IBP V DOJ

FACTS:
The IBP represents in this case its client, Jay-Ar Senin (Senin). Senin's rights were allegedly violated
because he has been detained for at least eight months without any finding of probable cause or a
case having been filed in court.
Senin's case started when a complaint against him and other unidentified persons was indorsed on
February 9, 2015, by Police Chief Inspector Crisante Pagaduan Sadino of the San Fabian Police
Station, Pangasinan to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. He was arrested while engaged in the sale
of illegal drugs during a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, he executed a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the RPC. After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor resolved to dismiss the
case. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ Circular, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for automatic
review.
The BJMP avers that D.C. No. 50 does not vest it unbridled discretion to release prisoners because a
court order is always required.

ISSUE: WON The IBP is correct that Senin must be released from detention eventhough he waives
article 125 of the RPC?

RULING:
The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities8 within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or
employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and
allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes public
officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law.
Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested without a
warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with
the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.
Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released to
avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period
(or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 9165 9 ) for the conduct of the preliminary
investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to
dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for
reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal automatically
results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a
person.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIONISIO MABONG

In the afternoon on May 20, 1955, Rufo Verano, who was a rural policeman, apprehended one
Dionisio Nabong after the latter went berserk and stabbed one Cipriano Tabel with a bolo. Verano
delivered him to the chief of police.
On May 23, 1955, after proper investigation, Mabong was charged with murder in two separate
informations by the chief of police before the Justice of the Peace of Lianga. When the, latter
conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation, Mabong pleaded guilty, whereupon the
Justice of the Peace forwarded the two cases to the court of first instance. In due time, the provincial
fiscal filed against the accused the informations required by law, and when the court set the same for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash and a petition for habeas corpus alleging as main
ground that his detention by the local authorities illegal upon the expiration of the period of eighteen
(18) hours without having been proceeded with in accordance with law, and that the filing later on of
the two criminal complaints against him by the chief of police did not have the effect of validating his
detention.
ISSUE: WON the accused has been illegally detained upon the expiration of the period of eighteen
hours?

RULING: The law on which the accused relies in claiming the illegality of his detention is article 125
of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The penalties
privided in the next preceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall
detain any persons to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
The law indeed provides that a public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within the period of eighteen (18)
hours if the crime for which he is detained calls for an afflictive or capital penalty, may be held
amendable to criminal prosecution, but there is nothing said therein that the charge from which he
has been detained and for which he has been properly indicted, becomes invalid or nugatory. While
public may be held criminally liable, the proceeding taken against him for the act he has committed
remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate. As a matter of fact, such an act on the
part of the public officer is not considered as one of the grounds on which one can predicate a motion
to quash the complaint or information under Rule 113, section 2, of the Rules of Court.
 SORIA vs.DESIERTO
FACTS:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001
Elections3 ), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It
was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to
have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were
brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before
whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From
there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was
released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while
petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the
time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already
elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner
Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista’s arrest for
alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an
information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-
S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.
At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation
of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional
Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No.
2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a
complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents.
11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the
first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125
of the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for
lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

ISSUE: WON Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was violated by the private respondent?

RULING: No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents.
based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be
included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in
courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.)
In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already
been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents. Hence,
there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak
of.14
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the
filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day).
Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15,
2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously,
however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous
detention.
 GEROCHE ET.AL VS PP

FACTS: At about 10:00 in the evening, Geroche (Barangay Captain) and his company who were
CAFGUs, entered the house of one Roberto Mallo against his will, and there, they searched the
effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and mauled one of the occupants. As
a consequence, the herein petitioners were charged with violation of domicile under Art. 128 of the
RPC but the RTC dismissed the case for lack of an essential element, that is, the prosecution failed
to prove that the accused are public officers. They were however, convicted for less physical injuries.
Upon appeal of the petitioners to the CA, the latter rendered its decision that petitioners are guilty of
violation of domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain and part of
the CAFGUs.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct for declaring that petitioners are guilty of violation of domicile under
art 128 of the RPC in the case at bar.

RULING: The SC held yes adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court and in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that he was a
Barangay Captain nor the other petitioners that they were CAFGUs. And in holding such petitions,
they were considered public officers/employees. Hence, the accused were sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 2yrs and 4 months to 4 yrs, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional,
as maximum.
 JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORP VS HON JUDGE LIDUA SR.

