Glenda Mae G.

Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019

LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

G.R. NO. 231658, JULY 4, 2017

FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, for a period not exceeding sixty days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao in
accordance with Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution which provides that, “In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

On May 25, 2017, after the proclamation of the Martial Law, the President
submitted a written report to the Congress pointing out that rebellion and lawless
violence worsened with the passing of time and that numerous acts of violence
challenged the authority of the duly constituted authorities. The President’s Report
stated that on May 23, 2017, Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City,
established several checkpoints within the city, burned down certain government and
private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces and started
flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby
indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, of their powers and prerogatives.

The President also explained that on May 23, 2017, the government conducted
operation in order to capture the high ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and the Maute Group who caused havoc in Mindanao by taking control of major social,
economic and political foundations of Marawi City. It was believed that Maute Group has
extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed such as the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and that illegal drug money was used to provide their financial
and logical support. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City
and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole
and the possible tragic consequences once it falls under the control of the lawless
groups.

Despite several petitions to the Supreme Court from the Lagman Group,
Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group questioning the factual basis of the
President’s Proclamation of martial law, the Senate declared that it found “no compelling
reason to revoke Proclamation 216.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court can review the petitions as stated in Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken
by Congress jointly or separately.

3. Whether or not the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration
of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely the
calling out powers; the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and the declaration of martial law.
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

1. YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the
petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.

2. YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by

the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis.
On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, such
a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation

beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration
not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration.
Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the
accuracy of the facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of
a petition “in an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand,
Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated
by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with,
and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any
perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny
the Court of its power to review.

3. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President’s decision pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to
avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence,

arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called
“graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the
President decides which power to choose.

4. YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation

or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the
President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be
limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President
only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law
and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified

news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to
have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence,
twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a
purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels
of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE MARVIC LEONEN

Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic Leonen dissenting opinion explained

that declaration of martial law in Mindanao by President Duterte is unconstitutional. He
said that the President cannot be granted undefined powers over the entire Mindanao
region because his reading of the Constitution is that the Court should be stricter, more
precise, and more vigilant of the fundamental rights of the people.

Justice Leonen pointed out that unlike previous versions of our Constitution, the
1987 Constitution provides for limitations for the declaration of martial law and therefore,
any declaration must clearly articulate the powers that would be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief. It cannot now just be a declaration of a state of
Martial Law. Otherwise, it would be unconstitutionally vague. It would not be possible to
assess the sufficiency of the facts used as basis to determine when public safety
requires it.

According to Justice Leonen, the terrorism acts that happened in Marawi City
could be stopped and prevented with the efforts of the military and police and not by the
declaration of martial law. The military can suppress the violence and can disrupt the
many planned violence that is yet to come.

The declaration of Martial law in Mindanao is considered unconstitutional in the

sense that it has no factual basis. The facts presented are not sufficient to reasonably
conclude that the armed hostilities and lawless violence happening in Marawi City is for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers or prerogatives.

Aside from the failure to present their sources to support the factual bases cited
in Proclamation No. 216 dated May 23, 2017 and the Report of President Duterte dated
May 25, 2017, there is also absolutely no factual basis for the dismantling and arrest of
illegal drug syndicates and peace spoilers. The inclusion of illegal drug syndicates and
peace spoilers unjustifiably broadens the scope of martial law. There has been no
evidence presented in this case that would explain their inclusion in the Operational
Directive for the Implementation of Martial Law.

Moreover, Justice Leonen said that there’s no need to declare martial law
because there was no actual rebellion but rather it was only a terrorism act by the
Maute Terror Group who cannot be considered as rebels but just plain terrorists
committing terror acts. They are not engaged in political acts of rebellion. They do not
have the numbers nor do they have the sophistication to be able to hold ground. Their
ideology of a pessimist apocalyptic future inspired by the extremist views of Salafi
Jihadism will sway no community especially among Muslims.

Jutice Leonen pointed out that those who lost their lives during the encounters in
Marawi City will be best honored if the Maute group will be rightfully called as “terrorists
doing atrocious acts. To him, the difference between terrorists and rebels boils down to
their intention. Terrorists use fear and violence to advance their agenda or ideology,
which may or may not be political in nature. While rebels use violence as a form of
strategy to obtain their goal of destabilizing or overthrowing the government to gain
controls over a part of or the entire national territory. If rebels succeed in overthrowing
the government, then they install themselves as the ruling party and their status is
legitimized.
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
The Maute Group are terrorists, pure and simple. They are not rebels within the
constitutional meaning of the term, neither is there armed conflict as understood under
International Humanitarian Law.

