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REFERENCE GUIDE

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT


Handbook for planning & co-ordination

Edition 3.2 / 2017


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PREFACE
The aim of the Edition 3.2 of ‘Joint Fire Support Reference Guide 2017’ is to provide
guidance to all staff officers and non-commissioned officers involved in planning and
conducting Joint Fire Support (JFS) as a part of the overall campaign plan.
This handbook offers a ‘common language’ for the planning and co-ordination of fire support.
It is not the intention that this handbook should restrict the authority of the maneuver
commander. He is expected to organize the forces assigned to him and to plan and execute
operations in a manner he deems appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment
of his mission.
JFS Reference Guide 2017 Version 3.2 is effective upon receipt and supersedes former JFS
Reference Guide Handbooks, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local
procedures for destruction of documents.
This JFS Reference Guide applies to:
- Joint Fire Support, 2013…. Field Manual, Austrian Armed Forces
- STF Land, 2016.…………. Regulation (DEU)
- Handbook JFSCG, 2017… Interim Publication 3rd Version (DEU)
- Opposing Forces, 2016...... Handbook (AUT)
- ATP-3.3.2.1(C), 2011…… Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CAS and AI
- AArtyP-5 EdB/1, 2015….. Fire Support Doctrine, NATO STANAG 2484
- AArtyP-1 EdC/1, 2015….. Land Based Fire Support Procedures, NATO STANAG 2934
- STANAG 3805/AJP 3.3.5. Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control
- JFIRE, 2016……………... Multi Service Techniques and Procedures for JFS, U.S.
- APP-06(D), 2015……...... Allied Procedural Publication for Joint Military Symbology
- STANAG 2014 (Ed. 9)….. Formats for Orders
- ATP-04 (Ed. F), 2014...... Allied Naval Fire Support, STANAG 1034
- Pamphlet No. 11 Part 1….. Battlespace Management, RSA, April 2008, UK
- ACP 125(F)……………… Radiotelephone Procedures, September 2001
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to NATO-
member or partner (PfP) nations.

AUSTRIA, August 2017

WO1 M. WIRTH
Chief Instructor & Senior-NCO | Joint Fire Support | Austrian Armed Forces.

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Table of Contents

A. JOINT FIRE SUPPORT ..........................................................................................9


1. What is Joint Fire Support? .......................................................................................11
2. Joint Fire Support Elements ......................................................................................12
3. JFS - EFFECTS ........................................................................................................ 15
4. JFS Processes............................................................................................................16

B. BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT ......................................................................19


5. Battlespace Coordination ..........................................................................................21
6. Measures for Battlespace Control..............................................................................22
7. Deconfliction ............................................................................................................26
8. Methods of Achieving Separation .............................................................................28
9. Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS) ......................................................31
10. Keyhole Template Method ........................................................................................31
11. Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) ...........................................................32
12. Airspace Control Usages (ASU) ................................................................................36
13. Airspace Control Means (ACM) Sections .................................................................39
14. Airspace Coordinating Measures Request (ACMREQ) .............................................42

C. LAND BASED INDIRECT FIRE SYSTEMS ....................................................... 43


15. Role of Land-Based Indirect Fire Systems (IFS) ....................................................... 45
16. Tasks of Land-Based IFS ..........................................................................................46
17. Standard Fire Support Tactical Tasks ........................................................................46
18. Command and Control Relationships ........................................................................48

D. STA – CAPABILITIES ..........................................................................................51


19. Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) ...............................................................53
20. Weapon Locating Radars- and Zones ........................................................................54
21. Air Recce Target Category List .................................................................................55

E. LAND BASED FS CAPABILITIES .......................................................................73


22. Land Based Indirect Fire Systems .............................................................................75
23. IFS (Land) Ammunition Capabilities ........................................................................ 89
24. Austrian (AUT) Field Artillery Ammunition .............................................................90
25. German (DEU) Field Artillery Ammunition ..............................................................90
26. Required AMMO expenditure for Fire Missions .......................................................91
27. Trajectory Correctable Munitions ..............................................................................92
28. International Artillery Weapon Ranges ..................................................................... 95
29. Call For Fire (CFF) Format .......................................................................................96
30. Message to Observer (MTO) .....................................................................................97
31. Fire Mission Command .............................................................................................98
32. Example of FS/CFF communication procedure ....................................................... 100

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F. OPFOR FS CAPABILITIES ............................................................................... 101


33. OPFOR Motor Rifle Division ................................................................................. 103
34. OPFOR Motor Rifle Regiment ................................................................................ 103
35. OPFOR Independent Motor Rifle Brigade............................................................... 103
36. Surface-to-air Missile / ADA Threat Capabilities .................................................... 104

G. SEA BASED FS CAPABILITIES ........................................................................ 105

H. AIR BASED FS CABABILITIES ........................................................................ 109


37. Air Delivered Indirect Fire Systems ........................................................................ 111
38. Aircraft-Delivered Munitions .................................................................................. 125
39. Air to Ground / Standard Conventional Loads (SCL) .............................................. 133

I. CAS & CCA .......................................................................................................... 137


40. Close Air Support Methods ..................................................................................... 139
41. Close Air Support Execution ................................................................................... 143
42. CAS – Briefing ....................................................................................................... 146
43. CAS – ‘9-Liner’ ...................................................................................................... 148
44. Types of Terminal Attack Control ........................................................................... 150
45. Close Combat Attack (CCA) ................................................................................... 153
46. Universal Briefing Format for CCA / DSF / ECAS ................................................. 154
47. Brevity Words – CAS Briefing Procedures ............................................................. 157
48. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request (JTAR) ................................................................ 158
49. Air Support Request Cycle ...................................................................................... 162

J. OPERATIONAL LAW........................................................................................ 163


50. Legal Considerations............................................................................................... 165
51. Collateral Damage Methodology Overview............................................................. 169
52. Target Authorization Record ................................................................................... 172
53. Graduated Enforcement Matrix ............................................................................... 173

K. PARAMETERS & GRAPHICS ........................................................................... 175


54. Target Location Error (TLE) ................................................................................... 177
55. Weapon Accuracy (2DRMS) .................................................................................. 177
56. Risk Estimate Distances (RED) ............................................................................... 178
57. Minimum Safe Distances (MSD) for Land Forces ................................................... 185
58. Tactical JFS Graphics ............................................................................................. 186
59. Target Overlay Examples ........................................................................................ 190
60. Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace (IPB) .......................................................... 193
61. Land Tactical Parameters ........................................................................................ 194
62. Conversion Tables .................................................................................................. 195
63. International Effects-Table (English-German) ......................................................... 197

L. D3A TARGETING METHODOLOGY............................................................... 198


64. Decide -Detect -Deliver-Assess (D3A) .................................................................... 199
65. Targeting - DMP - FS-Planning - Relations ............................................................. 201

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M. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING .............................................................................. 203


66. Decision-Making Process (DEU-NATO-AUT) ....................................................... 205
67. Principles and Concept of Fire Support Planning..................................................... 205
68. JFS Mission Analysis Brief - Format....................................................................... 207
69. Annex Fire Support (STANAG 2014) ..................................................................... 209
70. Brigade Fire Support Execution Matrix ................................................................... 212
71. Combined HPTL-TSS-AGM-List ........................................................................... 214
72. Battalion Fire Support Execution Matrix ................................................................. 215
73. SOP Fire Support Execution ................................................................................... 216
74. Joint Fire Support Liaison Network - Brigade ......................................................... 217

N. RADIO & VOICE PROCEDURES .................................................................... 219


75. Speech Technique ................................................................................................... 221
76. List of Proword ....................................................................................................... 222
77. J-Chat Abbreviations & Terms (AIR) ...................................................................... 227
78. 9-Line MEDEVAC Request .................................................................................... 229

O. ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... 231

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A. JOINT FIRE SUPPORT

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1. What is Joint Fire Support?


Firepower is a critical enabler of land combat on the battlefield, primarily through its
relationship with, and contribution to, maneuver. The term firepower is commonly used to
describe the collective offensive capabilities of a military force or, alternatively, the military
capability to direct force at an enemy. Firepower destroys, neutralizes, suppresses,
demoralizes and influences. It can be delivered by sea, land and air platforms. It has
physical, psychological and physiological effects. Firepower provides the force to amplify or
enable the effects of tempo, simultaneity and surprise. Its effectiveness depends on its
volume, accuracy, and its suddenness or unpredictability. It allows force to be applied
precisely, different systems to be concentrated against a single task, and the rapid switching of
fire between targets. The psychological and physiological effects of firepower are transient,
and should be exploited by maneuver before they wear off. Hence effective operations require
close coordination between firepower and maneuver. Firepower and maneuver are two of the
Combat Functions, identified in (land) tactical doctrine.
Joint Fire Support (JFS) is defined as the coordinated and integrated employment of land-,
air- and naval fire support platforms delivering indirect fires to achieve the required effects
on ground targets to support Land Operations in the full spectrum of conflict. It encompasses
the integration of indirect fires and effects in order to influence the adversary forces,
installations or functions. Depending on national doctrine, the Joint Fire Support Element
(JFSE) could either encompass influence elements as e.g. PSYOPS, CIMIC, EW or be
incorporated in a wider cell dealing with overall influence activities.

Figure. Firepower and within JF and JFS contributes to the Targeting Process

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2. Joint Fire Support Elements


Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE)1 is the element responsible for the overall planning,
coordination and employment of all allocated JFS assets at all levels. It is the single point of
contact for JFS coordination at all levels. This element should always be tailored to the
mission and to the level of force and reinforced by all necessary liaison cells as required.
The JFSE at the different tactical levels are:
a. Company/Platoon JFSE (Joint Fire Support Team, JFST)
(1) COY/PLT Fire Support Officer (COY-FSO)
(2) Forward Observer (FO) Team / (“Surface to Surface Team”)
(3) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) with Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) /
(“Air to Surface Team”)
(4) Other personnel tailored to mission (e.g. spotter)
b. Battalion / Battle Group JFSE (Joint Fire Support Coordination Team, JFSCT)
(1) Direction / Control cell with BN Fire Support Officer (BN-FSO)
(2) Artillery/Mortar Cell (e.g. Fire Direction Element)
(3) Personnel to coordinate and/ or deconflict airspace e.g. JTAC.
c. Brigade (to Corps) JFSE (Joint Fire Support Coordination Group, JFSCG)
(1) Direction / Control cell with BDE Fire Support Officer (BDE-FSO)
(2) Artillery Cell
(3) Army Aviation Cell (AHs)
(4) Air Forces Cell
(5) Navy Forces Cell (if required) and
(6) Airspace Control and/ or Coordination Cell
(7) Other cells tailored to mission (e.g. Air Defense cell or UAV cell)

1
This is a generic phrase not intended to replace any national term.

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FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (FSO)


The primary responsibility of the FSO is to ensure the integration of the fire support plan with
the maneuver plan, both during planning and execution. Integrating fire support must achieve
synergy between the different assets and effects. Secondarily the FSO commands and directs
his terminal control elements (Forward Observer (FO), Joint Terminal Attack Controller
(JTAC) and spotter, (if allocated) during planning and execution. The FSO is also the link to
the higher echelons JFSE for the planning and coordination of external fire support. The FSO
is the commander’s advisor for all (joint) fire support related matters. The FSO advises the
commander on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of all fire support assets
available to support his operation. The FSO bases his actions on the needs of the supported
force as directed by the maneuver commander's guidance. The FSO must have the proper rank
and experience for the mission, and have the commander’s full confidence.

FORWARD OBSERVER (FO)


The FO acts as the eyes of the land based fire support. The primary duty of the FO is to locate
targets and call for and adjust indirect land based fire support. The FO is a trained service
member able to execute safe and effective land based fire support. He is qualified to request
Call for Fires (CFF), or to order fires from a fire direction center (FDC) of organic or
supporting land based fire support units. Due to his qualification he conducts all types of Call
for Fires (Fire Missions) including explosive fires, smoke, illumination, danger close missions
and all available types of ammunition included Precision Guided Munitions (PGM).
In some countries the FO is also trained to provide JTAC target information for Close Air
Support (CAS) Type 2 and Type 3 controls where the JTAC cannot see the target. The
concept of operation is that these additional trained FOs will observe a large battle area and
liaise with one JTAC, multiplying the effective area of operations for that JTAC. See also
Joint Fires Observer (JFO).

MORTAR FIRE CONTROLLER (MFC)


The MFC is a trained service member able to execute mortar fire support. In some countries
the MFC is not fully certified / qualified as a FO but he can provide the necessary target
information to the FO in order to engage a target with Artillery Fire Support and conduct
adjustments, if necessary.

ALL ARMS OBSERVER


A Service member trained to request land based fire support (Call for Fire). The All Arms
Observer is not fully certified / qualified as a FO. The all arms observer can provide the
necessary target information to the forward observer in order to engage a target with land
based fire support and conduct adjustments, if necessary. The concept of operation is that
multiple all arms observers will observe a large battle area and liaise with one FO,
multiplying the effective area of operations for that FO.

JOINT FIRES OBSERVER (JFO)


A JFO is a trained and certified Service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-
to-surface fires. For air-to-surface fires, he can provide timely and accurate targeting
information to the JTAC or, when approved by the JTAC, to the aircraft directly, and perform
autonomous terminal guidance operations (TGO). The JFO adds joint warfighting capability
but cannot provide terminal attack control during CAS operations. A JFO is usually an
advanced FO.

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TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY (TACP)


The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) is the principal air liaison element aligned with land
force maneuver units from company through corps. The primary mission of battlegroup
through corps -level TACP is to advise their respective ground commanders on the
capabilities and limitations of air power and assist the ground commander in planning,
requesting, and coordinating CAS (Commonly known as TACP Air Liaison Officer (ALO)).
Below this level the TACP’s primary task is to support the JTAC during terminal attack
control of CAS in support of ground forces - commonly known as TACP (JTAC). Only a
JTAC is authorized to perform terminal attack control.

AIR LIAISON OFFICER (ALO)


The ALO is the senior TACP member attached to a ground unit from battalion through corps,
who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operations. An ALO is
usually an aeronautically rated officer and is an expert in the capabilities and limitations of air
operations. The ALO plans and executes CAS in accordance with the ground commander’s
guidance and intent. The commander uses a liaison officer to transmit critical information
while bypassing layers of staff and headquarters. A trained, competent, trusted and informed
ALO is the key to effective liaison.

JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLER (JTAC)


CAS is defined as air action by Fixed Wing (FW) and Rotary Wing (RW) aircraft against
hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. It requires detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Planning and executing safe and
effective CAS should include a terminal attack controller who is specifically trained, certified
and qualified to conduct terminal attack control, achieve the ground commander’s intent,
maximize and integrate fires on the battlefield, and mitigate fratricide.
The JTAC is a qualified individual who, from a forward position on the ground or in the air,
directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support of land forces. A JTAC
operating from an airborne platform is known as a FAC(A). A JTAC may be employed
outside of a TACP.

SPOTTER
The Maritime fire support observer for ground troops is called the Spotter. The JFSE on
company level has the additional responsibility of observing and controlling Naval Fire
Support (NFS) in support of the land component. The NFS procedures and amphibious
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTP) are described in detail respectively in ATP-04 and
08. A maritime fire support group consists of naval combatants assigned to support Land
Forces operations ashore by NFS.

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3. JFS - EFFECTS
Physical and functional effects2:
Harassment
Repeated, deliberate and intimidating activities intended to discourage, impede and disrupt.
Those fires are delivered on an irregular timeframe and location with a reduced amount of
delivery platforms.
Suppression
Suppression fires are fires on/or about a weapon system to degrade its performance below the
level needed to fulfill its mission objectives. The effect of suppressive fires usually lasts only
as long as the fires are continued. Suppression is used to prevent effective fire on friendly
forces. It is typically used to support a specified movement of forces.
Neutralization Fire
Fire delivered to render the target temporarily ineffective or unusable. Neutralization fire
results in adversary personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation
or the accomplishment of a particular course of action.
Destruction
Destruction fire physically renders an adversary force combat-ineffective unless it is
reconstituted, or so damaged that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable
condition without being entirely rebuilt.
Terrain effects
FS units are able to deliver area and precision effects by employing a wide variety of
munitions.
Psychological effects
All delivered fires and even the presence of FS assets has a positive effect on own troops
besides the classical effects generated on the adversary power. Even if FS assets just fire non-
lethal ammunition, friendly forces show their resolve and the readiness to use lethal
ammunition if necessary. Psychological effects encompass deter, demoralize, discourage, etc.
Operational effects
Those effects are known as e.g. delay, disrupt, defeat, divert, deter, degrade, dislocate, deny,
deceive, dissuade, limit, interdict, canalize, isolate, block, area control, separate, fix, contain,
compel, obscure, illuminate, coerce, hinder, hamper, contain, turn, neutralize, demonstrate,
eliminate, prevent, retaliate, etc.

SMOKE The capability to use smoke (SMK) can significantly reduce the enemy's
effectiveness both in the daytime and at night. Combined with other fires, it gives more
opportunities for maneuver forces to deploy and aircraft to attack frontline targets.
Obscuring smoke - Use and effects of a smoke screen placed directly on or near the enemy
with the primary purpose of suppressing observers and minimizing their vision.
Screening smoke - A smoke curtain used on the battlefield between enemy observation
points and friendly units to mask maneuvers.
Deception smoke - A smoke curtain used to deceive and confuse the enemy as to the nature
of friendly operations.
Signaling smoke - Smoke used to establish a reference for friendly forces.

2
For appropriate Task Verb Definitions see Page 184

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4. JFS Processes
Fire support in the context of JFS follows a dynamic process strictly oriented to a
predetermined procedural sequence whose contents might, however, be influenced by
numerous factors dependent on the situation and mission. An essential characteristic of JFS is
that calls for fire are generated “bottom up” to the command level which may decide on
engagement or assign appropriate delivery systems. In this context, responsibilities and target
engagement authorities (TEA) must be delegated as required by the situation so that
engagement decisions may be taken at the lowest possible command level. The information
obligation towards superior command levels remains unaffected.

a. Process levels.
(1) REQUEST LEVEL
The need for fire support arises at the request-level. This level requests an effect and
ensures target surveillance until completion of engagement. Request-levels may
include all tactical levels of national and international forces involved in a land
operation.
(2) DECISION MAKING LEVEL
The respective decision-making-level may draw on forces and assets attached, directed
to cooperate or assigned for JFS in the operations area. It checks the legal parameters,
assesses and prioritizes calls for fire within conduct of operations, decides on
deployment of delivery systems and ensures coordination. Decision-making
authorities can be flexibly assigned to the command levels as directed and extend from
unit level up to JFC level. The applicable ROE have an impact on the type and scope
of fire support and the designation of decision-making authorities. In low intensity
stability operations, decisions are generally taken at high levels. In high intensity
operations, however, decision-making-levels must be low to ensure minimum JFS
response times.
(3) PROVIDER LEVEL
The provider-level has the responsibility for the tactical employment of the delivery
system. Provider-levels are:
(a) For land forces: Artillery battalion, Artillery regiment, Infantry battalion
(mortars), army aviation/air mobile task force.
(b) For air forces: Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Air Operations
Coordination Center (AOCC).
(4) EXECUTION LEVEL
The execution-level has the responsibility for execution of weapons employment in
accordance with the decision-making- and provider-level. Execution levels are for
example:
(a) Howitzer units/ subunits.
(b) Mortar units/ subunits.
(c) Rocket launcher units/ subunits.
(d) Attack helicopter units/ subunits.
(e) Jet flight sections.
(f) Seagoing units (e.g. frigate), incl. on-board helicopters and airborne naval assets.

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b. Engagement seven stages process.


(1) IDENTIFICATION
Target identification and target location can be provided by Platoon- or Coy-JFSE,
maneuver forces (reconnaissance patrol, convoy etc.) special forces, ground-based and
airborne ISR and other sensors. In the scope of ROE, targets located by radar and
sound-ranging systems may require verification prior to engagement, using ground-
based or airborne imaging sensors
(eyes on target) to provide
surveillance of target environment.

(2) REQUEST
Besides target data, calls for fire
against identified targets comprise
unanimous effects requirements.
Effect requests always comprise
evaluation of hazards to friendly
and neutral forces and civilians
associated with safety distances to
be observed. This estimate of the
situation is always part of the
decision that should have Target
Engagement Authority (TEA) IAW
the operation order.

(3) PRIORITIZATION
On submission of several target
reports, engagement of identified targets must be prioritized by JFSE cell chief IAW
the force commander`s requirements and synchronized with the operation, among
others with missions from the targeting process.

(4) DECISION
Considering restrictions and ROE, targets must be evaluated at the respective decision-
level as part of an integrated approach22, and confirmed as targets or exempt from
engagement, as required. This includes, among others, a legal review and comparison
with target lists, Effects Guidance Matrix (EGM), Restricted Target List (RTL) and
No-Strike-List (NSL). This decision-making process can take valuable time and
should consequently be determined from the outset in the major formation SOP. If
available, legal advisors (LEGAD) should be involved in the decision-making process
from the beginning. Proper assignment of TEA and procedures is crucial for fast
decision making IOT ensure target engagement in a reasonable time.

(5) ASSIGNMENT
The most appropriate delivery system to achieve the desired effect is assigned for
target engagement. If no delivery systems/forces are attached or directed to cooperate,
appropriate and available delivery systems/forces should be requested suitable to the
level as part of the ordered or standardized reporting system (e.g. via Air Support
Request - ASR). For sea- and airborne delivery systems, assignment is generally the

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responsibility of the BG-JFSE subsequent to release by the responsible command


levels (e.g. MCC, ACC).

(6) EXECUTION
Following the assignment of delivery systems, engagement is provided by direct
cooperation of request-level and provider-level (e.g. COY-JFSE – Fire Direction
Centre (FDC) Artillery/Mortar, Aircraft, and Ship). The decision-making-level orders
establishment of communications and provides possibly required information (e.g.
frequencies, call-signs etc.). The JFST establishes early contact with the delivery
system and ensures the required information exchange. Target data and safety
distances should be updated continuously. Direct cooperation has no impact on the
information obligation towards superior coordination levels and supported maneuver
forces.

(7) ASSESSMENT
Weapons employment and effects are followed by Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
and Re-Attack Recommendation (R/R) if necessary.

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B. BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

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5. Battlespace Coordination

Battlespace. The Battlespace is defined as ‘all aspects of air, surface, sub-surface, land, space
and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompasses the area of operations’.
Dimensions of the Battlespace. The six dimensions of the Battlespace are Land, Sea, Air
(including Space), Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS), Computer Generated Space (CGS) and
Time.

Battlespace Management (BM). BM is the use of means and measures that enable the
dynamic synchronization, prioritization and deconfliction of activity across all dimensions of
an assigned area of operations within the battlespace.

PRINCIPLES OF BM
a. Command Led. BM is a core G3 function and must be command led throughout.
Authority can be delegated liaison but responsibility remains with the commander.

b. Define the Battlespace. The volume of Battlespace which a commander is allocated


must be clearly defined across all 6 dimensions of BM. The responsibilities within that
Battlespace must also be clear, so areas of activity which may cause friction can be
identified and it is understood who holds the authority to resolve potential conflict.

c. Shared Situational Awareness. Information Management (IM), Information


Exploitation (IX) and SSA are the key to conducting effective BM. The level, timeliness
and granularity of the SA will define the level of integration which can be achieved during
an operation. At the lowest levels of SA, BM will be limited to procedural methods but
approaching real time SSA, positive control of activity will be possible.

d. Identify the Level and Type of BM. Throughout both planning and execution the
levels of activity at each phase of an operation must be reviewed and evaluated, enabling
the type of BM, from procedural to positive, required to enable an operation. Additional
resources may be required for specific phase of an operation or the complexity reduced if
an appropriate level of command and control cannot be achieved.

e. Continuous Process. BM activity must be continuous. There are elements of the


Battlespace which once defined will endure, requiring only occasional reviews. However
there will be activity in all dimensions of the Battlespace, particularly during intense
periods of operations, where BM evaluation must be continuous in order to avoid loss of
tempo.

f. Collaborative Planning. BM is a collaborative process. It is the responsibility of all


levels to coordinate activity and ensure that friction is removed or reduced wherever
possible. Planning and execution must routinely consider BM.

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g. Simplicity. Simple BM controls and procedures are easier to manage and are less prone
to cause confusion or error. Complex BM is potentially inflexible, increases decision and
reaction times and can increase risk.

h. Resilience. BM planning must be resilient in the face of enemy action, loss of CIS or
communications. Procedural controls and procedures must be clear and robust to allow
operations to continue if positive control is degraded or fails.

6. Measures for Battlespace Control

LEVELS OF ACTIVITY
The function of BM is to coordinate activity in the Battlespace. The closer activity comes to
real time control the more demanding and resource intensive BM becomes. Coordination
requires forces to act together to achieve shared objectives. It prevents fratricide and
duplication, and ensures that effects complement each other. The degree of coordination
required is defined by the level of activity being conducted.

Figure. The Range of Interaction

The levels of activity within BM are as follows:

a. Independent Activity. Independent Activity is coordinated by the most basic form of


BM, where forces are separated in time and/or space. The deconfliction of activity in this
manner avoids fratricide and duplication, but does not contribute to synergy.
b. Synchronized Activity. Synchronized activity allows discrete elements of a force to
follow specified courses of action (COAs), enabling them to conduct a joint task without
fear of unexpected interference and with a controlled level of risk. Synchronisation is the
focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum combat power at the decisive
time, but not in space.

c. Integrated Activity. Integrated activity is at the opposite end of the range from
independent activity. It requires a complete state of mutual awareness and understanding
between 2 or more elements of a force such that they can conduct simultaneous activity
with impunity in the same portion of Battlespace. It typically requires faster and more
precise planning, with real-time communications and liaison.

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CONTROL MEASURES
Land combat is complex, dynamic and unpredictable with a large number of force elements
concentrated into a small volume of battlespace. Control is essential and BM can be executed
in a number of ways to achieve this.

Procedural Control. In its simplest form battlespace can be allocated procedurally. Volumes
of battlespace are allocated by time, and force elements operate within these without
constraint. While simple, this is inflexible and most suited to a situation where all elements of
a force can achieve their aims by conducting independent actions. Activity may be
synchronised in time, but not in space, or vice versa. It has the advantage of being less
susceptible to disruption.

Figure. Procedural Airspace Control Means

Procedural Airspace Control Means/Measures. The purpose of airspace control is to


maximise the effectiveness of military operations by promoting the ability of air land and
maritime forces to operate in and efficient, integrated and flexible manner with minimal
mutual interference and without undue restraint and risk to friendly forces and neutral air.
Procedural Airspace Control relies on previously agreed and promulgated orders
(ATO/ACO/SPINS) and set procedures (ACM). It is more restrictive than positive control but
is less vulnerable to interference by electronic and physical attack.

1. Coordination Level (CL). Definition: “An altitude or height used to establish


airspace control responsibilities primarily to deconflict airspace users.” The CL is an
altitude below which Air Force controlled traffic must be coordinated with army
aviation through the airspace coordination centre, and above which army controlled air
traffic must be coordinated with air force agencies to minimize the disruption of each
user`s operations and collisions between fast and slow traffic. The CL is procedural
means to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below
which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly.

(a) The height of the CL will be published in the Airspace Control Plan (ACP).

(b) Slow moving traffic will normally operate below the CL, fast moving traffic will
normally operate above it.
(c) The ACP/ACO will specify whether the CL is advisory or mandatory.

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Figure. Altitude Bands / Preferred CAS Flight Level

2. Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Switching Line. IFF Switch OFF and IFF
Switch ON Lines are to be established and will be published in the ACO. All aircraft
enroute to targets beyond the IFF Switch ON Line will stop squawk as they cross the
IFF Switch OFF Line. Aircraft conducting operations between the IFF Switch
On/Switch OFF Lines, or those returning to friendly territory after crossing the Switch
ON Line, should squawk at all times. For example:

Figure. IFF Switch OFF line, Showing Change in Co-ordination Level

3. Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ). Definition: “Airspace of defined dimensions,


designated by the Airspace Control Authority in response to specific situations and/or

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requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted.” A
ROZ is one of the principle ACM used by the fire support advisor when deconflicting
fires from air users. It offers a short-term volume of airspace (usually smaller than a
HIDACZ), reserved for a single activity, within which the designated commander can
exercise complete freedom for the specified activity. A ROZ may permanently be
established but not activated until specific criteria are met or created for a particular
operation or phase of battle.

Figure. GMLRS ROZ “Hot Wall”

4. High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ). The HIDACZ is airspace of


defined dimensions, designated by the Airspace Control Authority, in which there is a
concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. It offers
a short-term volume or airspace within which a ground commander can exercise
freedom of action for specified users (e.g. for CAS/CCA) A HIDACZ may be
permanently established but not activated until specific criteria are met or created for a
particular operation or phase of battle.

Land Battlespace Procedural Control. Fire support coordination is used to coordinate and
integrate land, air, and maritime fires to support the manoeuvre commander’s intent and
operations plan. As such Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) are a key part of
managing the Land Battlespace. Terrain Management using boundaries, ARA/AMAs, routes,
Phase/Report Lines, movement orders etc. is another aspect of procedural control. Some
aspects of Battlespace Spectrum Management can be conducted procedurally, such as
frequency management, EMCON and some coordination of EW assets.

1. Dynamic Procedural. To allow BM to react to the unexpected (including enemy


action) procedural measures may be developed in order to enable synchronised and
focussed actions which will better achieve the required effect. The Dynamic Procedural
approach to BM still requires a pre-established architecture based on FSCM/ACM/WCS
etc. but presupposes that these measures can be quickly activated and deactivated. This
will enable synchronised activity within the Battlespace, with the flexibility quickly to
respond to changing circumstances. The volume of Battlespace which this method can
effectively control is finite, as the larger and busier the volume is, the less responsive this
method of control can be. The use of GMLRS ‘walls’ is an example of dynamic
procedural. A wall can be routinely established, but with sufficient planning time planning

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(1-24hrs) the trajectory can be calculated to enable aircraft to fly below it. Where a more
dynamic response is required (<1hr) a simple ‘solid’ wall is established; this increases
GMLRS freedom of action but can constrain the use of air. SA is essential for the
effective implementation of any such short notice control measures.

Figure. GMLRS-Wall as an Example of Dynamic Procedural Control

2. Active Deconfliction. The automation of the dynamic procedural approach, through the
use of JADOCS or JETTS, enables Active Deconfliction. This allows the near-real time
coordination of all assets to achieve the required effects. This method may use a mixture
of procedural and positive control measures, but is absolutely reliant upon speed of
communication and reaction (automation) in order to minimise separation of activity in
both time and space. The level of SSA required to achieve Active Deconfliction is high.
Again this method will enable synchronised activity, further reducing the degree of
separation of activity.

3. Positive Control. Positive Control is the real time coordination and de-confliction of
activity in the Battlespace to enable fully integrated action and maximum freedom of
action by all elements involved. The required level of SSA is extremely high. Positive
control becomes easier at lower levels of BM where the numbers of players is low. A Fire
Support Team16 can already exercise positive control over manoeuvre and joint effects at
the lowest tactical level, but relies on the appropriate BM being in place to control the
Battlespace beyond the FST’s ‘firing space’ and to coordinate and deliver resources to it.
The terminal controllers manage and reduce risk in real time based on their knowledge of
safety distances etc.

7. Deconfliction
There is potential conflict between aircrafts (e.g. when providing CAS) and direct and indirect
fires. The JFSE and the AOCC are the primary players in integrating and deconflicting e.g.
CAS or INTEL. Should further conflictions subsequently arise, JTAC and personnel of the
JFSE provide final control to ensure a reasonably safe operating space for aircraft to
maneuver and attack targets. Deconfliction can be executed by formal and informal ACM
using time-, lateral-, altitude deconfliction methods. Different types of fires have to be
deconflicted IOT ensure safety e.g. for airplanes, helicopters or UAVs. The most important
areas of deconfliction are the following:

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a. Deconfliction of ground-based Fires with Air Force


When deconflicting fires with air, both trajectory and maximum altitude of the munition must
be considered. An appropriate ACM or FSCM will be established to encompass all the
airspace required by the weapon system for the specific operation. This does not stop air or
aviation from entering the ACM to prosecute targets in support of the maneuver commander
but ensures that aircrafts within this airspace are controlled. This maximizes the flexibility of
the ground commander in using the airspace during the operation, whilst ensuring safety of
other air users, including civilian air traffic. The establishment of a ROZ or HIDACZ is the
normal, but not the sole, method of fires and air deconfliction.

b. Deconfliction of ground-based Fires with Aviation


When deconflicting fires with aviation, ROZs should be established around both the gun or
launcher and target, therefore minimizing restrictions and ensuring own force safety. These
ACMs should always be pre-planned and nominated for the ACO. It is also possible to
impose immediate ROZs for use in TICs and short-notice situations, by clearing airspace
through the appropriate chain of command. Once a ROZ is imposed, the initiating ground
commander has the controlling authority for that airspace whilst it is activated.

c. Deconfliction of Surface-to-Surface Missiles


Missiles cannot be positively controlled for deconfliction and with a small cross section can
be difficult to track on radar or visually acquire by other airspace users. Therefore, procedural
ACMs are used during planning and will be included on the ACO. Procedural ACMs might
include:
· Establishing ROZ above launch, target or holding areas.
· Establishing corridors covering the flight path from the launch area to the target.
· Using time deconfliction by employing the weapon at a time when the area from
launch point to target is free of friendly aircraft.

d. UAS & Loitering Munitions


The established principles of airspace management used in manned flight operations also
apply to UAS or Loitering Munitions. These operations will be covered by the AOC in the
Airspace Control Plan (ACP). Pre-planned UAS or Loitering Munitions operations should be
included in the ATO to provide safe separation of both manned and unmanned aircraft as well
as preventing by friendly forces. Loitering Munitions can come in many forms but they are
generally small, non-re-useable platforms that are launched from ground platforms against
surface targets. Typically, they fly at 100 – 250 kts with a likely radius of effect of 150 –
300km and loitering time at maximum range of several hours. They can usually be re-directed
in flight and may carry a sensor that can provide real-time imagery of the ground to a ground-
based controller. However, they are very unlikely to be able to detect and avoid airspace
conflictions and, being small and ‘disposable’, are also very unlikely to carry transponders or
any other equipment that could enable their position to be displayed on airspace control
systems. Consequently, deconfliction of loitering munitions from other airspace users will
inevitably be based on Procedural control methods and the allocation of appropriate ACM. As
for other long range weapon systems or UAS, these could involve a ROZ around the launcher
position, a transit corridor of some sort to either a target or a holding area, and possibly a
further ROZ or HIDACZ covering the target area itself. For pre-planned operations, all details
and the ACM required should be published in the ATO/ACO as appropriate, but for
responsive use of these munitions, processes and procedures for real-time deconfliction must
be developed and established within theatre.

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8. Methods of Achieving Separation


Coordination in the 3 dimensions and time
The fire support elements have to comply with applicable ACM in the JOA. If necessary, the
land users can request additional measures if required to coordinate the fires and to avoid
fratricide. In absence of a dedicated cell for airspace coordination, the JFSE should assume
this responsibility.
(a) Lateral Separation Methods. Lateral separation is a means by which the effects of
indirect, direct and air delivered ordnance can be maximized without jeopardizing a pilots’
ability to identify and engage a target. The best way to conceptualize lateral separation is to
consider it on the ‘x’ and ‘y’ axis in relation to a GTL or aircraft operating on the ‘z’ axis.
Lateral separation is achieved by separating the indirect target from the air target by a set
distance or, where the target is common; by an aircraft attack profile that is offset form the
active GTL (Offset lateral separation is not possible with mortars).
Separate Target Locations. In order to deconflict the effects of the indirect fires
with that of the aircraft it is necessary to prescribe a Minimum Safe Distance (MSD)
between each target. This distance is determined by the type of ordnance and
distribution of fire. The observer must ensure that the aircraft target is separated from
the indirect fire target by the distances detailed in the following table.

Lateral Separation
(traditional 1,000 m either side of GTL, 3 NM for GMLRS)
High Explosive Munition Minimum Safe Distances (MSD)
120 mm mortar 600 m 2,300 ft
155 mm SPH 600 m 2,300 ft
227 mm GMLRS 600 m 2,300 ft
76 mm Naval Gun 750 m 2,470 ft
WARNING: MSDs in this table calculated without a distribution radius!

Figure. MSD Schematic Diagram | (PEr = Probable Error in Range)

If not engaging a “Point Target” the distribution of fire must be added to the
prescribed minimum safe distance. For example, when engaging a Target Area of
200x200 meters with 155mm howitzers, the observer must add the additional 100

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meters radius to the safe distance (600m MSD + 100m) giving a new MSD of 700
meters.

(b) Altitude (Vertical) Separation Methods. This is the optimum method of separation
allowing for the continuous engagement of a target by indirect and direct fire weapon
systems. The following options are available to the observer:

Stay (Remain) Above Height. The stay above height is calculated using the
maximum vertex height of the trajectory for a specific charge at a corresponding range
added to the altitude of the indirect fire unit in order to produce a vertex height Above
Mean Sea Level (AMSL). A further 1,000 feet safety buffer (in peace-time 3,000ft)
is added by the JTAC to this height. This type of separation is often imposed as an
informal or formal airspace coordination area (ACA) by an artillery tactical HQ.
Stay above heights may be specified as a formal ACA, as part of the force protection
measures associated with a theatre of operations or as a catch all deconfliction
measure issued by the tactical HQ. If requested the CP will calculate and report the
maximum vertex height AMSL to the observer, this information is passed to the JTAC
who then adds the 1,000 feet safety buffer and reports it to the aircraft as “Stay above .
. . . feet”.

Stay Below Height. An informal or formal ACA can be produced to allow air and
aviation to fly under the indirect fire trajectory. This method is best suited to rotary
wing aircraft due to their ability to operate at very low altitudes. Detailed planning
is required for fixed wing aircraft so much so that it cannot be used for CAS attacking
the same target as indirect fire. It is predominantly used for transiting aircraft around
the Battlespace. Ideal for AH, the stay below altitude is calculated by subtracting
1,000 feet safety buffer (in peace-time 3,000ft) from the reported maximum vertex
height AMSL. Unlike the ‘Stay above’ method of altitude deconfliction it is also
necessary to take into account the ascending and descending portions of the indirect
fire trajectory. In simplistic terms the MSD obtained from lateral separation may be
used as a minimum guide. However, due to the requirement for detailed analysis of
the predicted trajectory, it is simpler to restrict aircraft to operate no closer than
1,000 meters + MSD from an active fire unit or indirect fire target. Armed with
this information it is now possible to define a three dimensional formal ACA
underneath the indirect fire trajectory.

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(c) Time Separation Methods. Time separation contravenes the principle of concentrating
fires on a target in order to achieve an effect. The time separation between the impact of a
projectile and the over flight of an aircraft is 30 seconds by convention. Where it proves
absolutely necessary to deconflict indirect fires and an aircraft attack profile by time, the
following options are available to the observer:
Check Firing. Order the guns or mortars to check fire a minimum of 30 seconds plus
the Time of Fire (TOF) of the indirect fire system in use, for example, if the CAS
TOT is 1400, the check fire time is 1359:30 seconds minus the TOF. If the TOF were
25 seconds it would therefore follow that the observer will order “Check firing, air
inbound!” at 1359:05 seconds. ‘Cancel Check Firing’ is only given when the JTAC
reports the aircraft is clear of the engagement area. Due to the critical timing
requirement for control by radio it will be necessary to order 'Minimize! Minimize!
Minimize! Air inbound in . . . minutes" prior to 'Check Firing' being imposed. (When
radio relay procedures are in use the minimum time separation is increased to 90
seconds).

