Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 43, No.

5, 2011
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2008.00483.x

Philosophy, Critical Thinking and

Philosophy for Children1
Marie-France Daniel & Emmanuelle Auriac
Department of Kinesiology, Université de Montréal, Quebec; IUFM d’Auvergne (France)

Abstract
For centuries, philosophy has been considered as an intellectual activity requiring complex
cognitive skills and predispositions related to complex (or critical) thinking. The Philosophy
for Children (P4C) approach aims at the development of critical thinking in pupils through
philosophical dialogue. Some contest the introduction of P4C in the classroom, suggesting
that the discussions it fosters are not philosophical in essence. In this text, we argue that
P4C is philosophy.

Keywords: critical thinking, philosophy for children, philosophy

Introduction
For centuries, philosophy has been considered as an intellectual activity that
requires rigorous acquisition of knowledge, focused on complex cognitive skills (to
elucidate, examine, review, discriminate, distinguish, evaluate, criticize, etc.) and
predispositions (curiosity, open-mindedness towards others, thoroughness, accept-
ance of criticism, etc.)2 that are related to critical thinking.
The objective of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach, proposed by
American philosopher Matthew Lipman at the beginning of the 1970s, is the
development of critical thinking in children through philosophical dialogue, which
evolves in a perspective of cooperation to enrich the group’s perspective—versus
competitive argumentation, where victory at all costs is an individual objective
(Lipman et al., 1980; Lipman, 1995, 2003).
Although P4C has been implemented in 50 countries and its material has been
translated into 20 languages, some contest the Lipman approach, attesting that the
discussions it fosters are not philosophical in their essence. For example, inspired
by Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, some maintain that youngsters are not
capable of thinking critically and reflexively. Others justify their opposition by
claiming that philosophizing requires intellectual maturity and encyclopaedic
knowledge, two characteristics that are not found in children.
In the 1990s, a debate about whether or not P4C could be considered ‘real’
philosophy took place among philosophers. With the new wave of infatuation for

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Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2009 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
416 Marie-France Daniel & Emmanuelle Auriac

philosophy in schools, particularly in Europe, (UNESCO, 2006, 2007), we feel this

debate should be re-opened.
In this text, we argue that P4C is philosophy. More precisely, we argue that there
is a difference of degree (but not in kind) between the Lipman approach and
philosophy (understood in the traditional sense of the term). The main common
trait that we establish between P4C and philosophy is found in critical thinking.
To present our argument, we first propose definitions of philosophy and critical
thinking. Then we elaborate on modalities and characteristics that are particular to
the P4C approach. Finally, we discuss the arguments of its opponents.

1. Philosophy
Philosophy is an ancient activity, and its definition is not consensual. Indeed, we are
confronted, depending on the times and the culture, with different schools of thought
that emphasize, for instance, rationality and universality (which presupposes abstract
language, reflection, argumentation), search for meaning (which presupposes intuitive
reflection on particular experiences), a body of particular knowledge (which presup-
poses a study of the great philosophers) (see Gazzard, 1996). Philosophy is also defined
by different specializations such as epistemology, moral philosophy, political philosophy
and the philosophy of education. However, very generally, we can say that philosophy is
a discipline that studies concepts, and the relationships among these concepts, in order
to better understand human nature and the world (whether considered physically,
theoretically, socially, etc.), and which tends to provide the ultimate explanation
(Foulquié, Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique). This general definition underlies the
duality of philosophy’s nature, which is both an art and a science; a process and a
product: ‘The art of philosophizing is not limited to producing ideas; it also requires
dissecting, verifying, emphasizing and prioritizing ideas. Anyone can produce ideas on
anything, but the art of producing beautiful ideas and learning to recognize them, is
quite another matter’ (Brenifier, 2004, p. 2).
If we take a historical look at the philosophical tradition (Parain, 1969; Bélaval,
1973, 1974) we note that the foundations of philosophy are found in ‘good thinking’.
It is with philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Heraclites and
Parmenides that the thought process became more specifically reflexive (thinking
about thinking) and that it became a process.
With the contribution of Socrates, the human spirit learned to question method-
ologically and to analyze universal themes (truth, justice, beauty, kindness, etc.).
With Socrates’ ‘ironic’ questioning, knowledge was not transmitted by the adult-who-
knows but rather discovered by the learner himself. To use contemporary terms
issuing from pragmatism and constructivism, we could say that knowledge was
considered as a never-achieved awareness that is constructed and re-constructed in
and by the questioning. Indeed, Socrates did not teach philosophy, he taught to
philosophize. Rather than disseminating a single theory, his own, he disseminated
a method of learning to reflect. Philosophy then became knowledge of self, a
spiritual quest for the meaning of existence, made possible due to the ‘other’ and
to the intellectual rigour imposed by her/his questioning (Hadot, 1995).

