PFR Digest Final

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
FIRST SEMESTER A.Y. 2018-2019
Persons and Family

Relations Case Digests
ANDRES, Xylex Dave P. | BAUTISTA, Jamilla Kate A. | CAWAING, Roxanne L. | CERVANTES,

Kimberly O. | CHAGYO, Chalyne G. | DAMEG, Ranz Dominique C. | EVANGELISTA, Lyriz S. |
GANANCIAL, Leigh Taritz C. | JOSE, Kimberly P. | JULIO, Gerald | LAZA, Cecilia Joahna C. |
MORALES, Ester Cecilia T. | NAMORO, Maireen Jade C. | PACUNO, Pio Theodore S. | PAGUEL,
Val Mollyn E. | PASCUA, Frederick D.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (ART. 1-18, NCC) 24
TANADA V. TUVERA 24
BASA ET AL.V. MERCADO 24
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. V. TORRES 25
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION V. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA 26
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP. V. ANGELES 26
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. ENERGY REGULATROY
COMMISSION 27
ARROYO V. DEPARTMEN OF JUSTICE 28
FORTUNA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 29
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., (NMSMI) V. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES -
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 30
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER’S ASSOCIATION V. GARCIA 31
COMPUTATION OF TIME, ART. 13, NCC 31
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. 32

1 PEOPLE V. DEL ROSARIO TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS32
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, ART. 3, NCC 33
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 33

PEOPLE V. GASACAO 34
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION/PRESUMPTION OF IDENTITY OR SIMILARITY/PRESUMED-IDENTITY

APPROACH 35
WONG WOO YIU V. VIVO 35

YAO KEE V. SY GONZALES 36
DEL SOCORRO V. BRIKMAN VAN WILSEM 37
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM VS. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES LTD. 38
ASIAVEST LIMITED V. COURT OF APPEALS 39
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. V. GUERRERO 40
PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS, ART. 4 NCC 41
TAN V. CRISOLOGO 41
ARUEGO JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS 42
BERNABE VS. ALEJO 43
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION V. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN
BANK, INC. 44
MONTAÑEZ V. CIPRIANO 45
DACUDAO V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 46
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 47
WAIVER OF RIGHTS, ART. 6, NCC 48
GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS 48

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. V. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP. 49
PEOPLE V. MORIAL 51
ILADAN V. LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, INC. 53
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, V. REPUBLIC 54
HOW LAWS LOSE THEIR EFFECTIVITY, ART. 7, NCC 55
BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 55

GRANDE V. ANTONIO 56
CIR V. PRIMETOWN 57
MAGKALAS V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 58
2 GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS60
JUDICIAL APPLICATION AND TINTERPRETATION OF LAWS: JURISPRUDENCE, ART. 8, NCC 62
TING V. VELEZ-TING 62
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 63
BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA 64
UMALI, V. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL 66
FULGENCIO V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 68
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V. NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.
69
VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF APPEALS 70
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, V. COURT OF APPEALS 72
AYALA CORPORATION V. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 73
DUTY OF THE COURTS TO DECIDE, ART. 9, NCC 74
PEOPLE V. VENERACION 74
YAO KEE, V. SY-GONZALES 75
EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW, ART. 10, NCC 75

URSUA, V. COURT OF APPEALS 75
APPLICATION OF LAWS: APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, AND LAWS ON PUBLIC SECURITY AND SAFETY,
ART.14, NCC 76
ASAALI, V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS 76
APPLICATION OF LAWS ON FAMILY RIGHTS AND DUTIES, STATUS, CONDITION, AND LEGAL CAPACITY
OF PERSONS, ART.15, NCC 77
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS 77
PROHIBITIVE LAWS, ART. 17, PAR. 3, NCC 77
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 77

BANK OF AMERICA, NT AND SA V. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION 79
LAW ON PROPERTY ART. 16, NCC 79
MICIANO, V. BRIMO 79
3 AZNAR, V. GARCIA. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS80
BELLIS V. BELLIS 81
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS ART. 17, PAR. 1 AND 2, NCC 82
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION V. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC. 82
INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (IPAMS) V. DE VERA 83
HUMAN RELATIONS (ART.19-36, NCC): PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS, ART. 19, NCC 86
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS 86

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST V. JADER 87
GF EQUITY, INC. V. VALENZONA 88
HEIRS OF NALA V. CABANSAG 89
GO V. CORDERO 90
VILLANUEVA V. ROSQUETA 91
ARDIENTE V. PASTORFIDE 92
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK V. GOMEZ 93
DIAZ V. EN CANTO 94
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. V. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORP. 95
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA 97
CUSTODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS 97

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION V. CALDERON 98
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. V. YU 99
CARBONELL V. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 101
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA 102
HOTEL NIKKO V. REYES 102
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO, ART. 20, NCC 104
MANUEL V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 104
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES, ART. 21, NCC 106
PE V. PE 106
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY 106

4 TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
HERMOSISIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS 106
GALANG V. COURT OF APPEALS 108
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. COURT OF APPEALS 109
WASSMER V. VELEZ 110
NATIVIDAD V. TUNAC 111
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, ARTS. 22-23, NCC 112
SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. V. RRN INC. 112

CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC. V. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 113
ELEGIR V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. 114
BEUMER V. AMORES 116
HULST V. PR BUILDERS 116
GONZALO V. TARNATE, JR. 117
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE, ART. 24, NCC 118
VALENZUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS 118
RIGHT TO PRIVACY, ART. 26, NCC 119

CONCEPCION V. COURT OF APPEALS 119
PADALHIN V. LAVIÑA 120
REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OF PUBLIC SERVANT TO PERFORM DUTIES, ART. 27, NCC 120
PHILEX MINING CORP. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 121
UNFAIR COMPETITION, ART. 28, NCC 121
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION V. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 121
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME/DELICT, ARTS. 20, 29, 30, 35, NCC: SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF
RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT 122
MANANTAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 122

NUGUID V. NICDAO 123
PEOPLE V. AGACER 124
ROMERO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 124
DALURAYA V. OLIVA 125
PEOPLE V. GO 126
CALANG V. PEOPLE 126
ESTATE OF POBLADOR JR. V. MANZANO 127
INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITIES: CIVIL ACTION BASED ON OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS, ART. 31,
NCC 128
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS 128

CANCIO V. ISIP 129
HEIRS OF GUARING V. COURT OF APPEALS 129
CIVIL ACTION IN DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES, ART. 33, NCC 130
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., V. ARGOS 130

RUIZ V. UCOL 131
CIVIL ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ART. 32, NCC 132
COJUANGCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 132

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. CASTILLO 132
QUASI-DELICT/TORTS, ART. 2176-2177 133

BARREDO V GARCIA 134
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY INC. V TANGCO 134
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, ART. 36, NCC 135
BELTRAN V. PEOPLE 135

MERCED V. DIEZ 136
DONATO V. LUNA 137
CONSING, JR. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 139
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL 140
CITY OF PASIG V. COMELEC 140
DOMINGO V SINGSON 141
PERSONS AND CIVIL PERSONALITY (ARTS. 37-47, NCC): PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY, ART. 40.
NCC 142
QUIMIGUING V. ICAO 142
BIRTH, ART. 41, NCC 143
GELUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 143

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT, ART. 38-39, NCC 144
CATALAN V BASA 144

DOMINGO V COURT OF APPEALS 145
MENDEZONA V OZAMIZ 146
DEATH, ART. 42, NCC 147
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V MONTAÑO 147
SURVIVORSHIP, ART. 43, NCC 148
JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO 148
DOMICILE (ARTS. 50 AND 51, NCC) 149
MARCOS V. COMELEC 149
INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY CODE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION, ART. 256, FC 151

ARUEGO, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS 151
BERNABE V ALEJO 152
MARRIAGE DEFINITION AND NATURE, ART. 1, FC AND ARTICLE XV, 1987 CONSTITUTION 153
ANCHETA, V. ANCHETA 153

ABADILLA V. TABILIRAN 154
TILAR V TILAR 155
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE. 156
DELA ROSA V. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN 156

BALOGBOG V. COURT OF APPEALS 157
CALIMAG V. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ 158
REQUISITES: ESSENTIAL, ART. 2, FC SEX 159
SILVERIO V REPUBLIC 159

REPUBLIC V. CAGANDAHAN 161
7 CONSENT, ART. 2 PAR. 2, 6, FC 162

TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS 162
REQUISITES: FORMAL, ART. 3, FC AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER, ARTS. 3 PAR. 1, 7, 8, 10, 31,
32, 35 PAR. 2, FC 163
BESO VS. JUDGE DAGUMAN 163

ARANES V. OCCIANO 164
KEUPPERS V MURCIA 166
MARRIAGE LICENSE, ARTS. 3 PAR. 2, 9, 11-21, 24-25, FC 166
ALCANTARA V. ALCANTARA 166

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 168
CARIÑO V. CARIÑO 170
SY V. COURT OF APPEALS 171
SEVILLA V. CARDENAS 172
ABBAS V. ABBAS 173
GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN 174
KHO V. REPUBLIC 175
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT, ARTS. 27-34, FC 177
REPUBLIC V. DAYOT 177

MANZANO V. SANCHEZ 178
NIÑAL V. BAYADOG 179
COSCA V. PALAYPAYON 180
MARRIAGE CEREMONY, ARTS. 3 PAR. 3, 6, 8, FC 182
EUGENIO V. VELEZ 182

MORIGO V. PEOPLE 183
EFFECT OF IRREGULARITY OF FORMAL REQUISITE, ART. 4, FC THREE-FOLD LIABILITY 185
MORENO V. BERNABE 185

NAVARRO V. DOMAGTAY 186
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, ARTS. 6, 22-23, FC 187
VDA. DE JACOB V. COURT OF APPEALS 187

FOREIGN DIVORCE, ART. 26 PAR. 3, FC 188
REPUBLIC V. IYOY 188

REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO III 190
LAVADIA V. HEIRS OF LUNA 190
REPUBLIC V. MANALO 192
MISALUCHA V. PEOPLE 194
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 196
SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS 197
CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS 199
GARCIA-RECIO V. RECIO 201
MEDINA V. MICHIYUKI KOIKE 202
REPUBLIC V. COTE 203
VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES: NO MARRIAGE LICENSE, ART. 35 PAR. 3, 27-34, FC 205
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES 205

DIAZ-SALGADO V. SALGADO 206
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES, ART. 35PAR. 4, 41-44, FC; ART. 390 AND 391, NCC 208
ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE 208
QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS 208
TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS 209
JARILLO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 209
WEIGEL V. SEMPIO DIY 210
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION V. AZOTE 211
EXCEPTION: VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE 211
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO 211

BIENVENIDO V. COURT OF APPEALS 213
MANUEL V. PHILIPPINES 214
CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO 214
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA 215
REPUBLIC V. NARCEDA 216
REPUBLIC V. CANTOR 216
SANTOS V. SANTOS 217
REPUBLIC V. ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA 218
REPUBLIC V. SAREÑOGON, JR. 219
REPUBLIC V. TAMPUS 219
REPUBLIC V. CATUBAG 220
TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC 220
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40, 52-53, FC 221
DOMINGO V. COURT OF APPEALS 221

ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES 222
MARBELLA-BOBIS V. BOBIS 223
TY V. COURT OF APPEALS 223
CASTILLO V. DE LEON CASTILLO 224
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 225
CHI MING TSOI V. COURT OF APPEALS AND LAO 225

SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS 225
HERNANDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 226
YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 227
REPUBLIC V. DE GRACIA 228
BARCELONA V. COURT OF APPEALS 229
REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO 230
TONGOL V. TONGOL 231
MARCOS V. MARCOS 232
TE V. TE 233
AZCUETA V. REPUBLIC 235
AGRAVIADOR V. AGRAVIADOR 237
MARABLE V. MARABLE 238
AURELIO V. AURELIO 240
KALAW V. FERNANDEZ 241
VIÑAS V. PAREL-VIÑAS 244
REPUBLIC V. ROMERO II 246
DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO 247
GARLET V. GARLET 249
LONTON-CRUZ VS CRUZ 250
BAKUNAWA III VS BAKUNAWA 251
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 253
SINGSON V. SINGSON 253

REPUBLIC V. TOBORA-TIONGLICO 253
ESPINA-DAN VS. DAN 255
REPUBLIC V. JAVIER 256
REPUBLIC V. ENCELAN 256
MENDOZA V. REPUBLIC 257
REPUBLIC V. GALANG 259
OCHOSA V. ALANO 259
CAMACHO-REYES V. REYES 260
TORING V. TORING 263
LIGERALDE V. PATALINGHUG 264
SUAZO V. SUAZO 265
ASPILLAGA V. ASPILLAGA 265
ALCAZAR V. ALCAZAR 267
NAJERA V. NAJERA 267
PARAS V. PARAS 269
ZAMORA V. COURT OF APPEALS 269
PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS 271
ANTONIO V. REYES 272
CARATING-SIAYNGCO V. SIAYNGCO 274
VILLALON V. VILLALON 274
BUENAVENTURA V. COURT OF APPEALS 276
DEDEL V. COURT OF APPEALS 276
REPUBLIC V. DAGDAG 278
PESCA V. PESCA 279
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, ART. 48, FC; A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC 280
BOLOS V. BOLOS 280
GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE 280
MALLION V. ALCANTARA 280
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE 281
LEONOR V. COURT OF APPEALS 281

MINORU FUJIKI V. MARINAY 283
YU V. REYES-CARPIO 283
YU V. LIM-YU 285
PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE 286
JULIAJVO-LLAVE V. REPUBLIC 286

ENRICO V. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI 287
NINAL V. BAYADOG 288
CARLOS V. SANDOVAL 289
ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC 290
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE 291
MAQUILAN V. MAQUILAN 291

REPUBLIC V. CUISON-MELGAR 292
MALCAMPO-SIN V. SIN 293
TUASON V. COURT OF APPEALS 293
CORPUS V. OCHOTORENA 294
PROHIBITED: DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS RULE 9, SEC. 3 AND RULE 34,
SEC. 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT 296
PACETE V. CARRIAGA 296
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS, ART. 40, 51-53, FC 297
SEVILLA CASTRO V. CASTRO 297
EFFECTS, ART. 43-44, 50-53, FC 297
VALDES V. RTC AND VALDES 298

DIÑO V. DIÑO 300
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES: GROUNDS FRAUD, ART. 45 PAR. 3 AND 46, FC CONCEALMENT 300
ANAYA V. PALAROAN 300

BUCCAT V. BUCCAT-MANGONON 302
ALMELOR V. RTC BRANCH 254 302
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE ART. 45, PAR. 4, FC ARTS. 1335, 1336, 1337 OF THE CIVIL
CODE 303

MACARRUBO V. MACARRUBO 303
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION 305
ALCAZAR V. ALCAZAR 305

JIMENEZ V. CANIZARES 306
12 LEGAL SEPARARTION: GROUNDS, ART. 55 (1) TO (10), ART. 101 AND

TABLE OF128, FC; ART. 247,OF
CONTENTSTABLE 333CONTENTS
AND 334,
REVISED PENAL CODE 308
ONG ENG KIAM V. ONG 308

GAUDIONCO V. PENARANDA 308
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO V. COURT OF APPEALS 309
DEFENSES: CONDONATION/PARDON, ART. 56, PAR. 1, FC, FORMS 310
ARROYO V. COURT OF APPEALS 310

GINEZ V. BUGAYONG 311
PEOPLE V. ZAPATA 312
OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO 313
CONSENT, ART. 56, PAR. 2, FC 314
MATUBIS V. PRAXEDES 314

PEOPLE V. SCHNECKENBURGER 314
PEOPLE V. SENSANO 316
RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT, ART. 56, PAR. 4, FC 318

BENEDICTO V. DE LA RAMA 318
COLLUSION, ART. 56, PAR. 5 AND ART. 60, PAR. 2, FC 319
DE OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO 319
PRESCRIPTION, ART. 56, PAR. 6 AND ART. 57, FC 320
BROWN V. YAMBAO 320

DE OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO 321
CONTRERAS V. MACARAIG 322
PROCEDURE FOR AN ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION 323
BAEZ V. BAEZ 323

LAPUZ SY V. EUFEMIO 324
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD, ART. 58, FC 326
ARANETA V. CONCEPCION 326

13 SOMOSA-RAMOS V. VAMENTA, JR. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
327
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE, ART. 60, FC 328
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE, ART. 61-62 AND ART. 49, FC 330
SABALONES V. COURT OF APPEALS 330

ESPIRITU AND LAYUG V. COURT OF APPEALS 332
LAPUZ SY V. EUFEMIO 333
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION, ARTS. 63-64 TO ART. 43 AND 213, FC 334
LAPERAL V. REPUBLIC 334

SIOCHI V. GOZON 334
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES, ARTS. 68-81, 100 AND 127, FC 335
PELAYO V. LAURON 335
GO V. COURT OF APPEALS 337
ARROYO V. VASQUEZ-ARROYO 338
ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO, BILDNER 339
GOITIA V. CAMPOS RUEDA 339
IMBONG V. OCHOA 341
VALINO V. ADRIANO 342
EFFECT IF MARRIAGE DOES NOT TAKE PLACE, ART. 81, FC 343
PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR. 343
DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS, ART. 82-87, FC; ART. 725 OF THE CIVIL CODE 344
CANO V. CANO 344
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER, ART. 84 AND 87, FC; ART. 1490 AND 1782 OF THE
CIVIL CODE 345
ARCABA V. VDA. DE BATOCAEL 345

MATABUENA V. CERVANTES 346
HARDING V. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY 347
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY COMPONENTS, ART. 91,93 AND 95, FC 347
EXCLUDED PROPERTY, ART. 92 AND 95, FC 349
TAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 349
LIABILITIES/CHARGES, ART. 94-95, FC 350
CHING V. COURT OF APPEALS 350

MATTHEWS V. TAYLOR 350
DISSOLUTION, ART. 99, FC 352
IN RE: MULLER V. MULLER 352
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS COMPONENTS (WHAT CONSTITUTES), ART. 106, 116-120, FC 353
NAVARRO V. ESCOBIDO 353
IMANI V. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., 353
DELA PEŃA V. AVILA, 354
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V. DAVID 355
TAN V. ANDRADE 357
ONSTOTT V. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. 358
ORSOLINO V. FRANY 360
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENTT CORP VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL. 360
DEWARA V. LAMELA 362
DELOS SANTOS V. ABEJON 363
BORLONGON V. BANCO DE ORO 363
DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY, ART. 124-125, FC OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY,

ART. 110-112, FC 364
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES INC. V. DEL ROSARIO 364

HEIRS OF GO, SR. V. SERVACIO 365
ROS V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 366
SIOCHI V. GOZON 368
SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR. 369
FUENTES VS. ROCA 369
DADIS VS. DE GUZMAN 370
KO V. ARAMBURO 371
ALEJO V. CORTEZ 373
CARLOS V. TOLENTINO 373
DISSOLUTION, ART. 126, FC 374
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. V. NICHOLSON PASCUAL 374

DOMINGO V. MOLINA 376
UY V. FERNANDEZ 376
LIQUIDATION, ART. 129-133, FC 377
QUIAO V. QUIAO 377
COMPLETE/ABSOLUTE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: LIABILITIES/CHARGES 379
YAO V. PERELLO 379
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE: VOID OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS , ART. 147, FC
379
OCAMPO V. OCAMPO 379
BARRIDO V. NONATO 381
DIÑO V. DIÑO 382
MAXEY V. COURT OF APPEALS 383
CARIÑO V. CARIÑO 384
VALDES V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT 384
BUENAVENTURA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 385
GONZALES VS. GONZALES 386
MERCADO-FEHR V. FEHR 387
SALAS V. AGUILA 388
DIAZ-SALGADO AND SALGADO V. ANSON 389
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, ETC. RELATIONSHIPS, ART. 148, FC 390
CARIÑO V. CARIÑO 390

TUMLOS V. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ 391
FRANCISCO V. MASTER IRON WORKS 392
JOAQUINO V. REYES ET. AL 393
SAGUID V. COURT OF APPEALS 394
JUANIZA V. JOSE 395
ADRIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS 396
YASUO IWASAWA V. GANGAN 397
GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN, JR. 398
VENTURA VS. SPOUSES ABUDA 399
THE FAMILY COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS, ART. 150, FC 400
GUERRERO V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT 400

INING V. VEGA 401
SUIT AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY/NECESSITY OF EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD

COMPROMISE, ART. 151, FC; ART. 2035 OF THE CIVIL CODE 402
TAMBUYAT V. TAMBUYAT 402

HIYAS V. ACUNA 403
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS AND MARIA HONTIVEROS V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND SPOUSES
GREGORIO HONTIVEROS AND TEODORA AYSON 403
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ET AL V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL 404
NICANOR T. SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO AND ANDRES
GUERRERO 405
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE, ART.. 2034-2035 OF THE CIVIL CODE 405

CECILIO MENDOZA V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA 406
FAMILY HOME, ART. 152-162, FC 406
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR V. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON HER OWN BEHALF ET AL. 406

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ET AL. V. DANILO PANGILINAN, ET AL. 407
VILMA G. ARRIOLA AND ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA V. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA 408
JOSE MODEQUILLO V. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, ET AL. 409
ALBINO JOSEF V. OTELIO SANTOS 410
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. AND DORIS A. KELLEY V. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. AND JORGE A.
RAGUTANA 411
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ ET AL. V. ROEL, NOEL AND JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES AND HINAHON STA.
INES 412
FLORANTE F. MANACOP V. COURT OF APPEALS AND E & L MERCANTILE, INC. 412
PABLITO TANEO, JR., ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS AND ABDON GILIG 413
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA AND OFELIA FORTALEZA VS. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN AND RONA LAPITAN
414
SPOUSES DE MESA, V. SPOUSES ACERO, ET AL. 415
PATERNITY AND FILIATION: CONCEPT OF PATERNITY, MATERNITY, FILIATION 416
17 SURPOSA UY V. NGO CHUA TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS

416
KINDS/STATUS OF CHILDREN 417
DE ASIS V. COURT OF APPEALS 417

FERNANDEZ V. FERNANDEZ 418
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN, ART. 164 AND ART. 54 AND 43(1), FC 418
AGUILAR V. SIASAT 418
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: GROUNDS, ARTS. 166-169, FC 419
CONCEPCION V. COURT OF APPEALS 419

ANGELES V. MAGLAYA 420
JAO V. COURT OF APPEALS 421
BABIERA V. CATOTAL 422
WHO MAY FILE AND WITHIN WHAT PERIOD, ART. 170-171, FC 422
LIYAO, JR. V. TANHOTI-LIYAO 422
DE JESUS V. THE ESTATE OF DIZON 423
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY PROOF OF LEGITIMACY, ART. 172, FC 424
GERONIMO V. SANTOS 424

HEIRS OF ROLDAN V. HEIRS OF ROLDAN 425
TIJING V. COURT OF APPEALS 426
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN KINDS OF RECOGNITION: 427
CABATANIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 427

ECETA V. ECETA 429
RIVERO V. COURT OF APPEALS 429
PEOPLE V. BAYANI 431
PEOPLE V. MANANHAN 432
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY, ART. 172, FC 433
ALBERTO V. COURT OF APPEALS 433

NAPOMUCENO V. LOPEZ 434
CRUZ V. CRISTOBAL 434
PERLA V. BARING 436
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE, SUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 06-11-05-SC 436
TIJING V. COURT OF APPEALS 436

AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS 437
HERRERA V. ALBA 438
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO 440
ESTATE OF ONG V. DIAZ 440
LUCAS V. LUCAS 441
WHO MAY FILE AND WHEN TO FILE ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION, ART. 175, FC 443
GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS 443

MARQUINO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 444
TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLOR 445
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN, ART. 176, FC REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9255 446
GRANDE V. ANTONIO 446
DELA CRUZ V. GARCIA 447
BRIONES VS. MIGUEL 447
REPUBLIC V. ABADILLA 449
VERCELES V. POSADAS 450
PEOPLE V. GLABO 451
TONOG V. COURT OF APPEALS 452
MOSSESGELD V. COURT OF APPEALS 453
SILVA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 453
DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS 455
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTH OF TINITIGAN VS.
REPUBLIC 455
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN; ART. 178, FC AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9858 456
DE SANTOS VS ANGELES 456

ABADILLA VS. TABILIRAN 457
ADOPTED CHILDREN REPUBLIC ACT NO.8552/ DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998 WHO MAY ADOPT
458
19 REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS

458
REPUBLIC V. TOLEDANO 459
REPUBLIC V. ALARCON VERGARA 460
IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, AND MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM 460
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION 461
IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM 461

LANDINGIN V. REPUBLIC 462
CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS 463
CASTRO V. GREGORIO 464
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT V. BELEN 465
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION 466
REPUBLIC V. HERNANDEZ 466

IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA 467
TEOTICO V. DEL VAL 468
BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 469
GERONIMO V. SANTOS 469
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION 470
LAHOM V. SIBULO 470
SUPPORT CONCEPT OF SUPPORT, ART. 194, FC 471
LIM-LUA V. LUA 471
ACTUAL NEED VS. CAPACITY TO PAY, ART. 201-202, FC 472
LAM V. CHUA 472
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT, ART. 195-197, FC 473
BRIONES V. MIGUEL 473

QUIMIGUING V. ICAO 474
FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA 475
SANTERO V. COURT OF APPEALS 475
GOTARDO V. BULING 476
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC 477
20 LACSON V. LACSON 478
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT, ARTS. 195-197, 199-200 480
LIM V. LIM 480

MANGONON V. COURT OF APPEALS 481
DE GUZMAN V. PEREZ 482
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC 483
DEL SOCORRO V. BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, 484
RIGHT OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY, ART. 206-207, FC 485
LACSON V. LACSON 485
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE, RULE 61, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 485
ESTATE OF RUIZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 486
SUPPORT DURING THE PROCEEDINGS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

OR LEGAL SEPARATION, ART. 198, FC 487
REYES V. INES-LUCIANO 487
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY, ART. 210, FC 488
SILVA V. COURT OF APPEALS 488

IMBONG V. OCHOA, JR. 490
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY, ART. 211, FC 492
TONOG V. COURT OF APPEALS 492

VANCIL V. BELMES 494
BONDAGJY V. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY 496
SAGALA-ESLAO V. COURT OF APPEALS 498
SOMBONG V. COURT OF APPEALS 499
RECTO V. TROCINO 501
“TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION” RULE 501
GAMBOA-HIRSCH V. COURT OF APPEALS 502

PABLO-GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO 503
SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS 504
DAVID V. COURT OF APPEALS 505
ESPIRITU V. COURT OF APPEALS 506
PEREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 507
DACASIN V. DACASIN 509
EXTENT OF AUTHORITY, ART. 233, FC 511
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. ABEJAR 511
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY, ART. 219-221, FC 513
LIBI V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 513

TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS 514
EXTENT OF RESPONSIBILITY/LIABILITY, ART. 219, FC 514
AQUINAS SCHOOL V. INTON 514

ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE V. MIRANDA 515
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS 516
AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS 518
SALVOSA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 519
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF APPEALS 520
ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION V. PEREZ 521
NAMES AND SURNAMES, ARTS. 364-380 OF THE CIVIL CODE; ART. 178 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
523
REPUBLIC V. GALLO 523
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ART. 370-373, CIVIL CODE 524
REMO V. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 524

YASIN V. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT 525
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN, ART. 364-369, CIVIL CODE 526
IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA 526

IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG 526
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE 528
22 USE OF DIFFERENT NAME, ART. 379-380, CIVIL CODE 528

PEOPLE V. ESTRADA 529

URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS 529
CHANGE OF NAME, ART. 376, CIVIL CODE; RA 9048; RA 1017 530
BASILIO GAN V. REPUBLIC 530
CIVIL REGISTER, ARTS. 407-413, CIVIL CODE 531
YASUO IWASAWA V. GANGAN 531

BALDOS V. COURT OF APPEALS 532
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES, ART. 412, CIVIL CODE 532
REPUBLIC V. COSETENG-MAGPAYO 532

LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS 533
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG 534
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC 535
REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN 536
BRAZA V. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY 536
REPUBLIC V. LUGSANAY UY 537
CHUA V. REPUBLIC 538
REPUBLIC V. TIPAY 539

Effect and Application of Laws (Art. 1-18, NCC)
TANADA V. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 AND 146 SCRA 446
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,

and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters and administrative orders.
They invoked the principle that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette. However, the government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision in this case
on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Petitioners move for
reconsideration or clarification of that decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement

considering the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes. Publication is indispensable requirement for a law to have biding force and effect.
24 Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that “Laws shallTABLEtake OF
effect after fifteen days
CONTENTSTABLE following
OF CONTENTS
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.” The
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication. It is not correct to say that under the disputed
clause publication may be dispensed with altogether because such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Moreover, the term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders;
administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law;
charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; circulars issued by the Monetary Board if they
are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act. Therefore,
all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days
from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
2 of the Civil Code.
BASA ET AL.V. MERCADO
G.R. L-42226 JULY 26, 1935
FACTS:
On June 27, 1931, Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased.
On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the
estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration
proceedings.
On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed
that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the
matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the
notice of hearing prescribed in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure .The appellants also
contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which
the notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
ISSUES:
Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper is a newspaper of general circulation.

RULING:
Yes, the Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation. The record shows that it is
published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial
court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a
"newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that
publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the
newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. V. TORRES
25 GR No. 101279 AugustTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
6, 1992
FACTS:
DOLE Sec. Torres and the POEA Administrator issued DOLE Department Order No. 16,
Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, respectively,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of
processing and deploying such workers due to published stories regarding abuses of Filipino
housemaids in HK. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition their implementation and to annul the
circulars on the ground that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circulars are valid by virtue of compliance of proper publication
requirements
RULING:
No. The circulars are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article
2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987. In the case at bar, the circulars have been issued but were not
published, which is a requirement as in the ruling of Tañada vs. Tuvera, magnifying Art.2 of the
NCC, stating that “Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.” The circulars for
lack of proper publication due to the non-compliance of the 15-day period of effectivity after
publication may not be enforced and implemented. Therefore, the writ of prohibition granted;
DOLE and POEA circulars suspended.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION V. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA
GR No. 158761 December 4, 2007
FACTS:
November 13, 2000, Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
District II (ZAMSURECO). The screening committee disqualified Gonzaga because his spouse
was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based
on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC) which is promulgated by petitioner, National
Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies an elective
government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as director of an electric
cooperative.
On December 12, 2000, Gonzaga filed a second amended petition and averred that the
ECEC was null and void because it had not been published. On December 20, 2000, the RTC
issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the conduct of election for directorship, issued
summons to NEA, and required NEA to comment if the ECEC was published in any newspaper
of general circulation. NEA failed to state whether the ECEC was indeed published in a
newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code
of 1987. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga and denied NEA’s motion for reconsideration. NEA
appealed but was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
26 Whether or not the Electric Cooperation ElectionTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
Code (ECEC) was valid? OF CONTENTS
RULING:
The Electric Cooperation Election Code (ECEC) is invalid. The ECEC applies to all
electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative
regulation, or instruction to subordinates. It is of general interest. Thus, the ECEC should
comply with the requirements of the Civil Code. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that
laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided. Therefore, the the SC denied the petition and affirm in toto the decision of the lower
courts.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORP. V. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
FACTS:
The Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order

No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples
Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a
legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being
applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized
and existing under Philippines laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC
with the petitioner. They were granted such authority. Subsequently, import applications were
withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter both barred from
importing goods from PROC for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations. Private respondents filed a petition before
the RTC praying for the issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PITC.
The court grant the petition ordering PITC to cease from exercising any power to process
applications of goods from PROC. The court further declared the Administrative Order to be
null and void, since the same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid.

RULING:
NO. Although, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid
exercise of a power ancillary to legislation, this does not imply however, it is a valid exercise of
such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989,
under which the respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order,
legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code which states
that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.” The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were
filed with, and published by the U.P. Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does
not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. This court, in Tanada
vs. Tuvera stated, that Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing
27 law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to OF
TABLE LOI 444 and EO 133.
CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V.
ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners are rural electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree No. 269
or the National Electrification Administration Decree. Petitioners are engaged in the
distribution of electricity. On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted which imposed a
limit on the recoverable rate of system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to
their consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations the said law required every rural
electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) on or before 30 September
1995, an application for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No.
9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the
EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission. All electric
cooperatives were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory
Board had prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22 March 2006
Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order of the ERC
directing the refund of over recoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective and invalid
policy guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts
extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission
to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive application.
ISSUE:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC are ineffective and invalid for lack of
publication.
RULING:
NO. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Covered by this rule are
administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there are several exceptions to the requirement of
publication such as:1) an interpretative regulation as it adds nothing to the law and does not
affect substantial rights of any person; 2) regulation that is merely internal in nature; 3) letter of
instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by
subordinates in the performance of their duties. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy
guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it’s IRR, particularly on the computation of the
cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR.
Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.
ARROYO V. DEPARTMEN OF JUSTICE
GR. No. 199082 September 18, 2012
FACTS:
On August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a
28 committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), TABLEwhich shall conduct
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFpreliminary
CONTENTS
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and
2007 elections. The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding
Team are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec.
Thus, in its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato
and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. It recommended that petitioners be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results
in North and South Cotabato. The Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court petitions assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
Petitioners filed their motions but was denied by the Joint Committee.
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was
later indorsed to the Comelec. On November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the
Comelec En Banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to
modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 need not be published for it only enables the
Comelec and the DOJ to exercise powers which are already vested in them by the Constitution
and other existing laws.
RULING:
NO. A close examination of the Joint Committee’s Rules of Procedure would show that
its provisions affect the public. Specifically, the following provisions of the Rules either restrict
the rights of or provide remedies to the affected parties, to wit: (1) Section 1 provides that "the
Joint Committee will no longer entertain complaints from the public as soon as the Fact-Finding
Team submits its final report, except for such complaints involving offenses mentioned in the
Fact-Finding Team’s Final Report"; (2) Section 2 states that "the Joint Committee shall not
entertain a Motion to Dismiss"; and (3) Section 5 provides that a Motion for Reconsideration
may be availed of by the aggrieved parties against the Joint Committee’s Resolution.
Consequently, publication of the Rules is necessary. the assailed Joint Committee’s Rules of
Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors of the DOJ and the Comelec but also the conduct
and rights of persons, or the public in general. The publication requirement should, therefore,
not be ignored.
FORTUNA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173423, March 05, 2014
FACTS:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application before the RTC for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land situated in Brgy. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union.
They claimed that they have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of
the lot for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical
description, and certificate of assessment. RTC granted the application for registration in favor
of the spouses Fortuna. However, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Spouses Fortuna failed to
show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires. The spouses seek a
review of the CA rulings and contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 or
the Public Land Act as amended by RA No. 1942. RA No. 1942 required 30 years of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural
29 land of the public domain. However, this period was TABLEremoved by PD No. 1073
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFand instead
CONTENTS
required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD
No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and
published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January
2, 1979. They allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24,
1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the
30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession dates
back, at the latest, to 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act as amended by R.A.
No. 1942 is applicable for registration of land in favor of the spouses Fortuna.
RULING:
NO. Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that “Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation,” the Court has declared in Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, that the publication of laws is
an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. “All statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.” Accordingly,
Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its
publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8,
1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., (NMSMI) V.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
G.R. 187587 JUNE 5, 2013
FACTS:
On 12 July 1957, Proclamation No. 423 was issued reserving parcels of land in the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation known to be the Fort Bonifacio. On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of
Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared it open for disposition. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"
Proclamation No. 172 was issued on October 16, 1987 excluding Lots 1 and 2 of Western
Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for
disposition. Members of petitioner NMSMI filed a petition with the Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they occupied (Lot 3 of
Western Bicutan) from public land to alienable and disposable land. The COSLAP ruled that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and
30 was therefore, controlling. MSS-PVAO filed a Motion forTABLE
Reconsideration and wasOFdenied.
OF CONTENTSTABLE They
CONTENTS
filed a petition with the CA seeking to reverse the COSLAP resolution but was dismissed.
NMSMI filed its petitions for review with this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
RULING:
YES. It is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.” Under the above provision,
the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official
Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER’S ASSOCIATION V. GARCIA
GR No. 192708 October 2, 2017
FACTS:
On 14 November 1936, a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was created by

virtue of C.A. No. 186 in order to promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the
government of the Philippines. On 31 May 1977, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 was
approved amending, expanding, increasing, and integrating the social security and insurance
benefits of government employees and facilitating the payment thereof under C.A. No. 186. P.D.
1146 was amended, by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291, or the "The GSIS Act of 1997.” Under this
Act, the employee-member and the employer-agency are required by law to pay monthly
contributions to the system. The share of the employer ("GS," or government share) is sourced
from the national budget, while that of the employee ("PS," or personal share) is automatically
deducted by the former from the employee's salary. The employer is mandated to remit the GS
and PS directly to the GSIS within the first 10 days of the calendar month following the month to
which the contributions apply.
GSIS assailed Resolution No. 238, 90 and 179 which embody the Claims and Loans
Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse.
These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general circulation and were enforced
before they were even filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register. GSIS
maintains that the publication of the resolutions was unnecessary, because the policies were
"just a mere reiteration of the time-honored principles of insurance law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolutions are valid

RULING:
NO. The resolutions are invalid and of no force and effect due to lack of publication. the
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera hold that “Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.” When an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
31 increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the TABLEagency to accord at OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE least to those
CONTENTS
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law." In this case, the resolutions additionally obligate
member-employees to ensure that their employer-agency includes the GS in the budget, deducts
the PS, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the GSIS receives,
processes, and posts the payments. These processes are beyond the control of the employees; yet
they are being made to bear the consequences of any misstep or delay by either their agency or
GSIS. Therefore, the Court has invalidated administrative issuances as a consequence of their
non-publication.
Computation of Time, Art. 13, NCC
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

INC.
G. R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In his letter to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), he explained that the real estate industry suffered losses
because of the increase of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financial projects.
Because of the losses incurred, respondent contend that it is not liable for income taxes.
Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR. Therefore, respondent was entitled for tax
refund or tax credit. Respondent filed a petition for review in the CTA when his claim was not
acted upon. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period
for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. It invoked Section 229 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment.
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code. Thus, the two-year prescriptive period
under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days.
Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after
respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. Respondent
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA which reversed
and set aside the decision of CTA. The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the
fact that a particular year is a leap year. In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year,
the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000
should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent petition was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
RULING:
YES. The applicable law for this case is EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
which was enacted in 1987. The law provides that a calendar month is "a month designated in
the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is the "period of time
running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days
in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month. Both Article 13 of the
32 Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE deal with the
CONTENTS
same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. However, the Court hold that Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs
the computation of legal periods. Therefore, respondents petition filed on April 14, 2000 was
filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted
return on April 13, 1998.
PEOPLE v. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-723 May 21, 1955
FACTS:
On July 27, 1953 Paz M. del Rosario was charged with slight physical injuries committed
on the May 28, 1953. The accused thereupon presented a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and
dismissed the case. An order of dismissal was appealed directly to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense charged had already prescribed.

RULING:
NO. The pertinent provision of Articles 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in
computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents.
A month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not
the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the
length of the month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be understood as
containing 30 days; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides that a month means the civil or calendar month and not the regular 30-day
month. With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have
reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). This provision of the new Civil Code has
been intended for general application in the interpretation of the laws. As the offense charged in
the information in the case at bar took place on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil Code had come
to effect, this new provision should apply, and in accordance therewith the month in Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the regular 30 — day month.
In our conclusion that the term "month" used in the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term that a month shall be
understood as a 30-day month, said court held that the two months period for the prescription
of a light offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a month being a 30-day month.
Similarly, we hold that in view of the express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code the
term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the
30-day month and not the solar or civil month. We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in
the information prescribed in 60 days, said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the
commission of the offense, and we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the
offense had not yet been prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29.
Presumption of Knowledge of the Law, Art. 3, NCC
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
FACTS:
November 2, 1990, at around 1:30 p.m., Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.

Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was
crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. The falling
of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to
the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991,
Maria, Jose Juego’s widow, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. after receiving a copy of the police investigation report and
the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s
personnel. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the widow
Maria Juego. The case was appealed but the CA affirmed the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria is barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code pursuant
to Article 3.
RULING:
NO. Maria is not barred from recovering damages. The application of Article 3 is limited
to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision,
which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Also, private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. (Lack of knowledge or mistake of fact). There is also no showing that Maria
knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not
aware of her rights.
PEOPLE V. GASACAO
G.R. No. 168445, NOVEMBER 11, 2005
FACTS:
Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed
local manning agency, while his nephew and co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. On
August 4, 2000, appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
defined under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and penalized under the same law.
Informations read that the appellant and his nephew, unlawfully and criminally recruit,
enlist and promise overseas employment to the private complainants as overseas
seamen/seafarers. In relation to this, the said accused were charged for exacting and collecting
from the said private complainants cash bonds and/or performance bonds without any
authority to do so and despite the fact that the same is prohibited by the POEA Rules and
Regulations, which amount is greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Also, despite the payment of the said
fees, the said accused failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons as
34 determined by the Department of Labor and Employment and OF
TABLE despite the failure of
CONTENTSTABLE OFdeployment,
CONTENTS
the said accused failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said private complainants in
connection with their documentation and processing for the purpose of their supposed
deployment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment since he was a
mere employee of the manning agency.
RULING:
NO. The Court held that, appellant is not a mere employee of the manning agency but
the crewing manager. As such, he receives job applicants. Interviews applicants and informs
them of the agency’s requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to the
applicant’s deployment. As the crewing manager, he was the forefront of the company’s
recruitment activities.
Moreover, the collection for the cash bonds is a prohibition under Section 60 of the
Omnibus Rules and Regulation Implementing R.A. No. 8042 which states that “In no case shall
an employment agency require any bond or cash deposit from the worker to guarantee
performance under the contract or his/her repatriation.” The Court find as flimsy and self-
serving appellants assertion that he was unaware of the prohibition against the collection of
bonds or cash deposits from applicants. It is an established dictum that ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group. In this case, five complainants testified against
appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts tantamount to economic
sabotage.
Processual Presumption/Presumption of identity or similarity/Presumed-identity

approach
WONG WOO YIU V. VIVO

G.R. NO. L-21078, MARCH 31, 1965 (EN BANC)
FACTS:
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 found that petitioner declared that she came to the
Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married
in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a
village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision
finding that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her
into the country as a non-quota immigrant. This was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of
which petitioner was duly notified in a letter dated July 12, 1961. However, the Board of
Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28, 1962, found that petitioner's
claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of
substantial proof of husband-wife relationship". The said Board further held that, it appearing
that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first
visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that
she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas
claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he
admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941.
Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was
35 merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth
TABLEinOF
1908 it must have OF
CONTENTSTABLE been in 1912.
CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage to Perfeto Blas can be recognized in the

Philippines.
RULING:
NO. The record shows that not only is there no documentary evidence to support the
alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many
inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended
marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family
relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to
the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad,
and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be
valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice
of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the
Philippine Library and Museum). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner
to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized
in our country.
Since no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the
case, the Court ruled that what should apply is the general rule that in the absence of proof of
the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. Our law only
recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village
leader is not one of them, therefore it is clear that petitioner's marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
YAO KEE V. SY GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960 NOVEMBER 24, 1988
FACTS:
On January 17, 1977, Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines. Thereafter, Aida
Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration. They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. This was
opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that Yao Kee is
the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other
oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.
The trial court held if favor of the petitioner Yao Kee and her children and appointed Sze
Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. On appeal the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, declared that the Sy sibling are
the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego and declaring
the Sze siblings as the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese
wife Yao Kee, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not
been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China. From said
decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by
respondent court.
Petitioner argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law
and custom was conclusively proven with these following evidences: a) The testimony of Yao
Kee; b) testimony of Gan Ching, petitioner’s brother; c) statement made by Asuncion Gillego
before the trial court to the effect that she testified that Sy Mat admitted to her that he has a
chines wife whom he married according to Chinese law; d) Sy Kiat master card of registered
36 alien; e) Sy Kiat’s alien certificate of registration and; f)TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
certification OF Embassy
issued by the CONTENTSof
the PROC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee to Sy Kiat can be recognized in the Philippines.
RULING:
NO. The evidence presented by the petitioner may very well prove the fact of
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the
validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom. Custom is defined as "a rule
of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory. The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence".
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code. Construing this
provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in
the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 should
consider. Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
DEL SOCORRO v. BRIKMAN VAN WILSEM
G.R. NO. 193707 DECEMBER 10, 2014
FACTS:
On September 25, 1990, petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland and were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16)
years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came
home to the Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter,
respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Petitioner then
filed a complaint affidavit against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The RTC-Cebu
convict respondent for violating the said section of the law and ordered his arrest. However, in a
latter order of the same court, it dismissed the instant criminal case against respondent on the
ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child. 27
RULING:
YES. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that
he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon respondent
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree). Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards
the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM VS. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES LTD.
G.R. NO. 156330, NOVEMBER 19, 2014
FACTS:
On or about 14 September 1987, respondent Glow Laks Enterprises,Ltd, a foreign

corporation organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong, not licensed to do business in
the Philippines, loaded on board M/S Scandutch at the Port of Manila a total 343 cartoons of
garments, complete and in good order for pre-carriage tothe Port of Hong Kong. The goods
covered by Bills of Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and MHONX-3 arrived in good condition in Hong
Kong and were transferred to M/S Amethyst for final carriage to Colon, Free Zone, Panama.
Both vessels, M/S Scandutch and M/S Amethyst, are owned by Nedlloyd represented in the
Phlippines by its agent, East Asiatic. The goods which were valued at US$53,640.00 was agreed
to be released to the consignee, Pierre Kasem, International, S.A., upon presentation of the
original copies of the covering bills of lading. Upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Colon on
23 October 1987, petitioners purportedly notified the consignee of the arrival of the shipments,
and its custody was turned over to the National Ports Authority in accordance with the laws,
customs regulations and practice of trade in Panama. By an unfortunate turn ofevents, however,
unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of lading and on the basis of the
falsified documents, the ports authority released the goods.
Respondent initiated a civil case before the RTC seeking for the recovery of the amount
the recovery of the amount of US$53,640.00 representing the invoice value of the shipment. In
disclaiming liability for the misdelivery of the shipments, petitioners asserted that they were
never remiss in their obligation as a common carrier and the goods were discharged in good
order and condition into the custody of the National Ports Authority of Panama in accordance
with the Panamanian law. RTC dismissed the case and ruled that Panama law was duly proven
during the trial and pursuant to the said statute, carriers of goods destined to any Panama port
of entry have to discharge their loads into the custody of Panama Ports Authority to make
effective government collection of port dues, customs duties and taxes.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the RTC and held that foreign
laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and therefore, it cannot be given full faith and credit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Panamanian laws were proven in the manner provided by our Rules of
Court
RULING:
YES. It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Panamanian laws, particularly Law 42
and its Implementing Order No. 7, were not duly proven in accordance with Rules of Evidence
and as such, it cannot govern the rights and obligations of the parties in the case at bar. While a
photocopy of the Gaceta Official of the Republica de Panama No. 17.596, the Spanish text of Law
42 which is theforeign statute relied upon by the court a quoto relieve the common carrier from
liability, was presented as evidence during the trial of the case below, the same however was not
accompanied by the required attestation and certification.
To admit the deposition as proof of a foreign law is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationale
of Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is to ensure authenticity of a foreign
law and its existence so as to justify its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction
in issue. The above rule, however, admits exceptions, and the Court in certain cases recognized
that Section 25, Rule132 of the Revised Rules of Court does not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of foreign law. The Court allowed the foreign law to
be established on the basis of the testimony in open court. Furthermore, under the rules of
private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the
absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the
same as our local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. While the foreign
law was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner provided
by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. The decision of the RTC, which proceeds
from a disregard of specific rules cannot be recognized.
ASIAVEST LIMITED V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 128803, SEPTEMBER 25, 1998
FACTS:
On December 3, 1987, the plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against defendant
Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amounts awarded
by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The defendant admits the existence of the judgment dated
December 28, 1984 as well as its amendment but not necessarily the authenticity or validity
thereof. However, the plaintiff presented only documentary evidence to show rendition,
existence, and authentication of such judgment by the proper officials concerned. In addition,
the plaintiff presented testimonial and documentary evidence to show its entitlement to
attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation.
On the other hand, the defendant presented two witnesses, namely, Fortunata dela Vega
his personal secretary who testified that n writ of summons or copy of a statement of claim of
Asiavest Limite was ever served in their office and Russel Warren Lousich, an expert on the laws
of Hong Kong and as a representative of the law office of the defendant’s counsel who made a
verification of the record of the case filed by the plaintiff in Hong Kong against the defendant, as
well as the procedure in serving Court processes in Hong Kong and that no record of writ of
39 summons was served on the person of the defendant in Hong TABLEKong.
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
However, the trial court held that since the Hong Kong court judgment had been duly
proved, it is a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties; hence, the party
impugning it had the burden to prove want of jurisdiction over his person. Heras failed to
discharge that burden. He did not testify to state categorically and under oath that he never
received summons. Even his own witness Lousich admitted that Heras was served with
summons in his Quezon City residence. As to De la Vegas testimony regarding non-service of
summons, the same was hearsay and had no probative value. The trial court concluded that the
Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure
of Heras to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment. The CA reversed
RTC’s ruling and held it was necessary that evidence supporting the validity of the foreign
judgment be submitted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced against Heras.

RULING:
NO. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated and Heras was never able to
overcome the validity of it, it cannot be enforced against Heras in the Philippines because Heras
was not properly served summon. Moreover, there was no objection on the part of ASIAVEST on
the qualification of Mr. Lousich as an expert witness. And although it is desirable that foreign
law be proved in accordance with Section 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court, Section 41, Rule 143
of the same law does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law. There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that
touched on the specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in
rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong.
In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be
presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. V. GUERRERO
G.R NO. 136804, FEBRUARY 19, 2003
FACTS:
On May 17, 1994, respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (the Bank) with the RTC of
ManilA. Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged
against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth
US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his
account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation
Guerreros account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerreros
claims except actual damages and seek for the dismissal of the case. Subsequently, the Bank
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros. The affidavit
of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Banks Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Waldens affidavit stated that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated
that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except
actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On appeal, the Bank
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the RTC Orders. The CA sustained the
RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. It ruled that the Walden affidavit
does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support
its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public
documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence. Court of Appeals likewise
rejected the Banks argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to
move with the supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court
of Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in
Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties. The Court of
Appeals concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment,
the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Walden’s affidavit cannot serve as a proof of the New York Law relied
upon by petitioners in their motion for summary judgment.
RULING:
YES. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages
not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on
damages.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiants’ personal interpretation and
opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law
in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not
constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached
copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not
comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to
prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Prospective & Retroactive Effect of Laws, Art. 4 NCC
TAN V. CRISOLOGO
G.R. NO. 193993, NOVEMBER 8, 2017
FACTS:
On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America (US.A.). On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in
Quezon City. She indicated that she was a Filipino citizen by birth and subsequently approved by
the Election Registration Board (ERB). On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary public in Makati City. She also filed a petition
before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. She
stated in her petition that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she became a naturalized
American citizen. However, Tan executed a sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the
U.S.A. Thereafter, the BI confirmed her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. On the same day,
Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010 National Elections to run as
congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City. Respondent Crisologo filed a petition
before the MeTC, seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because (1) she was not a
Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and (2) she failed to meet the residency
41 requirement of the law. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
The MeTC rendered a decision excluding Tan from the voter's list. It held that she was
not a Filipino citizen at the time that she registered as a voter. Aggrieved, Tan appealed to the
RTC, where it was reversed and Crisologo's petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The RTC's
position was that Tan's questioned citizenship was cured. There is no doubt that Tan upon
registration as voter in the First District of Quezon City was still a naturalized American Citizen.
But her questioned citizenship was cured when [Tan] made the following acts: 1) she took an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on November 30, 2009; 2) he filed a
Petition for Reacquisition and/or Retention of Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 before the [BI]; and 4) Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that she make a formal
renunciation of her United States nationality; that she absolutely and entirely renounce her
United States nationality together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and
fidelity there unto pertaining before a notary public on December 1, 2009. With these acts of
[Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino citizenship.
Crisologo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reinstated the decision of the
MeTC. It held that R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied
retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
country prior to the effectivity of the said law and that Tan must have first taken her Oath of
Allegiance before she can be validly registered as a voter because R.A. No. 9225 itself says that
individuals with dual citizenships must comply with existing laws for them to enjoy full civil and
political rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9225 can be applied retroactively.

