Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210054
Agenda Formation
William H. Riker (ed.) (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1993),
viii þ 285pp., ISBN: 0 4721 0381 4
T
he relation between social clea- not reached a single consistent, generally
vages, policy issues and political accepted and empirically successful ana-
parties has been one of the most lytical framework. We distinguish an
extensively studied subjects in compara- overview between two groups of contri-
tive political science, since at least the butions. The first takes political parties as
1960s. The subject seems to target one of the dependent variable to be explained,
the core areas of politics, but different by pre-existing social cleavages and
approaches and schools of thought have issues, as in the classical works of
502 european political science: 4 2005
(502 – 520) & 2005 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680-4333/05 $30 www.palgrave-journals.com/eps
Lipset–Rokkan and Lijphart. The authors Once cleavages were ‘translated’ (in a
of the second group take political parties typical expression) into party systems
as an independent variable with strong during critical junctures, such as pro-
explanatory power regarding policy issue cesses of democratisation involving the
choices, electoral campaigns and political establishment of mass suffrage and
party competition, and includes different stable electoral systems, they were ‘fro-
approaches represented by Riker and by zen’ (also a very typical word) for a very
Budge et al. Our critical review of the long term. As famously stated, ‘The party
existing literature concludes with a systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but
new analytical proposal integrating significant exceptions, the cleavage
the variables mentioned, in which we structures of the 1920s’ (Lipset and
emphasise the initiative of party leaders Rokkan, p. 50).
as the origin of the politicisation of The Lipset–Rokkan approach implied a
issues through public policy design, as kind of sociological determinism. The
well as the indirect formation of social authors did not even make a clear dis-
structures. tinction between social cleavages and
politicised issues sustaining the formation
of political parties. Although they men-
FROM CLEAVAGES TO tioned that strategic considerations re-
PARTIES garding organisation, elections, and
coalition formation should be taken into
A generally recognised starting point for account, they did not elaborate or even
the study of the subject here consists of consider political party leaders’ moti-
Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset’s con- vations in such intermediate processes
tributions in the late 1960s (especially (as early noted, for instance, by Alford
Lipset and Rokkan; Rokkan et al, 1970; and Friedland, 1974; see also Flora,
see also the compilation by Flora, 1999). 1999: 46).
The usual way in which these seminal Even more so, the bulk of empirical
contributions were understood implied literature produced by the followers of
that deep social cleavages, produced by this approach did not take into account a
remote historical events and transforma- number of interesting suggestions, alter-
tions, shaped the formation of political native hypotheses and hints prudently
parties and, as a whole, the party system introduced by the founding authors in
in each country. National revolutions in their seminal works. Regarding, in parti-
the French variant produced centre-per- cular, the number of cleavages, Lipset and
iphery and state–church cleavages, while Rokkan indeed expected voter alignments
industrial revolutions in the English var- to be shaped ‘by such obvious socio-
iant produced land-industry and owner– cultural criteria as region, class, and
worker cleavages. Conservative and lib- religious denomination’. But they also
eral political parties were prominent in noted that, in any society, there was a
these processes. But new parties were potential for politicisation arising from ‘a
formed on the basis of the mentioned great variety of relationships in the social
cleavages, especially ethnic–territorial, structure’, even if many of these social
radical versus religious, agrarian, and relationships had not yet been trans-
socialist parties. In each country, the formed into occasions of political polar-
existence and relative strength of each isation. They even proposed to ‘consider
party depended on the importance of the the possibility that the parties themselves
originating revolutions and the depth of might establish themselves as significant
corresponding cleavages. poles of attraction and produce their own
josep m. colomer and riccardo puglisi european political science: 4 2005 503
alignments independently of the geogra- first section of the present review deals
phical, the social, and the cultural under- with these two strands of the literature.
pinnings of the movements’ (Lipset and
Rokkan, p. 3, underlined in the original). SOCIAL CLEAVAGES
This consideration would have been very
consistent, in fact, with the alternative Consistent with Lipset and Rokkan’s gen-
approach later developed in the literature eral suggestion for a ‘comparative politi-
here to be reviewed, in which political cal sociology’, the basic orientation of
parties are taken as the origin of further empirical work gave priority to
issue salience and even cleavage forma- the discovery of social parameters and
tion. operationalised data. They sought to
These caveats somehow eroded the confirm and refine the ‘social cleavage’
authors’ ‘freeze’ thesis. In fact, the very model and develop predictions about the
logic of the analysis suggested that new presence, strength, cohesion and fate of
‘critical junctures’ created by unpredicted various parties. Two different lines of
social transformations, as well as institu- investigations were, however, developed.