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A change in direction regarding the concept of philosophy was initiated when Plato
established an explicit association between knowledge (episteme) and adulthood, and
between belief (doxa) and childhood. This change was pursued when Aristotle,
in order to better map out the framework for reflection on universal concepts,
conceived the rules of formal logic. In doing so, he moved the ‘good thinking-
philosophy’ relationship toward a higher degree of abstraction.
It was in the Middle Ages (starting with Saint Thomas) that philosophy became
an intellectual knowledge reserved to an elite. Hadot (1981, 1995), among others,
specifies that the transition from accessible-to-all spiritual-philosophy to accessible-to-
an-elite formal-philosophy is situated in the Christian era, when Judaeo-Christian
religion was also creating spiritual exercises for itself. Becoming increasingly auto-
nomous, religion eventually proclaimed its supremacy over philosophy and empties
it of its content, so that with the advent of Scholastics, only the theoretical and
abstract dimensions of philosophy remained. Although a few centuries earlier Plato
had attempted to restrict the accessibility of philosophy to youngsters by maintaining
that dialectic was a double-edged sword that could prove to be subversive if used
by a person that lacked the necessary rationality and maturity, it was during the
Christian era that this ban materialized. From then on, the most refined instrument
for developing human thinking became the exclusive privilege of those that had
already mastered the art of good thinking.
During the Modern Era, some philosophers reverted to the ancient tradition to
create links with science, particularly mathematics, physics and politics (Spinoza,
Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, etc.). A duality was felt between rationalism, according
to which knowledge is purely intellectual, and empiricism, according to which
universal knowledge does not exist, only inferences that must be submitted to the
test of experience. During the 20th century, logic, particularly mathematical logic,
persisted, while analytical philosophy (Russell, Whitehead, Frege) and phenomen-
ology (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Ricoeur, Levinas, etc.) appeared.
With the pragmatists and especially with Peirce, logic lost some of its formality
to become applied logic. With Dewey, logic became ‘reflexive thinking’. Logical
thinking therefore became a social instrument to help individuals solve scientific,
social or personal problems. As for Rorty (1979, 1989, 1999), he resolutely sides
with the philosophers of Antiquity. As an ‘edifying philosopher’, he believes in a
consensual approach or in an inter-subjective concept of truth that has to be
constructed through an ongoing dialogue. His constructivist interpretation of
pragmatism presupposes that philosophy is not an instrument of conservation (as
traditional or ‘systematic’ philosophy would be), but a method to structure the
world such that it creates a better human future—a tool for effecting change and
creation. In his perspective, ‘real’ philosophy requires logical reasoning as well as
imagination and compassion (Weber, 2008).
Although some continue to believe that philosophy makes people and society
better, that it contributes to the development of free citizens, to the maintenance
of peace, and to the development of autonomous and critical judgments (UNESCO,
2006, 2007), philosophy is less and less popular with university students. And
with good reason, since it has not adapted to the needs of new generations. It does

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not offer the possibility of cultivating the skills and predispositions outside the
academic discourse (Weber, 2008). Consequently, ‘it fails to generate in its students
the desire to know how to live a more meaningful life’ (Gazzard, 1996, p. 11). Too
often, learning of philosophy remains an exercise of formal logic stripped of expe-
riential anchors; learning philosophy still occurs through the study of ‘philosophical
texts’ which appear as the expression of a formed and appropriated thought. This
learning consists in becoming aware of the consequences of the act of thinking in
the past and of its relevance in the present. In addition, the development of thought
in the learner—who attempts to understand the relationships outlined by the
philosophical text and the author’s style of thought—occurs in parallel with the
development of the logical argumentation inherent in (imposed by) the text being
studied (Morkuniene, 2005). The conditions needed to learn philosophy are thus
found specifically in the learner’s knowledge and maturity as well as in his intrinsic
motivation to comprehend the philosophical texts—such motivation being rather
absent in young adults (Murris, 2000).
In sum, although this section of the paper highlighted the diversity of philosophical
traditions, it also brought to light a common denominator in all philosophical
currents, namely the specific methodology of Questioning, of Conceptualizing
and of Complex Thinking (Parliament of the French Community of Belgium,
2001).
This complex thinking, which some refer to as critical, is in fact the bridge that
links philosophy to P4C.

2. Critical Thinking
As with philosophy, there is no consensus definition of critical thinking. Nonetheless,
critical thinking is generally recognized as a type of thinking that ‘doubts methodically’
(Foulquié, Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique), as it is the ‘examination of a prin-
ciple or a fact, for the purpose of making an appreciative judgment of this principle or
fact’ (Lalande, Le vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie).3
Despite the lack of consensus, the definitions of five American philosophers have
served as references: Robert Ennis, Matthew Lipman, Richard Paul, John McPeck
and Harvey Siegel.4 In 1962, Ennis defined critical thinking as logical thinking
characterized by complex cognitive skills. Then, at the end of the 1980s, he
adjusted his definition to include the influence of creative thinking and predispo-
sitions (1991, 1993). Creativity presupposes skills such as inventing, associating,
suggesting alternatives, making analogies, formulating hypotheses, etc. And by
predispositions, Ennis refers to attitudes such as being curious, strategic, rigorous,
etc. To Ennis, thinking in a critical manner implies the ability to judge the credibility
of sources, to identify conclusions, reasons and hypotheses, to appreciate the quality
of an argument, to develop and defend a point of view, to ask relevant clarifying
questions, to search for reasons, to draw conclusions that are credible and viable,
etc. (1993, p. 180). In sum, critical thinking is ‘reflected thinking focused on what
is to be believed or accomplished’ (1993, p. 180). In this definition, the term
‘reflected thinking’ refers to the awareness that is manifested in the search for, or