RULING:
NO. R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their
Philippine citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire
Philippine citizenship. Under the procedure currently in place under R.A. No. 9225, the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The law states that natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January 1993, prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August 2003. If we were to effect as retroactive Tan's Philippine
citizenship to the date she lost her Philippine citizenship, then the different use of the words
"reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225 would effectively be futile.
R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as
regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the
effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law would readily reveal
that only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens
who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be
considered as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. Finally, it is a well-settled rule that
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the legislature
intended to give them a retroactive effect. We must bear in mind that a law is a rule established
to guide our actions without no binding effect until it is enacted. It has no application to past
times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and
has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions.
42 ARUEGO JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R NO. 112193, MARCH 13, 1996
FACTS:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego
and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. On March 7,
1983, a Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was
filed by the minors, represented by their mother and natural guardian. The complaint prayed for
an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children
of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr. The lower court ruled that Antonia Aruego as illegitimate
daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian and that Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to
portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the
lower court. A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was
dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code can be applied retroactively.
RULING:
NO. Private respondents’ action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was
brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof,
which states the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation. The action
brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present
law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application
will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285
of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the
regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action
was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception
to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which
acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the
same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
BERNABE VS. ALEJO
G.R. NO. 140500, JANUARY 21, 2002
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying
that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
43 (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which
TABLEisOFnow being held byOFErnestina
CONTENTSTABLE CONTENTSas
the sole surviving heir. The RTC dismissed the complaint Citing Article 175 of the Family Code,
the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action. And that since the
putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation. The Court of Appeals however ruled that
in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the
Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has
attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away
that right. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
RULING:
YES. A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to
the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency. Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or]
arise from procedural laws.
The Court cite the case of Bustos v. Lucero which distinguished substantive from
procedural law. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive right is a term which includes those rights which one
enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is
a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years
from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to
file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. The
Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION V. STOCKHOLDERS OF
INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R NO. 181556, DECEMBER 14, 2009
FACTS:
On June 17, 1987, The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, filed with the RTC of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already insolvent and
its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general
public. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due
course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted
as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. Republic Act No. 9302 was enacted,
Section 12 of which provides that – after the payment of all liabilities and claims against the
44 closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the
TABLE OF legal rate of OF
CONTENTSTABLE interest, from
CONTENTS
date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in
accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank.
Relying thereon, PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final
Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings. In granting the motion,
the trial court resolved in the negative the sole issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be
applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends, it
otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to prevailing jurisprudence and unduly
prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their principal claim in
2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004. PDIC appealed to the CA which moved to
dismissed the apeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 may be applied retroactively n order to award

dividends to Intercity Bank creditors.
RULING:
NO. A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its
retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to
the contrary “section 28. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation. Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their
operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the
legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge
for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency
of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle
vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.
MONTAÑEZ V. CIPRIANO
G.R. NO. 181089, OCTOBER 22, 2012
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, respondent Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores in Lezo, Aklan.
On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio
V. Cipriano in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, she filed a Petition for the Annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. Respondent’s
marriage with Socrates was declared null and void. Said decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter
from the first marriage, filed a complaint for Bigamy against respondent for her failure to reveal
to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging that her marriage with
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to
speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. The prosecution filed its
Comment arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent
filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second
marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet
been annulled or declared void by the court.
45 The RTC denied the motion. Respondent filed aTABLE Motion for Reconsideration
OF CONTENTSTABLE claiming
OF CONTENTS
that since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the
petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy
was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because
this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a
completely void prior marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the
Family Code is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy.
RULING:
NO. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio
in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had
not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
bigamy were alleged in the Information. As ruled in numerous jurisprudences, the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted
the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
DACUDAO V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. NO. 188056, JANUARY 3, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the
Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored.
After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a
number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order
No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Aggrieved, petitioners have directly
come to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that
DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws,
and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction
46 of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment ofTABLE
laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DOJ No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing
laws with retroactive effect.
RULING:
NO. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist,
and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new
rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore, DOJ Order No. 182 can be
applied retroactively.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION V. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
G.R. NO. 205847, NOVEMBER 21, 2017
FACTS:
On July 21, 1973, PITC, a government-owned and controlled corporation that was
created under Presidential Decree No. 2524 Thereafter, said law was repealed by Presidential
Decree No. 1071, which was issued on January 25, 1977. On December 28, 1981, President
Marcos issued Executive Order No. 7566 which authorized the reorganization of PITC. On
February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877 that further authorized the
reorganization of PITC. Apparently, PITC continued to grant the benefits provided under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its qualified employees even after the lapse of the six-
month period specified in Executive Order No. 877.
The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly resolved by this Court in the
Decision dated June 22, 2010 in G.R. No. 183517 in which COA disapproved the claim of a
retired PITC employee for the payment of retirement differentials based on Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756. PITC moved for a reconsideration of the above ruling, but the same
was denied. Pending the resolution of the above motion, PITC still allocated part of its Corporate
Operating Budget for retirement benefits pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The
amount allocated therefor was ₱46.36 million.
On September 30, 2010, PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth Liberato informed PITC
that the accrual of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was bereft
of legal basis, in accordance with the Decision in G.R. No. 183517. PITC was advised to stop the
payment of such benefits or reverse the amount already accrued. PITC, on the other hand,
argued that it could continue to allocate part of its budget for the aforesaid benefits while its
motion for reconsideration was still pending. Should the Court deny its motion, PITC believed
that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively from the
time it became final on September 27, 2010.
RULING:
NO. It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of
the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal
thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law
of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior
to such adjudication. Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court disagrees
with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively.
As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old
doctrine nor adopted a new one. The Court merely construed therein the meaning and
application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 by taking into consideration the rationale
behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws, and the subsequent
enactments and statutes that eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No.
183517, there was no other ruling from this Court that explained the nature of the retirement
benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Thus, the Court's interpretation of the
aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when
Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.
There is likewise no merit in PITC's contention that the retroactive application of the
Decision in G.R. No. 183 517 would divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to
receive the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The fact that PITC
continued to grant the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 from the
time of the issuance of said executive order until the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 183517 does
not mean that said benefits ripened into a vested right.
Waiver of Rights, Art. 6, NCC

GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 163707, SEPTEMBER 15, 2006
FACTS:
June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes filed a petition for letters of administration. They
alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George
and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate.
Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver
of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabilities.
The RTC denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not
been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
renunciation of right occurred. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights.
RULING:
NO. Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution.
It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of
whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Considering
that the document did not specifically mention private respondent’s hereditary share in the
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides
that any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by
judicial authorization. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
Re: Waiver of rights
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. v. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP.
G.R. No. 187521, March 14, 2012
FACTS:
Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower
Agusan Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract
Agreement3 with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor,
equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the
East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract.
Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly
progress billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days
from receipt thereof. The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include
progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they
agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the
representative of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity.
Thereafter, HRCC commenced the construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract
Agreement. Before the completion of the project, an issue arose between FFCCI and HRRC as to
the payment of works completed by the HRRC. It then halted all operations and submitted the
issue to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) pursuant to the arbitration
clause in the Subcontract Agreement. In its Answer, FFCCI claimed, among others, that HRCC
failed to comply with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of
the latter’s progress billings, i.e. joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was
justified in not paying the amount stated in HRCC’s progress billings. The CIAC ruled that
FFCCI had already waived its right under the Subcontract Agreement to require a joint
49 measurement of HRCC’s completed works as a condition TABLEprecedent
to the payment of the
latter’s progress billings as FFCCI admitted that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its
progress billings, it never required compliance with the said contractual provision of a prior
joint quantification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FFCCI had waived its right under the Subcontract Agreement as to the
joint quantification prior to the payment of progress billings
RULING:
YES. FFCCI claims that its valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a
measurement of the completed works conducted by it and the DPWH. On the other hand, HRCC
maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of FFCCI’s failure to observe the joint
measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its completed works. The terms of the
Subcontract Agreement should prevail. It is basic that if the terms of a contract are clear and
leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.
The parties agreed that the extent of HRCC’s completed works that would be indicated in
the monthly progress billings should be determined through a joint measurement conducted by
FFCCI and HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and the consultants. It is the
responsibility of FFCCI to call for the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works.
As correctly found out by the CIAC, FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint
measurement of HRCC’s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of
a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.”
The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
‘waiver’ covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual,
are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy;
and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large.
Here, it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works
contemplated by the parties in the Subcontract Agreement never materialized. HRCC, on
separate occasions, submitted its monthly progress billings indicating the extent of the works it
had completed sans prior joint measurement. FFCCI did not contest the said progress billings
submitted by HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latter’s completed works as
required under the Subcontract Agreement. Instead, FFCCI proceeded to conduct its own
verification of the works actually completed by HRCC and, on separate dates, and made
payments to HRRC. FFCCI’s voluntary payment in favor of HRCC, albeit in amounts
substantially different from those claimed by the latter, is a glaring indication that it had
effectively waived its right to demand for the joint measurement of the completed works.
50 FFCCI’s failure to demand a joint measurement of HRCC’s completed
TABLE works reasonably
OF CONTENTSTABLE justified
OF CONTENTS
the inference that it had already relinquished its right to do so. Indeed, not once did FFCCI
insist on the conduct of a joint measurement to verify the extent of HRCC’s completed works
despite its receipt of the four monthly progress billings submitted by the latter.
PEOPLE v. MORIAL
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
FACTS:
The appellants herein were charged and convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide in the RTC of Southern Leyte. Appellants' conviction rested on two vital pieces of
evidence: the extra-judicial confession of appellant Leonardo Morial and the eyewitness account
of Gabriel Guilao.
According to the defense, appellant Morial underwent torture during interrogation and
was coerced into giving a confession. During trial, it was revealed that during custodial
investigation, Atty. Tobias Aguilar was the one who was called to assist him as his law office was
only fifty (50) meters away from the police station. Also, while appellant Morial was undergoing
custodial investigation, Atty. Aguilar would come and go from the room where the investigation
was being held. Moreover, in the middle of the investigation, he begged leave as he had more
pressing matters to attend to. This was after the “material points” were already asked from
appellant Morial.
Atty. Aguilar asked appellant if it would be alright with the latter to answer other
questions in his absence. Appellant Morial consented to this. Atty. Aguilar then instructed the
police officers to bring the appellant to his office where he would subscribe to the extra-judicial
confession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver of appellant Morial of his right to remain silent
and his right to counsel during custodial investigation
RULING:
NO. A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach
upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights. The prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the accused was
accorded said rights before he extra-judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.
Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 7438 requires that any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counse. The last paragraph of Section 3 of
the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted. The right of appellant to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate
departure of Atty. Aguilar before the termination of the custodial investigation.
Atty. Aguilar, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by
his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before
the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987
Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel."
Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires.
Precisely, it is Atty. Aguilar’s nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the
Constitution abhors and which the Court condemns.
Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the
investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was an invalid
waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of
the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in
evidence.
That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did
not cure its constitutional defects. As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
ILADAN v. LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, INC.
G.R. No. 203882 January 11, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for overseas employment. La
Suerte hired Iladan to work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a period of two years. Iladan
was then deployed to her principal employer in Hongkong, Domestic Services, to work as
domestic helper. Barely eight days into her job, Iladan executed a handwritten resignation letter.
In consideration of P35, 000.00 financial assistance given by Domestic Services, Iladan signed
an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim duly subscribed before Labor Attache Romulo of
the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong. On the same date, an Agreement, was signed by
Iladan, Conciliator-Mediator Diaz and a representative of Domestic Services, whereby Iladan
acknowledged that her acceptance of the financial assistance would constitute as final
settlement of her contractual claims and waiver of any cause of action against respondents and
Domestic Services. The Agreement was also subscribed before Labor Attache Romulo. On
August 10, 2009, Iladan returned to the Philippines.
Thereafter, Iladan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, refund of placement fee,
payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, as well as moral and
exemplary damages, against respondents. Iladan alleged that she was forced to resign by her
principal employer, threatened with incarceration; and that she was constrained to accept the
amount of P35, 000.00 as financial assistance as she needed the money to defray her expenses
in going back to the Philippines. She averred that the statements in the Affidavit of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and the Agreement were not fully explained in the language known to her;
that they were considered contracts of adhesion contrary to public policy; and were issued for an
52 unreasonable consideration. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether Iladan’s resignation and her execution of the Affidavit of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the Agreement were all voluntarily made
RULING:
YES. The Court is not convinced as we find no proof of Iladan’s allegations. It is a settled
jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to prove that his resignation is not
voluntary.24 However, Iladan did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that respondents
used force and threat.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes
that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no
other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act
of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment,
the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in
determining whether in fact, he or she intended to sever from his or her employment.
In the instant case, Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own handwriting. She also
accepted the financial assistance and executed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
and an Agreement, as settlement and waiver of any cause of action against respondents. The
affidavit of waiver and the settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before Labor Attache
Romulo, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. An affidavit of waiver duly
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document which cannot be impugned by mere
self-serving allegations. Proof of an irregularity in its execution is absolutely essential. The
Agreement likewise bears the signature of Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures of
these officials sufficiently prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the waiver and
settlement. Concededly, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In this case, no such evidence
was presented. Besides, the Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding
agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable
settlement, and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full
understanding of its import. Absent any extant and clear proof of the alleged coercion and
threats Iladan allegedly received from respondents that led her to terminate her employment
relations with respondents, it can be concluded that Iladan resigned voluntarily.
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Otamias were married in
1978 and had five (5) children. In 2000, Edna and Col. Otamias separated due to his alleged
infidelity. Edna filed a Complaint against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines as she demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. However, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment
where he waived only 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children.
The Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. The
agreement was honored for a few years until the AFP suddenly decided not to honor the
agreement without a court order.
Edna then filed a civil case for support where a judgment was rendered in her favour. A
53 Writ of Execution was subsequently issued and Col. TABLE Otamias’ pension with OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE theCONTENTS
AFP was
garnished.
The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals discussed that Section 3135 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638, otherwise known as the AFP Military Personnel Retirement and
Separation Decree of 1979, provides for the exemption of the monthly pension of retired military
personnel from execution and attachment,6 while Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court
provides that the right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support,
or any pension or gratuity from the Government cannot be subject of execution.
ISSUE:
Whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial
support of his legitimate family.
RULING:
YES. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. A waiver has been defined as a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the
intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or
such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional
doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.
The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the
word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any
matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner
or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in
the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and
further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and
agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing
on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right
to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement
benefits belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive
support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties,
and its provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was
coerced or defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between
parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. The Deed of Assignment executed by
Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in
the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.
How laws lose their effectivity, Art. 7, NCC
BARTOLOME v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
FACTS:
John Colcol (John) was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on
board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred
on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the
following day. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary,
filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS). However,
the SSS denied the claim, on the ground that petitioner is no longer considered John’s parent, in
view of John’s adoption by his great grandfather, herein petitioner’s grandfather. The denial was
appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the
SSS.
In denying the claim, both the SSS and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to
the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered
John’s primary beneficiary. It was held that the dependent parent referred to by the law relates
to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is considered as a beneficiary of John

RULING:
YES. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.
Rule XV, Sec. 1(c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the
clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended. Examining the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the
ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art.
167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision.
Article 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents." The term "parents"
in the phrase "dependent parents" in Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be
taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC
did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate
or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one
should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. Had the lawmakers
contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said
55 descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner TABLEbyOFwhich
CONTENTSTABLE OF in
the provision CONTENTS
question
was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all
parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
GRANDE v. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Grande and respondent Antonio lived together as husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This
prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer
to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, appending a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ordering, among
others, the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name of
Antonio as the father of the minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live
Birth from Grande to Antonio.
In affirming this order on appeal, the appellate court ratiocinated that the legal
consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname"ANTONIO.
ISSUE:
May a father compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children?
RULING:
NO. Art. 176 of the Family Code originally provided that illegitimate children shall use
the name of the mother. This provision was later amended by RA 9255 which provides that
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the
illegitimate children.
However, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255 makes use of the
word “shall”, intimating that it is mandatory for the illegitimate children to use the surname of
their father once they are acknowledged.
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the
power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
56 because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative
agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
The use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known
The Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as
void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies when found contrary to
statutes and/or the Constitution. In the exercise of this power, the Court struck down the
provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
CIR v. PRIMETOWN
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. He explained that
the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects
and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown. As a consequence, while
business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses. According to Yap,
because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent
paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate
sales to the BIR. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.
On May 13, 1999, the revenue officer required respondent to submit additional
documents to support its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus,
on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). However, the
CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit, as provided for by Section 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
According to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC
for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap
year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted
return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13
of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA,
even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and
April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days.
ISSUE:
Whether the claim for refund was filed on time

RULING:
YES. A law may be repealed expressly by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked
and abrogated by another, or impliedly, when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one. Section 27, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987, which contains its repealing clause, is not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the laws to be abolished. Thus, the provision only impliedly repealed all
laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
57 unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether theCONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF subsequent lawOF
encompasses
CONTENTS
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably
reconciled. Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal
periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a
leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case,
the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return on April 14, 1998 consisted of 24 calendar months. Respondent's petition filed on April
14, 2000 was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its
final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
MAGKALAS v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot located at the
corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39
years. On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Uban Bliss Project with the former to take possession,
control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. After
conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiff’s structure is
located should be classified as an area center. The Area Center was determined in compliance
with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.
Petitioner filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area as an Area Center. The
said appeal was denied by the NHA. Despite being given a relocation site,, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the NHA. The case was dismissed with the instruction that the
parties exhaust the administrative remedies available to the petitioner.
Sometime in March, 1994, plaintiff received a letter from the NHA which instructed her
to vacate her structure and to relocate. It was stressed in said letter that no Judicial Order was
required to remove the plaintiff’s structure pursuant to P.D. No. 1472.
Plaintiff filed for the issuance of a Writ of Injunction. The Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) against respondents. After hearing and submission of memoranda,
plaintiff’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied. Petitioner avers
that P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 were impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7279, otherwise
known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. She contends that while P.D. No.
1315 and P.D. No. 1472 authorized the NHA to eject without the necessity of a judicial order all
squatter colonies in government resettlement projects, R.A. No. 7279 discouraged such eviction
and demolition without a court order.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 7279 impliedly repealed P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472
58 RULING: TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
NO. R.A. No. 7279 does not necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 as it does
not contain any provision which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of P.D. No.
1315 and P.D. No. 1472. Neither could there be an implied repeal.
Well-settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature
should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
There is no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279
and P.D. No. 1315 and No. 1472, rather, they can be read together and harmonized to give effect
to their provisions. Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction
and demolition without a judicial order as in fact it provides for exceptions. The three laws have
a common objective ─ to address the housing problems of the country by establishing a
comprehensive urban development and housing program for the homeless. For this reason, the
need to harmonize these laws all the more becomes imperative. Hence, in construing the three
laws together, the Court concluded that demolition and eviction may be validly carried out even
without a judicial order in certain instances, to wit:
(1) when the property involved is an expropriated property in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315,
(2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants
in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to
Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472,
(3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279; and
(4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.
GARCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835, June 22, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. A complaint was filed by the Office of the Ombudsman against
Petitioner since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts
of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his
other lawful income, if any. On the basis of the said complaint, petitioner’s wife and three sons
were also impleaded as they allegedly acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of
petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
The Republic of the Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner, his wife,
and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379, as amended.
Petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set
59 aside public respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution1 TABLE datedOF29CONTENTSTABLE
October 2004OFand Writ of
CONTENTS
Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents
Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating
to the enforcement of the assailed issuances. The Sandiganbayan issued the questioned
Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently
issued. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss in the civil case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. Petitioner also filed the
present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the "civil action"
for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such
jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the law,
and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate actions
for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as
can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended, and Executive
Orders (E.O.) Nos. 14 and 14-A.
Petitioner claimed that the Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the
separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, regardless of
whether these civil actions were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No.
1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or indemnification for consequential damages or
other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws. According to petitioner, nowhere
in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the Sandiganbayan
has been vested jurisdiction over separate civil actions other than those filed against President
Marcos, his family and cronies.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and
prosecute petitions for forfeiture
RULING:
YES. Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to
initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No. 1486
was later issued vesting the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture
proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and
prosecute forfeiture cases. This may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the
jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to
file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and
authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.
An implied repeal is one which takes place when a new law contains some provisions
which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a former law. As a rule, repeals by
implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature
so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist, it must be shown that the statutes or
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with
the former. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable
with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that “any provision of law,
order, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.” This is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates
the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and
prior laws. The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction over
60 the forfeiture proceeding and the authority to file the petition
TABLE OFfor forfeiture. As OF
CONTENTSTABLE P.D. No. 1486
CONTENTS
grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special
Prosecutor, the then Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot exercise concurrent
jurisdiction or authority over such cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are
inconsistent with each other and the former should be deemed to have repealed the latter.
On the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No. 148765 creating the Office of
the Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed. The Tanodbayan initially had no
authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided in
Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier
mentioned. P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same
date was P.D. No. 1607 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate
administrative complaints and created the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. P.D. No. 1607
provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations
therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said cases.9 P.D. No. 1607 also removed from
the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law
first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided. From this it may fairly
be inferred that the old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not
expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing
law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. Hence,
the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor
General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts
of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time
remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.
Judicial application and tinterpretation of laws:
Jurisprudence, Art. 8, NCC
TING v. VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant
with their first child. The couple begot six (6) children. After being married for more than 18
years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
Carmen presented as witness Dr. Oñate, a psychiatrist. Instead of the usual personal
interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to
work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder.
The lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s
ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
61 conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at CONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF the time he married Carmen
OF CONTENTS
since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, contrary to
the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in applying the Molina decision which was more than five years
after Petitioner had filed her petition with the RTC.
RULING:
NO. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two
simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article
Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires
that high courts must follow its own precedents. There are also two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves
interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.
Respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis was also
raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, the
Supreme Court explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a
part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110398, November 7, 1997
FACTS:
In April of 1980, private respondent Miranda purchased from the petitioner four special
cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a
family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at
1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. Unfortunately,
a collision occurred and as a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished
in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the
four members of private respondents' families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner, seeking damages for the death
of their family members. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased
ticket numbers listed in the passenger manifest; however, it denied that the relatives of private
respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
62 Tacloban City. The trial and appellate court both held TABLEpetitioner liable for OF
death of
respondent’s’ family members, following the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case
of Mecenas v. IAC which arose out of the same incident.
ISSUES:
Whether the trial court and the appellate court were correct in applying the doctrine
pronounced in Mecenas v. IAC
Assuming the Mecenas case is correctly applied, should petitioner’s liability be limited to
that in the Mecenas case
RULING:
a. Yes. Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that,
although this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are
different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case
should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short,
on the record of this case.
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of maintaining stability
in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere"
(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as
in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue. In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case
were presented and applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the
principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gil, it was held that under the
doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original
proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia
court expressed itself in this wise: "Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different."
b. NO. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private
respondents should be allowed to claim only the amount which was awarded to the seven
children of the Mecenas couple.
Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the
personal circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified even if
private respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case. The doctrine of
stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue
involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the
previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presently
presented. The decision in the Mecenas case relates to damages for which petitioner was liable
to the claimants in that case.
BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
FACTS:
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. On August 28, 2013, petitioner Alcantara filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
63 seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE prohibition
CONTENTSbe
issued permanently restraining respondents from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it
may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. The Alcantara Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Belgica, et al. filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also,
they prayed that the Court issue a TRO against respondents for them to immediately cease any
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they prayed that the Court order the
respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators
who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the
proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003
to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto." Also, they prayed for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the
Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited
to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR." The Belgica
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Nepomuceno filed a Petition seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by
the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the
DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority. The
Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all
cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a
TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive
Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining
PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Consolidated
Comment, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational
and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners
to reply to the Comment. Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective
replies to the Comment. After the Oral Arguments were conducted, the Supreme Court directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
ISSUE:
64 Whether the Supreme Court‘s Decision in G.R. Nos. 113105,

TABLE 113174, 113766,
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFand 113888,
CONTENTS
as well as in G.R. No. 164987, bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
RULING:
NO. The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched
under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel
provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. Therein, petitioners‘ posturing
was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and
activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power,
since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal
and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." In deference
to the foregoing submissions, the Court concluded:: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation
carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation
law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and
identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is
apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to
Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of
(a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are
of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area
of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of
the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
The Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the
main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of
Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but
an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress.
From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is
an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority,
and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed
procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been
passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot
be merely recommendatory. Moreover, the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima
has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in
view of the separation of powers principle.
As for LAMP, the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has
not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in
these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
65 UMALI, v. THE JUDICIAL ANDTABLE
BAROF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNCIL
G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017
FACTS:
In the case of Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, the constitutionality of the practice of
having two representatives from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus,
increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. The Supreme Court, in a
Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of having two representatives from
Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. It was held that the use of the singular
letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or interpretation. The
same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to
the JBC. Had it been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
The Court further articulated that in the context of JBC representation, the term
"Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department as no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. There is no mechanism required between the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers.
Moreover, the ex officio members of the JBC consist of representatives from the three main
branches of government, to wit: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court representing the
judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the executive, and a representative of the
Congress representing the legislature. It can be deduced therefrom that the unmistakable tenor
of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government having equal say in the choice of judicial
nominees. To allow the legislature to have more than one representative in the JBC would
negate the principle of equality among these three branches of the government, which is
enshrined in the Constitution.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. In light of these, both
Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational representation in the JBC. It is by reason
of this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the selection of nominees for the
vacancies in the Supreme Court were not counted by the JBC during its En Banc deliberations.
Instead, the petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope and sealed subject to any
further disposition as this Court may direct in a proper proceeding. This prompted the
petitioner to file the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court’s ruling in Chavez should be applied in this case

RULING:
YES. A careful perusal, reveals that, although the petitioner questioned the JBC's
adoption of the six-month rotational representation of Congress leading to the non-counting of
his votes in its En Banc deliberations, the supporting arguments hereof still boil down to the
proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being mere
rehash of the arguments in Chavez, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis is inevitable.
More so, the petitioner failed to present strong and compelling reason not to rule this case in the
same way that this Court ruled Chavez.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere is a doctrine which means to adhere to precedents and
not to unsettle things which are established. This is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
66 doctrine is based on the principle that once a question ofTABLE
law has been examined and
OF CONTENTSTABLE decided, it
OF CONTENTS
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The same is grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus, time and again, the court
has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same.
It means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in
a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial
system that the Court has ruled that “[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this
Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished." Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
FULGENCIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 141600. September 12, 2003
FACTS:
Private respondent was engaged in the installation of airconditioning systems in the

buildings of its clients. In connection with such installation work, the herein petitioners were
among those hired by the private respondent to work in various capacities, such as tinsmith,
leadsman, aircon mechanic, installer, welder and painter. On different dates in 1992, the private
respondent served the petitioners with uniformly worded notices of termination of employment.
As a result, the petitioners joined other employees in filing three separate cases of illegal
dismissal against the private respondent. The proceedings in all the cases were subsequently
consolidated.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing the complaints for lack of merit. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter’s findings.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the ruling of the NLRC and ordered the private
respondent to reinstate herein petitioners. The judgment of the court became final and
executory.
The private respondent filed a motion for clarification claiming that it had offered
reinstatement to the petitioners but that the latter spurned its offer. The Court denied the said
motion. The case was remanded to the NLRC for implementation. In due course, the NLRC
computed the benefits due the petitioners and submitted an updated computation. The Labor
Arbiter approved the computation in an Order dated August 15, 1997. Meanwhile, on motion of
the petitioners, a writ of execution was issued. Pursuant to the said writ, the sheriff on garnished
the funds of the private respondent which was in the possession of Intel Technology Philippines,
Inc. The same amount was subsequently remitted by Intel to the NLRC.
The private respondent appealed the January 27, 1998 Order of the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC which rendered judgment granting the appeal.
ISSUE:
67 Whether the NLRC was correct in granting the appeal

RULING:
NO. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal of the case and directed the
payment of backwages, to be reckoned from the time of the petitioners dismissal up to the time
of their actual reinstatement. If the private respondent believed the computation to be
erroneous in the light of the factual circumstances obtaining between the parties, it should have
assigned the same as an error when it filed its petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 114290 assailing
the said NLRC judgment. The private respondent did not do so. Although the private respondent
filed a motion for clarification of the decision of the Court in the said case, the said motion was,
however, denied considering that entry of judgment had already been made.
It is, therefore, crystal-clear that the manner of the computation of the petitioners
backwages is an issue which was already resolved by this Court in its decision in G.R. No.
114290 which had long acquired finality. Hence, the Courts decision in G.R. No. 114290, which
directed the payment of the petitioners backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the
time they are actually reinstated, has become the law of the case which now binds the NLRC and
the private respondent. The law of the case doctrine has been defined as a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal. The private respondent, therefore, on appeal to the NLRC in the course of
the execution proceedings in the case, is barred from challenging anew the issue of the manner
in which the petitioners backwages should be computed. Corollarily, the NLRC can no longer
modify the ruling of the Court on the matter. Judgment of courts should attain finality at some
point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the
case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision,
continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was
predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and
enforceability of that dictum can no longer be relitigated anew since said issue had already been
resolved and finally laid to rest in that aforementioned case, if not by the principle of res
judicata, but at least by conclusiveness of judgment.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND
STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 214864 March 22, 2017
FACTS:
PPA is a government agency charged with the management and control of all ports in the
Philippines. On the other hand, NIASSI is a Philippine corporation engaged in the business of
cargo handling. Sometime in November 2000, PPA accepted bids for a 10-year contract to
operate as the sole cargo handler at the Nasipit Port. Subsequently, PBAC issued Resolution No.
005-20008 recommending that the 10-year cargo-handling contract be awarded to NIASSI as
the winning bidder.
The second highest bidder, Concord Arrastre and Stevedoring Corporation (CASCOR)
filed a protest, alleging that two of NIASSI's stockholders on record are legislators who are
constitutionally prohibited from having any direct or indirect financial interest in any contract
with the government or any of its agencies during the term of their office.
Notwithstanding the protest, PPA issued a Notice of Award in favor of NIASSI which the
latter conformed to. However, instead of formally executing a written contract, NIASSI
68 requested PPA to issue a Hold-Over Authority (HOA) inTABLEits favor, in view of CASCOR's
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protest. PPA granted NIASSI's request and issued a HOA dated August 1, 2001, effective until
October 31, 2001, "or until such time a cargo-handling contract shall have been awarded,
whichever comes first." Despite this, the HOA was subsequently extended several times upon
NIASSI' s request.
However, barely two months after the last extension of the HOA, PPA, through its
Assistant General Manager for Operations, Benjamin B. Cecilio (Cecilio), issued a letter dated
December 6, 2004 revoking the extension. In said letter, Cecilio advised NIASSI that PPA
received numerous complaints regarding the poor quality of its services due to the use of
inadequately maintained equipment. Cecilio further relayed that PPA would take over the cargo-
handling services at the Nasipit Port beginning December 10, 2004.19
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred when it issued the Amended Decision affirming the September
2011 RTC Resolution and December 2011 RTC Order, and directing PPA to execute a cargo-
handling contract in favor of NIASSI for a full 10-year term without deducting the period
covered by the HOA.
RULING:
In the instant Petition, PPA contends that the Amended Petition before the RTC had
been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214.56 On
this basis, PPA concludes that it can no longer be compelled to formally execute a contract with
NIASSI upon finality of the Amended Decision, since the term of the perfected contract already
expired on January 3, 2011, 10 years after PPA received notice of NIASSI's conformity to the
Notice of Award.
The CA's findings in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 constitute the law of the case between the
parties, and are thus binding herein. The Court notes that CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 and the instant
Petition both stem from the Amended Petition, and seek the same relief - the execution of a
written contract in accordance with the Notice of Award. Moreover, both cases involve the same
facts, parties and arguments. In this case, the Court held that the doctrine of the law of the case
is applicable.
The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure from a rule previously made by
an appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same case. Pursuant to
this doctrine, the Court, in De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees
Association (DLSUEANAFTEU), DLSU denied therein petitioner's prayer for review, since the
petition involved a single issue which had been resolved with finality by the CA in a previous
case involving the same facts, arguments and relief.
The Court's discussions in DLSU and Heirs of Timbol are in point here where the
allegations and reliefs prayed for in NIASSI' s Amended Petition show that their disposition
required the RTC to resolve a single issue - whether PPA is bound to formally execute the 10-
year cargo-handling contract pursuant to the Notice of Award.
In view of this, the Court resolved to grant the Petition.
VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142947, March 19, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties,
among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). As an appeal bond, IBC 13 filed
69 Surety Bond No. G (16) 00136 issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE (BF) with the
CONTENTS
Confirmation Letter dated September 20, 1993 supposedly issued by BF's Vice-President.
However, both documents were subsequently found to be falsified. Thus, the two (2) complaints
for falsification of public document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor's Office. The
charges against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III were dismissed by the City
Prosecutor's Office which, however, found probable cause against the other respondents.
Nonetheless, on a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), the latter affirmed
the dismissal against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in
the two (2) criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to include
respondent Villadores among those charged.
After the arraignment of respondent Villadores, the private prosecutor filed anew a
Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by private complainant,
herein petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The
incident was referred to the City Prosecutor's Office by the trial court. In compliance, the fiscal's
office submitted a Motion to Admit Amended Informations. The Motion was granted by the trial
court and the amended informations were admitted. Respondent Villadores subsequently filed a
Manifestation and/or Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied.
Respondent Villadores filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Said
petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, sought to annul the Order of the trial
court dated October 10, 1997 which admitted the second amended informations, as well as the
Order dated October 24, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate
court dismissed the petition of respondent Villadores. The decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103
became final and executory on July 18, 1998. Subsequently, respondent Villadores moved for the
disqualification of the private prosecutor in line with the following pronouncement of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 that Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases,
rather, it is IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had
taken from an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. himself
and wherein the latter prevailed. The private prosecutor opposed said motion on the ground that
the pronouncement of the appellate court is a mere obiter dictum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court to the effect that petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. is not the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 is obiter dictum.
RULING:
NO. An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made,
or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally
or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
The pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition
assailing the admission of the Amended Informations. Among the issues upon which the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 was anchored, was "whether Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. is the offended party. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was the
offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent Villadores. The body of the decision
contains discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
70 consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion,
TABLEand to any statement
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFas to matter
CONTENTS
on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some
other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A
decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can
an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one
ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of
which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points,
the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be
regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely
because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005
FACTS:
On 29 December 1999, twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that herein
private respondent Arturo Mojica several offenses. They also requested that an officer-in-charge
from the OMB-Manila be appointed to manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman
from harassing witnesses and wielding his influence over them. An officer-in-charge was
subsequently appointed.
After investigation, the Committee of Peers found prima facie cause to charge private
respondent. The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a
Resolution by the Court of Appeals that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining all therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in
the cases) against Mojica. Meanwhile, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
directed the private respondent Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges. Mojica
filed an urgent motion before the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again why
they should not be cited for contempt.
Despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica’s term of office, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision which dismissed all charges against private
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer

RULING:
NO. The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional
law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The
commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution agree in unison that the
impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In
their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may
be removed only through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw
them from the removal power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious
71 constitutionality. In the first place, the list of impeachable
TABLEofficers is covered by
OF CONTENTSTABLE the maxim
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"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution
states that all judges of inferior courts – and this would include the Sandiganbayan – are under
the disciplinary power of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This view is bolstered by
the last sentence of Article XI, Section 2. In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of
impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his
deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter dictum, that as with members of this
Court, the officers so enumerated were also constitutionally required to be members of the bar.
A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding
under the doctrine of stare decisis.
AYALA CORPORATION v. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284, December 1, 2000.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ayala sold one of its titled lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka
Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained
Special conditions of sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special Conditions of Sale were to
build on the lot and submit the building plans to the vendor before for the latter’s approval.
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special Conditions
of Sale. Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel Sy anf Sy Ka Kieng, were able to sell the lot to
respondent Rosa-Diana Realty with Ayala’s approval. As a consideration for Ayala to release the
Certificate of title of the subject property, Rosa Diana executed an Undertaking, together with
the buildings plans for a condominium project, known as "The Peak", Ayala released title to the
lot, thereby enabling Rosa-Diana to register the deed of sale in its favor and obtain a title in its
name. The title carried as encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the deed restrictions.
Rosa-Diana’s building plans as approved by Ayala were ‘subject to strict compliance of
cautionary notices appearing on the building plans and to the restrictions encumbering the Lot
regarding the use and occupancy of the same.’
Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of
building plans. While the first set of building plans complied with the deed restrictions, the
latter set seceded the same.During the construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium project,
Ayala filed an action for specific performance, with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter
to comply with the contractual obligations under the deed of restrictions annotated on its title as
well as with the building plans it submitted to the latter. In the alternative, Ayala prayed for
rescission of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty.
ISSUE:
Whether Ayala is now estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions

RULING:
NO. The only issue that was raised before the Court of Appeals was whether or not the
annotation of lis pendens is proper. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, in fact stated "the
principal issue to be resolved is: whether or not an action for specific performance, or in the
alternative, rescission of deed of sale to enforce the deed of restrictions governing the use of
property, is a real or personal action, or one that affects title thereto and its use or occupation
thereof.
72 In the aforesaid decision, the Court of AppealsTABLEeven OF
justified the cancellation
CONTENTSTABLE of the
OF CONTENTS
notice of lis pendens on the ground that Ayala had ample protection should it succeed in proving
its allegations regarding the violation of the deed of restrictions, without unduly curtailing the
right of the petitioner to fully enjoy its property in the meantime that there is as yet no decision
by the trial court. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was aware that the
issue as to whether petitioner is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions has yet to be
resolved by the trial court. Though it did make a pronouncement that the petitioner is estopped
from enforcing the deed of restrictions, it also mentioned at the same time that this particular
issue has yet to be resolved by the trial court. Notably, upon appeal to this Court, We have
affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals only as regards the particular issue of the propriety of
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.
The additional pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from
enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it recognized that this said issue is being tried before
the trial court was not necessary to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the annotation of
the lis pendens. A dictum is an opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or
determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, not
the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge himself. It is not necessarily limited to issues
essential to the decision but may also include expressions of opinion which are not necessary to
support the decision reached by the court. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare
decisis.
Duty of the Courts to Decide, Art. 9, NCC
PEOPLE v. VENERACION
249 SCRA 251
FACTS:
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the
necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and
Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged
with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. The two criminal cases were
consolidated.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead,
pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information. After trial and
presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a
decision finding the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of
Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original
penalty. Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge,
denied the same.
ISSUE:
Is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
or Death after a finding of guilt?
RULING:
NO. Respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant
73 at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
TABLE crime of Rape with
OF CONTENTSTABLE Homicide.
OF CONTENTS
Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge
found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not
Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion — depending on the existence
of circumstances modifying the offense committed — to impose the penalty of either Reclusion
Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these
three instances. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that when by reason or on the
occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no
room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the
circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
The trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence was because of his religious
convictions. While the Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to
emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of
the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and
well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty
is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
YAO KEE, v. SY-GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988
FACTS:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in Caloocan City leaving behind real
and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300, 000.00 more or less. Thereafter,
Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant
of letters of administration in said petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge Sy-Kiat’s marriage
to Yao-Kee. The petition was opposed by Yao-Kee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Kiat.
After the hearing, the probate court affirmed that Sy-Kiat was legally married to Yao-Kee. On
appeal, the CA held that respondents are the acknowledged natural children of Sy-Kiat and that
Sy-Kiat’s marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both the Philippine and
Chinese laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19, 1931, in Fookien,
China; that she is not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their marriage was an
agreement of their parents who were as well the signatories of the certificate; that they were wed
by a village leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing the signatures of the
couple’s parents and that she cannot provide any legal document proving that their wedding was
indeed part of China’s custom or China’s laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven?
RULING:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Accordingly,
in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same
as ours. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao-Kee and Sy-Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Wherefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Equity in the Application of Law, Art. 10, NCC
URSUA, v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Ofiicer

assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had a complaint against him for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits.
On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner requested to the
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against
petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the name “Oscar
Perez” on the visitor’s logbook and upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida
Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who introduced himself
as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for
review on his conviction in Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise
known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias.
RULING:
Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved on November 7,
1936 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases”, was amended by R.A. No. 6085on August
4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize the act of using an alias name
publicly and in business transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar
Perez” served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the
petitioner was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious
name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.
Application of Laws:
Application of Penal Laws, and Laws on Public Security and Safety, Art.14, NCC
ASAALI, V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

75 G.R. No. L-24170, DECEMBER 16, 1968
TABLE (En Banc) OF CONTENTS
OF CONTENTSTABLE
FACTS:
A customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the five sailing vessels in
the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu on September 10, 1950. These five vessels,
which were all of the Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu were
heading towards Tawi-Tawi, Sulu carrying cigarettes and some pieces of rattan chairs without
the require import license, hence smuggled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure can be made although the vessel was on the high seas
RULING:
Since the ship is registered in the Philippines, it is governed by our Revised Penal Code,
even outside our territorial jurisdiction. Likewise, in international law, it was agreed upon that a
state has the right to protect itself as well as its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory
but extending to the high seas (Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 234).
Application of Laws on Family Rights and Duties, Status, Condition, and Legal
Capacity of Persons, Art.15, NCC
LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
FACTS:
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in
Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certifiacte of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. In 1945, he discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente. On February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that
Llorente would not support Paula, the dissolution of their marital union, and that Lorenzo
would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act. On November 27, 1951, Lorenzo obtained a
divorce in California. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. On January 16,
1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and begot three children in his later years.
ISSUE:
Can foreign laws be made applicable in the Philippines?

RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and recognized the
validity of the divorce granted in favor of Lorenzo. The Court also remanded the cases to the
court of origin for determination of successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
Prohibitive laws, Art. 17, par. 3, NCC
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
established residence in the Philippines afterwards. The parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States in 1982. Petitioner re-married also in Nevada with Theodore Van Dorn. Dated
June 8, 1983, private respondents filed suit against petitioner claiming that the latter’s
properties in Manila were conjugal and that private respondent had a rightful claim to its
management. Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit claiming that the private respondent
acknowledged that he and petitioner had no “community property” in the divorce proceedings.
The Regional Trial Court denied the dismissal on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUES:
When is a certiorari proceeding justifiable and can the Philippines recognize divorce?
RULING:
The petition was granted, and respondent judge was hereby ordered to dismiss the
complaint filed where respondent judge denied her motion to dismiss said case, and her motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal order. When the lower court acts in a manner equivalent to
a lack of jurisdiction then it devolves upon the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippines nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. Since the couple had obtained a
divorced in Nevada, the husband is estopped from asserting his rights over supposed conjugal
property. The American husband in this instance who was granted absolute divorce with his
Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA v. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party
mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations. The
debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan.
Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage,
which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an
action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the
real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for
the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
RULING:
YES. In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
78 complete in itself. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the
other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition
not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to
be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the
debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner
then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a
cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of
filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the
real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein
private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing
extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause
of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
Law on Property Art. 16, NCC
MICIANO, V. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927
FACTS:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that
the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that
legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled.
By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded
because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre
sued contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will
shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD:
NO. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid
and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
AZNAR, V. GARCIA.
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
FACTS:
79 Edward E. Christensen, the deceased, who domiciled TABLEinOF

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of California, made a will executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 stating that Maria Lucy
Christensen was his only child and that a certain Maria Helen Christensen, though baptized as
Christensen, was not in any way related nor adopted by him. With this, Maria Helen Christensen
was just granted with 3,000 pesos, Philippine currency to be deposited in trust with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos,
Philippine currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, was exhausted while all that was left by the deceased be given to Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Since Maria Helen Christensen was declared by the Court in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen, opposition to the approval of
the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child.
However, the court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the Sate of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California. Oppositor Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but were denied. Some
of which claimed that the lower court erred in ignoring the decision of the SC that Helen was
acknowledged as a natural child; recognizing the calling for the application of International Law;
recognizing that the validity of the testamentary disposition of the distribution of estate should
be governed by the Philippine laws; declaring the schedule of distribution was contrary to
Philippine laws.
ISSUE:
What law will determine and recognize the validity of testamentary provisions and the
disposition of the bequeathed of the deceased given that his domicile was the Philippines but his
citizenship is in California; the repercussion of which is the determining factor of whether Maria
Helen Christensen’s appeal for ½ share of the properties be granted or not.
RULING:
Art. 16 of the Philippine Civil Code states that “…intestate and testamentary
successions…shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where
said property may be found. Since Edward Christensen was a California citizen, the Philippines
where he executed his testament referred back to the laws of which he was a citizen of –
California, USA. However, no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions was found, therefore it referred to no other than the private law of the state of which
the decedent was a citizen – State of California. Referring then to California Civil Code, Article
946 authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile.
Finding therefore that Philippines is the domicile of the deceased, the validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, pursuant to the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
Judgment is therefore reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine Law on succession provides.
BELLIS V. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. By his first
wife whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children. By his second wife who survived him, he
80 had three legitimate children. Finally, he had another threeTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
illegitimate OF CONTENTS
children. Before he died,
he executed two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything.
Texas has no conflicts rule governing successional rights. Furthermore, under the Texas Law,
there are no compulsory heirs, and therefore, no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the
wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes, to which they would be
entitled to, if the Philippine law were to apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is rested on the doctrine of renvoi?

RULING:
NO. The doctrine of renvoi cannot be applied in this case. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the
law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
Further, pursuant to Article 16 of the Civil Code, the said children are not entitled to
their legitimes for under Texas Law, which must apply, because it is the national law of the
deceased, there are no legitimes.
Forms, Solemnities of Contracts, and Wills Art. 17, par. 1 and 2, NCC
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.P. Eusebio

Construction, Inc.
G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004
FACTS:
On November 1980, the State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and
Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–
Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II (Project), in Baghdad, Iraqto Ajyal Trading and
Contracting Company for a total contract price of US$18.7 million. On March 1981, spouses
Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal
wherein the former undertook the execution of the project, while the latter would be entired to a
commission of 4% of the contracting price. On April 1981, respondent 3-Plex, not being
accredited by or registered with the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB), assigned
and transferred all its rights and interests under the joint venture agreement to VPECI, a
construction and engineering firm duly registered with the POCB. The SOB required the
contractors to submit a performance bond and an advance payment bond thus 3-Plex and
VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial
institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the
performance of approved service contracts abroad, to comply with this requirement. After
approval of the application, three layers of guarantees were arranged with Philguarantee issuing
its letters of guarantee first to Rafidain Bank then to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait, as counter-
guarantee, in favor of the respondent firms.
In June 1981, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ajyal executed the service
81 contract for the Project and constructions began in August TABLE 1981. Because of delay
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progress of construction work due to some setback and difficulties, the Project was not
completed as scheduled. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint
venture worked for the renewal or extension of the performance bond up to December 1986. In
October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond
counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development
Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement
that the penalty will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB
protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the
non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.
Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain
Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment
of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq. Philguarantee sought
reimbursement from respondents of the sum of money it paid to the guarantee it issued for
respondent VPECI. Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a civil case for collection of sum
of money. The RTC dismissed the case, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has
defaulted.
RULING:
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default
pertains to the intrinsic validity of the contract. No conflicts rule on essential validity of
contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems is that
the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the
contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the
law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may
be implied from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or
domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal
systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the
limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen
law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.
In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of
law. However, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction and one of the
parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of
whether VPECI defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq. But since that foreign law was
not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply. And Philippine law,
according to Art 1169 of the Civil Code, provides that in reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner
what is incumbent upon him.
As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by
factors not imputable to the Joint Venture, it was rather due to the persistent violations of SOB,
particularly it's failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint
venture does not incur in delay if the other party (SOB) fails to perform the obligation
incumbent upon him.
Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) v. De Vera
G.R. No. 205703, March 7, 2016
FACTS:
Alberto Arriola, a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines was hired by SNC-Lavin,
through its local manning agency, Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS),
as a Safety Officer in the former’s Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar. Arriola’s overseas
employment contract, which is to last for 19 months starting from June 9, 2008 to December 31,
2009, was processed with the POEA. According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment
in the Philippines and on June 9, 2008, started working in Madagascar. In September 9, 2009,
Arriola’s pre-termination of employment was issued informing him that he will be pre-
terminated effective September 11, 2009 due to diminishing workload in the area of his
expertise and the unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently, he was repatriated
and the company deposited in his bank account his pay, based on Canadian Labor Law.
Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against IPAMS and SNC-Lavin for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of overtime pay, sick leave and vacation leave pay before the Labor Arbiter. He asserts
that he was never offered any valid reason for his early termination and was not given sufficient
notice. He insisted that the petitioners must prove the applicability of the Canadian law before it
can be applied to his employment contract.
On the other hand, petitioners invoked the ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders, pointing out that
particular labor laws of a foreign country incorporated in a contract freely entered into between
an OFW and a foreign employer through the latter's agent was valid. In the present case, as all of
Arriola's employment documents were processed in Canada, not to mention that SNC-Lavalin's
office was in Ontario, the principle of lex loci celebrationis was applicable. Thus, the petitioners
insisted that Canadian laws governed the contract. They contend that the pre-termination of
Arriola's contract was valid for being consistent with the provisions of both the Expatriate Policy
and laws of Canada, which did not require any ground for early termination of employment, and
the only requirement was the written notice of termination. Even assuming that Philippine laws
should apply, Arriola would still be validly dismissed because domestic law recognized
retrenchment and redundancy as legal grounds for termination. They presented a copy of the
Employment Standards Act (ESA) of Ontario, which was duly authenticated by the Canadian
authorities and certified by the Philippine Embassy.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Arriola’s complaint based on Canadian law while the NLRC
reversed it, applying Philippine laws. CA affirmed the latter’s decision, explaining that even
though an authenticated copy of the ESA was submitted, it did not mean that it will
automatically apply in the case. Although parties were free to establish stipulations in their
contracts, the same must remain consistent with law, morals, good custom, public order or
public policy. The ESA being contrary to the Constitution, specifically on the right to due
process, the labor laws of the Philippines. Since the petitioners neither complied with the twin
notice-rule nor offered any just or authorized cause for Arriola’s termination under the Labor
Code, his dismissal is illegal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Laws apply to overseas employment contracts.

RULING:
As a general rule, the Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts. This
rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the State shall afford
full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his employment
abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a
living wage under our Constitution. As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law
shall govern the employment contract but the following requisites must be present:
1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a
83 specific foreign law shall govern; if absent, and theOFcontract
TABLE was executed
CONTENTSTABLE in the
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Philippines, the principle of lex loci contractus applies;
2. That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant
to the Philippine rules on evidence; if lacking, the doctrine of processual presumption
operates;
3. That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the
Philippines; if not met, Philippine laws govern based on Article 17 (1) and Article 1306
(2) of the Civil Code; and
4. That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the
POEA; if missing, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is violated.
Lacking any one of the four requisites would invalidate the application of the foreign law,
and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas employment contract. In the case at bar, only
the second and fourth requisites were observed.
Clearly, the petitioners failed to comply with the first requisite because no foreign law
was expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract with Arriola. They did not directly
cite any specific provision or stipulation in the labor contract which indicated the applicability of
the Canadian labor laws or the ESA nor did they show that a foreign law was agreed upon by the
parties. Further, it was shown that the overseas labor contract was executed by Arriola at his
residence in Batangas and it was processed at the POEA on May 26, 2008. 47 Considering that no
foreign law was specified in the contract and the same was executed in the Philippines, the
doctrine of lex loci celebrationis applies and the Philippine laws shall govern the overseas
employment of Arriola. And the foreign law invoked is contrary to the Constitution and the
Labor Code because based on the provisions of the ESA, it does not require any ground for the
early termination of employment and it allows the employer to dispense with the prior notice of
termination to an employee. The provisions of the ESA are patently inconsistent with the right
to security of tenure and deprive the employee of his constitutional right to due process by
denying him of any notice of termination and the opportunity to be heard.

Human Relations (Art.19-36, NCC):
Principle of Abuse of Rights, Art. 19, NCC
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R.No. 81262, August 25, 1989
FACTS:
Restituto M. Tobias, purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering

operations manager of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. He
reported them to his immediate superior GLOBE MACKAY Executive Vice-President Eduardo T.
Ferraren and General Manager Herbert C. Hendry. However, after Tobias made the report, he
was made the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. He
was also called a "crook" and a "swindler”, ordered to take a lie detector test, and instructed to
submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. Despite the police reports
exculpating Tobias from the anomalies, he was suspended from work and the company filed
criminal charges against him.
When the criminal complaints were dismissed, Globe Mackay terminated Tobias’
employment. During the pendency of the appeal of to the Office of the President of the illegal
dismissal case, Globe Mackay and Tobias entered into a compromise agreement. Unemployed,
Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was
85 dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners. RTC ruled in favor of Tobias, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

RULING:
YES. Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides, “Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.” A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. In the case at bar, the petitioners have indeed abused the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee. Regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering
the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. The imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the
right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then
the employer is liable for damages to the employee.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages
under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
University of the East v. Jader
G.R. No. 13234417, February 2000
FACTS:
Romeo Jader was enrolled a law student of University of the East from 1984 up to 1988.
After receiving an incomplete grade in Practice Court I after not being able to take the final exam
for the first semester of 1988, he applied for the removal of the incomplete grade the next
semester of 4th year law, which was approved by Dean Tiongson, thus he took the exam and was
given a grade of five. In the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of
Bachelor of Laws and also in the invitation for the graduation as of the second semester of 1987-
1988. Romeo attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. He then prepared himself for
the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to
September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having
learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.
He sued UE for damages when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising
from the latter's negligence. The university denied liability arguing mainly that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when
his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. The trial and appellate court
ruled in favour of Romeo Jader.
ISSUE:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the
case?
RULING:
YES. When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of

education is entered into between said institution and the student. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each
and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. 5 It is the school
that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act
and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the
prompt submission of grades.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which
is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Art.
19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law.
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led
to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer,
he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. 13 The modern tendency is to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If
mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby,
with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona
G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005
FACTS:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer Uytengsu hired Valenzona as Head
Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) under a
Contract of Employment. While the employment period agreed upon was for two years
commencing on January 1, 1988 and ending on December 31, 1989, the last sentence of
paragraph 3 of the contract carried the condition that “if at any time during the contract, the
COACH, in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive
ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may terminate this contract.” Despite the one-
sidedness of this provision of the contract, Valenzona still acceded to the terms of the contract
because he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who had recommended him to GF Equity.
During his stint as Alaskas head coach, the team placed third both in the Open and All-Filipino
87 PBA Conferences in 1988. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
On September 26, 1988, petitioner terminated his services. Close to six years after the
termination of his services, Valenzona demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation
arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. GF Equity, however,
refused the claim contending that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-
terminate Valenzonas employment due to incompetence. The trial court dismissed Valenzona’s
complaint while CA ruled in his favour providing that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily
terminating Valenzonas employment and opened itself to a charge of bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned last sentence of paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of
mutuality of contracts?
RULING:
YES. As enshrined in Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, mutuality is one of the
characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or compliance of which cannot be left to
the will of only one of the parties. In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the
right of GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective
of the soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion, which clearly
transgresses the principle Thus, it is null and void. Notwithstanding such nullity, GF Equity was
not precluded from the right to pre-terminate the contract provided it has legal basis, for it to be
justified. But GF Equity failedto advance any ground to justify the pre-termination. It simply
invoked the assailed provision which is null and void.
While GF Equity’s act of pre-terminating Valenzona’s services cannot be considered
wilful as it was based on a stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to consider
the abuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of the Civil Code. Since the pre-termination of
the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law, and GF Equity
negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached
the contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona
to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code the latter
of which provides that “Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag
G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008
FACTS:
Artemio Cabansag a 50-square meter property from spouses Gomez on July 1990. The
said lot was registered in the name of the spouses. Later, he received a demand letters from. Del
Prado, in behalf of Purisima Nala, asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he
leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions
will be filed against him. Because of such demands, he suffered damages and was constrained to
file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado. The latter claimed that he sent the letters in good
faith in behalf of Nala, who disputed Cabansag’s claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said
property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan,
which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property was conveyed to
spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely held by them
in trust for the Duyan's children. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property
which he occupies. RTC ruled in favour of Cabansag affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nala is liable for the damages incurred by Cabansag in sending the
demand letters to the latter
RULING:
NO. The basis of Cabansag’s claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code which sets
the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. It
should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the
other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or
some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her
counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to
respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the
property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying
the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by
Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after
respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. Moreover,
respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the sole intention
of prejudicing and injuring him.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the
demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights
over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no
injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.
Go v. Cordero
G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia,

who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA) met Mortimer
Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), whom he appointed as
exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. Codero
was able to close a deal for the purchase of 2 SEACA 25 with Allan Go, owner/operator of ACG
Express Liner of Cebu City. This was evidenced by a Memorandum Agreement, for which sale,
Cordero shall receive 22.43% of the purchase price as commission. He made 2 trips to AFFA in
Australia and in one occasion accompanied by Go to monitor the progress of the building of the
vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for the trip. But he later discovered that Go was dealing
directly with Robinson for the purchase of the second SEACAT 25. Cordero tried to contact Go
and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused
to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only
to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the
second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson,
Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale
89 between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
When further negotiations for amicable settlement served futile, Cordero filed a civil case
seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving
and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton
disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions and causing him actual,
moral and exemplary damages. The court ruled in favor of Cordero.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cordero is entitled to damages for breach of exclusive distributionship

and contractual interference?
RULING:
YES. Despite the fact that there was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents
actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA, this circumstance will not absolve
respondents from liability for invading Cordero’s rights under the exclusive
distributorship. Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed
the remaining payments to AFFA without advising him and furnishing him with copies of the
bank transmittals as they previously did, and directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson
regarding arrangements for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the
purchase of the second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement which Cordero
signed in behalf of AFFA. As a result of respondents’ actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he
was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive
distributorship revoked by AFFA. he purchased from AFFA.
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not
for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference
are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. The
presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. The third element was manifested by
the act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another
contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in
AFFAs breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and
unceremonious termination of Cordero’s appointment as exclusive distributor. Such act may not
be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.
The attendant circumstances, however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds
of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero.
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and good
faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the
prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article
Villanueva v. Rosqueta
G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010
FACTS:
Emma M. Rosqueta, former Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and

Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on
January 2001, shortly after President Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. Five months later, she
withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned
against her will on orders of her superior.
90 On July 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera
TABLEtoOF
Rosqueta’s position.
CONTENTSTABLE OFChallenging
CONTENTS
such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction
against Titus B. Villanueva, Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with
the RTC. RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Villanueva and the Finance
Secretary from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August 2001 the trial court superseded
the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction. While the preliminary injunction in the quo
warranto case was again in force, Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001,
authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its
special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except
respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee
headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosqueta’s
picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was “under litigation.”
Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s
picture but not Rosqueta’s.
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages against
Villanueva alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia and prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld
her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. RTC dismissed the case while CA
reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villanueva is liable in damages to Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary
injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case denying her of the right to do her
job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer?
RULING:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in
bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and
21of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such
abuse of right or duty. Villanueva’s claims that he merely acted on advice of the OSG when he
allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held
the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive Service
eligibility required for the job cannot be credited since the question of Valera’s right to replace
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith
and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His
exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any
reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the
position. A party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise
lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.
Ardiente v. Pastorfide
G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
FACTS:
Joyce Ardiente and her husband entered into a Memorandum of Agreement selling,
transferring and conveying in favour of Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all the rights and interests in the
former’s housing unit, carrying with it the stipulation that the water and power bill of the
property will be accounted in the account of Pastorfide effective on June 1, 1994. For 4 years,
Pastorfide’s use of water connection in the name of Ardiente was never questioned until in 1999,
when without notice, the water connection was cut off. The Cagayan de Oro Water District that
she was a delinquent for 3 months, which she paid. Later, she was informed that it was at the
instance of Ardiente that the water line was cut off. Aggrieved, she filed a complaint for
damages against Ardiente, COWD and its manager Gonzales. Both RTC and CA ruled in favour
of Pastorfide ruling that in the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties,
defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith.
The CA ruled that Ardiente has a legal duty to honor the possession and use of water line
by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement and that Pastorfide
applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and injury to the latter.As
to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by Pastorfide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ardiente should be liable for the disconnection of Spouses Pastorfide’s
water supply?
RULING:
YES. While it is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the
spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name
pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not
to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to
the injured party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply
without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for
disconnection was based on the advice of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with
COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then
she should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request
for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse
is the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was
clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad
faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Gomez
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015
FACTS:
A certain Colin Harrington opened a Savings account with PCIB and presented 2 genuine
bank drafts issued by the Bank of New Zealand. PCIB contends that a certain Sophia La’O, as a
representative of Harrington, was the one who presented the bank drafts. Josephine Gomez, a
new teller, received and entered the deposit slips into Harrington’s account after her immediate
supervisor, Flores, confirmed that the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were
acceptable for deposit to the savings account. On 2 separate dates, a certain individual
representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00.
Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor.
Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts
in his name.
After the incident, PCIB deducted Josephine’s salary and later, PCIB found Josephine
grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating procedures.
The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-50,600.00 through deductions in
her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. She asked for
the basis of such decision but PCIB did not respond. Josephine filed a complaint for damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB
had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay
Harrington.
The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of
Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public
policy. This was borne out by the fact that the PCIB had already deducted from her salary before
Josephine received the memorandum finding her liable for the P50,600.00. In addition, while
there were other individuals involved in this incident, it appeared that it was only Josephine
who was made solely responsible. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton
disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed
bad faith on how it had treated Josephine?
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, Josephine’s right to fair treatment was violated. Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The
principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right principle."
The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles 20 and 21of
the Civil Code.
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19
of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize
employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the
instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still
pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and
requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor.
When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused
to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary,
allowances, and bonuses.
Also, while Josephine was penalized, other employees of the bank involved in the subject
transactions were not. It was Josephine who was made solely responsible for the loss without
giving any basis. It was emphasized that the subject deposit could not have been received by the
bank and entered in Harrington's savings account without the participation of the other bank
employees. The PCIB could have exercised prudence before taking oppressive actions against
Josephine.
Diaz v. En Canto
G.R. No. 171303, January 20, 2016
FACTS:
Elizabeth L. Diaz, a full-time faculty member and an associate professor in the UP

College of Mass Communication (CMC), applied for sick leave effective November 23, 1987 until
March 1, 1988. After returning, she later applied for sabbatical leave with pay for 1 year directly
with the Office of the President. Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, recommended to
CMC Dean Encanto that Diaz’s application be granted. Later, Lazaro recommended instead that
that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she may be qualified for. In her May 2, 1988 letter,
Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach. Considering the CMC's experience with Diaz who
dropped her courses in the previous semester, Lazaro deleted Diaz's name in the final schedule
of classes for the 1st semester of A.Y. 1988-89 beginning June 6, 1988. Incidentally, Diaz
received her salary for June 1988, indicating that her sabbatical might be approved. Thereafter,
Encanto recommended for Diaz’s sabbatical application to be denied and requested to hold her
salaries until further notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet been
approved and that she did not teach during the semester. On November 1998, Abad, then OIC
of UP, confirmed denial of Diaz’s application for sabbatical leave due to shortage of staff.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P., Abueva,
Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the RTC praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and
severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among others, they conspired together as joint
tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year
1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the
salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989.
The RTC ruled in favour of Diaz while the CA reversed the decision finding that UP is only liable
for the unpaid salaries and allowances of Diaz but found neither negligence nor bad faith on the
part of the respondents in their denial of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and in
withholding her salaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave and withheld her salaries?
RULING:
NO. Diaz's complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged
bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the respondents had a duty to resolve Diaz's sabbatical
leave application. But they did so without the intention of prejudicing or injuring Diaz. The
grant of a sabbatical leave is not a matter of right, but a privilege. Therefore, Diaz cannot
demand its grant. While the RTC declared that Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical leave,
it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the
unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application, and
not its denial per se. Thus, Diaz's entitlement to a sabbatical leave should no longer be an issue
in this case.
It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the
burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same." Diaz has failed to prove bad
faith on the part of the respondents. There is nothing in the records to show that the
respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice and injure her. She
has not even shown that the delay of six months in resolving a sabbatical leave application has
never happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that occurred was due to the fact
that Diaz's application for sabbatical leave did not follow the usual procedure; hence, the
processing of said application took time.
94 Given that the respondents have not abused their rights,
TABLE they should not OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE beCONTENTS
held liable
for any damages sustained by Diaz. "The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been appropriately
denominated damnum absque injuria." Similarly, the Court cannot grant Diaz's claim for
attorney's fees as no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. "Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be
awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other
than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause."
St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corp.
G.R. No. 217426, Dec. 4, 2017
FACTS:
LWV Construction Corporation is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers

for deployment to Saudi Arabia. While petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf
Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) authorized to conduct
medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment. On January 10, 2008,
respondent referred Raguindin to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination in
accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. Petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit
for employment” evidenced by a Medical Certificate. Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent
another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi he purportedly tested
positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. A reexamination by the Ministry of Health of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia yielded to the same results leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the
Philippines. Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that
Raguindin is "fit for employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he
was positive for HCV, respondent filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages against
petitioner before the MeTC.
The MeTC ruled against petitioner and found that respondent was entitled to be
informed accurately of the precise condition of Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and
consequently, had sustained damage as a result of the erroneous certification. This was affirmed
by the RTC and CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for being negligent in issuing the Medical
Report declaring Raguindin “fit for employment”?
RULING:
NO. First, in this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on
the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not
proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages may be recovered
due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not
premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-
existing contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of
Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern.
Second, Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by
respondent to establish petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification61 dated April 28, 2008;
95 and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test Report. Notably, theTABLE examination conducted by
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF the General
CONTENTS
Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was conducted at least two
(2) months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence, even
assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive
for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same medical state at
the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it was
therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the
Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical
procedures were not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited
Raguindin's unfitness for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent only
proffered evidence which demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued,
Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such,
was no longer "fit for employment".
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV
only after his medical examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. The incubation
period for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months, and following initial infection, approximately
80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms. Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi
Arabia immediately after petitioner's medical examination and hence, could have possibly
contracted the same only when he arrived thereat.
It does not, by any means, create legal basis to hold the issuer accountable for any
intervening change of condition from the time of issuance up until expiration. Truly, petitioner
could not be reasonably expected to predict, much less assure, that Raguindin's medical status
of being fit for employment would remain unchanged. Thus, the fact that the Medical Report's
expiration date of April 11, 2008 was only seventeen (17) days away from the issuance of the
General Care Dispensary's April 28, 2008 Certification finding Raguindin positive for HCV
should not - as it does not - establish petitioner's negligence.
Damnum absque injuria
Custodio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
FACTS:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioner Spouses Custodio,
Spouses Santos and Rosalina Morato. From the main street P. Burgos, there are two possible
passageways to Mabasa’s property. One of the tenants of the apartment vacated because an
adobe fence was constructed thereby making the first passageway narrower in width. Ma.
Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence for security reasons. Morato also
constructed her fence and even extended it in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. It was then that the remaining tenants of the apartment left. Thereafter, Mabasa filed
a case for the grant of an easement ofright of way against petitioners. The RTC granted the
easement of right of way sought by private respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC and furthermore, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent a sum of money for
damages. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court with modifications only in so far as the
grant of damages is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper

RULING:
96 NO. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis.