tional changes, especially of electoral The first sought to prove a direct relation-
systems, could foster significant innova- ship between social cleavages and politi-
tions in party systems. When looking at cal party strength as measured by voter
cases of party systems which were shown alignments and stability. The second ac-
to be ‘more fragile and open to new- tually tried to prove a close relationship
comers’ than the ‘freeze’ thesis would between politicised issues (not necessa-
have permitted to expect, Lipset and rily related to social cleavages, although
Rokkan included as exceptions France, this was not always clear in the analysis)
Germany, Italy and Spain all outstanding and political party formation and differ-
cases in their initially small sample of ences.
countries. They even dared mocking The huge amount of empirical and
some easy, rigid implications that could analytical work that developed from the
be derived from their own vision: ‘In the purely ‘social cleavage’ assumption,
fifties many observers feared the devel- especially through the sociological tradi-
opment of permanent majority parties.. . tion of political behavioural research re-
It is heartening to see how quickly these presented by the Columbia and Michigan
observers had to change their minds’. schools cannot all be reviewed here. In
Regarding the future, they did not in fact comparison with the macro-structural
predict stability of voter alignments to relations between social cleavages and
political parties, but rather that ‘there party systems previously sketched, the
will clearly be greater fluctuations analysis was here transferred to micro-
than before’, producing not only fre- level relations between individual charac-
quent alternations of previously existing teristics, such as race, language, religion,
parties in government but also ‘new income or profession, and voter align-
varieties of coalition-mongering’ and ments with one or another political party.
party formation (Lipset and Rokkan, It was, thus, taken for granted that
pp. 50–55). cleavages were given and fixed, accord-
Further work arising from this initial ing to the ‘freeze’ thesis. The hypothe-
inspiration took two main directions: (1) sised line of causality was from social
social cleavages as a structural explana- cleavages to individual characteristics,
tion of voters’ behaviour; and (2) the which were produced by the former, to
relation between politicised policy issues political parties, which were conceived as
and the number of political parties. The ‘expression’ and ‘representation’ of those
504 european political science: 4 2005 cleavages, issues and parties
social and individual treats. Logically, the irrelevant to partisanship’ (Franklin,
expected finding was stability of voting 1992: 404).
behaviour, although this was not neces-
sarily the only inference possible from POLITICISED ISSUES
Lipset and Rokkan’s approach.
We do not review this body of literature A second group of contributions focused
here, but only summarise some evalua- on the relation not between social clea-
tions of the general results in electoral vages and political parties but between
sociology after several generations of politicised issues and parties. The main
scholarly endeavours. Regarding the Uni- reference in a comparative perspective is
ted States, Seymour Lipset himself very the work of Arend Lijphart (1984, 1999:
early on observed, ‘the existing political Chapter 5). He still used some ‘social
parties have found it difficult to link cleavage’ vocabulary, stating, for in-
positions on the new issues to their tradi- stance, ‘a relatively large number of
tional socioeconomic bases of supporty parties are needed to express all these
party loyalties have declined’ (Lipset, dimensions’ (p. 89). But in his empirical
1981). Lipset, thus, somehow confirmed recollection of relevant issues in 21 or 36
his and Rokkan’s own prediction about a countries (respectively, in the two edi-
future of fluctuations. But much more tions mentioned), Lijphart grouped to-
recently, a general survey of the accumu- gether the four basic social cleavages
lated research still saw ‘social cleavages previously identified by Lipset and Rokkan
as a necessary condition’, although ‘not a (ethnic, religious, rural–urban, and socio-
sufficient one for the emergence of poli- economic dimensions, roughly corre-
tical cleavages’ (Manza and Brooks, sponding to the previously mentioned
1999). (For the sake of clarity, in the centre–periphery, state–church, land–in-
present review we are calling political dustry, and owner–worker cleavages, re-
cleavages ‘issues’). spectively) plus another three dimensions
According to multi-country comparative not derived from social structures but
studies, also very early on since the more directly introduced and politicised
1970s, ‘change became the normal pat- by political entrepreneurs: regime sup-
tern in many countries’. After revising a port, foreign policy, and materialist ver-
series of contributions during the 1980s, sus post-materialist (also based on
prominent authors in the field sum- previous work by Taylor and Laver,
marised that ‘social structure has long 1973; Dodd, 1976; Sartori, 1976; and
been irrelevant to party choice’, while the Inglehart, 1977). Lijphart found an aver-
decline of cleavage politics was presented age of more than two relevant issue
as the removal of a straightjacket opening dimensions per country, with values be-
the gates to initiatives for politicising a tween 0.5 and 3.5.
