant of stay, if Court imposed condition and Petitioner failed to comply
with those conditions, it would automatically result in vacation of stay Order.
REASONING
They are relied upon for the proposition that every Court or even a Tribunal has jurisdiction
to recall an order passed earlier, so as to render justice between the parties. According to the
Petitioner, since police aid was ordered without notice to him, the said order ought to have
been recalled in the Application filed by him for the purpose. But as stated earlier, the decree
was a contested decree. As a matter of fact, the first 3 Revision Petitions which I have dealt
with in the first part of this order, arise out of the main proceedings for eviction. I have found
that the Petitioner has no case even on merits even in the main proceedings for eviction.
Therefore, the recourse taken by the Respondents to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 22,
C.P.C., and proceeding with the execution without notice cannot be found fault with. Hence,
the said contention also does not deserve any consideration.
CONCLUSION
I am constrained to point out that it has always been the practice of every judgment-debtor
who fails to comply with any decree of any Court to rely upon all Rules of procedure and
contend that the decree holder violated all of them. In other words, the Judgment-debtors
have no law to comply with, but the decree holders have an obligation to go through every
step in the process without tripping down. A Court, especially while dealing with a Revision,
cannot defeat substantial justice by picking holes in the procedure followed for the execution
of a decree. The Petitioner who is a legal practitioner has no explanation to offer as to why he
did not pay the fair rent fixed by the Court at least after 2007. Today the Petitioner claimed in
open Court that he was prepared to deposit the entire rental arrears calculated on the basis of
the fair rent, within 24 hours. He also claimed that he was prepared to buy the property itself
and that behind his back, the Respondents purchased the property from the erstwhile
owners.Therefore, all the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently
connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. However, it is open to the Petitioner to
file necessary Application before the Rent Controller for delivery of the articles left inside the
Petition-building.
22. NAME OF THE CASE: Engineers India Ltd vs . State of AP and Ors.
NAME OF THE COURT: The High Court Of AP and State of Telangana
BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and T. Rajani
FACTS: The petitioner is engaged in the business of execution of works contracts.
The petitioner entered into an agreement with the Gujarat State Petroleum
Corporation for the Design, Engineering, Procurement, Construction,
Commissioning Assistance for the execution of its on-shore Gas Terminal Project at
Deen Dayal Field Development at Mallavaram, East Godavari District. According to
the petitioner, they either imported or procured equipment and materials on an Inter-
State basis, for the purpose of execution of the said contract. The claim of the
petitioner was that since they entered into a works contract, they opted to discharge
VAT on the actual amount of sale of goods utilized in the execution of the works
contract in terms of Section 4(7)(a) of the Act. Initially, the petitioner was served
with one Form VAT 304 informing the petitioner of a statutory audit visit, for the
financial years 2011-12 and 2012-13. By a letter, the petitioner requested for
extension of time. The audit visit was conducted on 11-02-2013 and the petitioner
produced the documents sought by the audit party, on three different occasions.
A second Form VAT 304 served on the petitioner seeking further information and
documents, regarding the composition scheme opted for, material supplied to the
sub-contractors, details of sale and purchase summaries etc. The petitioner filed a
reply on 1-4-2013. After the completion of the audit, a show cause notice under Rule
25(5) of the APVAT Rules was served on the petitioner, proposing to disallow input
tax credit on the purchase of certain inputs during the financial years 2011-12 and
2012-13, up to December 2012. To this show cause notice dated, the petitioner
submitted their objections. Even during the pendency of those assessment
proceedings, another Form VAT 304 was served for the financial years 2011-12 and
2012-13. By a reply the petitioner requested reconsideration of the audit, in the light
of the fact that a similar audit was under process for the same period. The petitioner
also requested for personal hearing.
ISSUES:
Whether challenging an order of Assessment passed under Value Added Tax Act is justified ?
REASONING:
Therefore, there was a clear difference made out in the Contract between the items and
materials which are owned and supplied by Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation and
materials which the petitioner had to procure from third party suppliers.
Merely because invoices were drawn on Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation, it could not
have been presumed that there were two independent sales. What the Assessing Authority
ought to have seen in the ultimate analysis was that there were only three parties viz., (i)
Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation, who was the end user, (ii) the petitioner who was the
contractor who procured the material and (iii) the suppliers of materials. The internal
arrangement that the petitioner and Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation had as between
themselves, could not be interpreted to mean that there were two different sales.
CONCLUSION:
It is clear that the Assessing Authority committed a serious error in law in thinking that there
cannot be a sale in transit in respect of works contracts and that Sections 3 and 6 of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, may not apply to a works contract. Even in respect of a works
contract, a sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce can take place in transit, by
transfer of documents of title. Since the Assessing Authority thought that it was not possible,
it was clearly in error on a most important issue of law. Hence, the impugned order is liable
to be set aside. Though the learned Special Standing Counsel for the Department requested
for an order of remand for a detailed examination, we do not think that it is necessary, in view
of the fact that on the interpretation of the terms and conditions of the contract and on the
interpretation of the legal issues involved, no other view is possible. Therefore, the writ
petition is allowed and the impugned order set aside. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
closed. No costs.
OUTCOME OF THE PROJECT:
The researcher had understood the concept of interpretation in this procedure of case analysis
and the outcome of the project under this analysis is an clear view or a clear understanding
about the applicability of the rules of interpretation and it had made out that the beneficial
rule of construction is mainly used where the system of law is not there in a proper order. The
case analysis was made on the judgments given by the judge V. Rama Subramanianan and
the way he has interpreted the proviions of law in different cases along with the different
contexts where the rules of interpretation is concerned and clearly understood by analyzing
the case laws.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1. www.Manupatrafast.org
2. www.Indiankanoon.org