FACTS: The herein petitioner which is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to a City Ordinance, and is also authorized by
the same ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheel in a clamp if such
vehicle is illegally park, sued respondents Ang, Balajadia, and Doe for dismantling, taking, and
carrying away the clamp attached to the left wheel of their car. Accordingly, the car was illegally
parked and left unattended at a loading and unloading zone. In response thereto, the respondents
contended that the placing of the clamp on the wheel of the car was an illegal act since according to
them, did not park illegally. Hence, this incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and
respondents. The former filed 2 cases of robbery against the latter. On the other hand, the
respondents filed usurpation of authority against the petitioner. Now, based on the resolution of the
Provincial prosecutor, it finds no probable cause to charge respondents in the 2 cases of robbery
considering that respondents have no intent to gain and force upon things which are the elements of
robbery. They were however liable for their acts of removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the
cars involved, their failure to pay the prescribed fines and penalties for violation of the provisions of
such ordinance. 5 months later, from the discovery of the violations committed by the respondents,
the petitioner filed 2 criminal informations with the municipal trial court for violation of the city
ordinance of Baguio. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion to quash the 2 informations on the
ground that such liability they committed had prescribed based on Art 89 of the RPC and Sec. 1 of
Act 3326 as amended by Act 3763 which provides that violations penalized by municipal ordinances
shall prescribed in 2 months. Hence, their criminal liability was extinguished. Again, relative thereto,
the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that offenses charged had not yet prescribed
for under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information with the office of the prosecutor and not with the court.

ISSUE: WON filing of the complaint with the office of the city prosecutor on the same month where
offenses were discovered tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against the respondents.

RESOLUTION: The SC said NO. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended,
is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply. In
Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving the issue
of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the
time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without
question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. Under Section
9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of
the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that. Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did
not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. 
 RAB, ET AL. VS TORCITA

FACTS: The herein respondent who was a PNP Chief Inspector was charged with 12 administrative
complaints (which were consolidated into one major complaint for conduct of unbecoming) by Manuel
Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario for allegedly entering the compound of Hda. Aimee very
drunk with back up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted 2 of the complainants who stopped
him at the gate, shouting in a very loud voice, invectives and remarks. But the Regional Appellate
Board of PNP where the case was filed had dismissed it. However, according to the Board, he
committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcohol drinks while in the performance of duty so
the former ordered for the latter’s suspension for 20 days which caused him to appeal such decision
to the courts. Fortunately, the CA set aside the decision of the Board, and that caused for the instant
petition of the petitioners to the SC relative thereto.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the petitioners REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD to suspend the
respondent was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction.

RULING: The SC said YES because the respondent was found guilty of an offense for which he was
not properly charged. In Palu-ay v CA, a decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party
is deprived of the opportunity of being heard, and in Heirs of mayor Galvez case, a void judgment
never acquires finality. Hence, the Board’s decision to suspend the respondent cannot be deemed to
have become final and executory. Petition was dismissed, and the assailed decision of CA was
affirmed.

CO. VS RP

FACTS: At around 5:00 PM, one Antonio Francia (Miguel) was shot dead by a member of the Phil.
Army named Sgt. Roberto Reyes because of an alleged shifting of loyalty of the deceased to Mayor
Co’s political opponent. As a consequence, Jocelyn Francia, widow of the deceased filed a complaint
against Sgt.Reyes, a person named John Does (both as alleged body guard of Mayor Co), and Mayor
Marilyn Co and Wilson Co (the petitioners) as principal by induction. Moreover, there was an
allegation that while Miguel was in the hospital, the accused Sgt Reyes, SPO2 Aranas and John
Does entered the Francia’s house against the widow’s will, and there searched for papers and other
effects, and caused chaos and disarray in the house. And for that, the widow filed a complaint for
violation of domicile against the 3 aforesaid accused. But based on the joint resolution issued by the
Provincial Prosecutor, it declared that the murder that was filed against the accused be dismissed for
lack of probable cause and an information for homicide be filed only against Sgt. Reyes. An
information also for violation of domicile be filed against Reyes and Does and as the case of Aranas,
for lack of probable cause be dismissed. This was appealed to by the widow until that it was brought
before the courts for review and appealed thereon for the issuance of warrant of arrest against the
accused. This time, the issue at bar was focused on the determination of the trial court whether there
was a probable cause to prosecute the accused for the crime of murder as it ordered that the murder
case to be dismissed for lack of probable cause and sustained the information for homicide against
Reyes. This, upon appeal by the widow to the CA was reversed and set aside by the latter for being
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It gave rise
thereafter for the petitioners to question such ruling as they appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: WON the CA committed a reversible error in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the
information for murder against the accused for lack of probable cause.