Interrupted Suppression and Mark. The ‘Interrupted Suppression and Mark’ type
of engagement which will ensure that no rounds impact beyond 30 seconds prior to
the aircraft delivering ordnance. (This type of engagement has the added advantage of
delivering a visual reference point from which the JTAC can direct the aircraft on to
the target). This can be implemented at any time during an indirect fire engagement
by ordering “Interrupted Suppression and Mark, CAS TOT . . . . “.

(d) Mixture of Lateral and Vertical (Altitude) Methods.


E.g.: Surface Kill Box (SKB) is a three-dimensional area reference that enables timely,
effective coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks. It combines traditional aspects
of both an Airspace Control Means (ACM) and FSCM, used to facilitate the expeditious air-
to-surface attack of
targets, which could
also be augmented
by or integrated
with surface-to-
surface indirect
fires. When
established, the
primary purpose is
to allow air assets to
conduct air
interdiction (AI)
against surface
targets without
further coordination
with the establishing
commander and without terminal attack control. An SKB will normally be established for AI
missions. However, this does not restrict CAS missions inside of established SKBs if all CAS
requirements are met.

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9. Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS)

A cell (e.g. “9I”) is 30x30 NM. Each cell is sub-divided into nine 10x10 NM keypads
(e.g. “7”). A keypad can be further sub-divided into four 5x5 NM quadrants (e.g. “SE”).

10. Keyhole Template Method


A method for establishing hasty IPs is the Keyhole Template. When CAS aircraft are
passed to a JTAC from a contact point, the JTAC should immediately pass the coordinates for
an anchor point, known as Point Echo, to those
CAS players, and then anchor their hold point off
Point Echo with direction, distance and altitude.
Point Echo should be the target, if one has been
established; otherwise it may be a common
reference point. Each cardinal direction is labeled
with a letter: Alpha – North, Bravo – East, Charlie
– South, Delta – West, and Echo – center anchor
point. Distance is given in nautical miles.
Distances from point Echo are “no closer than”
distances for aircraft holding. In all cases,
consideration must be given to altitudes, turn
direction, and orbit locations.

Example: Establishing an IP on a Radial from Point Echo.


JTAC: “Stone 11, proceed to echo 240 at 8, ANGELS 3 1.5-1.6, hold southwest 5 mile
legs, report established”
CAS Player: “Stone 11, established 240 at 8, ANGELS 1.5-1.6”

3
ANGELS (Brevity Word) Height of friendly aircraft in thousands of feet from mean sea level (MSL).
(e.g. “ANGELS one decimal five” equals 1500 ft,

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11. Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM)


Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)
The CFL is a line beyond which conventional, indirect, surface fire support means may fire at
any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional co-
ordination.
Establishment. Normally, maneuver commanders are responsible for selecting or
recommending the CFL location within their zone of action or sector of defense. Supporting
indirect Fire commanders and indirect fire liaison officers from the JFSE at every echelon
should make appropriate recommendations concerning its location. The lowest level at which
a CFL is established is the battalion. A consolidated CFL may be published for the force as a
whole.
Location. The major factor for location should be the range of land-based indirect fire
systems. It does no good to have a measure in place for uncoordinated indirect fires when
there is limited range beyond the measure. The location of the CFL is also based on such
factors as the scheme of maneuver, patrol plans, locations of security forces and the troop
safety desires of the maneuver commander. There is no requirement for the CFL to be placed
on identifiable terrain, but it can be helpful for Forward Observers (Coy-JFSE) calling in
indirect fires. Additional factors such as the limits of ground observation, the location of the
initial objectives in the offense, and the requirement for maximum flexibility in both
maneuver and the delivery of supporting fires should be considered.

The CFL is graphically portrayed by a dashed black line, with “CFL” followed by the
establishing HQ above the line and the effective date-time group (DTG) below the line.
Locations for CFLs are disseminated by message and/or overlay through maneuver and fire
support channels to higher, lower, adjacent maneuver, and supporting units.

Free-Fire Area (FFA)


The FFA is a specific designated area into which any weapon system may fire without
additional co-ordination with the establishing headquarters. It is used to expedite joint fires
and to facilitate jettison of aircraft munitions. Where both surface-to-surface fires and aircraft
emergency munitions jettison share a FFA, consider establishing an ACA to assist in
deconfliction.

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The FFA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line defining the area and the letters “FFA”
within, followed by the establishing HQ and the effective DTG
Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force
commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other force elements which may
affect the commander’s current and planned operations. The FSCL applies to fires of air,
ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets. The
establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate
commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of
the fire support coordination line must be conducted under the positive control or
procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in
exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must
coordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonize joint
objectives. Note: in the context of this definition the term "surface targets" applies to those in
littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations.

The FSCL is graphically portrayed by a solid black line extending across the assigned areas of
the establishing HQ. The letters ‘FSCL’ are followed by the establishing HQ above the line
and the effective DTG below the line. FSCLs do not have to follow “traditional” straight-line
paths. Positioning the FSCL on terrain identifiable from the air is a technique that may further
assist in fratricide prevention. Curved and/or enclosed FSCLs have applications in joint
operations conducted in non-contiguous AOs and in Wide Area Security.
The decision on where to place a FSCL, or even whether to use a FSCL, requires careful
consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of
operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, concept and tempo of
the operation, organic weapon capabilities, and other factors are all considered by the
commander. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops in
the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning depends on the situation.
Placing the FSCL at greater depths will typically require support from higher organic HQ and
other supporting commanders. Also, when the FSCL is positioned at greater depth, there is
greater requirement for detailed coordination with the establishing commander and can slow
the expeditious clearance of fires short of the FSCL —
§ Air strikes short of the FSCL, both CAS and AI, must be under positive or procedural
control to ensure proper clearance of joint fires—for example, JTACs or FAC(A)s.
Land commanders must consider the need for extra control measures.
§ By establishing an FSCL close-in, yet at sufficient depth so as to not limit high-tempo
maneuver, land and amphibious force commanders ease the coordination requirements
for engagement operations within their AOs by forces not under their control such as
naval surface fire support (NSFS) or AI.
§ Coordination of engagements beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders
of air, land, and special operations forces (SOF) units operating beyond the FSCL.
Such coordination is also important when engaging forces are employing wide-area

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munitions or those with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding
conflicting or redundant engagement operations.
§ The establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace
with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change
frequently. A series of disseminated “on-order” FSCLs will help accelerate the
coordination required. The establishing commander quickly transmits the change to
higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting HQ to ensure engagement operations are
appropriately coordinated by controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the
location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force
sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term
operations. Careful planning and coordination is essential for changes to the FSCL.
This planning is necessary to minimize the risk of fratricide and avoid disrupting
operations.
No-Fire Area (NFA)
The NFA is an area into which no fires or the effects of fires are allowed except if temporarily
authorized by establishing authority or if an adversary force within this area engage our
forces.

The NFA is graphically portrayed as an area outlined with a solid black line with black
diagonal lines inside. The letters “NFA” are within, followed by the establishing HQ and the
effective DTG.
Restricted Fire Area (RFA)
The RFA is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed
those restrictions are not delivered without co-ordination with the establishing headquarters.

The RFA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line defining the area and the letters “RFA”
within, followed by the establishing HQ and the effective DTG. The restrictions may be
included within the graphic if space allows, or reference may be made to a specific OPORD
or OPLAN.
Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)
In NATO field artillery tactical doctrine the ACA is a fire support coordination measure and
is defined as “a restricted area or route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and
established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by
friendly forces”. ACA is part of both ACM (Airspace Control Means) and FSCM and can be
divided in formal and informal ACAs. Formal ACAs are published and formalized in the Air
Coordination Order (ACO) published by the ACC (Air Component Commander).

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Informal ACAs can be established using separation plans and may be established by any
supported commander. An informal ACA is an expedient measure designed to provide
immediate, yet temporary control and de-confliction. As such, informal ACAs are normally
short-lived and not as widely disseminated as formal ACAs. In an informal ACA, aircraft and
surface joint fires may be separated by time or distance (lateral, altitude, or a combination of
the two). Both types of ACAs are constructed with the assistance of the air liaison officer to
ensure they meet the technical requirements of the aircraft and weapon systems.
An ACA is graphically shown as an area
enclosed by a solid black line. Depicted
inside the enclosed area are ‘ACA’ the
establishing HQ, the minimum and
maximum altitudes, the width of the
ACA, the grid coordinates for each point of an irregularly shaped ACA, and the effective
DTG or the words “on order.” Informal ACAs are not normally displayed on maps, charts, or
overlays.
Producing a formal ACA above or below a GTL.
(2) Calculate the worst case MSD for the ordnance in use.
(3) Determine a point on the ground along the GTL, 1,000 meters from the closest fire unit to the
FLOT plus the MSD. Note this grid reference.
(4) Determine a point on the ground at least 1,000 meters short of the engagement area plus the
MSD. Note this grid reference.
(5) For ‘stay above’ altitudes, determine the height of the highest fire unit and the maximum vertex
height for the selected range, add these together and convert to feet. A further 1000 feet safety
buffer (in peace time 3000ft!) is added to this figure giving the stay above height AMSL.
(6) For ‘stay below’ altitudes, all aspects of the ACA must be 1,000 feet (3,000’) below the lowest
trajectory.
(7) The standard (minimum) width of an ACA is 2,000 meters. This can be increased as necessary.
(8) This information is then sent to the higher JFS Center as follows:
(a) ACA validity period from DTG until . . . . (may be until further notice).
(b) Point 1 and Point 2 grid references.
(c) Width either side of a line created between points 1 and 2.
(d) Maximum and Minimum height in feet AMSL.

Figure. ACA defined by 2 points below an active GTL

NOTE: Turning Rooms for CAS: A-/OA-10: ∩ 2.7 km | F-14, F-16: ∩ 4.4 km | B-1B: ∩ 15 km

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12. Airspace Control Usages (ASU)


The Airspace Control Usages listed below are used to provide more detailed information on
the particular way a volume of airspace is being used beyond the procedural information that
is provided by the ACM Groupings.

Table 1
Air Control Point ACP A point which is defined and used for navigation, command and
control, and communication.
Air Defense ADIZ Airspace within which ready identification, location, and control of
Identification Zone airborne vehicles are required.
Air Route AIRRTE The navigable airspace between two points, identified to the extent
necessary for the application of flight rules.
Air-to-air AAR Airspace of defined dimensions set aside for air-to-air refueling
Refueling operations.
Airborne Early AEW Airspace established specifically for aircraft conducting early
Warning warning.
Airspace Control ASCA Airspace which is laterally defined by boundaries of the area of
Area operations.
Airspace Coordination ACA A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by
Area the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are
reasonably safe from friendly surface fires.
Airway RWY A control area or portion thereof established in the form of a corridor
equipped with radio navigational aids.
Altitude ALTRV A block of altitude reserved for aircraft to transit or loiters.
Reservation
Approach Corridor APPCOR Airspace established for the safe passage of land-based aircraft joining
or departing a maritime force.
Base Defense Zone BDZ A zone established around airbases to enhance the effectiveness of
local GBAD systems.
Buffer Zone BZ Airspace designed specifically to provide a buffer between various
airspace control measures.
Class-A Airspace CLSA Airspace in which only IFR flights are permitted; all flights are
subject to air traffic control service and are separated from each other.
Class-B Airspace CLSB Airspace in which IFR and VFR flights are permitted; all flights are
subject to air traffic control service and are separated from each other.
Class-C Airspace CLSC Airspace in which IFR and VFR flights are permitted; all flights are
subject to air traffic control service and IFR flights are separated from
other IFR flights and from VFR flights. VFR flights are separated
from IFR flights and receive traffic information in respect to other
VFR flights.
Class-D Airspace CLSD Airspace in which IFR and VFR flights are permitted; all flights are
subject to air traffic control service and IFR flights are separated from
other IFR flights and receive traffic information in respect to VFR
flights. VFR flights receive traffic information in respect to all other
flights.
Class-E Airspace CLSE IFR flights and VFR flights are permitted; all flights are subject to air
traffic control service and are separated from other IFR flights. All
flights receive traffic information as far as practical.

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Table Continue
Class-F Airspace CLSF Airspace in which IFR and VFR flights are permitted; all participating
IFR flights receive an air traffic advisory service and all flights
receive flight information service if requested.
Class-G Airspace CLSG Airspace in which IFR and visual flights are permitted; all flights
receive flight information service if requested.
Contact Point CP A point used for control purposes in air-to-air refueling and close air
support missions.
Control Area CTA A controlled airspace extending upwards from a specified limit above
the earth.
Control Zone CONTZN A controlled airspace extending upwards from the surface of the earth
to a specified upper limit.
Coordinated Fire Line CFL A line beyond which conventional or improved conventional indirect
fire means, such as mortars, field artillery, and naval gunfire may fire
without additional coordination.
Coordination Level CL A procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by
determining an altitude below which fixed wing aircraft normally will
not fly.
Cross-Border Area CBA A temporary segregated area established over international boundaries
for specific operational requirements.
Drop Zone DZ A specified area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies
are airdropped.
Fire Support FSCL Boundary used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapon
Coordination Line systems against surface targets.
Force Air FACA An area surrounding a force within which air coordination measures
Coordination Area are required to prevent mutual interference between all friendly
surface and air units and their weapon systems.
Forward Edge of the FEBA The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units
Battle Area are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening
forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the
positioning of forces, or the maneuver or units.
Fighter Engagement FEZ In AD, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility
Zone for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft
Forward Line of Own FLOT A line indicating the most forward positions of friendly forces in any
Troops kind of military operation at a specific time.
Hand-over Gate HG A point at which the control of the aircraft, if radar hand-over is used,
changes from one controller to another.
High-Density HIDACZ Airspace of defined dimensions in which there is a concentrated
Airspace Control employment of numerous and varied weapons/airspace users.
Zone
IFF Switch Off Line IFFOFF Line demarking where friendly aircraft en-route to targets stop
emitting an IFF signal.
IFF switch on line IFFON Line demarking where friendly aircraft returning to friendly territory
start emitting an IFF signal.
Landing Zone LZ Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft.
Low Level Transit LLTR
Route

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Table Continue
Missile Engagement MEZ A designated airspace in which, under weapons control status
Zone “weapons free”, ships are automatically cleared to fire at any target
which penetrates the zone, unless known to be friendly, adhering to
airspace control procedures or unless otherwise directed by the anti-air
warfare commander
Missile Arc MISARC An area of 10 degrees or as large as ordered by the officer in tactical
command, centered on the bearing of the target with a range that
extends to the maximum range of the surface-to-air missile.
No Fly Zone NOFLY Airspace of specific dimensions set aside for a specific purpose in
which no aircraft operations are permitted, except as authorized by the
appropriate commander and controlling agency.
Prohibited Area PROHIB Airspace of defined dimensions, above the land areas or territorial
waters of a state within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited.
Reconnaissance Area RECCE Airspace established specifically for aircraft conducting
reconnaissance.
Restricted Area RA Airspace of defined dimensions, above the land areas or territorial
waters of a state, within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in
accordance with certain specified conditions.
Safe Lane SL A bi-directional lane connecting an airbase, landing site and/or base
defense zone to adjacent routes/corridors. Safe lanes may also be used
to connect adjacent activated routes/corridors.
Special Corridor SC An area established to accommodate the special routing requirements
of specific missions.
Standard Use Army SAAFR Route established below the coordination level to facilitate movement
Aircraft Flight Route of army aviation assets in the forward area in direct support of ground
operations.
Temporary Minimum TMMR A temporary route established to route air traffic between transit
Risk Route routes or the rear boundary of the forward area and their operations
area in direct support of ground operations.
Terminal Control TCA A control area normally established at the confluence of Air Traffic
Area Services routes in the vicinity of one or more major aerodromes.
Time Slot TS Period of time during which certain activities are governed by specific
regulations.
Transit Corridor TC Bi-directional corridor in the rear area. Air traffic services not
normally provided.
Transit Route TR A temporary corridor of defined dimensions established in the forward
area to minimize the risk to friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses
or surface forces.
Traverse Level TL Vertical displacement above low level air defense systems, expressed
both as a height and altitude, at which aircraft can cross that area.
Weapons Free Zone WFZ An air defense zone (adz) established around key assets or facilities
which merit special protection by ground based air defense assets,
other than airbases, where weapons may be fired at any target not
positively identified as friendly.

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13. Airspace Control Means (ACM) Sections


ACM TYPE ACU AIRSPACE CONTROL USAGE
ROZ RESTRICTED OPERATIONAL ZONE
AAR AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING
ABC AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL
AEW AIRBORNE EARLY WARING
CAP COMBAT AIR PATROL
CAS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT HOLDING AREA
DZ DROP ZONE
EC ELECTRONIC COMBAT
LC LANDING ZONE
NFA NO FIRE AREA
PZ PICKUP ZONE
RECCE RECONNAISSANCE AREA
ROA RESTRICTED OPERATIONS AREA
SEMA SPECIAL ELECTRONIC MISSION AREA
SOF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
TRNG TRAINING AREA
UAV UNMANNED ARIAL VERHICLE
CORRTE CORRIDOR/ROUTE
AIRCOR AIR CORRIDOR
AIRRTE AIR ROUTE
MRR MINIMUM RISK ROUTE
SAAFR STANDARD USE ARMY AIRCRAFT FLIGHT ROUTE
SC SPECIAL CORRIDOR
SL SAFE LANE
TC TRANSIT CORRIDOR
TMMR TEMPORARY MINIMUM RISK ROUTE
TR TRANSIT ROUTE
ADAREA AIR DEFENSE AREA
ADIZ AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE
BDZ BASE DEFENSE ZONE
BZ BUFFER ZONE
HIDACZ HIGH-DENSITY AIRSPACE CONTROL ZONE
HIMEZ HIGH-ALTITUDE MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE
JEZ JOINT ENGAGEMENT ZONE
JOA JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

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ACM TYPE ACU AIRSPACE CONTROL USAGE


LFEZ LAND FIGHTER ENGAGEMENT ZONE
LMEZ LAND MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE
LOMEZ LOW-ALTITUDE ENGAGEMENT ZONE
SHORADEZ SHORT RANGE AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT ZONE
WFZ WEAPONS FREE ZONE
ADOA AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS AREA
ADAA AIR DEFENSE ACTION AREA
AOA AIR DEFENSE ACTION AREA
APPCOR APPROACH CORRIDOR
COZ CROSSOVER ZONE
FIRUP FIRE UMBRELLA
ISR IDENTIFICATION SAFETY RANGE
MISARC MISSILE ARC
PIRAZ POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION RADAR ADVISORY ZONE
RTF RETURN TO FORCE
SAFES SAFETY SECTOR
ATCA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AIRSPACE
ARWY AIRWAY
ATCA ADVISORY ROUTE
ATSRTE ATS ROUTE
CBA CROSS-BORDER AREA
CDR CONDITIONAL ROUTE
CLSA CLASS-A AIRSPACE
CLSG CLASS-G AIRSPACE
CONTZN CONTROL ZONE
COZ CROSSOVER ZONE
CTA CONTROL AREA
DA DANGER AREA
FIR FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION
NAVRTE AREA NAVIGATION ROUTE
PROHIB PROHIBITED AREA
RA RESTRICTED AREA
RCA REDUCED COORDINATION
TRSA TERMINAL RADAR SERVICE AREA
WARN WARNING AREA

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ACM TYPE ACU AIRSPACE CONTROL USAGE


PROC PROCEDURAL
ACA AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA
ALTRV ALTITUDE RESERVATION
CFL COORDINATED FIRE LINE
CL COORDINATION LEVEL
DBSL DEEP BATTLE SYNCHRONIZATION LINE
FEBA FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA
FFA FREE FIRE AREA
FLOT FORWARD LINE OF OWN TROOPS
FSCL FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE
IFFOFF IFF SWITCH OFF LINE
IFFON IFF SWITCH ON LINE
RFA RESTRICTED FIRE AREA
RFL RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINE
SAFE SAFE AREA FOR EVASION
TL TRAVERSE LEVEL
REFPT REFERENCE POINT
ACP AIR CONTROL POINT
BULL BULLSEYE
CP CONTACT POINT
EG ELECTRONIC COMBAT
HG HAND OVER GATE
ISP IDENTIFICATION SAFETY POINT
MG MARSHALLING GATE
SARDOT SEARCH AND RESCUE POINT
SUA SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE
ALTERTA ALERT AREA
ASCA AIRSPACE CONTROL AREA
FACA FORCE AIR COORDINATION AREA
FARP FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT
FOL FORWARD OPERATION LOCATION
MOA MILITARY OPERATIONS AREA
NFA NO FIRE AREA
NOFLY NO FLY ZONE
SSMS SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEM
TRNG TRAINING AREA

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14. Airspace Coordinating Measures Request (ACMREQ)

ACMREQ
TO
FROM PHONE

SERIALS LINE DESCRIPTION

A Airspace Control Means Section

B Airspace Control Usage

C Horizontal / Lateral Dimension

D Vertical / Altitude Dimension

E Published Transit Route Details

Period of Time - Duration

F 1 START -DTG
2 END -DTG

G Effective DTG

H Controlling Authority

I Purpose Free Text

Transit Instructions – free text


J instruction and how the transit is
to be achieved

Remarks – amplifying comment


K as necessary

REMARK. The Abbreviation “ACMREQ” also stands for “Airspace Control Means Request”.

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C. LAND BASED INDIRECT FIRE SYSTEMS

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15. Role of Land-Based Indirect Fire Systems (IFS)


Land-based IFS units are always embedded in the LCC. They are characterized by a very
flexible organization in order to be able to deploy and operate in a highly centralized or
decentralized manner. As a result of this flexible structure, land-based Fire Support units are
able to perform efficiently in a complex operational environment. The main characteristics are
its 24/74, all weather capability to acquire ground targets and achieve effects over a wide area
and in depth. It should be able to deliver guided or unguided munitions in order to strike point
or area targets. The IFS is a system which includes the following five elements:
a. A family of Surveillance, Target Acquisition (STA) systems which are linked to the
wider ISTAR system,
b. A command, control and information system (C2IS) which provides a command and
control network over the battlefield and enables artillery commanders to act as fire
and effect integrators also responsible for operational environment management in all
dimensions,
c. Delivery (field artillery) platforms like guns, rockets and missiles launchers, as well
as mortars, and land forces-organic combat or weaponized/armed unmanned aerial
vehicles,
d. A variety of precision-guided, conventional and non-lethal munitions, including
loitering munitions,
e. An ammunition resupply system.

Field Artillery
Field artillery is the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use
of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers.

Field artillery is classified according to calibers as:

Light Medium Heavy


Very Heavy

- 60mm 60 - 107mm > 107mm

- 120mm 121 - 160mm 161 - 210mm > 210mm

110 - 200mm 200 - 300mm > 300mm

4
Ability to o function 24 hours a day and 7 days a week without interruptions

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16. Tasks of Land-Based IFS

The tasks of land-based IFS are based on the concept of operations and intent of the maneuver
commander. These are the basis of the combat organization. In detail:
a. Allocation of IFS assets (effectors and sensors).
b. Taking part in the intelligence cycle and STA.
c. Contribution to the Targeting Process
d. Fire support and effects integration for planning and delivery of fires.
e. Command and Control (C²) of all allocated Fire Support Systems.
f. Coordinating the Joint Fire Support effects.
g. Liaison and co-operation with other services, branches and combined forces.
h. Execution of combat service support.
i. Force Protection.

17. Standard Fire Support Tactical Tasks


General.
a. Once command relationships are established, the force commander assigns the FS
tactical tasks5. He bases his assignments on the advice of the FSO6.

b. An assigned FS tactical task may be one of four standard FS tactical tasks or a


nonstandard FS tactical task.

c. The 4 standard FS tactical tasks are


- Direct Support (DS),
- Reinforcing (R),
- General Support (GS),
- General Support Reinforcing (GSR).

d. Nonstandard FS tactical tasks are developed when none of these standard tasks
sufficiently addresses FS tactical requirements and/or responsibilities.
e. A FS tactical task describes in detail the support responsibilities of a FS unit. The task
also clearly defines the relationship of the FS unit with a maneuver unit or another FS
unit. It does not affect the organizational structure or the command relationships that
results from that structure. Each standard FS tactical task contains several inherent
responsibilities
f. Nonstandard FS tactical tasks usually address changes that are needed in these
responsibilities or additional responsibilities not addressed by the standard tasks.

Direct Support (DS).


a. DS is the support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the
supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by
that unit or formation.

5
This normally happens at the Brigade Level or higher
6
The Fire Support Officer (FSO) is the advisor to the maneuver commander at all levels in all JFS matters, consisting of FS
planning, -synchronization, coordination and integration.

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b. The DS task is used to provide responsive indirect fires to a particular maneuver unit
and thus primarily concentrates FS needs on that maneuver unit. The DS commander
is the FSO for the supported maneuver force. Fires are planned and coordinated with
the maneuver unit and the DS commander positions his units where they can best
support the scheme of maneuver. Because of this, a DS FS unit’s planning process and
operations are significantly integrated with their counterparts in the supported
maneuver unit. DS is the most decentralized standard FS tactical task.

Reinforcing (R).
a. R is a tactical task in which one FS unit augments the fire of another FS unit.
b. Commanders use the reinforcing mission to add weight (fires) to a specific area or
maneuver unit by designating one or more FS units to augment the fires of another FS
unit. The reinforcing FS unit will generally reinforce a DS FS unit. A reinforcing FS
unit can reinforce only one FS unit, but a reinforced battalion can be reinforced by
more than one FS unit.

General Support (GS).


(2) GS is a support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any
particular subdivision thereof.
(3) An FS unit in GS supports the maneuver force as a whole and remains under the
immediate control of the applicable JFSE. This task ensures FS is immediately
responsive to the needs of the maneuver force commander. Like the DS task, the GS
task establishes a relationship between a FS unit and a maneuver unit. It is the most
centralized of the standard FS tactical tasks.

General Support Reinforcing (GSR).


a. GSR is a tactical task in which an FS unit fires in support of the force as a whole and,
on a secondary basis, provides reinforcing fire for another FS unit.
b. The GSR task requires the FS unit to furnish FS fires for the maneuver force as a
whole and to reinforce the fires of another FS battalion as a second priority. A GSR
battalion remains under the control of the applicable JFSE. The GSR task gives the
maneuver force commander the flexibility to respond to a variety of tactical situations.

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FS non-standard tactical tasks.


If an unusual tactical situation exists, or none of the standard FS tactical tasks accurately
convey the maneuver commander’s guidance for fires, he assigns a nonstandard FS tactical
task to the FS unit. A nonstandard FS tactical task may amplify, limit, or change one or more
of the inherent responsibilities, or it may spell out contingencies not covered by those
responsibilities. If the revision is so complex that the standard FS task is no longer
recognizable, a nonstandard mission statement will address each of the inherent
responsibilities. Units sometimes use a nonstandard task when there are not sufficient FS to
cover all the contingencies or if an FS unit is assigned with more than one functional task. It
is also a means by which the commander can tailor his FS assets in anticipation of future
operations. A nonstandard task may involve limitations or guidance concerning ammunition,
positioning, or other critical factors.

18. Command and Control Relationships


Command Relationships
Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to a commander to assign
missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to
retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary.
Note: It does not include responsibility for administration.
Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks
to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher
authority.

Control Relationships
Operational Control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces
assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are
usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or
assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate
employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control.
Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of
movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
Administrative Control (ADCON). Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or
other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management,
supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the
subordinate or other organizations.
Coordinating Authority or Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH). The authority
granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific
functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or
more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require
consultation between the components involved or their representatives, but does not have
the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the components
involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is
unable to obtain essential agreement he shall report the matter to the appropriate authority.

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Inherent Responsibilities of the Fire Support Tactical Tasks

GENERAL GS
A FS UNIT WITH A DIRECT SUPPORT REINFORCING
SUPPORT REINFORCING
TASK OF (DS) (R)
(GS) (GSR)

1. Supported unit 1. Reinforced FS unit 1. Force FS HQ 1. Force FS HQ


Answers calls for 2. Own sensors 7 2. Own sensors 2. Own sensors 2. Reinforced unit 8
fire in priority from 3. Force FS HQ 3. Force FS HQ 3. Own sensors

Zone of action of
Zone of action of Zone of fire of Zone of action of supported unit to
Has its zone of fire
supported unit reinforced FS unit supported unit include zone of fire
of reinforced FA unit
Provides
temporary
Furnishes FS
replacements for No requirement No requirement No requirement
personnel
casualty losses as
required

Establishes Directly supported Reinforced FS unit


No requirement Reinforced FS unit
communication with maneuver unit HQ

Establishes liaison Directly supported


Reinforced FS Unit No requirement Reinforced FS Unit
with formation/unit

Observers to
maneuver element
Allocates observers No inherent No inherent No inherent
and sensors assets
and sensors to requirement requirement requirement
to the directly
supported unit
DS FS unit Force FS HQ or
Reinforced FS unit or
commander or as reinforced FS unit if
Is positioned by as ordered by force Force FS HQ
ordered by force approved by force
FS HQ
FS HQ FS HQ
Develops own fire
Has its fires plan in close Reinforced FS unit Force FS HQ or as
Force FS HQ
planned by cooperation with HQ otherwise specified
supported unit

7
Includes all target acquisition means and personnel deployed
8
As a result of the decision making process

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D. STA – CAPABILITIES

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19. Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA)


STA systems are designed to produce target data. They yield basic data and information for
fire support as well as contributing to the development of situational awareness. IFS STA
assets will be used for non-IFS intelligence collection tasks, but such use must be weighed
against the need to acquire IFS targets. Sensors not belonging to IFS (e.g. sensors of recce
unit) could also contribute to the target acquisition process. STA uses ground and air systems.
The following assets are generally provided by IFS units to perform these activities:
(1) Forward observers and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (FO/JTAC Teams) for target
acquisition, target engagement with ground, air and sea based assets, airspace
deconflicting as well as Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
(2) Radar systems for
a. Target acquisition,
b. Target engagement in the traditional fire support role or in the Counter Rocket
Artillery & Mortar protection (CRAM) concept,
c. Troop warning in the context of force protection engagement,
d. BDA.
(3) UAVs for surveillance, target acquisition, target engagement and BDA,
(4) Acoustic Weapon Location (AWL) Systems.
All of these assets are integrated in a system of systems supplementing and overlapping each
other, often operating independent of weather conditions and time of day.

STA-Ranges (Km)
STA - Asset 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
ALADIN (UAS) 5

BAA (Fennek) 5

AWL (‘ASP’; U.K.)

AVS 9 (AVISA™) SAF RAM

LUNA (UAS)

KZO (UAS) 100 km


ABRA

AN/TPQ 37 ‘Fire Finder’

COBRA, ARTHUR

TRACKER (AUT)

9
Acoustic Vector Sensor, e.g. RAM-LOC is designed to be used as part of C-RAM. It provides fast and
accurate location report of impact (POI) and points of origin (POO) of RAM and Small Arms Fire (SAF).

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20. Weapon Locating Radars- and Zones


Weapon locating radars play a key role in defeating the enemy’s surface-to-surface indirect
fire support systems. Without accurate targeting data, our own indirect fire systems are of
limited value. These weapons locating radars (WLR) are one of the primary means of locating
enemy indirect fire systems. They provide a 24 hour capability to detect and identify hostile
weapons systems. Specific functions of WLRs include:
a. Locating enemy indirect fire systems.
b. Generating artillery target information.
c. Generating fire missions.
d. Registering and adjusting friendly artillery and mortars.
e. Validating the location of friendly fires.
f. Providing information to allow friendly forces to take force protection measures.
g. Electronic support measures e.g. passive listening.

RADAR ZONES
Radar Zones10 are designed to assist the user in understanding the desired outcome. There are
seven types of zones:
a. Locating Zone (LZ)
b. Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ)
c. Engagement Zone (EZ)
d. Acquisition Target Report Zone (ATRZ)
e. Censor Zone (CZ)
f. Inhibit Zone (IZ)
g. Remaining Area (RA)

Locating Zone (LZ). An LZ is used to define the entire area that is required to be covered by
the counter battery radars and it is the area in which the radars/platoon is to search. NAIs
and/or TAIs can be used to outline the LZ for the radar platoon. The LZ is used as a technical
tool to optimize the antenna. It may also be referred to as a sector (grid coordinates) or arcs
(left and right azimuth).
Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ). A CFZ is an area established around a friendly unit or
location that is critical to the success of a commander’s plan. When the radar predicts an
enemy round will impact in a CFZ, a Priority Call for Fire is generated on the location from
which the round was fired. The CFZ does not have to be within the radar’s LZ.
Engagement Zone (EZ). An Engagement Zone (EZ) is an area inside the LZ where the
supported unit wants to engage hostile firing systems. An EZ may be placed around an enemy
fire support position identified during the IPB process as a TAI. A target identified in an EZ
normally generates a call for fire mission, if all requirements for accuracy are fulfilled. An EZ
must be in the radar’s Locating Zone.

10
A zone is a geometric shape defined by a series of grid coordinates or a circle of specified radius. The only
exception to this is the Locating Zone which is defined by an azimuth to indicate the left of arc and an azimuth to
indicate the right of arc.

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Acquisition Target Report Zone (ATRZ). An ATRZ is an area that the commander wishes
to monitor closely. Any weapon detected in an ATRZ will be reported ahead of all
acquisitions other than those from CFZs or EZs. An ATRZ must be in the radar’s Locating
Zone.
Censor Zones (CZ). Censor Zones (CZ) are areas from which the radar is prohibited from
reporting acquisitions. A CZ is normally placed around friendly weapon systems to prevent
them from being acquired by friendly radars. Care must be used when employing a CZ since
the radar ignores all acquisitions coming from the CZ. This may remain true in certain
systems even if the hostile weapon is firing from inside a CZ and into a CFZ.
Inhibit Zone (IZ). Inhibit Zones (IZ) are areas bounded by grid references, within the LZ
into which the radar should not radiate. It must be recognized that a given radar will be
inhibited throughout the sector or arcs within which the IZ lies.

Remaining Area (RA). The Remaining Area (RA) is that area of the LZ, not including the
IZ, which is not covered by ATRZ, CFZ, CZ or EZ. Reports of activity are generated for the
RA. A weapon located in the remaining area of the LZ will result in a report being sent to the
FDC/CP.

PRIORITIZATION.
Of all the zones, four are used to prioritize the areas and ensure that the appropriate speed of
response is applied for that area. The four zones which indicate priority are, in order; CFZ,
EZ, ATRZ and RA.

21. Air Recce Target Category List

Cat Targets Cat Targets

-01 Airfields -11 Coastal Reconnaissance


-02 Anti-Aircraft Artillery & Missile Systems -12 Bridges & Tunnels
-03 Electronic Installations -13 Water Control Installations
-04 Headquarters & Barracks -14 Ports Installations
-05 Storage & Repair Installations -15 Rail Installations
-06 Ground Activity -16 Industrial Installations
-07 Obstacle Crossing -17 Power Installations
-08 Shipping -18 Urban Areas / Habitation
-09 Route Reconnaissance -19 Specific Structure
-10 Terrain Reconnaissance
STANAG 3596, Edition 6

Categories 18 and 19 will give the tasker and analyst a means to task and report areas and facilities not covered
by categories 1 to 17, whereby category 18 is a means to give a general description of inhabited areas, and
category 19 is a means to define specific structures within those areas.

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JOINT FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (JFST)

Key Characteristics:
JFSTs integrate an indirect fire element for fire support by artillery, mortar and naval
assets with an air-to-ground element for employment of air forces and attack
helicopters (AH) providing Close Air Support (CAS) and Close Combat Attack
(CCA). The JFST has a crew of 6-7 in two vehicles. JFSTs usually support the main
effort (mounted or dismounted) from an OP or overwatch position.

Capabilities / Equipment:
Gyroscope for non-magnetic north
finding and precision azimuth
measurement
Thermal Imaging (IR)
Identification - 3 Km
Daylight Camera - 3 Km
Laser Rangefinder - 10 Km
GPS-Modul
ROVER
COMs
ROVER

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COUNTER BATTERY RADAR (COBRA)

Key Characteristics:

The COBRA system uses active radar to detect multiple batteries of indirect fire systems; mortar
bombs, artillery and rockets. It is capable of detecting 40 targets within two minutes, displaying
both location and classification of the shell/mortar/rocket fired. It is highly mobile and is
transported in the Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier (IMMLC) with a modified chassis.
The complete unit is mounted on a flat-rack and can therefore be lowered into a lower
profile/silhouette position. Qualified for target acquisition, troop warning in the context of force
protection or in the Counter Rocket Artillery & Mortar protection (CRAM) concept.

Capabilities:

Detachment 3

Detection Range 40 kilometers, 1,600 mil arc

Time in to action 15 minutes

Accuracy 50 meters CEP at 15 Kilometers

Ability Locate 40 batteries in 2 minutes, 8 targets simultaneously

Target Capacity 120 per minute

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MOBILE ARTILLERY MONITORING BATTLEFIELD RADAR


(MAMBA)

Key Characteristics:

The MAMBA is an air portable, small and accurate system, it was bought from the Norwegians
ARTHUR (Artillery Hunting Radar) system whilst COBRA was being developed. Qualified for
target acquisition, troop warning in the context of force protection or in the Counter Rocket
Artillery & Mortar protection (CRAM) concept.

Capabilities:

Detachment 8

Detection Range 30-40 kilometers, 1600 mil arc

Time in to action 5 minutes

Accuracy - Below 15 kilometers 50m CEP.


- 15 to 20 kilometers 100m CEP.
- Above 20 kilometers 0.35% of range to target.

Ability Locate a maximum of 8 targets simultaneously.

Target Capacity 100 per minute

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LEIGHTWEIGHT COUNTER MORTAR RADAR (LCMR)


Key Characteristics:

§ Light Counter Mortar Radar


§ Man packable (55 kg)
§ Omni-directional radar
§ Powered by mains, generator or vehicle
battery

Qualified for stationary camps in the Counter Rocket Artillery & Mortar protection (CRAM)
concept.

Capabilities:

Detachment 2

Detection Range Planning: 5 kilometers, 6,400 mil arc

Time in to action 20 minutes

Accuracy <100 m CEP

Ability mortar shells (60mm-120mm) from 1 – 6.5 Km

Target Capacity 20 shells simultaneously.

AN/TPQ-48 model: Planning Rng: 10,000m | CEP <50m

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GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR (GSR)


M113 ‘ABRA’ (DEU)

Key Characteristics:
ABRA is qualified for target acquisition and troop warning in the context of force protection.

Capabilities:

Sensor RATAC (DR-PC-1A) (Joint French-German Doppler radar). The


Radar is intended both for recce of moving ground targets as well as
for adjusting artillery fire (based on shell bursts) and can be connected
to various automated systems.

Elevation 6 m above ground

Detection - Ability Persons…………...…14 km


Wheeled vehicles….. 14 km
Helicopters……….... 28 km
Tracked vehicles…... 30 km
Tank Formations….. .38 km
155mm Impacts..….. 15 km
105mm Impacts….... 8 km

Accuracy TLE < 30m

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UAS
‘KLEINFLUGGERÄT FÜR ZIELORTUNG – KZO’ / BREVEL
(DEU Small UAV for Target Acquisition)

Key Characteristics:

The KZO is a division level Unmanned Aerial System for surveillance, target acquisition,
reconnaissance and battle damage assessment. NEP –protection.

Capabilities:

Wingspan, weight 3.44 m, 170 kg

Endurance 3.5 hrs | Enhanced: 4.75 hrs

Data Link 65 km (35 NM) | Enhanced: 100 km (54 NM) Data - 5 MBit (LOS)

Speed 120 – 200 km/h

Service Ceiling 4,000 m / 13,123 ft MSL


Recce Altitude 300 – 2,500 m / 985 – 8,200 ft AGL

Sensors IR-sensor OPHELIOS


Digital Zoom 1:8
Field of Vision (FOV):
+/- 70° right/left
+ 70° forward, -40° rear
New: SAPHIR (color)

Accuracy TLE < 50 m

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UAS
‘Luftgestützte Unbemannte Nahaufklärungs-Ausstattung – LUNA’
(DEU)

Key Characteristics:

The high-end motor-glider LUNA is the brigade level Unmanned Aerial System for the
surveillance of close and local named areas of interest (NAI), boundaries and lines of
communication (LOC).
Real-time recce day / night. GPS-navigation with either pre-programmed 3D-waypoint-list or
remote-controlled.