TABLE OF The mere fact that
CONTENTSTABLE OF the plaintiff
CONTENTS
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. There is a material distinction between damages
and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. At the time of
the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private
respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of
the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favour after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on
petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded
One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted
may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favour. Any injury or
damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for
hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by
lawful means.
Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon
G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004
FACTS:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and

abroad, a PLDT stockholder of PLDT, Manila Polo Club member and a seasoned traveller.
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa
card with EBC. Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of
$3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit. In April 1986, Calderon
together with some reputable business friends and associates, went to Hongkong for business
and pleasure trips. Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department
Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel and purchased several Gucci items
equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card. Shortly
after, he was informed that the card was blacklisted and when he sought for reconfirmation, the
saleslady simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair
of scissors. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities,
Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment on account of EBCs wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card
while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional Trial Court at Makati
City a complaint for damages against EBC. The latter denied liability alleging that the card was
suspended on account of Calderon’s prior use of the card in excess of the limit, failed to settle it
and failed to maintain the required minimum deposit. The RTC and CA awarded moral damages
to the respondent and held that defendant bank was negligent if not in bad faith, in suspending,
or blacklisting plaintiff’s credit card without notice or basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to moral damages?

RULING:
NO. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable
only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the breach
must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In this case, no
malice or bad faith attended petitioner’s dishonor of respondent’s credit card. For, as found no
less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card
Agreement with respondent. Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not
have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card.
There is, however, a material distinction between damages and injury. In this case, the principle
of damnum absque injuria is applied. The principle posits that there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Yu
G.R. No. 191033, January 11, 2016
FACTS:
On May 28, 2000, a Sunday, Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard Golf &
Country Club to play a round of golf with another member of the club. At the last minute,
however, that other member informed them that he could not play with them. Due to the "no
twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of
less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m., they
requested management to look for another player to join them.
Because Orchard were unable to find their third player, [respondent] Yu tried to
convince Francis Montallana, Orchard’s assistant golf director, to allow them to play twosome,
even if they had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. When Montallana refused,
Yu shouted invectives at the latter and still played although they did so without securing a tee
time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a result of
their actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board of directors. The Board
suspended the respondents. Among others, the respondents filed a claim for damages. Yuhico
stated that he distanced himself from his usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that he became
the butt of jokes of fellow golfers. On the other hand, Yu represented that some of his friends in
the business, like Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun Ramos started to evade or refuse
to have dealings with him after his suspension.
ISSUE:
98 TABLE
Whether or not respondents are entitled to a claim OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
of damages?
RULING:
NO. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an
action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means
adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury
or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for
hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by
lawful means.
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum
damnum facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria." In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that there is
fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for the alleged
damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership in the
Club is a privilege. Regular members are entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of the
Club, subject to its rules and regulations. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental
anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves
for deliberately and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that
respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them.
Indeed, the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By-Laws is a
means to protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the Club. This being so, the
suspension of respondents does not fall under any of the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining
to the grant of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation costs.
Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017
FACTS:
Spouses Carbonell travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing US$ l, 000.00 in

US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch. While in Bangkok,
they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100 bills had been
accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good”. When they tried to
exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok, the teller informed them it was,
confiscated it and threatened to report them to the police if they insisted in getting the fake
dollar bill back. So they had to settle for a Foreign Exchange Note receipt. Further, when they
used the remaining four bills to purchase a jewellery, the shop owner, on the next day,
confronted them at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be
counterfeit. The former had shouted at them: "You Filipinos, you are all cheaters!", which had
occurred within the hearing distance of fellow travellers and several foreigners.
Upon returning to the Philippines, they confronted the manager of the respondent's
Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had
released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office. Prior to the
filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent's
representatives, the latter reiterating their sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience
that the petitioners, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to
underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged
a walk-out.
The petitioners had submitted the subject US$ 100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) for examination and the BSP certified that the four US$100 bills were near
perfect genuine notes. Thereafter, the spouses demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and
exemplary damages. RTC and CA ruled in favour of the bank.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Spouse Carbonell are entitled to damages on account of their
suffering the unfortunate experience abroad brought about by their use of the fake US dollar
bills withdrawn from the latter?
RULING:
NO. With the respondent having established that the characteristics of the subject dollar
notes had made it difficult even for the BSP itself as the country's own currency note expert to
identify the counterfeiting with ease despite adhering to all the properly laid out standard
operating procedure and precautions in the handling of US dollar bills, holding it liable for
damages in favour of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted in the absence of proof of bad
faith, malice or fraud on its part. That it formally apologized to them and even offered to
reinstate the USD$500.00 in their account as well as to give them the all-expense-paid round-
trip ticket to Hong Kong as means to assuage their inconvenience did not necessarily mean it
was liable. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of liability, and is
inadmissible as evidence against the offeror.
Under the law, moral damages for culpa contractual or breach of contract are
recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The
breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. In order to
maintain their action for damages, the petitioners must establish that their injury resulted from
a breach of duty that the respondent had owed to them, that is, there must be the concurrence of
injury caused to them as the plaintiffs and legal responsibility on the part of the respondent.
Underlying the award of damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. In this regard, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury. That was not so in this case.
Volenti non fit injuria
Hotel Nikko v. Reyes

G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that while he
was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Dr.. Filart, his friend of several years, approached
him and invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse for the birthday of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: “of
course.” Mr. Reyes then went up with Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the
latter’s present for the celebrant. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner Ruby Lim, Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. In a loud voice and within
the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby
Lim told him to leave the party.
Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within
100 hearing distance, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame
TABLE and humiliation.
OF CONTENTSTABLE Not long
OF CONTENTS
after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having
asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the
latter. Dr. Filart gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes filed a case before the lower court, which dismissed the
complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim. The trial court likewise
ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited in accordance with the principle of volenti non fit injuria. On appeal, the CA reversed
the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of volenti non fit injuria applies to the case?
RULING:
NO. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not
find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
In the case, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable
and humane under the circumstances. Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes
(without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of
action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not
only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Without proof of any ill-motive on
her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite
Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith.

Liability Ex-Maleficio or Ex-Delicto, Art. 20, NCC
Manuel v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
FACTS:
Eduardo P. Manuel, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according
to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen
again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter
was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil
wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course
of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with
Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and
that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of
imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for
moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary
reward for moral damages was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eduardo is liable for moral damages?

RULING:
YES. Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal
cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous
cases. Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for
moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 19 establishes the principle of abuse of rights while Article 20 speaks of the
general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that
every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision is adopted to remedy
the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable
provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.
In the present case, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s
chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a
continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband
to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman,
lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and
endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her
lawful husband.
The petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
The petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a
social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Acts contra bonos mores, Art. 21, NCC
Pe v. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
FACTS:
Lolita Pe, an unmarried 24-year old woman had an illicit relationship with Alfonso Pe, a
married man, who is adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's
father. In 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who
was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of
her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the
rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden
from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home, in 1957. Lolita’s parents
and siblings filed for damages under Article 21 of the NCC, based on fact that defendant, being a
married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing great damage to the name
and reputation of plaintiffs.
The CFI of Manila considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they
failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
ISSUE:
104 TABLE
Whether or not the defendant can be held liable for OF CONTENTSTABLE
damages under Art. 21 OF CONTENTS
of the NCC?
RULING:
YES. He has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. based on the
chain of events from the frequent visits under the pretext of wanting to teach Lolita how to pray
the rosary to his defiance despite objections of Lolita’s parents to their illicit relationship, he not
only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of
Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Breach of promise to marry
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960 (En Banc)
FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an
insurance underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in
love with each other. Since 1953, both had a regular intimate and sexual affair with each other.
In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954,
Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with a different
woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his
daughter with Soledad and for damages due to Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry
Soledad. The trial court ruled in favour of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court and even increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for
him in order to satisfy his sexual desires – that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?
RULING:
NO. Under the Civil Code, there can be no recovery of moral damages for breach of
promise to marry, as such, the omission in the Civil Code of the proposed Chapter on Breach of
Promise Suits is a clear manifestation of the legislative intent not to sanction as such, suits for
breach of promise to marry, otherwise many “innocent men may become victims of designing
and unscrupulous females.” However, if there be seduction, as defined in Articles 337 and 338 of
the Revised Penal Code, moral damages may be recovered under Art. 2219, paragraph 3 of the
Civil Code. The Court, however, implied that if there be moral seduction as distinguished from
criminal seduction, there may be a grant of moral damages, possibly under Article 21. In this
case, however, it was the woman who virtually seduced the man, “by surrendering herself” to
him because she, a girl 10 years older, was “overwhelmed by her love” for him.

Galang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-17248, January 29, 1962
FACTS:
Beatrice Galang and Rodrigo Quinit are lovers since 1953 and lived as husband and wife
in the house of Adolfo Dagawan located at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province from April
27, 1955 to May 9 when Rodrigo left and never returned. It appears that they were engaged but
Rodrigo’s parents strongly opposed their marriage. The evidence on other pertinent facts is,
however, conflicting. Galang tried to prove that Rodrigo and his father went to her house and
her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant
Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, except
for the wedding dress and that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio. Maximo
then took them both to the house of Dagawan to live as husband and wife. When Rodrigo failed
to secure a marriage license in Baguio he went home to get his residence certificate but never
returned. On the other hand, Rodrigo and Maximo tried to establish that while he wanted to
marry Galang after his graduation his parents still strongly opposed the marriage. Because of
their continued relationship, he left his parental home intending to look for a job in Manila but
Galang convinced him instead to go to Colorado Falls and thereafter, she followed him.
However, because of Rodrigo persistently refused to marry Galang, the latter’s relatives tried to
intimidate him and thereupon brought home to be later induced by Dagawan to sign a marriage
license.
The plaintiff filed action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to recover
damages claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of
promise on the part of Rodrigo Quinit to marry her. The CFI of Baguio ruled in favour of Galang
but was later reversed by the CA absolving Maximo Quinit and eliminating Rodrigo Quinit’s
106 liability for moral damages and attorney’s fees. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodrigo Quinit is liable for moral damages for breach of promise to
marry Galang?
RULING:
NO. Rodrigo Quinit is not liable for moral damages to plaintiff because moral damages
for breach of promise to marry are not collectible under our laws. As settled in the case of
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, it has been ruled that "the action for breach of promises to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". Although the Civil Code of Spain permitted the
recovery of damages for breach to marry this was eliminated by the Cod Commission in drafting
our own Civil Code.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales is a twenty-two (22) years old, single woman of a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. While Gashem Shookat Baksh
is an Iranian exchange medical student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
The latter courted and proposed to marry Marilou. She accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married so agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was
in October of that year. Petitioner then visited her parents to secure their approval to the
marriage. Sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in his
apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him. A week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. he maltreated and threatened to
kill her. As a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and
the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
On October 1987, she filed with the trial court a complaintf or damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. The lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of the private respondent. This was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar?
YES. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. In accordance with Article 21, where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honour and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in
its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
FACTS:
On August 23, 1954 Beatrice Wassmer and Francisco Velez applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed,
with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but
two days before the wedding, Beatrice, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for
Wassmer stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to
his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again. The court granted Beatrice petition for actual, moral, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees against Velez due to latter’s default. Velez asserts that this judgement is contrary
to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for
breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Velez committed a mere breach of promise to marry?

RULING:
NO. This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
109 of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
TABLE set a wedding
OF CONTENTSTABLE and go
OF CONTENTS
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. It must not be overlooked that the
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
Natividad v. Tunac
G.R. No. 143130. July 10, 2000
FACTS:
Elsa Natividad and Ronald Tunac grew up together where their respective parents,
petitioners Marino and Clarita Natividad and respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac, resided. At
age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his
boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his
application for employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there.
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he
succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased
her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June
1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. The two families agreed to have the
wedding in January 1993. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's
family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby
which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two
families decided that Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her
during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house. After
her miscarriage, Ronald's attitude towards the former changed. In January of 1993, the
Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer
wanted to get married to her. Thus, she filed a complaint for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ronald Tunac is liable for damages?

RULING:
NO. Our laws do not provide for a right to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of
one's promise to marry another. In cases where this Court has allowed moral or exemplary
damages arising from similar circumstances, there was found moral seduction or
misrepresentation. In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by
Ronald, much less by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is
that the two became lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral
seduction contemplated by the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one
where the defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff.
In addition, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the families of the parties.
That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is
already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.
Unjust Enrichment, Arts. 22-23, NCC
Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. v. RRN Inc.

G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010
FACTS:
Shinryo and RRN executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-contract with RRN
signified its willingness to accept and perform for Shinryo in any of its projects, a part or the
whole of the works more particularly described in the Agreement. On June 11, 2002, the parties
executed a Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-
Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project in
a total amount of Php 25 Million. Shinryo supplied manpower chargeable chargeable against
RRN.
RRN was not able to finish the entire works with Shinryo due to financial difficulties.
Shiryo paid RRN with a total of Php 26.5 million. RRN demanded for the payment of its unpaid
balance and cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding. Shiryo claimed for material
back charges on which only the half was acknowledged by RRN. Shinryo denied any unpaid
account. Due to failure to reach an amicable settlement, they submitted the dispute to
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). RRN filed a claim for arbitration against
petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which consists of unpaid portions of the
sub-contract, variations and unused materials. Shinryo filed a counterclaim for overpayment in
the amount of P2,512,997.96.
CIAC ruled in favour of RRN and CA affirmed the decision. The CA upheld the CIAC
ruling that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that the parties had an agreement
111 regarding charges for respondent's use of the manlift.. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not Shinryo is may impose payment on RRN’s use of its manlift equipment
despite absence of proof of supposed agreement based on the principle of unjust enrichment?
RULING:
NO. The principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case. Unjust enrichment
is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or
benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account
for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or
request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution, as provided for under Article 22 of the NCC. In order
that an accion in rem verso may prosper, 4 requisites must be present. In this case, As found by
both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free use of the
manlift was without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus, the third
requisite, i.e., that the enrichment of respondent is without just or legal ground, is missing. In
addition, petitioner's claim is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite − that the plaintiff
has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict − is also absent.
Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 138088, January 23, 2006
FACTS:
The spouses Hector and Gloria Hizon Lopez were the original owners of the property
involved in the case at bar. They leased it to Car Cool since 1972. On 1992, they entered into a
Verbal Lease Agreement for two years. On 1995, the spouses informed Car Cool of their
intention to sell the property. They gave the latter the option to buy, however they ignored the
offer. For this reason, the spouses terminated the Verbal Lease Agreement with Car Cool and
gave notice to the company to vacate the property on the last day of August 1995. In the same
month, said property was sold to USHIO. The latter gave an extension to Car Cool to vacate the
same up to the last day of September 1995. USHIO gave their final demand on December 3 and
when Car Cool still ignored the notice, USHIO filed an ejectment case against the petitioner.
Previous to this, Car Cool filed a criminal complaint against USHIO for alleged Robbery
with force, Malicious mischief, and grave coercion during the attempt by the USHIO to eject the
former and that they know that there is an existing contract between them and the spouses
Lopez. They also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the spouses
invoking that they made an advance payment in checks to them as monthly rentals for the years
1995 and 1996. The lower courts rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. The CA affirmed
the decision with modification with regard to the monthly rental period, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at
the expense of CAR COOL?
NO. In this case, there is no dispute on the ownership of the property. An Absolute Deed
of Sale dated 14 September 1995 shows that the Spouses Lopez sold the property to USHIO
Realty. On 19 September 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued a Transfer Certificate
of Title for the property in the name of USHIO Realty. USHIO Realty, as the new owner of the
property, has a right to physical possession of the property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO
Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rentals as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the property. Contrary to CAR COOLs allegations, the payment of
damages in the form of rentals for the property does not constitute unjust enrichment.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that
[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him. The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such
benefit. Under Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, USHIO Realty has the legal
right to receive some amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOLs occupation of the
property.
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 181995, July 16, 2012
FACTS:
In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly
sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently, it sent an invitation to bid to all its flight deck crew,
announcing the opening of eight (8) B747-400 Captain positions that were created by the
refleeting program. Elegir, who was then holding the position of A-300 Captain, submitted his
bid and was fortunately awarded the same. Together with 7 other pilots, they were sent for
training at Boeing in Seattle, Washington, US to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge in
handling the new aircraft and completed the same. After rendering twenty-five (25) years, eight
(8) months and twenty (20) days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for optional
retirement authorized under CBA between PAL and ALPAP. PAL asked him to reconsider his
decision, asseverating that the company has yet to recover the full value of the costs of his
training. It warned him that if he leaves PAL before he has rendered service for at least three (3)
years, it shall be constrained to deduct the costs of his training from his retirement pay. Elegir
went on terminal leave for thirty (30) days and thereafter made effective his retirement from
service. Upon securing his clearance, however, he was informed that the costs of his training will
be deducted from his retirement pay.
The labor arbiter held that PAL had no right to withhold the payment of the petitioner’s
retirement benefits simply because he retired from service before the lapse of three (3) years [no
document evidencing the fact that the petitioner was required to stay with PAL for three (3)
years from the completion of his training or that he was bound to reimburse the company of the
costs of his training should he retire from service before the completion of the period.]
The NLRC modified the decision [petitioner is under obligation to reimburse a portion of
113 the expenses incurred for his training as B747-400 Captain]TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should reimburse PAL with the costs of his training?
RULING:
YES.The ruling in Almario v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. is controlling. PAL’s act of sending
its crew for training as an investment which expects an equitable return in the form of service
within a reasonable period of time such that a pilot who decides to leave the company before it is
able to regain the full value of the investment must proportionately reimburse the latter for the
costs of his training. By carrying over the same stipulation in the present CBA, both PAL and
ALPAP recognized that the company’s effort in sending pilots for training abroad is an
investment which necessarily expects a reasonable return in the form of service for a period of at
least three (3) years. This stipulation had been repeatedly adopted by the parties in the
succeeding renewals of their CBA, thus validating the impression that it is a reasonable and
acceptable term to both PAL and ALPAP.
The supposed absence of contract being raised by the petitioner cannot stand as the CBA
clearly covered the petitioner’s obligation to render service to PAL within 3 years to enable it to
recoup the costs of its investment. Further, to allow the petitioner to leave the company before it
has fulfilled the reasonable expectation of service on his part will amount to unjust enrichment.
Pertinently, Article 22 of the New Civil Code Undeniably, the petitioner was enriched at the
expense of PAL. After undergoing the training fully shouldered by PAL, he acquired a higher
level of technical competence which, in the professional realm, translates to a higher
compensation.
To allow the petitioner to simply leave the company without reimbursing it for the
proportionate amount of the expenses it incurred for his training will only magnify the financial
disadvantage sustained by PAL. Reason and fairness dictate that he must return to the company
a proportionate amount of the costs of his training.

Beumer v. Amores
G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980.
After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage
in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity
as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated
December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to
have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.
In defense,respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses
on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845
and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.She
submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased
Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.Accordingly, respondent sought
the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as payment for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of
unjust enrichment
RULING:
No. The Court cannot grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
115 enrichment. The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO
TABLE CUM ALTERIUS
OF CONTENTSTABLE DETER
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DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as
an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed
by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.
Hulst v. PR Builders
G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007
FACTS:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch
nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc.for the purchase of a 210-sq m
residential unit in respondents townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.
Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property
to petitioner. From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case. The HLURB Arbiter issued a
Writ of Execution addressed to Ex-Officio Sheriff of Batangas to execute his judgment. They
required the Sheriff to levy first on respondents personal property but the Sheriff levied on
respondent's 15 parcel of land. Respondent filed an urgent motion to Quash the Writ of levy on
the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate value of the property at
6500/sqm is P83,616,000 which was over and above the judgment award. However, the Sheriff
continued the auction and the 15 parcel of land was sold to Holly Properties Realty Corporation
for the amount of 5,450,653. g) The sum 5,313,040 was turned to petitioner in satisfaction of his
judgment award after deducting all the legal fees. The HLURB Arbiter and Director then
authorized the Sheriff to set aside the levy of the said property because of its inadequacy of the
price.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unjust enrichment on petitioner at the expense of respondent

RULING:
Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the
expense of respondent. Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under the
circumstances.Article 22 of the Civil Code, states: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The article is
part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.
G.R. No. 160600, January 15, 2014
FACTS:
After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on the
contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-
Benguet Road in the total amount of P7,014,963.33 to his company, Gonzalo Construction,1
petitioner Gonzalo subcontracted to respondent Tarnate on October 15, 1997, the supply of
116 TABLE OF
materials and labor for the project under the latter’s business CONTENTSTABLE
known OF CONTENTS
as JNT Aggregates. Their
agreement stipulated that Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the
contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate’s first and second billing in the project. Gonzalo
executed a deed of assignment whereby he was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to
10% of the total collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee (equivalent to
P233,526.13) was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project. In the
deed of assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of Gonzalo
Construction in the processing of the documents relative to the collection of the 10% retention
fee and in encashing the check to be issued by the DPWH for that purpose. The deed of
assignment was submitted to the DPWH. During the processing of the documents for the
retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of
assignment and that the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been issued
in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him.
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus,
he brought a suit against Gonzalo to recover the retention fee of P233,526.13. In his answer,
Gonzalo admitted the deed of assignment and the authority given therein to Tarnate, but
averred that the project had not been fully implemented because of its cancellation by the
DPWH, and that he had then revoked the deed of assignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unjust enrichment

RULING:
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., “when a person

unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” There is no
question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and materials for the project in compliance
with his obligations under the subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was Gonzalo
as the contractor who received the payment for his contract with the DPWH as well as the 10%
retention fee that should have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of assignment.
Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10%
retention fee that would have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project,
Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from
recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The prevention of
unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate’s favor.
Parens Patriae Doctrine, Art. 24, NCC
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-56168, December 22, 1998 (En Banc)
FACTS:
On November 29, 1960 Carlos Telosa obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc.
and as a security thereof, he mortgaged a parcel of land located at Bo. Amugeria, Malunay,
Quezon with an area of 50,000 square meters. This parcel of land was registered in the name of
the spouses Carlos Telosa & Rufina Telosa. Several months thereafter, the Rural Bank of Lucena
became a distressed bank. The Monetary Board later on decided to liquidate the Lucena Bank.
Among the accounts of the Lucena bank inventoried by the Central Bank's representative was
the account of Carlos Telosa in the principal amount of P5,000.00. A demand letter was thus
sent to Carlos Telosa on August 27, 1965 by the Central Bank examiner Agapito S. Fajardo.
Because Carlos Telosa knew that his obligation to the rural bank was only P300.00 not
P5,000.00, he executed an affidavit dated January 24, 1966 protesting the demand. Telosa paid
117 the amount of P400.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt of the Rural
TABLE Bank Carlos Telosa
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this amount represented the principal and interest with a remaining balance of P11.25 which
was paid by Dolores Telosa on April 18, 1972 as shown by official receipt of the rural bank.
Meanwhile, Carlos Telosa died on January 13, 1968. Claiming that the payments made
did not fully satisfy the whole amount due because the record still showed a balance of
P9,032.22 including interest as of February 29, 1972, Napoleon R. Cruz, then authorized deputy
of the Central Bank assigned at the Lucena bank, petitioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of
Quezon to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage and sell the collateral at public auction. The
foreclosure sale was scheduled on April 20, 1972.
To restrain the sheriff of Quezon from proceeding with the sale, a complaint was filed on
April 18, 1972, by the widow and children (now private respondents) of Carlos Telosa, before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, against the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc. The plaintiffs prayed
for a judgment declaring the contract of mortgage executed by Carlos Telosa in favor of the
Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. null and void and of no further force and effect and/or that the said
contract be reformed to state the true intention and agreement of the parties with a prayer for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to stop the sheriff of Quezon from proceeding with
the extra-judicial foreclosure
On May 4, 1972, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, this time against Carlota P.
Valenzuela in her capacity as Superintendent of Banks and authorized representative of the
Central Bank in the liquidation of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., as sole defendant. In addition
to the prayers in their original complaint, plaintiffs prayed in their amended complaint that the
extra-judicial foreclosure sale be annulled.
Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on two (2) grounds: (1) that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as the Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc., is in the process of liquidation in the Court of First Instance of Manila and (2) that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendant. The motion to dismiss was denied.
Thereafter, defendant filed her answer. In addition to the two grounds relied upon in the motion
to dismiss, she set up the defenses of the validity of the loan documents, reflecting in all respects
the correct amount (P5,000.00) which Carlos Telosa obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc. and that the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether the state may intervene applying the doctrine of parens patriae
RULING:
Yes. Needless to state in this regard this particular transaction was one of the fraudulent
and anomalous transactions involving the officers of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The latter
took advantage of the very limited education of Carlos Telosa.
To order the private respondents to refile and relitigate their case before the liquidation
court would be an exercise in futility. It would mean another several years of trial and additional
expenses to private respondents who are admittedly living in poverty. Incidentally, the property
in question is the only property of private respondents.
Right to Privacy, Art. 26, NCC
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M.
Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof,
Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was
118 located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the businessTABLE
of supplying governmentOFagencies
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private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit
basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on condition that after
her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between
her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased
husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accused him of
conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni
Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio.
Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."[1]
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some relatives
of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they
were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by
Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence.
Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor
from a relative. iNicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no
longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses
declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. To
make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors fidelity. Nestor was forced to write
Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the
demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nestor's right to privacy was violated

RULING:
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate
himself by claiming that he made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the
son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit
relationship with Florence.
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law.
Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
Padalhin v. Laviña
G.R. No. 183026, November 14, 2012
FACTS:
Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and
Consul General, respectively.
In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice. Prior to the
raids, Bienvenido Pasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in
the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to
take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.
Laviña received an information from the DFA in Manila that an investigating team was
to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the
Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses
Padalhin, on the other. The investigating team was led by Manalo and had Ebdalin and Dizon as
119 members. The team stayed in Kenya from April 20, 1997 to April
TABLE 30, 1997. On April
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the team entered Laviña’s residence unarmed with a search warrant, court order or letter from
the DFA Secretary. Laviña alleged that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed
cabinet locks, damaged furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks.
Subsequently, both Nestor and Laviña were recalled from their posts in Kenya.
On November 17, 1997, Laviña filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against
Nestor and his wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and
Dizon
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation to right to privacy on the unwarranted search and
seizure
RULING:
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act
cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.Defendant-appellant’s participation in
the invasion of plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to
take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the
plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter. The Article 26 of the civil code state
the instances when a person’s right are disturbed. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of one’s residence.
Refusal or neglect of public servant to perform duties, Art. 27, NCC
Philex Mining Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 125704, August 28, 1998
FACTS:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total
amount of P123,821,982.52
In a letter dated August 20, 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax
liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for
the years 1989 to 1991. In reply, the BIR found no merit in Philexs position. Since these pending
claims have not yet been established or determined with certainty, it follows that no legal
compensation can take place. Hence, he BIR reiterated its demand that Philex settle the amount
plus interest within 30 days from the receipt of the letter. In view of the BIRs denial of the
offsetting of Philexs claim for VAT input credit/refund against its exercise tax obligation, Philex
raised the issue to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 6, 1992. In the course of the
proceedings, the BIR issued a Tax Credit Certificate SN 001795 in the amount of P13,144,313.88
which, applied to the total tax liabilities of Philex of P123,821,982.52; effectively lowered the
latters tax obligation ofP110,677,688.52.
Despite the reduction of its tax liabilities, the CTA still ordered Philex to pay the
remaining balance ofP110,677,688.52 plus interest, elucidating its reason, to wit:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the malfeasance justified the non-payment of the taxes

RULING:
A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an
amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of tax cannot await the
results of a lawsuit against the government. To be sure, this is not state that the taxpayer is
devoid of remedy against public servants or employees especially BIR examiners who, in
120 TABLE OFFirst,
investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly. CONTENTSTABLE
if the BIR OF CONTENTS
takes time in
acting upon the taxpayer's claims for refund, the latter can seek judicial remedy before the Court
of Tax Appeals in the manner prescribed by law.Second, if the inaction can be characterized as
willful neglect of duty, then recourse under the Civil Code and the Tax Code can also be availed
of.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice
to any disciplinary action that may be taken."
Unfair competition, Art. 28, NCC
Willaware Products Corporation v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation

G.R. No.195549, September 3, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution

of plastic and metal products. Since its registration in 1992, respondent has been manufacturing
in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts.
Petitioner, on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of respondent. Respondent
further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of petitioner’s office to respondent’s office,
and in view of the fact that some of the respondent’s employeeshad transferred to petitioner,
petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s products, especially its plastic-made
automotive parts. Respondent discovered that petitioner had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but
was selling these products at a lower price as respondent’s plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unfair competition

RULING:
Yes, there is. It is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his
act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made
automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and
trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit
to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of
business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is
guilty of wanton wrong.As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioner’s
witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent
Action for damages based on crime/delict, Arts. 20, 29, 30, 35, NCC :
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
MANANTAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 107125, January 29, 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
121 Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
allegedly OF follows:
committed as CONTENTS On
or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, George Manantan was driving a Toyota car with a plate No. NGA-816, going home
with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas going home along the Daang
Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due
regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness
and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep
bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to
turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is civilly liable despite his acquittal.

RULING:
The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the
Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the
accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by
preponderance of evidence. Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the
courts did not give merit to this contention. The following elements must be present for double
jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first
jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the
first. In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the
criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.
NUGUID v. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785, September 15, 2006
FACTS:
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP
22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to
August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached
[petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been
convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the
latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,
000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1, 150,000.00. As security for the P1,
150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated Hermosa Savings Bank
(HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year,
[petitioner] can deposit the check. In June 1997, [petitioner] demanded payment of the sums
[above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on
October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks totaling P1, 150,000.00. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds. A verbal and written
demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks,
but [to] no avail. A complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the respondent. The trial
court convicted the defendant. The CA reversed the decision, thus acquitting Nicdao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is civilly liable despite her acquittal.

RULING:
A crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the
122 disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against TABLE the
private person injured by the
crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others. What
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of penal action does not carry with
it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The basic principle
in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being
one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal
charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability
(mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's
acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based
merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean
he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute
the offense charged. Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature
and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted. In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to
respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and
extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent,
who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil
liability.
PEOPLE v. AGACER
GR No. 177751, January 7, 2013
FACTS:
Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana,
Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his farm and
preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Farm
laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael Morgado and brothers Roden
(Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section of the same ricefield harvesting
Cesarios palay. • According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment
while Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana
plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved backwards and
retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin set afire the rice
straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire
and save his rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario
which forced the latter to retreat again.Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with
Eric, signaled Cesario to come closer.Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters
away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without
warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor
took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled
towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang.Thereafter, a short firearm was
thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants
then immediately left the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle. • After these
events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in different directions.
Genesis then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesarios son, Neldison Agacer
123 TABLECesarios
(Neldison), of the death of his father. At around 3:00 p.m., OF CONTENTSTABLE
friends in OF CONTENTS
said barangay
went to the scene of the crime and retrieved his corpse. During the autopsy, a total of eight
entrance wounds were found, mostly on the chest of Cesarios cadaver.According to the Medico-
Legal Officer, the fatal gunshot wounds were inflicted by the use of a firearm capable of
discharging several slugs simultaneously.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brother arose from final judgement of the
Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
Having established conspiracy, appellants assertion that each of them can only be made
liable for his own acts deserves no merit.Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the
fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted
for the criminal
ROMERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 167546, July 17, 2009
FACTS:
On April 1, 1992 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner3 driven by petitioner Sonny Romero
and the Apego Taxi4 driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose
Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for
Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision
resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr.,5 Arnaldo Breis,6 Gerardo Breis, Jr.,7 Rene Montes,8
Erwin Breis9 and Jimmy Padua.10 Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived
although they sustained serious injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is civilly liable despite his acquittal

RULING:
Yes. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was
established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove
negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that
there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly
liable. Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on
petitioner despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have been
held civilly liable if hisact from which the civil liability had arisen did not in fact exist.
DALURAYA v. OLIVA
GR No. 210148, December 8, 2014
FACTS:
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information4 for Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue
flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive
medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva
(Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya,
the purported driver of the vehicle.7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano),
124 an eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on saidTABLE
date,OF
heCONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
saw a woman crossing EDSA
heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette
bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who
testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s death; (b) Dr.
Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of
Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the
investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being
driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.8
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s
death despite his acquittal in the criminal case
RULING:
The CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that
Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a
remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil
aspect.1âwphi1 Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him.
Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such
acquittal.
PEOPLE v. GO
GR No. 168539, March 25, 2014
FACTS:
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of the Court's Decision in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court was correct in granting the demurer to evidence
RULING:
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to
commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the
existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators. The Court agrees with petitioner's
125 contention that, as alleged in the Information filed TABLEagainstOFrespondent,
which is deemed
hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the
other co-conspirators.
CALANG v. PEOPLE
GR No. 190696, August 3, 2010
FACTS:
At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No.
7001, owned by Philtranco along Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta.
Margarita, Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the
opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps driver, lost
control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing
along the highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at
about 25 meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeeps passengers, Armando Nablo and an
unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained serious physical
injuries.
The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical
injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philtranco may be held jointly and severally liable with Calang
RULING:
The Court emphasized that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC.
Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against
Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer
for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil
liability arising from delict. If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary.
ESTATE OF POBLADOR JR. v. MANZANO
GR No. 192391, June 19, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 9984
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Probate Court). Among its properties was one
share of stock in Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Wack-Wack Share) covered by
membership Certificate No. 3759 issued on September 17, 1974.
In an Order dated May 10, 1996, the Probate Court authorized petitioner's
administratrix, Elsa A. Poblador (Elsa), to negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner,
including the Wack-Wack Share. Upon Elsa's instruction, Rafael (one of the heirs of the
deceased Honorio Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the
services of Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated (Metroland) who, on
September 9, 1996, faxed a computation for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner,
showing a final net amount of ₱l5, 000,000.00. On September 18, 1996, the final net amount to
the seller was increased to Pl 5,200,000.00.
126 Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty,
TABLEInc. (Moreland), andOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE inCONTENTS
September
1996, the parties entered into a Deed of Absolute Salewith Elsa covering the Wack-Wack Share
for the gross amount of ₱l8, 000,000.00.
In October 1996, however, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the Wack-Wack Share.
Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the amount of ₱l8, 000,000.00 which the latter paid for the
Wack-Wack Share. Meanwhile, Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres
(Torres), allegedly requested Manzano for an accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on
behalf of petitioner. In response, Manzano faxed the following documents addressed to Torres:
(a) Cover letter dated
February 4, 1997; (b)Capital Gains Tax Return dated September 23, 1996 indicating the
payment of Pl,480,000.00 as capital gains tax; (c)BIR Certification dated September 23, 1996
indicating the payment of Pl ,480,000.00 as capital gains tax; (d) Authority to Accept Payment
dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P 13 5, 000. 00 as documentary stamp tax;
and (e) Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner, represented by Elsa, and Moreland.
Examining these documents, Rafael and Torres allegedly noticed a discrepancy in the faxed
Capital Gains Tax Return: while the typewritten portion of the Return indicated Pl,480,000.00
as the capital gains tax paid, the machine validation imprint reflected only P80,000.00 as the
amount paid. To clarify the discrepancy, petitioner secured a certified true copy of the Capital
Gains Tax Return from the BIR that reflected only P80, 000.00 as the capital gains tax paid for
the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. As a result, petitioner demanded Manzano to properly account
for the P2, 800,000.00 allegedly given to her for the payment of taxes and broker's fees, but to
no avail. This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Manzano before
the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case No. 113549. In the course of the proceedings, Manzano filed a
Demurrer to Evidence praying for the dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution to
establish the essential elements of Estafa with which she was charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex
delicto of Manzano
RULING:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on
the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or
the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him." Court finds no
reversible error in the CA ruling denying petitioner's appeal as its findings and conclusion are
well supported by the facts and are founded in law.
Independent Civil Liabilities:

Civil action based on other sources of obligations, Art. 31, NCC
PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS
GR No. 102007, September 2, 1994 (En Banc)
FACTS:
127 Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape andOFeventually
TABLE convicted
CONTENTSTABLE thereof on
OF CONTENTS
June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability
RULING:
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
CANCIO v. ISIP
GR No. 133978, November 12, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22
and three cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checks without
sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in the amount of P80, 000.00; 2)
Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) Interbank Check No.
25001157 in the amount of P30, 000.00.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation
of B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was deposited with the
drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The two other cases for Violation of B.P.
No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with and subsequently dismissed by the
Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of failure to prosecute.[5]
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 49, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On October 21,
1997, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa
cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil
action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions
of the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents can file a separate civil action

RULING:
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. In the case at bar,
a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa
contractual, an independent civil action. Thus, the Court ruled that the civil action can prosper.
128 HEIRS OF GUARING v. COURT OF OF
TABLE APPEALS
GR No. 108395, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
A vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway
in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven
by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415,
driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi
Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the Toyota Cressida
was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based
on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the
Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guarings car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that
in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guarings Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the
Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota
Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.
With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio
Clemente. Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores
Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the back were his daughter Katherine (who was
directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.
Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and
Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and
the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.
Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the
accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring
who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the highway and that in doing so he
encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force
Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer was thrown
back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.
On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for
damages to petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private
respondent and its driver for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring
RULING:
The criminal court appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the
ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be the relative capacity for
observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses.[6] The prosecution did not call Bonifacio
Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a statement to the
police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil
case involved a different set of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez, who was driving
the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a passenger in Guarings car. Thus, both had full
view of the accident.
It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that
they did not take part therein.
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case
should be remanded to it so that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and
the evidence. The issues raised by petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation
129 of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals inCONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF the exercise ofOFitsCONTENTS
exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.
Civil action in defamation, fraud, physical injuries, Art. 33, NCC
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., v. ARGOS

GR No. 130362, September 10, 2001
FACTS:
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporations operation
in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing
director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general
managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They
signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a
Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged
employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of
two Informations against Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.
On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil
Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its
subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
On October 23, 1995, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 65026 for respondents’ failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted in an order
dated January 9, 1996.
IFFI filed a motion to reconsider said order. This was denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil
complaint which it invoked before the court a quo. The appellate court dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether an action may proceed against petitioner

RULING:
The Court found petitioners contentions persuasive and respondents position untenable. The
well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought determine the nature of an action. A perusal of the respondents civil complaint before
the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not
primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned. Article 33 of the Civil Code
provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of
evidence.
Ruiz v. Ucol
G.R. No. L- 454404, August 7, 1987
FACTS:
Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an

administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health
130 center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol
TABLE OFalleged that Tagaca
CONTENTSTABLE was merely
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used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by
Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty.
Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint
for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the libel
case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to
the civil liability of the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred from filing a separate civil action for damages
RULING:
The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant

under the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon
which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation. Article 33 of the Civil Code gives an
offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate and
distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was made to that effect.
Civil action for violation of constitutional rights, Art. 32, NCC

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 119398, July 2, 1999
FACTS:
Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several

racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6,
1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first,
second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms. [Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits A, dated July 3, 1986; B
dated August 18, 1986; and C, dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private
respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him. And [herein private respondents]
consistently replied (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of
Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on
January 30, 1991, this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before
receipt of the summons on February 7, 1991, Presidential Commission on Good Government
advi[s]ed defendants that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize
winnings (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito
by [Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.].[5]
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioners
counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been
brought to court.
ISSUE:
Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by
evidence and the law
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence.[32] Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under
the Civil Code.[33] The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted, as
ruled by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial
court that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
which provides:Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 182976, January 14, 2013
FACTS:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling

fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrications under the name of
Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises (Permanent Light).
On March 2, 1994, the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) approved the award to Permanent Light of a contract for the supply and installation of
1,200 units of lateral steel filing cabinets. Immediately, Permanent Light began production of
the steel cabinets. An inspection was carried out and showed that the terminal seal of
Permanent Lights meter was deformed. Meralco sustained losse. In order to secure the
reconnection of electricity to Permanent Light, respondents paid P50, 000 as down payment on
the differential bill to be rendered by Meralco. Meralco performed a Polyphase Meter Test on
the disputed meter. Meralco billed Permanent Light the amount of P61, 709.11. Petitioner
received the amount of P5, 538.20 as full settlement of the remaining balance.
Subsequently, respondents received an electric bill in the amount of P38, 693.53
followed by another bill for P192, 009.64.Respondents contested both assessments and
complained of a significant increase in their electric bills since petitioner installed the
replacement meter. Meralco explained that the bill for P38, 693.53 was already a "corrected
bill." According to petitioner, the bill for P192, 009.64 was adjusted. It assured respondents that
Permanent Lights meter has been tested on and was found to be in order. While respondents
continued to pay, allegedly under protest, the succeeding bills of Permanent Light, they refused
to pay the bill for P38, 693.53. Respondents filed against Meralco a Petition for Injunction,
Recovery of a Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Respondents prayed for the
issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner from cutting power supply to Permanent
Light, refrain from charging them unrecorded electric consumption and demanding payment of
P38, 693.53. Corollary to this, respondents sought reimbursement of the P55, 538.20 that they
had paid as the estimated electric bill of Permanent Light from September 20, 1993 to March 22,
1994. They likewise prayed for the reinstatement of their old meter, which respondents believe
accurately records Permanent Lights electric consumption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be liable for damages
RULING:
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
132 humiliation and similar injury. Jurisprudence has established
TABLE OFthe following requisites
CONTENTSTABLE for the
OF CONTENTS
award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether physical, mental or psychological, which
was clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Pertinent to the case at hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for the award of moral
damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law, are violated. Also, the Court is convinced that respondents
sustained damages from the abnormal increase in Permanent Lights electric bills.
Quasi-delict/torts, Art. 2176-2177
BARREDO V GARCIA
GR No. 48006, July 8, 1942 (En Banc)
FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in
favor of the plaintiffs for P2, 000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1, 000 with legal
interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla’s negligence was
the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo should be civilly liable for the crime his employee committed
RULING:
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by the Court. Article 1903 of the Civil Code
says: "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. From
this article, two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve
from liability.This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant. The Court ruled that Barredo is liably for the crime committed by
his employee.
133 Safeguard Security Agency Inc. TABLEVOF
Tangco
GR No. 165732, December 14, 2006
FACTS:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to

Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the
banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder
with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard
Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents)
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide
againstPajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78.
Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC
of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19,
2000.On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in
a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001. Meanwhile,
on January 14, 1998, respondents filed a complaintfor damages against Pajarillo for negligently
shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency is liable under quasi-delicts

RULING:
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is

based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee. As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection
and supervision of his employee by operation of law.
Prejudicial question, Art. 36, NCC
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE
GR No. 137567, June 20, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973
at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,[2] petitioner
filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]
134 In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine
TABLE Felix alleged
OF CONTENTSTABLE that it was
OF CONTENTS
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting.[4]Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage[5] under Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and
ordered the filing of an Information[6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in
the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order[7] dated August 31, 1998.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case,
petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning
the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[8] In an Order[9] dated January 28, 1999,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently
issued another Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case
RULING:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the
civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
MERCED v. DIEZ
GR No. L-15315, August 26, 1960 (En Banc)
FACTS:
On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second
marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. R-5387. The
complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and
intimated him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living
together as husband and wife for over five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by
defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage
license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her relatives into
entering the marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde;
135 that immediately after the celebration of the marriage TABLE
plaintiff
OF left defendant and
CONTENTSTABLE never lived
OF CONTENTS
with her; that the defendant wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into
the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have the marriage annulled, but he refused to go
for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth Ceasar
filed her answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material allegations of the
complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's
previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to
intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent to their marriage as plaintiff could not
concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised him to
finish his studies first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff was
engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery,
showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim
defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit, fraud and insidious machinations
committed upon her by plaintiff.
On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar
filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of
the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-
6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a

prosecution for bigamy
RULING:
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a
marriage would be illegal and void. In the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second
marriage, which must be determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action
can proceed. In order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage
which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But
its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the
prosecution for bigamy can proceed.
DONATO v. LUNA
GR No. L-53642, April 15, 1988 (En Banc)
FACTS:
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity
of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as
Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent
consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she
had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R.
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed
the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and
deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least
five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which
reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil
Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
136 TABLE
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of OF CONTENTSTABLE
Criminal OF CONTENTS
Case No. 43554, petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627
seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial
question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUE:
Whether prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed
RULING:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted
that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the
second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of
bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B.
Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit.
CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz
various loans from Unicapital Inc., loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a
parcel of land, registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to
purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property.
Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes
of de la Cruz and Consing and paying an additional amount. However, before the respondents
could develop the property, it turned out, that the Tax Cetificate of Transfer held by De la Cruz
appeared to be spurious. Thus, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount that had
been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.
Consing filed for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding
the collection against him, on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
Unicapital then initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public
document against Consing and de la Cruz, the former sued Consing for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On the other
hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for
estafa through falsification of public document in the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question, and further denied the Prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration. The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the Regional Trial
Court. The CA promulgated its decision, dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding the
RTC’s questioned orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case?
RULING:
None. In the case at bar, the court found no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, while in Civil Case,
for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to
pay damages and to return the amount paid by resp[ondents. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil
Case for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public document.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may
be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. Moreover, neither is there
a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
FACTS:
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito R. Pimentel, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, petitioner
received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court for the pre-trial and trial of Civil
Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
On his part, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him.
Both the Trail Court and the Court of Appeals Ruled that there was no prejudicial
question pending the Trail for the Criminal case of Parracide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for
Parricide
RULING:
NO. The Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for
Parricide. The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
138 TABLE
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship OF CONTENTSTABLE
between OF CONTENTS
the offender and the victim
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short,
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999]
FACTS:
Immediately upon learning of Ordinances creating Barangay Karangalan and Napico in

Pasig City, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend their respective scheduled plebiscites,
and filed Petitions calling the attention of the with the Commission on Elections to a pending
case before the Regional Trial Court for settlement of boundary dispute. According to them, the
proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case;
hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments.
RULING:
Yes. The plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality
of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held to
ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that
portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to
the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
DOMINGO v SINGSON
[April 5, 2017. G.R. No. 203287]
FACTS:
Herein Engracia Singson filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila a complaint
for ejectment/unlawful detainer, against Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. She claimed
that she is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought the same from the Spouses
Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale. She likewise averred that the subject
property was already issued under her name. The petitioners only learned of the supposed sale
of the subject property when they received the summons and a copy of Engracia's complaint.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
seeking the nullity of the sale. They alleged that the Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which Engracia
bases her ownership of the subject property, was a nullity since the signatures of their parents
appearing thereon as the supposed vendors were forged.
Meanwhile, Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint claiming
that Engracia falsified the signatures of their parents in the Absolute Deed of Sale and, thus,
charging her with the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified
documents. Consequently, the OCP filed an Information with the RTC, charging Spouses
Singson with the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
The Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question
with the RTC. They alleged that the validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which
is the subject of Civil Case, then still pending with the RTC, are determinative of their guilt of the
crime charged.
The RTC Branch issued an Order, which granted the motion to suspend the proceedings
filed by the Spouses Singson. The private prosecutor sought a reconsideration of the Order, but
it was denied.
Unperturbed, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion when it directed the suspension of the proceedings in the
Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question.
They claimed that where both a civil and criminal case arising from the same facts are
filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence. The CA rendered denied the petition, it opined
that all the elements of a prejudicial question under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are present; hence, the RTC did not abuse its discretion when it directed the suspension of
Criminal Case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the proceedings in Criminal Case were properly suspended on the
ground of prejudicial question
RULING:
Yes. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following
requisites must -be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and
(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case and Criminal Case against the Spouses
Singson, and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed
appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense of the Spouses Singson in the
civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property from her parents
prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of Sale are true
and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts, which would be
140 necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused
TABLE OFin CONTENTSTABLE
the criminal case.
OF CONTENTS
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play
generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in
both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the
civil case before the criminal action can proceed. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflict decisions.
Persons and Civil Personality (Arts. 37-47, NCC):

Presumptive Civil Personality, Art. 40. NCC
QUIMIGUING v. ICAO
[G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970]
FACTS
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court
below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's
fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial
judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's
objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no
cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition lacks of cause of action, being that the child had not yet been
born.
RULING
No. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only a conceived child, yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854,
Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring
that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support
to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that
nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
141 "provided it be born later with the conditions specifiedTABLE in theOFfollowing article"OF
CONTENTSTABLE (i.e., that the
CONTENTS
foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries
(5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself
had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it
for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
Wherefore, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Birth, Art. 41, NCC
GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
FACTS
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant for the first time in 1948. In 1950 she
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by
the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by the defendant. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. Herein, Nita was again aborted her two-month old foetus. The plaintiff was at this
time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not
know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes
plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from physician who caused the same.
RULING
No. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical. It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified
in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
Restrictions or Modification on capacity to act, Art. 38-39, NCC
CATALAN v BASA
[G.R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007]
142 FACTS TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting in behalf and being the appointed guardian of Feliciano
Catalan after he was declared incompetent, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never
donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly
intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound
mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of
Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus
Basa, by Mercedes, should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the
property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its
registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought
remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the
deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of
competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation
in question must be upheld. Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the Court of
Appeal, however, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the present
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations done by Feliciano Catalan is despite being judged an
incompetent by the Court of First Instance
RULING:
Yes. The court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. A
donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like
any contract, renders the donation voidable.
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon
the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado
of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from
schizophrenia. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to
intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners
failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, Feliciano Catalan had lost total
control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound
mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced.
143 DOMINGO v COURT OF TABLE

APPEALS
[G.R. No. 127540. October 17, 2001]
FACTS
Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, including the house and warehouse on
one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin
Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly
took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to
vacate the same. Consequently, herein respondent Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint
for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court. He amended the complaint
and included his wife as co-plaintiff. They alleged that they were the owners of the three parcels
of land through the deed of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan; that since then, they had been in
continuous possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent improvements
thereon; and that defendants (now petitioners) entered the properties illegally, and they refused
to leave them when asked to do so.
Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs claims. According to
defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking
consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to anyone. As her
nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the three lots and
the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they had been in
possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages
against plaintiffs.
Further, petitioners assert that there was abundant evidence that at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale, Paulina Rigonan was already senile. She could not have consented
to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark on the deed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was valid in view of Paulina Rigonan’s state at the time of its
execution.
RULING:
No.The court held the sale is null and void ab initio. In the present case, at the time of
the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and
senile. She died an octogenarian in 1966, barely over a year when the deed was allegedly
executed on, but before copies of the deed were entered allegedly in the registry.
The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have
impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly
protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony
shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated
physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in
bed. Given these circumstances, there is in the court’s view, sufficient reason to seriously doubt
that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no
receipt to show that said price was paid to and received by her. Thus, the court agreed with the
trial courts finding and conclusion on the matter.
MENDEZONA v OZAMIZ
[G.R. No. 143370. February 6, 2002]
144 FACTS TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
In the case, a suit was instituted by the petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona
and Teresita M. Mendezona as initial plaintiff and in the amended complaint filed, included
herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona and Teresita Adad Vda.de Mendezona joined as
co- plaintiffs. Herein petitioners own a parcel of land wherein each ultimately traced their titles
of ownership over their respective properties from a deed of Absolute Sale executed in
their favor by Carmen Ozamiz
The petitioners initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their land titles caused by the
inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens, which came about as a result, a proceeding for
guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz.
It appears that, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with the
Regional Trial Court, alleging therein that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness,
had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she could no longer
take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and
absent-mindedness.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court reversed the factual findings of the trial court and ruled that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to disprove
among others, that at the time of the execution of the contract the mental faculties of
Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied their motion
in its Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in ruling that Carmen Ozamiz’s mental
faculties were seriously impaired when she executed the deed of absolute sale.
RULING:
Yes, the appellate court erred in ruling that at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired. It placed
too much reliance upon the testimonies of the respondents witnesses. However, after a thorough
scrutiny of the transcripts of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court founds that the
respondents core witnesses all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state of
mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. The testimonies
of the respondents witnesses on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz are far from being clear
and convincing, to say the least.
It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her
mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly
protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to
show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control
Considering, the court found the instant petition to be meritorious and the same should
be granted.
Death, Art. 42, NCC
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v Montaño

[G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009]
FACTS
145 Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
Steel and a member OF CONTENTS
of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. The claim was
based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Continental Steel immediately granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided
in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,
prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate. In a Submission Agreement, the Union and
Continental steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.
Atty. Montao, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave with pay and death benefits. He found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employee’s legitimate dependent occurred.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. In which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled for bereavement leave and other death benefits due
to the death of his unborn child.
RULING:
Yes. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death. As death has been defined as
the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die.Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
In view whereof, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Resolution f Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao,
which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits,
grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation.
Survivorship, Art. 43, NCC
JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO
[G.R. No. L-5426, May 29, 1953]
FACTS:
146 On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation

TABLE of
OFManila was raging,
CONTENTSTABLE OF the spouses
CONTENTS
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela
Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During
their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club
was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building,
especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground
near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to
seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a
friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came
out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped.
The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes
later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach
an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until they were forced to leave the
shelter because the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San
Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.
At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin
was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years
older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin,
were between 23 and 25.
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who
miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as
between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the
survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angela Joaquin died before her son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
RULING:
No. The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died disposes of the question
whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence
to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them;
that battle for the liberation of Manila.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son cannot be ruled out, it must be
noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction
from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was
killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life,
30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval
from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and
wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the
Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those
five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True,
people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who
had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her
husband and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea,
147 at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the TABLE
clubhouse at the momentOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE her husband,
CONTENTS
son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her,
the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez'
statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro
the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs.
Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and
the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds,
long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was still alive when her son
expired.
Domicile (Arts. 50 and 51, NCC)
MARCOS v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995]
FACTS:
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
Petitioner filed a Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months
to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
Consequently, petitioner filed the Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in
was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that
the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos lost her Domicile when she moved
with her husband on various residences.
RULING:
No. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a
given place for various purposes. . As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate; (1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) A bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which
correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
148 should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
TABLE concurrence OFofCONTENTS
OF CONTENTSTABLE all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment
of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was
obliged to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him, what petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
WHEREFORE, the court decided that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
Introduction to the Family Code

Retroactive application, Art. 256, FC
ARUEGO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996]
FACTS
The late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian sometime in until his death. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego on respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private
respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr;
that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their
deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for
compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children as stated in the Complaint.
Petitioners denied all these allegations. Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on
August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, private respondents’ action for compulsory
recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on
persons, specifically Article 285 thereof, which states the manner by which illegitimate children
may prove their filiation.
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the
ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172
of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate
filiation, if based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the
action will be barred by prescription.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent
and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their
presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as
149 provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain thatOFeven
TABLE if the action was
CONTENTSTABLE filed prior
OF CONTENTS
to the affectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to
Article 256 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively in the instant
case.
RULING:
No. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the
instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the
fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the
conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it
was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then
still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the
Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the
complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage the Family Code of
the Philippines.
BERNABE v ALEJO
[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying
that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
(Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as
the sole surviving heir.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the
Family Code, the complaint is now barred. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in
the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the
Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has
attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away
that right. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect,
since no vested right would be impaired.
RULING:
Yes, Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on
150 whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. TABLE OF the
Thus, CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
putative parent is given by
the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation,
and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested
prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced. The court held that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four
years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s
right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment. Wherefore, the Petition is hereby denied and the assailed Decision and
Resolution affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
Marriage
Definition and Nature, Art. 1, FC and Article XV, 1987 Constitution
ANCHETA, v. ANCHETA
[G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004]
FACTS
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married and had
eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children.
Later petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court, against the
respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property
with a plea for support and support pendente lite.Their conjugal properties were later separated
through a court-sanctioned the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the
conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children. When the husband
wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although
he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition
that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached
her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite.
Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month
after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties
void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio
her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her
person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so
she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court
of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between spouses Ancheta was
valid.
RULING:
No. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and
Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court, which provides in Sec 6 thereof that “No defaults
in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.”
151 The task of protecting marriage as an inviolableTABLE
socialOF
institution requires
CONTENTSTABLE OFvigilant
CONTENTSand
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage
and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the
State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not
a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological
imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
Wherefore, Petition is granted.
ABADILLA v. TABILIRAN
[A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995]
FACTS
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a
Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., respondent stands
charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.
Abadilla (a clerk of court) alleged that Judge Tabiliran had scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan (with whom he begot 3 children), respondent allegedly
shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan. Complainant claims that
this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela. It was further alleged that Judge Tabiliran falsely represented
himself as “single” in the marriage contract and that Mrs. Tabiliran also filed a complaint
against the respondent for abandoning the family home and living with Leonora Pillarion, with
whom he begot a son.
In his defense respondent declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not
and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and
until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being
alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife
when he married Priscilla Baybayan. The RTC said that the marriage between Tabiliran and
Baybayan is valid until the reappearance of his first wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in recognizing the second marriage valid.

RULING:
152 Yes. Contrary to his protestations that he startedTABLE

to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan
OF CONTENTSTABLE only
OF CONTENTS
after his first wife, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the
record that respondent had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as
early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, born on 1970, 1971, and
1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even
while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting.
The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which
provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession,
cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the
conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with
Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume
therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes.
Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his
marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral
conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social
institution. By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on
his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality
required of the law profession.
Wherefore, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross
immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the
service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all
without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
TILAR v TILAR
[G.R. No. 214529. July 12, 2017]
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of private respondent's (respondent) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. He alleged that he and respondent were married in aCatholic Church Cebu; that a
son was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the first few months but
respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to frequent
quarrels and petitioner being threatened and physically harmed; that she is a happy-golucky and
extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they eventually separated; and, that respondent
is now living with another man in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and
respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as histrionic
personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations.
Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The Public
Prosecutor certified as to the absence of collusion between the parties. 4 Trial, thereafter, ensued
with petitioner and his witness testifying. The RTC issued its assailed Decision, dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied, in denying the
motion for reconsideration, the RTC said; Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church
are [per se] governed by its Canon Law. Although the Family Code provides for some
regulations, the same does not follow that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity, The
Constitution is supreme to the Family Code. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the
Constitution is written in all laws, acts and transactions, hence, the same must be upheld.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that
the validity of church marriage is outside of the province of its authority.
RULING:
Yes, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Although, marriage
is considered a sacrament in the Catholic Church, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks
to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the
Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and
ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is
in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of
the church and state finds no application in this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the
Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may
be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter.
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the
rtc, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition for review
on certjorari is granted. The regional trial court is ordered to proceed with the resolution of the
case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
Presumption in favor of existence and validity of marriage.
DELA ROSA v. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN

[G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006]
FACTS:
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia both died, merely more than a year apart, without
a will and without descendants. This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives
claiming rights to their intestate estate.
Herein the petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to petitionersGuillermo proposed marriage to
Josefa, but no marriage actually took place. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no
record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried
woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married and lived together as husband and wife until
the death of Josefa. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known
among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to
the claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their
only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
154 excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs
TABLEwould be barred by the
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF principle
CONTENTSof
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple
were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence
is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption
of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of
the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
BALOGBOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997]
FACTS:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother,
Gavino, but he died, predeceasing their parents.
Private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate
of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their
brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents residence. They denied that her
brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before
this case was filed. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold
to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private
respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the
finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of
the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorneys fees and costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. However, the Court of
Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child
is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gavino and Catalina were married.

