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MISSION OPERATIONS BRANCH
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This material contains information affect the national defense d the United Stater
within the meaning of the espionage l a w s y i t l e 18, U. S. C . , Sece. 793 and 794, the
tranrrniasion or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is

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MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

HOUSTON . T E X A S

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 CONTENTS

Section Page

1.0 ..................
S U I T I N G AND I N G R E S S 1-1

STATUS CHECKS AND COUNTDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

e
2.0 2-1

3.0 POWEmD FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

c

4.0 EARTH ORBIT AND SYSTEMS CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

5.0 TLI THROUGH s-IVBCLOSEOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
6.0 TRANSLUNAR COAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
7.0 LOI THROUGH LUNAR MODULE ACTIVATION . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
8.0 LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT THROUGH SEPARATION . . . . . . . 8-1
8.1 COMMAND MODULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
8.2 LUNARMODULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11

9.0 DO1 THROUGH TOUCHDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

9.1 COMMAND MODULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

9.2 LUNAR MODULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

10.0 LUNAR SURFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

11.0 CSM CIRCUMLUNAR OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1

12.0 LIFT.OFF. RENDEZVOUS. AND DOCKING . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1

t

13.0 LUNAR MODULE J E T T I S O N THROUGH TEI . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

14.0 TRANSEARTH COAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1

15.0 ENTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1

16.0 LANDING AND RECOVERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-1

17.0 GEOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS ................ 17-1

.. I ................ .. , ..... , .................... . ...-.-. .-.. . . ......

 CONFIDENTIAL
Section Page

18.0 COMMAND MODULE SYSTEMS OPERATIONS........... 18-1

18.1 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION ............. 18-1
18.4 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM ............. 18-2

18.5 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM ............. 18-3

18.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM .......... 18-3

18.7 TELECOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-13

18.8 MECHANICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-14

19.0 LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-1

19.1 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION............. 19-1

19.2 PROPULSION SYSTEM ................ 19-2

19.3 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM ..... . .

...... 19-4
19.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM . . . . . . .
...... 19-4
19.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM . . . .
...... 19-4
19.6 TELECOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . .
...... 19-5
20.0 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS. FLIGHT EQUIPMENT. AND GFE . . . 20-1

21.0 VISUAL SIGHTINGS ................... 21-1

22.0 PRFMISSION PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-1

23.0 MISSION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-1

24.0 TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-1

25.0 HUMAN FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-1

26.0 MISCELLANEOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-1

27.0 CONCLUDING COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27-1

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 1-1
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1 . 0 S U I T I N G AND INGRESS

1.1 SENSOR APPLICATION

ALDRIN The c e n t e r l e a d d r i e d out i n f l i g h t . I w a s shaved i n t h a t

area, b u t it d r i e d out anyway. T h e one on q y r i g h t chest ,

must have i n t e r f e r e d i n some way w i t h t h e s u i t , because

when t h e s u i t w a s taken o f f , t h e r e w a s a s m a l l l a c e r a t i o n

on t h e o u t s i d e toward t h e rear of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s e n s o r .

I t h i n k t h a t ' s been documented i n t h e medical examination.

1 . 2 SUITING

ALDRIN We seemed t o have p l e n t y of pad i n t h e t i m e frame f o r

suiting. We were s i t t i n g around s u i t e d up a t least

20 minutes b e f o r e moving out t o t h e pad.

ARMSTRONG We had a reasonable amount of pad t i m e t o handle t h e

l i t t l e problems you might have at times. The t i m e l i n e

on s u i t i n g w a s good.

1.3 LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

COLLINS No problem w i t h l i f e support equipment or t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

out t o t h e pad.

1 . 6 PERSONAL COMFORT

COLLINS The only personal-comfort problem I had was t h a t my suit

f i t was t o o t i g h t through t h e c r o t c h area i n t h e r e g i o n

of t h e UCD. During CDDT, I was r e a l l y very, very

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-. . .. T -
.- .. . - . . . . ~. ._ .... , . -
1-2
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COLLINS uncomfortable for a couple o f hours w i t h t h e UCD pushing
( CONT'D)
i n t o my crotch a r e a . This problem goes back t o t h a t

f i r s t s u i t f i t at t h e f a c t o r y . ILC i s very concerned

about t h e m o b i l i t y i n s i d e a p r e s s u r i z e d s u i t , and I

t h i n k t h e y went a l i t t l e b i t overboard i n c u t t i n g t h a t

t h i n g on t h e t i g h t s i d e . I d i d n ' t r e a l l y put t h e UCD

on; you know w h a t I mean. They've g o t a house UCD up

t h e r e , and you s o r t of s l a p t h a t i n s i d e t h e s u i t and

then you g e t a f i t check. The only time it h u r t me w a s

when I a c t u a l l y had t h e UCD securely h e l d and I was

s t r a p p e d i n t o t h e couch and my l e g s were up. The only

t h i n g I could suggest i s t h a t when anybody goes t o t h e

f a c t o r y , they t a k e t h e i r own UCD and put t h e damn thing

on and, during t h a t f i t check, go through some k i n d of

an i m i t a t i o n of t h e watch p o s i t i o n with t h e c o r r e c t

leg-to-body angle which you have i n t h a t couch f o r launch

position. Put your own UCD on and see whether t h a t ' s

going t o be comfortable o r not. I f i d d l e d and diddled

with i t between CDDT and launch, and it w a s s t i l l f a i r l y

uncomfortable f o r launch; f o r CDDT, t h a t damn t h i n g

almost d i d me i n . Don't l e t them c u t t h e suit t o o

t i g h t , and t r y t o g e t a good f i t check a t t h e f a c t o r y .

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1 . 5 ELEVATOR AND FLIGHT DECK

ALDRIN F r o m t h e center-couch p o s i t i o n , i t ' s a very p l e a s a n t time

p e r i o d because I ' d s i t i n t h e e l e v a t o r and walk around up

t h e r e on t h e f l i g h t deck and contemplate j u s t about

everything, including t h e o u t s i d e world.

CDDT w a s a very p l e a s u r a b l e experience, looking out

over t h e whole beach.

1.8 INGFLESS

ARMSTRONG While we were completing t h e countdown procedures, t h e

number 2 r o t a t i o n hand c o n t r o l l e r was r a i s e d t o t h e

launch p o s i t i o n . A t t h a t p o i n t , it somehow managed t o

a t t a c h i t s e l f t o t h e shock a t t e n u a t o r r e l e a s e on t h e

lower l e f t s t r u t , It r e l e a s e d a f t e r a good b i t of work

and coordination between Mike and Fred, t h e BCMP. It

was relocked. No new procedure t h e r e ; it j u s t r e q u i r e s

care and properly i n s t a l l i n g those handrests t o avoid

a recurrence of t h a t problem.

It would be w e l l .for t h e BCMP t o assure himself t h a t he

knows how t o r e l o c k any one of t h e s t r u t r e l e a s e s t h a t

might come disengaged i n t h i s time period.

COLLINS The crew should know about t h e s t r u t s o f t e n e r s j u s t i n

case one of them g e t s p u l l e d loose i n a d v e r t e n t l y i n

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_. . _. . . ... - .. . ~ .. ,. _.....I-^ . . ._., . . ., .. .. , I ... I . . -. . . ., . ..

 1-4
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COLLINS flight. You should know how t o r e s e t them. This should
( CONT I D )
be added t o t h e i r l i s t of t h i n g s t o l e a r n .

ALDRIN I don't f e e l t h a t we r e a l l y need l i f e p r e s e r v e r s on f o r

launch. They i n t e r f e r e w i t h what l i t t l e m o b i l i t y you

have. It appears t o me t h a t i n any abort condition you

don't need t o make use of t h e l i f e p r e s e r v e r s and t h a t

i t would be a f a i r l y simple t h i n g t o g e t them dut of t h e c

l i t t l e pouches t h a t are i n t h e L-shaped bag.

1.10 COMFORT I N COUCH

ARMSTRONG Temperature w a s good i n our s p a c e c r a f t during both

CDDT and launch. I didn't s u f f e r any of t h e abnormally

law temperature conditions t h a t had been r e p o r t e d on

some of t h e previous flights.

COLLINS The reason w a s t h a t we were flowing g l y c o l through t h e

secondary loop. I b e l i e v e t h i s w a s t h e f i r s t time they

tried this. The secondary g l y c o l loop pump w a s on and

it w a s flowing through t h e suit c i r c u i t . heat exchanger.

I don't know what Apollo 10 d i d , b u t I remember Apollo 9

described t h i s d e a l of going bypass on t h e heat exchanger

f o r 15 seconds and a l l t h a t . We d i d n ' t have t o mess

with t h a t at a l l . Our procedure worked very w e l l . I

don't know who thought it up t o use t h e secondary loop;

-

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 1-5
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COLLINS b u t it made t h e system very comfortable, and I recommend
( CONT 'D)
t h a t t h e y continue t o do it t h e way w e d i d it.

1 . 1 2 VIBRATION OR NOISE SENSATIONS

COLLINS They c a l l e d out everything. Every time we were going t o

f e e l something, t h e y were very good about c a l l i n g it up.

ALDRIN W e d i d observe some b o o s t e r valving. They c a l l e d it o u t ,

and it w a s q u i t e obvious when t h e r e w a s v a l v i n g t a k i n g

place.

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-, . . . ' ... .. " -._ ~ . - . . - - . .. .. , .... - . .. . . -. . .

 2-1
CONFIDENTIAL
2.0 STATUS CHECKS AND COUNTDOWN

2.2 COMM VEXIFICATION

ARMSTRONG Our prelaunch COMM checks were a l l reasonably good.

ALDRIN I t ' s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t , because of t h e l o c a t i o n of t h a t c e n t e r

p a n e l , w e do have t o s p l i t t h e COMM and t a k e t h e c e n t e r couch

off t h e pad COMM. I c a n ' t say w e r e a l l y s u f f e r e d much on

account of i t , b u t it would be n i c e i f t h e r e were some way t o

m a k e t h a t switch p o s i t i o n change - e i t h e r f i g u r e out some

way t o l o o s e n t h e b e l t and g e t back up t h e r e and r e a d j u s t t h e

COMM, or change p o s i t i o n s i n some way.

2.4 G&C VERIFICATION

ARMSTRONG GDC a l i g n w a s good.

2.5 GROUND COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTDOWN

ARMSTRONG Communications were e x c e l l e n t throughout t h e prelaunch phase.

We had no problems w i t h c o n t r o l s and d i s p l a y s t h a t I can r e c a l l .

2.10 CREW STATION CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS

ALDRIN They had t h a t a t t e n u a t i o n s t r u t p o s i t i o n e d very n i c e l y so t h a t

I could see t h e altimeter. On t h e simulator i t ' s very d i f -

f i c u l t *om t h e c e n t e r couch t o see t h e altimeter. They had

r o t a t e d t h i s handle on t h e X s t r u t on t h e l e f t of my seat s o

t h a t I could see j u s t about t h e e n t i r e altimeter, which i s

good. I t h i n k t h a t ought t o be a s t a n d a r d procedure.

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2-2 CONFIDENTIAL
2.11 D I S T I N C T I O N OF SOUNDS I N THE LAUNCH V E H I C L E

COLLINS .
They c a l l e d a l l t h o s e o u t . I thought t h e y d i d an e x c e l l e n t

job of warning us of what t o expect. Not t h a t it r e a l l y

makes a heck of a l o t of d i f f e r e n c e because you g o t t o s i t .

t h e r e anyway, but i t ' s n i c e t o know.

2.12 V E H I C L E SWAY P R I O R T O I G N I T I O N , SWING ARM RETRACT

ALDRIN Well, it wasn't much of a j o l t when t h a t swing a r m moved out c

and came back i n again.

ARMSTRONG No. It w a s reasonably smooth. I d i d n ' t r e a l l y n o t e any

v e h i c l e sway p r i o r t o i g n i t i o n .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 3-1

3.0 POWERED FLIGHT

3.1
. S-IC I G N I T I O N

ALDRIN There r e a l l y wasn't much of a cue a t a l l t h a t I could

recall. I c a n ' t r e m e m b e r f e e l i n g much of anything b e f o r e

T zero. How about t h e rest of you?

COLLINS No. It w a s very q u i e t . You could f e e l t h e engines were

s t a r t i n g up because t h e r e w a s a l o w amplitude v i b r a t i o n .

3.2 COMM AUDIBILITY AT I G N I T I O N

ARMSTRONG COMM a u d i b i l i t y a t i g n i t i o n was good. Noise v i b r a t i o n

i n t e n s i t y p r i o r t o r e l e a s e w a s minor.

3.3 NOISE/VIBmTION INTENSITYy SHOCK AND

CREW SENSATION PRIOR TO RELEASE

COLLINS There w a s low n o i s e , moderate v i b r a t i o n . I ' d say

l i g h t t o moderate v i b r a t i o n . I didn't really notice

much v i b r a t i o n u n t i l w e r e l e a s e d . Crew sensation

p r i o r t o r e l e a s e i s j u s t about what you'd expect from

T i t a n o r from previous crew b r i e f i n g s on t h e Saturn V.

It w a s q u i t e m i l d p r i o r t o release, I thought.

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3-2
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3.4 HOLDDOWN RELEASE

ARMSTRONG Now, r e l e a s e i t s e l f , I t h i n k we have a l i t t l e b i t of d i f f e r -

ence t h e r e . I f e l t t h a t I could d e t e c t r e l e a s e , and I t h i n k

your comments were t h a t perhaps you weren't q u i t e s o sure

what t h e moment of release w a s .

3.5 LIFT-OFF

ALDRIN I c a n ' t r e c a l l any sudden change t h a t occurred a t t h a t p o i n t ,

b u t it seems t o me t h a t t h e r e w a s a g r a d u a l s e n s a t i o n of

upward movement. Then t h e v i b r a t i o n - w e l l , it w a s more of

an o s c i l l a t i o n , I t h i n k , t h a n a v i b r a t i o n . It c e r t a i n l y

wasn't j u s t l o n g i t u d i n a l ; it w a s a f a i r amount of motion i n

both t h e Y-direction and i n t h e Z-direction. I d o n ' t know

what t h e frequency w a s , but I ' d c a l l it a couple of c y c l e s

p e r second. It w a s a l i t t l e s u r p r i s i n g t o m e , and t h i s

s t a r t e d r a t h e r suddenly.

COLLINS About t h e t i m e of l i f t - o f f , t h a t ' s what I thought. I

c o u l d n ' t d e t e c t l i f t - o f f by t h e conventional means of sensing

a transverse acceleration. However, t h e moment of l i f t - o f f

w a s very apparent because t h i s v e h i c l e , which had been

r i g i d l y h e l d , w a s now suddenly r e l e a s e d and we were g e t t i n g

a l l manner of o s c i l l a t i o n s - X, Y , and Z , as near as I could

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 3-3
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COLLINS tell. All of a sudden, t h i s t h i n g changed c h a r a c t e r from
(CONT'D)
a s t a t i c t o a jlynamic s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t w a s w h a t I would

c a l l t h e i n s t a n t of l i f t - o f f .

ARMSTRONG Concerning t h e n o i s e / v i b r a t i o n i n t e n s i t y a t l i f t - o f f , it
w a s my impression t h a t t h e combination w a s r a t h e r s e v e r e

u n t i l approximately t h e t i m e of "Tower c l e a r , " a t which

t i m e t h e r e w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t decrease.

COLLINS Yes , b u t would you say n o i s e ? I would s a y v i b r a t i o n s .

I thought t h e n o i s e l e v e l w a s much l e s s than I had

expected. The v i b r a t i o n w a s more.

ALDRIN How about a rumbling? That i s p h y s i c a l l y f e l t as much

as heard.

COLLINS You d o n ' t h e a r it i n your ears. You f e e l it i n your

whole body. Whether t h a t ' s n o i s e or whether t h a t s

v i b r a t i o n , I d o n ' t know.

ARMSTRONG I would agree t h a t t h e n o i s e w a s low l e v e l .

COLLINS I n terms of i n t e r f e r e n c e with communications, though, I

t h i n k you would also have t o s a y t h a t it i s low l e v e l .

ARMSTRONG That's t r u e .

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-. . .. " _ , _ . - " , , -- I. . . ., . I. .. . . . .
. . . . . , . - . .. . __ -.
3-4
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ALDRIN S u b j e c t i v e l y , t h e f i r s t 1 0 t o 1 2 seconds u n t i l tower c l e a r

took longer than I t)lought it would. ? would have thought I

a long 1 0 or 1 2 seconds would have been over j u s t l i k e t h a t ,

COLLINS It w a s a l o n g , long time b e f o r e anybody gave "Tower c l e a r . "

ARMSTRONG It w a s r i g h t on time. I w a s looking a t t h e event t i m e r .

COLLINS Was it 1 4 seconds - something l i k e t h a t t o tower c l e a r ?

ARMSTRONG I ' d say 1 2 .

ARMSTRONG I thought t h a t t h e COMM came through q u i t e c l e a r .

ARMSTRONG Instrument observation w a s no problem during t h i s time. In

f a c t , some were a l o t b e t t e r because t h e l i g h t i n g i n t h e

cockpit i s b e t t e r t h a n i n t h e simulator.

ALDRIN But we a l l agree t h a t t h e r e w a s a decrease i n t h e v i b r a t i o n ,

o s c i l l a t i o n , or rumbling t h a t could p o s s i b l y b e a t t r i b u t e d t o

r e f l e c t i o n s o f f t h e tower.

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k maybe i t ' s j u s t r e f l e c t i o n s o f f t h e ground.

.
COLLINS Ground r e f l e c t i o n s .

ARMSTRONG It goes away a t about t h e tower-clear time.

ARMSTRONG I thought t h e y were.

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3.13 MACH 1 AND MAX g NOISE LEVELS

ARMSTRONG Well, I t h i n k I w a s s u r p r i s e d a t how l i t t l e t h e s e were

apparent t o m e , and p a r t i c u l a r l y Alpha. Alpha never cane

o f f zero throughout t h e launch, and I wondered if t h e y were

operating.

3.14 CONTROL RESPONSE I N H I G H g REGION

ARMSTRONG It w a s as smooth as g l a s s going through t h e high g r e g i o n .

ALDRIIJ What causes it , we d o n ' t r e a l l y know, b u t it could be ' t h e

v e h i c l e l e n g t h away from t h e ground; c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l e n g t h ,

or whatever you c a l l i t .

3.6 LAUNCH VEHICLE LIGHTS

ARMSTRONG Launch v e h i c l e l i g h t s , roll program, p i t c h program, roll

complete were on t i m e , as w e r e t h e r a t e changes. My impres-

s i o n i n t h e seat throughout t h i s phase, as w e l l as t h e subse-

quent f i r s t s t a g e , w a s t h a t o f going over rough r a i l r o a d

t r a c k s i n a t r a i n i n which v i b r a t i o n s occur i n a l l t h r e e

axes.

COLLINS That was a rougher r i d e t h a n I expected.

ARMSTRONG There were sharp bumps i n each of t h e t h r e e axes p e r i o d i c a l l y .

COLLINS Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t , and t h e g a i n of t h e system w a s p r e t t y h i g h ,

also.

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3.11 C A B I N PRESSURE (DECREASE )

COLLINS The valves worked as a d v e r t i s e d and s t a r t e d d e c r e a s i n g as

scheduled.

ARMSTRONG You can h e a r t h o s e v a l v e s r e l i e v i n g , I t h i n k , from a l l t h r e e

crew s t a t i o n s .

ALDRIN While t h e y were r e l i e v i n g , you c o u l d n ' t h e a r t o o much e l s e .

COLLINS I d i d n ' t t h i n k it w a s t h a t bad

3.15 W R G E N C Y DETECTION SYSTEM

ARMSTRONG No problems.

3.16 VEHICLE RESPONSE TO GIMBALING

ARMSTRONG The outboard engine gimbaling w a s not r e a l l y n o t i c e d .

3.17 NOISE LEVEL VARIATION

ALDRIN We were a n t i c i p a t i n g that', b u t it w a s j u s t a motion as I

recall. There were s e v e r a l l i t t l e j o l t s t o your r e l a x i n g of

t h e four g ' s . T h a t ' s how I r e c a l l it.

COLLINS I would say t h a t w e were ;ell b r i e f e d on t h a t . I mean t h e r e

w e r e n ' t r e a l l y any s u r p r i s e s .

c
3.22 DISTINCTION OF SOUNDS AND SENSATIONS

ARMSTRONG There w e r e sounds and s e n s a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e s t a g i n g .

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3.23 S-IC TWO-PLANE SEPARATION

ARMSTRONG S k i r t SEP, as I r e c a l l , w a s heard o r f e l - o r some observable

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e l i g h t going out a t t h e

t i m e , and I c a n ' t remember i f it w a s a bump o r a n o i s e , b u t

there was i n addition t o the fact.

ALDRIN This would g i v e you a c l u e i f t h e l i g h t s were not working, i f

something had happened a t t h a t p o i n t .

3.24 S-I1 ENGINE I G N I T I O N

ARMSTRONG S-I1 engine i g n i t i o n went smooth.

3.25 GASEOUS PRODUCTS

ALDRIN Now, t h a t s t u f f t h a t went oozing forward.

COLLINS That s t a g i n g - w e l l , it w a s j u s t l i k e s t a g i n g on t h e T i t a n .

It seemed l i k e t o me t h a t a t s t a g i n g t h e windows l i t up with

yellow, almost l i k e a f l a s h of l i g h t .

ALDRIN Well, l e t ' s s e e - S-IC. I d i d n ' t l i k e it e i t h e r , because we

were t o s s e d forward, and I c o u l d n ' t look out t h e hatch. You're

t h e only one t h a t had a window a t t h a t p o i n t . I d o n ' t remem-

b e r anyone saying t o o much about t h a t . W e ' l l get t o that a

4

l i t t l e l a t e r on t h e S-IIC.

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3.26 POGO OSCILLATIONS DURING S-I1 BOOST
ARMSTRONG I didn't note any.

COLLINS Smooth - smooth as glass.

L

ARMSTRONG S-I1 ride was the smoothest I've ever seen.

COLLINS It really was. It was beautiful.

3.27 INITIATION OF ITERATIVE GUIDANCE MODE

ARMSTRONG Guidance initiate was as expected.

COLLINS Tower went as advertised.

3.28 Q-BALL TRANSIENTS AT S-I1 IGNITION

ARMSTRONG No Q-ball transients were noted at S-I1 ignition. I may

have been looking at them.

3.30 SCALE CHANGE, VEHICLE.RESPONSE,AND OBSERVATION

ARMSTRONG Scale change was not utilized. There were no unusual noises

or vibration at this point in the'flight. It was all smooth.

3.32 SECOND IGM PHASE RESPONSE

ARMSTRONG The PM ratio shift was observable. You could feel g ' s

decrease. c

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 CONFIDENTIA L 3-9

3.33 LET AND BPC JETTISON

ARMSTRONG Tower jettison - you could watch it go. There wasn't any

question about it.

3.34 GUIDANCE - INITIATE

ARMSTRONG Guidance initiate was about as expected. The S-IVB staging

and engine cut-off were ...

ALDRIN Anybody notice any exhaust coming back on the windows when

the BPC went? It seemed to be a pretty clear separatton.

ARMSTRONG I didn't note any. I wasn't looking out the window at that
point.

COLLINS I was, and I didn't notice any. Those windows, 2 and 4 were
clear. They didn't have any deposits on them.

3.37 S-II/S-IVB SEPARATION

COLLINS The staging sequence is a long slow one. I'm sure it was

about equal to the simulated values we were used to. It

I .
seems like a l o n g time in flight to get the S-IVB ignited.

The S-IVB guidance was as expected.

. ALDRIN Any comment about the gimbal motors coming on?

ARMSTRONG The motors were put on at 6 minutes and all came on.

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COLLINS Well, you can confirm them with t h e f u e l c e l l flows, and

t h a t ' s n o t something t h a t reaches o u t and grabs you, If you

watched t h o s e meters c a r e f u l l y , you could d e f i n i t e l y s a y t h a t

a l l four gimbal motors came on.

ALDRIN I w a s looking a t t h i s s o r t o f t h i n g - l a t e r . I found t h a t

observing them several times r i g h t at t h e t i m e t h e y were

coming on, you look a t t h e c u r r e n t and you see t h a t i t ' s a

f a i r l y s m a l l b u t observable change i n t h e f u e l c e l l c u r r e n t ,

and t h e n j u s t about a h a l f second l a t e r you begin t o see t h e

r i s e and flow. You can c a t c h b o t h of them i f you look a t t h e

c u r r e n t f i r s t and t h e n t h e hydrogen and oxygen flow.

COLLINS I j u s t looked a t hydrogen flow. They say t h a t you have t o

be watching c l o s e l y . If you are, you can d e f i n i t e l y s a y t h a t

t h e y a l l four came on.

3.42 AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM

ARMSTRONG That w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y noted during powered f l i g h t .

3;43 POGO OSCILLATIONS OF S-IVB

ARMSTRONG No POGO o s c i l l a t i o n s .

ALDRIN There's a rougher r i d e on t h e S-IVB t h a n on t h e S-11.

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ARMSTRONG No doubt about it.

COLLINS I wouldn't c a l l it POGO, b u t it j u s t wasn't as smooth.

ARMSTRONG It w a s a l i t t l e r a t t l y a l l t h e t i m e .

COLLINS It w a s a l o t smoother t h a n S t a f f o r d described h i s r i d e . I

t h i n k w e had a d i f f e r e n t S-IVB t h a n he had.

ALDRIN PU s h i f t w a s n o t i c e a b l e .

COLLINS That w a s very n o t i c e a b l e .

ALDRIN That w a s q u i t e a j o l t . About as much as one engine o u t .

ARMSTRONG T h a t ' s probably about r i g h t .

ALDRIN About t h e same change i n t h r u s t .

3.44 SEPARATION LIGHTS

ARMSTRONG S e p a r a t i o n l i g h t s as a d v e r t i s e d .

3.45 DISTINCTION OF SOUNDS AND VIBFATIONS

ARMSTRONG Sounds and v i b r a t i o n s we've commented on.

3.50 COMMUNICATIONS

ARMSTRONG Communications with t h e ground f o r t h e go/no-go went without

a problem. There was a s h o r t t i m e p e r i o d i n t h e r e when w e

d i d n ' t h e a r anything. I t h i n k w e gave them a c a l l j u s t t o

make s u r e t h a t w e s t i l l had COMM.

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. . .
ALDRIN Following t h e t r a j e c t o r y throughout boost w a s q u i t e easy with

t h e card t h a t we had, and I found t h a t we were w i t h i n 20 t o

30 f e e t per second V and it seems t o me., 5 f e e t per second

I'
most of t h e t i m e H-dot. Guess t h e a l t i t u d e w a s a l i t t l e

lower, wasn't it? We might note t h a t we d i d e l e c t t o have

t h i s t r a j e c t o r y card over p a r t of t h e DSKY, which d i d cover

up some of t h e s t a t u s l i g h t s . The right-hand column of s t a t u s

l i g h t s w e r e covered up. The ones i n t h e LEB were observable

i n case any of t h o s e came on.

ARMSTRONG Engine cut-off w a s smooth, and we were standing by t o do a

manual cut-off with t h e LV s t a g e switch should cut-off not

occur on time.

ALDRIN We d i d n ' t seem t o elbow each o t h e r q u i t e as much as we had

i n some simulator runs. The s u i t s are b i g and t h e elbows

kind of s t i c k o u t , b u t I a i d n ' t n o t i c e any i n t e r f e r e n c e

with our a c t i v i t i e s .

COLLINS The only i n t e r f e r e n c e I noted w a s t h a t N e i l ' s s u i t pocket

i n t e r f e r e d w i t h t h e a b o r t handle. He w a s worried about t h a t ,

and I w a s worried about t h a t .

ARMSTRONG The contingency sample pocket where it w a s strapped on t h e

l e g w a s r i d i n g r i g h t a g a i n s t t h e a b o r t handle. We adjusted

t h a t as f a r t o t h e i n t e r i o r of t h e t h i g h as we p o s s i b l y

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ARMSTRONG could t o minimize t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e , b u t w e s t i l l were con-

( CONT i D )
t i n u a l l y concerned w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t w e might i n a d v e r t e n t l y

p r e s s t h a t t h i n g a g a i n s t t h e t o p o f t h e a b o r t handle.

ALDRIN Before we go on, d i d you all note any numbers? I have

w r i t t e n down h e r e : apogee 103.9, p e r i g e e 102.1.

COLLINS They t e l l me t h a t t h e y have b e t t e r sources.

ALDRIN I'm j u s t wondering why i n our c h e c k l i s t we're not a b l e t o

write down t h e CSM weight and gimbal motor numbers. We

c e r t a i n l y ought t o know what t h o s e are b e f o r e f l i g h t and

j u s t confirm t h a t t h o s e numbers have been s e t i n .

COLLINS I d o n ' t know why you f o o l w i t h them a t a l l . They come up t o

you on t h e f i r s t PAD p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t burn.

ALDRIN Everybody i n t h e world knows what t h e y are, and t h e y ought

t o be i n t h e c h e c k l i s t .

COLLINS I d o n ' t even know where t h e y l i s t them. The only o t h e r t h i n g

t h a t I had on t h e launch phase w a s t h e r e w a s some p e c u l i a r i t y

i n t h e s e r v i c i n g of t h e oxygen q u a n t i t y . Oxygen t a n k number 1

had 90 p e r c e n t on my gage, and oxygen t a n k number 2 had

95 p e r c e n t w i t h a 5 percent d i f f e r e n t i a l , and t h e y kept

t a l k i n g about some mission r u l e which allowed a m a x i m u m of

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COLLINS 4 percent differential. All t h i s w a s a l i t t l e confusing t o
( CONT'D)
me. It sounded as i f w e g o t shortchanged i n oxygen t a n k

number 1. I ' m not sure i f t h a t ' s t r u e , and it even occurred

c
t o m e t h a t t h e r e might have been a s l i g h t - l e a k i n t a n k num-

b e r 1. I ' m sure t h a t t h e r e w a s n ' t , or t h e y wouldn't have

launched us. A f e w words on t h a t s u b j e c t would have been

nice. I t h i n k as a g e n e r a l r u l e i f t h e l o a d i n g s are not

nominal, it would be n i c e t o l e t t h e crew know t h a t t h e y ' r e

COLLINS a l i t t l e o f f nominal. It sounded l i k e w e launched i n v i o l a -

t i o n of t h e launch mission r u l e .

ARMSTRONG D i f f e r e n t i a l between oxygen tanks?

COLLINS Yes. It w a s 5 p e r c e n t , and it sounded l i k e t h e mission

rule w a s 4 percent MAX. And I w a s p e r f e c t l y happy t o launch

w i t h t h a t i f t h a t w a s t h e only problem. I d i d n ' t want t o

b r i n g it up on t h e loop and make a f e d e r a l c a s e out of i.t.

On t h e o t h e r hand, it would have been n i c e t o know.

ARMSTRONG It only took 1 hour and 1 5 minutes t o g e t through a p e r f e c t l y

normal launch w i t h no problems.

COLLINS We s t a r t e d l a t e .

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4.0 EARTH ORBIT AND SYSTEMS CHECKOUT

ARMSTRONG It appeared t h a t t h e platform was i n reasonably good shape

and i t s v a l u e s compared f a v o r a b l y w i t h t h e MSFN ephemeris.

Everything went smoothly.

4.2 POST-INSERTION SYSTEMS CONFIGURATION AND CHECKS

COLLINS The i n s e r t i o n c h e c k l i s t i s f i n e , as f a r as I ' m concerned.

A f t e r t h e i n s e r t i o n c h e c k l i s t , t h e items i n t h e c h e c k l i s t

on page L-2 and L-9 need some work t o g e t them i n t h e proper

sequence.

ALDRIN I t ' s p r e t t y hard t o f o l l o w through on t h e time w i t h a l l t h o s e

t h i n g s happening according t o t h e t i m e schedule t h a t ' s on

t h e r e , e s p e c i a l l y when you g e t down t o t h e LEB.

COLLINS The one who goes down t o t h e LEB i s s o r t of jumping from one

p l a c e t o another and back and f o r t h . Some improvement could

be made on t h e order i n which t h o s e items a r e . I s o r t of

got l a z y and decided not t o f i g h t t h e c h e c k l i s t world and I

j u s t had my own o r d e r i n which I w a s going t o do them regard-

less of t h e order of t h e c h e c k l i s t . The follow-on crews

ought t o look a t t h i s s e c t i o n and have t h i n g s rearranged t o

t h e i r l i k i n g f o r a minimum m o u n t of moving around.

ALDRIN For example: S t e p 7 on 2-9, t h e 20 minutes ECS p o s t i n s e r t i o n

c o n f i g u r a t i o n , w e were doing o t h e r t h i n g s a t t h a t time and I

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ALDRIN d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t w e were i n p o s i t i o n t o be doing t h a t
(CON"' D )
u n t i l a f t e r we passed Canaries. Each person i s s o r t of

o p e r a t i n g on h i s own. We know we're going about i n t h e

v a r i o u s systems checks, and t h a t d o e s n ' t f i t i n t o a r e a l

good t i m e l i n e .

COLLINS An example h e r e on page ~ 2 - 8 , item 4, EMERGENCY CABIN PRES-

SURE valve t o BOTH. That check i s made p r i o r t o anybody's

going i n t o t h e LEB. T h a t ' s impossible t o do; obviously,

you have t o be down i n t h e LEB t o s e e it. The man who goes

down t o t h e LEB - i f he goes through s t e p s s e q u e n t i a l l y as

w r i t t e n i n t h e c h e c k l i s t -would s t a r t jumping from one

p l a c e t o another back and f o r t h . Some improvement could be

made i n t h e o r d e r . Now, I s o r t of g o t l a z y and decided not

t o f i g h t t h e c h e c k l i s t world. I j u s t had m y own order i n

which I w a s going t o do them r e g a r d l e s s of t h e o r d e r t h a t

is i n the printed checklist. But t o r e a l l y be p r e c i s e about

i t , t h e following crews ought t o l o o k a t t h i s l i t t l e s e c t i o n

and g e t t h i n g s rearranged t o t h e i r l i k i n g and f o r a minimum

amount of moving around.

ALDRIN Yes, w e l l , f o r example, t h a t s t e p 7 on 2-9: During 20 min-

u t e s of ECS p o s t i n s e r t i o n c o n f i g u r a t i o n , we've been doing

o t h e r t h i n g s a t t h a t time. I d o n ' t b e l i e v e we were i n

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~STRONG p o s i t i o n t o be doing t h a t u n t i l a f t e r we passed Canaries.

(CONT'D)
It w a s approaching 30 minutes, it seemed t o m e , y e t w e had

done s e v e r a l o t h e r t h i n g s ahead of t h a t p o i n t . Each person

i s s o r t of o p e r a t i n g on h i s own. We know what w e ' r e going

about i n t h e v a r i o u s systems checks, and it d o e s n ' t f i t i n t o

a good t i m e l i n e .

COLLINS This i s a s m a l l example h e r e : Page L2-8, i t e m 4, EMERGENCY

CABIN PRESSURE v a l v e t o BOTH. That check i s made p r i o r t o

anybody's going i n t h e LEB. T h a t ' s impossible t o do. Ob-

v i o u s l y , you g o t t o be down i n t h e LEB t o s e e it. Yet i t ' s

l i s t e d p r i o r t o t h e time t h e CMP goes t o t h e LEB for t h e

main r e g u l a t o r check. Just l i t t l e things l i k e t h a t , the

sequence h e r e i s crazy. And, as I say, I w a s l a z y and

d i d n ' t g e t it s t r a i g h t e n e d out i n t h e c h e c k l i s t world. I

j u s t went through i t . i n my own f a s h i o n . But t o be p r e c i s e

about i t , t h e following crew should go through t h i s one time

and rewrite t h i s i n a more e f f i c i e n t f a s h i o n .

. 4.3 I N I T I A T I O N OF TIME BASE 6 - AWARENESS

ARMSTRONG Okay. I n i t i a t i o n of time b a s e 6. I t h i n k w e ' l l postpone

that.

4.4 ORDEAL
ARMSTRONG Now t h e n , ORDEAL: We used a system where t h e CMP w a s a l r e a d y

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ARMSTRONG i n t h e LEB and under t h e couches, r e l e a s e d t h e l a t c h on t h e
(CONT'D)
ORDEAL, and l e t it f l o a t up t o t h e CDR who w a s s t i l l

s t r a p p e d down i n t h e couch t h a t w a s no problem.

COLLINS Here a g a i n , t h a t probably should be a c h e c k l i s t item i f

people want t h e CMF' t o do t h a t , as w e d i d i t . Then it

probably ought t o be w r i t t e n i n h i s l i s t of t h i n g s t o do.

ARMSTRONG That worked w e l l for u s , I t h i n k .

COLLINS Worked f i n e .

ALDRIN Optics Cover Check.

COLLINS The only t h i n g I can say as a g e n e r a l r u l e i s it goes back

t o t h i s t h i n g about becoming ill. And t h a t i s , i f y o u ' r e

r e a l l y worried about anybody becoming ill, t h e guy y o u ' r e

going t o worry about i s . t h e one who's r a t t l i n g around down

i n t h e LEB, I n our f l i g h t , t h a t w a s I and I w a s a l s o t h e

one who would be doing t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking. So

I w a s t r y i n g t o move around w i t h minimum head movements and

go minimum d i s t a n c e s and s o f o r t h . But on t h e o t h e r hand,

i f y o u ' r e convinced y o u ' r e not going t o be s i c k , w e l l t h e n ,

a l l t h o s e t h i n g s go away. I t ' s s o r t of a nebulous area. I

d o n ' t know what t o do about it.

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ALDRIN Well, i t ' s something you c a n ' t a f f o r d t o g e t ahead of your-

s e l f and b e moving around t o o f a s t . If t h e r e t s any q u e s t i o n

a t a l l and I t h i n k we a l l played it very c a u t i o u s l y u n t i l

each of us i n our own p a r t i c u l a r way r e a l i z e d that it w a s

j u s t no problem. A s we adapted t o i t , we could go about

any kind of movement t h a t we wanted without any p a r t i c u l a r

concern, But t h e s t a k e s a r e p r e t t y high and you c a n ' t af-

f o r d t o l e t t h e s e t h i n g s g e t t h e b e s t of you.

4.5 OPTICS COVER JETTISON (DEBRIS)

COLLINS I heard a l i t t l e n o i s e , b u t I s a w no d e b r i s and I could n o t

v e r i f y t h a t t h e y had j e t t i s o n e d . I looked through both

instruments and I c o u l d n ' t s e e t h a t t h e y had j e t t i s o n e d .

4.6 SCS ATTITUDE REFERENCE COMPARISON

COLLINS Okay.

ARMSTRONG It went w e l l . No problems.

4.7 SM AND CM RCS

ARMSTRONG We d i d hot RCS checks on t h e s e r v i c e module RCS p r i o r t o

TLI. The i n t e n t h e r e w a s t o assure o u r s e l v e s t h a t we d i d ,

i n f a c t , have an operable c o n t r o l system and t h a t our hand

c o n t r o l l e r s could, i n f a c t , talk t o something b e f o r e

committing o u r s e l v e s t o a l u n a r t r a j e c t o r y . We d i d t h a t i n

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ARMSTRONG MINIMUM IMPULSE and it w a s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o hear t h e
( CONT 1 D 1
thrusters f i r i n g . It w a s impossible t o r e a d an e f f e c t on

any i n d i c a t o r i n t h e c o c k p i t .

COLLINS This i s w i t h helmet and gloves on.

ARMSTRONG Helmet and gloves on. So w e were p l e a s e d when t h e ground

s a i d t h e y could, i n f a c t , see t h e t h r u s t e r s firing. We d i d

have t o r e p e a t one which t h e y d i d n ' t see.

ALDRIN I d o n ' t r e c a l l why w e had t h e helmets on a t t h a t p o i n t .

ARMSTRONG We d i d n ' t t a k e them o f f ?

COLLINS We took them o f f and w e p u t them back on,

ALDRIN That should have been w i t h a t l e a s t one man w i t h h i s helmet

o f f so he could hear i t .

ARMSTRONG Right.

COLLINS Well, on t h e o t h e r hand, i f you scheduled it over t h e S t a t e s

and t h e ground v e r i f i e s it, you d o n ' t much care.

ARMSTRONG I w a s s a t i s f i e d t h a t w e d i d , i n f a c t , prove the p o i n t t h a t

w e wanted t o prove.

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4 . 8 COAS INSTALLATION AND HORIZON CHECK

ARMSTRONG Unstowage; COAS i n s t a l l a t i o n : I d o n ' t r e c a l l any p o i n t s

there.

4.9 UNSTOWAGE AND CAMERA PREPARATION

ARMSTRONG We had t h e TV camera p r e p a r a t i o n a l s o i n t h e same time

p e r i o d ; any comments t h e r e ?

COLLINS Well, a g a i n , t h i s camera p r e p a r a t i o n probably should be

w r i t t e n i n t o t h e c h e c k l i s t on page L2-9, i n a b i t more

d e t a i l t h a n it i s .

ALDRIN Well, on 2-13 i n d e t a i l , b u t do you want it sooner?

COLLINS Well, t h i s i s when y o u ' r e unstowing i t , b e c a u s e . r e a l l y a l l

it s a y s i s cameras and t h a t r e a l l y means t h e 16-DIIUp l u s t h e

70-mm and t h e v a r i o u s l e n s e s . You hand them up and you g e t

t h e b r a c k e t from N e i l . I t ' s r e a l l y s o r t of an assembly

process t h e r e . This i s s o r t of a d e a l e r ' s choice, b u t I

suggest t h a t t h e following crews g i v e some thought r i g h t

on page 2-9 t o deciding what cameras t h e y want t o unstow

o r w h a t t h e y want t o do w i t h them and how t h e y ' r e going t o

do it. O t h e r w i s e , t h e y ' r e going t o have another t r i p back

down t o t h e LEB which r e a l l y i s n ' t necessary.

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4.10 DOCKING PROBE

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k t h e y ' r e attempting t o r e c a l l anything t h a t might

have gone abnormally.

COLLINS There were no f i n d i n g s i n t h a t docking probe.

4.12 COMMlTNICATIONS

ARMSTRONG Communications were more or less i n and out i n e a r t h o r b i t .

Sometimes t h e r e w a s q u i t e good S-band through t h e v a r i o u s

s t a t i o n s ; o t h e r t i m e s , it w a s only medium.

4.14 COMMENTS ON MTH-ORBITAL OPERATIONS

ARMSTRONG Any comments on t h e e a r t h - o r b i t o p e r a t i o n s ?

COLLINS I think, i n general, t h a t ' s a very nice timeline. We

hammered away a t it enough t o where we're only checking

t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t r e a l l y should be checked and t h e r e ' s

p l e n t y of t i m e a v a i l a b l e ' t o check them i n a l e i s u r e l y

fashion. I think t h a t ' s a nice timeline.

ALDRIN How about t h e alignment? On t h e Saturn?

COLLINS The p l a t f o r m alignment?

ALDRIN Yes, t o r q u i n g a n g l e w e g o t from t h e ground and the alignment

t h e y gave us -

COLLINS Yes, I d i d n ' t know what t o s a y about t h a t . I think t h a t ' s

probably w i t h i n normal t o l e r a n c e .

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ALDRIN Yes.

COLLINS The alignment a t ORB RATE i s no problem as o t h e r f l i g h t s

have r e p o r t e d ,

4.18 EMS DELTA-V

ARMSTRONG Okay. EMS DELTA V. No problems.

4.19 SCALE CHANGE

ARMSTRONG S c a l e change, systems, engine alignments, GO f o r T L I , and

then --

COLLINS Glad t o g e t it - no problems.

ALDRIN Well, I t h i n k i t ' s worthy t o note t h a t w e d i d i n t e n d t o have

t h e TV camera o u t . It d i d not seem t o crowd tfie t i m e l i n e ,

t r y i n g t o g e t t h o s e p i c t u r e s coming up on t h e West Coast,

We s t i l l seemed t o have a very comfortable approach t o T L I .

COLLINS That's right. O f course, t h a t ' s where we s a i d we weren't

going t o f o o l w i t h t h e t e l e v i s i o n i f we were rushed or be-

hind t h e t i m e l i n e .

4.23 DRIFT TEST

ARMSTRONG The d r i f t t e s t has t o do with your alignment, I guess.

- and a l s o with t h e GDC d r i f t , which was a c c e p t a b l e . I

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4.24 CREW READINESS AND COMFORT
ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we were ready f o r T L I . We were unrushed and had no

problems t h e r e .

4.25 SUBJECTIVE REACTION ON WEIGHTLESSNESS

ARMSTRONG Well, perhaps a l i t t l e b i t of f u l l n e s s i n t h e head.

ALDRIN I d i d n ' t n o t i c e t h a t q u i t e as soon coming on as i n Gemini,

ARMSTRONG Yes, I d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t it was as marked.as I had remembered.

COLLINS I t ' s s o s l i g h t , t h a t i f you have anything e l s e i n your mind,

you j u s t t r y t o i g n o r e i t , I mean, i t ' s not any b i g e f f e c t ,

ALDRIN Well, t h e r e ' s t h e f e e l i n g that your f a c e t e n d s t o l i f t up a

little bit.

COLLINS Yes, it does, Your eyes a r e puffy.

ARMSTRONG A s e n s a t i o n of head-down p o s i t i o n . I guess I had t K a t

s e n s a t i o n and expected it and thought it ought t o be t h e r e ,

because we were head-down,

ARMSTRONG Vertigo s p a t i a l d i s o r i e n t a t i o n .

ALDRIN No problems,

COLLINS None.

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ALDRIN A s f a r as I w a s concerned, t h e r e wasn't anything r e a l l y t o

be alarmed about i n t h e l e a s t . I do t h i n k t h a t t h e f a c t

t h a t you've been through it makes a good b i t of d i f f e r e n c e .

There was a good b i t made of t h i s s o r t of t h i n g b e f o r e t h e

f l i g h t , and I t h i n k someone who had not flown b e f o r e would

have been a l i t t l e b i t o v e r l y concerned.

ARMSTRONG Yes, w e were probably a l i t t l e bit o v e r l y apprehensive about

t h i s area, because t h e r e ' had been s o many comments on it i n

r e c e n t f l i g h t s ; w e j u s t d i d n ' t r u n i n t o any problems.

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5.0 T L I THROUGH S-IVB CLOSEOUT

5.1 T L I BURN MONITOR PROCEDURE

ARMSTRONG The procedure went very w e l l .

COLLINS Except yaw.

ARMSTRONG No, t h e yaw was p e r f e c t l y on, b u t t h e p i t c h showed approxi-

mately a l-1/2-degree b i a s from t h e v a l u e t h a t w e would have

expected. That i s t o s a y , with t h e ORDEAL s e t i n a LUNAR/

200 c o n f i g u r a t i o n , and being a t t h e proper p o i n t on t h e min-

u t e each minute p r i o r t o i g n i t i o n . The p i t c h a t t i t u d e w a s

i n d i c a t i n g about 1-112 degrees h i g h e r , t h a t i s , 1-1/2 degrees

t o t h e r i g h t or p l u s 1-1/2 degrees from zero. We expected

approximately zero. I t h i n k t h i s would be wise t o look a t

t h a t c a r e f u l l y with DCPS t r a i n i n g guide w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e

adequacy of t h a t procedure and see where t h a t l i t t l e b i t o f

d i f f e r e n c e occurs. Other t h a n t h a t , t h e T L I monitoring went

j u s t as expected.

ALDRIN But t h a t w a s an instrument t h a t was used t o make changes i f

w e were i n c o n t r o l . The c l o s i n g o f t h e loop w a s r e a l l y t h e

observation of t h e H-dot which w a s s u r p r i s i n g l y c l o s e . At

each 30-second p e r i o d , we c l o s e d t h e DSKY and looked a t t h e

H-dot and it w a s amazingly c l o s e . O f course, t h e r e g e t t o

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_" . . .-. . . . - - , - .. - . . . ..
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ALDRIN be some p r e t t y good H-dots a t about 4 minutes and 30 seconds
( CONT'D)
a t about 2200 H-dot; and I don't t h i n k it w a s o f f more t h a n

1 0 f t / s e c a t t h a t p o i n t , s o much c l o s e r t h a n we've seen i n

any s i m u l a t i o n s , r i g h t i n t h e groove.

ARMSTRONG Had we gone t o manual T L I , then we would have probably been

a l i t t l e b i t off i n pitch. I t h i n k we had soon seen t h a t

our H-dot was beginning t o g e t out of bounds and we made a

c o r r e c t i o n , b u t w e should understand t h a t a l i t t l e b e t t e r .

5.2 s-IVB PERFORMANCEAND ECO

ARMSTRONG S-IVB performance and engine cut-off were outstanding.

ALDRIN The t i m e of t h e burn.

ARMSTRONG Burn t i m e w a s not q u i t e book v a l u e , t h e r e . D i d we w r i t e

t h a t down i n our c h e c k l i s t ? Burn t i m e ? Give them a burn-

s t a t u s report?

ALDRIN A s I r e c a l l , it w a s a l i t t l e longer t h a n normal.

ARMSTRONG No, as I remember, it w a s l i k e a couple of seconds o f f i n

burn t i m e , b u t I j u s t d o n ' t r e c a l l now what t h e d i f f e r e n c e

w a s ; but o t h e r t h a n t h a t , it went very w e l l .

ALDRIN L e t me j u s t n o t e some numbers h e r e t h a t w a s recorded a t

f r e e z i n g t h e DSKY a f t e r cut-off and you are bound t o m i s s

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ALDRIN t h a t by a couple of seconds. The expected VI w a s 35575 and

( CONT'D)
I r e p o r t e d 35579; t h e H-dot expected w a s 4285 and I have

4321; and, of course, H-dot was b u i l d i n g f a i r l y r a p i d l y and

t h a t ' s n o t q u i t e a mile a second, s o t h e expected a l t i t u d e

was 174 and we read 176. The EMS was 3.3 p l u s .

ARMSTRONG Yes, w e knew, when t h e EMS showed only 3 f t / s e c o f f i n a

1 0 OOO-ft/sec b u r n , i t w a s going t o be p r e t t y good t o u s .

5.3 UNSTOWAGE AND PREPARATION OF CAMERAS

ARMSTRONG No problem.

5.4 S-IVB MANEUVER TO SEPAFUTION ATTITUDE

ALDRIN It w a s r i g h t on schedule and no comment.

5.5 PRESEPARATION CONFIGURATION

ALDRIN No problems.

5.6 MCC GO/NO GO FOR PYRO ARM

ALDRIN Well how about t h a t high O2 flow anomaly t h a t I t h i n k t h e

ground picked up?

ARMSTRONG Yes, I guess t h a t ' s r i g h t .

5.9 S-IVB/IU CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

ARMSTRONG Good.

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5.11 S-IVB TANK PFGBSURES

ARMSTRONG Good.

5.12 EDS OPERATION

ARMSTRONG A l l on t i m e .

5.13 PYRO OPERATION

ARMSTRONG No problem.

5.14 SEPARATION FROM SIA

COLLINS The only comment on s e p a r a t i o n from SLA i s t h e g e n e r a l com-

ment about t h e EMS during t h e s e p a r a t i o n , t u r n a r o w d , and

t h e docking w a s t h a t t h e EMS numbers g o t confused. The EMS

got j o l t e d and d i d not r e c o r d some a c c e l e r a t i o n t h a t it

should have or it recorded some t h a t it should not have; I

d o n ' t know which i s t h e c a s e . I used t h e EMS as an i n d i c a t o r

a f t e r turnaround as t o how much DELTA-V t o apply t h r u s t i n g

back toward t h e b o o s t e r . When I got t o t h a t s t a g e of t h e

,-
game, t h e EMS numbers made no sense a t a l l . They were

1-1/2 f t / s e c i n e r r o r , and a t docking, t h a t s i t u a t i o n con-

tinued. The EMS number t h a t I j o t t e d down a t docking w a s

99.1. There's no way t h a t t h e EMS could r e a d 99.1 a t dock-

ing.

A s I r e c a l l , I t h r u s t e d away from t h e b o o s t e r u n t i l t h e EMS

DELTA-V counter r e a d 100.8, j u s t like t h e procedures s a i d . e

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COLLINS Then I t h r u s t e d minus X u n t i l t h e DELTA-V counter r e a d minus

( CONT'D)
100.5. I t h i n k I t h r u s t e d p l u s X u n t i l it read minus 100.6.

The p o i n t where t h e EMS w a s i n e r r o r came a f t e r t h a t . That's

what I d o n ' t understand. When I completed t h e turnaround

maneuver, t h e EMS should have r e a d minus 101.1 and it d i d n ' t .

It r e a d down i n t h e 9 0 ' s . A t docking, when it should have

r e a d 1 0 1 p l u s , it r e a d 99.1. So t h e r e i s a funny t h e r e i n
t h e EMS.

5.15 HIGH GAIN ANTENNA ACTIVATION

ARMSTRONG That took u s q u i t e a while.

COLLINS You d i d t h a t l a t e r .

ALDRIN Yes, we d i d n ' t g e t t h a t done u n t i l a f t e r docking.

5.17 TRANSPOSITION

COLLINS T r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking, i n g e n e r a l , worked i n f l i g h t j u s t

as it worked a couple of times i n t h e simulator. I went

MANUAL ATTITUDE PITCH t o ACCEL COMMAND, and I s t a r t e d t o

p i t c h up. A f t e r 1 0 or 20 degrees of p i t c h u p , when it w a s

d e f i n i t e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e a t t i t u d e e r r o r needle i n

p i t c h w a s f u l l s c a l e high ( i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e DAP wished

t o continue t h e maneuver i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n i n which I

had s t a r t e d i t ) , t h e n I went PROCEED and MANUAL ATTITUDE

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COLLINS . PITCH t o RATE COMMAND. Then, j u s t as i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , t h e
( CONT'D)
DAP r o l l e d i t s e l f o u t . It ceased i t s p i t c h r a t e . I don't

understand t h a t . A t t h e t i m e , Buzz s a i d t h a t I had f o r g o t t e n

one PROCEED. A s I r e c a l l , I went through t h i s turnaround

procedure e x a c t l y as t h e c h e c k l i s t w a s w r i t t e n . In the

s i m u l a t o r , sometimes it worked l i k e magic and o t h e r times

it wouldn't. I n f l i g h t , it worked j u s t e x a c t l y l i k e a bad

simulator d i d . MIT or G&C people should check and see what

i f anything i s wrong w i t h t h i s procedure. If I w e r e going

t o f l y t h i s f l i g h t over a g a i n , I would say it d o e s n ' t matter

i f you p i t c h up or down. You ought t o put t h o s e NOUN 22

values i n t h e r e , h i t PROCEED t w i c e , and l e t t h e s p a c e c r a f t

t u r n i t s e l f around. You're going t o g e t around w i t h i n

30 or 45 seconds anyway. I t ' s such a n e a t , simple, c l e a n ,

easy procedure t o do t h a t way. The way we've got it de-

signed, t o make s u r e t h a t we go p i t c h u p i n s t e a d of p i t c h -

down, s o r t of mixes a p p l e s and oranges: Let t h e DAP do i t ,

t h e n you t a k e c o n t r o l away from t h e DAP, t h e n you give it

back t o t h e DAP; and, f o r reasons unknown t o m e , sometimes

it works and sometimes it d o e s n ' t .

ARMSTRONG I ' d say t h a t t h e manual procedure i s probably t h e b e s t . That

would be my p r e f e r e n c e .

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COLLINS This i s something t h a t I ' m s u r e Apollo 1 2 and o t h e r f l i g h t s

w i l l want t o massage. I ' m f i r m l y convinced t h a t t h e way t o

save gas on t h a t maneuver i s t o l e t t h e DAP do i t . Make it

a t o t a l l y automatic DAP maneuver. The p r i c e you pay f o r t h a t

i s t h a t you never know whether i t ' s going t o p i t c h up or

down. This i s not important. I n an e f f o r t t o save gas and

t o a s s u r e t h a t we always p i t c h e d up, I ended up wasting some

gas.

5.18 STABILIZATION AND ALIGNMENT AT 50 FEET

COLLINS My procedure w a s worked out s o I ' d be 66 f e e t a ray from t h e

b o o s t e r a t turnaround. Because of t h e s e delays and because

of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e DAP kept t r y i n g t o s t o p i t s turnaround

r a t e , I would say t h a t we were about 100 f e e t away from t h e

b o o s t e r when I f i n a l l y t u r n e d around. This c o s t e x t r a gas

i n g e t t i n g back t o it. I don't know how much extra g a s ,

t h e y s a i d 1 2 t o 18 pounds over. I don't know how much they

allocated. I t h i n k it w a s 60 o r 70 pounds. That whole

maneuver probably c o s t 80 pounds. I n t h e s i m u l a t o r , doing

it completed automated, I can probably do it f o r 30 t o

35 pounds. The d i f f e r e n c e between 30 t o 35 pounds and prob-

a b l y 80 pounds w a s j u s t wasted gas.

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5.19 DOCKING

COLLINS Docking, as i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , w a s very easy. I d i d have a

s l i g h t roll misalignment. I knew I had a s l i g h t roll m i s -

alignment, b u t everything e l s e w a s l i n e d up. Rather t h a n

d i d d l e w i t h it and make a last-minute c o r r e c t i o n , I just

accepted it. It t u r n e d o u t l a t e r t o be 2 degrees i n t h e

tunnel.

5.20 PHOTOGRAPHY DURING TRANSPOSITION AND .DOCKING

ALDRIN We used t h e 16-rnm camera. We used t h e s e t t i n g s t h a t were

l i s t e d i n the checklist. We'll j u s t have t o look a t how t h e

f i l m t u r n e d out b e f o r e we can say t o o much more about t h a t .

I d i d use a f a i r amount of f i l m and I t h i n k t h e p i c t u r e s

should come out reasonably w e l l .

5.21 CSM HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS DURING DOCKING

COLLINS Absolutely normal. I docked i n CMC , AUTO , narrow deadband

with a 2-deg/sec rate. I went t o CMC, FREE, a t c o n t a c t .

Docking alignment w a s f i n e .

5.23 ADEQUACY OF SUNLIGHT

COLLINS More t h a n adequate. There w a s p l e n t y of s u n l i g h t . CSM

docking l i g h t s were not r e q u i r e d . The COAS r e t i c l e b r i g h t -

n e s s , even with t h a t f i l t e r removed, w a s s t i l l q u i t e dim a t

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COLLINS p o i n t s during t h e docking. It i s d i s c e r n i b l e i f you r e a l l y

( CONT 'D )
look c l o s e l y . A t t h e end when you need i t , i t ' s more v i s i b l e
t h a n it i s 20 t o 30 f e e t o u t . I would say t h a t t h e COAS i s
marginable , b u t s a t i s f a c t o r y .

5.24 CABIN PURGE AND LM/CSM PRESSURE EQUALIZATION

COLLINS I b e l i e v e a l l t h a t went j u s t about e x a c t l y as p e r t h e numbers.

ALDRIN W e went PRESSURE EQUALIZATION v a l v e t o OPEN. Where i t says

go t o A, we went t o 3.8. T h a t ' s where it s t a b i l i z e d . Repres-

sure O2 only brought it up t o 4.4. That gave u s a DELTA-P

of near zero. There wasn't any c y c l i n g back and f o r t h . There

was j u s t one c y c l e open and t h a t ' s as f a r , a s it went.

COLLINS That c y c l i n g back and f o r t h only a p p l i e s i f you have a problem

when you d o n ' t have i n t h e f u l l volume of t h e LM.

5.25 CONFIGURING FOR LM'EJECTION, DOCKING PROBE, VENTING

LATCHES , UMBILICALS, POWER, AND TEMPERATURE

COLLINS Okay. The only funny here w a s when I opened t h e hatch t o

g e t i n t o t h e t u n n e l , there w a s a p e c u l i a r odor i n the t u n n e l .

This odor w a s not e x a c t l y t h e same as burned e l e c t r i c a l

insulation.

ALDRIN You commented t h a t t h e w i r i n g i n t h e c a b l e s seemed t o r e t a i n

t h i s odor.

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COLLINS I t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s j u s t normal. F a b r i c w i l l r e t a i n an

odor where m e t a l w i l l n o t .

ALDRIN I ' v e n o t i c e d t h a t same odor as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of some of

t h e s e new materials w e have. A l o t o f t h e bags , when you

g e t them r i g h t c l o s e t o you, have t h i s same burned-insulation

odor. I ' m n o t s u r e i f t h a t ' s i t , b u t t h a t might e x p l a i n i t .

COLLINS I d o n ' t know. My f i r s t impression w a s t h a t something w a s

burning or had been burned i n s i d e t h a t t u n n e l . I went over

every i n c h of w i r i n g and a l l t h e connectors. I got a flash-

l i g h t and looked a t everything. It a l l looked a b s o l u t e l y

normal. W e chose n o t t o d i s c u s s it with t h e . g r o u n d because

w e hadn't popped any c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s and everything looked

normal. It seemed l i k e evidence of a p a s t problem r a t h e r

t h a n an e x i s t i n g one.

ALDRIN I t h i n k it would be a good i d e a f o r subsequent crews t o s n i f f

around and s m e l l what t h i s probe and u m b i l i c a l s s m e l l l i k e

beforehand.

COLLINS They don't smell anything l i k e t h a t . This w a s a sharp odor.

I mean t h i s w a s enough t o knock you down when you opened t h e

tunnel. It w a s one s t r o n g odor.

ALDRIN This s t u f f had been exposed t o a vacuum.

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COLLINS It had been exposed t o t h e boost environment, t o o . I don't

know how s t u f f would g e t under t h e r e w i t h t h e BPC on. The

BPC d o e s n ' t leave u n t i l y o u ' r e darn near i n a vacuum. Despite

t h a t , I thought t h a t perhaps t h e r e was some odor a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h t h e h i g h temperature of b o o s t t h a t had somehow g o t t e n

through t h e BPC and through t h a t l i t t l e t u n n e l vent l i n e i n t o

t h e tunnel area. It s u r e smelled, and it smelled a couple

of days l a t e r coming up on LOI. When I went i n t o a c t i v a t e

t h e LM, t h e odor w a s j u s t as s t r o n g .

All t h e s e l a t c h e s made. Latch number 6 , which i s t h e one

t h a t had a c t e d up a l i t t l e b i t down a t t h e Cape during t e s t s ,

w a s t h e only one t h a t needed one a c t u a t i o n t o cock r a t h e r t h a n

two. Other t h a n 6 , a l l t h e o t h e r s s a i d t h a t t h e y w e r e going

t o r e q u i r e two p u l l s t o cock and t h e y d i d . A l l t h a t hardware

worked w e l l .

W e followed t h e c h e c k l i s t . We e x t r a c t e d i n CMC, FREE, and

t h e n went t o DAP c o n t r o l and f i r e d t h e a f t t h r u s t e r s f o r

3 seconds. We went t o CMC and DAP c o n t r o l 5 seconds a f t e r

spring actuations. N e i l and I both r e a d a memo p u t out by

MPAD, saying t h a t f o r some f a i l u r e modes you w e r e n ' t supposed

t o do t h a t ; i n s t e a d use SCS c o n t r o l . Ken Mattingly and I

s p e n t a l o t o f time t h e l a s t couple of days b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t

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COLLINS t r y i n g t o check a l l t h a t out. It t u r n e d o u t t o b e s o r t of
( CONT'D)
a witch hunt. For f'uture f l i g h t s , they might check i n t o

which i s t h e b e s t c o n t r o l mode f o r e x t r a c t i n g t h e LM. I

t h i n k i t ' s okay t h e way w e d i d i t ; b u t , i f one of t h e s p r i n g s

g e t s hung up and throws you sideways, it may be b e t t e r . t o do

t h a t maneuver under SCS c o n t r o l r a t h e r t h a n CMC, FRFE.

5.28 VEHICLE DYNAMICS OF CSM/LM

DURING EJECTION FROM S-IVB

COLLINS There were no abnormal dynamics. The t h i n g backed out abso-

l u t e l y symmetrically as f a r as I could t e l l .

5.29 ADEQUACY OF ATTITUDE CONTROL AND STABILITY

COLLINS The S-IVB w a s always very s t a b l e p r i o r t o , during, and a f t e r

LM s e p a r a t i o n . SM RCS plumes had a b s o l u t e l y no e f f e c t on

v i s i b i l i t y or on S-IVB s t a b i l i t y .

5.32 EVASIVE MANEUVERS

COLLINS We thought a t one t i m e we might be somewhat rushed during

t h a t t i m e period. It t u r n e d out t h a t w a s comfortable and

we were prepared t o do t h e evasive maneuver. We could have

done it 5 o r 1 0 minutes e a r l i e r t h a n it w a s c a l l e d f o r .