Capabilities:

Wingspan, weight 4.17 m, 30 kg

Endurance 2-3 hrs, (usual mission: 85 min)

Data Link 45 km (24 NM), with second UAV-Relay up to 90 km (48.5 NM).

Max. Speed - 160 km/h


Recce Speed 70-90 km/h

Service Ceiling 4,500 m / 14,780 ft MSL Area requirements: 2 x 2 km


Recce Altitude 250 – 1,500 m AGL

Sensors - Daylight Color TVS,


- IR,
- Mini Synthetic Aperture Radar

Accuracy TLE < 50 m

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SUAV (Mini UAS)


TRACKER (SurveyCopter™)
(AUT)

Key Characteristics:

The electrically-propelled TRACKER is particularly adapted to carry out tactical intelligence


missions. The hand-launched TRACKER, fitted with 2 electric motors, has a high level of visual
and acoustic discretion. Carried as a backpack, TRACKER is qualified to operate in severe
environment. Equipped with the EO/IR T120 gyrostabilizer turret, this Mini-UAV provides in
real time high-quality and perfectly-stabilized images, allowing to perform with efficiency day
and night intelligence missions.

Capabilities:

Wingspan, weight 3.6 m, 8.5 kg

Endurance max. 1.5 hrs (effective 60 - 75’)

Range 10 km

Max. Speed - 90 km/h


Recce Speed 30 - 50 km/h
Max. Wind Speed 15 m/s

Max. Service Ceiling 2,500 m / 8,200 ft AMSL


Recce Altitude 100 - 600 m / 330 - 1,970 ft m AGL

Sensor pod - ELOP (Elbit Systems) w/ HD color TV plus IR. GPS System

Accuracy TLE < 50 m

System: Ground Control Station (Data Link Ground Antenna, Laptop, Battery Charger).
For Airspace Deconfliction only 1x ROZ (radius 10 km) sufficient.

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E. LAND BASED FS CAPABILITIES

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22. Land Based Indirect Fire Systems

M-109A5 OE
Type, Use Self-Propelled Howitzer. M109 series was developed in the USA
in 1950s. In service in about 27 countries.
CAL (mm), Length 155 / L39
Weight Combat (tons) 28
min - max effective RNG 0.5 - 25 Km
max RNG - Extended 28.2 Km

Planning RNG (common) 13 Km (HE)

3,116 M109A5 (Austria)


at Range 16 Km
Vertex Height (m / feet)
(8.Charge, L/A) 10,223’
(max) Time of Flight 49 sec (16 Km)
Min. Safe Distance (m) 600 11 300 200
open | after warning | armored
7 CHG / White Bag RAP (max)
0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
1/3 Rng | 2/3 Rng | max Rng 300 460 695
STANDING 984’ 1,509’ 2,280’
CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) 48 | 115 (16 Km)
Rate of Fire / minute 6-8
Ammunition HE, HE-RAP, ILL, SMK
Turret Ammo Load 40-42 Shells
Fuses PD, PDD, PRX, MT
Annotations PAA: 9 -10 sqr-km each Battery;
min Combat Speed/Street: 25 Km/h | Terrain: 10 Km/h

11
Within Austrian Armed Forces (AAF): 700 meters

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PzH 2000
Type, Use Self-Propelled Howitzer developed by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann,
together with main subcontractor Rheinmetall Landsysteme for the
German Army. Also fielded in NL.
CAL (mm), Length 155 / L52
Weight Combat (tons) 57.66
effective RNG - HE 4.9 - 28 Km
effective RNG - SMArt® 24,6 Km
Planning RNG (common) 23 Km (HE)
at Range 25 Km 9,500
Vertex Height (m / feet)
(L/A) 31,200’

(max) Time of Flight 68 sec (24 Km) PzH 2000 (Germany)


Min. Safe Distance (m) 600 300 200
open | after warning | armored
0.1 % PI (meters / feet) IAW DBW Guidelines
1/3 Rng | 2/3 Rng | max Rng

CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) 70 | 170 (25 Km)


Rate of Fire / minute 8 (3 w/ 10 sec)
Ammunition HE/HE-FRAG (DM 111: 14,000
splinters, AL: 1,450 m2), ILL,
SMK-IR, SMArt® (DM 702 A1)
Turret Ammo Load 60 shells (48 Charges)
PD, PDD, PRX, Multifunctional
Fuses SMArt®, 2 sub-munitions
& Electronic Fuses
Annotations PAA: 9-10 sqr-km each Battery,
MSD for SMArt: 1,100 - 1,700m (Wind < 17.7 m/s)

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FH 77 BW L52 Self Propelled Gun-Howitzer - ‘ARCHER’ (SWE)


Type, Use By BAE Systems Bofors. ARCHER is the name of the complete
system of FH77BW L52 Self Propelled Gun-Howitzer mounted on
an ordinary 6x6 Volvo truck with reinforced armored cabin and an
automatic loading and resupply system.
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada.
CAL (mm), Length 155 / L52
Weight Combat (tons) 33
30 km standard shells, 40 km
effective RNGs
base-bleed, 60 km Excalibur
max RNG - Extended 70 Km
w/ Excalibur: >9,100m
Vertex Height (m / feet) (at Range 7.5 - 35
Km) >30,000’ 155mm ARCHER SPGH (wheeled)
Min. Safe Distance (m) 600 300 200
open | after warning | armored

0.1 % PI (meters / feet) IAW national Guidelines


1/3 Rng | 2/3 Rng | max Rng

CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) w/ Excalibur: 4 | 10


8-9
Rate of Fire / minute
6 with the multiple round simultaneous impact (MRSI) - mode
Ammunition HE/HE-FRAG,
HE-RAP, SMK, ILL,
Raython/Bofors-Excalibur
BONUS II top attack projectile
20 in fully automatic magazine
Turret Ammo Load
+ additional 20 for reload
PD, PDD, PRX, Multifunctional M982 Excalibur
Fuses
& Electronic Fuses
Annotations:
- Automatic loading system with magazines carrying shells and charges.
- Modern Gun Command, Control and Information System with interface towards different
levels of Battlefield Management Systems.
- Interoperable and has the NATO Ballistic Kernel (NABK).
- The Protection meets the outlined challenges and with the crew in the cabin during the whole
firing process they will also be protected against Blast Overpressure.
- The Vehicle cabin and the engine compartment are fully armored and the cap is fitted with
bullet and fragmentation proof windows.

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GMLRS, MARS II, HIMARS


Type, Use (GPS-)Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System.
PGM (Precision Guided Munitions), for attacking point targets
with reduced CD by providing a “one round, one kill capability”.
CAL (mm), Length 227
Weight Combat (tons) 55
min - max effective RNG 18 - 70 Km
min - max technical RNG 15 - 85 Km
Planning RNG (common) > 30 Km
~23,000
Vertex Height (m / feet) at Range 70 Km
~73,000’
(max) Time of Flight 148 sec (70 Km) GMLRS (UK)

Min. Safe Distance (m) 600


0.1 % PI (meters / feet) PD: 215 / 705’
STANDING PRX: 250 / 820’
CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) 2.5 | 7
Rate of Fire / minute 6 per block (12 w/ 2 blocks)
Unitary Warhead / Blast/Fragmentation (196lb HE - 4,000 splinters)
Ammunition
Mine Rocket DM 702 w/ 28x AT2 Mines, Range 10 – 35 km.
Ammo Load per Block: 6 rockets (Rocket Pod Container - RPC)
Tri-Mode Fuses 1) PD , 2) PDD (Delay- shallow, 1 meter / -deep, 3 meters)
(5 options) 3) PRX- Hi (7 meters) / PRX-Low (3 meters)
Annotations - Splinter Distance Radius: < 200m | Lethal Radius: 40m

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GMLRS Ballistic Trajectory Data

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120 mm Mortar
Type, Use Crew served towed heavy mortar. In service all over the world.
CAL (mm) 120 mm
Weight Combat (kg) 670
min - max effective RNG 0.6 - 7 Km
max RNG 7.7 Km

Planning RNG (common) 6.9 Km (HE)

3,172
Vertex Height (m / feet) at Range 7 Km
10,405’
(max) Time of Flight 50.3 sec (7 Km)
Min. Safe Distance (m) 600 12 300 200
open | after warning | armored
PD: 135 100 80
0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
1/3 Rng | 2/3 Rng | max Rng 443’ 328’ 263’
PRX:155 130 105 PLT-PAA: 1,000 x 1,000 m
STANDING 509’ 427’ 345’ SQT-PAA 500 x 500m
CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) 33 | 80 (7 Km)
Rate of Fire / minute 12 -18
Ammunition HE, ILL, SMK
Ammo Load 2 DOS: 104 Shells Fuses: PD, PDD, PRX (VT), MT
Mortar Effective Ranges & Vertexes (meters)

12
Within Austrian Armed Forces (AAF): 800 meters

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81 mm Mortar
Type, Use Crew served decomposable medium mortar.

CAL (mm) 81 mm
Weight Combat (kg) 40
min - max effective RNG 0.5 - 5.3 Km
max RNG 5.85 Km
5.3 Km (HE80)
Planning RNG (common)
4.2 km (HE70)
2,573
Vertex Height (m / feet) at Range 5 Km
8,440’
(max) Time of Flight 51 sec (5 Km)

Min. Safe Distance (m) 500 300 200


open | after warning | armored

0.1 % PI (meters / feet) 170 195 195


1/3 Rng | 2/3 Rng | max Rng 585’ 640’ 640’ PLT-PAA: 1,000 x 1,000 m
CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) 25 | 60 (5 Km) SQT-PAA 500 x 500m

Rate of Fire / minute 25


Ammunition HE, ILL, SMK
Ammo Load 2 DOS: 176 Shells
Fuses PD, PDD, MT
Mortar Effective Ranges & Vertexes (meters)

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23. IFS (Land) Ammunition Capabilities


The indirect fires munitions are divided into 2 different categories:

UNGUIDED MUNITIONS
It follows the ballistic trajectory. Their accuracy is directly related to the delivery platform
(e.g. Topographical, Meteorological and ballistic data). The ability to guarantee first round
fire for effect is depended on the accuracy. The accuracy of the system can be improved
through registration fires, calibration or/and adjustment.
Unguided (conventional) munitions are to be divided in the following types:

(1) High Explosive (HE),


(2) High Explosive Fragmentary (HE-FRAG),
(3) HE Rocked Assisted Projectiles (RAP),
(4) Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM, ‘Bomblets’),
(5) Smoke (SMK),
(6) Smoke Infrared (SMK-IR),
(7) Hexachloroethane (HC),
(8) Illumination (ILL),
(9) White Phosphorous (WP, ‘Willie Pete’),
(10) Red Phosphorous (RP),
(11) Scatterable Mines (SCAT-MINE),
(12) Antipersonnel Improved Conventional Munition (APICM).

PRECISION GUIDED MUNITION (PGM)


PGMs are munitions for which the effect and its point of delivery, in time and space, may be
controlled, either internally or externally, after departure from the launch platform.
PGMs are to be divided in the 6 following types:

(1) Laser-Guided Projectiles (LGP),


(2) Terminally Homing Projectiles (THP),
(3) Trajectory Correctable Munitions, e.g.
a) Course Correcting Fuses (CCF),
b) GPS Guided Munitions,
(4) Sensor Fused (Sub) Munitions,
(5) Loitering Munitions13 (LM),
(6) Video Link lock on Munitions.

13
Loitering munitions: Munitions able to remain in position over a target area and to be reassigned a target in
flight. During the attack phase target can be aborted with the munition returning to the loitering mode. These
munitions are delivered by a wide range of platforms e.g. rocket launcher, plane or ship.

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24. Austrian (AUT) Field Artillery Ammunition


Munition Range Data
2DRMS 14 Effective Range15 Max. Vertex
Weapon AMMO Charge
max (m) (min) (max) height (m)
60 mm mortar HE Mk2 0-6 35 220 3,540 1,720
81 mm mortar HE 70 0-6 50 200 4,650
2,551
HE 80A1 0-6 60 200 5,850
120 mm mortar HE 78 1-7 90 550 7,700 4,217
155 mm M109 HE M107 1 - 7 WB16 75 500 13,200 2,471 17
SPH
8 WB 113 NIL 16,300 3,328
HE94 eRW 9K 175 NIL 25,300 5,360
SMK 88 1-8 115 NIL 16,200 3,328
ILL M485 1-8 110 NIL 16,200 2,860
Standard Combat Load:

25. German (DEU) Field Artillery Ammunition


Munition Range Data
2DRMS Effective Range Max. Vertex
Weapon AMMO
max (m) (min) (max) height (m)
120 mm mortar HE PD (DM91) 90 500 6,930 3,500
HE PRX
SMK (DM65) 6,300
ILL (DM36) 5,500
Standard Combat Load: 54! (26 HE PD, 16 HE PRX, 6 SMK, 6 ILL)
155 mm PzH2000 HE (L15A1) 170 3,400 23,000 12,520
HE (mod 2000) (DM111) 3,400 28,000 12,520 18
IR SMK (DM125) 3,100 23,000 10,700
ILL (DM106/116) 3,200 22,000 9,850
SMArt (DM702) <10 5,500 24,600 10,460
Standard Combat Load: 60! (46 HE, 2 SMArt, 4 ILL, 8 SMK)
227mm MARS II 196 lbs Unitary HE Warhead 7 18,000 70,000 23,000
SCATMIN DM 702 w/AT-2 60 10,000 35,000 17,000

14
2DRMS. ‘Two distance root mean square’: 95 % of all rounds are expected within a circle of this specific
radius; Calculation: CEP50 x 2.4.
15
Effective Ranges apply to minimum technical range plus 10 % / respectively 90 % of maximum technical range
16
WB = White Bag
17
Low Angel
18
Low Angle

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26. Required AMMO expenditure for Fire Missions


AUT 120mm Mortar - Munition Data (100 x 100m)
Fire Mission Pieces Total Ammo HE PROX SMK ILL Remarks
19
DESTROY 6 48 cartridges 48 *) FFE with max. rate of fire
NEUTRALIZE 6 24 cartridges 18 *)
SUPPRESS 6 12 cartridges 12 *) 12 rounds per min
BLIND 6 16 cartridges 18 4 minutes
ILLUMINATE 1 2 cartridges 2 2 minutes
Note: *) for personnel in open terrain

DEU 120mm Mortar - Munition Data


Fire Mission Pieces Total Ammo HE PROX SMK ILL Remarks
DESTROY 4 20 cartridges 20 *) FFE with max. rate of fire
SUPPRESS 4 20 cartridges 20 *) 2 minutes / 6 rounds/ min
BLIND 4 8 cartridges 8 2 minutes
ILLUMINATE 1-2 1-2 cartridges 1-2 2 minutes
Note: *) for persons in open terrain

AUT 155mm M109A5 - Munition Data


Fire Mission Pieces Total Ammo HE PROX SMK ILL Remarks
DESTROY 8 **) 48 shells 48 *) FFE with max. rate of fire
NEUTRALIZE 8 24 shells 24 *)
SUPPRESS 6 6 shells 6 *) 6 rounds per min
BLIND 8 16 shells 16 per 5 min
ILLUMINATE 1 1 shell 1 1 round per min
Note: *) for persons in open terrain | **) AUT BTY w/ 8 pieces

DEU 155mm PzH2000 - Munition Data (100 x 100m)


Fire Mission Pieces Total Ammo HE PROX SMK ILL SMArt TGTs
20
DESTROY 30% 31 (152) 22 (86) 9 (66) 2 / STGT soft (armor)
DESTROY 70% 45 (210) 32 (120) 13 (90) 2 / STGT soft (armor)
SUPPRESS 22 (92) 16 (52) 6 (40) soft (armor)

DEU 227mm GMLRS (MARS II)


Fire Mission GMLRS Total Rockets each Launcher barrier width Remarks
BLOCK 2 24 12x DM 702 1,300 m 28x AT-2 per Rocket

19
6x mortars / 4x mortars w/ InfBn25 (airborne)
20
sub-target

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27. Trajectory Correctable Munitions


A) (X)M982, 155mm ‘EXCALIBUR’:

Excalibur is a 155mm precision-guided, autonomous artillery round with extended range and
a joint U.S.-Swedish development. The Projectile is designed to deliver DPICM, SADARM,
and Unitary payloads. Excalibur’s accuracy greatly reduces the number of rounds required to
perform any lethal artillery mission. Excalibur is fully autonomous, fire & forget, all-weather,
day & night (24/7). It is guided to its target by the use of a Global Positioning System (GPS)
and has a 4-axis Canard Control Guidance for enhanced maneuverability and an 8-tail finned
base for aerodynamic stability. The near-vertical angle-of-attack (85°) is ideal for achieving
effects in urban or complex terrain and increases the performance of the fragmenting warhead
while minimizing collateral damage. The multifunction fuse provides height-of-burst (HOB),
point detonating (PD) and point-detonate delay (PDD) fuse settings. The HOB setting will
enable troops in contact to engage enemy forces on rooftops and in trenches while the PDD
setting is ideal for penetrating structures and other enemy strong points. The PD setting is
effective against dismounted soldiers and towed artillery crews, light armor and trucks. For
exceptional cases, when Excalibur receives no GPS-satellite-signal, a Ballistic Impact Point
(BIP) is necessary.
Benefits
§ Accuracy ensures lower collateral damage and faster mission effects.
§ Optimized for targets in urban terrain.
§ Compatible with current and future 155mm artillery platforms.
What is Excalibur not?
§ ..a Point Target munition or a guided missile.
§ ..a Tank-Killer (no HEAT-warhead!).
§ ..qualified for destructing buildings.

M982 Data Sheet


3 sections Base Section: 8 Tail fins w/Fin Cover and base bleed
Payload Section: Unitary HE Warhead natural fragmentation. (More
payloads will be available in later development)
Guidance Section: GPS Receiver, IMU Processor, Data Hold Battery
Length 1m
Weight 47.2 kg
Range 7.5 – >35 km
Accuracy 2DRMS: 10 m with 98% hit ratio
Danger Close 0.1% PI: 175 m (574 ft)

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B) OTO Melara’s V155-GLR/SAL ‘VULCANO’:

The concept of the new guided long-range (GLR) precision munition family ‘VULCANO’
was developed by the OTO MELARA company of La Spezia and involves a sub-caliber with
sabot, not self-propelled - munition that, in its guided version, is equipped with fin-stabilized
aerodynamic controls, inertial/GPS navigation and a semi-active laser (SAL) seeker linked to
a ground laser target designator. Therefore the VULCANO family comprises the BER
(Ballistic Extended Range) variant and extends its reach to 80 kilometers. V155-GLR/SAL is
equipped with a high-performance tungsten effector with pre-formed fragments (PFF). The
explosive charge fulfils the conditions for insensitive munition (IS).
The GPS/INS/SAL round was originally to developed only for use from land 155mm
howitzers, but when Germany entered into the VULCAN program, they pushed to develop it
for the 127mm naval gun as well.
The addition of a SAL seeker to the GPS and inertial navigation guidance makes this variant
of the round extremely accurate. With external laser designation of the target (FO or UAV), it
can engage with high accuracy even moving targets (e.g. vehicles and small boats). The CEP
reduces to a handful of meters.

Variant Caliber Effective Range Accuracy (2DRMS)


GPS/INS 127mm n.a. 20 meters
GPS/SAL 127mm 80 Km 3 meters
V155-GLR/SAL 155mm 60 Km 3 meters

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NATO Artillery Projectile & Fuse Codes

Code Definition Code Definition


AML Anti-Materiel Mine, Long Delay JTA MLRS Terminally Guided Warhead
AMS Anti-Materiel Mine, Short Delay JTB MLRS SADARM
APL Anti-Personnel Mine, Long Delay JTC ATCMS Brilliant Anti-Tank
APS Anti-Personnel Mine, Short Delay MRD Multi-Role Fuse Delay
CP Concrete Piercing MRF Multi-Role Fuse
HEA High Explosive (HE) MRP Multi-Role Fuse Point Detonation
HEB Improved High Explosive MRT Multi-Role Fuse Time
HEC APICM21 Anti-Personnel Submunitions MRV Multi-Role Fuse Variable Time
HED DPICM Anti-Personnel & Anti-Material Subm. PD Point Detonation
HEI ATICM Anti-Tank Submunitions PDD Point Detonation Delay
HER Rocket Assisted RP Smoke Red Phosphorous
IIR Illuminating Infra-Red SMK Smoke
ILL Illuminating TI Time Action
JEE ATCMS Anti-Material & Anti-Personnel VT Variable Time
JEM DEU/GBR Reduced Range Practice Rocket VTD Variable Time Desensitized
JMT MLRS Anti-Tank Mine WP Smoke White Phosphorous

NATO Vulnerabilities Categories

Code Definition
1 Casualties to Personnel in Open
2 Casualties to Personnel in Tanks
3 Casualties to Personnel in APCs
4 Casualties to Personnel in Wheeled Vehicles
5 Casualties to Personnel in Earth Shelters
6 Casualties to Personnel in Foxholes
7 Moderate Damage to Exposed Wheeled Vehicles
8 Moderate Damage to Shielded Wheeled Vehicles
9 Moderate Damage to Towed Artillery
10 Moderate Damage to Tanks, APCs, and SP Artillery
11 Moderate Damage to Hard Fixed Bridges
12 Moderate Damage to Soft Fixed Bridges
13 Severe Damage to Supply Depots
14 Severe Damage to Randomly Parked Cargo/Transportation Helicopters

21
APICM. Anti-Personnel Improved Conventional Munition

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28. International Artillery Weapon Ranges


Arbitrary Selected (!)
Maximum Range in kilometers (not true-to scale)
Type, Caliber 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 > 100
towed
2B11 / 2S12 120
HE, WP, DPICM mortar

2S1 (SAU-122) 122 ILL, SMK, HE, HE-FRAG

2S19 MSTA 152 ILL, SMK, HE, HE-FRAG, DPICM Krasnopol

2S3 (SAU-152) 152


ILL, SMK HE, HE-FRAG

2S5 (Giatsint S) 152 ILL, SMK, HE, HE-FRAG, DPICM Krasnopol


L38/L52
AS90 155 all NATO ammo, + Marker L18
BLOCK 1 25
ATACMS n.a. (MLRS/GMLRS) Unitary HE, DPICM, SADARM 170 - 300
huge variants BM-21-P = single round
BM-21 122
AT-Mines, HE-FRAG launcher also Chemical

BM-22 220 AT-Mines, HE-FRAG

BM-30 300
“SMERCH” AT-Mines, HE-FRAG , Incendiary Bomblet, Jamming Rockets

CAESAR 155
all NATO ammo (+Bonus)
RAP towed
D-20 (M-1955) 152 ILL, SMK, HE-FRAG
21.9 RAP towed
D-30 (M-1963) 122
HE-FRAG, SMK, HEAT-FS
towed
D-74 122 HE, HE-FRAG, ILL, SMK
L52 SPGH
ARCHER 155 automatic loading sys. HE, ILL, SMK Excalibur

GMLRS 227
196 lb Unitary Warhead
towed
M101 105 HE, SMK, ILL
28 L38
M109A5 155
HE, SMK, ILL, RAP (HE)
M109A6 L38/L52
155 all NATO ammo, Copperhead, Excalibur (40)
(Paladin)
11,8 towed
M-30 122 HE-FRAG, SMK

M-240 240
HE-FRAG, SMK
towed
M777 ULH 155
HE, SMK, ILL, Excalibur (40) L52
L52
PzH2000 155
HE, ILL, SMK, SMArt 24,6|HE 28
36
RM-70 122
HE-FRAG, SMK if upgraded

SS-1C 880 “SCUD B”


Single Warhead chemical, nuclear warhead ( 5-70 kT) 300
“SCARAB”
SS-21 n.a. CEP 160 m HE-FRAG, bomblets, mines, nuclear warhead 120
SPGH
Zuzana 155 HEAT, ILL, SMK, HE, HE-Base Bleed

Comment: Extended Range: Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP) or Base Bleed (BB)

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29. Call For Fire (CFF) Format


The call for fire is divided in THREE PARTS:
a. Warning Order consisting of
(1) Observer identification
(2) Warning Order
b. (3) Location of target (including direction when necessary).
c. Target & Conduct of fire consisting of
(4) Target description.
(5) Complementary Data
(6) Method of fire and method of control

Elements and Transmissions of a Call for Fire Artillery / Mortar


1st Transmission
1 Observer Identification (ID). (Call Sign)
2 Warning Order — “Fire Mission (Adjust Fire, Fire for Effect, SEAD, Mark etc)
________________________________”
(Insert the known point or target number)
2nd Transmission
3 Target Location (grid, polar plot, or shift from a known point.)
3rd Transmission
4 Target Description (Brief but accurate statement describing the target.)
5 Method of Engagement (Danger Close, High Angle, Ammo Type Requested etc)
6 Method of Fire and Control (At My Command, TOT; Request TOF etc)

Example:

Parts Example
Observer Identification “… this is PM40 (papa-mike four zero),
Warning Order Fire Mission - Fire for Effect on JT8421 over”
Target Location “This is PM40 - GRID 14910 52360 Altitude 256 Zone 32”
Target Description “Towed Heavy mortar platoon in firing position - open
terrain , 200 by 50, Attitude 1600 (mils),
Method of Engagement Danger Close,
Method of Fire & Control destroy 50 percent, at my command…- over”

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30. Message to Observer (MTO)


Message to Observer (MTO). When the observer’s call for fire is received, the FDC/CP to
which it has been directed will prepare and transmit a message to observer as soon as
possible. The message to observer may include the elements shown in the table below. When
any element has been specified by the observer in his call for fire, it may be omitted from the
message to observer, if the FDC/CP can meet the observer’s requirements, otherwise it must
be included. If the request for fire cannot be met the FDC/CP will report “Cannot comply”
plus the reason (see section below).

MTO - Format
Serial Element Remarks
(a) (b) (c)

1 Call sign originator (M)


2 Target number (M) As given by the FO in its call for fire
3 Amount of guns (M) Maximum TWO digits to define the amount of guns
firing in effect
4 Number of rounds from each The amount of ammunition is specified if different of
gun for fire for effect (M) these requested by the FO in its call for fire or if it
was not specified in the call for fire
5 Projectile and/or fuse(O) If a type of ammunition is not specified in the call
for fire, the best possible projectile/fuse combination
taking into account the target description and size
will be fired, it will be sent to the FO (M).
A report must also be made if the FDC/CP changes
the type of ammunition requested by the FO or
cannot comply with the order (M).
6 Method of fire (M) The FDC/CP only reads back the method
commanded by the FO or modifies it if not
applicable. ONLY in voice procedure.
7 Method of control (O) The FDC/CP only reads back the method
commanded by the FO or modifies it if not
applicable.
8 Observer data (O) “Time of flight” is always sent for High angle
- Gun Target Line (GTL) mission, for an air observer, a mix of different
- Time of Flight (s) projectiles (e.g. illuminating with HE shells) It can
- Ordinate Altitude be repeated if there is major change after the
- Error probable in range (m) command “Shot”.
- Other information Observer data is mandatory if the CFF is
“Danger Close”
Note: M = mandatory | O = optional
“GTL” &“Ordinate Altitude” (Serial 8 / Observer data) are mandatory within the Austrian Armed Forces!

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31. Fire Mission Command


Fire mission commands:
It allows the FO conducting fire to interrupt the fire or the FDC/CP to warn the FO of the
completion of fire.

a. Warning Part:
(1) Originators Identification (mandatory):
This is the establishment of communication between the observer and the FDC/CP.
(2) Mission type (mandatory):
“Fire Mission Command” as stated in 312 b and c.
(3) Target number (mandatory):
To identify the target to which the message is related.

b. Fire Mission Commands:


(1) “Cease Loading”:
The command used during firing two or more rounds to mean that the guns are not to be
reloaded. Fire shall be brought to an end with bores (barrels) clear.
(2) “Check Firing”:
A command to cause a temporary halt in firing while all other drills continue.
(3) “Fire”:
A command used to ask the delivery of a fire for which the method of control is “At my
command” or to command an objective belonging to a fire plan
(Example: “SC27 this is SC37 “Fire” for KT1589 over!”)
(4) “Cancel”:
(a) The series (1) and (2) are annulated by sending “Cancel cease loading” or Cancel
check firing”.
(b) Can also be used to cancel other orders. (Not with target grids)
(5) “End of mission”:
The observer sends “End of mission” to specify the mission will be considered as ended
after completion of the fire. With the “”End of Mission” command a Battle Damage
Assessment can be transmitted. The BDA can be transmitted in plain text or in code. The
number of casualties or destroyed vehicles may added using a maximum of FOUR digits.
(6) “Stop”:
This order caused the halt of ALL activities in case of safety incidents and is lifted by
“Cancel stop”. It is always sent on voice net and transmitted at all levels.
Comment: BEL, DNK, HUN and POL use this term.
(7) “Repeat”:
a) During the adjustment, it is given to ask for another round(s) at the last data,
coupled with any change in number of guns and/or ammunition, if necessary.
b) During Fire for Effect, it is given to ask for the same number of rounds using the
same method of fire for effect as last ordered.
Comments:
* Changes may be made to the number of guns, the interval and the ammunition.
* Target grid corrections at FFE may also be coupled with this order.

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c. Report to observer (given after a call for fire or message to observer):


(1) “Ready”:
The term to indicate that a weapon or weapons are aimed, loaded and/or prepared to fire.
(2) “Rounds complete”:
“Rounds Complete” is always reported when fire for effect is completed.
(3) “Cannot comply”:
The FDC/CP warns the FO when it is not able to deliver the requested fire or effect; it also
tells the reason.
(4) “Shot”:
It is reported for the first round of adjustment or the first fire for effect volley.
(Example: “SC37 this is SC27 “Shot” on KT1589 over”)
(5) “Splash”:
“Splash” is reported by convention, five seconds prior to predicted time of impact when:
firing high angle, an air observer is controlling the mission, requested by a ground
observer.
Notes:
-If an observer requires an alteration to the interval of five seconds, he couples the
alteration with “Report Splash”, e.g., “Report Splash 10”.
-USA and ESP always report “Splash”.
(6) “Neglect”:
It is reported when for any reason a shell is fired at incorrect data or with incorrect
ammunition. Another shell or shells is fired at the correct data without any order from the
observer; unless “At My Command” is in force, or during a “danger close” mission.
(7) “Target Recorded”:
This may be reported by the FDC/CP when it has recorded the data of the fire mission.

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32. Example of FS/CFF communication procedure


Example 1: Warning Order (Communications established after a preliminary call)
Forward Observer FDC/CP (or JFSCT)
Remarks
(c/s S9C37) (c/s S8C27)
“S8C27, This is S9C37, Fire Mission Note: During mortar
on target number KT 2015 Over” procedures an alternate
frequency may be
“S9C37, This is S8C27, Fire Mission assigned to link the MFC
on target number KT 2015 Out” with the fire unit.
Example 2: FO continues with the Call for Fire (ADP or non ADP procedure)
Forward Observer FDC/CP (or JFSCT) Remarks
“GRID 14789 93658, Altitude 250,
Zone 31 Over”
“GRID 14789 93658, Altitude 250,
Zone 31 Out”
”Heavy Armor, radius 80, strength 5,
effect 15, Fire for effect, At my
command, Over”
”Heavy Armor, radius 80, strength 5,
effect 15, Fire for effect, At my
command, Out”
Example 3: Message to Observer
FDC/CP (or JFSCT) Forward Observer Remarks
“This is S8C27 on KT 2015, 8 guns in
effect firing Two Rounds HE, At my 1. The adjusting fire unit
command, GTL 3000 mils, time of may be indicated.
flight 45, ordinate altitude 3000 2. The ammunition type
meters MSL, Over” must be sent. Standard
defaults for the projectile
“This is S9C37 on KT 2015, 8 guns in type is not advisable.
effect firing Two Rounds HE, At my 3.”GTL” and “Ordinate
command, GTL 3000 mils, time of Altitude” is mandatory
flight 45, ordinate altitude 3000 within the Austrian
meters MSL, Over” Armed Forces!
Example 4: Report to Forward Observer after FFE
FDC/CP (or JFSCT) Forward Observer Remarks
“Shot, Over” The FDC/CP informs the
FP when the guns start
“Shot, Out” the method of FFE.
“Rounds Complete, Over” The FDC/CP informs the
FO when the guns finish
“Rounds Complete, Out”. the method of FFE.
Example 5: End of mission and BDA
Forward Observer FDC/CP (or JFSCT) Remarks
“End of Mission, moderate damage to
tank formation, Over”
End of Mission, moderate damage to
tank formation, Out”

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F. OPFOR FS CAPABILITIES

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33. OPFOR Motor Rifle Division


Formation № Type Size Cal. Name/Code Rng RAP Ammo
3 x 18 SPH Bn 152 2S3 / SAU-152 18.5 24 HE, SMK, ILL, DPICM
Arty Regt
1 x 18 MLRS Bn 122 BM-21 20.5 >30 HE, SMK, DPICM, Mine
STA-CAPABILITIES
Automatic Sound Ranging System “1B33” (mortars 5-8 km; artillery 12-16, artillery bursts >122m: 12 -16)
Counter Battery Radar “RICE BAG” (Detection Ranges: Howitzers – 8Km; Rocket Artillery: – 25km)
Ground Surveillance Radar “TALL MIKE” (Detection Ranges: Personnel – 3Km; Vehicles: – 12km)
Ground Surveillance Radar “BIG FRED” (Detection Ranges: Vehicles: – 16km; Shell impacts: – 10km )
4x UAV “SHMEL-1” (Range - 80km)
4x EloKa Radio (mounted) “NRS-1/POLE DISH” (Range : - 35 km)
AD-CAPABILITIES
↑ 12 x SA-15 “GAUNTLET” (max. vertical ALT: 19,700 ft). Self-propelled-AD-System, Radar: -24 km
↑ 80 x SA-14 “GREMLIN” (max. vertical ALT: 12,000 ft). 1 per each Howitzer/Launcher crew
AAVN CAS/CCA-CAPABILITIES
6x AH Mil Mi-24 “HIND” (12,7mm Gatling Gun; Fixed twin barrel cannon, 6x hardpoints).

34. OPFOR Motor Rifle Regiment


Formation № Type Size Cal. Name/Code Rng RAP Ammo
*)
3x6 SPH Bty 122 2S1 / SAU-122 15.3 21.9 HE, SMK, ILL, DPICM
Arty Bn or *)
3x6 Towed Bty 122 D-30 15.3 21.9 HE, SMK, ILL, DPICM
*) motInfBde (BMP) w/ 2S1 ; MotInfBde (BTR) w/ D-30
STA-CAPABILITIES
8 x Ground Surveillance Radar “TALL MIKE” (Detection Ranges: Personnel – 3Km; Vehicles: – 12km)
AD-CAPABILITIES
↑ 3 x SA-13 “GOPHER” (max. vertical ALT 11,500 ft)
“ DOG EAR” Long Track Air Defense Warning (ADW) System: 35 – 80km
“ SNAP SHOT” AD Target Allocation Radar – 10,3 km
↑ 4 x 2S6 “TUNGUSKA” Is an anti-aircraft “gun-missile-complex” with 2 x twin-30mm barrels (4 km) and
8x SA-19 missiles in transport-launch container. (max. vertical ALT 26,200 ft). Deployed in 1 st echelon.
”HOT SHOT” Target Allocation Radar – 18 km (tracking modus)
↑ 21 x SA-14 “GREMLIN” (max. vertical ALT: 12,000 ft). 1 per each Howitzer/Launcher crew
NOTES: Brigade Arty Bn deployment: 1 – 4 kilometers behind first echelon.

35. OPFOR Independent Motor Rifle Brigade


Formation № Type Size Cal. Name/Code Rng RAP Ammo
2x6 SPH Bty
122 2S1 / SAU-122 15.3 21.9 HE, SMK, ILL, DPICM
Arty Bn
1x6 MLRS Bty
122 BM-21 20.5 >30 HE, SMK, DPICM, Mine
STA-CAPABILITIES
8x Ground Surveillance Radar “TALL MIKE” (Detection Ranges: Personnel – 3Km; Vehicles: – 12km)
4x EloKa Radio (man-portable) “NRS-1/POLE DISH” (Range: - 25 km)
2x UAV “SHMEL-1” (Range - 80km)
AD-CAPABILITIES
HQ-Radar: Target Allocation Radar “LONG TRACK” (150km) | Radar altimetry “THIN SKIN” (240 km)
↑ 4 x SA-15 “GAUNTLET” ↑ 6 x SA-13 “GOPHER ↑ 6 x 2S6 “TUNGUSKA”
↑ 36 x SA-14 “GREMLIN” (AD-Radars as in motor rifle regiment)

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36. Surface-to-air Missile / ADA Threat Capabilities


Towed, mounted, and Man Portable SAMs
max. min. max. vertical Associated
System Effective Effective Altitude Radars or
Guidance
(NATO CODE) Range Range Delivery Means
(km) (km) km feet (without radar)
SA-7 (GRAIL) 4.2 1.2 2.3 7,500 IR MANPAD
SA-8 (GECKO) 10.2 1.5 5.0 16,500 Radar LAND ROLL
SA-9 (GASKIN) 4.2 0.8 3.5 11,500 BRDM-2
SA-10 (GRUMBLE) 75.0 5.0 25.0 82,000 Radar FLAP LID
SA-11A (GADFLY) 32.0 3.0 22.0 72,000 Radar FIRE DOME
SA-12A (GLADIATOR) 75.0 7.0 30.0 98,000 Radar GRILL PAN
SA-12B (GIANT) 100.0 13 30.0 98,000 Radar GRILL PAN
SA-13 (GOPHER) 5.0 0.6 3.5 11,500 IR SNAP SHOT
SA-14 (GREMLIN) 6.0 0.6 6.0 12,000 IR MANPAD
SA-15 (GAUNTLET) 12.0 1.5 6.0 19,700 Radar 22 SCRUM HALF
SA-16 (GIMLET) 5.0 0.5 3.5 11,500 IR MANPAD
SA-17 (GRIZZLY) 32.0 3.0 25.0 82,000 Radar FIRE DOME
SA-18 (GROUSE) 5.2 0.5 3.5 11,500 IR MANPAD
SA-19 (GRISON) 23 12.0 1.0 8.0 26,200 IR /DF 24 HOT SHOT
SA-20 (GARGOYLE) 200.0 5.0 27.0 88,600 Radar TOMB STONE
SA-21 (GROWLER) 120.0 1.0 30.0 98,000 Radar 64N6
SA-22 (GREYHOUND) 20.0 1.0 15.0 49,200 IR/Radar SNAP SHOT
SA-24 (GRINCH) 8.0 1.0 3.5 11,500 IR-Seeker MANPAD
STINGER (Basic) 25 7.4 4.1 3.0 9,800 IR MANPAD
MISTRAL 6.0 1.0 3.0 9,800 IR MANPAD
Air Defense Artillery
Barrel Tactical max. Vertical
System x Range Range Radar Remarks
Caliber
km feet km feet
ZFlAK 85 2 x 35 5.0 16,400 3.0 9,800 Yes AZR
ZU-23 2 x 23 2.0 6,800 5.1 16,700 No Towed or APC mounted
ZSU 23-4 4 x 23 2.5 8,200 5.0 16,400 Yes Tracked vehicle
ZSU 57-2 2 x 57 4.0 13,100 9.4 30,800 No Tracked vehicle
2S6 (Tunguska) 4 x 30 4.0 13,100 6.2 20,300 Yes Tracked w/ 8x SA-19(!)

