Cayetano v.

Monsod --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Madria v. Rivera ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19

In re: Cunanan --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21

Philippine Lawyer’s Association v. Agrava ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

Kuroda v. Jalandoni -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25

In re: David ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 33

1
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,  The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of
our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
2
 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice
of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation
of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during
our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed
in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision
on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten
years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA
now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
3
 MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15). have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document
drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are
both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.). constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a
social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.). practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of
lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating
self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon
us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a
lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of
an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in

4
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation
(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to
enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number
of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms
deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
5
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion
and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific
technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental
policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than
internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding
of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged
in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel
hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge
of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast
tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will
the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
6
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
(p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of
the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise
the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized
into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements
contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must
also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept
of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it
is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
7
 qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution
which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice
of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern
concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the
eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say,
law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising
law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can
the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
8
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot
two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any
blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
 
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended
by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court
in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to
DENY the petition.
 
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only
to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to
prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority
of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means,
to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business
executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
9
 Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,
enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-
client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law
but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics,
1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST
TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for
at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion
or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of
law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for
the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
10
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless.
From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does
not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved
in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized
under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have
to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would
still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in
or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The
decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not
as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue
of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is
focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for
agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-
lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is
doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote
to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind
on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law.
11
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice
of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, b. Dataprep, Philippines
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears e. CBL Timber Corporation
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely Member of the Board of the Following:
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the
Bar there? a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

The professional life of the respondent follows: b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
the following:
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
e. Graphic Atelier
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation f. Manila Electric Company

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

12
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if
not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument,
the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases
cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law
according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition,
we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to
the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether
or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the
procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he
had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have
no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not
remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any
legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts,
deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices
over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d
773)
x x x           x x x          x x x
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in
his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for
suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much
used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being
an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster,
is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his
client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client
informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb
"practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually;
to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x           x x x          x x x
13
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at
p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
x x x           x x x          x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use
of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the
context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC
Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
 
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended
by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court
in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to
DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only
to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to
prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority
of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
14
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means,
to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business
executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,
enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et
al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-
client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law
but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics,
1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST
TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for
at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion
or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of
law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
15
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for
the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless.
From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does
not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved
in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized
under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have
to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would
still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in
or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The
decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not
as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue
of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is
focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for
agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-
lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is
doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote
to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind
on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
16
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
the term beyond rational limits.

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law. 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice
of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, b. Dataprep, Philippines
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears e. CBL Timber Corporation
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely Member of the Board of the Following:
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
Bar there?

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

The professional life of the respondent follows:

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of
the following:
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
e. Graphic Atelier
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation f. Manila Electric Company