RULING:
Yes. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by
cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the certification presented by
private respondents was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant
municipal treasurer of Asturias.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents
herein, were recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of
Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be
presumed
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
CALIMAG v. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ
[G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016]
FACTS:
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case,
with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra). On the other hand, respondents are the children of
Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de
Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, was duly registered in the
names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate
of Title. In said certificate of title is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights
and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.
Silvestra died without issue and the land transfer was issued in the name of the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the
petitioner for P300,000.00. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by
Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds, making the same legally ineffective.
Then respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action
for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of the TCT with Damages against the petitioner.
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision in favor of the
respondents.
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of
sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the
brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.
The CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with modification as to the
amount of damages. The petitioner sought reconsideration, but her motion was denied in the
Resolution Hence, this petition.
156 ISSUE: TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS

Whether or not the documents presented as proof of marriage, namely a marriage
contract, the canonical certificate of marriage and the birth certificate of their children are
enough to prove the existence of marriage.
RULING:
Yes. Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the
fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts
of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
(Civil Registrar). Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them. Prima
facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient.
Further, Art. 220 of the family code stes that, in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
Requisites: Essential, Art. 2, FC

Sex
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC
[G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner alleged in his petition
that he was born and was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. In his
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.
Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar
of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made. And the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals, alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
157 the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
The Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Change of Entry in the Birth Certificate as to Sex on the Ground of
Sex Reassignment valid.
RULING:
No. There are no laws that Allows the Change of Entry in the Birth Certificate as to Sex
on the Ground of Sex Reassignment. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides, that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. No reasonable interpretation can justify the conclusion that it covers
the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. Even if the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
[G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008]
FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth

Certificate before the RTC. In her petition, she alleged that she was born and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General
entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his
behalf. The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate
of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
RULING:
No. Ultimately, the court is of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent
is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being
a male.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
Consent, Art. 2 par. 2, 6, FC
REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS
[G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013]
FACTS:
Fringer, an American citizen, and respondent, Albios were married before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. Then Albios filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. At the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite
being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued. The RTC
declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. In its assailed decision, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
No. Respondent’s marriage valid. Consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer.
In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
do so. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences,
and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Requisites: Formal, Art. 3, FC

Authority of Solemnizing Officer, Arts. 3 par. 1, 7, 8, 10, 31, 32, 35 par. 2, FC
BESO vs. Judge DAGUMAN

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]
FACTS:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty
and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil
Registrar.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report found that
respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined with a
warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing
out that: "As presiding judge, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code,
wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other
than his sala, to wit: (1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death; (2)
when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; (3) where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
160 house or place designated by them in a sworn statement TABLEtoOFthat effect. Thus OF
CONTENTSTABLE theCONTENTS
foregoing
circumstances are unavailing in the instant case. Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent
Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito
Yman. Being that such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, and has he also
undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our society.
RULING:
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation
report of the OCA well-taken. The court agreed with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent
Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. However,
the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part. This
Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their
dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent
upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.
The Court then adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
ARANES v. OCCIANO
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint. Respondent is a Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court. Petitioner alleges that respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, and outside his territorial
jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the
vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
Respondent judge vigorously denied that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence. In his
Comment respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to
solemnize the marriage of the parties. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling
from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties
161 TABLE OF
did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to CONTENTSTABLE
solemnize the OF CONTENTS
marriage and
suggested it’s resetting to another date. However, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in
the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up
with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would
be delivered to his sala.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and
for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine was recommended to be imposed on
respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and
without the requisite marriage license.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas of their jurisdiction and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
In said case, the court suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that
his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
In the case at bar, the judge’s act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.

KEUPPERS v MURCIA
[A.M.No. MTJ-15-1860. April 3, 2018]
FACTS:
This administrative matter commenced form the endorsement of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman to the office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action of the
case initiated by affidavit-complaint by complainant against respondent Judge. Herein
respondent was charged with estafa, and grave misconduct and conducts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
In his comment, respondent denied personally knowing the complainant and insisted
that he had only met her at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and that the
solemnization of the marriage had been assigned to him; asserted that the documents necessary
for a valid marriage were already duly prepared; and claimed that he was entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties considering that the documents
submitted by her had been issued by appropriate government agencies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
RULING:
Yes. The court Found respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband
outside his territorial jurisdiction and in a venue other than the judge’s courtroom or chambers.
163 Such solemnization id a blatant violation of Article 7 and
TABLE OFarticle 8 Of the Family
CONTENTSTABLE Code. By
OF CONTENTS
agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had
nothing to do with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and
cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage. Article 8 of the Family code contains the
limiting phrase “and not elsewhere”, which emphasizes the place of the solemnization of
marriage of a judge like him should only be on his courtroom.
Marriage License, Arts. 3 par. 2, 9, 11-21, 24-25, FC
ALCANTARA v. ALCANTARA
[G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007]
FACTS:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license,
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married
on the same day, then Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony. The
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged
marriage license, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham. Herein respondent gave birth
to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. However, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering
the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the
validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by
a certification. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara . Petitioner
has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. In fact, repondent has filed a case
for concubinage against petitioner. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The case was
raised to the Court of Appels, whereby CA rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners
appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage.
RULING:
No. The instant Petition is denied for lack of merit. Petitioner cannot insist on the
absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are
clear-cut.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
164 reflects a marriage license number. A certification to thisTABLE
effectOF
was also issued byOF
CONTENTSTABLE the local civil
CONTENTS
registrar. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable intendment will
be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the court held that there
is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage
license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of
the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994]
FACTS
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M.
Castro in the Regional Trial Court seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued
to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract
itself states that a marriage license was issued in the name of the contracting parties.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only a year later, when Castro discovered she was
pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for
four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Castro gave birth and the baby was adopted by
Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The trial court denied the petition. Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. The appellate court reversed the
Decision of the trial court. It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and
void and directed the cancelation of the subject marriage contract. Hence this petition for
review.
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
RULING
Yes. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject
marriage license.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized, the law governing marital relations was
the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Additionally, the fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any
other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be
held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the
proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For
failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for
her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no
evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her
husband Cardenas.

CARIÑO v. CARIÑO
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
FACTS:
Late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children. And the second was
on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children in
their almost ten years cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23, 1992, SPO4
Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
one hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that
they have no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño
who allegedly married in the said municipality on June 20, 1969.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first marriage is void ab initio?

RULING:
YES, marriage of Susan and Santiago is void ab initio. Under the Civil Code which was
the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized
in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the
license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data to
the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. The
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40
of Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, othe
rwise, the second marriage would also be void.
SY v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 127263 April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on Nove

mber 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of t
heir mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgm
ent was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separ
ation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 19
88, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila con
victed Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage t
o Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appe
als denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petition
er for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage licen
se at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is c
ontained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration o
f absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their ma
rriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different an
d incongruous.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
RULING:
Yes, the marriage is void from the beginning. A marriage license is a formal requirement;
its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner a
t the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremo
ny, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license nu
mber 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided
in Carmona.
From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one y
earafter the Ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this
case, there being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Ci
vil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the begin
ning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion
of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of mar
riage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
SEVILLA v. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
FACTS:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces
of The Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduce
d to a Certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date,
the father Of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his suppo
sed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registr
y, consequently, no Marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its Deci
sion dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack
Of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decisi
on Dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a
Motion For Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resol
ution dated 6 April 2005. This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
Herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?
RULING:
169 Given the documentary and testimonial evidence TABLE to theOFeffect that utmost efforts
CONTENTSTABLE were no
OF CONTENTS
t Exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
Presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issui
ng The certifications, is effectively rebutted. Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusi
ve proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true
in the case at bar, that the logbook just Cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent ef
forts to search for the said logbook, we Cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means
non-existence or falsity of entries therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of The marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. T
he courts look upon this presumption with Great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the con
trary, the presumption is of great weight.
ABBAS v. ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
FACTS:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991
And they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Phi
lippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was
At his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mothe
r-inlaw Arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some C
eremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature o
f Said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did
not Know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that
he did Not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided i
n that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to ch
eck on their Marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein t
he marriage License number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encar
nacion, issued a Certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number ap
pearing in the Marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number
of another marriage License issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license w
as Issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus th
eir Marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dat
ed November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned dec
ision To the Court of Appeals. The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her app
eal. It held that the Certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that
170 a diligent search for the Marriage license of Gloria and SyedTABLE OFconducted,
was CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
and thus held that s
aid certification could not be Accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient te
stimonial and documentary Evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that the
re was compliance with all the Requisites laid down by law. Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsi
deration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied By the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2
008 hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of t
he RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria a
nd Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria And Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to anot
her couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage Licen
se No. 9969967 Was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do Not appear in the document. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his
marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his Motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a big
amy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not Make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the Weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The
lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed To him, as it was Gloria who took steps to pr
ocure the same. The law must be applied. As the Marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly a
bsent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab Initio.
GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
FACTS:
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. Married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Aleg
re was Outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’
s father Was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a pur
ported Marriage contract in March 1982. In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin s
oured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to
declare his alleged marriage to Sally as Non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, S
ally presented a marriage license Allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

RULING:
No. The elements of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That th
e marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, The absent spou
se could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or s
ubsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites f
or validity. In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sall
y was not Authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the
alleged Marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the es
sential Requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
KHO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 187462 June 1, 2016
FACTS:
In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the office of the municipal treasur
er to Instruct him to arrange the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their son, Raquel
Kho And Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the two were married at 3 in the morning at a church. Cl
aiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage Lic
ense and had not seen nor signed any papers in connection to the procurement of a marriage Lic
ense, and considering the ONE DAY difference between the time the clerk was told to obtain The
papers to the actual moment of the marriage, no marriage license could have been validly Issued,
Raquel Kho filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage. The RTC ruled that the
marriage was void due to the lack of the require site marriage license and Ruled in favor of Raqu
el Kho. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the RTC and Ruled in favor of Vero
nica Kho. Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar who attests to the absence in I
ts records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist In the
said office despite diligent search;
Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the Lack
of a marriage license and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the
Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring T
he marriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite marriage license.
No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino v. Yee Carino), the Supreme Court considered the
Certification issued by the local civil registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage Licen
se, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. In the present case, the petitioner Wa
s able to present a certification issued by the civil registrar attesting that the Office of the local Ci
vil registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued between the parties.”
Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack of a
Marriage licence and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent Bec
ause the certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former Civil
Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the subject Marriage lic
ense. Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the Family Code
Was not effective yet) makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a lice
nse first Issued by the local civil registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it cl
ear that a Marriage performed without a marriage license is void.
Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the M
arriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite marriage license because the petitioner has Succ
essfully overcome the presumed validity of the marriage by presenting the certification of The ci
vil registrar which was sufficient to prove the absence of the marriage license. In addition, The r
espondent was not able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such Validity.
Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and the respondent’s failure to Produce a c
opy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was Ever issued,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. Hence, the
marriage performed is null and void. The decision of the CA was reversed and set Aside.
Marriages exempt from marriage license requirement, Arts. 27-34, FC
REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu
of a Marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5ye
ars. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both E
mployees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an A
ction for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsma
n. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or Declaration of n
ullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham And his consent
was secured through fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a swor
n Affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
RULING:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at t
he time They executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started livi
ng Together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
173 November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of AppealsTABLE
are binding in the Supreme
OF CONTENTSTABLE Court. The
OF CONTENTS
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and Invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating To the period
of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
Exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to A quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by th
e parties Under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled th
at an Action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not pr
escribe And may be raised any time. SC held that an action for nullifying a marriage is imprescri
ptible. It May be raised anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated without a marriage li
cense. No Other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
MANZANO v. SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David ManzanoH
aving been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Ca
loocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her Hus
band contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
Respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void
and Bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separa
ted.” For This act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross i
gnorance of The law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administra
tor on 12 May 1999. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administ
rator Recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered To pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act w
ould be dealt With more severely. Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea fo
r the dismissal of the Complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a dirime
nt Impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comm
174 ent, he Stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
TABLE he would have
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFdiscouraged
CONTENTS
him from Contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manz
ano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which Were subscribed and sworn to before him. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstr
ated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a Void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
“ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special Application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the Embodiment of competence, integrity, and indepen
dence. It is highly imperative that judges be Conversant with the law and basic legal principles.
And when the law transgressed is simple and Elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with
Themodificationthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.00.
NIÑAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their Marri
age were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma Executed
an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and Wife fo
r at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 199
7, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for Declarati
on of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for Lac
k of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
The second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismi
ss On the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who Could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license?
RULING:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the Require
ment of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In this Cas
175 e, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot beOF
TABLE said that they haveOF
CONTENTSTABLE lived with Ea
CONTENTS
ch other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pe
pito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twent
y Months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and T
hereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted f
or Five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
Contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
Rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marria
ge at The time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each Other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsisten
ce of the Marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between th
e spouses Cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "h
usband and Wife". Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack A void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by l
aw concerning the Properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership throu
gh actual joint Contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provide
d in Article 50 in Relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code .
On the contrary, The property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partne
rship and the children Conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
COSCA v. PALAYPAYON
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
FACTS:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on Octob
er 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal Solem
nization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in Consideratio
n of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) Infidelit
y in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from Exempted e
ntities. Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requi
site Marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of pa
ying the Marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is allege
d that Respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven marriages in the month of Jul
y, 1992, When in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that resp
ondents Likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992,
but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which
were Notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 f
or each Document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference. Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent j
udge Forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and J
essell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of
court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed be
cause she Gave a brand-new airconditioning unit to respondent judge. Finally, respondents are c
harged with Collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. Altho
ugh such entity is Exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the correspondin
176 g receipt was issued, Respondent Baroy failed to remit theTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
amount to the SupremeOF CONTENTS
Court and, in
stead, she deposited the Same in her personal account.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the com
plaints charged
RULING:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the Dispens
ation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with The
heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by Prop
riety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an E
xample of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, i
t is a Necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its Personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality impos
ed upon a Court of justice. On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinentl
y provides that the Formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except i
n the cases provided for Therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the ess
ential or formal requisites Shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an ir
regularity in the formal Requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or partie
s responsible for the Irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The Cour
t hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a st
ern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will Definitely be se
verely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the Service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, Agency or i
nstrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled Corporations.

Marriage Ceremony, Arts. 3 par. 3, 6, 8, FC
EUGENIO v. VELEZ
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental all
eging That she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the
herein Petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The resp
ondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but The wri
t was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had Died o
n 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject Of ha
beas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial Perm
it. Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

RULING:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brother
s and Sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “Persons charged
with Duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin;
178 the Duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kinTABLE
of theOF
deceased. Philippine
CONTENTSTABLE Law does n
OF CONTENTS
ot recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally Married who cohabit for ma
ny years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public As husband and wife, and
who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they Live may be considered le
gally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that our la
ws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in Our society, and that th
ey produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by Law, authority exists i
n case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the Man and woman living t
ogether must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In Any case, herein petitione
r has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment Which disqualified him fro
m even legally marrying Vitaliana.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tag
bilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school Year
1977-78, luciomorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, luciomorigo Was s
urprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an E
xchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left A
gain for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1
990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
Petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
Take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jec
echa Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993,
accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of Marriage in the Regional Trial Cou
rt of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage With Lucia, on the ground tha
t no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, Appellant was charged with Bi
gamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond reaso
nable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA- G.R. CR No. 20700 was p
ending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 decl
aring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage Ceremony actually
179 took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which TABLE
thenOF CONTENTSTABLE
became OF CONTENTS
final and Executory. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the Ma
rriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus hel
d That the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As t
he Dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was No marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the fir
st Marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declarati
on of The first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the a
ccused Was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no appeal was tak
en from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long beco
me final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a Crime requires that the accused must h
ave been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the Petitioner was never married to L
ucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the Principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The co
ntract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument To its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he Contracted the marriage wi
th Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being An essential element
of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot Be sustained wh
ere there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted Of the insta
nt charge.

Effect of irregularity of formal requisite, Art. 4, FC Three-Fold Liability
MORENO v. BERNABE
A.M. No. MJT-94-963 July 14, 1995
FACTS:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judg
e Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
Released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respond
ent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract beca
use the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Resp
ondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. In his comment, Re
spondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno To solemnize the marri
age for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. The Respondent Judge Contends that he did n
ot violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law When he, in good faith,
solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging And pleading com
plainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant Condition. In order
to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage Ceremony, with
the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the Necessary
documents were complete. In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court A
dministrator Recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a ma
rriage without a Marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed
against him.

Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance
of The law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemniz
ed The marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage licen
se, has Dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integ
rity and Independence" and to his promise to be "faithful to the law." Respondent cannot hide b
ehind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at Most, would serve only to mitigate
his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions Could never justify violation of t
he law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 And is sternly warned that a r
epetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
NAVARRO v. DOMAGTAY
A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19, 1996
FACTS:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Ta
gadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his fir
st Wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between florianodador Sumayl
o and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent ju
dge holds Office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the munic
ipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Mo
nica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte. Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint Re
spondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross Miscond
uct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in

Office and ignorance of the law?
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The leg
al Principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated;
Prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehensi
182 on Of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who,
TABLE OF if not experts, are
CONTENTSTABLE OFatCONTENTS
least, prof
icient In the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled
and Competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic Legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect the
m to know and Apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foun
dation indeed, Compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While mag
istrates may at Times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respond
ent judge exhibited Ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly preju
diced the status of Married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and arlynborga is co
nsidered bigamous and void, There being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Id
a Peñaranda. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Co
urt, a six-month suspension and a Stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a biga
mous union and therefore void, And the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judg
e, the Court adopts said Recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in app
lying the law and to cultivate A deeper understanding of the law.
Marriage Certificate, Arts. 6, 22-23, FC
VDA. DE JACOB v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
FACTS:
Tomasa Vda. De Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jac
ob And was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
Reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the
other Hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he present
ed an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Su
r, granting The petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During t
he proceedings For the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to Intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopte
d son and as his sole Surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appel
lant Tomasa and his Adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Interve
ntion and filed a Complaint for injunction with damages questioning appellee's claim as the lega
l heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and again
st tomasaguison. Such Decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff tomasavda. De Jacob and deceased Alf
redo E. Jacob was valid?
The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
Established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five yea
rs. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriag
e was Exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civi
l Code. The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adopt
ion Took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. On the second issue some considerations
cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. I
n his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that He did not dictate decisions in adoption ca
ses. The only decisions he made in open court were Criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded
guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch Where he was assigned was always indicat
ed in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order Did not contain this information. Furth
ermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he Recognized his own alleged adoption, as sho
wn by the documents that he signed and other acts that He performed thereafter. In the same ve
in, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as An adopted child. Likewise, both th
e Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of The Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record That Pedro Pilapil had been adopt
ed by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably Negate the alleged adoption of
respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the Person claiming such relat
ionship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence Presented by petitioner sh
ows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
Foreign Divorce, Art. 26 par. 3, FC
REPUBLIC v. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jo

nes Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, D
ebbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
Respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984,
Fely Left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five childr
en, the Youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year aft
er Fely left For the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign t
he enclosed Divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Cra
sus learned, Through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an Ameri
can, with whom She eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
American family, Staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to
talk to Fely because He was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had
caused him. Fely Returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of the
ir eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1
995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A.
She had been openly using The surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named
as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely l
184 eft and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no TABLE more OF
possibility of reconciliation
CONTENTSTABLE betwe
OF CONTENTS
en them. Respondent Crasus finally Alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly Demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the ess
ential obligations of marriage. Such Incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a gr
ound for declaration of nullity of marriage Under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72,
of the Family Code. On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marr
iage of Respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its de
cision Affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicabl
e to the case at bar?
RULING:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the C
ouple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
Celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the cas
e of Respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer Filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime afte
r she left for The United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time s
he filed for Divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle em
bodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws o
n family rights and Duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already livin
g abroad. Philippine laws, Then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely Could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, ciprianoorbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a s
on And a daughter, kristoffersimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ci
priano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipri
ano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Ci
priano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certa
in Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to rema
rry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding meri
t in the petition, The court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cipriano Orbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his A
llegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
Decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fac
t And demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be pr
oved As our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws mus
186 t be Alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must alsoTABLE show that the divorceOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE decree allows
CONTENTS
his Former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no e
vidence Sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless,
we are Unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 20
9, as Amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced By a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. How
ever, Considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on re
cord, we Are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was nat
uralized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is Now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly u
pon respondent’s Submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marria
ge begot Seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his
wife Agreed to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement for Separation a
nd Property Settlement” whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal Pr
operty. On January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia F
rom the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad. In 1977, Atty. Luna organiz
ed a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office Thru Atty. Luna obtained a con
dominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After Full payment, the condominiu
m title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio Shares. When the law office
was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the Names of the owners, with Atty.
Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law Firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After
Atty. Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, His law books and furniture were
taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 Share in the condominium was
also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz v Soledad, the second wife, Then filed a complaint against the
heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties were Acquired by Atty. Luna and her durin
g their marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of The property became hers, 1/2 being
her share in the net estate, and the other half bequeathed to Her in a last will and testament of A
tty. Luna. The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from
the first Marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both
parties Appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by A
warding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first Marri
age. In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that
the Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the fir
st Wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved. In deciding the case, the S
upreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce Decree between Atty. Lun
a and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending Parties were entitled to th
e properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had vali
dly Dissolved the first marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15.
RULING:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death. The Supre
me Court: The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void: “From the time of the celebrat
187 ion Of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until theTABLE
present, absolute divorceOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE between Filip
CONTENTS
ino Spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
Between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouse
s Are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws hav
e Been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marria
ges Have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the Mar
riage.” No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement: “Consider
ing that September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains g
overned Their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at
the time Of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that t
hey had not Entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 1
19 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit: “Article 119. The future spouses may in the marria
ge settlements agree upon absolute or Relative community of property, or upon complete separa
tion of property, or upon any Other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the System of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established
in this Code, 2Shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.” Atty. Luna’s marr
iage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, Their property relatio
ns is governed by the rules on co-ownership: “In the Philippines, marriages That are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly States: Article 71. All mar
riages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in Force in the country wh
ere they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in This country, except biga
mous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine Law. Bigamy is an illeg
al marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before The first marriag
e has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared Presumptively dead b
y means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous Marriage is considered
void ab initio. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the Petitioner being void ab i
nitio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the Bigamous marriage wer
e governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 Of the Civil Code, viz: Art
icle 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, But they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by Either or both of them thr
ough their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be Governed by the rules on co-own
ership. Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subjec
t of the Case, the subject properties were awarded in favor of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the firs
t Marriage. Petition denied.
REPUBLIC v. MANALO
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
FACTS:
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a

petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by
virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. Manalo alleged and attached the
following in her petition: 1. That she is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract x x x; 2. That
recently, a case for divorce was filed by her in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;3. That at present, by virtue
of the said divorce decree, she and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together
and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband; 4. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the she and the former Japanese husband's
marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is
188 still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
TABLEherOF
husband or is no longer
CONTENTSTABLE married
OF CONTENTS
to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage; 5. That this petition is filed principally for the
purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was
already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; 6. That petitioner prays, among
others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed
to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law. The CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
RULING:
The fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines. there is no real and substantial difference
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article
26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands.
Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese
law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. In this case, Manalo was able to
submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the
Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese
national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules
of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, we are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.

MISALUCHA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018
FACTS:
On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the
second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R. Aguila
(Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4 June
2007.
The RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The trial
court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case
because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his
failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission that he did not seek
judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The
appellate court ratiocinated that assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate
of Divorce, since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not presented, it could not
ascertain whether said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to
remarry. It continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he had filed and had secured
a judicial declaration that his first marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Philippine
laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they found petitioner Redante Sarto y
Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an
automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be
required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition
of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that
purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a
party as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. Before the divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which, the divorce was secured is
mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial
notice of foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce
decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule
that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented
and admitted in evidence.
In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking
them must present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven
through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal
custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of
said documents must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce as a fact
or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe. Aside
from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the
defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14 January 2008.

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
FACTS:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established Their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 197
3 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, i
n 1982; and that Petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Date
d June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P Of the R
egional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Man
ila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner B
e ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
Right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the Cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court Wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community proper
ty" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on
the ground That the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree ha
s no bearing in The case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?
RULING:
192 The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his nationalTABLElaw, private respondent
OF CONTENTSTABLE is no longe
OF CONTENTS
r The husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino w
ife, Which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his In
terest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
Recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the prop
erties Acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. To maintain, as private respondent does, t
hat, under our laws, petitioner has to be Considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. Seq. Of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitio
ner should not be obliged to live together with, Observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not Continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights t
o conjugal property. She should not be Discriminated against in her own country if the ends of j
ustice are to be served.
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was t
he Former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
Marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which wer
e born six Children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 19
63, Virginia Predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a Son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an Ame
rican citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce an
d Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respond
ent Felicidad San Luis, then Surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of t
he United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no childre
n with respondent but lived With her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnersh
ip assets and the settlement Of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before The Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged tha
t she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 S
an Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving he
irs are respondent as legal spouse, His six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real Properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,
178.00 more or less; that the decedent Does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
the conjugal partnership assets be Liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
193 On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis,TABLE
one ofOFthe
children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss On the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the Petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this Was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his deat
h. He further claimed that respondent has no Legal personality to file the petition because she w
as only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at The time of his death, was still legally married
to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked The same grounds and joined her brother Ro
dolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition.
On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismis
s. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It H
eld that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the P
rovince of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside th
e Orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for lett
ers Of administration?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested Person who has
a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the Existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity t
o remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed Under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This pr
ovision governs the property relations between parties who live together as Husband and wife wi
thout the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It Provides that the p
roperty acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their Wages and sal
aries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not Necessary that
the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property Acquired d
uring the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is Proven.
The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to Prov
e the validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.

CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship throu
gh Naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Da
isylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert Left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in Apr
il 2005 to Surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two ye
ars after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina Fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registr
y Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. D
espite the registration of the Divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) inf
ormed Gerbert that the Marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; t
o be enforceable, the foreign Divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent P
hilippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petit
ion for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or Declaration of marriage as dissolved (petiti
on) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not File any responsive pleading but subm
itted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Ger
bert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case Herself but was prevented by fi
nancial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be Considered as a party-in-in
terest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. In its October 30, 2008 decision, The RTC denied Gerb
195 ert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
proper OFthe
party to Institute CONTENTS
action fo
r judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It rule
d that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second Paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens t
he Right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
RULING:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this C
onclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
Unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necess
arily Strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s nat
ional law Have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evid
ence of right In favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which pro
vides for the Effect of foreign judgments. In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, Recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to
be official acts of a sovereign Authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into pl
ay. This Section requires proof, Either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the off
icer having legal custody of the Documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Ph
ilippines, these must be (a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or cons
ular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by The seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to
his petition a copy of the divorce Decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authentic
ity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at t
his point, simply dismiss the petition for Insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is con
sistent with the Canadian divorce law. The Petition was granted and the case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.

GARCIA-RECIO v. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Ma

labon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, A decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian fami
ly Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate
of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and Re
spondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatua
n City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" And "Filip
ino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without Prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal Assets were div
ided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On
March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage In the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting Marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of Respondent's marriage to E
ditha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the Marriage dissolved on the gro
und that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in The Philippines. It deemed t
he marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential Element of the marriage; th
at is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it Based its Decision on the d
ivorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had Ended the marriage; thus, the
re was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samso
n Appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is n
ot Sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. For
tunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in Evid
ence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had Not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it Was a
dmissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and Accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce Decree a
dmissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the Quoted
articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer Bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the le
gal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and Civil rights belonging to a citi
zen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their Former states, don the attires o
f their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent Severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine Personal laws. On the second
issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence That proves respondent's lega
l capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the follo
wing exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for Petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"– Complai
nt;(b) Exhibit "B"– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C"–
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D"– Office of the City Registrar of Caba
natuan City Certification that no Information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Edit
ha D. Samson was in its records; And (e) Exhibit “E"– Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Re
derick A. Recio;(2) for Respondent: (Exhibit “1”) – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit "S"– Family La
w Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit
"3"– Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of D
issolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; and Exhibit "5"– Statutory De
claration of The Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since Oc
tober 22, 1995. Based on the records, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who
was then a Naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce Decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requ
iring him to Adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the Very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is thus
remanded To the trial court for further proceedings.
MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE
G.R. No. 215723 July 27, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki K
oike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippin
es. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka
Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the
Laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. Th
ey were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly Rec
198 orded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.TABLE
Seeking
OF to have the said Divorce
CONTENTSTABLE Certifi
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cate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon Cit
y, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial Recognition of foreign divorce and decl
aration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.No. Q-13- 72692. At the hearing, no one appeared to oppos
e the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented Several foreign documents, namely, "Certifi
cate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"
both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republ
ic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a documen
t entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued By the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that
was authenticated by the Department Of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by t
he City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and re
corded in the said Office. In Addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their correspo
nding English translation, as Well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and
"The Civil Code of Japan 2009" were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law
on divorce.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign d
ivorce.
RULING:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, Our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses fore
ign Marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse
to Contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spo
use Capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnize O
utside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were Solem
nized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited Under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.” Where a marriage between a Filipino Citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by The alien s
pouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have Capacity to re
marry under Philippine law. Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law Confers jurisdictio
n on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse withou
t undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the Marriage. Thus, in Garcia v.
Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the Alien spouse to be re
cognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid According to the n
ational law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing Personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do
Not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that
both theDivorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any oth
er fact. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as wel
l as the Existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a r
eevaluation Of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is O
bviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Well Entrenc
hed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the Functio
n of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in Fact b
inding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from Judgmen
ts or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising Questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accord
199 ance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, despite TABLEthe
OF procedural Restrictions
CONTENTSTABLE on Rul
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e 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under Paragraph 2, Secti
on 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “Since the said Rules Denote discretion on
the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, The question of fact
involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the Case be referred to
the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural Rules were intende
d to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure Ought not to be app
lied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not Override, substantial
justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain Its prime objective,
for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of The courts.”
REPUBLIC v. COTE
G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018
FACTS:
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace
Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the time of their marriage, the
spouses were both Filipinos and were already blessed with a son, Christian Gabriel
Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America (USA). On
August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. This was
granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a decree. Seven years later, Florie
commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment granting the divorce before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage
contract, hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the National
Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the Solicitor General, representing Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf
of the State during the trial.
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be
capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and a decree of absolute
nullity has been issued. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CA denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC12 applies in a case

involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
RULING:
No. The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section 20 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from
annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void19and
voidable20marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of
the Philippines.
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce
involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of
the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can
remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce. The
starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
200 that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
TABLE OF and laws.
CONTENTSTABLE Justice
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Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Void ab initio marriages:
No marriage license, Art. 35 par. 3, 27-34, FC
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
FACTS:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living Tog
ether at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991, Up
on opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Th
ereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
His children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko wi
th Whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and
Liabilities.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that
the Filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residenc
e, which Was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, al
though he Admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went thro
ugh a marriage Ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not
a valid marriage For lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, resp
ondent went Through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, ne
ither party applied For a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving
their children to his Care and custody as a single parent. Respondent claims that when he marrie
d De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California On December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good
201 faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he Was single because
TABLE OF his first marriage
CONTENTSTABLE was sol
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emnized without a license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his fir
st Marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the s
econd Marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
RULING:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous M
arriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on th
e Basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Article 40 is applicable
to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is giv
en "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or Acquired rights in accor
dance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule
of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by The application
of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the Litigants' righ
ts may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent made a Mocker
y of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, Who be
get him five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to The
practice of law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness
For membership in the legal profession.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of Impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his B
ehavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by h
is Private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the Judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties a
nd in his Everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No positi
on exacts a Greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the judiciary.
DIAZ-SALGADO v. SALGADO
G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016
FACTS:
Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa
and she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo
ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real
properties and according to him, since there was no marriage settlement, the properties pertain
to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo Ann. When Severina died,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina
adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment
of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps Maya. The latter countered that they were not aware
of any marriage between Luis and their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as
common-law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one
Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that divided their properties without court
intervention, both Sps claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties
202 of Severina. Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE included a
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certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina.
The RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between
Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document,
enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not
present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence of
a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the
Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the
said office that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was
issued on or before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina.
ISSUE:
Whether or notthe marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void
RULING:
Yes. All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of
marriage license or certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license, such certification is
not the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license. A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3). "Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or
at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular
marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties." Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on
the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion
other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage
license and is thus, void ab initio.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

Bigamous/polygamous marriages, Art. 35par. 4, 41-44, FC; Art. 390 and 391, NCC
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee

G. R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen, allegedly obtained a divorce in the

United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with
petitioner.
When Orlando died in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration to the intestate estate. While the case was pending,
respondent Louella, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC. Wherein, the two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground
of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file the petition. Furthermore, alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction,
the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It
considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er
for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage
with Bristol was still valid.
RULING:
No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because
petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and
was valid.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce
Quita v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No

children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment
of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will.
All surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition.
The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the
death of Arturo, that the marriage between the private respondent and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
ISSUE:
Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
RULING:
No dispute exists as to the right of the Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself
even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage
considered void ab inito.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, (En Banc)
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April
10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
205 certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
showed OF CONTENTS
Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this
one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes
cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence
he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

RULING:
Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a

valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second
marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Jarillo v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164435, 29 September 2009
FACTS:
Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony. Both
newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a church ceremony, in 1975 in San Carlos
City, Pangasinan. Out of the union, the spouses bore a daughter.
Jarillo, however, contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
celebrated through a civil ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a
church wedding in Manila.
Uy filed a civil case for annulment against Jarillo in 1992. On the basis of the foregoing,
she was charged with Bigamy before the RTC.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision, holding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy.
In the meantime, the RTC where Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo rendered
judgement declaring Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillo’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of bigamy.

RULING:
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy.
The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had
206 TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent OF petitioner’s
second marriage, CONTENTS
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to jurisdiction,
was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.
Weigel v. Sempio Diy
G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva
Weigel on the ground that the latter has existing marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion.
Lilia claimed that prior marriage was null and void because she and Eduardo were forced
to enter said marital union. She likewise alleged that Eduardo was married to someone else.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karl's marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING:
Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is
still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise,
there is no need of introducing evidence on Lilia's prior marriage for then such marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration before she can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s
marriage are regarded void under the law.
Social Security Commission v. Azote
G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
FACTS:
In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as
beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a
deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another
set of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as
beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She
then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no
answer.
The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal wife as
Edna could not prove that Edgardo’s previous marriage was annulled or divorced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member.
RULING:
No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e)
and (k)thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of
207 the latter’s SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proofTABLE
thatOFEdgardo
contracted an earlier
marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Since the second
marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code wasalready in force. Edna,
pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that
the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to
Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of
Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of
Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna
was the second wife of Edgardo.
Exception: Valid Bigamous Marriage
Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993
FACTS:
Nolasco, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with him
on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.
After their marriage he got another employment contract and left the province. He then
received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut
short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote
several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed
that he inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed
before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the
CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco
had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the
trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the
Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.
Article 41states the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4
years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to marry. However, it imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged
208 refusal to give any information about her was too convenient an CONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF excuse to justifyOF
his failure to
CONTENTS
locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he
asked leave from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When
the Court asked Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he
was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.The
circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
Republic v. Court of Appeals
477 SCRA 277
FACTS:
The herein petitioner, Alan Alegro was married with Lea in January 1995. In February
1995 Alan then told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go
back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. He then checked if she went to her parents’ house
but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house
and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from
the Barangay Captain. For some time, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during
his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s
disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the
disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING:
The court ruled against Alan thus failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before
he filed his petition with RTC. One, He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay
Captain and even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his
testimony. Two he also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s
whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. Which could have enhanced his credibility had
he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father
was the owner of Radio DYMS. Lastly he did report and seek help of the local police authorities
and NBI to locate Lea but he did only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
RTC.
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111717, October 24, 1994
FACTS:
On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty years after,

without his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another marriage with respondent
Luisita Camacho.
In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita Bienvenido, who he lived with from 1968 until at
the time of his death in 1989. Sometime in 1982, Aurelio bought a house and lot which was
registered in his name.
Two years after, he executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita,
the TCT was issued in her name. After the death of Aurelio, respondent brought a petition before
the RTC seeking the annulment of the sale of the property of petitioner.
Petitioner answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased the property in
question using their joint funds and that she was a purchaser in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.

RULING:
That exception involved by respondent in accordance with Art. 83 of the NCC; That this
exception cannot be invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. Since Aurelio had
a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void
for being bigamous.
There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of
the conjugal partnership of Luisita and Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
first place.
Manuel v. Philippines
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
FACTS:
Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in
1996. However, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or
thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap
her. In January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her
neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was “single” in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant,
he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. The CA rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral
damage when it has no basis in fact and in law.
RULING:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. She lived with
Eduardo and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her
lawful husband. Until Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her, and she had no inkling that he was
already married to another before they were married
Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception,
210 TABLE series
the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous OF CONTENTSTABLE
of acts. OF CONTENTS
The Court rules that the Eduardo’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with Tina were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Calisterio v. Calisterio
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS:
On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving parcel of land. Teodorico was survived by
his wife respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was second husband of Marietta who had
previously been married to James William Bounds. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven
years later without court declaration that James presumptively dead. On October 9, 1992
petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled “In
matter of Intestate Estate of the deceased Teodorico Calisterio, claiming to be inter alia, the sole
surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta
being bigamous and thereby null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Marietta between the deceased Teodorico valid that in turn
would determine her right as surviving spouse.
RULING:
The marriage of Marietta having contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should
be thus deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of judicial declaration of marriage of
presumptive death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, upon
its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should be rightly divided one portion to
the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
Republic v. Granada
G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married
in 1993. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified
that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert
earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. The motion was denied.
The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment
thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. Petitioner moved for
211 TABLE OF
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition CONTENTSTABLE
under Rule 45. OF CONTENTS
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of
presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.
RULING:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the
RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
“as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
Republic v. Narceda
G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013
FACTS:
The present case stems from a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the
Philippines praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal
filed by the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction to decide on the matter. The subject matter of the
appeal was the decision of the RTC of La Union declaring presumptive death of respondent’s
wife final and executory.
Robert P. Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract
he presented will reveal at the time of their wedding when Marina was only 17 years and 4
months old. According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore and never returned
since. There was never any communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could
not find her.
Several years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from
Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a
Singaporean husband. In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, respondent filed with
the RTC on 16 May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or
absence of Marina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse
is dead.
RULING:
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding

is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit. As a matter of course, it follows
that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because
the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
212 TABLE OFhas
Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
failed to establish a well-
founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this.
Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a
violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted
a diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant to
RULING:
Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on
the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in
determining the same. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in
hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional or planned. Her search for
Jerry was far from diligent. The RTC ruling declared that the presumptive death should have
been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.

Santos presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos had filed a petition
for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.
Ricardo remarried on September 17,2008.Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to
locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, butthey did not know their
daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but noone
gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his
Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or
other appropriate remedies.
Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in
court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court
that she was a resident of Tarlac City.
As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead. Celerina claimed that all
the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never resided in Tarlac and never left to
work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was not true that she had
213 been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that sheTABLE
neverOFleft
CONTENTSTABLE OF dwelling
their conjugal CONTENTSin
Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment
of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the

ground that the proper remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her
reappearance as stated in Article 42 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. For
fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva
G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
FACTS:
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. In 1993, Edna
heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or
information as to his whereabouts. She took a leave from work and returned to the country to
look for Romeo. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She also went to his
birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its Order, the RTC granted
the petition on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo's death.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-
founded belief that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision despite the fact that the
conclusion reached by the RTC is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.
RULING:
The Court grants the petition. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires
the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on efforts and inquiries, she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
Mere absence of the spouse even beyond the period required by law, lack of any news
that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied petitions for the declaration of
214 presumptive death on the said basis. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because
none of them had knowledge of the existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years.
Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband
had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG observed, there was not even
any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared.
Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough
to give meaning to her well-founded belief that Romeo was already dead.
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. filed a Petition before the RTC of Ozamiz City-
Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie. Jose testified that he first
met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts and on
August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived
together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while
Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive any
communication from her. He returned home after his contract expired. He inquired from her
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because
of these, he had to presume that his wife was already dead.
The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough
for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The Republic's appeal sought to correct or review the RTC's alleged misappreciation of
evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse
of discretion.
The Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have
Netchie declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife do not
sufficiently support a “well-founded belief” that the respondent’s wife is probably dead.
RULING:
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case
basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of
presumptive death, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC's finding that Jose's
Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-
founded belief standard. If anything, Jose's pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing
Netchie required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence.
Republic v. Tampus
215 G.R. No. 214243, MarchTABLE

16, OF
2016
FACTS:
Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days
thereafter, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was
assigned. The couple had no children. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved
futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively
dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively dead.

RULING:
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown
that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a
well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such,
the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that
such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice.
Republic v. Catubag
G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018
FACTS:
Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each otheras husband and wife, and had 2
children together. Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The marriage was
solemnized by a Municipal Judge in Rizal, Cagayan.
Sometime in 2006, while Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left their house and
never returned. Ludyson’s relatives took care of the children.
Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquired with close
friends and relatives and even travelled as far as Bicol, where he wife was born and raised, but to
no avail. He also searched various hospitals and funeral parlors, also to no avail. Ludyson
subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his wife’s disappearance.
Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner’s resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.

RULING:
Yes. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies
available. As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor
appeal decision in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because these
judgments are immediately final and executory by express mandate of law.
216 TABLEproceedings
However, parties may challenge the decision in such OF CONTENTSTABLE
throughOF CONTENTS
a petition for
certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Tadeo-Matias v. Republic
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner is of legal age, married to Wilfredo. Wifredo is of legal age, a member of the
Philippine Constabulary. The petitioner and Wilfredo entered into a lawful marriage on January
7, 1968.
Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines and set out from their conjugal home to
again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. He never came back from his tour of
duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the
petitioner nor to his relatives. That according to the service record issued by the National Police
Commission, he was already declared missing since 1979.
Weeks became years and years became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope,
and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times
had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now
necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or
at least declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court; that this petition is being filed
not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638.
RULING:
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the
petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's
decision must, therefore, be set aside.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action
that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a
petition that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Hence, by acting upon and eventually
granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated
prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful
that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer
be replicated in the future.
The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
Marriage in violation of Art. 40, 52-53, FC
Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993
FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela
Paz. He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in
Saudi Arabia, for support and subsistence. Delia only found out about the prior marriage when
Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983. In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting
with another woman and he was disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge and
consent. In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Roberto and separation of property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in

affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for the said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Atienza v. Brillantes
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706, March 29, 1995 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against

Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that
he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati,
which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He
asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take
care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the
affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida
Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated
twice without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his first
marriage was solemnized without marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because
his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991
under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.
ISSUE:
218 Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous

TABLE marriage justifies
OF CONTENTSTABLE his act
OF CONTENTS
to cohabit with De Castro
RULING:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law
in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already
a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time.
His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
FACTS:
Maria Dulce Javier got married. This was the first marriage of the respondent which was
not judicially declared as nullified before the second marriage. It was also alleged that there is a
third marriage contracted by the respondent with Julia Hernandez.
Thereafter, the respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the grounds that this was celebrated without a marriage license
which is a formal requisite for a valid marriage. The respondent also contends of his ignorance
of the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting in a new
marriage.
The petitioner then files this case for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can invoke his ignorance of the requirement under
RULING:
No, the respondent cannot invoke his ignorance of the requirement for the judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting a new marriage. Hence, the decision of the
RTC in suspending the criminal case pending the civil case was reversed because it is wrong to
invoke ignorance of a law which is already in effect and force like the Family Code.
Ty v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in
Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared
null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the
decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner and had their
church wedding.
CA ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first
be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that
the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing
so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
RULING:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife
who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition
for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal
or common funds.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and
subsisting.
Castillo v. De Leon Castillo
G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016
FACTS:
Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent
opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had
not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to
which the solemnizing officer belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on
the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said
that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato which
makes her marriage to Renato bigamous rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed
Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the
nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a

marriage.
RULING:
No. The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage
only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages were the Civil Code. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
220 TABLE OF
purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage CONTENTSTABLE
contracted OFthe
prior to CONTENTS
issuance
of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
Characteristics of psychological incapacity
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao

G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an
effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went
with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March
1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese
General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations
that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination
and the result was there is no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE:
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly

indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.
Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 1120219, January 4, 1995 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the
couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents
into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was
then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then virtually
221 abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity onTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
the ground OF CONTENTS
of psychological incapacity.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be

appreciated.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable.
Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario C. Hernandez were married and had three
children. Lucita, petitioner, filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City a petition for annulment on
the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent, Mario. The petitioner claimed that the
respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household. Respondent engaged in drinking sprees, gambled and
womanized at which came a point that he had an illegitimate child. Petitioner also added in her
petition full custody of her three children, Php 9,000 monthly financial support for the children,
sole ownership of the parcel of land purchased during their marriage as well as of the jeep which
private respondent took when he left his family.
RTC dismissed the petition. This decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was psychologically incapacitated at the time of his marriage to
the petitioner
RULING:
The petitioner failed to provide evidence proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated. The respondent’s habitual alcoholism, womanizing and
cohabitation with those he’s had extra-marital affairs with do not constitute psychological
incapacity. Art. 36 of the Family Code requires that incapacity must be psychological, not
physical, although the manifestations or symptoms are physical.
As for the other claims prayed for by the petitioner, the Court believed that those should
be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or
custody of children. Judgment was affirmed.
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines
GR No. 184063 January 24, 2011
FACTS:
Cynthia and Patricio were married. Their relationship, however, lasted only for 35 years
until Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to Patricio’s
alleged psychological incapacity.
Among the reasons stated therein were his difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the
family business, jealousy towards relatives and acquaintances to whom she interacts with, his
indolence (eating and sleeping all day), propensity to gambling and even to the point of
threatening to kill her. All these were, however, not appreciated by court to have satisfied the
grounds for psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Patricio suffered from psychological incapacity.

RULING:
Psychological capacity must be judged according to gravity, juridical antecedence and

incurability. Gravity pertains to the seriousness of the case causing the party alleged to have
been suffering from the incapacity to incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be given and accepted mutually. On the other hand, juridical antecedence
refers to that which is rooted in the history of the party. As for the incurability, this implies the
permanence, medically or clinically, of the illness.
It can be inferred from the given Facts: that the reasons cited by the petitioner do not
satisfy the above qualifications for psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy to consider the
fact that they had already been married for 35 years.
Republic v. De Gracia
GR No. 171557 February 12, 2014
FACTS:
Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were students and
he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy. At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of
age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero
sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal home
and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where
she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann
Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991
with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan
de Oro City. From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of
Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which,
however, proved futile because of Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be
incurable. For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite
service of summons. Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for
psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s
claims. Rodolfo also underwent the same examination. In her psychiatric evaluation report, Dr.
Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional
immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons
who abide by established norms of conduct." As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she
lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly,
223 Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
adding OF CONTENTS
too that he sired a son with
another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already
existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was bereft of the mind, will and heart
for the obligations of marriage." On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an oppositionto the
complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological
incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage

under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical
– incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. There exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity. The
RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail how
Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeplyrooted and incurable within the
parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is, therefore, granted and the
decision of CA reversed and set aside.
Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple
got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered
his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
224 constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing TABLEof
OF irreconcilable
differences and
confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which
would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that
would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely
showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of
the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which
is not considered as psychological incapacity.
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 130087 September 24, 2003
FACTS:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married
at Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon
City and begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all
day. During a family crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness
of a child, the petitioner would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her
pregnancy, she would insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal
dwelling. The husband would eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become
estranged from each other.
On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On
July 21, 1995, respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to
state a cause of action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state
the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status.
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred
resolution of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court
through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s
failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition
itself. According to Judge Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that
petitioner has violated respondent’s right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also
rejected petitioner’s claim that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when
respondent filed the second petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed
without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if
proven true as well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of
action.
2. Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-49 in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its
termination and status.
1. Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner
in violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions
need not be alleged, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –x x x.
2. What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete Facts: showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration
of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the
dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 154994 June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started cohabiting, living a common-law

relationship. Toshio was a Japanese national who would necessarily go back and forth from
Japan to Philippines.
Sometime in 1987, as Toshio went to Japan and while Lolita was in the Philippines, they
decided that they would get married 1 year thereafter. Their child was born, but he had to go
back to Japan promising the latter that he will return but he never kept his promise and even if
he returned he never visited her and their son and had only provided financial support for only
two months.
This prompted Lolita to file a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Summons was
served to his house but the known address was no longer where he resides. As a result, they
deemed it necessary to cause its publication in the newspaper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital

obligation.
RULING:
It is not enough that one’s act of abandonment would render him psychologically
incapacitated. In the present case, instead of constantly alleging that her husband could not
fulfil his obligation, Lolita could have just presented psychological examination or evaluation of
her husband which would definitely strengthen her case. The definition of psychological
incapacity does not evolve on the idea that one neglects or refuses to fulfil his obligation, it must
be based on one’s inability or incapacity to perform essential marital obligation.
Tongol v. Tongol
GR No. 157610 October 19, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were married on

226 TABLE OF
August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four children, CONTENTSTABLE
namely: Crisanto, OF CONTENTS
born in 1968;
Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, which was granted. On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of
Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the
ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection
of the latter's family; their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued
interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas,
even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and without
the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business,
Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business became
successful and he was able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a
pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and
began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of her bad attitude, the
employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the
employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she
even suspected that the income of the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their
continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile
because their differences had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990,
Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for
dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation
have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage
failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a
married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol,
and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses
Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a
psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their
marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution
of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the
spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas
only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or
“neglect”. Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must
be grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Third, there was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the
psychological incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the
family business. Marriage obligations must correspond to the management of the household and
227 the provision of support for the family. Fifth, marital TABLE
obligations must not only
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF include
CONTENTSthe
spouse’s obligation to the spouse but also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the
respondent was negligent in the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of
the Family Code. Although, the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there
was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Marcos v. Marcos
GR No. 136490 October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Brenda and Wilson, both rendering military service, were married twice. The first was
solemnized by a judge, while the second was solemnized by a command chaplain. Out of their
marriage, five children were born. After the EDSA Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service. Wilson engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper. Brenda, on the other, was engrossed in the business of selling “magic uling” and
chickens. From this, she was able to put up a trading and construction company. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children will see him as a role model. However,
Wilson failed to engage in any gainful employment. This resulted to quarrels and physical
altercations. On October 16, 1994, the spouses had a bitter quarrel. Due to this, Wilson and their
children left their conjugal property. A complaint to have the marriage between her and Wilson
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity was then filed. The trial court
found in favor of Brenda. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
contending that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented by Brenda B. Marcos show Wilson’s
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
It did not. Although the Court was convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of
his acts were does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on the part of Wilson. No
evidence was presented that would show that his “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
The Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
Te v. Te
GR No. 161793 February 13, 2009
FACTS:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After
almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
228 classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s,
TABLE that of the
OF CONTENTSTABLE narcissistic
OF CONTENTS
and antisocial personality disorder.
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set
aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity
of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied
only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated
in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the
Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on
certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity.
He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void based on Article 36 of
the Family Code?
RULING:
The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed
and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null
and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
1. medically or clinically identified,
2. alleged in the complaint,
3. sufficiently proven by experts and
4. clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the
Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it
be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning.

Azcueta v. Republic
GR No. 180668 May 26, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months
after their first meeting, they got married. After four years of marriage, Marietta decided to leave
Rodolfo. Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look
for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. In
fact it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the
monthly rental. She also averred that Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave
Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him,
Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only
once a month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta
that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready
for a child.
In 2002, Marietta filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Rodolfo. Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Marieta presented as expert witness Dr. Cecilia Villegas.
Villegas did not personally evaluate Rodolfo but based on her interview with Marieta, she
concluded that Rodolfo is inflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder (mama’s boy) as he was
too dependent on his mother so much so that he cannot decide for himself. The RTC ruled in
favor of Marietta but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
RULING:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the SC held that there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her
husband. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained
in the trial court’s decision. Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding
that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage,
witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfo’s
irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already
evident. Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to
render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his
responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to
support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding
even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute
to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36. The incurability of
Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
In all, the SC agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.

Agraviador v. Agraviador
GR No. 170729 December 8, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique and and Respondent Erlinda contracted marriage in 1973 wherein
they begot four children. The family of Enrique, however, was apprehensive about their
marriage because of Erlinda being a waitress, and that she came from a broken family. On
March 1, 2001, Enrique filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Erlinda on
the ground of psychological incapacity. He alleged that she was carefree and irresponsible,
refused to do household chores, stayed away from their house for long periods of time, had an
affair with a lesbian, did not take care of their sick child which led to the latters death, consulted
a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate, and refused to use the family name Agraviador in
her activities. She also refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became very close to
a male tenant in their house. Enrique submitted the psychiatric evaluation report made by Dr.
Patac who found that Erlinda was suffering from a Mixed Personality Disorder that had existed
since her adolescence. Dr. Patac also found that such condition has no definite treatment. The
trial court saw merit on the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation
report, which led to a judgment declaring the marriage between Enrique and Erlinda null. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Erlinda was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
RULING:
The Court held that the totality of evidence presented failed to prove Enrique’s claim.
The theory of Enrique that his wife was psychologically incapacitated was based on her refusal to
perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as
immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. The Court held that this do not rise to the level
of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. The theory of Enrique also failed to establish that the respondent’s
condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
marital obligations. He also failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s condition. He also
did not mention that the alleged illness was incurable.
As to the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Patac, the Court held that it fell short in
proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital
duties. Dr. Patac, also, did not personally examine Erlinda. The report also failed to establish the
juridical antecedence of the respondent’s condition by stating that the respondent manifested
inflexible maladaptive behavior before marriage. The report also failed to prove the gravity or
seriousness of the respondent’s condition.
Considering all of this, the Court affirmed the decision and the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Marable v. Marable
GR No. 178741 January 17, 2011
FACTS:
Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still classmates
studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they happened to sit
beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted the
respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love, time and
attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two eloped
and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was
followed by a church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid
Prison. They begot five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels
increased when their eldest daughter transferred from several schools because of juvenile
misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace, love and
affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna eventually found out about the affair.
These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved,
unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the conjugal home;
gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor
family and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for
attention and strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void
in his relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological
Report of Dr. Nedy L. and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals
233 reversed the said decision. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore

rendering the marriage null and void.
RULING:
The findings of Dr. Tayag’s psychological report merely made a general conclusion that
the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina
Doctrine. Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant,
rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act
responsibly during the marriage by working hard to provide for his family especially his
children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear that his family background was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when, actually, he was simply dissatisfied with
his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his extra-marital affairs and has
immediately terminated them. In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and
conflicts in child-rearing does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder
which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various
cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that Persons and Family Relation 227 the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. That not being the case with
petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Aurelio v. Aurelio
GR No. 175367 June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Danilo Aurelio, petitioner, and Vilda Ma. Corazon, respondent, got married on March 23,
1988. Out of their love, Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel came into existence. But the happy
story did not last since on May 9, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondent alleged that both of them are
psychologically incapacitated in performing and complying with their respective essential
marital obligations. She furthered that the said psychological incapacity existed prior and even
during the time of marriage ceremony. On the part of the husband, the manifestations are the
following: lack of financial support, lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his
working wife, exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife, mood swings, refusal
to assist in the maintenance of the family, arrogance, insensitive to the feelings of the wife, and
humiliation of his wife even in front of their children. On the side of the wife, some of the
manifestations are the following: low tolerance on boredom, sudden change in feelings,
emotionally immature, cannot delay to gratify herself, and self-indulgence lifts her spirit easily.
In a nutshell, the husband suffers from passive aggressive personality disorder making him
immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage, while the wife
suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the RTC. A motion for
Reconsideration followed but it was also denied. Upon appeal in CA, the petition was also
denied. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that
the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage are sufficient
for the court to declare the nullity of marriage between Vida and Danilo.
RULING:
No. The CA simply followed the Molina guidelines which is in contrast with the assertion
of the petitioner that the court did not comply with the guidelines. Petitioner alleged the non-
compliance on the following guidelines: root cause of psychological incapacity must be alleged
in the complaint, gravity of the illness enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume essential obligations of marriage, and that the non-complied marital obligation must be
stated in the petition. The responded on the issues. First, the root cause of Psychological
incapacity, which is the family backgrounds of petitioner and respondent, was stated and alleged
in the petition. It was supported by the competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition
alleged, through the report of the psychologist, that respondent suffers from Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features while the petitioner suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. These disorders incapacitated them to perform
marital obligations for they are grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court stated that
the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. Thus,
petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Republic v. Court of appeals
GR No. 159594 November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina)
were married on March 1977. On April 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house
and lot.
On August 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision declaring the
marriage between Eduardo and Catalina a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family,
and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of
determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr.
Annabelle Reyes (Dr. Reyes), the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was
the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological incapacity
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed on the decision of
the RTC. On July 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the judgment of
the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing
that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina
had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital
obligations" and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in declaring that the marriage between
Eduardo and Catalina is null and void due to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No, the decision by RTC and CA declaring the marriage between Eduardo and Catalina is
incorrect. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not
merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.
Both RTC and CA did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently
explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological
incapacity. Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the
house without Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their
adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other
witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior and his testimony was self-serving.
Both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation
by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. Catalina’s immaturity alone did not constitute psychological
incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Kalaw v. Fernandez
GR No. 166357 January 14, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Valerio Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) got
married and begot four children, Rio, Ria, Miggy and Jay. Tyrone then had an extramarital affair
with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn) and had four children with her.
In 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. While in 1990,
Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children, leaving his four children
with Malyn in a rented house with only a driver and a househelp who would just call Malyn to
take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. The children stayed with Malyn on
weekends pursuant to their custody agreement. Malyn also allowed her two elder children for a
week vacation in Japan but were actually brought to the US by Tyrone. Ria, upon return from
the US, chose to live with her mother.
On July 1994, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code and alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the
time of the celebration of their marriage for being immature and irresponsible towards Tyrone
and their children during their co-habitation as manifested by her acts of leaving the children
without proper care and attention to play mahjong all day and all night; leaving the house to
party with male friends and returning in the early hours of the following day; and having an
adulterous relationship which Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.
Tyrone then presented testimonies of two expert witnesses to prove Malyn’s
psychological incapacity. Psychologist Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates) testified that Malyn may
have narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) – a person being obsessed to meet her wants and
needs in utter disregard of her significant others, as manifested in her utter neglect of her duties
as a mother. She further reported that such personality disorder may have been evident even
prior to her marriage for she materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model
237 thus, rooted in her family background and upbringing. Such TABLEdiagnosis
OF CONTENTSTABLE
were basedOFonCONTENTS
the Facts:
revealed in the interviews with Tyrone, son Miggy and Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law),
as well as the transcript of Tyrone’s testimony.
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), corroborated Dr. Gates’
assessment and concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity was rooted in her role as the breadwinner
of her family which allegedly inflated her ego that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and
husbands’ needs became secondary. Her being so self-absorbed made her incapable of
prioritizing her family’s needs. He further clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with
friends only constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time were
spent on such activities to the detriment of one’s familial duties. He also characterized her
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable. He averred that his opinion was based on his
interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr.
Dayan), Malyn’’s expert witness.
On the other hand, Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. She admitted
playing mah-jong but claimed that she always had Tyrone’s permission and would often bring
the children and their respective ‘yayas’ with her. Thus, she did not neglect her duties as mother
and wife. Her leaving the conjugal home in May 1985 was to escape her physically abusive
husband. She likewise denied the allegation of adultery and maintained that Benjie only booked
a room for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends, and that her relinquishing
all her spousal and parental rights was under duress.
As an affirmative defense, she maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from
psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing,
and physical violence. She also presented an expert witness, clinical psychologist Dr. Dayan,
who interviewed spouses Tyrone and Malyn, and three of their children, for the psychological
evaluation of said spouses, and established that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of
her mahjong habit, while Malyn was fed up with Tyrone’s sexual infidelity, drug habit, and
physical abuse.
Dr. Dayan further determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature.
In her psychological evaluation, she reported that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe,
dependency, narcissism, and compulsiveness, while on the stand, she elaborated that Malyn
appeared to have a good relationship with her kids despite relationship problems with Tyrone.
As for Tyrone, Dr. Dayan found him psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty because
of his commitment issues preventing him from committing to his duties as a husband and of
him being unable to remain faithful to Malyn.
Their children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their
needs, and loved them. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned. However,
one of the children, Ria, admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother.
The two elder kids evoked that after the separation, their mother would visit them only
in school. The children were in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and
would tend to their needs during the time that their dad was abroad and that the househelp
would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was
sick.
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone’s attending psychiatrist, commended Malyn for the support
she gave to Tyrone during his confinement. He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for
drugs and was not a drug dependent.
The court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), was ordered by the trial court to conduct
a social case study on the parties as well as their children. She recommended that the custody be
awarded to Malyn for being more available to the children and exercises better supervision and
care based on the interviews of family members themselves. She also commended Malyn for the
efforts made to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools and to personally
238 attend to their needs and to devote time with them. On the other
TABLE OFhand, she did notOF
CONTENTSTABLE find Tyrone a
CONTENTS
reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded because he tended to prioritize
his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn.
Thus, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to
perform their essential marital obligations and held that the parties’ psychological incapacity
had been clinically established to be serious, pervasive, grave and incurable. The trial court then
declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Malyn then appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed the
ruling. Tyrone then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tyrone has sufficiently proved that Malyn suffers from psychological
incapacity
RULING:
Article 36 of the Family Code, which governs a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations. And the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state, and that the psychological problem must be grave, incurable and
have existed at the time of marriage.
The Supreme Court held that the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses were
insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Malyn because their conclusions were
premised on her alleged acts or behavior which had not been sufficiently proven and they
heavily relied on Tyrone’s allegations of her constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. In fact, Malyn even refuted
such allegations by presenting contrary evidence.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that Malyn actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, the Court held that there was no basis for concluding that she
was indeed psychologically incapacitated. The totality of the evidence even points to the
opposite conclusion. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother.
On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and
cooked the food they like. And it appears that she also made real efforts to see and take care of
her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
The Court observed that the trial court did not assess the veracity of these allegations,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence, and it also did not make factual
findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals was
AFFIRMED.
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas
GR No. 208790 JANUARY 21, 2015
FACTS:
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace Viñas, got married. They lived together,
239 however, in March 2006, Mary Grace left. Glenn subsequently found
TABLE OF out that sheOF
CONTENTSTABLE went to work
CONTENTS
in Dubai and was romantically involved with another man. Glenn alleged, among others, that his
wife was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing, self-centered, and immature; she lived as if she
was single and was unmindful of his needs.
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted
himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag)., who
found him as "amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and
healthy heterosexual relationship." On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s
personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo
(Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in college. Based on their testimonies, Dr. Tayag
diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social
traits. He concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love,
trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, he recommended the propriety of
declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace because of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. Summons were served upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana Rosita. Mary
Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as
evidence. The RTC declared the marriage null and void.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by
the RTC. The OSG appealed to the CA claiming that no competent evidence exists proving that
Mary Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, a petition for review was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sufficient evidence exists justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of
Glenn’s marriage with Mary Grace due to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of CA, thereby, declaring the marriage between Glenn
and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting.
The lack of personal examination of Mary Grace by an expert is not necessarily fatal in
the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. As jurisprudence provides, "If the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
The cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary
evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
Grace’s condition. Considering that she was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence. Further, her departure from their home in
2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her
obligation to live with her husband.
While the Court also sympathizes with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence
presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.