Luckily, it i s n o t a maneuver t h a t i s t i m e - c r i t i c a l . I think

t h e p r e s e n t scheme o f causing t h e S-IVB t o overburn by

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COLLINS 2 meters p e r second, and t h e n i n t e n t i o n a l l y burning t h e SPS

( CONT' D)
f o r 3 seconds t o compensate f o r t h a t overburn appears t o be

a sound procedure. I recommend no changes t o it.

ALDRIN I d i d n o t i c e t h e o x i d i z e r unbalance t o s t a r t o u t because it

w a s bouncing around, b u t I have a n o t e down h e r e on t h e eva-

s i v e maneuver t h a t it changed from minus 180 t o 130 decrease.

That's only 3 seconds of burn, b u t you could see t h a t t h i s

t h i n g w a s i n i t s decrease p o s i t i o n a l l t h e t i m e , which i s

what we expected. W e j u s t l e f t it a l o n e during t h a t s h o r t

burn. We g o t t h e f i r s t gimbal motor o f f a l i t t l e b i t b e f o r e

I w a s a b l e t o confirm i t , s o w e had t o go through a l i t t l e

r a i n dance of t u r n i n g t h a t back on and t h e n back o f f again.

That took a l i t t l e e x t r a t i m e , and we used up a l i t t l e e x t r a

amp-hours out of t h e b a t t e r i e s , b u t t h e ground d i d confirm

it o r a t l e a s t t r y t o confirm t h a t we d i d g e t t h a t gimbal

motor o f f .

5.34 S-IVB SLINGSHOT MANEWER

COLLINS Now, we never saw t h a t . It seems l i k e t h e a t t i t u d e t h e y

gave us w a s n o t c o r r e c t .

ALDRIN It was q u i t e a while b e f o r e we picked up t h e S-IVB, and it

was r o l l i n g w i t h a l i t t l e b i t of o s c i l l a t i o n , a l i t t l e coning

effect. It d e f i n i t e l y had a good roll t o it moving away.

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ALDRIN This w a s during t h e nonpropulsive p a r t of t h e v e n t and you
( CONT'D)
could see two streams coming o u t of e i t h e r s i d e as t h e oxi-

d i z e r w a s vented o u t . Exactly o p p o s i t e t o each o t h e r were

two cones going o u t . I guess t h e cones were 30 degrees out

one s i d e and 30 degrees out t h e o t h e r , s o it w a s d e f i n i t e l y

observable.

COLLINS But something appeared t o be wrong w i t h t h e a t t i t u d e t h e y

gave us. I d o n ' t know whether t h e y m i s c a l c u l a t e d or what,

b u t t h e y gave us an a t t i t u d e t o see t h e s l i n g s h o t out t h e

h a t c h window. W e confirmed t h a t w e w e r e looking through t h e

c o r r e c t window, and it wasn't t h e r e .

5.35 S-IVB VENTING OPERATION

COLLINS I d o n ' t know what t o say about t h a t . I guess it went nor-

mally .
5.36 PROPELLANT DUMP DURING SLINGSHOT MANEUVER

ALDRIN We d i d n ' t make use o f t h a t procedure of keeping - w e didn't

use it t o any advantage of having t h e o t h e r s t a t e v e c t o r

keep t r a c k of t h e S-IVB. It sounds Mickey Mouse, b u t it

could have been some a s s i s t a n c e i n t e l l i n g u s where t h e

S-IVB w a s .

ARMSTRONG Yes.

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ALDRIN A range r a t e and a VERB 89. I d o n ' t know whether i t ' s of

any value; t h e o t h e r guys considered it anyway.

COLLINS I t h i n k t h a t t h i n g of watching t h e S-IVB i s j u s t t h e d e a l e r ' s

choice anyway. There's no need t o watch t h e S-IVB. It's

j u s t t h a t i f y o u ' r e going t o go t o a l l t h e t r o u b l e of g e t t i n g

t h e ground t o compute t h r e e angles w i t h which you should b e

a b l e t o s e e t h e S-IVB out a c e r t a i n window, t h e n you ought

t o g e t t h e correct angles.

5.37 EDS DEACTIVATION

COLLINS Nothing t o say about t h a t .

5.39 S-IVB CLOSEOUT

COLLINS I don't know what t o say about t h a t .

5.40 DOSIMETER

COLLINS I n g e n e r a l , w e got v e i y l i t t l e r a d i a t i o n . O f course, w e

were going through t h e B e l t s about t h i s t i m e . I don't r e c a l l

t h a t we looked a t t h e radiation-survey meter. Did w e do

that? Did anybody look a t t h a t ? I don't b e l i e v e t h a t w a s

c a l l e d out. We gave d a i l y dosimeter r e a d i n g s , which as far

as I ' m concerned f a l l i n a s o r t of a gee-whiz category. It's

j u s t information of very l i t t l e value t o anybody. They have

o t h e r sources f o r i t , a n d , I suppose it goes on somebody's

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COLLINS graph somewhere f o r p o s t e r i t y . Other than t h a t , I d o n ' t

( CONT'D)
have anything t o say about i t .

ARMSTRONG It wasn't c a l l e d out.

COLLINS And t h e dosimeter we j u s t gave them a once-a-day reading on

t h a t dosimeter.

5.41 WORKLOAD AND TIMELINES

COLLINS J u s t i n g e n e r a l , I thought a l l t h e s e workloads and t i m e l i n e s

were q u i t e reasonable and had been w e l l worked out by previous

crews and I ' d recommend no changes t o them. I thought t h a t

whole f i r s t 3 or 4 hours worth of a c t i v i t y w a s w e l l thought

o u t , and we were never rushed and we were never behind.

ALDRIN Well, our p o s i t i o n i n g of d i f f e r e n t people i n d i f f e r e n t s e a t s

w a s a l i t t l e unique, s o i t ' s a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t , I t h i n k , f o r

other f l i g h t s .

COLLINS Yes. Well, our s e a t p o s i t i o n i s a s e p a r a t e s u b j e c t i n i t s e l f .

A s far as being h u r r i e d , we were n o t , although t h e f i r s t

5 hours of t h e f l i g h t I thought were q u i t e reasonable, and

t h a t ' s a l l I have t o say.

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6.0 TRANSLUNAR COAST

6.1 M
I U REALIGNMENT

COLLINS We r e a l i g n e d t h e IMU i n E a r t h parking o r b i t . The next

t i m e w e r e a l i g n e d i t , we were, I guess, i n e r t i a l l y f i x e d .

I remember now t h a t our X-torquing angle was 0.172 degrees

t h e f i r s t t i m e , which seems excessive t o me. We asked t h e

ground t o v e r i f y and t h e y said it seemed excessive t o

them and t o go ahead and redo i t . So I went through P52

a second t i m e . I n s t e a d of a minus 0.172 I got a

minus 0.171. The results were r e p e a t e d ; t h e r e f o r e , t h e

ground said go ahead and t o r q u e t h e m , and we d i d . I

d o n ' t understand why t h a t t o r q u i n g angle w a s t h a t l a r g e .

I guess it w a s an uncompensated X - d r i f t , which t h e y l a t e r

compensated f o r more a c c u r a t e l y , because t h e platform w a s

w e l l w i t h i n i t s limits during t h e remainder of t h e f l i g h t .

Yet t h i s does seem l i k e a l a r g e t o r q u i n g angle.

Another g e n e r a l comment about t h e IMU w a s I c o u l d n ' t g e t

c o n s i s t e n t s t a r angle d i f f e r e n c e numbers. A t various

t i m e s i n t h e f l i g h t , I got e i t h e r 5 b a l l s 0 . 0 1 or 0.02,
. and t h e r e w a s no c o r r e l a t i o n . A s a matter o f f a c t , t h e r e

was n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n . The more t i m e I took and t h e

more p r e c i s e I attempted t o b e , t h e more o f t e n I got 0.01.

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COLLINS On a couple of marks, when I got 5 b a l l s , I know t h a t I
(COW'D)
w a s not p r e c i s e l y c e n t e r e d when I took t h e mark. So, I

t h i n k t h a t t h e r e was some s m a l l b i a s i n t h e s e x t a n t .

6.2 DOFF PGA'S

COLLINS There were, as f a r as I can r e c a l l , no s u r p r i s e s i n

d o f f i n g t h e PGA's.

ARMSTRONG Buzz took h i s o f f f i r s t .

ALDRIN We were going t o stow t h a t from t h e back, and I w a s going

t o be t h e l a s t one t o p u t it on. Anyway, you were going

t o p u t yours on b e f o r e I d i d .

ARMSTRONG A s a result of a day t h a t we spent i n t h e CMS p r a c t i c i n g

t a k i n g t h e s u i t s o f f and stowing them i n t h e r i g h t p l a c e ,

i n t h e r i g h t o r d e r , and so on, w e decided t o p u t a l l s u i t s

i n t h e L-shaped bags: Mike's i n t h e t o p , Buzz's s u i t

i n t h e bottom s e c t i o n t o t h e rear towards t h e upward

edge o r t h e head end of t h e couch, and mine i n t h e lower

p a r t of t h e L-shaped bag i n t h e lower s e c t i o n . That

worked f i n e .

A l l t h r e e s u i t s d i d go i n t h e L-shaped bag s a t i s f a c t o r i l y

and could be stowed there. W e l e f t them o u t though f o r some

p e r i o d of time p r i o r t o stowing them t o allow them t o a i r o u t

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ARMSTRONG s i n c e t h e y had been worn f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t p e r i o d of t i m e

(CONT'D)
I .
prior t o this. We wanted t o t r y t o d r y them out b e f o r e

p u t t i n g them i n t h e bags f o r t h r e e days. That worked as

planned, and we t h i n k t h a t ' s a reasonable procedure,

L ALDRIN Folding them, t a k i n g a l i t t l e b i t of c a r e , seemed t o pay

I

o f f when you g o t t o t h e p o i n t o f w r e s t l i n g w i t h them t o

I

s t u f f them i n , i f you d i d it i n a somewhat methodical way

l i k e p u t t i n g one a r m r i n g i n s i d e t h e - h e l m e t r i n g , and

p u t t i n g t h e o t h e r one i n t h e c h e s t . I a c t u a l l y took a l l

t h e z i p p e r s o f f , t h e n folded it over t h e gas connectors,

and t h e n r a n both l e g s over and around and g o t it as t i g h t

as p o s s i b l e b e f o r e p u t t i n g it i n . Well, it went i n side-

ways. It seems to, f i t i n t o p o s i t i o n q u i t e w e l l . No doubt

about i t ; it w a s a b i t of a w r e s t l i n g match t o do t h i s and

s t u f f it i n . It j u s t took a l i t t l e b i t of e x t r a time and

effort.

ARMSTRONG Maybe we're a l i t t l e over p r o t e c t i v e , b u t I doubt t h a t

you could r e a l l y damage t h o s e a i r l o c k connectors and

helmet r i n g s and s o on. It w a s o u r i n t e n t t o t r e a t t h o s e

w i t h as much c a u t i o n as w e c o u l d , s i n c e w e were r e a l l y

committed t o t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n l a t e r .

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6.3 OPTICS CALIBRATION

COLLINS Optics c a l i b r a t i o n worked a l l r i g h t .

6.4 PHOTOGRAPHY; EARTH AND MOON

COLLINS We d i d n ' t photograph t h e Moon a t t h i s time; t h e E a r t h we

did.

6.5 SYSTEN ANOMALIES

ARMSTRONG A t t h i s t i m e , I t h i n k , we were s t a r t i n g t o home i n on

the 0 flow d i s c r e p a n c i e s .
2

ALDRIN Yes.

ARMSTRONG I ' m n o t sure we understand it completely. 'The gage w a s

n o t , a p p a r e n t l y , i n d i c a t i n g t h e c o r r e c t flow l e v e l and w a s

varying w i t h t i m e . T h a t ' s an i n d i c a t i o n f o r what w e t h i n k

might b e a p a r t i c u l a r f l o w varying with t h e . It i s evi-

denced by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e quad accumulator c y c l e flow

r a t e continued t o decrease u n t i l it got down t o about 0.3,

and t h e n it went back up t o 0.4.

ALDRIN It would r e g i s t e r around t h e r e each t i m e . Then it seemed

t o go up almost t o t h e safe vaIue. That l e d m e t o b e l i e v e

t h a t t h e r e w a s nothing wrong w i t h our gage.

COLLINS Sounds l i k e t h e gage w a s operable b u t out of c a l i b r a t i o n .

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ALDRIN Right.

COLLINS We spent a l o t of time w i t h EECOM b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t d i s -

c u s s i n g w h a t items t o check and w h a t i t e m s not t o check.

I suppose as long as we have space f l i g h t s , w e ' r e going

t o have p h i l o s o p h i c a l disagreements on how e x h a u s t i v e l y

we want t o check a l l t h e equipment. My personal philosophy

i s t h a t if you d o n ' t have some reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t ' s

broken, l e a v e it alone. Don't f o o l around w i t h it.

FOD', of course, has a number of mission rules t h a t r e q u i r e

v e r i f i c a t i o n of each and every component of each and every

system t o make s u r e t h a t t h e y ' r e not going t o v i o l a t e one

of t h e mission rules. I can understand t h e i r viewpoint.

Maybe t h e t r u t h l i e s somewhere i n t h e middle. We ended

up a f t e r many, many d i s c u s s i o n s i n c l u d i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n

t o make sure t h a t t h e g l y c o l w a s flowing s a t i s f a c t o r i l y

through t h e secondary r a d i a t o r s without any l e a k s and t o

make s u r e t h a t t h e secondary water b o i l e r w a s f u n c t i o n i n g

properly. We d i d t h a t pre-TLI. Then pre-LOI, w e checked

only f o r gross r a d i a t o r leaks and d i d not check secondary

water b o i l e r o p e r a t ion.

ALDRIN It wasn't r e a l l y a d i f f i c u l t time-consuming t a s k . It went

very smoothly.

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COLLINS I t ' s a q u e s t i o n of whether you want t o do it. For example,

on t h e secondary g l y c o l r a d i a t o r l e a k check, t h e secondary

g l y c o l l o o p has been bypassed, t h a t i s , no f l u i d has been

allowed t o go through t h e r a d i a t o r . You put t h e valve from

bypass t o flow f o r 30 seconds, t u r n t h e pump on, and allow

f l u i d t o flow through t h e r a d i a t o r . Then you confirm t h a t

t h e r e i s no l e a k by checking t h e accumulator q u a n t i t y and

making s u r e t h a t it does not decrease. So what happened?

I n t h i s c a s e , accumulator q u a n t i t y decreased by about

4 percent. This had never come up before. The ground

suspected t h a t it w a s due t o thermal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n

c o n t r a c t i o n s or expansions i n t h e system, and not a l e a k .

It dropped and t h e n s t a b i l i z e d . I preferred t o leave

t h a t equipment a l o n e r a t h e r t h a n m e s s w i t h it.

I guess t h e r e w a s no l e a k . On t h e o t h e r hand, w e could

have g o t t e n i n t o a b i g argument over a suspected l e a k

even t o t h e p o i n t $here you might have t o d e l a y T L I by a

revolution. If you d o n ' t have c o n c r e t e evidence t h a t

something has malfunctioned, and i t ' s your backup system,

l e a v e it alone. Don't mess w i t h it.

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6.7 CHLORINATE POTABLE WATER

ARMSTRONG We d i d t h i s once a day b e f o r e bedtime. The l i t t l e

i n j e c t o r assembly got more and more d i f f i c u l t t o o p e r a t e

as each day went by. The c h l o r i n e t e n d s t o s t i c k and

corrode t h e screw t h r e a d s . What s t a r t e d out t o be a

f a i r l y low t o r q u e a p p l i c a t i o n , towards t h e e i g h t h day got

t o be a f a i r l y d i f f i c u l t t a s k t o screw t h e c o n t a i n e r down

s o t h a t t h e c h l o r i n e capsule i n it would g e t squashed.

We a l s o g o t some leakage t h e f i r s t day due t o t h e f a c t

t h a t I d i d not have t h e t h r e a d s f u l l y engaged. It f e l t

t o m e as i f I d i d have t h e t h r e a d s engaged. However,

when I s t a r t e d screwing it down, I found I d i d n ' t .

Chlorine w a s escaping, and I had t o g e t t h e towel out and

mop it up. A f t e r t h a t , I d i d n ' t have any t r o u b l e w i t h it.

ALDRIN I found myself i n v a r i a b l y wanting a d r i n k of water a f t e r

w e c h l o r i n a t e d t h e water. You c o u l d n ' t do t h a t unless

you p u t some i n ' t h e bag ahead of time. We should have

done t h a t . It j u s t d i d n ' t OCCUT t o us u n t i l afterward.

COLLINS I c e r t a i n l y don't t h i n k i t ' s worth changing t h e system

f o r mainline Apollo. For f u t u r e s p a c e c r a f t , you'd cer-

t a i n l y l i k e some b u i l t - i n way of a s s u r i n g y o u r s e l f o f a

germ-free water supply without having t o go through t h i s

kind of procedure.

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6.8 COMMUNICATION SETUP FOR REST PERIOD

ALDRIN The way t h a t t h e f l i g h t p l a n handled it w a s a l i t t l e

involved. We were i n a t r a n s l u n a r switch s e t u p . It

would say each time f o r r e s t p e r i o d go t o l u n a r c o a s t

except f o r such and such. I n t h e LM, w e had a f a i r l y

simple way of handling it. W e j u s t l a b e l e d , s t r a i g h t on

down t h e l i n e , t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e switches. We could

probably come up w i t h something similar t o t h i s . It could

i n c l u d e j u s t a c e r t a i n s e t number of switches t h a t are

all S-band. You j u s t make a quick check of a l l t h e s e and

have them i n t h e r i g h t c o n f i g u r a t i o n , i n s t e a d of having

t o r e f e r back t o t h e systems management book. Keep t h a t

c h e c k l i s t out of t h e f l i g h t p l a n , and keep it i n t h e

checklist.

ARMSTRONG The c h e c k l i s t i s p r e t t y l o n g , so you end up w i t h a f a i r l y

complex p i e c e i n t h e f l i g h t p l a n and a l s o a complex l i s t

i n t h e systems book.

ALDRIN But t h e f l i g h t p l a n does have two s l e e p mode o p t i o n s :

h i g h g a i n or OMNI. So, you r e a l l y have more t h a n you

need i n t h e f l i g h t plan.

ARMSTRONG We i n s i s t t h a t we o n l y go i n t h e ONMI mode during s l e e p

periods. We decided t h a t it would be b e s t .

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6.10 EASE OF OPERATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS

COLLINS They were a l l r i g h t . There were a l s o times when w e had

communications dropout t h a t I d o n ' t t h i n k were explained.

I had t h e f e e l i n g t h a t t h e r e were a l o t o f ground antenna

switching problems. There would be times when we r e a l l y

should have had sound and we d i d n ' t . It was due t o some

s o r t of a ground problem. It seemed t o m e t h a t t h e r e

were a l o t more of t h o s e problems on t h i s f l i g h t t h a n

t h e r e were on Apollo 8.

ARMSTRONG You probably n o t i c e d t h a t i n t h e Center, t o o , handovers

and switching.

ALDRIN We chose not t o c o n t r o l it on board, switching from one

OMNI t o t h e o t h e r . We l e t t h e ground handle t h e whole

t h i n g , and t h e y j u s t have a choice between two O M N I ' s .

They are going t o run i n t o some dropouts i n v a r i a b l y .

COLLINS The PTC r a t e w e hsed w a s 0.3 deg/sec. For t h e crew t o

switch OMNI' s manually and go around A , B, C y D 'during

t h e t i m e when t h e y ' r e awake i s r e a l l y t o o much of a j o b ,

because y o u ' r e having t o switch O M N I ' s approximately

every 5 minutes.

ALDRIN I t ' s 18 minutes.

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COLLINS So, I t h i n k i t ' s a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n t o l e t t h e ground

switch between opposites B and D OMNI antenna r a t h e r than

having us switch manually A, B , C , D ; but I guess t h e

ground needs some refinement i n t h a t procedure because we ' I

d i d have a number of cases of COMM dropouts, and l a t e r on

i n l u n a r o r b i t , it w a s even more so.

6.12 PREFERRED PTC MODE AND TECHNIQUE FOR INITIATION

COLLINS There a r e a l l s o r t s of r e a l v a r i e d funnies i n t h e check-

l i s t (page ~ 9 - 6 )f o r how t o g e t i n t o PTC. Now, j u s t f o r

example, during t h e period when you a r e w a i t i n g f o r t h e

t h r u s t e r f i r i n g a c t i v i t y t o q u i e t down, t h e r e ' s a

20-minute nominal w a i t p e r i o d f o r t h r u s t e r f i r i n g t o

diminish. And f o r i n s t a n c e , i f t h e crew wants t o see how

t h e t h r u s t e r f i r i n g a c t i v i t y i s coming along, t h e way of

v e r i f i c a t i o n i s VERB 16. NOUN 20, monitoring t h e gimbal

angle, and watching t h e l a c k of change i n t h e gimbal

angles. Yet, i f yoa do t h a t and l e a v e VERB 16 NOUN 20

displayed on t h e DSKY, when you proceed 8 or 1 0 s t e p s

l a t e r t o t h e p o i n t where you start t o s p i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t

up, i n s t e a d of g e t t i n g 0.3 deg/sec r a t e , you w i l l g e t a

r a t e i n excess of 1 deg/sec. And t h i s f a c t i s not w e l l

known. This i s something t h a t we found i n t h e simulator

s h o r t l y before t h e f l i g h t and penciled i n t o t h e c h e c k l i s t .

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COLLINS But I would j u s t s a y i n g e n e r a l t h a t t h a t c h e c k l i s t should
(CONT ' D )
be reworked. There are many l i t t l e p i t f a l l s . For example,

i f you f i n d y o u r s e l f i n an i n e r t i a l a t t i t u d e , and a l l you

want t o do i s s p i n up around t h a t a t t i t u d e , t h e c h e c k l i s t

implies t h a t you can j u s t go i n t o it a t t h a t i n t e r m e d i a t e

p o i n t , b u t t h a t i s not t h e c a s e e i t h e r . You must p r e t e n d

t h a t you are i n t h e wrong a t t i t u d e , ask t h e computer t o

maneuver you t o t h e r i g h t a t t i t u d e and t h e n go through

t h e e n t i r e c h e c k l i s t from t h a t viewpoint, or it won't

work properly. These are j u s t two p i t f a l l s t h a t I happen

t o know about r i g h t now.

ARMSTRONG It seems t o m e t h a t t h e p o i n t i s t h a t t h i s i s a very good

procedure t h a t worked extremely w e l l , and we're going t o

f i n d t h a t i t ' s extremely easy t o use b u t has not stood

t h e t e s t of time yet. It needs a l o t more experience i n

use b e f o r e we could use it r e l i a b l y and r e p e a t e d l y every

t i m e without causing a l a t e r problem t h a t we c o u l d n ' t

predict.

COLLINS That's r i g h t . Another l i t t l e f a c e t of it i s t h a t a f t e r

the PTC i s i n i t i a t e d , t h e n t h e r e are c e r t a i n no-no's in

r e g a r d t o t h e use of t h e DSKY's having t o do w i t h c o l l a p s -

ing deadband and o t h e r problems i n t e r n a l t o t h e camputer.

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COLLINS So, I t h i n k some explanation and expansion i n those pages
( CONT'D)
i n t h e c h e c k l i s t i s i n order.

ARMSTRONG I t ' s probably worth n o t i n g h e r e , while we're t h i n k i n g

about i t , t h e r e seems t o be some advantage t o w r i t i n g a

program t o do t h i s job. A t l e a s t it should be considered,

r a t h e r than t h e one we're using a t t h e present time. It

could obviate many kinds of minor d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t we

d i d n ' t mention u n t i l now.

6.14 EASE OF HANDLING OPTICS AND SPACECRAFT FOR

NAVIGATIONAL SIGHTINGS

COLLINS With P23, as I p r a c t i c e d it i n t h e simulator and made use

of t h e AUTO o p t i c s t o maneuver t h e s p a c e c r a f t t o each

star s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t , t h e f l a w i n t h i s technique i s t h a t

t h e s p a c e c r a f t roll angle i s unconstrained i n t h a t with

l a r g e trunnion angles, t h e computer may pick a roll a t t i -

tude which causes t h e star t o be occulted by t h e LM

structure. Now, t h e f l i g h t planners came t o me a couple

of weeks before t h e f l i g h t and s a i d t h a t t o g e t around

t h i s disadvantage of t h e AUTO o p t i c s , they wanted t o use

ground-computed angles t o which t o maneuver, and then

t h e s e ground-computed angles would have a roll angle which

would assure t h a t t h e star would not be occulted by t h e

LM s t r u c t u r e . And a t t h a t t i m e , I t o l d them t h a t a l l my

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COLLINS t r a i n i n g had been b u i l t toward using AUTO o p t i c s f o r t h e s e
( CONT D )
maneuvers. I asked them t o go back and f i n d stars whose

t r u n n i o n angles were small enough t h a t t h i s would not t h e n

be a problem ( t h e LM s t r u c t u r e o c c u l t i n g i t ) . F l i g h t

planning t a l k e d t o t h e MPAD people and said t h a t t h e y could

.&atf i n d such stars w i t h t h e proper i n plane/out of plane

geometry. But t h e ground-computed angles would l o c a t e

s a t i s f a c t o r y s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t s and a l l subsequent maneu-

vers would b e very small. Now, I should have called a

h a l t r i g h t t h e r e and s a t down w i t h t h e f l i g h t planning

people and w i t h t h e MPAD people, and I should have gone

through each s t a r , each maneuver, each gimbal a n g l e , each

subsequent s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t , and ironed out j u s t e x a c t l y

s t e p by s t e p how many maneuvers would be r e q u i r e d ; t h e

s i z e of them and e x a c t l y what w a s being f u r n i s h e d t o me

i n r e g a r d t o roll angles. Xowever, I d i d n ' t . T h a t ' s one

of t h e t h i n g s t h a t f e l l through t h e crack. So, i n f l i g h t

when I maneuvered t o t h e ground-supplied a n g l e s , I found

t h a t I w a s nowhere near t h e s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t as determined

by the f a c t t h a t t h e s e x t a n t r e t i c l e w a s not p a r a l l e l t o

t h e horizon a t t h a t p o i n t . And h e r e I t h i n k we had some

kind of a communications breakdown w i t h t h e ground,

because I kept t e l l i n g them t h a t t h i s w a s not a t a satis-

f a c t o r y s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t , t h a t t h e r e t i c l e w a s not p a r a l l e l

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C9LLINS t o t h e horizon. They kept t e l l i n g me t h a t it w a s a l l
( CONT'D)
r i g h t t o go ahead and mark anyway.

ALDRIN They d i d n ' t r e a l l y mean t h a t . We're sure t h e y d i d n ' t .

COLLINS Now, I'm not s u r e what t h e y meant. Maybe you h i t t h e n a i l

on t h e head. What t h e y meant w a s t h a t t h e s p a c e c r a f t d i d

n o t have t o be r o l l e d i n such a manner t h a t t h e s p a c e c r a f t

roll w a s p a r a l l e l t o t h e s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t . I n o t h e r words ,
what t h e y were saying i s t h a t t h e computer program could

accommodate a change i n s p a c e c r a f t roll simply by t o r q u i n g

t h e o p t i c s around t o go o f f a t a p e c u l i a r angle. Nonethe-

l e s s , when you look through t h e s e x t a n t t o . g e t a c c u r a t e

marks, you must have t h e r e t i c l e p a t t e r n p a r a l l e l t o t h e

horizon or you are not measuring t h e t r u e angle between

t h e s t a r and horizon. Here's t h e s t a r and t h e h o r i z o n ,

and i n s t e a d of measuring t h i s a n g l e , y o u ' r e measuring t h i s

angle or t h a t angle or some o t h e r oblique angle t h a t i s

l a r g e r t h a n t h e t r u e a n g l e , which i s t h e angle from t h e

s t a r normal t o t h e horizon. So t h i s i n i t i a l run on P23

g o t v e r y confused. The following day, t h e problem went

away because w e were f a r enough away from t h e E a r t h , and

t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i r angles were not a t t h e s u b s t e l l a r

p o i n t became immaterial because t h e E a r t h w a s small enough

t h a t a very small maneuver on my p a r t could l o c a t e t h e

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COLLINS substellar point. But when you are c l o s e t o t h e E a r t h ,
(CONT'D)
and t h e E a r t h i s very l a r g e , and you have an obvious roll

on i t s alignment i n t h e r e t i c l e , t h e n it r e q u i r e s a very

l a r g e maneuver t o maneuver t h e s p a c e c r a f t over t o t h e

substellar point. I ' d be happy t o d r a w it on a black-

rJoard some o t h e r time for t h e proper people. I was

r e l u c t a n t t o make t h e s e l a r g e maneuvers, because I

thought something w a s wrong. And t h e y kept saying go

ahead and mark, t h a t it w a s a l l r i g h t , and s o I d i d t a k e

some marks and t h e DELTA-R's and t h e DELTA-V's were

excessive. I d o n ' t know what e l s e t o say now. I ' d sort

of l i k e t o g e t a blackboard and t a l k t h i s over w i t h

f l i g h t planning and w i t h t h e people from WAD, i f neces-

s a r y , and s e e where we went wrong. I t ' s ray f a u l t i n t h a t

I d i d n ' t g e t a l l t h e i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s and s i t down and

go through s t e p by s t e p and maneuver by maneuver e x a c t l y

where w e were going t o go and what w e were going t o do.

ALDRIN I t h i n k i t ' s one of t h e s e a r e a s t h a t it would have been

n i c e maybe, f o r you anyway, t o have had an a b b r e v i a t e d simu-

l a t i o n w i t h Houston as p a r t of our t r a i n i n g . One b i g prob-

l e m t h e r e i s t h a t you j u s t c a n ' t always count on t h e

s i m u l a t o r g i v i n g enough f i d e l i t y .

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ARMSTRONG Yes. I t h i n k t h a t ' s one of t h e a r e a s where t h e s i m u l a t o r

probably f a l l s a l i t t l e s h o r t .

COLLINS I n my mind, i t ' s a q u e s t i o n of t i m e a v a i l a b l e . I had s o

much s t u f f t o l e a r n , and I had d i v i d e d up t h e t i m e , and

P23 wa: a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l s l i c e of t h e o v e r a l l t r a i n i n g .

I d i d n ' t want t o r e a l l y spend t h e t i m e t o s i t down and

go and hammer t h i s s t u f f a l l t h e way through, although

it appears I should have. T h a t ' s another t h i n g . That

s t a t e v e c t o r was another h e a r t a c h e .

ARMSTRONG The s t a t e v e c t o r may have been bad i n i t i a l l y b u t e s p e c i a l l y

when you g e t two l a r g e e r r o r s i n a r o w . W e incorporated

i t , and from t h a t p o i n t on, t h e s t a t e v e c t o r wasn't any

good.

COLLINS That's r i g h t . The s t a t e v e c t o r was mediocre t o begin

w i t h and it r a p i d l y got worse.

But each s t a r has i t s own d i s t i n c t s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t , and

you t a k e a measurement on two s t a r s i n a row. This

r e q u i r e s t h a t you maneuver from one s u b s t e l l a r p o i n t t o

another. I kept t e l l i n g t h o s e people t h a t b e f o r e t h e

f l i g h t and t h e y kept s a y i n g , "Oh no. They're a l l r i g h t

c l o s e together.'' I t h i n k t h e r e ' s some confusion on t h e i r

p a r t and maybe some on mine.

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ALDRIN I t h i n k i t ' s a l l unfortunate t h a t t h e f i r s t mark, t h e

f i r s t s t a r s e t t h a t w e had, w a s changed i n t h e flight p l a n .

COLLINS Well, t h a t ' s another t h i n g . We d i d n ' t mark c o r r e c t l y .

Sometime between t h e l a s t t i m e we simulated it and t h e

- i r s t t i m e we p u l l e d t h i s out i n t h e f l i g h t , s t a r num-

b e r 2 had been moved from t h e number 1 p o s i t i o n down t o

number 4 position, and t h e y had done it j u s t by changing

the 1 t o a 4 and drawing a l i t t l e arrow. When you r e a d

me t h e numbers, you d i d n ' t n o t e t h a t I r e a d star number 2

and it w a s t h e same o l d s t a r I had always marked on f i r s t .

That w a s j u s t a bad a r e a . A l i t t l e b i t of work could have

cleaned t h a t up b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t , and I j u s t d i d n ' t have

t h e time or t h e i n c l i n a t i o n t o s i t down and hammer it out

w i t h t h e people r e q u i r e d , and I should have.

Well, w e were f i n e t h e next day only because t h e E a r t h

w a s s o much smaller. If you have a l i t t l e E a r t h and

y o u ' r e supposed t o be marking on t h i s p o i n t and y o u ' r e

a t t h i s p o i n t , i t ' s no b i g d e a l t o move from h e r e over

t o here. But t h e E a r t h i s b i g and y o u ' r e supposed t o be

marking on t h i s p o i n t , and y o u ' r e r e a l l y over t h e r e ; t h a t

r e q u i r e s a b i g maneuver. The same problem e x i s t e d t h e

next day. However, a t i n y maneuver on my p a r t solved

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COLLINS t h e problem; whereas t h e day b e f o r e it w a s a huge maneuver,
( CONT'D)
and I w a s r e l u c t a n t t o m a k e t h a t maneuver.

A s a g e n e r a l comment, I ' v e found t h a t t h e t e l e s c o p e was

a very poor o p t i c a l instrument i n t h a t i t r e q u i r e d l o n g ,

long Z e r i o d s of dark a d a p t a t i o n b e f o r e any s t a r p a t t e r n s

were v i s i b l e . I n most c a s e s , it was n o t convenient t o

s t o p and spend t h e amount of t i m e necessary t o make any

use of t h e t e l e s c o p e . Thus, we k e p t our platform powered

up c o n t i n u a l l y . My procedure w a s t o ignore t h e t e l e s c o p e

and t o t a k e a t f a c e value what t h e s e x t a n t s a i d . I n other

.words, i f t h e s e x t a n t AUTO o p t i c s came up w l t h a s t a r i n

t h e s e x t a n t f i e l d of view, I accepted it as a m a t t e r of

f a c t t h a t it w a s t h e c o r r e c t star. W e marked on t h a t

s t a r without any f u r t h e r v e r i f i c a t i o n . I suppose t h i s

could r i s e up and b i t e . y o u , b u t I f e l t safe and comfort-

a b l e w i t h i t , and it worked throughout t h e f l i g h t .

6.15 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES TO PREPARE FOR AND ACCOMPLISH

THE TRANSLUNAR MIDCOURSE COFjRECTIONS

COLLINS Now by t h a t I assume t h e y mean t h e ground-supplied

sequence, and t h a t I f e l t w a s f i n e . Got any comment

about t h a t ?

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ARMSTRONG Well, t h e y may a l s o be > e f e r r i n g t o P30 and P40 sequence

and s o on. And it w a s our i n t e n t i o n t o do t h o s e very

c a r e f u l l y i n j u s t t h e way t h a t t h e y a r e d e t a i l e d i n t h e

procedures; not because t h e burn w a s a l l t h a t important

and w e compensated f o r it i f w e made an e r r o r , b u t r a t h e r

because t h e a n a l y s i s of t h a t burn on t h e ground w a s going

t o b e t h e t h i n g t h a t determined t h a t we have a go-od SPS

f o r LOI. Because t h a t w a s t h e c a s e , we wanted t h e ground

not t o be a t a l l confused about what procedures we would

u s e and j u s t how t h e burn w a s made. So w e t r i e d t o s t i c k

p r e c i s e l y w i t h t h e same procedures you'd use f o r an SPS

burn.

COLLINS I n g e n e r a l , I thought a l l t h e P30's and P40's worked out

very smoothly.

6.16 MIDCOURSE CORRECTION

ARMSTRONG Well, t h e f i r s t midcourse w a s c a n c e l l e d t o allow t h e

DELTA-V v a l u e t o grow i n s i z e s o t h a t t h e second mid-

course c o r r e c t i o n would be reasonably l o n g e r , allowing

engine o p e r a t i o n t o be w e l l s t a b i l i z e d and more a c c u r a t e l y

analyzed on t h e ground.

ALDRIN Midcourse 2 w a s 21.3 f e e t p e r second.

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ARMSTRONG The r e s u l t s of t h a t were v e r y , very good and t h e r e s i d u a l s

were very small, 0.30 and 0.20. But t h e r e w a s some ques-

t i o n about t h e f a c t w e had a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e EMS r e s i d u a l ;

namely, 3.8 f t / s e c i n about a 20-ft/sec burn. The pre-

d i c t e d knowledge of t a i l - o f f s a p p a r e n t l y w a s badly i n

e r r o r or e l s e t h e knowledge of t h e EMS i t s e l f i n t h e

tail-off r e g i o n w a s badly i n e r r o r . That never was cor-

r e c t e d throughout t h e f l i g h t . W e s a w t h i s condition

through t h e r e s t of t h e SPS burns.

ALDRIN Did it say anything about t h e s e x t a n t star check? They

updated t h a t . It w a s p r e t t y much out of sequence.

ARMSTRONG The f i r s t one t h e y gave us. Then t h e second one was i n

t h a t d i r e c t i o n because, of course, t h e LM w a s t h e r e .

COLLINS It w a s o w d e s i r e t h a t . i n s o f a r as p o s s i b l e an i n e r t i a l

a t t i t u d e check be made ( i n t h e absence of t h e b u r n ) s o

t h a t i f you made t h e burn they knew you were i n f a c t

pointing i n the right i n e r t i a l direction. O f course,

t h e LM i s out i n f r o n t of you and you c a n ' t look down

t h e X-axis of t h e o p t i c s , s o y o u ' r e c o n s t r a i n e d n o t t o

p o i n t any c l o s e r t o t h e X - a x i s t h a n t h e LM w i l l allow.

However, t h e i n i t i a l v a l u e s t h a t t h e y gave us were s o r t

of l i k e down t h e Z-axis. O f c o u r s e , you could have t h e

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COLLINS o p t i c s p o i n t i n g down t h e Z - a x i s and t h e n you could be f r e e
( CONT'D)
t o pass t h a t t e s t and s t i l l have t h e s p a c e c r a f t p o i n t i n g

180 degrees out from where you want it t o be. It w i l l

s t i l l pass t h a t t e s t , s o i n our view t h a t wasn't par-

t i c u l a r l y good. You were r e a l l y j u s t checking your

alignment of t h e p l a t f o r m , which i s r e a l l y not what y o u ' r e

t r y i n g t o do. You're t r y i n g t o check t h a t t h e s p a c e c r a f t

i s p o i n t e d t h e way you want it pointed s o t h a t was t h e

reason for our r e q u e s t f o r a d d i t i o n a l s t a r checks.

6.1-7 ADEQUACY OF CSM/MSFN COMM PERFORMANCE AND PROCEDURES

FOR COAST DURING AGA REFLECTIVITY TEST

COLLINS Okay. Adequacy of a l l t h i s s t u f f for t h e AGA r e f l e c t i v i t y

test. I understand we d i d n ' t have t h a t and we c a n c e l l e d

that.

6.18 TELEVISION PREPARATION AND OPERATION

COLLINS I thought i n g e n e r a l t h e onboard c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n system

w a s w e l l designed and w a s easy t o o p e r a t e . Buzz, you

got anything t o say about t h a t ?

ALDRIN It w a s q u i t e easy t o hook up and p u t t o g e t h e r . We ended

up p u t t i n g t h e two t o g e t h e r making use of t a p e i n s t e a d

of t h e Velcro t h a t w a s on t h e r e , t o g e t t h e monitor r i g h t

c l o s e t o t h e camera. I t h i n k i n i t i a l l y w e were a l i t t l e

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ALDRIN t a n g l e d up i n w i r e s There were w i r e s a l l over t h e p l a c e ,
( CONT'D)
and we were running around from one s t r u t t o t h e o t h e r .

We found out t h a t it was s e t t o have t h e monitor a t t a c h e d

r i g h t t o t h e camera i t s e l f , s o from t h a t p o i n t on, we

t a p e d t h e monitor b e s i d e t h e camera.

ARMSTRONG Well, we have a couple of comments w e ' l l g e t i n t o sometime

l a t e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t e l e v i s i o n , b u t with r e s p e c t t o i t s

o p e r a t i o n , i t ' s unquestionably a magnificent l i t t l e p i e c e

of equipment. However, you cannot o p e r a t e it without any

planning a t a l l . You do have t o t h i n k about whether t h e

v e h i c l e i s r o t a t i n g o r n o t , i n what a r e a y o u ' r e going t o

t a k e p i c t u r e s , where t h e l i g h t i n g i s going t o b e from,

and through what windows, and a l l t h a t s o r t of t h i n g .

This t a k e s some planning t o enable you t o a s s u r e y o u r s e l f

t h a t you are going t o g e t a good TV p i c t u r e of whatever

you decided you a r e going t o t a k e a p i c t u r e o f .

COLLINS T h a t ' s r i g h t , and t h e monkey i s on t h e back of t h e crew,

f u n c t i o n i n g a s s c r i p t w r i t e r , producer, and a c t o r , for

t h e d a i l y t e l e v i s i o n shows. We had no t i m e nor i n c l i n a -

t i o n p r e f l i g h t t o p l a n t h e s e t h i n g s out so t h e y were a l l

s o r t of spur-of-the-moment shows. And maybe t h a t ' s a

good w a y t o do b u s i n e s s and maybe t h a t ' s n o t . I don't

know. Maybe o t h e r f l i g h t s w i t h perhaps more t i m e t o devote

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t o t h i s should give some thought t o what has p r e v i o u s l y

been done and what a r e t h e b e s t t h i n g s t o cover and when

i s t h e b e s t time t o p r e s e n t them. The next crew should

spend a s i m u l a t o r s e s s i o n working out t h i n g s l i k e angles

and l i g h t and what have you.

ALDRIN There i s no doubt t h a t you w a n t t o do it r i g h t , because

t h e r e ' s a b i g audience looking on.

ARMSTRONG It i n s p i r e s you a l i t t l e b i t when a l l of a sudden you

have about 10 minutes l e f t t o go f o r a scheduled TV

broadcast and t h e ground s a y s t h e r e a r e 200 m i l l i o n

people w a i t i n g t o s e e you. They're a l l . w a t c h i n g . Now

what a r e you going t o b e showing?

COLLINS We're t r y i n g t o p a i n t t h e p i c t u r e of having t h i s h i g n l y

t r a i n e d p r o f e s s i o n @ crew performing l i k e amateurs.

They d o n ' t know where t o p l a c e the camera or what t o do

o r what t o s a y . It h a s n ' t been w e l l worked o u t . I feel

uncomfortable about t h i s .

ARMSTRONG I t ' s j u s t f o r t u n a t e t h a t t h e camera i s as good as it i s

and it compensates f o r t h e i n a b i l i t i e s of t h e o p e r a t o r s .

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h a t some of t h e b e t t e r t h i n g s t h a t w e d i d were

j u s t monitoring and j u s t t r y i n g t h i n g s out b e f o r e we got

t o t h e p o i n t of p u t t i n g on t h e show. I think there is

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ALDRIN t h e a b i l i t y of people on t h e ground t o see what's coming
( CONT'D)
a c r o s s , look a t i t , s e l e c t what t h e y want, and t h e n

assemble it t o g e t h e r and r e l e a s e it. I ' m sure everyone

wants t o have a real-time p i c t u r e and voice along w i t h

i t , b u t y o u ' r e going t o s u f f e r somewhat i n the q u a l i t y

you g e t . For example, a c t i v i t y i n t h e LM, when w e were

j u s t t r y i n g t o see how it w a s working. A l l of a sudden

w e found t h a t w e w e r e going out l i v e and w e were completely

happy w i t h t h a t . This w a s one of t h e b e t t e r shows we d i d .

ARMSTRONG I agree w i t h t h a t , b u t on the o t h e r hand t h e r e i s

m o t h e r s i d e t o t h a t d i s c u s s i o n t h a t d o e s n ' t involve

somebody t h i n k i n g about how t h a t s i t u a t i o n can b e handled.

We can p u t out something t h a t t h e agency i s w i l l i n g t o

s t a n d behind and can b e proud of without t h e crew having

t o make a l o t of last-minute quick guesses as t o what

they ought t o b e doing.

6.19 HIGH GAIN ANTENNA PERFORMANCE

COLLINS It was okay, I guess.

ALDRIN It seemed t o work f i n e . I placed it i n AUTO, threw t h e

switch over t o MEDIUM or NARROW, and j u s t a couple of

seconds l a t e r t h e s i g n a l s t r a n s f e r r e d .

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ARMSTRONG There was one observation h e r e t h a t seemed t o me t o b e

d i f f e r e n t from t h e s i m u l a t o r . I n t h e s p a c e c r a f t , I could

seldom i f ever d e t e c t a d i f f e r e n c e i n s i g n a l s t r e n g t h

between MEDIUM and NARROW. I n t h e s i m u l a t o r , i t ' s always

decidedly d i f f e r e n t . The conclusion t o be reached is

t h a t e i t h e r t h e s i m u l a t o r i s not an a c c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a -

t i o n of s i g n a l s t r e n g t h or t h a t w e r e a l l y weren't g e t t i n g

any d i f f e r e n c e between MEDIUM and NARROW beam. We were,

i n f a c t , s t u c k i n one o r t h e o t h e r i r r e s p e c t i v e of switch-

ing.

ALDRIN I would expect t h e r e wasn't as much d i f f e r e n c e between

WIDE and MEDIUM, b u t when you went t o t h e NARROW, you

could see it. It wasn't c o n s i s t e n t . I n any c a s e , it w a s

u n l i k e what w e were used t o and as long as t h e s i g n a l w a s

r e c e i v e d , I guess i t ' s n o t a problem.

COLLINS I t h i n k t h a t ' s a f u n c t i o n of d i s t a n c e , too. Now i n lunar

o r b i t , t h e r e was a n o t i c e a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between MEDIUM

and NARROW. But t h e r e were some funnies i n t h a t high g a i n

antenna. We were p l a y i n g w i t h it some t i m e and w e d i d n ' t

have c o n t r o l over it and t h e ground had one of t h e O M N I ' s

selected. We thought we were c o n t r o l l i n g it and w e

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COLLINS weren't. Another funny w a s t h a t t h e r e were ground-
( CONT'D)
switching problems where t h e t h i n g w a s n o t . r e c e i v i n g a

proper s i g n a l .

ALDRIN I remember one t i m e t h e ground s a i d go ahead and t u r n

t h e h i r h gain off. I complied and w e l o s t COMM. I don't

t h i n k t h e y expected it; t h e next t i m e t h e y had c o n t r o l ,

w e were on OMNI a t t h a t t i m e . It wasn't a t a l l c l e a r t o

me a t a l l t i m e s who had c o n t r o l and who ,was running t h e

show. .

COLLINS T h a t ' s r i g h t and it w a s a g r e a t temptation t o go t o com-

mand reset t o make s u r e t h a t w e had c o n t r o l , except t h a t

t h a t threw s i x or e i g h t o t h e r switches t h a t we were re-

l u c t a n t t o change. I suspected a t t i m e s t h a t it w a s n o t

working p r o p e r l y . I never a b s o l u t e l y caught it m a l -

functioning. I t h i n k t h o s e s u s p i c i o n s mostly had t o do

w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t we d i d n ' t have c o n t r o l of it or t h e

ground had some s o r t of a s i g h t i n g problem.

ARMSTRONG The confusion i n nry mind o f t e n w a s t h a t I wasn't r e a l l y

sure what OUT configuration a c t u a l l y was. You c a n ' t t e l l

by t h e switches and t r y i n g t o i n t e r p r e t what you see i n

terms of t h e d i s p l a y s you have a v a i l a b l e and what you h e a r

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ARMSTRONG through your earphone d o e s n ' t always l e a d you t o t h e
(CONT'D)
r i g h t conclusion and t h a t ' s a l i t t l e b i t d i s c o n c e r t i n g .

6.21 S-BAND SQUELCH

c
ARMSTRONG It worked v e r y w e l l , I thought.

6.22 I U REALIGN AND STAR CHECK

DAYLIGHT M

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we already covered t h a t by saying t h a t w i t h t h e

LM on i n t h e d a y l i g h t t h e t e l e s c o p e i s n e a r l y u s e l e s s and
you have t o r e l y on t h e s e x t a n t . Now, w e never went i n t o

t h a t mode t h a t Apollo 1 0 discovered of p o i n t i n g t h e p l u s X

a x i s a t t h e sun. We never had an occasion or need t o do

that. Therefore, w e c a n ' t c o m e n t on it. Just staying

r e g u l a r PTC a t t i t u d e , normal t o t h e s u n l i n e , t h e t e l e s c o p e

w a s j u s t about u s e l e s s .

6.23 VENTING BATTERIES AND WASTE

ALDRIN When we s t a r t e d a b a t t e r y charge, w e would look a t t h e

vent and f i n d it w a s u s u a l l y down f a i r l y low. I don't

t h i n k t h e r e was any time when we s a w it above 1.6 and

as soon as we went t o VENT, it would drop down t o 0.2

o r 0.3. I d o n ' t know how s e r i o u s t h a t i s . Nobody seemed

t o b e concerned about t h a t . I ' m s u r e t h a t t h e ground has

a r e a d o u t , b u t t h e y never i n d i c a t e d o r suggested t o us

t h a t we vent t h e b a t t e r i e s .

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6.2 4 RADIATORS

COLLINS We never flowed through t h e secondary r a d i a t o r s because

t h e primary worked f i n e . The cabin temperature

( t r a n s l u n a r ) was s l i g h t l y warmer t h a n we would l i k e i t ,

although t h e gage readings were q u i t e cool. We were

running 60 degrees cabin temperature and 57 degrees s u i t

temperature.

ARMSTRONG High 40's i n t h e s u i t and low 60% i n t h e cabin.

COLLINS Yet w e were w a r m i n s p i t e of t h o s e low numbers.

6.25 CM/LM DELTA PRESSURE

COLLINS Well, t h e LM p r e s s u r e would slowly decay, b u t remain

well within tolerance. I d o n ' t have any good numbers.

It w a s a t i g h t LM.

6.26 RE-ESTABLISHING PTC

COLLINS We've a l r e a d y discussed t h a t , I t h i n k . We always used

0.3 deg/sec roll and we never t r i e d t h e 0.1. It would

be advantageous, i n regard t o antenna switching i f

s t a b i l i t y i s s a t i s f a c t o r y , and 0 . 1 deg/sec would prob-

a b l y be a b e t t e r mode t h a n 0.3. It would a l s o save some

gas. However, we d i d not i n v e s t i g a t e t h a t . Perhaps t h a t

ought t o be something f o r f u t u r e f l i g h t s t o look i n t o .

I t h i n k t h a t theory has been mentioned t o FOD.

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ALDRIN Maybe.

6.27 HIGH GAIN ANTENNA P T C REACQ CHECK

COLLINS We d i d it coming back.

ALDRIN When it worked, it worked l i k e a charm. There were a

couple of times when it d i d n ' t seem t o want t o work.

6.28 OPTICS CALIBRATION

COLLINS Optics CAL t h e next day worked f i n e .

6.29 FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE AND PURGING

COLLINS The f u e l c e l l s performed p e r f e c t l y . Purging d i d n ' t pre-

s e n t any problems. We followed t h e c h e c k l i s t on t h e

h e a t e r s and t h e y worked normally.

6.30 LM AND TUNNEL PRESSURE

COLLINS LM and t u n n e l p r e s s u r e s were normal.

6.31 LATCH VERIFICATION

COLLINS Latches, as I s a y , were a l l v e r i f i e d . Latch number 6

r e q u i r e d one a c t u a t i o n t o cock. That w a s t h e only anomaly

and it w a s w i t h i n t h e realm of normal..

6.32 INSPECTION OF TUNNEL MECHANICS

COLLINS I ' m n o t s u r e what t h a t means, b u t everything i n t h e t u n n e l

was normal.

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6.33 REMOVAL OF PROBE AND DROGUE

COLLINS Probe and drogue removal w a s a b s o l u t e l y normal. Have you

anything t o say about t h a t ?

6.34 IVT TO IM
ALDRIN Well, as f a r as I ' m concerned t h e r e w a s no d i s o r i e n t a t i o n

i n going from one s p a c e c r a f t t o another. It w a s q u i t e

easy t o go from one t o t h e o t h e r . It would t a k e a l i t t l e

r e a d j u s t i n g t o g e t y o u r s e l f i n t o p o s i t i o n when you f i r s t

e n t e r e d one v e h i c l e or t h e o t h e r . You weren't sure.what

y3u were looking a t . But t h e r e w a s no d i s o r i e n t a t i o n

a s s o c i a t e d with t h a t .

ARMSTRONG I d i d n ' t observe any problems with t h a t .

6.35 16-MM CAMERA

ALDRIN We may not g e t back t o t h i s again, b u t I t h i n k t h a t t h e

e x e r c i s e we had i n t h e LM w a s extremely v a l u a b l e from

our standpoint. It w a s conducted from a very comfortable

timeline. W e had no p a r t i c u l a r schedule t o meet; we used

t h e camera t o document. In addition, the television s e t

a t t h i s t i m e w a s q u i t e valuable.

6.37 I V T TO CM

COLLINS From t h e CMP p o s i t i o n , it was of g r e a t value t o have a

one-day head s t a r t on t h e removal of t h e probe and t h e

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COLLINS drogue. If problems a r o s e w i t h t h e probe o r the drogue,
( CONT'D)
you have t i m e t o t r o u b l e s h o o t with t h e ground. I was glad

t o g e t t h a t probe and drogue out a day e a r l y .

ARMSTRONG It w a s something you know t h a t h a d n ' t p r e v i o u s l y been

done q u i t e t h i s way. It j u s t seemed t h a t it would m a k e

us more comfortable, going back and f o r t h t o t h e LM, t h a t

i f t h e r e w a s anything wrong, we'd have some chance t o

t a l k and t h i n k about it and g i v e t h e ground some time t o

t h i n k about it. That d i d n ' t t u r n out t o be necessary

because it w a s p e r f e c t , b u t s t i l l I t h i n k a l l of us f e l t

a l o t more comfortable having spent sgme time going back

and f o r t h and checking t h e stowage and looking over every-

' thing. The r e p e t i t i o n j u s t took t h e p r e s s u r e o f f t h e

next day's IVT.

ALDRIN Working i n t h e very r e l a x e d environment o f t h e c o n s t a n t

w e a r garment, there were no problems. We d i d n ' t r e a l l y

need t o be r e s t r a i n e d . I used t h e r e s t r a i n t s and a l l it

seemed t o do w a s p u l l my p a n t s down. You d i d have t o be

a l i t t l e concerned about f l o a t i n g a w a y from what you were

doing; however, it w a s no g r e a t problem t o push y o u r s e l f

back down t o where you wanted t o be.

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ARMSTRONG This enabled us t o g e t a l i t t l e ahead i n stowage.

ALDRIN Concerning t r a n s f e r items: We brought s e v e r a l books

back - updates and a couple of procedures.

ARMSTRONG So, a l l i n a l l , I guess it worked out w e l l . We recommend

it as a u s e f u l procedure.

6.38 EATING PERIODS

COLLINS They were w e l l spaced and I thought adequate time w a s

given t o e a t i n g . Q u a l i t y of t h e food w i l l be discussed

later.

6.39 WORKLOADS

ARMSTRONG The workload during t h e t r a n s l u n a r coast i s very l i g h t

as it should be.

ALDRIN In comparison t o t h e p r e f l i g h t workload, it gave us a

couple of days t o r e l a x . I t h i n k i t ' s important t o s t o r e

up t h e r e s t .

COLLINS I think s o too.

6.40 REST PERIODS

ALDRIN We're a l l good s l e e p e r s . The f i r s t one w a s not as good

as t h e second or t h i r d , b u t t h e f i r s t s l e e p p e r i o d w a s

s t i l l s u r p r i s i n g l y r e s t f u l as far as I ' m concerned.

*

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COLLINS I t h i n k p a r t i c u l a r l y when you g e t i n t o t h e l a t e r f l i g h t s

of extended EVA'S and l u n a r a c t i v i t y , somehow t h e crew

must p l a c e themselves i n a frame of mind of looking on

t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e LM as t h e beginning of t h e f l i g h t

plan and t o r e l a x , g e t p l e n t y of s l e e p , and conserve

t h e i r energies i n a l l t h e events l e a d i n g up t o t h a t

point. To a r r i v e i n l u n a r o r b i t t i r e d can c r e a t e prob-

lems and i t ' s p o s s i b l e t o do t h a t i f you don't approach

it i n t h e r i g h t frame of mind.

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k Mike's h i t t h e n a i l on t h e head. We did precisely

that. We got a l o t of r e s t and got i n t o lunar o r b i t eager

t o go t o work and t h a t ' s a p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t u n a t e p o s i t i o n

t o be i n .

COLLINS This i s something we've t a l k e d about b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t

and I d o n ' t know how you can g e t y o u r s e l f i n t h a t frame

of mind but I t h i n k it i s a frame of mind. You have t o

g e t y o u r s e l f convinced t h a t there w i l l be a n i c e r e l a x i n g

couple of days going t o t h e moon.

ALDRIN The f i r s t unusual t h i n g t h a t w e s a w I guess w a s 1 day out

o r something p r e t t y c l o s e t o t h e moon. It had a s i z e a b l e

dimension t o i t , s o we put t h e monocular on it.

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COLLINS How'd we s e e t h i s t h i n g ? D i d we j u s t look out t h e window

and t h e r e it was?

ALDRIN Yes, and we weren't s u r e b u t what it might be t h e S-IVB.

We c a l l e d t h e ground and were t o l d t h e S-IVB w a s 6000 miles

away. We had a problem with t h e high gain about t h i s

t i m e , d i d n ' t we?

COLLINS There w a s something. We f e l t a bump or maybe I j u s t

imagined it.

ARMSTRONG He w a s wondering whether t h e MESA had come o f f .

COLLINS I don't guess we f e l t anything.

ALDRIN O f course, we were seeing a l l s o r t s of l i t t l e o b j e c t s

going by a t t h e various dumps and t h e n we happened t o see

t h i s one b r i g h t e r o b j e c t going by. We couldn't t h i n k of

anything e l s e it could be o t h e r t h a n t h e S-IVB. We looked

a t it through t h e monocular and it seemed t o have a b i t

of an L shape t o it.

ARMSTRONG Like an open s u i t c a s e .

ALDRIN We were i n PTC a t t h e time so each one of us had a chance

t o t a k e a look a t t h i s and it c e r t a i n l y seemed t o be with-

i n our v i c i n i t y and of a very s i z e a b l e dimension.

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ARMSTRONG We should say t h a t it w a s r i g h t a t t h e l i m i t of t h e reso-

l u t i o n of t h e eye. It w a s very d i f f i c u l t t o t e l l j u s t

what shape it was. And t h e r e w a s no way t o t e l l t h e s i z e

without knowing t h e range or t h e range without knowing

the size.

ALDRIN So t h e n I got down i n t h e LEB and s t a r t e d looking f o r it

i n the optics. We were g r o s s l y mislead because w i t h t h e

s e x t a n t o f f focus what we saw appeared t o b e a c y l i n d e r .

ARMSTRONG Or r e a l l y two r i n g s .

ALDRIN Yes.

ARMSTRONG Two r i n g s . Two connected r i n g s .

COLLINS No, it looked l i k e a hollow c y l i n d e r t o me. It d i d n ' t

look l i k e two connected r i n g s . You could see t h i s t h i n g

tumbling and, when it came around end-on, you could look

r i g h t down i n i t s g u t s . It w a s a hollow c y l i n d e r . But

t h e n you could change the focus on t h e s e x t a n t and it

would be r e p l a c e d by t h i s open-book shape. It was r e a l l y

weird.

ALDRIN I guess t h e r e ' s not t o o much more t o say about it o t h e r

t h a n it wasn't a c y l i n d e r .

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COLLINS It w a s during t h e p e r i o d when w e thought it w a s a c y l i n d e r

t h a t we i n q u i r e d about t h e S-IVB and we'd almost convinced

ourselves t h a t ' s w h a t it had t o be. But we d o n ' t have

any more conclusions than t h a t r e a l l y . The f a c t t h a t we

d i d n ' t s e e it much p a s t t h i s one time p e r i o d -we really

d o n ' t have a conclusion as t o what it might have been,

how b i g it w a s , or how far away it w a s . It w a s something

t h a t wasn't p a r t of t h e u r i n e dump, we're p r e t t y s u r e of

that.

Skipping ahead a b i t , when we j e t t i s o n e d t h e LM, you know

we f i r e d an explosive charge and got r i d of t h e docking

r i n g s and t h e LM went boom. Pieces came o f f t h e LM. It

could have been some Mylar o r something t h a t had somehow

come loose from t h e LM.

ALDRIN We thought it could have been a p a n e l , b u t it d i d n ' t

appear t o have t h a t shape a t a l l .

COLLINS T h a t ' s r i g h t , and f o r some reason, we thought it might

have been a p a r t of t h e high g a i n antenna. It might have

been about t h e t i m e we had h i g h g a i n antenna problems.

I n t h e back of my mind, I have some reason t o suspect t h a t

i t s o r i g i n w a s from t h e s p a c e c r a f t .

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ALDRIN The o t h e r o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t I made accumulated g r a d u a l l y .

I d o n ' t know whether I s a w it t h e f i r s t n i g h t , b u t I ' m

sure I s a w it t h e second n i g h t . I w a s t r y i n g t o go t o

s l e e p w i t h a l l the l i g h t s out. I observed what I thought

w e r e l i t t l e flashes i n s i d e t h e c a b i n , spaced a couple of

minutes a p a r t and I d i d n ' t t h i n k t o o much about it other

t h a n j u s t note i n my mind t h a t t h e y continued t o be t h e r e .

I c o u l d n ' t e x p l a i n why my eye would see t h e s e flashes.

During t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t , we had more t i m e and I devoted

more opportunity t o i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h a t t h i s could have

been. It w a s a t t h a t p o i n t t h a t I w a s able t o observe

on two d i f f e r e n t occasions t h a t , i n s t e a d of observing

j u s t one f l a s h , I could s e e double f l a s h e s , a t p o i n t s

s e p a r a t e d by maybe a f o o t . A t other t i m e s ,I could s e e

a l i n e w i t h no d i r e c t i o n of motion and t h e only t h i n g

t h a t comes t o my mind i s t h a t t h i s i s some s o r t of pene-

tration. A t l e a s t t h a t ' s my g u e s s , without much t o sup-

p o r t it; some p e n e t r a t i o n of some o b j e c t i n t o t h e

spacecraf't t h a t causes an emission as it e n t e r s t h e cabin

itself. Sometimes it was one f l a s h on e n t e r i n g . Possibly

d e p a r t i n g from an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p a r t of t h e c a b i n ,

o u t s i d e t h e f i e l d of view. The double f l a s h e s appeared

t o have an e n t r y and t h e n impact on something such as

the s t r u t s . For a w h i l e , I thought it might have been

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ALDRIN some s t a t i c e l e c t r i c i t y because I w a s a l s o a b l e , i n moving
( CONT'D)
my hand up and down t h e s l e e p r e s t r a i n t , t o generate

very small sparks of s t a t i c e l e c t r i c i t y . But t h e r e w a s

a d e f i n i t e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two as I observed it

more and more. I t r i e d t o c o r r e l a t e t h i s with t h e direc-

t i o n of t h e sun. When you put t h e window shades up t h e r e

i s s t i l l a small amount of leakage. You can g e n e r a l l y

t e l l w i t h i n 20 or 30 degrees t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e sun.

It seemed as though they were coming from t h a t g e n e r a l

d i r e c t i o n ; however, I r e a l l y couldn't say i f t h e r e w a s

near enough evidence t o support t h a t t h e s e t h i n g s were

observable on t h e s i d e of t h e s p a c e c r a f t where t h e sun

was. A l i t t l e b i t of evidence seemed t o support t h i s .

I asked t h e o t h e r s i f t h e y had seen any of t h e s e and,

u n t i l about t h e l a s t day, they h a d n ' t .

ARMSTRONG B U Z Z , I ' d seen some l i g h t , b u t I j u s t always a t t r i b u t e d

t h i s t o s u n l i g h t , because t h e window covers l e a k a l i t t l e

b i t of l i g h t no matter how t i g h t l y secured. The only

time I observed it w a s t h e l a s t n i g h t when we r e a l l y

looked f o r it. I spent probably an hour c a r e f u l l y watch-

i n g t h e i n s i d e of t h e s p a c e c r a f t and I probably made

50 s i g n i f i c a n t observations i n t h i s period.