variety of issues producing massive elec- The crucial point was the relation be-
toral change. ‘Indeed, much recent scho- tween these issue dimensions, whether
larship has emphasised the apparently derived or not from social cleavages, and
increasing independence of issue-based the party system. Initially, Lijphart noted
voting choice from conventional cleavage that ‘some important issues in a country
structures’ (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, may not constitute issue dimensions of its
1992: 55; after revising Nie et al, 1981; party system, they may divide parties
Franklin, 1985; Rose and McAllister, internally instead of from each other’. But
1986; and Knutsen, 1988). More expedi- when proceeding to the applied analysis,
tiously, Mark Franklin concluded that issue dimensions were ‘defined in terms
‘social cleavages had (finallyy) become of differences between instead of within
josep m. colomer and riccardo puglisi european political science: 4 2005 505
parties’ (Lijphart, pp. 78, 87, emphasis found the best empirical fit for their
added). Logically, he found a very strong relation as I þ 1 ¼ P71. But this somehow
correlation between the number of deviated from Lijphart’s operative defini-
issue dimensions in each country, as tion of issues as differences between, not
defined in terms of differences between within, parties. In further work, Taage-
parties, and the number of different pera (1999) himself clarified the ques-
political parties. tion. First, he referred to issues as ‘the
A more precise relation between the number of social cleavages that are
number of issues and the number of politicised’, noting that ‘social heteroge-
parties was established, on the basis of neity is not the same as political hetero-
Lijphart’s first collection of data, by Rein geneity. The former deals with potential
Taagepera and Bernard Grofman (1985). cleavages, the latter with the actually
They apparently still confused social clea- politicised ones’. Although he still men-
vages and politicised issues, as revealed tioned that ‘low heterogeneity puts a lid
in their interpretation that both ‘Lipset on the number of partiesy because there
and Rokkan (1967) and Lijphart (1984) will be no demand for many parties’
may be interpreted as standing for the (emphasis added), he also noted – from
proposition that ‘the more axes of clea- what could be rather called, in contrast, a
vage there are within a society, the ‘supply-side’ approach – that ‘some poli-
greater will be the number of political tical issues do not reflect pre-existing
parties’’. But, by taking Lijphart’s list of social heterogeneity’. The number of
issue dimensions for what they were – issues can, thus, be higher or lower than
politicised issues, derived or not from the number of social cleavages. But it will
social cleavages – Taagepera and certainly be related to the number of
Grofman found a simple relation that parties. Taagepera concluded that if ‘po-
made much sense: ‘parties minus issues liticised issues mean issues on which
equals one’, or I þ 1 ¼ P (where I stands some parties disagreey the connection
for issues and P for parties). The (between the number of issues and the
basic logic behind this finding is that number of parties) may be tautological’
when there is a single politicised issue (Taagepera, 1999: 545).
dimension two parties proposing alterna- The substantive findings of the social
tive policies define the issue as a con- cleavage literature can be summarised in
troversial one. Thus, the minimum values the following way. First, causality from
in democracy would be I ¼ 1, P ¼ 2. social cleavages to the creation and
A second issue can be politicised if a strength of political parties has not been
new, third, party takes the initiative of proved, but rather dismissed and found
introducing a new policy proposal on that irrelevant, probably because the structu-
issue alternatively to the status quo. The ral-deterministic hypothesis did not ser-
politicisation of a third issue would iously consider the intermediate strategic
imply that a fourth party enters the stage of politicising cleavages into issues
scene, and so on. and building the corresponding organisa-
Of course, it may also happen that a tions or coalitions. Second, the correla-
new policy issue is raised by an already tion between the number of politicised
existing party. Conversely, there can be issues and the number of political parties
more than two policy proposals (and the is strong (of the type I þ 1 ¼ P71), but
corresponding parties) on an issue, or a somewhat tautological since, in the em-
new issue can give place to the creation of pirical data used, issues had been
not one but two new parties with opposite defined precisely as differences between
stands. In fact, Taagepera and Grofman parties.
506 european political science: 4 2005 cleavages, issues and parties
‘Electoral sociology, tions developing an activity directly ad-
dressed to voters in search of their votes,
even after a long-term but also having a crucial role in the
sustained effort with design, implementation and evaluation
sophisticated analytical of public policy. We do not consider here
other important aspects of political par-
techniques and abundant ties, such as their different forms of mass
empirical data, seems to or activist organisation or other institu-
have abandoned the tional features.
Four different kinds of contributions are
hypothesis that social considered, coming from the rational
cleavages can explain choice school in political science, the insti-
individual votes for tutionalist branch of political economy,
electoral campaign and media studies,
political parties.’ and the party manifestos project.