Republic v. Romero II
GR No. 209180 February 24, 2016
FACTS:
Reghis M. Romero, respondent, and Olivia Lagman Romero, the petitioner, first met in
Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia's family who were stranded along Kennon Road,
which caused the development of closeness of the latter to Reghis and they tried to matchmake
him to Olivia. In the desire toe please Olivia's parents, Reghis courted Olivia and eventually they
became sweethearts.
Reghis was still a student that time, determined to finish his studies and provide for his
family thus, in less that a year into their relationship he decided to break up with Olivia because
he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his dreams. Olivia,
however, refused and insisted on staying on Reghis' dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and,
instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory.
Olivia's parent's believed that they eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis
initially objected as he was unemployed and unprepared however Olivia's parents assured him
that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are financially able.
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 and were blessed with two children.
On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage,
citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. In support of
his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to please
the latter's parents who were kind and accommodating to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the RTC's declaration of nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The Court finds merit in the petition. It has consistently been held that psychological
incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing
requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis' testimony shows
that he was able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of
a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia
lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 14 years and both of them contributed in
purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take
care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good
provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter's
parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36
of the Family Code.
Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract is not the only
valid for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario
GR No. 222541 February 15, 2017
FACTS:
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old. They became
romantically involved. Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic
helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college
education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil
rites ceremony and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February
19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony.
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital
obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose
conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father. According to Rachel,
Jose was hot tempered and violent and on one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly,
caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Rachel,
however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only
later in their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.
Rachel also presented the testimony of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag who prepared the
Psychological Report on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily
based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial
Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b)
his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and
comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital
commitments; and(d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings. In a Decision dated April 23,
242 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between JoseTABLE and OF CONTENTSTABLE
Rachel void on theOF CONTENTS
ground of
psychological incapacity however, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, holding that the
totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a
finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
RULING:
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal
basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological
incapacity.
The Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Court
laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.An
expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article
36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. The evidence
need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons
intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of the marriage.
Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for
establishing psychological incapacity. Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or
interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that could have given her a more
accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing at
the inception of the marriage.
Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to
show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and
emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity

Garlet v. Garlet
GR NO. 193544 AUGUST 2, 2017
FACTS:
Yolanda Garlet and Vencidor T. Garlet met and became intimately involved with each
other which resulted in Yolanda getting pregnant. She gave birth to their son and later on, ot
married. They soon had another child. Vencidor is aware that Yolanda is working in Japan as an
entertainer. There was no antenuptial agreement before they contracted marriage and also there
/as no separation of properties during their marriage. After awhile Yolanda and vencidor
experienced marital problems and they separated. Yolanda has the custody of the children and
she /as the one supporting them. She admitted that they acquired properties during their
cohabitation with her on money. She then filed for a Declaration of Nullity of marriage on the
around of vencidor0s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations to
Yolanda and their children. Yolanda also admitted that vencidor did not undergo a psychological
e4amination &y the psychologist sought by her because he did not appear to the invitation. The
clinical psychologist found vencidor to be suffering from Narcissistic Type of Personality
Disorder. The RTC rendered a decision that their marriage is null and void on the, round of
psychological incapacity. The C3 on appeal rendered a decision contrary to that of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Yolanda and vencidor is null andvoid
RULING:
No. The marriage between Yolanda and vencidor is not null and void.
244 Decision: The Supreme Court agrees with thatTABLE the OF
totality of olanda0s
CONTENTSTABLE OF evidence
CONTENTSis
insufficient to establish encidor0s psychological incapacity. Yolanda imputes almost every
imaginable negative character trait against but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute
manifestations of encidor0s psychological incapacity as contemplated in the family Code.
Lonton-Cruz vs Cruz
GR NO. 201988 OCTOBER 11, 2017
The Court is not found &y the psychological report. While the Court previously held that
9there is no requirement that the person to &e declared psychologically incapacitated &e
personally examined by a physician yet this is qualified by the phrase if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.: The psychologist0s
findings must still to a careful and serious scrutiny as to the cases of the same particularly the
sources of information as well as the methodology employed.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1952, Maximo Sta. Maria (Sta. Maria) obtained a crop loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), with Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., (Associated)
acting as surety for Sta. Maria and Antonio Banzon (Banzon) and Emilio Naval (Naval) as
inseminators for Associated .When Sta. Maria failed to pay PNB the amount of the loan, PNB
demanded payment from Associated who, instead of paying PNB, filed a complaint against
Sta.Maria, Banzon and Naval. In 1957, the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI of Manila)
granted the petition of Associated, and ordered therein defendants to pay Associated jointy and
severally. Associated then levied Banzon’s two lots inCaloocan to satisfy the judgment of CFI
Manila. As it was the highest bidder (P41, 000.00) at the execution sale conducted by the Sheriff
of Rizal, the latter issued a certificate of sale in favor of the former. Associated then demanded
from Banzon the delivery of the latter’s owner’s duplicate of certificate of title, to which Banzon
refused, prompting Associated to file a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI
of Rizal) for an order directing Banzon to present said certificated for cancellation and for
another order directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the certificated and to issue new
245 transfer certificates in the name of Associated. The trial court
TABLE ruled in favor OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE of Associated.
CONTENTS
However, it was then discovered that Associated never discharged its liability with PNB.PNB
then filed a complaint against Sta. Maria, his six brothers and sisters, and associated. After the
trial court ruled in favor of PNB, Sta. Maria began paying his outstanding loan with the former,
which then amounted to only ½ of the amount earlier awarded to Associated to be paid to PNB.
In other words, PNB collected directly from its debtor Sta. Maria the amounts owing to it, with
Associated never having to put in one centavo. After collecting from
Sta. Maria, PNB released Associated from its obligation as surety. This should have put
an end to the matter and Banzon’s two lots therefore restored fully to his ownership, but it was
then discovered that Associated has allowed and permitte done Pedro Cardenas (Cardenas) to
execute and levy one of Banzon’s two parcel of land being held by Associated as trustee, which
then resulted to the issuance of a new title in the name of Cardenas. OnMarch 13, 1970, having
learned of PNB’s release of Associated as of February 20, 1970, filed a complaint for
reconveyance of their two parcels of land, one of which is under Cadenas’s name and the other,
while still under Banzon’s name, washeld by Associated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Banzon has the right to ask for reconveyance of his two lots in question.
RULING:
Yes, he has. When Associated nevertheless prematurely and contary to the intent and
condition of the basic 1957 judgment levied in execution on the two Caloocan City lots of Banzon
the interest it acquired was clearly impressed with a trust character. Such acquisition of
Banzon'sproperties by Associated was effected, if not through fraud on Associated's part,
certainly through mistake and there Associated was "by force of law, considered a trustee of
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" by virtue of Article
1456 of the Code.
Bakunawa III vs Bakunawa
GR NO. 217993 AUGUST 9, 2017
FACTS:
Manuel and Nora met in 1974... and became sweethearts.When Nora became pregnant,
she and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975... they lived with Manuel's parents
Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father Manuel... assigned to provincial
projects... came home only during weekends.
However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments... e chose to
spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and
they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on
Nora for their family's needsManuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents.their
verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.1977, Nora gave birth to their second child.
However, nothing changed in their relationship... eventually left Nora and their children in 1980
to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves separatedin 1985... Nora became
pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child2008, Manuel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage... on the ground that he and Nora are psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified thaManuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder,
characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr.
Villegas diagnosedNora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of
negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel
246 Her findings were based on her interview withTABLE Manuel and the parties'
OF CONTENTSTABLE eldest son,
OF CONTENTS
Moncho
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred when it upheld the validity of the marriage of the parties
despite more than clear and convincing evidence to declare its nullity due to the psychological
incapacity of either or both parties to perform their marital obligations
RULING:
The totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr.
Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he
and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,[20] the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can
be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's
examination and report."[21] In Toring v. Toring, et al.,[22] the Court stated that:Other than
from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as
relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring
events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the
spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable
witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the
Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.
While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician,[24] much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

Other jurisprudence on psychological incapacity
Singson v. Singson
G.R. No. 210766, Jan. 8, 2018
FACTS:
This is a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleged that when they started living together, petitioner
noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's
welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,” and a compulsive gambler; that respondent
was immature, and was unable to perform his paternal duties; that respondent was also
irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior
made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because
she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly
hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner. Respondent countered that petitioner failed
to demonstrate gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. He averred that it was not true
that he failed to render any help, support or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the
family home where petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital property;
that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious
cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the standards required to obtain a decree of
nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a complaint of a woman
with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim
that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business administration, and is a
bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that is
248 the wall that divided him and petitioner. The RTC declared theOF
TABLE marriage null and OF
CONTENTSTABLE void while the
CONTENTS
CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void due to psychological incapacity?
RULING:
Petition denied; CA decision affirmed RATIO: 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to

nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental -
not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a mar
Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico
G.R. No. 218630, Jan. 11, 2018
FACTS:
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a
brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as
both their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as
he was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the situation.
Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000. Even during the early stage of their marriage,
it was marred by bickering and quarrels.
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of
their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz). Lawrence was distant and did not help in
rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a family. Lawrence
spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina noticed that
Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of
immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all
intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to
the needs of Lanz.
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions - from the
manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights
ended up in full blown arguments, often in front of Lanz.
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents'
home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact since then.
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed
her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of
Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is characterized by a
heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void
249 ab initio. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of
both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.
RULING:
No. Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended
by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals has set out the guidelines that
has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity. Using these standards, Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, judgments must be based not solely on the expert opinions presented by the
parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. Here, the
totality of evidence clearly wanting.
Although the Court commiserate with Katrina's predicament, it is hardpressed to affirm
the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or
witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic
is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e.,
mere allegations are not evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina
did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological
incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary
value.
ESPINA-DAN vs. DAN
GR No. 209031, Apr 16, 2018
FACTS:
In May 2005, petitioner Abigael Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan, an Italian
national met "in a chatroom on the internet". They soon became "chatmates" and began
exchanging letters which further drew them emotionally closer to each other even though
petitioner was in the Philippines while respondent lived in Italy. In November, 2005,
respondent proposed marriage and the tied the knot with petitioner January the following year.
The couple lived together in Italy. On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back
into the country.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines
opposed the petition. RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the ground that
petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.
Petitioner testified that during their honeymoon, petitioner noticed that the respondent
was not circumcised. Moreover, when petitioner left to join respondent in Italy, she testified that
respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco whom
she had known thru the internet. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He
depended on his mother to do or to decide things for him. Respondent was also addicted to
video games, extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the household chores. He also
250 has extremely poor hygiene. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
However, the trial court ruled that the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her
petition is miserably wanting in force to convince the trial court that her marriage with
respondent comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the Family Code and hence
unable to discharge completely her burden of overcoming the legal presumption of validity and
the continuance of her marriage with respondent, declaration of nullity of same marriage is not
in order.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA which denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC
Decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence is insufficient to prove

respondent-appellee was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of respondent-appellee as irresponsible, childish,

overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor
hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage, are not
enough. These traits do not equate to an inability to perform marital obligations due to a
psychological illness present at the time the marriage was solemnized. Psychological incapacity
must be more titan just a "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance, of some marital
obligations. It is not enough the respondent-appellee, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations.
Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the
respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations - must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of the spouse, is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
essential that the spouse must be shown to be incapable of performing marital obligations, due
to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Respondent-
appellee's condition or personality disorder has not been shown to be a malady rooted on some
incapacitating psychological condition.
Republic v. Javier
G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018
FACTS:
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002. Martin filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child. He alleged that
both he and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint
custody of their minor child, Amanda M. Javier.
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf, and
presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos.
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos diagnosed her with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Likewise, Dr. Adamos concluded in the Psychological
Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the same disorder. Their disorder was considered
grave and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential
Whether or not Martin and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to comply their
obligations of marriage in pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of evidence
supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
The various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition; this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
As such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a
reversible error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
REPUBLIC V. ENCELAN
GR No. 170022 January 9, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita on August 25, 1979 and the union bore two children,
Marica and Manny. Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar
learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. After such action of Lolita, Cesar and
Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity. At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for
Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. RTC declared
Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The
Office of the Solicitor General then filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.

RULING:
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for

declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court have constantly stressed out that psychological
incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence
(i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged
psychological incapacity. In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse discharging the essential marital obligations.
MENDOZA V. REPUBLIC
GR No. 157649 November 12, 2012
FACTS:
In 1989, Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and Dominic met upon his return to the country
from his employment in Papua New Guinea. After a month of courtship, they became intimate
and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa
Bianca. On June 24, 1991, they got married in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, although
remaining dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner’s
best friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for
support until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet
the family’s needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992, and in 1993, as a full-time
employee in a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all
of the family’s expenses.On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months after
his graduation from college before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in
Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.
Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends
inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his
irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit
relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between
them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms. In November 1995, Dominic
gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage. She soon found out, however,
that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse,
she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to
pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening
petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the
conjugal abode. A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten
to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place
concealed from him. On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an
absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC. Hence, the appeal by petitioner was laid in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence to entitle petitioner’s spouse to a declaration
of the nullity sufficiently prove that psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing
prior to the time of the marriage.
RULING:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
253 juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoingTABLEguidelines do not require
OF CONTENTSTABLE that a
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physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of
Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to
support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any
form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have
automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What
was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition, as the Court said in Marcos.
The Supreme Court find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to
prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage.
Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
REPUBLIC V. GALANG
GR No. 168335 June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Nestor and Juvy got married in Pampanga on March 9, 1994. They resided in the house
of Nestor’s parents. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development
Corporation, while Juvy stayed at home as a housewife. They had only one child, Christopher.
Nestor, then, filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged in his petition that Juvy
was suffering from kleptomaniac that she stole money from his parents, his ATM card and often
asks money from their friends and relatives with the pre-text that their son was confined in the
hospital. He also claimed that Juvy was immature and indolent. He even testified catching Juvy
playing mah-jong and kuwaho three times that she would leave their child to the care of their
neighbours.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the marriage under the grounds provided
under Article 36 of the Family Code be appreciated.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the totality of evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient
to establish Juvy’s psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The
petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of Juvy’s condition. No sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ochosa v. Alano
G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011
FACTS:
Jose, a young lieutenant in the AFP, married Bonain Basilan in 1973. In 1976, they
254 adopted as their daughter Ramona. During the marriage, TABLE OF was
Jose CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
often assigned to various
parts of the Philippines as a member of the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts,
preferring to stay in Basilan. Bona had illicit relations with other men whenever Jose was
assigned in various parts of the country. She was even caught by a security aide having sex with
Jose’s driver. Word circulated of such infidelity and when Jose confronted Bona about it, the
latter admitted her relationship with said driver. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage on the ground of Bona’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage. Jose and his two military aides testified on Bona’s infidelity. A psychiatrist testified
that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that Bona was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder and that her personality was that she had an excessive emotion
and attention seeking behavior and therefore could not develop sympathy in feelings and had
difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. She further testified that whenever Jose was gone,
her extramarital affairs was her way of seeking attention and emotions from other persons and
that said disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler and
womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. Finally, the psychiatrist said that there was
no possibility of a cure since Bona did not have an insight of what was happening to her and
refused to acknowledge the reality. The Solicitor-General opposed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

essential marital obligations.
RULING:
No. Article 36 of the Family Code provides: “a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. CA, it was held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In Republic
v. CA and Molina, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code were laid down: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of
the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or relative only in regard to the other
spouse; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Article 68 up to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code; (7) Interpretations given
by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; and (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated and that what is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. In the case at bar, the evidence presented were the testimonies of Jose, his military
aides and the psychiatrist. But this is inadequate in proving that her “defects” were already
255 present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Only the uncorroborated
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE testimony of Jose
OF CONTENTS
supported the allegation that Bona’s sexual promiscuity already existed prior to the marriage.
The psychiatrist’s testimony on Bona’s histrionic personality disorder did not meet the standard
of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity as her findings did not emanate
from a personal interview with Bona herself and merely relied on her interview with Jose and
his other witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to
the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual
infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
CAMACHO-REYES v. REYES
G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010
FACTS:
In 1972, Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the
University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, when they were both nineteen (19) years old.
Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright,
although he did not follow conventions and traditions. At that time, respondent held a job in the
family business. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the
latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
On December 5, 1976, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner
was already five (5) months pregnant and employed. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family where all living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the
couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.
When their first child was born, financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage,
the monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer
handed his salary to petitioner because he had resigned. Sometime in 1996, petitioner
confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking
to his girlfriend. When petitioner had undergone operation for the removal of a cyst, respondent
remained unconcerned and inattentive. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only
unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his
obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
Adolfo, respondent’s elder brother, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group.
The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions but these did not improve the parties’
relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did
not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
256 Whether or not the totality of evidence established

TABLEpsychological incapacity
OF CONTENTSTABLE therefore
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rendering the marriage null and void.
RULING:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray. In
this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of
psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there
are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating a
marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on
the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted
upon its hapless partners for life.
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent. We do not agree with the CA. The lack of personal examination and
interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not
per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically
constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties,
herein petitioner.
Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
psychologists and the psychiatrist. For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of
petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with
them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the
doctors’ assessments. In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo
therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is
incurable.

TORING v. TORING
G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
FACTS:
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978. On February 1, 1999, more
than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He
claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological
evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and
Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies. Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a
squanderer. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his
wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment. Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts
she collected as sales agent, she left the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees
unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo
acquired for the family. Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she
was pregnant with another man’s child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that
Teresita’s stomach was slightly bigger.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and
demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was
very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive,
critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family;
and was most painfully unmindful of him.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the
258 marriage was Teresita’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder TABLEthat rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations.
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological
evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita’s eldest son). She admitted,
though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a
personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred for disregarding the factual findings of the trial
court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court – in
declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina.
RULING:
Yes. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not
constitute sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related
to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have
been expected to know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely
recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations
during the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.
LIGERALDE v. PATALINGHUG
G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
FACTS:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. Silvino claimed that, during their
marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He
described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal
activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to
have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be
conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His persuasions would
often lead to altercations or physical violence.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The
psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest
after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
RULING:
259 The acts of private respondent do not even rise TABLEtoOF

the level of the OF
CONTENTSTABLE “psychological
CONTENTS
incapacity” that the law requires. Private respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must
be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.
The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 603
SCRA 604 (2009), Relevant to this petition are the following: (1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the “time of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010
FACTS:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985. Without any
means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after their
marriage. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito,
on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to
find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts. Jocelyn left Angelito
sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

RULING:
No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively
show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. A
later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
260 opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
TABLE OFtotality of evidence
CONTENTSTABLE shows that
OF CONTENTS
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be
duly established.
ASPILLAGA v. ASPILLAGA
G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
FACTS:
In 1980, Aurora and Rodolfo got married. Rodolfo claimed their marriage was
"tumultuous." He described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front
of his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget
and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was
tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him
a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed
on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to
Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months.
In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo
brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that
Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their
eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his psychiatric evaluation of
the parties as well as his recommendation that the petition be granted.
In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological handicaps which
could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering,
disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological
incapacity
RULING:
No. It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. The intention
of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
As this Court has repeatedly, declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest
themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000. On October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked
as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five
times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a
co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines.
Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Upon learning that respondent was in Occidental Mindoro, petitioner traveled to San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There
was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

RULING:
No. In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into
petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being
apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and
distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife. To be tired and give up on
one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can
falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital
knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available
to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation—a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where
one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage
was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads
abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion dated 21
August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez,
who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is
living-in with another woman named “Sally.” Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again,
petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
NAJERA v. NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817, July 3, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but
respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on
January 31, 1988. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
Respondent did not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for
support. Only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent
able to land a job as a seaman. While employed, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient
financial support. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation,
he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to
parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her
body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police
Station. Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
No. the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995): “psychological incapacity must be
263 characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,TABLE
and OF
(c)CONTENTSTABLE
incurability.” The foregoing
OF CONTENTS
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the
evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
PARAS v. PARAS
G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007
FACTS:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras. Twenty-nine
(29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint
for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code.
She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipated her business
assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and
sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d) he has been
remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered
documentary and testimonial evidence.
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring
an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that
after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. As expected, Justo
has a different version of the story. As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in
Rosa’s attitude after her return from the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring,
and overly focused on the family’s businesses. He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in
her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship
was blissful. As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress,
but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle
Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
ISSUE:
Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
RULING:
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in
Molina. One of the Guidelines set forth therein states: (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. In
the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), the Court clarified that the above
Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is
important is “the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition.”
ZAMORA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970. In 1972, private
respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the Philippines for a
few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989,
when she was already a U.S. citizen.
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
"psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of
having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore,
he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in
fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not
more than three years.
On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She
portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that she would
from time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted
her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He
allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC’s decision dismissing the
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
RULING:
No. The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented,
265 considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court
TABLE OF of the psychological
CONTENTSTABLE incapacity
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of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit
with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out.
Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during
the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before
or at the inception of the marriage.
PEREZ-FERRARIS v. FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
FACTS:
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix
Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order and the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his
"defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.
The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at
the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral
element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and
complying with the essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage
RULING:
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of
such factual determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
ANTONIO v. REYES
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married. On 8
March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. In support of his
petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, stated, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It
undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further
asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. In addition, respondent presented Dr. Reyes, a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that
the series of tests conducted by his assistant, together with the screening procedures and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to
conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring
their marriage null and void.
RULING:
Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family
life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had
exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure
on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth.
Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to
telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to
reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO
G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
FACTS:
On 25 September 1997, or after 24 years of married life together, respondent Manuel

filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering
and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose
nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with
him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she
showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the
house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents
since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment
could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity
of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to
her for twenty-two (22) years.
Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in
Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to
marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who
was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all
269 his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised TABLEin
OFaCONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
real happy family and had a
happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychologically incapacity exist.

RULING:
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag is apropos. There, we held that whether or

not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and
judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on “all fours” with another.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.—We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. With this cardinal state policy in
mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
VILLALON v. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005
FACTS:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. As
ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even
prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his
chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a
normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential
obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life
unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental
obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that
his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer denying petitioner’s allegations. She
asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been "fruitful and characterized by joy,
contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship" and that their marital squabbles
were normal based on community standards. Petitioner’s success in his professional life aided
him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that
petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family

Code.
RULING:
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is
the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior
270 to their separation, a loving father to their children and TABLE
a goodOF
provider of the family.
CONTENTSTABLE Although
OF CONTENTS
he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and
gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one
afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as “self-centered,” “characterized by
grandiose ideation” and “lack of empathy in relating to others,” and one with Casanova Complex
as a “serial adulterer,” the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.
BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, filed a petition for declaration of nullity
on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura,
herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended
his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, declaring and
decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant
Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same
271 set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE theCONTENTS
possibility
of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced
in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage,
it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private
respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of
the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel and respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel exchanged their
marital vows on September 28, 1966 which was ratified on May 20, 1967. Petitioner avers that
during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.
She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a
perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his
best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.

RULING:
“Psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be “legitimate.”
272 It must be shown that the disordered personality TABLEcompletely unable respondent
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTSto
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.—Respondent’s sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity
or sexual promiscuity.
REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001
FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Dagdag, 20 years
old. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would
disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the
times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return
home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he
would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the
last they heard from him. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,
and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Since Avelino could
not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990. Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to
establish jurisdictional facts. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag,
as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live
in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never
stayed for long at the couple's house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated

RULING:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply
with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No.
2 which requires that the root “cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as
to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband
is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested
was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.
PESCA v. PESCA
G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca got married on March 1975.
It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay
together - when respondent was on vacation. It started in 1988, when petitioner noticed that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital
covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at
least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased
petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The
children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner
for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She
submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed
her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay
authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
274 TABLE
Whether or not the guidelines in the case OF CONTENTSTABLE
of Republic vs. Court ofOFAppeals
CONTENTS
and
Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
RULING:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in
her evidence. The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely
novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family
Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time,
the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Action for declaration of nullity of marriage, Art. 48, FC; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
BOLOS v. BOLOS
G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
FACTS:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code where the RTC ruled in her favor.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this
case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before
the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli to the effect that the coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC pertains to petitions during the effectivity of the
275 Family Code and not to marriages TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
RULING:
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope—This Rule
shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code
Grounds for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
MALLION v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition 7 upon the finding that
petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is
seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution dated
June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.
After the decision attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null
and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part,
respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss dated August 13, 1999, praying for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of lack of marriage license.
RULING:
The instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil
Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been
solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented
and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case.
Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the
276 nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed basedTABLEon another ground, there
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFisCONTENTS
a splitting
of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage
had no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did
not question the absence of a marriage license.
Proper Action and Procedure for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
LEONOR v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112597, April 2, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr., in San
Carlos City on March 13, 1960. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond
abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation
and alimony. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce.
On February 14, 1991, the lower Cantonal Civil Court of Switzerland pronounced the
divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership.
Meanwhile, Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines, Justice of the Peace
Mabini Katalbas, failed to send a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City for registration. Hence, on July 11, 1991, Virginia applied for the late registration of
her marriage. The Civil Registrar, finding said application in order, granted the same.
On May 22, 1992, Mauricio, represented by his brother Teodoro, filed a petition for the
cancellation of the late registration of marriage in the civil registry. Mauricio's petition was filed
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void.
RULING:
Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. On its face, the
Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding “marriages” in the civil
registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not
as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this
Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or
nullity of a marriage. “A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing or some
harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
mis-statement of the occupation of the parent.

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the

Philippines on January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on May 2008 in the Philippines. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper for Minoru Fujiki to be the one to file for a declaration of
nullity of marriage of Marinay and Maekara.
RULING:
Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the
278 dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
TABLE decree does not
OF CONTENTSTABLE involve the
OF CONTENTS
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
YU v. REYES-CARPIO
G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
FACTS:
The instant petition stemmed from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed
by petitioner Eric U. Yu against private respondent Caroline T. Yu. On May 30, 2006, Judge
Suarez issued an Order, stating that petitioner’s Partial Offer of Evidence dated April 2006
would already be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits of petitioner have been
remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of marriage of the parties.
On September 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on the declaration
of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the
parties’ marriage.
Thereafter, while the case was being heard, private respondent filed an Omnibus Motion
on May 21, 2008. The Omnibus Motion sought (1) the strict observation by the RTC-Branch 261
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, in the subject proceedings; and (2) that the incident on the declaration of nullity of
marriage be already submitted for resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first
before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.
RULING:
This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a
judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is
issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner’s assertion that ruling the main issue
without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the
assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.
279 To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and OF
TABLE legal soundness. OF CONTENTS
CONTENTSTABLE
YU v. LIM-YU
G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 1984. In
1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and filed a Petition for
Legal Separation against Philip for repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct against
her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life.
Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who actually
attacked him a few times. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was arranged according to the
Chinese tradition and that it was much later when he discovered Viveca's excessively jealous,
cynical, and insecure behaviour. Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage due to Viveca's psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of
complying with her marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was constructively notified of the proceedings and was not
denied due process having been duly notified by publication.
RULING:
No. The Court finds that such service of summons on their conjugal home address
cannot be deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to
deception warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a nonresident and is not found in the
280 country may be served with summons by extraterritorialTABLE service
OF in four instances:OF(1)
CONTENTSTABLE when the
CONTENTS
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of
three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication
and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s
last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
Parties for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 1993 and subsequently, under a civil ceremony on
June 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
On November 1994, private respondents Zorayda and her son Adib in their own behalf
and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint
with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958, under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
On August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring
Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether Zorayda and Adib, has legal standing to file a declaration of nullity of marriage
of Estrellita and Sen. Tamano.
RULING:
281 TABLEaOF
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in CONTENTSTABLE
void marriage canOFfileCONTENTS
a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. However, this interpretation
does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a
void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since
both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli
G.R. No.173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad filed with the
RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14
June 1962. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner. Six
months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was
entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family
Code, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together
under the circumstances required by said provision.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the
action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the
death of Eulogio.
RULING:
282 No. The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment ofTABLEVoidable Marriages and OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE Declaration
CONTENTSof
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on
Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.: 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. On December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
especially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead
RULING:
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
283 Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage TABLE OFthat is annulable OF
CONTENTSTABLE is CONTENTS
valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having
never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Carlos v. Sandoval
G.R. No. 179922 , December 16, 2008
FACTS:
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. Teofilo, in
turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos. Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the
name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo
died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Parcel Nos. 5
& 6 were registered in the name of respondents.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, against respondents before the court a
quo with declaration of nullity of marriage as one cause of action. He asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of
the required marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages
RULING:
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating: SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.—(a) Who may file.
284 —A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of voidTABLE marriage may be filed OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE solely by the
CONTENTS
husband or the wife. Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
However, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. It is emphasized, however, that the Rule
does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Cod
Ablaza v. Republic
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
FACTS:
A petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage between Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato was filed by petitioner Isidro Ablaza, the brother of the late
Cresenciano. Isidro alleged that the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license,
due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, and the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between his brother and Leonila at any time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action as he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in
the suit. It is true that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. This, however, only applies to
marriages covered by the Family Code. Also, being a procedural rule that is prospective
application, it is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Since the
285 marriage was contracted on December 26, 1949, A.M. TABLENo. 11-10-SC had OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE absolutely
CONTENTS no
application to the petitioner. The provisions of the old Civil Code is, hence, to be applied. Under
this, a party who stands to be benefitted by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit,
such party is deemed to be a real party in interest. Hence, since the petitioner was the brother
and is a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, he is then a real party in interest.
Appearance of the State
Maquilan v. Maquilan
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were happily married, and out of that happy marriage
they begot a son. However, the wonderful marriage did last. It all started when petitioner found
out that respondent was having an illicit sexual affair with her paramour. This event caused him
to file a case of adultery against respondent and her paramour. The respondent and her
paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced. Subsequently, respondent,
through her counsel, filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity, Dissolution and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages with the RTC Compostela Valley. The alleged
ground is psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. Upon pre-trial, they entered into
a Compromise Agreement. Later on, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the
repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on
Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge claiming that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously appraise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise
Agreement. The said motion was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration, still it was
denied. As a result, he appealed before the CA, however, it was dismissed as well for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement is void due to the absence of the
286 participation of provincial prosecutor or solicitor. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the
validity of their marriage. Also, the settlement being referred to did constitute a collusion
between two parties. Art. 48 of the Family Code clearly states that “In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”
The court added that while the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public
Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se
nullify the Compromise Agreement. The petition is denied.
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
FACTS:
On March 1965, Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio Melgar (Eulogio) were
married. On August 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of
Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. According to
Norma, the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
family since December 1985.
On November 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the Public Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation on the case to determine whether or not there exists collusion between
Norma and Eulogio. On December 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven Maramba submitted his
Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed.
On January 1997, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and
Eulogio. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), contending that the evidence presented
are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On August
1999, the CA rendered its decision affirming the RTC stating that contrary to the submission of
the OSG, the grant of annulment is not based merely on Eulogio’s habitual alcoholism but also
because of his inability to cope with his other essential marital obligations. Hence, the petition
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OSG has the authority in contending that the evidence presented are
not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates, in all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Similarly, the same is
emphasized under Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court, the rule then applicable. In
Republic v. Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the
OSG to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
In the given case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the at the
trial level other than the Public Prosecutors Manifestation that no collusion existed between the
contending parties and the brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface. No
pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.
Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication
or suppression of evidence.
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001
FACTS:
On January 4, 1987, petitioner Florence Malcampo and Portuguese respondent Philipp

Sin were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994,
Florence filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Philipp before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The CA also denied
the filed motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed
RULING:
Article 48 of the Family Code provides that in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as the counsel for the State. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
288 his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.
TABLEThe records are bereft
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF of evidence
CONTENTS
that the State participated in the prosecution of the case, thus, the case is remanded for proper
trial.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as that of the Regional Trial Court.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
FACTS:
On June 1972, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner
Emilio Tuazon. Due to the series of Emilio’s physical abuse against Victoria, his use of
prohibited drugs, cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal
child support, abuse of usage of conjugal property and incurring of bank debts without consent,
Victoria filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in 1989 on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
Emilio filed his opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his evidence.
Counsel for Emilio moved for a postponement, however, he failed to appear. The RTC declared
him to have waived his right to present evidence. The RTC then rendered judgment declaring
the nullity of marriage and awarding the custody of common children to Victoria. Counsel for
petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the
decision. No appeal was taken.
Thereafter, Victoria filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by Emilio. The latter,
through a new counsel, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the decision. The RTC
denied which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the absence of Emilio in the hearing, the Court should have ordered a
prosecuting officer to intervene.
RULING:
The Court denied the petition.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code provides the following:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts, or a
confession of judgment.
Emilio used the preceding provisions to support his contention that when he failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings, the RTC should have ordered the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.
The facts in the case do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. Emilio was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. He filed
his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by Victoria. He actively
participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the
witnesses of his wife. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a
no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
289 separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
TABLE OFbetween the parties
CONTENTSTABLE OF and to take
CONTENTS
care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Emilio’s intense opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There
is no allegation by the him that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, the Court was convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.
Corpus v. Ochotorena
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861, July 30, 2004
FACTS:
On February 6, 2001, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr. Macias) filed declaration of nullity
of marriage against her wife Mrs. Margie Macias. The case was raffled to Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena’s court. On the same day the Complaint was filed, Judge Ochotorena, the
respondent, immediately issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.However, the Summons was not
served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.
Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication.
On March 7, 2001, respondent granted the motion in his Order with the directive that
Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused
the publication of the Summons in the local weekly newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in
Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001 issue.
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons during the first
week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within the 30-day period to file an
answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001. However,
instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the
subject case on April 19, 2001, or one day before.
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing
on the merits then after the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case
submitted for decision. Various motions and manifestations, one after the other but interrelated,
were filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before
the respondent judge but denied and ignored and hearing proceeded without resolving the other
motions and manifestations. Without waiting for the OCAs Indorsement, the respondent judge
submitted his Comment/Answer. Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision is valid and
prays for the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or procedural short-
cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Ochotorena is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

RULING:
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated Mrs.
Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it
is his duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence. When the law or procedure is so
elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from
290 the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office
TABLEfor
OFmore than three (3)
CONTENTSTABLE OF months
CONTENTSbut
not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20, 000.00) but
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus, dismissal or
suspension from the service is no longer possible. Nonetheless, a penalty of fine may still be
imposed upon him considering that under the Resolution of the First Division in A.M. No.
10597-Ret. dated October 22, 2001, the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever administrative sanction the
Court may impose upon him with regard to this case. Considering that this is the first time the
respondent judge will be meted a penalty, the Court finds a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) appropriate.
Prohibited: default judgment and judgment on the pleadings Rule 9, Sec. 3 and
Rule 34, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court
Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53880, March 17, 1994
FACTS:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting
and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30
April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named
Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned
of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired
vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names
of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed a motion for an extension of
twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the
motion. On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second
motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January
291 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for twentyTABLE OF (20) days to be counted
CONTENTSTABLE from 20
OF CONTENTS
December 1979 or until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was mailed to defendants'
counsel on 11 January 1980. Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05
February 1980, again filed another motion (dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen
(15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously sought" within which to
file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the court denied this last motion on
the ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first extension had expired."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato,
Branch I, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to
file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518.
RULING:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in
order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”The stated provision
calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is
more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that
an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period.
In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The
significance of the substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of
a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for
annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.”
Final judgment and subsequent proceedings, Art. 40, 51-53, FC
Sevilla Castro v. Castro

G.R. No. 140484, January 28, 2007
FACTS:
A petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under

Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by private respondent Lamberto R. Castro against
petitioner Isabelita S. Castro on July 1, 1998. Summons, along with a copy of the petition for
annulment, was allegedly received by petitioner’s nephew on her behalf at her residence. For
failure of petitioner to file an answer, the RTC ordered the state prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and to submit to the court a report thereon. The state prosecutor submitted a
report stating that no collusion existed between the parties in the filing of the petition. The
petition was then set for hearing however for the failure of the petitioner to appear and file any
response the trial court allowed the private respondent to present evidences ex parte in the
presence of the prosecutor. Castro stated that they have been living apart for number of years
292 and that they have four children. Furthermore, their relationship
TABLE OF did not last long OF
CONTENTSTABLE because of the
CONTENTS
petitioner was irresponsible, violent and had failed to show love and affection to their children
and had an illicit affair with the family driver. The trial court then granted the respondents
petition to annul his marriage with Sevilla. On September 8,1998 petitioner filed a Motion to Set
Aside or Declare Judgement Null and Void on the ground that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person for failure to serve summons and a copy of the petition. She averred
that the sheriff did not exert earnest efforts to serve her summons.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied her
appeal, and maintained the assailed decision.
RULING:
The trial court’s decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was
entered on October 29, 1999. For this reason and on account of private respondents death on
January 14, 2004, the judgment is binding on both parties. Section 24 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
provides: Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. (b) If
the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding
upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular
courts.
Effects, Art. 43-44, 50-53, FC

Valdes v. RTC and Valdes
G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In
1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage
null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering
that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed,
arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of
the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio
293 on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, TABLE OFsame
the CONTENTSTABLE
may be read OFconsistently
CONTENTS
with Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case where the parties are psychological incapacitated.
RULING:
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they
do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both
of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in
equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses.

Diño v. Diño
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
Alain and Ma. Caridad started as childhood sweethearts. They began living together in
1984 but decided to go their separate ways in 1994. After 2 years, the relationship was restored
until they decided to get married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas.
On 30 May 2001, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of psychological capacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. He claims that Caridad
failed to fulfil her marital obligations as she was irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. She was
also allegedly violent towards him. Summons were sent to the residence of Caridad in the
Philippines but she was already residing in the US but immediately upon learning this, Cardidad
executed and filed an answer within the reglementary period.
A psychological report, stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personaity
Disorder, was also presented. The said disorder was said to have rooted from her early formative
years and which was founded to be long-lasting and incurable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING:
In a void marriage regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
295 period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
TABLE OF 148 of the FamilyOFCode.
CONTENTSTABLE Article
CONTENTS
147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as a
petitioner and respondent in the case before the court. For Article 147 to apply, the following
elements must concur: (1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; (2)
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) Their union is without the
benefit of marriage, or the marriage is void. All these elements are attendant to the case and
there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
The petition holds water. The Court ruled that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no
basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rules does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Voidable Marriages: Grounds

Fraud, Art. 45 par. 3 and 46, FC
Concealment
Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force
and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and
granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such
pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of
her marriage with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
RULING:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to..
chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not
constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon
G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941
FACTS:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met on March 1938. They got
engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they got
married. However, on dated February 23, 1939, 89 days after their marriage, Luida gave birth to
a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On
March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed
to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in avour of
Luida.
ISSUE:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that
Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
RULING:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred
institution in which the State is interested and where society rests. In this case, the court did not
find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything
about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. Enlarged stomach) when they got married.
Almelor v. RTC Branch 254
G.R. No. 179620 August 28, 2008
FACTS:
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3
children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified
that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are often
unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of
imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is
more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida.
Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual
closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior
to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and
she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage
is null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of
his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to
fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
RULING:
The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is

the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that
Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the public’s perception against
Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his
homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even
granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere
in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that
Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
Force, Intimidation, Undue Influence Art. 45, par. 4, FC Arts. 1335, 1336, 1337 of
the Civil Code
Villanueva v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress
forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and
that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her
but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand
denied Orly’s allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and
she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
RULING:
The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it
is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not
concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-grounded
reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by
Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the
threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an
erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a
prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file
an action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo
A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004
FACTS:
Records show that in the Decision dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred
respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first
marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a
lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with Esparza
was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo. Teves
alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza was void; that
Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and then Macarrubo subsequently
married another woman named Josephine Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned.
Teves presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbo’s marriages as well as photos of him
and his wife as a family.
Macarrubo was initially declared in default for failing to appear multiple times but was
subsequently given the opportunity to defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he
was only coerced to marry Teves in order to save her face because at that time she was already
pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented
a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for
being a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case serves as res judicata on the
disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He also avers that his
third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to similar circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in
supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is void,
recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for grave
misconduct
ISSUE:
Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is
subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is still
undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second
marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first
marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense that both second
and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One
incident of a “shotgun marriage” is believable, but two such in succession would tax one’s
credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and
family. His act import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution of
marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui
generis cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the annulment of
Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove such second marriage as a ground for
disbarment.
Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation
Alcazar v. Alcazar
G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar (Veronica) was married to Rey Alcazar (Rey) on October
2000. After their wedding, Veronica and Rey lived together for five days in Occidental Mindoro.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica at the latter’s
abode. On October 2000, Rey left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to work. While working
in Riyadh, Rey did not communicate with Veronica by phone or by letter. About a year and a
half, Veronica was surprised when a co-teacher informed Veronica that Rey was about to come
home to the Philippines.
When Rey arrived in the Philippines, he did not go home to Veronica. Instead, he
proceeded to his parents’ house in Occidental Mindoro. Veronica traveled to Occidental
Mindoro, where she was informed that Rey had been living with his parents since his arrival in
March 2002.
Veronica asserted that from the time Rey arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted
300 her. Thus, Veronica concluded that Rey was physically incapable
TABLE OF of consummating
CONTENTSTABLE OFhis marriage
CONTENTS
with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5,
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Veronica’s complaint for annulment of her
marriage to Rey. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC. On appeal with the
Court of Appeals (CA), it affirmed the RTC’s decision and also denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, a petition before the Supreme Court was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rey’s physically incapacity of consummating his marriage with Veronica
was sufficiently proven to warrant the annulment of their marriage under paragraph 5, Article
45 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No, Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Said provision
states that a marriage may be annulled if either party was physically incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable.
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform
the complete act of sexual intercourse.
No evidence was presented in the case to establish that Rey was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. Veronica even admitted during her cross-
examination that she and Rey had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before the latter
left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on Rey’s part, then, there is no
ground for annulling Veronica’s marriage to Rey. Veronica’s complaint was rightfully dismissed.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132955, October 27,2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got

married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent’s child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees
and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent.
RULING:
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
301 overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to aCONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF contract of marriage. It is not
OF CONTENTS
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard
in a bank.
Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the
fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Jimenez v. Canizares
G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed an annulment of marriage to the defendant Remedios

Cañizares upon the ground that her vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a penis for
sexual intercourse, that this condition existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist, and
for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after their marriage. On June
14, 1955, court summoned the wife and served her a copy of the complaint. She, however, did
not answer. Eventually, defendant was also absent during the hearing and failed to submit a
medical examination of her genitals to the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the basis of the lone testimony of the
plaintiff.
RULING:
The Court did not grant the petition or annulment for it averred that the lone testimony
of the husband is insufficient to make the marriage void. Also, the former set aside the
complaint and remanded it to the lower court for further proceedings. The Court suspected that
there might be collusion between petitioner and defendant to annul the marriage. For this
reason, the Court did not decide on the case and brought it back to the court of origin.

Legal Separartion:
Grounds, Art. 55 (1) to (10), Art. 101 and 128, FC; Art. 247, 333 and 334, Revised
Penal Code
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
FACTS:
On July 13, 1975, William Ong (William) and Lucita Ong (Lucita) were married wherein
their union was blessed with 3 children. On March 21, 1996, a complaint for legal separation was
filed by Lucila alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation, and grossly abusive conduct. On his defense, William denied inflicting physical
harm on his wife, the use of insulting language against her, or the whipping of their children
with the buckle of his belt. The trial court rendered its decision decreeing legal separation.
William appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation considering
that she abandoned their conjugal home.
RULING:
Yes. William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife.
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous instances when William displayed violent
303 temper against Lucita and their children which, in effect,TABLE
resulted to physical injuries.
OF CONTENTSTABLE The Court
OF CONTENTS
held that such actions constitute a ground for legal separation. Although one of the testimonies
came from the sister of the respondent, the Court gave it credence because of the testimonies
being straightforward. Due to this, the Court believed that the testimonies were not tainted with
bias.
The Court also found no merit in the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56 (4) of
the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have
given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita
left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by
the said provision.
Gaudionco v. Penaranda
G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Froilan C. Gandionco and HON. Senen C. Peñaranda, the legal wife of the petitioner.
Froilan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch
18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner
for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private
respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against
petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of
support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private
respondent in the civil case for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed
with the criminal action.
RULING:
Civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with a criminal action because concubinage is not one to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense. Moreover, legal separation is not to recover civil liability but it
aimed at the conjugal rights of spouses and their relationship with each other. A decree of legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon by preponderance of evidence and
no criminal proceedings is necessary.
Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82606, December 18, 1992
FACTS:
Ho Hang, private respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children.
The first of these three women, the petitioner, claims to be his legal wife and with her he begot a
daughter, Monina Jo. In 1980, petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property before the RTC Negros Oriental. Prior to that she also filed an action for
support against him and in the same branch as well. Thus these two cases were consolidated.
Upon decision, the action for support was granted, however as to the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property, it was not stated therein. Jo appealed the motion before the
Court of Appeals but it only affirmed the decision of the RTC on complaint for support, but the
304 complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property TABLE OFwasCONTENTSTABLE
dismissed. AOFmotion
CONTENTS for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal
by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner sufficed to constitute abandonment
as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Article 128 supports this
argument. The Court averred that the aggrieved party, in this case the petitioner, may petition
for judicial separation pursuant to the provision aforementioned, on either of these grounds: 1.
Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause, and 2. Failure of one spouse to
comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does
not leave the other spouse. The record clearly manifests that since 1942, private respondent had
rejected his wife upon the latter’s return to their conjugal house. This is a manifestation of he
had no intention of continuing their conjugal relationship. Aside from this, the petitioner
refused to financially support his family since 1968. Thus, the petition is granted and the
assailed decision of the respondent court is modified.
Defenses, Condonation or Pardon
Defenses:
Condonation/Pardon, Art. 56, par. 1, FC, Forms
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 96602, November 19, 1991
FACTS:
On November 2, 1982, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri (Ruby), Mrs Linda Sare (Linda) and
Jabunan took the morning plane to Baguio. At around 7:00 in the evening, Eduardo Arroyo
(Eduardo) arrived at Neri’s condominium. Jabunan opened the door for Eduardo who entered,
he went at the master’s bedroom where Ruby and Linda were. On Ruby’s request, Linda left the
room and left Ruby and Eduardo. Dr. Jorge Neri (Dr. Jorge) filed a criminal complaint for
adultery against his wife, Ruby, and Eduardo. On December 17, 1987, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) convicted Ruby and Eduardo of adultery. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Dr. Jorge submitted an affidavit dated November 23, 1988 before the CA and a
compromise agreement dated February 16, 1989 before the RTC stating that he had pardoned
Ruby and Eduardo; and that the criminal complaint was filed out of “pure misunderstanding.”
Eduardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s decision. Ruby also moved for
reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, Dr.
Jorge, and that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he
is presently cohabiting. Both motions were denied by the CA.
305 On August 26, 1991, Dr. Jorge filed a ManifestationTABLE OFpraying that theOFcase
CONTENTSTABLE against
CONTENTS
Eduardo and Ruby be dismissed as he had “tacitly consented” to his wife’s infidelity. Eduardo
and Ruby then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or for the granting of new
trial of the case claiming as basis for their motions Dr. Jorge’s manifestation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Jorge’s Manifestation after the judgment was made is sufficient basis
for the dismissal or granting of a new trial.
RULING:
No, Dr. Jorge’s Manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of testimony

given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by witnesses should
result in the granting of a new trial. The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute
criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. While there is a conceptual difference between
consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon
is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it
must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint.
Ginez v. Bugayong
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United Stated Navy, and respondent
Leonila Ginez, after their marriage, lived with their sisters and later moved to Sampaloc, Manila.
Leonila then informed Benjamin through a letter that she left the dwelling of her sister-in-law
and went to Asingan, Pangasinan to reside with her mother.
Benjamin, afterwards, started to receive anonymously written letters informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of Leonila. Thus, Benjamin sought for Leonila in Asingan, Pangasinan.
They both proceeded to the house of a cousin of Benjamin, Pedro, and stayed and lived there as
husband and wife for two nights and a day. Subsequently, they returned to the house of
Benjamin and passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the third day, Leonila packed
up and left when Benjamin tried to verify from her the information he received regarding her
acts of adultery. Such act of Leonila was taken by Benjamin as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity that were suspected on her. Still, despite such belief, Benjamin made efforts to locate
Leonila.
Benjamin then filed for legal separation against Leonila who in turn, timely filed an
answer wherein she vehemently denied the averments in the complaint and claimed that
Benjamin already condoned her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation by Benjamin in favor of Leonila

RULING:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation.
A detailed examination of the testimony of Benjamin clearly shows that there was a
condonation on his part for the supposed “acts of infidelity amounting to adultery” committed
by Leonila. The act of the husband in persuading his wife to come along with him, and the fact
that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin wherein they
slept together as husband and wife, and that they again slept together as such in their own house
– all these Facts: have no other meaning in the opinion of this Court than that there was
reconciliation between them and effected a condonation of the wife by the husband.
The reconciliation took place after almost ten months from the time Benjamin had
knowledge of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery committed by Leonila. It has been held
in a long line of decisions of the various Supreme Court decisions of the different states of the
U.S.A. that ‘a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of
the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband’.
In the lights of the facts testified to by the petitioner-husband, of the legal provisions
above quoted, as well as the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there
is condonation.
People v. Zapata
GR NO. L-3047, May 16, 1951
FACTS:
Andres Bondoc filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for
adultery against his wife, Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour. They have
been cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947.
On the date of filing, Dalmacio was knowledgeable that Guadalupe is a married woman.
Guadalupe was pleaded guilty and sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor.
In the same court, on September 17, 1948, Andres filed another complaint for adulterous
acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948.
On February 21,1949, Guadalupe and Dalmacio filed a motion to quash the complaint
because they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court
granted the motion and quashed the second complaint. It held that the adulterous acts charged
in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in
both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having
taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948. This is within the scope
and meaning of the constitutional provision that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.” Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation on the part of Andres

RULING:
307 The Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945) each sexual
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF intercourse
CONTENTS
constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). Hence, adultery is
a crime of result and not of tendency.
There is no constitutional .or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints
for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime, hence there
would be no double jeopardy.
After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the
defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which
the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of
adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provisional release during the pendency of
the case in which they were later convicted, had sexual intercourse up to the time when they
were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them (S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim.
pp. 208-210).
Even if the Andres should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the
wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon
was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.
Therefore, the decision of trial court was reversed and set aside.
Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious
ceremony and they begot several children who are now living with the plaintiff. In March, 1951,
plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining an
illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Jose sent Serafina to Manila to study beauty culture for a
year but during those times he discovered that Serafina was going out with several men. After
Serafina finished her course, she left Jose and they lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, Jose surprised Serafina in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of filing a petition for
legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. On July 5, 1955, Jose filed petition for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Does the failure of Jose to take Serafina home condoned the acts of latter?
RULING:
We don’t think that plaintiff’s failure actively to search for defendant and take her home
(after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations to Nelson Orzame. It will be remembered that she “left” him after having sinned with
Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was his duty to
search for her home. Hers was the obligation to return home.
Consent, Art. 56, par. 2, FC
Matubis v. Praxedes
G.R No. L-11766, October 25, 1960
FACTS:
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur, on April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal Separation and
changed of surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes. Socorro Matubis and Zoilo
Praxedes were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree
on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live
separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3,
1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement : (a) That both of us relinquish our
right over the other as legal husband and wife, (b) That both without any interference by any of
us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or
suit arising from our separation, (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from
my husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for
anything from my wife and (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the
time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal
separation into writing. In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion
Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child who was recorded as the
child of said defendant. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as
husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.

Whether or not there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.
RULING:
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph
6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed.
The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of
the court’s sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). Plaintiff’s counsel even
agrees that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the
dismissal should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, “but on the ground that
plaintiff and defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the
marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code” (appellants
brief, pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to counsel’s contention, because it is contrary to the
evidence.
People v. Schneckenburger
G.R. No. 48183, November 10, 1941
FACTS:
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured
a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico.
On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice
of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in
the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint
herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated
in the conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one
day of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of
double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the
dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure and without
deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the
merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is consent on the part of both parties to commit illicit acts.
RULING:
As the term “pardon” unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission,
“consent” must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense
prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with
his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the
vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for
adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after
its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective
as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

People v. Sensano
G.R. No. 37720, March 7, 1933
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one
child. Shortly after the birth of this child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of
Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything
for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she
could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met
the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the
husband in 1924, he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both
were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor.
The court, in its decision, stated the following: In the opinion of the court, the husband
of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife, having abandoned her as he
did. After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She thereupon appealed to
the municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might
ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his
pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or
to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do
with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child
went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos in the year 1924 and they have lived with him ever
since.
The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her co-defendant in 1924, did
nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he
left for the Territory of Hawaii where he remained for seven years completely abandoning his
311 TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented OF CONTENTS
the second charge of adultery
here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the
provisions of Act No. 2710.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the offended husband consented to the adultery committed by his
wife Ursula Sensano in that he refused to live with her after she extinguished her previous
sentence for the same offense, and by telling her then that she could go where she wanted to and
do what she pleased, and by his silence for seven years notwithstanding that he was informed of
said adultery.
RULING:
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows: Prosecution of
the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he
signed the complaint as the “offended” spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence
in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations
existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding. The Court cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years
of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the
Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the
accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.