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ALDRIN Sometimes a minute o r two would go by and t h e n you'd s e e

t h e two w i t h i n t h e space of 1 0 seconds. On an average,

I'd say j u s t as a guess it w a s maybe something l i k e one

a minute. C e r t a i n l y more t h a n enough t o convince you

t h a t it wasn't an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n . It d i d g i v e you a

r a t h e r funny f e e l i n g t o contemplate t h a t something was

zapping through t h e cabin. There wasn't anything you

could do about it.

ARMSTRONG It could be something l i k e Buzz suggested. Mainly a

neutron o r some k i n d of an atomic p a r t i c l e t h a t would

be i n t h e v i s i b l e spectrum.

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7.0 LOI THROUGH LUNAR MODULE ACTIVATION

7.1 PREPARATION FOR LOI

ARMSTRONG With r e s p e c t t o p r e p a r a t i o n f o r L O I , our f l i g h t p l a n w a s

w r i t t e n i n such a way t h a t it depended on doing m i d -

course 4 and o p t i o n 1 P52 t o g e t t h e landing s i t e REFSMMAT

i n t o t h e computer and t h e n an option 3 REFSMMAT P52.

ALDRIN Was t h a t b e f o r e midcourse 4 w a s performed?

COLLINS Yes, midcourse 4 was w i t h t h e landing s i t e REFSMMAT.

ARMSTRONG Then w e d i d our s i m u l a t i o n of LO1 where we checked t h e

gimbal motors and a 360" p i t c h maneuver t o look a t t h e

Moon, followed by p r e p a r a t i o n f o r LOI. The midcourse 4

w a s cancelled. We d i d not do t h e o p t i o n 1 P52 t h a t es-

t a b l i s h e d our new REFSMMAT. ... s e t up t h e computer f o r

t h e LOI. When we g o t around t o t h e P52 i n t h e f l i g h t

p l a n , which occurred a t 73 h o u r s , w e d i d o p t i o n 3. We

recognized t h a t we had never done a new P52 t o an o p t i o n 1.

We are not sure t h a t w e could a t t h a t p o i n t i n t i m e .

COLLINS Did t h e y have an uplink?

ARMSTRONG I ' m n o t sure t h e y had uplinked t h e necessary d a t a i n t o t h e

computer. I n any c a s e , w e recognized t h a t we were not

o p e r a t i n g t h e way t h e f l i g h t p l a n had intended, due t o

t h i s c a n c e l l a t i o n of midcourse 4; t h e r e f o r e , w e got t h a t

information from t h e ground. We d i d a P52 o p t i o n 1, t h e n

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ARMSTRONG a P52 option 3, and our simulation of LO1 where we brought
( CONT I D )
t h e gimbal motors on and checked t h a t everything was r e a l l y

copasetic. During t h i s process w e got behind t h e t i m e -

l i n e because we d i d t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y than we had in-

tended i n t h e f l i g h t plan. consequently, we cancelled

- 1

t h e 360O p i t c h maneuver t o photograph t h e Moon. We d i d

not f e e l very bad about t h a t s i n c e s h o r t l y b e f o r e , when

we went i n t o t h e Moon shadow, we d i d look at it exten-

s i v e l y through t h e windows and took a l o t of p i c t u r e s

with t h e high-speed b l a c k and white f i l m . I t h i n k we

accomplished what w e wanted t o do i n looking at t h e Moon

from a r e l a t i v e l y c l o s e range. We agreed t o cancel t h e

360' p i t c h maneuver. We were then s l i g h t l y ahead of t h e

t i m e l i n e i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r LOI. We spent a l i t t l e more

t i m e d i s c u s s i n g t h a t among ourselves than we had planned,

s i n c e it w a s d i f f e r e n t t h a n our simulations.

ALDRIN There w a s something e l s e . Was it j u s t t h e two d i f f e r e n t

alignments t h a t got us a l i t t l e b i t behind?

COLLINS I t h i n k it w a s not having a REFSMMAT.

ARMSTRONG There w a s something 'else. I do not r e c a l l r i g h t now what

it might have been. We d i d t h a t secondary loop check, and

a secondary r a d i a t o r flow check.

COLLINS We could not s e e t h e stars. Was t h e r e a star check at a

certain t i m e ? We were s i t t i n g around on one f o o t and

I

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COLLINS t h e n t h e o t h e r w a i t i n g f o r something. There w a s a time
(CONT'D)
i n t h e pad when t h e s t a r check was only v a l i d a f t e r 11

p a s t t h e hour.

ALDRIN That appears a t some time. I d o n ' t see t h a t w r i t t e n on

t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e t up.

ARMSTRONG I might mention on t h e sextant s t a r checks t h a t , on most

occasions, we manually drove t h e o p t i c s C D U ' s t o t h e

L

ground-computed values for t h e s t a r and checked t h e at-

t i t u d e i n t h a t manner. That a l w a y s worked f o r us. We

were always a b l e t o s e e t h e s t a r i n t h e s e x t a n t f i e l d of

view by manually guiding t h e o p t i c s r a t h e r t h a n using t h e

computer t o d e s i g n a t e t h e o p t i c s .

7.3 SPS BURN FOR LOI-1

ARMSTRONG Now we w i l l go up t o LOI. LO1 w a s on t i m e , and t h e re-

s i d u a l s were v e r y low. Again we s a w a l a r g e value of

DELTA V c ' s - 6.8. Buzz w i l l now comment on t h e PUGS.

ALDRIN W e had been b r i e f e d on t h e experiences t h a t Apollo 1 0 had

had w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e PUGS o x i d i z e r blow v a l v e ,

whereby t h e y had responded t o t h e i n i t i a l decrease t h a t

t h e system gave them by p l a c i n g t h e switch t o DECREASE.

Subsequently, it went t o INCREASE. They followed it b u t

were never a b l e t o c a t c h up w i t h it. It was suggested t o

us t h a t t h e b e s t procedure w a s t o monitor t h i s i n t h e

f i r s t 25 seconds, again expect it t o be i n DECREASE, ana

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ALDRIN t h e n expect t h a t maybe even by going t o FULL INCREASE you
( CONT’D)
could n o t keep up w i t h t h e system. With t h i s i n mind, I

watched it throughout t h e burn. A s soon as it s t a r t e d

toward t h e -100, when it was around -120, I w a s convinced

t h a t it w a s i n t h e upward swing toward INCREASE. I threw

it t o FULL INCREASE w e l l b e f o r e t h e normal ground rules

r e q u i r e d , and t h e valve went t o MAX. Despite t h e f a c t

t h a t it was i n INCREASE, t h e needle e v e n t u a l l y went i n t o

t h e INCREASE p o s i t i o n . I don’t t h i n k w e got over a 100.

A t t h e end of t h e burn w e were t h r e e - o r f o u r - t e n t h s be-

hind.

ALDRIN Even by l e a d i n g it as much as I d i d , I s t i l l ended up

being a l i t t l e b i t behind. That w a s p r e t t y small compared

t o what it could have been.

.ARMSTRONG How about t h e burn i t s e l f , Mike?

COLLINS It w a s j u s t about nominal.

ARMS TR ONG BUZZ, give t h e pad value f o r burn t i m e .

ALDRIN 6 02.

ARMST’RONG Burn time was about 5 57. So it was 5 seconds ...

ALDRIN Yes. F a i r l y e a r l y i n t h e burn, we could t e l l t h a t .

COLLINS I remember, you were p r e d i c t i n g t h a t .

ALDRIN Three or 4 seconds e a r l y i s what w e p r e d i c t e d .

COLLINS S t a r t t r a n s i e n t w a s very s m a l l , and s t e e r i n g w a s extremely

q u i e t and a c c u r a t e . The chamber p r e s s u r e , which w e had

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COLLINS n o t i c e d t o be a l i t t l e b i t low i n t h e f i r s t SPS burn,

( CONT'D)
climbed slowly and a c t u a l l y ended up s l i g h t l y over 100.

I p u t some s p e c i f i c comments on t h e voice t a p e . I thought

it was a nominal burn.

7.5 ORBIT PARAMETERS.

ARMSTRONG I n postburn NOUN 34, we had a 60.9-mile p e r i g e e and a

169.9-mile apogee.

7.6 BLOCK DATA UPDATES

ALDRIN The LOS t h a t we used, i n a d d i t i o n t o star checks, t o t e l l us

i f w e were i n t h e r i g h t p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o t h e Moon and

t h e E a r t h w a s l i k e t h e horizon check and i s an a d d i t i o n a l

c r o s s check. These c a l c u l a t i o n s t u r n e d out t o be w i t h i n

a second of t h e ground-predicted time. When t h e ground

s a i d we were going t o l o s e s i g n a l a t 75 41 23, it was a

second l a t e r t h a t s i g n a l s t r e n g t h dropped down. It w a s

very comforting.

ALDRIN We could see t h e horizon coming up a good b i t b e f o r e . I

guess it w a s t h e one f o r TEI t h a t w a s a l i t t l e confusing

as t o which way we were pointed.

ARMSTRONG You were t h e only one confused.

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7.8 ADEQUACY OF CONTACT WITH GROUND OPERATIONAL

SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR LO1

ALDRIN Before t h e burn, I had n o t i c e d a d i f f e r e n c e t n t h e A and

B N2's. I d i d n ' t r e c o r d which one w a s h i g h e r . They were

w e l l w i t h i n what we consider nominal; it s t u c k i n my mind

t h a t there was a difference. It wasn't t o o s u r p r i s i n g when

t h e ground c a l l e d us a f t e r t h e burn and s a i d t h a t t h e y

had observed t a n k B n i t r o g e n had dropped down somewhat

during %he t i m e of t h e burn. I t h i n k it dropped t o 1900.

ARMSTRONG The v a l u e s I have a r e B -1950 p s i and A - 2250 psi

postburn. The helium w a s 1500 p s i . Those came up a l i t t l e

b i t a f t e r t h e temperature s t a b i l i z e d .

ALDRIN We'll t a l k a l i t t l e more about t h a t . Evidently t h e r e

w a s n o t any p a r t i c u l a r l e a k . It might have been a thermal

c o n d i t i o n t h a t one t a n k had been exposed t o .

ARMSTRONG The flow through t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s o l e n o i d v a l v e could have

been g r e a t e r t h a n emphasized.

ALDRIN We s t a r t e d t h a t one on B and t h e n went t o A . I don't

know i f t h a t would be any explanation.

ARMSTRONG I c a n ' t t h i n k offhand why t h a t would a f f e c t it. The only

t h i n g I t h i n k about i s t h e s i z e of t h e o r i f i c e through

which t h e gas i s passing or t h e chamber s i z e t h a t , somehow,

-it w a s f e e d i n g .. .

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COLLINS I d o n ' t t h i n k we were ever concerned t h a t we had a prob-

lem on t h e B s i d e .

ARMSTRONG No.

COLLINS We were g l a d t h e ground was looking a t it. It seemed t o

be a l l r i g h t t o us.

7.10 ACQUISITION OF MSFN

ARMSTRONG I n t h e post-LOI, we had a MSFN c o n t a c t on t i m e and d i d a

P52 o p t i o n 3 and 2 d r i f t check. Those numbers w e r e re-

ported.

7.15 SPS BURN FOR LOI-2

ARMSTRONG LOI-2 w a s a bank A only burn. I assume t h i s w a s t o con-

serve nitrogen pressure i n t h e B c e l l . This w a s a

17-second burn. Residuals w e r e reasonable - 3.3, 0 , and

0.1. The DELTA-V a g a i n w a s 5.2.

C

7.17 ORBIT PARAMETERSFOR LOI-2

ARMSTRONG Postburn NOUN 44 w a s 54.4 by 66.1.

COLLINS Did you want t o t a l k about t h a t o r b i t being t a r g e t e d

55 by 65 r a t h e r t h a n 67?
ARMSTRONG Yes, I t h i n k we made it c l e a r on a number of occasions

p r e f l i g h t t h a t w e were not i n agreement with t h e change,

j u s t p r i o r t o f l i g h t , t o t h e 55 by 65 o r b i t . We d i d not

d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e i n t e n t of what t h e y were t r y i n g t o

achieve; i t ' s j u s t t h a t t h i s d i d not have t h e b e n e f i t of

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ARMSTRONG i t s e f f e c t on a number of o t h e r areas of t h e f l i g h t plan.
( CONT'D)
I s t i l l f e e l as though t h a t w a s somewhat of a mistake.

There were some o t h e r s i d e s t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t had

not been f u l l y reviewed by a l l p a r t i e s .

SPEAKER What about items between t h e two maneuvers?

ALDRIN One item t h a t came up w a s t h e r e q u e s t t o look a t t h e

c r a t e r A r i s t a r c h u s t o see i f w e could s e e any glow o r

evidence of some observations t h a t had been made by

people on t h e ground. That does b r i n g t o mind t h a t as

we were coming i n on LO1 and I could s e e t h e edge of t h e

Moon coming back i n t o t h e d a y l i g h t , it appeared t o m e

t h a t a t one p o i n t (which I c a n ' t i d e n t i f y ) t h e r e w a s one

p a r t i c u l a r area along t h e horizon t h a t w a s lit up. I

doubt t h a t it w a s anywhere near A r i s t a r c h u s . There ap-

peared t o be one r e g i o n t h a t w a s a l i t t l e unusual i n i t s

lighting. Maybe our films w i l l c a t c h t h a t . We'll j u s t

have t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y t h a t one when w e see t h e p i c -

tures. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s any p a r t i c u l a r con-

n e c t i o n , b u t I thought I ' d mention it because it d i d

s t r i k e m e as a l i t t l e unusual.

ARMSTRONG A s long as we're t a l k i n g about A r i s t a r c h u s , I ' d a g r e e

w i t h Buzz's o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e b r i g h t e s t p a r t of t h e

area t h a t w a s somewhat i l l u m i n a t e d might a g r e e w i t h t h e

zero phase p o i n t of e a r t h s h i n e . This would mean t h a t

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ARMSTRONG y o u ' r e g e t t i n g a l o t of l o c a l r e f l e c t i o n from e a r t h s h i n e .

( CONT D)
That c e r t a i n l y -
ALDRIN You t a l k i n g about once when w e were i n l u n a r o r b i t ?

ARMSTRONG Yes. I would c e r t a i n l y a g r e e , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e

h i g h l y i l l u m i n a t e d p a r t s of t h e i n s i d e of t h e c r a t e r w a l l .

I t h i n k it was a l s o t r u e t h a t t h e area around A r i s t a r c h u s ,

t h a t i s i n t h e p l a i n s , w a s a l s o more i l l u m i n a t e d .

ALDRIN It wasn't j u s t t h e c r a t e r , it was t h e whole g e n e r a l area.

ARMSTRONG I t ' s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y obvious t h a t t h i s a l s o would happen

t o agree w i t h t h e zero phase p o i n t of e a r t h s h i n e .

COLLINS It could. We had nothing t o compare it w i t h .

ALDRIN This w a s not i n s u n l i g h t ; it w a s i n e a r t h s h i n e . That

wouldn't have been zero ...

ARMSTRONG Offhand, it d o e s n ' t agree w i t h anything I can t h i n k o f ,

and it seemed t o extend f o r q u i t e a d i s t a n c e around t h a t

area. Although I c a l l e d t h a t a f l u o r e s c e n c e , i t ' s prob-

a b l y not a v e r y good term. It c e r t a i n l y d i d not have any

c o l o r s t h a t I could a s s o c i a t e it with. There w a s j u s t

a higher l o c a l i l l u m i n a t i o n l e v e l over t h e s u r f a c e a t t h a t

point.

ALDRIN It w a s a b r i g h t e r area t h a n anything else w e could s e e i n

either direction. I d o n ' t know i f you could compare t h a t

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ALDRIN w i t h any of t h e b r i g h t e r areas w e s a w i n t h e s u n l i t por-
( CONT 'D)
tions-- say on t h e back s i d e ; it d i d n ' t look l i k e it w a s

t h e same t h i n g a t a l l . Not having anything t o compare it

w i t h i n t h e way of e a r t h s h i n e i l l u m i n a t i o n , w e r e a l l y

c o u l d n ' t t e l l much.

ARMSTRONG We could say t h e e f f e c t w a s t h e r e , and it w a s a v e r y

pronounced e f f e c t . I t ' s a more obvious e f f e c t t h a n look-

ing a t t h e Earth's zodiacal l i g h t . I t ' s a more pronounced

e f f e c t t h a n z o d i a c a l l i g h t which i s a l s o observed e a s i l y

w i t h t h e eye. Our post-LOI-2 P52 o p t i o n 3 w a s a good one

w i t h an extremely low t o r q u i n g a n g l e (torqued a t 81.05).

After t h i s , w e prepared t h e t u n n e l f o r LM i n g r e s s .

ALDRIN L e t ' s go back t o t h e f i r s t t i m e w e went i n t o darkness on

t h e f r o n t s i d e , i n higher o r b i t b e f o r e LOI-2. This w a s

b e f o r e w e g o t t o t h e r e g i o n of t h e landing s i t e . It

wasn't i l l u m i n a t e d a t t h a t p o i n t . I guess i t ' s a q u e s t i o n

of your eyes being light-adapted t o t h e l i g h t e r t h i n g s

t h a t you are looking a t t h a t are i n s u n l i g h t . . T h e con-

t r a s t when going i n t o t h e t e r m i n a t o r was v e r y v i v i d .

There w a s j u s t nothing t o b e seen, y e t you would wait a

s h o r t while and t h e n you'd p i c k up e a r t h s h i n e , and you

could see q u i t e w e l l . A s soon as t h e s u n l i t p o r t i o n of

t h e Moon disappeared from your eyes, you could g e t dark-

adapted. Then w e could s t a r t looking a t t h i n g s l i k e

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ALDRIN Aristarchus. There w a s as much e a r t h s h i n e on t h e dark

(CONT'D)
s i d e of t h e t e r m i n a t o r as t h e r e w a s l a t e r on, b u t your

eyes could j u s t not adapt t o i t , and it w a s j u s t p i t c h

black. After a s h o r t while you would be a b l e t o p i c k up

f a i r l y reasonable l i g h t i n g coming from t h e E a r t h . I don't

know what you would r e l a t e t h a t t o , o r i f you'd say t h a t ' s

a t a l l adequate for any landing o p e r a t i o n s . I doubt t h a t .

It c e r t a i n l y d i d enable you t o make observations.

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k t h a t adequately s t a t e s it.

ALDRIN W e d i d n ' t do an e x t e n s i v e amount of observing i n earth-

shine.

ARMSTRONG I thought it w a s about 5 t o 1 0 minutes p a s t t h e t e r m i n a t o r

b e f o r e I w a s r e a l l y observing t h i n g s i n e a r t h s h i n e v e r y

well.

ALDRIN I t h i n k e a r t h s h i n e i s f o u r or f i v e t i m e s as b r i g h t as

moonshine on t h e Earth.

ARMSTRONG I d o n ' t remember making t h e comparison. It w a s done on

previous f l i g h t s . Some of t h e people on previous f l i g h t s

thought it might be conceivable t o make l a n d i n g s i n t o

earthshine. I d o n ' t guess I would be w i l l i n g t o go t h a t

far y e t . It looked l i k e t h e amount of d e t a i l t h a t you

could p i c k up, a t l e a s t from o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e , wasn't

c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what you r e a l l y need i n o r d e r t o do a

descent.

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ALDRIN You might do t h i n g s l i k e t e l e s c o p e t r a c k i n g o r even sex-

t a n t tracking. ... c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s i n t h e sex-

t a n t , though we d i d n ' t t r y t o do t h a t .

ARMSTRONG I t ' s d i f f i c u l t t o p i c k out t h i n g s i n e a r t h s h i n e , u n l e s s

i t ' s a v e r y pronounced f e a t u r e l i k e Copernicus, Kepler,

o r some of t h e bigger c r a t e r s . You could s e e t h o s e way

o u t ahead and t r a c k them c o n t i n u a l l y . For smaller fea-

tures t h a t a r e not w e l l i d e n t i f i e d w i t h l a r g e f e a t u r e s

c l o s e by, I d o n ' t t h i n k you would b e a b l e t o p i c k them

up. We a r e ready f o r t h e second h a t c h removal now.

7.21 REMOVAL AND STOWAGE OF HATCH FOR IVT TO LM

COLLINS We s t o r e d t h e hatch i n t h e conventional. p l a c e , t h a t i s ,

i n t h e hatch stowage bag underneath t h e left-hand couch.

That w a s an easy and convenient p l a c e t o stow it s i n c e

t h e y enlarged t h a t bag and it f i t very w e l l . It w a s out

of t h e way.

7.24 REMOVAL OF PROBE AND DROGUE

COLLINS We stowed t h e probe, as one of t h e previous f l i g h t s sug-

g e s t e d , under t h e right-hand couch w i t h t h e nose of t h e

probe i n t h e plus-Y d i r e c t i o n . It was strapped underneath

t h e f o o t of t h e right-hand couch w i t h two s t r a p s which

were s p e c i f i c a l l y designed t o stow it. We just stuffed

t h e drogue i n between t h e LEB and t h e probe and held it

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COLLINS i n p l a c e w i t h a couple of general-purpose s t r a p s . It
( CONT D )
seemed t o work w e l l .

ARMSTRONG I was t h i n k i n g ahead about our o v e r a l l LM stowage which

w a s d i f f e r e n t from our p r e f l i g h t p l a n w i t h r e s p e c t t o

l e a v i n g t h e probe and drogue stowed i n t h e command module

overnight.

ALDRIN A f t e r LOI-2.

ARMSTRONG Subsequent t o t h i s time.

ALDRIN I t seemed t h a t a l l t h e p l u s e s were i n f a v o r of doing t h a t .

ARMSTRO NG I a g r e e ; I r e a l l y d i d not t h i n k it w a s a b i g t h i n g . We

d i d it t o t r y and save t i m e a t t h e s t a r t of t h e D O 1 da:J.

We had it removed and it w a s stowed. That meant t h a t on

one n i g h t , w e had t o arrange a s l e e p c o n f i g u r a t i o n w i t h

t h e probe and t h e drogue stowed i n t h e command module.

SPm m Who s l e p t with t h i s ?

ALDRIN I did. I t w a s a l i t t l e cramped under t h e r i g h t seat w i t h

t h e probe and drogue, b u t I w a s a b l e t o sneak i n under-

neath it. I t h i n k I made one e x i t over t h e hatch end of

the seat. I guess t h e only t h i n g t h a t l e a v e s you a little

b i t open t o having t h e probe and t h e drogue i n t h e corn--

mand module i s i f you've g o t t e n separated from t h e LM.

7.29 TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT

ALDRIN I n our a c t i v a t i o n c h e c k l i s t , we have a CSM t o IN trans!'er

list. We reviewed t h i s , added a f e w t h i n g s , and put s;cliot~

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ALDRIN n o t e s on it. I t h i n k it would behoove follow-on crews
(CONT'D )
t o pay c l o s e a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s t y p e of l i s t , e s p e c i a l l y

i f t h e y u s e t h i s l i s t t o r e c o r d anything t h a t i s brought

back i n t o t h e command module from t h e LM.

We brought t h e p u r s e back i n w i t h u s . The t r a n s f e r s t o r -

age assembly, along w i t h one t r a n s f e r bag, w a s used t o

keep t r a c k of everything t h a t w a s going t o be t r a n s f e r r e d

t o t h e LM t h e next day. We e l e c t e d t o take a f e w snacks

i n w i t h u s and a l s o added t i s s u e s t o t h e t r a n s f e r l i s t .

I n t h i n k i n g about i t , I d o n ' t b e l i e v e we had any t i s s u e s

i n t h e LM.

ARMSTRONG There were, b u t w e c o u l d n ' t r e c a l l where t h e y were.

ALDRIN I s t i l l d o n ' t ' r e c a l l where t h e y were. We had a couple of

towels but w e c e r t a i n l y needed t h e t i s s u e s . We found

t h a t out t h e f i r s t day w e went i n t r a n s l u n a r ; when we

p u l l e d t h e window shades down, t h e windows were covered

w i t h moisture. I n o r d e r t o g e t ,any p i c t u r e s and t o t e s t

t h e cameras, we had t o b r i n g i n some t i s s u e s and wipe t h e

windows o f f . We found c o n s i d e r a b l e use f o r t h e two packs

of t i s s u e s t h a t we took i n . I t h i n k t h a t i s something t h a t
ought t o be added t o t h e LM stowage.

ARMSTRONG It i s probably worth mentioning t h a t , due t o v a r i o u s at-

t i t u d e c o n s t r a i n t s , sun p o s i t i o n s , and so f o r t h , you

f r e q u e n t l y f i n d y o u r s e l f p u t t i n g t h e LM window b l i n d s up

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ARMSTRONG and down i n lunar o r b i t . When you put them up, you are
( CONT'D )
going t o s t a r t t o c o l l e c t moisture on t h o s e windows i n

some a t t i t u d e s . I n v a r i a b l y , when you t a k e t h e window

shades down, you have p a r t i a l l y degraded windows.

ALDRIN It took a long t i m e . You c o u l d n ' t j u s t wipe it off once;

it came r i g h t back because t h e g l a s s had cooled so much.

ARMSTRONG It would c l e a r if it w a s l e f t exposed t o t h e s u n l i g h t f o r

a s i g n i f i c a n t p e r i o d of t i m e , b u t we d i d n ' t always have

t h a t much time b e f o r e w e had t o be t r a c k i n g or looking a t

t h e ground or doing something e l s e . Having t h e t i s s u e s

or towels t h e r e t o d r y t h o s e windows o f f so t h a t w e could

use them as windows w a s important.

ALDRIN Another item t h a t w e added t o t h e t r a n s f e r l i s t , and w e

asked f o r approval from t h e ground f o r t h i s , w a s t h e

monocular. We f e l t we could use it more i n t h e LM than

Mike could i n t h e command module so w e took t h a t i n w i t h

us. We d i d u s e it on t h e s u r f a c e , looking a t and observ-

ing c e r t a i n rocks b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e EVA. I certainly

w i l l recommend t h a t crews have something l i k e t h a t on-

board t h e LM, i n t h e way of a magnifying devihe.

ARMSTRONG It i s u s e f u l a l s o b e f o r e EVA t o h e l p p l a n your EVA r o u t e s

and o b j e c t s of i n t e r e s t .

ALDRIN I might mention t h a t when we went i n t h e r e t h e f i r s t day,

I d i d go over t h e c i r c u i t - b r e a k e r c h e c k l i s t t h a t w e were

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ALDRIN going t o do on LO1 day and I a l s o went over t h e complete
( CONT'D)
switch c h e c k l i s t . I n essence, we got ourselves 1 day

ahead. On LO1 day, I went over t h e c i r c u i t breakers but

d i d not go through t h e complete switch l i s t again. That

gave u s a l i t t l e more time t o go through t h e r a t h e r b r i e f

COMM procedures t h a t we had. I might mention here t h a t

t h e systems t e s t meter i n t h e command module showed t h a t

t h e LM power p o s i t i o n w a s always w i t h i n l i m i t s . It did

o s c i l l a t e r a t h e r r a p i d l y between about 0.3 o r 0.4 and

about 2.2 v o l t s ; g e n e r a l l y around 1 . 2 . The on and o f f

cycling of t h e LM loads w a s much more r a p i d t h a n I had

anticipated.

ARMSTRONG h r e r y few seconds, t h e volt-e l e v e l of t h e LM bus would

change s i g n i f i c a n t l y .

7.31 POWER TRANSFER TO LM

ALDRIN I have logged t h e times of t r a n s f e r t o LM power, 83 hours

even, and t r a n s f e r back t o CSM power, 83:38. The i n t e r -

vening time w a s spent checking o u t t h e COMM. A l l of t h i s

w a s done on low v o l t a g e t a p . We checked t h e OPS pres-

s u r e s b o t h on t h e f i r s t and second days and t h e y were w e l l

up t h e r e - 5750 and 5800. The REPRESS valve c e r t a i n l y

does make a loud bang when you move it t o CLOSE. There

doesn't seem t o be any way t o avoid t h a t , e s p e c i a l l y when

you go t o CLOSE; it seems you are r e l i e v i n g some pressure.

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ALDRIN When you go t o REPRESS, it is' p o s s i b l e t h a t you could
( CONT'D)
avoid it by being v e r y d e l i b e r a t e when you open it. I
wasn't a b l e t o do it any of t h e times t h a t I a c t i v a t e d it.

The COMM seemed t o be v e r y loud and c l e a r . I guess t h a t ' s

about it f o r t h e LO1 day a c t i v a t i o n .

ARMSTRONG J u s t about t h i s same time we had a P22 - our f i r s t P22.

Comment on t h a t , Mike.

7.33 LANDMARK TRACKING

COLLINS It went normal. I have on my map t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e

c r a t e r on which I marked. I ' l l g i v e t h a t t o t h e appro-

p r i a t e people. All procedures, t h e update, t h e map, t h e

a c q u i s i t i o n , everything w a s nominal.

ALDRIN I ' m not s u r e whether it w a s t h i s pass o r t h e one b e f o r e

t h a t you were back i n t h e command module and w e had a

good view of t h e landing s i t e coming up. I ' m s u r e it

must have been because w e were t o o busy t o be gazing out

t h e window on D O 1 day. I ' d recommend t h a t both LM crew

members be i n t h e LM on LO1 day. Even though you thought

you had a good view, I w a s convinced t h a t I had a much

b e t t e r one t h a n you d i d .

ARMSTRONG You probably d i d .

ALDRIN ... s t r a i g h t out t h e window of t h e approach. I t h i n k both

crew members probably ought t o be i n t h e LM during t h a t

time .
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7.37 CONSUMABLES - ACCOUNTABLE

COLLINS Because of t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking and P23, we s t a r t e d

o f f behind on RCS and w e s t a y e d s l i g h t l y behind on RCS.

The o t h e r consumables, oxygen and hydrogen, w e r e w i t h i n

limits. What about LM consumables?

ALDRIN I guess we went t o bed according t o t h e f l i g h t plan. How

many hours d i d we have scheduled?

ARMSTRONG We had a 9-hour r e s t p e r i o d scheduled s t a r t i n g a t 85 hours.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e r e a s o n w e were a b l e t o b e i n p o s i t i o n t o t a k e

advantage of t h e rest p e r i o d a t t h e beginning of it w a s

because w e had a l r e a d y g o t t e n used t o t h e LM o p e r a t i o n .

ARMSTRONG I guess w e knew a l l along t h a t t h a t could b e t h e problem

on our t i m e l i n e , j u s t as it could have been on 10. Any-

t i m e you g e t hung up i n t h a t DO1 day on LM systems, y o u ' r e

not going t o make it. We had t h a t same s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n

t o t r y t o b e ahead and t r y t o understand t h e LM as b e s t

w e could b e f o r e t h a t t i m e p e r i o d .

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8.0 LUNAR M O D U U CHECKOUT THROUGH SEPARATION

8.1 COMMAND MODULE

8.1.1 CSM power t r a n s f e r

COLLINS I r e c a l l t h a t went without i n c i d e n t . Prior t o t h i s t i m e ,

t h e CSM had been p r o v i d i n g power t o t h e LM h e a t e r s , and

you could watch t h e l o a d cycle on t h e s e r v i c e meter as

t h e h e a t e r s c u t i n and out. They were always w i t h i n

limits. Eleven amps i s supposed t o be t h e m a x i m u m and

I d o n ' t t h i n k w e ever went over two-thirds of t h a t .

ALDRIN I t h i n k i t ' s worth while t o p o i n t out t h a t w e d i d n ' t jump

ahead of t h e t i m e l i n e by g e t t i n g up e a r l y . I think we

f e l t confident t h a t t h e time we had was s u f f i c i e n t .

ARMSTRONG We had 2 hours b e f o r e w e went i n from wakeup. I think

it probably worth mentioning t h a t , none of us g o t as good

a n i g h t s l e e p t h a t n i g h t as we had t h e previous n i g h t .

I'm sure it was j u s t t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e w a s beginning t o

build at t h i s point. We were coming up on DO1 d a y . We

got 5 t o 6 hours s l e e p t h a t n i g h t . I guess I should have

expected t h a t .

8.1.2 Updates

COLLINS They updated us w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t A l w a s 500 f e e t above

t h e landing site. That d i d n ' t seem t o t u r n anybody on

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COLLINS because t h e LM c h a r t s a r e n ' t t h a t accurate.
(CONT'D)

8.1.3 M
IL
J realign

C 0LLINS We d i d t h e MJ r e a l i g n , and it worked okay.

IL

8.1.5 Assist LM VHF A and B checks

COLLINS I a s s i s t e d t h e LM VHF checks, and t h e y worked f i n e .

8.1.6 Tunnel closeout ; probe , drogue , and hatch

COLLINS Tunnel closeout went normally. The probe , drogue, and

hatch worked f l a w l e s s l y . A t t h i s time, I w a s on t h i s

solo book, and t h e s o l o book worked w e l l . I went through

it and checked t h i n g s o f f item by item. The undocking

went normal. You may want t o say some t h i n g s about t h a t

undocking and s t a t i o n k e e p i n g i n regard t o who w a s going

t o t h r u s t , how it worked o u t , and what it d i d t o our

s t a t e vectors.

ALDRIN We do want t o go back and review some LM a c t i v i t i e s .

ARMSTRONG L e t ' s go back t o t h e t u n n e l closeout. A s I remember,

you were c l i c k i n g along i n good shape t h e r e , but we were

w e l l ahead over i n t h e LM. We were, i n f a c t , w a i t i n g on

CMP t o get t h i s whole long s e r i e s of t h i n g s done. That

w a s completed by c l e a r i n g t h e t u n n e l and g e t t i n g t h a t

ready f o r u s t o go. This i s a time p e r i o d when t h e LM

and command module a c t i v i t i e s a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d

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ARMSTRONG and dependent on each o t h e r . You have t o do t h i n g s i n

(CONT'D)
p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r and b e c a r e f u l t h a t you don't g e t out

of sequence h e r e . That w a s t h e f i r s t p l a c e where w e had

t o s i t s t i l l and w a i t .

COLLINS It d i d go according t o ~qyschedule; it went r i g h t along

l i k e it should have. There i s n ' t much you can do t o

hurry t h a t probe and drogue. A l l t h a t I did i n t h a t

t u n n e l I d i d v e r y slowly and d e l i b e r a t e l y as p e r t h e

checklist.

8.1.7 Maneuvering f o r landmark t r a c k i n g

ARMSTRONG The next t h i n g w e d i d w a s maneuver t o t h e t r a c k i n g a t t i -

t u d e which you had t o do a f t e r g e t t i n g t h e t u n n e l a l l

s e t up t o do t h e P22.

COLLINS The hooker w a s I c o u l d n ' t do t h a t u n t i l t h e t u n n e l had

vented down t o a c e r t a i n p r e s s u r e l e v e l . There i s a

c o n s t r a i n t on 2 - j e t roll, 4-jet roll, and no-jet r o l l ,

depending on t h e condition of t h e t u n n e l . That may have

been when you were just s i t t i n g t h e r e w a i t i n g . I had

you i n h i b i t roll command u n t i l t h e LM/CM DELTA-P w a s

r a t e d at 3.5. Then I had 2-jet roll s t a r t e d and I was

going t o s t a r t maneuvering t o t h e t r a c k a t t i t u d e . All

t h a t t i m e l i n e went e x a c t l y according t o t h e f l i g h t plan.

If you were ahead, t h e n t h a t w a s t h e p o i n t at which you

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COLLINS had t o s t o p . We d i d P22 on c r a t e r 130 t h i s t i m e , and
( CONT'D)
it w a s with h a l f - j e t a u t h o r i t y because you'd unstowed

your radar antenna. I had t o d e a c t i v a t e two t h r u s t e r s .

P22 went j u s t f i n e .

ARMSTRON G Then you maneuvered t o t h e AGS c a l i b r a t i o n a t t i t u d e .

COLLINS The AGS c a l i b r a t e a t t i t u d e h e l d steady. A s f a r as I

know you were l e i s u r e l y a b l e t o g e t a good AGS c a l .

8.1.13 Undocking

ARMSTRONG Undocking w a s one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t had t o be done very

c a r e f u l l y i n o r d e r t o avoid g e t t i n g some muddled DELTA-V

i n t h e s t a t e v e c t o r from which we could never recover.

The procedure t h a t we used w a s one t h a t w a s agreed upon

w i t h i n t h e l a s t week o r two b e f o r e f l i g h t . It involved

t h e LM g e t t i n g up both P47 and t h e AGS during t h e undock-

i n g time and zeroing t h e DELTA-V's of t h e undocking.

P47 w a s one t h a t we chose t o zero. A s I remember, t h e r e

w a s a l i t t l e r e s i d u a l l e f t i n t h e AGS. D o you remember,

Buzz?

ALDRIN Yes.

ARMSTRONG We went P47 t o z e r o , and we s t i l l had a l i t t l e l e f t i n

t h e AGS. I c a n ' t remember whether it was 0 . 1 or 0.2.

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ALDRIN It w a s 0.3 o r 0.4. It jumped - t h i s was i n 470. It

j u s t appeared t o us t h a t s i n c e w e had P47 going it w a s

probably t h e more a c c u r a t e of t h e two.

ARMSTRON G A f t e r s e p a r a t i n g f o r a d i s t a n c e of 30 t o 40 f e e t - t h e n
t a k i n g t h e DELTA-V o u t i n P47 -we asked Mike t o choose

h i s own s e p a r a t i o n d i s t a n c e for watching t h e g e a r . He

t h e n stopped h i s r e l a t i v e motion w i t h r e s p e c t t o o u r s ;

and t h e i n t e n t w a s , at t h a t p o i n t , both v e h i c l e s would

have e x a c t l y t h e same s t a t e v e c t o r t h a t t h e y had p r i o r

t o undocking.

COLLINS Any error w e had i n t h e r e might w e l l have been t h e rea-

son why you might have been long.

ARMSTRONG P o s s i b l y , it may have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h a t .

COLLINS I d o n ' t know how much e r r o r we had i n t h e r e . I d i d have

t o f i r e l a t e r a l t h r u s t e r s s e v e r a l times and p i t c h t h r u s t e r s

once o r twice. A s n e a r as I can t e l l , t h o s e t h i n g s should

have j u s t about compensated f o r each o t h e r .

ARMSTRONG It w a s our i n t e n t i o n t o try and keep t h e command module

from f i r i n g any t h r u s t e r s once he had k i l l e d t h e r e l a t i v e

rate. We didn't q u i t e accomplish t h a t .

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COLLINS I d i d n ' t have t o f i r e any toward you or away from you,

b u t I had slow d r i f t rates back and f o r t h a c r o s s you

and up and down while you were doing your turnaround

maneuver. I had t o k i l l t h o s e rates. I d o n ' t know how

t h e y developed.

ARMSTRONG The r e s u l t a n t s t a t i o n k e e p i n g w a s one t h a t w a s very good.

The v e h i c l e s were p r e t t y much glued t o g e t h e r , 50 t o

70 f e e t a p a r t . How about t h e i n s p e c t i o n ?

COLLINS I n s p e c t i o n c o n s i s t e d of two t h i n g s , a gear check and a

second j u s t looking f o r any obviously damaged p a r t s or

b i t s of hanging d e b r i s . The LM looked normal t o me. I

had t o confirm t h r e e o f t h e g e a r s by a c t u a l l y checking

t h e downlocks. I never could g e t i n t o a p o s i t i o n t o

check t h e downlock on t h e f o u r t h gear. I t h i n k it w a s

i n p o s i t i o n i n i t i a l l y f o r downlock i n s p e c t i o n b u t I

missed it due t o camera a c t i v i t y . Then it r o t a t e d around,

and I never r e a l l y could check t h e f o u r t h downlock. I

was r e l a t i v e l y confident i n saying all f o u r of them were

down and locked j u s t by t h e angle which t h e g e a r i t s e l f

made. All f o u r gears were a t t h e same angle.

I took considerable 70-mm as w e l l as 16-JDII p i c t u r e s

during t h i s t i m e . I f I had spent more t i m e looking out

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COLLINS t h e window and l e s s time f i d d l i n g w i t h t h e cameras, I
(CONT 'D)
probably would have had t o f i r e t h e l a t e r a l t h r u s t e r s

and v e r t i c a l t h r u s t e r s a l i t t l e b i t l e s s . I c a l l e d P20

a f t e r t h e s e p a r a t i o n burn.

The SEP burn w a s w i t h i n 8 seconds o f t h e f l i g h t p l a n

time. I c a l l e d P20 i n t h a t l i t t l e f o o t b a l l we w e r e i n ,

b u t it w a s not very a c c u r a t e . The f l i g h t s t a t e v e c t o r

... m a k e considerable inaccuracy i n P20, s o t h e s e x t a n t

w a s not a b l e t o t r a c k t h e LM.

I had been on t h e s o l o f l i g h t p l a n book now e v e r s i n c e

a GET of 94 hours. This s o l o book concept, where I had

a l l t h e information I needed i n one book, worked very

well. I have no suggestions f o r any modifications t o

t h i s book. I used t h e f l i g h t p l a n as a b a s i s f o r it and

t h e n I i n s e r t e d more d e t a i l e d pages during t h e i n t e r v a l s

when t h e t i m e l i n e was busy. I@o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i n using

t h a t approach w a s t h a t it would be less work f o r t h e

people who had t o make up t h e book i f t h e y could start

w i t h something t h a t a l r e a d y e x i s t e d , l i k e t h e f l i g h t

plan.

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COLLINS A t any t i m e , I could see what w a s going on i n s i d e t h e
( CONT 'D)
LM i f I had an i n c l i n a t i o n t o do s o . I ' m not s u r e it

t u r n e d out t o be any l e s s work. I never was t o o con-

cerned about what w a s going on i n s i d e t h e LM, b u t it

d i d have one g r e a t advantage which s o r t of a c c i d e n t a l l y

f e l l out. The d e t a i l e d procedures were done by t h e

McDonald Douglas people, and t h e f l i g h t p l a n w a s done

by t h e f l i g h t p l a n people; and i n case a f t e r c a s e , t h e

two d i d not agree. Having them sandwiched i n b e l l y t o

b e l l y immediately p o i n t e d out areas where t h e y d i d not

agree. The two groups would t h e n g e t t o g e t h e r and f i n d

out why t h e y d i d n o t agree. It w a s a good mechanism f o r

making s u r e t h a t a l l counties were heard from. The com-

mand module solo a c t i v i t i e s were e x a c t l y i n keeping w i t h

t h e f l i g h t plans. For t h a t r e a s o n , I recommend t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r format.

8.1.21 Rendezvous r a d a r and o p t i c s checks

C 0LLI NS About t h e only o p t i c s checks I got p r i o r t o D O 1 w a s t h e

f a c t t h a t I could see t h e LM through t h e o p t i c s . P20

._
w a s not t h a t a c c u r a t e .

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8.1.22 Fuel c e l l p u r i n g

COLLINS Fuel c e l l purging w a s nominal.

8.1.23 Update pads

COLLINS Update pads were good.

8.1.24 COAS c a l i b r a t i o n

COLLINS I d i d not c a l i b r a t e t h e COAS.

8.1.25 COAS t r a c k i n g

COLLINS I d i d not t r a c k with t h e COAS. A f t e r D O I , I d i d P20

t r a c k i n g of t h e LM. I updated t h e s t a t e vector by

using both VHF ranging marks and s e x t a n t marks. This

i s something t h a t w a s not p a r t of t h e o r i g i n a l f l i g h t

plan. There w a s no requirement i n i t i a l l y f o r t h e com-

mand module t o t r a c k t h e LM between DO1 and PDI. It

w a s something t h a t I added and I'm glad I d i d , because

it allowed me t o s e e t h a t t h e system w a s working. We

had no scheduled checks on it t o see t h a t t h e mark d a t a

were incorporated and j u s t g e n e r a l l y t o prepare f o r t h e

next day's a c t i v i t i e s when I would be marking on t h e LM

for real.

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8.1.26 Workload, t i m e l i n e , and f l i g h t p l a n s

COLLINS This w a s a f a i r l y busy time i n t h e command module. These

procedures were w e l l designed, and I w a s a b l e t o s t i c k

with t h e f l i g h t p l a n .

I d i d get some accepted updates from t h e s e x t a n t marks.

They were: 6 . 1 f t / s e c , 7 . 1 f t / s e c , and t h e t h i r d one

3.7 f t / s e c . From t h e r e on, t h e y were a l l down below t h e

threshold.

ALDRIN I ' v e given you s e v e r a l thoughts on t h e various t h i n g s I

had t o do - where I w a s going t o put t h i n g s , when we

were going t o g e t t h e LCG's o u t , when we were going t o

open them up, and t h a t s o r t of t h i n g . I t h i n k when t h e

\
time came t o do t h i s we d i d n ' t have t o do a l o t of

\ fumbling around. We knew j u s t what t o do. There's only

one exception t o t h a t - our a t h l e t i c supporters. I had

no i d e a where t h e y were. I thought t h e y might have been

i n t h e same compartment with t h e SCS's and t h e LCG's. I

d i d n ' t s e e them anywhere, and we c o u l d n ' t s e e asking

t h e ground where t h e heck t h e y were. F i n a l l y we s a i d

t o heck with i t , and if t h e y weren't t h e r e , why we'd

g e t along without them. Low and behold, t h e y were

i n s i d e t h e LCG's when we opened them up.

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ARMSTRONG I t h i n k I commented t h a t i s where t h e y were stowed, b u t

when we looked i n t h e LCG's we s u r e c o u l d n ' t see them

anywhere.

COLLINS I thought t h o s e had been s e a l e d up l o n g ahead of t i m e .

AFUGTRONG Yes, t h a t ' s what I remembered, b u t we s u r e couldn't

prove it t o o u r s e l v e s .

ALDRIN I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e was anything t h a t got m e hung up at

a l l i n g e t t i n g a good meal. We knew t h a t w e would be

going about 6 t o 8 h o u r s , a t l e a s t ; s o we had a good

s i z e breakfast, t o o k c a r e o f e v e r y t h i n g , got up about

on schedule, s u i t e d up, and stowed t h i n g s p r e t t y w e l l

i n t h e LM.

8.2 LUNAR MODULE

8.2.1 PGA donning and IVT

ALDRIN Mike had t h i n g s w e l l under contrcl, and 1'1 been i n t o

t h e IM twice b e f o r e , s o t h e e n t r y procedure went very

rapidly. We were due t o go i n a t 9 5 : 5 0 .

ARMSTRONG We d i d no complete self-donning. We always used whoever

e l s e was a v a i l a b l e t o h e l p w i t h z i p p e r s and check where-

ever t h e y could. We checked each o t h e r whenever t i m e

allowed.

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, . . . . ._. ~ .I .. . .- . ., _ .- ... .. -_ . I ._- . .. - -. I ~ .- -. .... . - .... __ -

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8.2.2 Power' t r a n s f e r a c t i v a t i o n and checkout

ALDRIN I t r a n s f e r r e d t o LM power a t 95:54. We d i d e n t e r t h e

LM r i g h t on schedule. We d i d n ' t get ahead. I think

we had b u i l t up enough confidence i n t h e a c t i v a t i o n pro-

cedure by having done t h i s many times i n t h e SIM's.

Gene Kranz wanted t o run as many of t h e D O 1 and PDI

SIM's as we could, s t a r t i n g r i g h t from a c t i v a t i o n , and

I t h i n k it w a s a good t h i n g t h a t we d i d . Leaving t h e

simulator run, we found t h a t we had p l e n t y of t i m e t o

go out and get a cup of coffee or make a phone c a l l and

get back i n again. Having gone over t h i s many t i m e s ,

we had t h e confidence t o go ahead and not t r y t o jump

ahead. I t h i n k t h a t t h i n g s worked out q u i t e w e l l . We

were g r a d u a l l y , comfortably g e t t i n g 15 t o 20 minutes

ahead.

I ' d l i k e d t o have delayed going t o t h e high-voltage

t a p s and a c t i v a t i o n . Page 19 says t o go ahead and do

t h a t and get t h e bus voltages below 27, but t h e y w e r e n ' t .

I don't r e c a l l t h e exact time i n t h e checkout when t h e y

d i d begin t o approach 27. I t h i n k it w a s during t h e

c i r c u i t breaker a c t i v a t i o n when we put everything on

the line. It w a s about t h a t time t h a t t h e v o l t a g e

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 CONFIDENTIAL 8-13

ALDRIN s t a r t e d going down. Her.-. i s an example of how OUT time

( CONT ID)
schedule went: caution and warning checkout w a s t o

start ht 96:41, and a t tile l a t t e r -,art of t h a t i s a

s t e p c a l l e i : p r i r n a y evaporator f l o w 1, open. I logged

96:05, as t h e tine we opned that. A t t h a t point, we

were 30 minutes ahead. I n t h e c i r c u i t breaker a c t i v a -

tjon, trl? c n l y ?my; $ha> i obsertred was i n p u t t i n g t h e

L G C USKY z i r ~ & : ;reer.er ;L. 'de l l a i a program alarm 520

on t h e DSKY; 523 i s r a d a r e r u p t , not expected at t h i s

t i m e , and I can't e x p i a i n t h a t . W e reset i t . W e didn't

nave any radar on. We'll Jus-t have t o s e e what t h e people

say about t h a t . I t h i n k t h a t Neil came i n j u s t about on

schedule. I was a b l e t o acconplisli t h r e e o r four head-

ings t h a t w e were going t o b e doing t o g e t h e r . I had

t o wait u n t i l he g o t i n b e f o r e doing t h e s u i t pan water

s e p a r a t o r check. Iie ?.ad t j be hooked up a t t h a t t i m e .

It appeare; as though i t wouldn't be wise t o g e t t h a t

came i n , I w a s t o t h e p o i n t where I was ready t o go

back i n and I;L: ny s u i t 01;. T h a t got m e something i n

t h e v i c i n i t y of 1 5 t c 2G minutes ahead. I knew we

p r e t t y w e l l had it made a: t h a t point. We d i d t h e

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ALDRIN E-memory dump, and you d i d some work w i t h t h e DSKY and
( CONT I D )
t h e alignment checks.

ARMSTRONG The E-memory dump w a s r e p e a t e d f o r some reason or o t h e r .

I t h i n k w e l o s t S-band.

ALDRIN I c a n ' t r e c a l l i f it was an a t t i t u d e problem, b u t we

d i d do t h a t again.

ARMSTRONG For some r e a s o n , w e l o s t t h e high b i t r a t e during t h i s

time p e r i o d . The VHF checkout was good. Both VHF A

and B between t h e two v e h i c l e s were good. The time and

i n i t i a t i o n s were without problem, and we d i d t h e

T~~~~
docked M
I U coarse a l i g n . The advantage of being s l i g h t l y

ahead showed i t s e l f i n t h a t MSFN w a s a b l e t o compute t h e

t o r q u i n g angles b e f o r e w e l o s t s i g n a l w i t h them, b e f o r e

w e went on t h e backside. They gave us t h e t o r q u i n g

a n g l e s , and w e torqued t h e p l a t f o r m at 97:14, about an

hour b e f o r e we were scheduled t o do t h e i n i t i a l t o r q u i n g .

This gave us b e t t e r d r i f t checks, which w a s a h e l p i n

analyzing t h e LM platform. We had never done t h a t i n t h e

SIM's. Later on I w a s a l i t t l e confused i n my own mind

as t o what cages t h a t might result i n and whether w e

would have t h e subsequent t o r q u i n g s about an hour and

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l
ARMSTRONG a half later. A t t h i s t i m e , I had nothing r e a l l y f u r t h e r
( CONT I D )
I t o do u n t i l Buzz r e t u r n e d w i t h h i s s u i t on. When he

, came back, w e only had t o w a i t on Mike t o g e t t h e . t u n n e 1

c l o s e d up b e f o r e we could continue w i t h t h i n g s l i k e t h e

p r e s s u r e i n t e g r i t y checks and r e g u l a t o r checks.

ALDRIN It seemed t o me we spent a good b i t of t i m e h o l d i n g a t

j u s t about t h a t p o i n t .

ARMSTRONG We were a l i t t l e ahead, and it t u r n e d out t h a t t h e r e

w a s very f e w t h i n g s t h a t w e could do o r wanted t o do a t

t h a t point.

8.2.5 ECS

ALDRIN The g l y c o l pump s u r e made a l o t of n o i s e .

8.2.13 Ascent b a t t e r i e s

ALDRIN You k i n d of h a t e t o b r i n g t h e ascent b a t t e r i e s on t h e

line. You've got a system going and t h e n t u r n o f f a l l

t h e descent b a t t e r i e s j u s t t o prove t h a t t h e a s c e n t b a t -

t e r i e s are working. You have no backup i f you t u r n e d

o f f all t h e b a t t e r i e s ; a t t h a t p o i n t , everything would

go dark. Maybe t h a t wasn't t h e only way you could go

about checking t o see t h a t t h e ascent b a t t e r i e s worked.

But, t h a t worked out all r i g h t .

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8.2.15 ARS/PGA p r e s s u r e I

ALDRIN The p r e s s u r e i n t e g r i t y check h e l d w i t h t h e s u i t loop

decreasing maybe 0 . 1 or something l i k e t h a t . I think

t h e r e i s a l i t t l e l a g i n t h e r e when you f i r s t c l o s e t h e

regulators. The t o l e r a n c e i s 0.3. I t wasn't anywhere

near t h a t . There wasn't any s i g n i f i c a n t change going

t o t h e secondary c a n i s t e r . The r e g u l a t o r check i s a

f a i r l y involved s e t u p of valve switching. I ' m sure a l l

of t h e s e t h i n g s a r e n i c e t o do, but unless you have a n

extremely i n t i m a t e knowledge of e x a c t l y what you're

doing, you can run i n t o some problem t h e r e . The f a c t

t h a t you're doing t h i s one s t e p r i g h t a f t e r another p u t s

you i n a non-nominal s i t u a t i o n . I would much p r e f e r

t h a t t h i s s o r t of a check be done on t h e Earth s i d e

where you have COMM, because y o u ' r e dumping t h e cabin

p r e s s u r e down and y o u ' r e using a REPRESS valve. I

t h i n k t h e ground would agree with t h a t , too. If i n

o t h e r f l i g h t s it could be worked i n t o t h e e a r t h - s i d e

p a s s , I t h i n k it would be b e n e f i c i a l .

ARMSTRONG I agree with t h a t , although I t h i n k t h e p r e s s u r e i n t e g r i t y

check i s r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .

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ARMSTRONG But t h e s e two a r e coupled t o g e t h e r . It's t i e d t o the
( CONT I D >
t r a c k i n g and t o t h e t u n n e l c l o s e o u t .

8.2.16 AGS a c t i v a t i o n , s e l f - t e s t , calibration, and alignment

ALDRIN We had a l r e a d y had t h e p l a t f o r m up and it had been

a l i g n e d t o t h e command module's p l a t f o r m , s o I went

through t h e AGS i n i t i a l i z a t i o n update. I knew t h a t we

d i d n ' t have a s t a t e v e c t o r , s o t h e r e wasn't any p o i n t

i n putting t h e state vector i n . I was s m a r t enough at

t h a t p o i n t t o recognize t h i s and I knew t h a t t h e s t a t e

v e c t o r w a s coming up l a t e r . But I thought , "Well,

t h e r e ' s nothing t o s t o p me from a l i g n i n g t h e AGS p l a t -

form t o t h e PGNS platform," s o I d i d t h i s and immediately

looked at t h e AGS b a l l and it was way out i n l e f t f i e l d .

It d i d n ' t agree t o t h e PGNS b a l l at a l l , and it took me

about 5 minutes o r s o t o t r y and f i g u r e out why t h i s

was. I f i n a l l y r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e reason f o r it w a s t h a t

t h e PGNS d i d n ' t have a REFSMMAT, and i t s computer d i d n ' t

know where i t s platform w a s . Even though t h e p l a t f o r m

w a s i n t h e r i g h t s p o t , it d i d n ' t have any r e f e r e n c e sys-

tem s o it couldn't t e l l t h e AGS what i t s p l a t f o r m ought

t o be. The AGS p l a t f o r m , i n terms of t h e command module,

i s i n t h e forward plane. The PGNS d i d n ' t know t h i s .

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ALDRIN It j u s t came up with some garbage. Well, t h i s caused
(CONT'D)
a l i t t l e b i t of concern because we were q u i t e anxious

t o have t h e AGS with us f o r t h e whole f l i g h t . W e were

beginning t o wonder whether we would o r not. Let's see,

t h e r e was one funny t h i n g t h a t I don't t h i n k we've men-

tioned. It w a s p r e t t y minor. One of t h e s t r o k e s on

t h e DEDA w a s not i l l u m i n a t e d . Each c h a r a c t e r i s made

up of all t h e s e d i f f e r e n t s t r o k e s . The one missing w a s

i n t h e middle c h a r a c t e r , and it would l e a v e you i n a

p o s i t i o n where you couldn't t e l l whether it w a s a t h r e e

o r a nine. I d i d n ' t r e a l i z e a t t h e time t h a t t h e r e w a s

any room f o r confusion. L a t e r , i n looking at some

numbers, you could not r e a l l y t e l l whether i n f a c t t h a t

was a t h r e e o r a nine.

ARMSTRONG Yes. You j u s t need t h a t one s t o k e t o c l o s e i t , and it

becomes a nine.

COLLINS I got t h e bottom one.

ALDRIN With t h i s p a r t i c u l a r one missing, t h e r e was some doubt

as t o exactLy what you had.

ARMSTRONG T h a t ' s t r u e of any d i g i t on any of t h o s e e l e c t r i c a l switch

displays.

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COLLINS Remember, we had one of t h o s e i n t h e EMS.

AFNSTRONG Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . Fortunately, t h e simulators usually

got some out and you got used t o p u t t i n g up w i t h t h a t .

But, i t ' s a problem t h a t r e a l l y could g e t t o you some-

t i m e if you m i s i n t e r p r e t t h a t number.

ALDRIN We missed p u t t i n g t h e AGS time i n t h e r e . We missed by

15 centiseconds h i t t i n g it r i g h t on, which I thought

w a s very c l o s e . We d i d even b e t t e r t h a n t h a t when we

updated a t 120 h o u r s .

8.2.17 S-band antenna

ALDRIN The S-band antenna seemed t o work very w e l l at t h i s

stage. It d i d n ' t make q u i t e as much n o i s e as I had

anticipated.

ARMSTRONG However, it w a s n o t i c e a b l e .

8.2.18 ORDEAL

ARMSTRONG As we s e t up t h e ORDEAL, we got back t o our f a v o r i t e

argument. That i s , what i s r i g h t t o set i n t h e ORDEAL -

t h e AGS or t h e PGNS, when you're at nonzero yaw? I
guess we b e l i e v e d t h a t it w a s t h e AGS t h a t was r i g h t .

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ARMSTRONG We s e t it i n and as it t u r n e d o u t , it w a s r i g h t and t h e
(CONT'D)
PGNS w a s wrong. By about 40 degrees o r something l i k e

that.

ALDRIN The PGNS w a s wrong by 40 degrees.

ARMSTRONG T h a t ' s an i n t e r e s t i n g one, because you can g e t e i t h e r

answer depending on who you ask; I s t i l l t h i n k t h a t today.

We a t l e a s t proved t o ourselves t h a t t h e AGS w a s t h e

c o r r e c t one.

8.2.19 Deployment of landing gear

ARMSTRONG Landing gear went down very n i c e l y . No problem with t h e

l a n d i n g gear and t h e r e w a s no question about t h a t one.

ALDRIN We were expecting two d i s t i n c t sounds, but r e a l l y t h e y

weren't i d e n t i c a l sounds. You could hear t h e PYRO's f i r e ,

and just a s h o r t time a f t e r , t h e r e was not as much sound

as t h e r e was a v i b r a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d up t h a t i n d i c a t e d

something had locked down. O f course, w e had no way of

knowing how many of them had done t h a t . However, when

we d i d f i r e , w e opened up l o g i c power A when we f i r e d

them, and t h e n we closed l o g i c power A and f i r e d again,

and at t h i s t i m e w e heard a c l i c k j u s t l i k e a r e l q going,

b u t no PYRO's f i r e d .

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8.2.23 DPS gimbal d r i v e and t h r o t t l e t e s t

ALDRIN Now, how about t h e gimbal t r i m .

' .
..
I

ARMSTRONG We d i d not d r i v e t h e gimbal. Some question arose while

we waited f o r confirmation from t h e ground, b u t t h e y

had proper gimbal p o s i t i o n s , and we d i d not have t o

drive.

8.2.24 RCS p r e s s u r i z a t i o n and checkout

ALDRIN I r e c a l l no problems t h e r e . The Parker valves i n t h e

talkbacks gave us some r a t h e r funny responses. Gene's

comments i n d i c a t e d t h a t when you a c t i v a t e one of t h e

quad p a i r s o r main s h u t o f f valve t o a p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n ,

it d i d n ' t go t o t h a t new p o s i t i o n u n t i l you r e l e a s e d it.

Through most of our t r a i n i n g i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , you'd

move t h a t v a l v e as soon as you'd g e t it t o t h e spring-

loaded p o s i t i o n of open and c l o s e , it would change, and

it would s t a y changed when you would r e l e a s e it back t o

t h e center. I f it d i d n ' t work t h a t way, when you moved

i t , it d i d n ' t go t o i t s new p o s i t i o n u n t i l you r e l e a s e d

it. So we changed t h e s i m u l a t o r .

We found something even f u r t h e r t h a n t h a t . The ascent

feed 1's were open, and t h e 2 ' s were closed. All of

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ALDRIN them were barberpoled as w e expected. A f t e r pressuriza-
( CONT 'D)
t i o n , t h e procedure w a s t o go through and cycle each

valve t o i t s p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n - where it should be. So,

I went t o t h e ascent feed 1's and went open, and nothing

changed; it s t a y e d barberpole. As soon as I went t o

number 2, t h e closed p o s i t i o n which would put them bar-

berpole, they both went d i r e c t . They went t o t h e opposite

p o s i t i o n t h a t you would not expect. When I released

i t , t h e y went back t o barberpole again. I think t h e

same t h i n g happened t o t h e s h u t o f f valves. When you'd

move it t o t h e closed p o s i t i o n , where it should go bar-

b e r p o l e , it would go gray. Then, as you r e l e a s e d , it

would go t o i t s p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n . You c a n ' t t e l l t h e

p o s i t i o n of t h e valve u n t i l you r e l e a s e it. As a m a t -

t e r of f a c t , i t ' l l g i v e you t h e opposite i n d i c a t i o n i n

some cases.

We had good helium p r e s s u r e and read t h a t out t o MSFN.

We went through t h e RCS checkout. We had one quad,

upper right-hand one, t h a t stuck two d i f f e r e n t times

i n t h e red i n d i c a t i o n .

When going through t h e cold f i r e , we were g e t t i n g a l l

d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s from t h e ground as t o whether t h e s e

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ALDRIN talkbacks would go red. The f i n a l one t h a t I got was,
( CONT 'D
"NO, t h e l a t e s t s t o r y i s they won't go r e d on you." Well,

they a l l went red. F i r s t f o u r of them, then a l l of them

went red. I t ' s a very l i g h t - c o l o r e d r e d , I might add.

It d i d n ' t look much l i k e t h e simulator. It r e a l l y s t a n d s

out much more than t h e simulator.

W e got t h e numbers we r a n on t h e DSKY when we went t o t h e

s o r t stops. For t h e most p a r t , they agreed p r e c i s e l y .

There were a couple of them t h a t missed by one l a s t d i g i t ,

but we were t o l d t h a t t h a t w a s not s i g n i f i c a n t .

8.2.25 Rendezvous r a d a r and s e l f - t e s t

ALDRIN Everything went j u s t as expected. I ' v e got t h e numbers

w r i t t e n down h e r e ; t h e y ' r e a l l w i t h i n limits.

8.2.26 DPS p r e p a r a t i o n and checkout

ARMSTRONG DPS p r e p a r a t i o n and checkout went as expected.

ALDRIN The AGS CAL a t t i t u d e angles a r e w r i t t e n down i n my l o g .

Mike maneuvered t o t h e angle, and we're steady as a rock

f o r a good long time p e r i o d ; more t h a n adequate t i m e

p e r i o d t o perform t h e check.

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ARMSTRONG I ' d always wondered i f t h e r e was anything t h a t you could

do during t h e AGS CAL 5-minute p e r i o d t h a t would maybe

give a l i t t l e j o l t , go back t o t h e AGS, and g i v e you an

erroneous reading so you wouldn't p a s s . I n any c a s e , w e

j u s t avoided t h a t problem by not doing anything except

t h e AGS CAL during t h e AGS CAL. We d i d n ' t p r e s s u r i z e

t h e DPS, o r put down t h e landing g e a r , o r run t h e rendez-

vous radar o r any of t h o s e t h i n g s which might put a

l i t t l e o s c i l l a t i o n i n t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t and t r i g g e r an

accelerometer o r something of t h a t s o r t t h a t might cause

a problem. We just l e t it run a l l by i t s e l f .