17
 g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if
not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument,
the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases
cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law
according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition,
we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to
the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether
or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the
procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he
had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have
no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large
number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not
remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any
legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts,
deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices
over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d
773)
x x x           x x x          x x x
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in
his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for
suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much
used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being
an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster,
is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his
18
 client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client
informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb
"practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually;
to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x           x x x          x x x
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at
p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use
of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the
context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC
Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11256, March 07, 2017
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court and its processes, but also
betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client and must be disbarred to maintain the integrity of
the Law Profession.
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the respondent in his law office in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan C.
Madria. After giving the details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the annulment, the respondent told
her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of annulment. He told
her, too, that his legal services would cost P25,000.00, and that she should return on November 19, 2002
inasmuch as he would still prepare the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the consultation, she was
accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson Argonza. 1
The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed her
the petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of P4,000.00. 2He
acknowledged the payment through a handwritten receipt.3
19
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial
payment, and to follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her
complaint, and assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices and
processes would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments. 4 On
December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her payment, and he also issued his receipt for the
payment.5
The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several followups on behalf of her mother. In the latter
part of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant that her petition had been granted. 6Thus, Vanessa
went to the respondent's office and received a copy of the trial court's decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by
Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao City. 7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five months to lapse after the release of the
decision before she could safely claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time, she declared in her
Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single. 8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent a copy of the certificate of finality
dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4). 9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported decision and certificate of
finality in applying for the renewal of her passport.10 However, she became the object of an investigation by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew Dowson Grainge, had filed a
complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only then did she
learn that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in the court records,
as borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch
IV, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City
Madam:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment
of Marriage between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed and decided by this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per
Order of this Court dated April 6, 2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the alleged decision attached to your
letter is a blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance.  persistent prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if not
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in
Tuguegarao City.12 She claims that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the respondent; and
that he had taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her money and to rely on the falsified
court documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant. He averred that he had informed her
that he would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that she had insisted that he
should prepare the draft of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed
upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to fabricate the
certificate of finality; that she had assured him that such simulated documents would be kept strictly
confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had paid no
attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled hearings despite notice; and
that he had not heard from her since then, and that she had not even returned to his office.
Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the
recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment through its Resolution No.
XXI-2015-242, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
                RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
                CDB Case No. 14-4315
                Flordeliza A. Madria vs. Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath as a lawyer and a member of
the Bar by preparing a simulated Court decision granting the petition for annulment of marriage of
complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of
the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so only upon the complainant's
altogether empty. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of finality
of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer to know so, but
it was worse in the respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally intolerable.
Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision
20
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration of justice in
this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like the complainant could have swayed a
lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if he had
committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a lawyer, he was
aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly those
quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from committing the falsification, as well as to
make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to always act
with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express
undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission."17 Indeed, the ethics
of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. 18 As we have observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility required the
respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for the
sake of getting her money, he committed a further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to
"delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients." He compounded
this violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish motives, thereby
disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of
which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.24The
moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. 25 That he turned his back on such
standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness
to continue as an officer of the Court.26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v.
Rivera,27 he was suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized documents without a notarial
commission. This circumstance shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the
documents that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly
removed through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and only for the most imperative
reasons or in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like in the
respondent's case. We wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein
described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law Profession. As we reminded in Embido v.
Pe,29 in which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a court decision:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that
the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who
fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of
malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly
connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P. RIVERA guilty of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY,
ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name be STRICKEN from the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for appending to the
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.c
hanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the
Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.Resoluti,
1954onMarch 18Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar
Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Inaccordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to
the bar those candidateswho had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its
21
approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
barinvoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pendingalso invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who havesought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoidinjustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective ofwhether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is
constitutional and valid.Held:RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,
those candidates who sufferedfrom insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.In the
judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
andreinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision
have beenindisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ourshas been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys
at law in thepractice of the profession is concededly judicial.On this matter, there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.It is
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to
this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
otherauthorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.Republic Act Number 972 is
held to be unconstitutional.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the
general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As
per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes
a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice
of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the
judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
22
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the
respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination
given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such
as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent
cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent
cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act
No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law,
in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that
prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office,
to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards
members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and
before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the
question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions
be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. )
179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business
in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still,
all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well
as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance:
Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or
morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or
patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one
year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the
true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of
any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any
person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the
cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32
23
provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case
the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the
day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not
being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met
to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented
article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary
to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been
prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel
a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the
acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to
a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of
the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the
Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur.
537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and
delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the
proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but
also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . .
(60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the
Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he
deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or
technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar.
He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and
of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules
of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in
the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx     xxx     xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render
applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and
of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination
which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be
waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent
Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
24
 The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe
rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they
are of good moral character and in good repute, are  possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to
competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case
from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any
applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or
by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action
of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law
just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to
practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act
No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of
all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States
Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to
practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require
attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to
and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to
be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has
not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the
qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration
of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of
his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for
the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been
promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are
allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated,
such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these
as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising
before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal
to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that
much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application
of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved;
that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
G.R. No. L-2662             March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, 
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major
FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now
charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines
with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial
25
Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish
the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the
Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor
an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues —
"That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an
illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in
behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that
they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a
party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing
the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947
This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section
3, that —
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our
Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief
of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz.,
664) 1 when we said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel
and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte  Quirin 317
U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period
of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend
beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War  Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar
Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect
of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive
Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international
law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan
who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle
of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under
the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with
Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and
obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles
us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against
our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76
Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port
in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines
in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our
national sovereignty.
26
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and
not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order
No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional law.
There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be
attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is
common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only
fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and
her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If
there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State
Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the
spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of
attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have
been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the
Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the
vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody,
this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for Violation
of the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice
law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner has also
challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the Philippines
as accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It appearing
that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law there could not be any
question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as with such appearance they would
be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved in the
challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several constitutional
ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole context of said order which
is reproduced as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING
RULES AND REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR
CRIMINAL.
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office charged with the
responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of war crimes committed in
the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate General of
the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and control of the
Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available sources evidence of war
crimes committed in the Philippines from the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December
1941, maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring
about the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said Office
information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
27
(a) General. — person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be
convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. — Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority at the time of
the trial.
investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required. One specially qualified member whose
ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an objection to the admissibility of evidence
offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. — Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the Commission
shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not
less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of
the member present.

(e) Presiding Member. — In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the
(b) Over Offenses. — The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
offenses including but not limited to the following: member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission present
shall preside.

(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of
international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the IV. PROSECUTORS
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(a) Appointment. — The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct the
(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to prosecution before each commission.
murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on the seas or (b) Duties. — The duties of the prosecutor are:
elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage; plunder of public or private property wanton destruction
of cities towns or village; or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.