RULING: The SC said NO because first and foremost ,in the case at bar, what was brought before
the trial court was the preliminary examination. The trial court’s jurisdiction is limited to the
determination of whether there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
accused. What the trial court did was preliminary investigation which falls within the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor, to determine WON there was probable cause to prosecute the accused for the crime of
murder was beyond its jurisdiction and therefore, it committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, petition was denied.
 PP VS. LOVEDIORO
FACTS: Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along the public market when
suddenly a man walked beside him, pulled a .45caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at SPO3
Lucilo’s right ear and fired. The man who shot the policeman had three other companions with him,
one of whom shot the fallen police four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun, the
man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
Someone witnessed the incident and identified Elias Lovedioro as the one who fired the fatal
shot. The policeman died on the same day due to massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds
on the face, chest and other body parts.
Appellant, Lovedioro was found guilty of murder, however, he appealed contending that as a
member of NPA he should have been charged with rebellion and nor murder because the killing of
Lucilo was a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends.
ISSUE: W/N conviction of the appellant of murder instead of rebellion is correct.
RULING: YES. The Court ruled that [Under Art. 134 of the RPC] rebellion is an armed public
uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. It
is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven but also purpose must be proved. In fact,
even ii cases where the acts were committed simultaneously with or in the course of rebellion, if the
killing, robbing, etc were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation,
it has been held that the crime would be separately punished as common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime of rebellion.
Since the appellant failed to established that the reason for the killing was to further or carry
out rebellion, the conviction of murder is just proper.
LADLAD, ET. AL. VS. VELASCO, ET. AL.
In case of Rebellion
FACTS: Ladlad and co-accused were charged with rebellion under Art. 134 in relation to Art. 135
of the RPC. The prosecution’s witnesses stated in their affidavits that Ladlad and other co-acused
were leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot
was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a tactical alliance.
ISSUE: W/N Ladlad and other co-accused were rightfully charged with the crime of Rebellion.
RULING: No. Rebellion under Art. 134 of the RPC, by its nature, is a crime of the masses or
multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the
panel of prosecutors consisted of affidavits and other documents are insufficient to show probable
cause to indict the accused for Rebellion. Affidavits of the witnesses only stated that accused and
others were present during the 1992 CPP Plenum and none of said affidavits stated that accused and
others committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining or heading a rebellion as found in the DO?J
Resolution. Their mere presence during the CPP Plenum does not automatically make them leader of
rebellion.
 SAMSON VS. RESTRIVERA
FACTS: Samson is a government employee being the head of Population Commission in Trece
Martirez City, Cavite who agreed to help her friend Restivera in the registration of the latter’s land
under the Torrens System. Samson accepted Php 50,000.00 to cover the initial expenses for the
titling of the Restivera;s land. However, she failed to accomplished her task because if was found out
that the land is government property. And when she failed to return the Php 50k she was sued for
Estafa and administrative case for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a public officer. The
Ombudsman found her guilty in her administrative case, thus, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N appellant Samson is administratively liable being a public officer.
RULING: YES. In the context of Sec. 4 (a) (b) of RA 6713, the observance of professionalism also
means upholding the integrity of public office by endeavoring “to discourage wrong perception of their
role as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.” Thus, a public official or employee should avoid
any appearance of impropriety affecting the integrity of government services. Samson failed to carry
out the standard of professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of
her solemn public duty. Her act of accepting the money from Restivera with the assurance that she
would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer.
And for reneging her promise to return the Php 50k as their agreement, Samson is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a public officer.
KAPUNAN VS. CA
FACTS: Kapunan was charged of double murder in connection with the killing of KMU Chairman
Rolando Olalia and his driver when the two were found dead with their bodies riddled with bullets.
The crime stirred considerable public anger, given Olalia’s high profile as chairman of the KMU at the
time of his death. That Kapunan and his co-accused Legaspi were officers of the AFP.
ISSUE: W/N that acts of Kapunan constitute rebellion, insurrection or coup d’eta.
RULING: No. the murders of Olalia and his driver do not indicate they are components of
rebellion. It is not self-explanatory how the murders of two private citizens could have been oriented
to the aims of rebellion, explained in the RPC. That their death would bring about massive protest
action that would contribute to the destabilization of the Cory Aquino government and eventually a
military take over. The killings were intended to spark immediate instability which would be exploited
for the coup attempt. However, the absence of any immediate rebellion taking place after the
Olalia/Alayay killings calls to question whether there was a casual connection between the murders
and the consummated crime of rebellion. The murders took place on 1986 which is difficult to connect
with the 1987 or 1991 coup attempts.
 Gallego v PP