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the use of, valid reasons; the term ‘focused’ implies a non-accidental intellectual
activity, in other words, an activity based on reasons and consciously focused on a
goal; and the phrase ‘regarding what is to be believed or accomplished’ indicates
that critical thinking can evaluate statements and beliefs as well as actions (Norris
& Ennis, 1989).
What Richard Paul calls ‘strong sense critical thinking’ is, in his words, ‘very
close’ to what he was calling ‘philosophical thinking’ in his previous writings (1990,
p. 473). Strong sense critical thinking is found in the Socratic ideal of questioning
and in developing critical and reflective attitudes toward ideas, behaviours and life
(1990). Strong sense critical thinking manifests itself when thinkers reflect and
integrate the insights discovered, when their beliefs are their own constructions
rather than the result of absorption of society’s beliefs and prejudices and when
they objectively take into consideration the interests of all parties (1990, 1992).
Paul adds that strong sense critical thinkers cultivate moral traits such as: humbleness,
courage, empathy and integrity. Thus, to Paul, educating toward critical thinking
requires strategies that are both cognitive (i.e. logical and creative thinking) and
emotional/moral (1993a). Paul’s definition of critical thinking comes closer to
Rorty’s edifying philosophy; also, taking into account the emphasis he places on
the moral aspect of critical thinking, his conception is close to that of Antiquity’s
philosophers, who believed that intellectual rigour was bound to spiritual exercise.
Paul addresses not only instructed adults, he also implicitly integrates youngsters
in his considerations.
To John McPeck, critical thinking is the ability and the propensity to engage in
a reflexive and active skepticism (1991, 1994). The appropriate use of a well-
thought-out scepticism serves to establish the true reasons on which various beliefs
are based. These reasons are related to the epistemology of each discipline. It
follows, for McPeck, that critical thinking can only be judged within the framework
of each specific discipline. In his view, critical thinking ‘in general’ is an inconceivable
concept, since a person is always thinking of something and the quality of this
thinking always depends on the manner in which the criteria of the specific discipline
were learned. In a sense, McPeck’s perspective, because it requires expertise in a
field, refers to Plato’s concept of philosophy, which explicitly excludes youngsters
and the uneducated.
Harvey Siegel suggests a concept of critical thinking that includes, besides reason,
a critical spirit. In his view, this would indicate that critical thinking is manifested
through dispositions, personality inclinations, habits of the mind, and traits of
character (Siegel, 1988, 2003). ‘A critical thinker is a person who acts, takes a
stand, works out judgments based on reasons, and who understands and adapts to
the principles that govern the evaluation of these reasons’ (1988, p. 38). To Siegel,
critical thinking is directly related to rationality. The critical thinker is thus able to
provide the reasons on which he bases his actions, his judgments and his evalua-
tions (see Cuypers and Ishtiyaque, 2006). Again, although Siegel emphasizes the
notion of critical spirit, he essentially addresses young adults.
To Matthew Lipman, individuals need critical thinking to help them distinguish,
from among all the information they receive, the most relevant according to the

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objectives they pursue. So critical thinking is a tool for countering unconsidered

actions and thoughts (Lipman, 1988, 1995). To Lipman, critical thinking presup-
poses skills that develop according to four categories: conceptualization, reasoning,
generalization and research. Its definition revolves around three fundamental
criteria: 1) Use of particular criteria (to evaluate the terms of statements); 2)
Self-correction (to engage in an active search for one’s own mistakes); 3) Sensitivity
to context (to recognize that different contexts require different applications of
rules and principles) (Lipman, 1988, 1995). Finally, to Lipman, critical thinking
occurs within and because of interactions with peers. Influenced in this by Vygotsky,
he rejects critical thinking that is taught in a ‘technical’ manner, and instead
favours the development of this type of thinking through verbal exchanges among
peers (Lipman et al., 1980). Thus, the definition of critical thinking proposed by
Lipman is pragmatic, in that for him, critical thinking is a complex process that is
integrated into a utilitarian design for the improvement of personal and social
experience. With regard to the development of such thinking, it is a process (versus
a product) that occurs through peer interrelations and especially through philo-
sophical dialogue within a community of inquiry (we will come back to this in the
following section). If the influences of Dewey and Vygotsky are at the root of
Lipman’s concept of education and critical thinking, his approach to stimulating
critical thinking in children and youngsters is undoubtedly influenced by that of
Socrates.
To sum up the two first sections of this paper, let us say that philosophy can
be defined as a field of study or a mode of thinking. As a field of study, philo-
sophy aims at the discovery of truth; inspired by Plato and Scholastics, it is focussed
on knowledge and logical reasoning. As a mode of thinking, philosophy aims
at the construction of truths by means of dia-logos; with roots in Socratic question-
ing and in Pragmatism, philosophy, as a mode of thinking, incorporates practical
wisdom, imagination, compassion and critical thinking as part of the philosophical
thinking. Transcending the distinctions, both philosophical currents are linked by a
common foundation, namely the ideal of exchanging in a reflexive and critical
manner.
Critical thinking is reflective and evaluative thinking oriented toward what to
think, to believe and to do. Critical thinking implies not only complex skills
(related to logical, creative and caring thinking) but also a critical spirit (related
to social and dialogical skills and predispositions). As philosophy does, critical
thinking aims at the development of autonomous thinkers who can engage in a
constructive scepticism—the best means to improve the quality of human experi-
ence. If, at its origins, critical thinking was the realm of philosophy, since the early
1960s, the critical thinking movement has extended its influence into the field of
education.
Although the objective of this paper is to argue that P4C is philosophy, it is
important, firstly, to determine parallels between philosophy and critical thinking
since we have placed the latter in hyphens between the two. In this regard, we have
noted many more resemblances than differences between philosophy and critical
thinking, that is, both aim at the development of reflexive and complex thinking

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(questioning, conceptualizing, evaluating, etc.) and to do so, both philosophy and

critical thinking propose logical reasoning, critical dialogue and methodical doubt.
Let us add that the manifestations of any philosophical activity are found in critical
thinking and critical discourse. As we will see in the following section, this last
point does not imply that critical thinking, although necessary, is a sufficient con-
dition for philosophy. Among the differences that came to light, we note the practical
and applied aspect of critical thinking, which does not appear in traditional philosophy
(but which is present in philosophy understood as a way of thinking).
In the following pages, we define the principal components of the Philosophy for
Children approach, and comment on objections to the approach. This enables us
to subsequently analyze the link that exists between this approach and traditional
philosophy.

