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 Current Affairs (Global Issues)

 International Security
 Terrorism and Counter Terrorism
 Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Security
 Nuclear Politics in South Asia
 Globalization
 Pakistan Affairs
 Nuclear Program of Pakistan
 its Safety and Security
 International Concerns
 Pakistan and US
 War on Terror
 Pakistan’s Nuclear Program started
 during Ayub Khan period
 as a response to Indian nuclear designs which
were detrimental to Pakistan’s future

 Initially, in 1956 the program was aimed to

produce energy by the enactment of
 Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
 Pakistan began its nuclear efforts during the
1950s as an energy program

 It was prompted in large part by the United

States’ “Atoms for Peace” program
 which sought to spread nuclear energy technology
across the globe

 The United States gave Pakistan its first reactor

 the five megawatt Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor
(PARR-1)—in 1962.
 Pakistan’s plan to produce nuclear energy for
country’s energy needs was justified
 by International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
 in its study of Pakistan’s electric power needs

 Nuclear energy is economical as compared to

production of energy through
 fossil fuel, oil, natural gas, coal or hydro-electric
 Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was
established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
 Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971
war with India, Bhutto initiated the program
 India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave
Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum
 Through the late 1970s,
 Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium
enrichment technology and expertise
 Pakistan began receiving considerable
international support for its nuclear program
 Canada, for example, provided a 137-megawatt
heavy water nuclear reactor known as Canada
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU)
 The reactor was installed at the Karachi Nuclear
Power Plant (KANUPP) and was soon producing
weapons grade plutonium
 France likewise agreed to supply the Chashma
plutonium separation plant
 International community cracked down on
the proliferation of nuclear materials after
India’s first nuclear test in 1974.
 Canada withdrew its support for Pakistan in 1976,
 France never completed the Chashma plant
▪ A plutonium bomb suddenly seemed like a distant
 The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan
 Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist
 who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge
 He was put in charge of Kahuta facility, which was
established in 1976.
 Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine
▪ in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology
 Uranium bomb project even had a special
codename: Project-706
 In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of
weapons-grade uranium production,

 By 1986 it is thought to have produced

enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon
 Pakistan continued advancing its uranium
enrichment program

 In 1987 as per sources, the nation acquired

the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion
 In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a
significant impact for Pakistan
 Under President Ronald Reagan, the United States gave
military support
 Pakistan—a neighbor of Afghanistan with crucial supply
routes—proved to be an essential ally in this effort
 As a result, the United States largely turned a blind eye
to the Pakistani nuclear program
 In 1982, for example, Zia made an official visit to the
United States. “He’s a good man,” wrote Reagan in his
diary. “Gave me his word they were not building an
atomic or nuclear bomb.
 In 1985, the U.S. Congress passed the Pressler Amendment
 which established a protocol for sanctions against Pakistan if it
crossed certain “red lines,”
 such as manufacturing highly enriched uranium and making a
fissionable bomb core
 The law was designed to allow the United States to maintain good
relations with Pakistan, but it ultimately forced the American
government to implement sanctions in the 1990s

 Beginning in the early 1980s, Pakistan conducted a series of

“cold tests,” which involved a nuclear device without fissile
 It conducted over 20 additional cold tests during the next
 Pakistan also strengthened its alliance with China against
 Among other assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program,
the Chinese government invited Pak scientists to Beijing
 On May 26, 1990, China tested a Pakistani bomb (Pak-1)
on Pakistan’s behalf at the Lop Nur test site
 The “Event No. 35” was most likely a uranium implosion
bomb, a derivative of the Chinese CHIC-4 design
 Pakistan also reached an agreement with North Korea
 for Nodong ballistic missiles in exchange for Pakistani
uranium enrichment technology

 The United States even offered a repeal of the Pressler

Amendment and additional military aid should Pakistan
refrain from testing
 China played a major role in the development of
Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure,
 when increasingly stringent export controls in western
countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials
and technology elsewhere

 According to a 2001 Department of Defense report

 China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and
 Provided critical assistance in the construction of nuclear

 In the 1990s
 China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor,
which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium
 A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation
contributed to expand uranium enrichment capabilities
 by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a
key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed
rotation of centrifuges

 China also provided technical and material support in the

completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and
plutonium reprocessing facility, in mid 1990s
 The project had been initiated as a cooperative program
with France
 Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept
IAEA safeguards caused France to terminate assistance.
 Pakistan currently possesses a growing
nuclear arsenal, and remains outside:
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT)
 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