Remarks: Tunguska is an anti-aircraft “gun-missile-complex” with 2 x twin-30mm barrels and 8x SA-19 missiles in
transport-launch container.

22
Fire Control Radar: 20 km
23
The SA-19 GRISON (9M111) is a radar command guided, two-stage surface to air missile mounted on the
2S6 Tunguska Integrated Air Defense System. (Radar “DOG EAR”: Identification 80 km, Tracking 35 km).
24
DF - Direction Finding
25
Effective against low altitude, high speed

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G. SEA BASED FS CAPABILITIES

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Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) | Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)

Some land operations may be supported by sea based indirect fire systems as e.g. amphibious
operations and defense of coastal areas. The coordination of naval fires happens at every level. If
there is no allocated maritime fire support observer for ground troops, the JFSE has the
additional responsibility of observing and controlling NGS in support of the land component.
Naval Gun - ERGM EX 17126 or
Weapon Systems RBS 15 Mk328
(automatic) - VULCANO27
76 mm 127 mm (5" / 54 gun) ≥ 155mm

Ammunition

(German -Frigate) GPS

Fuse, PD PD ‘Dive Mode’ or


target engagement PRX PRX ‘Fly Above Mode’
Maximum Range 23 km | 12.3 NM 76 km | 41 NM 200 km | 110 NM
Ready-to-fire-rounds 40 n.a. 2-4

Communication - Naval Gunfire Ground Spot Net (Spotter29 to Support Ship)


- Naval Gunfire Air Spot Net (Airborne Spotter - Support Ship - Air Control)
- Shore fire control party local net (SFCP Local): VHF (Voice).
Types of NGS - Pre-arranged fire, - (on) Call fire or - Opportunity fire as
- direct fire, - indirect fire, or - blind fire
MSD 750 yards = 686 m / practice yds = m → (750m)

26
ERGM. Extended Range Guided Munition with HE Penetrator. Essential part of the U.S. Littoral Warfare
Navy Concept.
27
Extended Range Guided Munition by ‘OTO Melara’ applicative for 127/54C and 127 LW guns
28
Precision guided missile w/ GPS/TERNAV
29
The ‘spotter’ is the ‘FO’, he needs as well to-way communication to the NGLO (Naval Gunfire Liaison
Officer), as to the support ship.

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Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)


a. Communications.
(1) Naval gun fire (NGF) ground spot net: HF / VHF (Voice).
(2) NGF air spot net: UHF / VHF (Voice).
(3) Shore fire control party local net (SFCP Local): VHF (Voice).

b. Call for Fire. c. Brevity words.

(1) PEPPER.
Nonscheduled Fire Mission
Report. Made by ship to
supporting arms coordination
center (SACC) as soon as
possible after firing.

(2) HONEY.
New Target Report. Made by
spotters to SACC as soon as
possible as new targets are
discovered or when known
targets are given a corrected
location.

(3) PICKLE.
Unfired Target Report. Made
by ship or spotter to SACC
when scheduled targets cannot
be fired or when effectiveness
is assessed as under 50 percent.

(4) CANDY.
Ammunition Remaining
Report. Sent — coded — IAW
the operations order.

(5) GURF.
Guns Up Ready to Fire Report.
Made by ship when coming
onto Naval Gunfire Support
(NGS) station. Summarizes
NGS capability when it may be
unknown to NGS agencies.

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H. AIR BASED FS CABABILITIES

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37. Air Delivered Indirect Fire Systems


Lockheed Martin F-16C ‘Fighting Falcon’

Huge Versions for


USA, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, NORWAY, TURKEY, GREECE,
POLAND, ITALY
Multirole Fighter/Bomber. Aircrew :1(A) | 2(B)
Type, Use
OCA/DCA, AI, CAS, FAC-A,TAR, EW
empty 8,200 kg
Weight Combat
max 19,000 kg
Dimensions 15 x 9.5 x 5.09 m
Overpass-Range 2,105 nm | 3,900 km
Combat Action Radius 325 nm | 600 km
Fuel 4,060 liter internal
Mach 2.0
Maximum Speed
2,200 km/h
max Altitude 15,240
(m / feet) 50,000’

RECCE & AN/APG-86 radar, GPS, SADL, NVG, Link-16, Sniper/Litening Pod,
TA-Systems Helmet Mounted Cueing System (HMCS)

Variety of Air to Ground Weapons


Weapon Warhead Damage Mechanism Target Type
300 lbs HE Penetrator/Blast/Frag Semi-hardened
AGM-65 Maverick
Single Shaped Charge Shaped Charge/Blast Armor
20mm Vulcan, Gatling
HE Blast/Frag Soft
Cannon
Rockets CRV-7, Soft, Area
HE Blast/Frag
19 x 70mm Targets
2,000 lbs/ precision Cratering/
GBU-31 JDAM Semi-hardened
guided /Blast/Frag
GBU-39 SDM 250 lbs / GPS/INS Blast/Frag Semi-hardened
Mk 82/83/84
500 – 2,000 lbs Cratering/Blast/Frag Area Targets
GP-Bombs
BRIMSTONE Vehicles (incl.
Tandem Shaped Charge Shaped Charge/Frag
millimeter wave radar armor)

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Boeing F/A-18C/D ‘Hornet’

Huge Versions for


USN, USMC, AUSTRALIA, SPAIN, CANADA, FINLAND, SWITZERLAND
Multirole Fighter. Aircrew :1 (18C) | 2 (18D)
Type, Use
OCA/DCA, AI, CAS, FAC-A,TAR, EW
empty 11,325 kg
Weight Combat
max 23,590 kg
Dimensions 17.1 x 11.7 x 4.7 m
Overpass-Range 1,800 nm | 3,335 km
(internal tank)

Combat Action Radius 400 nm | 740 km


Fuel 4,926 liter internal
Mach 1.8
Maximum Speed
1,915 km/h
max Altitude 16,000
(m / feet) 52,500’

RECCE & AN/APG-73 radar, GPS, SADL, NVG, Link-16, Sniper/Litening Pod,
TA-Systems Helmet Mounted Cueing System (HMCS)

Variety of Air to Ground Weapons


Weapon Warhead Damage Mechanism Target Type
300 lbs HE Penetrator/Blast/Frag Semi-hardened
AGM-65E Maverick
Single Shaped Charge Shaped Charge/Blast Armor
20mm M61 Vulcan, Soft,
HE Blast/Frag
Gatling Cannon Semi-hardened
Rockets CRV-7 HE Blast/Frag Soft, Infrastruc.
AGM-88 HARM 146lbs w/laser PRX fuse, radar antenna or
Blast/Frag
(High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile) detect, attack and destroy transmitter
Mark 82 GPB 500 lbs / precision guided Cratering/Blast/Frag Soft, Infrastruc.
GBU-12 / -24 500 / 2000 lbs (Laser guided) Cratering/Blast/Frag Area Targets
GBU-38 500 lbs (GPS/INS) Cratering/Blast/Frag hardened TGT
Stand-off AGM w/ Shaped Charge/Frag Vehicles (incl.
AGM-154 JSOW
Bomblets or Skeets30 (Armor Piercing) armor)

30
Sensor-fused projectiles. Skeets fire an explosively-formed penetrator to destroy tanks and APCs

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Panavia 200 ‘TORNADO’

Versions: IDS (interdiction/strike) | RECCE | ECR | GR4 (UK) for


UK, GERMANY, ITALY, SAUDI-ARAB
Multirole Fighter/Bomber w/ variable sweep-wings. Aircrew: 2
Type, Use
OCA/DCA, AI/CAS/SEAD/EW/TAR /NAVAL AIR STRIKE
empty 14,500 kg
Weight Combat
max 28,000 kg
Dimensions 18.1 x [8.65/13.91] x 6 m
Overpass-Range 2,105 nm | 3,900 km
Combat Action Radius 550 nm | 1,100 km
Fuel 6,560 liter internal
Mach 2.2
Maximum Speed
2,350 km/h
max Altitude 15,240
(m / feet) 50,000’

Ground Mapping with Terrain Following Radar (TFR), FLIR, NVG,


RECCE & GPS-Inertial System (GPINS), Laser Ranger & Marked Target Seeker
TA-Systems (LRMTS), ECM-Pods, RAPTOR (Recce Airborne Pod Tornado),
with down-link capacity (LOS 150 km)

Variety of Air to Ground Weapons


Weapon Warhead Damage Mechanism Target Type
300 lbs HE Penetrator/Blast/Frag Semi-hardened
AGM-65 Maverick
Single Shaped Charge Shaped Charge/Blast Armor
27mm Mauser Cannon HE Blast/Frag Soft
GBU-24, Paveway III 2,000 lbs Penetrator Hardened
GBU-54, JDAM 500 lbs (Laser/GPS) Penetrator/Blast/Frag All Targets
BRIMSTONE Tandem Shaped Charge Shaped Charge/Frag Armor
millimeter wave radar

AGM-88 HARM 146lbs w/laser PRX fuse, radar antenna or


Blast/Frag
(High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile) detect, attack and destroy transmitter
Shaped Charge &
STORM SHADOW BROACH Very Hardened
follow through

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AH-64D ‘Apache’
Type, Use Attack Helicopter, Ground Fire Support (CAS, CCA), Armed
Reconnaissance, Air-to-air combat.
2 pilots, PF rear, WSO/Captain front
empty 5,165 kg,
Weight Combat
max 9,525 kg
Dimensions 17.8 x 14.6 x 4.29 m
Endurance 2:10 hrs + 20min reserve
Range 260 nm / 480 km;
with additional 4 external
tanks:
880 nm / 1,628 km
Radius of Action
91 nm / 170 km
(return to FOB)
Fuel 1,422 liter internal
Speed Cruise 120 kts | tact.110 kts
max Altitude 6,250
(m / feet) 20,500’
Target Acquisition Designation Sight (TADS), FLIR, DAY-TV, Pilot
RECCE &
Night Vision Sensor (PNVS), Fire Control Radar (FCR), Direct View
TA-Systems
Optics (DVO)
Air to Ground Weapons
30mm Cannon Rockets HELLFIRE
(M230 CHAINGUN) (2.75” / 70mm) (AGM-114 L/R/K)
Range: 3,500 m Range: max. 7,000 m Range: max. 8,000 m
Max: 1,200 rnds / 625 rpm Max: 76 (19 x 4 pods) Max: 16 missiles
(High Explosive Dual Purpose Unguided 200 x 100 m Laser guided / Hit ratio: 90%
– HEDP). at 6 km

Used for: Used for: Used for:


- APC - Soft skin - Aircraft shelters
- soft skin - APC - Air defense installations
- Inf & Self Defense - Bunkers - Armor-moving/static
Danger Close / 0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
75 (for range 500 m) 305 (for range 1,500 m) 110
256’ 1,001’ 361’

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Eurocopter ‘TIGER’
Variants: Tiger HAP [France], Tiger ARH [Australia], Tigre HAD [France & Spain],
UH Tiger [Germany]
Type, Use Attack Helicopter, Ground Fire Support (CAS, CCA), Armed
Reconnaissance, Air-to-air combat. 2 Pilots: PF rear, WSO/Captain front
empty 3,100 kg,
Weight Combat
max 6,100 kg
Rotor blade diameter 13,00 m
Endurance 2:30 hrs | w/ External Tank 4:30
Range 292 nm / 540 km;
with additional external tanks:
610 nm / 1.130 km
Radius of Action
160 nm / 296 km
(return to FOB)
Fuel 1,360 liter internal
Cruising Speed 120 kts | 223 km/h
max Altitude 4,000 Sling load: 2 x 2 (Air to Air) STINGER
(m / feet) 13,122’
RECCE, TA &
Weapon Ranges:

· MMS: Mast Mounted


Sight, fitted with IR
and TV.

· The FN® HMP400


LCC is a self-
contained airborne
weapon system that
includes a .50 cal
combat-proven
machine gun.

Options for SCL


4x Hardpoints:
32
HOT-3 External Tank RSS 70mm .50cal MG
2x AIM-92 2x AIM-92
Stinger 31 4x 350 19! HMP-Pod w/ Stinger
Wire-guided liters Unguided 400!

31
Air-to-Air (Self-) Defence System
32
Future: PARS-3, fire & forgot, range 6,000m

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Bell OH-58B ‘Kiowa’ ::::::: OH-58D ‘Kiowa Warrior’


Operators: Austria, Canada, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Dominican Republic, USA
Type, Use Utility / Scout Helicopter for Observation, Ground Fire Support (CCA),
Defensive Suppressive Fire (DSF), Defensive Counter Air against ‘Slow
Movers’, Tactical Reconnaissance, and Armed Reconnaissance. 2 Pilots.
Weight Empty 762 kg
Weight Combat max. 1,450 kg
Transport ~ 250 kg / 2 PAX
Dimensions 9.8 x 10.8 (rotor) x 2.92 m
Endurance 2:30 hrs + 20min reserve
Range 243 nm / 450 km;
Radius of Action 107 nm / 200 km / 2.0 hrs
(return to FOB)

Fuel ~ 280 liter internal


Austrian Minigun Variant â
Speed max. 119 kts | 220 km/h
max Altitude 6,400m
(m / feet) 21,000’
AN/AAQ-22 Safire by FLIR
RECCE & Systems, TVS, NVG,
TA-Systems Improved Data Modem (IDM),
Xenon-Floodlights

Communication UHF, VHF-FM

Air to Ground Weapons

Hellfire 2.75 rockets 7.62mm Minigun (M134)


Range: max. 8,000 m Range: max. 7,000 m Range: max 1,000 m
Max: 16 missiles Max: 76 (19x4) 6 barrels Gatling
Laser guided / Hit ratio: 90% Unguided 200 x 100 m Rate of fire: 2,000 per minute
at 6 km
Used for: Used for: Used for:
- Aircraft shelters - Soft skin - Self Defense
- Air defense installations - APC - Soft skin
- Armor-moving/static - Bunkers - Infantry
Danger Close / 0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
110 305 (for range 1500 m) 100
361’ 1,001’ 328’

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MQ-9 ‘Reaper’ (“Predator B” or “MQ-1B”)


Type, Use Weaponized/armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long-endurance
remotely piloted aircraft that is employed primarily against dynamic
execution targets and secondarily as an intelligence collection asset. It
provides a unique capability to perform strike, coordination, and
reconnaissance against high-value, fleeting, and time sensitive targets.
MQ-9 ‘Reaper’ can also perform the following missions and tasks:
STA, CAS combat search and rescue, precision strike, buddy lase,
convoy/raid overwatch, target development, and terminal air guidance.
Weight Combat (kg) 10,500 max
Range (nm) 1,000
Effective Playtime 15 hrs
Wing spread 20.1 m
Speed 170 -195 knots
15,240
max Altitude (m / feet)
50,000’

RECCE & TA- SAR, EO/IR-Multisensory ‘Reaper’


Systems / TVS, LTD, FLIR, GPS

Minimum Safe AGM-114 GBU(500 lb)


Distance (N/A) 1,000 m
AGM GBU GBU
Danger Close - -114 K -12 -38
0.1 % PI
(meters / feet) 110 280 280
361’ 919’ 919’

CEP50 | 2DRMS (m) 1 | 2.4 (HELLFIRE) ‘Hellfire’ Warheads:


- High Explosive Anti-Tank
4 Hard points: (20 lbs. tandem anti-armor);
- Metal Augmented Charge
Ordnance, payload - 4 x AGM-114K Hellfire, (18 lbs. shape);
- 2 x GBU-12 Paveway II, - Blast Fragmentation
- 1 x GBU-38 JDAM - Range: 500 - 8,000 m
Annotations:
Crew (remote): two (pilot and sensor operator)
Manual and automatic/programmable flight routes and target areas. Auto-return Home.
Requires 5,000 by 125ft of runway.
TCAS: Traffic Alert and Collateral Avoidance (“Sense and Avoid Technology”)
[MQ: M=multi-role, Q=unmanned vehicle]

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38. Aircraft-Delivered Munitions


1. General Purpose Munitions
a. All general purpose (GP) munitions are similar in construction and vary only in size and weight
with a streamlined cylindrical body. Conical fins are designed for low drag (LD) releases.
Retarding fins / air inflatable retarder (AIR) are designed for high drag (HD) releases.

b. 500-pound LD / HD
(1) Mk-82: Selectable HD / LD when fit with AIR or retarding fins.
Effects: blast, fragmentation, and limited cratering.
(2) BLU-111: Improved, thermally protected GP bomb.
Effects: blast, fragmentation, and limited cratering.
(3) BLU-126 – 500 lb thermally protected low collateral damage bomb
(LCDB) (20% explosive fill BLU-111)
Effects: blast and limited fragmentation.

c. 1,000-pound LD / HD
(1) Mk-83: Selectable HD / LD when fit with AIR or retarding fins.
Effects: blast, fragmentation, and cratering.
(2) BLU-110/B: Improved, thermally protected GP bomb.
Effects: cratering and hard target penetration.

d. 2,000-pound LD / HD
(1) Mk-84: Selectable HD / LD when fit with AIR or retarding fins.
Effects: blast, fragmentation, and cratering.
(2) BLU-109/B: Penetrator, improved protected GP bomb.
Effects: cratering and hard target penetration.
(3) BLU-117: Improved, thermally protected GP bomb.
Effects: blast, fragmentation, and cratering.

e. Other weights:
(1) BLU-113 Penetrator bomb: 4,400-pound improved GP bomb.
Effects: cratering and hard target penetration.
(2) M-117: 750-pound GP bomb with very thin bomb casing.
Effects: more blast and less fragmentation than other GP bombs.
(3) M-117R: Selectable HD / LD by means of retarding tail assembly.

2. Guided Bombs
a. IAMs (Inertially Aided Munitions) are accurate (near precision), all weather, INS / GPS-guided
bombs for use against stationary targets. IAMs may be employed via two methods: bomb on
coordinate (BOC) or bomb on target (BOT). Both delivery methods are equally accurate, the only
difference being the associated TLE. The tactical situation (type of target, desired weapons effects,
closest friendlies, etc.) determines the acceptable delivery method. Multiple IAMs can be dropped
on different targets in a single pass. Effects: blast / fragmentation or cratering with a delayed fuse
(Mk-83/84 bomb body) or hard target penetrator with (BLU-109/110 bomb body).
(1) GBU-38 JDAM w/ Mk-82 bomb body
(2) GBU-38 (v)4/B JDAM w/BLU-126 bomb body (USN)
(3) GBU-32 (v)2/B JDAM w/ Mk-83 bomb body (USN / USAF)
(4) GBU-32 (v)4/B JDAM w/ BLU-110 bomb body (USN)
(5) GBU-31 (v)1/B (USAF) or (v)2/B (USN) JDAM w/ Mk-84 bomb body

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(6) GBU-31 (v)3/B (USAF) or (v)4/B (USN) JDAM w/ BLU-109 bomb body
(7) GBU-39 / Small Diameter Bomb (SDB). An accurate, extended range all-weather, 250-
pound class, GPS guided munition. It is effective against fixed or stationary targets and has
limited penetration capabilities. Multiple weapons can be dropped on different targets in a
single pass. As a standoff weapon, the SDB may climb in altitude after release to assume its
glide profile. The weapon’s flight path may present deconfliction problems depending on the
ACAs in place.
Effects: blast / fragmentation or penetration.

b. Paveway II – Laser-guided, free-fall weapon. Laser codes are pre-flight selectable (code 1511-
1788). These weapons can be fused for instantaneous (fragmentation) or delayed (cratering)
detonation.
(1) GBU-12 uses an Mk-82 bomb body.
(2) GBU-16 uses an Mk-83 or BLU-110 bomb body.
(3) GBU-10 uses an Mk-84 or BLU-109 bomb body.
(4) GBU-15/EGBU-15 – TV- or IR-guided, automatically or manually by the weapon system
operator (WSO). Mk-84 or BLU-109 body. Effects: same as Mk-84/BLU-109. The hybrid
EGBU-15 incorporates GPS / INS guidance providing precision adverse weather capability
for autonomous or man-in-the-loop deliveries.
(5) GBU-51/B – Laser-guided, free-fall GBU-12 kit with a BLU-126 LCDB body.

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c. Paveway III – Low-level, laser-guided, maneuverable free-fall weapon. Uses Mk-84 (GBU-
24), BLU-109 (GBU-24A) or BLU-116 advanced unitary penetrator (AUP) bomb bodies. AUP is
a 2,000-lb class penetrator bomb with twice the penetration capability of the BLU-109. Used only
in GBU- 24C/B (USAF) and GBU-24D/B (USN).
Effects: cratering and hard target penetration. GBU-24E/B adds GPS / INS guidance to allow
adverse weather capability with BLU-109 bomb body. Can be released from very low or very high
altitudes. Can be released below a low overcast (3,000–4,500’ AGL) if the correct mode switches
have been set prior to takeoff. Can be launched without laser signal acquisition.
Effects: same as Mk-84.

d. Hybrid weapons – Guided by laser and / or GPS-aided INS.


Hybrid weapons are capable of using both laser energy as well as a GPS aided INS for guidance
providing all-weather strike capability. The weapon may be released in a BOC mode as described
in the IAMs section above, and then refined using laser energy to effectively reduce TLE to zero.
If no laser energy is seen, the bomb will act as a standard IAM. Advantages of hybrid / dual-mode
weapons: all-weather capability, increased standoff range, expanded delivery envelope, and
greater capability against moving targets (up to 60 mph). Some hybrids allow off-bore sight
release as well as programmable impact parameters.

(1) GBU-12F/B Dual-mode LGB (DMLGB) – 500-lb bomb with LASER and IAM capability.
(2) GBU-28 (GBU-37) – Laser-guided (GPS) BLU-113. 4,700-lb weapon used for hard target
penetration.
(3) GBU-52/B DMLGB – similar to GBU-12F/B but with BLU-126 LCDB body.
(4) GBU-54 Laser JDAM (LJDAM) – a multi-mode 500-lb weapon that includes guidance via
GPS with coordinate refinement through laser updates. It uses a GBU-38 tail kit with the
addition of a laser kit attached to the nose and can be used in legacy mode as GPS only with no
degradation in capability. LJDAM is capable of hitting high speed moving targets. Target
heading and velocity can be programmed into the weapon to generate an impact point in front of
the target. At 4.5 km, if laser energy is present, the LJDAM will calculate new coordinates based
on the movement of the laser. The weapon will then guide to the updated lead point. LJDAM is
a coordinate seeking weapon and does not guide on laser energy like an Enhanced PWII. It
continuously calculates new coordinates based on the laser spot. Therefore, if the weapon loses
laser energy it will guide on the last known coordinates.

3. Guided Missiles
a. AGM-65 (Maverick) – Tactical, air-to-surface guided missile designed for high probability of
strike against tanks and a variety of tactical targets, including moving vehicles. Maverick seeker is
locked on to the target prior to release and guides autonomously (except AGM-65E), providing
standoff ranges of up to 15 nm.
(1) Guidance: TV (A,B,H,K); IR (D,F,G2); Laser (E).
(2) Warheads: 125 lbs. shaped charge jet and blast (A,B,D,H) or 300-lbs. penetrator / blast-
fragmentation (E, F, G2, K).

b. AGM-84E Stand-Off Land Attack Missile (SLAM)-AGM-84H (SLAM Expanded Range [ER])
– An intermediate range (over 150 nm for SLAMER) missile designed to provide day, night, and
adverse weather precision strike capability against land targets and ships in port. The SLAM uses
an inertial navigation system with GPS, infrared terminal guidance, and is fitted with a titanium
warhead for better penetration.

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c. AGM-88 High-speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM). A supersonic air-to-surface tactical


missile designed to seek and destroy radar-equipped air defense systems. The AGM-88 can detect,
attack, and destroy a target with minimum aircrew input.(Range > 40 nm).

d. AGM-114 (Hellfire) – Solid propellant laser or radar frequency guided antiarmor missile. Can
also be used against buildings and field fortifications. Hellfire variants include shaped charge,
blast fragmentation, and metal augmented charge warheads. Max effective range: 8,000 meters.
Min range is based on employment technique, but 500 meters should be used as a guide. Radar
frequency Hellfire (Longbow) is all weather capable.
(1) A/B/C/F/K – Shaped Charge Warhead – Designed for use against armored vehicles.
(2) F/A,K2A – Shaped Charge Warhead with Fragmentation Sleeve.
(3) L – Shaped Charge Dual Warhead – Radar guided compatible with Apache Longbow.
(4) M – Blast-Fragmentation Warhead – Designed for personnel and thin-skinned vehicles.
(5) N – Thermobaric Warhead – Designed to kill by overpressure in confined spaces.
(6) P+ - 3 variants, capable of UAS off-axis employment. Designed for structures, armor, light
vehicles and personnel.
(a) P4 – Shaped Charge Warhead (K).
(b) P-AA - Shaped Charge Warhead with Fragmentation Sleeve.
(c) P2A - Shaped Charge Warhead with Fragmentation Sleeve (K2A).
(d) N4 - Blast-Fragmentation Warhead with Metal Augmented Charge (N).
(7) R – Multi-role, Programmable Fuse, Integrated Blast Fragmentation Sleeve Warhead (IBFS);
Tandem Shaped Charge, Blast Fragmentation Warhead, and Integrated Steel Sleeve in a single
warhead system. Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) high off-axis capable. Designed for
structures, armor, vehicles, and personnel.

e. AGM-130 – Rocket-powered version of GBU-15. Standoff range between 15 and 40 nm.


Midcourse guidance version uses GPS for guidance (WSO is still able to steer the weapon during
terminal guidance for pinpoint accuracy).

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f. AGM-154 JSOW. A low-observable, all-weather 1,000-lb class family of standoff air-to-


ground glide weapons. Modular payload assembly to attack armored and light armored vehicle
columns, surface-to-air targets, and personnel.
(1) Guidance: AGM-154A & B-INS/GPS
AGM-154C (Navy only) INS / GPS w/ IR Seeker.
(2) Warheads: AGM-154A = 145 BLU-97 bomblets
AGM-154B = 6 BLU-108s (24 skeets)
AGM-154C = BLU-111 or BROACH
(3) Range: 15nm at low altitude, >40nm at high altitude.

g. AGM-158A Joint air-to-surface stand-off missile (JASSM). A precision cruise missile designed
for launch from outside area defenses to kill hard, medium-hardened, soft, and area type targets.
Guidance: Imaging, Infrared Radar. 2,000-lb Unitary Warhead.

h. BGM-71 Tube-launched, optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) Missile. Solid propellant,


wire-guided, anti-armor missile. Range: min. 500 m; max 3,750 m; max time of flight: 21.5 sec.

Figure. Laser Designation and Optimal Attack Zones:

4. Guns
a. 7.62 Mini-Gun – Up to 6,000 rounds / min. target practice (TP), armor piercing (AP), tracer.

b. 50 Cal – 1,150 to 1,250 rounds / min. TP, AP, armor piercing incendiary (API), and tracer.

c. 20mm – 750 to 850 rounds/min. AP, HE, and incendiary.

d. 20mm Gatling – 2,500-6,000 rounds / min. TP, high explosive incendiary (HEI), API, target
practice tracer (TPT), HEIT, PELE [penetrator with enhanced lateral efficiency].

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e. 25mm Gatling (GAU-12) – 3,600-4,200 rounds / min (AV-8B) or 1,800 rounds / min (AC-130)
TP, HEI, API, TPI, or HEIT.

f. 30mm (M230 cannon AH-64) – TP, high explosive dual purpose (HEDP) (Shaped charge and
fragmentation.) Target types: personnel, material, and light armor.

g. 30mm Gatling (GAU-8) – 3,900 rounds / min. 1.5-lb projectile TP, HEI, API on A-10 (can fire
1,174 rounds in 10, 2-second bursts).

h. 40mm (AC-130) – 100 rounds / min. HEI, API, high explosive incendiary plugged (HEI-P).
Target types: personnel undercover and all light vehicles. Fired from 4,500 ft AGL min altitude to
18,000 ft AGL max altitude.

i. 105mm (AC-130) – 10 rounds / min. HE and HE/High Fragmentation, Proximity. Target types:
personnel, light vehicles, buildings. Fired from 4,500 ft AGL min altitude to 18,000 ft AGL max
altitude.

5. Rockets
a. 2.75” Rocket Warheads
(1) High Explosive.
(a) M-151 - (10-lb. HE). Fuses: PD, TD.
(b) M-229/146 - (17-lb HE). Fuses: PD, TD.
(c) M-261 - Multi-purpose submunition (MPSM), Fuse AB; 9 shape charge/fragmentation
submunitions.
(d) M-282 - Multi-purpose penetrator used for military operations on urbanized terrain
(MOUT) applications or hardened structures; equivalent to M229 with TD fusing and
hardened penetrator nosecone.
(e) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). LASER guided 2.75 inch HE
rocket.
(2) Illumination.
(a) M-257 - Overt illumination, 1 M Candlepower, average 100-sec. burn.
(b) M-278 - Covert (Near IR) illumination, (.7 – 1.1 microns) ~1M candlepower, average
180-sec burn.
(3) Flechette – All are airburst.33
(a) M-255A1 - 1,179 / 60 grain flechette (USA).
(b) WDU-4A/A - 2,200 / 20 grain flechette (USMC).
(c) M-149 - 1,179 / 60grain flechettes (USMC).
(4) Phosphorus.
(a) Mk-67 mod 1 - Smoke red phosphorous (RP).
(b) Mk-67 mod 0 - Smoke white phosphorous (WP).
(c) M-156 - WP. Used for target marking.
(d) M-264 - RP (smoke screening), AB.
(5) Training.
(a) M-274 - TP. A practice M-151.
(b) M267 - TP. A practice M-261/multipurpose submunition (MPSM) warhead.

b. 5.00” Rocket Warheads.


(1) High Explosive.
(2) Illumination.

33
CRV7 (Canadian Rocket Vehicle Seven) - with tungsten flechettes (80 needle-sharp darts).

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(3) Flechette.
(4) Phosphorus.
(a) Mk-63 mod 0 - Fuses: PD, P, TD; HE-fragmentation; AP, anti-material.
(b) Mk-24 GP - Fuses: PD, P, TD; fragmentation, AP, anti-material, and light armor.
(c) Mk 32 Antitank (AT)/AP - Fuses: PD, P, TD; for use against personnel.
(d) Mk 34 Mod2 RP - Fuses: PD, P, TD; smoke.
(e) MK 84 - Chaff rocket for use against radar threats.
(f) Mk 6/24/32 and WTU-11/B practice rounds – Inert practice variants.

6. Cluster Munitions
a. Mk-20 and CBU-99/100 cluster munitions (USN) – Excellent weapon against armor,
personnel, artillery, etc. Dispenses 247 Mk 118 mod 0/1 bomblets in an oval pattern. Bomblet
density and pattern size vary with release parameters.

b. CBU-78 GATOR (USN) – “Rockeye” dispenser loaded with 60 submunition mines. 45 BLU-
91/B antitank and 15 BLU-92/B anti-personnel mines are in each weapon. Submunitions must be
set to one of three self-destruct times: T1 (3.2-4.0 hours), T2 (38.2-48.0 hours), and T3 (288-360
hours).

c. CBU-87/B Combined Effects Munitions (CEM) – Excellent weapon against armor, personnel,
artillery, etc. Dispenses 202 BLU-97 bomblets with a shaped charge for armor, steel-scored liner
for fragmentation, and incendiary ring. (Note: Dispersion is an oval with density and size of the
area covered dependent upon release parameters and spin rates.)

d. CBU-89/B GATOR – SUU-64 Tactical Munitions Dispenser loaded with a mix of 72 BLU-
91/B anti-armor and 22 BLU-92/B anti-personnel mines with preset self-destruct time. (Note:
Dispersion varies from circular at high altitudes to linear at low angles.)

e. CBU-97/B Sensor-Fused-Weapon (SFW) – SUU-64 with an airbag dispensing system and 10


BLU-108/B submunitions. Provides multiple kills per pass capability against tanks, armored
vehicles, artillery, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and support vehicles. This cluster weapon
is dropped over an area with armor. The fuse sensors detect heat and fires down at the engine of
the armored vehicle.

f. CBU-103 to 105 Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) – All weather, INS-guidance
tail kit for CBU. The tail kit inertially steers the munition from a known release point to precise
target coordinates while compensating for launch transients, winds aloft, surface winds, and
adverse weather.
(1) CBU-103 = CBU-87/B + WCMD tail kit.
(2) CBU-104 = CBU-89/B + WCMD tail kit.
(3) CBU-105 = CBU-97/B + WCMD tail kit.

g. CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon – 1,000-lb CBU-87 canister loaded with a mix of inert
kinetic energy penetrators (364 large, 1004 medium, 2406 small rods) fused with an FZU-39/B
proximity sensor and equipped with a WCMD tail kit.

h. PDU-5 Leaflet Dispenser (USN) – CBU-100 munition body loaded with leaflet materials for
psychological operations purposes.

i. BL-755 – European munitions loaded with 147 anti-armor submunitions. Designed for low-
altitude, low-angle deliveries against armor. (Note: Dispersion is a rectangular pattern).

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7. Common United Kingdom Weapons


a. Paveway II (PWII) – Laser guided free-fall weapons. Laser codes are pre-flight selectable
(code 1511-1788). These weapons can be fused for instantaneous (fragmentation) or delayed
(cratering) detonation, preset on the ground. The bomb is a 1000-lb class weapon, slightly broader
than the US Mk-83.
PAVEWAY™ SPECIFICATIONS
ENHANCED ENHANCED
PAVEWAY II PAVEWAY III
Type PAVEWAY II PAVEWAY III

Weapons GBU-10: MK-84, BLU-109 GBU-22: Mk-82 EGBU: Mk-84, BLU-109 GBU-2: Mk-84, BLU-116,
GBU-12: MK-82, BANG 250 GBU-24: MK-84, EGBU-12: Mk-82 BLU-109
GBU-16: Mk-83 BLU-109, EGBU-16: Mk-83 (GBU-48) GBU-27: BLU-109
GBU Mk-81, BANG 125 BLUE-116, Enhanced Paveway™ II GBU-28: BLU-113,
UK Mk-13/18/20 CPE 800 DMLGB / Lot 1: Mk-13/20 BLU-122
GBU-28: BLU-113 Enhanced Paveway™ II Enhanced Paveway™ III
DMLGB/ Lot 4: Paveway IV DMLGB (UK): BLU-109
Description Combat-tested laser guidance Combat-proven design for Low cost combined with Adds GPS guidance to low-
features pinpoint accuracy and low-level, long-range dual-mode laser (GPS altitude/long-range capability
low cost delivery guidance greatly increases of Paveway™ III LGB. Flight
envelope of legacy path optimizer or penetrator
Paveway™ II LGB. Combat warhead. Combat proven.
proven
Method of Laser Laser Independent dual-mode laser Blendes dual-mode GPS (pre-
Guidance or GPS/INS (pre- or post- or post-launch acquisition)
launch acquisition)
Range 15,000 – 40,000 ft 15,000 – 100,000+ ft 9,000 – 80,000 ft 15,000 – 120,000+ ft

GPS 10m GPS 10m


Accuracy Laser < 10m Laser < 5m
Laser < 10m Laser < 5m
Target Type Soft, Hard, Fixed Soft, Hard, very hard, Soft, Hard, Fixed Soft, Hard, very hard, Fixed
Mobile and Moving Fixed, Mobile and Moving Mobile and Moving Mobile and Moving
Target-of-opportunity Target-of-opportunity Target-of-opportunity Target-of-opportunity
Impact None Angle-of-attack Angle-of-attack Angle-of-attack
Control Impact angle Impact angle
Impact heading
Aircraft A-4, A-6, A-7, B-52, F-4, F-5, B-1, B-52, F-14, F-15E, F- Harrier, Mirage, tornado, B-2, F-14, F-16, F/A-18, F-
Certified F-14, F15E, F-16, F/A-18, F- 16, F/A-18, F-11, Mirage Undergoing certification on 117, Tornado
111, F-117, AMX, Buccaneer, 2000, Mirage F-1, Tornado Eurofighter, F-15E, f-16,
Harrier, Hawk, Jaguar, Mirage F/A-18, AMX, Super
2000, Mirage III, Mirage F-1, Etendard
Super Etendard, Tornado

NOTE: Differences between Paveway II (UK) and Paveway III (UK):


a) Wind and Target Motion. The Paveway II (UK) guides using pure pursuit navigation, whereas the
Paveway III (UK) uses lead collision navigation. Consequently, the Paveway III is capable of
compensating for a combined wind and target motion of 28 kts.
b) Guidance Logic. The Paveway II (UK) steers to where the target was, whereas the Paveway III
(UK) navigates to where the target will be.
c) Canard Control Movement. The Paveway II (UK) uses ‘bang bang’ controls (full-scale deflection
steering), whereas the Paveway III (UK) uses proportional control (differential steering).
b. Enhanced Paveway II (EPWII) – Hybrid version of the PWII. Weapon can be released in
legacy (no GPS) or GAINS mode. If released using the GPS (GAINS) mode, then the target
position can be refined by the use of the laser – the seeker will prioritize a valid laser return over
the GPS position. Laser codes are pre-flight selectable (1511-1788). Carried by Tornado GR4,
Harrier GR7 and Typhoon. The E prefix means “enhanced.”. GBU-48 Enhanced Paveway II – Mk
83 (1,000 lb) bomb. Raytheon's Enhanced dual-mode GPS and Laser guided version of the laser-

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only GBU-16. Although GBU-48 etc. are the formal designation for the versions with GPS/INS,
they are widely referred to as EGBU-16 etc. ("Enhanced GBU-16"). Carried on Eurofighter.
c. Enhanced Paveway II Plus, (EPWII+) – A Paveway IV seeker on a PWII bomb body and tail.
Introduced as an interim for PWIV, it has the ability to define impact conditions in flight and has a
greater launch acceptable range (LAR). Otherwise similar to EPWII, still a 1000-lb class weapon.
Carried on the Harrier GR9.
d. Paveway III (PWIII) – Similar to the GBU-24 (BLU-109 warhead). Carried on Harrier and
Tornado.
e. Enhanced Paveway III (EPWIII) – Enhanced version of the PWIII with the addition of a GPS
guidance kit. EWPIII only carried on Tornado GR4.
f. Paveway IV (PWIV) – Fully programmable in-flight for impact angle, azimuth, fuse settings
(impact, delayed, airburst) 500-lb class weapon. Large LAR, for use with Tornado GR4 and
Harrier GR9. Dual mode using either GPS or laser for terminal guidance.
g. 540-lb bomb – Unguided freefall weapon similar to US Mk-82. Can be set to retard or freefall
before flight. Fused with a 960 (standard UK fuse), which can be set to impact, delay, or airburst.
Carried on the Harrier GR7/9 only.
h. 1000-lb bomb – Unguided freefall weapon similar to US Mk-83. Can be set to retard or freefall
before flight. Fused with 960 (standard UK fuse), which can be set to impact, delay, or airburst.
Carried on the Harrier GR7/9, Tornado GR4, and Typhoon.
i. CRV-7 Rocket – A mach 4 rocket, similar to the 2.75” used in the US. Pods are designated
“Training” (reusable 6-shot pod) and “Operational” (disposable 19-shot pod). Warhead types are
kinetic energy penetrator or high explosive semi-armor piercing, with a time delay.
j. Brimstone – Dual Mode Seeker (DMS) Brimstone – Low–collateral, dual-mode missile based
on Hellfire body, using either laser or millimeter-wave radar for terminal guidance. Optimized for
moving targets and small groups of personnel. Carried on the Tornado GR4. Sometimes referred
to as “Hellfire UK”.