2.1 The Philosophy for Children (P4C) Approach

Lipman, without opposing traditional philosophy as a way of transmitting intellectual
knowledge to individuals who are mature and already capable of complex thinking,
suggests a philosophy-based approach to fostering critical thinking in pupils. Indeed,
complex thinking is neither innate nor magic. It is not because one enters adul-
thood that one automatically becomes a critical thinker.5 To Lipman and colleagues
(Lipman et al., 1980; Lipman, 2003), fostering good thinking does not occur
through technique, repetition and memorization, but by means of a praxis.
In that regard, let us mention that not all approaches related to teaching critical
thinking are rooted in philosophy (aiming as such at the development of reflexive,
autonomous and caring citizens). 1) A first objective is based on the transmission
of skills related to critical thinking. This objective aims at what Mayer (1933)
referred to as learned behaviour or reproductive thinking. Because of the rather
behaviourist learning context in which these thinking strategies are situated, namely
the repetition of exercises, we are inclined to believe that the transmission-of-
information objective is not likely to develop a philosophical mind in students (see
Lewis & Smith, 1993). In this perspective, critical thinking is a technique. 2) A
second objective of teaching critical thinking prioritizes values such as respect and
subjectivity related to personal experience. This objective enables students to: a)
think critically in order to enrich their personal experience; this helps them to place
themselves within the limits of their culture, and b) reflect upon the elements of
content suggested by their academic program. In this perspective, critical thinking
is a practice; its development occurs through comprehension of the environment
and falls within the scope of an intra-subjective (the self confronted with the self)
perspective where each justification, each meaning, each interpretation is accepted
without question. What we might refer to as the humanistic conception of critical
thinking is therefore apt to generate a ‘negative relativism’ in the students’ episte-
mology. It could be related to what Paul calls the ‘weak sense’ of critical thinking.
3) A third objective considers that the educational goal in teaching critical thinking
does not consist of simply initiating students to the standards, rules, laws and
traditions of their culture, but that it consists of encouraging students to embrace

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them in a critical manner (see Freire, 1970, 1985; Giroux, 1981, 1990). The
conception related to the third objective is philosophical. Indeed, it presupposes
that the goal of teaching critical thinking is to stimulate doubts, questions and self-
correction in youngsters to improve the personal and social experience (Dewey,
1983; Vygotsky, 1985; Paul, 1990, 1992). In this perspective, critical thinking is
inter-subjective in that it implies an open dialogue within a community of peers
and a dialectical relationship between reflection and action. Critical thinking is a
praxis. Lipman’s P4C is of this latter type.
To enable this praxis, at the beginning of the 1970s, Matthew Lipman and his
colleagues from Montclair State University (NJ) proposed a curriculum called
‘Philosophy for Children’ (P4C). P4C has now been implemented in 50 countries,
and its material has been translated into 20 languages. Lipman’s material includes
educational guides for teachers, and philosophical novels intended for youngsters
aged 6 to 15 years in which concepts that stem from various areas of philosophy
are adapted for this audience. The purpose of the philosophical support materials
conceived by Lipman is to stimulate in young generations skills and attitudes
related to critical thinking and to the ability to hold a dialogue with peers, in order
to solve a common problem.
There are three steps suggested to facilitate philosophical sessions with pupils:
1) Reading of a novel that includes ambiguities and paradoxes; 2) Collecting
pupils’ questions concerning ambiguous or paradoxical situations that intrigue
them and that they would like to discuss among their peers; 3) Holding a dialogue
in the community of inquiry (CI), in order, as a group, to construct elements of
response to their questions.
The CI is a micro-society in which pupils are initiated into the ethics of social
life and in which, by differentiating viewpoints and explicitly producing alternative
solutions, it generates socio-cognitive conflicts in pupils’ minds (Vygotsky, 1985).
It is ‘a virtually self-orchestrating process of transforming change’ (Kennedy, 1993).
In a CI, all members aim at common objectives, share ideas and information with
each other, and try to be impartial and objective in their mutual criticism. Also,
each member is urged to feel an interest in the beliefs and feelings of others and
to respect differences of perspective (Dewey, 1983). When a classroom is trans-
formed into a CI, pupils internalize universal concepts and fundamental principles
of social life on a day-by-day basis (Vygotsky, 1985). Gradually, extrinsic motivation
is transformed into the intrinsic motivation to act voluntarily in order to solve the
common problem by means of dialogue (Daniel et al., 2000).
Dialogue, understood in its strong sense of dia-logos, is an active and critical
method of communication. It differs from conversation6 in that it calls upon
complex cognitive and social skills, these being constant attention to the words of the
other and a surpassing of oneself in the search for questioning that holds meaning,
valid justifications, appropriate arguments, constructive criticisms, etc. (Splitter &
Sharp, 1995; Gregory, 2007) In fact, dialogue presupposes a horizontal relation-
ship (versus hierarchical), that is, an inter-subjective communication between two
or more people who are joined in a common inquiry. Dialogue, in this sense, is an
individual and a social experience (Dewey, 1983; Vygotsky, 1985).

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However, not all dialogical exchanges are critical per se. A research project con-
ducted with pupils aged 10 to 12 years in three cultural contexts7 revealed that a
dialogical exchange among pupils could be non-critical, semi-critical or critical: a)
An exchange was considered ‘non-critical dialogical’ when pupils constructed their
interventions based on those of their peers, without, however, evaluating the points
of view or the perspectives at stake. b) An exchange was considered ‘semi-critical
dialogical’ when some pupils were sufficiently critical to question the statements of
peers, however, they were not critical enough to be cognitively influenced by the
criticism expressed, so that the latter did not lead to modifying the point of view
or the perspective. c) Finally, an exchange was considered ‘critical dialogical’ when
the pupils modified their point of view, in particular using the criticisms, nuances
and additional points the dialogue provided. These types of exchange not only
imply complex thinking skills, but also complex predispositions (see Giancarlo &
Facione, 2001; Facione, 2007) such as explicit interdependence between pupils;
open-mindedness regarding the possibility of stating an incomplete or erroneous
point of view; awareness of the validity of criticism to further the group’s perspective;
desire to negotiate a point of view (rather than debating competitively); explicit
ethical preoccupation in interventions; etc. Following is an illustration of a critical
dialogical exchange among pupils aged 10 to12 years, who had experienced P4C
for two or more years. This extract illustrates their capacity to philosophize, that
is, to exchange in a reflexive and critical manner (Daniel et al., 2005):

Teacher: Yesterday, we looked at the order of animals and the order of

maths, which ones you thought were higher ... P4 (pupil 4), if you can
remember what it was you wanted to say to start us off again.

P4: With what P1 was saying (yesterday), it’s about brain power. Well just
think about the whales. Their brains are huge. They’re not, they act
mostly on instinct, they use this much portion of their brain. (...) With
brains, I wouldn’t rely on brain size because any animal could have a
huge brain and use a tiny bit or someone could have a tiny brain but use
all of it.