(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed against (2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all cases
civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or religion ground in
referred for trial.
executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the local
laws.
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
(a) Conduct of the Trial. — A Commission shall:
(a) Appointment. — The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the President
of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be appointed by the (1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the charges,
convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission, and in case of illness or other excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or interference.
incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy
among the members or alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening (2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment
authority but the substance of all proceeding had evidence taken in that case shall be made known to therefor.
the said new member or alternate. This facts shall be announced by the president of the commission
in open court.
(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
(b) Number of Members. — Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) members.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by the
convening authority.
(c) Qualifications. — The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom he
determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by personal interest
or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in which he personally (b) Rights of the Accused. — The accused shall be entitled:

28
(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so as to
apprise the accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening authority or
counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in support
of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears before the
commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any documentary
evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(c) Witnesses. — The Commission shall have power:
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or
affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties set forth
in (1) and (2) above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in proving or
disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the
mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of evidence and pleading set forth
herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without
limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be
admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have been
signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any
Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the International
Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any investigator or intelligence
officer, or by any other person whom commission considers as possessing knowledge of the matters
contained in the report.
(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the commission to
contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not
immediately available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official government
documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of
any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of proof
whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be considered
in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's superior, or of his
Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if
the commission determines that justice so requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence without
any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or statement was
procured by mean which the commission believe to have been of such a character that may have
caused the accused to make a false statement the commission may strike out or disregard any such
portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. — The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as follows
unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this or any
other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the commission
and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the close of
the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a finding of not
guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission may defer action on any such
motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available
evidence.
29
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding member
may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to submit to the
commission where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the
prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the commission may rule as
being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless otherwise
directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and sentence if any. The
commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.
( f ) Record of Proceedings. — Each commission shall make a separate record of its proceeding in
the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the prosecutor under the
direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall be
responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the presiding member of the commission or
his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.
(g) Sentence. — The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by hanging or
shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment as the
commission shall determine to be proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. — No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into effect until
approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be
carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the Philippines. For the purpose of his
review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review to be composed of not more than three
officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office.
The Chief of Staff shall have authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute,
suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused)
remand the case for rehearing before a new military commission; but he shall not have authority to
increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and
sentence of a commission shall final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
Supplementary Rule and Forms. — Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern its
procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as may be
prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the Philippines.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the
appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in the
accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in accordance with
the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the President. The buildings,
fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other property herefore used by then
Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Power, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippines Government through
the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification
reserved for use off the National War Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of congressional
enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question, is whether
or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly vested in Congress by the
Constitution. .
The Constitution provides:
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by
agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to
the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to
the veto power of the President of the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the
president of the Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the
Philippines under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court.
30
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in the tripartite
system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by Montequieu and accepted
and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of America, whose Constitution, after which
ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power of government — legislative, executive, judicial — to
distinct and separate department of government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in the nature of
grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may exercise any power or
authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish government
office is essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions. Whether such
a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military commissions
jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a
usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the Philippines
cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more
reason, delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established by the
said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the Philippines
usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive Order No.
68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the President of
the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power granted to him by Commonwealth
Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are
transcribed below:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD
THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY
OF ITS INHABITANTS.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency
which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with extraordinary power in
order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by
suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all subversive to the people adequate shelter and clothing
and sufficient food supply, and by providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian
population the establishment of an air protective service and the organization of volunteer guard
units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public. To
carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall
have the force and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall
have the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First
Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of Philippines.
Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other
subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when not engaged in any lawful
occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such services as
may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage
of crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order to insure
adequate production, controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes
whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in
the interest of national security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and
salaried employees in industrial or business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even
distribution of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of
transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued transportation
facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by the
Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity, both
imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity,
monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations, and private control affecting the supply,
distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material,
implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to
requisition these commodities subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com.
Act No. 620.)
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President may
designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this Act
or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the authority of
section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of
not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is committed by a firm or
31
corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with the management of the business
of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the date of
the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under the authority
herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such amounts as
may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth Act Numbered four
hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be
unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.
Approved, August 19, 1940.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and Asia,
which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers
in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulation
as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly,
he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its
subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the
heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivision, branches, departments, offices,
agency or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to
continue in force laws and appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to
modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
imposed new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds
through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds thereof;
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for
purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the
payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by
him under the power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations. promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved December 16, 1941.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had
elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of
Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in
their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as chairman of the
Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to state
that said measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of
impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941. We approved said extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances then
prevailing legislative power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following
provisions of the Constitution:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI, section 26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the emergency created
by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution. We are of the
opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still be any the same should be resolved in
favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan
can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of Japan, or since the
middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can prevail,
then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic
of the Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and independence
legislative organs, — Congress and the President of the Philippines — would have been and would continue
enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature including those of emergency character, and the latter
to enact laws, in the form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be
32
pregnant with dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines
democracy.

Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a possibility that no
one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long recess of Congress (two-thirds
of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of
dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental guarantees
of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit the admission of many
kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to
determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation governing the
trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of the United State
Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General Yamashita and Homma.
What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in
the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946
in disposing the Homma case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive
Order No. 68. Said rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.

For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to declare
Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.

In re: David
Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of five
years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed on March
17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to
November 8, 1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent. (For
and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion
for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a
brief for an order to demolish homes.
“In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the
Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the
Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am
Practicing as attorney-at-law.”

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under
the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-
qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by
such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the constitutional
restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.”

33