39. Air to Ground / Standard Conventional Loads (SCL)


SCL Aircraft
Armament UH TIGER AH-64D TORNADO F-16C F/A-18C/D Eurofighter
.50 cal Machine Gun 1
20 / 27 / 30mm Cannon O 1 1 1 1 1
Unguided Rockets 1 x 19 2 x 19 O O
Mk-82/83/84 O 2 2
HOT-3 or PARS-3 1x4
AGM-65E O 2 2
1) 2)
AGM-114 L/R/K O 2x4
BRIMSTONE 2x3 O
GBU-24 (2000 lbs) 2 O O
GBU-54 JDAM (500 lbs) O
AGM-88B HARM O O O
GBU-38 LCDB 3) O
GBU-39 JDAM 2
GBU-12 / PWII O 2
GBU-48 (EPW II) 2x3
O = optional | 1) not for the German Version | 2) up to a maximum of 4 x 4 = 16 Hellfire | 3) Low Collateral Damage Bomb

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Targets and suggested air-to-surface ammunition


Priorities 1-4 represent the recommended weapon-to-target match to achieve the most
destructive effect on the target. Consideration should be given to the type of aircraft,
aiming system, delivery mode, threat, and required time to employ in order to select
the most appropriate weapon.

Recommended Target-Weapons Pairings for Ordnance


Targets Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4
HELLFIRE LJDAM, JDAM, GP,
Soft targets: K2A/M/P4A/R, DMLGB, Flechette f/w 20-40mm
vehicles, radar, MAVERICK, LGB HE Rockets SAPHEI,
aircraft in open BRIMSTONE, r/w 7.62-30mm
TOW SAPHEI
HELLFIRE LJDAM DMLGB, Flechette
K2A/M/P4A/R, LGB HE Rockets,
MAVERICK, f/w 20-40mm
Moving vehicles
BRIMSTONE, SAPHEI,
TOW r/w 7.62-30mm
SAPHEI
Armored HELLFIRE LJDAM, JDAM, CBUs
vehicles: K/K2A/P4A/R, DMLGB, CBU-97-B
(Moving or MAVERICK, LGB
stationary) tanks, BRIMSTONE,
APCs TOW
DMLGB, HELLFIRE JDAM, GP AB,
LGB, K2A/M, CBU, HE Rockets,
Personnel:
HELLFIRE MAVERICK, Flechette f/w 20-40mm HEI
Individual/small
K2A/P4A/R BRIMSTONE Rockets,
group
r/w 7.62-30mm
HEI
LJDAM, LGB MAVERICK, HE Rockets,
DMLGB, GP, f/w 20-40mm
In tree line or cover JDAM Flechette SAPHEI,
Rockets r/w 7.62-30mm
SAPHEI
Notes: JSOW – joint stand-off weapon
AB – air burst
LJDAM – Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition
CBU – cluster bomb unit
LGB – laser-guided bomb
DMLGB – dual-mode laser-guided bomb r/w – rotary wing (aircraft)
f7w – fixed wing (aircraft)
SAPHEI – semi-armor piercing, high explosive incendiary
GBU – guided bomb unit
SFW – sensor-fused weapon
GP – general purpose
SLAM-ER – stand-off land attack missile – expanded range
HEI – high explosive incendiary TOW – tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
WCMD – wind corrected munitions dispenser

All LGB, DMLGB, LJDAM, JDAM, and GP are assumed to utilize 500lbs class or higher bomb bodies

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Recommended Target-Weapons Pairings for Ordnance (cont.)


Targets Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4
LJDAM, LGB MAVERICK, HE Rockets,
DMLGB, GP, f/w 20-40mm
In tree line or cover JDAM Flechette SAPHEI,
Rockets r/w 7.62-30mm
SAPHEI
DMLGB, MAVERICK, HELLFIRE
Hardened position LGB, HELLFIRE K/K2A/P4A,
(i.e., sandbag JDAM M/N4/R (to BRIMSTONE,
fortified) attack personnel TOW
inside)
DMLGB, MAVERICK, TOW GP
LGB, LJDAM,
Buildings JDAM, HELLFIRE K2
LJDAM INST A/M, M/N4/R,
P4A/R
Building construction type can vary greatly among structures. Material composition and construction
techniques will directly impact weapon effectiveness. The weapons in Priority 1 may provide a greater
damage mechanism than those in Priority 2 due to their warhead size. If localized effects to specific
rooms or smaller structures are desired, consider Priority 2 weapons as the primary weapon-to-target
match.
LJDAM, JDAM HELLFIRE GP
Artillery/ DMLGB, K2A/M,
Fixed AAA LGB MAVERICK,
BRIMSTONE
(Primary threat (Primary threat JDAM, GP,
to r/w) to f/w) CBU Flechette
LJDAM, HELLFIRE Rockets,
Self-propelled DMLGB, K2A/M, HE Rockets,
SAM and AAA LGB, TOW f/w 20-40mm
BRIMSTONE, SAPHEI,
MAVERICK r/w 7.62- 30mm
P4A/R SAPHEI
Notes: JSOW – joint stand-off weapon
AB – air burst LJDAM – Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition
CBU – cluster bomb unit
LGB – laser-guided bomb
DMLGB – dual-mode laser-guided bomb r/w – rotary wing (aircraft)
f/w – fixed wing (aircraft)
SAPHEI – semi-armor piercing, high explosive incendiary
GBU – guided bomb unit SFW – sensor-fused weapon
GP – general purpose
SLAM-ER – stand-off land attack missile – expanded range
HEI – high explosive incendiary
TOW – tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided
JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition
WCMD – wind corrected munitions dispenser

All LGB, DMLGB, LJDAM, JDAM, and GP are assumed to utilize 500lbs class or higher bomb bodies

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I. CAS & CCA

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40. Close Air Support Methods


CAS is air action by FW and RW aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity
to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces. The mission is flown in direct support of ground forces, in
offensive and defensive operations, to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix or delay enemy forces
where they are in close proximity to friendly forces. The two key parts of the CAS definition
are ‘close proximity’ and ‘detailed integration’. The term ‘close’ does not imply a specific
distance; rather it is situational. To succeed, detailed integration is required between each air
mission and the fire and movement of surface forces to maximize mission effectiveness and
minimize the risk of fratricide. CAS should include a terminal attack controller who is
specifically trained and qualified to conduct terminal attack control, achieve the ground
commander’s intent, maximize and integrate fires on the battlefield, and mitigate fratricide.
Control of CAS is performed by qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC ,also
known as Forward Air Controller [FAC] in some nations) in support of surface forces.

a. Close proximity refers to the distance within which some form of terminal attack
control is required for targeting direction and fratricide prevention.

b. Detailed integration refers to the level of coordination required to generate the


desired effects without overly restricting CAS attacks, surface firepower or the ground
scheme of maneuver. It is also necessary to protect aircraft from the unintended effects
of friendly surface fire.

Close Air Support Employment Methods

Pre-planned CAS is conducted in 3 categories, ‘scheduled’, ‘on-call’ and ‘push’; aircraft


flying the missions are scheduled for a particular time or time period, which normally
coincides with the anticipated time when CAS will be needed by the supported component.

Scheduled CAS (listed as CAS on the ATO) puts the CAS assets over the area of the
battlefield where they are needed most at a pre-planned TOT and where a need for CAS has
been established in advance. Scheduled missions are more likely to have good intelligence on
the expected type of target resulting in a better weapons-to-target match.

On Call CAS (often listed as GCAS or XCAS in the ATO) involves putting aircraft on
ground/deck or airborne alert during a period when the need for CAS is foreseen. This is a
less efficient use of CAS resources because assets involved may or may not actually be
employed unless a back up target is nominated. To ensure a prompt response, the available
assets for tasking could be in the following readiness states:

a. Ground Alert CAS (GCAS) is a mission placed on ground alert status to provide
responsive air support to ground forces that encounter substantial enemy resistance.
CAS assets located close to the supported ground forces normally provide faster
response times. GCAS missions may be changed to Airborne Alert CAS (XCAS) as
the situation dictates.

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b. Airborne Alert CAS (XCAS) is a mission on airborne alert status in the vicinity of
ground forces that expect to encounter enemy resistance. XCAS sorties typically
remain in established holding patterns to provide responsive air support while
awaiting tasking from any ground unit that needs CAS. If no tasking evolves during
the vulnerability period, XCAS missions may swing to an AI role if other appropriate
targets exist.

Push CAS is a form of pre-planned XCAS that provides massed on-call CAS when needed.
When a significant number of CAS assets are available and the tactical situation dictates, a
continuous flow system providing a constant stream of CAS missions to the contact points
may be employed.

Immediate CAS usually results from unanticipated needs on the battlefield, often of an
emergency nature, that require diverting or rescheduling aircraft from other missions. When
appropriate, and when tasking authority has been delegated, aircraft already airborne on a
CAS mission could be diverted by the AOCC collocated with the supported CC to higher
priority targets demanding immediate CAS. In some situations, airborne aircraft with
appropriate ordnance on another mission may also be diverted to CAS. The decision rests
with the JFACC and is usually delegated to the CAOC. During the planning cycle lower
prioritized sorties may be identified for potential re-tasking to immediate CAS missions if
required. These aircraft can be on airborne or ground/deck CAS alert before executing their
primary mission. Planning to meet re-tasking requirements can be included in the allocation
plan. Warning of the possibility of re-tasking should be included in the ATO.

Control. The supported CC determines the aircraft attack clearance requirements for CAS
missions. Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, i.e. Emergency CAS, CAS
missions are conducted under the control of a qualified JTAC (ground or airborne).There are
various types of terminal attack control that follow their own set of procedures. The
commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the JTAC based on
recommendations from his staff and associated risks identified in the tactical risk assessment.
The intent is to offer the lowest level supported commander, within the constraints established
during risk assessment, the latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best
accomplishes the mission. The types of control are not ordnance specific.

Method of Attack (MOA). The method of attack is not specific to a type of control,
ordnance, or aircraft and may be different between aircraft in a flight.

a. Bomb on Coordinate (BOC) – Attacks are used when the JTAC determines that he
can create the desired effects against that target with CAS aircraft and ordnance
employing on a specified set of coordinates. CAS aircraft are not required to be
TALLY / CONTACT / CAPTURE the target when conducting BOC attacks. If
executing an IAM via BOC, each aircraft delivering an Inertial Aided Munition (IAM)
is required to read back the target coordinates and elevation from the weapon/system
to the JTAC. When using aircraft system targeting, aircrew will confirm the
coordinates loaded into the waypoint, offset, or target points. Aircrew will verify
correct data is selected prior to the “IN HOT” call. Aircraft altitude and speed can
yield significant standoff ranges (in excess of 10 NM.). Therefore, it is necessary to
de-conflict high altitude/long range release profiles from other systems operating
below the release altitudes.

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b. Visual / Bomb on Target (BOT) – attacks require the aircrew to be TALLY /


CONTACT / CAPTURE the JTAC’s intended target or aim point. This delivery mode
is advantageous in dynamic situations where accurate (low TLE) coordinates cannot
be obtained. Although not as accurate as BOC with low TLE, these weapons are at
least as accurate as unguided weapons when employed visually. Therefore, all normal
methods of de-confliction and release restrictions apply.

Timing. A common time reference is essential to accomplish the high degree of coordination
necessary for effective CAS. All participants (aircrew, JTAC, C2 agency, FSCC/FSE, and
artillery) must use the same timing method. Refer to the two methods, Time on Target
(TOT) and Time to Target (TTT), described below:

a. Time on Target. TOT is a time at which the aircraft are to have bombs on target and
around which supporting surface fires can be coordinated. TOT requires minimum
communication and is usually easier to employ than TTT. All participants, air and
ground, must understand the time standard in use (Zulu or local), and the JTAC must
ensure all clocks are synchronized by providing a time check. GPS time, if available,
is normally used to establish a TOT. Strict adherence to timing by participants is
required for aircraft safety. Aircrew can update the clock on check-in with air
control/fire support coordination agencies.

b. Time to Target. TTT establishes a precise number of minutes and seconds that elapse
between an established time hack and bombs on target. This is an accurate method of
time control and is easy to implement when few participants are involved. The time
hack must be of sufficient duration for the FSC/FSO to synchronize indirect fires.
Additionally, the JTAC must consider time required for the aircraft to execute the
attack. After the CAS brief, specify the TTT and give the “time hack” (e.g. “TIME TO
TARGET 5+00, READY, READY, HACK”). The JTAC normally provides the
“hack”. Aircrew will acknowledge receipt of the time check.

CAUTION
Inability to meet coordinated TOTs or TTTs must be immediately announced or the attack
aborted to prevent conflict.

FAC(A) Integration.
The objectives of a FAC(A) are to achieve the ground commander’s desired intent, maximize
and integrate fires on the battlefield, and mitigate fratricide. FAC(A) tasks include
reconnaissance, asset coordination and de-confliction, call for fire, target marking and
designation, terminal attack control, bomb hit assessment (BHA) / BDA, radio relay, and
SEAD. To effectively accomplish this, the FAC(A) must conduct detailed planning and
integrate with the supported maneuver element. FAC(A)s may operate as an airborne
extension of the TACP in conjunction with a JTAC / JFO or work directly for a ground
commander in the absence of an on-scene TACP.

Procedural Control Measures. Procedural control measures provide target orientation to


aircrew, align aircraft for the attack or egress, provide separation from other supporting fires,

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and provide separation from enemy AD assets. Procedural control measures include IP
selection, offset 34 direction, and attack heading.

a. IP Selection. The JTAC selects the IP based on enemy capabilities, target orientation,
friendly location, weather, aircraft capabilities and fire support coordination
requirements. IP should be identifiable visually and with radar and normally located
from 5 to 15 Nautical Miles (NM) from the target. (see Keyhole Template, page 31).

b. Offset Direction. The offset direction tells the aircrew on which side of the IP-to-
target line they can maneuver for the attack (see Figure).

FAC use an offset direction to ease fire support coordination, align the aircraft for the
attack or egress, or keep aircrew away from known threats. An offset direction aids fire
support coordination by restricting aircrew from using airspace on the side of the IP-to-
target line where there might be a conflict with a GTL. The offset direction regulates the
attack quadrant without assigning a specific attack heading.

c. Attack heading. FACs assign attack headings for several reasons: to increase ground
troop safety, aid in aircraft acquisition, aid aircrew in target acquisition by the JTAC,
meet laser safety cone attack restrictions and facilitate fire support coordination.
Controllers may employ attack cones that allow aircrew to maneuver on either side of
the attack heading. This gives aircrew more flexibility in prosecuting the target while
maintaining the required degree of restriction on the aircraft heading. Attack cones
might be particularly useful when the attack aircraft are using coordinate dependent
weapons, since it is possible for the weapon final attack heading to significantly differ
from the aircraft heading. Aircrew and FACs must understand that the attack cones
may differ between the aircraft and the weapon. FACs must weigh the advantages of
issuing an attack heading with the disadvantages of restricting aircraft tactics. Final
attack headings will be issued when mandatory. Aircrew will adhere to them.

Informal ACAs. Informal ACAs can be established using separation plans and may be
established by any supported commander. (See also FSCM, Page 32 ff).

34
German: Versatz, versetzen, versetzt, Ableger

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41. Close Air Support Execution

Aircraft on the Air Tasking Order. If the aircraft are on the ATO, they may simply state
“AS FRAGGED”, which would eliminate the need to pass anything other than the mission
number and abort code.

1. Aircraft Check-In. At check-in, the aircrew establishes the abort code for terminating
the attack. This eliminates unnecessary heads-down time in the target area. Authentication
and abort procedures are identified in the SPINS. JTAC should have a list of current standard
conventional loads available and confirm actual ordnance loads at aircraft check-in.

Format. Close Air Support Check-In


(Aircraft Transmits to Controller)
Aircraft: “_________________ this is _________________
<Controller Call Sign> <A/C Call Sign>
Identification / Mission Number: ___________________________________”
Note: Authentication (initiated by the net control agency) and appropriate response suggested
here. The brief may be abbreviated for brevity / security (“as fragged” or “with exception”)
Number and Type of Aircraft:
“______________________________________”
Position and Altitude:
“______________________________________”
Ordnance:
“______________________________________”
(Fuzing, Laser Code)
Time on Station:
“______________________________________”
Type of Sensor and Capabilities: Targeting Pod (TGP), Laser, Laser Spot Tracker (LST),
Infrared (IR) marker, Video Downlink (VDL), Digital Capabilities, FAC(A), etc. as applicable,
Abort Code:
“______________________________________”
Remarks (optional):
“______________________________________”
Note: Flight lead will establish abort code. FAC/JTAC can brief abort code to follow-on aircraft.
Abort code may not be applicable during secure communications

2. Situation Update. After CAS aircrew checks in, the JTAC will provide a current
situation update. This update should include:

a) Target - General enemy situation


b) Threat activity
c) Friendly situation

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d) Friendly positions
e) Artillery activity
f) Clearance authority
g) Ordnance requested
h) Restrictions/Remarks
i) Localized SEAD efforts (suppression/EW)
j) Hazards (Weather/terrain/obstructions)

a. Target: Weapons effects on target can vary depending on how the target is orientated.
Armored vehicles are more vulnerable from the back or top than the front. Fortified positions
should be attacked along their most vulnerable axis.

b. Threat: Determining the enemy's disposition, composition, order of battle, capabilities and
likely courses of action helps ensure aircraft survivability and aids in target planning.
Knowing where the threat is could significantly influence aircraft ingress and egress tactics.

c. Friendly situation: The own situation needs to be analyzed to enhance own aircraft
survivability and aid in target planning. Knowing where friendly forces are located and their
disposition will significantly influence aircraft ingress and egress tactics.

d. Friendly positions: The closer friendly forces are to the intended target, the more
deliberate the JTAC needs to be. As a general rule, avoid having aircraft release weapons in
the direction of friendly forces. Long bombs, skipping bombs, precision weapons going dumb
or bullets going long increase the chance of fratricide.

e. Artillery: If artillery is being utilized at the same time as aircraft, within the same general
area it is essential to ensure de-confliction.

f. Clearance: The authority and responsibility for expenditure of any ordnance on the
battlefield rests with the supported commander. The supported commander will delegate
weapons release clearance authority to his terminal controllers to facilitate CAS attacks.
Controller will announce what type control (1,2 or 3) will be used. Clearance should be given
as soon as possible in the delivery sequence after the terminal controller is convinced the
attacking aircraft sees the target and will not release on friendly positions. This allows the
aircrew to concentrate on the weapons solution and improves delivery accuracy, further
reducing the possibility of fratricide.

g. Ordnance: Selection of the number and type of munitions to achieve the desired effects,
takes into consideration the protection of target, location of target, nature of target, target size
and shape, and the commander's guidance. Whenever the JTAC considers the capabilities and
limitations of a weapon against a target, he must consider the entire weapon system. This
includes not just the weapon that is released, but also the system that is releasing it. How
accurate are the aircraft systems? Can the aircraft be positioned to release on the target given
your restrictions? What is the fragmentation pattern of the weapon and is it appropriate for the

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target? In most cases aircrews are better suited to attack the target based on the weapons they
are carrying.

h. Restrictions: Used to safeguard friendly forces and CAS aircraft. These restrictions will be
given by theJTAC and may be a geographic reference, cardinal direction or altitude
restriction. For example "remain west of X" or "remain above/or below altitude X".

i. Localized Suppression of Enemy Air Defense: Localized SEAD is planned to destroy or


disrupt air defense threats within a specific geographical area during a specific time period,
normally for the benefit of a specific package of friendly aircraft. Localized suppression
operations are normally confined to geographical areas associated with specified ground
targets or friendly transit routes. These operations contribute to local air superiority and
facilitating joint operations in the area. The objective of localized suppression is to protect
friendly aircraft as they fly their specific missions. EW provides close-in-jamming and
standoff jamming of radar, data links, and voice communications signals, enemy indirect
threat radars such as warning, acquisition, and Ground Controlled Interception (GCI) systems
or threat radars for SAM and AAA systems.

j. Hazards: Weather plays a significant role in CAS operations. It influences both enemy and
friendly capabilities to locate, identify, and accurately attack CAS targets. Weather can also
influence the effectiveness of laser designators, Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM), NVD,
and thermal imaging systems. Planners at every level require an understanding of the effects
that weather can have on CAS aircraft navigation, sensors, and weapons systems. Weather
may also limit the operations of one type of platform without affecting another. RW aircraft
operate effectively under low ceilings that might render FW CAS ineffective, while FW can
operate above blowing surface dust that might keep helicopters grounded. A terrain survey is
used to determine the best routes to and from the target area. Where the terrain permits and
when the threat dictates, flight routes should maximize the use of terrain masking to increase
survivability against air defense systems. When practical, flight routes, holding areas, IP,
release points, and BP should use terrain features that are easily recognizable, day or night.
Broad area satellite imagery and air mission planning and rehearsal systems can assist in
selecting optimum flight parameters, and recognize obstructions to flight, like towers, cables,
terrain and other aircraft flight routes.

3. FIDO. To brief f/w or r/w aircraft on specific flight routes use FIDO-Format:
- FROM (Starting Point)
- IN DIRECTION (Direction to Follow)
- DISTANCE (Between Starting and Ending Point
- OBJECT (Ending Point)
Example: “From the bridge, follow the road tracking to the north for two ‘clicks’ *),
until you’ll find a village.”

*) 1 ‘click’ = 1 kilometer

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42. CAS – Briefing


The CAS briefing is the standard for use with FW and RW aircraft. The CAS briefing form
helps aircrew in determining if they have the information required to perform the mission.
The brief is used for all threat conditions and does not dictate the CAS aircraft’s tactics. The
mission brief follows the sequence (1-9) of the CAS Briefing Form. Line titles must be passed
to prevent confusion due to missed or clipped radio transmissions. Additionally, the JTAC
may need confirmation that the aircraft has correctly received other critical items of the brief.
In those situations, the JTAC will specify the additional items to be confirmed

NOTE
Mandatory read-back items are underlined.

Line 1 - IP/BP. The IP is the starting point for the run-in to the target. For RW aircraft, the
BP is where attacks on the target are commenced.

Line 2 - Heading. The bearing is given in degrees magnetic (unless requested differently by
aircrew/system operators) from the IP to the target or from the center of the BP to the target.
JTAC give an offset (offset left/right) if a restriction exists. The offset is the side of the IP-to-
target line on which aircrew can maneuver for the attack.

Line 3 - Distance. The distance is given from the IP/BP to the target. For FW aircraft, the
distance is given in NM and should be accurate to a tenth of a NM. For AHs, the distance is
given in meters from the center of the BP and is accurate to the nearest 5 meters. The unit of
length must be specified.

Line 4 - Target Elevation. The target elevation is given in feet above MSL.

Line 5 - Target Description. The target description should be specific enough for the aircrew
to recognize the target. The target should be described accurately and concisely.

Line 6 - Target Location. The JTAC can give the target location in several ways (e.g. grid
coordinates, latitude and longitude, relative to a navigational aid, or visual description from a
conspicuous reference point). Because of the multiple coordinate systems available for use,
the datum that will be used must always be specified in the air request. If using grid
coordinates, JTAC must include the 100,000 - meter grid identification. For an area target,
give the location of the target’s center or location of the greatest concentration. For a linear
target, give the location of intended end impact point, orientation, and the distance to each end
in the remarks section of the 9-line brief if required.

Line 7 - Type Mark. The type of target indication the JTAC will use (smoke, laser, or IR)
and the Laser Code the JTAC will use. Laser to Target Line (LTL) (in degrees magnetic,
unless requested differently by aircrew/system operators).

Line 8 - Location of Friendly Forces. The distance of friendly forces from the target is given
in meters and cardinal heading from the target (north, south, east, or west). If the friendly
position is marked, identify the type of mark.
CAUTION: Friendly positions should not be defined by anything other than bearing and
range from the target

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Line 9 - Egress. These are the instructions the aircrew use to exit the target area. Egress
instructions can be given as a cardinal direction or by using control points.
Remarks. The following information should be included if applicable:

a. Final Attack heading. Mandatory final attack heading.


b. Threats. Threat and location and type of suppression (if any).
c. Weather. Significant weather.
d. Hazards. Hazards to aviation.
e. Ordnance delivery.
f. Any active GTL.
g. ACA.

Restrictions. The following information should be included if applicable:


h. Additional target information.
i. Night vision capability.
j. TLE Category
k. Danger Close (if applicable with commander’s initials).
l. Other time considerations.
m. Attack clearance. (if issued by different entity) give callsign and radio
frequency/channel.

Time to Target. TTT is the time in minutes and seconds, after the time “HACK” statement is
delivered, when ordnance is expected to hit the target. The time “HACK” statement indicates
the moment when all participants start the timing countdown.

Time on Target. TOT is the synchronized clock time when ordnance is expected to hit the
target. TOT is the timing standard for CAS missions. There’s no time “HACK” statement
when using TOT.

CAS Weapon Release Authority

The authority and responsibility for expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with
the supported commander. The supported commander will delegate weapons release clearance
authority to his JTAC to facilitate CAS attacks. Weapons release authority grants JTAC the
authority to provide to attacking aircraft:

(1) ‘CLEARED HOT’- Term used by a JTAC during Types 1 and 2 control, granting
weapons release clearance to an aircraft attacking a specific target.

(2) ‘CLEARED TO ENGAGE’- Term used by a JTAC during Type 3 control, granting a
“blanket” weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets
which meet the prescribed restrictions set by the JTAC.

(3) ‘CONTINUE DRY’- Term used by a JTAC during Types 1 and 2 control, granting an
overflight for simulated release, used during training and for “Show of Force”

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43. CAS – ‘9-Liner’

Format. CAS 9-Line Briefing


Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless briefed. Lines 4, 6, 8, and Restrictions are mandatory readback (bold).
JTAC may request additional readback. JTAC should transmit portions of line titles that are underlined.

JTAC: “ this is “
<Mission / aircraft Callsign> <JTAC Callsign>
“This will be a Type _________________ Control <1,2,3 - Terminal Attack Control Type>, and for this
target I request __________________ <type ordnance>. Advise when ready for 9-Line.”
1. IP/BP
2. HEADING °mag °true Offset L / R
3. DISTANCE NM AH: m
4. TARGET ELEVATION ft m
5. TARGET DESCRIPTION
6. TARGET LOCATION (UTM/MGRS)
TARGET LOCATION (LAT-LONG)
7. TYPE MARK Code Laser to Target Line:

(WP, Laser, IR) actual code °mag | °true


8. LOCATION OF FRIENDLIES Position marked by

9. EGRESS
REMARKS (as appropriate)
FINAL ATTACK HEADING °mag °true

THREATS
WHEATHER
HAZARDS
ORDNANCE DELIVERY
ANY ACTIVE GTL °mag °true
ACA
RESTRICTIONS (as appropriate)
ADDITIONAL TGT INFORMATION
NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY
TLE CATEGORY
DANGER CLOSE Commanders Initials
ATTACK TIME (TOT/TTT/ASAP)
ATTACK CLEARANCE C/S: TAD:

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Example. CAS 9-Line Briefing


JTAC: “ EAGLE 11 this is BLACKJACK 14 “
<Mission / aircraft Callsign> <JTAC Callsign>
“This will be a Type ___ two ____ Control <1,2,3 - Terminal Attack Control Type>, and for this
target I request BOT, two Mk-82 each aircraft <type ordnance>. Advise when ready for 9-Line.”
1. “IP/BP YANKEE
2. HEADING two seven five °mag °true Offset Left / R
3. DISTANCE niner point one NM AH: m
4. TARGET ELEVATION fower five zero feet m
5. TARGET DESCRIPTION is platoon of infantry dug in
6. TARGET LOCATION (UTM/MGRS) Grid: Charly-Mike tree-six-seven-niner-seven-one
(CM 367971)
TARGET LOCATION (LAT-LONG)
7. TYPE MARK Laser, Code Laser to Target Line:
one-zero-one-zero (1010) tree-fower-zero
(WP, Laser, IR) actual code 340 °mag | °true
8. LOCATION OF FRIENDLIES North east nine-hundred, Position marked by
troops in contact
9. EGRESS South to ZULU-one, advise when ready for remarks and
restrictions”
REMARKS (as appropriate)
“FINAL ATTACK HEADING three hundred to three hundred °true
forty-five °mag
..report when leaving IP…
THREATS
WHEATHER
HAZARDS
ORDNANCE DELIVERY
ANY ACTIVE GTL ..Gun Target Line two hundred !” °mag °true
ACA
RESTRICTIONS (as appropriate)
ADDITIONAL TGT INFORMATION
NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY
TLE CATEGORY
DANGER CLOSE Commanders Initials
ATTACK TIME (TOT/TTT/ASAP) “……..Readback Correct, Time on Target thirty two”
ATTACK CLEARANCE C/S: TAD:

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44. Types of Terminal Attack Control


There are three types of terminal attack control (Type 1, 2 and 3). Each type follows a set of
procedures with associated risk. The commander considers the situation and issues guidance
to the JTAC based on recommendations from his staff and associated risks identified in the
tactical risk assessment. The intent is to offer the lowest level supported commander, within
the constraints established during risk assessment, the latitude to determine which type of
terminal attack control best accomplishes the mission. The three types of control are not
ordnance specific.

Type 1.
This type of terminal attack control is conducted when the JTAC is required to visually
acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. In order to minimize fratricide the
JTAC needs to consider attacking aircraft nose position and geometry. The JTAC will clear
each individual attack against each target (“CLEARED HOT”).

Type 2.
This type of terminal attack control is conducted when the commander requires the JTAC to
control each individual attack. The commander will accept the associated risk levels for the
different control techniques below and decide which ones to approve under the following
parameters:
(1) There is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target or attacking
aircraft at weapon release.
(2) The attacking aircrew may not be able to see the target/mark at weapon release.
(3) The JTAC may have either:
(a) line of sight to the target and eyes on target throughout the control, or
(b) to rely on a third party observer (for example, a scout or SOF) for fighter
guidance or target coordinates/marking, or
(c) to rely on an airborne sensor with real-time targeting information (for example,
FMV from a UAV) for target coordinates/marking. However, the JTAC should have
good overall target area SA prior to using FMV as a single source sensor. If SA is
inadequate, a Type 3 control must be effected.
(4) The JTAC must pass timely and accurate targeting data to the attacking aircraft.
(5) The JTAC will clear each individual attack against each target (“CLEARED HOT”).
(6) The JTAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls based on
the information provided by observers. Examples of when type 2 controls may be used
are night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, high altitude and standoff weapons
employment, or where the target moves out of sight from the JTAC, but visible for third
party observer or airborne sensor. The JTAC will declare to the aircraft whether or not
he is “VISUAL” and indicate the source of his target acquisition.

Type 3.
This type of terminal attack control is conducted when the JTAC requires the ability to
provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to specific attack
restrictions.
(1) Like Type 1 and 2, only an JTAC can provide Type 3 control.

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(2) During Type 3 control, JTAC provide attacking aircraft targeting restrictions (e.g.,
time, geographic boundaries, final attack heading, specific target set, etc.) and then grant
a “blanket” weapons release clearance (“CLEARED TO ENGAGE”).
(3) Type 3 control does not require the JTAC to visually acquire the aircraft or the
target; however, all targeting data must be coordinated through the supported
commander’s battle staff. The JTAC will monitor radio transmissions and other
available digital information to maintain control of the engagement. The JTAC
maintains abort authority. Observers may be utilized to provide targeting data and the
target mark during Type 3 Control.
(4) Type 3 is a CAS terminal attack control procedure and should not be confused with
SCAR procedures.
(5) As with Type 2 the JTAC will declare whether he is visual with the aircraft or the
target, or neither.

Briefing and Control Procedures

FACs will transmit the type of control in use upon aircraft check-in. Type 1 is the default
method of control. It is not unusual to have two types of control in effect at one time. For
example, a JTAC may control helicopters working Type 2 control from an attack position
outside the JTAC’s field of view while simultaneously controlling medium or low altitude
fixed-wing attacks under Type 1 or 3 controls. The following procedures will be used when
executing Type 1, 2 or 3 terminal attack controls: (all transmissions can be either verbal or
digital).

Type 1:
1. JTAC will visually acquire the target.
2. JTAC will transmit a CAS briefing to attack aircraft. Attack aircraft will confirm the
mandatory read back items IAW the CAS brief, as well as any restrictions imposed by
the JTAC.
3. Aircraft will provide a "Leaving IP" call if applicable.
4. JTAC will mark/designate target (as practicable).
5. Attack aircraft will provide the JTAC "IN HOT" call indicating maneuvering for
weapons firing solution.
6. Attack aircraft will visually acquire target or mark.
7. JTAC will visually acquire the attacking aircraft. In case that aircraft acquisition by
the JTAC is not achieved, attack aircraft will be forced to modify their attack profile or
repeat their attack to aid acquisition.
8. JTAC will ensure attack will not affect friendlies by visual acquisition and analysis of
attack aircraft geometry/nose position to determine weapon impact point.
9. JTAC will provide a "CLEARED HOT" or "ABORT".

Type 2:
1. JTAC or an observer will "see" the target (an observer may be a scout, UAV, Special
Operations Forces (SOF), the attacking aircrew, or other Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) asset with real
time targeting information).
2. JTAC will transmit a CAS briefing to attack aircraft.

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3. Attack aircraft will verify target coordinates correlate with expected target area.
4. Attack aircraft will confirm mandatory fighter read back items in accordance with the
CAS briefing as well as any restrictions imposed by the JTAC.

NOTE
Attack aircraft verifies target location by using all appropriate means: map plot, target
designation displayed on digital map set, Head-up display (HUD) Symbology, FLIR,
Radar, etc.
5. Aircraft will provide a "LEAVING IP" call if applicable.
6. Attack aircraft will provide the JTAC with an "IN HOT" call indicating maneuvering
for a targeting solution. Aircrew employing standoff precision munitions should make
this call at the appropriate time to allow clearance before entering the release window.
7. JTAC will provide a "CLEARED HOT" or "ABORT".

Type 3:
1. An observer may "see" the target and provide target data.
2. JTAC will transmit a CAS briefing to attack aircraft. Briefing will include target type
and priority, the area for attacks, attack time window, restrictions/limitations, and BDA
reporting procedures. Attack aircraft will confirm mandatory fighter read back items in
accordance with the CAS briefing as well as any restrictions imposed by the JTAC.
3. Attack aircraft will verify target coordinates correlate with expected target area.
NOTE
When delivering IAM, attack aircraft will confirm that the briefed target location and
elevation have been accepted by the selected munitions. When using aircraft system
targeting, aircrew will confirm the coordinates loaded into the waypoint, offset, or target
points. Aircrew will verify correct data is selected prior to the “IN HOT” call.
4. Attack aircraft will confirm mandatory read back items in accordance with the CAS
briefing as well as any restrictions imposed by the JTAC, either by voice or digitally.
5. Once satisfied the attacking aircraft have SA of the target area, the JTAC will provide
attack aircraft “CLEARED TO ENGAGE” (verbally or digitally).
6. Aircraft will provide a “LEAVING IP” call (verbally or digitally) if requested.
7. Prior to initial weapons release, the attack aircraft will provide “COMMENCING
ENGAGEMENT” to the JTAC (verbally or digitally).
8. JTAC will continue to monitor the engagement by all means available (visual, voice,
digital, etc.). No other communications are required unless directed by the JTAC.
9. Attack aircraft will provide “ENGAGEMENT COMPLETE” to the JTAC (verbally
or digitally).
NOTE
The JTAC maintains abort authority in all cases

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45. Close Combat Attack (CCA)


CCA is defined as a coordinated attack by Army aircraft against targets that are in close
proximity to friendly forces. During CCA, the attack team engages enemy units with direct
fires that impact near friendly forces. Targets may range from tens of meters to a few
thousand meters from friendly forces. CCA is coordinated and directed by a team, platoon, or
company-level ground unit using the standard CCA brief.

Format: Close Combat Attack Check-In (Aircraft Transmits to Ground Unit)


1. Aircraft:
“ __________________ , this is __________________ “
(Ground unit in contact) (Aircraft Call Sign)
2. Aircraft Team Composition
“_________________________________________________________”
and Location:
3. Munitions Available
“_________________________________________________________”
(Rockets / Guns / Missiles):
4. Night Vision Capability
“_________________________________________________________”
and Type (If Appropriate):
5. Station Time (In minutes)
“_________________________________________________________”

Format: Close Combat Attack Briefing – Ground to Air (5-Line)


Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless briefed. Lines 4, 6 and restrictions are
mandatory read back (*). JTAC may request additional read back.

1. Observer / Warning Order:


“ __________________ , this is __________________ “
(Aircraft Call Sign) (Observer Call Sign)

“Fire Mission, Over”

2. Friendly Location / Mark:


“ My position __________, marked by __________________“
(TRP, Grid) (Strobe, Beacon,
IR Strobe, etc)
3. Target Location:
“Target Location ___________________________________________”
(Bearing [magnetic] and Range [meters], TRP, Grid, etc.)
4. Target Description:
“ __________ __________, marked by __________________“
(Target Description) (IR Pointer, Tracer, etc)
5. Remarks:
“ ___________________________________________________ - over”
(Threats, Danger Close Clearance, Restriction, At My Command etc.)
AS REQUIRED:
1. Clearance: Transmission of the 5-Line CCA Brief is clearance to fire (unless “danger close”). For closer
fire, the observer/commander must accept responsibility for increased risk. State “Cleared Danger Close” in
line 5. This clearance may be pre-planned.
2. At My Command: For positive control of the aircraft, state “At My Command” on line 5. The aircraft will
call “Ready for Fire” when ready.
TRP - Target Reference Point; [Strobe – German: stroboskopisch; beacon – German: [Leucht-] Signal]

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46. Universal Briefing Format for CCA / DSF / ECAS

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‘RAMROD’ - Authenticate Examples:


1) “Authenticate Sequence Zero - One?” » “LIMA!”
2) “Authenticate FOXTROTT - ALPHA?” » “PAPA!”
3) “Authenticate Six?” » “CHARLIE!”

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47. Brevity Words – CAS Briefing Procedures


BREVITY35 MEANING
ABORT Observer directs aircrew to abort the attack. This is a mandatory instruction.
AUTHENTICATE To request or provide a response to a coded challenge.
AWAY Term used by aircrew for “…Bombs away.. “ (mainly after “IN HOT”)
BINGO Running short on fuel. Fuel state needed for recovery.
BLIND Informative call indicating that an aircraft has lost visual contact with friendly ground
position (opposite of VISUAL).
BURN EO/IR illuminator is used to provide illumination or surface points of interest.
CLEARED HOT Term used by an JTAC during Types 1 and 2 controls, granting weapons release clearance
to an aircraft attacking a specific target.
CLEARED TO Term used by an JTAC during Type 3 controls, granting a “blanket” weapons release
ENGAGE clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets which meet the prescribed
restrictions set by the JTAC.
CONTINUE Authorized to proceed with the attack profile, but you may not release any ordnance yet.
Used to acknowledge aircraft without providing clearance.
CONTINUE DRY Term used by a JTAC during Type 1 and 2 controls, granting an overflight for simulated
release, used during training and for “Show of Force”.
CONTACT Acknowledges the sighting of a specific reference point. Opposite to LOOKING.
IN DRY (..Heading) Aircrew has begun final attack to conduct a simulated attack without expending ordnance.
Heading should be reported when an attack is made from med/hi altitude
IN HOT (..Heading) Aircrew has begun final attack run and intends to expend ordnance. Heading (HDG) should
be reported when an attack is made from med/hi altitude.
(USA does not use the term "In Hot" to preclude confusion with "Cleared Hot". US will use
"In" with magnetic direction - "In heading 270").
LOOKING Aircrew has not yet the ground object, reference point or target in sight. Opposite to
CONTACT.
NO JOY Aircrew does not have visual contact with the target (opposite of TALLY).
PLAYTIME Amount of time aircraft can remain on station, given in hours + minutes. (e.g., ONE PLUS
THIRTY equals 1 hour and 30 minutes).
REMINGTON No ordnance remaining except gun or self-protect ammo.
SPLASHED Weapons impact or Target destroyed
TALLY The enemy position/target is in sight. Opposite of NO JOY
THUNDER One minute until A/S weapons impact.
VISUAL The JTAC has the attack aircraft in sight, or the attack aircraft has positively identified the
JTAC’s or friendly ground position. Opposite to BLIND.
WINCHESTER Informative call indicating the aircraft is out of ordnance.
WARNING: The words “CLEARED”, “HOT” and “ENGAGE” will be used only by the JTAC and when
ordnance is actually to be delivered. Use standard radio calls to the maximum extent possible. This will
reduce the chance of dropping ordnance on dry passes and reduce the risk of fratricide. The attacking
aircrew shall not repeat “Cleared Hot” or “Cleared to Engage.”