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DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

PROJECT NAME : JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

NAME OF THE FACULTY: Mr. R. BHARATH KUMAR

NAME OF THE SUBJECT: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

NAME OF THE STUDENT: P.B.S.SAI PAVITHRA

Born on June 30,1958, Justice Ramasubramaian studied B.Sc at Vivekananda

Subject: Tax Law

Objective of the study

Body of the Project

 About the judge

Outcomes of the project

BODY OF THE PROJECT:

 About the judge:

Born on June 30,1958, Justice Ramasubramaian studied B.Sc at Vivekananda

1. NAME OF THE CASE: Associated Cement companies ltd V. the Assistant

NAME OF THE COURT: Madras High Court

BENCH COMPOSITION: MR. JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

CASE CITATION:21.04.2009 MADHC

SUBJECT: Tax law

2. NAME OF THE CASE: Dream Castle and Others V. Union Of India

NAME OF THE COURT : Madras High Court

BENCH COMPOSITION : V.Ramasubramanian and T.Mathivanan.

CASE CITATION:18.04.2016- MADHC

Name of the Court: Hyderbad High Court

Bench Composition: V. Ramasubramanian and K. Vijaya Lakshmi,

Issues: Removal of service by compulsory retirement valid or not?

5. NAME OF THE CASE: Manidhari Stainless Steel(P) Ltd V. Union of India

NAME OF THE COURT: THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE TO AP AND

BENCH COMPOSITION : V. Ramasubramanian And Abhinand Kumar Shavili

CASE CITATION : (31.10.2017 - HYHC)

NAME OF THE COURT: Madras High Court

BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Rama Subramanian

CASE CITATION:12.12.2014, MADHC

SUBJECT: Tax Law

7. Case Name: T. R. Nanniar and Ors vs Commissioner of customs, Tiruchirapalli

Name of the Court: Madras High Court

Bench Composition: V. Ramasubramanian and N. Kirubakaran

NAME OF THE COURT: Madras High Court

BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and T. Mathivanan

SUBJECT: Sales Tax/VAT

(i) that the exports were covered by Form-H and

9. NAME OF THE CASE: K. Kathiresan vs. The Registrar, Central Administrative

NAME OF THE COURT: High Court of Madras

BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and P.R. Shivakumar

CASE CITATION: (16.02.2015 - MADHC)

Issues: Weather manager is competent to impose or initiate a major penalty of compulsory

Conclusion: the writ petition is dismissed

NAME OF THE COURT: Hyderabad High Court

BENCH COMPOSITION: V. Ramasubramanian and J. Uma Devi

CASE CITATION: 24.03.2017 - HYHC

Facts: Aggrieved by the cancellation of a selection made to 69 posts of Office Subordinates

Issues: Is the cancellation order valid?

(b) Operator through Contractor shall designate in writing representative or representatives

(c) Sub-contractor shall designate an Area Manager in-charge of Sub-contractor's Drilling

NAME OF THE COURT: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD

BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian, and Justice Aniis.

CASE CITATION: 26.10.2016-HYHC

BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V. Ramasubramanian and Uma Devi

Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 reads as follows:

(2) Any person, who issues-

14. CASE NAME: Venkateswara Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh

NAME OF THE COURT: IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT

BENCH COMPOSITION: Justice V Ramasubramanian and J.Uma Devi