Justice Leonen also believed that the said declaration of martial law is vague and
not duly expansive because the government’s presentation of facts and their arguments
of their sufficiency are wanting. The vagueness of Proclamation No. 216 hides its real
intent. The Operational Directive for the Implementation of Martial Law issued by the
Chief of Staff of the AFP orders his forces to dismantle the NPA, other terror-linked
private armed groups, illegal drug syndicates, peace spoilers, and other lawless armed
groups.

Arresting illegal drug syndicates and so-called “peace spoilers” under Martial Law
unduly expands Proclamation No. 216. The factual basis for the declaration of martial
law as presented does not cover these illegal acts as rationale for its proclamation.
They are not acts falling within “rebellion” and cannot serve as justification for arrests
but are made possible because of a vague and overly broad Proclamation.

In his departing words, Justice Leonen said that relying on the iron fist of an
authoritarian backed up by the police and the military to solve our deep seated social
problems that spawn terrorism is fallacy. He argues that the ghost of Marcos’ Martial
Law lives within the words of our Constitution and that ghost must be exorcised with
passion by this Court whenever its resemblance reappears.

According to him, the court will never allow itself to step aside when the powerful
invoke vague powers that feed on fear but could potentially undermine our most
cherished rights. Never again should we fall victim to a false narrative that a vague
declaration of martial law is good for us no matter the circumstances. We should have
the courage to never again clothe authoritarianism in any disguise with the mantle of
constitutionality.

The extremist views of religious fanatics will never take hold in our communities
for so long as they enjoy the fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution. There
will be no activists for so long as our government is open and tolerant of the activism of
others who demand a more open, tolerant and socially just society.

We all need to fight the long war against terrorism. This needs patience,
community participation, precision and a sophisticated strategy that respects rights
while at the same time using force decisively at the right time and in the right way. The
terrorist wins when we suspend all that we believe in. The terrorist wins when we
replace social justice with disempowering authoritarianism.

We should temper our fears with reason. Otherwise, we succumb to the effects of
the weapons of terror. We should dissent–even resist–when offered the farce that
Martial Law is necessary because it is only an exclamation point.

DISSENTING OPINION OF SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO

Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
On July 4, the Supreme Court voted, with one dissent, to uphold the
constitutionality of President Duterte’s 60-day martial law proclamation in Mindanao.
Senior Associate Justice Carpio was one of three who voted to uphold, but partially–
limiting it only to Marawi City.

He partially granted the petitions in G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, 231774, and
declared Proclamation No. 216 unconstitutional as to geographic areas of Mindanao
outside of Marawi City, for failure to comply with Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. Proclamation No. 216 is valid, effective, and constitutional only within
Marawi City. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno and Associate Justice Alfredo
Benjamin Caguioa found the proclamation justified in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and
Sulu, but unconstitutional when applied to the rest of Mindanao.

Justice Carpio’s opinion based in Article VII, section 18 was that actual rebellion
or invasion and public safety must both concur before the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, may be authorized by the 1987 Constitution to impose martial law or suspend the
privilge of the writ of habeas corpus in any part, or in the entirety, of the country.

Thus, the Court, in discharging its duty to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the proclamation and/or suspension has a duty to make a finding of fact that
there is or there is no actual rebellion or invasion and to determine whether public safety
requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to
suppress the rebellion or invasion.

Also, Justice Carpio’s finding is that there is probable cause as to the existence
of an actual rebellion and the necessity to the public safety of a proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City but
not elsewhere. This finding is based on Proclamation No. 216 and the President’s
Report to Congress which show clearly that the actual rebellion is confined to Marawi
City only.

The capacity to rebel, absent an actual rebellion or invasion, is not a ground to

declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the
Constitution. The fear that the rebellion in Marawi City would spread to other areas in
Mindanao cannot justify martial law outside of Marawi City as “imminent danger” of
rebellion, as a ground for declaration of martial law, no longer exists, having been
removed from the 1987 Constitution. Allowing martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the rest of Mindanao where there is no actual
rebellion is a gross violation of the clear letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution.

Ending his dissent, Justice Carpio noted the significance of the President’s own
words, “Immediately after issuing Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte announced
to the entire nation and to the world that his martial law “will not be any different from
what Marcos did.” The Court must take this public and official statement seriously for
this is no trivial matter. When President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972
under the 1973 Constitution, he abolished Congress, shut down media, imprisoned
leaders of the political opposition, packed the Supreme Court with his law school
classmates and loyalists, and ruled by decree thereby making himself a dictator for over
13 years until the people ousted him from power in 1986.