Initially, the ‘agenda formation’ model
Electoral sociology, even after a long- (Riker, 1983, 1986, 1993, 1996) emerged
term sustained effort with sophisticated as an alternative to Downsian spatial
analytical techniques and abundant em- models of electoral competition (Downs,
pirical data, seems to have abandoned 1957). Roughly speaking, in the Down-
the hypothesis that social cleavages can sian models it is assumed that both
explain individual votes for political par- voters’ preferences and the issue policy
ties. In some of the other cases, the space (whether one-dimensional or multi-
weakness of positive results can be due dimensional) are exogenously given, while
to the number of variables considered, parties or candidates choose policy-
the data available or the operationalising ideological ‘positions’ in the available
methods used. But none of the disparate space. The Rikerian agenda model, in
scholarly contributions gathered and re- contrast, assumes that voters’ prefer-
viewed above, all of them trying to ences and party positions are basically
explain the formation, survival and given (as constrained by an ideological
strength of political parties as dependent ‘argument’) and then party leaders
on some social structural variables, has choose issue dimensions to be given
achieved conclusive results. salience in order to shape the policy
space.
FROM PARTIES TO ISSUES Some elements in this approach had
already been sketched out by Stokes
A completely different approach has tried (1963) in an early critique of Downs’
to explain the number and selection of theory. Based on his and other colleagues’
politicised issues in elections, as well as empirical findings in the field of electoral
its role in explaining electoral competi- sociology mentioned above (especially
tion, post-electoral coalition formation Campbell et al, 1960), Stokes remarked
and government performance, not as that the electoral policy space tends to be
derived from social cleavages or any multi-dimensional and it does not have a
other similar structural variable, but from stable structure. In order to understand
political parties’ strategies. In the follow- electoral competition, he recommended
ing, we will refer to ‘political parties’ in the that ‘different weights should be given
limited sense of organisations driven by (to) different dimensions at different
electorally oriented leaders. This implies, times’. Stokes even sketched the strate-
a vision of political parties as organisa- gic argument: ‘The skills of political
josep m. colomer and riccardo puglisi european political science: 4 2005 507
leaders who must maneuver for public A number of crucial points in this
support in a democracy consist partly in approach which have been further devel-
knowing what issue dimensions are sali- oped are discussed in the following
ent to the electorate or can be made pages: (1) the origins of policy issue
salient by suitable propaganda’ (Stokes, proposals and preference formation; (2)
1963: 372). the role of parties and ideologies in policy
More specifically, Stokes made an ana- design; (3) the implications for electoral
lytical distinction between position- and campaigns; and (4) the evaluation of
valence-issues, which would clarify some policy performance and the subsequent
of the further discussion. For position- attachment of certain issues to specific
issues, there is a set of policy alternatives parties.
the parties can take and for which a
distribution of voters’ preferences can be THE ORIGINS OF POLICY
defined – for instance, on trade or school PROPOSALS
issues. Stokes suggested that, on these
issues, the Downsian analytical frame- An issue may become salient in voters’
work, in which parties choose policy perception if it is known that problems
positions, would be appropriate. For va- related to it have occurred which deserve
lence-issues, in contrast, there can only some policy action (note that ‘agenda’,
be a dichotomous positive–negative evalu- which literally means ‘things to be done’,
ation. An ‘overwhelming consensus’ is has the same Latin root of ‘action’ and
assumed to be the goal of government ‘agent’). The status quo policy might have
action on these issues: all parties and become unsatisfactory, even if it has been
electorate want it – for instance, peace or stable for a long period. Durable dissatis-
prosperity. Party competition on those faction can be the result of the fact that a
issues consists in claiming credit or get- single vote on multiple policy issues may
ting blamed for it (based on the party’s impede the implementation – on less
previous government record and the like- salient issues – of policy positions that
lihood of its performing well in the future). are preferred by a majority of voters (a
Interestingly, Stokes acknowledged that Downsian insight noted, for instance, by
a position-issue can become a valence- Besley and Coate, 2000, 2003). Dissatis-
issue (for instance, a consensus for less faction may also derive from changing
taxes can be created) and vice versa circumstances, such as technology or
(peace at any cost, for instance, can migration, causing a traditional policy to
suddenly become a divisive issue). Also, produce new unintended, undesirable
voters can change their minds regarding effects. But all of this also implies that
which parties can be positively or nega- voters’ preferences may not be exogen-
tively associated with each issue. ously given but formed in the process of
To summarise according to the Down- challenging the status quo and giving new
sian model of two-party competition, salience to an issue.