Recrimination/Mutual Guilt, Art. 56, par. 4, FC
BENEDICTO v. DE LA RAMA
[G.R. No. 1056, December 8, 1903]
FACTS:
The plaintiff and defendant had lived happily together from the time of their marriage in
July 1891 until August of 1892, when defendant stated that on his return from an inspection of
one of his estates, his wife’s maid gave him a letter in the handwriting of his wife addressed to
her lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard, named Zabal. Plaintiff admitted her fault and
implored the defendant to pardon her. That same day, the defendant took his wife to the house
of her parents, left her there and never lived with her afterwards.
The plaintiff filed for an action for divorce on the grounds of abandonment and adultery.
The court decided in favour of the plaintiff for having found the defendant guilty of having
committed adultery with Gregoria Bermejo in 1892.
Aggrieved, the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the facts found were
not justified by the evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not either party can file a petition for divorce against the other
RULING:
No. Neither party is entitled to file a case against the other. Law 8, title 2, partida 4,
313 expressly provides that: "For the sin of each one of them TABLE
is of itself a bar to an accusation
OF CONTENTSTABLE against
OF CONTENTS
the other."
Having proved that both husband and wife are mutually guilty of infidelity, the Court
finds that neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce.
ADJUDICATION: Neither party is entitled to judgment of divorce against the other;
neither party can recover of the other any costs either in this court or the Court of Instance
Collusion, Art. 56, par. 5 and Art. 60, par. 2, FC
DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
[G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960]
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered
on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff
sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again,
plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men,
aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying
her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Petitioner expressed his wish to file a petition for
legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by
the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as
she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. The court of first instance of
Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of
judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription, that under Art. 101,
legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a collusion between the petitioner and defendant
RULING:
No. Pursuant to Article 100 of the New Civil Code: The legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause
the dismissal of the petition; and Article 101: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife
for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of
enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
In this case, the defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal.
She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk. In this connection, it has been
held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the
offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof
that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
ADJUDICATION: A decree a legal separation was issued with all the consequent effects.
Costs of all instances against petitioner.
Prescription, Art. 56, par. 6 and Art. 57, FC
BROWN V. YAMBAO
[G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957]
FACTS:
William H. Brown alleged that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to
1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations
with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct
only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter, the spouse lived separately and later
executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to
the erring wife as her share.
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage;
that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as
might be just and equitable.
The court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time,
despite service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate, in
whether or not a collusion exists between the parties. The fiscal elicited the fact that after
liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her.
Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the
ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of
similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, and that
315 there had been consent and connivance, and becauseTABLE Brown's action had prescribed
OF CONTENTSTABLE under
OF CONTENTS
Article 102 of the same Code, since the evidence showed that he learned of his wife's infidelity in
1945 but only filed action in 1945.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Brown’s action for legal separation has already prescribed
RULING:
Yes. Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that: An action for legal separation cannot
be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant
of the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.
Brown’s action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release
from internment in 1945.
ADJUDICATION: Decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed: Legal
action for separation is denied. Costs against appellant.
DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
[G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960]
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered
on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff
sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again,
plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men,
aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying
her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Petitioner expressed his wish to file a petition for
legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by
the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as
she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. The court of first instance of
Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of
judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription, that under Art. 101,
legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff’s right to legal separation on account of the defendant’s adultery
with Jose Arcalas had prescribed
RULING:
Yes. Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that: An action for legal separation cannot
be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant
of the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.
Plaintiff’s right to legal separation on account of the defendant’s adultery with Jose
Arcalas had prescribed because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when
plaintiff discovered defendant’s infidelity.
ADJUDICATION: A decree a legal separation was issued with all the consequent effects
as to the adultery committed with Nelson Orzame. Costs of all instances against petitioner.
CONTRERAS v. MACARAIG
[G.R. No. L-29138, May 29, 1970]
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Immediately before 1961,
defendant, who was employed as a manager at MICO Offset, met and came to know Lily Ann
Alcala who also works at the same office.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant
was living with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the
conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report in her desire not to anger nor
drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was
seen with a woman, she was so happy that defendant again return to the family home in May
1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him.
After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent
Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. Felicisima Antioquia was
given a copy of the baptismal certificate upon request to the parish priest, which she gave to
plaintiff sometime in October 1963.
In the early part of December 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant where plaintiff
pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring
him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer
leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted an action for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned, from September 1962 or from December 1963
RULING:
The period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted
from December 1963, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of
her husband.
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that: An action for legal separation cannot be
filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.
The Court concludes that it was only on the occasion when her husband admitted to her
that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that
appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal
separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have
commenced.
ADJUDICATION: Appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint
Procedure for an Action for Legal Separation
BAEZ v. BAEZ
[G.R. No. 132592, January 23, 2002]
FACTS:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided Civil Case No. CEB-
16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity. Thereafter, petitioner
Aida Baez filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Baez urgent ex-parte motion to modify
the decision the Commitment of Fees and filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written opposition. Thereafter, the trial court
denied Aida’s motion for moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses but gave due
course to the execution pending appeal.
In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
which set aside the lower court’s decision as well as the writ of execution and the Order granting
the motion filed by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the subject house and motor vehicle
to the administrator of the partnership. As prayed for by petitioner, the Administrator of the
conjugal partnership was ordered to cause the reimbursement by counsel for the private
respondent [Aida Baez] of the amount of P100, 000.00 released to him as advance payment of
attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals denied Aida’s motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the
trial court gave due course to Gabriel’s Notice of Appeal and elevated the entire case records to
318 the Court of Appeals. Aida filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
TABLE to dismiss theOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE appeal on the
CONTENTS
ground that Gabriel had failed to file with the appellate court a Record on Appeal. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the appointment of the petitioner-appellee as
administratix of the conjugal properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not multiple appeals are allowed in an action for legal separation
RULING:
No. The issues raised by petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals
arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee
relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be
violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree
of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court
and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere
incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
ADJUDICATION: The instant petitions are denied for lack of merit; the Order of the
Regional Trial Court authorizing the release of P100, 000 to petitioners counsel; the Omnibus
Order granting the motion pending appeal; the writ of execution; and the Order granting the
motion by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the house and vehicle are set aside. Further,
the Administrator of the conjugal partnership is ordered to cause the reimbursement by
petitioner’s counsel of the released amount of P100, 000.
LAPUZ SY v. EUFEMIO
[G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 2002]
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio were married civilly on 21 September 1934
and canonically on 30 September 1934; they lived together as husband and wife until 1943 when
the Eufemio left Carmen; they have no children; they acquired properties during their marriage.
Carmen discovered that her husband is cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or
about March 1949.
Carmen filed a petition for legal separation on 18 August 1953 and that she prayed that
the court would order that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
Eufemio alleged counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Before the trial could be completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969.
On 9 June 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2)
grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period
provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. The court
stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the
question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved
319 in the negative. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action; If it does, whether or not abatement will also apply if the action
involves property rights
RULING:
Yes. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in
its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation;
and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
— actio personalis moritur cum persona.
The death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death
has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of
jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the
action itself.
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance. A
review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely
the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if
it occurs prior to the decree.
A claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies,
under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a
substitute of the deceased party.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
ADJUDICATION: The appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Mandatory Cooling-Off Period, Art. 58, FC
ARANETA v. CONCEPCION
[G.R. No. L-9667, July 31, 1956]
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation against his wife, on the ground of adultery.
After the issues were joined, defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three
minor children, a monthly support of P5, 000 for herself and said children, and the return of her
passport, to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and
to have plaintiff pay for the fees of her attorney in the action.
Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that
defendant had abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were worth only
P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged by defendant; denying the taking of her passport or
the supposed vexation, and contesting her right to attorney’s fees. He also contended that
defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she had abandoned them and had
committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being
unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love, respect and care of a true
mother and without means to educate them. As to the claim for support, plaintiff claims that
there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to support because of her infidelity and that
she was able to support herself.
The judge resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to
defendant and a monthly allowance of P2, 300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a
house and P2, 000 as attorney’s fees.
321 Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order,TABLE
Petitioner filed the present
OF CONTENTSTABLE petition for
OF CONTENTS
certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to require the
parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the refusal of the judge for the parties to submit evidence before deciding
the omnibus petition is proper
RULING:
Yes. The main reason given by the judge, for refusing plaintiff’s request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil
Code which provides that: “An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.” This provision of the code is
mandatory. The law, up to the last minute, exerts efforts at preserving the family and the home
from utter ruin.
It is conceded that the period of six months is evidently intended as a cooling off period
to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against
each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the
lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this
practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony
and support pendente lite according to the circumstances.
ADJUDICATION: The writ prayed for is issued and the respondent judge is ordered to
proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite. The court’s order fixing the
alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.
SOMOSA-RAMOS v. VAMENTA, JR.
[G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972]
FACTS:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge
against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's
part and an attempt by him against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her
paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of
respondent Clemente Ramos.
An opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code
which provides that: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be
entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband
shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it
may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the
same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the
capital except in accordance with the orders of the court.”, was filed. It was contended that if the
motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the
reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim.
On September 3, 1971, petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent
Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ
of mandatory preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period
RULING:
No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. The court where the
action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It is precluded from hearing the
suit. However, the law remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert
itself from what is set forth in the article. There would appear to be then a recognition that the
question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during
such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the
property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under
the preceding article is thereby eased. It does not have the effect of overriding other provisions
such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstance. The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the
court according to the circumstances. At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order
complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus, there can
be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
ADJUDICATION: The order of respondent Court suspending the hearing on the petition
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is set aside; Respondent Judge is directed to
proceed to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction; Costs against respondent
Clemente G. Ramos.
PACETE v. CARRIAGA
[G.R. No. L-53880, March 17, 1994]
FACTS:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion,
as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of
property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938; that
they had a child named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently
contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such
marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast
property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
of his children with Clarita and other "dummies"; and that reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a
motion for an extension of twenty days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer.
The court granted the motion. The defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another
thirty days which the lower court granted but only for twenty days. The defendants again filed
another motion for an extension of fifteen days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period
previously sought, which the court denied.
The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. On 17 March 1980, the court promulgated a decision in favour of the
plaintiff, decreed the legal separation of Enrico L. Pacete and Concepcion Alanis and held to be
null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the decree of legal separation is proper

RULING:
No. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code mandates that an
action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible
jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed
intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to
alone dictate.
ADJUDICATION: The decision of the lower court is nullified and set aside.
Necessity of Trial and Intervention of State, Art. 60, FC
PACETE v. CARRIAGA
[G.R. No. L-53880, March 17, 1994]
FACTS:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion,
as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of
property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938; that
they had a child named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently
contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such
marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast
property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
of his children with Clarita and other "dummies"; and that reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a
motion for an extension of twenty days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer.
The court granted the motion. The defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another
thirty days which the lower court granted but only for twenty days. The defendants again filed
another motion for an extension of fifteen days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period
previously sought, which the court denied.
The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. On 17 March 1980, the court promulgated a decision in favour of the
plaintiff, decreed the legal separation of Enrico L. Pacete and Concepcion Alanis and held to be
null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper

RULING:
No. Article 101 of the Civil Code provides that: “No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.”
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
324 attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties
TABLE exists. If there isOFnoCONTENTS
OF CONTENTSTABLE collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The policy of Article 101, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation, is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere
contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves.
The significance of the above substantive provision of the law is further underscored by
the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.
ADJUDICATION: The decision of the lower court is nullified and set aside.
Legal Separation Pendente Lite, Art. 61-62 and Art. 49, FC
SABALONES v. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 106169, February 14, 1994]
FACTS:
Samson T. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines
but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro Manila, belonging to the
conjugal partnership.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a
counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied
by her and their six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from
another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi
Izumi. She also informed the court that he had not returned to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence in Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and
their three children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the
occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal
properties.
After trial, the court decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support
325 from his respondent wife. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
interfering with the administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. The
petitioner filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new contract of lease
over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his
consent.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by the
wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with
her administration of the properties
RULING:
Yes. Pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal
assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal
properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However,
Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the
administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court
denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as
administrator thereof).
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the
rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the
court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards
in favor of the plaintiff.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost
nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. The injunction
is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the
dissipation of the conjugal assets.
ADJUDICATION: The injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as
the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending
the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

ESPIRITU and LAYUG v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995]
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in
1976 in Iligan City began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife in the
United States of America. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On
October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in
1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however,
that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her
children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to
leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended
Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to
be approved by the Court. On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita Masauding is entitled gain custody over the children
RULING:
No. Art. 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall
be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons
for such measure; and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides that: In case of
separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
A social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel
clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada
Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited
with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who
did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused
by her mother's infidelity.
There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article
213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of
attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by
her behavior.
ADJUDICATION: The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and
Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is
made as to costs.
LAPUZ SY v. EUFEMIO
[G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972]
FACTS:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and
canonically on 30 September 1934; that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed
for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of
his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one
Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a
vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? If it does, whether or not abatement will also apply if the action
328 involves property rights TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
RULING:
Yes. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved since these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being
the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
ADJUDICATION: The appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations, which was the dismissal of the case, is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as
to costs.
Decree of Legal Separation, Arts. 63-64 to Art. 43 and 213, FC
LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC
[G.R. No. L-18008, October 30, 1962]
FACTS:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition
which reads that petitioner's maiden name is Elisea Laperal; that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court
on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs.
Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her;
that the said partial decision is now final; that in view of the fact that she has been legally
separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many
years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume
using her maiden name, to wit: Elisea Laperal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can resume using her maiden name pursuant to the issuance
of a decree of legal separation
RULING:
No. Article 372 of the New Civil Code provides that: When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
329 separation. The language of the statute is mandatory that
TABLE OF the wife, even after
CONTENTSTABLE the legal
OF CONTENTS
separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should
continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
ADJUDICATION: The order of the lower court granting the petition, is hereby set aside
and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.
SIOCHI v. GOZON
[G.R. No. L-169900, March 18, 2010]
FACTS:
Elvira Gozon filed a case of Legal Separation against her husband Alfredo. Later, she
filed a notice of lis pendens over a 30,000 square meters lot registered in the name of “Afredo
Gozon married to Elvira Gozon”.
While the case was pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement to sell said lot to Mario
Siochi for 18 Million. Mario gave a down payment of 5 Million with an agreement that Alfredo as
the exclusive owner of the property, will secure the exclusion of the property in the Legal
Separation case and secure the removal of notice of lis pendens. After giving the down payment,
Mario took possession of the property. Later, the Legal Separation case was granted, the CPG
(Conjugal Partnership of Gains) was declared dissolved and liquidated; the land declared
conjugal. Alfredo being the offending spouse, the net profit of his share shall be forfeited in favor
of their daughter, Winifred.
Alfredo later donated the land to Winifred. Through SPA, Alfredo sold the land to Inter-
Dimensional Realty for 18 Million wherein the latter obtained the TCT in their name free from
annotation of the notice of lis pendens. Mario Siochi then filed a case for specific performance,
damages and the annulment of the donation and sale.
The CA decided that sale between Mario and Alfredo is void. Share of Alfredo (offending
spouse) was forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred. Alfredo must pay the 5 Million down
payment to Mario with damages. Winifred has the option of either to dispose of the land or not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfredo’s (offending spouse) entire share of said conjugal property shall
be deemed forfeited as effect of the Legal Separation case.
RULING:
No. As provided under Art 63 (2) of Family Code— “The decree of legal separation shall
have the following effects:
(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated
but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in favor of common
children , or if there are none, to the children of the guilty spouse in previous marriage, if there
are none, to the innocent spouse.
Pursuant to this Article, Alfredo’s share of the conjugal property is not entirely forfeited
in favor of their common child, but only his share of the net profits earned from said conjugal
property.
ADJUDICATION: The Supreme Court affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals with
the following modifications: (1) delete the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons
one-half undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and (2) order Alfredo Gozon
and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the Eighteen
330 Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLERealty, Inc. for
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the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this Decision.
Rights and Obligations of Spouses, Arts. 68-81, 100 and 127, FC
PELAYO v. LAURON
[G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909]
FACTS:
On the 23d of November, 1900, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of
October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants to render
medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that the just
and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to
pay; that for said reason he prayed that judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that
might be deemed proper.
In order to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it
becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law
of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded by the
plaintiff upon rendering medical assistance to the defendants’ daughter-in-law
RULING:
No. The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. When either of them by
reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable
obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored,
and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to
furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert
for his professional services.
The person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth is the husband of the
patient and not her father and mother-in-law. The fact that it was not the husband who called
the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfilment of the said
obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger to which the life of the patient was
at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed.
ADJUDICATION: The Supreme Court affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals with
the following modifications: (1) delete the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons
one-half undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and (2) order Alfredo Gozon
and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the Eighteen
Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for
the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this Decision.

GO V. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 114791, May 29, 1997]
FACTS:
Spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981. The video coverage of
the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1, 650.00. The newlyweds tried
to claim the video tape of their wedding but they failed because the tape was apparently not yet
processed. When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, they found out that
the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.\
Furious at the loss of the tape, private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a
complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners. After a protracted trial, the
court a quo declared defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs
Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong for the payment of damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Alex Go is jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy
regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed
RULING:
No. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may
exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.
In the instant case, it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private
respondent. Consequently, she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded
below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who
332 execute them. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ADJUDICATION: Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private
respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the
judgment award. Costs against petitioners.
ARROYO v. VASQUEZ-ARROYO
[G.R. No. 17014, August 11, 1921]
FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of
wedlock by marriage in the year 1910. They have lived together as man and wife until July 4,
1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separately
from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to
resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the
fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred
by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment
on the part of her husband.
Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of
separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees
and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in
favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband.
Upon appeal the court found that, the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to
forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral
and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other
RULING:
No. It is not within the province of the courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. The Court is disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. The Court is unable to hold that Mariano
B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without
sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
ADJUDICATION: It is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself
from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to
costs of either instance.
ILUSORIO v. ILUSORIO, BILDNER
[G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000]
FACTS:
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio
did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus
to have the custody of Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo
City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in conjugal bliss
RULING:
No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but
on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus
possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to
some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. In
case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
ADJUDICATION: The Court nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
GOITIA v. CAMPOS RUEDA
[G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916]
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her
parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal
home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on
his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other
than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her
by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her face and different body parts. The trial court
ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home
RULING:
Yes. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfil the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
ADJUDICATION: Goitia can claim support from the husband for separate maintenance
even outside the conjugal home.

IMBONG v. OCHOA
[G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 10354 (Reproductive Health (RH) Law) is unconstitutional for

violating the right to marital privacy and autonomy and for being anti-family
RULING:
Yes. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as
the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
336 institutions of marriage and the family. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and
violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)
(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in
their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in
elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
ADJUDICATION: Wherefore, the petitions are partially granted. Accordingly, the court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as not unconstitutional except with respect to the provisions which are
declared unconstitutional.
VALINO v. ADRIANO
[G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014]
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano, a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married
respondent Rosario Adriano on November 15, 1955. The marriage, however, turned sour and
they were eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his
clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he
continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children.
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United
States. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the
funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of
the family of Valino.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano
before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes,
respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for
more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took
good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She
also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left
for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be
337 TABLE OFPark.
interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano
RULING:
Under the law, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements is the surviving legal
wife.
Article 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the Civil Code provides who
has rights over the funeral arrangements. The Supreme Court stated that the law simply
confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived
or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end.
ADJUDICATION: Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make
arrangements for the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family
and disturbed the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of
preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to include the provisions on
"Funerals." Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Effect if Marriage does not take place, Art. 81, FC
PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR.

[G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012]
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and others are accused of murder before the.
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233. On July 9, 1997 the RTC
rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of
death.
On appeal, the Court affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to
reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of
evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of
temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim
to be paid solidarily by them. The decision became final and executory.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of
the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. Efren and Melecia
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE:
338 Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses TABLE OF and
Efren CONTENTSTABLE
Melecia canOF
beCONTENTS
levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case
RULING:
Yes. Article 122 of the Family Code provides: The payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither
shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them may be enforced against the
partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of
her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on
her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
ADJUDICATION: The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first
ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and
Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter
accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered.
Donations Propter Nuptias, Art. 82-87, FC; Art. 725 of the Civil Code
CANO v. CANO
[G.R. No. 188666, December 14, 2017]
FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Injunction against petitioners on the
basis of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor in 1982 by Feliza, the registered owner of
the property. Respondents asserted that they benevolently allowed petitioners to take actual
possession of the property after the sale because the parties were all blood relatives, until the
petitioners allegedly harassed the individuals hired by respondents to spray the mango trees
with chemical fruit inducers.
Petitioners denied the allegations claiming ownership of the property on the basis of a
donation propter nuptias (unregistered) executed in their favor by Feliza and their continuous
possession of the land since they were born or for more than 63 years. They contend that
according to Article 749 of the Civil Code, donations of immovable property are considered valid
so long as these are made in a public document, thus registration is not necessary. Respondents
denied that they were aware of petitioners’ claim over the property at the time they purchased it.
During the pendency of the Ejectment case, a second Petition for Quieting of Title was
filed by the Petitioners involving the same property and the same parties. The Regional Trial
Court in the Quieting of Title Case ruled that declared respondents are the rightful owners of the
property declaring that sale prevailed over the donation because of the operative fact of
registration. The appellate court agreed with the trial court but on the ground of invalidity of
the donation propter nuptias due to the fact that the document does not show that plaintiffs
accepted the subject parcel of land as a gift from the donor, hence, ownership did not pass to
339 plaintiffs. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not acceptance and notification to the donor are required for donations
propter nuptias executed under the Civil Code;
2. Whether or not the unregistered donation propter nuptias is binding to third persons
RULING:
1. No. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are
applicable thereto. The donation propter nuptias in this case was executed on 30 May 1962,
while the provisions on such donations under the Civil Code were still in force and before the
Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988. The formal requisites for the validity of the donation
should therefore be determined in accordance with the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Article 126 provides that: Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses;
Article 127 provides that these donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations,
except as to their form which shall be regulated by the Statute of Frauds; and insofar as they are
not modified by the following articles; and Article 129 provides that express acceptance is not
necessary for the validity of these donations.
The absence of proof that the gift was accepted in a public instrument is not controlling,
since implied acceptance – such as the celebration of marriage and the annotation of this fact in
the OCT – must be deemed sufficient.
2. No. Pursuant to Article 709 of the Civil Code, all rights over immovable property must
be duly inscribed or annotated on the Registry of Deeds before they can affect the rights of third
persons. As between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is
for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the Registry of Property. Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall
not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
In order for prior unregistered interest to affect third persons despite the absence of
registration, the law requires actual knowledge of that interest. Nothing less would suffice. In
the absence of proof that respondents participated in the transaction, or had knowledge of
petitioners’ interest over the land at the time the property was purchased in 1982, this Court
must rule that they are not bound by the unregistered donation. Hence, the conveyance had no
effect as to respondents.
ADJUDICATION: Resolution of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104200, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Resolution ordering
petitioners to vacate the property and surrender possession thereof to respondents is affirmed.
Prohibition against donation to each other, Art. 84 and 87, FC; Art. 1490 and 1782
of the Civil Code
ARCABA v. VDA. DE BATOCAEL

[G.R. No. 146683, November 22, 2001]
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two
lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼
340 share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot inOFhis
TABLE name. Having OF
CONTENTSTABLE no CONTENTS
children to
take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin
Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila
and Francisco. Leticia said that they were lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda
claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she
was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila,
who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being
made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.
Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages.
Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged
that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille
be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code
RULING:
Yes. Francisco and Cirila’s public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Tabancura's testimony, there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were
common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by Cirila
using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a business permit
to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit, and the death certificate of Francisco. These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would
not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in RTC Civil
Case No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law
spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash
wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee.
ADJUDICATION: Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under
Art. 87 of the Family Code.
MATABUENA v. CERVANTES
[G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971]
FACTS:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, Petronila
Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation
was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, Cornelia
Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased,
filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The
lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the
time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
341 inapplicable. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban of donation between spouses applies to a common-law

relationship
RULING:
Yes. While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
If the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half pursuant to
Article 1001, Civil Code.
ADJUDICATION: The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff
and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is
remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
HARDING v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY
[G.R. No. 12707, August 10, 1918]
FACTS:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received
as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the
Philippines. The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr.
Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic,
considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value
was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value
was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim
but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as
to the cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also
stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift from her husband is void
under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

RULING:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by
Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of
the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then
342 thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paintsTABLE which amounted toOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE P900.00. Mr.
CONTENTS
Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection
of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this
valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of
necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the
validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated
value.
ADJUDICATION: Plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in question and had an
insurable interest therein; there was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; the
valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding upon the defendant
corporation.
Absolute Community Property

Components, Art. 91,93 and 95, FC
VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004]
FACTS:
Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October
7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. During their marriage, they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion,
Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited
from his parents as well as the purchaser of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels
of land. Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations. In 1945,
Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only
person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she
could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son
is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties.
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her
husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties, claiming that such are her conjugal
properties with Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia
Nicloas are conjugal
RULING:
Yes. The properties are conjugal. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are
not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. Nicolas
343 and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. NicolasTABLE and Pacita started cohabiting
OF CONTENTSTABLE in1936.
OF CONTENTS
Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of
acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Since the
subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
ADJUDICATION: Pacita failed to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code that the subject properties are conjugal.
Excluded Property, Art. 92 and 95, FC
TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 120594, June 10, 1997]
FACTS:
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against the Alfonso’s brothers, Celestino and Maximo, and their
respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-
owners of a residential lot with improvements acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the
provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-
owners to the extent of one-third (1/3) portion of the lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the
action for accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963, the brothers together with
other siblings put up a business which they registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was
engaged in the sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are entitled to the
fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business, so that, an accounting of the assets and
liabilities of the partnership, as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper
in the premises.
On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed their answer alleging that an accounting
is not feasible because the company had long been dissolved. It was further alleged that Alfonso
mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager. Finally, private respondents
asserted that Alfonso’s one-third (1/3) share of the subject property was mortgaged by him to
his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in order to secure a loan he obtained from her.

Whether or not the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land is an exclusive
property of Alfonso Tan
RULING:
Yes. The undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's
exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of
the property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. Tan, married to Eteria Teves,
Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy Kuchin and Maximo U. Tan. It is clear that the title was
entered on January 9, 1970 and a transfer when the latter covered the 906-square meter lot
which was one of the properties left by the late Trinidad Uy to her children when she died
intestate and which property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties.
Article 148 provides that the following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (2)
That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
The husband's acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his marriage to his
wife simply means that the lot is his exclusively property because it was acquired by him during
the marriage by lucrative title pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, petitioner had adduced no evidence at all that the lot was acquired by
her and her husband with their funds. Neither was her allegation that the house was constructed
with the loan she and her husband obtained duly substantiated. From whom the loan was
obtained was not even revealed.
ADJUDICATION: Accordingly, the Petition is denied. Although the subject property was
acquired during the marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan
brothers that the same was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.
Liabilities/Charges, Art. 94-95, FC
CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004
FACTS:
On September 26, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a
loan from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). The PBMCI executed a promissory note,
promising to pay on December 22, 1978, at an interest rate of 14% per annum and executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC, binding them to jointly and severally guarantee the payment
of all the PBMCI obligations, owing the ABC. On December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another
loan to the PBMCI payable within 18 months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan,
the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing
on June 29, 1981. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Thus, on August 21, 1981,
the ABC filed a complaint for the sum of money with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against the PBMCI. On August 26, 1981, the trial court issued an order denying the
ABC’s application for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. On April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and
Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the SEC, at the same time
seeking the PBMCI’s rehabilitation. On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce
the Amount of the Preliminary Attachment Bond. On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an
order granting the motion of ABC. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching filed a Motion
to Set Aside the Levy on Attachment. On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their
Reply/Opposition to the Motion to Expunge Records. The trial court issued on December 15,
345 1993 an order lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment on the
TABLE shares of stocksOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE and ordering
CONTENTS
the sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the Motion to Quash the Levy on
attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines.
RULING:
The petitioner-wife filed her Motion to Set Aside the Levy on Attachment of the 100,000
shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband, claiming that the said shares of stocks were
conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the
motion for said relief.
Absolute Community Property Administration, Art. 96, FC
MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married
Joselyn Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year-old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was
subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot. The sale was allegedly
financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin also, using the latter’s funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort
known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of
Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, sublease, and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as
lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease
(Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were
used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that
he was Joselyn’s husband any transaction involving said property required his consent.
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community party of Benjamin and Joselyn,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the
funds used in purchasing the same.
RULING:
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for
taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: (1) that he was the actual owner of the
346 property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the OF
TABLE same; and (2) that OF
CONTENTSTABLE Joselyn could
CONTENTS
not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent.
The Court finds and holds that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from
acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition.
By entering into such contract, knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his
favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that
the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would allow indirect
renunciation of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition, which is a right that the Constitution does
not permit him to have.
Dissolution, Art. 99, FC
IN RE: MULLER v. MULLER

G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
FACTS:
The petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married
in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany in a house
owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines
in 1992. Respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of
a house. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner. Due to
incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. On August 12, 1996, the trial court terminated the regime of
absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent, Helmut Muller. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his
funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
decision, modifying the trial court’s decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the
347 respondent. As regards to the house, the Court of AppealsTABLEruled that there is nothing
OF CONTENTSTABLE in the
OF CONTENTS
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition for the property of the Antipolo property.
RULING:
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. The finding
that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot and will not, at this stage
of the proceedings, be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to counter, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal
funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Components (what constitutes), Art. 106, 116-120, FC
NAVARRO V. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009
FACTS:
On September 12, 1998, the respondent Karen Go filed two complaints before the RTC for
replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go
prayed that the RTC issue Writs of Replevin for the seizure of two motor vehicles in Navarro’s
possession. On October 12, 1998 and October 14, 1998, the RTC issued Writs of Replevin for
both cases. As a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession
of Karen Go. In his answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two
complaints stated no cause of action. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaints did not state a cause of action. The CA denied Navarro’s petition and affirmed the
RTC’s order. The CA also denied Navarro’s Motion for Reconsideration, leading to the filing of
the present petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a Writ of Replevin.
RULING:
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the
348 contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with whatOFisCONTENTSTABLE
TABLE expressly determined in this
OF CONTENTS
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations
of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and suppletorily by the spouse’s marriage settlement and by the rules
on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement
between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance. Glenn
and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name. Hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying
Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that in default of contracts or special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, we find further support in
Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment
with respect to the co-owned property. In this case, one spouse filed an action for the Recovery
of Credit, a personal property considered conjugal property, without including the other spouse
in the action.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains – Components (what constitute) Art. 106, 116-120, FC
IMANI V. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.,
G.R. NO. 187023, NOVEMBER 17, 2010
FACTS:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship

Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with her
co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P.
Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). When
CPDTI failed to pay the loans despite several demands, Metrobank fileda collection suit against
the former and its sureties. The RTC ordered to pay respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company. Metrobank then filed a motion for execution, which was granted. A writ of execution
was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957 P(M) and registered in the name of petitioner. A
public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest
bidder.
Metrobank filed a Manifestation and Motion, praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be
directed to surrender the owners copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for cancellation. Petitioner
opposed the motion and filed her Comment with Urgent Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy
on Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale Over TCT No. T-27957 P(M). She argued
that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Attached to her opposition were
an Affidavit executed by Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the property, attesting that
spouses Sina and Evangeline Imani were the vendees of the subject property; and the
photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property as
such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither
can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the
nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in
favor of Metrobank.
RTC rendered decision in favor of petitioner declaring the said property to be conjugal which
cannot be held answerable for petitioner’s personal liability. However, the CA on appeal,
reversed RTC’s. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership.

RULING:
NO. Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material. To support her assertion that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, attesting that
petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the
checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to
prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said
Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to
affirm the veracity of his Affidavit.
DELA PEŃA V. AVILA,
G.R. NO. 187490 February 8, 2012
FACTS:
On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of
₱250,000.00 which, pursuant to the Promissory Note the former executed in favor of the latter,
was payable on or before 7 July 1996, with interest. On the very same day, Antonia also executed
in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of
securing the payment of said loan obligation.
On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the said property
in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila for the stated consideration of ₱600,000.00.
Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT as well as the issuance of a new TCT No. naming her as
the owner of the subject realty.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect
that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had been titled in the name of
Gemma under TCT No. 32315; and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring
her title was simulated. On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela
Peña, filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale claiming that the subject
realty was conjugal property. Gemma specifically denied the material allegations of the
foregoing complaint.
RTC ruled that the subject property was conjugal in nature and the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and
ruled that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the
same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership.

RULING:
NO. Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peña’s did
not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage
350 between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bareTABLE and uncorroborated assertion
OF CONTENTSTABLE that the
OF CONTENTS
property was purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from
which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When queried about the
matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the
property was owned by his parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect.
Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when
the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, the Court find that the CA cannot be faulted
for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property.
Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peñas insist that the
registration thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela Peña, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Antegono A. Dela Peña" should have already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. The
phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted
to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the
property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her
marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was
acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V. DAVID
G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
FACTS:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March
25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon
City, which was registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Manuel A. David and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer
communicated with each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the
property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of dated
April 24, 1995, and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 130129 in
the name of Titan. Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Contract and Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City.Manuel alleged that
the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and
therefore void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is void.

RULING:
Yes. Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
We are not persuaded by Titans arguments that the property was Marthas exclusive
property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970,
hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property
in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of
the property. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required
to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Here, we
find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the
351 spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except
in cases provided by law.
Re: Conjugal Partnership of Gains
TAN V. ANDRADE
G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013
FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of which she
mortgaged to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was
about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject
properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests
over the properties. The Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons, as
instrumental witness. Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso, giving
the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum of
P310,000. When Proceso failed to purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the
properties, and the TCTs were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed a complaint
for reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the RTC. They
alleged that the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable
mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also
claimed that since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject
properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective
shares. The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
352 Whether the properties belong to the conjugalTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
partnership of RosarioOF CONTENTS
and her late
husband and co-owned by her and her children
RULING:
NO. Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which
states that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wif For this presumption to
apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage.
As held in Go v. Yamane:
“x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in
favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.”
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was a cquired. Moreover, the presumption
may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon
the party asserting it.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer, certificates of title over
the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario
Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino."
Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish
that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same
were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner
of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso,
Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the
RTC’s finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
Components (what constitutes), Art. 106, 116-120, FC
ONSTOTT V. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 221047 September 14, 2016
FACTS:
Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the
Province of Rizal. Due to non-payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal sold
the subject property at public auction to one De Serra. UTNAI, an association representing the
actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed the same from De Serra. In
2008, UTNAI filed a complaint for cancellation of OCT Number and for the issuance of a new
title in its name before the RTC against Albert and Federico M. Cas. In 2009, after RTC’s
decision of cancelling the OCT number and issuing a new title in the name of UTNAI became
final, Michael Onstott, claiming to be the legitimate son of Albert with a certain Josephine
Arrastia Onstott, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that UTNAI, in its complaint,
impleaded only Albert, notwithstanding knowledge of the latter's death. He contended that his
mother Josephine was an indispensable party to the present case, being the owner of half of the
subject property, which he claimed to be conjugal in nature. RTC denied the petition but found
that its March 30, 2009 Decision never attained finality for not having been served upon Albert
by publication in accordance with Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. hence, it directed the
Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. B-9655 and to reinstate OCT No. (-2645-) M-556.
Both parties appealed to the CA. it dismissed Michael’s appeal and rejected his theory
353 that his mother Josephine was an indispensable party toTABLE
the complaint filed by UTNAI
OF CONTENTSTABLE against
OF CONTENTS
Albert. It found that the subject property was registered in the name of "Albert Onstott,
American citizen, married to Josephine Arrastia" which is merely descriptive of the civil status
of Albert and does not show that Josephine co-owned the subject property. Hence, contrary to
Michael's stance, the subject property was not conjugal in nature and it cannot be presumed to
be conjugal in the absence of evidence showing that it was acquired during their marriage.
Furthermore, the CA pointed out that if Michael were indeed Albert's compulsory heir,
he could have transferred the subject property in his name by right of succession upon his
father's death, or redeemed the same in 2005 after it was sold at public auction in 2004, or
intervened in the proceedings before the RTC. Having failed to avail of any of the said legal
remedies, he can no longer claim ownership of the subject property by the simple expedient of
filing a petition for relief.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI
notwithstanding the failure to implead his mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party, since
the subject property was allegedly conjugal in nature?
RULING:
No. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. However, the p who invokes this presumption must first prove that
the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses.
As Michael invokes the presumption of conjugality, he must first establish that the
subject property was acquired during the marriage of Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the
presumption cannot stand. Indeed, records are bereft of any evidence from which the actual
date of acquisition of the subject property can be ascertained. Considering that the presumption
of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing when the property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired, the subject property is therefore considered to be Albert's exclusive property.
Consequently, Michael's insistence that Josephine who, the Court notes, has never personally
appeared in these proceedings to directly challenge the disposition of the subject
property sans her participation is a co-owner thereof and necessarily, an indispensable party to
the instant case, must therefore fail.

Orsolino v. Frany
G.R No. 193887, March 29, 2017
FACTS:
A complaint was filed for ejectment over a house and lot located at No. 37 Ilang-Ilang
Street corner Camias Street, Barangay Capri, Novaliches, Quezon City by Spouses Frany against
petitioners Spouses Orsolino, and all persons claiming rights under them.
Spouses Frany claimed that Carolina, the mother of petitioner Dennis, authorized her
other son Sander, to sell the subject property as evidenced by a Special Power of Attorney7
(SPA) dated November 20, 2004. On the same date, Sander sold the subject property to Spouses
Frany for the sum of ₱200,000.00, evidenced by a Deed of Sale.8 The respondent said that it
was agreed upon that Spouses Orsolino, who are the current occupants of the subject property,
shall vacate and peacefully surrender the possession of the same to Spouses Frany on or before
the end of November 2004. However, despite repeated demands to vacate the subject property,
the petitioners failed to do so. The said matter was also brought before the barangay for
conciliation but no settlement was reached.9
For their part, the Spouses Orsolino claimed that the subject property is a government
property which is being used as a relocation site. They said that they had been occupying the
subject property since May 2000 and they derived their right to stay therein from their mother
Carolina, who has bought her right to the subject property from Julieta Guaniso in August of
1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was valid

RULING:
The Court does not agree with the RTC's finding that the sale was void because the subject
property was conjugal at the time Carolina sold it to the respondent. Article 160 of the Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the
presumption under said article applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential. Condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENTT CORP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
[G.R. No. 118305. February 12, 1998]
FACTS
The petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in Spouses Alfredo
and Encarnacion Ching vs Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, et. al., upholding
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts
secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
In the case. Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed
security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to
AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance. After trial, the court
rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Upon a motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
AIDCs then put up a bond, a writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo
Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff and appointed sheriff in the Civil Case, caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal
properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
Here, private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners with then Court of
First Instance, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership
albeit the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership
RULING
No. Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
In the case at bar, the loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
petitioners-appellees - this despite the fact that the members of the said family happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
356 partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming
TABLE as such. In the
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF case at bar,
CONTENTS
respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband,
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is apparent from the facts of the case is
that the judgment debt was contracted in the name of the Corporation Philippine Blooming
Mills and appellee-husband only signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt
and respondent-appellants right of recourse against appellee-husband as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of
the family of petitioners-appellees.
DEWARA V. LAMELA
GR No. 17901 April 11, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Dewara were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Elenita worked
in California while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod. While driving a private jeepney registered in the
name of Elenita, Eduardo hit Ronnie. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The lower court found Eduardo guilty of the
charge and sentenced him to suffer thepenalty of imprisonment, and to pay civil indemnity. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the lower court and it became final and executory. The
writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Alvero,
to levy on a lot in the name of Elenita, Eduardo’s wife, to satisfy the judgment on the civil
liability of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and
subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested
buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and
Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie then caused the
consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation
of the TCT in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
respondent spouses. The above incidents happened while Elenita was working in California.
Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment
of sale and for damages against Spouses Lamela and ex-officio sheriff Alvero. Elenita claimed
that the levy on execution of the subject lot was illegal because the said property was her
paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of
her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she received no notice of the
357 execution sale. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
On the other hand, the Spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of
Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the
time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in
the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any
objection pending the levy on execution of the property. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Elenita. The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this
conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary
evidence submitted, Elenita’s grandfather, Exequiel, originally owned the lot. Upon his death,
his children Jesus, Elenita’s father, Salud and Concepcion, inherited the property, and
subsequently a new title on their favor was issued. As to how Elenita acquired the lot, the RTC
gave credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the
property. First, it was sold to her by her father and her aunt so that the family would remain on
the lot. Second, the minimal and inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for
the purpose of helping her expand her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was
essentially a donation and was therefore gratuitous in character. Having declared that the
property was the paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of
Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross
inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. The CA ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during
their marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of
gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the

conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo
RULING:
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption.
The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not
affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption
of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to
arise.
DELOS SANTOS v. ABEJON
G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017
FACTS:
Respondents filed Complaint for Cancellation of Title with collection of sum of money
against Petitioners before the RTC. The complaint alleged that Erlinda and her late husband
Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro) borrowed money from the former's sister, Teresita, as evidenced by
a Promissory Note. As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. which mortgage was annotated on the title. After Pedro
died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject land
358 to Teresita. They executed a Deed of Sale and a ReleaseTABLE
of Mortgage, and eventually
OF CONTENTSTABLE issued in
OF CONTENTS
the name of "Teresita, Abejon.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners should be held liable to
respondents.
RULING:
Petitioners admitted the existence of the loan obligation as well as respondents' right to
collect on the same, it does not necessarily follow that respondents should collect the loan
amount from petitioners, as concluded by both the RTC and the CA. It must be pointed out that
such loan was contracted by Erlinda, who is only one out of the four herein petitioners, and her
deceased husband, Pedro, during the latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still
subsisting.
Both the RTC and the CA erred in holding petitioners liable to respondents for the loan
obligation.
Borlongon v. Banco De Oro
G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017
FACTS:
In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title. In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to
obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their
surprise, the title contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of
an execution sale in a Civil Case pending before Branch 134 of Makati RTC. Petitioner
immediately procured a copy of the records and found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO),
formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation,
the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were
several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements
totaling ₱13, 500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the
consolidation of BDO’s ownership over the subject property
RULING:
Yes. It is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed
violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a
TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. The primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the
appellate court is the declaration of the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC and its Decision
dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely confined to the prevention of the issuance of the writ
of possession and the consolidation of the ownership of the subject property in BDO's name-the
concerns of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI. Indeed, the petitioner's prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and/or WPI was intended to preserve the status quo ante, and not to pre-empt the
appellate court's decision on the merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it was a grievous
error on the part of the CA to deny her of this provisional remedy.
Disposition
Of conjugal partnership property, Art. 124-125, FC
Of exclusive property, Art. 110-112, FC
Boston Equity Resources Inc. v. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 193228, November 27, 2017
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant Edgardo Del Rosario was married to herein plaintiff-intervenor-

appellant Rosie Gonzales Del Rosario on March 9, 1968 and their marriage has been blessed
with three children, herein plaintiffs-intervenors-appellants, Christina, Peter and Paul, all
surnamed Del Rosario.
On April 12, 1999, Del Rosario and Boston entered into a Real Estate Mortgage whereby
the former, representing himself as single, mortgaged six (6) parcels of land. Thereafter,
additional loan obligations amounting to Php15, 000,000.00 was obtained. On various dates,
Del Rosario paid a total amount of Php3, 178,667.00 represented by encashed Checks and
Php25, 000,000.00 on December 8, 1999, as evidenced by the Official Receipt.
On various dates in the year 2000, Del Rosario again obtained several loans totaling Php
34,400,000.00 but because Boston made an advanced deduction of interest Php 11,660,347.00,
he was able to receive only Php22, 739,653.00 from the said loan.
Boston did not grant Del Rosario's request for time to settle his loan but proceeded to
foreclose Del Rosario's properties by causing the publication of the Notice of Foreclosure. As a
consequence, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City sent a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale of Real
Property Under Act 3135 (As Amended) dated May 28, 2001 to Del Rosario saying that the
parcels of land shall be sold at a public auction on June 27, 2001 in order to satisfy his Php 52.9
Million debt with Boston. In the said sale, Boston was declared the sole bidder for the properties
in the amount of Php75, 000,000.00.
On May 21, 2002, the late Rosie, the spouse of Edgardo, and their children, namely:
Christina, Peter and Paul, all surnamed Del Rosario, filed in the RTC their motion to admit their
complaint-in-intervention on the basis that they had a legal interest as the co-owners of the
mortgaged properties by reason of the same forming part of the conjugal partnership of gains of
Rosie and Edgardo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the mortgage executed by
Edgardo is null and void because of the alleged lack of consent of Roise, wife of Edgardo in the
mortgage contract and its amendment.
RULING:
The submission by the petitioners regarding Rosie's having consented to the REM and its
amendment by virtue of her signature thereon as an instrumental witness was not among the
issues framed and joined by the parties during the trial in the RTC. For the petitioners to make
the submission only now is impermissible. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues
the parties framed at the start; hence, issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. The Court will not deal with and resolve issues not properly raised and
ventilated in the lower courts. To allow such new issues on appeal contravenes the basic rule of
fair play and justice, and is violative of the adverse party's constitutional right to due process.
As a consequence, the findings of the CA on the lack of Rosie's written consent to the
REM and its amendment stand unrefuted.1âwphi1 Such findings warrant the nullification not
360 only of the REM and its amendment, but also of all the proceedings taken to foreclose
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE the REM.
OF CONTENTS
Such invalidity applied to the entire mortgage, even to the portion corresponding to the share of
Edgardo in the conjugal estate
The petitioners' assertion that the mortgaged properties could be made liable for the
obligation contracted solely by Eduardo on the basis that the proceeds of the loan had
redounded to the benefit of the family is also unwarranted. The mortgage was but an accessory
agreement, and was distinct from the principal contract of loan. What the CA declared void was
the REM. Since the REM was an encumbrance on the conjugal properties, the contracting
thereof by Edgardo sans the written consent of Rosie rendered only the REM void and legally
inexistent. The petitioners could still recover the loan from the conjugal partnership in a proper
case for the purpose. Where the mortgage was not valid, the principal obligation that the
mortgage guaranteed was not thereby rendered null and void. The liability of the debtor under
the principal contract of the loan subsisted despite the illegality of the REM. That obligation
matured and became demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. What was
lost was only the right to foreclose the REM as a special remedy for satisfying or settling the debt
that was the principal obligation. In case of its nullity, the mortgage deed remained as evidence
or proof of the debtor's personal obligation, and the amount due to the creditor could be
enforced in an ordinary action.
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio
G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
FACTS:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of
17,140 square meters Protacio, Jr. Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was
his father, Protacio, Sr., not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land.
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and
mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito sold a portion of
the property to Servacio On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to
resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of
the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of
the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito
countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it
with his own money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.

RULING:
No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family
Code. Their property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. With Marta‘s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175
(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the
other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Marta‘s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any
361 specific portion of Marta‘s share without an actual partition of CONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF the property being first done
OF CONTENTS
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta‘s share and as a co-owner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of
the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of
Title IV (Property Relations between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any
disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be
made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Ros v. Philippine National Bank
G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
FACTS:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB,
Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803.
The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Laoag City.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a
loan of ₱115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan,
plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land – Lot No. 9161
of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one
(1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in
the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property
– a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.1avvphi1
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action,
and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees’ own acts [of] omission/connivance that bar them
from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and
prescription.
ISSUE:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate mortgage valid?
RULING:
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s
marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was
acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he
mortgaged it for P115, 000.00 on 23 October 1974. PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as
evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the
other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies affixing her
signature to the mortgage and loan documents.
362 The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal
TABLE real propertyOFwithout
OF CONTENTSTABLE CONTENTSthe
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject
property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not
give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule
that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence
they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by
law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the
mere denial of the alleged signer. PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners’ omission to
present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners’
cause. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who
could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures were really forged.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional
working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete confirmed
that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was
also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money." Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
Siochi v. Gozon
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
FACTS:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this
case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property
regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a
notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still
pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money
and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the
guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter,
Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of
Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of
Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of
lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her
father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT
was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in
Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove
notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell
between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-
Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void
because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½
undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the
Cavite RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?

RULING:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void.
Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The
agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court
however said that the CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in
favour of Winifred. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer
which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the
property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly
indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal
property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal
separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides
that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The
Court said, “Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus,
as regards this point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no.
Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.
SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR.
G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010
FACTS:
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January
1991. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property
and showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner‘s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots;
(b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed
by Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners
delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in
their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner‘s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming
that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them
that the owner‘s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner‘s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on
April 15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses
praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and
the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners,
Aggabao spouses and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific
performance with damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the
petitioners.
ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
RULING:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the
Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of
the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract.
FUENTES vs. ROCA
G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010
FACTS:
Tarciano Roca offered to sell a titled lot he brought from his mother under a deed of
absolute sale to the petitioners Fuentes spouses. Atty. Plagata prepared the documents and
requirements to complete the sale which expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.
Among the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses was to secure the consent
of his wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca, to the sale. Accordingly, Atty. Plagata was able to get the
signature of Rosario in Manila however notarized the document in Zamboanga. The deed of sale
was executed January 11, 1989 with the spouses Fuentes having possession over the lot.
Subsequently, Tarciano and Rosario died.
In 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case of annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the land on the ground that the sale was void since Rosarios’ signature was a
mere forgery thus, there was no actual consent from the latter.
The spouses Fuentes claimed that the action has already prescribed since an action to
annul a sale on the ground of fraud is four years from discovery and that only Rosario can
invoke the claim of forgery since it was personal only to her.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses. On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the
RTC stating that the property relation of Tarciano and Rosario is governed by the Civil Code
which provided that sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is
voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years from the transaction. However, also
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the spouses Fuentes who are builders in good faith are
entitled to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed.
RULING:
No, however the Supreme Court stated that the law that applies to this case is the Family
Code, not the Civil Code because the property was only sold on January 11, 1989, a few months
after the Family Code took effect. Further, the Article 105 of the Code also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Consequently, when
365 Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January
TABLE OF 11, 1989, the lawOF
CONTENTSTABLE that governed
CONTENTS
the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
The Court further held that Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property.
Hence, when the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without Rosario’s
written consent; the passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
DADIS vs. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 206008 June 7, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Delfin Domingo Dadis (Delfin) filed a Complaint for reconveyance against
respondents alleging that he and his deceased wife, Corazon Pajarillaga Dadis (Corazon), were
the registered owners of a parcel of land that on December 11, 1996, their daughter, Marissa P.
Dadis (Marissa) mortgaged in favor of the spouses Magtanggol to secure a loan obligation; that
the spouses De Guzman made it appear that Marissa was authorized by the Spouses Dadis by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA); and that the SPA was a forged document because he
was in the United States of America (USA) at the time.
The spouses De Guzman countered all the allegations and stated that an action to annul
the SPA executed in 1996 already prescribed.
The RTC ruled in favour of petitioner but the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to annul the executed Special Power of Attorney already
prescribed.
RULING:
No, the Court, citing the their ruling in Spouses Ravina v. Villa Abrille hold that the
governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted is Article 124 of the Family Code
which is explicit. The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. And just like the
rule in absolute community of property, if the husband [or wife], without knowledge and
consent of the wife [or husband], sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with
the knowledge but without the approval of the wife [or husband], thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife [or husband] who is given five
(5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband [or wife] to
institute the case.
Ko v. Aramburo
G.R. No. 190995, August 9, 2017
FACTS:
On November 26, 1993, Virginia, together with her co-respondents herein, filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with Declaration of Nullity and/or Alternatively
Reconveyance and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against Corazon. Subject of this case
are seven parcels of land located in Tabaco City, Albay The complaint alleged that Virginia and
366 her husband Simeon (Spouses Simeon and Virginia), together
TABLE OFwith Corazon andOFher
CONTENTSTABLE husband
CONTENTS
Felix (Spouses Felix and Corazon), acquired the subject properties from Spouses Eusebio and
Epifania Casaul (Spouses Eusebio and Epifania) through a Deed of Cession dated April 10, 1970
On April 13, 1970, Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix and Corazon executed
a Deed of Cession in favor of Augusto's heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-indiviso
portion of the subject properties. However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents,
Corazon was able to have the entire subject properties transferred exclusively to her name,
depriving her co-owners Virginia and Augusto's heirs of their pro-indiviso share, as well as in
the produce of the same
For her part, Corazon admitted having acquired the subject properties through cession
from their uncle and auntie, Spouses Eusebio and Epifania. She, however, intimated that
although the said properties were previously registered under Spouses Eusebio and Epifania's
name, the same were, in truth, owned by their parents, Spouses Juan and Juliana Aramburo
(Spouses Juan and Juliana). Hence, when her parents died, Spouses Eusebio and Epifania
allegedly merely returned the said properties to Spouses Juan and Juliana by ceding the same to
their children, Corazon and Simeon. She further averred that the said properties were ceded
only to her and Simeon, in that, her husband Felix's name and Virginia's name appearing in the
Deed were merely descriptive of her and Simeon's civil status, being married to Felix and
Virginia, respectively.
Corazon alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing a third of the subject properties
with the heirs of their brother Augusto who predeceased them, hence they executed a Deed of
Cession on April 13, 1970 but later on decided to recall and not implement the same. In fine,
thus, Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon share one-half portion each of the subject
properties. She further alleged that on December 14, 1974, Simeon sold and conveyed his entire
one-half share in the co-owned properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole owner
thereof and consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the same to her name. Corazon
argued that the subject properties belong to Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's
conformity to such sale was not necessary.
The CA also correctly observed that the forgery, as found by the RTC, is evident from the
admitted fact of strained marital relationship between Simeon and Virginia and the fact that at
the time the question Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, Simeon had been living with Corazon
in Tabaco City, Albay, while Virginia and her children were living in Paco, Manila
Accordingly, without Virginia's conformity, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
December 14, 1974 between Simeon and Corazon purportedly covering one-half of the subject
properties is voidable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly sustain the RTC decision, declaring the parties as co-
owners of the subject properties?
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious. At the outset, let it be stated that the law which
governs the instant case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family Code, as the circumstances of this
case all occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Proceeding, thus,
to the issue of ownership, the Court find no reason to depart from the RTC's ruling as affirmed
by the CA.
The courts a quo found that the said deed, ceding a third of the subject properties to
Augusto's heirs, was in fact implemented as evidenced by Corazon's testimony that she was
merely administering the said properties for Augusto's heirs as her nephews and nieces were
Article 160 of the Old Civil Code, which is the applicable provision since the property was
acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code as stated above, provides that "all property
367 of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE proved that it
CONTENTS
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
Thus, in this case, the subject properties, having been acquired during the marriage, are
still presumed to belong to Simeon and Virginia's conjugal properties. Unfortunately, Corazon,
or the petitioners for that matter, failed to adduce ample evidence that would convince this
Court of the exclusive character of the properties.
Simeon could not have validly sold the one-third share of Augusto's heirs, as well as the
one-third portion of his and Virginia's conjugal share without the latter's consent, to Corazon
As for the one-third portion of the subject properties pertaining to Augusto's heirs, We
are one with the CA in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void as the said portion is owned
by Augusto's heirs as above-discussed and thus, Simeon had no right to sell the same. It is basic
that the object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller
Nemo dat quod non habet, as an ancient Latin maxim says. One cannot give what one
does not have
However, as to the one-third portion commonly-owned by Spouses Simeon and Virginia,
Simeon's alienation of the same through sale without Virginia's conformity is merely voidable.
Alejo v. Cortez
G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017
FACTS:
The parcel of land in dispute is in Pulilan, Bulacan. The property belonged to the
absolute community of property of the respondent Spouses Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo
(Spouses Leonardo) and upon which their residential house was built. Sometime in March 1996,
Jorge's father, Ricardo, approached his sister, herein petitioner Dolores Alejo... negotiate the
sale of the subject property.
Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale of the property for a purchase
price of PhP500,000. Under the Kasunduan, Dolores was to pay PhP70,000 as down payment,
while PhP230,000 is to be paid on April 30, 1996 and the remaining balance of PhP200,000
was to be paid before the end of the year 1996. The Kasunduan was signed by Jacinta and
Ricardo as witness. Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement.
However, on July 3, 1996, Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying knowledge and
consent to the Kasunduan. Jorge further informed Dolores that Jacinta was retracting her
consent to the Kasunduan due to Dolores' failure to comply with her obligations.
As a result, Jorge went to her house, destroyed its water pump and disconnected the
electricity. Before the officials of the Barangay, Dolores tendered the balance of PhP200,000 but
Jorge refused to accept the same. Instead, Jorge filed cases for ejectment and annulment of sale,
reconveyance and recovery of possession against her. These cases were later on dismissed by the
trial court on technical grounds.
During the pendency of said cases, the subject property was sold by Jorge and Jacinta to
respondents Spouses Ernesto Cortez and Priscilla San Pedro (Spouses Cortez) under a Deed of
Absolute Sale... new transfer certificate of title was issued in the latter's names.
368 At the time of said sale, Dolores was in possessionTABLE
of theOF CONTENTSTABLE
subject property. OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Kasunduan is a perfected and binding contract as it was accepted by
Jorge through his overt acts.
RULING:
Sale by one Spouse of Conjugal Real Property is Void without the Written Consent of the
other Spouse
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void.
The disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the written consent of the other
is void. Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and
signed by her alone. By plain terms of the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.
CARLOS V. TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 234533, June 27, 2018
FACTS:
On February 23, 2012, the respondent, Juan C. Tolentino filed a complaint for
annulment of title with damages against his wife, Mercedes Tolentino, his grandson, Kristoff M.
Tolentino, petitioners Spouses Julieta B. Carlos and Fernando P. Carlos, and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. Without Juan's knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff, allegedly
forged a Deed of Donation making it appear that Juan and Mercedes donated the parcel of land
with an area of 1,000 square meters to Kristoff.
In April 2011, Kristoff offered the sale of the subject property to Julieta's brother, Felix
Bacal. Kristoff and Felix then arranged for the ocular inspection of the subject property.
Thereafter, Kristoff surrendered to Felix copies of the title and tax declaration covering the said
property. After a series of negotiations, Kristoff and Julieta executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) dated April 12, 2011 stating that Kristoff is selling the subject property to
Julieta in the amount of Two Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos. Upon learning of the
foregoing events, Juan executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and he also filed a criminal
complaint for Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City against Kristoff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was the previous registered owner of the land in dispute,
thereby acting on oblivion to the fact that the real property is essentially conjugal in nature.
RULING:
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property
369 regime, the presumption is that their property relationsTABLE
is governed by the regime
OF CONTENTSTABLE of conjugal
OF CONTENTS
partnership of gains. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the absolute owners of their
undivided one-half interest, respectively, over the parcel of land. When Mercedes died, the
conjugal partnership had already been terminated. It is apparent that during her lifetime, she
relinquished all her rights thereon in favor of her grandson, Kristoff. Accordingly, the right of
Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the one half undivided portion that Mercedes owned. The
Deed of Donation insofar as it covered the remaining one-half undivided portion of the subject
property is null and void, Juan not having consented to the donation of his undivided half. Upon
the foregoing perspective, Spouses Carlos' right, as vendees in the subsequent sale of the parcel
of land, is confined only to the one-half undivided portion thereof. The other undivided half still
belongs to Juan.
Lastly, as a matter of fairness and in line with the principle that no person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Kristoff should be liable to reimburse Spouses
Carlos of the amount corresponding to one-half of the purchase price of the subject property.
Dissolution, Art. 126, FC
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744, February 29, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the u
nion, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an
apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of m
arriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the Famil
y Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and liquidation
of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren‘t able to liquidate their conj
ugal partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation.
Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan fro
m petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their pr
operties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor
of Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally incl
ude the lot in question (bought from Sering).
When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated forecl
osure proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM‘s. Nicholso
n filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that t
he property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer: All
eged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted
having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to file a
n answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and Metrobank is mortgag
ee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision. Petitioner then ap
pealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolv
ed the regime of community of property of the spouses.
b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid.
RULING:
No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically re
sult in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conj
370 ugal assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson andCONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF Florencia severed their marit
OF CONTENTS
al bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before s
uch declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and pa
rtition of the partnership.
No. Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and ben
efits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the a
lienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which m
ay be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Florencia has the
right to mortgage or even sell her 1⁄2 undivided interests in the disputed party even without the c
onsent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2
undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covere
d the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consente
d to the mortgage of his undivided half.
DOMINGO v. MOLINA
GR No. 200274, April 20, 2016
FACTS:
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camilin
g, Tarlac, The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering th
e subject property. Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina. In 1986, Anastacio died. In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967 and transferred the entire one-half undivid
ed portion of the land to the spouses Molina.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Co
mplaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave t
he subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio bor
rowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’
s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died
during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio Molina.
The RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio
did not sell the property to the spouses Molina. the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s con
sent is valid and legal
RULING:
371 In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we CONTENTSTABLE

TABLE OF held that the properties of a di
OF CONTENTS
ssolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse,
however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not co
nsist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal par
tnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anas
tacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partitio
n; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as
his share, but this is an undivided interest.
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal pr
operties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. N
onetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subj
ect property.
Uy v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017
FACTS:
Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay (Vipa) is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Lopez Jaena Street, faro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her husband, Levi Lahaylahay (Levi), have two
children. At some time, A contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy (Rafael)
over the subject property and the improvements to which Rafael bound himself to pay Vipa, as
consideration ·for the lease of the property, the amount of P'.3,000.00 per month, with a
provision for a 10% increase every year thereafter. On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will
or testament whatsoever. Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, the estate of
Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC against Rafael.
The MTCC rendered a decision ordering Rafael to vacate the premises and to pay the amount of
unpaid rents with 12% interest per annum. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC and
dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer. According to the RTC, Grace was the plaintiff not
the estate and it had failed to bring the dispute to the barangay conciliation; that the property is
part of conjugal property and after Vipa’s death the conjugal partnership was terminated. Levi
sold his property to Rafael, thus making him co-owner of the property. Estate filed a petition for
review to CA and reinstated the decision of MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s decision?