 It also is the sole country blocking

negotiations of the
 Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
 Pakistan claims its export controls being
amongst the best in the world
 The export controls legal framework is governed
by the following legal and administrative
 The Import and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 Act No.
XXXIX of 1950:
 Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
(PNSRP) Ordinance of 1984 and Regulation of 1990
 Pakistan’s Trade Policy 2004-05:
 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance
2000, Ordinance No. LIV of 2000:
 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance (PNRA),
2001, Ordinance No. III of 2001

 Salient elements of the new Export Control Act include:

 Controls over export, re-export, transshipment and transit of
goods, technologies, material and equipment covered
 Prohibition of diversion of controlled goods and technologies
 Wide jurisdiction
 Provides for an authority to administer rules and regulations
 Comprehensive control lists and catch all provisions
 Licensing and record keeping provisions
 Penal provisions:
 On 11 & 13 May 1998, India conducted a 5 nuclear explosions
 PM Nawaz Sharif decided to test, and Pakistan detonated
 five on 28 May
 a sixth on 30 May 1998
 Ras Koh Hills in the southwestern Baluchistan province as a test site

 Pakistan abandoned its nuclear ambiguity and stated that it

would maintain a "credible minimum deterrent" against India
 In 1998, Pakistan commissioned its first plutonium production
reactor at Khushab
 capable of producing approx. 11 kg of weapons-grade plutonium
 Pakistan does not have a formally declared nuclear
 Does not have a no first use doctrine regarding its nuclear

 “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves,

even go hungry, but we will get one of our own,” -
ZA Bhutto after 1965 War
 In 2002, President Pervez Musharraf stated that
 "nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India,"
 would only be used if "the very existence of Pakistan as a
state" was at stake
 Institutional Framework: Pakistan has put in place a
comprehensive institutional framework
 National Command Authority (NCA) at the apex for policy
formulation, employment and development of strategic
 The Prime Minister is the Chairman

 Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) is the Secretariat to the NCA

 This structure makes it clear that the final authority on the use
of nuclear weapons rests with the civilian chief executive and
that any such decision would require detailed consideration in
the NCA set up for this purpose.
 The Security Division of SPD has also been
significantly expanded
 to maintain a close watch on all aspects and
organizations of the nuclear program
 with a special security emphasis on sites, activities,
material management, material inventory, personnel
reliability and counter intelligence
 It also controls a significant armed security force—a
specialized armed force—which has only recently
been further augmented for physical security.
 There is also a training academy to impart
specialized training and skills.

 Then there are the Services Strategic Forces of all

the three Armed Forces of the Army, Navy and
Air Force
 While technical, training & administrative control
rests with the respective services, operational
control is vested in the NCA
 National Security Council
 Economic Coordination Committee (ECC)
 Development Control Committee (DCC)
 Employment Control Committee (ECC)
 Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU)

 Strategic combat commands

 Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC)
 Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)
 Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)
 Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
 Directorate of Technical Development
 Directorate of Technical Equipment
 Directorate of Technical Procurement
 Directorate of Science & Engineering Services

 Ministry of Industries & Production

 State Engineering Corporation (SEC)
 Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC)
 Pakistan Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.
 Pakistan machine tool factory
Legislative Framework
 The NCA Act which replaces the former NCA
 The purpose of this legislation is to give cover to the NCA
for complete command and control
 to provide for the safety and security

 In effect, the Act entrusting upon the NCA with

three major areas of responsibility;
 effective command and control of the strategic programs
 safety and security of strategic programs
 maintenance of a system of personnel reliability
Limiting Factors
 PNRA (Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority)
ability to license new sites, certify new reactor
designs, regulate operations of existing plants
 PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission) ability
to train fast enough adequate number of stations
technical staffs, industry support infrastructure
 Relying on small number of new reactor designs,
constructing multi-unit stations, will bring Pakistan
benefits of Plant standardization, on-site replication
Safety Considerations
 Standardization, on-site replication of new reactor designs,
carry risks of generic design defects identified later in life,
requiring fleet-wide modifications & loss of generation
 New reactor designs maybe more susceptible to common-
mode failures affecting entire stations or several stations
 New, not well trained station staffs may exacerbate initiating
events, propagating them to significant nuclear accidents
 Grid-Station interactions may propagate station shutdown to
grid instability, ultimately electric grid collapse, with severe
economic, social, consequences
 Natural disasters could affect multiple-unit stations,
particularly with inexperienced staff, leading to further grid
 Two Operating Nuclear Power Plants, One under
 KANUPP 125 MWe (Net) CANDU Type reactor,
Near Karachi, commercial operation 12/1972
 CHASNUPP-1 300 MWe (Net) PWR, Near
Chasma in the Punjab, commercial operation
 CHASNUPP -2 300 MWe (Net) PWR, Near
Chasma, Under construction, commercial
operation expected ~2012
 Nuclear Power Plants & all fuel Cycle facilities
 operated - Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC )
 Pakistan nuclear safety issues regulated by
 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)
 All Pakistani Nuclear Power Plants
 under IAEA Safeguards
 Pakistan is member of
 CANDU Operators Group (COG),
 World Association of Nuclear (Plant) Operators (WANO)