we should expect that parties will con- For a political party or entrepreneurial
verge in their positions on position- politician, giving salience to an issue
issues. But, according to Stokes’ (which essentially means talking about it
contribution, parties will coincide on and making it news) implies taking a new
wanting more of consensual valence- ‘position’ on the issue itself in contrast to
issues. So, in general, no confrontation the presumably unsatisfactory status quo
between highly different policy positions policy, as well as framing the new position
could be expected in electoral competi- or policy proposal with some value or argu-
tion in the long term. ment. Only the presentation of alternative
508 european political science: 4 2005 cleavages, issues and parties
policy proposals induces the ‘activation’ favour of the poor while the other party
of relevant voters’ preferences. Voters may give salience to the implication that it
can then form their preferences over requires new taxes, thus creating a two-
different policy alternatives on an issue value dimension for the issue. On the
by comparing the status quo policy on the abortion issue, one party will give sali-
issue and some new policy proposal. ence to the value of ‘freedom’ of choice,
Thus, voters’ clearly defined preferences while another party will try to make the
cannot exist in the absence of alternative value of ‘life’ more salient. Giving a new
policy proposals and the corresponding issue salience may make the space one-
issue salience. If no new policy proposal is issue dimensional, but this might be only
presented, the issue will not be salient, the first step in a process in which the
but then voters will not have preferences party disadvantaged on that issue will
on the issue either. This line of reasoning react by giving salience to an alternative
is consistent with the idea that voters as value on the issue, by this way creating
decision makers have a limited amount of new multi-dimensionality in the space. In
attention to devote to the formation of such a framework, rhetoric can be con-
preferences regarding policy issues. Once sidered as a further development of
an issue becomes salient thanks to a new heresthetics, within a single issue that
policy proposal, voters will dedicate some can be framed in different ways.
time and attention to defining their pre- In this approach, the formation of the
ference. public agenda is explained as the result of
William H. Riker once made a distinc- endogenous salience structures based on
tion between ‘heresthetics’ as the art of information and messages, without hav-
selecting issues and ‘rhetoric’ as the art of ing to include previously formed voters’
arguing about the issue by means of preferences or exogenous preference
persuasive values. Regarding the latter, changes. The selection of salient issues
it has been frequently remarked that two is not determined by pre-existing social
types of arguments exist: ‘negative’ ar- cleavages, but the result of political
guments oriented to rejecting the status party’s or entrepreneurial politician’s in-
(quo) and which, according to standard itiative to provide information, news and
psychology, are likely to be given rela- values on some potentially politicised
tively high weight by voters; and ‘posi- issues.
tive’ arguments for choosing new
proposals, which may be accepted by PARTY AND IDEOLOGY
default. (cf. in Bailey, 1969; Davis and
Ferrantino, 1996; Riker, 1996; Sartori, It is mainly the parties that choose new
1998). issues in their platforms and public de-
It should be possible to develop similar bate. Each party, apart from deciding
spatial models for each of the two manip- which position to hold on each issue, has
ulative strategies just mentioned. In a a fixed endowment of ‘effort’ (measurable
multi-dimensional issue space, for each in terms of time, money, personnel,
issue-dimension there can be a multi- organisation) that can be distributed
dimensional value space. For instance, across issues. The share of effort devoted
governmental social spending and abor- to an issue can determine the weight
tion can be two salient issues in an given by voters in evaluating the party’s
election forming a two-dimensional issue position on that issue (Cantillon, 2001).
space. But for the issue of social spending In addition, parties may also want to
one party may want to emphasise its select candidates who are more compe-
characteristic of social investment in tent on the issue they want to highlight.
josep m. colomer and riccardo puglisi european political science: 4 2005 509
This could be a way to commit credibly to which a single-seat election is decisive for
devote effort to a given issue. the composition of both the parliament
As remarked above, voters’ preferences and the cabinet, as well as for all the set of
and choices are also determined by the corresponding policies, is likely to be
limits of their resources, in this case potentially highly multi-dimensional and
involving memory and capacity of atten- open to issue innovation. In contrast,
tion span. They are likely to give more within institutional frameworks involving
weight to repetitive, intense messages, division of powers and decentralisation,
as is often remarked by cognitive psychol- each election for a separate institution
ogy (see comments by Riker, 1983). For (say, the presidency, each of the cham-
many voters, a reasonable hypothesis is bers of parliament, regional and local
that salience suggests the pre-commitment governments) is likely to deal with
of the party, if it arrives in government, relatively low numbers of potential
to dedicate the corresponding fraction of issues and make innovation more diffi-
time and resources to the issue. An cult. Ultimately, if there were a single
alternative hypothesis more in accord issue for each election because the
with traditional Downsian assumptions, division of powers among different
would be that a voter can choose a party institutions made policy decisions highly
on the basis of the voter’s concern for an fragmented, no choice of issues would be
issue and the party’s position on the issue possible. The standard Downsian model
even if it is not raised or giving salience by of a single-issue space with only a
the party. However, it would be highly position-taking strategy would apply
risky for a voter to vote for a party on the very well.