35
A brevity code is a single word or phrase that does not provide security but shortens the message rather than
concealing its content. For a full list of NATO brevity terms see APP-7.

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48. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request (JTAR)


SECTION I - MISSION REQUEST DATE
1. UNIT CALLED THIS IS REQUEST NUMBER TIME SENT BY

2. PREPLANNED: A PRECEDENCE______ B PRIORITY____________ TIME RECEIVED BY

IMMEDIATE: C PRIORITY__________

3. A PERS IN OPEN________ B PERS DUG IN_______ C WPNS/MG/RR/AT______ D MORTARS, ARTY_________

E AAA, ADA____________ F RKTS MISSILE______ G ARMOR______________ H VEHICLES_______________

I BUILDINGS__________ J BRIDGES__________ K PiLLBOX, BUNKERS____ L SUPPLIES, EQUIP________

M CENTER (CP,COM)____ N AREA_____________ O ROUTE_______________ P MOVING N E S W ________

4. TARGET LOCATION IS
A _________________ B ________________ C ________________ D _______________ CHECKED
(COORDINATES) (COORDINATES) (COORDINATES) (COORDINATES) BY
E TGT ELEV________ F SHEET NO.______ G SERIES__________ H CHART NO._____

5. TARGET TIME/DATE
A ASAP______________ B NLT_________________ C AT__________________ D TO________________

6. DESIRED ORD / RESULTS A ORDNANCE _________________________________________________


B DESTROY___________ C NEUTRALIZE_________ D HARASS/INTERDICT________________

7. FINAL CONTROL
A JTAC_______________ B CALL SIGN___________ C 1st FREQ_____________ (ADDITIONAL FREQ)___________

D CONTROL POINT ___________________________

8. REMARKS

SECTION II - COORDINATION
9. NSFS 10. ARTY 11. AIO/G-2/G-3

12. REQUEST 13. BY 14. REASON FOR DISAPPROVAL


APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

15. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLAN 16. IS IN EFFECT

A IS NOT IN EFFECT B NUMBER A (FROM TIME)____________ B (TO TIME)_____________

17. LOCATION 18. WIDTH (METERS) 19. ALTITUDE / VERTEX


A __________________ B _________________ A ________ B _________
(FROM COORDINATES) (TO COORDINATES) (MAX VERTEX) (MIN VERTEX)

SECTION III - MISSION DATA


20. MISSION NUMBER 21. CALL SIGN 22. NO. & TYPE AIRCRAFT 23. ORDNANCE

24. EST/ALT TAKE OFF 25. EST TOT 26. CONTROL POINTS (COORDS) 27. INITIAL CONTACT

28. JTAC/FAC(A)/TAC(A) CALL 29. AIRESPACE COORD. AREA 30. TGT DESCRIPTION 31. TGT COORD/ELEV
SIGN FREQ (transmit as appropriate)

32. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) REPORT / (INFLTREP)


LINE 1 / CALL SIGN ________________________ LINE 4 / LOCATION ________________________
LINE 2 / MSN NUMBER ________________________ LINE 5 / TOT ________________________
LINE 3 / REQ NUMBER ________________________ LINE 6 / RESULTS ________________________
REMARKS ________________________

JTAR DD Form 1972 / JP 3.09.3

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JTAR - DESCRIPTION IAW JP 3-09.3


SECTION I – MISSION REQUEST
Line 1.
· UNIT CALLED. Identifies the unit designation/call sign/reassigned number.
· THIS IS. Identifies the request originator by unit designation/call sign/reassigned number.
· REQUEST NUMBER. For preplanned missions, indicates the originator’s request number in
series. For an immediate mission, this number is assigned by the ASOC/DASC.
· SENT. Indicates the time and the individual who transmitted the request.

Line 2. (Mission Categories).

· PREPLANNED: For preplanned requests, enter precedence (block A) or priority (block B).
- PRECEDENCE is stated numerically in descending order of importance, as determined by
the requestor.

- PRIORITY is expressed as shown below (#1 for emergency, #2 for priority, or #3 for
routine).
· IMMEDIATE:

- PRIORITY. For immediate requests, enter priority (block C). A precedence entry is not
required for immediate requests because, by definition, all immediate requests are
precedence #1. Use the numerical designation below to determine priority (e.g., define the
tactical situation) for preplanned (block B) or immediate (block C):

#1. Emergency is #1. Targets that require immediate action and supersede all other
categories of mission priority.

#2. Priority is #2. Targets that require immediate action and supersede routine targets.
#3. Routine is #3. Targets of opportunity. Targets which do not demand urgency in
execution.

· RECEIVED. Indicates the time and the individual who received the request.
Line 3. TARGET IS/NUMBER OF - Describes the type, approximate size, and mobility of the target
to be attacked. It is necessary to specify, even if a rough estimate, the number of targets (e.g., 10
tanks) or the size of the target area (e.g., personnel on a 500 meter front). Otherwise planners cannot
accurately determine what force is required — aircraft numbers/type and ordnance amount/type. Note:
Item M: “Centres (CP, COM)” refers to C2 centres, command posts, etc.
Line 4: TARGET LOCATION IS - Locates the target by using the military grid reference system
prescribed for the area concerned.
BLOCK A. COORDINATES. Locates a point target or starting point
BLOCK B. COORDINATES. When used together with A, provides from A to B coordinates.
BLOCK C. COORDINATES. When used together with A and B, provides a route.
BLOCK D. COORDINATES. When used together with A through C, provides a route or
describes a target area.
BLOCK E. TGT ELEV. Target elevation in feet above MSL.
BLOCK F. SHEET NO. Self-explanatory.
BLOCK G. SERIES. Self-explanatory.

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BLOCK H. CHART NO. Self-explanatory.


CHECKED. Indicates with whom target information has been crosschecked.

Line 5. TARGET TIME/DATE. Indicates the time/date when the air strike is
requested.
BLOCK A. ASAP - As soon as possible.
BLOCK B. NLT - The target is to be attacked before, but not later than the time indicated.
BLOCK C. AT - Indicates time at which target is to be attacked.
BLOCK D. TO - Denotes end of period of time in which support such as airborne alert or
column cover is required. When TO is used, NLT and AT are unnecessary.

Line 6. DESIRED ORD/RESULTS. Indicates the requestor’s desired air strike results.
This is essential information for the planner and must be carefully considered by the
requestor.
BLOCK A. ORDNANCE - Desired ordnance.
BLOCK B. DESTROY - Self-explanatory.
BLOCK C. NEUTRALIZE - Self-explanatory.
BLOCK D. HARASS/INTERDICT - Self-explanatory.
Line 7. FINAL CONTROL. Identifies the final controller (e.g., JTAC, FAC[A]) who will conduct
the briefing and control the release of ordnance.
BLOCK A. JTAC - Transmit the type of terminal control.
BLOCK B. CALL SIGN - Call sign of terminal controller.
BLOCK C. FREQ - Recommended TAD frequency.
BLOCK D. CONTROL POINT - Military grid coordinates and/or navigational aid fix of a
control point which is the furthest limit of an attack aircraft’s route of flight prior to control by
the final controller.

Line 8. REMARKS - Allows incorporation of information not included elsewhere in the request.
Situation Update. When submitting a JTAR, the JTAC or requesting agency will provide a current
situation update to the ASOC/DASC. The situation update may consist of:

(1) Situation update number (#)


(2) Target, general enemy situation
(3) Threat activity
(4) Friendly situation
(5) Friendly positions
(6) Artillery activity
(7) Clearance authority
(8) Ordnance requested
(9) Restrictions/Remarks
(10) Localized SEAD efforts (suppression/EW)
(11) Hazards (weather terrain/obstructions)

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SECTION II – COORDINATION
Line 9. NSFS - NSFS coordination.
Line 10. ARTY - Artillery coordination.
Line 11. AIO/G-2/G-3 - Air Intelligence Officer, G-2, G-3, or other Service equivalent coordination
Line 12. REQUEST - Indicates the approval or disapproval of the request.
Line 13. BY - Indicates the individual who approved or disapproved the request.
Line 14. REASON FOR DISAPPROVAL - Self-explanatory.
Line 15. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLAN - The ACA establishes airspace that is reasonably safe
from friendly surface-delivered nonnuclear fires. The ACA provides a warning to aircrew of the
parameters of surface-delivered fire in a specific area. A plan number or code name is issued, as
appropriate.
Line 16. IS IN EFFECT - Establishes the time period that the applicable ACA plan will be in effect.
Line 17. LOCATION - Grid coordinates of the start/end points of the ACA’s centreline.
Line 18. WIDTH (METERS) - Defines ACA from either side of the centreline.
Line 19. ALTITUDE/VERTEX - ACA altitude given in feet above MSL.

SECTION III – MISSION DATA


NOTE: Mission data information transmitted to the requesting agency may be limited to those items
not included in the request.
Line 20. MISSION NUMBER - Self-explanatory.
Line 21. CALL SIGN - Self-explanatory.
Line 22. NO. AND TYPE AIRCRAFT - Self-explanatory.
Line 23. ORDNANCE - Type of ordnance either by code number or actual nomenclature.
Line 24. EST/ALT TAKEOFF - Estimated or actual time the mission aircraft will take off.
Line 25. EST TOT - Estimated time on target.
Line 26. CONTROL POINT (COORDS) - The farthest limit of the attack aircraft’s route of fight
prior to control by the final controller. Same as Line 7, item D, when designated in the request.
Line 27. INITIAL CONTACT - Indicates the initial control agency the flight is to contact.
Line 28. JTAC/FAC(A)/TAC(A) CALL SIGN/FREQ - Call sign and frequency of the final control
agency.
Line 29. AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA - Refer to lines 15 through 19 for this data.
Line 30. TGT DESCRIPTION - Self-explanatory.
Line 31. TGT COORD/ELEV - Self-explanatory.
Line 32. BDA REPORT (INFLTREP) This optional space is used to record BDA for each mission.

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49. Air Support Request Cycle

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J. OPERATIONAL LAW

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50. Legal Considerations


Joint Fire Support is bounded by international and national domestic law. Furthermore, all
military and civilian personnel are accountable for their actions and decisions, and are subject
to their Domestic Criminal Law at all times and wherever in the world they are serving. The
principal international agreements that govern the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) [also
known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 36] include the Hague Conventions and
Regulations37, the Geneva Conventions 38 and the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions (AP 1)39.

Law of Armed Conflict. The LOAC is based on customary principles and international
agreements. A primary source of rules that apply to targeting is the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflict (1977). The basic principles of this Convention are:

a. Military Necessity. A target should not be attacked simply by virtue of being military in
nature; the test of definite military advantage must also be satisfied. In addition, no more
force should be applied than is absolutely necessary to achieve the desired effect. Indeed, if
there is a choice between targets to realize a similar military advantage, the target that offers
least risk to civilians, and civilian objects, is to be attacked.

b. Humanity. The concept of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or


destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.
Thus once a military purpose has been achieved, the further infliction of suffering is
unnecessary.

c. Distinction. Offensive action must be directed against military objectives only. Military
objectives are objects, which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
All feasible precautions must be taken in the choice and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding, or at least minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects. Particular care must be taken when considering sites of religious
or cultural significance and specially protected objects. The word “feasible” means that
which is practicable, or practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances at the
time using all the information reasonably available. Indiscriminate attacks are those that are
not directed at specific military objectives, those that employ a method or means of combat
that cannot be directed at a specific military objective and those that employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited. Consequently, indiscriminate
attacks are those that strike military objectives and civilians, or civilian objects, without
distinction. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. A disproportionate attack is also
considered to be indiscriminate.

36
Also known as the Laws of War (LOW) by the US.
37
1907 Hague Conventions.
38
Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949.
39
1977 Geneva Protocols 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP 1).

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d. Proportionality. An attack will be disproportionate if it is expected to cause incidental


loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. The military advantage anticipated refers to the advantage from the attack
considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.

Legal Advisers (LEGAD) must be available to operational commanders and their staff at all
levels of command, either personally or by ‘reach-back’, to provide guidance to ensure that
any action is consistent with international and domestic law. Commanders should always
seek legal guidance where any doubt exists.

Rules of Engagement. The formulation of Rules of Engagement (ROE) requires the


amalgamation of legal, policy and operational perspectives. ROE are issued with the
objective of ensuring that action taken by (national) forces is lawful and that such action is
within the parameters of political acceptability, as determined by ministers. ROE determine
the context in which actions in Self-Defense could be undertaken, and when the use of
offensive force is permitted.

Regulating the use of Indirect-fire Weapons


Indirect-fire weapons include both precision-guided and unguided munitions delivered by air,
land or maritime platforms. For the purpose of regulation, the use of indirect-fires is divided
into four categories:

a. Pre-Planned Targeting. Pre-Planned targeting is conducted against targets


identified and located during the planning phase of operations. Pre-planned targeting
best ensures that the weapon effects contribute to the campaign plan, achieve the
military objective and avoid collateral damage.

b. Accelerated Targeting. Accelerated Targeting is conducted against targets


identified but not located during the planning phase of operations, and includes
Dynamic Targeting (DT) and Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST).

c. Combat Engagement. Whenever possible, targets should be engaged using pre-


planned or accelerated targeting procedures. However, in certain tactical situations this
may not be possible if the target has not previously been identified, located or
considered to be of military necessity. In such situations, indirect-fire attacks (other
than those conducted in Self-Defense) are regulated by combat engagement
procedures. Combat engagements can include attack against targets showing hostile
intent or conducting a hostile act and normally involve Joint Fires including tactical
Close Air Support (CAS).
The use of indirect-fires during a combat engagement must be conducted under the
command of the local commander40 and under the control of a Qualified Controller. In
every case, the Commander must satisfy himself that, immediately before committing to
the attack, the Qualified Controller has:

(1) Observed the target area either directly or indirectly, and

40
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(2) Ensured that the target has been positively identified, and

(3) Conducted a deliberate analysis of the wider target area beyond the immediate
target surroundings, and

(4) Considered the expectation of collateral damage on surrounding objects and


taken responsibility for ensuring that the target complies with LOAC (Distinction,
Humanity, Proportionality and Military Necessity), which requires constant care to
avoid and, in any event, to minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian
property.

d. Self-Defense. The use of lethal force in Self-Defense is limited to circumstances


where such force is necessary to avert an imminent threat to life. In every case, the
force used must be assessed as proportionate to the risk encountered and the minimum
necessary to avert that risk. Therefore, under certain circumstances indirect-fire may be
used in Self-Defense.

Qualified Controller
The table below lists those (national) qualifications that are accepted as Qualified Controllers.

Qualification Weapon Categories Training Required


JTAC, All Air Weapons and Battlefield - JTAC Course
Airborne FAC [ FAC(A)], Helicopter weapons (all nations) - Currency and competency
TACP(JTAC) training
Mortar Fire Controller (MFC) 60mm and 81mm Mortars - Mortar Advanced Course
Commanders and Assistants, - Currency and competency
training
Joint Fires Observer (JFO), AH weapons - CCA Controllers Course
Close Combat Attack (CCA) - Currency and competency
Controller training
Joint Fire Support Team (JFST) GMLRS, Arty, 120mm mortars - Observer Course
Commanders and Assistants, - Currency and competency
[Forward Observer (FO)] training
AH Aircrew Own weapon systems - AH Conversion to Role (CTR)
training, Currency and
competency training
Fast Jet Aircrew Own weapon systems - Level 1 trained
- Currency and competency
training

Positive Identification. PID is to be established visually or by other means to the satisfaction


of the commander. Additional means that may assist in determining PID include but are not
limited to Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Pattern of Life
(PoL), weapon locating radar and weapon locating acoustic systems 41.

41
E.g. COBRA, MAMBA, ARTHUR, LCMR and ASP (UK).

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“PID” is defined as follows: “The reasonable certainty that a functionally and


geospatially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with
the LOW and applicable ROE.”

‘Positive’ does not mean a 100% mathematical certainty. However, for Accelerated
Targeting, the recommended requirement for PID is nominally Full Motion Video (FMV)
coupled with near-real time SIGINT. Commanders should do everything feasible to verify
that the target is a military objective. If PID is lost, it must be re-established prior to
engagement.

Troops in Contact (TIC) Declaration / TIC for CAS


TIC means, that an attack is imminent and the ground unit requires non-organic air assets.
‘Imminent’ in this context means that the need to defend is manifest, instant and
overwhelming. Under no circumstances a TIC-declaration for CAS is to be used for situations
not needing above criteria. TIC may be declared over the JARN, via chat-program, radio or
any other means.
TIC-Declaration for CAS does not fulfill any ROE criteria to strike a target with CAS-
Assets, but it does however prioritize access to the theater. On-ground Commanders / On-
scene Cdrs (OSC) must apply ROE dictated by the situation on the ground.

IAW applied ROEs the following threat definitions may trigger a robust Force
protection w/ IFS:
a) ENY fighting from prepared ambush site(s).
b) Own troops movement on a single route terrain.
c) ENY using man pad AD weapons, grenades, RPGs.

‘5 Pillars of Strike’

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51. Collateral Damage Methodology Overview


The Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) Process
Before authorizing offensive operations, commanders must be satisfied that all reasonable
methods of assessing collateral damage have been used, and that their delegated level of
authority for the expectation of collateral damage will not be exceeded. For Pre-Planned
and Accelerated Targeting this delegated level of authority will be articulated by a
maximum Level of analysis that may be used before referring the decision for clearance to
higher authority.

Collateral Damage Thresholds


The outputs of the
CDM provide
commanders with easily
recognizable measures
of operational risk
based on the CDE level
required to achieve a
final collateral damage
estimate. The collateral
damage threshold in
CDE Levels 1, 2, and 3
mitigates risk to less
than 10-percent probability of serious wounds from fragmentation or other primary
damage mechanism to standing unprotected personnel. The collateral damage threshold in
CDE Level 4 reduces this risk mitigation to less than 1 percent fractional structural damage to
collateral structures from primary warhead blast effects.

Components of the CDE Levels


Collateral Effects Radius (CER). A CER is a radius representing the
largest collateral hazard distance for a given warhead, weapon, or
weapon class considering predetermined, acceptable collateral damage
thresholds that are established for each CDE level. A CER value
contains the total error associated with a specific munition and method
of employment as well as the radius of dominant warhead effects. For
cluster or ICM, the CER value includes the pattern radius of the sub-
munitions.

Collateral Hazard Area (CHA). CHA is formed by measuring a CER from either the edge
of a target facility outline, the aimpoint for a point target, the edge of an engagement zone or
artillery sheaf, or target area outline for an area target. Essentially, the CER is used to form
the CHA. The analysis conducted at each CDE level is based on the existence of collateral
concerns within the corresponding CHA. Within a CHA there is an unacceptable probability
for damage or injury to collateral concerns, which include persons and objects. Each
succeeding CDE level employs mitigation techniques and weaponeering restrictions designed
to reduce the area of collateral effects to an acceptable level.

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CDM QUICK GUIDE

Remarks: CER Reference Tables are RESTRICTED

Fundamental Questions of the CDM conducting Level 1-3


1. Can I PID the object I want to affect?
2. Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or noncombatant personnel, involuntary
or unwitting human shields, or significant environmental concerns within the effects range
of the weapon I would like to use to attack the target?
3. Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by striking the target with a different
weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still accomplish the mission?

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CDM QUICK GUIDE Continued

Field CDE. Field CDE is typically used in dynamic targeting when there is a time-
constrained opportunity to engage a fleeting target. Field CDE differs from Formal CDE,
which is conducted by certified/qualified CDE analysts. Field CDE is typically conducted by
JTACs, FOs, or by a JFSCT. Field CDE is a degraded mode of CDE, and creates the
opportunity for increased risk. A Field collateral damage estimate will typically be a verbal
call, and should be documented for future review/analysis. When authorizing Field CDE
commanders should ensure Field CDE utilizes existing concepts and reference tables derived
from the CDM, and that somebody in the Field CDE fires approval chain is a certified and
qualified CDE analyst. Typically, CDE Level 4 analysis is not authorized for Field CDE.

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52. Target Authorization Record

TARGET AUTHORIZATION RECORD


Target Report Form Ser No: Target Description:

Target No:

Target Location: Time to be engaged NLT:

Ser Consideration YES NO Remarks


Do you have authority under ROE or
1 Targeting Directives (TD) / Orders to Authorized to sign: Commander + LEGAD
conduct attack?

Is the Target (TGT) on a No Strike


2 List (NSL) or a Restricted Strike If YES, reassess
List (RSL)?

Does the TGT make an effective


3 contribution to ENY MIL action?

Will its destruction or neutralization,


4 offer a define MIL advantage in the
current circumstances?

Is there any likelihood of Collateral


If assessed CD is not within delegated level
5 Damage (CD) / Risk to civilians?
then refer TGT to senior HQ for consideration
Is level of CD within the level delegated?

Is there an alternative MIL TGT available


6 with the same MIL advantage, with If YES, return to Ser 1 for new TGT
less risk of CD?

Have all means been used to minimize CD?


7 Consider: Weapon Type? Axis of Attack?
Time?

Has a warning been issued to any


8 potential affected civilians regarding
the attack if the tactical situation permits?

Does the MIL advantage anticipated from


9 proceeding with the attack outweigh the
CD that is likely to be caused?

10 ATTACK PERMITTED

11 WEAPON SELECTED

The attack on this TGT is authorized by:


DTG: Signature:

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53. Graduated Enforcement Matrix

GRADUATED ENFORCEMENT MATRIX (GEM)


TIMELINE

PHASES

TERRAIN

(Symbolic)

Situation of non
compliant troops

ENFORCEMENT LOW MEDIUM HIGH


LEVEL / Enforcing Enforcing by
STEPS OF Warning - Show of Warning
by Fire and
ESCALATION Identification Force Fire
Fire Maneuver
Lowest Level of Delegation:
Weapons Release LCC LCC
Authority 1) Brigade Task Force Commander
Authority Notify LCC / AOC Notify Brigade
NONE NONE
to Fire of firing intent of firing intent
ARTY 2)
+ Passiv Exercising 1. ILLUM - Round GS 2) DS
2. Smoke - Round 1. Suppress TO CLOSE
MORTAR Actions 3. Smoke - Volley 2. Neutralize OPERATIONS
NO FIRE NO FIRE
4. HE-ammo 3. Destroy - all effects
1. Recce
2. Presence 2) 2)
AIR FORCE Recce
3. Simulated Warning Shot AI + CAS AI + CAS
Attack
ARMY Recce
1. Recce 2) Attack HELO: Attack HELO:
2. Presence Warning Shot 2)
CAS + CCA
AVIATION CAS

REQIRED ROEs Deployment & Monitoring Prepare & conduct offensive actions, detaining persons
Riot Control
TO MANEUVER PSYOPS
C-Harassment
Harassment, - Attack against hostile act
TROOPS Liaison activities Simulated Attack - Attack against hostile intent
PSYOPS
(SER) SELF DEFENCE - Use (including deadly use) of tank &
Small Arms Fire EXTENDED SELF DEFENCE - REQUEST anti-tank weapons

1) Under no circumstances the right of self-defence and force protection will be infringed!
2) To ensure Target Location Accuracy the use of Indirect Fire requires a “Qualified (Target) Controller”
(e.g. certified FO, JTAC) Copyright by Fire Support Analyst WO1 Wirth

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K. PARAMETERS & GRAPHICS

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54. Target Location Error (TLE)


(1) The definition of TLE is the difference between the coordinates generated for a target and
the actual location of that target. TLE is expressed primarily in terms of circular and vertical
errors, or infrequently, as spherical error.
(2) In order to facilitate the communication of targeting accuracy, TLE is characterized in six
categories (CATs). The first row presents the categories of TLE which range from best (CAT
1) to worst (CAT 6) and are used to classify the accuracy of any coordinate generating
system. See table below.

Table. Target Location Error Categories


Cat-1 Cat-2 Cat-3 Cat-4 Cat-5 Cat-6
0-20 ft 21-50 ft 51-100 ft 101-300 ft 301-1,000 ft >1,001 ft
0-6 m 7-15 m 16-30 m 31-91 m 92-305 m > 305 m

55. Weapon Accuracy (2DRMS)


The definition for the Weapon Accuracy is the difference between the coordinates generated
for a target (TLE!) and the de facto point at which a projectile or bomb impacts or is expected
to impact (Mean Point of Impact - MPI). These errors (MPI-Error) are also expressed in terms
of circular errors (Circular Error Probable - CEP).
CEP is an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in
determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a
missile’s projectiles or bombs are expected to fall (CEP 50). 2 DRMS expresses a circular error
probability of 95% (CEP50 x 2.4).

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56. Risk Estimate Distances (RED)

1. Surface-to-surface Risk-estimate Distances. 42


Danger close is usually 600 meters for cannon, mortars and GMLRS.
WARNING: Mortar and Howitzer REDs were calculated assuming an observer has
adjusted fires onto the target. Unadjusted fire for effect (FFE) missions may significantly
increase the 0.1% Pi (Standing) distances!

Table 1. Unguided Ballistic Munitions Risk-estimate Distances 43


0.1 % PI (meters / feet) 0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Item / (Standing) (Prone)
Description, ammo
System 1/3 2/3 Max 1/3 2/3 Max
Rng Rng Rng Rng Rng Rng
170 / 195 / 195 / 160 / 190 / 185 /
M252 / M29 81mm mortar
558’ 640’ 640’ 525’ 624’ 607’

280 / 395 / 430 / 260 / 365 / 410 /


M120 / M327 120mm mortar
919’ 1,296’ 1,411’ 853’ 1,198’ 1,345’

155mm Howitzer 300 / 460 / 695 / 285 / 440 / 665 /


M109 SPH HE (White Bags) 984’ 1,509’ 2,280’ 935’ 1,444’ 2,182’

155mm Howitzer 360 / 530 / 1,045 / 360 / 520 / 965 /


M109 SPH RAP (eRW 44) 1,076’ 1,739’ 3,428’ 1,181’ 1,706’ 3,166’

Table 2. Precision Guided Munitions Risk-estimate Distances


Item / 0.1 % PI 0.1 % PI 0.1 % PI
Description, ammo Standing Prone Prone Protected
System
155mm (X)M982 175 / 574’ 150 / 492’ 115 / 377’
M109 (L52)
Excalibur, PGM (not range (not range (not range
M777A2 dependent) dependent) dependent)
(PX-Fuse)
GMLRS, Unitary Warhead, 250 / 820’ 210 / 689’ 170 / 558’
(not range (not range (not range
MARS-II (PX-Fuse) dependent) dependent) dependent)
Note: - Lethal Blast Radius - Point Detonation: 40m, Splinter Distance: 200m

WARNING: 0.1% probability of incapacitation numbers are for combat use only during
“danger close” situations and are not minimum safe distances for peacetime training.
Commanders, controllers, and aircrew will still apply Danger Close conditions at or inside
the ranges listed under the Standing column for air-to-surface REDS.
NOTE: The REDs in this document are highly generalized.

42
Do not confuse the “Danger Close” method of engagement with risk estimate distances (RED) or minimum
safe distances (MSD).
43
Reference: The methodology and assumptions concerning the REDs are available via a White Paper on the
ALSA classified Web site: http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/library/mttps/jfire.html.
44
eRW: „erhöhte Reichweite“

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2. Air-to-surface Risk-estimate Distances.


Danger close is usually 1000 meters.
Prone Protected REDs.
a) Some operating environments (such as urban battlefields or those with armor-shielded
troops) provide an enhanced degree of protection for friendly forces. In these cases, friendly
troop postures could potentially allow supporting arms fires to be safely employed at closer
ranges than would be possible in more open battlefields.
b) The Prone Protected column lists REDs that are modeled for situations in which friendly
ground troops are afforded a greater degree of protection than is the case for Standing and
Prone columns. Even with a greater degree of protection, however, careful consideration is
required with regard to weapons selection and delivery profiles.

Table 3. Fixed-wing Risk-estimate Distances


0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Weapon Description Danger Close Prone
Prone
or Standing Protected
Mk-82/BLU-111
500-lb bomb 305m / 1,001’ 225m / 738’ 165m / 541’
Contact
Mk-82/BLU-111
500-lb bomb 425m / 1,394’ 325m / 1,066’ 255m / 837’
Airburst
Mk-83/BLU-110
1,000-lb bomb 345m / 1,132’ 270m / 886’ 205m / 673’
Contact
Mk-83/BLU-110
1,000-lb bomb 435m / 1,427’ 350m / 1,148’ 295m / 968’
Airburst
Mk-84/BLU-117
2,000-lb bomb 355m / 1,165’ 255m / 837’ 195m / 640’
Contact
Mk-84/BLU-117
2,000-lb bomb 440m / 1,444’ 335m / 1,099’ 270m / 886’
Airburst

CBU-87 1) CEM 2) 300m / 984’ 285m / 935’ 255m / 837’

GBU-10 2,000-lb LGB 315m / 1,034’ 230m / 755’ 165m / 542’

GBU-12 500-lb LGB 275m / 902’ 200m / 656’ 130m / 426’

GBU-16 1,000-lb LGB 310m / 1,017’ 245m / 804’ 165m / 541’

Notes:
1) Cluster munitions not recommended for use in proximity to friendly forces.
2) Combined Effects Munition

WARNING: 0.1% probability of incapacitation numbers are for combat use only during
“danger close” situations and are not minimum safe distances for peacetime training.

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Table 3. Fixed-wing Risk-estimate Distances (cont’d)


0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Weapon Description Danger Close Prone
Prone
or Standing Protected

GBU-24/B 2,000-lb LGB 340m / 1,115’ 235m / 771’ 180m / 591’

GBU-31 Contact 2,000-lb JDAM 335m / 1,099’ 235m / 771’ 180m / 591’

GBU-31 Airburst 2,000-lb JDAM 420m / 1,378’ 295m / 968’ 230m / 754’

GBU-32 Contact 1,000-lb JDAM 320m / 1,050’ 250m / 820’ 180m / 591’

GBU-32 Airburst 1,000-lb JDAM 410m / 1,345’ 315m / 1,034’ 255m / 837’

GBU-38 Contact 500-lb JDAM 290m / 951’ 200m / 656’ 140m / 459’

GBU-38 Airburst 500-lb JDAM 410m / 1,345’ 295m / 968’ 220m / 722’

500-lb LCDB 3)
GBU-38v4 Contact 175m / 574’ 115m / 378’ 90m / 296’
(BLU-126)
500-lb LCDB
GBU-38v5 Contact 140m / 460’ 90m / 296’ 65m / 214’
(BLU-129)

GBU-39 Contact 250-lb SDB 4) 205m / 673’ 145m / 476’ 100m / 328’

1,000-lb
GBU-48 5) 625m / 2,050’ 305m / 1,000’
EPW II
500-lb
GBU-49 Contact 290m / 951’ 205m / 673’ 145m / 476’
EPW II
500-lb LCDB
GBU-51 Contact 150m / 492’ 105m / 345’ 70m / 230’
(BLU-126)
500-lb JDAM/
GBU-54 Contact 290m / 951’ 200m / 656’ 140m / 459’
LJDAM
500-lb LJDAM
GBU-54v5 140m / 460’ 90m / 296’ 65m / 214’
LCD BLU-129
BLU-109 PGM
2,000-lb
(GBU-24A/B/GBU- 380m / 1,247’ 260m / 853’ 185m / 607’
Penetrator
31V3)
Notes:
3) Low Collateral Damage Bomb
4) Small Diameter Bomb
5) Raytheon's Enhanced dual-mode GPS and Laser guided version of the laser-only GBU-16. Although
GBU-48 etc. are the formal designation for the versions with GPS/INS, they are widely referred to as
EGBU-16 etc. ("Enhanced GBU-16"). Carried on Eurofighter.

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Table 3. Fixed-wing Risk-estimate Distances (cont’d)


0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Weapon Description Danger Close Prone
Prone
or Standing Protected

AGM-65 Maverick (All) 175m / 574’ 115m / 378’ 80m / 263’

AGM-158A JASSM 5) 290m / 952’ 195m / 640’ 140m / 459’

AGM-176 II Contact Griffin 120m / 394’ 90m / 296’ 80m / 263’

AGM-176 II Airburst Griffin 145m / 476’ 120m / 394’ 90m / 296’

2.75” Rockets
Mk151/229/261 265m / 870’ 250m / 820’ 240m / 788’
Med Alt
2.75” Rockets
Mk151/229/261 290m / 952’ 265m / 870’ 250m / 820’
Low Alt

Mk24 5” Zuni Rocket 340m / 1,116’ 300m / 984’ 265m / 870’

FW Gun 20mm 95m / 312’ 75m / 246’ 70m / 230’

FW Gun 25mm/30mm 95m / 312’ 85m / 278’ 65m / 214’

AC-130 40mm 95m /312’ 80m / 263’ 65m / 214’

105mm
AC-130 190m / 624’ 140m / 460’ 100m / 328’
cannon

AC-130W 30mm 100m / 328’ 90m / 296’ 70m / 230’

AGM-114
Hellfire 110m / 361’ 100m / 328’ 80m / 263’
K/M/N/FA

AGM-114R Hellfire 130m / 426’ 90m / 296’

Paveway IV 500-lb PGM 6) 480m / 1,575’ 320m / 1,050’

Dual Mode
UK Hellfire 7) 175m / 574’ 90m / 296’
Brimstone
Notes:
6) Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
7) REDs for the Paveway IV and Brimstone were calculated using NATO methodology

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Table 4. Rotary-wing Risk-estimate Distances


0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Weapon Firing Range Danger Close Prone
Prone
or Standing Protected
M134
(OH-58B, 7,62mm <1,000m 100m / 328’ 50m / 164’
Minigun)
300m 60m / 197’ 50m / 164’ 45m / 148’
AH-1/
Cobra/20 mm 800m 80m / 263’ 70m / 230’ 70m / 230’
(M56)
1,500m 115m / 378’ 100m / 328’ 100m / 328’
500m 75m / 246’ 60m / 197’ 55m / 181’
AH-64 /
Apache/30 mm 1,000m 95m / 312’ 80m / 263’ 75m / 246’
(M789)
1,500m 115m / 378’ 100m / 328’ 90m / 296’
300m 140m / 460’ 115m / 378’ 100m / 328’
2.75” HE Rockets
800m 210m / 689’ 175m / 574’ 160m / 525’
(Mk146/151/229)
1,500m 305m / 1,001’ 280m / 919’ 270m / 886’
2.75” Flechette
1,000m 170m / 558’ 170m / 558’
(Mk149/255)

5” HE Rockets 1,000m 300m / 984’ 245m / 804’ 215m / 706’


(Mk-24) 1,500m 370m / 1,214’ 315m / 1,034’ 270m / 1,026’

APKWS 8) Rockets All 95m / 312’ 75m / 246’ 60m / 197’

AGM-114
All 110m / 361’ 100m / 328’ 80m / 263’
K/M/N/FA/L

AGM-114R All 130m / 426’ 90m / 296’

8) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System

Note 1: Door-gun REDs are not available due to the inability to model employment of a crew-
served weapon without a fire control system.
Note 2: .50 cal fixed forward platforms are not able to be modeled at this time. REDs will be
released as RW delivery accuracy programs increase in fidelity for systems without
fire control computers.

WARNING: 0.1% probability of incapacitation numbers are for combat use only during
“danger close” situations and are not minimum safe distances for peacetime training.

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3. Maritime surface-to-surface Risk-estimate Distances.


Danger close is usually <750 meters for naval gunfire.

Table 5. Naval Gunfire Risk-estimate Distances


0.1 % PI (meters / feet) 0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Item / (Standing) (Prone)
Description
System 1/3 2/3 Max 1/3 2/3 Max
Rng Rng Rng Rng Rng Rng
380 / 415 / 595 / 320 / 370 / 475 /
M-45 5" / 54 gun
1,247’ 1,362’ 1,952’ 1,050’ 1,214’ 1,558’

Table 6. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile Risk-estimate Distances


0.1 % PI (meters / feet) 0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Item / System Description
(Standing) (Prone)
1,000-lb
TLAM 300 / 984’ 225 / 738’
unitary warhead
BGM-109
DANGER CLOSE: 300 meters

Note: TLAM risk-estimate distances are not range dependent. TLAMs are near-
precision sub-sonic cruise missiles launched from cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines. Guidance: INS aided by GPS / terrain contour matching / digital
scene matching area correlation with TOT options.

WARNING: 0.1% probability of incapacitation numbers are for combat use only during
“danger close” situations and are not minimum safe distances for peacetime training.

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4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Risk Estimate Distances

Table 7. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)


Risk Estimate Distances /
United Kingdom (UK) REDs
0.1 % PI (meters / feet)
Weapon Description Unprotected
Protected
(Danger Close)

(E)PWII Ballistic release 1,000-lb PGM 625m / 2,050’ 305m / 1,000’

EPWII >70 deg impact 1,000-lb PGM 430m / 1,410’ 305m / 1,000’

PWIV All releases 500-lb PGM 480m / 1,575’ 320m / 1,050’

27mm Mauser HE 27mm Cannon 130m / 426’ 95m / 312’

Dual Mode Brimstone UK Hellfire 175m / 574’ 90m / 295’

AGM-114K Hellfire 175m / 574’ 95m / 312’

AGM-114K1A Hellfire 215m / 705’ 175m / 574’

AGM-114K1A HIA Hellfire 245m / 804’ 190m / 623’

AGM-114M Hellfire 290m / 951’ 140m / 459’

AGM-114N Hellfire 235m / 764’ 135m / 443’

2,000-lb Penetrator
PWIII (All Modes) 930m / 3,050’ 380m / 1,246’
(BLU- 109 PGM)
Single CRV7
2.75” Rockets 220m / 722’ 200m / 656’
All Warheads

Pod CRV7 All Warheads 2.75” Rockets 275m / 902’ 255m / 836’

Notes: UK Protected requirements:


- Entire body behind an adobe mud wall (10cm thick)
- Entire body below ground level (e.g., in a ditch)
- Within an armored vehicle with minimum Protection Level of P2.

WARNING: 0.1% probability of incapacitation numbers are for combat use only during
“danger close” situations and are not minimum safe distances for peacetime training.

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57. Minimum Safe Distances (MSD) for Land Forces


Following table establishes minimum safe distances (MSD) that ground personnel and
civilian persons may be safely located relative to the target / impact area of standard
munitions. The MSDs in this document are highly generalized and will not apply to all
cases encountered on the battlefield. The numbers in the MSD column should not be used
without understanding the detailed assumptions used to develop values. The MSDs
provided are not intended to allow personnel to deviate from any national published
guidance.
Table 8. Minimum Safe Distances for Ground Parties (extract)
MSD
IFS Weapon (meters / feet)
Notes

Within Austrian Armed Forces


120mm mortar 600m / 1,968’
(AAF): 800 meters
Within Austrian Armed Forces
155mm (SPH) HE 600m / 1,968’
(AAF): 700 meters
155mm SMArt 1,100 - 1,700m Wind < 17.1 m/s, 33.3 kn
Artillery
NFS - 5" / 54 gun 750m / 2,461’

GMLRS (MARS II) unitary 600m / 1,968’ Ricochet Fan: 200m

SCATMIN AT 2 1,000m / 3,208’

GBU-10 (2,000-lb) 1) 1,300m / 4,264’

GBU-12 (500-lb) 1) 1,000m / 3,280’

Mk-82 LD/HD (500-lb) 1,300m / 4,264’


Fixed-wing
Mk-83 LD/HD (1,000-lb) 1,500m / 4,920’

Mk-84 LD/HD (2,000-lb) 1,600m / 5,248’

AGM-65 „Maverick“ 1) 1,300m / 4,264’

2.75” Rockets WP / HE 700m / 2,297’ Ricochet Fan: 1,700m

30mm | .50 cal | 7.62 mm 500m / 1,640’ Ricochet Fan: 3,400m


Rotary-wing
AGM-114 „Hellfire“ 1) 900m / 2,952’

M134 (7.62mm Minigun) 500m / 1,640’ Ricochet Fan: 700m


1) Hazard areas for guided weapons (AGM-65, AGM-114,..) are highly dependent upon launch conditions
and, in some cases, coordinate accuracies. Coordinate quality target location error (TLE) and passage present
a significant risk to ground personnel for coordinate-seeking weapons release. Weapon malfunctions (such as
fin failures) are not included, with the assumption that malfunctioning weapons have the same probability of
impacting any point within the weapons danger zone (WDZ) area.