RULING:
The petition is partly granted.

Complainants by and against corporations, partnerships, or other juridical entities may
not filed with, received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa, which
is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, separate and distinct from
that of Grace Joy. Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay conciliation
prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC.
On the issue of ownership of Rafael, Levi had the right to freely dispose of his undivided
interest. Thus the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not
necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer
Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. Accordingly, Rafael could no-longer be directed to
vacate the subject property since he is already a co-owner thereof. Nevertheless, Rafael is still
bound to pay unpaid rentals from 1998 to 2003.
Liquidation, Art. 129-133, FC
QUIAO v. QUIAO
G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the
petitioner Brigido Quiao before the RTC. The court declared the legal separation, custody of
children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and real properties, and forfeiture on the part of
Brigido on the net profits earned from the conjugal properties in favor of the common children.
Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration and appealed within the required period for
legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution and was later on granted.
Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the ―net profit earned. The Court defined it as
the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of
the] spouse and the debts. The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and the RTC issued an Order on November 8, 2006 holding that although the
petition was after the required prescriptive period, the court granted the petition since its
purpose was to clarify the meaning of the ―net profit earned. The respondent, Rita, then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) praying for the reversal of the November 8, 2006 court order.
The trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the MR of respondent. Brigido filed a
Petition for Review questioning the dissolution and liquidation of the common properties being
governed by Article 129 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dissolution and the consequent liquidation of the common properties
of the husband and wife by virtue of the decree of legal separation is governed by Article 129 of
the Family Code?
RULING:
YES. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties’ property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry. The husband and the wife also own
in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. Another point is that since the
time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other law.

Complete/Absolute separation of property:
Liabilities/Charges
YAO v. PERELLO
G.R. No. 153828, October 24, 2003
FACTS:
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
which included Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy
sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and the property
was scheduled for public auction. Private respondent, Bernadine Villarin, filed a petition for
prohibition alleging that the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate
liability of her husband as the property regime between her and her husband was complete
separation of property, and that she was not a party in the HLURB case. The trial court granted
the petition and exempted the subject property from execution. Hence, the scheduled auction
sale did not materialize. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for intervention, but the same
was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the
subject property exempt from execution and therefore cannot be sold to satisfy the obligation of
private respondent’s husband?
NO. The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the subject
property exempt from execution. Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code governs the regime of
complete separation of property which provides:
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own
separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all
earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or
civil, due or received during his marriage from his or her separate property.
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in
case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.
The liability of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary.
It is clear from the foregoing that the only time the separate properties of the spouses
can be made to answer for liabilities to creditors is when those liabilities are incurred for family
expenses. This has not been shown in the case at bar. Accordingly, private respondent acted well
within her rights in filing a petition for prohibition against the deputy sheriff because the latter
went beyond his authority in attaching the subject property.
Property regime of unions without marriage:

Void or Live-in relationships, Art. 147, FC
OCAMPO v. OCAMPO
GR No. 198908, August 3, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her
Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity. The decision became final, since no party
appealed the judgment annulling the marriage. On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the
parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so,
a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree
on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the
assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a
50-50 sharing. Virginia appealed but was later denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains on the ground of psychological incapacity?
RULING:
NO. The presumption is that if the properties are acquired during the marriage then they
are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. The
court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
It is clear that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated
to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The
375 term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provisionTABLE
pertains to the legal capacity
OF CONTENTSTABLE of a party
OF CONTENTS
to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part
of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. From the foregoing, the property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held
that the parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the
properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
BARRIDO v. NONATO
GR No. 176492, October 20, 2014
FACTS:
Leonardo and Marrietta’s marriage was dissolved by reason of psychological incapacity

in 1996, hence Leanardo filed a complaint for partition over their co-ownership. In her defense,
Marrietta claimed that the property had been sold to their children Joseph Raymod and Joseph
Leo. She also moved for the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MTCC Bacolod City, the action for partition being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Per decision of the MTCC, it ruled in favor of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being
the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. It also awarded
moral damages in favor of her. Leonardo appelad the ruling to the RTC, which reversed the
MTCC ruling and ordered the partition of the property, hence Marrietta appealed the RTC
decision to the CA by petition for review. The appellate court denied Marrietta’s appeal and held
that the RTC correctly ordered the partition of the property. Marrietta elevated her case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that Article 129 of the Family Code
has no application in the present case, on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction
over the case?
RULING:
NO. The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
376 psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family TABLE
Code.OF
During their marriage,
CONTENTSTABLE however,
OF CONTENTS
the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129
provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147
specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the
names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and
cannot be converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact,
she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property
remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance
with the rules on co-ownership.
DIÑO v. DIÑO
G.R. No. 17804, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have been childhood friends
and sweethearts. They lived together for ten years then separated. After two years, they reunited
and later on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad. The
RTC declared the marriage to be null and void however, it held that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. For
this to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be
377 capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusivelyTABLE
with OF
each other as husband
CONTENTSTABLE and wife;
OF CONTENTS
and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. All these
elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad.
The Court agrees with Alain that the ruling of the trial court has no basis because it is
clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Article 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Famiy Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
MAXEY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984
FACTS:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united
in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne
and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired
the parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919
sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26,
1962, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of
sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from
the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide ―When a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Thus, the
property in question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by
Maxey alone was invalid.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne
Maxey thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the
378 land. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
YES. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by
applying Article 144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when
the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of
the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are
concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina
Morales to a share under the applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by
Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.
Wherefore, the private respondents are ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs
of Regina Morales.
CARIÑO v. CARIÑO
GR No. 132529, February 2, 2001
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he
had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146, 000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21, 000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993,
Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the P146, 000 she had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the
funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted
that Cariño‘s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required
marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from
government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage?
RULING:
No. It does not follow that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab
initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions without
Marriage.
VALDES v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in ―unions without marriage‖. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership?

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party‘s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.
BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision,
declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation
ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as
the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner
appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent‘s motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack
of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied,
380 hence this petition. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage?

RULING:
YES. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to
have been included or involved in said distribution.
GONZALES vs. GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521, March 7, 1933
FACTS:
Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living as

husband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this
union, four (4) children were born. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondent. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that he exclusively owns the properties.
However, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties should be divided equally between the parties?
RULING:
YES. Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the Appellate Courts Decision
declaring his marriage with respondent void. Consequently, their property relation shall be
governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code. These provisions enumerate the
two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a
man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-
381 ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union,
TABLE in the absence OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE of proof to the
CONTENTS
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be
owned by them in equal shares. Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired
during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or
industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza
business, petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and it appeared
that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be his partner in his
pizza business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing the business in
1976. Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage the
personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets. She reported for
work every day, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance. That
she helped him in managing the business.
MERCADO-FEHR v. FEHR
G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003
FACTS:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebu and moved in
with Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in December the same year. They purchased a
condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGC condominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983.
They got married in March 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and
Bruno, void ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of their conjugal
partnership. The court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was
purchased on installment also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno‘s exclusive property?

RULING:
NO. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were
capacitated to marry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidence shows that the
property was acquired during their cohabitation and in applying Article 147 of the Family Code,
the rules on co-ownership should govern. Suite 204 must be considered as common property of
Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties does not apply also. Property regime should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.

SALAS v. AGUILA
GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013
FACTS:
On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married.
Aguila gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child. On October 7, 2003,
Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties
whatsoever”. On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of
their conjugal property, if any. On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion
stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by
proper instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and
Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them?
RULING:
YES. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the
383 validity of their marriage. The phrase “married to” in the titleOF
TABLE is CONTENTSTABLE
merely descriptive of the civil
OF CONTENTS
status of the registered owner, Salas. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property
regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership. Thus, the
Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.
DIAZ-SALGADO AND SALGADO v. ANSON
G.R. No. 20449, July 27, 2016
FACTS:
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado
(Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya
(Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral
Deeds of Sale dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the
Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis
-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. According to Luis,
because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that the
marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered
another Decision which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and
DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT” the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
the Deceased Severina De Asis. The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by
virtue of the said Deeds.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado
did not present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the
evidence presented by Luis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which
declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal
properties?
HELD:
NO. As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the
beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code in relation to Article
147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership.
Property regime of unions without marriage: Bigamous, adulterous, etc. Relationships
Bigamous, adulterous, etc. Relationships, Art. 148, FC
CARIÑO v. CARIÑO
GR No. 132529, February 2, 2001
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he
had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146, 000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21, 000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993,
Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the P146, 000 she had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the
funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted
that Cariño‘s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required
marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from
government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage?
RULING:
No. It does not follow that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab
initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions without
Marriage.
TUMLOS v. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to
occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of
any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay
P1,600.00 a month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which
agreement was not complied with by the said defendants.
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since
she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated
that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.
Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until
she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez?
RULING:
NO. In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that
―In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to
be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the
property. Article 148 did not include the administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.
FRANCISCO v. MASTER IRON WORKS
G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984,
Josefina purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of
title in the name of ―Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco‖. On January
13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo
affixed his marital conformity to the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of
execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel
of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had
no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a
petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when
they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the
marriage between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot
be held liable for the Eduardo‘s personal obligations?
RULING:
NO. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held
to answer the liabilities of Eduardo.
Even though Eduardo and Josefina‘s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be
held conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had
enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her
mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.
JOAQUINO v. REYES ET. AL
G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
FACTS:
Before Rodolfo died, he was he was employed at Warner and Barnes Company wherein
he received a sizeable amount of income and retirement benefits. Lourdes was his widow yet he
was also cohabiting with Milagros. A Deed of Sale of Property, a house and lot, was executed in
favor of Milagros where respondent alleges that the funds used to purchase the said property
came from the conjugal funds and earnings of her late husband.
Petitioner contends that she has also contributed in the purchase of the property using
her own funds as it was only for convenience that Rodolfo has facilitated the same through
mortgage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed property belongs to the conjugal ownership of Lourdes and
Rodolfo or it is exclusively owned by Milagros, or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
RULING:
The Court ruled that because the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo
and Lourdes, it is therefore conjugal. The loans obtained were used to pay for the property, and
the same were paid from his salaries and earnings which are, under the Civil Code, conjugal
funds. Petitioner’s argument that she has contributed in the purchase of the property lacks proof
that she was gainfully employed and be financially capacitated on her own.
Moreover, the registration of the property in petitioner’s name is an act of donation by
388 Rodolfo but Article 87 of the Family Code also prohibits TABLEdonations between persons
OF CONTENTSTABLE living
OF CONTENTS
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage hence, the property is conjugal even if
acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Under Article 1456, a constructive trust is created because the registration of the
property was under petitioner’s name that she cannot be because it is a deprivation of right
ownership of the legal spouse and heirs. Milagros is deemed to hold the property in trust for
them.
SAGUID v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Gina S. Rey was previously married when she met petitioner. They cohabited and built a
house on a lot owned by the latter’s father. Jacinto was a patron of their fishing vessel while
Gina worked as a fish dealer and later decided to work in Japan as an entertainer. Soon they
decided to end their relationship. Gina filed for Partition of Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership because she claimed that because of her work as an entertainer, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of the house. Furthermore, she also said that she has
acquired personal properties such as appliances and household effects from her earnings as a
fish dealer with a value of P111, 375.00; she prayed for reimbursement of these amounts.
Petitioner argued that the expenses for the construction of their house were solely borne
through his income and that Gina did not work continuously in Japan but only for six months
each year. He alleged that she did not contribute in the expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is correct in claiming for partitions over the contributions
she claimed to have made in the building of their house and in the total amount of the said
personal properties?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that according to Article 148 of the Family Code, wherein
it states that properties acquired by both parties through actual joint contribution of property,
389 shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
TABLE contributions.
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFHowever,
CONTENTSin
the case at bar, Gina failed to prove how much was the exact amount she has contributed hence,
it shall be presumed to be equal. The disputed properties aggregates to P111, 375.00 and which
half is equivalent to P55, 687.50. Private respondent’s extent of ownership of the house only
amounts to P11,413.00 based on the receipts she presented as evidence. She is the declared as
co-owner of the house and Jacinto is ordered to reimburse the former in the amount of P11,413
and P55,687.50 totaling to P67,100.50. Furthermore, the house is subject to public auction.
JUANIZA v. JOSE
G.R. No. L-50127-28, March 30, 1979
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose is married to Socorro Ramos and is cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo.
Eugenio, also the registered owner of a passenger jeepney, was involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways. The accident caused the death
of seven persons and physical injuries of five of the passengers.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered a decision stating that Eugenio and
Rosalia to jointly and severally pay Victor Juaniza the sum of P1, 600.00 plus legal interest, and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus. Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario
Anonuevo, and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12, 000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalia Arroyo be deemed as co-owner of the passenger jeepney and
should also be held liable for the damages with Eugenio.
RULING:
NO. The Court said under Article 144 of the Civil Code that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. However, in the case at bar, respondent
is legally married to Socorro hence he and Rosalia are incapacitated to contract marriage.
Rosalia, here also cannot be held liable for damages because she cannot be deemed as co-owner
of the passenger jeepney such belongs to the conjugal property of Eugenio and Socorro.

ADRIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000
FACTS:
Lucio Adriano was previously married to Gliceria Dorado and has soon separated.
Gliceria then died, and five months after her death Lucio contracted a subsequent marriage with
Vicenta Villa. He executed a last will and testament wherein he assigned all his properties to
Vicenta and to all his children in both first and second marriages.
Petitioners argue that the last will and testament be annulled because it disposes the
entire rightful share of Vicenta. They also alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and Vicenta,
the latter had acquired properties and are part of their conjugal partnership.
But the respondents presented evidence which indicated that the purchase money of the
disputed properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership during the
subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria. It was obtained from the conjugal fund of his first
marriage.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena City rendered the decision that the last will and
testament be declared as valid and effective. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision in
toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property covered in the last will and testament constitutes the co-
ownership of Vicenta Villa?
RULING:
391 NO. Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption ofOF

TABLE conjugality because
CONTENTSTABLE OFrespondents
CONTENTS
presented sufficient evidence to support their claim. The disputed properties were purchased by
Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of the first marriage. There was no evidence presented
to support that Vicenta actually contributed to the acquisition of the property in question. The
Court held that the property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the
subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in the name
of the common-law wife. According to Article 1456 of the Civil Code, a constructive trust is
deemed to have been created over the property which lawfully pertains to the conjugal
partnership of the subsisting marriage.
YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Yasuo Iwasawa is a Japanese national and has married Felisa Gangan. After getting
married they went to reside in Japan. On July 2009, respondent confessed to petitioner that her
husband has previously died which the former found out that Felisa was previously married to
one Raymond Arambulo. Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
bigamy.
Petitioner presented to the Court a certificate of marriage between him and respondent,
a certificate of marriage between respondent and Raymond Arambulo, certificate of death of
Raymond, and a certification from the National Statistics Office (NSO) that two marriages of
respondent has been recorded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NSO certification is admissible as evidence and should be accorded
with evidentiary weight?
RULING:
The Court ruled in accordance with Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that,
books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of facts stated therein hence the NSO certification
is a public document and therefore admissible due to their execution and genuineness. The
marriage was a bigamous marriage hence it is declared null and void as provided for under
392 Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR.
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
FACTS:
Benjamin Bangayan Jr. filed for decalaration of nullity of marriage between him and
Sally Go-Bangayan because it was a bigamous one. Benjamin was previously married to Azucena
Alegre and had cohabited with Sally. Petitioner’s father was against the relationship, so to please
her father, she made Benjamin sign a simulated marriage contract.
During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Sally then file for a criminal case
against Benjamin alleging that he falsified a public document and for contracting a bigamous
marriage, using the simulated marriage contract.
On the other hand, Benjamin alleged that their marriage was bigamous because it lacked
formal requisites of a valid marriage and that he should be the owner of the properties acquired
therein.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the properties be solely owned by Benjamin and that Sally is not entitled
to a part of the partition of the properties?
RULING:
YES. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous rather it is void ab
initio. Their marriage was one made in jest or a simulated one, and it lacked a valid marriage
license hence there was no marriage to speak of in the first place.
The property relations of both parties are governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
393 They cohabitated without the benefit of marriage thus only properties
TABLE acquired byOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE them through
CONTENTS
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common proportion to their respective contributions. In the case at bar, Benjamin and his
siblings own the 37 properties being claimed by Sally, which were given by Benjamin’s father to
his children as advance inheritance. The other property which was registered in their names as
“spouses” is solely owned by Benjamin because the words “married to” and “spouses” are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner and do not prove co-ownership. Sally has
no proof either that she had actual contributions to be entitled of co-ownership of the same.
VENTURA vs. SPOUSES ABUDA
G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013
FACTS:
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was
married to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr.
(Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with
Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue
of the death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the
remaining portion was purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978,
Esteban and Evangeline also had small business establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo
(Delpan Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the
properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora,
petitioners mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of
the sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased
by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to
Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her
heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan
properties were not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision,
applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties?
RULING:
According to the Family Code, in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the
subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of.property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership
and equal contribution do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the
assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
The Family: Coverage of Family Relations
The Family
Coverage of Family Relations, Art. 150, FC
GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

229 SCRA 274
FACT:
Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-in-law. Gaudencio filed a case
against Pedro without alleging that earnest efforts were resorted to settle the dispute before the
case was filed. Pedro overlooked such fact and did not file a motion to dismiss, but during the
pre-trial, the judge noticed their relationship, so, he gave five (5) days for Gaudencio to file
amend his complaint. When Gaudencio failed to amend, the judge dismissed the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the absence of an allegation of previous efforts towards
reconciliation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?
RULING:
NO. There is no need. It has been held by the Court in the case of Gayon vs. Gayon that
the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family, does not comprehend
brothers or sisters-in-law. Hence, there is no need to exert efforts towards a compromise before
395 filing the present case in court. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
INING v. VEGA
G.R. No. 14727, August 12, 2013
FACTS:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of
land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was
survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who
are now both deceased. The first sibling, Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion
Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased).
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M.
Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents. Gregoria, on the
other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon
Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case
No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s
heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucimo Sr. is a co-owner of the property?
RULING:
NO. Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;
he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is
merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a
co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
Suit among members of the same family/Necessity of earnest efforts toward
compromise, Art. 151, FC; Art. 2035 of the Civil Code
TAMBUYAT v. TAMBUYAT
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
FACTS:
Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom – Tambuyat were married on

September 16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a
700 sq. m. parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was
bought on November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee. One of
the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis – Tambuyat, who signed therein as
“Rosario Tambuyat”. All this time petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco.
When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis. When Adriano died intestate, Wenifreda filed a
Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she was the surviving spouse of
Adriano. That the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name of “Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.” That per annexed marriage contract, Banguis was
still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be cancelled. That a new certificate of
title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be
ordered to surrender her a copy of the TCT.
Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988, and
thereafter lived together as married couple; that their union produced a son; and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
397 proceeding – considering that a thorough determinationTABLE
will have to be made as to
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFwhether
CONTENTSthe
property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court?
RULING:
YES. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to
the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano
and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a
common law relationship at all. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and
wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the
fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” it
contemplates a lawfully wedded spouse.
The Family: Suit among members of the same family/Necessity of earnest efforts toward
a compromise
HIYAS v. ACUNA
500 SCRA 514
FACTS:
Alberto filed a case against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, and
three more defendants. Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to
comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members
of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. can invoke Article 151 of the Family
Code?
RULING:
NO. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code.
The Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is
398 applicable only in cases which are exclusively between orTABLE
amongOFmembers
of the same family, it
necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same
family, as provided for by Article 150 of the Family Code. Hence, once a stranger becomes a
party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition
precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS v. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON
[G.R. No 125465, June 29, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private

respondents Hontiveros and Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. They alleged
that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz which was withheld from them in bad faith
by private respondent Hontiveros and thus deprived of income from the land as a result of the
filing of a land registration case against them.
In their Reply, private respondents alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora
was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land.
On the contrary, private respondents alleged that the possession of the property in question had
already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion as the complaint was not verified as provided in
Article 151.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that the absence of the verification required in Art. 151 do
not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. Otherwise, mere
suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest
efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties efforts proved unsuccessful is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really
been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Moreover, the Court ruled
that Article 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively
among family members. Citing several cases decided by this Court, petitioners claim that
whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the requisite showing of
earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity have no legal effect. Consequently,
private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Article
151.
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, et al v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al
[G.R. NO. 129242, January 16, 2001]
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo died intestate on February 1992 and was survived by his wife, Manalo
and his 11 children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and Tarlac and a
399 business with several offices. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
In November 1992, herein private respondent respondents, eight (8) of the surviving
children of the late Manalo, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo
Manalo as administrator thereof. Subsequently, several pleadings were filed by petitioners
which led to the filing of an Omnibus Motion.
The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal via a petition for certiorari, the Court of
Appeals likewise dismissed the petition and its Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned
orders of the respondent trial court.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room
for doubt as regard the intention of the herein private respondents to seek judicial settlement of
the estate of their deceased father.
Article 222 of the civil code is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. Additionally, the
Court provided an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission which reveals the intention
of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, to wit: x x x It is necessary that
every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness
than stranger.
The Court also emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued for
any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. Private respondents herein
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized
as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate
in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate court.
NICANOR T. SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO T. SANTOS-
GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO
[G.R. No. 134787, November 15, 2005]
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are

brother and sister. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a
"Basic Agreement of Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, Guerrero filed a suit with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for
recovery of inheritance.
The judge thereat ruled in favour of the spouses Guerrero. However, after six years,
spouses Guerrero again filed a complaint for the revival of said Decision. Petitioner averred that
the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards an amicable
settlement have been made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court has no application.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the provision making honest efforts towards a
settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the
same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same
family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code.
Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. But
a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence
effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.
The civil case, being merely an action for revival of judgment of a dormant decision
rendered in an original action, can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222 of the
Code. The Court agreed with the appellate court that Article 222 is inapplicable since:
xxx The rule should have been invoked by [petitioner] in the original action where the
actual controversy is still at issue and not in the present case where the actual controversy
between the parties had already been decided by the Court and what remains to be done is the
enforcement of the decision.
Prohibited Compromise, Art.. 2034-2035 of the Civil Code
CECILIO MENDOZA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUISA DE LA

ROSA MENDOZA
[G.R. No. L-23102, April 24, 1967]
FACTS:
Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza instituted a complaint against petitioner. Private respondent

averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza and has lived together as husband and wife
until petitioner departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession.
However since then, Mendoza has failed and refused to provide for the maintenance and
support of private respondent, who is alleged to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of
revenue, while petitioner is already employed in a hospital in the United States.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint contained no
allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit,
invoking the provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals committed error in
refusing to dismiss the complaint.
RULING:
No, the Court ruled that the same involved a claim for future support that under Article
2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is,
therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner
relies.
Although the Court agree with the argument of petitioner that Article 222 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the same family (in this
case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when the suit
401 is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint.
TABLE OFThe same however
CONTENTSTABLE OF have failed,
CONTENTS
subject to the limitations in article 2035.
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) x x x;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) x x x;
(4) Future support.
Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to
compromise them would be superfluous. The possibility of compromise on the latter does not
negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future support, to which Article 222 cannot
apply.
Family Home, Art. 152-162, FC
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON HER OWN BEHALF et al.

[G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018]
FACTS:
On February 28, 1990, private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of
Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Felisa).
The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno,
Pangasinan (subject property).
However, during the trial of the case, Romualdo died.
Consequently, a Motion for Substitution was filed by the decedent's wife, Felisa, and
their children. The RTC then rendered a Decision, declaring the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute
owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate
the lands and to surrender possession thereof.
Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas), daughter of Romualdo, sought the nullification
of the RTC Decision claiming that she was deprived of due process when she was not impleaded
in the case for Recovery of Ownership, before the RTC.
The Court of Appeals refused to give credence to the contention of petitioner. The CA
further ratiocinated that since the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the original
defendants Romualdo and Felisa, the outcome of the case is binding on all their heirs or any
such persons claiming rights under them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the execution of the Decision
dated March 16, 2004
RULING:
No, the Court note that although the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which
it is situated and that it cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases, the
residence in the family home must however be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the
occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be
actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.
It bears emphasis that it is imperative that petitioner’s claim must be backed with
evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home, (ii)
constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in
402 by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries),TABLE
(iv) forms part of the properties
OF CONTENTSTABLE of the
OF CONTENTS
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse
with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual
value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.
Felicitas admitted that she is, and has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija. Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz,
Nueva Ecija.
Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC in the
case for recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera
since the 1950s. This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her family home.
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ET AL. v. DANILO PANGILINAN, ET AL.
[G.R. No 185920, July 20, 2010]
FACTS:
In 2003, herein respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric Inc., a company owned by Ernesto Ramos, the father of herein petitioners. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay respondents
aggregate amount representing back wages, separation pay and other incentive pay.
The Decision, being final and executor, the Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC levied a property
in Ramos’ name in Pandacan, Manila.
Alleging that Pandacan property is a family home, Ramos moved to quash the writ of
execution. However, respondents averred that the Pandacan Property is in fact served as the
company’s business address as borne by the company’s letterhead. Consequently, the Labor
Arbiter denied the motion to quash.
Ramos appealed to the Court of Appeals but during the case’s pendency, Ramos died and
was substituted by herein petitioners. The latter filed opposition to the case which the Labor
Arbiter denied and was affirmed by the NLRC.
Petitioners invoked that Pandacan property was constituted as family home in 1944;
Article 153 of the Family Code is applicable. However, the appellate court decided that the
property in question is not exempted from execution because Article 153 of the Family Code has
no retroactive effect to family homes deemed to have been constituted prior to the its
enactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the propriety of the Court of Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon
the Pandacan property was valid.
RULING:
Yes, the Court held that if the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided
under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home
requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order
with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial
constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a
public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply
with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of
the privilege.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by
403 the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan
TABLE property was
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFjudicially
CONTENTSor
extra-judicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle cannot be
availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means
to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accounts were already closed while
other properties in his or the companys name had already been transferred, and the only
property left was the Pandacan property.
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA v. JOHN NABOR C.
ARRIOLA
[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
FACTS:
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed a Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial

Court of Las Pinas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola
(petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. The court rendered
a Decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and
among his heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal shares of one-third each without prejudice to
the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
Respondent proposed to sell the land through public auction since they cannot come to
an agreement. Spouses Arriola initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prayed that
he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built on
it. The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the
subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied the said motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject
land
RULING:
No, respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together,
these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code.
An innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family
home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need for the judicial or
extrajudicial. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home
not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it
stands. Thus, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the
moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home cannot be partitioned at this time, even
if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died
on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted
cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set
aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate
public auction of the portion of the subject land, which falls outside the specific area of the
family home.
JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, et al.
[G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990]
FACTS:
Because of a final judgment issued by the Court of Appeals, the sheriff levied on a parcel
of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1998, a parcel of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur; both registered under
the name Jose Modequillo.
A Motion to Quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where
the family home is built since 1969 and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and
that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those
enumerated. The trial court denied the motion and subsequently the motion for reconsideration
thereof was also denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

RULING:
No, The Court observed that in the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4,
1987 (1988 being a leap year).
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the
time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
ALBINO JOSEF v. OTELIO SANTOS
[G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008]
FACTS:
Albino was found liable by the trial court to pay to Otelio the sum of 404,836.50
representing the shoe materials he bought on credit. The judgment of the lower court was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, it
was dismissed and thus became final and executor.
405 Respondent moved for the issuance of writ of TABLE execution and to satisfy OF
judgment
award which was affirmed by the trial court. Albino’s house and lot was then attached, auctioned
and issued to Otelio as the highest bidder.
Albino questioned the levy and sale of his properties; claiming that the personal
properties belong to his children and that the real property as his family home thus exempt from
execution.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment or judicial order is legal for the attachment and sale on public
auction of the family home to satisfy the judgment award.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that the above Order did not resolve nor take into account
petitioners allegations in his Opposition, which are material and relevant in the resolution of the
motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes
petitioners family home, the trial court should have observed the proper procedures.
The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction.
Being void, the July 16, 2003 Order could not have conferred any right to
respondent. Any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. the respondent should observe
the procedure prescribed in Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an order for the
sale on execution of the petitioners family home, if so, and apply the proceeds less the maximum
amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Code which should remain with the petitioner
for the rebuilding of his family home to his judgment credit. Instead, both the trial court and
respondent completely ignored petitioner’s argument that the properties subject of the writ are
exempt from execution.
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY v. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
[G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on

consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to
pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial
Court. The tried ruled in favour of the latter and issued a writ of execution. A parcel of land in
Naga was issued to PPI as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A.
Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground
that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioner’s
motion was denied for failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of
the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action
and was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
RULING:
Yes, in consonance with the Courts’ ruling in Gomez v. Sta. Ines where the Court held
that:
[The husband and children] were not parties to the Pasig RTC case and are third-party
claimants who became such only after trial in the previous case had been terminated and the
judgment therein had become final and executory. Neither were they indispensable nor
necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case, and they could not therefore intervene in said case. As
strangers to the original case, respondents cannot be compelled to present their claim with the
Pasig RTC which issued the writ of execution. xxx
The husband and children of the judgment debtor filed a complaint for annulment of
sale of the levied property in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where the alleged family home was
situated. As they were considered strangers to the action filed in the Pasig RTC, we ruled that
the Nueva Vizcaya RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint and that they could vindicate their
alleged claim to the levied property there.
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ et al. v. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA.
INES and HINAHON STA. INES
[G.R. No. 132537, October 14, 2005]
FACTS:
On 17 June 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez (Mary Josephine) and Eugenia Socorro C.
Gomez-Salcedo (Socorro) filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines (Marietta) alleging that they are the children of the
deceased Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez who, during her lifetime, entrusted her rice land located
at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to Marietta, together with the Transfer Certificate of Title
covering said land, for the latter to manage and supervise. Mary Josephine and Socorro further
alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice land while under
the management of Marietta, and for the return of the TCT to the property, but the latter
refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a civil case before the Pasig RTC.
During the pre-trial conference of the case, both Marietta and her counsel failed to
appear, thus, by motion of counsel for Mary Josephine and Socorro, the trial court declared
Marietta in default. The trial court then rendered judgment against Marietta. After said
judgment became final and executory, a parcel of land with improvements located in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, was levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Vizcaya, to
satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction to Mary
Josephine as the highest bidder.
A complaint for annulment of said sale was filed before the RTC by Hinahon Sta. Ines
husband of Marietta and their other children against Mary Josephine and the Sheriff on the
ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is
thus exempt from execution under Section 12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property can be sold

RULING:
Yes, in the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted as a family
407 home, whether judicially or extra-judicially, at the time Marietta
TABLE incurred herOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE debts. Under
CONTENTS
prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family
home.
The complaint against Marietta was instituted on 1986 to seek redress for damages
suffered by them due to acts and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she
assumed management and supervision of their deceased mother’s rice land. This means to say
that Marietta’s liability, which was the basis of the judgment, arose long before the levied
property was constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Under the
circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of the
instances when a family home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as
provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to answer for debts incurred prior to
the constitution of the family home.
FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.
[G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997]
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to
a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein so
both agreed to a compromise agreement.
Private respondent then filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted.
Consequently, the corresponding issued writs of execution triggered the attachment of a parcel
of land in Quezon City owned by the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a
family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt
from attachment. The trial court said otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted
under the provisions of the said Code.
RULING:
Yes, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be
followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extra-judicially constituted as a family home, it follows that
the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was
incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner
cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by
the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries
enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly
by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by an
overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case is insufficient compliance with the law.
PABLITO TANEO, JR., et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG
408 [G.R. No. 108532, March TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
9, 1999]
FACTS:
Two (2) of petitioners’ properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis
Oriental, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The
subject properties were sold to the private respondent as the highest bidder. However, the
petitioner failed to redeem the same, so a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.
The petitioner filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title
over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. They further alleged that the
property was acquired through free patent; therefore, it is inalienable and not subject to any
encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. And that the
Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance issued by the Deputy Provincial Sheriff in favour of the private
respondent over the subject property including their family home which was extra-judicially
constituted in accordance with law.
Private respondent refuted the petitioner’s contentions and averred that the subject land
was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941,
as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an
application for free patent which was final only in 1979.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in possession
of the subject property, he has been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore,
prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession has been restored to them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taneo’s family home is exempt from execution.

RULING:
No, the Court also observed that even before the application for homestead had been
approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land. The Deed of conveyance issued on
February 9, 1968 finally transferred the property to Abdon Gilig. As of that date, Pablo Taneo
did not actually have anymore rights over the land which he could have transferred to herein
petitioners. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot claim to be such by
invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration
of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain
instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. At that time when the
debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly,
petitioners alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the
exception of Article 243(2).
The trial court also found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos’
owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the family
home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is
situated, it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to
another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was
merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail.
409 SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE RAUL
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LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN
[G.R. No. 178288, August 15, 2012]
FACTS:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses
Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest
per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over
their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna
(subject property).
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and
penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM. At the sale, the
creditors’ son, Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest
bidders.
Then the one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming
the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and the
registration of the subject property in their names. However, the spouses Fortaleza refused to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
Spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with the
RTC. Spouses Lapitan claimed that they were entitled to its possession of the subject property. It
was granted by the trial court.
Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, claiming that the subject property is their
family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. The RTC issued an Order denying their
motion. Court of Appelas affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the house which the petitioners’ father constituted as family home is

exempt from execution
RULING:
No, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home
"for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case,
there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of
record.
As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:50
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from
later claiming the exemption.
SPOUSES DE MESA, v. SPOUSES ACERO, et al.
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners jointly purchased a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house

was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their
family home.
410 A year after, Araceli contracted a loan from Claudio Acero, which was OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE secured by a
CONTENTS
mortgage on the said parcel of land; he the issued a check as payment of the loan. When Acero
presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already
closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a
complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them
to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said
property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction with Acero being the highest bidder. He
then leased the subject property to petitioners but they again defaulted in payment of the rent.
Acero then filed a complaint for ejectment against the latter.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint, ordered
Spouses De Mesa to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the
TCT issued to Acero, contending that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt
from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for
purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in
this case.
RULING:
Yes, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extra-judicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution.
The Court agreed with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or
within a reasonable time thereafter.
In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or
approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that
the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a
family home.
The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their present assertion doubtful; it
appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be countenanced without doing
the respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their favor.
Paternity and Filiation: Concept of Paternity, Maternity, Filiation
SURPOSA UY v. NGO CHUA

G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate

filiation against respondent.
411 That respondent, who was then married, had an TABLE
illicit relationship with Irene
OF CONTENTSTABLE Surposam
OF CONTENTS
petitioner’s mother. Petitioner also alleged that respondent attended to Irene when the latter
was giving birth to petitioner; respondent financially supported petitioner and her brother;
respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got married;
he also provided her with employment; and that respondent's relatives even attended the
baptism of petitioner's daughter.
However, in his Answer, respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene,
and that petitioner was his daughter.
Both parties eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and
respondent is valid.
RULING:
No, the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent provides that in
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although
unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner
also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner
and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
It is settled, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of
a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement between petitioner
and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
Kinds/Status of Children
DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999
FACTS:
Vircel Andres, legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide
support and maintenance despite repeated demands.
Manuel however denied paternity of said minor and he cannot therefore be obliged to
provide for support.
Petitioner and private respondent then mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim.
However in 1995, filed a similar complaint against Manuel, this time this time in the
name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by Vircel as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother. Manuel interposed the legal maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the
case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity
between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support.

RULING:
No, the right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's
mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the
dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It
violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown
between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is
a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
"The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the
right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such
a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause."
FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 143256, August 28, 2001
FACTS:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City and the two-storey building constructed
thereon. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that the late Spouses being
childless by the death of their son, purchased from a one (1) month baby boy, later referred to as
Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent
to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and
disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de
Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate which they later divided among themselves
through a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son.
Respondents then an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of
Sale void ab initio. The trial court ruled in favour of respondents and also found that Rodolfo
Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo has a right to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses
Fernandez.
RULING:
None, petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses
Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by
the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court.
Since petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal
heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
413 Fernandez between Generosa VDA. de Fernandez andTABLE Rodolfo is null and void
OF CONTENTSTABLE insofar as
OF CONTENTS
Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code.
Legitimate Children, Art. 164 and Art. 54 and 43(1), FC
AGUILAR v. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Aguilar died, intestate and without debts and included in their estate are two
parcels of land.
Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat which alleged that
petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the
Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and
filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; he filed before the Bacolod RTC
a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy which respondent opposed; and that during
the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies
of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the
owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession.
Respondent however claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity
and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses;
that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited
the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers
and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen,
but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as
their son.
The trial court ruled in favour of respondents which was affirmed by the court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SSS Form E-1 satisﬁes the requirement for
proof of ﬁliation and relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code particularly
paragraph3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.
RULING:
Yes, a scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage
of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their
father.
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded
that petitioner – who was born during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue
of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies
the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of
the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Action to Impugn Legitimacy:
Grounds, Arts. 166-169, FC
CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. TheresaAlmontewere
married in 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991,
however, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married private respondent, the latter had married
one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s
marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as
a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate

child of Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.
RULING:
Yes, in the case at bar, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon
City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no
evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was
certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material
to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy,
their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of
physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defencelessness.
ANGELES v. MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Belen Angeles is the wife of the deceased while the respondent Aleli Maglaya
is the child of the deceased Francisco Angeles in his first wife. Francisco died intestate and the
respondent seeks administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the surviving wife
(2nd wife) alleging that the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased. Petitioner also
averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded
as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, records of
415 marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE took place
OF CONTENTS
were destroyed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado.
RULING:
No, respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite
clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948,
Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite
utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows
that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genovevas death,
would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case petitioner could not be, as
respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a surviving spouse of the
decedent.
Another, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom
legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician,
one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by
law itself. It cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the
declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could
veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the
putative fathers name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate.
JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. L-49162, July 28, 1987]
FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against
Perico V. Jao. Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due
course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court declared the child the offspring of Jao.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the blood grouping test could have
been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the
trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity.
RULING:
Yes, for the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as
to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother
and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
416 blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when theOFblood
TABLE of the mother
CONTENTSTABLE and that of
OF CONTENTS
the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the
result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on
the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented
showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards
for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as
accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
BABIERA v. CATOTAL
[G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000]
FACTS:
Respondent Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of petitioner

Teofista. She asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
birth; the signature of informant forged, and contained false entries.
Presentacion asked the trial court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and
ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary
rights of Presentacion who inherited the estate of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as shown therein
on her Certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also avers
that the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of
Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to
Art. 171 of the Family Code; and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance
with Art. 170 of the Family Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Presentacion.
RULING:
No, while it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys
the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera
which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her
husband Eugenio's.
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has
presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogena's child; neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make
a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.
Who may file and within what period, Art. 170-171, FC
LIYAO, JR. v. TANHOTI-LIYAO

[G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002]
FACTS:
417 William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased,

TABLE OF as represented by
CONTENTSTABLE OF her mother
CONTENTS
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda
Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be
entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by
the decedent during his lifetime.
There were two sides of the story. Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living
separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the
said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of
William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of
Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage. On the other hand, one of the children
of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents
were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father, William Liyao
RULING:
No, under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate.
The present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then
minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr,
as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
As previously ruled, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that
Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of
the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself
through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled
that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
DE JESUS v. THE ESTATE OF DIZON
[G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001]
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
Juan died intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and
Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing
that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call
for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
418 illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to

inherit from him.
RULING:
No, the presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to
be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the
acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an
action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B.
de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled
that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
Action to Claim legitimacy Proof of legitimacy, Art. 172, FC

GERONIMO v. SANTOS
[G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015]
FACTS:
Respondent Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the
defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her... father. She alleged
that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land
located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan... and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by
the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document entitled
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and
Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that consequently they
took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names. She prayed that the document be annulled and the tax declaration of the land
transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
The petitioners denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of
their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir – being the legitimate child – of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad. The CA agreed
with the trial court that respondent has proven her legitimate filiation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that petitioner does not have personality to impugn respondent’s
legitimate filiation.
RULING:
No, in the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother
Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence
shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of
respondent – even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove one’s
filiation. In the following cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of
secondary evidence in actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not the child
of a particular couple – even if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172.
The Court held that this legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt.
HEIRS OF ROLDAN v. HEIRS OF ROLDAN
[G.R. No. 202578, September 27, 2017]
FACTS:
Natalia Magtulis owned an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan. Her heirs included
Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her two children by her first marriage; and, allegedly,
Leopolda Magtulis her child with another man named Juan Aguirre.
After her death in 1961, Natalia left the lot to her children. However, Gilberta and his
heirs took possession of the property to the exclusion of respondents. The latter then filed before
the RTC a Complaint for Partition and Damages against petitioners. The latter refused to yield
the property.
During trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale of Silvela's
share to Gilberto. Thus, in its Decision, the RTC ruled that the heirs of Silvela remained co-
owners of the property they had inherited from Natalia. As regards Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial
court concluded that he was a son of Natalia based on his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage
Contract.
Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the RTC
declared each set of their respective heirs entitled to one-third share of the property.
Consequently, it ordered petitioners to account and deliver to respondents their equal share to
the produce of the land.
Petitioners appealed to the CA; the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son of Natalia based
on his baptismal and marriage certificates.
RULING:
420 No, in this case, the only other document considered by CONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF the RTC and theOF CA was the
CONTENTS
Marriage Contract of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate, his Marriage Contract also
lacks probative value as the latter was prepared without the participation of Natalia.
All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which merely
stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation with the property owner.
Moreover, by virtue of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA could not have justly
concluded that Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were entitled to a one-third share of the
property left by Natalia, equal to that of each of her undisputed legitimate children Gilberto and
Silvela. As held in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, a baptismal certificate is certainly not
proof of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA erred in
presuming the hereditary rights of Leopoldo to be equal to those of the legitimate heirs of
Natalia.
TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001]
FACTS:
Petitioners are husband and wife and their youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, she was on her way to do some marketing and
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
under the care of the latter since she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida
was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone.
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they... looked for their
missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later, upon reading about the death of Angelita’s common law husband,
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years.
She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Petitioners the filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from
respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the
other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person and is the son of petitioners
RULING:
Yes, a close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips,
she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in
1974. Second, Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of
the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Third, the court find it unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
421 attendance at birth should cause the registration of suchTABLEbirth.OFFourth, the trial court
CONTENTSTABLE observed
OF CONTENTS
several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Fifth, Lourdes
Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN KINDS OF RECOGNITION:
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004
FACTS:
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who
was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted
that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental
to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working
there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they
checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her
if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their
sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later,
on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead
brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982,
assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child,
private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return
to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for
another job.
422 They spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
TABLE intercourse. While doing
OF CONTENTSTABLE it, he felt
OF CONTENTS
something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child
of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to
petitioner’s house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Petitioner’s wife noticed that her
stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner’s
wife that the baby was by her husband.
Consequently, she was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when
they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been voluntary recognition by the petitioner to his alleged
child.
RULING:
The Court held that private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal
certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.Thus,
certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence
to prove the same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary
recognition.

Eceta v. Eceta
G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their
marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the
disputed property located at Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 61036. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs.
In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an
illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother,
Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 218, for Partition and Accounting with Damages against Rosalina alleging that by virtue
of her fathers death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8922.
In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus
belonged to her exclusively.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein
they both admitted their relationship to one another, i.e., that Rosalina is Maria Theresa’s
grandmother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her granddaughter
is enough to prove respondents filiation with Vicente Eceta, the only son of petitioner.
The Court held that the petition has no merit. The Court noted Rosalina’s attempt to mislead the
Court by representing that this case is one for compulsory recognition, partition and accounting
with damages. Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals
is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition
by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already
agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial courts pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is
Rosalinas granddaughter.
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by
presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate.Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth
certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed
to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
Rivero v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005
FACTS:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against
defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During
trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with
plaintiff whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and
pay petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC granted the
compromised agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy- Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed
for annulment of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to
dismiss. CA directed Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her
uncle. In her reply, shequestion assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of
Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the
parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she
and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA
ruled in favor of the defendants, hence a petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise regarding filiation is valid.

RULING:
No. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is
null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil
status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence
or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary
Jane , however, is ineffectual, because under the law, there cognition must be made personally
by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.

People v. Bayani
G.R. No. 120894, October 3, 1996
FACTS:
Victim Ma. Elena Nieto, then 15 yrs old, was living with her paternal grandmother
together with her siblings as their parents were abroad. Appellant frequented their house as he
was a neighbor and a “kumpadre” of her paternal uncles. One day, appellant asked victim’s
grandmother for her consent to let victim accompany him to visit a friend. Victim’s grandmother
consented. After visiting his friend who was allegedly his mistress, appellant invited her to have
lunch in a hotel restaurant but victim declined and suggested they go home. Appellant however
said they would still visit another friend. Turns out, the building they went to was a motel, where
appellant deceived the friend they were going to visit was in the 2nd floor. When appellant
opened a room, he forcibly let victim in and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her,
intimidating and threatening her with a gun pointed at her. After his lust was sated, he
threatened to kill her and her family if ever she’ll divulge the incident. Victim did not divulge the
incident because of fear, until it became apparent that she was pregnant. She was then sent to
another place for her safety and as the trial ensued, appellant’s contention was that victim
consented to the act, she being the appellant’s mistress. The trial court found him guilty of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his
crime.
RULING:
426 No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides thatOF
TABLE persons guilty of rape,
CONTENTSTABLE seduction,
OF CONTENTS
or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the
offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense
coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that
acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the
offspring as part of the sentence. Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the
offender in a rape case who is married, as in the case at bar, can only be sentenced to indemnify
the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.
People v. Mananhan
G.R. NO. 128157, September 29, 1999
FACTS:
Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as stay-in waitress, and
sleeps at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the brother-in-law of the owner of the
canteen. He and his wife lives temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One
night, as victim was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her.
When she opened her eyes, she saw that it was Manahan who immediately placed himself on top
of her. Victim tried to shout but accused covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no
avail. In her weakened state, accused succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, he left her. Within the
month, victim left the canteen and returned to her parents. The incident resulted to her
pregnancy, thus, she was forced to divulge the rape incident to her parents. They then filed a
criminal complaint against accused. The accused on his part, alleged that they were lovers and
that the sexual congress between them were consensual. The court favored the testimony of the
victim and convicted accused of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his
crime.
RULING:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also
be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so,"
427 and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case TABLE
at bar,OFcompulsory acknowledgment
CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTSof
the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears
that the accused is a married man
Proof of illegitimacy, Art. 172, FC
Alberto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86639, June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Aurora Reniva and Juan M. Alberto had a child born out of wedlock in the person of the
petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and
correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s
gun, died intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his
estate. The petition was granted but was reopened as petitioner filed a motion that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and be entitled to share in the estate of the
deceased. The court favored the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child.
RULING:
Yes. During his lifetime, deceased acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to
recognize petitioner as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family
name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly, by
openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter.
Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and gang mates, and
428 openly visiting his daughter in school, had meetings with herOF
TABLE atCONTENTSTABLE
the MOPC, manifesting
OF CONTENTSopen
acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to
disprove.
Deceased died during the minority of the petitioner, thus, Art 285 of the Civil Code
allows her to file an action for recognition 4 years from the time she reaches majority age. Such
motion was filed seasonably before the expiration of the 4-yr period.
Napomuceno v. Lopez
G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She

therefore filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her
birth certificate which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to
do so. Another evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating
himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy.

RULING:
No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such
is to be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar,
the adduced evidence which is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any
429 statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. ItCONTENTSTABLE
TABLE OF is, therefore, not
OFaCONTENTS
competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation as an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note
cannot be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not
even notarized. Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied
it
Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
Cruz v. Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private
respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventura’s children from his second marriage.
Long after their alleged father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred
such to their names. Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their
alleged shares in the property.
To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such
contention was also confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently
proven.
RULING:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the
child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has
been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission.
In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were adduced. In the case of
Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact
that records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented
who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they
reside as being the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to
prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing
430 evidences thus suffice to prove that petitioners are children of the
TABLE late Buenaventura.
Perla v. Baring
G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a result, Randy was
born to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he left them and refused to give
support to their son. Antonio for his part, denied that they ever cohabited although admitted
that he had a one night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s birth
and baptismal certificates. She avers that she and Antonio supplied the information indicated in
the certificates, as the ‘hilot’ who assisted her went to Antonio’s house to solicit the said
information. Randy also testified, saying that he even had a vacation at her aunt, Antonio’s sister
for a week with which he 1st met Antonio, calling him Papa and while the latter hugged him, he
promised to support Randy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Randy’s filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven.

RULING:
No. Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules
for establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of the Family Code. Whereas, in the case
at bar, the birth and baptismal certificates presented have no probative value to establish the
alleged filiation since the Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such evidences adduced
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in their preparation. Mirasol failed to present the mentioned
431 hilot to prove her claim that it was Antonio who suppliedTABLE
the information in the certificates.
Besides, they do not contain Antonio’s signature and that there were also inconsistencies
such as Antonio’s middle name, signifying that he had no hand in their preparation.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The single instance of
Antonio’s hug and promise to support Randy cannot be considered as proof of continuous
possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, the father’s conduct towards his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned
single instance, there were no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.
Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol, still, none of these
sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES

Rules on DNA Evidence, Supreme Court A.M. No. 06-11-05-SC
Tijing v. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO. 172471, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let
Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s
efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law
husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son
Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own
son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own
brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no
children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
ISSUE:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
RULING:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation
years before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas
was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married
which is false because even Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry
puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not
432 necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in futureTABLE
it would be useful to allOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE concerned
CONTENTSin
the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Agustin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents
alleged that the petitioner impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The baby’s
birth certificate was purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered
the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption.
The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had
allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He admitted that their affair started in
1993 but theirs was an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to
bear the prospect of losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims that the signature
and the community tax certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgement of Martin’s birth
certificate were falsified.
The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner opposed said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
stating that there was no cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate
was a forgery and that under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not
recognized by the putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD.
b) Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity
testing and was a form of unreasonable search.
RULING:
No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private
respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by
the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no
uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
433 critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, TABLE
as already stated, his argument
OF CONTENTSTABLE that his
OF CONTENTS
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
HERRERA V. ALBA
G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner
opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to
conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that “under the present
circumstances, the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.”In an Order dated 8 June
2000, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and
affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner
merely desires to correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available
remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right
against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the
appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA
paternity testing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation.
RULING:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an
overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and
filiation.Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure
a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden
of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father
of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the
putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward
and shift it to the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of
434 either physical absence or impotency. The putative father may
TABLE OFalso show that the
CONTENTSTABLE OFmother
CONTENTShad
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The
child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.Finally,
physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although
likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how
much a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to
the emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba,
respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is
respondent’s biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court,
she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand,
denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated
that respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial
by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to
the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating
acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.
People v. Vallejo
G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002
FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in an
assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At
5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s
house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning,
Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter
strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he
was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told
the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested
for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes
were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the
NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a
vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in
Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O.
Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when
trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the
cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was
sentenced to death by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic
substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical
twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is
collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the
evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
FACTS:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was
filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio
got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky
was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on
19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to
September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship,
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after
delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of
minor Joanne’s needs that is recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped
supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite
Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for
the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a
motion for reconsideration seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on
what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo
for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.
RULING:
436 As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of OF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE minor Joanne
CONTENTS
for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just
to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as
citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.
He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to
be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as
Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima
faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for
filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse
failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order
RULING:
437 Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case
TABLE OF vis-à-vis the
CONTENTSTABLE motion for
OF CONTENTS
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. Misapplication of
Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera
v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented
their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The
DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the
moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a
court order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction
to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.”
Who may file and when to file action for compulsory recognition, Art. 175, FC
Guy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006
FACTS:
438 The special proceeding case concerns the settlement TABLE of
OF the estate of Sima
CONTENTSTABLE Wei (a.k.a.
OF CONTENTS
Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors
were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for
the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled
without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss
alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a
Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from
the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any
and all liabilities.The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she
could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the
certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.

RULING:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must
necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in
order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the
release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived
their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the
decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the
petitioner, the latter do not have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants
even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends
to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of
heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in
one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
Marquino vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR. No. 72078 , June 27, 1994
FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of

Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly
of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status
of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she
died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in
439 holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio,
TABLE can continue
OF CONTENTSTABLE the action
OF CONTENTS
already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not
extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be

transmitted to the heirs and
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child
can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even
as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative
father in an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the
former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the
case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time
of death of their father.IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed.
TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR
GR. No. 174680, March 24, 2008
FACTS:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag- Gallor, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that
she is one of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties
both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10
October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly
promised to give respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds
of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the
properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred
that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag
as his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further
encroachment upon the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
The motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration

sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she
is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or
recognized as such by the latter.
RULING:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child
suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the
440 Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled TABLEthat since Graciano OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE was claiming
CONTENTS
illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the
death of the alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her
deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on
affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to
compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether
indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s
voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
Rights of Illegitimate children, Art. 176, FC Republic Act No. 9255
Grande v. Antonio
GR. No. 206248, 18 February 2004
FACTS:
Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation
of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors
from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under
Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio citing the “best interest of the child”.
Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC and modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed
the granting of the custody of the two children to the respondent but affirmed the surname
change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife filed petition for certiorari in SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the father can exercise parental authority and consequently, custody,
over his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Wether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
RULING:
441 On the first issue, no, petitioner cannot exercise custody over
TABLE OF the children. OF CONTENTS
CONTENTSTABLE
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that
adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors; she
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
On the second issue, the answer is still a no.
An acknowledged illegitimate child isunder no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father.
Even if IRR of RA 9255 provides that a surname change “shall” be necessary upon
recognition of paternity, it is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of
“may” in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary governand
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. Case is
remanded to lower court to determine the choice of said children.
Dela Cruz v. Garcia
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to
the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include
the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name
against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the
unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of
paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his
offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the
putative father in the private handwritten instrument.
442 The following rules respecting the requirement TABLEofOFaffixing the signature
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acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation
of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL
GR. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in
Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P.
Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner
prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father
and has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority
was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child,
authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded
to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental
authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

Republic v. Abadilla
GR. No. 133054, January 28, 1999
FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname “Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor
children, Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition
was granted.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the
Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed
the deletion of the “date and place of marriage of parents” from the birth certificates of minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors’
surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.
RULING:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be
444 under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
TABLE to support in conformity
OF CONTENTSTABLE with
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this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.”Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.
Verceles v. Posadas
GR. No. 159785, April 27, 2007
FACTS:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making
amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where
she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow
up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes
Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They
met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the
restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as
he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed
he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances.
But again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner
was proven.
RULING:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna
Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence
presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and
irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no
evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
People v. Glabo
GR. No. 129248, December 7, 2001
FACTS:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and
her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his
house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore,
accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters
away from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard,
where she was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made
her lie down. He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and
made push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant’s brute strength. She
shouted for help, but there were no neighbors nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She
went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath
the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo
floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the
kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant’s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However,
the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila’s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was
her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought
Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
RULING:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power
to exercise parental authority over his children, no “further positive act is required of the parent
as the law itself provides for the child’s status.” Hence, accused-appellant should only be
ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support
shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201
of the Family Code.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
FACTS:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V.
Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after
Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial
court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment and the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and
the court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision
and granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.

RULING:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother
has seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
“compelling reasons” for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her
447 child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS are
neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent,
or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 111455, December 23, 1998
FACTS:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child’s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge
at the hospital refused to place the presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.
Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar’s office,
rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General’s Circular No. 4, which
provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after August
3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the status of
the registration of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar
General denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary
to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the local
civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His
petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend
the petition to substitute the child’s mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted,
but motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the RTC’s decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register
thecertificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the
latter admitted paternity.
RULING:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of
their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in their
record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been
acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support
inconformity with the provisions of the Family Code.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
FACTS:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who
averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect
the moral and social values of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.

RULING:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation
rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her
parental authority from immigrating to Holland with her two children.

DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
FACTS:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married,
and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually
followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had
enrolled him at the HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and
ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of
suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie.

RULING:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary
support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar,
450 was married to another woman other than his mother. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who,
as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her
rightful custody of her child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF LIVE
BIRTH OF TINITIGAN VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 222095 August 07, 2017
FACTS:
The petitioner, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote bore a child out of wedlock with a married
man named Ricky 0. Tinitigan whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote. On 24 August 2011,
she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. She was
not able to register the births of their child because she did not give birth in a hospital and to
avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with
Tinitigan.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote
finally decided to register the births of both children. However, upon submission of the copies of
the late registration of the births to the National Statistic Office, Barcelote was informed that
there were two certificates of live birth with the same name of the mother and the years of birth
of the children in their office.The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar
of Davao City state the names “Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan
Barcelote Tinitigan”. Ricky Tinitigan was the listed Informant in both birth certificates.
Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the
subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and
for containing erroneous entries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by
their father which were not duly signed by their mother were void.
RULING:
Yes. The facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage after August 3,
1988, which means that they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. Article 176
of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname
of the children is therefore incorrect and that their surname should have been “Barcelote” and
not “Tinitigan.”
It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her
child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only
legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child
451 who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, TABLE
the lawOFensures that individuals
CONTENTSTABLE are not
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falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in
the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child.
Legitimated children; Art. 178, FC as amended by Republic Act No. 9858
DE SANTOS VS ANGELES
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
FACTS:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter,
herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. But their relationship became strained to the
breaking point wherein Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private
respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia,
which produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died and on April 23, 1967, Antonio
and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws.
On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of
P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband’s estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. Petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the
trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to the properties as the only natural child of
the deceased.
RULING:
Yes. Article 269 of the Family Code states that “Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural." It means that a child's
parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him
to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent
and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time.
The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and
unmistakable language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all point to the correctness
of petitioner's claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gray area of law that calls
for interpretation, or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud
unintentionally created by the letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this
case one which decidedly favors legitimacy over illegitimacy.
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN
452 A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25,

TABLE OF 1995
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Jose Tabiliran on
the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.
With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986 and had three children.
On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that
the respondent caused his three illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate”
by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew that these children cannot be legally
registered as legitimate. The respondent averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla, hence the cohabitation was neither
bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, the three children were
born on 1970, 1971 and 1975.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three children can be considered as legitimate children.