ALDRIN This p r e s s u r i z a t i o n sounds l i k e a b i g t h i n g , b u t r e a l l y

it took about 2 minutes t o do.

ARMSTRONG Yes.

ALDRIN And w e went through t h e f i n a l c i r c u i t breaker v e r i f i c a -

tion. Cards worked q u i t e w e l l . We'd l o s e maybe a l i t t l e

b i t of time by having t o pass them back and f o r t h . I

don't t h i n k t h a t ' s t o o s i g n i f i c a n t . T

8.2.28 Undocking

ARMSTRONG Undocking w a s very smooth. We had a very good v i s u a l .

W e could always t e l l where t h e command module w a s by

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ARMSTRONG looking out t h e window. We commented on our concern about
( CONT'D)
t h e manner i n which t h e undocking w a s c o n t r o l l e d . I think

t h e r e ' s s t i l l room f o r improvement on t h a t procedure.

One t h a t w a s d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e f l i g h t w a s : extend t h e

probe, and t h e n release t h e c a p t u r e l a t c h e s - essentially

have no v e l o c i t y between t h e v e h i c l e s . Then t h e command

module r e a l l y wouldn't move at a l l a t t h e time w e c l e a r

away and wouldn't compromise t h e s t a t e v e c t o r i n any w a y .

We thought t h a t might be a very good way t o do t h i n g s

but w e j u s t d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t t h e r e w a s enough t i m e b e f o r e

launch t o look i n t o t h e secondary e f f e c t s you might g e t

out of doing something l i k e t h a t , s o w e chose t o go w i t h

t h e way undockings had been performed p r e v i o u s l y . That

may be something future f l i g h t s might want t o look i n t o

w i t h more c a r e t h a n w e were a b l e t o .

ALDRIN P u t t i n g t h e helmet and gloves on and o f f d i d n ' t seem

r e a l l y t o be much of a b o t h e r . We put them on f o r t h e

i n t e g r i t y check, took them back o f f a g a i n , p u t them

back on f o r undocking, and took them o f f . The l i t t l e

p i e c e of Velcro on t h e f e e t p o r t worked q u i t e w e l l ,

j u s t slapping it down on t h e ascent-engine cover. I

put my gloves over by t h e right-hand c o n t r o l l e r . You

could put them i n t h e helmet j u s t as w e l l .

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ALDRIN The v e r i f i c a t i o n of about 8 t o 10 AGS addresses I w a s
( CONT 'D)
a b l e t o get done before undocking. There i s a bad

amount of data t h a t t h e ground reads up t o you i n t h a t

time p e r i o d -the D O I , PDI, PDI p l u s 1 2 pads, and various

loads t h a t a r e coming up. You have t o devote one m a n

j u s t t o copying a l l t h o s e t h i n g s down. It seemed l i k e

it took f o r e v e r t o get them a l l done. Even a f t e r we got

t h o s e , we s t i l l had some more coming up after D O I ; t h e

s u r f a c e pad had t o come up.

8.2.33 Formation f l y i n g

ARMSTRONG Formation f l y i n g w a s considerably l e s s d i f f i c u l t than

our simulation would l e a d us t o b e l i e v e . We were able

t o maintain p o s i t i o n with r e s p e c t t o t h e o t h e r v e h i c l e .

It w a s l e s s t r o u b l e than i n simulations and used less

fuel, A t s e p a r a t i o n , we thought we had r e l a t i v e v e l o c i t y

n u l l e d t o l e s s than 0.1 f t / s e c i n a l l axes. This was

based on t h e s i z e of t h e t r a n s l a t i o n a l i n p u t s required

t o maintain a constant p o s i t i o n over p a s t 10 o r 1 5 min-

u t e s before s e p a r a t i o n .

ALDRIN We d i d add 20 degrees t o our p i t c h a t t i t u d e a f t e r undock-

i n g , so t h a t we'd get b e t t e r high gain during t h e yaw

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ALDRIN maneuver. That, I t h i n k , i s peculiar with t h e p a r t i c u l a r

( CONT 'D)
l a n d i n g s i t e , b u t w e were a b l e t o get high gain lockon.

A s a matter of f a c t , I could have g o t t e n it b e f o r e we

made t h e p i t c h maneuver, b u t it d i d n ' t look l i k e t h e r e

w a s t o o much p o i n t i n doing t h a t .

A s soon as w e f i n i s h e d t h e p i t c h maneuver, we had high

g a i n lockon and had it throughout t h e yaw maneuver. I

was going t o t a k e some p i c t u r e s w i t h t h e 16-mm camera

mounted on t h e b r a c k e t , b u t it looked l i k e it was canted

off t o t h e side.

N o comment at a l l on using t h e AGS f o r t h i s v e r s u s t h e

PGNS. W e made a change from MAX deadband t o MIN dead-

band. This t o me i s an open a r e a .

ARMSTRONG W e were i n AGS , ATTITUDE HOLD, M I N deadband, and PULSE

i n t h e axis t h a t we were maneuvering i n . The s e p a r a t i o n

a t t i t u d e w a s not t h e a t t i t u d e w e had expected t o be i n

as a r e s u l t of some changes t o t h e ephemeris at t h i s

point. I n o t h e r words, Mike w a s s e p a r a t i n g on t h e local

v e r t i c a l , b u t t h a t w a s n o t at t h e same i n e r t i a l p i t c h

angle t h a t we expected t o be a t . It w a s o f f by about

1 0 degrees as I r e c a l l .

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COLLINS No, SEP occurred w i t h i n about 8 seconds of t h e planned

time.

ARMSTRONG You d i d s e p a r a t e on t h e l o c a l v e r t i c a l ? The p i t c h a t t i t u d e

t h a t we were at w a s about 1 0 degrees d i f f e r e n t .

COLLINS It was a 7-degree-different attitude. It w a s p i t c h 007

i n s t e a d of p i t c h 014.

ARMSTRONG I w a s holding i n t h e a t t i t u d e t h a t w a s on our t i m e l i n e ,

and s u r e enough, it d i d n ' t look l i k e you were i n t h e r i g h t

attitude. Some changes occurred a f t e r launch t h a t we

d i d n ' t properly a p p r e c i a t e . I n any c a s e , 285 i s what w e

expected t o be. That wasn't t h e r i g h t number. That

w a s important, because it was t h e t h i n g t h a t made t h e

C O S p o i n t at' you and check l a t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n s , com-

p a r i n g t h e formation f l y i n g during s e p a r a t i o n .

Immediately after t h i s , we d i d t h e landing radar t e s t ,

r i g h t after your s e p a r a t i o n . That went w e l l , as I remem-

ber , everytime.

ALDRIN Yes , they were r i g h t on.

ARMSTRONG A f t e r t h a t , w e d i d our first alignment i n t h e LM, f i n e

a l i g n , P52, option 3 . We d i d t h a t on t h e f l i g h t p l a n

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ARMSTRONG stars, Acrux and Antares. The t o r q u i n g angles were
( CONT ID)
about 0.3 degree.

ALDRIN Yes, and t h e y s u r e d i d n ' t i n s t i l l a l o t of confidence.

This w a s t h e l a s t alignment we were going t o have, and

we changed what we had by 0.3 degree. I guess t h a t ' s

t o be expected, but I was s u r e hoping t o have s m a l l e r

ones t h a n t h a t . T h i s i n d i c a t e d t h e kind of d r i f t we had

from t h e l a s t alignment from t h e command module, and it

w a s my understanding t h a t t h e s e alignments were q u i t e

good -b e t t e r t h a n t h e s e t o r q u i n g angles would i n d i c a t e .

ARMSTRONG We're i n t e r e s t e d i n f i n d i n g out what t h e d r i f t s were

t h e r e ; whether . t h a t w a s j u s t an i n a b i l i t y t o c a l c u l a t e

any b i a s e s and put them i n t o t h e computer so t h a t you

could improve t h e p l a t f o r m up t o what we normally would

expect.

ALDRIN We had a manual lockon w i t h t h e r a d a r before we d i d t h i s .

ARMSTRONG Yes.

ALDRIN We had P20 s t a n d i n g b y , but we d i d n ' t use it a t a l l .

ARMSTRONG We had a manual lockon and our radar needles and COAS

agreed very w e l l . This w a s your f i r s t chance t o look at

t h e transponder and a l l t h a t s t u f f i n o p e r a t i o n .

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COLLINS Yes. I r e c a l l I gave you some ranges. I didn't write

them dawn.

ALDRIN It agreed w i t h our values very c l o s e l y .

COLLINS And t h e y agreed wi-h my s - a t e v e c t o r . I j u s t wrote lorn

one value which w a s f a i r l y c l o s e t o yours. When I had

you at 0.72 miles on VHF ranging, my state v e c t o r s i n d i -

c a t e d 0.62.

ALDRIN That w a s c l o s e . D i d we g e t t h a t alignment f i n i s h e d ? It

seemed t o me it took a l i t t l e longer.

ARMSTRONG Yes, we took f i v e marks on each star, and it d i d t a k e us

q u i t e a while.

ALDRIN Yes, I wouldblike t o emphasize t o subsequent crews t o

allow l o t s of time i n t h e i r t i m e l i n e s when t h e y ' r e doing

t h e alignments.

We made a p r a c t i c e e a r l y i n t r a i n i n g of l e a v i n g t h e TTCA

switches d i s a b l e d as much as p o s s i b l e , and t h e d i r e c t

c o i l s 4-jet a c t i v e . I ' m not s u r e everyone understands

why you do t h a t . I t ' s a good sound t h i n g , I t h i n k , t o

keep as many hand c o n t r o l l e r s out of t h e loop as you can.

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ALDRIN It m a k e s t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g far e a s i e r and it minimizes t h e

(CONT'D)
number of problems you can g e t into.

WTRONG I t ' s j u s t a b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e i n philosophy. Most of

our D i r e c t o r a t e t a k e s t h e viewpoint t h a t you l e a v e every-

t h i n g on, and e s s e n t i a l l y everything i s hot a l l t h e time.

We took j u s t t h e opposite approach; namely, we t u r n e d all

t h e t h i n g s off t h a t we d i d n ' t t h i n k were c o n t r i b u t i n g ,

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e c o n t r o l system. We i s o l a t e d t h a t

many more p o s s i b l e failures causing us d i f f i c u l t i e s enroute.

COLLINS We d i d t h e very same t h i n g i n t h e command module i n t h a t

w e used hand c o n t r o l l e r number 1 as a s p a r e . We never

powered it up and l e f t it alone.

AFMSTRONG A l o t of people d i d n ' t understand about d i s a b l i n g t h i s

and d i s a b l i n g t h i s switch. It w a s r e a l l y j u s t a m a t t e r

of preventing failures from g e t t i n g t o us i n c r i t i c a l

times.

I
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9.0 D O 1 THRU TOUCHDOWN

9.1 C O ~ N DMODULE

9.1.1 LM D O 1 burn
COLLINS I d i d n ' t have any monitoring t o do o t h e r t h a n j u s t con-

f i r m i n g t h a t t h e y d i d it on time and t h a t it w a s normal

which it w a s .

9.1.2 AUTO maneuver t o s e x t a n t t r a c k i n g

COLLINS I d i d t h a t , and l o and behold, t h e IN was i n t h e s e x t a n t .

This i s a good e x e r c i s e t o do between D O 1 and PDI. It

g i v e s you an opportunity t o make some s e x t a n t marks, make

VHF marks, and t h e n t o s e e t h e s e marks incorporated i n t o

the state vector. I t ' s a good end-to-end t e s t of t h e

whole system.

9.1.3 MSFN a c q u i s i t i o n

COLLINS No problem.

9.1.4 Optics t r a c k - e a s e of t r a c k i n g ' m

COLLINS The LM w a s easy t o t r a c k . AUTO o p t i c s worked w e l l , and

t h e o p t i c s d r i v e w a s extremely smooth. When using r e s o l v e

and i n low speed, it was easy t o t a k e a c c u r a t e marks on

t h e IM. The LM, of course, g o t smaller and smaller, and

out a t about 100 m i l e s , it became q u i t e d i f f i c u l t t o see

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COLLINS t h e LM through t h e s e x t a n t . The LM would appear t o be
( CONT 'D)
j u s t a t i n y l i t t l e dot of l i g h t which w a s e a s i l y confused

w i t h many other l i t t l e d o t s of l i g h t on t h e o p t i c s . One

t r i c k t h a t you can use i s switch from AUTO t o manual and

slew t h e o p t i c s up and down and l e f t and r i g h t . All t h e

o t h e r l i t t l e d o t s t h a t are a s s o c i a t e d with t h e background

of t h e s u r f a c e w i l l remain f i x e d , and t h e LM w i l l t h e n

move a c r o s s them; and you can p i c k out which l i t t l e dot

i s t h e LM by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e LM has motion r e l a t i v e t o

t h e background.

This technique works f o r another few m i l e s , but I don't

know how long I could have kept t h e LM i n s i g h t . I lost

it p r i o r t o PDI when I switched from P20 t o POO. My pro-

cedures c a l l e d f o r me t o do t h i s , and i n t h e simulator it

worked q u i t e w e l l ; however, i n t h e r e a l world a t t h e

i n s t a n t I c a l l e d POO, I went VERB 37, ENTER 00 ENTER.

That stopped t h e P20 r a t e d r i v e , and d e s p i t e t h e f a c t

t h a t I w a s prepared f o r it and w a s looking through t h e

s e x t a n t , t h e i n s t a n t t h e computer went t o PO0 and t h e r a t e

d r i v e stopped, t h e IM j u s t disappeared fram view. It

h

. __
took o f f f o r p a r t s unknown at a g r e a t r a t e --of
- speed and

disappeared t o t h e 6 o'clock p o s i t i o n i n t h e s e x t a n t and

a t an extremely r a p i d r a t e . It w a s impossible t o bring

it back, and I never s a w t h e LM again throughout t h e

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COLLINS descent or on t h e s u r f a c e or during t h e a s c e n t u n t i l a f t e r
( CONT D ) / *

insertion.
/

9.1.6 Voice conference r e l a y

COLLINS We d i d n ' t u s e t h e r e l a y mode a t a l l , although I had a

l i t t l e s t i c k e r made f o r p a n e l 1 0 which showed t h e p o s i t i o n

of each switch. I t h i n k t h a t ' s probably a good scheme

because i f you want t h e r e l a y mode, you want i t i n a

hurry; and you d o n ' t want t o p u l l a c h e c k l i s t o u t , s o I ' d

recommend t h a t .

9.1.7 CSM backup pad

COLLINS Nothing t o say about t h a t . I , of course, used ~ 7 t6o
inform my computer t h a t t h e LM had made t h e burn.

9.1,8 Monitoring LM phasing

COLLINS We d i d n ' t have a phasing burn.

9.1.9 Sextant marks

COLLINS I ' v e covered t h o s e .

9.1.10 SPS setup

COLLINS For a l l b u r n s , I w a s t o go i n t o P40 o r P41 as a p p r o p r i a t e .

I t h e n went t o t h e p o i n t of t u r n i n g on t h e gimbal motors

and stopped s h o r t , I never t u r n e d on any gimbal motors,

but I d i d f e e l t h a t I could l i g h t t h e motor w i t h i n

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COLLINS probably a matter of a few seconds a f t e r being informed
t CONT D )
t h a t t h e LM had not made t h e burn.

9.1.11 Monitoring and confirming LM DO1

COLLINS A f t e r I went t o POO, I l o s t t h e LM. This was a couple

of minutes before PDI i g n i t i o n . I j u s t went ahead open

loop. I followed my a t t i t u d e t i m e l i n e i n hopes t h a t I

could see t h e LM again. I d i d my pitchdown maneuver t h a t

t h e f l i g h t plan c a l l e d f o r . I d i d t h a t as a VERB 49
maneuver, and it worked f i n e i n t h a t I had a good unob-

s t r u c t e d view of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e , including t h e landing

a r e a and a l l t h a t ; but again I never s a w t h e LM, so f o r

f u t u r e f l i g h t s , I d o n ' t r e a l l y know what t o recommend.

A t t h e beginning of PDI on t h i s f l i g h t , t h e LM w a s

120 miles i n ' f r o n t of t h e command module, and touchdown

w a s l i k e 200 miles behind t h e command module; s o t h e

geometry i s changing extremely r a p i d l y , and t h e r e i s no

automatic program i n t h e computer f o r helping you t r a c k .

You had t o abandon P20 p r i o r t o PDI, and I don't r e a l l y

have any h e l p f u l suggestions. The only t h i n g I can say

i s t o be aware of t h e f a c t t h a t when P20 i s terminated,

t h e LM i s going t o depart v e r y a b r u p t l y from t h e s e x t a n t

f i e l d of view.

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9.1.12 LM tracking

COL INS However, i f you a r e a l l poised and are i n resolvet- medium

S peed and switch from AUTO t o manual a t t h e i n s t a n t t h e

C omputer switches from P20 t o POO, t h e r e i s a f a i n t chance

t h a t you might b e able t o t r a c k t h e LM during PDI manually

and during t h e d e s c e n t . I t r i e d t o do t h i s , not because

t h e r e w a s any r e a l requirement t o do so, but j u s t because

I f e l t t h a t it would be a good i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n f o r an

ab o r t i f I were a b l e t o s e e t h e LM i n t h e s e x t a n t .

9.1.13 Lunar s u r f a c e f l a g

COLLINS A. f t e r t h e LM landed, I set t h e s u r f a c e f l a g -- There

W 'as no evidence ever of any f l a s h of s p e c u l a r l i g h t o r

a.nything l i k e t h a t o f f t h e LM. The LM, a t d i s t a n c e s of

1.OO m i l e s , o r s o , i s j u s t another l i t t l e l i g h t , l i t t l e

1.unar bug t h a t w a s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on t h e background

Su r f a c e . The s u r f a c e i s pockmarked w i t h l i t t l e irregu-

1. a r i t i e s -light spots, dark spots - and w i t h P20

dr i v i n g s o as t o hold that background s u r f a c e r e l a t i v e l y

C onstant and a t t h o s e d i s t a n c e s , you j u s t c a n t t p i c k t h e

LIM o u t .

9.2 LUNAR MODULE

9.2.1 P r e p a r a t i o n f o r DO1

ALDRIN It w a s 40 minutes b e f o r e D O 1 that we were scheduled t o

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ALDRIN begin t h e P52 and we were about 2 minutes behind when
(CONT'D) .
w e completed looking a t t h e r a d a r and VHF ranging and

designated t h e r a d a r down so t h a t w e could do t h e P52.

ARMSTRONG I d o n ' t t h i n k w e had any d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e D O 1 prep.

9.2.2 DPS/DOI burn

ARMSTRONG A t DO1 i g n i t i o n , which w a s our f i r s t DPS maneuver, I could

n o t hear t h e engine i g n i t e . I could not f e e l it i g n i t e ,

and t h e only way t h a t I w a s s u r e t h a t it had i g n i t e d w a s

by looking a t chamber p r e s s u r e and accelerometer. Very

low a c c e l e r a t i o n - -

COLLINS I would t h i n k under zero g , it would throw you a g a i n s t

your s t r a p s , one way o r t h e o t h e r .

ARMSTRONG We're p u l l e d down i n t o t h e f l o o r w i t h t h e r e s t r a i n t , and

t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h a t and t h e 10-percent t h r o t t l e

a c c e l e r a t i o n w a s not d e t e c t a b l e t o m e , However, a t

1 5 seconds, when we went t o 40 p e r c e n t , it d e f i n i t e l y w a s

detectable.

ALDRIN On t h e r e s t r a i n t s , I found t h a t i n s t e a d of being p u l l e d

s t r a i g h t down, t h e g e n e r a l tendency w a s t o be p u l l e d f o r -

ward and outboard. So much so t h a t t h i s might have been

a s u i t problem, as m y r i g h t f o o t around t h e i n s t e p w a s

t a k i n g a good b i t of t h i s l o a d , being p u l l e d down t o t h e

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ALDRIN floor. It d i d f e e l as though t h e s u i t w a s a l i t t l e t i g h t .
( CONT'D)
P r i o r t o power d e s c e n t , t h e problem w a s obscured from m y

mind, b u t it w a s aggravated somewhat by t h e r e s t r a i n t

p u l l i n g down and forward.

ARMSTRONG I guess I n o t i c e that last - I had expected a good 6 f

of l a t e r a l s h i f t i n g due t o r e p o r t s of previous f l i g h t s .

ALDRIN I w a s a b l e t o l e a n over and make e n t r i e s on t h e d a t a card

without p u l l i n g it down; b u t as you can s e e , when you do

make e n t r i e s on them, you make them sideways.

ARMSTRONG The cut-off w a s a guided c u t - o f f . What about t h e r e -

s id u a l s ?

ALDRIN We burned both X and Z , and I ' m sure t h e y weren't i n

excess of .4.

ARMSTRONG It w a s l e s s t h a n 1 f t / s e c , b u t I d o n r t recall t h e t e n t h s .

9.2.6 Trimming r e s i d u a l s

ARMSTRONG I t ' s probably worth noting t h a t t h e f l i g h t p l a n a t t h i s

p o i n t does not adequately r e f l e c t the time requirements

of t h e f l i g h t . 1 t h i n k t h e DO1 r u l e i n t h e f l i g h t plan

says, "Trim V
X residuals ."
ALDRIN So does your c h e c k l i s t .

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ARMSTRONG That i s n ' t r i g h t . This w a s a r e s u l t of t h a t o r b i t a l

change t h a t w a s put i n l a t e , and paperwork and s o on

j u s t c o u l d n ' t keep up w i t h t h o s e last-minute changes.

But, a g a i n , it shows t h a t last-minute changes are always

dangerous. You could f o l l o w t h e f l i g h t p l a n h e r e and

p o s s i b l y f o u l up t h e procedure. Do you r e c a l l t h e VERB 8 2

values? 9.5 w a s perilune, I think.

ALDRIN Preburn f o r NOUN 42 was 57.2 and 8.5. We had 57.2 and

9 . 1 a f t e r t h e maneuver.

ARMSTRONG I guess w e c a n ' t account f o r t h a t .

ALDRIN No. The NOUN 86 t h a t w e g o t out of t h e t h r u s t program

a l s o d i f f e r e d from what t h e ground gave u s i n t h e pad,

p r i m a r i l y , i n t h e Z-component t h a t ' s loaded i n t o t h e AGS;

t h a t pad v a l u e i s 9.0, and t h e computer came up w i t h 9.5.

The c o o r d i n a t e frame t h a t you l o a d them i n i s f r o z e n

i n e r t i a l l y , and i f t h e r e are any d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e

f r e e z i n g of t h i s , you w i l l g e t a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t burn

d i r e c t i o n r e q u i r e d o u t of t h e two guidance systems. I

t h i n k t h a t e x p l a i n s t h e l a r g e r AGS r e s i d u a l i n t h e

Z-direction of minus 0.7. I t h i n k w e would have t o have

t h e guidance people v e r i f y t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n NOUN 86

produced t h a t e r r o r i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n .

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9.2.9 Radar t r a c k i n g

ARMSTRONG We had a good manual r a d a r a c q u i s i t i o n , and d a t a from

t h e radar agreed w e l l w i t h t h e VHF ranging information.

ALDRIN Again, we had P20 i n t h e background, but we d i d n ' t u s e i t .

'This was a manual lockon.

ARMSTRONG The r a d a r w a s depowered t o cool during t h e D O 1 t o PDI

phase.

9.2.16 Adequacy of procedures necessary t o accomplish DPS maneuver

ARMSTRONG The platform d r i f t check, a P52, w a s done a g a i n s t t h e Sun.

This procedure seemed t o v o r k as we had planned; however,

t h e v a r i a t i o n i n t h e d a t a w a s somewhat l a r g e r t h a t I

would've guessed. Do you have t h o s e numbers?

ALDRIN Yes. The technique t h a t we used was t o compare what t h e

computer thought t h e l i t t l e gimbal or t h e i n n e r angle

w a s and t o p o i n t t h e rear d e t e n t a t t h e Sun. We'd compare

t h a t w i t h what t h e a c t u a l rnicldle gimbal was. Now we d i d

t h i s i n PGNS p u l s e .

The way t h a t we found t o work out b e s t w a s f o r N e i l t o

t e l l me when, i n t h e background, we'd have t h e AUTO

maneuver d i s p l a y 50 18 i n ~ 5 2 . We'd c a l l up on t o p of

t h a t VERB 6 NOUN 20 or 22. And I ' d have NOUN 20 up. As

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ALDRIN soon as N e i l would say "MARK", I ' d h i t ENTER, record
(CONT'D)
NOUN 20. Now t h e d e s i r e i s t o f i n d out e x a c t l y what t h e

computed v a l u e i s i n a c l o s e t i m e p e r i o d . So what I would

do i s h i t t h e ENTER on t h e NOUN 20, v i s u a l l y r e c a l l what

t h o s e numbers were, not w r i t e them down, b u t h i t K E Y

RELEASE, which put m e back t o t h e 50 18 d i s p l a y . A

PROCEED would recompute t h e numbers o r maneuver. A s soon

as I would do t h a t , t h o s e numbers would be f r o z e n and t h e

d e s i r e d gimbal a n g l e s would b e loaded i n NOUN 22. Then

it w a s j u s t a q u e s t i o n of my c a l l i n g than up, and t h e y

should not change t h e time I h i t ENTER t o r e c o r d t h e gim-

b a l angle t h a t we had u n t i l it w a s recomputed as a d e s i r e d

one t h a t d i d not exceed 3 seconds, O f course, we had

p r e t t y low r a t e s . So I t h i n k t h a t t h e comparison d i d n ' t

s u f f e r any from a l a c k of proper procedure, W e did find

t h a t t h e numbers were a l i t t l e l a r g e r t h a n we thought t h e y

would be. We had it worked out w i t h t h e ground how w e

arranged t h e s i g n s on t h e d i f f e r e n c e s , so we'd s u b t r a c t

NOUN 22 from NOUN 20. The f i r s t one w a s 0.19; second

one, 0.16; and t h e t h i r d one, 0.11. The GO/NO-GO value

w a s 0.25. So we're a l i t t l e c l o s e r t o t h i s t h a n we had

hoped t o b e ,

ARMSTRONG The simulator i s a b l e t o reproduce c o r r e c t l y t h e c o n t r o l

modes t h a t a r e r e q u i r e d t o f l y it. I t ' s an unusual

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ARMSTRONG c o n t r o l mode wherein you f l y t o i n p i t c h and f l y from i n
( CONT'D)
yaw. While f l y i n g AOT, you depend on t h e o t h e r crewmember

t o a s s u r e you t h a t t h e roll gimbal a n g l e i s s t a y i n g a t a

reasonable v a l u e . The simulator was never a b l e t o simu-

l a t e a c c u r a t e l y what you would see through t h e Sun. We

e s p e c i a l l y s e t up t h e AOT on t h e G&C roof (MSC) t o look

a t t h e a c t u a l view. I n a d d i t i o n , on t h e way t o t h e Moon,

w e looked a t t h e Sun with t h e t e l e s c o p e ; looked through

t h e CSM t e l e s c o p e w i t h t h e Sun f i l t e r on t o g e t used t o

what t h e f i l t e r e d view of t h e Sun would look l i k e i n t h e

optics. I t ' s somewhat d i f f e r e n t i n t h e t e l e s c o p e t h a n i n

t h e AOT i n c o l o r and g e n e r a l appearance. I c a n ' t account

f o r t h a t , b u t it i s d i f f e r e n t .

I thought t h e numbers ought t o be both c l o s e r t o zero if

w e d i d n t t have any platform d r i f t , o r c l o s e r t o g e t h e r i n

either case. But we had q u i t e a spread, s o I'm not s u r e

t h a t t h e check i n g e n e r a l i s r e a l l y as good y e t as it

should be. I n o t h e r words, our v a r i a t i o n was 0.08 degree

between our various measurements. The limit on t h e GO/NO-

GO i s 0 . 2 5 . So, we were e s s e n t i a l l y using up a t h i r d of

our margin j u s t i n v a r i a t i o n between our marks. That's

not r e a l l y a good enough procedure f o r this important

check of t h e platform. This procedure, being a GO/NO-GO

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9-12
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AFMSTRONG f o r t h e PDI needs a d d i t i o n a l work p r i o r t o t h e next
( CONT'D)
flight.

There a r e some a l t e r n a t i v e methods of understanding p l a t -

form d r i f t , which w e j u s t d i d not have time t o implement.

Perhais t h e next f l i g h t s w i l l be a b l e t o look a t sane of

t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s and decide on an even b e t t e r method

t h a n t h e Sun check.

ALDRIN We turned t h e p r o p e l l a n t q u a n t i t y on before D O 1 and I

b e l i e v e t h e q u a n t i t y l i g h t came on a t t h a t p o i n t , which

w a s expected as a p o s s i b i l i t y . J u s t r e c y c l i n g t h e switch

o f f and back on a g a i n would e x t i n g u i s h t h e l i g h t . The

values t h a t we s a w i n f u e l were about 94 and 95, which i s

what we g e n e r a l l y saw i n t h e simulator. The o x i d i z e r

v a l u e w a s somewhat lower t h a n t h a t . The simulator v a l u e s

were 95 and 95. I don't believe t h a t there was sufficient

time during D O 1 f o r t h e s e t o s e t t l e down completely.

They d i d approach t h e m a x i m u m numbers w i t h a reading of

approximately 94. Anyway, t h e y weren't dancing around

t h e way we might have been l e d t o expect them t o do.

ARMSTRONG The pre-PDI a t t i t u d e prevented good S-band high g a i n

contact, We had c o n t i n u a l communications d i f f i c u l t y i n

t h i s a r e a u n t i l we f i n a l l y yawed t h e s p a c e c r a f t r i g h t

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 CONFIDENTIAL 9-13

ARMSTRONG between 1 0 and 1 5 degrees t o g i v e t h e high g a i n antenna

( CONT ' D )
more margin. This seemed t o enable a s a t i s f a c t o r y high-

b i t - r a t e c o n d i t i o n , b u t it d i d degrade our a b i l i t y t o

observe t h e s u r f a c e through t h e LPD and make downrange

and crossrange p o s i t i o n checks. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t our

a l t i t u d e checks were s i g n i f i c a n t l y degraded.

ALDRIN I c a n ' t e x p l a i n why we had some dropouts t h e r e . The

a n g l e s , 220 i n p i t c h and yaw 30, are not ones t h a t would

lead you t o b e l i e v e t h e y would g i v e you t r o u b l e as f a r

as i n t e r f e r e n c e s from t h e LM s t r u c t u r e . It seemea t o me

t h a t t h e i n i t i a l lockon was not bad. There i s a c e r t a i n

r a i n dance you had t o go through each t i m e you'd come

around t o a c q u i r e lockon. Each time you'd have LGS, we'd

u s u a l l y be on t h e ONKI's. O f course, t h e r e ' s a choice

of forward o r a f t , Then you'd want t o switch t o SLEW and

slew i n t h e proper v a l u e s f o r t h e s t e e r a b l e , Before LGS

on t h e o t h e r s i d e , t h e ground would l i k e you t o not break

l o c k i n t h e slew mode, because i n some c a s e s t h e antenna

would t h e n d r i v e i n t o t h e s t o p s . So, approaching LOS,

you'd switch t o maybe t h e a f t GMNI and t h e = you'd slew i n

some new numbers.

We'd make u s e of p i t c h 90 and yaw zero, t o keep t h e

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9-14
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ALDRIN antenna away from t h e s t o p s , Once you d r i v e it t o t h o s e
( CONT D )
v a l u e s , t h e n you'd have t o s e t i n new numbers.

Coming around on t h e o t h e r s i d e , you'd maybe switch from

a f t t o forward t o p i c k up t h e ground. Once you picked

thenr xp, you'd s w i t c h over t o SLEW and you might have t h e

r i g h t v a l u e s down t h e r e o r you might have t o tweak them

up. I n any event$ t h e i n i t i a l c o n t a c t would b e made on

one antenna; and t h e n , a f t e r you e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t , you'd

have t o t a k e t h e chance of breaking it t o switch over t o

t h e high g a i n . Occasionally, we got t h e jump on them a

l i t t l e b i t because t h e ground w a s t a l k i n g t o t h e command

module, We s a w t h a t we had s i g n a l strength s o I t d go

ahead and t r y t o l o c k on t h e S-band. It i s a r a t h e r

involved process t h a t you have t o go through, I didn't

f i n d t h a t , i f you l e f t t h e antenna without an a u t o lockon

s i g n a l , it would have a tendency t o d r i v e t o t h e s t o p s .

A t l e a s t from t h e i n d i c a t i o n s , it d i d n ' t seem t o be moving

so r a p i d l y t h a t you c o u l d n ' t , w i t h i n s e v e r a l seconds i f

you knew what you were doing, s t o p it from where it w a s

going and prevent it f r m h i t t i n g t h e s t o p s .

We had two methods of computing a l t i t u d e : one based on

r e l a t i v e motion from the CSM and t h e o t h e r based on

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 CONFIDENTIAL 9-15

ALDRIN angular r a t e t r a c k of o b j e c t s observed on t h e ground.

(CONT'D)
We superimposed t h e two of them on one graph and r e a r -

ranged t h e graph a l i t t l e b i t w i t h some r a t h e r last-minute

d a t a s h u f f l i n g t o g i v e us something t h a t t h e two of u s

could work on a t t h e same time and t o g i v e i n d i c a t i o n of

what t h e a l t i t u d e and i t s time h i s t o r y appeared t o be.

With t h e ccanmunications d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t w e were expe-

r i e n c i n g i n t r y i n g t o v e r i f y t h a t we had a good lockon

a t t h i s poinf,, I had t h e opportunity t o g e t only about

two or t h r e e range-rate marks. They appeared t o g i v e us

a p e r i l u n e a l t i t u d e of v e r y c l o s e t o 50 000 f e e t , as f a r

as I could i n t e r p o l a t e them on t h e c h a r t .

Those measurements g i v e you a l t i t u d e below t h e command

module, e s s e n t i a l l y . And, of course, t h e r e a r e some mod-

i f i c a t i o n s of t h e command module o r b i t , from t h e nominal

p r e f l i g h t o r b i t t h a t you expect. The numbers e i t h e r have

t o be updated o r you have t o accept t h e e r r o r .

ARMSTRONG The measurements a g a i n s t t h e ground course w e r e i n d i c a t i v e

of a l t i t u d e d i r e c t l y above t h e ground.

ALDRIN The main purpose of t h e r a d a r h e r e was t o confirm t b t

we were i n t h e same b a l l p a r k , t h e same kind of a n o r b i t ,

And I t h i n k once you accomplish t h i s s e v e r a l times, t h e n

--- - ___ _. - - __ f -

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9-16
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ALDRIN i t ' s adequate t o go on w i t h t h e t r u e r a l t i t u d e measuring
( CONT'D)
d e v i c e , which i s from t h e ground.

ARMSTRONG The ground measurements were. v e r y c o n s i s t e n t . If t h e y

made a h o r i z o n t a l l i n e , it would i n d i c a t e t h a t you were

going t o h i t a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i l u n e , i n t h i s c a s e ,
-.------
50 000 f e e t ( i n t h e middle of t h e c h a r t ) . They d i d n ' t

say t h a t . They w e r e v e r y c o n s i s t e n t , b u t t h e y came down

a s l o p e , which s a i d f i n a l l y t h a t our p e r i l u n e w a s going

t o b e 51 000 f e e t . It s t e a d i e d out a t about 54 000 f e e t

h e r e a t t h e bottom and our l a s t p o i n t w a s 51 000 f e e t .

This i n d i c a t e d t h a t e i t h e r t h e ground w a s sloping; and,

i n . f a c t , it w a s about 1 0 000 f e e t lower t h a n t h e landing

s i t e where w e s t a r t e d (which i s not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e

A-1 measurement t h a t we made), o r t h a t t h e l i n e of a p s i d e s

was shifted a l i t t l e b i t . So a c t u a l l y p e r i l u n e w a s

coming a l i t t l e b i t b e f o r e PDI.

So w e w e r e a c t u a l l y reaching p e r i l u n e a l i t t l e b i t b e f o r e

PDI, which would t e n d t o s l o p e t h e curve t h a t way. This

was a l l v e r y encouraging t h a t w e were, i n f a c t , going t o

h i t t h e guidance box s o f a r as a l t i t u d e w a s concerned

from both measurements ( t h e r a d a r measurements and t h e

ground measurements), But I w a s q u i t e encouraged t h a t

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 9-17
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ARMSTRONG t h e s e measurements, made w i t h t h e stopwatch, were con-
( CONT D )
sistent, i n fact.

ALDRIN When y o u ' r e a b l e t o smooth t h e numbers and p l o t a reason-

a b l e number of them, your accuracy i n c r e a s e s considerably.

I t h i n k t h e p r e f l i g h t estimates were something on t h e

order of a 6000-foot c a p a b i l i t y , and I t h i n k we demon-

s t r a t e d a much b e t t e r c a p a b i l i t y t h a n t h a t .

9.2.17 PDI burn .

v
ARMSTRONG Our downrange p o s i t i o n appeared t o be good a t t h e minus

3 and minus 1 minute p o i n t . E d i d not a c c u r a t e l y c a t c h

t h e i g n i t i o n p o i n t because I w a s watching t h e engine

performance. But it appeared t o be r e a s o n a b l e , c e r t a i n l y

i n the r i g h t ballpark, Our crossrange p o s i t i o n was d i f -

f i c u l t t o t e l l a c c u r a t e l y because of t h e skewed yaw

a t t i t u d e t h a t we were obliged t o maintain f o r COMM. How-

e v e r , t h e downrange p o s i t i o n marks a f t e r i g n i t i o n i n d i -
' .
c a t e d t h a t we were long, Each one t h a t w a s made i n d i c a t e d

t h a t we were 2 o r 3 seconds long i n range. The f a c t t h a t

t h r o t t l e down e s s e n t i a l l y came on time, r a t h e r t h a n being

delayed, i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e computer w a s a l i t t l e b i t

confused a t w h a t our dowrsange p o s i t i o n w a s , Had it known

where it w a s , it would have t h r o t t l e d down l a t e r , based

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9-18
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ARMSTRONG on engine performance, so t h a t we would s t i l l h i t t h e
( CONT D )
r i g h t place. Then, it would be l a t e t h r o t t l i n g down s o

t h a t it would brake toward a higher t h r o t t l e l e v e l p r i o r

t o the pitchover.

9.2.24 F i n a l approach and landing

ARMSTRONG Landmark v i s i b i l i t y w a s v e r y good. We had no d i f f i c u l t y

determining our p o s i t i o n throughout a l l t h e face-down

phase of power d e s c e n t . C o r r e l a t i n g w i t h known p o s i t i o n s ,

based on t h e Apollo 1 0 p i c t u r e s , w a s very easy and v e r y

useful. ,

ALDRIN A s I r e c a l l , t h e r e w a s a c e r t a i n amount of manual t r a c k i n g

-,
being done a t t h i s t i m e w i t h t h e S-band antenna. During

t h e i n i t i a l p a r t s of power d e s c e n t , t h e AUTO t r a c k d i d

not appear t o m a i n t a i n t h e h i g h e s t s i g n a l s t r e n g t h . It

dropped down t o around 3.7 and t h e ground wanted reacqui-

s i t i o n s o I tweaked it up manually.

I g o t t h e impression t h a t it w a s not completely impossible

t o conduct a manual t r a c k throughout powered d e s c e n t ,

You'd not be a b l e t o do v e r y much e l s e b e s i d e s t h a t . I

t h i n k it would be p o s s i b l e t o do, i f you had sets of

predetermined v a l u e s t h a t you could s e t i n .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 9-19

ALDRIN We d i d have S-band p i t c h and yaw angles immedlately

(CONT'D)
following t h e yaw maneuver, and t h o s e t h a t were acq.ui.red

a t about 3000 f e e t . After t h e yaw, t h e S-band appeared

t o have a l i t t l e b i t b e t t e r communications. It w a s J u s t

about a t t h e yaw-around maneuver ( t r a j e c t o r y monitoring

from t h e DSKY up t o t h a t point agreed very c l o s e l y espe-

c i a l l y i n H-dot and VI w i t h t h e values we had on t h e

charts). It w a s almost immediately a f t e r yaw around

t h a t t h e a l t i t u d e l i g h t went o u t , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t we

had our landing radar a c q u i s i t i o n and lockon.

ARMSTRONG The d e l t a a l t i t u d e w a s - 2600 or 2700, I b e l i e v e , i s t h e

number t h a t I remember. I t h i n k it w a s plus 2600 or

2700. The yaw around was slow. We-- had

..-
inadvertently I

l e f t t h e r a t e switch i n 5 r a t h e r t h a n 25, and I w a s yawing

.-.
-. L_ w _i

a t only a couple of degrees per second as opposed t o t h e

5 t o 7 t h a t we had planned. The computer would not hold

t h i s r a t e of say, 1 t o 2 deg/sec. It w a s jumping up t o

3 degrees and back, a c t u a l l y changing t h e s i g n and
stopping t h e roll r a t e . It w a s t h e n t h a t I c l e a r l y

r e a l i z e d t h a t we weren't r o l l i n g as f a s t as was necessary

-
and I noted t h a t we were on t h e wrong s c a l e switch.
- So

I went t o 25 and put i n a ?-deg/sec command and it went

r i g h t around. However, t h i s delayed it smewhat and

CONFIDENTIAL

, I ... .. ... -. . - ^.. . ._.._ - " ... -. . I -- . .. . , . , . -. .I_ . -. . . -. _. . .

9-20
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ARMSTRONG consequently we were i n a s l i g h t l y lower a l t i t u d e a t
( CONT'D)

<
t h e completion of t h e yaw around t h a n we had expected t o

be s o we were probably down t o about 39,000 or

40,000 f e e t a t t h e time when we had r a d a r lockup, as

opposed t o about 41,500 t h a t we expected t o be.

?
ALDRIN There a r e no discrepancies noted i n any of t h e systems

t h a t were checked throughout t h e f i r s t 4 minutes. The

RCS was s u p r i s i n g l y h i g h i n i t s q u a n t i t y i n d i c a t i o n s .

The s u p e r c r i t i c a l d i d tend t o r i s e a l i t t l e b i t a f t e r

i g n i t i o n and t h e n it s t a r t e d back down again. I don't

r e c a l l t h e maximum value t h a t it reached. I guess t h e

f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t we had of anything going wron$_was

/-
I
probably around 5 minutes, when we f i r s t s t a r t e d g e t t i n g
/
__5
__ -/------

program alarm a c t i v i t i e s .
t
-. I

ARMSTRONG We probably ought t o s a e w e d i d have one program I

----
alarm prior t = t h i s ; .
sometime p r i o r t o i g n i t i o n , t h a t

had t h e r a d a r i n t h e wrong s p o t . I n any c a s e , as I I

remember, we had a 500 s e r i e s alarm t h a t s a i d that t h e I

r a d a r w a s out of p o s i t i o n , which I don't have any way of

accounting f o r .

positions.
C e r t a i n l y t h e switches were i n t h e r i g h t

They hadn't been changed s i n c e prelaunch.

.
But we d i d , i n f a c t , go t o t h e descent p o s i t i o n on t h e

antenna and leave it t h e r e f o r a half a minute o r s o ,

CONFIDENTlAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 9-21

ARMSTRONG and t h e n go back t o AUTO and t h a t c l e a r e d t h e alarm.

( CONT'D) .--- .--.._.- ..-
After 5 minutes i n t o d e s c e n t , we s t a r t e d g e t t i n g t h i s
series of program alarms; g e n e r a l l y of t h e series-thaL,
-------.-----+-- ---- -
i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e computer w a s being overloaded. Nor-
- - --
-..- _c___-
m a l l y , i n t h i s time p e r i o d , t h a t i s , from P64 onward, w e ' d

be e v a l u a t i n g t h e landing s i t e and checking our p o s i t i o n

and s t a r t i n g LPD a c t i v i t y . However, t h e concern h e r e w a s -

not with t h e landing area w e w e r e going i n t o , but r a t h e r
_- -- - --- - _ _ __
whether we could continue a t a l l . Consequently, our
- . - - __
a t t e n t i o n was d i r e c t e d toward c l e a r i n g t h e program alarms,

keeping t h e machine f l y i n g , and a s s u r i n g o u r s e l v e s t h a t

c o n t r o l w a s adequate t o continue without r e q u i r i n g an

--.--- --
abort. Most of t h e a t t e n t i o n was d i r e c t e d i n s i d e t h e
T---

cockpit during t h i s time p e r i o d and i n my view t h i s would

account f o r our i n a b i l i t y t o study t h e landing site and

f i n a l landing l o c a t i o n during f i n a l d e s c e n t . It wasn't

-
u n t i l we g o t below 2000 f e e t t h a t w e were a c t u a l l y a b l e
\--. -- --__ ---------__- __-_c--

t o look out and view t h e landing area.

7- -- .----.//--

ALDRIN Let m e s a y something h e r e t h a t answers t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t

w e had b e f o r e about t h e AGS r e s i d u a l s on D O I . They were

0 . 1 b e f o r e n u l l i n g and we n u l l e d t h a n t o zero. X was

f--'-~

minus 0.1, Y minus 0.4, Z minus 0.1, and we Fu1led)X and

Z t o zero. Looking a t t h e t r a n s c r i p t s , we

CONFIDENTIAL
9-22
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ALDRIN c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s of l o c k approaching PDI. And we d i d
(CONT 'D )
have t o r e a c q u i r e manually s e v e r a l times. It looked l i k e

w e had some o s c i l l a t i o n s i n t h e yaw a n g l e on t h e antenna.

The alarm t h a t we had w a s 500 and w e went t o d e s c e n t 1

and proceeded i n t h e c m p u t e r and t h e n went back t o AUTO

a g a i n on t h e landing r a d a r switch. This w a s p r i o r t o

i g n i t i o n and t h e ground recommended t h a t we y a w r i g h t

1 0 degrees.

SPEAKER You had t h e rendezvous r a d a r on?

ALDRIN The rendezvous r a d a r w a s on, not through the computer,

b u t through i t s own AUTO t r a c k .

ARMSTRONG We d i d not have t h e r a d a r d a t a feeding t o t h e computer

i n t h e LGC p o s i t i o n ; b u t , a p p a r e n t l y , i f you have it i n

AUTO t r a c k , t h e r e ' s some requirement on t h e computer time.

T h i s i s t h e way we've been doing it i n a l l s i m u l a t i o n s .

It w a s agreed on. We were i n SLEW. Prior t o t h i s t i m e ,

we'd been i n AUTO t r a c k u n t i l such time as we s t a r t e d t o

l o s e lock i n t h e pitchover. Then we went t o SLEW, i s n ' t

t h a t r i g h t ?,

ALDRIN Are you t a l k i n g about t h e program alarms during t h e

des cent ? W e 've passed t h e p o i n t of having t h e rendezvous

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 9-23
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ALDRIN L a d a r i n AUTO. We'd switched it over t o SLEW a t t h a t
(CONT'D)
point.

ARMSTRONG We were i n SLEW w i t h t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s i n . Radar w a s

t u r n e d on, but it w a s i n SLEW. I n t h e e a r l y phases of

~64,
I d i d f i n d time t o go out of AUTO-control and check

t h e manual c o n t r o l i n both p i t c h and yaw and found i t s

response t o be s a t i s f a c t o r y . I zeroed t h e e r r o r needles

and went back i n t o AUTO. I continued t h e descent i n AUTO.

A t t h a t p o i n t , we proceeded on t h e f l a s h i n g 64 and obtained

t h e LPD a v a i l a b i l i t y , b u t w e d i d not u s e it because we

r e a l l y weren't looking o u t s i d e t h e cockpit during t h i s

phase. A s w e approached t h e l5OO-foot p o i n t , t h e program--

----

alarm seemed t o be s e t t l i n g down and w e committed o u r s e l-

ves
-- ---_-
-
t o continue. We could s e e t h e landing area and t h e p o i n t

a t which t h e LPD w a s p o i n t i n g , which w a s i n d i c a t i n g we

were landing j u s t s h o r t of a l a r g e rocky c r a t e r surrounded

- - 1__--

w i t h t h e l a r g e boulder f i e l d w i t h v e r y l a r g e rocks cover-

* __- --
i n g a high percentage of t h e surface. I i n i t i d l y felt
* ---c

t h a t t h a t might be a good landing area i f w e could s t o p

s h o r t of t h a t c r a t e r , because it would have more s c i e n t i f i c

o-, -
v a l u e t o be c l o s e t o a l a r g e c r a t e r . Continuing t o monitor
--
LPD, it became obvious t h a t I could not s t o p s h o r t

enough t o f i n d a safe landing a r e a .

CONFIDENTIAL
9-24
CONFIDENTIAL
9.2.25 Manual c o n t r o l / p i t c h o v e r

ARMSTRONG We t h e n went i n t o MANUAL and p i t c h e d t h e v e h i c l e over

t o approximately zero p i t c h and cohtinued. I was i n the

20- t o 30-ft/sec h o r i z o n t a l - v e l o c i t y r e g i o n when c r o s s i n g

t h e t o p of t h e c r a t e r and t h e boulder f i e l d . I then

proceeded t o look f o r a s a t i s f a c t o r y landing area and t h e

one chosen w a s a r e l a t i v e l y smooth area between some s i z e -

-
-----_ /
/

a t e r s and a ray-type boulder f i e l d . I first noticed

t h a t we were, i n f a c t , d i s t u r b i n g t h e d u s t on t h e s u r f a c e

-
when w e were a t something l e s s t h a n 100 f e e t ; we were

beginning t o g e t a t r a n s p a r e n t s h e e t of moving d u s t t h a t

obscured v i s i b i l i t y a l i t t l e b i t . A s we g o t lower, t h e

v i s i b i l i t y continued t o decrease. I don't think t h a t

t h e a l t i t u d e d e t e r m i n a t i o n w a s s e v e r e l y h u r t by t h i s

blowing d u s t , b u t t h e t h i n g t h a t w a s confusing t o m e w a s

t h a t it w a s hard t o p i c k out what your l a t e r a l and down-

____I_--

w
-e v e l o c i t i e s were, because you were s e e i n g a l o t of
- - - - ,
moving d u s t t h a t you had t o look through t o p i c k up t h e

s t a t i o n a r y rocks and base your t r a n s l a t i o n a l v e l o c i t y

d e c i s i o n s on t h a t .
I found that t o b e q u i t e d i f f i c u l t .
r - i - -----2_

I spent more time t r y i n g t o a r r e s t t r a n s l a t i o n a l veloc-

--
7
I
' /

i t i e s t h a n I thought would be n e c e s s a r y . , A s w e g o t
\

below 30 f e e t o r s o , I had s e l e c t e d t h e f i n a l touchdown

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 9-25

ARMSTRONG
(CONT'D)
-
area. For same r e a s o n t h a t 1 am n o t sure o f , w e
-
s t a r t e d t o p i c k up l e f t t r a n s l a t i o n a l v e l o c i t y and a back-
-
ward v e l o c i t y . That's t h e t h i n g t h a t I c e r t a i n l y d i d n ' t
--_- - __
t

want t o do, because you d o n ' t l i k e t o be going backwaxds,

c - __- -
unable t o see where y o u ' r e going. So I a r r e s t e d t h e
- / - z
backward r a t e w i t h same p o s s i b l y s p a s t i c c o n t r o l motions,
__
b u t I w a s unable t o s t o p t h e l e f t t r a n s l a t i o n a l r a t e . As

w e approached t h e ground, I s t i l l had a l e f t t r a n s l a t i o n a l

r a t e which made me r e l u c t a n t t o s h u t t h e engine o f f w h i l e

I s t i l l had t h a t r a t e . I w a s a l s o r e l u c t a n t t o slow down

my descent r a t e anymore t h a n it w a s o r s t o p because w e

were c l o s e t o running o u t of f u e l ,
-
We were h i t t i n g our
-
%.

abort l i m i t .

9.2.28 Touchdown

ARMSTRONG We continued t o touchdown w i t h a s l i g h t l e f t t r a n s l a t i o n .

I c o u l d n ' t p r e c i s e l y determine touchdown. Buzz c a l l e d

l u n a r c o n t a c t , but I never s a w t h e l u n a r c o n t a c t l i g h t s .
-8

ALDRIN I c a l l e d contact l i g h t .
---

ARMSTRONG I ' m s u r e you d i d , but I d i d n ' t h e w i t , nor d i d I see

it. I heard you say something about c o n t a c t , and I was --A-

--..
I

T 'Ac
s p r i n g loaded t o t h e s t o p engine p o s i t i o n , b u t I r e a l l y

d o n ' t know whether we had a c t u a l l y touched p r i o r t o

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9-26
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ARMSTRONG c o n t a c t or whether t h e engine o f f s i g n a l w a s b e f o r e
( CONT 'D ) -..--- - _ _ _ - - _---.-.--- I__-

contact. I n any c a s e , t h e engine shutdown w a s not v e r y

-;--_______
high above t h e s u r f a c e . The touchdown i t s e l f w a s rela-

t i v e l y smooth;

-
t h a t I could f e e l .
*.-___.
on t h e ground and landed.
It j u s t s e t t l e d down l i k e a h e l i c o p t e r

ALDRIN We had a l i t t l e r i g h t d r i f t , and t h e n , I guess j u s t b e f o r e

touchdown, we d r i f t e d l e f t .

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k I w a s probably o v e r c o n t r o l l i n g a l i t t l e b i t i n

lateral.
.
I w a s confused somewhat i n t h a t I couldn't
---------- _c_

7- rv i n
-__-
e w h a t 3 l a t e r a l v e l o c i t i e s were due t o
--- ---I__

I could see rocks

and c r a t e r s through t h i s blowing d u s t , It was m y i n t e n -

t i o n t o t r y and p i c k up a landing s p o t p r i o r t o t h e

100-foot mark and t h e n p i c k out an area j u s t beyond it

such t h a t I could keep my eyes on t h a t a l l t h e way down

through t h e descent and f i n a l touchdown. I wouldn't, i n

f a c t , be looking a t the p l a c e I w a s going t o land; I

would b e looking a t a p l a c e j u s t i n f r o n t of i t . That

worked p r e t t y w e l l , b<I was s u r p r i s e d that 1 had as

--\

. -- much trgu-hle I d i d in_detemininp; t r a n s l a t i o n a l vel=-

T- &s

ities. I d o n ' t t h i n k I d i d a v e r y good j o b of f s n g t h e

I
- L__ ---___-/-- -
)---

' CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 9-27

ARM STRONG v e h i c l e smoothly i n t h a t t i m e p e r i o d .

_---- /- - -_ I f e l t t h a t I was
(CONT'D) _------.-- -- -- - -
a l i t t l e bit erratic.

ALDRIN I w a s feeding d a t a t o him a l l t h e time. I d o n ' t know

what he w a s doing w i t h i t , b u t t h a t w a s r a w computer d a t a .

ARMSTRONG The computer d a t a seemed t o b e p r e t t y good information,

and I would say t h a t my v i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n of both a l t i t u d e

and a l t i t u d e r a t e w a s not as good as I thought it w a s

going t o b e . - -__-
I n o t h e r words, I w a s a l i t t l e more depend-
/--

e n t on t h e information. I t h i n k I probably could have

_- ___ -

made a s a t i s f a c t o r y determination of a l t i t u d e and a l t i t u d e

r a t e by eye a l o n e , b u t it wasn't as good as I thought it

-
was going t o b e , and I t h i n k t h a t i t ' s not n e a r l y s o good
--

a m

ALDRIN I g o t t h e impression by j u s t glimpsing out t h a t we were

a t t h e a l t i t u d e of seeing t h e shadow. Shortly a f t e r triat,

t h e horizon tended t o b e obscured by a t a n haze. This

may have been j u s t an impression of looking down a t a

b5-degree angle. The d e p t h of t h e material being kicked

up seemed t o be f a i r l y shallow. I n o t h e r words, it was

scooting along t h e s u r f a c e , b u t s i n c e p a r t i c l e s were being

picked up and moved along t h e s u r f a c e , you could s e e l i t t l e

rocks or l i t t l e protuberances caning through t h i s , SO YOU

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9-28
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ALDRIN knew t h a t it w a s s o l i d t h e r e . It wasn't obscured t o
(CONT'D)
t h a t p o i n t , but it d i d tend t o mask out your a b i l i t y t o

d e t e c t motion because t h e r e w a s s o much motion of t h i n g s

moving o u t . There were t h e s e f e w l i t t l e i s l a n d s t h a t

were s t a t i o n a r y . If you could s o r t t h a t out and f i x on

t h o s e , t h e n you could t e n d t o g e t t h e impression of being

stationary. But it w a s q u i t e d i f f i c u l t t o do.

ARMSTRONG It w a s a l i t t l e b i t l i k e landing an a i r p l a n e when t h e r e ' s

a r e a l t h i n l a y e r of ground f o g , and you can see t h i n g s

through t h e f o g . However, a l l t h i s fog w a s moving a t a

g r e a t rate which w a s a l i t t l e b i t confusing.

ALDRIN I would t h i n k t h a t it would be n a t u r a l looking out t h e

l e f t window and seeing t h i s moving t h i s way t h a t you

would g e t t h e impression of moving t o t h e r i g h t , and you

c o u n t e r a c t by going t o t h e l e f t , which i s how we touched

down.

ARMSTRONG Since w e were moving l e f t , w e were yawed s l i g h t l y t o t h e

l e f t s o 1 could g e t a good view of where we w e r e going.

I t h i n k w e were yawed 13 degrees l e f t ; and, consequently,

t h e shadow was not v i s i b l e t o m e as it w a s behind t h e

p a n e l , b u t Buzz could see it. Then I saw it i n t h e f i n a l

phases of d e s c e n t . I saw t h e shadow came i n t o view, and

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 CONFIDENTIAL 9-29

ARMSTRONG it w a s a very good s i l h o u e t t e of t h e LM a t t h e time I

(CONT'D)
saw it. It w a s probably a couple of hundred f e e t out

i n f r o n t of t h e LM on t h e s u r f a c e .

This i s c l e a r l y a u s e f u l t o o l , but I j u s t d i d n ' t g e t

/
-- -7
t o observe it very long.

ALDRIN Here's a log e n t r y : 46 seconds, 300 f e e t , 4 seconds a f t e r

t h e next minute. Watch your shadow, and a t 1 6 seconds,

220 f e e t . So I would e s t i m a t e t h a t I c a l l e d out t h a t

shadow business a t around 260 f e e t , and it w a s c e r t a i n l y

large at t h a t point. I would have s a i d t h a t a t 260 f e e t

t h e shadow would have been way t h e h e l l and gone out

t h e r e , b u t it w a s n ' t . It w a s a good-size v e h i c l e . I

could t e l l t h a t w e had our gear down and t h a t w e had an

a s c e n t and a descent s t a g e . Had I looked out sooner, I ' m

s u r e I could have seen something i d e n t i f i e d as a shadow

a t 400 f e e t ; maybe h i g h e r , I d o n ' t know. But anyway, a t

t h i s a l t i t u d e , it w a s u s a b l e . Since t h e ground i s movirg

away, it might be of some a i d . But of course, you have

t o have it out your window.

9.2.23 LPD a l t i t u d e

ARMSTRONG The LPD w a s not used u n t i l we were below 2500 f e e t , and

i t was followed f o r some number of computation c y c l e s .

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9-30
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ARMSTRONG The landing p o i n t moved downrange w i t h time as evidenced
( CONT'D)
by successive LPD r e a d i n g s .

FCOD REP. D o you r e c a l l when you proceeded?

ARMSTRONG It w a s very s h o r t l y a f t e r w e were going i n t o ~ 6 4 .

ALDRIN We g o t ~ 6 a4 t 4 1 minutes 35 seconds; t h e n you went

MANUAL, ATTITUDE CONTROL.

ARMS TR ONG I c a n ' t say whether t h a t w a s b e f o r e or a f t e r proceeding.

ALDRIN It wasn't t o o long a f t e r t h a t , 41:35-P64, 42:05-manual

a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l i s good, 42:17-program alarm. What I ' m

wondering i s d i d t h e proceed have anything t o do w i t h

maybe g e n e r a t i n g same more a c t i v i t y which would cause

t h e program alarm? We weren't i n 1668 a t t h a t p o i n t .

ARMSTRONG I have no r e c o l l e c t i o n of t h a t a r e a .

CONFtDENTIAL
 10-1
CONFIDENTIAL
10.0 LUNAR SURFACE

ARMSTRONG The postplanning c h e c k l i s t went as planned, and venting

w a s i n i t i a t e d i n t h e OX t a n k almost immediately - even

b e f o r e t h e p o i n t on t h e t i m e l i n e c a l l e d f o r i t .

W e ran t h e OX p r e s s u r e down t o t h e 40- t o 50-psi range

and opened t h e f u e l vent and vented it down t h e same

amount. We t h e n closed it o f f a f t e r which time Houston

became concerned with tank p r e s s u r e s and asked us t o

reopen it a g a i n , although a t t h e time we were reading

r e l a t i v e l y low t a n k p r e s s u r e s . I t h i n k t h e OX b u i l t

up s l i g h t l y over 50 a t t h e t i m e , b u t t h e y were a p p a r e n t l y

reading a h i g h e r v a l u e , and I assume perhaps t h a t t h e y

had an e r r o r i n t h e i r s i g n a l from t h a t tank p r e s s u r e .

I n any c a s e , we opened both tanks a f t e r t h a t and l e t them

b l e e d down t o about 1 5 p s i , which w a s probably t h e s t a b l e

-.-
c o n d i t i o n of t h e vapor p r e s s u r e i n t h e t a n k a t t h a t p o i n t .

ALDRIN A f t e r touchdown, we got a GO f o r T-1 and t h e n we

proceeded t o e n t e r P68 and recorded t h e l a t i t u d e and

longitude and a l t i t u d e . We t h e n proceeded out of t h a t

and r e s e t t h e s t o p b u t t o n and e n t e r e d P12 f o r T-2. At

t h i s point, I think t h a t a l i t t l e shuffling i n the data

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10-2
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ALDRIN cards might prevent someone from making t h e same e r r o r
( CONT'D 1
t h a t I d i d i n loading t h e t a p e f o r a s c e n t . On t h e d a t a

c a r d , we've g o t t h e PDI pad, which i s r e f e r r e d t o somewhat

during descent. It has PDI a b o r t s on it with a NO PDI

p l u s 1 2 a b o r t on t h e r i g h t s i d e . I t h i n k t h a t t h e NO PDI

p l u s 1 2 a b o r t would be b e t t e r p l a c e d on t h e back of t h i s

a l t i t u d e card because, once you i g n i t e , y o u ' r e through

w i t h t h a t NO PDI p l u s 12 a b o r t and you ought t o g e t it

out of t h e r e . I n i t s p l a c e , I t h i n k t h e T-2 a b o r t pad

should be on t h e d a t a c a r d because when I s t a r t e d t o

l o a d P12 with NOUN 33 ( t h e TIG f o r t h i s T-2 a b o r t , which

i s PDI p l u s 2 3 ) , I loaded t h e TIG f o r t h e NO PDI p l u s

1 2 a b o r t , and t h e ground caught m e on it and s a i d , "You

loaded R-2 wrong." I n s t e a d of loading 10254 29, I loaded

10244 27. Now, t h e two a r e p r e t t y c l o s e and t h e y both

s a y TIG NOUN 33. So, I t h i n k i f we can g e t t h a t one

a b o r t ( N O PDI p l u s 12 a b o r t ) out of t h e r e and p u t t h e

o t h e r one i n i t s p l a c e , i t ' l l save someone from coming

up w i t h t h e same s o r t of t h i n g .

We g o t remote c o n t r o l back t o ATTITUDE HOLD and AGS, OFF

and t h e n cycled t h e Parker valves again. A f t e r having

seen t h e erroneous t a l k b a c k i n d i c a t i o n s ,I w a s expecting

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 10-3

ALDRIN t h a t when I put t h e feeds t o c l o s e t h e y would i n d i c a t e

( CONT'D)
open momentarily. The c r o s s f e e d w a s cycled again t o

close. I t u r n e d t h e camera o f f and proceeded with t h e

switch c o n f i g u r a t i o n . Cycling t h e CWEA c i r c u i t b r e a k e r

d i d , i n f a c t , t u r n off t h e descent Reg warning l i g h t s .