The 1987 Constitution was written precisely to prevent a recurrence of the martial
law of Marcos. It is apparent that President Duterte does not understand, or refuses to

understand, this fundamental principle that forms the bedrock of our democracy under
the 1987 Constitution, despite his having taken a solemn oath of office to ‘preserve and
defend the 1987 Constitution.’
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019

The Court cannot simply gloss over this Presidential mindset that has been
publicly broadcasted to the nation and to the world. Any sign of acquiescence by the
Court to this Presidential mindset would be fatal to the survival of the 1987 Constitution
and our democracy. The Court cannot play with the fire of martial law which could turn
into ashes the very Constitution that members of the Court are sworn to preserve and
defend, a tragic event that once befell the Court in 1972 and brought the Court to its
lowest point in its entire history. The Court must never allow the 1972 debacle to be
repeated again. With this wisdom from hindsight, the Court must now stand firm and
apply the clear letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution without fear or favor, for the
nation and history demand no less from every member of the Court.

The decision of the Court in the present petitions has far reaching ramifications
on the future of our civil liberties and our democratic society under the rule of law. For in
deciding the present petitions, the Court prescribes the fundamental rules governing the
exercise of the Commander-in-Chief powers under the 1987 Constitution not only for
the incumbent President but also for all future Presidents. The Court should not
mercilessly inflict on the Filipino people the constant fear of a recurrence of the terrifying
martial law of Marcos.

1st Extension of Martial Law

G.R. No. 231658
December 5, 2017
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
On July 4, 2017, the Court rendered its Decision finding sufficient factual bases
tor the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and declaring it as constitutional. Petitioners
timely filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) also filed its Comment.

After a careful review of the arguments raised by the parties, we find no reason to
reverse our July 4, 2017 Decision.

All three Motions for Reconsideration question two aspects of the July 4, 2017 Decision,
i.e., the sufficiency of the tactual bases of Proclamation No. 216 and the parameters
used in determining the sufficiency of the factual bases. Petitioners, however, tailed to
present any substantial argument to convince us to reconsider our July 4, 2017
Decision.

Sufficiency of the Factual Bases of Proclamation No. 216 has been rendered moot by
tile expiration of the said Proclamation.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that "the President x x x may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x x x Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it."

From the foregoing, it is clear that the President's declaration of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is effective for 60 days. As aptly
described by Commissioner Monsod, "this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good
for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates."1 Any
extension thereof should be determined by Congress. 1be act of declaring martial law
and/or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President, however,
is separate from the approval of the extension of the declaration and/or suspension by
Congress. The initial declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is determined solely by the President, while the extension of the declaration
and/or suspension, although initiated by the President, is approved by Congress.

In this case, Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 2017 expired on July 23, 2017.
Consequently, the issue of whether there were sufficient factual bases for the issuance
of the said Proclamation has been rendered moot by its expiration. We have
consistently ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when it "ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical value."2 As correctly pointed out by the OSG, "the martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus now in effect in Mindanao
no longer finds basis in Proclamation No. 216"3 but in Resolution of Both Houses No.
11 (RBH No. 11) adopted on July 22, 2017. RBH No. 11 is totally different and distinct
from Proclamation No. 216. The former is a joint executive-legislative act while the latter
is purely executive in nature.

The decision of the Congress to extend the same is of no moment. The approval of the
extension is a distinct and separate incident, over which we have no jurisdiction to
review as the instant Petition only pertains to the President's issuance of Proclamation
No. 216.
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
Thus, considering the expiration of Proclamation No. 216 and considering further the
approval of the extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress, we find no reason to disturb our
finding that there were sufficient factual bases for the President's issuance of
Proclamation No. 216.

However, although the Motions for Reconsideration are dismissible on the ground of
mootness, we deem it prudent to emphasize our discussion on the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy.

Petitioners, in essence, posit that the Court is required to determine the accuracy of the
factual basis of the President for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To recall, we held that "the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or
invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3)
there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion."4 Moreover, we stated in the assailed Decision that "the phrase 'sufficiency of
factual basis' in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the
only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."5 Requiring the Court to determine the
accuracy of the factual basis of the President contravenes the Constitution as Section
18, Article VII only requires the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis.
Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher degree of
standard. As we have explained in our July 4, 2017 Decision:

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
basis, and not piecemeal or individually. either should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported
to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's
appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his
decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on
the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period
that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of
course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very
purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of
Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to 'immediately put an end to the root cause of the
emergency'. Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the
facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could
have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.

Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military
officers as credible evidence that the President can appraise and to which he can
anchor his judgment, as appears to be the case here.