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58. Tactical JFS Graphics

Task Verbs / Effects Graphics IAW NATO STANAG 2287

Destroy
1. To destroy is to damage an object or an enemy force so that it is rendered
useless to the enemy until reconstituted.
2. To render a target so damaged that it cannot function as intended nor be
restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
In aviation mission requires 70 % incapacitation/destruction of ENY force.
In artillery missions requires 30 % incapacitation/destruction of ENY force.

Disrupt
To disrupt means to break apart an enemy’s formation and tempo, interrupt the
enemy timetable, cause premature and/or piecemeal commitment of forces, so
D
that his actions become uncoordinated and off-balance.

Neutralize
To neutralize is to render an enemy element temporarily incapable of
interfering with the operation, so that the enemy element need not be
suppressed during the rest of the operation.
Neutralization Fire
Fires which are intended to render a target out of the battle temporarily by
causing a minimum of 10 %t casualties

Interdict
To divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy’s surface military potential before it
can be used effectively against friendly forces, using fire support or maneuver
forces.

Suppress
1. A tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the
performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to
accomplish the mission.
2. One of the five breaching fundamentals. The focus of all fires on enemy
personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent effective fires on friendly forces.
The purpose of suppression is to protect forces reducing and maneuvering
through the obstacle and to soften the initial foothold.
More Task Verbs
Support by Fire Attack by Fire Block Fix

Delay Contain Overwatch Separate


(by Fire)

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FSCM - Areas
Free Fire Area (FFA)
A specific designated area into which any weapon system may fire without
additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Normally, it is
established on identifiable terrain by division or higher headquarters.

No Fire Area (NFA)


An area in which no fires or effects of fires are allowed. Two exceptions are
(1) when establishing headquarters approves fires temporarily within the
NFA on a mission basis, and
(2) when the enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force, the
commander may engage the enemy to defend his force.

Restricted Fire Area (RFA)


An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that
exceed those restrictions may not be delivered without prior coordination
with the establishing headquarters.

Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)


A restricted area or route of
travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for the purpose
of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces
(AAP-6).

FSCM - Lines
Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
The FSCL is used to co-ordinate the fires of air, ground or sea weapon
systems using any type of ammunition.
Supporting elements may attack forward of the FSCL provide that the
weapons used do not produce effects on or to the rear of the line.
Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) /
Fire Support Safety Line (FSSL)
A line short of which indirect fire systems do not fire except on request or
approval of the commander who established the line, but beyond which they
may fire at any time without danger to friendly troops. The FSSL is used to
expedite the quick attack of targets beyond it by fire support units (of higher
levels), without the delay of unnecessary co-ordination but also to guarantee
that no targets are attacked short of it without co-ordination with the
responsible maneuver commander.
Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)
A line established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be moving)
that prohibits all fire or effects from fires across the line without coordination with
the affected force.

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Target Overlay
Target (TGT) /
JT8401: TGT - Number
Target Reference Point (TRP) /
Fire Support Point
An easily recognizable point on the ground
used to initiate, distribute and control fires.
destroy: desired effect

Actual TGT-Location is accurate known or


estimated approximately +/- 500 meters. If HQ/6INFBDE: Responsible for
not feasible use the “Series Target” – Target Acquisition and -
Symbology. engagement

P2: TGT-Priority IAW HPTL

Example TGT with line indicator (object is


away from its actual location)

Linear Target, „SMOKE (Blind / Screen) 10


minutes“
Linear Smoke Target

Series Target (pre-planned) The accurate TGT-location is


In fire support, a number of targets planned unknown, but within the target
in a predetermined time sequence to area.
support a maneuver phase. A series of
targets is indicated by a code name or
nickname.

Series Target „24th MechInfBn plans 3


missions destroy and 2 missions
(Planning Guidance) SMK in TAI „TANGO““

Group of Targets SEAD – Suppression of Enemy


Two or more targets on which fire is Air Defence
desired simultaneously (All targets are
fired at the same time). A Group of targets
is designated by a letter/number
combination.

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Target Area of Interest (TAI)


The geographical area along a mobility corridor the successful interdiction of
which will cause an enemy to either abandon a particular course of action or
require him to use specialized engineer support to continue and where he can
be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all TAI will form part of the
friendly COA; only TAI associated with higher pay-off targets (HPTs) are of
interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and
wargaming. TAIs differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas
plan for the use of all availables; TAI might be engaged by a single
weapon.

Point Target Area of Interest

Blue SKB
A blue SKB permits air-to-surface fires without further coordination with the
establishing headquarters.

Purple SKB
Same as above, plus a purple SKB permits the integration of surface-to-
surface indirect fires with air-to-surface fires without further coordination
with the establishing headquarters.

EXAMPLE:

Target Numbering System:


The target number is comprised of six characters, comprising TWO letters followed by FOUR number positions.
(E.g. KT 1764). The two-letter group may be used to indicate the originator of the target number and/or the level
holding the target data. Other than the letter Z, there are no permanently assigned first letters for any Nation or
organization. The senior land forces artillery headquarters for an operation will establish and publish, in orders, the
assigned first letter for junior Nations and organizations. The senior land forces artillery headquarters is not
refrained from using any of the letters (less Z) nor are they limited to a sequential use of letters. Coordination
should be conducted between major geographic commands to ensure that identical letters are not used in areas
close to adjacent boundaries. Nations may use any letter during national training. Standing multinational
organizations are recommended to establish a target numbering system within their Standard Operating Procedure.
The following is an example of the assignment of first letters The Target Number prefix “Z” is reserved for the technical use
for targeting in an operation: by Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems in nations. The
following second letters are allocated to nations as specified
A….United States and are reserved for the sole use of the listed nation.
B….United Kingdom
E….EUROCORPS ZA……France ZE……United States
F…..France ZB……Germany ZF……Turkey
G….Germany ZC……Italy ZG……Netherlands etc….
M…MNC NE Corps etc. ZD……United Kingdom ZQ – ZZ: not yet allocated

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59. Target Overlay Examples

A) TARGET OVERLAY using Series Targets and (single) Targets

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B) TARGET OVERLAY using the “KILL BOX SYSTEM”

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Indirect Fire Systems - Military Symbols


AIR SYMBOLS ARTY SYMBOLS

FIELD ARTILLERY
ROTARY WING
HOWITZER/GUN
UTILITY MEDIUM MEDIUM

FIELD ARTILLERY
ROTARY WING
HOWITZER/GUN
ATTACK SELF-PROPELLED

ROTARY WING MULTIPLE LAUNCH


CARGO AIRLIFT ROCKET SYSTEM
(TRANSPORT) SELF-PROPELLED

MULTIPLE LAUNCH
ROTARY WING ROCKET SYSTEM
MEDEVAC TRUCK
(e.g.: HIMARS)

FIELD ARTILLERY
FIXED WING
TARGET ACQISITION
ATTACK/STRIKE RADAR

FIELD ARTILLERY
FIXED WING
HEAVY MORTAR
FIGHTER TOWED

AVIATION FIELD ARTILLERY


TACICAL AIR MORTAR, TOWED,
CONTROL PARTY MOUNTAIN

JOINT
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT
TERMINAL ATTACK
COORDINATION TEAM
CONTROLLER

AVIATION
FIELD ARTILLERY
UNMANNED AERIAL
OBSERVER
(FORWARD)
VEHICLE

AVIATION
UNMANNED AERIAL NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT
VEHICLE / NAVAL GUNFIRE
FIXED WING

AVIATION
POSITION AREA FOR
UAV
ARTILERY
CONTROL

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60. Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace (IPB)


IPB is also known as Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE). It is a process
designed to support the commander’s decision with, as its product, an overlaid map on which
all critical factors have been considered to present a view of the likely outcome of future
maneuver.

Terrain-Examples:

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61. Land Tactical Parameters


Tactical Rate of Movement Planning scopes (hrs)
Combat Actions Km/hrs Level Order Planning-Horizon
Tactical road march 20 45 Corps, LCC 36 72 - 96
Tactical cross-country march 15 Division 24 48
Tactical foot march 4 Brigade 12 24
Mounted attack 10 Battalion 6 12
Dismounted attack 1.5
Urban attack 0.5

Reaction / Response Times 46 ; Times for Occupation of Hasty Defense (minutes)


Leading Decision Issuing of Response Overall Occupation of a
Element Making Orders Time for Time Hasty Defense Pos.
Brigade 25’ 10’ Bn: 25’ 60’ 120’
Battalion 10’ 5’ Coy: 10’ 25’ 60’
Company 30’
Platoon 20’

(Minimum) Time Need (minutes) for the DMP


Type “A” Type “B” Type “C”
Issuing
of
of Orders

of Orders

of Orders
Planning

Planning

Planning

Orders
Overall

Overall

Overall
Process

Process

Process
Issuing

Issuing

Issuing

without
Time

Time

Time
time
Level pressure
Division 300’ 60’ 360’ 180’ 60’ 240’ 50’ 20’ 70’ 120’
Brigade 150’ 30’ 180’ 90’ 30’ 120’ 25’ 10’ 35’ 120’
Battalion 75’ 15’ 90’ 45’ 15’ 60’ 10’ 5’ 15’ 60’
Company 35’ 10’ 45’ 20’ 10’ 30’ 10’ 5’ 15’ 30’

Comparison of Combat Power


Weapon Systems Defense Attack Meeting Engagement
Tanks, Combat Vehicles (CVs) 1:2 3:1 1:1–2:1
Antitank Guided Weapons (ATGW) 1:2–3 --- ---
Light Antitank Weapons (e.g. “RPG”) 1:1 2:1 1,5 : 1
Infantries (hasty position) 1:2 3:1 1:1–2:1
Infantries (prepared position) 1:3 4:1 ---
Attack Helicopters (against CVs) 1 : 4 – 6 47 --- ---

45
Imminent threat from Indirect Fire Systems (e.g. Arty) slows down tactical movement speeds to 10 km/hrs.
46
forces begin to move
47
1 : 6 e.g. AH “Tiger”, “Apache”

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62. Conversion Tables

KM ---------------- Speed - km/hrs ---------------> KM


Distance 0,5 1 1,5 4 10 15 20 25 30 Distance

1 02:00 01:00 00:40 00:15 00:06 00:04 00:03 -- 00:02 1


1,5 03:00 01:30 01:00 00:22 00:09 0:.06 00:04 -- 00:03 1,5
2 04:00 02:00 01:20 00:30 00:12 00:08 00:06 00:05 00:04 2
2,5 05:00 02:30 01:40 00:37 00:15 00:10 00:07 00:06 00:05 2,5
3 06:00 03:00 02:00 00:45 00:18 00.12 00:09 00:08 00:06 3
3,5 07:00 03:30 02:20 00:52 00:21 00:14 00:10 00:09 00:07 3,5
4 08:00 04:00 02:40 01:00 00:24 00:16 00:12 00:10 00:08 4
4,5 09:00 04:30 03:00 01:07 00:27 00:18 00:13 00:11 00:09 4,5
5 10:00 05:00 03:20 01:15 00:30 00:20 00:15 00:13 00:10 5
5,5 11:00 05:30 03:40 01:22 00:33 00:22 00:16 00:14 00:11 5,5
6 12:00 06:00 04:00 01:30 00:36 00:24 00:18 00:15 00:12 6
6,5 13:00 06:30 04:20 01:37 00:39 00:26 00:19 00:16 00:13 6,5
7 14:00 07:00 04:40 01:45 00:42 00:28 00:20 00:17 00:14 7
7,5 15:00 07:30 05:00 01:52 00:45 00:30 00:22 00:18 00:15 7,5
8 16:00 08:00 05:20 02:00 00:48 00:32 00:24 00:20 00:16 8
8,5 17:00 08:30 05:40 02:07 00:52 00:34 00:25 00:21 00:17 8,5
9 18:00 09:00 06:00 02.15 00:54 00:36 00:27 00:22 00:18 9
9,5 19:00 09:30 06:20 02:22 00:57 00:38 00:28 00:23 00:19 9,5
10 20:00 10:00 06:40 02:30 01:00 00:40 00:30 00:25 00:20 10
15 -- 15:00 10:00 03:45 01:30 00:45 00:45 00:37 00:30 15
20 -- 20:00 13:20 05:00 02:00 01:20 01:00 00:50 00:40 20
25 -- 25:00 16:40 06:15 02:30 01:40 01:15 01:03 00:50 25
30 -- 30:00 -- 07:30 03:00 02:00 01:30 01:15 01:00 30
35 -- 35:00 -- 08:45 03:30 02:20 01:45 01:28 01.10 35
40 -- 40:00 -- 10:00 04:00 02:40 02:00 01:40 01:20 40
45 -- 45:00 -- 11:15 04:30 03:00 02:15 01:53 01:30 45
50 -- 50:00 -- 12:30 05:00 03:20 02:30 02:00 01:40 50

KM 0,5 1 1,5 4 10 15 20 25 30 KM
Distance ---------------- Speed - km/hrs ---------------> Distance

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Use Table 1 to calculate the number of minutes : seconds that it will take an aircraft to go
from the IP to the target at various ground speeds. Ground speed (GS) is airspeed adjusted for
winds at altitude. Table 2 converts meters to feet.

Table 1: Speed and Time Conversions


GS nm 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(kts) /min nm nm nm nm nm nm nm nm
60 1 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00
80 1.3 6:00 6:45 7:30 8:15 9:00 9:45 10:30 11:15
90 1.5 5:20 6:00 6:40 7:20 8:00 8:40 9:20 10:00
110 1.8 4:22 4:55 5:28 6:00 6:33 7:05 7:38 8:11
120 2 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:30 6:00 6:30 7:00 7:30
150 2.5 3:12 3:36 4:00 4:24 4:48 5:12 5:36 6:00
270 4.5 1:47 2:00 2:13 2:27 2:40 2:53 3:07 3:20
300 5 1:36 1:48 2:00 2:12 2:24 2:36 2:48 3:00
330 5.5 1:28 1:39 1:50 2:00 2.11 2:23 2:33 2:44
360 6 1:20 1:30 1:40 1:50 2:00 2:10 2:20 2:30
420 7 1:09 1:17 1:26 1:34 1:43 1:51 2:00 2:09
450 7.5 1:04 1:12 1:20 1:28 1:36 1:44 1:52 2:00
480 8 1:00 1:08 1:15 1:23 1:30 1:38 1:45 1:53
510 8.5 0:57 1:04 1:11 1:18 1:25 1:32 1:39 1:45
540 9 0:53 1:00 1:07 1:13 1:20 1:27 1:33 1:40
Aircraft Run-in Speeds:
Aircraft GS (kts) Aircraft GS (kts)
AH-1 60 - 120 AH-64 60 - 120
MH-60 60 - 120 AH-6 60 - 90
OH-58 60 - 90 A-10 270 - 350
B-1 480 - 540 AV-8B 420 - 480
B-2 400 - 460 F-15E/F-16 480 - 540
B-52 380 - 440 TORNADO 480 - 540

Table 2: Distance Conversion (1 meter = 3.28 feet)


Meters Feet Meters Feet Meters Feet
25 82 525 1,722 1,025 3,362
50 164 550 1,804 1,050 3,444
75 246 575 1,886 1,075 3,526
100 328 600 1,968 1,100 3,608
125 410 625 2,050 1,125 3,690
150 492 650 2,132 1,150 3,772
175 574 675 2,214 1,175 3,852
200 656 700 2,296 1,200 3,936
225 738 725 2,378 1,225 4,018
250 820 750 2,460 1,250 4,100
275 902 775 2,542 1,275 4,182
300 984 800 2,624 1,300 4,264
325 1,066 825 2,706 1,325 4,346
350 1,148 850 2,788 1,350 4,428
375 1,230 875 2,870 1,375 4,510
400 1,312 900 2,952 1,400 4,592
425 1,394 925 3,034 1,425 4,674
450 1,476 950 3,116 1,450 4,756
475 1,538 975 3,198 1,475 4,838
500 1,640 1,000 3,280 1,500 4,920

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Table 3: Conversions

Statute Miles
Centimeters

Kilometers
Distance /

Nautical
Meters
Inches
Length

Yards

Miles
Feet
1 Inch ---- 2.54 0.0933 1 0.0254 ---- ---- ----
1 Feet 0.333 30.5 1 12 0.3048 ---- ---- ----
1 Yard 1 91.4 3 36 0.9144 ---- ---- ----
1 Meter 1.0936 100 3.28 39.37 1 ---- ---- ----
1 Kilometer 1,094 ---- ---- ---- 1,000 0.62137 0.5399 1
1 Statute Mile ---- ---- 5,280 ---- 1,610 1 1.151 1.6093
1 Nautical Mile ---- ---- 6,076 ---- 1,853 0.869 1 1.853

Table 4: Speed
Knots NM per minute Km per minute Kmph
360 6 11.118 667
420 7 12.971 778
480 8 14.824 890
540 9 16.677 1,000
Speed of Sound (Mach 1.0)
660 340 meters per second 1,223

63. International Effects-Table (English-German)


English Bundeswehr (gem. D2-227/0-0-2050)
Desired Abbr. One-Letter Geforderte Kurz Expected ENY
Effect (Task Verb) Wirkung Default
interdict int I Abriegeln ABR 30 % 48
illuminate ill Beleuchten BEL
engage eng Bekämpfen BEK 10 %
blind bli B Blenden BLE
suppress sup S Niederhalten NIE 20 %
block blo Sperren SPE
harass --- Stören STÖ 10 %
overwatch ovw Überwachen UBW
anihilate anni Vernichten VER 40 %
destroy destr D Zerschlagen ZSL 30 %
destruct destr Zerstören ZST

48
with a probability of 90%

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L. D3A Targeting Methodology

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64. Decide -Detect -Deliver-Assess (D3A)


The emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources (targets) that the adversary can least
afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage, then further identifying the
subset of those targets which must be acquired and effected, to achieve friendly success.
(Tactical) Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and
capabilities.
The Land Targeting Cycle is based on a cycle of functions; Decide, Detect/Track, Deliver and
Assess. This methodology provides a systematic approach to enable the right target to be
effected with the appropriate system at the right time and place.

The DECIDE function is divided into 6 elements:

1 - Identify Target Types. Target types and categories will depend on the nature of
the operation and the range of effects available. Targets will be developed into target lists and
further refined through intelligence collection and the need to manage the dynamic nature of
the formation/maneuver commanders' operational requirements.

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2 - Identify Target Areas. This stage will consider the Area of Operations and
identify areas of targeting interest. All dimensions of the battlespace environment should be
considered and limitations such as protected areas taken into account.

3 - Establish Target Accuracy. The capabilities of available detection systems and


effects systems will dictate technical and procedural limits that should be established. It is
important to match appropriate ISTAR and effects systems in order to engage targets.

4 - Input to Intelligence Collection Plan. Targeting input to the intelligence


collection mechanism aims to provide a focus for the management of detection systems.
Input will identify priority targets, how they might be detected and whether target tracking is
required.

5 - Establish Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Criteria. Decisions must be made


early in the process as to what can be defined as a successful (or unsuccessful) attack. There
should also be decisions concerning the direction of systems to obtain BDA. Only effective
BDA can assess that the effects desired by the formation/maneuver commander are being
produced.

6 - Develop Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM). The AGM provides a consolidated,


tabulated support tool for operational targeting decisions and is the culmination of the Decide
phase of the cycle. The matrix is intended to act, as far as practical, as an executive document
allowing rapid engagement decisions to be made during current operations. AGM should be
developed for each phase of an operation and for different operations.

Decide Function Products

The result of the Decide function should be a focused targeting effort and a series of
supporting products. Some of the product possibilities are listed below:

a. High Value Target (HVT) List (HVTL). The HVTL is derived from
consideration of the mission, enemy intentions and vulnerabilities, and direction provided by
the formation/maneuver commander arising from the formation estimate process. The HVTL
is normally generated by the intelligence staff. HVTs are those assets, the loss of which
would significantly damage the enemy's capability to achieve his intentions. There will be
several categories of warfighting target and, probably different non-warfighting targets.

b. High Payoff Target List (HPTL). The HPTL identifies those HVTs; the loss
of which would significantly contribute to the success of the commander’s mission and which
can be effected, given the systems available. The HPTL should change according to the
phase and nature of operations and may be used to focus the intelligence collection effort.
The HPTL is a Command decision and should be disseminated accordingly.

c. Target Selection Standards (TSS). TSS are criteria that are applied to
possible future targets to determine what degree of accuracy and timeliness is required from
detection systems, to enable the selected attack weapon system to achieve a successful attack.

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d. Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM). The AGM provides detail on specific


HPT's, when and how they should be attacked and any attack restrictions. It allocates assets
to targets and, in so doing, facilitates future tactical and logistic planning. The AGM may
also identify target tracking requirements.

e. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) requirements. Those targets on which


BDA is required are identified and passed to the intelligence staff/section. BDA is further
discussed in the Assess function.

f. Combined HPT/TSS/AGM. It may be useful to combine decision products.


Individual products should still be developed and maintained to provide a decision audit
function. (An Example you find on page 214).

65. Targeting - DMP - FS-Planning - Relations

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M. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

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66. Decision-Making Process (DEU-NATO-AUT)

67. Principles and Concept of Fire Support Planning


GENERAL. The Land Component Command (LCC) provides planning of operations based
on instructions/orders from the Joint Forces Command (JFC) as directed by COM LCC. The
outcome of this planning process is implemented in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS),
the Operation Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD) in coordination with other
Component Commands, including required coordinating instructions. For the future JFS
planning process, it is important, that initial guidelines especially for the decision-making
authorities are already included, i.e. which level may decide on delivery systems employment
dependent on the situation, mission, intensity, available delivery systems and Collateral
Damage Estimate (CDE) Level. JFS represents a significant contribution to the maneuver
commander’s combat power. It is essential to have a concept of JFS that is synchronized with
and supports the maneuver commander’s concept of operations. The ultimate purpose of the
JFS planning, coordination and synchronization is to optimize the use of all JFS assets
delivering lethal or non-lethal effects. Although the concept shall be drafted by the JFS staff,
the commander is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the application of JFS is
synchronized with the other elements of his force.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. The JFS planning, coordination, and synchronization


ensures that all available lethal and non-lethal FS assets are employed in accordance with the
commander's concept of operations. The JFSE chief at all appropriate levels is the primary
staff officer concept of FS.

The concept of operation describes his intent and priorities for the FS. The JFS plan should
reflect this concept of FS.
a. Intent for Joint Fire Support
The intent for JFS is the maneuver commander’s declaration of what the FS assets must
accomplish.
b. Joint Fire Support Priorities
The commander’s guidance prioritizes the targeting effort, and clarifies the expected
availability of FS assets for a given operation or period, and how resources should be
allocated during the execution of the operation.
c. The commander frequently delegates authority for drafting of the concept of FS and the
planning and execution of FS for the operation to the JFSE.

CONCEPT OF JFS-PLANNING. In order to plan effective employment of FS assets, the


FSO will rely on the following principles:

a. Early involvement of all liaison and command elements deployed within the scope of
the JFSE (e.g. TACP Air Liaison Officer [ALO]) in order to guarantee integrated and
effective planning of non-land organic FS assets,
b. Early and continuous planning (in order to effectively integrate FS with the scheme of
maneuver),
c. Exploitation of all target acquisition assets (from own, higher and adjacent echelon),
d. Effective employment of FS assets and capabilities (lethal/non-lethal, lowest suitable
assets capable of achieving required effects [economy of forces], integration of all
restraints),
e. Air, naval and land coordination in order to minimize the risk of fratricide/collateral
damage by deconflicting the use of the three dimensional battle space,
f. Rapid and proactive coordination in order to support the battle effectively,
g. Establishing coordinating measures as FSCM or requesting other measures as ACM in
order to speed up the target engagement process while safeguarding friendly forces,
h. Flexibility in order to facilitate future operations (e.g. contingency, sequel, branch, on
order plan).

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68. JFS Mission Analysis Brief - Format

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69. Annex Fire Support (STANAG 2014)

1. This Annex provides the commander’s direction to fire support commanders. It informs the
supported units of the fire support they will receive and gives necessary details of fire support
coordination and, in particular, the part they play in such coordination. The Fire Support
annex serves as the basis for preparing the Fire Support Orders/Appendices of the air,
aviation, artillery and naval gunfire support elements and the Fire Support Orders/Appendices
for chemical and nuclear weapons when they are required.
2. A paragraph concerning each type of fire support should be provided. These types of fire
support may be in alphabetical order but such an arrangement should not be used if logic
dictates otherwise.
3. The example format shown below provides an aid memory/check list of the content for the
sub-paragraphs of the Fire Support Annex. The detailed content of sub paragraphs should be
included as necessary.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX …. (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER No…


Copy No. _____ of _____ copies
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue (may be in code)
Date-Time Group of Signature
Message Reference No.
References: Maps, charts and relevant documents
Time Zone used throughout the Order:

1. SITUATION
(Any items of information which affect fire support and which were not included in
Paragraph 1 of the Operation Order or which need to be expanded should be given here.)

a. Enemy Forces / Conflicting Parties.


(1) See Annex __ to Operation Order No. __.
(2) Enemy Forces / Conflicting Parties air support (fixed wing and helicopters),
artillery, air defense and naval gunfire capabilities.

b. Friendly Forces.
(1) Outline higher unit/formation mission and commander’s intent.
(2) Outline of higher and adjacent unit/formation Fire Support Plans.
(3) Note additional air, naval and nuclear resources supporting the unit/formation.

c. Attachments and Detachments.


List fire support resources attached to the unit/formation by higher headquarters along
with any unit/formation elements detached under command or control of the higher
headquarters or adjacent units/ formations. Differences will exist between national
command and control terminology.

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2. MISSION.
A clear, concise statement of the task or tasks including a unifying purpose of the fire support
elements.

3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operation.
A brief statement of the fire support operation to be carried out, including any major
grouping/arrangement of forces and allotment of effort.

b. Air Support.
(1) General. Outline major supporting roles/tasks to be carried out by the
Air Component (and/or air assets of other components as applicable).
(2) Allocation. Allocation by sorties, of close air support (CAS) including any
priorities or specific control arrangements.
(3) Miscellaneous. Points of detail not covered above or reference to an Air Support
Order/ Appendix.

c. Aviation Support.
(This paragraph may be omitted and information put in an Army Aviation Annex [H])
(1) General. Outline major roles/tasks to be carried out by Army aviation elements in
support of operations.
(2) Allocation. Allocation of aviation support including any priorities or specific
control arrangements.
(3) Miscellaneous. Points of detail not covered above or in the tasks to the Aviation
maneuver unit subparagraph or the Aviation annex.

d. Artillery Support.
(1) Field Artillery.
(a) General. General concept, including major comments on the phasing,
duration or general employment.
(b) Allocation. The grouping/organization for combat.
(c) Miscellaneous. Some points to include, if applicable , are:
1. Deployment areas (overlay).
2. Counter-battery policy.
3. Location of Surveillance and Target Acquisition Assets.
4. Priority tasks.
5. Reference to Artillery Order/Appendix.
6. Artillery Controlled Supply Rate (CSR).

(2) Air Defense Artillery: (Can be a separate annex).


(a) General. Concept of employment and major comments on tactical control
procedures.
(b) Allocation. The grouping/organization for combat.
(c) Miscellaneous. Some point to include, if applicable, are:
1. Deployment areas (overlay).
2. Command and control procedures.
3. Air Defense Artillery (ADA)/Controlled Supply Rate (CSR).
4. Weapons Control Status.

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e. Naval Gunfire Support.


(1) General. Concept of employment, including limitations related to duration of
phasing of the support.
(2) Allocation. The grouping/organization for combat, including:
(a) Allocation of observers/spotters.
(b) Allocation of ships to units/formations.
(3) Miscellaneous. Some points to include, if applicable, are:
(a) Trajectory limitations.
(b) Frequency allocations.
(c) Reference to Naval Gunfire Support Order/Appendix.
f. Nuclear Fire Support. NIL.
g. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Battlespace Synchronization.
(a) Timings (Z-, Local Time).
(b) Reference Systems (e.g. UTMREF).
(c) Altitudes (feet/meter).
(2) Command and control procedures.
(a) Procedural Control, Formal FSCM (CFL, ACA, NFA etc).
(b) Airspace Control.
(3) Battle Rhythm & Formats. E.g. Request for Fire, „Daily Reports“, etc
(4) Miscellaneous.
(a) Target Numbering System.
(b) Essential ROEs for JFS (e.g. Qualified Controller, PID, WRA etc).
(c) Safety Regulations (Danger Close, REDs etc). Collateral Damage Estimation.
(d) IPB.
(e) Weather & Meteorology.

4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS.
a. Reference to Administrative/Logistics Orders.
b. Location of ammunition supply points.
c. Daily maintenance requirements/expenditure rates for each weapons system.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.


a. Command.
(1) Locations of main and alternate headquarters.
(2) Location of formation artillery Command Post (CP) and/or Fire Support
Coordination Cell (FSCC)/Fire Support Elements (FSE)/Air Liaison Elements.
(3) Liaison.
b. Signal.
(1) Signal Operating Instructions (SOIs).
(2) Counter-Surveillance Instructions.
(3) Code-words.

ACKNOWLEDGE:
NAME (Commander’s last name)
RANK
OFFICIAL: (Authentication)
APPENDICES: (e.g. Fire Support - Target Overlay etc)
DISTRIBUTION:
NOTES:

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70. Brigade Fire Support Execution Matrix

8MECHINFBDE FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION MATRIX 02 FSEM HQ,


Headquarters for Phase 2 B - offensive operation IVO LANGAU BDE 12apr
PHASE 2b - 1 2b - 2 2b - 3
TF (BN) OBJ 81, 82, 12 BDE OBJ “LIMA” Consolidation
Task / Purpose Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)
- Surveillance and Recce - Non-compliant forces will be enforced to Surveillance and
- Demonstrating combat withdraw by measured steps including Force Protection
power by all available Joint limited attack IAW ROE
Fire Support Assets. - Measured actions against non-statutory
- Force protection forces (NSF) endangering MFOR FOM
Supported Units Method
8AUTBDE / HQ JFSCG/Brig responsible for coordination and synchronization of fire support IAW ROE
<------------4 msn CAS (TORNADO) per day available (including air presence) ------------>
JFSCG (Arty, AH, AIR) <---------------------------------4 msn (R) GMLRS per day available -------------------------------->
AVNTF-11 <--------------------------------------Quick Reaction Force (QRF) ------------------------------------->
BAE (OH-58 for CAS / CCA, NTM 15’)
TF-81 POF 1 POF o/o
FS-Elements: TF-11 plans and ensures 3 msn
JFSCT-1/ ARTYBN, ARTY Fire for OBJ “81”
3 x MFC
Trigger: Force protection
TF-82 POF o/o POF o/o
FS-Elements:
JFSCT-2 ARTYBN,
3 x MFC

Phase 2b-3 will be ordered in a separate FRAGO


1. RECCE COY (mech) POF o/o POF o/o
(P) Series Target “FOXTROTT” JT8431-8436 (à
FS-Element: 2 x SMOKE, S, D 30%), Trigger: o/o.
BFO-3/ RECCEARTYBN
(P) JT 8402 D30% of mortar PLT:
Trigger: hostile act IAW ROE 99a/b,
FSCM: CFL “LIMA”, NFAs active.
(A for 2.RECCE): JT 8301 D100% /GMLRS,
(P) Target Group “N 81/2” (SEAD & CAS)
Trigger and FSCM: o/o ICCW JFSCG
2. RECCE COY (mot) POF o/o POF o/o
(P) JT 8301 D100%.
FS-Element: (P, A=1.RECCE) JT8302 D100% /GMLRS.
BFO-1 / RECCEARTYBN
(A for BFO-2) Series Target “LIMA” JT8411-
8419. Trigger for all TGTs: o/o
FSCM: CFL “LIMA”, NFAs active
BFO-2/ RECCEARTYBN POF o/o POF 1 (P, A = 2 RECCE COY)
(TACOM) Series Target “LIMA” JT8411-8419
(à 3 x SMOKE, S, D 30%).
Trigger for all TGTs: o/o
FSCM: CFL “LIMA”, NFAs active
TACP (JTAC-01) Terminal Attack Control for 4 msn CAS (TORNADO) o/o JFSCG
(TACOM) <---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->

Required Force protection to Non-compliant forces have removed to


Effects, End state maneuver units successful. cantonment areas. Reduced threat from TBD

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FA / FS ORG for CMBT AIR / FIRE SUPPORT (C) DOS / ammo


th
FA: 10 RECCEARTYBN AMMO Arty AIR OH58
JFSCG / HQ / 8AUTBDE consists of TACP (ALO)………to HQ / 8AUTBDE HE/+RAP
- C2-Cell (Chief = ECOORD) TACP (JTAC-1)……HQ / 8AUTBDE TACON 5
SMOKE
DOS
- ArtyCell AVNTF-11/BAE… to HQ / 8AUTBDE ILLUM
- AVN/AH-Cell (linked to BAE) QRF available 7,62 mm X
- AIR Liaison Cell AGM65E X
- Battlespace/Airspace Coordination Cell
GBU-24 X
Standard IFS tactical mission: DS

FSCMs / SAFETY REGULATIONS High Pay-off Targets (HPT)


AVN / AIRSPACE COORDINATION: Target- Target-
Target
Priority Selection Remarks
SAAFR, CL max. ALT 150ms AGL System(s) Element(s) of
Standards *)
width: 2500ms a 50m
HOLDING AREA for HELI: 41RLFBDE 1a b ≥Coy CAS/AI
ACP H1: WQ 46870709 c < 25’
Rubian Land Forces (RLF)

a 10m
only with PGMs,
NFAs (all ammo) IFS Safe distance:1500 ms. C3IS, Sensors 1b b Single
TLE CAT ≤2
c < 10’
Ø General MSD / SPH: a 20m

700 ms to own troops if unprotected and in open


AD 2 b PLT ARTY
c < 15’
terrain.
a 20m
Danger Close Missions under authority of tactical ARTY, MRT 3a, 3b b (-) PLT ARTY, CAS/AI
Cdr, REDs IAW Annex II to OPORDER-01 c < 15’
a 20m
MORTAR, ARTY,
Tanks, ATGW 4 b (-) PLT
KHS
c < 10’
*) a) Target Location Error b) Minimum Target Size, c) Timeline (if necessary)
Cut off time / Fire for Registration &
PAAs 8th RECCEARTYBN
Fire Support Plan submitted Field Training
o/o o/o NIL
TGT-Numbering System Coordinating
Limitations, ROE
(1) Artillery & Mortars Instructions
JT8400-8499 HQ/8AUTMECHINFBDE Weapons Release Authority:
73a: Prior to an engagement PID (Positive Identification)
has to be achieved either with a single sensor (visual, BDE CDR
JT8300-8399 RFT : GMLRS/LCC
IR/TI, electro-optic-real time) or by at least two of the
following sensors – e.g: SIGINT / EW, SATINT, electro- JT8200-8299 TF-82 / DS Arty planning Warning Shots have to be in
optic-time delayed, Radar & track behavior, flight plan following sequence:
correlation, acoustic intelligence or other secure JT8100-8199 TF-81 / DS Arty planning Arty:
active/passive systems 1. 1 round SMOKE
JT8500-8599 mortar/TF-81
99a/b: If Conflicting parties are displaying hostile act, 2. 1 volley SMOKE
(not constituting an actual attack), use of offensive force – JT8600-8699 mortar/TF-82 3. 1 round HE
including lethal force – is permitted. E.g.:
(1) No-Flight Zone trespasses.
(2) AIR (REQUEST) NUMBERING SYSTEM
(2) Establish roadblocks inside DMZ. First Digit Second Digit Third / fourth digits. Calendar day (01-31)
(3) Switched-on (active) AD-Radar-Systems.
1 Immediate CAS A LCC Last two digits. Sequence number (01-99)
(4) Bringing IFS-weapons to bear which can
endanger targets inside the DMZ Battlespace. 2 Pre-planned CAS B AUTBDE Example:
(5) Mine laying or laying IEDs. 3 Reconnaissance C GEBDE “2B1402”, pre-planned CAS for AUTBDE on
4 Air Interdiction D UKBDE 14. Calendar day, second msn for this day.

Explanation, Remarks
Acronym Mission Degree of Effectiveness
POF Priority Of Fire (DS) DESTROY …% (D) …30%-100% casualties or material damage
QRF Quick Reaction Force (HELI) NEUTRALIZE (N) …10 %, render a target out of the battle temporarily
P, A primary, alternate observer SUPPRESS (S) … temporary or transient degradation (minimum 4 minutes)

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71. Combined HPTL-TSS-AGM-List


This HPTL (actually combined with an attack guidance matrix [AGM] and the target
selection standards [TSS] – footing on guidelines of the effect guidance Matrix [EGM]) is a
key product for prioritizing targets and used to determine Fire Support attack guidance.

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72. Battalion Fire Support Execution Matrix


TF-10 (BN) FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION MATRIX (FSEM) No. 050800A
HQ Joint Fire Support for offence operation in the area of RADESSEN 1 mar12
PHASE
1 2 3
RECCE / FIX NONDORF / HASTY DEFENCE / OBJ 2
TF-10 APPROACH OBJ “N” & “S”
H EFF 1125 0/0
Task / Purpose Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)
Ü Recce and Target Acquisition in ÜDelay and disrupt proceeding ENY Ü Surveillance
the area of KLEIN-ULLRICHSCHL, motINFBN “SUMMA” IVO
and LANGAU IOT ensure conditions ZISSERDORF IOT provide the Ü Ensure Force protection
for Joint Fires Engagements. defence of 4th MECHINFCOY. and DS for TF-10 attacking
Ü Destroy ENY mortar in Ü DS for attack OBJ “N” & “S” OBJ 2
RADESSEN Ü Destroy ENY Reserve entering
Ü Ensure Force protection from KLEIN-ULLRICHSCHLAG.
Supported Units Method
HQ/TF-10 JFSCT/TF-10 responsible for coordination and synchronization of available fire support assets
1 msn AIR (CAS/AI) 1115 -1212, 1 mission AAVN (CAS/CCA) and Reinforcement by GMLRS on request
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
(-)RECCE-Element POF o/o (P&A)
LANGAU Destroy MBTs and ATGW-Capacity of motINFBN “SUMMA” / 1 msn AI/CAS in TAI “LIMA”.
JFS-Element: Trigger: ENY crosses boarder north of LANGAU / minimum size (+) COY.
JFST-1 BBT destroy ENY ArtyBn northeast of LANGAU o/o
(FO+JTAC) FSCM:
(-)RECCE-Element POF 1 (P&A) POF o/o (P&A)
KL-ULLRICH Destroy ENY mortar in RADESSEN Destroy MBTs and ATGW-Capacity of ResCoy / 1 msn AHS
JFS-Element: HPT No… 4 msn ARTY/MRT-Fire (CAS/CCA) in TAI “ROMEO” IVO KLEIN-ULLRICHSCHLAG
2nd FO (pre-planned asset: MRT/5thBN) Trigger: immediate-if recce - NLT own forces crossing LD in
ICC with Trigger: o/o PHYRAHOFSIEDLUNG
4thMECHINFBN / FSCM: [ plans 3 msn ARTY Fire for DS of fixing elements ]
penetration area Trigger: on request / FSCM:
(+)4th NIL POF 1 (P&A)
MECHINFCOY Destroy MBTs and ATGW-Capacity of motINFBN “SUMMA” / 1
msn AI/CAS in TAI “BRAVO”
JFS-Element: [ (+)4th plans 3 msn ARTY Fire ]
3rd FO Trigger: attack of motINFBN “SUMMA” north of ZISSERDORF
FSCM: CFL “XXX” (TF-10) active
(-)2 nd NIL POF 2 (P, A = (±) 1st COY ) POF o/o
nd
TKCOY [ ( -)2 plans 3 msn ARTY Fire for
DS of OBJ “NOVEMBER” ]
JFS-Element: Trigger: Crossing LD
st
1 MRC FSCM: CFL “XXX” (TF-10) active
st
(±) 1 NIL POF o/o (P & A) POF o/o
st
MECHINFCOY [ (±) 1 plans 3 msn ARTY Fire for
DS of OBJ “SIERRA” ],
JFS-Elements: Trigger: Crossing LD
2nd MRC, ALTERNATE for (-)2nd TKCOY
rd Trigger: o/o
3 MRC
FSCM: CFL “XXX” (TF-10) active
Observer Positions occupied. LANGAU or ZISSERDORF: 6 - 8
Mission kill of 50% mortars in MBTs / ATGWs destroyed.
BDA RAFFHOLZ. KL-ULLRICHSCHLAG: 4 - 5 MBTs
Endstate Force Protection for TF-10 / ATGWs of ResCoy destroyed.
successful.
TF-10 gained OBERE SASS ATK of OBJ N/S successful
2nd page analogical to a BDE FSEM

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73. SOP Fire Support Execution

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74. Joint Fire Support Liaison Network - Brigade

The figure above plots the ‘joint fire support liaison network’ from the viewpoint of a Brigade
Fire Support Coordination Group (JFSCG, see also page 15), without Naval Surface Fire
Support.