W e r e a d t h e s i n e and cosine out of AGS (and I ' m s u r e

t h e y copied t h a t down) and went immediately i n t o r e c o r d i n g

t h e AGS gyro c o e f f i c i e n t s . I ' m sure t h a t these w e r e the

same numbers t h a t w e f i n i s h e d up w i t h , b u t it might be a

good t i m e t o check. Then we went t o cabin on t h e regu-

l a t o r s and took our helmets and gloves o f f . Then we

s t a r t e d i n w i t h t h e i n i t i a l g r a v i t y alignment. I don't

have t h e f i r s t NOUN 0 4 t h a t w e g o t . I d i d n ' t record t h a t

one, b u t it w a s f a i r l y l a r g e . I ' v e seen s o many of them

i n simulation t h a t I j u s t c a n ' t r e c a l l what t h a t number

was.

ARMSTRONG I am sure t h a t it w a s recorded on t h e ground.

ALDRIN After t h e r e c y c l e , it w a s 00001. We asked them about

r e c y c l i n g and t h e y s a i d affirmative. Got a s t a r - a n g l e

d i f f e r e n c e of 00015 and some t o r q u i n g a n g l e s , which

showed a f a i r l y good change. I guess t h e p i t c h i s t h e

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10-4
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ALDRIN one y o u ' r e concerned with. T h a t ' s about t h e Y-axis;
( CONT'D)
t h a t w a s 0.1. I d o n ' t know whether t h e s i n e of t h a t

agrees a t a l l w i t h t h e approximation of 0 . 1 t h a t we g o t

i n t h e Sun check. We d i d n ' t t o r q u e t h o s e a n g l e s F e

i d e a l w a s t o g e t a g r a v i t y d i r e c t i o n and t h e n t o do a

two-star alignment and look a t t h e t o r q u i n g angles a f t e r

t h e two-star check which would t h e n g i v e an i n d i c a t i o n as

t o what t h e drift had been s i n c e t h e l a s t alignment.

i n i t i a l g r a v i t y alignment , combined with t h e two-star

Pe
alignment, would produce a new l o c a t i o n of t h e landing

site. Had w e landed s t r a i g h t ahead, my i n t e n t w a s t o

use R i g e l i n t h e lef't'deten

righttten).
2 number 6 and Capella i n t h e

The 13-degree yaw moved Capella out of t h e

right-rear d e t e n t , b u t R i g e l w a s i n good shape t h e r e .

T h a t ' s t h e one I used f i r s t . I t h e n s e l e c t e d Navi i n

I
number 4 d e t e n t , t h e r i g h t r e a r , and t h a t w a s n ' t

particularly satisfactory. It w a s q u i t e dim and it took

a good b i t longer t h a n I had hoped t o g e t t h e marks on

that. I c a n ' t comment p a r t i c u l a r l y on t h e s t a r - a n g l e

d i f f e r e n c e o t h e r t h a n it w a s a l i t t l e d i s a p p o i n t i n g i n

t h a t it w a s 00009. Torquing angles w e have recorded,

and w e d i d t o r q u e . The l a t i t u d e and l o n g i t u d e - we'd

have t o l i s t e n t o t h e guidance people as t o j u s t what

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 10-5
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ALDRIN t h a t d i d t o our p o s s i b l e touchdown p o i n t . It seemed t o
( CONT'D)
me, when we f i n i s h e d t h a t , we were j u s t about on schedule,

maybe a l i t t l e b i t behind s o we proceeded i n t o t h e

o p t i o n 3 which w a s g r a v i t y p l u s one s t a r ; because R i g e l

had been so good, I used t h a t one again. The g r a v i t y

alignment seemed t o be q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t . The f i r s t time

w e d i d t h e g r a v i t y alignment on option 3 , it came up

w i t h 00000, our s t a r - a n g l e d i f f e r e n c e on t h e g r a v i t y

p l u s one s t a r , which i n d i c a t e s an e r r o r i n t h a t g r a v i t y

measurement and s t a r measurement w a s 00008. I know we

had t h e t o r q u i n g angle recorded on t h a t a l s o . The

azimuth i s very l a r g e - 0.2 degrees. We received a

GO f o r T-3. I n t h e v i c i n i t y of loading t i m e s f o r a
_c_

T-2 a b o r t , I n o t i c e d t h a t t h e mission timer wasn't

working, It was f r o z e n ; it j u s t stopped.

ARMSTRONG No, it d i d n ' t j u s t s t o p .

ALDRIN Yes, it had gone t o 900 hours.

ARMSTRONG 900 and some hours. I c o u l d n ' t c o r r e l a t e t h e minutes a n d

t h e seconds w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r previous event.

ALDRIN Yes. 903:34:47. I d o n ' t know what time t h a t relates to.

Obviously, t h e 9 d i g i t changed. It might have stopped,

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__ . ,. .. " " . ,.. ._ - .- ... .-_ . " . , . ...- .-. - .-. -. .. . -. . -..
._
10-6
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ALDRIN b u t it w a s s t a t i c a t t h a t p o i n t . We ran through t h e
( CONT'D)
c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s b u t c o u l d n ' t seem t o g e t i t moving again.

The ground suggested t h a t we t u r n it o f f which we d i d ,

b u t when we t u r n e d it back on w e got a l l n i n e s . You

could change t h e l a s t d i g i t with t h e d i g i t sequencer.

We t u r n e d it o f f f o r a while and t u r n e d it back on again

and it worked a f t e r t h a t . We gave them an E memory dump;

g o t a new a s c e n t pad o r t h e CSI p a d , f o r T-3. W e then

proceeded on w i t h t h e o p t i o n 3 alignment. Continuing

through t h e c h e c k l i s t , looking a t switch s e t t i n g s , and

c i r c u i t b r e a k e r c a r d s , we found ourselves 1 0 minutes t o

go and e s s e n t i a l l y up on t h e c h e c k l i s t . A t that point,

we had t o s t a r t p r e s s u r i z i n g t h e APS i f w e were going

t o launch, s o we r e a d through t h e remainder of t h e

simulated countdown and decided t h a t t h e r e wasn't any

p o i n t i n s t i c k i n g w i t h t h a t t i m e l i n e any f u r t h e r . So w e

terminated t h e simulated countdown and went t o t h e

i n i t i a l powerdown sequence. W e had discussed among

ourselves t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of e v a l u a t i n g , during t h i s

f i r s t 2 h o u r s , whether w e wanted t o go on w i t h t h e r e s t

p e r i o d t h a t w a s scheduled o r t o proceed with t h e EVA

preparation. I t h i n k w e had concluded b e f o r e t h e end of

t h e simulated powerdown t h a t w e would l i k e t o go ahead

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ALDRIN w i t h the EVA and it w a s sometime i n h e r e t h a t N e i l c a l l e d
( CONT'D)
t o ground and l e t them know t h a t .

ARMSTRONG There were two f a c t o r s t h a t w e thought might i n f l u e n c e

t h a t decision. One w a s t h e s p a c e c r a f t systems and any

abnormalities t h a t w e might have t h a t we'd want t o work

on, and t h e second w a s our a d a p t a t i o n t o 1/6g and whether

Y

-- we
__ thought more time i n 1 !6g b e f o r e s t a r t i n g t h-- e EVA
---- -. . _-
would b e advantageous o r disadvantageous a t t h a t p o i n t .

B a s i c a l l y , my p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g was t h a t t h e a d a p t a t i o n

t o ~ / 6 gwas very r a p i d and was very p l e a s a n t , easy t o

\-
i
work i n , thought at t h e t i m e t h a t we were ready t o

go r i g h t ahead i n t o t h e s u r f a c e work and recomended t h a t .

ALDRIN Now, we e s t i m a t e d EVA a t 8 o ' c l o c k . I t h i n k t h a t was a

l i t t l e optimistic. The ground recognized t h a t , because

t h e y s a i d , "DO you mean beginning o f PREP or beginning

hatch opening?" And a l l during t h i s t i m e , we could t e l l

t h a t Mike w a s kept busy each p a s s , doing P22's t r y i n g

t o f i n d where we were.

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10.8 HORIZON, S I G H T I N G , APPEARANCE

ARMSTRONG The t h i n g s t h a t seem worthy of comment h e r e are observations

from t h e window p r i o r t o l u n a r s u r f a c e work. We were i n

a r e l a t i v e l y smooth area covered w i t h c r a t e r s varying

from up t o perhaps 100 f e e t i n t h e n e a r v i c i n i t y down t o

less than a foot, w i t h density inversely proportional t o

t h e s i z e of t h e c r a t e r . The s m a l l e r t h e y were, t h e more

t h e r e were of them. The ground mass w a s very f i n e s i l t ,

and t h e r e were a l o t of rocks of a l l s i z e s , a n g u l a r i t i e s ,

and t y p e s i n t h e area. Our immediate a r e a w a s r e l a t i v e l y

f r e e of l a r g e rocks. S e v e r a l hundred f e e t t o our r i g h t

t h e r e w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t boulder f i e l d , an a r r a y of b o u l d e r s ,

e s s e n t i a l l y , t h a t had many boulders g r e a t e r t h a n 1 o r

2 feet i n size. We never were a b l e t o g e t i n t o t h a t a r e a

n -
-40look a t t h o s e rocks i n d e t a i l .
-------

\/ ALDRIN Distances are deceiving. When we looked at t h i s f a i r l y

l a r g e boulder f i e l d o f f t o t h e r i g h t , it d i d n ' t look

very f a r away a t a l l b e f o r e w e went o u t . O f course,

once we g o t o u t , w e wandered as far as seemed a p p r o p r i a t e .

O f course, we never came c l o s e t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d .

What r e a l l y impressed m e w a s t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n d i s t a n c e s .

After w e were back i n again looking out a t t h e f l a g , t h e

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ALDRIN t e l e v i s i o n , and t h e experiments, t h e y looked as though t h e y
( CONT'D)
were r i g h t o u t s i d e t h e window. I n f a c t , on t h e surface,

we had moved them a reasonable d i s t a n c e away.

So I t h i n k d i s t a n c e judgment i s n o t t o o good on f i r s t

e t t i n g down. The tendency i s t o t h i n k t h a t t h i n g s are

a good b i t c l o s e r t h a n t h e y a c t u a l l y a r e . This says t h e y

a r e probably a good b i t l a r g e r t h a n what we might have

i n i t i a l l y estimated.

10.10 COLORS AND SHADING OF LUNAR SURFACE FEATURES

ARMSTRONG Probably t h e most s u r p r i s i n g t h i n g t o m e , even though

I guess we suspected a c e r t a i n amount of t h i s , w a s t h e

l i g h t and c o l o r observations o f t h e s u r f a c e . The

down-Sun a r e a w a s extremely b r i g h t . It appeared t o be

a l i g h t t a n i n c o l o r , and you could s e e i n t o t h e washout

r e g i o n reasonably w e l l . Detail w a s obscured somewhat

by t h e washout, b u t not badly. A s you proceeded back

toward cross-Sun , brightness diminished , and t h e c o l o r

s t a r t e d t o f a d e , and it began t o be more gray. As we

looked back as f a r as we could from t h e LM windows, t h e

c o l o r on t h e s u r f a c e w a s a c t u a l l y a darker gray. I'd

say not completely without c o l o r , b u t most of t h e t a n

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ARMSTRONG had disappeared as w e got back i n t o t h a t area, and w e
( CONT'D)
were looking a t r e l a t i v e l y dark g r a y . I n t h e shadow, it

w a s very dark. We could s e e i n t o t h e shadows, b u t it

was difficult.

ALDRIN We could s e e very s m a l l g r a d a t i o n s i n c o l o r t h a t were t h e

r e s u l t of very small t o p o g r a p h i c a l changes.

ARMSTRONG O f course, when w e a c t u a l l y looked a t t h e m a t e r i a l ,

p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e s i l t , up c l o s e it d i d , i n f a c t , t u r n out

t o be s o r t of c h a r c o a l gray or t h e c o l o r of a graded l e a d

pencil. When y o u ' r e a c t u a l l y faced w i t h t r y i n g t o

i n t e r p r e t t h i s kind of c o l o r and t h a t l i g h t r e f l e c t i v i t y ,

it i s amazing.

ALDRIN When i l l u m i n a t e d , it d i d have a gray appearance, very

l i g h t gray.

ARMSTRONG Wouldn't you s a y it i s something l i k e t h e c o l o r o f t h a t

wall? It i s n ' t very f a r away from what it looked l i k e .

Yet when you look a t it c l o s e , i t ' s a very p e c u l i a r

phenomenon. -

10.15 PREPARATION FOR EGRESS

ARMSTRONG Now, a p r e l i m i n a r y comment has t o do with t h e longer time

t h a t it took t h a n during our s i m u l a t i o n s . It i s

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ARMSTRONG a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e f a c t t h a t when you do s i m u l a t i o n s of

( CONT'D)
EVA PREP you have a clean cockpit and you have all t h e

t h i n g s t h a t y o u ' r e going t o use t h e r e i n t h e cockpit

w i t h you and nothing e l s e . I n r e a l i t y , you have a l o t

of c h e c k l i s t s , d a t a , food packages, stowage p l a c e s f i l l e d

w i t h odds and ends, b i n o c u l a r s , s t o p watches, and

a s s o r t e d t h i n g s , each of which you f e e l obliged t o

e v a l u a t e as t o whether i t s stowage p o s i t i o n i s s a t i s -

f a c t o r y f o r EVA and w h e t h e r you might want t o change

anything from t h e p r e f l i g h t p l a n s . F o r example, our

mission t i m e r w a s o u t , and we decided we had b e t t e r

l e a v e one wristwatch i n s i d e i n case it g o t damaged. We

would have a t l e a s t one working watch t o back up t h e

mission t i m e r or t o use i n p l a c e of t h e mission t i m e r ,

i n case w e could not g e t it going again.

All t h e s e items took a l i t t l e b i t of t i m e , a l i t t l e b i t

of d i s c u s s i o n , which never showed up i n any of our EVA

PREP'S on t h e ground, r e a l l y accounted f o r t h e b e t t e r

p a r t of an hour o f a d d i t i o n a l time. O u r view o f EVA

PREP w a s t h a t we were not t r y i n g t o meet a time schedule.

We were j u s t t r y i n g t o do each item and do it r i g h t

s e q u e n t i a l l y and not worry about t h e time. Well, t h e

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ARMSTRONG r e s u l t w a s , a l o t of a d d i t i o n a l t i m e used t h e r e . I don't
( CONT'D)
t h i n k t h a t ' s wrong. I j u s t t h i n k i n f u t u r e planning you

a r e probably b e t t e r o f f adding t i m e f o r t h e s e kinds of

things.

ALDRIN No m a t t e r how many times you run through an EVA PREP, t o

t h e b e s t of t h e i n s t r u c t o r ' s a b i l i t y t o p u t t h i n g s i n a

l o g i c a l sequence, when y o u ' r e faced w i t h ' d o i n g t h e s e

t h i n g s , t h e r e i s a n a t u r a l tendency t o d e v i a t e somewhat

from t h e p r i n t e d sequence t h a t you have. It's a rather

complex o p e r a t i o n . Nobody w r i t e s a c h e c k l i s t t o t e l l

you i n t h e morning when you g e t up a l l t h e sequences you

go through t o p u t your c l o t h e s on, brush your t e e t h ,

shave, and a l l t h a t . If you had one s e t t i n g t h e r e , you

wouldn't follow it t h e same every day. You would m a k e

small d e v i a t i o n s j u s t based upon what seems a p p r o p r i a t e

at t h a t t i m e . It i s a very d i f f i c u l t t h i n g t o b u i l d a

checklist for.

ARMSTRONG W e s h o u l d n ' t imply t h a t t h e EVA p r e p a r a t i o n c h e c k l i s t

wasn't good and adequate. We d i d , i n f a c t , follow it

p r e t t y much t o t h e l e t t e r j u s t t h e w a y we had done

during t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s . That i s , t h e hook ups, and

where w e put t h e equipment, and t h e checks were done

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 10-13
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ARMSTRONG p r e c i s e l y as p e r our c h e c k l i s t . And it w a s very good.
( CONT'D)
I d o n ' t have any complaints about t h a t a t a l l . It's

t h e s e o t h e r l i t t l e t h i n g s t h a t you d o n ' t t h i n k about

and d i d n ' t consider t h a t took more t i m e t h a n w e thought.

There w a s one c o n t r o l on t h e PLSS t h a t s u r p r i s e d us. I

d o n ' t know i f it w a s d i f f e r e n t from t h e t r a i n e r s o r t h e

f l i g h t PLSS's a t t h e t i m e w e w e r e looking a t them o r

n o t , but t h e r e w a s a press-to-test knob of some s o r t

t h a t n e i t h e r one of us could c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i * as t o

function. A t t h i s t i m e , we aren't r e a l l y quite sure

what it does.

ALDRIN It w a s a thumb depress b u t t o n t h a t seemed t o go i n

somewhere as i f it w a s r e l i e v i n g some p r e s s u r e from

something. I c a n ' t remember e v e r having seen t h a t b e f o r e .

It protruded out toward your back and looked as i f it

might come f a i r l y c l o s e t o r i d i n g on t h e back of t h e

suit.

ARMSTRONG We both thought we knew t h e EMU very w e l l and knew every

f u n c t i o n and how it operated. But it t u r n e d out we were

wrong. It w a s something t h a t we h a d n ' t l e a r n e d t h e r e ,

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ARMSTRONG and i f it had been t h e r e b e f o r e , somehow it escaped us.
( CONT'D)
It took a l i t t l e t i m e t o d i s c u s s t h a t , and w e proceeded.

ALDRIN Mounting t h e 16-~IIIcamera and t h e two u n i v e r s a l b r a c k e t s ,

one of t h e m i r r o r mount and t h e o t h e r on t h e c r a s h b a r ,

went p r e t t y much t h e way w e had planned it t o go. The

two b r a c k e t s w i t h t h e e n l a r g e d knobs 'helped out tremen-

dously i n t h a t I was a b l e t o t i g h t e n them down t o a much

g r e a t e r degree t h a n I had any of t h e t r a i n i n g models.

It gave m e much g r e a t e r confidence t h a t t h e cameras would

s t a y where I placed them and t h a t t h e r e would b e no

problem with any camera banging i n t o t h e window when we

d i d n ' t want it t o . The RCU camera b r a c k e t s w e r e d i f f i c u l t

t o t i g h t e n down. By t i g h t e n i n g j u s t as hard as w e could,

t h e r e w a s s t i l l a l i t t l e b i t of p l a y i n both of them. I

t h i n k an improvement i n t h a t knob would b e q u i t e advan-

tageous, s o t h a t it could b e cinched down a l i t t l e

tighter. Perhaps t h e kind of knob t h a t h a s edges t h a t

s t i c k out s o t h a t you can g e t much h i g h e r t o r q u e on it

would be a good t h i n g t o use.

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k all t h e remainder of t h e EVA PREP went as p e r

checklist.

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 10-15
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10.17 PLSS AND OPS PREPARATION AND DONNING

ALDRIN The h e a t e r s t e s t e d o u t . Both l i g h t s came on, p r e s s u r e s

r e g u l a t e d at very c l o s e t o 3.7. Then when it came t i m e

t o unstow t h e h o s e s , t h e p r e s s u r e s had dropped down t o

j u s t about zero.

ARMSTRONG Yes. They were below 25.

ALDRIN Overshoes went on q u i t e e a s i l y . W e p u t t h e a n t i f o g on

as soon as we got t h e k i t out i n s t e a d of w a i t i n g u n t i l a

little bit later. I t h i n k t h a t maybe t h e r e were two t h i n g s

t h a t brought t h a t about. One w a s t h a t we weren't r e a l l y

s u r e it w a s going t o appear l a t e r i n t h e c h e c k l i s t , and

w e wanted t o make s u r e w e had t h a t . The o t h e r w a s , i n

t r a i n i n g , we wanted t o avoid as many a c t i v i t i e s as w e

could w i t h t h e PLSS on our back because it was very

uncomfortable doing any a d d i t i o n a l e x e r c i s e s i n one g.

We d i d f i n d , however, t h a t it w a s q u i t e comfortable, even

without t h e shoulder p a d s , t o have t h e PLSS mounted on

your back. The mass o f it w a s not a t a l l o b j e c t i o n a b l e .

It d i d r e q u i r e moving around methodically and very

-
slowly t o avoid banging i n t o t h i n g s
-
- no g e t t i n g around

it. You j u s t c o u l d n ' t always t e l l what t h e back of t h e

PLSS o r t h e OPS might b e i n c o n t a c t with a t any p a r t i c u l a r ,

time .

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ARMSTRONG A s w a s r e p o r t e d , w e broke one c i r c u i t b r e a k e r w i t h t h e

PLSS and w e depressed two o t h e r s , one on each s i d e ,

sometime during t h e o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e PLSS on t h e back.

So t h a t ' s an area t h a t we s t i l l need t o improve on t o be

a b l e t o have confidence t h a t t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e LM

i t s e l f won't be jeopardized by t h e o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e

PLSS on t h e back.

ALDRIN We had problems with t h i s one p a r t i c u l a r e l e c t r i c a l

connector, t h e one t h a t j o i n s t h e RCU t o t h e PLSS, ever

s i n c e t h e f i r s t time we'd e v e r seen i t .

ARMSTRONG It s about a 50-pin Bendix connector.

ALDRIN I t ' s j u s t very d i f f i c u l t t o g e t t h e t h i n g p o s i t i o n e d

p r o p e r l y s o t h a t t h e t h r e e p i n s on t h e o u t s i d e , t h e

t h r e e l i t t l e protuberances, w i l l engage i n t h e ramp s o

t h a t , when you t h e n t w i s t , it '11 cinch on i n . That must

,
have taken a t l e a s t 1 0 minutes. The problem w a s n o t w i t h

mine, b u t i n hooking up N e i l ' s . I c a n ' t say t h a t t h e r e

w a s t h a t much d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e many times t h a t I t r i e d

it unsuccessfully and t h e one time it d i d go i n c o r r e c t l y .

It appeared t o be squared away each time.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-17

ARMSTRONG This i s not because we d i d n ' t understand t h e problem.

We had had t r o u b l e w i t h t h a t connector f o r 2 y e a r s o r

more. We'd always complained about it. It had never been

redesigned, and it w a s u s u a l l y a s c r i b e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t

a l l t h e t r a i n i n g models were o l d and gouged, and s o on.

But when we looked a t t h e f l i g h t u n i t s during CCFF on t h e

EMU, it t u r n e d out t h a t t h e y were s t i l l d i f f i c u l t . We

accepted t h e f a c t t h a t by being very c a r e f u l w i t h t h a t

connector we could, i n f a c t , connect and disconnect it

satisfactorily. We d i d t h a t i n t h e l a b a t t h e Cape.

W e had a l i t t l e b i t of d i f f i c u l t y w i t h it t h e r e . When

we g o t on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e , it w a s t h e same problem.

It took us a t l e a s t 1 0 minutes each t o mate t h o s e con-

nectors. I t ' s t h e b i g e l e c t r i c a l cable from t h e RCU t o

t h e PLSS. It a t t a c h e s a t t h e PLSS end. I t ' s our recom-

mendation t h a t i t ' s a s u f f i c i e n t l y s e r i o u s problem t h a t

w e c a n ' t a f f o r d t o j e o p a r d i z e t h e success of an EVA on

t h a t connector. And t h a t ' s r i g h t now what we're b e t t i n g .

It began t o look l i k e w e never would g e t t h o s e connectors

made on t h e s u r f a c e . W e j u s t have t o improve t h a t .

ALDRIN Connecting up t h e s t r a p s went q u i t e smoothly. The

i n i t i a l COMM check out on t h e audio p a n e l and t h e v a r i o u s

communications checks t h a t w e made i n t h e F'M mode a l l

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ALDRIN seemed t o go q u i t e w e l l , u n t i l we s t a r t e d switching t h e
( CONT'D)
PLSS modes. For a w h i l e , w e a s c r i b e d some of t h e d i f -

f i c u l t y perhaps t o t h e antenna b e i n g stowed. So w e

unstowed N e i l ' s , and t h a t d i d n ' t h e l p immediately. A

l i t t l e l a t e r , it seemed t o h e l p o u t , b u t t h e n w e g o t back

i n t o about t h e same problem, s o I stowed h i s antenna.

. There d i d n ' t seem t o b e any p a r t i c u l a r rhyme or reason t o

when w e d i d appear t o have good COMM and when we d i d n ' t .

ARMSTRONG It s u f f i c e s t o say t h a t we never d i d understand what w a s

r e q u i r e d t o enable good COMM while we were i n s i d e t h e

It c o c k p i t , r e l a y i n g through t h e PLSS's. We had it p a r t of

t h e t i m e , and w e d i d n ' t p a r t of t h e t i m e . We t r i e d a

l o t of v a r i o u s o p t i o n s , and t h e y j u s t weren't u n i v e r s a l l y

successful. But w e w e r e a b l e t o have adequate COMM t o

enable us t o continue. I t h i n k , once o u t s i d e , we r e a l l y

d i d n ' t have any a p p r e c i a b l e COMM problems a t a l l . It

seemed t o work w e l l .

10.20 DEPRESSURIZATION

ARMSTRONG This was one area of f l i g h t p r e p a r a t i o n t h a t was never

completely performed on t h e ground. I n t h e chamber, t h e

PLSS's w e r e l e f t on t h e engine cover and w e never put

them on our backs because of t h e i r weight, and t h e

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ARMSTRONG p o s s i b i l i t y of j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e LM. So
(CONT'D)
t h e COMM was o p e r a t e d , and t h e connections were made, b u t

t h e d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n sequence w i t h t h e PLSS's on t h e

backs was never completed. The times when we a c t u a l l y

o p e r a t e d t h e PLSS w a s done always i n t h e chamber and

never done w i t h t h e systems operable.

So two t h i n g s were new t o us. One was t h a t it took a

very long time t o d e p r e s s u r i z e t h e LM through t h e

b a c t e r i a f i l t e r with t h e PLSS adding gases t o t h e cockpit

environment and t h e water b o i l e r o p e r a t i o n or something

adding some cabin p r e s s u r e . The second w a s t h a t w e

weren't familiar w i t h how long it would take t o s t a r t a

sublimator i n t h i s c o n d i t i o n . It seemed t o t a k e a very

long t i m e t o g e t through t h i s sequence of g e t t i n g t h e

cabin p r e s s u r e down t o t h e p o i n t where w e could open t h e

I
h a t c h , g e t t i n g t h e water t u r n e d on i n t h e PLSS, g e t t i n g
' .
t h e i c e cake t o form on t h e s u b l i m a t o r , and g e t t i n g t h e
I

water alarm flag t o c l e a r s o t h a t w e could continue. It

seemed l i k e it took us about a h a l f hour t o g e t through

t h i s d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n sequence. And it w a s one t h a t w e

had never d u p l i c a t e d on t h e ground. Well, i n r e t r o s p e c t ,

it a l l seemed t o work okay, i t w a s j u s t t h a t w e weren't

used t o spending a l l t h a t time s t a n d i n g around w a i t i n g .

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10-20

10.21 OPENING OF HATCH

'rgy
ALDRIN

and decaying slowly.

d
Well, t h e r e ' s a s t e p v e r i f y i n g PG4 p r e s s u r e above

And it d i d t h a t .
4.5,
It decayed slowly,

and t h e cabin s t a y e d at around 1 p s i . We had t o g e t t h a t

c _ _

down b e f o r e we could open t h e h a t c h , it appeared t o me.

We were j u s t w a i t i n g t h e r e between t h o s e s t e p s of PGA

p r e s s u r e and cabin p r e s s u r e coming down, and opening t h e

hatch. And we d i d n ' t r e a l l y want t o go and open t h e

L-. /

overhead h a t c h . We l i k e t o-.- open only one of t_hemLand

c ----
leave t h e o t h e r one t h e way i t ' s been. When t h e hatch
. --
was f i n a l l y opened, it took an i n i t i a l t u g on i t , and it

appeared t o bend. The whole h a t c h as it opened on t h e

f a r s i d e came toward m e . A s soon as it broke t h e s e a l ,

it appeared as though I could see some small p a r t i c l e s

rushing o u t . Then, of course, t h e hatch came open and

gave us a more complete vacuum.

i --_- -/----.-
Then we went t o opening I

t h e water. It seems t o me t h a t , i f t h e r e i s t h a t delay

t o g e t r i d of t h e p r e s s u r e , maybe one could go ahead and

open up t h e water ahead of t i m e b e f o r e you a c t u a l l y g e t

it down t o t h e p o i n t where t h e hatch i s open. Maybe t h a t

would compound t h e problem. Once t h e water window d i d

----
c l e a r , it seemed t h a t t h e cooling w a s n o t i c e a b l e almost

immedi at e l y .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-21

10.22 FINAL SYSTEMS STATUS

ARMSTRONG The f i n a l system s t a t u s was without problems.

10.23 LM EGRESS

ARMSTRONG I guess t h e most important t h i n g h e r e with r e s p e c t t o t h e

e g r e s s through t h e h a t c h and t h e work on t h e l a d d e r and

t h e p l a t f o r m i s t h a t our s i m u l a t i o n work i n both t h e tank

and i n t h e a i r p l a n e w a s a r e a s o n a b l y ' a c c u r a t e simulation.

They were adequate t o l e a r n t o do t h e job and w e d i d n ' t

have any b i g s u r p r i s e s i n t h a t a r e a . The t h i n g s t h a t we'd

l e a r n e d about body p o s i t i o n i n g , a r c h i n g t h e back, c l e a r -

ances r e q u i r e d , and one person h e l p i n g another and s o on

worked j u s t l i k e t h e r e a l case. There weren't any d i f -

f i c u l t i e s i n movement through t h e hatch or w i t h s t a b i l -

i t y on t h e porch.

After g e t t i n g onto t h e porch, I came back i n t o t h e LM

and went up around t h e 2-27 c o r n e r , made s u r e t h a t w a s as

expected and it w a s . I r e t u r n e d t o t h e porch, got on t h e

l a d d e r , discarded our d u f f l e bag with arm r e s t and OPS

p a l l e t s , r e l e a s e d t h e MESA without any d i f f i c u l t y , and

descended t h e l a d d e r j u s t as expected. The f i r s t s t e p

was p r e t t y h i g h ; 3 t o 3 1 / 2 f e e t . So t h e i n i t i a l t e s t

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10-22
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ARMSTRONG w a s t o s e e i f we would have any t r o u b l e g e t t i n g back on
( CONT'D)
t h e first step. There were no d i f f i c u l t i e s , so w e pro-

ceeded with t h e planned a c t i v i t i e s . The work and e f f o r t

r e q u i r e d t o go up and down t h e l a d d e r and i n through t h e

h a t c h are not o b j e c t i o n a b l e enough t h a t they need be

worried about. Going up t h e l a d d e r and going through

t h e hatch are not high-workload items. They a r e items

t h a t r e q u i r e some caution and p r a c t i c e . I had it a good

b i t e a s i e r than Buzz d i d because he had t o go through t h e

hatch and around t h e corner by himself. '

ALDRIN Once I had m y f e e t and p o s t e r i o r out t h e h a t c h , Neil w a s

i n good p o s i t i o n , as good as I.was t o h e l p me move out ,

by just observing t h e p r o f i l e o f t h e PLSS as it matched

with t h e hatch opening.

ARMSTRONG The two-man operation i s good because a l l t h e h e l p t h a t

each man can give t h e o t h e r one i s money i n t h e bank.

ALDRIN
-
I t h i n k t h e first man moving out has a l i t t l__---
e
e b i t more

difficulty because t h e second man has t o be back behind

..- /

011t of t h e w
t h e hatch and has t o t r y t o move if. s so

you have t h e tendency t o be more over t o your s i d e away

f r o m t h e hatch and anything you a r e contacting w a s

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 10-23
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ALDRIN u s u a l l y on your s i d e , your edge of t h e lower p a r t of
( CONT'D)
t h e DSKY t a b l e .

ARMSTRONG There weren't any temperature e f f e c t s noted i n t h e e g r e s s

or l a d d e r . Nothing f e l t h o t o r cold or had any temperature

e f f e c t s a t a l l t h a t I w a s aware o f .

ALDRIN The platform i t s e l f a f f o r d e d a more-than-adequate position

t o t r a n s i t i o n from going out t h e hatch t o g e t t i n g on t h e

ladder. The i n i t i a l s t e p i s a l i t t l e b i t d i f f i c u l t t o

see. When I g o t t o t h e f i r s t one, I w a s g l a d t o have you

t e l l m e about where my f e e t were r e l a t i v e t o t h a t f i r s t

s t e p so t h a t I d i d n ' t have t o make a conscious e f f o r t t o

look around t o t h e s i d e or underneath. What I a m g e t t i n g

at i s t h a t o p e r a t i o n s on t h e p l a t f o r m can be c a r r i e d out

without concern about l o s i n g your balance and f a l l i n g

off. There i s p l e n t y of area up t h e r e t o s t a n d on t h e

s t e p and do any manipulating t h a t might be r e q u i r e d .

There are a l t e r n a t e ways o f b r i n g i n g t h i n g s up, o t h e r

t h a n by t h e LEC. I t h i n k t h e r e i s promise of b e i n g able

t o b r i n g t h i n g s up over t h e s i d e ; s t r a i g h t up, versus

making use of t h e LEC. W e d i d n ' t have t h e opportunity

t o exercise those.

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10-24
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ALDRIN
( CONT'D)

-
I n g r a v i t y f i e l d s , I would have come up w i t h something

c l o s e r t o one-tenth, j u s t by judging t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n

weight and f e e l of t h i n g s i n t h e way t h e masses behaved

one t o s i x . I n t h e behavior of o b j e c t s , it gives you t h e

impression t h a t t h e r e i s a much g r e a t e r d i f f e r e n c e . In

my maneuvering, t h e r e d i d n ' t seem t o be anything l i k e a

f a c t o r of 6 difference. It would appear a s though t h e

g r a v i t y d i f f e r e n c e w a s much l e s s . What I ' m saying i s

t h a t it seems t h e human can adapt himself t o t h i s q u i t e

easily. It a l s o appears t h a t o b j e c t s can be handled

- I

e a s i e r i n 1/6g t h a n we had a n t i c i p a t e d . I n maneuvering

t h e o b j e c t s around, they do have a c e r t a i n m a s s . When

they get going i n a d i r e c t i o n , they w i l l keep going

t h a t way. This w a s evidenced when t h e o b j e c t s were

coming i n t h e hatch on t h e LEC; they were f a i r l y easy

t o manage, b u t you had t o t a k e your t i m e i n handling

them.

-
10.24 ADEQUACY OF HARDWAFE AND PROCEDURES

ALDRIN The i n i t i a l LEC operation of lowering t h e camera seemed

t o work f a i r l y w e l l . It appeared as though you might have

been p u l l i n g on t h e wrong s t r a p a t f i r s t ; however, w e

r e c t i f i e d t h a t without any p a r t i c u l a r t r o u b l e .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-25

ARMSTRONG I n i t i a l l y , I had a b i t of d i f f i c u l t y . I was not t r y i n g

t o g e t t h e camera up or down a t t h a t p o i n t ; I w a s t r y i n g

t o p u l l t h e s l a c k out of t h e l i n e and m a k e both s t r a p s

taut. For some reason o r o t h e r , it w a s hung up, and I

had some d i f f i c u l t y g e t t i n g t h e s l a c k out of t h e l i n e s ;

Once having done t h a t , it came down very n i c e l y . Here

w e changed t h e f l i g h t p l a n somewhat and got t h e camera

down b e f o r e doing t h e contingency sample. I wanted t o

g e t t h a t camera down and hooked up while I w a s over t h e r e

i n t h e shadow, because t o do t h e contingency sample, I

w a s going t o have t o stow t h e LEC and go over i n t o t h e

c---

area out of t h e shadow. Since I wanted t o do it on t h e

right s i d e where t h e camera w a s mounted, I w a s going t o

have t o make a t r i p of about 1 0 or 1 5 f e e t b e f o r e I

s t a r t e d t h e contingency sample. T h a t ' s t h e reason w e

changed t h e o r d e r .

The o p e r a t i o n o f t h e s u i t , i n g e n e r a l , w a s very p l e a s a n t .

There was very l i t t l e hindrance t o m o b i l i t y , with t h e

exception of going down t o t h e s u r f a c e t o p i c k t h i n g s up

w i t h your hands which w a s a very d i f f i c u l t t h i n g t o do.

A s f a r as walking around and g e t t i n g from one p l a c e t o

a n o t h e r , t h e s u i t o f f e r e d very l i t t l e impediment t o t h a t

kind of progress. It w a s , in general, a pleasant operation.

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10-26
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ARMSTRONG Thermal l o a d s i n t h e s u i t were not bad a t a l l ; I r a n on
( CONT'D) .
minimum flow almost t h e e n t i r e time. Buzz found a h i g h e r

flow t o be d e s i r a b l e . This w a s c o n s i s t e n t with our

i n d i v i d u a l p r e f l i g h t experience. I d i d n ' t n o t i c e any

temperature thermal d i f f e r e n c e s i n and out of t h e shadow.

There were s i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e s and v i s i b i l i t y

changes b u t no thermal d i f f e r e n c e s . The only temperature

problem I had (and Buzz d i d n ' t have t h i s problem) w a s

with t h e gloves. I d i d not wear i n n e r gloves. I chose

t o go without t h e i n n e r l i n e r s i n t h e gloves, and m y hands

were a l i t t l e w a r m and very wet all t h e time. They got

very damp and clammy i n s i d e t h e gloves. I found t h a t t h i s

problem degraded my a b i l i t y t o handle o b j e c t s and t o g e t

firm g r i p s on t h i n g s .

ALDRIN I had c o o l e r l e v e l s set on t h e d i v e r t e r v a l v e , because

it j u s t seemed t o be comfortably p l e a s a n t t h a t way. In

r e t r o s p e c t , it appears t h a t t h i s l e a d s toward a higher

consumption of water. I wasn't f i l l y aware t h a t when you

are on higher flow, you a r e going t o be pumping more water

overboard. It w a s not c l e a r t o me p r e f l i g h t t h a t it d i d

have t h a t e f f e c t on your water consumption. I certainly

could have operated at lower l e v e l s much sooner without

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 10-27
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ALDRIN overheating. I n confirmation of Neil's f i n d i n g s , I d i d n ' t
(CONT ' D )
experience any hot or even w a r m s p o t s i n t h e s u i t . I

d i d n ' t w e a r any i n n e r g l o v e s , e i t h e r , i n my d e s i r e t o g e t

a b e t t e r f e e l through t h e gloves. During t h e donning, I

d i d n o t have t h e w r i s t l e t s on. I thought t h a t t h e LCG

extending down far enough i n t o t h e w r i s t would be

adequate. I f I had t o r e p e a t t h i s e f f o r t , I would put

t h e w r i s t l e t s on, because once I w a s i n t h e gloves and I

s t a r t e d moving them around, I d i d f i n d t h a t it w a s rubbing

a s m a l l amount on t h e wrist. I thought t h a t it might g e t

t o be more annoying t h a n it a c t u a l l y t u r n e d out t o b e ,

but looking back, I would have p r e f e r r e d having t h o s e

w r i s t l e t s on.

10.25 ENVIRONMENTAL FAMILIARIZATION

ARMSTRONG With r e s p e c t t o work on t h e s u r f a c e , t h e 1 / 6 g r a v i t y

w a s , i n g e n e r a l , a p l e a s a n t environment i n which t o

work, and t h e a d a p t a t i o n t o movement w a s not d i f f i c u l t .

I f e l t it w a s q u i t e n a t u r a l . Buzz had t h e opportunity t o

look a t more d e t a i l e d a s p e c t s of i t , a good b i t more

t h a n I d i d , b u t , i n g e n e r a l , w e can say it w a s not

d i f f i c u l t t o work and accomplish t a s k s . I think certain

exposure t o 1/6g i n t r a i n i n g i s worthwhile, b u t I d o n ' t

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10-28
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ARMSTRONG t h i n k it needs t o be pursued exhaustively i n l i g h t of
'
(CONT D )
t h e ease of a d a p t a t i o n .

ALDRIN Moving around i s very natural.. Some a t t e n t i o n must be

paid t o t h e mass t h a t you have i n t h e s u i t and a l s o t o

t h e mass of t h e PLSS t h a t i s on your back. I t h i n k we

a n t i c i p a t e d t h i s adequately, and t h e f a c t t h a t we d i d have

a s i z a b l e mass mounted t o t h e rear was not d e t r i m e n t a l

t o moving around.

10.26 WALKING d

ARMSTRONG Buzz d i d more i n t h a t a r e a than I d i d . I would say t h a t

balance was not d i f f i c u l t ; however, I d i d some f a i r l y s

high jumps and found t h a t t h e r e was a tendency t o t i p

over backward on a high jump. One time I came c l o s e t o

f a l l i n g and decided t h a t was enough of t h a t .

ALDRIN There i s no doubt t h a t it was much e a s i e r t o reach t h a t

n e u t r a l point by j u s t l e a n i n g back s l i g h t l y than it was

leaning forward. I t h i n k t h e happy medium w a s t o l e a n

forward more than w e d i d . It w a s more comfortable f o r

us t o s t a n d e r e c t than t o lean forward t o be a t t h a t

absolute neutral point. The pogo tends t o give you t h e

impression t h a t most of your moving around w i l l be t h e

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 10-29
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ALDRIN result of t o e p r e s s u r e s - t h a t you w i l l rock up on your
( CONT D)
t o e s and t e n d t o push o f f . I d i d not r e a l l y f i n d t h i s

t o b e t h e case as much as I had a n t i c i p a t e d . The 1/6g

a i r p l a n e i s a very poor s i m u l a t i o n o f t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e .

There i s e x c e l l e n t t r a c t i o n i n t h e a i r p l a n e , s o you c a n ' t

relate t o o much as t o how t h e f o o t d e p a r t s or what s o r t

of r e s i s t a n c e you need when you put your f o o t back down

again. I d i d n ' t f i n d t h a t t h e r e w a s much of a s l i p p i n g

tendency on t h e s u r f a c e i n t r y i n g t o put i n sideways

motions o r stopping motions. It w a s q u i t e n a t u r a l as

you began t o apply a f o r c e t o make a change i n your

momentum. I t h i n k you were a b l e t o t e l l j u s t how much

you could p u t i n b e f o r e you would approach any i n s t a -

b i l i t y case. I n g e n e r a l , it would t a k e a couple of s t e p s

t o m a k e a good sideways change i n motion and it would

take two or t h r e e s t e p s t o come comfortably t o a s t a b l e

s t a t i o n a r y p o s i t i o n from a f a i r l y r a p i d forward movement.

To g e t a s u s t a i n e d pace e v a l u a t i o n , I would have had t o

have gone a good b i t f a r t h e r t h a n I d i d . Before t h e

f l i g h t , I f e l t t h a t you might be a b l e t o s u s t a i n a f a i r l y

r a p i d pace comfortably. My impression now i s t h a t t h i s

w a s a l i t t l e t i r i n g on t h e l e g s . There w a s a rubbing i n

t h e s u i t somewhere i n t h e knee j o i n t s and you had t o keep ,

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ALDRIN moving t h e knees, even though t h e y are very mobile i n t h e
( CONT'D)
suit. I f e l t t h a t , as easy a s t h i n g s looked, a 1-mile

t r e k w a s not going t o be an easy t h i n g . J u s t by having

t o move your muscles and your body i n t h e s u i t , you would

end up g e t t i n g t i r e d on any prolonged t r e k . Because t h e

t e r r a i n v a r i e s a good b i t r e l a t i v e t o your a b i l i t y t o

move over i t , you always have t o be a l e r t t o what i s

coming up next. On e a r t h you only worry about one or

two s t e p s ahead; on t h e moon, you have t o keep a good

eye out f o u r or f i v e s t e p s ahead. I t h i n k t h e one f o o t

i n f r o n t of another i s a much b e t t e r mode of locomotion

t h a n t h e more s t i l t e d kangaroo hop. You can do i t , b u t

it doesn't seem t o o f f e r any p a r t i c u l a r advantage. When

your f e e t a r e on t h e s u r f a c e , you can do f a i r l y vigorous

sideways movements such as l e a n i n g and swinging your arms

without a tendency t o bounce y o u r s e l f up o f f t h e s u r f a c e

and l o s e your t r a c t i o n . This w a s one experiment t h a t w a s

suggested and I found t h a t you do t e n d t o remain well-

rooted on t h e s u r f a c e where you a r e , d e s p i t e motions t h a t

you m a y have. I guess t h e b e s t t h i n g i n c a r r y i n g t h i s

f u r t h e r i s t o answer t h e questions t h a t people may have

about c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c s .

ARMSTRONG I went t h e f a r t h e s t . While Buzz w a s r e t u r n i n g from t h e

EASEP, I went back t o a b i g c r a t e r behind us. It w a s a I

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-31

ARMSTRONG c r a t e r t h a t I ' d estimate t o be 70 o r 80 f e e t i n diameter

( CONT'D)
and 1 5 or 20 f e e t deep. I went back t o t a k e some p i c t u r e s

of t h a t ; it was between 200 and 300 f e e t from t h e LM. I

r a n t h e r e and r a n back because I d i d n ' t want t o spend

much t i m e doing t h a t , b u t it was no t r o u b l e t o make t h a t

kind of a t r e k - a couple of hundred f e e t o r s o . It j u s t

took a f e w minutes t o l o p e back t h e r e , t a k e t h o s e p i c t u r e s ,

and t h e n come back.

ALDRIN I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e i s such a t h i n g as running. It's a

l o p e and i t ' s very hard t o j u s t walk. You break i n t o

t h i s l o p e very soon as you begin t o speed up.

ARMSTRONG I can b e s t d e s c r i b e a lope as having both f e e t o f f t h e

ground a t t h e same t i m e , as opposed t o walking where you

have one f o o t on t h e ground a t a l l t i m e s . I n loping,

you l e a v e t h e ground w i t h both f e e t and come down w i t h one

f o o t i n a normal running f a s h i o n . I t ' s not l i k e an e a r t h

run h e r e , because you a r e t a k i n g advantage of t h e l o w

gravity.

ALDRIN The d i f f e r e n c e . t h e r e i s t h a t i n a r u n , you t h i n k i n terms

of moving your f e e t r a p i d l y t o move f a s t , and you c a n ' t

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ALDRIN move your feet any more r a p i d l y than t h e next time you
( CONT'D)
come i n contact with t h e s u r f a c e . I n g e n e r a l , you have

t o w a i t f o r t h a t t o occur.

ARMSTRONG And you a r e w a i t i n g t o come down. So t h e foot motion i s

a c t u a l l y f a i r l y slow, but both f e e t a r e off' t h e ground

simultaneously. You can cover ground p r e t t y w e l l t h a t

way. It w a s f a i r l y comfortable, but a t t h e end of t h i s

t r i p , going out t h e r e and back, I w a s already f e e l i n g

l i k e I wanted t o s t o p and r e s t a l i t t l e . After about

500 f e e t of t h i s l o p i n g with a 1-minute s t o p out t h e r e

i n t h e middle t o t a k e p i c t u r e s , I was ready t o slow down

and rest. There were a l o t of i n t e r e s t i n g a r e a s within

500 f e e t or so t o go and look a t i f we had had t h e time.

It would have been i n t e r e s t i n g t o t a k e t h a t time and go

out and i n s p e c t them c l o s e l y and get some p i c t u r e s , but

t h a t w a s a luxury we d i d n ' t have.

ALDRIN There were so many of them; it i s t h e s o r t of t h i n g you

j u s t cannot a n t i c i p a t e before f l i g h t . You can plan t o

some degree when you a r e on t h e s u r f a c e , but u n t i l you

g e t out and look around, you c a n ' t make your f i n a l

decision as t o what you are really going t o do. Inside,

you a r e only looking at perhaps 60 percent of t h e a v a i l a b l e ,

panorama.

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ALDRIN We w e r e supposedly i n a nondescript area, b u t t h e r e w a s

( CONT'D)
f a r more t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h a n we could ever hope t o cover.

We d i d n ' t even s c r a t c h t h e s u r f a c e .

ARMSTRONG I'll be i n t e r e s t e d i n g e t t i n g t h e p i c t u r e s back and looking

at t h e m . I t h i n k y o u ' l l f i n d t h a t even though it i s n o t

a t e r r i b l y rough area - it i s b a s i c a l l y a smooth area -

o p e r a t i n g around i n any t y p e of a v e h i c l e i s going t o

t a k e some planning. The Moon has f a i r l y s t e e p s l o p e s ,

deep h o l e s , r i d g e s , e t c e t e r a . I am sure t h a t we can

d e v i s e t h i n g s t h a t w i l l do t h a t , b u t it i s n ' t going t o

b e j u s t any v e h i c l e t h a t w i l l cover t h a t kind of ground.

ALDRIN It w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g t o s e e j u s t how soon you depart

from t h e walking-return concept. I d o n ' t t h i n k you can

s t r e t c h t h a t too far. I wouldn't guess as t o what t h a t

d i s t a n c e i s ; you could g i v e some reasonable d i s t a n c e you

could r e t u r n on f o o t , b u t it i s n ' t m i l e s . When you t a l k

about m i l e s , you are t a l k i n g about being out of s i g h t of

t h e LN.

ARMSTRONG Another area t h a t i s not l i s t e d h e r e i s t h e s t e r e o camera.

I would l i k e t o m a k e a couple of c o m e n t s about t h a t .

The s t e r e o camera worked f i n e . We had no problems w i t h

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.- - . I . . .. ... . .. '.._II.. .. _. -. .~ .I. . . II. . . .. . _.

I_ . -. . I__ - , .* .- -
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ARMSTRONG i t ; however, it, was hard t o operate. I found t h a t t h e
(CONT'D)
angle t h a t I had t o put my hand on t h e handle t o p u l l it

and t h e f o r c e t h a t it took w a s excessive.

ALDRIN The squeezing of t h e t r i g g e r ?

ARMSTRONG Yes. I found my hand g e t t i n g t i r e d very soon while t a k i n g

p i c t u r e s with t h a t camera. It w a s wearing out my g r i p .

ALDRIN Would you say t h a t t h e angle w a s t o o h o r i z o n t a l ?

ARMSTRONG Yes.

ALDRIN You would l i k e t o have had it sloped down more towards

you.

ARMSTRONG Yes. It w a s r e q u i r i n g t h e wrist t o be cocked down.

ALDRIN The i n i t i a l opening up o r deploying of it went q u i t e

smoothly. The extension of t h e handle and t h e opening up

9

of t h e case w a s q u i t e w e l l engineered, Separating t h e

cover, t a k i n g it o f f , c u t t i n g t h e f i l m , and removing t h e

c a s s e t t e a l s o went q u i t e smoothly. I think that the

b i g a r e a for reengineering n i g h t be j u s t a change i n t h e

angle t h e handle comes o u t . We might have t o add a hinge

o r something l i k e t h a t t o it. What about t h e h e i g h t of

t h e handle? That would probably not be t o o bad.

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ARMSTRONG I t h i n k t h a t probably was reasonable. The o t h e r problem

we had with t h e camera was t h a t it was f a l l i n g over a l l

the time. I t h i n k t h i s was t h e r e s u l t of a l i t t l e b i t of

d i f f i c u l t y i n f i g u r i n g out t h e local v e r t i r k l .

ALDRIN Yes.

ARMSTRONG You’d s e t i t down and t h i n k it w a s l e v e l , b u t a p p a r e n t l y

it w a s n ’ t , because t h e next time you looked it would b e

l a y i n g over on i t s s i d e . O r you would bump it inad-

v e r t e n t l y w h i l e you were looking somewhere e l s e and

knock it over. I picked it up t h r e e d i f f e r e n t times o f f

t h e s u r f a c e and i t ’ s a major e f f o r t t o get down t o t h e

s u r f a c e t o p i c k t h e t h i n g up.

ALDRIN How’d you do t h a t ? By going down on t h e knee?

ARMSTRONG On one occasion I got it w i t h t h e knee, one t i m e I got

it with t h e t o n g s , and t h e l a s t t i m e I had something

e l s e i n my hand l i k e a scoop or something t h a t I could

l e a n on and go down and g e t i t .

I n g e n e r a l , t h e r e were a l o t of times t h a t I wanted t o

g e t down c l o s e r t o t h e s u r f a c e f o r one reason o r another.

I wanted t o g e t my hand down t o t h e s u r f a c e t o p i c k up

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ARMSTRONG something. This w a s one t h i n g t h a t r e s t r i c t e d us more
( CONT'D)
t h a n we'd l i k e . We r e a l l y d i d n ' t have complete clearance

t o go put our knees on t h e s u r f a c e any time we wanted.

We thought t h e s u i t w a s q u a l i f i e d t o do t h a t i n an

emergency, b u t it wasn't planned as a normal operation.

We d i d n ' t l e t ourselves s e t t l e t o our knees a l o t of

times t o get our hand on t h e s u r f a c e . Now I t h i n k t h a t

i s one t h i n g t h a t should be done more on f u t u r e f l i g h t s .

We should c l e a r t h a t s u i t s o t h a t you could go down t o

your knees, and we should work more on b e i n g a b l e t o do

t h i n g s on t h e s u r f a c e w i t h your hands. That w i l l make

our time a l o t more productive, and we w i l l be less

concerned about l i t t l e i n a d v e r t e n t t h i n g s t h a t happen.

ALDRIN Now we can say we have t h e confidence t o know t h a t w e

could get back up from t h e s u r f a c e . You might have t o

put your hand down i n t o a l l t h i s . The t h i n g t h a t d i s -

couraged me w a s t h e powdery n a t u r e of t h e s u r f a c e and

t h e way t h a t it adhered t o everything. I d i d n ' t see

any real need i n g e t t i n g down. I had no concern about

doing it. But I agree. I t h i n k i f w e need something

on t h e s u i t t o q u a l i f y it t o do t h i s , then we ought t o

go ahead and do t h a t . If it d o e s n ' t , i f it j u s t

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ALDRIN requSres :ookir?g at, 5he s u i t s t h a t we brought back and

(CONT'D)
saying that they're q u a l i f i e d f o r k n e e l i n g , we ought t o

do t h a t .

ARMSTRONG I f you have a g r i p on something like a scoop, o r a s t i c k

t o hold o n , t h e n t h e r e ' s no problem a t a l l i n g e t t i n g

buck up. You c a n qo r i g h t down and j u s t push on your

hand and push your-scLii r i g h t back up. it was easy t h e

t i m e I d i d it w i t h +,he scosp i n xy naand. ?'hat's one

t h i n g t h a t we h a d n ' t done a l o t i n our s i m u l a t i o n s , an2

it would be a h e l p , I t h i n k . L e t ' s go on with i n g r e s s .

10.35 FHdI'OGRAPITY

ARMSTRONG Photography through t h e Hasselblads on t h e RCU mounts

was s a t i s f a c t o r y . I d i d have some t r o u 3 i e i n s t a l l i n g

t h e camera on t h e XCU mount. The opening t o t h e s l o t as

you f i r s t put t h e tongue i n t h e groove was binding a b i t ,

ard I always tad d i f f i c u l t y g e t t i n g it s t a r t e d . I'a

never observed t h a x problem on t h e ground, and X c a n ' t

account for i t .

ALDRIN I took t h e f i r s t panorama out i n f r o n t without having

t h e camera nounted on t h e RCJ, and it d i d not appear t o

be unnatural t o do so. I t ' s nuch e a s i e r to opere-te with

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ALDRIN it mounted; however, I d i d n ' t f i n d t h a t t h e weight of t h e
( CONT'D)
camera w a s as much a hindrance t o o p e r a t i o n as p r e f l i g h t

s i m u l a t i o n s i n d i c a t e d it wQuld be. There i s no doubt

t h a t having t h e mount frees you t o o p e r a t e both hands on

other tasks. The handle i s adequate t o perform t h e j o b

of p o i n t i n g t h e camera. I don't t h i n k w e took as many

i n a d v e r t e n t p i c t u r e s as some p r e f l i g h t simulations would

have i n d i e a t e d . It seems as though, i n a l l t h e simu-

l a t i o n s where w e picked up t h e camera, w e always managed

t o take pictures. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t w a s t h e case i n

t h i s mission as much as w e thought it w a s going t o be.

We'll know i f a number of t h e p i c t u r e s taken are pointed

a t odd angles.

10.36 SWC DEPLOYMENT

ALDRIN I found t h a t t h e s h a f t extended and locked back i n t o

p o s i t i o n very e a s i l y . It f o l d e d o u t , deployed, and

unrolled, I w a s a b l e t o hook it i n t h e bottom catch

without any undue s h i f t i n g around, I n p u t t i n g it i n t h e .

ground, it went down about 4 or 5 inches. It wasn't

q u i t e as s t a b l e as I would have l i k e d it t o have been,

b u t it w a s adequate t o h o l d it i n a v e r t i c a l p o s i t i o n .

I could make t h e adjustments so t h a t it w a s perpendicular

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ALDRIN t o t h e Sun. The shadow t h a t w a s c a s t by t h e s o l a r wind
( CONT'D)
a b o r t e d a good check i n t h e f a c t t h a t you d i d have it

mounted perpendicular t o t h e Sun. So I t h i n k we g o t a

very high degree of c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l coverage. When we

g e t t o s u r f a c e p e n e t r a t i o n s , l a t e r , i t ' s going t o b e q u i t e

evident t h a t once you go p a s t a depth of 4 or 5 i n c h e s ,

t h e ground g e t s q u i t e hard. However, I d i d n ' t g e t much

of a cue t o t h i s a t t h i s p o i n t while i n s t a l l i n g t h e s o l a r

wind experiment.

10.37 TELEVISION

ARMSTRONG The TV w a s operated as planned w i t h no p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i -

culties. The one t h i n g t h a t gave us more t r o u b l e than

w e expected w a s t h e Ti c a b l e ; I kept g e t t i n g my f e e t

t a n g l e d up i n i t . I t ' s a white cable and w a s e a s i l y

observable f o r a w h i l e , b u t it soon picked up t h i s b l a c k

d u s t which blended it i n w i t h t h e t e r r a i n , and it seemed

t h a t I w a s f o r e v e r g e t t i n g my f o o t caught i n it. -For-

t u n a t e l y , Buzz w a s u s u a l l y a b l e t o n o t i c e t h i s and keep

~

- - ---- - .___ - - " . _ _ _ I

me untangled. Here w a s good j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e two

men helping each o t h e r . There was no question about t h a t

e i t h e r ; he was a b l e t o tell me which way t o move my f o o t

t o keep out of t r o u b l e . We knew t h i s might be a problem

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ARMSTRONG from our s i m u l a t i o n s , but t h e r e j u s t w a s no way t h a t we
( CONT'D)
could avoid c r o s s i n g back and f o r t h across t h a t cable.

There w a s no camera l o c a t i o n t h a t could prevent a c e r t a i n

amount of t r a v e r s e of t h i s k i n d ,

ALDRIN Neil i n i t i a l l y p u l l e d out about 20 f e e t of cable and then

I p u l l e d out t h e r e s t of it. It seemed t o reach a s t o p ;

it seemed t o have a c e r t a i n amount of r e s i s t a n c e , and I

thought t h a t was t h e end of t h e cable. However, when I

p u l l e d normal t o t h e opening, I found t h a t I could then

e x t r a c t t h e cable t o t h e p o i n t where I saw t h e b l a c k and

white marks on it. The c a b l e , being wound around t h e

mounting i n s i d e t h e MESA, developed a s e t i n it s o t h a t

when it w a s l y i n g on t h e s u r f a c e i n 1/6g, it continued

t o have a s p i r a l s e t t o it which would l e a v e it s t i c k -

ing up f r o m t h e s u r f a c e 3 o r 4 inches. It would be

advantageous i f we could g e t r i d of t h a t some way.

ARMSTRONG Your f Q o t is c o n t i n u a l l y going underneath it as you walk,

/

r a t h e r than over t h e t o p of it.

- -

ALDRIN One time when Neil d i d g e t t h e cable wrapped around h i s

f o o t , t h e cable very n e a t l y wrapped i t s e l f over t h e t o p

of t h e t a b on t h e back of t h e boot. That c r e a t e d a

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ALDRIN problem i n disentanglement. I d o n ' t know whether i t ' s
( CONT'D)
worth moving t h a t t a b o r n o t .

10.38 BULK SAMPLE OPERATIONS

ARMSTRONG The b u l k sample took longer t h a n i n t h e s i m u l a t i o n s

because t h e area where t h e bulk sample w a s c o l l e c t e d w a s

s i g n i f i c a n t l y f a r t h e r from t h e MESA t a b l e t h a n t h e way

we had done it i n t r a i n i n g . The MESA.table was i n deep

shadow and c o l l e c t i n g samples i n t h a t a r e a was f a r l e s s

d e s i r a b l e t h a n c o l l e c t i n g them out t h e r e i n t h e s u n l i g h t

where we could see what we were doing. In addition, we

were f a r t h e r from t h e exhaust plume and t h e contamina-

t i o n of t h e p r o p e l l a n t s . So I made a number of t r i p s

back and f o r t h out i n t h e s u n l i g h t and t h e n c a r r i e d t h e

samples back over t o t h e s c a l e where t h e sample bag w a s

mounted. I probably made 20 t r i p s back and f o r t h from

s u n l i g h t t o shade. It took a l o t l o n g e r , b u t by doing

it t h a t way, I w a s a b l e t o p i c k up both a hard rock and

ground mass i n almost every scoopful. I t r i e d t o choose

v a r i o u s t y p e s of hard rocks out t h e r e s o t h a t , i f w e

never got t o t h e documented sample, a t l e a s t we would

have a v a r i e t y of types o f hard rock i n t h e bulk sample.

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ARMSTRONG This w a s a t t h e c o s t of probably double t h e amount of t i m e
(CONT'D)
t h a t we normally would t a k e f o r t h e bulk sample.

ALDRIN I want t o i n j e c t a thought about s p a c e c r a f t l o c a t i o n i n

r e s p e c t t o l u n a r s u r f a c e working l o c a t i o n . Putting the

a r e a of t h e MESA i n t h e shadow a l s o put t h e cable i n t h e

shadow. The white c a b l e , b e i n g covered with a l i t t l e b i t

of t h i s powdery s t u f f and being i n t h e shadow, w a s very

d i f f i c u l t t o observe. Consideration should be given t o

keeping any cable or small o b j e c t out i n s u n l i g h t whenever

possible. It l e a d s one t o t h i n k t h a t i f you're going t o

yaw one way or t h e o t h e r , i t ' s p r e f e r a b l e t o p u t your

working areas out i n t o t h e s u n l i g h t .

ARMSTRONG We've discussed free-launch on a number o f occasions and

whether we wanted t o yaw s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r l i g h t i n g at

touchdown. There a r e obviously a l o t of advantages, but

I was very r e l u c t a n t t o do any fancy maneuvering on t h e

f i r s t l u n a r touchdown f o r s e l e c t e d yaw f o r l i g h t i n g con-

siderations. I f i g u r e d we'd j u s t t a k e what we got and we

p a i d f o r t h a t l a t e r , because we had a l o t of operations

i n t h e shadow during EVA t h a t would have been e a s i e r had

we had b e t t e r l i g h t i n g .

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ARMSTRONG I t ' s very easy t o see i n t h e shadows a f t e r you adapt f o r
( CONT'D)
a l i t t l e while. When you f i r s t come down t h e l a d d e r ,

y o u ' r e i n t h e shadow. You can see everything p e r f e c t l y ;

t h e LM, t h i n g s on t h e ground. When you walk out i n t o t h e

s u n l i g h t and t h e n back i n t o t h e shadow, it t a k e s a while

t o adapt.

ALDRIN I n t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h e shadow, when you f i r s t move

f r o m t h e s u n l i g h t i n t o t h e shadow, when t h e Sun i s s t i l l

s h i n i n g on t h e helmet as you t r a v e r s e cross-Sun, you've

got t h i s r e f l e c t i o n on your f a c e . A t t h i s point, i t ' s

j u s t about impossible t o s e e anything i n t h e shadow. As

soon as you g e t your helmet i n t o t h e shadow, you can

begin t o p e r c e i v e t h i n g s and t o go through a dark-

a d a p t a t i o n process. Continually moving back and f o r t h

from s u n l i g h t i n t o shadow should b e avoided because i t ' s

going t o c o s t you some time i n perception a b i l i t y .

ARMSTRONG We'll s t a r t h e r e w i t h t h e f l a g i n s t a l l a t i o n . It went

as planned except t h a t t h e t e l e s c o p i n g t o p rod c o u l d not

b e extended. Both Buzz and I o p e r a t i n g t o g e t h e r were

unable t o put enough f o r c e i n t o extending t h e rod. It

appeared t o j u s t be s t u c k and we gave up t r y i n g . So

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ARMSTRONG t h e f l a g w a s p a r t i a l l y folded when we i n s t a l l e d it on t h e
( CONT'D)
flagstaff. I suspect t h a t d i d n ' t show very much on t e i e -

v i s i o n but our s t i l l photographs should show t h e r e s u l t

of t h a t .