P1: I think that humans are the only ones that can do math, because it’s
like English: Humans invented English. And math is just like another
language that we invented. We use it to understand things, to explain the
reasons why things are. Like why the sky is blue and why we can’t float or
fly. So we invented maths to explain it ... But the animals they just think
sky and they don’t really think about it, because they’ve got one main
instinct, which is, eat and reproduce ...

P2: I agree with P1, well sort of. If I had to rank any of the animals in a
higher order or whatever, I think I’d put humans on the top as well
because, well, we build things, animals don’t, yes they just rely on
instinct. Animals don’t know what English is, animals don’t know what
maths is or anything. They just do what they’re meant to do, really ... We

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usually do whatever we want because we’ve got better resources for it and
we’ve created more things. It’s just our brain power is larger. I don’t know
if it is, but I think that our brain-power is larger.
P3: I strongly disagree; I disagree with P2, when he said they don’t build
things. They build nests, they build burrows, they have got to work out
how to build them, that’s not really easy. And they only kill what they
need, ... but we buy stuff and we throw it away. An average household
would throw away quite a bit in a week also.
Teacher: So does that make them smarter than us or are we smarter than
them?
P3: I haven’t got to that yet. Because, as P1 said, it does depend, because
we invented maths and you can’t blame them for ... like animals are
stupid because they don’t know maths. It’s our maths, it’s not theirs and
we don’t have a sit-down classroom with animals how we teach them our
ways, they’ve got their own ways. And people just think they’re dumb
because they don’t know our ways, but they probably think we’re dumb,
if they do think. So I kind of, I don’t know ... And look at us, we have
massive holocausts over land and we kill thousands of people but they’ll
just have one old fight and then it’ll be over. I kind of think animals are
smarter in their own way and we’re smarter than them in our own way.
P2: I think, I sort of changed my mind, I sort of agree with P3, but I still
think that we’re in a higher level than animals because ... yes, it really
depends. Like in World War II, well you know Hitler, he was killing lots
of ... Jewish people and had to be stopped. Even though lots of people
died, we really needed to stop him. And even though we may be selfish
and throw away lots of things that man made to buy something that had
lots of plastic in it or whatever and used up trees and everything, I think
we’re still smarter even though we do that. It’s silly but we’ve just got a
higher intelligence.
Teacher: Why? On what criteria do you base yourself?
P2: On how complex (we) are. And also on the fact that we have other
kinds of intelligence, like we said last week, empathy, sympathy and
things like that.
P1: Well, for me, my theory is that we were a couple of different species
placed on Earth as a test, to see if we could evolve.
Teacher: Who placed them on Earth?
P1: The universe. The universe is like ... we’re a cell inside billions of
cells. It’s like a gigantic cell that will always keep on multiplying. And
we’re just an ordinary cell. Like a cell inside our body that is made of
cells that are made of cells. And it has nothing to do with intelligence. It
has to do with whether we will evolve or not.

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P3: Then there would be like two different paradigms.

P4: Yes, there’s the intelligence to think about how to make things and
there’s the intelligence about how you’re going to use those things. We’re
both the most stupid and the most intelligent.
To pursue our argumentation regarding the difference in degree between philosophy
and P4C, we analyze four objections raised by philosophers (among others, Kitchener,
1990; White, 1992), according to which P4C is not real philosophy, and elementary
school pupils do not have the cognitive abilities needed to philosophize.

2.2 P4C and the Objections Raised Against It

The objections concern the fact that P4C is not ‘real’ philosophy—which suggests
that children are not capable of thinking in a complex or critical (or philosophical)
manner. The objections that are most regularly brought up are the following: 1)
after their P4C sessions, youngsters do not know the great philosophers that
marked the discipline; 2) youngsters do not have the ability to produce structured
arguments; 3) the themes on which they reflect are not universal principles and they
need a concrete support to philosophize; 4) their thinking skills are not suffi-
ciently complex to be called critical. In the following paragraphs, we examine the
nuances of each of these points.
Firstly, it is true that praxis of P4C does not provide children with a body of
explicit knowledge regarding the great philosophers that marked history, or the
classical philosophical texts. However, there is a distinction between ‘learning philos-
ophy’ and ‘doing philosophy’. The aim of P4C consists in initiating youngsters to
engage in or practice philosophy through critical thinking, not in teaching them a
body of abstract knowledge. ‘The objection suggests that philosophy as a subject
matter is something one learns about, and as such, it is not actually relevant to
Philosophy for Children because the latter is founded on the view that philosophy
is something one does’ (Gazzard, 1996, p. 13).
Secondly, it is true that pupils’ exchanges are sometimes less structured than
those of adults, but again, it is necessary to make a distinction: on one hand, the
aim of philosophical praxis is precisely to guide pupils in the elaboration and the
refinement of their arguments and analyses (Lindop, 1993) so that a number of
them produce highly structured and articulated philosophical ideas (Gazzard,
1996). On the other hand, studies have shown that first-year university students
also show idiosyncratism (King & Kitchener, 1994; Tremblay, 1999). And yet, it
is said that these university students philosophize, and the discipline they study is
referred to as ‘philosophy’.
Thirdly, we admit to the fact that the vocabulary of youngsters who philosophize
in elementary schools is simple, and to the concrete foundations of their exchanges.
However, the objection of the Neo-Aristotelians is not successful in discriminating
P4C since, as stated by Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy not only consists in
discussing general principles that are disembodied from reality, but also requires
concentrating on the words of common language and their use in various situations