At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. in Fortun:
President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, considering that the
matter of the supposed armed uprising was within their realm of competence, and that a
state of emergency has also been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless
violence similar to the 'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
is a threat to the public safety warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of
the writ.

Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring
martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched,
does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called to
act as public safety requires.
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to
proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for
purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not
been accurately reported to him. After all, the Court's review is confined to the
sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or
suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is
concerned. x x x

Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case.
Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or
suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report
that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public
safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.

In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the
President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination
on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether
the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are
sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.6 (Emphasis supplied)
This is consistent with our ruling that "the President only needs to convince himself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed."7 The standard of proof of probable cause does not
require absolute truth. Since "martial law is a matter of urgency x x x the President x x x
is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring
martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."8

Notably, out of the several facts advanced by the President as basis for Proclamation
No. 216, only five of them were being questioned by the petitioners. However, they were
not even successful in their refutation since their "counter-evidence were derived solely
from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown that efforts were
made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile."9 Even granting
that the petitioners were successful in their attempt to refute the aforesaid five incidents,
there are other facts sufficient to serve as factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

There is absolutely no basis to petitioners' claim that the Court abdicated its power to
review. To be sure, our findings that there was sufficient factual basis for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and that there was probable cause, that is, that more likely than
not, rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, were reached after due
consideration of the facts, events, and information enumerated in the proclamation and
report to Congress. The Court did not content itself with the examination only of the
pleadings/documents submitted by the parties. In addition, it conducted a closed-door
session where it tried to ferret additional information, confirmation and clarification from
the resource persons, particularly Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana and
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Eduardo Año. At this juncture, it must be
stated that the Court is not even obliged to summon witnesses as long as it satisfies
itself with the sufficiency of the factual basis; it is purely discretionary on its part whether
to call additional witnesses. In any event, reliance on so-called intelligence reports, even
without presentation of its author, is proper and allowed by law.

The Court's acknowledgment of the President's superior data gathering apparatus, and
the fact that it has given the Executive much leeway and flexibility, should never be
understood as a prelude to surrendering the judicial power to review. The Court never
intended to concede its power to verify the sufficiency of factual basis for the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The leeway
and flexibility accorded to the Executive must be construed in the context of the present
set up wherein the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus are grounded on actual invasion or rebellion, not on imminent threat
or danger thereof; as such, time is of the essence for the President to act quickly to
protect the country. It is also a recognition of the unassailable fact that as Commander-
in-Chief, the President has access to confidential information. In fact, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas even opined that the Court might have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of
the Executive; in turn, the Executive should share its findings with the Court if it wants to
convince the latter of the propriety of its action.10 Moreover, it is based on the
understanding that martial law is a flexible concept; that "the precise extent or range of
the rebellion [cannot] be measured by exact metes and bounds;"11 that public safety
requirement cannot be quantified or measured by metes and bounds; that the
Constitution does not provide that the territorial scope or coverage of martial law should
be confined only to those areas where the armed public uprising actually transpired; that
it will be impractical to expand the territorial application of martial law each time the
coverage of actual rebellion expands and in direct proportion therewith; and, that there
is always a possibility that the rebellion and other accompanying hostilities will spill over.

As regards the other arguments raised by petitioners, the same are a mere rehash
which have already been considered and found to have no merit.

WHEREFORE, petitioners' Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH

FINALITY for mootness and lack of merit.

No further pleadings shall be entertained.

Let entry of judgment be made in immediately.

2nd Extension of Martial Law

Lagman vs. Pimentel III
G.R. No. 235935
February 06, 2018

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018. On May 23, 2017,
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty days, to address the rebellion mounted by
members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives
his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue
Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while
the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity
of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of

Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one
year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security
assessment.”

On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar

recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-
inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign
Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist
terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of
lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao.”

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8,

2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address
the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives
his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while
the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff
General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning
January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.”

On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar

recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-
inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign
Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist
terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of
lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao.”

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017,

asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to
extend Proclamation No. 216.

RULING:
YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases
for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety
requires the extension.

Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial law
or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reasons cited by
the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which
caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have
been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through
the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces and continued attacks.

AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the
DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of
the Dawlah Islamiyah.
Glenda Mae G. Gemal 1-A September 6, 2019
Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-
inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint
Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in Marawi has
substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to other places in
Mindanao.

Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public

The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension
was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public.

The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally
emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court
will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the
Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its
“briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been
vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from
personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified
official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the
same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the
information thus presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its
reliability.

The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish
that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it.
The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for the further extension
sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses
No. 4.