ALDRIN Neither of us i n d i v i d u a l l y could extend i t . We thought

maybe w e could extend t h e rod by both p u l l i n g , but t h e n

we d i d n ' t want t o e x e r t t o o much f o r c e because i f it ever

gave way, we'd probably f i n d ourselves o f f balance, I

don I t know how we '11 ever f i n d out what happened. I

suspect t h i s i s j u s t something t h a t may i n some way be

due t o thermal conditions or vacuum welding o r something

like that. It came out of i t s mount f a i r l y e a s i l y . I

thought w e had a l i t t l e b i t of t r o u b l e with one of t h e

p i p p i n s t h e r e f o r a while. Generally, it was a s t r a i g h t -

forward job t o dismantle it.

AIiMSTRONG The f l a g s t a f f w a s pushed i n t o t h e ground a t a s l i g h t angle

such t h a t t h e c.g. of t h e o v e r a l l u n i t would t e n d t o be

somewhat above t h e p o i n t at which t h e f l a g s t a f f w a s in-

s e r t e d i n t h e lunar s u r f a c e . That seemed t o hold a l r i g h t ,

but I noted l a t e r a f t e r g e t t i n g back i n t o t h e LM t h a t t h e

weight of t h e f l a g had r o t a t e d t h e e n t i r e u n i t about t h e

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ARMSTRONG f l a g p o l e axis such t h a t t h e f l a g was no longer p o i n t e d i n
( c ONT D )
t h e sane d i r e c t i o n as it was o r i g i n a l l y . I suspect t h a t

t h e weight of t h e f l a g p o l e probably had s h i f t e d i t s posi-

t i o n i n t h e sand a l i t t l e b i t from t h e p o s i t i o n w h e r e it

had o r i g i n a l l y been i n s t a l l e d .

ALDRIN How f a r would you estimate you got it i n t o t h e ground?

ARMSTRONG S i x t o 8 inches w a s about as f a r as I could g e t it i n .

ALDRIN It w a s f a i r l y easy t o g e t it down t h e f i r s t 4 or 5 inches.

ARMSTRONG It g e t s hard quickly.

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10-46
CONFIDENTIAL :

10.39 LM INSPECTION
ALDRIN I d o n ' t t h i n k we n o t i c e d a t h i n g t h a t w a s abnormal. I gueFs

t h e o n l y t h i n g t h a t I made n o t e of w a s t h e j e t plume d e f l e c -

tors. The one on t h e r i g h t s i d e as I was looking a t t h e LM

(which would make it t h e quad 1) appeared t o . b e a b i t more

wrinkled t h a n t h e one on quad 4. O f c o u r s e , t h e r e ' s nothing

t o compare it w i t h , because I'd never seen them b e f o r e . As

a m a t t e r of f a c t , t h e f i r s t time we r e a l l y s a w them w a s when

w e looked out o f t h e command module and g o t a p r e t t y good

idea of t h e i r s t r u c t u r e .

ARMSTRONG The only abnormality I n o t i c e d was (and it wasn't an abnor-

m a l i t y ) t h a t t h e i n s u l a t i o n had been t h e r m a l l y damaged and

broken on t h e secondary s t r u t s of t h e forward l e g .

ALDRIN This i s t r u e i n t h e rear, a l s o .

ARMSTRONG We d i d n ' t c a r e f u l l y check every secondary s t r u t , b u t t h e

primary s t r u t s d i d n ' t seem t o be damaged.

ALDRIN Yes, i n t h e f o o t passage, it d i d n ' t appear t o have s u f f e r e d

hardly at a l l . There w a s a s o o t i n g o r darkening o r carbon-

i n g ; I d o n ' t know what you c a l l it. A t l e a s t , I f e e l it was

a d e p o s i t r a t h e r t h a n j u s t a baking o r s i n g e i n g of t h e mate-

rial.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-47

ARMSTRONG We have some p i c t u r e s of t h e s t r u t s .

ALDRIN The p a r t k h a t had been melted, s e p a r a t e d , and r o l l e d back

or peeled back on t h e secondary s t r u t appeared as though it

w a s a much more flimsy design t h e n any o t h e r thermal cover-

i n g on t h e r e . I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e i s anything s i g n i f i c a n t

i n t h e f a c t t h a t p a r t of t h e thermal c o a t i n g t h a t w a s h i g h e r

up had s e p a r a t e d , whereas t h e m a t e r i a l .lower down had n o t .

I d i d n ' t n o t i c e anything p e c u l i a r about t h e v e n t s . There '

d i d n ' t seem t o be anything a t a l l deposited on t h e s u r f a c e

from any of t h e vents underneath or from t h e o x i d i z e r f u e l

vent up above.

ARMSTRONG The most pronounced i n s u l a t i o n damage w a s on t h e f r o n t

plus Z s t r u t . I t s being i n deep shadow obviated t h e possi-

b i l i t y o f g e t t i n g a good closeup p i c t u r e i n t h a t dark en-

vironment.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e b e s t p i c t u r e s we got were of t h e minus 2 s t r u t .

ARMSTRONG m e r e w a s l e s s damage t h a n on t h e examples we looked a t

preflight. J u s t t h e very o u t e r l a y e r s were p e n e t r a t e d .

ALDRIN From what I could s e e of t h e probes, t h e y had j u s t b e n t o r

broken a t t h e upper a t t a c h p o i n t . I d i d n ' t observe t h a t

t h e y had any o t h e r f r a c t u r e s i n them. One of them on t h e

minus Y s t r u t w a s s t i c k i n g almost s t r a i g h t up.

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10-48
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ALDRIN It was p r e t t y s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e metal case on t h e o u t s i d e
(CONT'D)
o f i t , and t h e r e w e r e n ' t any thermal e f f e c t s noted on it

at a l l . The i n n e r thermal c o a t i n g w a s t r y i n g t o p r o t e c t

something t h a t w a s r e l a t i v e l y f r a g i l e , t h e f l a g i t s e l f ; how-

e v e r , t h e r e w a s no s i g n of degradation on t h e f l a g . I don't

remember s e e i n g t h e minus Z probe. I d o n ' t know; maybe it

was there.

ARMSTRONG I thought I remembered s e e i n g a l l t h r e e probes. I t h i n k one

w a s s t r a i g h t up and one had a V shape.

10.40 EASEP DEPLOYMENT

ALDRIN Taking t h e cover o f f t h e l a n y a r d w a s very easy. It p u l l e d

away and d i d n ' t seem t o have any thermal or b l a s t e f f e c t s

on it.

ALDRIN Underneath t h e EASEP, t h e r a d a r looked l i k e it came through

without any h e a t damage t h a t I could t e l l . The l a n y a r d

underneath t h e thermal cover w a s i n g r e a t shape. I didn't

s e e any evidence of thermal e f f e c t s . When it f o l d e d o u t ,

t h e doors went up even e a s i e r t h a n t h e t r a i n e r . As the top

door folded back, it d i d n ' t seem t o f a l l i n t o a d e t e n t and

I tugged on it a couple of t i m e s . It looked l i k e it w a s

going t o s t a y up t h e r e without any tendency t o come back

down again. I n an e f f o r t t o save some time, I e l e c t e d t o

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 19-49

deploy both packages manually; I p u l l e d out t h e seismometer

f a f e w i n c h e s , disengaged t h e hook, disconnected it from t h e

t o p , and s l i d it o u t . I w a s unable t o t o s s t h e lanyard over

t h e s i d e door t o keep it out o f t h e way, s o it d i d come down

from t h e boom and had. a tendency t o g e t i n t h e way. The

package i t s e l f w a s q u i t e easy t o manage. I had my l e f t hand

on t h e handle and moved t h e r i g h t hand around t o support t h e

weight as it s l i d o f f t h e r a i l s . It w a s disengaged q u i t e

e a s i l y from t h e boom a t t h e p i p p i n . I had it down on t h e

s u r f a c e , and t h e n t o g e t ample maneuvering room t o g e t t h e

r e t r o r e f l e c t o r down, I decided t h a t I wanted t o move t h e

seismometer away. However, t h e r e happened t o be a s m a l l

c r a t e r r i g h t t h e r e , s o I had t o move it maybe 10 f e e t away

and come back. Remember, it d i d n ' t seem t o be a gocd p l a c e

t o s e t t h a t seismometer down, o t h e r t h a n r i g h t i n f r o n t .

It appeared t o b e i n my way a l i t t l e b i t . I n p u l l i n g out

t h e l a s e r package, I used t h e same technique, p u l l i n g out

a few i n c h e s , t h e n disconnecting t h e lanyard from t h e pack-

age i t s e l f , t h e n p u l l i n g t h e s t r i n g t h a t was a t t a c h e d t o t h e

pip pin. I n t r a i n i n g s e s s i o n s , I had p u l l e d t h i s one r a t h e r

slowly and f i r m l y and had a few problems w i t h t h e p i p p i n

binding. The recommendation w a s t o g i v e it a f a i r l y good

jerk. When I d i d t h i s , t h e wire r i n g t h a t a t t a c h e d t h e cord

i t s e l f t o t h e p i p p l n sprung open. E i t h e r it w a s a welded

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10-50
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j o i n t t h a t s e p a r a t e d o r thermal e f f e c t s somehow weakened i t ;

b u t it opened up and came loose from t h e p i n . I w a s able

t o g e t t h e p i n out by depressing t h e one s i d e . Then by push-

i n g it w i t h my r i g h t hand and pushing it through, it came

loose. Then I lowered it down t o t h e s u r f a c e and again it

w a s q u i t e easy t o handle. The boom s l i d back i n with no

problem. I l e f t t h e l a n y a r d s dangling out t h e bottom, p u l l e d

t h e r e t r a c t l a n y a r d s , and t h e doors came back down and f i t t e d

t o g e t h e r very n i c e l y . The whole o p e r a t i o n w a s q u i t e smooth

and I thought w e got a l i t t l e b i t ahead i n time i n t h e de-

ployment of these t h i n g s . I picked up t h e two packages and

we headed out t o t h e minus Y s t r u t looking for a r e l a t i v e l y

l e v e l area. Looking f o r l e v e l areas, I found. it d i f f i c u l t

i n looking down a t t h e s u r f a c e and saying e x a c t l y what w a s

level. I d o n ' t know what t o a t t r i b u t e t h i s t o p a r t i c u l a r l y .

You d o n l t have as good a horizon d e f i n i t i o n as on t h e e a r t h .

When you look out t o t h e s i d e , you've got a v e r y f l a t area

on t h e Moon. When you l o o k out t o t h e edges, you've got

varying s l o p e s . I t h i n k i t ' s f u r t h e r compounded by t h e f a c t

c

t h a t w i t h 1/6g, and a c e n t e r of mass d i s p l a c e d consid-

e r a b l y a f t and up from where it normally i s , your p h y s i c a l

,
cues o f supporting your weight are d i f f e r e n t . The r e s u l t

w a s t h a t it w a s j u s t a l i t t l e b i t d i f f i c u l t t o tell. what w a s

l e v e l and what w a s s l o p i n g , e i t h e r t o one s i d e or up or down.

CONFIDENTIAL
 10-51
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ARMSTRONG You d o n ' t have as s t r o n g a g r a v i t y i n d i c a t i o n e i t h e r , I

don ' t t h i n k .

ALDRIN Yes. It d o e s n ' t have as f i r m an o r i e n t a t i o n . That p r e t t y

w e l l covers t h e deployment out t o t h e s i t e . I n going

through t h e numbers of p u l l i n g t h e l i t t l e l a n y a r d s , every-

t h i n g progressed as n e a t as can be. The handle deployed

upward and r o t a t e d around, even t h o u g h ' I wasn't a b l e t o

s e e it f i t i n t o i t s s l o t . This i s t h e maneuvering handle

on t h e PSE. I might p o i n t out t h a t t h e f l i g h t a r t i c l e w a s

d i f f e r e n t i n c o n f i g u r a t i o n t h a n t h e t r a i n i n g package, t h e

d i f f e r e n c e being t h a t you c o u l d n ' t s e e when t h e handle w a s

out and locked i n i t s d e t e n t as w e l l on t h e f l i g h t package

as you could on t h e t r a i n i n g package. Anyway, t h i s worked

out quite well. Orienting t h e package i n azimuth w a s

q u i t e easy. The shadow o f t h e gnomon stood out q u i t e w e l l

i n our s e s s i o n i n t h e l a b w i t h t h e f l i g h t packages. We had

had some concern as t o just how w e l l t h i s shadow w a s going

t o s t a n d out a g a i n s t t h i s s i l v e r s u r f a c e . However, a l l

t h r e e of t h e p i n s i n t h e gnomon were q u i t e c l e a r . I won't

say t h e y were a very c r i s p shadow, as t h e r e w a s a l i t t l e

b i t o f f i z z i n e s s t o them, but i t was q u i t e easy t o determine

where t h e c e n t e r of it w a s and g e t it o r i e n t a t e d a t t h e

45-degree mark. The b i g problem a r o s e i n t r y i n g t o g e t

t h e BB t o s e t t l e down i n t o t h e c e n t e r of i t s l i t t l e cup.

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10-52
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ALDRIN It seemed t o want t o f i n d a home away from m e a t about
(CONT'D)
11 o ' c l o c k as I faced t h e package. I would t r y t o push it

down t o g e t it t o r o t a t e around and it would move away from

t h i s p o s i t i o n and s t a r t spinning around t h e o u t s i d e . Try

as I would t o move it g r a d u a l l y away or push down on t h e

package (away from where t h e bubble was) t o g e t it t o d r i f t

a c r o s s , I w a s completely unsuccessful i n g e t t i n g t h e BB t o

f i n d a home anywhere b u t along t h e perimeter. As I would

bend down and look a t t h i s t h i n g , it j u s t appeared t h a t

t h i s cup, i n s t e a d of being concave, had somehow changed i t s

shape and w a s convex. It d i d n ' t appear t h a t t h e r e w a s any

hope of t h e BB ever being anywhere b u t along t h e edge, so

I v i s u a l l y t r i e d t o l e v e l it as b e s t I could. As I indicated

b e f o r e , t h a t wasn't t o o easy t o do with any degree of c o n f i -

dence. Then I went t o deploy t h e p a n e l s . One of t h e two

r e t a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s t h a t should have f a l l e n away when you

r i g h t t h e package ( b o t h should f a l l down exposing t h e p a n e l s )

failed. So I walked around t h e package and e a s i l y reached

down w i t h my f i n g e r and f l i c k e d it l o o s e . It d i d n ' t r e q u i r e

much f o r c e a t a l l . When I deployed t h e p a n e l s , t h e l e f t one

came out and deployed completely; t h e n following another p u l l

on t h e l a n y a r d , t h e r i g h t one deployed. There w a s a c e r t a i n

amount of rocking motion and dancing around on t h e s u r f a c e

as t h e two deployed panels f l u n g themselves around b e f o r e

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-53

ALDRIN f i n a l l y s e t t l i n g down. During t h e process of doing t h i s ,

( CONT' D)
I b e l i e v e two of t h e f o u r corners came i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e

s u r f a c e and picked up a l i g h t c o a t i n g of s u r f a c e material.

I ' d say t h e t r i a n g l e t h a t w a s coated might have been

2 inches on one s i d e and maybe 1 inch on t h e o t h e r -a very

s m a l l triangle. So I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e was much degradation

a t a l l on t h e s u r f a c e s w i t h t h a t p a r t i c u l a r c o a t i n g . I

made one f i n a l i n s p e c t i o n and, when I l e f t i t , t h e BB w a s

s t i l l s i t t i n g on t h e edge. N e i l came by w i t h t h e camera t o

photograph it and he looked a t it and found t h e BB w a s s i t -

t i n g r i g h t i n t h e c e n t e r of it. I have no explanation f o r

that at all.

ARMSTRONG It would have been n i c e t o have a b i g rock t a b l e t o s e t

t h o s e packages on, b u t t h e r e wasn't any. The a r e a where

t h e y were placed w a s a r i d g e between some shallow c r a t e r s .

I t h i n k we have reasonably good p i c t u r e s of t h o s e r i d g e s .

They have t h i s same kind of s o i l consistency as t h e sur-

rounding a r e a . The packages were i n e s s e n t i a l l y s o f t

m a t e r i a l which allowed us t o j i g g l e them down and g e t them

reasonably w e l l s e t i n t o t h e sand, b u t t h e r e i s nc knowing

whether t h e y w i l l s t a y t h e r e f o r a long p e r i o d of time or

might slowly s e t t l e .

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10-54
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ALDRIN I think t h a t they retained t h e i r present position pretty

well. When I decided t h a t I wanted t o change t h e s l o p e of

t h e package one way or a n o t h e r , I found t h a t I had d i f f i -

c u l t y i n g e t t i n g it t o s i n k down a l i t t l e more on one s i d e .

Even by s c r a p i n g it back. and f o r t h , I c o u l d n ' t seem t o

lower one edge as.much as I would have l i k e d t o have.

ARMSTRONG There was no d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e laser r e f l e c t o r i n s t a l l a t i o n .

It worked as we expected.

10.41 DOCUMENTED SAMPLE COLLECTION

ALDRIN L e t ' s d i s c u s s t h e documented sample. We were o b v i o u w

/-
--_- /-

running- out
- - _- t t h e end of t h e EASEP
of time a w deployment.
- We

had l i m i t e d time t o conduct t h e documented sample. A figure

-
o f 1 0 minutes w a s used. I thought w e might a c t u a l l y progress

i n a formal excursion and g e t something s t a r t e d anyway.

As t h e box w a s opened, we got t h e r e p o r t t h a t t h e y wanted

two core tubes and it looked l i k e t h a t w a s probably going

t o take most of t h e time. While I proceeded t o t h a t -

because t h a t ' s e s s e n t i a l l y a one-man o p e r a t i o n -N e i l went

around t h e backside of t h e LM and picked up what rocks he

could i d e n t i f y , g e t t i n g as wide a v a r i e t y as p o s s i b l e . In J

unpacking t h e box w i t h t h e c o r e t u b e s , I w a s q u i t e c a r e f u l

t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y where t h e caps were.

\ -
I n some s i m u l a t i o n s ,

w e had misplaced them o r t h e y had dropped t o t h e s u r f a c e . v

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-55

ALDRIN I do t h i n k we -need a b e t t e r way of i d e n t i f y i n g t h e v a r i o u s

( CONT'D) - ____ -- -
packages t h a t have t h i s packing m a t e r i a l wrapped around them,
~
._
- ____ - _. -- - .
. .
s o t h a t a t a glance you'd know what i s i n s i d e a c e r t a i n

roll. I n many c a s e s , t h e r e i s nothing i n it. In other

c a s e s , i t ' s g o t an environmental c o n t a i n e r i n i t , or i t ' s

got t h e caps t o t h e core t u b e s . I n p u t t i n g t h e extension

handle on t h e core t u b e , t h e f i r s t one went on f a i r l y

c l e a n l y and locked i n t o p o s i t i o n with a f a i r l y high degree

of confidence t h a t it w a s not going t o come o u t . I won't

say t h a t t h e r e w a s complete c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e y were not

going t o come a p a r t . I t h e n picked up t h e hammer, went

out i n t o t h e v i c i n i t y of where t h e s o l a r wind experiment

w a s , and drove t h e f i r s t c o r e t u b e i n t o t h e ground. I

--
pushed it i n about 3 o r 4 inches and t h e n s t a r t e d tapping
---_
it with t h e hammer. I found t h a t wasn't doing much a t a l l

i n t h e way of making it p e n e t r a t e f u r t h e r . I - m t p d beat_=_

i n g on it h a r d e r and h a r d e r and I managed t o g e t it i n t o

,2_. - ___ --_--- - _______. \ -

t h e ground maybe 2 inches more. I found t h a t when I would

__ _ _ --- /

h i t it as h a r d as I could and l e t my hand t h a t w a s steadying

t h e t u b e r e l e a s e i t , t h e t u b e appeared as though it were

going t o f a l l over. It d i d n ' t s t a y where it had been

pounded i n .
-- -_
This made it even h a r d e r because you c o u l d n ' t
- -- __-- -

b a c k w d r e a l l y l e-ave it. I d o n ' t know i f we

__-

have any way of measuring t h e exact f o r c e or impact t h a t

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ALDRIN w a s applied other than subjective. Maybe watching t e l e -
( CONT D )
v i s i o n would be some h e l p . I w a s hammering it i n about

as h a r d as I f e l t I could s a f e l y do it. Unfortunately, w e

d o n ' t have any of t h e s u r f a c e s on t h e extension back t o

look a t t h e impact. I w a s h i t t i n g it w i t h t h e hammer t o

t h e poin'i. t h a t I w a s p u t t i n g s i g n i f i c a n t dents i n t h e t o p

of i t . I d i d n ' t f i n d any r e s i s t a n c e a t a l l i n r e t r a c t i n g

t h e core tube. It came up q u i t e e a s i l y . On r o t a t i n g it

up t o t h e i n v e r t e d p o s i t i o n t o keep anything from coming

f i n d -any tendency a t all f o r t h e material t o

o u t , I d i d n ' t___-
/

come out of t h e c o r e t u b e . When I unscrewed t h e c u t t e r ,

/ -
t h e s u r f a c e seemed t o s e p a r a t e a g a i n without any tendency

f o r t h e material t o flow or move. This meant t h a t t h e con-

s i s t e n c y of t h i s material, even though it looked t o be

about t h e same, w a s a good b i t d i f f e r e n t . If I had some

very c l o s e s u r f a c e m a t e r i a l and s h i f t e d it a l i t t l e , it

. would t e n d t o move from one s i d e t o t h e o t h e r . A t the

bottom of t h e core t u b e , I had t h e d i s t i n c t impression-

and i t ' s j u s t a d e s c r i p t i v e p h r a s e h a t t h i s w a s moist

L

material. It w a s adhering or had t h e cohesive p r o p e r t y

t h a t w e t sand would have. Once it w a s separa.ted from t h e

c u t t e r , t h e r e w a s no tendency a t a l l f o r it t o f l a k e or t o

flow. I p u t t h e cap on, p u t it away, and t h e n went t o

another area I would judge 1 0 , maybe 1 5 f e e t away. 4

I
/
.-
r_-------
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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-57

ALDRIN encountered about t h e same d i f f i c u l t y i n d r i v i n g t h e t u b e

( CONT I))
in. I imagine it went i n about t h e same
-
depth. It s t r u c k
r;L- -

me t h a t when I w a s removing t h i s core t u b e from t h e exten-

s i o n h a n d l e , it w a s coming o f f . I had less confidence i n

i n i t i a l l y p u t t i n g t h e two t o g e t h e r t h a t t h e y were going t o

s t a y together properly. When I w a s removing i t , it appeared

as though t h e end of t h e core t u b e t h a t a t t a c h e s t o t h e ex-

t e n s i o n handle had a tendency t o come o f f . I had noted t h i s

e a r l i e r i n some of t h e bench checks. When you. screw t h e

core t u b e i n , i f you a r e n ' t c a r e f u l when you disengage it

y o u ' r e l i a b l e t o disengage t h e cap on t h e o t h e r end. And

t h e reason I 'm b e l a b o r i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i s because

-_ I understand t h a t one of t h e ends d i d come

/-- --
- .
- ---
off. I guess I

c a n ' t be s u r e t h a t it d i d n o t come o f f at t h e time of d i s -

engaging. Perhaps it could have come o f f i n t h e box, b u t

I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h e y found t h e o t h e r end. So t h e assumption

i s t h a t when it w a s t a k e n off t h e extension handle, t h e

o t h e r end came o f f w i t h i t . It d o e s n ' t appear as though t h e

material spread around i n s i d e t h e box because none could be

found, s o it must have adhered p r e t t y w e l l . Did %e g e t

photos of both t h o s e areas?

ARMSTRONG I d i d not g e t s t e r e o p a i r s . I got one photograph of t h e

second one. Well t h e f i r s t one t o a high degree of

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10-58 CONFIDENTIAL
ARMSTRONG confidence w a s r i g h t i n t h e area of t h e SRC. We can
( CONT D )

-
i d e n t i f y i t s l o c a t i o n p r e t t y w e l l by t h e photograph. The
-------
s o l a r wind disengaged from i t s s t a f f q u i t e e a s i l y . When it
/

r o l l e d up, it had a tendency t o sneak o f f t o t h e s i d e and

r---------

c r i n k l e on t h e edges. I spent some 20 t o 30 seconds un-

r o l l i n g it and t r y i n g t o g e t it t o go up a l i t t l e smoother.

I t h e n remembered t h a t they r e a l l y d i d n ' t c a r e about exact

neatness. A l l t h e y wanted w a s t h e material back because

t h e y were going t o c u t it up i n many p i e c e s anyway. So

I bunched it t o g e t h e r and it s l i d i n t o i t s c o n t a i n e r f a i r l y

easily.

I n regard t o t h e SRC h e i g h t , we c o u l d n ' t t e l l , due t o t h e

i n s u l a t i o n , j u s t w h a t it w a s ; b u t w e gave t h e h e i g h t of our

l a d d e r above t h e ground. The photographs would f i l l i n t h e

story there.

ALDRIN It might be a d v i s a b l e t o have some simple measuring device.

It wouldn't t a k e very much. Perhaps by t h e use of some

marks you j u s t m a k e a judgment whether t h e d i s t a n c e between

t h e 3 and t h e 4 i s t h e same as between t h e 4 and t h e 5 or

whatever t h e sequence might be.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-59

10.42 SRC

ALDRIN The SRC's worked as planned. The only d i f f i c u l t y t h a t I

c-
._

encountered was i n c l o s i n g t h e boxes. Opening the second

one, I f e l t , r e q u i r e d a l i t t l e more f o r c e t h a n I had a n t i c i -

p a t e d i n j u s t l i f t i n g up t h e l e v e r lock.

ARMSTRONG Closing t h e bulk sample box took a l o t more s t r e n g t h t h a n

- -
-
I had expected. It took j u s t about everything I could do

t o c l o s e t h e document sample box. I was a f r a i d I might

have l e f t t h e seal i n t h e box. I d o n ' t t h i n k I d i d because,

at t h e t i m e , I thought I remembered c l e a r l y t a k i n g t h e

seal o f f and throwing it away; but t h a t ' s w h a t it f e l t l i k e .

I i n a d v e r t e n t l y t r i e d t o c l o s e one w i t h t h e seal i n p l a c e

at one t i m e during t r a i n i n g , and t h i s w a s very much t h e

same k i n d of s i t u a t i o n . It took an i n o r d i n a t e amount of

force. There's another d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e .

g r a v i t y i s s o low t h a t t h e box t e n d s t o s l i p around very

easily. It f e e l s very l i g h t ; s k i d s away from you. So, i n

a d d i t i o n t o c l o s i n g i t , you have t o h o l d it f i r m l y down on

the t a b l e . The t a b l e ' s not very r i g i d . It's quite flexible.

So j u s t holding t h e box s e c u r e l y enough i n p o s i t i o n t o ap-

p l y t h e high f o r c e on t h e s e a l i n g handles w a s some t r o u b l e .

QUESTION: Compare lunar versus Earth g r a v i t y .

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ALDRIN S u b j e c t i v e l y comparing t h e weight of t h e boxes (following

removing them from t h e s p a c e c r a f t on t h e c a r r i e r ) , I would

- just
say c l o s e r t o one t o t e n
/ - judging t h e d i f f e r e n c e s

i n weight and f e e l of t h i n g s and t h e way t h e masses behaved.

One t o s i x gives you the. impression t h e r e i s a much g r e a t e r

d i f f e r e n c e than t h a t . Now i n your own maneuvering around,

it d o e s n ' t seem t o be anything l i k e a f a c t o r of s i x i n t h e

e a s e i n being a b l e t o do t h i n g s . It would appear as though

t h e g r a v i t y d i f f e r e n c e was much l e s s . What I ' m saying i s

t h a t it looks l i k e t h e human can adapt himself t o t h i s

quite easily. It a l s o appears as though t h e handling of

/--- -
o b j e c t s i s considerably e a s i e r i n 1 / 6 g , as we had a n t i c-i -
i - _ _ __ ___
e- -
pated. I n maneuvering o b j e c t s around, t h e y do have a cer--
\ - -- __ I - _-

t a i n mass. When t h e y g e t going i n a d i r e c t i o n , they w i l l

_I--------

keep going t h a t way

--.as w a s evidenced when t h e y were coming.
<-----

i n t h e h a t c h on t h e LEC. They a r e f a i r l y easy t o manage,

b u t you.have t o t a k e your time i n handling them.

10.44 LM INGRESS

ALDRIN S t a b i l i t y and balance: Well, t h e f i r s t s t e p up t o t h e

bottom rung no doubt i s a p r e t t y good s t e p , though Neil

rr
t e l l s me he got up t o t h e t h i r d one.

ARMSTRONG The t h i r d s t e p .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-61

ALDRIN The c a p a b i l i t y e x i s t s t o do a good b i t more i n terms of a

v e r t i c a l jump t h a n c e r t a i n l y t h e POGO l e a d s you t o b e l i e v e .

There's no way t o e v a l u a t e t h a t i n t h e a i r p l a n e . The b i g

problem i n t h e POGO w a s t h a t it j u s t d i d n ' t seem t o be

a b l e t o b r i n g you down w i t h enough t o b e a r so t h a t your

i n e r t i a would c a r r y you as f a r as i t ' s a b l e t o with good

l e g extension.

ARMSTRONG The technique I used was one i n which I d i d a dee$'knee

bend w i t h b o t h l e g s and got my t o r s o down a b s o l u t e l y as

c l o s e t o t h e f o o t pad as I could. I t h e n sprang v e r t i c a l l y

e--------_ .

up and guided myself with my hands by use of t h e h a n d r a i l s .

T h a t ' s how I got t o t h e t h i r d s t e p which I guess was e a s i l y -L'

0..

1- __ . -~ - - -- - t w-r L~

5 t o - 6 f e e t above t h e ground.
I--
- - _---

ALDRIN The rungs of t h e l a d d e r were not i n any way dangerously

slippery. M a t e r i a l on t h e bottom of your boots tended t o

cause them t o s l i d e back and f o r t h .

ARMSTRONG They were -a l i t t l e s l i p p e r y .

ALDRIN I t h i n k we have a l r e a d y mentioned t h e adequacy of t h e p l a t -

form f o r o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s , t h a t i s , a l t e r n a t e ways of

b r i n g i n g t h i n g s up. The hatch moved inward very e a s i l y .

As I faced t h e h a t c h , I moved t h e camera from i t s p o s i t i o n

on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e floor, up o n t o t h e 2-27 bulkhead.

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ALDRIN I had very l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y , again u s i n g t h e same tech-
( CONT'D)
nique t h a t N e i l used. About h a l f way i n , make concerted

e f f o r t t o a r c h your back t o keep t h e PLSS down by keeping

your b e l l y down a g a i n s t t h e f l o o r . This a f f o r d s you t h e

l e a s t p r o f i l e going i n . .There d i d n ' t seem t o be any exer-

t i o n at a l l a s s o c i a t e d with r a i s i n g y o u r s e l f up and t r a n s i -

t i o n i n g t o a p o i n t where you can b r i n g your knees on i n s i d e

. t h e c o c k p i t , and t h e n moving from a kneeling t o an u p r i g h t

position. It a l l seemed t o work q u i t e smoothly. When

t h e r e i s a l a r g e b u l k a t t a c h e d t o you, you have t o be care-

ful. Once you g e t i n s i d e , b e f o r e you s t a r t t o t u r n around,

you must make adequate allowance for all t h i s material be-

h i n d you.

ARMSTRONG That w a s an i n t e r f a c e problem. As a matter of c a u t i o n ,

each person should be h e l p i n g t h e o t h e r as much as p o s s i b l e .

_c_c_-----
-
The f i r s t man i n has t h e b i g g e s t problem, a t l e a s t when
- he

gets inside t h e cockpit. H e has nobody t o h e l p him w i t h

c l e a r a n c e and I ' m s u r e he must use a good b i t of c a u t i o n .

ALDRIN The LEC d i d n ' t seem t o g e t i n t h e way a t a l l while I w a s

getting in. We had t h e mirror a v a i l a b l e , b u t I d o n ' t

t h i n k e i t h e r of us found any p a r t i c u l a r use f o r it.

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 10-63
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1 0 . 4 5 EQUIPMENT JETTISON

ARMSTRONG I d o n ' t r a c a l l any d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h a t .

ALDRIN Well, t h i s p e r i o d w a s prolonged a b i t t o try t o make as

much use o f t h e f i l m remaining. I t h i n k w e probably took

__
/--
- -_ __ . __
more p i c t u r e s t h a n we should have i n an e f f o r t t o make s u r e
_ _ --- - -
-
i

t h a t w e covered each p a r t i c u l a r window as thoroughly as

p o s s i b l e and w i t h as wide a range of s e t t i n g s as w e could

b e f o r e we proceeded t o j e t t i s o n t h e camera.

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k t h e equipment j e t t i s o n went w e l l and as planned.

ALDRIN We made an L i O H change a t t h i s p o i n t .

ARMSTRONG We included t h e c a n i s t e r as a s e p a r a t e j e t t i s o n a b l e i t e m

a t t h i s p o i n t , which w e had planned t o do b e f o r e t h e EVA.

&DRIN W e e l e c t e d t o l e a v e t h e helmets on because at this p o i n t

t h e r e w a s s o much s t u f f r a t t l i n g around i n s i d e t h e cabin

t h a t t h e y would have added j u s t one more bulky i t e m . The

primary c a n i s t e r change proceeded q u i t e w e l l t o t h e p o i n t

o f i n s e r t i n g t h e new c a n i s t e r . I ran i n t o a minor problem

i n g e t t i n g it t o r o t a t e f u l l y so t h a t I could g e t t h e cover

on. When it f i n a l l y d i d s e a t i t s e l f i n p r o p e r l y , I c a n ' t

f o r s u r e i d e n t i f y what I d i d d i f f e r e n t l y from t h e times

when it d i d n ' t seem t o r o t a t e . That seemed t o be what

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ALDRIN w a s stopping t h e cover from going on completely, t h e f a c t
(CONT'D)
t h a t when t h e c a n i s t e r w a s i n s e r t e d I c o u l d n ' t seem t o

r o t a t e it as much as I thought it should have been r o t a t e d .

However, t h e c a n i s t e r container behind t h e ascent engine

removed very e a s i l y , and.we were a b l e t o j e t t i s o n it w i t h -

out any problems. We d i d n ' t have any problem; I d i d n ' t

n o t i c e you had any d i f f i c u l t y giving t h e packages t h e

heave-ho. I t h i n k each PLSS bounced once on t h e porch

before it went on down.

ARMSTRONG Only one t h i n g stayed on t h e porch. That was a small p a r t

of t h e left-hand-side s t o r a g e container t h a t did not make

it off t h e porch onto t h e s u r f a c e . That w a s t h e l a s t item

jettisoned. Concerning t h e LEC, I had neglected t o lock one

of t h e LEC hooks which normally wouldn't have caused any

-.--

trouble. You would expect t o proceed normally whether t h a t

-\ ,

w a s locked or n o t . However, f o r an unknown reason when I got

t h e SRC about h a l f way up, t h e Hasselblad pack j u s t f e l l o f f .

-
I c a n ' t account for t h a t . I j u s t took t h e pack on up and

a t t a c h e d i t , and ensured t h a t it w a s locked when I put it on

t h e SRC t h e second time. When it f e l l onto t h e s u r f a c e , it

w a s covered w i t h s u r f a c e m a t e r i a l .

ALDRIN I ' m s u r e t h e r e i s a l o t of i n e r t i a with any package l i k e

t h a t and, w i t h t h a t low g r a v i t y , it-tends t o swing back

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-65

ALDRIN and f o r t h ; and i f t h e r e i s some tendency t o reach an

( CONT'D)
unlocked p o s i t i o n , it w i l l .

ARMSTRONG There w a s no problem because t h e l a d d e r w a s r i g h t t h e r e ,

s o I j u s t leaned over and down t o t h e ground and picked

it up. I had t h e l a d d e r t o hold on t o and t h e n I could

push myself r i g h t back up t o a standing p o s i t i o n .

ALDRIN Did t h e film magazine h i t t h e pad or drop r i g h t t o t h e

s u r f ace ?

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k it h i t t h e s u r f a c e c l e a r of t h e pad, on t h e r i g h t

s i d e , which would be t h e s p a c e c r a f t ' s l e f t . I wasn't

worried about t h e contingency sample because t h a t w a s i n -

s i d e a bag. If-anythgng--wAs going t o c a t c h f i r e , it w a s

--__.___-- -
going
- t o b e my whole s u i t because it w a s j u s t covered
-~ -_ - --
__--
w i t h that stuff.
_----

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10.46 POST-EVA CONFIGURATION
ARMSTRONG The post-EVA c h e c k l i s t went v e r y w e l l . It was w e l l planned

and we went p r e c i s e l y by t h e preplanned r o u t e w i t h p o s s i b l y

a few exceptions. They went very w e l l and probably took

about t h e same or a l i t t l e more time t h a n w e expected.

O f course, t h e time p e r i o d t h a t w e took while w e w e r e

b
waiting f o r t h e canister before s t a r t i n g t h e repressuriza-

t i o n w a s comparably long. We had t o p u t an e a t p e r i o d i n

t h e r e as I remember and took a l o t of p i c t u r e s .

ALDRIN Well, t h e r e ' s no g e t t i n g around i t , i t ' s another EVA PREP

exercise. I t ' s e a s i e r , b u t you s t i l l have t o go through

t h e same e x e r c i s e s such as p r e s s u r e - i n t e g r i t y check,

reading t h e cabin down, and configuring t h e ECS. I guess

i f you have two EVA'S, it probably would b e n i c e r t o

j e t t i s o n your equipment a t t h e beginning of t h e second

one, r a t h e r t h a n having t o add another DEPRESS. I ' m not

s u r e how t h e y ' r e planning t o do t h i s .

ARMSTRONG There s t i l l w a s a f u l l t r u c k l o a d of equipment i n s i d e t h a t

cockpit a t t h e end of EVA. I t ' s j u s t a bunch of s t u f f ,

and I w a s glad t h a t we were a b l e t o g e t r i d of a l o t of

it and f i n i s h t h e j e t t i s o n b e f o r e we s t a r t e d our s l e e p

period. With a l l t h a t s t u f f i n t h e c o c k p i t , t h e r e ' s

r e a l l y no p l a c e l e f t f o r people t o r e l a x .

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10.50 UPDATES FOR LIFT-OFF

ALDRIN On P57 b e f o r e l i f t - o f f , t h e Sun moved up i n t h e f i e l d of

view, as d i d a l l t h e r e s t of t h e s t a r s . The E a r t h s t a y e d

t h e same. The E a r t h obscured t h e forward d e t e n t and t h e

r i g h t detent. The Sun w a s now i n t h e r e a r d e t e n t , and

f o r some r e a s o n , it also obscured t h e l e f t - r e a r d e t e n t ,

which w a s t h e one I was counting on using with R i g e l .

T h i s w a s t h e one w e had used b e f o r e . I w a s q u i t e sur-

p r i s e d t o discover t h i s . The Sun w a s not w i t h i n more

t h a n 1 5 degrees of t h e t o t a l f i e l d of view. It completely

obscured t h e l e f t - r e a r d e t e n t . It e f f e c t i v e l y l e f t us

two o u t of t h e s i x d e t e n t s t o p i c k s t a r s from. Looking

a t t h o s e two d e t e n t s , t h e r e w e r e n ' t any stars n e a r t h e

center. T h e c l o s e r t o t h e c e n t e r of t h e d e t e n t you g e t

t h e g r e a t e r t h e accuracy i s . The day b e f o r e w e had used

Navi and i t wasn't p a r t i c u l a r l y b r i g h t . So I went back

and now could use C a p e l l a , b u t it w a s f a i r l y c l o s e t o t h e

edge of t h e f i e l d of view. So w e d i d a g r a v i t y l o n e - s t a r

alignment and t h a t f i r s t g r a v i t y alignment came up w i t h

00010. VERB 32 gave us 00001. , W e used a sequence of

marking t h a t involved an onboard averaging of f i v e succes-

s i v e c u r s i v e r e a d i n g s , followed by depressing t h e MARK

b u t t o n , and t h e n f i v e s u c c e s s i v e s p i r a l readings t h a t Neil ,

would l o g down as I would r e a d them o f f . Then h e would

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ALDRIN average t h e s e up and w e would p u t them i n . We'd use
(CONT 'D)
e i t h e r s p i r a l or c u r s i v e f i r s t , whichever appeared t o be

convenient.

I t h i n k t h i s averaging technique worked out b e t t e r t h a n

l e t t i n g t h e computer do i t , because it would have amounted

t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e r o t a t i n g of t h e s p i r a l and c u r s i v e

r e t i c l e f i e l d back and f o r t h t o make o n e ' s p i r a l , t h e n a

c u r s i v e , t h e n a s p i r a l , and do a r e c y c l e . There i s t h e

o p t i o n , however, t o do one o r t h e o t h e r . This w a s a

REFSMMAT alignment. The t o r q u i n g angles were f a i r l y l a r g e ,

t h e s t a r - a n g l e d i f f e r e n c e w a s 00007 which p r e f l i g h t w a s

t h e expected value of a two-star alignment. Torquing

a n g l e s were v e r y c l o s e t o 0.7 i n a l l t h r e e axes, which

i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e p l a t f o r m d i d d r i f t a f a i r amount during

t h a t t i m e period. We t h e n d i d t h e P22. I had hoped a t

t h a t p o i n t t o u s e t h e AGS t o t e l l me where t h e command

module was , b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y w e d i d n ' t update t h e AGS

w i t h t h e l a t e s t PGNS s t a t e v e c t o r s o it wasn't g i v i n g us

good range and range rate. I would recommend doing t h a t ,

i f anyone does a P22 i n t h e f u t u r e , because you c a n ' t use

t h e PGNS t o t e l l you what t h e range and range r a t e are.

And you c a n ' t u s e t h e r a d a r because i t ' s not going t o

l o c k on u n t i l it g e t s t o 400 miles. But t h e AGS g i v e s

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ALDRIN you v e r y good i n d i c a t i o n s as you a r e approaching t h a t
( CONT ID)
range. So we were a l i t t l e misled and I thought w e were

s t i l l w e l l out of range when we f i n a l l y got t h e lockon.

You c a l l up t h e program before t h e command module g e t s t o

400 miles. It s i t s ' a n d w a i t s ; and, when it g e t s l e s s

t h a n 400, it locks on a u t o m a t i c a l l y , and you s e e t h e s i g n a l

s t r e n g t h grow and it s t a r t s t o track: But i t ' s i n mode 2

s o you d o n ' t s e e t h e needles doing anything; t h e cross-

p o i n t e r s move, i n d i c a t i n g i t ' s got r a t e d r i v e going as i t ' s

t r y i n g t o keep up with it. Because we d i d n ' t want t o run

t h e t a p e meter i n t o t h e s t o p s , we l e f t it i n ALTITUDE/

ALTITUDE RATE.

We r e a l l y d i d n ' t have much of an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t any good

information was coming i n , o t h e r t h a n s i g n a l s t r e n g t h .

I guess t h e ground got t h e data on t h e downlink. When it

broke lock, I thought t h e command module w a s overhead and

it had broken l o c k because of a maximum r a t e d r i v e . The

r a d a r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from RCA had i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e SPEC

s a i d it might break l o c k , b u t he d i d n ' t t h i n k it would as

it went over t h e z e n i t h . But, because of t h e AGS indica-

t i o n s , I thought t h a t w a s what had caused t h e break-lock.

E v i d e n t l y , it had gone out t h e f r o n t f i e l d of view. It .

broke l o c k just a s h o r t time a f t e r t h e time given us by

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ALDRIN t h e ground f o r t h e z e n i t h passage. So I w a s f u l l y
(CONT'D)
expecting it t o acquire again. I d o n ' t t h i n k we had

our AGS configured and t h e ground w a s not as h e l p f u l as

they might have been had we run t h i s s o r t of t h i n g pre-

v i o u s l y i n simulations and had a b i t more t r a i n i n g on it.

We s t a r t e d t o do t h e P57 and r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s would be

t o o soon b e f o r e l i f t - o f f . It seems t o me we had a t i m e

period i n which we were e s s e n t i a l l y s t a n d i n g by. We d i d

a n abbreviated RCS check. Because one of them w a s a cold-

f i r e check, we got a l l t h e r e d f l a g s coming on. We d i d

an AGS c a l i b r a t i o n , got t h e ascent pad; t h e n , a t about 45

o r 50 minutes b e f o r e l i f t - o f f , we c a l l e d up t h e P57 again.

We d i d a landing s i t e option a t t h e TIG of l i f t - o f f . The

t o r q u i n g angles between t h i s alignment and t h e previous

one were on t h e order of 0.09 degree maximum. The g r a v i t y

alignment had an i n i t i a l e r r o r of 0.00001 and on r e c y c l e

had t h e same t h i n g . I d o n ' t have logged darn what t h e

s t a r - a n g l e d i f f e r e n c e was, but it w a s - probably on t h e

order of 7 t o 9 , somewhere i n t h e r e . It wasn't anything

t h a t made me jump up and down. But again it w a s measuring

t h e d i f f e r e n c e between g r a v i t y and a s t a r and, of course,

doesn't r e a l l y i n d i c a t e how w e l l you know t h e s t a r p o s i t i o n

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ALDRIN o r how w e l l you measured t h a t , because i t ' s relative t o

( CONT'D)
how w e l l t h e g r a v i t y w a s measured.

W e had an update concerning t h e p o s i t i o n t o leave t h e

radar for a s c e n t . W e were i n s t r u c t e d by t h e ground not

t o t u r n t h e radar o n during ascent and t o leave it i n

SLEW.

I t h i n k we l e f t t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s o u t . This was t o

keep from overloading t h e computer, i n a similar way t o

what had happened during t h e previous day d u r i n g descent.

I t h i n k t h a t ' s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t we do have t o deprive our-

s e l v e s of one a d d i t i o n a l check f o r i n s e r t i o n confirmation.

There w a s one more v e n t i n g of t h e descent tanks a t i n s e r t

- lift-off minus 30 minutes. I had t h e r a d a r i n SLEW

and t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s o f f .

ARMSTRONG I ' m q u i t e s u r e t h e y were o f f .

ALDRIN Well, I d i d n ' t want u s t o use t h e t a p e meter i n P G N S . Now

t h a t would have given us a l t i t u d e and a l t i t u d e r a t e out

of t h e PGNS, r i g h t ? So t h e y d i d n ' t want t o burden down

t h e P G N S with doing t h a t . Here I have on t h e c i r c u i t

b r e a k e r c a r d , l e a v i n g both r a d a r c i r u i t b r e a k e r s open.

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ALDRIN W e got t h e b a t t e r i e s on t h e l i n e a l i t t l e sooner because
(CONT 'D)
I t h i n k t h e ground thought t h a t t h e y might have cooled

down a l i t t l e b i t more t h a n t h e i r p r e f l i g h t information

might have i n d i c a t e d . So w e brought t h o s e on b e f o r e

T I G minus 30.

Another change - we l i f t e d o f f w i t h t h e updata l i n k i n

VOICE BACKLTP, brought t h e VHF ranging on. a t T I G minus 15,

and p r e s s u r i z e d t h e APS t a n k s . I guess it s l i p p e d my

mind, perhaps N e i l ' s t o o , t h a t t h e Apollo 1 0 crew had noted

t h a t t h e y s a w very l i t t l e decrease i n t h e helium p r e s s u r e .

A t f i r s t , it looked l i k e w e had about a 100-psi d e c r e a s e

i n Tank 1 and zero decrease i n Tank 2. That w a s probably

t h e worst t h i n g w e could have seen because w e f i g u r e d t h a t

j u s t one t a n k had p r e s s u r i z e d . The ground w a s a l i t t l e

concerned about t h a t . If t h e y were not concerned, I wish

t h a t t h e y had given us j u s t a l i t t l e b i t more comforting

thoughts a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , because we h e s i t a t e d

a t t h a t p o i n t , a t least I d i d , i n doing some more of t h e

switch c o n f i g u r a t i o n , w a i t i n g f o r a confirmation from them.

10.51 GENERAL LUNAR SURFACE FATIGUE

ARMSTRONG I wasn't t i r e d at a l l . I worked real hard a t a high

workload r i g h t t h e r e near t h e conclusion when I w a s p u l l i n g

t h e rock boxes up. We knew t h a t was going t o b e h a r d ,

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ARMSTRONG p l u s t h e f a c t t h a t we were r a c i n g around a l i t t l e b i t
( CONT D )
towards t h e end, t r y i n g t o g e t e v e r y t h i n g thrown i n t o

boxes and g e t t i n g a l l t h e p i e c e s put t o g e t h e r , I expect

ngr h e a r t r a t e r a n up p r e t t y good r i g h t t h e r e , b u t I had

a l o t of energy and r e s e r v e a t t h a t p o i n t , because w e had

been s o r t of t a k i n g it easy a l l through t h e EVA. Every-

t h i n g w a s , w i t h a few s m a l l e x c e p t i o n s , accomplished w i t h

a comfortable workload. We d i d n ' t have t o work h a r d

throughout t h e whole t i m e l i n e , and I knew I could a f f o r d

t o r a c e around t h e r e for 5 o r 1 0 minutes without jeopard-

i z i n g t h e operation a t a l l . They c a l l e d f o r a s t a t u s

check and I gave them one and we proceeded, b u t t h e r e

wasn't a problem w i t h r e s p e c t t o a v a i l a b l e energy and

reserve.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e f a c t t h a t y o u ' r e w e l l cooled o f f enables you

t o absorb a f a i r amount i n an i n c r e a s e of a c t i v i t y b e f o r e

it manifests i t s e l f . The oxygen flow r a t e concerned me

a l i t t l e b i t p r e f l i g h t because I found, i n doing some

f a i r l y s t r e n u o u s e x e r c i s e i n t h e thermal vacuum chamber,

t h a t t h e f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n I gut w a s t h a t t h e r e w a s not

q u i t e enough c i r c u l a t i o n of a i r o r oxygen t o b r e a t h e . It

tended t o g e t a l i t t l e s t u f f y i n t h e helmet.

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ALDRIN I t h i n k a l l of u s who have been through t h i s b u s i n e s s
(CONT'D)
know a good b i t about t h e pace of a c t i v i t i e s following

i n s e r t i o n , which i s r a t h e r l e i s u r e l y t.aken. However, you

can g e t wrapped around t h e axle doing a l o t of d i f f e r e n t

t h i n g s t h a t a r e n ' t r e q u i r e d -many of them are doing

t h i n g s j u s t t o s a y , "Yes" -you can add more and more

solutions. T h e r e f o r e , t o c a r r y out a minimum-rendezvous

e f f o r t i s n o t , as I would see i t , a very t i r i n g t a s k t o

look forward t o a f t e r descent and a prolonged EVA. I

t h i n k w e would have been f u l l y capable of c a r r y i n g out

a lift-off and rendezvous.

ARMSTRONG We handled one.

ALDRIN You j u s t are not going t o g e t any s l e e p while y o u ' r e

w a i t i n g f o r it t o be completed, but y o u ' r e c e r t a i n l y not

going t o be completely bushed chasing y o u r s e l f around t h e

cockpit. With t h e automatic radar l i f t - o f f and rendezvous

1
are f a i r l y l e i s u r e l y e x e r c i s e s . I guess I ' d have more

concern about Mike's a b i l i t y t o c o n t i n u e , because h e ' s

q u i t e a c t i v e moving back and f o r t h and doing a l o t of

manual t a s k s w i t h t h e s e x t a n t t h a t w e d i d n ' t have t o do.

ARMSTRONG We cleaned up t h e cockpit and got t h i n g s p r e t t y w e l l i n

shape. This took u s a while and w e had planned t o s l e e p

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 CONFIDENTIAL 10-7 5

ARMSTRONG w i t h our helmets and gloves on f o r a couple of reasons.

(CONT'D)
One i s t h a t i t ' s a l o t q u i e t e r w i t h your helmet and gloves

on, and t h e n we wouldn't have any mental concern about

t h e ECS and so on having two loops working f o r us t h e r e .

ALDRIN We wouldn't b e b r e a t h i n g a l l t h a t d u s t .

ARMSTRONG That w a s another concern. Our cockpit w a s s o d i r t y w i t h

s o o t , t h a t w e thought t h e s u i t loop would b e a l o t c l e a n e r .

ALDRIN . I guess t h e q u e s t i o n i s - Can you keep it cleaner? I

guess you could keep it a l i t t l e c l e a n e r , b u t t h e r e are

s o many t h i n g s going i n and out t h a t i t ' s almost impos-

s i b l e t o avoid g e t t i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of l u n a r

material i n t h e r e .

ARMSTRONG A couple o f comments w i t h r e s p e c t t o going t o sleep i n

t h e LM: One i s t h a t i t ' s n o i s y , and two i s t h a t i t ' s

illuminated. We had t h e window shades up and l i g h t came

through t h o s e window shades l i k e crazy.

COLLINS Why d i d n ' t you p u l l t h e window shades?

ARMSTRONG We had them closed. A l o t of l i g h t comes through t h e

window shades. They're l i k e negatives and a l o t of l i g h t

w i l l s h i n e through.

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ALDRIN You c a n ' t s e e w h a t ' s going on o u t s i d e , b u t you can come

q u i t e c l o s e t o it.

ARMSTRONG For example, you can s e e t h e horizon out t h e r e through

t h e window shades. There's t h a t much l i g h t t h a t comes

through. The next t h i n g i s t h a t t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l warning

l i g h t s t h a t a r e very b r i g h t t h a t c a n ' t be dimmed. The

next t h i n g i s t h a t t h e r e a r e a l l t h o s e r a d i o a c t i v e illumi-

nated d i s p l a y switches i n t h e r e . T h i r d , a f t e r I got i n t o

my s l e e p s t a g e and a l l s e t t l e d down, I r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e r e

w a s something e l s e s h i n i n g i n my eye. It turned out t o be

t h a t t h e Earth w a s s h i n i n g through t h e AOT r i g h t i n t o my

eye. It w a s j u s t l i k e a Light bulb. If I had thought of

t h a t ahead of t i m e , we could have put t h e Sun f i l t e r on

or something t h a t would have cut t h e l i g h t out.

The next problem we had w a s temperature. We were very

comfortable when we completed our a c t i v i t i e s and were

bedded down. Buzz w a s on t h e f l o o r and I was on t h e

ascent engine cover. We were reasonably comfortable i n

terms of temperature. We had t h e water flowing and t h e

s u i t loop running. We had t o have t h e s u i t loop running

because our helmets were closed. A f t e r a while, I s t a r t e d

g e t t i n g awfully c o l d , s o I reached i n f r o n t of t h e f a n

and t u r n e d t h e water temperature t o f u l l up, MAX i n c r e a s e .

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ARMSTRONG It s t i l l got c o l d e r and c o l d e r . F i n a l l y , Buzz suggested

( CONT 'D)
t h a t w e disconnect t h e w a t e r , which I d i d . I s t i l l got

colder. Then I guess Buzz changed t h e temperature of t h e

a i r flow i n t h e s u i t .

ALDRIN Yes. We f e l l v i c t i m s t o a time c o n s t a n t . Once w e n o t i c e d

it going bad t h e r e wasn't anything we could do about i t .

I n a d d i t i o n , because w e w e r e t r y i n g t o minimize our a c t i v -

i t y and s t a y i n some s t a t e of drowsiness, w e d i d n ' t want

t o g e t up and s t a r t s t i r r i n g around because it would be

t h a t much h a r d e r t o g e t back t o t h a t same s t a t e again.

So we t r i e d t o minimize our a c t i v i t y . W e underestimated

how much l i g h t w a s coming i n through t h e windows. There

must have been a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of l i g h t and h e a t

coming i n and j u s t b e i n g r e f l e c t e d o f f t h e s u r f a c e . We

had no f e e l f o r what gas-flow s e t t i n g w e should have had,

because w e ' d been on t h e c o o l i n g a l l t h e time up t o t h a t

p o i n t w h i l e moving around. I ' m not sure t h a t t h e r e ' s much

c o n t r o l over t h a t anyway. We f i n a l l y disconnected t h e

oxygen flow.

ARMSTRONG But t h a t r e q u i r e s you t a k e your helmet o f f , s o t h a t you

can b r e a t h e when you t u r n t h e s u i t disconnects. This

means t h a t it g e t s noisy a g a i n , and a l l you h e a r i s a

g l y c o l pump and s t u f f l i k e t h a t . This was a never-ending

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ARMSTRONG b a t t l e t o o b t a i n j u s t a minimum l e v e l of s l e e p i n g condi-
(CONT'D)
t i o n s , and w e never d i d it. Even i f we would have, I'm

not sure I would have gone t o s l e e p .

ALDRIN I d o n ' t know who w a s on BIOMED a t t h e t i m e , b u t I f e e l

t h a t I d i d g e t a couple of hours of maybe mentally f i t f u l

drowsing. I'll have t o say t h a t I t h i n k t h a t I had t h e

b e t t e r sleeping place. I found t h a t it was r e l a t i v e l y

comfortable on t h e f l o o r , e i t h e r on my back w i t h f e e t up

a g a i n s t t h e s i d e o r w i t h my knees b e n t . Also, I could

roll over on one s i d e or on t h e o t h e r . I had t h e two

OPS's s t a c k e d up at t h e f r o n t of t h e h a t c h , s o t h e r e w a s

ample room on t h e f l o o r f o r one. But t h e r e wasn't room

f o r two.

To c u t down on t h e l i g h t l e v e l , we're j u s t going t o have

t o do something w i t h t h e window shades t o make them more

effective. I t h i n k s l e e p i n g w i t h t h e helmet w i l l keep

t h e c o o l i n g down and i s probably a good reasonable way

t o go as long as y o u ' r e going t o keep t h e s u i t on. Unless

some change i s made, we'd never even t h i n k about t a k i n g

the suits off.

COLLINS Apollo 1 2 i s planning t o t a k e t h e i r s u i t s o f f . With t h e

longer stay-time and a couple of EVA'S, t h e y ' r e planning

t o take t h e i r suits off.

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ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e y ought t o t h i n k a l i t t l e more about i t . I

d o n ' t know what t h e temperature would b e i n t h e r e . I got

t h e impression t h a t it w a s a l o t c o o l e r o u t s i d e t h e s u i t

t h a n it would have been i n s i d e . I d o n ' t f e e l t h a t having

t h e s u i t on i n 1 / 6 g i s t h a t much of a b o t h e r . It's fairly

comfortable. You have your own l i t t l e snug s l e e p i n g bag,

u n l e s s you have some p r e s s u r e p o i n t somewhere. Your head

i n t h e helmet assumes a very comfortable p o s i t i o n . Even

out of t h e helmet, you d o n ' t have t o worry about what

you're leaning against. Your head d o e s n ' t weigh t h a t much,

and w i l l very comfortably p i c k j u s t about any p o s i t i o n .

I j u s t d o n ' t see t h e r e a l need f o r t a k i n g t h e helmets o f f .

ARMSTRONG I d i d n ' t mind s l e e p i n g on t h e ascent-engine cover. I

d i d n ' t f i n d it t h a t bad. I made a hammock out of a waste

t e t h e r (which I a t t a c h e d t o some of t h e s t r u c t u r e hand-

h o l d s ) t o hold my f e e t up i n t h e a i r and i n t h e middle of

t h e cockpit. This kept my f e e t up about l e v e l w i t h o r a

l i t t l e higher t h a n torso.

ALDRIN Well, you were back out of t h e mainstream of t h e l i g h t

except f o r t h e windows i n t h e AOT. I t h i n k w e could f i x

t h a t up and o b t a i n a more h o r i z o n t a l p o s i t i o n or t h e

c a p a b i l i t y t o roll f'rom one s i d e t o t h e o t h e r . That's

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ALDRIN j u s t something t h a t has t o be worked o u t . It wasn't
( CONT'D)
satisfactory. If we had known t h e n what we know now,

we could have preconditioned t h e cabin a l i t t l e b i t b e t t e r .

We needed t o s t a r t a t a warmer l e v e l by t u r n i n g t h e water

off , thereby s t o r i n g a small amount of h e a t .

ARMSTRONG T h a t ' s j u s t one of t h o s e areas t h a t d i d n ' t occur t o us.

It c l e a r l y needs some more work.

10.53 LFC

ARMSTRONG The LEC worked as expected; however, I have a few comments

worth noting. The primary one i s t h a t t h e L E C w a s a g r e a t

a t t r a c t o r of l u n a r d u s t . It w a s impossible t o operate

t h e LEC without g e t t i n g it on t h e ground some of t h e time.

Whenever it touched t h e s u r f a c e , it picked up a l o t of

t h e s u r f a c e powder. A s t h e LEC was operated, t h a t powder

w a s c a r r i e d back up i n t o t h e cabin. When t h e LEC went

through t h e p u l l e y , t h e l u n a r dust would shake o f f , and

t h e p a r t of t h e LEC t h a t w a s coming down would r a i n powder

on t o p of me, t h e MESA, and t h e SRC's s o t h a t we a l l

looked l i k e chimney sweeps. I was j u s t covered w i t h t h i s

powder, p r i m a r i l y as a r e s u l t of d i r t being thrown out by

the U C . This a l s o tended t o bind i n t h e pulley. I felt

like t h e r e was enough s i l t c o l l e c t i n g i n t h e p u l l e y t h a t

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ARMSTRONG it w a s a c t u a l l y binding. F o r t u n a t e l y , Buzz w a s able t o
( CONT ' D )
help a great deal. H e a c t u a l l y p u t t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e

f o r c e s i n t o p u l l i n g t h e boxes up from t h e t o p end, r a t h e r

t h a n me from t h e bottom end. I w a s s t a n d i n g a t a very

s e v e r e a n g l e , which prevented me from u s i n g as much f o r c e

as I had planned f o r p u l l i n g . The ground w a s t o o s o f t

and my f e e t s l i p p e d e a s i l y . I w a s l e a n i n g over a t approxi-

mately a 45-degree angle. I had one f o o t behind m e s o

t h a t i f my f o o t s l i p p e d , I wouldn't f a l l down.

The s u r f a c e was worse. I t h i n k t h e angle and s o on were

about t h e same, b u t I d i d not have t h e f o o t i n g . I couldn't

g e t t h e f o o t i n g i n t h i s s o f t powder t h a t you needed t o do

t h a t job.

ALDRIN There are s e v e r a l p o i n t s t h a t t e n d t o make f o o t i n g more

difficult. One i s t h e powdery, g r a p h i t e - l i k e substance.

When it comes i n contact w i t h rock, it makes t h e rock q u i t e

slippery. I checked t h i s on a f a i r l y smooth, sloped rock.

It w a s q u i t e easy t o g e t t h i s material on i t , and t h e boot

would s l i p f a i r l y e a s i l y . That f a c t o r t e n d s t o make one

more u n s t a b l e . The second p o i n t i s t h a t t h e s u r f a c e may

look t h e sme, b u t w e found t h a t i n many areas ( w i t h just

very small changes i n t h e l o c a l s u r f a c e topography) t h e r e .

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10-82
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ALDRIN would b e unexpected d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e c o n s i s t e n c y and
(CONT'D)
t h e s o f t n e s s of t h i s t o p l a y e r . For example, w e might

f i n d i n some areas where t h e r e w a s j u s t a s m a l l s l o p e

t h a t when w e were on t h e edge of t h i s s l o p e , t h e r e would

b e l i t t l e change i n t h e t h i c k n e s s o r depth a t which w e

penetrated. I n o t h e r p l a c e s , w e would f i n d w e had put

our f e e t down and w e would t e n d t o depress t h i s s u r f a c e

t o a new l o c a t i o n , as i f t h e r e were a d i f f e r e n t depth of

t h e more r e s i s t i v e subsurface. These two f a c t o r s gave us

a low confidence l e v e l i n our balance and f o o t i n g s e t u p s .

To keep t h e LEC coming smoothly on t h e i n s i d e and t o have

my p u l l on it i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d i r e c t i o n s o t h a t it

n e i t h e r t a n g l e d up near t h e p u l l e y end nor tended t o move

or s l i d e t h e p u l l e y as it went out t h e h a t c h , I found t h a t

I w a s completely unable t o look out t h e window a t t h e same

time. It w a s a q u e s t i o n of my looking at t h e LEC, t a l k i n g

t o N e i l , and hoping w e were coordinated. It would b e n i c e

t o work t h i s over more and t r y t o f i n d some way t o maintain

v i s u a l c o n t a c t back and f o r t h . I d i d n ' t f i n d t h a t easy

t o do.