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426 Marie-France Daniel & Emmanuelle Auriac

of everyday life (see Murris, 2000). During P4C sessions, youngsters work with
ambiguous and problematic concepts that can be concrete or abstract, but that are
generally embodied in contexts of everyday life (Splitter & Sharp, 1995). Further-
more, if youngsters cannot achieve general and universal principles from examples
that stem from their everyday life, they can nonetheless make transfers, analogies,
etc. to reach a ‘general’ comprehension of a complex phenomenon (see dialogue
previously presented). The distinction between the words of youngsters and those
of (some) adults is not absolute, but relative. Finally, the distinction between
‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ philosophy cannot determine a difference in nature
between P4C and philosophy, since the latter accepts as its own two traditions with
designs embodied in daily experience and that constitute the theoretical founda-
tions of P4C, namely Socratic questioning and pragmatist philosophy.
The fourth objection—related to the incapacity of youngsters to think in a complex
manner—is the one that is mentioned most often and with the most insistence. Yet,
a recent experiment conducted with elementary school pupils from eight class-
rooms in Australia, Mexico and Canada (see endnote 7) revealed different—if not
opposite—results (see also McCall, 1990; Evans, 1995; Murris, 2000; Mitias,
2004; Weber, 2008). Indeed, results of the analysis indicated that even the pupils
who were newly introduced to P4C manifested critical thinking skills and dispositions
at the end of one school year. Critical thinking manifested itself through four
components that is, the logical, creative, responsible and meta-cognitive thinking
modes (see Daniel et al., 2005). As the philosophical praxis continued, each of
these modes became more complex—starting from the egocentric perspective (at
the beginning of the year), moving on to the relativistic (at mid-year) and finally
reaching the inter-subjective perspective (at the end of the year). By way of example,
let us look at how logical thinking (one of the modes related to critical thinking),
evolved during the school year:
1) At the beginning, logical thinking was expressed in a concrete or egocentric
manner through statements based on sensory observation of a personal and particular
fact. The pupils (newly introduced to P4C) were not able to justify their viewpoint:

– Teacher: Does a perfect cube exist?

– P 1: A die could be a perfect cube.
– Teacher: P2, does a perfect cube exist?
– Pupil 2: I don’t want to say there is no such thing, but I haven’t really
seen one.

2) In the middle of the year, these pupils’ logical thinking was slightly more
abstract than in the previous transcript. Logical thinking seemed to be anchored
in a relativistic epistemology, as pupils did not propose criticism of peers. Never-
theless, they questioned their own actions and they addressed each other without
the facilitator’s intervention. This extract shows that, with the praxis of P4C, pupils
developed a critical spirit that affected their way of thinking:

– P1: When you draw, you make shapes but then are you doing geometry
at the same time?

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 Critical Thinking and Philosophy for Children 427

– P2: Before grade 6, before we started talking about this (P4C), I drew
like this. But ever since we started talking about it, when I draw, I always
question myself.
– P3: Before, I drew like this and I didn’t think it was geometry, but now
since we started talking about it, I tell myself it always has to be well done.
3) At the end of the year, the same pupils had progressed in the logical mode:
their viewpoints were spontaneously justified (without the teacher’s guidance),
their reasoning was more elaborate in the sense that the basis of their argumenta-
tion rested on more abstract concepts (self-esteem, paying attention, being logical,
knowing how to think), which led the pupils to increasing complexity in their
thinking. More important, pupils’ logical thinking was anchored in inter-subjectivity.
Indeed, they pooled their viewpoints to construct together a meaningful answer to
their questioning regarding the qualities necessary for success in chess. P1 men-
tioned self-confidence, and others added, in a critical manner:

P2: (Among) the qualities to play chess there is self-confidence yes but you
also have to pay attention. If you don’t pay attention if you listen to
someone talking and you don’t pay attention to his move you won’t know
what’s happening and then ...

P3: You also need logic. Let’s say you place your queen on a diagonal to
a bishop it isn’t logical because the bishop is going to take your queen. And
this is one of the main rules. Which means you have to have a lot of logic.

P4: You have to know how to think it’s good for logic. Also to be able to
keep quiet during the game to concentrate. If just as you are ready you
have to speak with someone who tells you ‘You’re no good, you’re no
good’ you won’t see what’s going on in the game. This is why keeping
quiet during a game of chess is good.

These three extracts illustrate exchanges among pupils who are novices in P4C. As
the example from section 3.1 of this paper illustrates, when pupils (from the same
age group) engage in P4C for two or more years, inter-subjectivity manifests itself
more explicitly and pupils’ complex thinking skills are more diversified (inferences,
deductions, evaluative questions, analogies, comparisons, nuances, justifications, clarifi-
cation of ideas, argumentation, self-correction) and more sustained. In addition, the
pupils show intellectually-complex predispositions: awareness of the complexity
of the concepts discussed, respect for divergent points of view, acceptance of intel-
lectual uncertainty, constant doubt, open-mindedness with regard to new alternatives,
compromises in the elaboration of viewpoints, social/moral preoccupations, etc.
(Daniel et al., 2003, 2005). These predispositions denote philosophical awareness,
not to say ‘philosophical intention’ (White, 1992, pp. 75–76). These are philosophical
commitments—the sort of commitments to procedural principles that make philo-
sophical discourse possible (Evans, 1978 quoted by Murris, 2000).
We do not infer that, in our research project, critical dialogues among pupils
reflected the level of complexity and abstraction likely to characterize an exchange

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428 Marie-France Daniel & Emmanuelle Auriac