basis of non-salient issues because it is The second limitation on policy innova-
obviously likely that the party, once in tion derives from the role of ideology. The
government, will not pay much attention relation between policy issues and politi-
to them and will spend more effort on cal ideology has been systematically ex-
issues in which it has committed itself plored in extensive empirical analyses by
during the electoral campaign. the Manifesto Research Group led by Ian
Parties’ innovative proposals are, thus, Budge (Robertson, 1976; Budge et al,
limited, especially by the party system 1987, 2001; Laver and Budge, 1992).
itself and the communication role of Even in an internally highly flexible party
political ideologies. First of all, policy or in a multi-party system with low entry
innovation is limited because a party sells costs, policy-issue innovation is limited by
packages on several issues at the same the encompassing, rigid role of political
time. This implies that a system of policy ideologies. Although ideologies may not
choice based on political parties’ initiative give detailed guidance of which position
may be unsatisfactory for many citizens to take on the issue in policy space, they
on many policy issues. New issues can be do indicate the general policy ‘area’ (in a
developed inside old parties or create spatial sense) that a party should occupy.
the occasion and motive for the formation On the basis of general ideologies, parties
of new parties – as already suggested recognise each other’s spatial boundaries
by Lijphart’s comments. Which of the and, then, ‘parties cannot move much
two alternatives will occur strongly de- beyond the centre, nor change their
pends on the electoral and institutional relative positions to left or to right,
system. because of the confusing effects this
Also, simple institutional frameworks – would have on electors and the lack of
such as a single-chamber parliamentary credibility of a party which repudiated its
regime with single-member districts – in past commitments, not to mention the
510 european political science: 4 2005 cleavages, issues and parties
‘Even in an internally tions on other issues. The need to main-
tain ‘ideological consistency’ in order to
highly flexible party or keep their members together and com-
in a multi-party system municate in simple ways with voters
with low entry costs, limits parties’ capabilities to innovate or
fight successfully on certain issues be-
policy-issue innovation cause they cannot take the most popular
is limited by the position on them.
encompassing, rigid role Ideological consistency, thus, con-
demns some parties to appearing as
of political ideologies.’ disadvantaged on certain issues and
therefore not interested in emphasising
policy beliefs of leaders themselves’ or giving them salience. However, as
(Budge, 1994: 451). some authors remark, the specific policy
In fact, this is a very Downsian argu- position contents of ‘left’ and ‘right’ or of
ment. According to Downs, the relevance ‘progressive’, ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’
of the left-right (or a similar) dimension global ideological positions are acciden-
for a high number of economic, social, tal: ‘There is after all no logical or inherent
moral and cultural issues is largely due to reason why support for peace (for in-
communicative restrictions imposed by stance) should be associated with govern-
the existence of mass electorates and ment interventionism (also for instance)’
media. It would not be rational for a voter (Budge et al). What is less accidental is
with very small influence on the electoral the convenience to maintain predictable
result to pay high costs for obtaining and relatively stable positions on each
detailed information about each party’s issue and on the encompassing ideologi-
stands on each issue. General ideological cal dimension, in order to be able to offer
and symbolic messages may provide understandable ‘packages’ to the voters
sufficiently good hints and cues to make over time.
a voter’s choice probably correct. The analysis of party electoral manifes-
But a party’s ideological consistency tos in twenty-five countries during the
can produce cognitive dissonance among period 1945–1998, which relies heavily
voters. Certain voters can find it hard to on ‘intensive reading of the texts them-
manage instances in which their agree- selves’, distinguishes fifty-seven policy
ment with a party is partial, in the sense issues and a limited number of ideological
that they agree on some issues and they dimensions. These are the politicised
definitely disagree on some other issues. issues that take salience in electoral
Instead of weighting pros and cons on campaigns, in a similar vein to Lijphart’s
different issues when making their previously mentioned issue dimensions,
choice, some voters may prefer to em- which claimed to capture all relevant or
brace a given political party, which may ‘salient’ issues in elections. Budge and the
entail dissonance on some issues. members of the Manifesto Research
At the same time, communicational Group distinguished seven groups of
requirements prevent parties from adopt- issues (close to but not exactly corre-
ing disparate or apparently contradictory sponding to Lijphart’s seven dimensions),
positions on different issues and force roughly characterised as: minority groups,
them to take rather predictable positions morals, the economy (including agrarian
when a new issue emerges in order to be protectionism), social issues (including
understood by the electors as being environment), political regime, foreign
consistent with the party’s previous posi- policy, and government effectiveness
josep m. colomer and riccardo puglisi european political science: 4 2005 511
(the latter not included in Lijphart’s) (see, 1987; see survey by Budge et al, 2001).