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N. RADIO & VOICE PROCEDURES

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75. Speech Technique

# Phonetic Alphabet
A ALFA AL-FAH N NOVEMBER NO-VEM-BER
B BRAVO BRAH-VO O OSCAR OSS-CAH
C CHARLIE CHAR-LEE P PAPA PAH-PAH
D DELTA DELL-TAH Q QUEBEC KEH-BECK
E ECHO ECK-OH R OMEO ROW-ME-OH
F FOXTROT FOKS-TROTT S SIERRA SEE-AIR-RAH
G GOLF GOLF T ANGO TANG-GO
H HOTEL HOH-TELL U UNIFORM YOU-NEE-FORM
I INDIA IN-DEE-AH V VICTOR VIK-TAH
J JULIETT JEW-LEE-ETT W WHISKEY WISS-KEY
K KILO KEY-LOH X XRAY ECKS-RAY
L LIMA LEE-MAH Y YANKEE YANG-KEY
M MIKE MIKE Z ZULU ZOO-LOO
# Figures
Figure spoken as Figure spoken as
1 WUN 6 SIX
2 TOO 7 SEV-EN
3 TREE 8 AIT
4 FOW-ER 9 NINE-ER
5 FIFE 0 ZE-RO
# Rules for Figures
Figure Satisfactory conditions Difficult conditions
23 Twenty three FIGURES two three
50 Fifty FIGURES five zero
146 One hundred and forty six FIGURES one four six
200 Two hundred FIGURES two zero zero
1,009 One thousand and nine FIGURES one zero zero nine
1,630 hours Sixteen thirty hours FIGURES one six three zero hours

# Spelling

- Difficult conditions
- Unpronounceable words
- Obscure words “I SPELL:………“
Always spelling:
- Callsign
- UTM grid references
- Target indications
- Authentication
- DTG
- Encrypted text Without I SPELL!

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76. List of Proword

Proword Explanation
ACKNOWLEDGE (ACK) An instruction to the addressee that the message must be
acknowledged
ADDRESS GROUP The group that follows is an address group
ALL AFTER The portion of the message to which I have reference is all that
follows……………
ALL BEFORE The portion of the message to which I have reference is all that
precedes…………..
ANSWER AFTER The station called is to answer after call sign…….. when
answering transmissions.
ASSUME CONTROL You will assume control of this net until further notice
AUTHENTICATE The station called is to reply to the challenge which follows
AUTHENTICATION The transmission authentication of this message is……….
BREAK I hereby indicate the separation of the text from other portions
of the message
BROADCAST YOUR NET Link the two nets under your control for automatic rebroadcast
CALL SIGN The group that follows is a call sign
CLOSE DOWN Stations are to close down when indicated. Acknowledgments
are required
CORRECT You are correct, or what you have transmitted is correct.
CORRECTION a) An error has been made in this transmission. Transmission
will continue with the last word correctly transmitted.
b) An error has been made in this transmission (or message
indicated). The correct version is……
c) That which follows is a corrected version in answer to your
request for verification
DISREGARD THIS This transmission is in error, disregard it. (This proword shall
TRANSMISSION OUT not be used to cancel any message that has completely
transmitted and receipted).
DO NOT ANSWER Stations called are not to answer this call, receipt for this
message, or otherwise transmit in connection with this
transmission. When this proword is employed, the transmission
shall be ended with the proword OUT.
EXECUTE Carry out the purport of the message or signal to which this
applies. (To be used only with the Executive Method.)

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Proword Explanation
EXECUTE TO FOLLOW Action on the message or signal which follows is to be carried
out upon receipt of the proword EXECUTE. (To be used only
with the Delayed Executive Method.)
EXEMPT The station(s) immediately following is (are) exempted from
the collective call or from collective address
FIGURES Numerals or numbers follow.
FLASH Precedence FLASH.
FROM The originator of this message is indicated by the address
designator immediately following
GRID The portion following is a grid reference GROUPS This
message contains the number of groups indicated by the
numeral following
GROUP NO COUNT The groups in this message have not been counted.
I AM ASSUMING I am assuming control of this net until further notice
CONTROL
I AUTHENTICATE The group that follows is the reply to your challenge to
authenticate
IMMEDIATE Precedence IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE EXECUTE Action on the message or signal following is to be carried out
on receipt of the EXECUTE. (To be used only with the
Immediate Executive Method.)
INFO The addressees immediately following are addressed for
information
I READ BACK The following is my response to your instructions to read back
I SAY AGAIN I am repeating transmission or portion indicated
I SPELL I shall spell the next word phonetically.
I VERIFY That which follows has been verified at your request and is
repeated. (To be used only as a reply to VERIFY.)
MESSAGE A message which requires recording is about to follow.
(Transmitted immediately after the call. This proword is not
used on nets primarily employed for conveying messages. It is
intended for use when messages are passed on tactical or
reporting nets.)
MORE TO FOLLOW Transmitting station has additional traffic for the
receiving station

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Proword Explanation
NEGATIVE No. Cancel message(s) sent by the Delayed Executive Method.
(NEGAT may be used to cancel a single message or a group of
messages awaiting execution.)
NET NOW All stations are to net their radios on the unmodulated carrier
wave which I am about to transmit.
NO PLAY During exercises the words NO PLAY are used to distinguish
real activity from messages concerned with exercise play e.g. a
real emergency or real casualty. The first words of any message
is to contain the works exercise (nickname e.g. Red Flag) NO
PLAY
NOTHING HEARD To be used when no reply is received from a call station
NUMBER Station serial number.
OUT This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is
required or expected.
OVER This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is
necessary. Go ahead, transmit…
PRIORITY Precedence PRIORITY
READ BACK Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as received
REBROADCAST Link the two nets under your control for automatic rebroadcast.
YOUR NET
RELAY (TO) Transmit this message to all addressees (or addressees
immediately following this proword). The address component
is mandatory when this proword is used.
RELAY THROUGH Relay your message through call sign………
ROGER This is a method of receipt. I have received your last
transmission satisfactorily.
ROUTINE Precedence ROUTINE.
SAY AGAIN Repeat all of your last transmission. Followed by identification
data means “Repeat………… (Portion indicated).”
SEND YOUR I am ready to receive your message, report, etc. (Used only in
reply to the offer of a message, etc., on tactical or reporting
nets.)
SERVICE The message that follows is a SERVICE message
SIGNALS The groups which follow are taken from a signal book. (This
proword is not used on nets primarily employed for conveying
signals. It is intended for use when tactical signals are passed
on non-tactical nets.)

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Proword Explanation
SIGNALS The groups which follow are taken from a signal book. (This
proword is not used on nets primarily employed for conveying
signals. It is intended for use when tactical signals are passed
on non-tactical nets.)
SILENCE Cease transmissions on this net immediately. Silence will be
(Repeated three or more maintained until lifted. (Transmissions must be authenticated
times) by use of a self-authenticated system, code word, etc.)
SILENCE LIFTED Silence is lifted. (Transmissions must be authenticated by
means of self-authentication system, code word, etc.)
SPEAK SLOWER Your transmission is too fast. Reduce speed of transmission.
STOP Cut the automatic link between the two nets that are being
REBROADCASTING rebroadcast and revert to normal working.
THIS IS This transmission is from the station whose designator
immediately follows.
THIS IS A DIRECTED NET From now until further notice this net is directed.
THIS IS A FREE NET From now until further notice this net is directed.
THROUGH ME Relay your message through me
TIME That which immediately follows is the time or date time group
of the message.
TO The addressees immediately following are addressed for action
--TO-- The portion of the message to which I have reference is all that
which appears between the groups………and………
UNKNOWN STATION The identity of the station with whom I am attempting to
establish communication is unknown.
USE ABBREVIATED Call signs are to be abbreviated until further notice.
CALL SIGNS
USE ABBREVIATED As conditions are normal, all stations are to use abbreviated
PROCEDURE procedure until further notice.
USE FULL CALL SIGNS Call signs are to be sent in full until further notice
USE FULL PROCEDURE As conditions are not normal, all stations are to us full
procedure until further notice.
VERIFY Verify entire message (or portion indicated) with the originator
and send correct version. (To be used only at the discretion of,
or by, the addressee to which the questioned message was
directed.)
WAIT I must pause for a few seconds

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Proword Explanation
WAIT – OUT I must pause for longer than a few seconds.
WILCO I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR SIGNAL, UNDERSTAND IT,
AND WILL COMPLY. To be used only by the addressee.
Since the meaning of ROGER is included in that of WILCO,
WORD AFTER The word of the message to which I have reference is that
which follows…………..
WORD BEFORE The word of the message to which I have reference is that
which precedes…………..
WORDS TWICE Communication is difficult. Transmit each phrase (or each
code group) twice. (This proword may be used as an order,
request, or as information.)
WRONG Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version
is…….

Punctuation Spoken as Symbol


Full stop/period Full stop .
Comma Comma ,
Slant/Oblique Slant /
Hyphen Hyphen –
Left-hand bracket Brackets on (
Right-hand bracket Brackets off )
Colon Colon :
Semi-colon Semi-colon ;
Question Mark Question Mark ?
Decimal point Day-See-Mal .
Underscore Underscore _
backslash Backslash \
At At @

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77. J-Chat Abbreviations & Terms (AIR)


a, arr arrived mc, msn mission complete, mission
a/c aircraft mx maintenance
a/s airspace neg negative
abn airborne np no problem
ack acknowledged nstr nothing significant to report
aff, affirm affirmative o/c on channel
afk away from keyboard o/s on station
ar air to air refueling ob outbound
arct air to air refueling time pax people (e.g. persons to seat)
ata actual time of arrival pers person
atd actual time of departure pls, pse please
att at this time poi point of injury / impact
c copy poo point of origin
c/s call sign pri priority
cba closed before air pt play time
cfa closed for air px position
chk check r/r radar and radios (good)
cip come in please rgr roger
cir, cird clear(ed) rip remain in place
cnx, canx cancel rolex move timings
cnx ff cancel flight follow ron remain overnight
consol consolidate rpt report
d, dep departed rs30 a/c on 30 mins standby to launch
d/o drop off rtb return to base
dc disconnected rtd return to duty
decon deconflicted rtn routine
df direct fire rx receive
enr, enrt en route saf small arms fire
eta estimated time of arrival sb, sby standby
ete estimated time of enroute slide move timings
f+ frag plus sod safe on deck
fl flight level (altitude in hundreds) sof show of force
frg fragged t test
g2w, qtw good two way t/o take off
gt good test thx thanks
gtg good to go tx transmit
hc how copy ty than you
i+ instantaneous unk unknown
ib inbound urg urgent
idf indirect fire urg surg urgent surgical
IFE in flight emergency w/d wheels down
ifr in flight report w/u wheels up
iot in order to wkg working
iso in support of words direction
ivo in vicinity of wspr whisper (private conversation)
l/c loud and clear wx weather
lz landing zone yoyo a/c to air refueling individually
NOTICE: All BREVITY words and tactical abbreviations are still in effect.

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78. 9-Line MEDEVAC Request


Long Message Procedure is required to reduce time spent on the air and allow another station to break in with
precedence traffic if required. Transmission length should be no longer than 20 seconds in any one transmission.
Line 1 Location of the pick-up site UTM POSREP (8 digit format)
Line 2 Call sign, HLZ frequency Call sign and suffix may be transmitted in the clear
Line 3 Number of patients by A – Urgent (w/in 2 hrs) (P1)
precedence B – Priority (w/in 4 hrs) (P2)
C – Routine (w/in 24 hrs) (P3)
Line 4 Special equipment required A – None
B – Hoist
C – Extraction Equipment
D – Ventilator
– Other (Specify)
Line 5 Number of patients to be carried L – Number of patients (Litter)
A – Number of patients (Ambulatory)
E – Escorts (e.g. children)
Line 6 Security at pick-up site N – No enemy troops in area
In Peacetime: number and types P – Possible ENY troops in area
of wounds, injuries, and illness E – Enemy troops in area (Caution)
X – Armed Escort Required (Hot pick-up site)
Line 7 Method of marking pick-up site A – Panels
B – Pyrotechnic signal
C – Smoke signal
D – None
E – Other (Specify)
Line 8 Patient nationality and status A – Coalition or NATO/PfP Military
B – Coalition or NATO/PfP Citizen
C – Non-Coalition or Non-NATO/PfP Military
D – Non-Coalition or Non NATO/PfP Citizen
E – Opposing Force / PW / Detainee
F – Child
Line 9 HLZ Terrain and Obstacles
Include a “(Z) M.I.S.T AT” Report:
[Z – ZAP-Number] M – mechanism of injury I – injury S – signs and symptoms T – treatment
A – Adult/Child T – Time

Example:
“AN39 this is VH23 MEDEVAC request over.”
“This is AN39, send your request, over.”
“This is VH23.
Line one: landing zone EAGLE, Grid 33T WU 2339 6878, break.
Line two: HF 245.5 VH23.
Line tree: one ALPHA, two CHARLIE.
Line fower: ALPHA, break.
Line five: one LIMA, two ALPHA.
Line six. NOVEMBER
Line seven: ALPHA
Line eight: ALPHA, break.
Line niner: LZ clear, small bushes, over.” “This is AN39, roger, stand-by for MEDEVAC, over.”

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O. ABBREVIATIONS

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A
2DRMS Two Distance Root Mean Square (CEP50 x 2.4 = 95%)
A Alternate
A/S Air-to-Surface
AA Assembly Area
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAOB Army Aviation Operating Base
AAR After Action Review
AArtyP Allied Artillery Publication
AAVN, AAVn Army Aviation
AAVnLO Army Aviation Liaison Officer
ABF Attack by Fire (-Position), (Air, HELI)
ACA Airspace Coordination Area
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACE Allied Command Europe
ACM Airspace Coordinating Measures; Airspace Control Means
ACMREQ Airspace Coordinating Measures Request (or “Control Means”)
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Air Control Point
ACP Ammunition Control Point
ACP Airspace Control Plan
AD Air Defense (Defence / brit.)
ADM Air Deconfliction Message
ADP Automated Data Process (e.g. Arty Fire Command & Control)
ADW Air Defense Warning
AGF Anti-Government Forces
AGL Above Ground Level
AGM Attack Guidance Matrix
AGM Air-to-Ground Missile
AH Attack Helicopter
AI Air Interdiction
AIRREQ Air Request
ALICE Air Liaison & Coordination Element
ALO Air Liaison Officer

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ALR Artillery Locating Radar


ALT Altitude
AMA Artillery Maneuver Areas
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level (UK)
AMMO, ammo Ammunition
AO, AOO Area of Operations
AOC Air Operation Centre (Center)
AOCC Air Operations Coordination Centre (Center)
AOCC (L) Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land)
AOD Air Operations Directive
AOR Area of Responsibility
AP Armor Piercing
APAM Anti-Personnel, Anti-Armor
APICM Anti-Personnel Improved Conventional Munition
APKWS Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System
APOD Airport of Debarkation
AR Air Route
ARA Artillery Reserved Areas
ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO)
ARTY Artillery
ASAP as soon as possible
ASC Air Space Coordination
ASC Air Space Control
ASCA Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities
ASFAO Anti-Surface Force Air Operations
ASM Airspace Manager / Management
ASP Acoustic Sounding ranging Post (UK)
ASP Ammunition Supply Point
ASR Available Supply Rate
ASR Air Support Request
ASZ Air Safety Zone
AT anti-tank
AT Air Transport
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

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ATC Air Traffic Control


ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile
ATGW Anti-Tank Guided Weapon
ATI Artillery target Intelligence Zone
ATK Attack
ATM Air Tasking Message
ATO Air Tasking Order
ATRZ Acquisition Target Report Zone (Radar Zone)
AVN, Avn Aviation
AVTF, AVNTF Aviation Task Force
AVS Acoustic Vector Sensor (micro flown)
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWL Acoustic Weapon Locating

B
BAE Brigade Aviation Element
BAE Battlespace Area Evaluation (common known as IPB)
BALO Brigade-ALO
BB Base-Bleed (arty ammo)
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BDE, Bde Brigade
BDZ Base Defense Zone
BG-JFSE Battle Group-Joint Fire Support Element
BIP Ballistic Impact Point (arty)
BKB Blue Kill Box
BLU Bomb Live Unit
BMCT Begin of Morning Civil Twilight
BMNT Begin of Morning Nautical Twilight
BOC Bomb on Coordinate (CAS, AI)
BOT Bomb on Target (CAS, AI)
BP Battle Position
BPSE Brigade PsyOps Element
BPT be prepared to
BR Beam Riding (e.g. Missile Guidance by Laser)

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BRDM “Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina”


(armored reconnaissance vehicle)
BS Battlespace
BSM Battlespace Management
BTRY, BTY, Bty Battery
BXP Border Crossing Point

C
C/S Call Sign
C2IS Command & Control and Information System
3
C Command, Control and Communication
C2W Command and Control Warfare
CA Counter Air
CA Coordination Altitude
CAEL Commander’s Approved Effect List
CAESAR franz. Camion Equipe d’un Système d’Artillerie
CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear
CBU Cluster Bomb Unit
CC Component Command
CCA Close Combat Attack
CCF Course Correcting Fuse
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
CCIRM Collection, Coordination and Intel Requirement Management
CCT Combat Camera Team
CCTL Components Candidate Target List
CD Collateral Damage
CDA Collateral Damage Assessment
CDE Collateral Damage Estimation
CDM Collateral Damage Methodology
CE Casualty Estimate
CEM Combined Effects Munitions
CEP Circular Error Probable (Probability)

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CER Collateral Effects Radius (for the largest CH distance)


CFA Cease-Fire Agreement
CFF Call For Fire
CFL Coordinated Fire Line (NATO-FSCM)
CFL Cease-Fire Line (EU, UN)
CFZ Critical Friendly Zone (Radar Zone)
CGRS Common Geographic Reference System
CHA Collateral Hazard Area (formed by the CER)
CHB Clear - Hold - Build (tasks in COIN-operations)
CHG (propellant) Charge (ammo)
CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
CIVCAS Civilian Casualties
CJSOAC Combined Joint Special Operations Air Command
CJSOCC Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command
C/K Capture or Kill (option; mission)
CKP Checkpoint
CL Coordination Line
CL Coordination Level (airspace)
CLOS Command to Line-Of-Sight
CMD Command
CMSD Collateral/Combat Minimum Safe Distance
CNA Computer Network Attack
CND Computer Network Defense
CNE Computer Network Exploitation
CNO Computer Network Operations
COA Course(s) of Action
COIN Counter-Insurgency Operations
COLT Combat Observation and Lasing Team
COM, COMD Commander, command
CONOPS Concept of Operations
COP Common Operational Picture
COS Chief of Staff
CP Contact Point, Command Post
CPHD Copperhead (arty)

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CPOE Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment


CRAM, C-RAM Counter Rocket Artillery & Mortar (protection)
CRM Composite Risk Management
CS Combat Support
C/S Call Sign
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSS Combat Service Support
CTOC Combined Tactical Operation Center
CUAV Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
CWA Consent Winning Activities (e.g. with money)
CZ Censor Zone (Radar Zone)

D
D Destroy
D3A Decide, Detect, Deliver & Assess (Tactical Targeting)
DAMRA Defense Against Mortar Rocket Attack
DARB Daily Recce Board
DCA Defensive Counter Air
DE Desired Effect
DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses
‘DH’ ‘Delta Hotel’ (direct hit)
DMLGB Dual-Mode Laser-Guided Bomb
DMPI Desired Mean Point of Impact
DMS Degrees - Minutes - Seconds
DMZ De-Militarized Zone
DNL Do Not Load!
DOS Day of Supply
DP Decision Point
DP Displaced Persons
DPI Desired Point of Impact
DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition
DS Direct Support
DSF Defensive Suppressive Fire
DSM Decision Support Matrix

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DSO Decision Support Overlay


DT Dynamic Targets
DTG Day-Time-Group
DTWG Division Targeting Working Group
DVO Direct View Optics

E
E enhanced
EA Engagement Area
EA Electronic Attack
E-CAS, ECAS Emergency CAS
EBA Effects Based Approach
EBAO Effects Based Approach to Operation
ECR Electronic Counter Reconnaissance
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
ECOORD Effects Coordinator
EECT End of Evening Civil Twilight
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EENT End of Evening Nautical Twilight
EFATs Essential Field Artillery Tasks
EFF effective
EFSTs Essential Fire Support Tasks
EGM Effects Guidance Matrix
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
ELM Element
EMCON Emission Control
EN, ENY enemy
ENG, eng engage
EO Electro Optical
EOB Electronic Order of Battle (EW)
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOM End of Mission
EPW Enhanced Paveway
EPW Enemy Prisoner of War

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ER Extended Range
ERGM Extended Range Guided Munition (e.g. naval gunfire)
ESM Electronic Support Measures
EST estimated
ET Emerging Targets
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
EW Electronic Warfare
EZ Engagement Zone (Radar Zone)

F
FA Field Artillery
FABINT Forensic and Biometric Intel
FAC Forward Air Controller
FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)
FARP Forward Arming & Refueling Point
FASCAM Family of Scatterable Mines (arty)
fb followed by (brit.)
FDC Fire Direction Centre
FEBA Forward Edge of The Battle Area
FEZ Fighter Engagement Zone
FFA Free Fire Area
FFIR Friendly Forces Info Requirement
FFE Fire for Effect
FIST Fire Support Team
FL Flight Level (air)
FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared
FMV Full Motion Video
FNC Framework Nations Concept
FNU (a person’s) First Name Unknown
FO Forward Observer
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOM, FoM Freedom of Movement
FRAG Fragmentation
FRAGO Fragmentary Order

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FS Fire Support
FSC Fire Support Cell / Centre / Coordinator
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Centre
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCM Fire Support Coordination Measures
FSE Fire Support Element
FSEM Fire Support Execution Matrix
FSLO Fire Support Liaison Office
FSO Fire Support Officer
FST Fire Support Task
F(I)ST Fire Support Team
ft feet (0,3048 meters)
FW, F/W Fixed Wing
FWD forward
FZ Fuse, Fuse (ammo)

G
GAAI Ground Assisted Air Interdiction (Air)
GARS Global Area Reference System
GAT Guidance, Apportionment & Targeting (Air Planning)
GBAD Ground-based Air Defense
GBFS Ground-based Fire Support
GBU Guided Bomb Unit
GCAS Ground Alert Close Air Support
GEM Graduated Enforcement Matrix (wirth©)
GEOINT Geospatial (Geographic) Intelligence
GIRoA Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GLE Gun Location Error
GLTD Ground Laser Target Designator
GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
GND ground
GP General Purpose
GRG Grid Reference Graphics
GS General Support

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GSR General Support Reinforcing


GSV ‘go and see visit’
GTL Gun-Target Line

H
H/A High Angle (arty, brit.)
HA Holding Area (AVN)
HA Humanitarian Assistance
HALE High Altitude Long Endurance (UAV)
HARM High-Speed Antiradiation Missile
HBCT Heavy Brigade Combat Team
HD High Drag (air / bomb)
HE High Explosive
HELTASK Helicopter Tasking
HEP High Explosive Plastic
HEAT High Explosive Anti-Tank
HHQ Higher Headquarters
HICON Higher Control
HIDACZ High-Density Airspace Control Zone
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HLZ Helicopter Landing Zone
HMCS Helmet Mounted Cueing System
HNS Host Nation Support
HOB Height of Burst (arty, brit.)
HOTO Hand Over - Take Over
HOW Howitzer
HPT High Pay-Off Target
HPTL High Pay-Off Target List
HRF High-Readiness Force
HTS HARM-Targeting-System
HUD Head-up Display
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVAA High Value Airborne Asset
HVI High Value Individual

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HVT High Value Target

I
IA Influence Activities
IA Interdiction Attack (same as AI)
IAM Inertial Aided Munition
IAW in accordance with
IC International Community
ICG Intelligence Collection Group
ICM Improved Conventional Munitions
ICP Intelligence Collection Plan
ICW in coordination with / in co-operation with
IDP International Displaced Persons (UN)
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IFF Identification: Friend or foe
IFREP In-Flight Report
IFS Indirect Fire System(s)
IFR Information Requirements
ILL, ILLUM Illumination
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
INFLTREP In-Flight Report
INS Insurgent(s), Insurgency
INS Inertial Navigation System
INTREP Intelligence Report
IO International Organization
IO, Info Ops Information Operations
IOCB Info Ops Coordination Board
IOO Issuing of Orders
IOT in order to
IP Initial Point
IP Information Protection
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IRT Incident Response Team (for CASEVAC / MEDIVAC))
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

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ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance


IVO in vicinity of
IZ Inhibit Zone (Radar Zone)

J
JAAT Joint Air Attack Team
JAM Jammer, jamming
JARN Joint Air Report(ing) Net
JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JEC Joint Effects Cell
JEL Joint Effects List
JEO Joint Effects Observer
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Command (er)
JFHQ Joint Force HQ
JFO Joint Forward Observer
JFIB Joint Fires and Influence Branch
JFS Joint Fire Support
JFSCG Joint Fire Support Coordination Group
JFSCT Joint Fire Support Coordination Team
JFSE Joint Fire Support Element
JFST Joint Fire Support Team
JI(P)TL Joint Integrated (Prioritized) Target List
JMC Joint Military Committee
JPEL Joint Prioritized Effects List
JPTL Joint Prioritized Target List
JRFL Joint Restricted Frequency List (Electronic Warfare)
JSOW Joint Stand-Off Weapon
JSP Joint Service Publication (brit.)
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller
JTACC Joint Terminal Attack Controller Competence Center
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTL Joint Target List

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JTP Joint Targeting Process


JTST Joint Time Sensitive Targeting
JTWG Joint Targeting Working Group

K
K thousand
KEA Kinetic Effects Area (wirth©)
KIAS knots indicated airspeed
KLE Key Leader Engagement
KLEP Key Leader Engagement Plan
KT Key Terrain
KTD Key Terrain District
KTAS knots true airspeed
L
L/A Low angle (arty, brit.)
LAT latitude
lb, lbs pound, pounds
LCC Land Component Command(er)
LCDB Low Collateral Damage Bomb
LCMR Light Counter-Mortar Radar (brit.)
LCR Limited Combat Ready
LD Line of Departure
LD Low Drag
LEGAD Legal Advisor
LGB Laser-Guided Bomb
LGM Laser-Guided Missile
LGW Laser-Guided Weapon
LJDAM Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition
LM Loitering Munitions
LOA Limit of Action
LOA Line of Attack
LOAC Laws of Armed Conflicts
LOB Line of Bearing (EW)
LOC Lines of Communication

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LONG longitude
LoO Line of Operation
LOS Line of Sight
LR long range
LRF Laser Range Finder
LSD Lethal Splinter Distance (brit.)
LTD Laser Target Designator
LTL Laser Target Line
LTM Laser Target Marker (commonly referred to as IR marker)
LZ Locating Zone (required to be covered by radar)

M
MAAP Master Air Attack Plan
MALE Medium Altitude Long Endurance (UAV)
MANPAD Man-Portable Air Defense
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
MAOP Master Air Operation Plan
MASINT Measurements and Signals Intelligence / “Technical INTEL”
MAX maximum
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
ME Main Effort
MEZ Missile Engagement Zone
MEA Munitions Effects Assessment
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
MET Meteorological
METAR Meteorological Aviation Routine Weather Report
METGM Meteorological Gridded Message
MET-TC Military-Enemy-Terrain / Time-Civilians
MFC Mortar Fire Controller
MFOM MLRS - Family of Munitions
MFOR Military Forces
MGRS Military Geographic Reference System
MISCDR Mission Commander
MICLIC Mine Clearing Charge

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MISREP Mission Report


MLC Military Loaded Class
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MND Multinational Division
MNSE Multinational Support Element
MOE, MOEs Measures of Effectiveness
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MOP Massive Ordnance Penetrator (14t)
MOP Measure of Performance
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPI-E Mean Point of Impact-Error
MPSM Multi-purpose Submunition
MRF Multi-role Fuse
MRR Minimum-Risk Route
MRSI Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (Arty firing mode)

MRT, MORT Mortar


MSD Minimum Safe Distance
MSL Missile
MSL Mean Sea Level
MSN, msn Mission
MSR Main Supply Route
MST Military Stabilization Team
MSU(s) Maneuver Subordinated Units
MT Mechanical Time (Fuse)
MTV Medical Task Force
MV Muzzle Velocity (Vo)
MVR Maneuver, Maneuver

N
N Neutralize
N/A not available
NAI Named Area of Interest
NCL Non-Compliant(s) - (Troops)
NCR Non-Combat-Ready

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NET not earlier than


NFA No-Fire Area
NFS Naval Fire Support
NFTL No-Fire Target List
NGF Naval Gun Fire
NGLO Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer
NGS Naval Gunfire Support
NIL, nil nothing in line
NKET Non-Kinetic Effects Team
NLT not later than
NM Nautical Mile
NMR Next Moonrise
NMS Next Moonset
NOE Nap-of-the-Earth
NOSIG no significant change (e.g. weather)
NSF Non-Statutory Forces
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support
NSL No-Strike List
NST No-Strike Target(s)
NTISR Non Traditionnel Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
NTM Notice to Move
NVD Night Vision Device
NVG Night Vision Goggles

O
O/O, o/o on order
OA Operational Analysis
OBJ, Obj Objective
OCA Offensive Counter Air
OCC Operational Coordination Center
OISIG Operational Intelligence Supporting Group (brit.)
OMF Opposing Militant Forces
OOTW Operations other Than War
OP Observation Post, Orbit Point

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OPCOM Operational Command


OPCON Operational Control
OPFOR Opposing Force
OPLAW Operational Law
OPORD Operation Order
OPSEC Operation(al) Security
ORBAT Order of Battle (Report)
OSC On-Scene Commander
OSINT Open Sources Intelligence
OTC Officer in Tactical Command
OTL Observer Target Line

P
P Primary
P/K, PK Probability of Kill
PA Position Area
PA Public Affairs
PAA Position Area for Artillery
PAO Public Affairs Officer
Pax Official military term for people
PCAT Police Combined Action Teams
PD Point Detonating
PDD Point Detonation Delay (includes Short Delay and Delay)
PDSS Persons with Designated Special Status (Law, RoE)
PE d / PE r Probable Error in Deflection / Probable Error in Range
PFF pre-formed fragments
PGK Precision Guidance Kit (arty ammo)
PGM Precision Guided Munition
PGMM Precision Guided Mortar Munition
PI Probability of Incapacitation (%)
PID Positive Identification
PIFWC Person Indicted for War Crime
PIR Prioritized Intelligence Requirements
PKB Purple Kill Box

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PL Phase Line
PLT Platoon
POA, PoA Point of Aim
POF Priority of Fire
POI Persons of Interest
PoL Pattern of Life
POL Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants
POLAD Political Advisor
POO Points Of Origin
PPP Presence-Posture & Profile (of Troops)
PR, PRIOR Priority
PRDSS Properties with Designated Special Status (Law, RoE)
PRI Priority Immediate (CAS; to distinguish from “routine immediate”)
PRX Proximity
PSE PsyOps Support Element
PSU Pilot-Sight-Unit
PTL Prioritized Target List
Q
QNH („Query Newlyn Harbor“) Code for atm air pressure / QNH 1012 hPa
QRF Quick Reaction Force
QRS Quick Reaction Section (e.g. air mobile)

R
R, RFT, rft Reinforcing, Reinforcement
RA Remaining Area (Radar Zone)
RAAMS Remote Anti-Armor Mine System
RAF Request of Authority to Fire
RAP Rocket-Assisted Projectile
RAP Recognized Air Picture
RB Reach Back
RBFA Rear Boundary (of) Forward Area (Air)
RCH Red card Holder (for national caveats)
Rds, rnds rounds (arty ammo)
RED Risk-Estimate Distance

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REF Reference(s)
RFA Restricted Fire Area
RFF Request for Fire Support
RFI Request for Intelligence/Information
RFL Restrictive Fire Line
RIP Relief in Place
RL Report Line
RND(s) round, rounds (arty)
RNG, Rng range
ROA Restricted Operations Area
ROA Remotely Operated Aircraft
ROE, RoE Rules of Engagement
ROEREQ Rules of Engagement Request
RoL Rules of Law
ROVER Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver
ROZ Restricted Operations Zone
RP Release Point
RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft
RP/C Rocket Pod Container
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle (UAV)
RS Readiness State (Air Defense)
RSA Royal School of Artillery (United Kingdom)
RSR Required Supply Rate
RTL Restricted Target List
RW, R/W Rotary Wing

S
S Suppress
SA Staging Area
SA Situational Awareness
SAA Slow-Aviation-Assets
SAAFR Standard used Army Aircraft (Aviation) Flight Route (Network)
SACEUR Supreme Allied Command Europe
SADARM Search & Destroy Artillery Munition

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SAF Small Arms Fire


SAL Semi-active Laser
SALUTE (-Report) Size / Activities / Location / Uniform / Time / Equipment
SAM Surface-to-Air Missiles
SANDA (Intelligence) Sources and Agencies (brit.)
SAPHEI Semi-Armor Piercing, High Explosive Incendiary
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SAR Search & Rescue
SASE Safe And Secure Environment
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SBF Support by Fire (- Position)
SC Special Corridor
SCAR Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (Air)
SCATMIN Scatterable Mines
SDB Small Diameter Bomb
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SER Self-Defenses - Extended Self-Defenses - Request
SFA Security Force Assistance
SFW Sensor-Fused Weapon
SHAPE Supreme Allied Command Europe
SHL Shell (ammo)
SHOF Show of Force
SHORADEZ Short Range Air Defense Engagement Zone
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
SIP Subject Intelligence Pack(age)
SIR Special Intel Requirement
SITREP Situational Report
SKB Surface Kill Box
SL Safe Line (ASCM)
SLAM Stand-Off Land Attack Missile
SLAM-ER Stand-Off Land Attack Missile – Expanded Range
SMK Smoke (ammo)
SOATU Special Operations Air Tasking Unit
SOF Special Operations Forces

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SOI Standing Operation Instructions


SOLE Special Operations Liaison Element
SOP Standing Operating Procedures
S oS System of Systems
SOTAC Special Operation Terminal Attack Controller
SOTG Special Operations Task Group
SOTU Special Operations Task Unit
SP Self-Propelled
SPH Self-Propelled Howitzer
SPGH Self-Propelled Gun-Howitzer (e.g. “ARCHER”)
SPINS Special Instructions (air)
SPOD Seaport of Debarkation
SQD Squad
SQDN Squadron (AVN)
SQOC Squadron Operations Centre
SSA Shared Situational Awareness
SSR Security - Sector Reform
STA Surveillance & Target Acquisition
STANAG Standardization Agreement (NATO)
SWO Squadron Weapons Officer

T
TA Target Audience
TAA Target Audience Analysis
TAC Tactical
TAC Terminal Attack Control (Air)
TACOM Tactical Command
TACON Tactical Control
TACP Tactical Air Control Party
TACP (ALO) Tactical Air Control Party - Air Liaison Officer
TACP (JTAC) TACP - Joint Terminal Controller
TACRES Tactical Reserve
TAD Tactical Air Direction

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TADS Target Acquisition and Designation System


TAI Target Area of Interest
TAL Tactical Air Lift
TAR Tactical Air Reconnaissance
TARN Tactical Air Request Net
TAT Tactical Air Transport
TB Targeting Board
TBC to be considered
TBD to be determined
TBM Tactical (Theatre) Ballistic Missile
TCM Trajectory Correctable Munitions
TCT Tactical CIMIC Team
TD Time Delay (fuse)
TD Targeting Directive (brit.)
TDL Total Daylight
TEA Target Engagement Authority
TEREC (TER) Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance
TF Task Force
TFR Terrain Following Radar
TGO Terminal Guidance Operation (Air)
TGP Targeting Pod
TGT, Tgt Target
TGTG, Tgtg Targeting (wirth©)
THP Terminally-Homing Projectile(s), e.g. STRIX
TIC, TiC Troops in Contact
TIM Toxic Industrial Material
TIO Targeting and Information Operations
TIP Target Intelligence Pack(age)
TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TLE Target Location Error
TLP Troop Leading Procedures
TLSA / TLSR Transfer of Lead Security Authority / ….Responsibility
TMRR Temporary Minimum-Risk Route
TNL Target Nomination List

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TOC Tactical Operation Centre


TOF Time of Fire
TOT Time on Target
TOW Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided
TPT Tactical PsyOps Team
TR Transit Route (air)
TRA Temporary Restricted Area
TRP Target Reference Point
TSA Target System Analysis
TSC Target Support Cell
TSK Tasking
TSS Target Selection Standards
TSS Target Summary Sheet (brit.)
TST Time Sensitive Targets / Targeting
TTF Time to Fire
TTP Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
TTT Time to Target
TUAS Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems
TV, TVS Television, Television Sensor

U-V-W
U utility
UAS, UAV Unmanned Aircraft System, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UH Utility Helicopter
ULH Ultra-Lightweight Howitzer (e.g. M777)
USAR Urban Search and Rescue
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
VBIED Vehicle Borne (Buried) Improvised Explosive Device
VCP Vehicle Check Point
VDL Video Downlink
VE Vertical Error
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

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VOIED Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device


VOL volley (arty)
VRT Visual Reporting Team
VT Variable Time (Fuse)
W/, w/ with
WB White Bag (arty ammo)
WCMD Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
WCS Weapon Control Status
WFF War Fighting Functions
WFZ Weapons Free Zone
WGS World Geodetic System
WLR Weapon Locating Radar
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WNGO Warning Order
WOC Wing Operations Centre
WRA Weapon Release Authority
WSO Weapon System Operator (Air, Avn)
WP White Phosphorous
WX Weather
X-Y-Z
XCAS Airborne Alert Close Air Support
ZULU Universal Time

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Copyright by

Austrian Armed Forces


WO1 Michael WIRTH
michael.wirth@bmlvs.gv.at

With the friendly assistance of

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