RULING:
No. The three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate
since the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and
Teresita. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
Adopted Children
Republic Act No.8552/ Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 Who may adopt
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
FACTS:
James Anthony Hughes is a natural born citizen of the United States of America and is
married to Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a
citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Mario, all surnamed
Mabunay, the minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even
prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption.
On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the
petition. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's
decision. This Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed
the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
453 Whether or not the spouses James Anthony Hughes

TABLE and Lenita Mabunay
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF Hughes are
CONTENTS
qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
RULING:
No. It is clear that James Anthony is not qualified to adopt. Article 184 of the Family
Code states those persons who may not adopt which includes: (1) The guardian with respect to
the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their
guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can
qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a), but the problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185
of the Family Code expressing: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. If one of
the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall
not be allowed.
REPUBLIC V. TOLEDANO
G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
FACTS:
Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn A. Clouse, a Filipino, who
thereafter became a naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally,
morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor and who is
the younger brother of Evelyn who has been under their care and custody for quite a time.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a widow,
due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the
social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the
granting of the petition for adoption.
The respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption and
decreeing that said minor be considered as their child by adoption. Petitioner, through the OSG
appeal led for relief via a Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the lower court,
contending that it erred in granting the petition for adoption because spouses Clouse are not
qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.
RULING:
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of the Family Code, the spouses Clouse are clearly barred
from adopting Solomon. Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are
not qualified to adopt: (3) An alien, except:(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
454 spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
TABLE OF to adopt jointly with
CONTENTSTABLE his or her
OF CONTENTS
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Firstly, Alvin is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen. Secondly,
Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Lastly,
when spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino
citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a US citizen.
Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article
184 of Family Code. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife except in the following
cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
REPUBLIC V. ALARCON VERGARA
G.R. No. 95551 March 20, 1997
FACTS:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr., a member of the United States Air
Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga and Rosalina Due
Dye, a former Filipino who became a naturalized American filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively, the younger siblings of Rosalina. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin
Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption. They are mentally and
physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, have sufficient financial capability and love
and affection for the intended adoptees.
The lower court granted the petition and declared Alvin and Maricel to be the children of
the spouses Dye by adoption but they disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the
law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months
older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the
very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The
Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye
are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Samuel and Rosalina are qualified to adopt Alvin and
Maricel.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under
Article 184 of the Family Code which states: The following persons may not adopt: (3) An alien,
except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a
Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of
the latter.
Samuel, who is an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due
because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He
is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek
to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by
consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized
455 American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding TABLE OFhim from the coverage
OF CONTENTS
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen
seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the
general rule that aliens may not adopt.
Rosalina cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law under Article 185 of the Family
Code which provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one
spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina, for
they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, AND MICHAEL JUDE
P. LIM
G.R. No. 168992 May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of Department of Social Welfare and Development. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She
then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Monina decided to adopt
the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 or “ An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for other
Purposes” to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monina who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING:
No. The time the petitions were filed, Monina had already remarried. Section 7, Article
III of RA No. 8552 reads: Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse
seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the
case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The
use of the word “shall” signify that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA No. 8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. Parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION
IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM

G.R. No. 168992 May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of Department of Social Welfare and Development. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She
then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Monina decided to adopt
the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 or “ An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for other
Purposes” to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monina who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING:
No. The time the petitions were filed, Monina had already remarried. Section 7, Article
III of RA No. 8552 reads: Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse
seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the
case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The
use of the word “shall” signify that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA No. 8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. Parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
LANDINGIN V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the
adoption of three natural minor children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia
Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
457 paternal grandmother for their biological mother went TABLE
to Italy,
OF re-married thereOF
CONTENTSTABLE and now has
CONTENTS
two children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to
the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for
their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, Diwata
failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. She also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assent to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptee’s biological mother.
RULING:
No. Section 9, par (b) of Republic Act No. 8552 or “An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for other Purposes”, provides that
the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, Diwata failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in
the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano had three children and, following their
separation, Anna Marie was awarded custody of the children and alimony by a Court in the
Philippines. Herbert moved to the United States, where he obtained a legal divorce in the state
of Nevada. The divorce order from Nevada granted sole custody of the children to Anna Marie
and visitation rights to Herbert and he continued to pay alimony to Anna Marie and his
children. A few years later, the respondents Ronald and Maria Clavano, respectively the brother
and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed proceedings for the adoption of the three children, with
the consent of one of the children who was then 14 years old, as well as the consent of Anna
Marie, who alleged that Herbert had abandoned his children and forfeited his parental rights.
Anna Marie submitted that the respondents have been assisting with the care of the children
458 and will be ideal adoptive parents in her absence as she plans
TABLEtoOFmove to the United
CONTENTSTABLE OFStates.
CONTENTS
Upon learning of the application for adoption, Herbert immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition to the adoption. However, the trial court approved the
adoption application based on the good standing of Ronald and Maria Clavano and observed
that Herbert is morally unfit, financially inadequate and had taken citizenship abroad. Herbert
appealed to the Court of Appeal and asserted that the petition for adoption was defective
because he had never abandoned his children and did not provide his written consent to the
adoption and the children did not properly give their written consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parental consent is needed to the adoption.

RULING:
Yes. The Court explained that, although the law states that the written consent of the
natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption, this requirement can be
dispensed with in cases where the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane
or hopelessly intemperate”.
In the current case, however, the Supreme Court held that Herbert had provided
evidence demonstrating his on-going relationship with his children which the lower courts had
ignored as they relied solely on the conclusion that the he was not able to meet the welfare and
best interests of the children, as he was poorer in financial status compared to respondents, and
did not consider the emotional and psychological wellbeing of the children and the relationship
they had with the petitioner.
The Court said that parental rights cannot be entrusted to a person simply because the
person could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. In
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code
to take into account all relevant considerations, with the welfare of the child being the
paramount consideration. Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person
of parental authority over his children. Therefore, there should be a holistic approach to the
matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual
needs of the child.
CASTRO V. GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801 October 15, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Jose Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Rosario). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies.
Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from
birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Joana). On
August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. He alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report
conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption on the ground that Rosario’s consent
was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent.
She also alleged that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the
father to is Jose, while another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be
Larry. She also further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children
but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA
denied the petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the
adopter is required?
RULING:
Yes. Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552 or “An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for other Purposes” requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but
also the consent of his legitimate children 10 years old and above. As a rule, the husband and
wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several exceptions to
the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out
of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt
must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse. In the absence of any decree of legal
separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice
on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT V. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997
FACTS:
The spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are
naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision
dated June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the
child as their own.
Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent judge based his decree primarily
on the findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand
and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and
parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor. On these considerations, respondent
judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Said Department of Social Welfare
Development findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment, are
contained in the Adoptive Home Study Report and Child Study Report prepared by the local
office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaa.
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said
minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption
and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a Home
and Child Study Report in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge
for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the
required reports for said minor’s adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adoption is valid as it never passed through the DSWD
RULING:
No. Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires that petitions for adoption
shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee,
the natural parents and the adoptive parents.
The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too
evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken
was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830
so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department
which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social
welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never
have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the
DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it
that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other
requirements of the law.
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
REPUBLIC V. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
FACTS:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson and Regina, filed a
petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same petition, they prayed
for the change his first name to Aaron Joseph, the name with which he was baptized and by
which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of
the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption arguing that these petitions
should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings and that petition for adoption
and a petition for change of name, which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are
not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. The trial
court ruled in favor of herein private respondents. Hence this appeal by certiorari .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given
or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
RULING:
Paragraph (1), Article 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effects of
adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters.
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname
to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
461 adoption and must specifically be contained in the orderTABLEof theOF
court, in fact, evenOFif CONTENTS
CONTENTSTABLE not prayed
for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
FACTS:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents’ spouses
Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen
years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven
years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C.
Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that
judgment be rendered: a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all
intents and purposes; b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first
name this was mistakenly registered as “Midael” be corrected to “Michael."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case for adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was
"Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live
Birth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Regional Trial Court correctly granted the petition
for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of
the trial court, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied
with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor,
is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
462 mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed TABLE
to OF CONTENTSTABLE
Catindig, OF CONTENTS
his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir,
and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code which states: (3) The adopted shall remain an
intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should
be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, agreed with Honorato for her
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any
confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189, she remains to be an intestate heir
of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father can use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child to be adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, and for her to be able to use her mother’s surname,
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255 or “An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father” is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects
of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552 or “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998” provides that an illegitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother.
TEOTICO V. DEL VAL
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
FACTS:
On July 1955, Maria Mortera died leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a
will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and
the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged
natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ana del Val Chan has right to intervene in the said proceeding.
RULING:
463 TABLE OF
No. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person mayCONTENTSTABLE
be allowed to OF CONTENTS
intervene in a
probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be
affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or
one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to
intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator
because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of
the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is
not under the Civil Code. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate
child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father
and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by
law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
FACTS:
John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by

Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits with the Social Security System (SSS).
However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent
of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore
Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because she is not the deceased’s
legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three
years since the decree of John’s adoption became final.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account, the
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by virtue of adoption, the question is that who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away.
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to
the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
464 death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the OF
TABLE estate of the adopted
CONTENTSTABLE child, the
OF CONTENTS
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
GERONIMO V. SANTOS
G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
FACTS:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of
possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her
father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the
parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan and belonging to her parents was passed
on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of
spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that
consequently they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax
declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay
her damages.
The defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of
their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible
for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had
never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan
never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963 until October
1984.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that petitioners have no personality to impugn respondent's
legitimate filiation.
RULING:
While petitioner admits that the Court of Appeals "did not directly rule on this particular
issue,” he nonetheless raises the said issue as an error since the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling
of the trial court that the filiation of respondent is strictly personal to respondent's alleged father
and his heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, thereby denying petitioner the
"right to impugn or question the filiation and status of the plaintiff."
We grant the petition. Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent
offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and
the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The Regional Trial Court based this
conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children. Only the
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
465 with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wifeOF
TABLE produces; and he OF
CONTENTSTABLE should decide
CONTENTS
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
LAHOM V. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple, Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom adopted the the latter’s
nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for
adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin
Lahom. Isabela commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred,
that, despite her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, Republic Act No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
This turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted the Lahom spouses to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972 but there was already a new law
on adoption, specifically Republic Act No. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 8552.
RULING:
No. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 8552 that the Lahom spouses filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by the Lahom spouses after Republic Act
No. 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Support
CONCEPT OF SUPPORT, ART. 194, FC
LIM-LUA V. LUA
G.R. No. 175279 June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage
with a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to
P500,000.00 per month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in
several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, Regional Trial Court cited
Article 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also
granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.
The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled
to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from
their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-
being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. The husband also asserts that
the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive support is unconscionable and
beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
Motion for Reconsideration was denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the
monthly support to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the
final Court of Appeals decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the
children, their cost of maintenance and advances are given to the petitioner and his children.
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be
considered advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the
petitioner and the two children. It ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80
from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two
children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.
RULING:
The Supreme Court partly granted Court of Appeal’s decision. First, is to resume
payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this
amount was deferred by him. Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed
as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not
PhP3,428,813.80 which was rendered by the Court of Appeals.
ACTUAL NEED VS. CAPACITY TO PAY, ART. 201-202, FC
LAM V. CHUA
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2003
FACTS:
Adriana Chua and Jose Lam were married on January 13, 1984 and they begot one son,
John Paul Chua Lam. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana against Jose in
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on the ground that Jose was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then
apparent and that such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the
celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and
irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains. In order to save
467 what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced TABLE
to agree
OF with Jose on theOF
CONTENTSTABLE dissolution
CONTENTSof
their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties. The
agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in a Decision dated
February 28, 1994. They had long been separated in bed and board and they have agreed that
the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed
that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and
pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose should still give the corresponding support to his son.
RULING:
Yes. The Pasay Regional Trial Court should have been aware that in determining the
amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of
the Family Code.
Article 194 states that support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to
in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 201 states that the amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and
196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient.
Article 202 provides that support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be
reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence
presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are
jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code;
and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation of the child.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT, ART. 195-197, FC
BRIONES V. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to
include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas
Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before
this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock
in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his
Birth Certificate.
468 The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now marriedTABLE
to a Japanese national and
OF CONTENTSTABLE OF is presently
CONTENTS
residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be
given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:
Petitioner concedes that respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child.
He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and
during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor,
such that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he,
as the biological father should also have custody. According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in
the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he
adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney
dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor.
However, at present, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus
was pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion
for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers
of the minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father expressly admits paternity or not.
QUIMIGUING V. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 1970
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in
having sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed
for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees. Carmen, suing through her parents, Antonio
and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga Court of First Instance,
which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of
complaint.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to
allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case
and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was
allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint.

Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had the right to claim for support of the
child she was carrying from the defendant and an independent cause of action for damages.
Article 40 of the Civil Code recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child,
which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “fetus in utero.” Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through
persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of
the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for
damage caused per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which
provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA
G.R. No. 43794 August 9, 1935
FACTS:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario
Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case,
alleging that he is the latter’s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support.
Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and
was not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio’s birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an
order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was
denied, hence the writ for certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein
petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during the
pendency of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his
status as petitioner’s son.
RULING:
No. As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first
before a right of support can be derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to
prove, through his guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no right of
support can be given because the very civil status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is
in question.
It held that there is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person
who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he
is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former
there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact
in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.
Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly
support in light of herein private respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT, ART. 195-197, FC
SANTERO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
470 FACTS: TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Pablo Santero had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico
and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private respondents). These children are all natural
children since neither of their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the Court of First Instance-
Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly
without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition
fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the
administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents
were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for
Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the
said expenses.
The private respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which
included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo
Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven
children as their allowance from the estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private
respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included
in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four
minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have
been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of
their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition
of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to allowance.

RULING:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be
regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the
New Civil Code which states: “Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his
education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority”
and “From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is
delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them”, respectively.
GOTARDO V. BULING
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
FACTS:
Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of January 1993.
They started intimate sexual relations sometime in September 1993. By August 1994 Divina
found out she was pregnant. The couple made plans to marry but later on Charles backed out of
the wedding plan. Divina filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for breach of
471 TABLE
promise to marry. This was later on amicably settled. Divina OF birth
gave CONTENTSTABLE OFMarch
to Gliffze on CONTENTS
1995.
Charles failed to show up and support the child. Divina sent him a demand letter on July 1995
demanding recognition and support. When Charles did not answer, she filed her complaint for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. Charles denied the imputed paternity.
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent. It ordered the respondent to
return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Court of Appeals departed from the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s
testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of
the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and
ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC appreciation of the
respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
RULING:
No. The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina established
prima facie case against Charles through her testimony, corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm
owner), that she’s only been involved with one man at the time of conception. Charles did not
deny his sexual relations with her, only that it occurred at a later date. One can prove filiation,
either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s filiation may be a “baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative
proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father.
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189516 June 08, 2016
FACTS:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias was married to Colonel Francisco Otamias on 1978. The couple
had five children. On September 2000, they separated because of Colonel Otamias’ alleged
infidelity. After the separation, their children remained with Edna. She then demanded support
equivalent to 75 percent of the colonel’s retirement benefits. However, Colonel Otamias
executed an affidavit stating that he can commit only 50 percent of his retirement benefits to his
children and wife. Because of this, they entered into a compromise agreement. On February 26,
2003, the colonel executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50 percent of his salary and
pension in favor of Edna and his children. Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003, and the
agreement had been honored until January 6, 2006. According to Edna, the Armed Forces of the
472 Philippines (AFP) decided not to honor the agreement. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edna and the Children are entitled to support.

RULING:
Yes. According to Article 194 and 195 of the Family Code, support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person
entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation
shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give support: (1) The
spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate children
and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate
children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers
and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.
WHEN DEMANDABLE, ART. 203, FC
LACSON V. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
FACTS:
The husband left the conjugal home. Since their separation, wife did not ask the husband
for support, relying initially on a note of commitment by the husband to give support. Wife, in
behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against husband for support at the Regional Trial
Court when first child was about to graduate from college.
Husband contends that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he
inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also
claims that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, since no previous extrajudicial nor
judicial demand have been made by the respondents.
Supreme Court held that requisite demand for support appears to have been already
been made through the note that husband left in his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not support should be awarded to the wife.

RULING:
Yes. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Payment
shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies,
his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance.
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the
situation is no less than a demand because it came by way of a request or plea. Any third person
may furnish support to a needy individual with the right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support. Amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
473 recipient. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Who must pay support, Arts. 195-197, 199-200
Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009
FACTS:
Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three
children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their
children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s
ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim. Edward’s family business, which
provided him with a monthly salary of ₱6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.
Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the minor children with her, after
a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak
in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide
monthly support of ₱6,000 pendente lite. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing,
among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s
income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should
be "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to
respondents.
RULING:
The Court ruled that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide
support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, their
grandchildren. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide
legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Although the obligation to provide support
arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation
arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. Also,
while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s
inability to provide sufficient support. However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation
extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support
from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years
old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without
the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of
her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had
totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about
to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University
and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following: i)
The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year, broken down
as follows: Tuition Fees US$13,000.00 Room & Board 5,000.00 Books 1,000.00 Yearly
Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00 Total US$ 22,000.00 Or a total of US$44,000.00,
more or less, for both Rica and Rina
ISSUE:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support

RULING:
Yes. In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of
the second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action,
the relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin
daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among
them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being.
The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical
family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of
this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the
parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that
those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines
in the company of those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.
De Guzman v. Perez
G.R. No. 156013, July 25, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying
law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent
became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987. Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another
woman with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the
second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000
to help defray the cost of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these
instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private
respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was
only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to
school. However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide
for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education thus became uncertain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the
education his station in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect
RULING:
476 Yes. The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any
TABLE parent. LiabilityOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE for the crime
CONTENTS
does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish
the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education
which the family’s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful
compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to
shield himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the
care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603,
the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child’s Development. – (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum
period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development
including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code."
The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as
"indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised
Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic
G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Col
onel Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September 2000, Ed
na and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with Ed
na. On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provo
st Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly support e
quivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otami
as executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in fav
or of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as a compr
omise agreement. The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006 until AFP decided not to h
onor the agreement between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family. Edna, on behalf of herse
lf and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case No.
2006-039.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Colonel Otamias’ legitimate family is entitled for support.

RULING:
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides that the benefits authorized under th
is Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy,
477 execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
TABLE OFceded, or conveyed
CONTENTSTABLE OFto any third
CONTENTS
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any ben
efit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in th
e active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due suc
h officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to se
ttle such accountabilities. Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt fro
m execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has
enough funds to support himself and his family.
Del Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem,
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina
and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under
the Philippine law?
RULING:
YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
478 does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
TABLE Norma’s son OF
OF CONTENTSTABLE altogether.
CONTENTSIn
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.
Right of third persons who pay, Art. 206-207, FC
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006
FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters o
f petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson Not long after the birth of Maona
a, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to
seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea
s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Dab
an. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother.
As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period
of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. It appears that
from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relyin
g initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support t
o his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, desp
ite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occas
ionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the year and up to the
middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the scho
oling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Il
oilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint ag
ainst Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was
about to graduate. Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, de
479 spite being gainfully employed and owning several piecesTABLE
of valuable lands, has not
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFprovided
CONTENTSthe
m support since 1976. Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet thei
r needs. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sis
ters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate for
mula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which
represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a third party may furnish a support.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals Article 207 of the
Family Code provides that when the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails t
o give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the n
eedy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. Mention
may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner a
nd Noel Daban is a quasi-contract an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching
himself at the expense of another. Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the
petitioner. The provision reads: When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or
fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to
the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
Support pendent lite, Rule 61, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996
FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ru
iz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaugh
ters, On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death,
it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Bra
nch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance
of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.
ISSUES:
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certa
in heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
RULING:
No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the fun
ds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and doe
s not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mention
ed has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum t
o be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the c
480 ourt directs. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the r
eal and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, He cannot unilateral
ly assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first sub
mitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering
a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligatio
ns and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, pro
priety and justness.
Support during the proceedings for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage or legal separation, Art. 198, FC
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
G.R. No. L-48219, February 28, 1979
FACTS:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on
June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt,
wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her
driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support
pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for
support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent
Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a
motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during
the pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was
excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition
which made the husband appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

RULING:
Yes, provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will
not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the
pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of
the case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from
the period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on
the accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence
and because it wasn’t excessive.
Characteristics of Parental Authority, Art. 210, FC
Silva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
FACTS:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children,
namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and
Suzanne had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends.
The legal conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation
rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights to
his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays.
The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out
without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision to the
Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She
eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. The Court
of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated that as alleged by
Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.

RULING:
Yes. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his o
r her child or children. There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition
on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code e
xpresses that family relations include those between parents and children. Article 209, in relatio
n to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exerc
ising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them
love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itse
lf speaks in terms of the natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth. There i
s nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to l
egitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and succession
al rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so expl
icitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the decla
ration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article
49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given cus
tody of their children. The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even ass
uming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears e
xpressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their chi
ldren once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of responden
t's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever
take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimat
e children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of
tender ages. It seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more
than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own chil
dren. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary me
asure, in no case can petitioner take out the children without the written consent of the mother.

Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
FACTS:
The Reproductive Health Law violates the right to life of the unborn. Ac
cording to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against aborti
on, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees prote
ction of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conceptio
n. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal a
ccess to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes canc
er and other health problems. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of
one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law pr
oviding for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their consti
tutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs is cla
imed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reprodu
ctive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spou
ses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their family.
In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who h
as suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whet
484 her their child should use contraceptives. Various
TABLEparties also sought
OF CONTENTSTABLE and were
OF CONTENTS
granted leave to file their respective comments-inintervention in defense of t
he constitutionality of the RH Law.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petiti
oners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that
1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not y
et ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to ques
tion the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declarator
y relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Meanwhile, on Marc
h 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took ef
fect. On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, th
e Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and imp
lementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
Res. On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the c
ounsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raise
d by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed i
n the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 201
3, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was order
ed extended until further orders of the Court. Thereafter, the Court directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, a
t the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some conten
tions of the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH Law violates the provision on the family?

RULING:
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-makin

g. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, a
nd barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a w
edge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and en
danger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the populatio
n. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect ma
rriage as an inviolable social institution. Decision-making involving a reprod
uctive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not j
ust one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children signific
antly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs ex
clusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart t
heir own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it
prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State s
hould see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family. At any r
ate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
Who exercises parental authority and custody, Art. 211, FC
Tonog v. Court of Appeals

485 G.R. No. 122906, February TABLE
7,OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
2002
FACTS:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where
she found a work as a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents. Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In
March 1992, the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In
May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the
judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial
court issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's
motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let
Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the
Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter
of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the
mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had
not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that
Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the custody of Gardin

RULING:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother h
as seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling
reasons” for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is b
elow seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandon
ment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of th
e child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a ch
ild is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may ex
ercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to
be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.B
earing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the appell
ate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.
Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an at
tachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be pro
perly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.

Vancil v. Belmes
G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
FACTS:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-
law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent. On August 13, 1987,
Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she
had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June
27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where
they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia
was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove
and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority
at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of
Vincent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has the right to child to be his guardian?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the
preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family
Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of
minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. "Of
considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incidents to parenthood,’ a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. xxx." Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that
Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,
Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability.
Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be
the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of
Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now
of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone
else who may not also qualify as a guardian. There is nothing in the law which requires the
courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the
fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find
much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are
not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement; the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and
guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married
on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21,
1987, or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion.
However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13,
1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a
Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced. After their marriage, the couple moved in with
respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia where they lived for more than two years. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived
in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he
could not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court order, he could
only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names
changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to
Amouage Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses,
and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed
that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children
come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to
see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going
489 home from school. Petitioner filed with the Regional TrialTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
Court, OF CONTENTS
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City
an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status
quo until further orders from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No.
1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth
and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does
not apply to this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court
found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent
Fouzi was capable both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor
children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a
Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws
of Islam in the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any
parent are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children, and [2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
parents. The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to
Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-
Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the
Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy
environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides
that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or
legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental
authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate children.

Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the
couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely
Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while
Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the
custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later,
Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to
US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with
her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the
child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned
Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate
transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child
RULING:
No. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
491 guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
TABLE institution. When
OF CONTENTSTABLE a parent
OF CONTENTS
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria
entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Sombong v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in
Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was
brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner
did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not
be discharged as a result. Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was
only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully
detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and
summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the
detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who
claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of
petitioner’s complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the
child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named
Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely
sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the
respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues
492 TABLE OF
raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus CONTENTSTABLE
proceeding OFthe
vis-a-vis CONTENTS
problem
respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the
mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the
circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount
consideration in this case which involves child custody. The RTC decision was reversed. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella
RULING:
Yes, but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This
is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty.”
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.”
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we
have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
of custody over a child. The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant
case will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the
right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from
the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to
be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.

Recto v. Trocino
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, Nov. 7, 2017 (En Banc)
FACTS:
A petition for Child Custody in relation to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and damages filed by
Magdaleno Peña (Peña) on December 20, 2005 against complainant, entitled Magdaleno M Peña,
for himself and in behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Pena v. Marie Roxanne G.
Recto. The petition was raffled to the RTC-Branch 62.
The RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary Protection Order, granting, among others, the temporary
custody of their fifteen month - old child, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Pena (Henri), to her former live-in
partner, Magdaleno Pena. Hence, an administrative complaint against Judge Henry J. Trocino,former
1
Executive Judge and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City (RTC), filed by
Marie Roxanne G. Recto (Complainant) for bias and partiality, ignorance of the law, grave
oppression, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing an ex parte Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) in relation to Civil Case No. 1409, a case for Child Custody under the Family
Code.
The OCA found no basis to hold Judge Trocino liable for bias and partiality and grave
oppression. It, however, found him liable for gross ignorance of the law for issuing an ex parte TPO
pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge acted with grave abuse of ignorance

RULING:
Yes, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Trocino
acted with gross ignorance of the law when he issued, ex parte, the December 23, 2005 TPO
pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262, which granted, among others, the
temporary custody of the minor child to Peña and issued a protection order against complainant
effective for thirty (30) days. He deliberately ignored the provisions of the Family Code, A.M. No. 03-
04-04- SC otherwise known as the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation
to Custody of Minors and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or the Rule on Violence against Women and their
Children. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A
judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law when the law or a rule is basic and the facts are
evident. Not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental authority of an illegitimate
child to the mother. This preference favoring the mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family
Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else. The mother's fitness is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings
before the trial court.
“Tender Age Presumption” Rule

Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the
CA which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their
minor daughter Simone. Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes
wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When
Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s
permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an
intention not to come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce
Simone in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with
Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody
in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below.
RULING:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under
495 Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling
TABLE evidence ofOFthe
OF CONTENTSTABLE mother’s
CONTENTS
unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of
the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of
caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child
from the mother’s custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the
mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their
almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and
his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to
appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for
the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another
witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations. The
judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody
of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling
reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
RULING:
Yes. Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take
into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.” No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
496 mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,”
TABLE This CourtOF
OF CONTENTSTABLE has held that
CONTENTS
when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art
363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”
Santos v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his
two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and
clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art.
214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when
both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not
been successfully shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the father should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel
Santos, Jr.
RULING:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody
of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case
of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as
to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the
minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the
legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position
to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed
as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his
only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held
that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still
the natural guardians of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting
away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody
from him.
David v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced
him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his
house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked
Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie
agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie
filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.

RULING:
Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule
102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as
498 the Court of Appeals observed, that the determinationTABLE of the
OF right to the custody
CONTENTSTABLE of minor
OF CONTENTS
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. For example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus
is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though
the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling
her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman
other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is
under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of
her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody
of her child. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground
for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to
support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the
grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give
support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving
and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter
case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."In the case at bar, as has already been pointed
out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by
the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years
of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must
respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and
here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child.
Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for
him on the award of his custody to him.
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as
a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to
the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was
born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of
499 giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded byOF
TABLE Reynaldo, TeresitaOF
CONTENTSTABLE left Reynaldo
CONTENTS
and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back
by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and
her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus
starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental
authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority
over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by
the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children
be granted.
RULING:
No. Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and
retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values against the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is
a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have
been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
Perez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
FACTS:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a
registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa
finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S.
twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a
tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in
Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home
only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband
stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.
According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was
in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back
immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely
solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay
here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it
would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation
by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile. Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of
their son to her.
The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph
of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon
500 TABLE
appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial OF CONTENTSTABLE
court’s order and heldOF CONTENTS
that granting
custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains
a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: “SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated appeal. When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care,
custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason
of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor.” The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease. It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration
is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international
instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working
mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well,
applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to
qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long
as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother. Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the
records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and
teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.

Dacasin v. Dacasin
G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo
Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the
Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as
exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to
obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce
the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
RULING:
No. At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995);
and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States
because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses
separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also
undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x. (This
statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound
policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.) Clearly then,
the Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and
petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law. The Agreement is
not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when
she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses
have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority. when spou
ses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole
custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is
void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2)
separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commons
ensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of t
he child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cann
ot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below sev
en years any more than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, hab
itually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custod
y of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of t
he exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213. Further, the im
posed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting
only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law g
ives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on cust
ody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even upposing that petitioner and respondent are not b
arred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiate
d the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought t
he parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.

Extent of Authority, Art. 233, FC
Caravan Travel And Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar

G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
FACTS:
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane
of Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300
van with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To
avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a
witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the
driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so,
Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the
van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her
since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint
for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was
an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real
party in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental
authority. She is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the
deceased. She is also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased." According
to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana
such as Abejar's action for damages. Abejar counters that Caravan failed to provide proof that it
504 exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. SheOF
TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE adds that the
CONTENTS
Court of Appeals' ruling that Caravan is solidarily liable with Bautista for moral damages,
exemplary damages, civil indemnity ex delicto, and attorney's fees should be upheld. Abejar
argues that since Caravan is the registered owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, and
solidarity liable for the tortious acts of its driver.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring
an action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on
account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death
RULING:
Yes. Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and
is, thus, a real party in interest in this case. Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons
who exercise substitute parental authority: Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointe
d guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in th
e order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother
or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; And (3) The child's actual cus
todian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or
a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preferen
ce shall be observed. Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of perso
ns exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents: Art. 233.
The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the perso
n of the child as the parents. Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grand
parents are also both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are unknown.
There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that
respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and
thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised
the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article
220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her personal n
eeds. To echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own da
ughter. We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of m
ajority, she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated up
on emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18.
Except for the legal technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her relationship with respondent remai
ned the same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no different b
ecause of Reyes' emancipation.

Rights and Duties of persons exercising parental authority, Art. 219-221, FC
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992
FACTS:
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single
gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The
respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the
respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility
in monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by
means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly
506 checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that
TABLE OF itCONTENTSTABLE
was missing from the safety
OF CONTENTS
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a
civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition
for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere
filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
ISSUES:
Whether or not natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action
RULING:
No. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and
unconscionable. Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and
disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over
Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused
by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”.
Extent of responsibility/liability, Art. 219, FC
Aquinas School v. Inton

G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011
FACTS:
This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a
student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and
not move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student
at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade
three religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of
surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis
got up again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and
kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s
seat. She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor.
Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their
son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation
of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to
the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC
dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to
him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees
of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of
damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin
for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
RULING:
No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers
to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
508 Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the taskOF
TABLE of CONTENTSTABLE
catechizing the OF
school’s grade
CONTENTS
three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in
public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons
had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the
responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach
its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the
occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed
records, certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that
she came from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in
handling the students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They
have a classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have
sufficient opportunity to observe her.
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010
FACTS:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where respondent Miranda
belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder and iron fillings
under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the
adviser is Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without
having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result
of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being
held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s
eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result, thereof,
Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo
surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case in the lower court, his
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jayson’smother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and
had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00. Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and
wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the
degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable
for moral damages.
The trial court orders and holds the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable to pay Jayson.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.

RULING:
Yes, the court held the same that the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable for the
accident. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the
conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher
degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and
teachers. "The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by petitioner St.
509 Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it hasOFbeen
TABLE shown that itOFwas
CONTENTSTABLE guilty of
CONTENTS
inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process
for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for
conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the
teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools
should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from
expected risks and anticipated dangers. Art. 218. Family Code provides: The school, its
administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
St. Mary‘s Academy of Dipolog City, the defendant-appellant, conducted an enrollment

drive for the school year 1995 to 1996. A feature of their enrollment campaign was the visitation
of different schools from where the prospect enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary‘s,
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Correspondingly, on that fateful day,
Sherwin and other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep that was owned by the
defendant, Vivencio Villanueva, on their way to Larayan Elementary School in Dapitan City. The
jeep was driven by James Daniel, II, who was then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, Daniel drove the jeep recklessly, and as a result, the jeep turned turtle. Carpitanos
died as a result of the injuries that he sustained during the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed
a case against James Daniel, II, and his parents, James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel; the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva; and St. Mary‘s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City, claiming
for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Mary‘s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
RULING:
The Court held that in order for St. Mary’s Academy to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission that was considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused. Negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. However, there was no
showing of such. Thus, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the jeep who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

AMADORA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, like other prospective graduates, looked forward to their

commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and receive his high school diploma
in the presence of his relatives and friends. As it turned out, however, fate would intervene and
would deny him that much awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while in the auditorium of
their school, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, one of his classmates, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun
which mortally hit Alfredo. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Aside
from that, the petitioners, the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos; its rector, the high school
principal; the dean of boys; and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to
the plaintiffs. Upon appeal, however, the decision was reversed, and all the defendants were
completely absolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be held liable
for the death of Alfredo Amadora.
RULING:
The Court concluded that Art. 2180 should apply to all schools, academic as well as
511 nonacademic. Following the doctrine of reddendo singular singuli,
TABLE where the school
OF CONTENTSTABLE OFisCONTENTS
academic,
responsibility for the offense committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student. This is the general rule. The reason for this is that the heads just supervise the
teachers who are the ones directly involved and interacting with their students. However, if the
school is for arts and trades, it is only the head that shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. The reason for this is that in old schools of arts and trades, they saw the masters or
heads of the school personally and these heads directly instructed their apprentices. Therefore,
in the case at bar, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is also not liable because there
was no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he
waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their nonobservance.
Also, the fact that he was not present during the incident cannot be considered against him
because the teacher was not required to report on that day as classes had already ceased.
SALVOSA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-70458, October 5, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioners in this civil case filed for damages against Jimmy Abon with Benjamin
Salvosa being the Executive Vice President of BCF. Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as an armorer of the school‘s ROTC Unit. As
an armorer of the ROTC, Jimmy Abon received his appointment from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). He received orders from Captain Roberto Ungos, the Commandant of the
BCF ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee
(officer) of the AFP. On March 3, 1977, at around 8 p.m., at the parking space of BCF, Jimmy
Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm
which Abon took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of BCF. Napoleon Castro died, and Jimmy
Abon was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No.
30, AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy Abon for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the wrongful act of Jimmy Abon.
RULING:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale
of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
512 "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to their TABLE
students and is called upon
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reasonable supervision over the conduct of their students." Likewise, "the phrase used in Art.
2180 — 'so long as the students remain in their custody’ means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are in attendance at the school, including recess time." In line with the case of
Palisoc, a student not "in attendance at the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as
the concept is embraced in the phrase "in attendance at the school," contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his
mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school
activity is conducted. Recess, by its nature, does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of
being enrolled or being in the premises of a school does not constitute "attending school" or
being in the "protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, it was held that Jimmy Abon cannot be considered to have
been "in attendance at the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable
with Jimmy Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA). Assailants, who were not members of the school’s academic community,
stabbed Bautista to death while in the premises of PSBA. This incident prompted his parents to
file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means, and methods before, during, and after the
attack on the victim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the complaint
states no cause of action against them, based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover
academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for
reconsideration was also dismissed but was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was
brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING:
Because the circumstances of the present case demonstrate a contractual relation

between PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. An
examination of Article 2176 shows that obligations that arise from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, only arise between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented the Supreme
513 Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
TABLE is a contract. Article
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conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in loco parentis. Article 2180
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody. But, this material situation does not exist in this case for the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. However, it does not
necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved from liability. When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is an established contract between them which results in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school aims to provide
the student with an education that would presumptively suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the
students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student agrees to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Failing on its contractual
and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is held liable for Carlitos Bautista’s
death, and hence, the petition was denied.
ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL
FOUNDATION v. PEREZ
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016
FACTS:
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four of its 4th-year medical students to the clinic,
namely: plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses
Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos).
They were tasked to complete a 4-week clerkship rotation at the clinic. Like the previous
batches, they were housed in the 2nd floor of the clinic. Per Ramos, he and his group mates
reported for duty at the Cabiao Clinic at approximately 10 a.m. of February 8, 2010. When their
shift ended at 5 p.m., the group went for a job and returned to the clinic at around 7 p.m. They
again went out at 9 p.m. to buy beverages, cooking oil, and other items needed for their
breakfast the following day and went to sleep sometime after midnight. Ramos admitted that
one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar that consisted of
either vodka or gin. He also admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic beverage
which they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole bottle. Ramos was
awakened sometime between 3 to 3:30 a.m. of February 9, 2010 when he heard Murillo
shouting from the other side of the room that there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to the
door which led to the living room, and when he opened the same, he saw thick smoke coming
from the left portion of the living room where there was a glow. He also felt extreme heat,
prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he tried to extinguish
the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When Ramos' attempt
to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on the
girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire. Unfortunately, the fire
514 resulted in the deaths of the female medical students,TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE
including the daughtersOFofCONTENTS
plaintiffs-
appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting to asphyxia. As a result of the deaths, defendant-
appellee St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased students in the amount of
PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds. The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted
an investigation on the incident, and in a Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified that the
fire was "purely accidental in nature due to unattended cooking."
ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Luke’s is liable for the death of the students.
RULING:
In the case at bar, one must remember that the victims were in the Cabiao Community
Clinic because it was a requirement of the school/petitioners. The students were complying to
an obligation under the enrollment contract - they were rendering medical services in a
community center as required by petitioners. It was thus mandatory upon the petitioners to
comply with their own obligations under the enrollment contract which is to ensure that the
community center where they would designate their students is safe and secure, among others.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners were negligent in inspecting the
premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in
order. These precautionary steps could have minimized the risk to the safety of the victims. The
petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As found by
the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in violation of numerous provisions of the
Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no
permits or clearances from the appropriate government offices. Petitioners additionally assert
that the Clinic was built under the direction, supervision, management, and control of the
Municipality of Cabiao and that it ensured that there was an agreement for the Municipality of
Cabiao to provide a 24-hour security to the Clinic. In the case at bar, it was amply shown that
petitioners and the victims were bound by the enrollment contracts and that the petitioners
were negligent in complying with their obligation under the said contracts to ensure the safety
and security of their students. For this breach of contract, petitioners are held liable.

Names and Surnames, Arts. 364-380 of the Civil Code; Art. 178 of the Revised
Penal Code
Republic v. Gallo
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
FACTS:
The case involves a Petition for Review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
denying the Republic of the Philippines' appeal from the Regional Trial Court’s order granting
respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of
Live Birth.
Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo" and has always been female. For
her, in her petition before the RTC, her Certificate of Live Birth contained errors which should
be corrected. For her, she was not changing the name that was given to her but was merely
correcting its entry.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the RTC of Ilagan
City, Isabela for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological
sex from "Male" to "Female."
Also, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle
name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May
23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and her parents' marriage
certificate.
516 The RTC, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form
TABLE and substance,OF
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a hearing
and ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) authorized the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to appear on its behalf.
During trial, Gallo testified and showed that her college diploma, voter's certification,
and transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who examined
her also certified that she was female. On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she never
undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any civil
or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport.
The RTC granted the petition and lent credence to the documents Gallo presented and
found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous." It concluded that there
was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The OSG appealed. The CA denied the OSG’s appeal and found that Gallo availed of the
proper remedy as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that
the change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error
RULING:
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act
No. 10172, amending Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on
changes or corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code. Article 376 states the
need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name. On the other hand,
Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the civil register
may be changed or corrected. Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court
under Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or surname provided they fall under
any of the valid reasons recognized by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine
the nature of the correction sought by Gallo. Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the
changes were substantive while respondent contends that it is Rule 108 which governs as the
changes pertain only to corrections of clerical errors. Upon scrutiny of the records in this case,
the Court rules that Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors. A clerical or
typographical error pertains to a “mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or records.” Considering that Gallo had shown that the
reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is commonly known, this Court
rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition to change her
current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name.
The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano
Gallo is granted. The Court directs that the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo be
corrected as follows:
1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";
2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";
5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and
517 6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "MayTABLE
23, 1981."
Use of Surname by Women, Art. 370-373, Civil Code
REMO v. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 1629202, March 5, 2010
FACTS:
While her marriage with Francisco Rallonza was still subsisting, Maria Virginia Remo
applied to renew her passport which was about to expire on October 27, 2000. With her renewal
application is the request to revert to her maiden name. When her request was denied, she
brought her request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs also
denied her request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married
name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the
implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and
death of the husband. The Office of the President affirmed the Secretary’s ruling when Remo’s
case was brought to it. The CA also affirmed the ruling. Consequently, Remo filed a petition for
review before the Supreme Court. She argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996)
conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife
to continue using her maiden name upon marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remo can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
RULING:
No. Indeed, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides, and as settled in the case of Yasin v.
Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court, a married woman has an option but not an obligation to
use her husband’s surname upon marriage. This means that she is free to either use her
husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. This is because when a woman
marries, she only changes her civil status and not her name. RA 8239 does not conflict with this
principle. It does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) actually allows a married woman who applies for a
passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt
her husband’s surname. In the case of renewal of passport, if a woman chooses to adopt her
husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will never prohibit her from continuously using her
maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name except in the cases enumerated in
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 which are; 1) death of husband, 2) divorce, 3) annulment, or 4) nullity
of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she cannot resume her maiden
name in the renewed passport.
YASIN v. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT
G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995
FACTS:
Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a Petition to
Resume the Use of Maiden Name. The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition
because it was lacking in form and substance in accordance with Rule 103 of Rules of Court
regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly
indicated in the title thereof, which should include all the names by which the petitioner has
been known. Hatima filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid order, alleging that the
petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and is merely a petition to resume
the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and after marriage of her former husband
to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion as compliance to Rule 103 is needed
if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s
maiden name and surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a woman is required to file a petition for change of name and comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court when she desires to resume her
maiden name in the case of annulment, divorce under the Code of Muslim Laws and her
husband is married again to another woman.
RULING:
No. When a woman marries, she does not need to apply and/or seek judicial authority to
use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by
adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right under
Article 370 of the Civil Code. Similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists, as in the case of
death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee does
not need to seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her
maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.
When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after
the marriage as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after
annulment of the marriage, and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory
except in case of legal separation. The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name
filed by petitioner before the respondent court a redundant and unnecessary proceeding since
the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Use of Surname by Children, Art. 364-369, Civil Code
IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He asserted that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption and ordered that pursuant to Article 189 of
the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a Motion for Classification and/or Reconsideration, praying that
Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her biological mother (Garcia) as her middle name.
The lower court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, holding that there is no law or
519 jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
TABLE OFofCONTENTSTABLE
his biological mother as his
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middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her biological father,
like Stephanie, to use as middle name her mother’s surname. The Court finds no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255 (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to use the Surname of Their Father), is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter. Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998) provides that as legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG
G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005
FACTS:
His parents were not yet married to each other when Julian was born on February 20,
1998, in Cebu City. When they eventually got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Julian’s parents planned to live in Singapore where Julian will
study together with a sister who was born in Singapore. His mother decided to file a petition in
the Regional Trial Court, seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the
Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given
for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when
he studies in Singapore because of his middle name as in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition as the reason given did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a
person, it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC
said that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julian considering that he was still a
minor. It is only when he reaches majority could he decide whether to change his name by
dropping his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether the mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname.
RULING:
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or
520 acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten
TABLE OF instrument,
CONTENTSTABLE he then
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bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a
middle name, and a surname. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
In this case, the only reason given by the petitioner for dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established and that the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA
DUTERTE
G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980
FACTS:
On April 28, 1978, petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte prayed to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal that her name be changed to Estrella S. Alfon. Her parents,
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte, have been taken care of by Mr. and
Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing in the same house
in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for 23 years. Petitioner has been using the name Estrella Alfon
since her childhood, has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name,
has continuously used the name Estrella Alfon since her infancy, and all her friends and
acquaintances know her by this name; and she has exercised her right of suffrage under the
same name. The lower court ruled that pursuant to Article 364 of the Civil Code which provides
that “legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father,” the
change of name of petitioner is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The
lower court further explained that the fact that petitioner has been using a different surname
and has become known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate also clearly shows that
the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. The lower court granted the petition insofar as the
first name is granted but denied with respect to the surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should have been allowed to change her whole name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court should have fully granted the petition. As
held in the case of Haw Liong vs. Republic, it was stated there some proper or reasonable causes
that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as
when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and
(3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.
In this case, it was shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella
Alfon, although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise. She was enrolled in
the schools from elementary up to college under the name Estrella Alfon. All her friends call her
by this name. She finished her course in Nursing in college and graduated and was given a
diploma under this name, and she exercised the right of suffrage under this name. There is
therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the
contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground which is to avoid confusion.
Use of Different Name, Art. 379-380, Civil Code
PEOPLE v. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 164368, April 2, 2009
FACTS:
An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was
likewise filed. The Amended Information reads: “…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired
during his tenure and his true identity as the President, represents himself as JOSE VELARDE
in several transactions and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias, Jose Velarde, was allowable under
banking rules despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that it was indeed allowable when the act was committed. The
Court cited the decision on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, stating that “A name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in
addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority.” Thus, the law on illegal use of alias to be
applied in the case at bar is that there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name, and there must be a habituality. The
repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual as it does not amount to a
customary practice or use.
URSUA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996
FACTS:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked
him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer
asked him that because the law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the
Ombudsman. Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that
he feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the
said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to
reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez.” When
he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. However, a staff
of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then
recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to 3
years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate
The Use Of Aliases.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper.

RULING:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A.
No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity – something which could not have been
intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use
a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law,
what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in
business transactions without prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua
merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not used in a business transaction. The use of
the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in
this instance, he was not even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman.
When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public. In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the
C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict
application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was
committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the
law is to punish evils defined therein, so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law
need not be applied.
Change of Name, Art. 376, Civil Code; RA 9048; RA 1017
BASILIO GAN v. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016
FACTS:
Emelita Basilio Gan, the petitioner, was born on December 21, 1956, out of wedlock to
Pia Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a
Filipino citizen. The petitioner's birth certificate, registered in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.
523 On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition TABLEfor
OF Correction of Name
CONTENTSTABLE with the
OF CONTENTS
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the
full name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She
claimed that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from
elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government
records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for correction of name should be granted.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter
of right; and a proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to
change his name. In this case, the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for
change of name is that she has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records
and is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. In her amended petition for
change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock. She did not state
whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, which would make her a natural child. The petitioner also failed to allege any
evidence that would show that she indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's
evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by her mother, school records,
employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records.
Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she still
could not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus, a clear error on the part of the RTC
to have allowed the petitioner to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio
Gan."
Civil Register, Arts. 407-413, Civil Code
YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN

G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, married private respondent on

November 28, 2002, in the Philippines. Then, while they were residing in Japan, petitioner
found out that his wife was previously married to another man. Petitioner filed for nullity of
marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. During trial, aside from his testimony,
petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent.
The RTC, however, ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man on the basis that petitioner’s
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior
marriage nor of Arambulo’s death, which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage
certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further
524 ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification
TABLEisOFlikewise unreliable
CONTENTSTABLE OFsince he is a
CONTENTS
stranger to the preparation of said document.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. There is no question that the documentary
evidence submitted by petitioner is all public documents as provided in Art. 410 of the Civil
Code. As public documents, they are admissible as evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the
sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due
execution was not necessary anymore. Moreover, not only are the said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein, and in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since
neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
BALDOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 170645, July 9, 2010
FACTS:
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on October 30, 1948. However, his
birth was not registered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar until roughly 36 years later or
on February 11, 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and
Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate
of live birth. On March 8, 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
a complaint for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that
Reynaldo was not really her son.
ISSUE:
Whether the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid.

RULING:
Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to

have gone through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on
March 8, 1995, after the lapse of 10 long years from the approval on February 11, 1985, of the
application for delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition.
She should have done so within the 10-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no less
than Nieves herself informed the Local Civil Registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of
her application for delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son.
Between the facts stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping statements
of Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books
making up the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the
truth of the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys
the presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of
live birth but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
525 Petitioners miserably failed to do so. TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Amendments/Correction of Entries, Art. 412, Civil Code
REPUBLIC v. COSETENG-MAGPAYO
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, the respondent Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo is the son of Fulvio Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming,
however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008, at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to Change His Name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification
from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in
its National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth
certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001, and 2004
Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the
name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be
made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that respondent’s petition to change his name lacks merit. They
stated the grounds on how a person can effect a change of name under Rule 103:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
interest.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous
to, the recognized grounds. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to
affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
FACTS:
The petitioners contended that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court was
improper as the private respondents sought to have the entry for the name of petitioners’
mother changed from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who was a completely different person.
What private respondents therefore sought was not merely a correction in name but a
declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng,
but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.” Petitioners thus label
private respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy
in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners’ above argument, the Court of Appeals observed that the
proceedings were simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status, and/or right. Stated
differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the
occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise
deprived said persons of rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register can be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order.
RULING:
The Supreme Court cited Republic Act No. 9048 which substantially amended Article
412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.”
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil
register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of
Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is
left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of
the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre
had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005
FACTS:
A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in the Civil Registry of her son, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a
minor, before the RTC of Cebu City. Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang.
They were not yet married to each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julian’s
parents got married, the latter executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s
name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The reason for the
petition is that since the family plans to stay in Singapore and in Singapore the middle names or
the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipated that
Julian will be discriminated against because of his current registered name carrying a middle
name. Also, the spouses’ daughter and Julian might get confused if they are really brothers and
sisters because they have different surnames. Lastly, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R,” but if there is, they pronounce it as “L”.
ISSUE:
Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the case as it is a common
practice in Singapore to omit said surname.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court stated the valid grounds for change of
name, which are:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion;
(4) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
(6) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
interest.
The only reason given by petitioner for dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly established and that the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from
his registered name. Also, petitioner is only a minor, and it is best that the matter of change of
his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand the value of the change of his name and granting of the
same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He is a biological male who feels
trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The
procedure was successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a
petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in
his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these
changes so that he can marry his American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on
equity that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him and that there was no opposition to his petition (even the
OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point and that no harm, injury or prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting
the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and her fiancé and
the realization of their dreams.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender reassignment.
RULING:
528 No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such TABLEentries
finds no support in existing
legislation. Pursuant to R.A. 9048, it should be the Local Civil Registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio
insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition
filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is based (gender
reassignment) is not one of those provided for by the law.
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition
for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it and not with
the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male. Hence, it
was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is permanent.
REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appeared that Jennifer Cagandahan was
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued
by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus
has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor, but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the Local Civil
Registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex, as appearing in her birth certificate, be changed.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme
Court made use of the available evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his
529 mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult forTABLE
the ordinary person. TheOFCourt
OF CONTENTSTABLE added
CONTENTS
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died
in a vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin
Titular showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo.
Cristina made inquiries. In the course of which, she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the
Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that:
(1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January
13, 1997; and
(2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents;
hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza.
Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille
were married in 1998. Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo)
filed before the RTC of Negros a Petition to Correct the Entries in the Birth Certificate Record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated
by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is
bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
RULING:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article
412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical
error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction
of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003,
and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.
530 REPUBLIC v. LUGSANAY
TABLEUY
G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013
FACTS:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate
of Live Birth. Respondent was born on February 8, 1952, and averred that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Accordingly, her Certificate of Live Birth shows that
her full name is "Anita Sy," when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as
"Norma Lugsanay." Her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of
Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is
an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the
surname of her mother. She is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an order in favor of
respondent. OSG assailed the decision for failure to implead indispensable parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the correction of entry in her birth certificate.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court nullified the decision of the lower courts. If the subject matter of
a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true
that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. The Supreme Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition. The respondent seeks the correction of her first name and surname,
her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino."
Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also
her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or
corrections respondent wanted to make.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity
or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is mandated.
Chua v. Republic
G.R. No. 231998, November 20, 2017
FACTS:
On January 7, 2013, Eric filed a Petition for Change of Surname from "Kiat" to "Chua."
In his petition, Eric alleged that he was born on November 8, 1973, to a Chinese father named
"Cheong Kiat" (Cheong) and a Filipino mother named "Melania Sibayan" (Melania). However,
after his birth, his father Cheong allegedly secured a favorable judgment allowing him (Cheong)
to change his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." Thus, Eric adopted the new surname of his father,
"Chua," and had been using the name "Eric Sibayan Chua" in all of his credentials. Eric likewise
alleged in his petition that he is known in their community as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat."
The petition was docketed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Balaoan, La Union.
531 After the R TC found that the petition is sufficientTABLEinOFform and substance,
CONTENTSTABLE and upon
OF CONTENTS
establishing the requisite jurisdictional facts, trial ensued. Eric testified that he was not able to
secure a copy of his father's birth certificate since the latter was born in China and that his
mother Melania told him that his father Cheong changed his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua;"
and that his Certificate of Live Birth is the only document where his surname appears as "Kiat."
Offered in evidence were his Certificate of Baptism, Voter’s Certification, Police Clearance,
National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, High School Diploma, and the Certificates
of Live Birth of his children, which all state Eric's name to be "Eric Sibayan Chua." Melania also
testified, claiming that Cheong used the surname "Kiat" in China but used "Chua" in the
Philippines and that "Chua" is the surname Cheong used when they got married and that it was
her uncle who erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric Kiat" and when Eric
was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to China and contacted them no longer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in disallowing petitioner from officially
changing his name.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is legal and factual
basis for granting Eric's petition for change of name. To recall, his petition is not only anchored
on his father's alleged change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua," but also on the fact that Eric
had been using the surname "Chua" in all of his credentials. Thus, it may be that Eric and
Melania's testimonies are not preponderant proof of Cheong' s change of surname, but this
should not foreclose the possibility of granting the petition on a different ground.
As Eric has established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric
Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the Court, other than his Certificate of
Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." To reiterate, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter
Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High
School Diploma all reflect his surname to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric
Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his
official documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will correspondingly
be compelled to have their records changed. For even their own Certificates of Live Birth state
that their father's surname is "Chua." To deny this petition would then have ramifications not
only to Eric's identity in his community but also to that of his children.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition be granted.
Additionally, public respondent failed to demonstrate that allowing petitioner to change his
surname will prejudice the State, strengthening the Court’s resolve to grant the sought-after
relief.
Republic v. Tipay
G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018
FACTS:
In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgie L. Tipay (Virgel) sought the correction of
several entries in his birth certificate. Attached to the petition are two copies of his birth
certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao
Oriental and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Both copies reflect his gender as "FEMALE"
and his first name as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in the local civil
registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born on
May 12, 1976. Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous and sought the correction of his
532 birth certificate as follows: TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
(a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;"
(b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and
(c) his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976."
The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case proceeded to trial.
Aside from his own personal testimony, Virgel's mother, Susan L. Tipay, testified that she gave
birth to a son on February 25, 1976, who was baptized as "Virgel." The Certificate of Baptism,
including other documentary evidence such as a medical certificate stating that Virgel is
phenotypically male, were also presented to the trial court.
The RTC granted Virgel’s petition. The CA denied the Republic’s appeal. The CA ruled in
favor of Virgel, stating that while the correction of the entry on his gender is considered a
substantial change, it is nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The CA also held that the petition filed with the trial court fully complied
with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 108 because notices were sent to the concerned
Local Civil Registrar and the OSG. Since Virgel was able to establish that he is indeed male, a
fact which remains undisputed, the CA upheld the trial court's decision. Unsatisfied with the
ruling of the CA, the Republic appealed to the Supreme Court insisting that the entries sought to
be corrected are substantial changes outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Republic also
added that the CA should not have equated the procedural requirements under Rule 103 with
that of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entries sought to be corrected are substantial changes outside the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
RULING:
The Court denies the petition. However, this Court finds that the evidence is insufficient
to establish that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976. It is true that initially, the changes that
may be corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or
harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship, or nationality of a person are
considered substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the rule.
R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in. the
performance of clerical work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to the understanding.
It was further amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 1017230 was passed to expand the authority of
local civil registrars and the Consul General to make changes in the day and month in the date of
birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a
typographical error or mistake in the entry. Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the
petition for correction with the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to
correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth certificate, the proper remedy
was to commence the appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The changes in the entries pertaining to the gender and date of birth are
indisputably substantial corrections, outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical
error that may be corrected administratively. The RTC proceedings were clearly adversarial in
nature. It dutifully complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Since the
Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even cite a specific rule of procedure that
Virgel failed to follow, the Court has no reason to depart from the factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence refuting Virgel's assertion that he is
indeed phenotypically male, the correction of the entry on Virgel's sex in his birth certificate,
from "FEMALE" to "MALE," was correctly granted.
With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court again disagrees with the CA that the
533 alleged date (i.e., February 25, 1976) is undisputed. The TABLE
NSOOF CONTENTSTABLE
copy OF CONTENTS
of Virgel's birth certificate
indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976, a date obviously different from that alleged in the
petition for correction. As a public document, the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is
presumed valid and prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. Virgel bore the burden of
proving its supposed falsity.
Virgel failed to discharge this burden. The police clearance presented to the trial court
corroborates the entry in the NSO copy, indicating Virgel's date of birth as May 12, 1976. The
Court is also unconvinced by the other documentary evidence supposedly showing that Virgel
was born on February 25, 1976 because the information indicated in the identification card from
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Member Data Record from the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, were all supplied by Virgel. These are self-serving information, which do
not suffice to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the date of birth reflected in the
NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate.
Thus, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is denied. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in is affirmed, only insofar as the corrections of the following entries in
the birth certificate are concerned: (a) first name, from "Virgie" to "Virgel;" and (b) gender, from
"FEMALE" to "MALE."

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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

Persons and Family

ANDRES, Xylex Dave P. | BAUTISTA, Jamilla Kate A. | CAWAING, Roxanne L. | CERVANTES,

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (ART. 1-18, NCC) 24

COMPUTATION OF TIME, ART. 13, NCC 31

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. 32

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, ART. 3, NCC 33

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 33

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION/PRESUMPTION OF IDENTITY OR SIMILARITY/PRESUMED-IDENTITY

WONG WOO YIU V. VIVO 35

PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS, ART. 4 NCC 41

WAIVER OF RIGHTS, ART. 6, NCC 48

GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS 48

HOW LAWS LOSE THEIR EFFECTIVITY, ART. 7, NCC 55

BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 55

JUDICIAL APPLICATION AND TINTERPRETATION OF LAWS: JURISPRUDENCE, ART. 8, NCC 62

DUTY OF THE COURTS TO DECIDE, ART. 9, NCC 74

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW, ART. 10, NCC 75

ASAALI, V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS 76

LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS 77

PROHIBITIVE LAWS, ART. 17, PAR. 3, NCC 77

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 77

LAW ON PROPERTY ART. 16, NCC 79

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS 86

CUSTODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS 97

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA 102

HOTEL NIKKO V. REYES 102

LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO, ART. 20, NCC 104

MANUEL V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 104

ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES, ART. 21, NCC 106

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY 106

UNJUST ENRICHMENT, ARTS. 22-23, NCC 112

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. V. RRN INC. 112

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE, ART. 24, NCC 118

VALENZUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS 118

RIGHT TO PRIVACY, ART. 26, NCC 119

PHILEX MINING CORP. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 121

UNFAIR COMPETITION, ART. 28, NCC 121

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION V. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 121

MANANTAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 122

PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS 128

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., V. ARGOS 130

COJUANGCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 132

QUASI-DELICT/TORTS, ART. 2176-2177 133

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, ART. 36, NCC 135

BELTRAN V. PEOPLE 135

QUIMIGUING V. ICAO 142

BIRTH, ART. 41, NCC 143

GELUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 143

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT, ART. 38-39, NCC 144

CATALAN V BASA 144

DEATH, ART. 42, NCC 147

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V MONTAÑO 147

SURVIVORSHIP, ART. 43, NCC 148

JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO 148

DOMICILE (ARTS. 50 AND 51, NCC) 149

MARCOS V. COMELEC 149

INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY CODE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION, ART. 256, FC 151

ANCHETA, V. ANCHETA 153

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE. 156

DELA ROSA V. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN 156

REQUISITES: ESSENTIAL, ART. 2, FC SEX 159