for instance, Budge et al, Table 3.2). According to these analyses, the inde-
As can be seen, these distinctions be- pendence of the number of issues politi-
tween groups of politicised issues were cised by political parties in electoral
not necessarily related to pre-existing campaigns from social cleavages or other
social cleavages, since several of them pre-existing structural variables seems to
were strictly related to government per- be complete.
formance.
By using factor analysis, the Manifesto
Research Group tried to identify how ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS
many issue dimensions, that is, groups
of issues on which parties could be The literature reviewed here supports the
distinguished, were relevant in each hypothesis that, in electoral campaigns,
country. Budge and his co-authors have parties devote more effort to persuading
repeatedly emphasised that the left-right voters that some issue should be ‘salient’
ideological dimension is the most com- in their decision rather than to confront
mon one across countries and they have different policy proposals on any issue,
provided the corresponding relative party that is, party ‘positions’ in the typical
positions over time. On all issues parties spatial approach. In the public debate,
tend to locate themselves on the same using campaign advertisements and
relative part of the spectrum with respect media messages, each party seeks to
to other parties (no ‘leap-frogging’), give salience to those issues on which it
although they do not follow any pattern is more credible and expects to obtain
of convergence or divergence in the long voters’ attention and votes. It follows that
term (Budge et al; see also Laver and parties do not debate policies but simply
Hunt, 1992; Laver, Benoit and Garry, try to give salience to different issues,
2003). ‘In most countries, there is no even using ambiguous statements re-
steady movement to convergence or garding their policy proposals.
divergence; parties come together and No party is, of course, in full control of
move apart presumably in response to the environment, in which other parties,
imperatives of party competition, not to pressure groups, unexpected events and
secular trends towards deideologisation’ the media contribute to shaping the public
(Budge, 1993). agenda. From this point of view, two
In the short term, during election cam- types of campaign agendas could be
paigns, parties can fight on several di- distinguished, depending on whether
mensions at once by choosing different they are endogenous to party competition
issues to emphasise. No single number of or exogenous if imposed by external
issue dimensions has been found appro- events, pressure groups or independent
priate to make generalisations across media.
countries. Initially, a major finding was For endogenous formation of campaign
that ‘the optimal spaces for each country agendas, Riker distinguished two strate-
were never less than three-dimensional, gic principles. By the ‘dominance princi-
and sometimes four- or five-dimensional’ ple’, the party insists on an issue where
(Budge et al, 1987; Chapter 18; Budge, the party proposal proves to be success-
1993: p. 58). Further research has pre- ful; by the ‘dispersion principle’, the party
sented results in two (Robertson, 1976; abandons an issue where the party pro-
Schofield and Laver, 1985; Miller and posal fails in attracting voters’ attention
Schofield, 2003), three (Warwick, 2000), or support. These party strategies pro-
or five issue dimensions (Budge et al, duce electoral campaigns in which fail to
512 european political science: 4 2005 cleavages, issues and parties
discuss with one other – so they talk Electoral campaigns are also charac-
about different issues and change the terised by a prominent role of mass
subject when are explicitly challenged media in forming the agenda. As was
(Riker). already remarked by Cohen (1963), the
Several electoral tactics can be identi- media ‘may not be successful much of
fied in the continuing effort to attract the time in telling people what to think,
attention to some preferred issue. One but it’s stunningly successful in telling
may include personal attacks of provoca- its people what to think about’. McCombs
tion on the rival party or candidate in and Shaw (1972) is the seminal empirical
order to divert their attention or put them contribution in which such concept of
on the defensive and then fill the corre- agenda-setting effects of news coverage
sponding vacuum with the preferred has been put to test. Further empirical
message. Also, a party can create oppor- studies have adopted a wide range of
tune events, which may go from the usual research designs, from cross-sectional
town visits and press conferences to book surveys to aggregate time series ana-
presentations and artfully provoked inter- lysis, from repeated cross-sections to
national conflicts. controlled experiments. The broad
Similarly, Budge underlined that elec- message stemming from this literature,
toral campaigns are mostly about sal- even if with some internal variation, is
ience, not confrontation, therefore lea- that agenda-setting effects on public
ding to no real debates (see also Simon, opinion are indeed sizeable. However,
2002 for empirical support). Somewhat there are several causal links connecting
more strongly, Budge even held that voters’ real-world experience, the
parties ‘rarely take specific policy stands media agenda, and the voters’ concerns.