among ‘professional’ philosophers (e.g. professors of philosophy). Our research

showed that the pupils’ critical dialogues were situated in an inter-subjectivity we
refer to as ‘oriented toward meaning’, in other words, youngsters searched for the
meaning of the words, the meaning of the concepts and ideas, so as to provide
significance to their existence and to the world that surrounds them.8 In doing so,
pupils did not develop all their arguments within an explicit ‘if ... then’, nor did
they engage in theoretical perspectives. Instead they based their critical reflections on
reasoning that stemmed from their experiences. We could assert that inter-subjectivity
‘oriented toward meaning’ is a preliminary step to inter-subjectivity ‘oriented
toward knowledge’ (Daniel et al., 2003), which requires a greater capacity for
abstraction and formal logic, and which could ‘be seen as a search for the absolute,
universal meaning of a particular concept independent of its use in particular
circumstances’ (Murris, 2000, p. 270). Nevertheless, inter-subjectivity—whether
oriented toward meaning or toward knowledge—indicates a complex epistemology
that presupposes de-centering and open-mindedness towards others. It also presup-
poses higher-order thinking skills and complex predispositions. Thus, following the
empirical results, we are able to maintain that youngsters can think in a reflective
and critical manner.
In this section, we have shown that elementary school pupils are ‘philosophizing’
and that P4C constitutes applied philosophy. First, we noted a distinction between
learning philosophy and doing philosophy. Then, we indicated that idiosyncratism
is not the sole prerogative of youngsters, but also of a number of adults and
university students. Subsequently, we showed that concrete experience is not char-
acteristic only of P4C, but that it has marked some philosophical traditions over
the course of history. Finally, we noted that the distinction between inter-subjectivity
oriented toward meaning and inter-subjectivity oriented toward knowledge is simply
a difference of degree, since both are complex epistemologies.
Based on these considerations, we consider philosophical activity to be situated
on a continuum. At one end, we have elementary school pupils who are philoso-
phizing (perhaps we could place university students, who are also philosophizing,
in the middle) and at the other end we have professional philosophers.
Although we argue in favour of taking a stand concerning a simple difference in
degree between traditional philosophy and P4C, nonetheless, we admit to the fact
that, in the reality of the classroom, some supposedly-philosophical sessions are not
oriented toward learning critical dialogue or dialogical critical thinking.

2.3 Difference in Degree but Under Certain Conditions9

Some of our observations of P4C in the classroom in Australia, Europe, Mexico,
Canada and elsewhere lead us to assert that a tendency toward letting the pupils
‘converse’ (see endnote 6) is rapidly becoming apparent and widespread. If, as
confirmed by our research results, the implementation of philosophical dialogue
among youngsters is not spontaneous and the use of critical thinking is not innate,
then we maintain that the teacher’s responsibility is to ask Socratic questions to
foster in children clarification of their opinions, clear articulation of their points of

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 Critical Thinking and Philosophy for Children 429

view, a search for coherence, the formulation of hypotheses, reliance on criteria and
the examination of alternatives:

– What are the similarities and the differences between the terms x and y?
– Can you define the terms you just used?
– How do you justify your statement?
– On what criteria do you base yourself to say that ... ?
– Can you provide a counter-example?
– What could you add to improve this point of view?
– Could we relate such behaviour to known principles or rules?
– How would you prioritize the criteria that were just mentioned?
– How has your perspective or the group’s perspective evolved between the beginning
and the end of the exchange?
– etc. (Lipman et al., 1980)

Observations in elementary classrooms where pupils experienced philosophy

highlighted the intrinsic relationships between the teacher’s maieutics and the
pupils’ apprenticeship. For example, we noted that when the teacher did not
accompany pupils with appropriate questions, that is, when he or she let them
converse on any topic, the pupils discussed many ideas at a time (instead of
exploring just a few); they did not focus on a common objective but on a diversity
of specific objectives related to their personal interests; their exchange was linear
since it was scarcely or not at all argumentative; finally the class remained an
agglomeration of individuals, rather than forming a community of inquiry.
Our observations also allowed us to note that when the teacher (unlike the
previous situation) asked all the questions or, in other terms, when he or she kept,
despite the use of a philosophical support, to a traditional role, then the pupils’
objective was to understand the instructions and to correctly answer the teacher’s
questions, instead of trying to construct meanings together with their peers. Fur-
thermore, they waited for their teacher to question them to state their point of
view, instead of engaging in an autonomous inquiry.
We also observed that when the teacher abandons his or her role as a transmitter
in favour of that of ‘guide’, and when he or she supported the pupils in their
reflections without, however, stimulating their critical and argumentative skills,
then the pupils learned to think autonomously, but they did not learn to use
argumentation; they sometimes showed opposition, but mostly in a perspective of
confrontation rather than negotiation; they rarely succeeded in completely justifying
their points of view; instead, they mostly used personal examples to demonstrate
their points of view.
Finally, we observed that when the teacher encouraged pupils to reflect, fostered
interaction among pupils, asked for justifications, encouraged them to provide
criticism, etc., then the pupils learned to respect divergent points of view, to justify
their opinions, to become critical with regard to peers’ statements and their own,
to become aware of the validity of criticism for the enrichment and the modification
of perspectives; in sum, they learned to philosophize.

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430 Marie-France Daniel & Emmanuelle Auriac

Therefore, one of the challenges teachers face when using P4C with preschool
and elementary school pupils consists of becoming aware of the distinctions, on
one hand between conversation and dialogue and then between non-critical and
critical dialogue and, on the other hand, between thinking and critical thinking. In
other words, teachers who want their pupils to philosophize must remain aware of
the ‘philosophical intent’10 of the exchange, because without an awareness of this
intent, learning philosophy in school is likely to stagnate into mere conversation
and, in doing so, fall within the scope of negative relativism, where all perspectives
are accepted and acceptable, where assertions are neither evaluated nor prioritized.
Too often, young generations that are influenced by neo-liberal values and illusions
end up considering power, money, sex, over-consumption, and so on, as the main
sources of happiness; they have no need for schools to also convey the illusion that
they are engaged in a critical dialogue when in fact they are merely conversing, or
that they are philosophizing when in fact they are reflecting in a linear (simple)
manner.