Facts: In the morning of March 10, 1957, appellant and his companions were about to hold a meeting
of the Jehovah's Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao, Iloilo. The chief of police,
Avelino Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him whether he had a permit to hold said
meeting. As appellant could not produce any, the chief of police enjoined him from so proceeding with
the meeting but instead of desisting in obedience to the chief of police's intimation, appellant, in a
challenging vein, addressed his followers, "You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to
the chief of police and his policemen) can do for us." Whereupon, the chief of police warned appellant
if he continued with the meeting, he was to place him under arrest. However, appellant, disregarding
the warning, continued the meeting for at least 30 minutes more — whereupon, he was arrested and
charged accordingly.

CA: That there was disobedience on appellant's part is self-evident from his immediate reaction to the
chief of police' warning for him to discontinue the meeting — his exhorting his followers "to continue
the meeting as they were prepared to see what can the police do for them." And these words were
followed by the overt act of continuing the meeting for at least 30 minutes as sufficiently established
by the evidence.

Issue: WON Gallego is guilty of slight disobedience to an agent of a person in authority based on
Art. 151, RPC?

Resolution: Upheld CA’s decision.

Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the order of the chief of police, he
was not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to
proceed with their meeting, as in fact the latter did. As justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize
resistance (also disobedience) to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be
clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of
excessive violence to enforce defendant's idea of a debatable legal question." (People v.Veloso, 48
Phil. 169).

PP v Perucho

Facts: In the evening of December 21, 1992, Barangay Gumaok, San Jose del Monte, agents of the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission were conducting a surveillance operation when they saw
Perucho (alleged leader of the Perucho gang involved in the kidnapping of Grace Chua and her
grandfather) carrying a .45 caliber pistol. While agents are making arrest, Perucho allegedly evade
arrest by delivering a quick blow upon SPO4 Nemeno and by attempting to draw his gun, which he
could have used against said agents of a person in authority were it not for the latter's quick reaction
of subduing him and forcing him to lie face on the ground.

On the other hand, Perucho said that while he was watching tv with his brother-in-law in their
nipa hut, the agents of PACC barged into their house and pointed armalite rifles at him and his
brother-in-law. The armed men ordered them to lie flat on the floor as they searched the whole house.
They
asked who Nick Perucho was; when the accused identified himself, he was tied and brought to Camp
Crame with his face covered with a t-shirt. From 9:00 in the evening to 4:00 in the morning, he was
investigated for the Cavite kidnapping. He also alleged that he lost consciousness because of the
water torture administered to him.

In cross-examination, the testimonies presented by the prosecution was found to be

improbable and unbelievably nonchalant.

Issue: WON the testimonies presented by the prosecution is credible.

Resolution: Accused is acquitted. Finding of guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence, not
on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. Herein appellant interposes denial
and alibi, which have been widely held to be inherently weak and unavailing. However, when the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable, the said defenses assume
significance.

Evidence must not only proceed from a credible witness, but also be credible in itself. Thus, this Court
has held: "We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Finding of guilt must rest on the prosecution's own evidence, not on the
weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.

PP v Siton

Facts: SPO1 JAY PLAZA, arresting officer, conducted a surveillance in view of the reports that
vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused, Siton and Sagarano (among
other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer, which
resulted to the arrest of the two accused, in violation of the anti-vagrancy law and prostitution
provided in Art 202 of the RPC.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits, the two accused questioned the constitutionality
of the anti-vagrancy law for being vague and overbroad.

Issue: WON the accused are guilty of violating the anti-vagrancy law?

Resolution: SC upheld the constitutionality of Art 202 (2) and ordered the continuation of the
proceedings against Siton and Sagarano.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a
public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time
which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as
would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.