at all’, but, at the same time, emphasise Real-world cues and experience influence
some policy areas because ‘their credibil- both the media and the voters’ concerns,
ity on that position is strong enough to while the media, if the theory of agenda-
pick up votes’ or the party is ‘committed setting is correct, has a strong and
and hence most trusted by electors’ (see separate influence on the salience
Budge et al, 1987, 2001). structure of the voters. Additionally,
In ‘exogenous’ campaign agendas, political parties can have clear incentives
however, a party may face itself forced to alter the set of news that voters
to deal with an issue on which it has a receive. Political leaders may try and
disadvantaged position – say, for in- manipulate media outlets by buying their
stance, after a big scandal, massive silence on the bad news; a more subtle
popular protests, a terrorist attack or an way of obtaining the same result is to
external war. Then, given that the topic make the story on the preferred issue
may have received overwhelming weight more palatable to the taste of media
in news and voters’ perception, the best editors or journalists (Besley and Prat,
response for the disadvantaged party is to 2004; Puglisi 2004a). From an empirical
give salience to the least unfavourable point of view, Puglisi (2004b) in fact
value attributes within the topic itself. As shows that the New York Times, over
already mentioned, the corresponding the time period spanning from 1946 to
discussion on different values for the 1994, systematically gives more cover-
same issue will create a new multi- age during presidential campaigns to the
dimensional value space within the one- Democratic topics of health care, civil
dimensional issue space. Parties will talk rights, labour and social welfare, but only
now on the same issue, but still without when the incumbent president is a
discussing it with one another. Republican.
josep m. colomer and riccardo puglisi european political science: 4 2005 513
‘Political leaders may try will also lose salience in future contests.
In the long term, thus, whether new
and manipulate media policy proposals fail or succeed, we
outlets by buying their should expect increasing policy consen-
silence on the bad news; sus among political parties. The number
of issues potentially to be politicised and
a more subtle way of given salience by offering new policy
obtaining the same result proposals will always be very large, but
is to make the story on an increasing number of them will be
successively discarded from the electoral
the preferred issue more contest.
palatable to the taste At this stage, we can compare again the
of media editors or implications of this model of agenda
formation with some basic elements in
journalists’ classical Downsian spatial models of elec-
toral competition. In the latter, in which
POLICY PERFORMANCE AND the basic strategy is the party’s choice of
PARTY ADVANTAGE policy positions, the main results are
either policy convergence on a single
When a new policy issue is given salience issue-dimension or chaotic trajectories
in order to attract voters’ attention and or unpredictably changing policies in a
votes, three alternative outcomes may multi-dimensional issue space (see Grof-
happen. First, the party may fail in its man, 2004 for a revision). In the model of
endeavour, never arrive in government agenda formation, in contrast, a multi-
and not be able to implement the policy. dimensional issue space does not nece-
Second, the party may win sufficient ssarily produce policy instability. It is
support to enter government and imple- expected that parties will select some
ment the policy, but this may produce issues to be given salience, while voters
unexpected or undesirable effects, caus- will vote on the basis of the vector of
ing voters to prefer again the previous weights they attach to the different
status quo or a similar position. Finally, issues. In spatial terms, the sequence
the new policy may be successful in the implicitly assumed in the agenda model
sense of being satisfactory for the citizens can be presented with the following
and this may reinforce the party’s elec- steps:
toral support. In the first and the second
occurrences, which both imply a policy (1) There is a status quo policy on an
failure, it is likely that the party, having issue which is non-salient, on which
promoted salience for the new issue, will voters have no real preferences (be-
be either electorally weakened in future cause they have no alternatives to
elections or withdraw its policy proposal. compare), and on which there is no
The previous status quo policy will pre- party competition.
vail. In the third occurrence, as the new (2) An innovative party chooses a new
policy will be implemented with wide issue ‘position’, that is, a new policy
popular acceptance, it is likely that the proposal in contrast to the status quo
other party or parties will lower the and give it salience and value.
salience of the issue or even adapt their (3) Voters form their preferences by
positions on the issue to the new status comparing the status quo with the
quo. A new policy consensus may be new policy proposal. It is in the
created and as a consequence, the issue subsequent distribution of voters’
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