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JULY 31, 1969

PREPARED BY:
MISSION OPERATIONS BRANCH
FLIGHT CREW SUPPORT DIVISION
VOL. I I
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MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

HOUSTON . T E X A S

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 11-1

1 1 . 0 CSM CIRCUMLUNAR O P E R A T I O N S

11.1 O P E R A T I O N S OF SPACECRAFT

COLLINS I n g e n e r a l , CSM circumlunar o p e r a t i o n s went smoothly, and

t h e r e w e r e no s u r p r i s e s . The s p a c e c r a f t operated normally;

it d i d n ' t have any f a i l u r e s .

11.2 NAVIGATION

COLLINS There wasn't much n a v i g a t i o n t o be done. I d i d u s e P21

s e v e r a l times t o p i n down t h e t i m e o f a r r i v a l a t t h e

150' W meridian, which w a s t h e prime meridian on t h e map.

It w a s a simple and easy t h i n g t o use P 2 1 t o g e t t h a t

information and update t h e map. The map worked f i n e w i t h

t h e t i m e t i c k marks, as long as you are i n an o r b i t of

approximately 2 hours' t i m e . The map i s a u s e f u l t o o l

i n helping l o c a t e where you a r e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e

ground.

11.3 LANDMARK TRACKING

COLLINS The o p e r a t i o n of P22 w a s easy. The procedures t h a t I

. had condensed i n t o a c h e c k l i s t on t h e LEB p a n e l were
-
more t h a n adequate. I always went t o P22 e a r l y , got
6
AUTO o p t i c s , and pointed a t t h e landmark far i n excess of

50 degrees t r u n n i o n . I sat t h e r e w i t h a PROGRAM ALARM

u n t i l such t i m e as t h e t r u n n i o n a n g l e came down below

50 degrees. A t t h i s t i m e , I punched off t h e PROGRAM

,
11-2
CONFIDENTIAL
COLLINS ALARM, and t h e o p t i c s t h e n began t o t r a c k . I found t h i s
( CONT 'D)
w a s an easy way t o o p e r a t e t h e system. I'had t h e center

couch underneath t h e left-hand couch f o r EVA. It w a s easy

t o move from t h e LEB up t o t h e MDC. I found t h a t window

2 o r p r e f e r a b l y window.3 could be used t o g i v e you a n

i d e a of where you were r e l a t i v e t o t h e landing s i t e . I

could look out e i t h e r of t h o s e windows and see a l l t h e

landmarks approaching. When I got f a i r l y c l o s e , a l l I

had t o do w a s l e i s u r e l y wander down t o t h e LEB, look

through t h e o p t i c s , and be ready t o mark. The problem

w a s I d i d n ' t know where t h e LM w a s , and t h e ground d i d n ' t

either. There i s t o o much r e a l e s t a t e down t h e r e w i t h i n

t h e intended landing zone t o scan on one, two, t h r e e , o r

f o u r passes. On each p a s s , I could do a decent j o b of

scanning one or two g r i d squares on t h e expanded map.

That map i s t h e 1:lOO 000 map c a l l e d LAM 2. The ground

w a s g i v i n g m e c o o r d i n a t e s i n t h e g r i d square c o o r d i n a t e

system t h a t were as much as 1 0 squares a p a r t . This

t o l d m e t h e y d i d n ' t r e a l l y have much of a handle a t a l l

on where t h e LM had landed. A s I s a y , it w a s j u s t t o o c

l a r g e an area f o r m e t o v i s u a l l y scan. I used AUTO o p t i c s

each time I looked a t t h e a r e a t h e y suggested. I never

d i d see t h e LM. I d o n ' t have any suggestions f o r future

flights. You have t o know w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e accuracy

- CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 11-3

COLLINS where t h e IN i s b e f o r e you can mark on it. If you knew

( CONT'D)
where it w a s t h a t a c c u r a t e l y you wouldn't r e a l l y need

P22 t o r e f i n e your e s t i m a t e . Perhaps a d i f f e r e n t Sun

a n g l e would y i e l d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a f l a s h o f s p e c u l a r

l i g h t off t h e LM s k i n g i v i n g you a c l u e . I looked f o r

.-
f l a s h e s and never s a w any.

1 1 . 4 MSFN

COLLINS MSFN worked f i n e . I w a s using AUTO on t h e high-gain

antenna. It worked w e l l . The ground w a s conscientious

i n updating AOS and LOS times. I don't t h i n k t h a t ' s r e a l l y

necessary. If y o u ' r e i n a near nominal t r a j e c t o r y , as

we were, i t ' s an easy t h i n g t o do i f you have good COMM.

If t h e COMM i s i n t e r m i t t e n t , you can waste 4 or 5 minutes

t r y i n g t o r e a d back and f o r t h AOS and LOS times which

r e a l l y axe not r e q u i r e d . When t h e LM i s on t h e s u r f a c e ,

t h e command module should a c t l i k e a good c h i l d and be

seen and not heard. The communications w i t h it should

t a k e on a n e g a t i v e r e p o r t i n g method.

11.5 PLANE CHANGE

COLLINS Plane change w a s not r e q u i r e d . The plane change pro-

cedure of uplinking a new REFSMMAT and gyrotorquing t h e

platform around t o t h a t new REFSMMAT i s a t e d i o u s pro-

cedure. I ' m not s u r e t h a t t h e gyrotorquing i s t h e way

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11-4
CONFIDENTIAL
COLLINS t o go. A f e w days b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t , w e abandoned t h a t
( CONT D )
gyrotorquing method i n favor of c o a r s e a l i g n i n g t o t h e

new REFSMMAT. The gyrotorquing took an excessive p e r i o d

of t i m e and had no p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t gimbal lock. We

could not even p r e d i c t , i n which d i r e c t i o n t h e platform

would gyrotorque. That w a s t h e s t o r y we were given.

Some thought should be given t o a b e t t e r procedure f o r

doing t h a t .

11.7 SLEEP ATTITUDE

COLLINS The procedure w a s worked out f a i r l y w e l l . I don't r e c a l l

any mention about deadbands. The ground, i n a l l c a s e s ,

wanted a lo-degree deadband. This w a s something t h e y

asked f o r i n r e a l t i m e . I t h i n k it would have saved some

c h a t t e r over t h e r a d i o had a l l t h i s been worked out and

put i n t o t h e f l i g h t plan. I needed t h e c o n t r o l mode and

t h e f o u r o r f i v e DSKY o p e r a t i o n s t h a t are necessary t o

achieve a 10-degree deadband. Had t h e y been p r i n t e d i n

t h e f l i g h t p l a n , I t h i n k . t h a t would have helped.

11.8 PHOTOGRAPHY
COLLINS I thought photography worked out w e l l when I w a s i n t h e r e

by myself. The amount of time I devoted t o photography

was somewhat l i m i t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t I w a s do'ing P22

each and every pass. P22 w a s not compatible w i t h good

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL 11-5

COLLINS photography. I probably would have spent more t i m e

(CONT'D)
t a k i n g p i c t u r e s had it not been f o r t h e question of t h e

LM landing l o c a t i o n and t h e need f o r t h e a d d i t i o n a l P22's.

I did use t h e intervalometer. I'll have t o w a i t and s e e

how t h o s e p i c t u r e s came o u t . I f e e l t h e command module

.-
should c a r r y p l e n t y of f i l m , and I t h i n k t h e key t o

g e t t i n g some good p i c t u r e s from t h e command module i s

having t h e luxury of being a b l e t o expose lots of f i l m

without worring about running out of f i l m .

1 1 . 1 0 MONITORING LUNAR A C T I V I T Y

COLLINS
. There w a s some d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e ground S-band r e l a y .

The p r e f l i g h t agreement w a s t h a t a l l my t r a n s m i s s i o n s

would be r e l a y e d t o t h e LM, and a l l LM t r a n s m i s s i o n s

would be r e l a y e d t o me u n l e s s t h a t mode of o p e r a t i o n ,

because o f systems f a i l u r e s o r o t h e r problems, became

too cluttered. A t t h i s t i m e , t h e ground w a s f r e e t o

amputate t h a t r e l a y mode. I n f l i g h t , it d i d not work out

t h a t way. The r e l a y w a s r a r e l y enabled. I gather t h a t

t h i s w a s because t h e r e w a s a ground switching problem.

I would have p r e f e r r e d t o b e r e c e i v i n g continuous S-band

r e l a y from t h e LM, and I f e l t somewhat c u t out of t h e

l o o p , although it w a s not a s a f e t y problem. I f e l t out

of t h e loop during t h e extended p e r i o d s of t i m e when

t h e r e l a y w a s not i n e f f e c t .

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11-6
CONFIDENTIAL
11.11 VISUAL MONITORING (MONOCULAR OR SEXTANT)

COLLINS I d i d not u s e t h e monocular because I d i d not have t h e

monocular. It went t o t h e s u r f a c e w i t h t h e LM. I don't

b e l i e v e it would have been of any u s e i n looking f o r t h e

LM. The s e x t a n t i s a more powerful and s t e a d i e r i n s t r u -

ment. It w a s not p o s s i b l e f o r me t o f i n d t h e LM on t h e

surface with t h e sextant.

11.12 C02 CANISTER CHANGING

COLLINS CO c a n i s t e r changing w a s t h e same as when t h r e e people

2
are i n t h e spacecraft.

11.13 MANEUVERING TO SUPPORT LIFT-OFF

COLLINS Maneuvering t o support l i f t - o f f w a s worked out w e l l pre-

f l i g h t , and I followed it t h a t way. I c o u l d n ' t see t h e

LM, b u t I d i d nonetheless go through t h e motions of

maintaining t h e proper a t t i t u d e s s o t h a t my r a d a r t r a n s -

ponder would be a v a i l a b l e i n c a s e t h e LM wanted t o l o c k

on. The CSM s o l o o p e r a t i o n s were f i n e . I w a s a t ease

about going t o s l e e p and l e a v i n g t h e command module

unattended. That d i d n ' t bother me a t a l l . I would have

guessed p r e f l i g h t t h a t it might have, and it might have

i f I had had some f a i l u r e s p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 12-1

12.0 LIFT-OFF, FSZNDEZVOUS , AND DOCKING

ARMSTRONG Feed water measurement w a s performed and t h e numbers were

passed t o t h e ground. I d o n ' t remember what t h e y were.

F i r s t , we zeroed t h e s c a l e and t h e n w i t h t h e empty bag on,

... w e took t h e bag o f f and r e p o r t e d t h e RCU weight, w i t h t h e

RCU and not t h e bag on. Then, we p u t t h e w a t e r i n t h e bag

and r e p o r t e d t h a t weight. T h a t ' s about a f u l l bag of

water.

ALDRIN Throughout a l l of t h i s , I d i d n ' t have a r e a l high confi-

dence l e v e l of t h e accuracy of what w e were doing.

ARMSTRONG One f u l l bag of f e e d water i s a l o t .

ALDRIN I would t h i n k t h a t a volume measurement might be j u s t as

accurate.

ARMSTRONG A volume measurement w a s t h e i n i t i a l p l a n . That w a s d i s -

carded based on i t s accuracy.

ALDRIN The ground had concluded t h a t t h e water l e v e l w a s lower i n

my PLSS. It would have seemed t o m e t h a t t h a t would have

been t h e one t o measure, b u t t h a t wasn't t h e i d e a from t h e

beginning. Since t h e y had some i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t consump-

t i o n w a s h i g h e r on mine, it would have been b e t t e r t o

v e r i f y t h a t one. We'll see what we g e t on t h a t .

CONFlDENTlAL

- . .. . . ._.. ... .. - . ... " _ . . _. . . .."

12-2
CONFIDENTIAL
ALDRIN We were given an update on consumables, and we have al-
( CONT'D)
ready t a l k e d about t h e s l e e p p e r i o d . They were looking at

your BIOMED during t h e r e s t p e r i o d s . A s f a r as I know, we

g o t up just about on schedule and s t a r t e d our a c t i v i t i e s .

I t might have been a good b i t ahead of schedule, maybe a

h a l f an hour o r something l i k e t h a t . To t r y and i d e n t i f y

j u s t what our p o s i t i o n w a s , t h e ground wanted us t o go

through a P22 r a d a r t r a c k of t h e command module. We had

done t h i s once, maybe t w i c e , i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , and on t h e

s u r f a c e , i t looked l i k e a f a i r l y involved t a s k . Once hav-

i n g r u n through it i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , i t ' s f a i r l y s t r a i g h t -

forward. It t u r n e d out t o be q u i t e a simple o p e r a t i o n .

Before doing t h i s , we configured c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s and went

through a DSKY computer check. I ' m n o t sure why it w a s

f e l t we needed t o do t h i s . These were notes as t o how w e

were t o handle a P22, option 1, no update. If w e g o t a

503 alarm, w e were t o key i n a proceed and l e a v e t h e t a p e

meter i n a l t i t u d e / a l t i t u d e r a t e s o it wouldn't d r i v e i n t o

the stops - i f it w e r e on range and range r a t e . It would

have been much easier t o do a VERB 95 b e f o r e s t a r t i n g i t ,

because t h a t ' s e v i d e n t l y what t h e y meant. We went through

an LGC . s e l f - t e s t and brought t h e AGS back on l i n e and t h e n

proceeded i n t o t h e P57. I might p o i n t o u t a f e w t h i n g s on

t h e previous day's P57. The yaw l e f t tended t o move the one

CONFIDENTIAL
 12-3
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ALDRIN star I wanted t o use, Capella, o u t of t h e r i g h t rear d e t e n t .
( CONT'D)
The Sun w a s i n t h e rear d e t e n t and g e n e r a l l y obscured i t ,

even though i t was not v i s i b l e i n t h e d e t e n t . Its light

l e v e l was s u f f i c i e n t l y high s o t h a t no stars could be seen

i n the rear detent. , The E a r t h w a s i n t h e forward d e t e n t ,

and due t o t h e yaw l e f t , it was also i n the right detent.

12.1 APS LIFT-OFF

ALDRIN We had another update from t h e ground i n s t r u c t i n g u s not

t o go t o AGS i n t h e event t h a t t h e LM engine d i d n ' t i g n i t e

and not t o make a manual s t a r t . We agreed t h a t we would

w a i t a mV. Everything worked according t o t h e c h e c k l i s t .

We j u s t emphasized t h a t w e d i d use t h e l u n a r a l i g n mode i n

t h e AGS and d i d not a l i g n t h e AGS t o t h e PGNS, s o it l i f t e d

o f f with i t s own r e f e r e n c e system. It d i d have a PGNS

s t a t e v e c t o r i n s t e a d of t h e manual one t h a t w e could have

given it i n t h e LM s l o t .

.
L i f t - o f f , or a t i g n i t i o n , we waited u n t i l t h e l a s t 2 o r

3 seconds , o r almost simultaneously, N e i l depressed t h e

a b o r t stage and threw t h e engine a r m switch t o a s c e n t and

I proceeded on t h e computer.

It might have been a second a f t e r t h e T-zero t h a t any

motion w a s detected. There w a s , as I r e c a l l , an a p p r e c i a b l e

CONFIDENTIAL

- . .. , ... .. . ., 7 . - ' '

. . . . . ..
12- 4
CONFIDENTIAL
ALDRIN bang of t h e PYRO's and a f a i r amount of d e b r i s t h a t w a s
( CONT'D)
t o s s e d out a t t h e same t i m e t h a t we d i d d e t e c t f i r s t motion.

I t w a s a f a i r l y smooth o n s e t of l i f t i n g f o r c e . There wasn't

any j o l t t o i t . Yaw s t a r t e d g r a d u a l l y ; it w a s not abrupt

e i t h e r i n s t a r t i n g or ending. As a matter of f a c t , I

r e a l l y d i d n ' t n o t i c e it. I w a s looking more a t some of t h e

gages and t h e a l t i t u d e r a t e , both i n t h e PGNS and t h e AGS.

It seemed t o take q u i t e a while b e f o r e w e accumulated 40 o r

50 f e e t p e r second.

The p i t c h maneuver, as seen from i n s i d e t h e c o c k p i t , w a s

n o t i n any way v i o l e n t o r very r a p i d as w e were expecting.

We seemed t o have a good a l t i t u d e margin looking down on

the surface. It wasn't something t h a t you'd d e s c r i b e as

a p a r t i c u l a r l y s c a r y maneuver. I f e l t t h a t w e had adequate

a l t i t u d e r a t e a t t h e t i m e f o r t h a t type of a maneuver.

Right a f t e r t h e p i t c h o v e r , I could s t i l l look o u t t o t h e

s i d e and s e e t h e horizon. We could v e r i f y out t h e window

what OUT p i t c h angle w a s .

12.4 VELOCITY AND ALTITUDE

ARMSTRONG V e l o c i t y , a l t i t u d e , a l t i t u d e r a t e , and a t t i t u d e s were con-

s i s t e n t . w i t h t h e a s c e n t t a b l e t h a t we were monitoring. AGS

and PGNS were c o n s i s t e n t i n a t t i t u d e as f r e q u e n t crosschecks

on t h e a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r s showed and a l s o i n a l t i t u d e r a t e ,

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ARMSTRONG which w a s being r e a d o f f t h e DEDA and compared w i t h t h e PGNS
( CONT' D)
value of H-dot.

ALDRIN A couple o f y e a r s ago, w e had a s i m u l a t i o n r i g g e d up t h a t

tended t o g i v e us t h e s e n s a t i o n s i n t h e cockpit t h a t you

were l i a b l e t o experience during LM a s c e n t . We d i d t h i s

i n t h e DCPS and t h e y r o t a t e d us back and f o r t h . Based upon

t h i s and many a s c e n t s i m u l a t i o n s i n the s i m u l a t o r , watching

t h e r a t e needles pop back and f o r t h , and t h e arrow needles

wipe back and f o r t h , I expected q u i t e a r o l l e r c o a s t e r r i d e

of whipping back and f o r t h . Nothing could have been f u r t h e r

from t h e way it a c t u a l l y t u r n e d o u t . It w a s a very smooth

wallowing t y p e of an a s c e n t w i t h fax l e s s excursions.

Maybe t h e t o t a l rates were approximately t h e same, b u t t h e

p h y s i c a l e f f o r t of them w a s not a t a l l o b j e c t i o n a b l e .

ARMSTRONG The r a t e s and a t t i t u d e e r r o r s and a t t i t u d e changes were

consistent with t h e simulations. The p h y s i o l o g i c a l e f f e c t

of t h e s e w a s much more akin t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n p r e s e n t e d

by t h e Apollo 10 crew of t h e i r a s c e n t engine burn. It w a s

very p l e a s a n t . It had a Dutch r o l l mode and r e l a t i v e l y

low frequency. It w a s not a t a l l d i s t r a c t i n g toward your

a b i l i t y t o monitor t h e a s c e n t q u a n t i t i e s t h a t were s i g n i f i -

cant. I t was a very p l e a s a n t and unusual t r a j e c t o r y .

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ALDRIN I t w a s q u i t e easy t o look out t h e window and p i c k up cra-

t e r s as w e approached them. W e were keyed t o look f o r t h e

Cat's Paw o r anything i n t h e c l o s e v i c i n i t y t o t h e landing

site. I d i d s e e s e v e r a l c r a t e r s , none of which I could

p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i e as being t h e Cat's Paw o r i n t h a t

immediate v i c i n i t y . The t r a c k looked good as we came up

and went by R i t t e r and approached t h e c r a t e r Schmidt.

Communications were e x c e l l e n t throughout t h e l i f t - o f f . We

had backup S-band angles a t 3 minutes. We d i d n ' t need t o

change any o f t h o s e . W e d i d accomplish everything i n t h e

checklist. The balance couple came o f f ; we were c a l l e d on

t h e START b u t t o n a t a minute o r s o a f t e r l i f t - o f f .

Changed t h e f i l m frame r a t e t o a t about 3 minutes from

1 2 frames a second t o 6 frames a second. Throughout t h e

remainder of t h e t r a j e c t o r y , I monitored t h e t a r g e t i n g

q u a n t i t i e s i n NOUN 76, looked a t t h e countdown t i m e i n

NOUN 77, t h e n picked up t h e DELTA-V t o go i n NOUN 85 , and

crosschecked it back w i t h V t o compare it w i t h t h e t r a -
I
jectory. The numbers agreed very c l o s e l y i n H-dot and V
I'
The a l t i t u d e looked l i k e it w a s coming r i g h t i n on t h e

t a r g e t e d values , and t h e AGS agreed q u i t e c l o s e l y . The

V t o go, i n address 5 0 , d i d d i f f e r a good b i t from what I

w a s reading i n NOUN 85. However, t h e AGS gave s l i g h t l y

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ALDRIN different targeting. I t s t a r g e t i n g i s done on a d i f f e r e n t

(CONT'D)
computation cycle , and I a t t r i b u t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t o t h a t .

The RCS q u a n t i t y looked good, and t h e a s c e n t f e e d seemed t o

be o p e r a t i n g q u i t e w e l l . To avoid any rush approaching

i n s e r t i o n , I e l e c t e d , t o open t h e s h u t o f f valves a t about

TOO t o 600 f t / s e c t o go. I opened them one a t a t i m e ,

t u r n e d o f f t h e a s c e n t f e e d , and c l o s e d t h e c r o s s feed.

A s we approached 50 f t / s e c t o g o , w e s t i l l had good pres-

sure i n b o t h a s c e n t tanks. O f course, t h a t w a s one t h i n g

w e were looking a t r i g h t up t o l i f t - o f f t o make s u r e we

were feeding on both tanks. I t h i n k we i n s e r t e d with

TOO o r 800 p s i i n b o t h helium tanks. Approaching 50 f t /

s e c t o go, w e disarmed t h e engine and it w a s an AUTO cut-

off.

ARMSTR ONG I t h i n k t h e overburn w a s about 2 f t / s e c , and we n u l l e d

those.

ALDRIN There was a c e r t a i n amount of bounce t o them, b u t s i n c e

w e d i d n ' t have anything over 1 or 2 i n Z-component, w e

were a b l e t o g e t t h e X-component down t o near zero, I

t h i n k 0 . 1 or 0.2. The out-of-plane residual was s m a l l , i n

t h e o r d e r of 1, b u t not over 2 . The AGS showed about

8 f t / s e c out of plane , and it was , as I mentioned, operat-

i n g on an independent alignment. VERB 82, as I r e c a l l ,

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ALDRIN showed something l i k e a 47-mile apogee. We d i d n ' t have
( CONT'D)
t h e r a d a r t o confirm t h e i n s e r t i o n , b u t MSFN w a s quick

t h e n t o g i v e us a good o r b i t . The AGS agreed very c l o s e l y

w i t h t h e PGNS.

We g o t our range r a t e from t h e CSM.

ARMSTRONG It w a s a s a t i s f a c t o r y range r a t e .

12.5 ATTITUDE

ALDRIN We got t h e a t t i t u d e h o l d and balance couple on. I don't

t h i n k w e reset a b o r t s t a g e and engine s t o p immediately.

We h e l d o f f on t h o s e , d i s a b l e d t h e T T C A ' s , and designated

t h e r a d a r down out of t h e f i e l d of view i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r

t h e alignment. We configured t h e s w i t c h e s , stopped t h e

camera, and progressed on with a l i g n i n g t h e platform.

12.6 PGNS AND AGS

ARMSTRONG The i n i t i a l p l a t f o r m alignment planned use of Acrux and

Antares as t h e s t a r s , knowing t h a t Acrux, based on our

s i m u l a t i o n s , would be c l o s e t o t h e horizon. I had an

a l t e r n a t e i n case it w a s t o o b r i g h t down t h e r e . When I

AUTO maneuvered t o Acrux, i t w a s below t h e horizon and I

c o u l d n ' t s e e i t , s o I chose t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t e , A t r i a and

Altair. I AUTO'ed, s o I went out of t h e program. I re-

e n t e r e d P52, going t o star 34, A t r i a , AUTO maneuvered t o

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ARMSTRONG t h e p o i n t , and it wasn't i n t h e f i e l d of view e i t h e r . Both

(CONT'D)
o f t h o s e stars had been i n t h e f i e l d of view i n a l l s h u l a -

tions. We terminated t h e program and r e e n t e r e d at Antares,

I think. Is t h a t r i g h t ?

ALDRIN 37 and 34 are what I have.

ARMSTRONG We r e e n t e r e d a t Nunki, which w e knew would be i n t h e f i e l d

of view. While I w a s g e t t i n g marks on N u n k i , I had Buzz

look up something t h a t might f i t w i t h Nunki t o be a good

second s t a r , and I guess you came up w i t h A t r i a .

ALDRIN Yes. I t w a s up i n t h e f i e l d of v i e w a t t h a t time.

ARMSTRONG By t h i s t i m e , of course, t h e s t a r s were r i s i n g a t a r a p i d

c l i p , and w e could go back t o A t r i a and be q u i t e s u r e it

w a s i n t h e f i e l d of v i e w .

SPEAKER Which one d i d you t r y f i r s t ?

ALDRIN Acrux. That wasn't i n , and n e i t h e r w a s Antares.

ARMSTRONG N e i t h e r w a s Atria.

No. We came back a t A t r i a and g o t i t , and t h e horizon

w a s - i n t h e f i e l d of view during t h e mark. But w e had

s a t i s f a c t o r y marks. We g o t a l l zeros on our s t a r angle

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ARMS TRONG d i f f e r e n c e and very s m a l l t o r q u i n g a n g l e , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t
( CONT'D)
our graph, our prelaunch alignment, w a s q u i t e good.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e l a r g e s t one w a s i n roll; and, of c o u r s e , t h a t

d o e s n ' t a f f e c t t h e i n s e r t i o n as much. The most c r i t i c a l

one i s t h e p i t c h and t h a t had 00064. The one t h a t i n t r i g u e d

m e w a s yaw (which w i l l a f f e c t t h e out-of-plane insertion),

and t h a t had 406. The yaw t h a t we had b e f o r e t h a t was

based s o l e l y upon t h e stax alignment t h a t w e used b e f o r e

lift-off. I t went w i t h t h e g r a v i t y , s o it i n d i c a t e d t h a t

w e had a very good azimuth alignment on t h e s u r f a c e . The

g r a v i t y w a s c e r t a i n l y adequate t o do t h e job.

12.7 RENDEZVOUS NAVIGATION

ARMS TRONG It w a s our i n t e n t t o p i c k s t a r s h e r e t h a t would be i n t h e

f i e l d of view and r e q u i r e a minimum amount of maneuvering

and time t o g e t through t h e alignment and would end up

back i n plane s o t h a t we would be i n a p l a c e where w e could

t u r n t h e r a d a r on, d e s i g n a t e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n , and s t a r t

g e t t i n g marks s o t h a t w e would have a good s o l u t i o n f o r

CSI. Somehow o r o t h e r , a l l t h i s planning d i d n ' t work out

on t h o s e stars. Why o u r s i m u l a t i o n s d i d n o t c o r r e c t l y

p l a c e t h o s e stars r e l a t i v e t o t h e h o r i z o n , I d o n ' t know.

They d i d n ' t , s o w e wasted a l i t t l e t i m e and a l i t t l e f u e l .

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ALDRIN Even w i t h t h e s e problems, we d i d q u i t e w e l l because we

f i n i s h e d about 28 - 27 minutes b e f o r e CSI and were a b l e t o

proceed w i t h g e t t i n g t h e r a d a r t o lock on. That w a s accom-

p l i s h e d without any d i f f i c u l t y . We got one VERB 1 NOUN 49

t h a t we accepted. Before e n t e r i n g t h e program, w e had

VERB 95 t h e n loaded t o W-matrix. The enable updates - only'

one o f them ( t h e f i r s t ) f a i l e d t o pass t h e t e s t , b u t it w a s

s i g n i f i c a n t l y s m a l l , s o we proceeded on it. While N e i l w a s

doing t h e alignment, I q u e r i e d t h e AGS t o s e e what it thought

o f t h e i n s e r t i o n and what it thought t h e CSI maneuver would

be. It came up, j u s t based on t h e i n s e r t i o n v e c t o r , w i t h

1 5 . 5 DELTA-H and 51.3 f t / s e c .

12.10 ASCENT CAMERA

ALDRIN The camera w a s s e t up with s e t t i n g s as i n t h e c h e c k l i s t ,

and i n s e r t e d ( p a s t e d ) i n t o t h e c h e c k l i s t a t T I G minus 2 w a s

a n o t a t i o n of camera on. A t t h a t p o i n t , s i n c e w e were

s t a r t i n g a t 1 2 frames p e r second, it w a s t o o e a r l y t o b r i n g

t h e camera on. I would e s t i m a t e something on t h e o r d e r of

30 t o 40 seconds i n t o t h e a s c e n t b e f o r e t h e camera w a s t u r n e d

on.

I n looking down a t t h e t i m e o f t h e p i t c h o v e r , I could see

r a d i a t i n g out m a n y , many p a r t i c l e s of Kapton and p i e c e s of

thermal c o a t i n g from t h e descent s t a g e . It seemed almost

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ALDRIN t o be going out w i t h a slow-motion t y p e view. It d i d n ' t
( CONT D)
seem t o be dropping much i n t h e n e a r v i c i n i t y of t h e LM.

I ' m sure many of them were. They seemed t o be going enor-

mous d i s t a n c e s from t h e i n i t i a l PYRO f i r i n g and t h e a s c e n t

engine impinging upon t h e t o p of t h e descent s t a g e .

MTRONG A t t h e completion of t h e p i t c h o v e r , you could e a s i l y d e t e c t

v i s u a l l y t h a t a s t r o n g p o s i t i v e outward r a d i a l r a t e had

been e s t a b l i s h e d . There was no concern about a t t i t u d e o r

f a l l i n g back toward t h e Moon. I observed one s i z a b l e p i e c e

of t h e s p a c e c r a f t f l y i n g along below us f o r a very long

p e r i o d of t i m e a f t e r l i f t - o f f . I s a w it h i t t h e ground

below us somewhere between 1 and 2 minutes i n t o t h e tra-

jectory.

ALDRIN I t ' s very d i f f i c u l t t o conceive of such l i g h t w e i g h t p a r t i -

c l e s l i k e t h a t just t a k i n g o f f without any r e s i s t a n c e a t

all. I t ' s easy t o t h i n k back and say t h a t they would do

that. But it j u s t seems s o u n n a t u r a l f o r such flimsy par-

t i c l e s t o keep moving a t t h i s c o n s t a n t v e l o c i t y r a d i a l l y

outward i n every d i r e c t i o n t h a t I could s e e o u t t h e f r o n t

window. I don't r e c a l l s e e i n g any impact w i t h t h e ground,

b u t t h e r e were s i z a b l e p i e c e s .

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12.13 UPDATES FOR CSI

ALDRIN The ground gave us an update of 51.5 f t / s e c f o r CSI w i t h a

1 f t / s e c out of plane. I have t h e values logged down h e r e

for what t h e PGNS came up w i t h , and i t e v e n t u a l l y s e t t l e d

down on 51.5, a l s o . .Mike's s o l u t i o n agreed w i t h t h e AGS

a t 51.3, and we e l e c t e d t o burn o u r s o l u t i o n without any

out-of-plane component.

ARMSTRONG I w a s j u s t amazed t h a t we had f o u r s o l u t i o n s w i t h i n

0 . 2 f t / s e c f o r CSI. That never happened b e f o r e .

12.15 RCS/CSI BURN

ALDRIN I might p o i n t out two reasons why we d i d n ' t g e t a backup

chart solution. One of them w a s t h e alignment. It took a

l i t t l e more t i m e . I t h i n k w e could have g o t t e n a range

r a t e a t 28 and s t i l l g o t t e n a good s o l u t i o n ; however, t h e

range r a t e t h a t w e were reading a t t h a t p o i n t w a s about

51 ft/sec. This w a s l e s s t h a n t h e values t h a t were accept-

able f o r the chart. I n o t h e r words , it exceeded t h e l i m i t s

for t h e rendezvous c h a r t s , and s i n c e w e d i d end up w i t h a

1 5 - m i l e DELTA-H and had a good nominal i n s e r t i o n , t h e only

t h i n g I can a t t r i b u t e it t o i s t h e command module not being

i n a c i r c u l a r o r b i t having enough e c c e n t r i c i t y t o p e r t u r b

t h e R-dot from what it should have been. I think t h i s i s

another i n d i c a t i o n of where a l a t e t r a j e c t o r y change was

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ALDRIN not completely analyzed t o see what e f f e c t s it had. Cer-
( CONT D )
t a i n l y , w e had nominal c o n d i t i o n s , but the trajectory

change d i d r e s u l t i n range r a t e values t h a t exceeded t h e

a b i l i t y of t h e c h a r t t o cope w i t h them.

SPEAKER How about t h e handling?

ALDRIN The n u l l i n g of r e s i d u a l s w i t h t h e t h r u s t e r s , even w i t h two-

j e t operations , produced a pronounced d i f f e r e n c e i n t r a n s -

l a t i n g with j u s t t h e ascent stage. Each t i m e you h i t t h e

t h r u s t c o n t r o l l e r , t h e v e h i c l e behaved as i f somebody h i t

it w i t h a s l e d g e hammer, and you j u s t moved. There i s no

doubt about t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t h r u s t e r s were f i r i n g .

ARMSTRONG I t ' s a very l i g h t , dancing v e h i c l e , and t h i s i s t r u e i n

a t t i t u d e also. I t ' s very unusual, and t h e f a c t t h a t w e

g o t f i v e zeros on thak alignment, I t h i n k , i s j u s t a m a t -

t e r of being c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a l l t h e o t h e r good luck we

had t h a t day. It c e r t a i n l y w a s more d i f f i c u l t t o do t h a n

t h e unstaged alignment where t h e v e h i c l e w a s a l o t s t e a d i e r ,

and w e d i d n ' t g e t results t h a t were t h a t good.

ALDRIN It w a s s p o r t y ; t h e r e ' s no doubt about it. It appeared

t h a t w i t h t h e automatic t r a c k i n g and t h e wide deadband o f

t h e r a d a r t h a t it w a s not bouncing a l l over t h e sky. I

guess I a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t it might have been even s p o r t i e r

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ALDRIN t h a n it t u r n e d out t o b e , even though it w a s a d i f f i c u l t

( CONT'D)
job doing p r e c i s e a l i g n i n g w i t h it. I t h i n k t h e 10 m i s -

sion indicated that. They thought t h a t t h e y had a l i g h t -

weight v e h i c l e , b u t , o f c o u r s e , t h e y had much more f u e l on

board t h a n w e d i d . ,

ARMSTRONG We d i d n o t f i n d as s e v e r e a r e a c t i o n t o o p e r a t i n g i n PGNS

AUTO as had been e a r l i e r r e p o r t e d . I c a n ' t confirm j u s t

what t h e i r c o n f i g u r a t i o n w a s i n terms of t h e DAP and v e h i c l e

i n e r t i a s , b u t our combinations made t h e v e h i c l e f l y q u i t e

comfortably i n PGNS AUTO. We used t h a t mode more or l e s s

i n t e r m i t t e n t l y w i t h PGNS p u l s e . We almost d i d a l l t h e man-

u a l f l y i n g i n PGNS p u l s e , and t h e remainder of t h e t i m e , w e

were i n PGNS AUTO. Burns i n PGNS a t t i t u d e holds were gen-

e r a l l y done with VERB 77.

ALDRIN That l i g h t w e i g h t a v e h i c l e d i d appear as though it w a s not

an easy t a s k t o m a k e e i t h e r X- o r Z-axis burns. O f course,

a l l burns were Z - a x i s burns. To make them, and a t t h e

same time avoid having r e s i d u a l s o f a f a i r l y s i z a b l e number

( a t least l e s s than 1 f t / s e c ) i s q u i t e d i f f i c u l t . We d i d

end up w i t h minus 0 . 2 , p l u s 0.7, minus 0.1. The AGS agreed

f a i r l y c l o s e a g a i n , showing t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f e r e n c e i n Z ,

which I t h i n k i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e r o t a t i o n o f t h e burn

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ALDRIN when loaded i n t o t h e AGS. The r a d a r s t a y e d locked on
( CONT D )
throughout t h e maneuver.

We s t a r t e d updating r i g h t on schedule, changing t h e

W-matrix t o t h e f l i g h t p l a n v a l u e s . We checked t h e num-

b e r s j u s t b e f o r e w e changed i t . I t h i n k w e could r e c a l l

t h e m , i f somebody wanted t h e m . 1 9 0 0 , maybe something l i k e

15.3 m i l l i r a d i a n s . Then w e s t a r t e d t o work on t h e plane

change. What I d i d w a s make use of VERB 90 and ask it

what out-of-plane c o n d i t i o n it had r i g h t now. This saves

a l i t t l e b i t of t i m e i n n o t having t o load i n numbers. We

w e r e coming up w i t h t h i n g s on t h e o r d e r of 1 mile out of

plane and 2 o r 3 f t / s e c . The a c t u a l s o l u t i o n s t h a t both

v e h i c l e s came up w i t h w e r e : our f i r s t one w a s minus 3.2,

Mike had minus 2.3; our f i n a l one w a s minus 2.9. As s m a l l

as t h e y w e r e , w e c a n c e l l e d t h e plane change maneuver t o

g e t more t r a c k i n g d a t a .

12.18 RCS/CDH BURN

ALDRIN A t CDH, w e took o u t t i m e as computed by t h e CSI program

f o r t h e CDH maneuver and voiced i n t h e maneuver t o Mike

t o put i n h i s ~ 7 6 . When y o u ' r e r e a l l y g e t t i n g p r e c i s e ,

t h e q u e s t i o n arises what t o do w i t h r e s i d u a l s on t h e o r d e r

of a couple of t e n t h s . Do you t a k e advantage of them o r

ignore them? We chose t o i g n o r e t h e s e small amounts and

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ALDRIN not t h r u s t . The exception w a s t h e out-of-plane condition,

( CONT'D)
and w e were handling t h a t as a s e p a r a t e item anyway.

DELTA-H v a r i e d between CSI and CDH s o l u t i o n s anywhere from

15.3 t o 15.7. I n g e n e r a l , t h e CDH maneuver decreased i n

magnitude. Even on t h e ones w e had i n t h e CSI program, it

came up w i t h 1 9 . 3 f t / s e c and s e t t l e d down t o 18, which I

t h i n k i s i n d i c a t i v e of t h e n o n c i r c u l a r i t y of Mike's o r b i t .

We had no concrete evidence of t h a t r e a l l y . O u r procedures

had n o t c a l l e d f o r f i n d i n g w h a t h i s o r b i t w a s . The ground

never d i d t e l l us what h i s o r b i t w a s and what w e ought t o

expect f o r CDH. I t h i n k we were k i n d of l e f t on o u r own

coming up f o r CDH as t o w h a t was an acceptable burn. The

d a t a card g i v e s a nominal €1-dot of 4 ft/sec. We had 1.8.

COLLINS Four i s f o r c i r c u l a r CSM o r b i t .

ALDRIN Yes, and t h a t ' s what y o u ' r e supposed t o have.

COLLINS I didn't.

12.20 TARGETING PGNS AND AGS

ALDRIN I had components h e r e f o r t h e AGS maneuver: CDH 9 . 1 ,

2 . 4 , and 14.6. A s p e r t h e procedures loaded i n t h e PGNS

maneuver, t h e AGS w a s updated w i t h t h e PGNS f o r CDH.

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12.21 UPDATING AGS WITH RR DATA

ALDRIN A f t e r CDH, t h i n g s seemed t o b e working s o smoothly, and

DELTA-H seemed t o be s o c o n s t a n t t h a t I e l e c t e d t o s t a r t

p u t t i n g r a d a r d a t a i n t o t h e AGS. This seemed t o b e accom-

p l i s h e d without an undue time burden. I ' v e got t h e d a t a

h e r e t h a t i n d i c a t e s what t h e AGS s o l u t i o n w a s f o r TPI with

only AGS update going i n t o it. I t h i n k t h i s w i l l be f a i r l y

i n t e r e s t i n g t o some people. I n o t h e r words, it s o l v e d for

a TPI.

12.23 RCS/TPI

ALDRIN We burned t h e PGNS a t TPI and t h e n I l e f t t h e AGS r e s i d u a l s ,

which are a measure o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t it would have

solved, and t h e y were on t h e o r d e r of 2-1/2 t o 3 f t / s e c .

Everybody zeroed i n on about t h e same maneuver f o r t h e T P I .

I guess i n t h e LM you want t o delay committing y o u r s e l f ,

s i n c e y o u ' r e p i c k i n g t h e angle o p t i o n , t o saying e x a c t l y

what t i m e TPI i s going t o be u n t i l as l a t e as p o s s i b l e .

Unfortunately, t h i s p r e s e n t s a burden on t h e C M P , because

h e ' s g o t t h e time option. He wants t o know what time we're

executing i t . We gave him a t i m e , and it changed by maybe

30 seconds.

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12.27 MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS

ALDRIN The f i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n was l e s s t h a n 1 f t / s e c . I

t h i n k we gave t h e values t o t h e CMP, and he p u t them i n

external targeting. The second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s

about 1-1/2 f t / s e c . We burned them i n components. I guess

i t ' s up t o you on angular r a t e s . We picked up range r a t e s

from t h a t p o i n t on.

I n a moment of confusion about t h i s t i m e , I observed a

s i g n i f i c a n t nonzero l a t e r a l d e f l e c t i o n i n my c r o s s p o i n t e r ,

which I i n t e r p r e t e d as being a l a t e r a l l i n e - o f - s i g h t rate

i n d i c a t i n g some out-of-plane velocity. This w a s j u s t a

m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , however. I had t o switch i n landing

r a d a r computer r a t h e r than r a d a r l i n e - o f - s i g h t rate. So

w e were a c t u a l l y reading i n e i t h e r AGS o r PGNS a v e r s i o n

of out-of-plane velocity at t h a t point. I can't explain

why t h a t w a s i n d i c a t e d t o be a l a r g e number. There wasn't

a r e a l number. The line-of-sight r a t e s were, i n f a c t ,

very low. And as I remember, it w a s i n d i c a t i n g something

like 7 ft/sec.

ARMSTRONG The whole t h i n g from once w e f i n i s h e d alignment w a s j u s t

a very l e i s u r e l y running through of what we had done many

t i m e s before. Where w e were f a m i l i a r w i t h it w a s a rela- ,

t i v e l y simple operation. Rendezvous with t h e PGNS i s a

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AFDISTRONG p i e c e o f cake as long as e v e r y t h i n g ' s working. When you
( CONT'D)
s t a r t g e t t i n g PROGRAM ALARM'S and radar won't go i n , it

gets pretty hairy. This happened during s e v e r a l SIM's.

You s t a r t chasing y o u r s e l f around t h e cockpit. But with

t h i n g s working f i n e , i t ' . s simple. I t does r e q u i r e c l o s e

coordination with t h e o t h e r v e h i c l e t o keep t h e flow of

information going back and f o r t h . The ground d i d n ' t b o t h e r

us a t a l l . They were watching what w a s going on, and they

c a l l e d up confirmation of our CDH s o l u t i o n .

12.31 BRAKING GATES

ARMSTRONG Braking w a s p r e t t y much on t h e braking schedule; no problems

there. The line-of-sight rates were s m a l l and e a s i l y con-

trolled. The line-of-sight r a t e i n d i c a t o r gave us proper

i n d i c a t i o n s of line-of-sight rates. The l i n e - o f - s i g h t

r a t e i n d i c a t o r does n o t work l i k e t h e s i m u l a t o r i n several

areas. The most s i g n i f i c a n t i s when t h e r a d a r antenna goes

from a Sun l i n e - o f - s i t e r a t i n g back t o zero; it does not do

it i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y as i n t h e s i m u l a t o r . It t a k e s about

5 seconds for t h e antenna t o slow down for a s t o p f o r t h e

r

needle t o come t o t h e peg back t o zero. Both t h e s i z e s of

t h e needle d e f l e c t i o n s and t h e rates t h a t t h e y d e f l e c t are

n o t c o r r e c t l y simulated i n t h e s i m u l a t o r .

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12.36 DOCKING

ARMSTRONG We stopped braking phase a t 50 t o 100 f e e t , i n s u r e d t h a t

both v e h i c l e s were i n a docking c o n f i g u r a t i o n , and a t t h i s

p o i n t , we ran i n t o a problem t h a t we wouldn't have a n t i c i -

psted preflight. O u r procedure was f o r t h e LM t o g e t i n t o

s t a t i o n k e e p i n g p a s i t i o n 40 f e e t o u t i n f r o n t of t h e command

module p l u s X-axis, p i t c h over 90 degrees s o t h a t t h e

X-axes a r e c o l i n e a r , then yaw l e f t 60 degrees s o t h a t we

a r e i n t h e docking a t t i t u d e w i t h t h e command module. It

w a s obvious when w e g o t t o t h i s p o i n t , i f we p i t c h e d t h e

LM over 90 degrees, we would be looking d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e

Sun. We knew t h a t would be an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y l i g h t i n g

condition f o r docking. So t h e a l t e r n a t i v e would be t o

r o l l t h e LM 60 degrees, p i t c h down, and then you'd be i n

t h e same a t t i t u d e and would have prevented t h e Sun coming

i n t o t h e window. After a r r i v i n g at t h a t a t t i t u d e , a dis-

cussion between t h e LM and t h e command module i n d i c a t e d

t h a t we w e r e n ' t q u i t e f a r enough, s o I r o l l e d a l i t t l e

f a r t h e r , p i t c h e d o v e r , and waited looking through t h e t o p

window. We were asked t o r o t a t e a l i t t l e f a r t h e r by t h e

command module t o l i n e up t h e docking a i d s and g e t t h e

proper alignments. We complied and promptly maneuvered

t h e v e h i c l e d i r e c t l y i n the, gimbal l o c k . I wasn't aware

o f it because I w a s looking out t h e t o p window. No doubt,

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 12-22
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ARMSTRONG we were f i r m l y ensconced i n gimbal lock. We had a l l t h e
( c ONT D )
l i g h t s on, t h e DAP w a s not o p e r a t i n g anymore, w e had no

c o n t r o l o u t p u t s , c l e a r l y no CDU outputs were being processed,

s o w e just p u t it i n AGS and completed t h e docking i n AGS.

ALDRIN And I d x ' t t h i n k t h e AGS i s a good system t o dock i n , or

PGNS e i t h e r .

ARMS TRON G This w a s j u s t a goof on our p a r t . We never should have

a r r i v e d at t h e conclusion from any s e r i e s of maneuvers.

However, t h a t ' s how it happened. It wasn't s i g n i f i c a n t

i n t h i s c a s e , b u t it c e r t a i n l y i s never a d e s i r a b l e t h i n g

t o do. There's nothing c a t a s t r o p h i c about it h e r e , but

I ' m sorry t h a t somehow or o t h e r we h a d n ' t s t u d i e d t h e dock-

i n g maneuver a l i t t l e b i t more c a r e f u l l y and recognized

t h a t t h e r e might be some a t t i t u d e c o n s t r a i n t s i n t h e

maneuver t h a t w e h a d n ' t considered.

ALDRIN The f e w times t h a t we'd done t h a t p r e v i o u s l y w e ended up

approaching docking w i t h t h e Sun more along t h e l i n e of

s i g h t t o t h e two v e h i c l e s . This w a s more our concern,

a r r i v i n g at t h e docking p o i n t a l i t t l e b i t l a t e . If you

a r r i v e t h e r e a l i t t l e l a t e and t h e l i n e - o f - s i g h t motion

happens t o b e such, t h e Sun i s going t o b e p r e t t y c l o s e

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ALDRIN t o where t h e command module w a s . In this particular
.( CONTI D )
c a s e , it w a s about 90 degrees away. After g e t t i n g i n t h a t

a t t i t u d e ( o r g e t t i n g docked) , t o have a PGNS o p e r a t i n g ,

I a l i g n e d it t o zero and went through t h e quick alignment

procedure. I got t h e PGNS back i n o p e r a t i o n again and

f i g u r e d it was not a known REFSMMAT. There were no

postdocking maneuvers planned by t h e LM, s o t o g e t

b o t h systems t h e same, I t h e n a l i g n e d t h e AGS t o t h e

PGNS. Both of them l o s t t h e i r r e f e r e n c e , but both of

them were 00 and as f a r a w a y from any f u t u r e gimbal l o c k

as t h e y could be. That might have been a b e t t e r Way t o

o p e r a t e anyway.

COLLINS The rendezvous procedures from t h e command module view-

p o i n t were about as w e l l worked o u t , I t h o u g h t , as t h e y

could b e w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g command module computer

s t r u c t u r e and w i t h t h e degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n necessary

by t h e CMF' . I have always f e l t , and I s t i l l f e e l , t h a t

t h e system i s designed i n such a f a s h i o n t h a t t h e CMP

i s t o o busy during t h e rendezvous procedure. Although

I w a s able t o keep up w i t h t h e t i m e l i n e q u i t e w e l l , I

f e l t t h a t I was devoting t o o l a r g e a percentage of my

t i n e t o t h e j o b and t h a t I r e a l l y w a s poorly placed t o

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coLLIrls cope w i t h any systems problems o r any o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s
( CONT'D)
o r a b n o r m a l i t i e s t h a t might have come up. I don't propose

any sweeping changes from mainline Apollo. It would b e

f r u i t l e s s t o do s o , but I r e a l l y t h i n k t h a t f o r f u t u r e

v e h i c l e s t h e rendezvous should be something t h a t i s

r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , something which does n o t

r e q u i r e l i t e r a l l y hundreds of s i m u l a t o r hours t o master

t h e procedural aspects of. I t h i n k , as w e g e t i n t o

t h e s e lunar-exploration f l i g h t s , t h e crew i s going t o

be forced t o devote more and more o f t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o

what t h e y ' r e going t o do once t h e y ' v e arrived, not j u s t

t o working out t h e procedures f o r how t o arrive. I really

think t h a t . From t h e command module viewpoint, w i t h one

m a n i n s i d e t h e command module, I t h i n k t h e procedure

should be s i m p l i f i e d , and i f t h a t r e q u i r e s a g r e a t e r

degree of automation, t h e n I t h i n k we ought t o have more

automation. I had a s o l o book which combined features of

v a r i o u s o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s , t h e i d e a being I wouldn't have

t o chase around t h e c o c k p i t ; I would have everything

under one cover. This concept worked w e l l . I recommend

it h i g h l y . The only funny I had during t h e rendezvous

w a s t h e VHF ranging kept breaking l o c k . I had a good

lockon during a s c e n t j u s t as I had during t h e s i m u l a t i o n s .

*

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 . CONFIDENTIAL 12-25

COLLINS I was s u r p r i s e d when, a f t e r i n s e r t i o n , VHF ranging broke

( CONT'D)
lock. I d i d r e a c q u i r e , but from then on, t h e t h i n g broke

l o c k 25 t i m e s during t h e course of t h e rendezvous.

Sometimes, I could immediately r e a c q u i r e w i t h t h e reset

switch on p a n e l 9. . Other times, it w a s not p o s s i b l e

I

.-
t o reacquire. I would have t o go VERB 88 ENTER t o l o c k

t h e VHF ranging d a t a out of t h e computer, and t h e n a t

some l a t e r i n t e r v a l , I would g e t a good r e a c q u i s i t i o n

/

and do VERB 87 ENTER t o allow t h a t d a t a t o come back i n t o

t h e computer. It w a s p o s s i b l e f o r me t o t e l l , a f t e r a

l i t t l e p r a c t i c e , whether I was going t o g e t a good lock

o r not by l i s t e n i n g t o t h e t o n e during t h e lockup procedure.

There are t h r e e t o n e s , two of which are i n t h e a u d i b l e

range. If it w a s going t o be a good s o l i d l o c k , t h e

t o n e s would be very c l e a r and s h a r p j u s t as t h e y are i n

t h e simulator. If it w a s n o t going t o b e a good lock,

i f t h e l o c k w a s going t o be u n s u c c e s s f u l , t h e t o n e

sounded very s c r a t c h y and had a l o t of s t a t i c . After

t h e t h i r d t o n e had completed i t s c y c l e , t h e numbers

would appear very b r i e f l y on t h e EMS and t h e n t h e y would

almost immediately go t o z e r o , i n d i c a t i n g t h e t h i n g had

broken l o c k . I used a technique of s e t t i n g t h e mission

timer i n t h e lower equipment bay t o t h e nominal LM

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. . . . . . - ~f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- . .^ . . .- .
12-26
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COLLINS l i f t - o f f t i m e of 124 h o u r s , 23 minutes and 25 seconds.
( CONT'D)
A t t h e i n s t a n t t h e LM l i f t e d o f f , I s t a r t e d t h a t clock

running. I kept two t i m e s ; t h e L;EB time w a s f l i g h t

p l a n time. If I followed it ,I could w i t h a high degree

of accuracy t e l l you where I should be i n my procedures

book. I l e f t t h e MDC clock u n d i s t u r b e d , s o t h a t a l l

t h e updates and communications w i t h t h e ground could

be done i n t r u e and c o r r e c t time. It worked w e l l f o r me.

I p r a c t i c e d it i n t h e SIM's. I was i n f l u e n c e d by t h e

f a c t t h a t t h e d i g i t a l event t i m e r s had a poor h i s t o r y of

r e l i a b i l i t y and that the d i g i t a l event t i m e r s i n

spacecraft lo7 had been r e p l a c e d once and f u r t h e r had

l i t t l e funnies i n them during t e s t s . If you t r u s t t h e

COLLINS d i g i t a l event timers t o count down t o b u r n s , t h e n probably

( CONT ID)
my procedure i s an unduly complicated one. On t h e o t h e r

hand, it i s workable. I found it an a i d i n running

t h o u g h t h i s , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t w e were a couple of
-> ~

minutes o f f nominal. I have some numbers on breaking l o c k .

I f i r s t got lockon during t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h e a s c e n t

burn. It broke l o c k . a t 124 hours and 31 minutes , re-

acquired immediately, and broke t h e second time a t

124:34. It broke t w i c e t h e r e a f t e r i n r a p i d succession.

I r e l a y e d my out-of-plane s o l u t i o n s t o t h e LM. They

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COLLINS w e r e , a f t e r i n s e r t i o n , on t h e order of 1 f t / s e c , and

( CONT’D)
t h e LM Y-dot minus 1 . 0 . I had my own Y-dot p l u s 1.4.
C S I s o l u t i o n s compared f a i r l y c l o s e w i t h t h e LM and t h e
ground s o l u t i o n s . I t h i n k Buzz has r e p o r t e d t h o s e

numbers previously., I was i n an o r b i t of 63.2 by 56.8,

which could e x p l a i n some of t h e up-down component i n t h e

CDH s o l u t i o n , as w e l l as some R-dot p e c u l i a r i t y t h e LM

experienced.

.
I had some e c c e n t r i c i t y i n your o r b i t a f t e r CSI. I had

you 49.5 by 46.1. I t h i n k t h e combination of t h o s e two

screwy o r b i t s could e x p l a i n l o t s of R-dot d i s p e r s i o n s

and up-down components .

ALDRIN I asked t h e computer what t i m e w e were going t o get t o

apogee, and it was only a couple o f minutes o f f t o CSI

time.

ARMSTRONG Yes, but you d i d n ’ t know where h i s apolune w a s .

ALDRIN That ‘ s r i g h t . Ninety degrees away.

COLLINS I don’t t h i n k i t ’ s worth our spending a l o t of t i m e h e r e

t r y i n g t o hash out t h e s e numbers. I j u s t mentioned them

f o r t h e record. A plane change was not r e q u i r e d during

t h e burn. I s t i l l t h i n k t h a t i t ’ s p o s s i b l e under sone

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COLLINS d i s p e r s e circumstances t o have a l a r g e p l a n e change
( CONT'D)
r e q u i r e d following an a s c e n t from t h e lunar s u r f a c e .

This p l a n e change might have t o be done by t h e command

module u s i n g t h e SPS. This i s something t h a t had never

had procedures worked out for it. I d i d invent a procedure.

I d o n ' t t h i n k FOD l i k e d it although t h e y d i d n ' t have any

b e t t e r procedure. I would suggest t h a t t h e FCOD come up

w i t h a procedure t h a t MTT and FOD and t h e Center agree

might b e used t o allow t h e command module t o whip around

and make an out-of-plane SPS burn. Now, t h e one t h a t I

invented w a s s o r t of sneaky. It took P52, t h e p l a t f o r m

a l i g n program, and t o l d P52 t o a l i g n t h e p l a t f o r m t o a

l a n d i n g s i t e which a r b i t r a r i l y w a s s a i d t o b e 35 degrees

north l a t i t u d e . O f course, t h i s i s completely phony,

b u t it cocked t h e p l a t f o r m o f f 35 degrees i n roll, s o

t h a t when you yaw out of plane e i t h e r l e f t o r r i g h t ,

y o u ' l l go above t h e c h e r r y or below t h e c h e r r y , because

t h e p l a t f o r m has been r o l l e d out of t h e way. It worked

w e l l i n t h e simulator. I d o n ' t know what t h e o b j e c t i o n

t o it i s . I had a l i t t l e procedure drawn up, and it

was included i n t h e rendezvous book. If t h i s i s not a

good procedure, t h e n it should have been s u b s t i t u t e d

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COLLINS f o r something b e t t e r . You need t o have i n your h i p pocket

( CONT'D)
some quick way of whipping t h a t command module around

90 degrees and burning SPS.

ALDRIN You d i d n ' t want t o do it by j u s t t a k i n g it 45 and asking

for a good p r e f e r r e d alignment?

C OLLI NS But you have t o get a new REFSMMAT from t h e ground and

everything e l s e .

ALDRIN Another way, you l o a d t h e burn i n P30.

COLLINS I see w h a t y o u ' r e saying.

ALDRIN Then go i n t o P40, f i n d out what it i s , s e t t h e REFSMMAT

f l a g , and t h e n go i n t o i t .

COLLINS Yes. T h a t ' s another way of doing it. You can do it t h a t

way as w e l l . This P52 way w a s j u s t quick and' simple and

dirty.

Another l i t t l e funny I n o t i c e d (maybe i t ' s something t h a t

I overlooked i n my t r a i n i n g ) was a f t e r CSI when I went

t o P20. P20 would not t r a c k t h e LM; i n f i d d l i n g around,

I found t h a t i f I r e c y c l e t h e o p t i c s zero switch it

would t r a c k t h e LM. Now, as a matter of p r a c t i c e , I had

'

always l e f t t h e LFB i n o p t i c s manual and o p t i c s zero t o

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COLLINS zero. The reason you l e a v e it t h a t way i s because of
( CONT'D)
f a i l u r e modes i n t h e C D U ' s , which are shared w i t h t h e

t h r u s t v e c t o r c o n t r o l i f y o u ' r e going t o burn t h e SPS.

I n t h e s i m u l a t o r , when you g e t back down i n t o t h e LEB,

a l l you have t o do i s t a k e t h a t o p t i c s zero switch and

throw ,t, o f f , and P20 w i l l immediately s t a r t t r a c k i n g

t h e LM.

ALDRIN D i d you have it i n CMC?

COLLINS Yes, CMC. But on two occasions it wouldn't do it. I

found if I cycled t h e o p t i c s zero s w i t c h , it would t r a c k

t h e LM. I d o n ' t understand t h i s . I t ' s as i f t h e r e i s a

funny i n t h a t switch i n r e g a r d t o t h e o p t i c s power. When

you f i r s t t u r n o p t i c s power on f o r P52, you have t o c y c l e

t h a t switch back t o zero f o r ' t h e program t o be aware t h a t

it h a s been zero. Otherwise, you g e t i n t o CDU d i f f i c u l t i e s .

I t ' s something s i m i l a r t o t h a t . Anyhow, af'ter CSI when

I went t o P20, t h e s e x t a n t would not t r a c k t h e LM u n t i l

I had recycled t h e o p t i c s zero switch. How I knew t o

do t h a t , I d o n ' t know. It was j u s t t r i a l and e r r o r .

VHF ranging broke l o c k again along about plane-change

time. It broke l o c k again a t 126 hours. We've already

d i s c u s s e d t h e CDH s o l u t i o n s .

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 C 0 NFIDENTIA L 12-31

COLLINS I had hoped t o g e t some s e x t a n t marks immediately a r t e r

( CONT’D)
CDH, b u t p r i o r t o going i n t o P34 t h i s was q u e s t i o n a b l e

because of t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e Sun. I thought t h a t I

” could probably g e t t h r e e o r f o u r marks b e f o r e Sun s h a f t i n g

prevented i t . I w a s wrong. I c o u l d n ’ t g e t any marks

at a l l . A f t e r CDH , I w a s a b l e t o g e t VHF marks only f o r

a l i t t l e while.

I n t h e meantime, I went i n t o P34 and I had a very slow

COMP c y c l e t h e f i r s t time through on P34. Up u n t i l t h i s

t i m e , t h e AUTO o p t i c s had been doing a smooth j o b o f

t r a c k i n g t h e LM. I n o t i c e d t h a t t h i s smoothness disappear-

ed a few minutes p r i o r t o t h e TPI. It became q u i t e j e r k y .

I made a l i t t l e n o t e h e r e - t h e LM t r a c k i n g j e r k y i n

s e x t a n t , and DAP excessive p i t c h t h r u s t e r f i r i n g s . It

seemed l i k e t h e r e was a l i t t l e f l u r r y of p i t c h t h r u s t e r s

f i r i n g s along about t h i s p o i n t as w e l i , which I don’t

have any explanation f o r .

Everything progressed normally through TPI. It was

along about midcourse t i m e when I f i r s t s a w t h e LM coming

up from below. It look‘ed l i k e t h e doggone 1;M w a s r i d i n g

on r a i l s . There w a s a b s o l u t e l y no l i n e - o f - s i g h t rate

t h a t I could s e e . It r e a l l y looked g r e a t t o see t h e LM

coming up from t h e s u r f a c e . For t h e first time, I had

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COLLINS t h e f e e l i n g t h a t t h a t son of a gun was r e a l l y going t o
CONT ' D )
g e t t h e r e i n one p i e c e .

Midcourses were very small. Braking w a s done e n t i r e l y by

t h e LM. I w a s completely p a s s i v e , and t h a t ' s a l l I have

t o say about t h e rendezvous.

Docking w e d i d i n CMC, AUTO, narrow deadband under DAF'

control. N e i l made t h e crude alignments t o g e t t h e

c o r r e c t s i d e of t h e LM p o i n t e d toward t h e COAS. Then

I made t h e f i n a l adjustments. I estimated t h a t I contact-

ed t h e LM j u s t about e x a c t l y dead c e n t e r and a t a slow-

but-adequate closing velocity. I would guess s l i g h t l y

i n excess of 0 . 1 f t / s e c . Despite t h i s f a c t , I c o u l d n ' t

t e l l t h e i n s t a n t of c o n t a c t . The empty a s c e n t s t a g e i s

l i g h t enough r e l a t i v e t o t h e command module t h a t when t h e

two v e h i c l e s t o u c h , i t ' s j u s t s o r t of l i k e pushing i n t o

a p i e c e of paper. The LM r e c o i l e d enough t h a t t h e y could

f e e l it i n t h e LM, b u t I c o u l d n ' t r e a l l y f e e l it i n t h e

command module. I thought I w a s g e t t i n g t h e r e , and I

thought I w a s g e t t i n g t h e r e , and I f i n a l l y w a s f a i r l y

s u r e I had c o n t a c t . I looked up f o r t h e t h i r d or f o u r t h

time, and I d i d have two b a r b e r p o l e s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e

c a p t u r e l a t c h e s had made. A t t h i s t i m e , I looked out t h e

window, and t h e s i t u a t i o n appeared s t a t i c . I threw t h e

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COLLINS switch from AUTO t o FREE, s o t h a t I w a s i n CMC, FREE.
( CONT'D)
I looked out t h e window again - t h i s was a l l going

p r e t t y f a s t now -I would say t h i s was 3 seconds a f t e r

contact. The s i t u a t i o n looked l i k e it had p r e v i o u s l y ;

t h a t i s , t h e two v e h i c l e s w e r e s t a t i c a l l y j o i n e d t o g e t h e r

w i t h no motion. A t that t i m e , I fired the bottle. No

sooner d i d t h e b o t t l e f i r e t h a n a yaw g y r a t i o n s t a r t e d

between t h e two v e h i c l e s . I ' m not sure whether it was

a r e s u l t of t h e r e t r a c t c y c l e beginning o r whether it

w a s a r e s u l t of t h e LM f i r i n g t h r u s t e r s toward me. At

t h a t t i m e , t h i s s t a t i c s i t u a t i o n became very dynamic,

and a f a i r l y l a r g e yaw excursion took p l a c e . I would

say t h a t r e l a t i v e t o t h e LM I r a p i d l y went t o about a

15-degree yaw r i g h t angle. I p u t t h e CMC, FREE switch

back t o CMC, AUTO. This enabled t h e hand c o n t r o l l e r

i n r a t e command and minimum deadband. I made'manual

i n p u t s t o yaw back over towards t h e c e n t e r l i n e , and t h e r e

were a couple of o t h e r o s c i l l a t i o n s enroute. I can remem-

b e r t h i n k i n g , "I d o n ' t t h i n k w e ' r e going t o g e t a success-

f u l hard dock t h i s t i m e . I ' m probably going t o have t o

l e t t h e LM go and t r y again.'' About t h a t t i m e , t h e dock-

i n g l a t c h e s f i r e d , and we were hard docked. I would

guess t h a t t h e t i m e i n t e r v a l from f i r i n g t h e b o t t l e t o

hard dock was about 6 t o 8 seconds. This i s probably

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,.. - - - " . . .. . .. . . . _ _. - .. .
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. .
COLLINS a p r e t t y normal r e t r a c t t i m e . Things were happening f a i r -
( CONT'D)
l y r a p i d l y , and t h e o s c i l l a t i o n s had b u i l t up almost

e x a c t l y a t t h e t i m e I f i r e d t h e b o t t l e which w a s

primary 2 .