 Pakistan attempt to harmonize export control policies to

NSG Guidelines (Meetings 2005)
 Pakistan well complied with Reporting Requirements of
UNSC Resolution 1540
 Protection of Spent Fuel Storage Pools
 Fissile Material Diversion from Nuclear Power
 Terrorist Attack, Seizure, or Take-Over of Nuclear
Power Stations - Multi-unit
 Possible Airplane Attack on Nuclear Power
 Military Take-Over of Nuclear Station Sites
 Straining PNRA Regulatory Resources
 Inadequate Training of Nuclear Operation Staffs
 Protection of Spent Fuel Storage Pools
 Common-Mode Failures & Impacts on Grid
 Impacts of Natural Disasters
Missile Class Range News
Ababeel MRBM 2,200 km In development
Exocet ASCM 40-180 km Operational
Hatf 2 "Abdali" SRBM 180-200 km Operational
Shaheen 3 MRBM 2,750 km In development
Hatf 9 "Nasr" SRBM 60 km In Development
Hatf 8 "Ra'ad" Cruise Missile 350 km In Development
Hatf 7 "Babur" Cruise Missile 350-700 km Operational
Hatf 6 "Shaheen 2" MRBM 1,500-2,000 km Operational
Hatf 5 "Ghauri" MRBM 1,250-1,500 km Operational
Hatf 4 "Shaheen 1" SRBM 750 km Operational
Hatf 3 "Ghaznavi" SRBM 290 km Operational
Hatf 1 SRBM 70-100 km Operational
 U.S. priorities related to nuclear weapons in
South Asia have shifted over time.
 While the United States first sought to prevent the
development of nuclear weapons in the region
 the focus shifted to cap and rollback of the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear programs
 then to ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons and technologies.
 Today, there are two priorities above others that
should guide U.S. policy.
 First priority is the prevention of intentional or
inadvertent use of nuclear weapons
 Second is to maintain the security of nuclear weapons
and materials in order to prevent their theft or
 The challenges inherent in these priorities
 Increases in fissile material stocks
 Changes in nuclear posture toward greater readiness
and possible deployment especially of tactical nuclear
 Evolving nuclear and conventional military strategies
and postures pose greater risks of rapid conflict
 Violent non-state actors
 The growth in Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and the broadening of its
deterrence objectives raise thorny challenges for U.S. interests
 to prevent a nuclear explosion
 to maintain effective security on nuclear weapons and materials.

 The stated Pakistani concerns about India’s offensive conventional

military planning are not without merit
 Pronouncements from the Indian military and strategic community
make clear that India has been contemplating ways to punish Pakistan
 Accordingly, the Indian Army has sought to formulate and exercise a
proactive strategy, often called “Cold Start,”
 the point of which is to be able to rapidly mobilize sufficient firepower to
overwhelm Pakistani defenses and inflict defeat on the Pakistan Army

 But for Pakistan, this threat—real or perceived—has provided ample

justification for its nuclear build-up.
 Should there be another crisis
 the potential speed of escalation may not afford the United States much
time to intervene and attempt to contain the conflict

 But the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks on military facilities,

including on some thought to store nuclear weapons, speaks to the high
threat environment
 In addition to implementing the best possible nuclear security, it is also
necessary to degrade the capabilities and reach of non-state groups
that might seek to steal or explode a nuclear weapon or material
 Thus, U.S. policy can’t focus only on improving security—there is
necessarily a counterterrorism component as well
 It is a long-standing American (and Indian) complaint that Pakistan
harbors—and in some cases actively supports—groups that harm U.S.
interests in the region
 One possible opportunity is through membership
in international regimes that both seek to join,
 specifically the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
 If there were a process to negotiate benchmarks for
membership for both states
 the policy of the current U.S. administration to
support an unconditional and exceptional NSG
membership path for India is problematic
 It also opens no pathway to membership for Pakistan
that would incentivize it to consider nuclear restraints
 Reduce incentives to test and deploy new
nuclear weapons
 Resolve the Kashmir issue
 Urge Pakistan to make its nuclear trading
record transparent to the IAEA
 Improve the security of Pakistani nuclear
 Involve the International community
regarding apprising their role in the Nuclear
Arena both in weaponry and power