4. Conclusion
The text proposes the argument that P4C is philosophy. We have seen differences
of degree (not of kind) between P4C and traditional philosophy, and many
similarities between P4C and philosophy understood as a mode of thinking. With
regard to traditional philosophy, as currently taught in colleges and universities, its
task is to discover Truth, while P4C’s task is to construct truths with peers. In
philosophy, the solving of philosophical problems is often done through individual
critical thinking, while in P4C it occurs through the apprenticeship of critical
thinking in a community of inquiry. In philosophy, the means of reaching text
comprehension is through individual critical reading, while in P4C, conceptual
comprehension occurs through critical dialogue among peers. The traditional
means to arrive at understanding are the classical texts that represent poles of
contradiction, while in P4C it is the peers who represent the poles of contradiction.
Philosophical texts propose to adults complex argumentation, while the philosophical
novels for pupils question ambiguities and paradoxes in order to lead them to
complex argumentation. Prerequisites for learning traditional philosophy are intrinsic
motivation to understand, plus autonomy of thought, plus philosophical knowledge,
while there is no prerequisite in P4C except the intrinsic motivation to participate
in the philosophical exchanges. The result of philosophy classes is the mastering of
argumentative and critical thinking and an increased knowledge of philosophers’
thought, while the result of P4C sessions is pupils’ development of argumentative
and critical thinking skills and predispositions. Traditional philosophy is an outcome,
while P4C is a learning process.
As for the link between philosophy understood as a mode of thinking and P4C,
it has been clearly demonstrated that P4C—being a philosophy-based approach to
critical thinking—finds its roots in Ancient philosophy, particularly Socratic philo-
sophy, and in Pragmatism. P4C uses Socratic questioning to foster reflexive and
critical thinking in children. P4C is sometimes seen as an illustration of Rorty’s

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 Critical Thinking and Philosophy for Children 431

edifying philosophy (Weber, 2008). Indeed, the latter (as P4C is) is a love of
wisdom, a search for practical sagacity and an ongoing dialogue. The edifying
philosophy is a mode of thinking that presupposes logic as well as imagination and
compassion, while P4C refers to logical, creative and caring thinking. Nevertheless
the criterion of age is still present, since edifying philosophy is not addressed to
children.
Critical thinking is a fundamental link between philosophy (whether traditional
or edifying) and P4C, as both have as their goal the development of critical thinkers
motivated to question, conceptualize, evaluate, etc. From this perspective, philo-
sophy and P4C are two components on the same continuum.
If one accepts that critical thinking is not innate or that it does not occur
automatically at the onset of adulthood, then it can be agreed that critical thinking
requires learning—and that this learning can be managed successfully by elemen-
tary school pupils as long as they benefit from regular philosophical praxis.

Notes
1. This is the text of a conference delivered at Society of Philosophy of Quebec (SPQ) in May
2007.
2. The predispositions we refer to are understood within the meaning of intellectual attitudes;
they possess a reflected and self-corrective character (Splitter, 2007).
3. Many philosophers, researchers and ministries of education consider that teaching critical
thinking is a fundamental right (Curley, 1993; Letwin, 1993; Daniel, in press). Basically,
critical thinking 1) gives young people the freedom to doubt, ask questions and express
themselves, and it instills in them an intellectual rigour (Desbiens, 1999); 2) it encourages
the understanding and stability of learning (Peters et al., 2002); 3) when applied to oneself,
it enables each individual to learn to know himself/herself and to exercise metacognitive
control in order to improve his/her individual experience (Ministry of Education of British-
Columbia, 2000; Ministry of Education of Quebec, 2001); 4) it enables the student to better
integrate socially (Ministry of Education of Ontario, 2005), to make enlightened moral
decisions (Thomas, 2001; Darling, 2002, 2006; Fong, 2002) and it energizes democracies
(Paul, 1993b; Boisvert, 1999; Giancarlo & Facione, 2001; Lipman, 2003).
4. Although we focus exclusively on the works of philosophers, it is important to underline that
a number of psychologists have also written on critical thinking (see among others Good-
man, 2007). Whereas philosophers generally link critical thinking to methodical doubt, psy-
chologists link it to problem-solving.
5. According to Piaget, a number of adults perceive reality based on their own perspective.
Their field of perception is then limited to a personal point of view. Along the same lines,
Toch and Smith (quoted in Paul, 1987) maintain that, although adults invent concepts,
establish relationships between them and hypothesize, they are scarcely, or not at all, aware
of this. As this exercise is generally performed implicitly, these adults rarely put any effort
into testing their judgments, even though these judgments are at the root of what they are
and what they do. In other words, since these adults are comfortable with their certainties,
they lack criticism regarding their personal and social experience. As maintained by Lipman
(2003), critical thinking must be stimulated in the youngest pupils to foil this search for
certainty, as it tends to characterize the thinking of too many adults.
6. Conversation is a spontaneous exchange (see Flahault, 1999) that requires little or no
intellectual effort. It is not based on the clarification of concepts (Klir & Weierman, 1999),
problem resolution and procedural criticism (Pask & de Zeeuw, 1992). However, this does
not mean that conversation should be neglected in education. It constitutes a social contract

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Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2009 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
432 Marie-France Daniel & Emmanuelle Auriac

that includes an implicit system of rules and requirements (i.e. listen, not monopolize the
conversation) that presupposes a ‘way of being together’ and that allows each individual to exist.
7. Thanks to a subsidy from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada,
we were able to conduct, with six researchers from three countries (L. Lafortune, R. Pallascio,
P. Mongeau, C. Slade, L. Splitter and T. de la Garza), a research project with eight groups
of elementary school pupils (aged 10 to 12 years) from classrooms in Australia, Mexico and
Quebec. We recorded a total of 24 exchanges among pupils, spread over an eight-month
period between the beginning and the end of the school year. The analysis, based on the
Grounded Theory method, revealed two learning processes among the pupils: that of ‘criti-
cal dialogue’ and that of ‘dialogical critical thinking’ (Daniel et al., 2002, 2003, 2005). The
critical dialogue learning process brought to light two types of non-dialogical exchanges
(anecdotal and monological) and three types of dialogical exchanges (non-critical, semi-
critical, and critical).
8. ‘(...) what we all seek is meaning—children as much as (more than?) adults. Reasoning
correctly, thinking skillfully are not enough unless they lead to meanings’ (Evans, 1995, p. 9).
9. This critique was part of the opening conference delivered by M-F. Daniel at the UNESCO
Conference for International Philosophy Day (Paris, November 2006). The complete text of
the conference is in French on the UNESCO website. An English translation is published in
Thinking, 18:4, 2008, pp. 36–48.
10. The expression Discussion à visée philosophique was introduced by Jean-Charles Pettier.

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