ARMSTRONG I can add a f e w comments here from t h e o t h e r s i d e . At

t h e t i m e we f e l t t h e c o n t a c t - which r e a l l y was d i f f i -

cult t o feel - it w a s a very low bump sound, or touch

i n t h e t u n n e l ; w e f i r e d p l u s X RCS i n t h e LM as p e r t h e

p r e f l i g h t plan. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , w e a l s o observed

significant attitude oscillation. I guess it would-be

p r i m a r i l y r i g h t r o l l as observed i n t h e LM. We were i n

AGS RATE COMMAND minimum deadband and, i n a d d i t i o n , p l u s

X. A s soon as t h e a t t i t u d e d e v i a t i o n s t a r t e d , I l e f t

t h e p l u s X o f f and c a l l e d for Buzz t o give m e MAX deadband

i n t h e t h r u s t e r s s o we wouldn't be f i r i n g a l o t of a t t i -

tude t h r u s t e r s . Then I took c o n t r o l and manually maneuver-

ed t h e v e h i c l e back toward c o l i n e a r s t a t u s . About t h a t

t i m e , it snapped us i n t h e r e and locked t h e l a t c h e s .

COLLINS .I d i d n ' t l i k e t h e i d e a of t h e s e two v e h i c l e s being joined

t o g e t h e r j u s t by t h e s e two l i t t l e c a p t u r e l a t c h e s . I

w a s i n t h e h a b i t of f i r i n g t h e b o t t l e t h e f i r s t t i m e it

appeared; t h e two v e h i c l e s had been j o i n e d t o g e t h e r and

t h e s i t u a t i o n was s t a t i c . I never gave t h e s e o s c i l l a t i o n s

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COLLINS a f a i r chance t o develsp. Nayte a b e t t e r t h i n g t o do i s
( CONT'D)
delay f i r i n g t h e b o t t l e u n t i l you a r e s u r e t h e o s c i l l a t i o n s

are not going t o develop. Although it was s o r t of alarm-

i n g t h e r e f o r a second or two, t h i s way d i d work and it

w a s w i t h i n t h e envelope. I ' m c o t s u r e i f I had it t o do

b r e r a g a i n t h a t I would do d i f f e r e n t l y . It depends on

what caused t h e o s c i l l a t i o n s t o g e t s t a r t e d . It could

T o r it could be some
be t h e t h r u s t e r f i r i n g o f t h e U

o t h e r cause. If i t ' s t h e t h r u s t e r f i r i n g o f t h e M yt h e n

you ought t o d e l e t e t h e t h r u s t e r f i r i n g on t h e LM. Irm

not r e a l l y s u r e ycu need t h a t t h r u s t e r f i r i n g on t h e LM.

ALDRIN I ' m not e i t h e r ...

COLLINS If i t ' s some o t h e r cause, t h e n t h e t h r u s t e r f i r i n g o f

t h e IN i s probably not a bad t h i n g .

ALDRIN It should t e n d t o g i v e sane s t a b l i z i n g e f f e c t t o t h e

IM. You'd l i k e t c have some :ontrol sj;stem t h a t ' s holding

t h e LM f a i r l y c l o s e t o wkiFrr3 ycu want i t t o b e . I think

automatic is probhbiy a b l e t o catch sooner t h a n manual.

Because y o u ' r e lcoking UP tl;is -day, i t ' s p r e t t y darn hard

t o maintain a c l o s e posi-tion. That argument says t h a t

you ought t o be i n some kind of automatic r a t e command

system.

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ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we have t o admit t h a t t h i s w a s one area, i n retr6-

s p e c t , t h a t w e gave l e s s thought t o t h a n it probably

deserves. During simulations , none of our s i m u l a t o r s

i s able t o d u p l i c a t e t h i s kind of dynamics. We s a w some

f i l m t h a t had been t a k e n of a McDonald study. We s a w t h e s e

and okserved what t h e i r recommendations were. That's

what w a s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n o x docking p l a n .

That r e a l l y w a s devised t o g e t t h e c a p t u r e l a t c h e s i n .

I r e a l l y suspect t h a t everything we experienced happened

a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e l a t c h e s were engaged. The r e s u l t s

of t h a t study r e a l l y w e r e n ' t p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r

phenomenon. We h a d n ' t experienced any .trouble a t a l l on

your previous docking. '!Chat was j u s t as smooth as g l a s s .

ALDRIN It seems t o m e t h a t i t ' s not t o o good a mode t o be

working i n . You're tempted, i f t h e t h i n g s - t a r t s ' t o move

on you, t o touch t h e s t i c k . A s soon as you do t h a t ,

you have now reset a nev a t t i t u d e t h a t may not be what

t h e combined systems a r e going t o . b e happy w i t h ; and i f

i t ' s n o t , i t ' s going t o f i r e .

ARMSTRONG T h a t ' s r'ight . I 'm not sure t h a t a l o t of thought on our

p a r t i n t h i s area would have made t h e s i t u a t i o n any b e t t e r .

COLLINS No. That ' s r i g h t .

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 12-37'
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ALDRIN I don't t h i n k w e got a tremendous amount of guidance

out of t h e AOH or anybody. It seemed t o be, however

you want t o do i t . You can do it t h i s way or t h a t way.

They a r e both acceptable. means i n t h e AOH. It seemed t o

me t h e r e were two ways t o be a c c e p t a b l e , and t h i s w a s

w i t h primary guidance c o n t r o l . We d i d n ' t have primary

guidance c o n t r o l because of t h e gimbal l o c k problem. It

seemed t o me t h a t t h e book t r e a t e d that s u b j e c t a l i t t l e

lightly. Wasn't it w r i t t e n f o r LM a c t i v e ?

ARMSTRONG Yes.

COLLINS We gave t h e s u b j e c t very l i t t l e t r a i n i n g t i m e , b u t had

we given it a l o t of t r a i n i n g t i m e , I ' m not s u r e w e could

have come t o any d i f f e r e n t conclusions.

ARMSTRONG It d i d b i t e us a l i t t l e b i t .

.ALDRIN I t ' s worthy of concern because i f you do prang something

t h e consequences are t i m e consuming and n a s t y t o have t o

go through.

ARMSTRONG T h i s one got t o us. and, for one reason or a n o t h e r , w e

d i d n ' t understand it w e l l enough. I suggest t h a t t h e

next crew spend a l i t t l e more time t h a n w e d i d i n t h i s

area and t r y t o improve on t h e procedures.

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ALDRIN All o t h e r dockings were done i n PGNS.

COLLINS This w a s t h e same procedure from t h e command module.

The only d i f f e r e n c e w a s t h a t t h e LM a s c e n t s t a g e w a s
considerably l i g h t e r .

ARMSTRONG The LM c o n t r o l c o n f i g u r a t i o n ' w a s d i f f e r e n t .

COLLINS Yes, I meant from t h e dynamics of t h e command module

viewpoint. I had t h e f e e l i n g t h a t going t o FREE under

t h e s e circumstances was a mistake.

ALDRIN You d o n ' t have a good choice of deadbands. Half a degree

seems t o me t o be t o o t i g h t f o r t h i s o p e r a t i o n , and

5 degrees i s much t o o loose.

' COLLINS Flag it as a problem. I d o n ' t have a s o l u t i o n .

12.38 POST DOCKING CKECKS AND PRESSURIZATION

COLLINS When I went i n t o t h e t u n n e l t h i s t i m e , I had t h a t sake

s t r o n g odor of b u r n t m a t e r i a l . Again, I checked every-

t h i n g very c l o s e l y and c o u l d n ' t f i n d anything wrong. All

t h e d e c a l s and c h e c k l i s t s were w e l l worked out f o r t h e

probe and drogue. I w a s g l a d t o s e e it work. I never had

much confidence t h a t our tunnel was going t o work as

a d v e r t i s e d , b u t it sure d i d . 5 was very happy t o see t h e

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 C 0 NFIDENTIA L 12-39

COLLINS t u n n e l , t h e probe, t h e drogue, and a l l t h a t s t u f f p a r t

( CONT D )
company and go along w i t h t h e LM.

12.39 TUNNEL OPERATIONS

COLLINS We went through an extra o p e r a t i o n , and t h i s i s something

t h a t we never p r a c t t c e d j o i n t l y . It was my i n t e n t t o

take t h e probe o u t , t h e drogue o u t , and p u t t h o s e two

items i n s i d e t h e command module. I guess it was your

i n t e n t t o t a k e them out from your s i d e and put them i n s i d e

the LM. I j u s t happened t o beat you t o i t . It r e a l l y

wasn't very e f f i c i e n t t h e way I d i d i t .

ALDRIN I thought you were going t o do i t .

ARMSTRONG . I had it i n my mind t h a t I w a s going t o ,do i t .

COLLINS The f l i g h t p l a n d i d n ' t mention i t . It s o r t of implied

t h a t you guys were going t o do i t , because i t ' s a i d t o

remove and stow t u n n e l h a t c h , and t h e n it s a i d to' n o t i f y

LM crew t h e y could open t h e i r hatch. It d i d n ' t mention

t h e probe and drogue. When I came t o t h a t , I thought

t h e y j u s t l e f t t h a t out of t h e f l i g h t plan. I said,

"Stand by one." Then I got t h e probe and drogue out and

stowed them onboard i n t h e command module. This w a s an

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12-40
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COLLINS e x t r a o p e r a t i o n because subsequently t h e y had t o be t r a n s -
( CONT'D)
f e r r e d t o t h e LM. T h i s i s another a r e a where we c o u l d n ' t

s a y t h a t we had smooth c o o r d i n a t i o n . I knew how t o do

my end, and t h e LM knew how t o do t h e i r end; b u t we

h a d n ' t sat down and d i s c u s s e d who w a s going t o do pre-

c i s e l y what.

12.40 TRANSFER OF LM EQUIPMENT AND FILM

ARMSTRONG The equipment t r a n s f e r and c l e a n i n g back contamination

procedures were done e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e manner t h a t .was

planned. We had a couple of small d i f f e r e n c e s . We

decided we wanted t o b r i n g t h e LEVA b a g s , and t h e LEVA'S,

and t h e EVA gloves back with us f o r p o s t f l i g h t examination.

We brought t h e whole ISA, i n t e r i m stowage assembly, w i t h

a l l i t s t r a n s f e r g e a r i n t o t h e commmand module. The

i n t e n t w a s t o unload t h a t , restow it i n t h e command

module, and t h e n t a k e t h e ISA back i n t o t h e IM. We d i d n ' t

do t h a t . W e brought t h e ISA back i n t h e command module

with us. T h a t ' s a 1-pound item or something. We were

a b l e t o g e t through t h a t procedure about on t h e planned

t imeline .
.
ALDRIN A s a m a t t e r of f a c t , t h e y were t h i n k i n g about moving

up T E I .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 12-41

ARMSTRONG Well, as it t u r n e d o u t , our LM j e t t i s o n t i m e could not

have been moved forward a REV.

ALDRIN Because of a t t i t u d e .

ARMSTRONG We c o u l d n ' t have made it r e a l l y .

ALDRIN Because of t h e a t t i t u d e ?

ARMSTRONG No, we j u s t c o u l d n ' t have g o t t e n through i n t i m e .

COLLINS We were an hour, maybe an hour and a h a l f , ahead of t i m e .

12.41 VACUUMING EQUIPMENT

ARMSTRONG I w a s concerned t h a t it might take us a l o t of time t o

c l e a n t h e LM, and I w a s a l s o concerned t h a t we would

have a l o t of f r e e - f l o a t i n g l u n a r d u s t i n t h e cockpit

going back t o i n s e r t i o n . We r e a l l y wondered a t engine

cut-off whether we wouldn't be completely engulfed i n

soot and be unable t o t a k e our helmets o f f f o r t h e

alignments. However, t h e r e wasn't much d u s t , and w e

couldn't f i g u r e t h a t out because - -

ALDRIN The s t u f f seemed t o s t i c k t o t h i n g s and s t a y t h e r e .

ARMSTRONG I thought we'd tramped a l o t of it w i t h u s , b u t it d i d n ' t

b o t h e r us.

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ALDRIN I wiped it up w i t h my s u i t on t h e floor.

ARMSTRONG We d i d c l e a n with t h e vacuum c l e a n e r as b e s t we could.

That vacuum c l e a n e r has a very low s u c t i o n , and more

time w a s r e q u i r e d t h a n we planned t o do t h e cleaning

job. We were a f r a i d it wouldn't be done t o t h e degree

of completeness t h a t we had hoped f o r .

We were a b l e t o c l e a n t h e s u i t s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y w i t h a

scrubbing motion. However, t h e r e wasn't a l a r g e amount

of f r e e contaminate i n t h e LM. We wore t h e s u i t s back

i n t o t h e command module and restowed them i n t h e L-shaped

bag a f t e r a drying-out p e r i o d . The L C G ' s were a l s o stowed

w i t h t h e s u i t s i n t h e L-shaped bag. The s u i t s were

r e l a t i v e l y c l e a n , b u t t h e y had a l o t of r e s i d u a l smudges

on them.

ALDRIN There w a s no hope of g e t t i n g t h a t o f f .

12.43 STOWAGE OF SRC's

ALDRIN The bags for t h e rock box, I t h i n k , could have some

b e t t e r l a b e l i n g on them. You want t h e box t o b e mounted

c o r r e c t l y i n t h e command module s o t h a t one g o r t h e g

f o r c e s of e n t r y w i l l push t h e material down towards t h e

bottom of t h e box i n s t e a d of t h e t o p . But nothing r e a l l y

t e l l s you how you p u t t h e box i n s i d e t h e bag. You can

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ALDRIN p u t it e i t h e r w a y . We l e a r n e d by t h e way t h e l e t t e r i n g
( CONT'D)
was, you had t o p u t t h e bag on t h e box upside down

t o t h e way you normally t h i n k . It would h e l p i f t h e

z i p p e r went around t h e bottom i n s t e a d of around t h e

t o p ; s o I t h i n k t h a t some more l a b e l i n g would b e i n

o r d e r j u s t t o make sure t h a t no one p u t s t h e box i n

t h e bag upside down. I d o n ' t know how c r i t i c a l t h a t i s ,

b u t it ' s worth n o t i n g .

ARMSTRONG Stowage w a s planned, p l u s w e had a l a r g e temporary stowage

bag completely f i l l e d w i t h command module t r a s h , food

wrappers, and s o on, which was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e LM

t o c l e a n up t h e command module volume.

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13.0 LUNAR MODULE JETTISON THROUGH TEI

13.1 LM JETTISON

ARMSTRONG LM j e t t i s o n went as planned.

ALDRIN Was t h e r e ever any i n t e n t i o n s t o t r a c k t h e LM a f t e r

jettison.

COLLINS No. That w a s never even d i s c u s s e d .

ALDRIN I d o n ' t understand why we l e f t it i n VHF ranging mode and

l e f t t h e t r a c k l i g h t on.

COLLINS I have no idea. We never had a DTO on i t , or t o my

knowledge, it w a s never even discussed.

ARMSTRONG T h e s e p a r a t i o n w a s slow and m a j e s t i c ; we were able t o

- L

follow it v i s u a l l y f o r a long t i m e .

COLLINS The LM h e l d i t s a t t i t u d e extremely w e l l . I d o n ' t know

what mode you l e f t it i n , b u t I thought when t h e explo-

-
sive charge f i r e d , it would s o r t of s t a r t going ass over

tea kettle. It must have been i n some good a t t i t u d e hold

-\
mode , wasn't i t ?

ARMSTRONG We could watch t h e j e t s f i r e t o hold a t t i t u d e as it went

away.

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ALDRIN It w a s i n MAX deadband, AGS ATT hold. It seemed t o me

t h a t , r i g h t a t t h e t i m e o f s e p a r a t i o n , as t h e LM moved

away, I could s e e some c r a c k s t h a t had developed i n t h e

o u t e r t h i n s k i n of t h e t o p p a r t of t h e LM i n t h e gray

material t h a t f o r m s an a r e a around t h e docking cone.

However, according t o t h e ground it h e l d p r e s s u r e . I

c o u l d n ' t see any o t h e r damage t h a t had been caused by

blowing t h e t u n n e l .

COLLINS The only comment t h a t I had i s t h a t t h e s e p a r a t i o n burn

w a s something t h a t MPAD had changed t h e i r minds about a

t i m e o r two. O r i g i n a l l y , it w a s going t o be 1 f t / s e c

h o r i z o n t a l retrograde. Then f o r some reason, t h e y wanted

it 45 degrees up from h o r i z o n t a l , and t h e y wanted 1 f t / s e c

r e t r o g r a d e component o r a t o t a l burn o f 1.4 ft/sec. I

d o n ' t have any p r e f e r e n c e one way or t h e o t h e r . It j u s t

seems l i k e t h a t ' s a f a i r l y simple t h i n g , and t h e y ought

t o g e t t h e i r d e s i r e worked out e a r l y i n t h e game and not

have t h a t be a l a t e , l a s t minute change, because it j u s t

makes f o r l a s t minute conversations on unimportant t h i n g s .

13.2 DOFFING AND BAGGING HELMETS AND GLOVES

ALDRIN We d i d n ' t put t h e helmets i n t h e LEVA'S d i d w e ?

ARMSTRONG No.

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ALDRIN Looking back on it, I think it would have eased the stowage

problem in the command module.

ARMSTRONG Yes, but there w a s a reason for that, and that's that the
c

LEVA'S and the EVA gloves were both awfully smudgy. The

choice there was to leave them sealed up in the LEVA bags

rather than to get that soot out into the command module.

13.4 ORBITAL NAVIGATION

COLLINS The activities prior to TEI were leisurely. The updates

were passed up in good time, we passed our sextant star

check. In general, the usual sequence of P30 and P40 is

one that has been well worked out and TEI had no surprises

up until TIG time.

13.9 TARGET-OF-OPPORTUNITY PHOTOGRAPHY

COLLINS Well, we took a few photographs prior to TEI, but es-

sentially we spent the time preparing for the burn. We

didn't do any television prior to TEI.

13.12 TEI OVERBURN CRITERIA

COLLINS Those criteria were ones that had been hammered out for

a long time. We didn't have any argument with them.

Essentially it was a 2-second overburn, if confirmed by

EMS reading of minus 40 ft/sec. We came close to shutting

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COLLINS t h e burn down manually -I'll get i n t o t h a t a l i t t l e
( CONT'D)
bit later.

13.15 PREPARATION FOR T E I

COLLINS A t T I G , t h i s w a s t h e f i r s t burn w i t h CSM only. I had my

r a t e needles on 5/l and I d i d t h a t because I t h i n k i t ' s

a good mode t o be i n i f y o u ' r e worried about any s o r t of

abnormal dynamics. They're much more r e a d i l y apparent on

the sensitive scale.

13.16 SPS/TEI BURN AND ECO

COLLINS AT T I G , I n o t i c e d more rate-needle a c t i v i t y t h a t I had seen

i n previous burns. I had a s t a r t t r a n s i e n t of probably

0.4-ft/sec a c t i v i t y on t h e r a t e needles i n both p i t c h

and yaw; t h e r e w a s very l i t t l e a t t i t u d e d e v i a t i o n . It

w a s j u s t a f a i r l y r a p i d o s c i l l a t i o n of both t h e gimbal

p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r s and t h e r a t e needles and it damped

i t s e l f down I ' d say w i t h i n t h e f i r s t 1 0 or 15 seconds of

t h e burn. I n roll, t h e v e h i c l e w a s deadbanding. Instead

of p l u s or minus 5 d e g r e e s , it appeared on my a t t i t u d e

i n d i c a t o r t o be more l i k e p l u s or minus 8-degree roll

deadband' and it w a s banging a g a i n s t t h e roll s t o p s f a i r l y

crisply. It would c r u i s e o v e r , h i t deadband and j e t s would

f i r e , and it would go back t h e o t h e r way.

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COLLINS This r o l l deadbanding w a s q u i t e obvious during t h i s burn

(CONT'D)
as opposed t o t h e o t h e r burns. I t h i n k a l l t h e s e indica-

t i o n s a r e normal. They were j u s t somewhat exaggerated

during t h e f i r s t 20 seconds of t h e burn compared t o t h e

more damped c a s e of having t h e LM a t t a c h e d . The EMS

counter moves out p r e t t y s w i f t l y and it w a s d i f f i c u l t f o r

me t o estimate e x a c t l y when I might have minus 40 on t h e

counter. The I of t h e engine must have decreased o r

SP

something; a t any r a t e , t h e burn d u r a t i o n w a s longer t h a n

p r e d i c t e d and when burn time plus 2 seconds had e l a p s e d ,

I had thought t h a t I would have minus 40 on t h e EMS

counter by t h e time I could g e t t h e t h i n g shut down.

There w a s some doubt i n my mind as t o whether it w a s shut-

t i n g i t s e l f down a u t o m a t i c a l l y o r n o t ; s o , a t burn t i m e

p l u s 2 seconds and some s m a l l f r a c t i o n , I t u r n e d both

EMS DELTA-V - o r both DELTA-V -normal switches o f f . I

t h i n k j u s t a f r a c t i o n of a second p r i o r t o t h i s w e got

a good automatic shutdown. A t any r a t e , our r e s i d u a l s

I . w e r e very s m a l l ; s o e i t h e r w e g o t a good automatic shut-

down followed immediately by my t u r n i n g t h e switches o f f

o r else I s h u t t h e t h i n g down manually and w a s j u s t ex-

tremely lucky i n t h a t it coincided with t h e PGNS r e s i d u a l s .

For some r e a s o n , t h a t burn d u r a t i o n w a s a l i t t l e b i t

l o n g e r t h a n I would have expected. L O I , you remember,

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COLLINS w a s s h o r t e r t h a n w e had p r e d i c t e d and t h i s w a s t h e next
(CONT'D)
burn t o follow L O I , s o I w a s s o r t of s u r p r i s e d t h a t it

d i d t a k e longer t h a n normal.

ALDRIN The PUGS w a s a l i t t l e b i t u n p r e d i c t a b l e based upon per-

formance during LOI. The f a c t t h a t I c o u l d n ' t c a t c h up

w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e and it g o t ahead by about 0.4 o r 0 . 5 ,

something l i k e t h a t , p l u s t h e p r e f l i g h t b r i e f i n g t h a t t h a t

would be t h e c a s e w a s why I l e f t t h e switch i n INCREASE.

We lit o f f and got through t h e i n i t i a l guidance and I

looked a t t h e meter and it w a s showing down i n DECREASE,

which s t r u c k me as not being what it should do. I ex-

pected i t t o be i n INCREASE, b u t I thought "Well, maybe

t h i s i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c such t h a t e a r l y i n t h e burn it

does t h i s s o r t of t h i n g . " So I l e f t t h e switch where it w a s

t o t r y t o c a t c 3 up. I guess i n t h e meantime t h a t ' t h e t w o

numbers -where one had been bigger t h a t t h e o t h e r -

had changed p o s i t i o n s , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t when

it says INCREASE, you throw i t i n t h e INCREASE d i r e c t i o n .

I t ' s not a t a l l obvious during a burn i f one i s a l i t t l e

bigger t h a n t h e o t h e r . You're not sure whether t h e needle

i s b e l i e v a b l e or n o t , so I l e f t it i n INCREASE and it

seemed as though it w a s g e t t i n g f a r t h e r a p a r t and t h e

needle w a s s t a y i n g down; s o c o n t r a r y t o what we had been

l e d t o b e l i e v e , I p u t t h e t h i n g down t o DECREASE j u s t t o

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ALDRIN s e e what was going t o happen. Sure enough, it stopped

( CONT ' D )
t h e divergence of t h e two numbers. We d i d n ' t have a long

enough burn f o r it t o g e t r i g h t t o z e r o , b u t it was w i t h i n

0.2. Anyway, it was a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t t h a n what w e had

expected. I guess, i f you r e a l l y want t o p l a y t h a t game,

you might need t o w r i t e some cues or something on t h e r e

so you d o n ' t m i s i n t e r p r e t anything. It worked o u t w e l l .

But it w a s unusual and t h a t might have something t o do

with burn t i m e .

ARMSTRONG We-tried something d i f f e r e n t on t h i s f l i g h t . The ground

computed a postburn s t a t e v e c t o r , a p r e d i c t e d postburn

s t a t e v e c t o r and put it i n t h e LM s l o t . A f t e r t h e end

of t h e b u r n , we could c a l l up VERB 83 and g e t an R and

R-dot from our s t a t e v e c t o r over t o t h e p r e d i c t e d s t a t e

vector. It came out r e a l c l o s e - 0.7 mile and

0.8 f t / s e c - indicating ( i t ' s kind of another double

check) t h a t we r e a l l y d i d g e t t h e burn t h a t w e thought

w e were going t o g e t . T h a t ' s not r e a l l y any kind of

requirement if everything works. It i s a n i c e kind of

t h i n g i f you have an SPS problem o r i f you t a k e over w i t h

t h e SCS i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e burn when your computer i s

working okay, b u t t h e guidance i s n ' t working. You can

use t h a t v e c t o r i n your h i p pocket t o f i n d o u t how good of

a switchover you d i d and how c l o s e your SCS burn came out.

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1 4 . 0 TRANSLUNAR COAST

1 4 . 1 SYSTEMS VERIFICATION FOR COAST

COLLINS A l l t h e systems were GO; t h e r e wasn't anything t o do.

14.2 NAVIGATION , NAVIGATIONAL SIGHTINGS, AND OPTICS

COLLINS We d i d n ' t do any onboard n a v i g a t i o n . O u r f l i g h t plan

c a l l e d f o r doing it only i n t h e event of COMM failures.

The o p t i c s worked normally on t h e way home.

14.3 EVAPORATORS: ACTIVATION AND D E X T I V A T I O N

COLLINS We d i d not a c t i v a t e e i t h e r t h e primary or t h e secondary

evaporators u n t i l j u s t prior t o e n t r y ; s o , during trans-

e a r t h c o a s t , t h o s e were not i n t h e system.

1 4 . 4 PASSIVE THEBMAL CONTROL

COLLINS Passive thermal c o n t r o l t h r e e modes -we d i d n ' t have t h r e e

modes, we j u s t had t h e one mode. We always r o l l e d G&N

c o n t r o l a t 0 . 3 d e g / s e c ; t h a t procedure we've a l r e a d y

t a l k e d about. There were no d i f f e r e n c e s i n t r a n s e a r t h ,

although t h e geometry of t h e v e h i c l e s w a s a l o t d i f f e r e n t

and I thought t h a t t h e command module by i t s e l f would go

u n s t a b l e more quickly. N e i l thought it would n o t , apd h e

was right. It w a s very s t a b l e on t h e way back, j u s t as

it w a s on t h e way o u t .

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ALDRIN The LMP would have p r e f e r r e d p o i n t i n g n o r t h . However,

t h e r e was an added advantage i n t h a t w e got t o look at t h e

Magellanic clouds by PTC-ing at 2 7 0 .

ARMSTRONG To look a t t h e e a r t h , t o look n o r t h , you had t o g e t upside

down.

COLLINS Yes, w e went out i n 090 p i t c h angle and came back 270 p i t c h

angle. I t ' s 'lmacht n i c h t s " t o me; I d o n ' t c a r e one way

or the other.

14.5 EXCESSIVE MOISTURE ON TUNNEL HATCH AREA

COLLINS There w a s a l i t t l e t i n y b i t of moisture up i n t h e r e a t

various t i m e s . On t h e way home, t h e r e w a s l e s s t h a n t h e r e

had been e a r l i e r . The l a s t time I checked w a s a t 180 hours

or thereabouts .
ALDRIN You thought it w a s l e s s ? I d o n ' t remember much moisture

at a l l .

ARMSTRONG I thought it w a s more on t h e way home.

ALDRIN I did too. We made u s e of t h e ECS hoses.

COLLINS Yes , I put t h e hoses up t h e r e and t h e r e ' s one c o m e n t i n

here. Here it i s - "180 hours , dry as a bone."

ALDRIN That w a s a f t e r we put t h e hoses up t h e r e .

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COLLINS P r i o r t o t h a t , t h e r e was a l i t t l e b i t of moisture up t h e r e

and I d i d wipe it o f f with a towel sometime a f t e r T E I .

ARMSTRONG I could go i n t o t h e t u n n e l u s u a l l y and wipe my f i n g e r

around t h e h a t c h up t h e r e and come back with a wet f i n g e r .

COLLINS W,.il, you could s e e l i t t l e beads of moisture l i k e on a

b e e r b o t t l e or something l i k e t h a t .

COLLINS There w e r e n ' t g r e a t globs of moisture and, as I s a y , a t

180 h o u r s , it w a s dry as a bone. When we came t o e n t r y ,

we wiped excessive moisture from t h e t u n n e l hatch a r e a .

That l e a d s me t o b e l i e v e t h a t it has something t o do with

t h e r o u t i n g of t h o s e hoses. I f you r e a l l y cram a s e t of

hoses up i n t h a t t u n n e l as f a r as it w i l l go and sort of

wedge t h e hoses up around t h e s i d e of t h e hatch as f a r as

you can, it might h e l p keep t h e c i r c u l a t i o n p a t t e r n up.

That would keep it f a i r l y dry.

ALDRIN We s h o t up a batch of f i l m r i g h t a f t e r T E I . We pitched

down and picked up a good a t t i t u d e t o photograph t h e moon

out t h e hatch window.

COLLI?$S Yes, we took a whole l o t of what I t h i n k should b e r e a l

good p i c t u r e s .

ARMSTRONG We made a l o t of color-comparison checks.

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ALDRIN Well, we h a v e n ' t mentioned anything y e t about t h e c o l o r as

viewed p a r t i c u l a r l y and I guess it i s one t h i n g people a r e

going to be l i s t e n i n g o r looking f o r b e f o r e t h e y d e b r i e f

us. I t h i n k t h a t it makes some d i f f e r e n c e which window

y o u ' r e looking out because t h e windows do seem t o have a

l i t t l e b i t of a c o a t i n g on them. I g o t t h e d i s t i n c t im-

p r e s s i o n t h a t it depended on how you looked out of a par-

t i c u l a r window, w h a t a n g l e you looked out of i t , t o t e l l

you j u s t what c o l o r you were going t o s e e on t h e s u r f a c e .

It d i d n ' t look t h e same out of each window. That could

answer a l o t of questions about t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t people

s e e and I ' m s u r e t h a t not every s p a c e c r a f t has t h e same

c o a t i n g s on t h e windows. I d o n ' t know how s i g n i f i c a n t it

i s though.

14.6 FUEL CELL PURGING

COLLINS Fuel c e l l purging w a s normal on t h e way back.

14.7 CONSUMABLES
COLLINS We f i n a l l y - we almost caught t h e RCS budget. Last hack

on t h a t , we were 1 percent down and on t h e hydrogen and

on t h e oxygen we were very c l o s e t o nominal. Whoever

f i g u r e d t h o s e out d i d a good job.

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14.8 SPS MIDCOURSE CORRECTION

COLLINS None w a s r e q u i r e d on t h e way back. We d i d have one

midcourse of 4.8 f t / s e c which we d i d w i t h t h e RCS.

14.9 MIDCOURSE LUNAR LANDbIARKS

COLLI MS T h a t ' s not a p p l i c a b l e .

1 4 . 1 0 STAR/EARTH HORIZONS

COLLINS That s not a p p l i c a b l e .

1 4 . 1 1 ECS REDUNDANCY
COLLINS We d i d not i n v e s t i g a t e any of t h e redundant systems of t h e

ECS.

1 4 . 1 2 DAP LOADS

COLLINS DAP loads were as c a l l e d out i n t h e f l i g h t p l a n ; I d o n ' t

have any comments on t h o s e . We widened up t h e DAF dead-

band PTC t o 30 degrees, which i s r e a l l y s o r t of a waste

o f time i n t h a t DAP PTC procedure, because as soon as you

widen t h e deadband, you t u r n all 1 2 or 1 6 of your RCS

t h r u s t switches o f f . I t r e a l l y d o e s n ' t matter whether

t h e deadband i s wide o r narrow, t h e t h i n g i s incapable of

f i r i n g any t h r u s t e r s anyhow. The DAP loads as w r i t t e n

i n t h e f l i g h t p l a n were s a t i s f a c t o r y .

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1 4 . 1 3 IN REALIGNMENT

COLLINS IMU r e a l i g n w a s a l l r i g h t . Throughout t h e f l i g h t , I w a s

a b l e t o g e t s a t i s f a c t o r y I M U alignments during t h e PTC

a t 0.3 d e g l s e c . This i s a f a i r l y f a s t r a t e , and it f e e l s

uncomfortable. You have t o go t o RESOLVE MEDIUM, and you

have t h e f e e l i n g t h a t you a r e lucky t o c l i c k t h e s t a r s

t h a t pass through t h e c e n t e r of t h e r e t i c l e p a t t e r n . It's

not r e a l l y p o s s i b l e t o t r a c k smoothly and hold t h e s t a r

i n t h e c e n t e r and make a very p r e c i s e mark. However, t h e

s t a r - a n g l e d i f f e r e n c e s came out u s u a l l y 00001, s o I guess

t h a t t h e accuracy i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s t h a t you would

c a l l satisfactory.

14.14 COMMUNICATIONS
COLLINS Again, t h e ground w a s changing between OMNI B and D i n

PTC. When w e were stopping PTC, w e were g e t t i n g l i t t l e

snatches of t h e high g a i n . D i f f i c u l t i e s with t h a t system

were t r a c e d mostly t o ground-switching problems, although

you would have t o say it i s a f a i r l y cumbersome system

using t h e f o u r O M N I ' s and t h e high g a i n . I d o n ' t have

any suggestions f o r improving t h e o p e r a t i n g procedures.

ALDRIN It would be n i c e i f t h e ground had c o n t r o l of t h a t O M N I

switch t o s e l e c t any of t h e four.

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COLLINS Yes, t h a t ' s true'. Right now, t h e ground can e i t h e r switch

between h i g h g a i n and D Dog o r between D Dog and whatever

i s s e l e c t e d on t h e switch t o i t s l e f t , which i s normally

B Baker.

14.15 BATTERY VENTING

COLLINS B a t t e r y v e n t i n g and waste dumps were a l l normal, j u s t as

t h e y were on t h e way o u t .

14.16 POWERING UP AND DOWN OF SPACECRAFT

COLLINS We only powered a few items down each n i g h t . We r e a l l y

maintained power f o r t h e e n t i r e f l i g h t , and t h a t w a s a

mode of o p e r a t i o n I enjoyed, not having t o power down.

14.17 TELFVISION
COLLINS We made a goof on our l a s t t e l e v i s i o n show. We l e f t t h e

c i r c u i t b r e a k e r o u t , which allows t h e monitor t o b e

o p e r a b l e without t r a n s m i t t i n g . Consequently, we l o s t a

l o t of t h e e n t r y d a t a . I t ' s t h e one on 225 c a l l e d S-band,

FM t r a n s m i t t e r , data stowage equipment f l i g h t bus. Of

c o u r s e , t h e e n t r y c h e c k l i s t d i d n ' t mention checking t h a t

c i r c u i t b r e a k e r , because t h e people who wrote t h e e n t r y

c h e c k l i s t had no i d e a t h a t it would b e out because of a

t e l e v i s i o n program hours p r i o r . I guess t h e TV c h e c k l i s t

d o e s n ' t mention it e i t h e r as b e s t I can r e c a l l .

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ALDRIN I w a s s o r t of d i s a p p o i n t e d i n t h e ground n o t c a t c h i n g t h a t .

It seemed t o me t h a t t h e y might want t o make some checkout

of t h e t a p e because t h e y had c o n t r o l of it b e f o r e e n t r y ,

or because we c a l l e d out t o them t h a t t h e t a l k b a c k barber-

p o l e d i d n ' t go gray.

COLLINS We d i d l o s e c o n t r o l of t h e t a p e because t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r

was out. I b e l i e v e t h a t we and t h e ground both g o t t r i c k e d

i n t o t h i n k i n g it w a s because we h a d n ' t gone t o COMMAND

RESET. But d i d n ' t you t e l l them once t h a t you had gone

t o COMMAND RESET and you s t i l l d i d n ' t have t a p e c o n t r o l ?

ALDRIN Yes.

COLLINS To make a long s t o r y s h o r t , we d i d i n a d v e r t e n t l y l e a v e

t h a t TV c i r c u i t b r e a k e r o u t , and t h e r e f o r e , t h e taped

e n t r y d a t a were l o s t . T h e y ' l l s t i l l have a l o t o f informa-

t i o n through t h e downlink.

14.18 COAST PARAMETERS - ANOMALIES

COLLINS The machine h e l d t o g e t h e r b e a u t i f u l l y on t h e way home.

I d o n ' t know of any anomalies.

14.19 H I G H GAIN ANTENNA T U C K I N G

COLLINS High g a i n antenna t r a c k i n g w a s as it always w a s .

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14.20. S-BAND PERFORMANCE

COLLINS S-band performance w a s good.

1 4 . 2 1 NECESSITY OF ADDITION& IMU REALIGNMENTS

COLLINS The IMU, by t h i s t i m e , had had i t s compensation terms

updated once o r t w i c e , and it w a s i n good shape. I don't

r e c a l l t h e l o n g e s t p e r i o d of t i m e w e went without an IMU

alignment, b u t it w a s on t h e o r d e r of '12 hours. At t h e

end of t h i s p e r i o d of t i m e , t h e stars were s t i l l w e l l

w i t h i n t h e s e x t a n t f i e l d of view.

14.22 MCC UPDATE

COLLINS Midcourse c o r r e c t i o n update w a s w e l l handled. We only

had an RCS burn.

14.23 W-MATRIX

COLLINS We d i d n ' t f o o l with i t ; we l e f t it alone.

14.25 PRESLEEP AND POSTSLEEP CHECKLISTS

ALDRIN We t a l k e d once about looking i n t o some m o d i f i c a t i o n s of

t h e COMM s o t h a t you d i d n ' t have t h e two o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e ,

p l u s r e f e r r i n g t o m o t h e r c h e c k l i s t w i t h exceptions. I

t h i n k \ t h e r e ' s some way t o s i m p l i f y t h a t .

14.26 PHOTOGRAPHY
COLLINS We took l o t s of p i c t u r e s on t h e way home, u s i n g up t h e

remainder of t h e f i l m . W e took photos of t h e e x t e r i o r of

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COLLINS t h e E a r t h and t h e Moon a t v a r i o u s s e t t i n g s . We'll j u s t
( CONT 'D )
have t o w a i t and see how t h e y came o u t .

14.27 PASTIME ACTIVITIES

COLLINS What d i d w e do w i t h our f r e e t i m e ? We mostly j u s t waited.

We had p l e n t y of t i m e t o e a t , had p l e n t y of time t o g e t

r e s t e d up. We used simultaneous s l e e p p e r i o d s on t h e way

home. Our i n c l i n a t i o n during p r e f l i g h t w a s t o u s e stag-

gered s l e e p p e r i o d s on t h e way home. I ' m not s u r e i n

r e t r o s p e c t which i s t h e b e s t way t o go.

ALDRIN I d i d n ' t see anything wrong w i t h t h e way we d i d it.

COLLINS I d i d n ' t s e e anything wrong w i t h what w e d i d , because

nothing broke. Had w e had t h i n g s s t a r t b r e a k i n g , I ' m not

s u r e w e wouldn't have been b e t t e r with t h e s t a g g e r e d s l e e p

periods.

14.30 TIMELINES AND FLIGHT PLAN UPDATES

COLLINS There w a s none t h a t I r e c a l l .

14.31 MANEUVERING TO ENTRY ATTITUDE

COLLINS Maneuvering t o e n t r y a t t i t u d e w a s done e a s i l y and e a r l y .

14.32. BORESIGHT AND SEXTANT STAR CHECKS

COLLINS We d i d not have a b o r e s i g h t s t a r , b u t t h e s e x t a n t star

check passed as it always d i d .

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14.33 ELS LOGIC AND STAR CHECKS

COLLINS The ELS l o g i c check w a s done e a r l y with t h e ground look-

i n g over our s h o u l d e r , and it gave us a GO f o r PYRO ARM.

14.34 EMS

COLLINS We checked t h e EMS out i n s o f a r as w e could t h e day p r i o r

t o entry. I t h i n k t h i s i s a good i d e a because i f t h e r e

are any f u n n i e s i n i t , t h e n t h e ground has a good 24 hours

or more t o have meetings and decide whether or not a l l or

p o r t i o n s of t h e EMS are GO or NO GO f o r e n t r y . The

DELTA-V c o u n t e r worked normally i n EMS. Accelerometer

b i a s - I d o n ' t r e a l l y r e c a l l t h a t we checked t h a t p r e e n t r y

We j u s t ran through a l l t h e s e l f - t e s t p a t t e r n s , and one

of t h o s e checks accelerometers when it counts down t o

zero p l u s or minus something.

14.35 ENTRY CORRIDOR CHECK

. COLLINS The ground kept r e p o r t i n g our gamma, which w a s i n d i c a t i n g

a l i t t l e s t e e p , 65 something. Then w e got c l o s e r and

c l o s e r t o nominal as w e g o t c l o s e r i n , and I d o n ' t r e c a l l

what our a c t u a l gamma w a s . I t h i n k it w a s 652.

ARMSTRONG No. 648 w a s t h e l a s t w e hit.

COLLINS 648 i s as c l o s e t o nominal as you can g e t .

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. . _. .., -. . . ~ - ... . - - . . .. . . .. . .
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14.36 FINAL STOWAGE
COLLINS We had a couple of i t e m s , mostly helmets, t h a t d i d not

go according t o t h e entry-stowage p l a n . The helmets were

supposed t o go i n t h e foodboxes. Only one helmet f i t i n

t h e food box and t h a t l e f t us w i t h two helmet bags plus

two LEVA bags. These f o u r l i t t l e packages we bundled up

and put i n s i d e t h e right-hand s l e e p r e s t r a i n t and l a t c h e d

down with tiedown cord. That system worked f i n e . Our

f i r s t i n c l i n a t i o n w a s t o p u t a l l t h o s e bags i n s i d e t h e

h a t c h bag underneath t h e left-hand couch. However, t h e

ground o b j e c t e d t o t h a t because t h e y thought t h a t t h e bag

wasn't stressed s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r t h a t weight during e n t r y ,

b u t I t h i n k you could have put 10 helmet bags i n s i d e t h e

h a t c h bag and it would have been p e r f e c t l y s a f e . That

hatch bag i s v e r y s t r o n g and i t ' s a very convenient p l a c e

t o stow t h i n g s even of helmet weight during e n t r y .

ALDRIN W e ought t o f i n d out w h a t l i m i t s North American p l a c e s

on t h a t f o r e n t r y .

COLLINS You could grab t h a t h a t c h bag and p u l l on it with a l l your

might and you w e r e n ' t about t o p u l l t h a t t h i n g l o o s e .

14.37 SYSTEMS VERIFICATION

COLLINS The systems worked f i n e .

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14.38 FINAL ENTRY PmPARATIONS

COLLINS F i n a l e n t r y p r e p a r a t i o n s were done e a r l y with a good

checklist .
14.39 CM RCS PREHEAT

COLLINS CM RCS p r e h e a t w a s not r e q u i r e d .

14.40 MANEWERING TO ENTRY ATTITUDE

COLLINS W e used t h e system of manually t r a c k i n g t h e horizon and

cross-checking gimbal angles and horizon p o s i t i o n s i n t h e

window v e r s u s t i m e out from 400 000 f e e t . The ground had

given us s e v e r a l check p o i n t s a t E1 minus 30 minutes and

E 1 minus 17 minutes. I n a d d i t i o n , we had a l i t t l e graph

t h a t showed f o r any i n s t a n t i n t i m e what t h e p i t c h gimbal

a n g l e should b e t o keep t h e horizon on t h e 31.7-degree

l i n e on t h e window. A l l t h e s e checks r e i n f o r c e d our

b e l i e f t h a t w e d i d have a good platform and t h a t we had

a good t r a j e c t o r y .

14.42 CM/SM SEPARATION

COLLINS CM/SM SEP went normally. The water b o i l e r w a s i n opera-

t i o n during t h i s p e r i o d of t i m e , which gave t h e s p a c e c r a f t

a l e f t yaw. I w a s i n MINIMUM IMPULSE a good percentage

of t h i s t i m e , and t h u s it was q u i t e n o t i c e a b l e . I yawed

out 45 degrees l e f t , j e t t i s o n e d t h e s e r v i c e module, and

yawed back i n plane by yawing r i g h t . When I got a yaw

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COLLINS r a t e s t a r t e d , t h e water b o i l e r would f i g h t me, t h e r a t e
( CONT'D)
would reduce t o near z e r o , and I would t h e n have t o make

another input.

Having g o t t e n back t o z e r o yaw a f t e r j e t t i s o n i n g t h e

s e r v i c e module, I n o t i c e d t h e r e appeared t o b e something

wrong w i t h t h e yaw-left t h r u s t e r a t t h i s time. It had

worked normally f o r a l i t t l e w h i l e , b u t a f t e r s e v e r a l

minutes of o p e r a t i o n , it d i d n o t . That w a s command

module RCS t h r u s t e r 1 6 , yaw l e f t . It appeared t o b e

f u n c t i o n i n g improperly u s i n g t h e automatic c o i l s . When

you yawed l e f t , it made some n o i s e , b u t it d i d n o t g i v e

t h e proper response. It would work p r o p e r l y i f you'd

move t h e hand c o n t r o l l e r all t h e way over t o t h e hard

s t o p s and u s e t h e d i r e c t c o i l . A t t h i s l a t e s t a g e of t h e

game, I didn't- want t o devote any time t o t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g

or t a l k i n g about it. I probably should have brought t h e

number 2 system on t h e l i n e i n t h a t a x i s , b u t I d i d n ' t ;

and e v e r y t h i n g e l s e seemed t o b e working normally. I'm

j u s t f l a g g i n g t h a t as a p o s s i b l e systems problem; some-

body should look a t t h a t t h r u s t e r and i t s a s s o c i a t e d

w i r i n g a f t e r t h e f l i g h t and s e e i f t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g wrong

w i t h it.

FCOD REP Did you see t h e s e r v i c e module?

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C OLLI NS Yes. It f l e w by us.

ALDRIN It f l e w by t o t h e r i g h t and a l i t t l e above u s , s t r a i g h t

ahead. It w a s spinning up. It w a s f i r s t v i s i b l e i n

window number 4, t h e n l a t e r i n window number 2 , r e a l l y

spinning.

14.44 O.O5g EMS AND CORRIDOR CHECK

ALDRIN What w a s t h e comparison of when t h e f i n a l g l i g h t came

on?

COLLINS Twenty-eight seconds, I t h i n k .

ARMSTRONG When t h e DSKY i n d i c a t i o n of t h e accelerometer accelera-

t i o n r e a d 5 , t h e O.O5g l i g h t came on. A t that point,

t h e c l o c k r e a d 28 seconds.

COLLINS The s p a c e c r a f t w a s b r i e f l y out of t h e s u n l i g h t a t 400 K ,

and a l l o f a sudden t h e t h i n g l i t up and I thought w e

were s t a r t i n g t o g e t i o n i z a t i o n , b u t it r e a l l y wasn't

t h a t ; it w a s a b r i e f p e r i o d o f sunshine.

ARMSTRONG I wasn't looking o u t , b u t t h e r e w a s a weird i l l u m i n a t i o n .

I a l s o thought it w a s j u s t i o n i z a t i o n a t t h e t i m e .

COLLINS We got t h e O.O5g l i g h t , and I got t h e O.O5g switch and

t h e EMS roll switch on. We were cross-checking t h e c l o c k ,

and t h i s w a s 28 seconds a f t e r 400 000 f e e t . I d i d not

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COLLINS n o t i c e t h e c o r r i d o r v e r i f i c a t i o n l i g h t , e i t h e r t h e upper
( CONT 1 D )
one or t h e lower one. Both of them could have been on.

I w a s busy a t t h i s t i m e checking o t h e r t h i n g s , such as

were we h o l d i n g t h e r i g h t bank a n g l e s with t h e l i f t v e c t o r

up and d i d t h e g on t h e EMS a g r e e with t h e g meter. I

w a s a l s o l i s t e n i n g t o what N e i l w a s saying about t h e

computer. O f c o u r s e , our i n t e n t w a s t o h o l d t h e lift

v e c t o r up unless we had some considerably off-nominal

entry w i t h no communications; s o w e s t a r t e d t o do t h a t

r e g a r d l e s s of what t h e c o r r i d o r v e r i f i c a t i o n l i g h t s a i d .

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15.0 ENTRY

15.1 ENTRY PARAMETERS

COLLINS Normally we're targeted for 1108 miles from pointer K

to the ship. Initially the weather in that area looked

good, but as we got'in closer, Houston started making

grumbling noises about the weather in that recovery area.

Finally they said there were thunderstorms there and

they were going at 1500 miles. I wasn't very happy with

that fact because the great majority of our practice and

simulator work and everything else had been done on a

1187 target point. The few times we fooled around with

long-range targets, the computer's performance and the

ground's parameters seemed to be in disagreement. Spe-

cifically, there's an exit velocity and exit-drag-level

check that's got to be within certain bounds, and it

rarely, if ever, was within those bounds. So, when they

said 1500 miles, both Neil and I thought, "Oh God, we're

going to end up having a big argument about whether the

computer is GO or NO GO for a 1500-mile entry." Plus

1500 miles is not nearly as compatible - it doesn't look

quite the sane on the EMS trace. If you had to take

over, you'd be hard-pressed to come anywhere near the

ship.

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* . . .. . ..... .. - . . * . " ... " . - ._. . . .. . _...I_ "_. . ...- -. -- . . I__C.

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COLLINS For t h e s e r e a s o n s , I w a s n ' t t o o happy about going 1500
( CONT ' D )
m i l e s , b u t I cannot q u a r r e l w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n . The

system i s b u i l t t h a t way and, i f t h e weather i s bad i n

t h e recovery area, I t h i n k i t ' s probably advantageous

t o go 1500 m i l e s t h a n t o come down through a thunderstorm.

c

15.2 COMMUNICATIONS BLACKOUT

COLLINS I never p a i d t h e s l i g h t e s t b i t of a t t e n t i o n t o t h a t .

They read up a l l t h e numbers; i t ' s simple t h a t , i f y o u ' r e

i n , a b l a c k o u t , you c a n ' t communicate; i f y o u ' r e e i t h e r

s i d e of t h e b l a c k o u t , you can. I guess t h e ground u s e s

it a l i t t l e more t h e n t h a t , it can g i v e them more o f a

hack on where you are r e l a t i v e t o t h e nominal t r a j e c t o r y .

15.3 IONIZATION

COLLINS Along about .O5g, w e s t a r t e d t o g e t a l l t h e s e colors p a s t

t h e windows; Buzz t o o k some movies, which w e looked a t

last night. They d o n ' t r e a l l y show what t h e human

eye sees. Around t h e edge of t h e plasma s h e a t h , t h e r e

are a l l v a r i e t i e s of c o l o r s - l a v e n d e r s , lightish

b l u i s h g r e e n s , l i t t l e t o u c h e s o f v i o l e t , and g r e a t I

v a r i a t i o n s mostly of b l u e s and g r e e n s . The c e n t r a l c o r e

h a s v a r i a t i o n s on a orange-yellow theme. I t ' s s o r t of

a combination o f a l l t h e c o l o r s o f t h e rainbow r e a l l y .

The c e n t r a l p a r t looks l i k e you would imagine a burning

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 CONFIDENTIAL 15-3

COLLINS material might look. Orangeish, yellowish, whitish,

( CONT'D)
and then completely surrounded by almost a rainbow of

colors.

ALDRIN I thought there was a surprisingly small amount of

material coming off.

COLLINS That's right; there didn't seem to be any chunks as there

were on Gemini.

ALDRIN That's right; there didn't seem to be any droplets or

anything coming off. There was a small number of sparks

going by; you could definitely see the flow pattern.

Looking out the side window, you could get a very good

indication of the angle of attack by the direction of

motion of the particles. That didn't seem to change too

much. When a thruster would fire, you could .pick it up

immediately, because it deflected the ion stream behind

you. I am not sure whether that was because of a roll

or whether it was actually changing the direction of the

lift vector.

15.4 SOUNDS, SENSATIONS, AND OBSERVATIONS

COLLINS I didn't hear any unusllal sound at all during that time.

ALDRIN No, it seemed to be rather quiet.

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15-4
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COLLINS Yes, t h e r e w a s n ' t any s i z z l i n g , popping, or any n o i s e s

t h a t you commonly a s s o c i a t e w i t h e n t r y h e a t i n g .

ALDRIN I thought t h e g c o n s t a n t w a s ' q u i t e smooth.

COLLINS I thought it w a s smooth a l s o .

ALDRIN More r a p i d from a p h y s i c a l s t a n d p o i n t t h e n I had a n t i c i -

pated.

COLLINS I thought it w a s slower t h a n t h e c e n t r i f u g e . I think

i t ' s probably e x a c t l y t h e same time d u r a t i o n .

ALDRIN Well, I d i d n ' t have a meter t o l o o k a t .

COLLINS You're more keyed up and t i m e seems t 3 go more slowly.

Anytime t h a t I go from zero g t o p o s i t i v e g , I g e t a

f e e l i n g of t r a n s v e r s e a c c e l e r a t i o n i n s t e a d of f e e l i n g

l i k e t h a t of what it t r u l y i s . The f i r s t f e w seconds I

g e t the s e n s a t i o n o f body r o t a t i o n , mostly i n p i t c h .

Usually I t h i n k we're p i t c h i n g up.

ARMSTRONG Yes, I would a g r e e t h a t I f e l t a l i t t l e b i t o f a r o t a t i o n a l

s e n s a t i o n d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l g p u l s e , b u t i t ' s not d i s -

orienting.

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15.6 CONTROL MODE

COLLINS We gave S p a c e c r a f t c o n t r o l over t o t h e computer a f t e r we

passed a l l our p i t c h a t t i t u d e cross-checks. We gave it

t o t h e computer s h o r t l y b e f o r e 400 000 f e e t . I don't

r e c a l l e x a c t l y when, b u t a m a t t e r o f seconds b e f o r e

400 000 f e e t . We s t a y e d i n CMC, AUTO f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e

entry. The computer d i d i t s u s u a l b r i l l i a n t j o b a t

steering. We j u s t s o r t o f peered over i t s shoulder and

made sure t h a t t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s responding t o t h e bank

a n g l e s t h a t t h e computer commanded, and t h a t t h o s e bank

a n g l e s made s e n s e i n l i g h t of what w e s a w on t h e EMS and

through o t h e r b i t s and p i e c e s of i n f o r m a t i o n , The

computer d i d not f l y t h e EMS t h e same way I would have

flown t h e EMS. A s soon as it g o t s u b c i r c u l a r , it seemed

t o s t o r e up a l o t more e x c e s s . e n e r g y t h a n I thought w a s

reasonable. It w a s h o l d i n g on t o an approximate

250 m i l e s downrange e r r o r . When t h e downrange d i s t a n c e

t o go w a s , s a y , 500 m i l e s , it would have about 750 miles

a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r g l e v e l we were s e e i n g a t

the time. I thought t h i s w a s probably a l i t t l e e x c e s s i v e ,

b u t , i t hung on u n t i l v e r y , v e r y l a t e i n t h e game and t h e n

it decided a l l of a sudden t o dump it. It s o r t of r o l l e d

over on i t s back and gave u s a second peak p u l s e of 6g's ,

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COLLINS g e t t i n g r i d o f t h a t e x c e s s energy. A f t e r t h a t , everything
(CONT'D)
w a s a l l cross-ranges and downranges, and e v e r y t h i n g made

sense. It w a s e s s e n t i a l l y on zero e r r o r f o r t h e remain-

der o f t h e r u n . Our f i r s t peak p u l s e w a s 6.5 as n e a r l y

as you can read t h a t t h i n g , and t h e second one w a s 6.0.

The EMS t r a c e looked more l i k e a r o l l e r c o a s t e r t h a n a

horizontal l i n e . It r e a l l y climbed f o r a t i t u d e a f t e r

t h e i n i t i a l p u l s e and hung way up t h e r e h i g h . All of a

sudden, it decided t o dump i t , and r o l l e d over on i t s

back and w e came screaming back i n . That i s r e a l l y a

p r e t t y gross exaggeration, but t h a t was the trend.

15.8 DROGUE CHUTE DEPLOYMENT

ALDRIN I could see t h e r i n g d e p a r t i n g j u s t a f r a c t i o n o f a

second b e f o r e I f e l t a s m a l l p u l s e . There wasn't much

o f a r o t a t i o n as t h e drogue c h u t e s deployed. They seemed

t o o s c i l l a t e around a good b i t , b u t d i d n o t t r a n s m i t

much o f t h i s o s c i l l a t i o n t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t . The space-

c r a f t seemed t o s t a y on a p r e t t y s t e a d y course.

15.9 MAIN CHUTE DEPLOYMENT

ALDRIN The main c h u t e deployment a g a i n gave us a s m a l l j o l t ,

b u t n o t one t h a t would move you around i n t h e s e a t

a p p r e c i a b l y o r cause any concern. I c a n ' t say t h a t I

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ALDRIN n o t i c e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e between f i r s t deployment and
( CONT' D )
dereefing. It seemed t o be one continuous o p e r a t i o n .

COLLINS It seemed t o m e t h e r e w a s ' q u i t e a b i t of d e l a y b e f o r e

they dereefed. All t h r e e c h u t e s were s t a b l e and all

d e r e e f e d and t h e y kept s t a y i n g t h a t way u n t i l I was j u s t

about t h e p o i n t w h e r e I w a s g e t t i n g worried about whether

t h e y w e r e e v e r going t o dereef; t h e n t h e y d i d .

15.10 COMMUNICATIONS

COLLINS A s soon as w e got o u t of b l a c k o u t , we heard Recovery 1

and H a w a i i Rescue 1. Houston, as p e r agreement, s t a y e d

o f f t h e a i r and w e p r e t t y much s t a y e d o f f t h e a i r except

t o speak when spoken t o and t o l e t t h e recovery people

know t h a t we were i n good shape and t h a t t h e r e w a s no

h u r r y about t h e i r r e c o v e r y o p e r a t i o n s .

1 5 . 1 1 ECS
COLLINS We d i d n o t have s u i t s on. W e brought t h e primary water

b o i l e r on t h e l i n e as p e r t h e c h e c k l i s t ; t h e same for

t h e secondary. They were brought on roughly 45 minutes

and 15 minutes , r e s p e c t i v e l y , b e f o r e s e p a r a t i o n , some-

thing l i k e that. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e secondary b o i l e r

r e a l l y had a chance t o do any b o i l i n g ; however, I be-

l i e v e t h e primary d i d .

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. ._ -- . . .". " ~ . ~ . . "I. . .. I . .. . . .. -. .- . I

- .- . .. .. I __
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ALDRIN A t any r a t e , it s t a r t e d p e r k i n g away. You c a n ' t t e l l

how e f f e c t i v e it i s by l o o k i n g a t t h e gages.

COLLINS The c o o l i n g w a s very good. Even d u r i n g t h e e n t r y i t s e l f ,

w e were p e r f e c t l y . comfortable. We d i d n ' t have t o f r e e z e

o u r s e l v e s o u t by cold-soaking p r i o r t o e n t r y . We d i d n ' t

go through any cold-soak procedure. It w a s p l e a s a n t l y

cool throughout t h e e n t r y , and it was q u i t e comfortable

on t h e water, as opposed t o our Gulf-egress t r a i n i n g .

I t h i n k you'd g e t an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t viewpoint o f

t h a t recovery operation with t h e BIG'S, i f you s t a r t e d

o u t h o t w i t h s t o r e d body h e a t .

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 16-1
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16.0 LANDING AND RECOVERY

1 6 . 1 TOUCHDOWN - IMPACT
COLLINS I f e l t a solid jolt. It was a l o t h a r d e r t h a n I expected.

ALDRIN It p i t c h e d me forward w i t h a l i t t l e b i t of sideways r o t a -

tion. I w a s s t a n d i n g by w i t h my f i n g e r s q u i t e c l o s e t o

the c i r c u i t breaker. The c h e c k l i s t f e l l , and t h e pen o r

p e n c i l , whatever I had, dropped. It d i d n ' t seem as though

t h e r e w a s any way of keeping your f i n g e r s on t h e c i r c u i t

breakers.

ARMSTRONG When you a r e 18 k n o t s away, it l o o k s p r e t t y promising.

COLLINS I t h i n k t h o s e procedures f o r t h e main chute a r e w e l l

worked o u t . I t h i n k it i s 50/50 whether or not you a r e

going t o S t a b l e 11.

1 6 . 3 POSTLANDING CHECKLIST

COLLINS The p o s t l a n d i n g c h e c k l i s t worked w e l l . The b i g item f o r

u s w a s t h a t w e not contaminate t h e world by l e a v i n g t h e

p o s t l a n d i n g v e n t open. W e had t h a t u n d e r l i n e d and c i r c l e d

i n o u r procedures t o c l o s e t h a t v e n t v a l v e p r i o r t o popping

t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s on p a n e l 250. I'd l i k e t o s a y f o r

t h e f o l l o w i n g crews t h a t t h e y pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h a t i n

their training. If you c u t t h e power on panel 250 b e f o r e

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COLLINS you g e t t h e v e n t v a l v e c l o s e d , i n t h e o r y , t h e whole world
( CONT'D)
g e t s contaminated, and everybody i s mad a t you.

ALDRIN I have a couple o f t h i n g s noted i n t h e c h e c k l i s t . I don't

t h i n k any of t h e f l i g h t s have e v e r used t h e CM RCS p r e h e a t .

If you m i s s a c i r c u i t b r e a k e r , it i s not r e a l obvious t h a t

you are going t o come back and see t h a t c i r c u i t b r e a k e r

later. You do, b u t it i s tucked away. For example, when

you g e t ready t o p r e h e a t , you push some c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s

i n and t u r n t h e h e a t e r s on. You w a i t awhile t h e n p u l l

some c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s o u t a g a i n . The way t h e c h e c k l i s t

i s w r i t t e n , some of t h o s e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s s t a y i n and

you wonder whether you ought t o go through t h e mechanics

of checking a l l t h o s e t h i n g s o f f . The o t h e r one i s t h e

CM RCS a c t i v a t i o n . When w e g o t t o t h e p o i n t of b r i n g i n g

t h e v a r i o u s logic s w i t c h e s on, t h e sequence a r m c i r c u i t

b r e a k e r s were o u t . Mike c a l l e d it t o my a t t e n t i o n t h a t

u n l e s s we pushed t h o s e i n , we w e r e n ' t going t o g e t any

RCS p r e s s u r i z a t i o n . We d i d n ' t go back and r e s e a r c h t h i s

at that particular t i m e . I believe that if the checklist

people check, t h e y w i l l f i n d t h a t t h o s e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s

should be c a l l e d out t o be pushed i n a t t h a t p o i n t .

During t h e CM RCS check, it s a y s t o go t o s p a c e c r a f t con-

t r o l SCS, b u t it d o e s n ' t t e l l you what mode t o be' i n for

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ALDRIN t h e check. I t h i n k you want a minimum impulse. I think

( CONT'D)
t h a t it i s l o g i c a l t h a t it b e c a l l e d out i n t h e c h e c k l i s t .

1 6 . 4 TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY

COLLINS It w a s d e f i n i t e l y humid i n s i d e . W e g o t about a q u a r t of

w a t e r i n through t h e s n o r k l e v a l v e . It w a s d e f i n i t e l y

humid, b u t it w a s comfortable.

16.5 COWNICATIONS
COLLINS Communications were good a f t e r we became s t a b l e I . Of

c o u r s e , we could n o t h e a r anybody i n S t a b l e I1 , because

t h e antennas were i n t h e w a t e r .

16.7 BATTERY POWER

COLLINS B a t t e r y power w a s more t h a n adequate f o r t h e b r i e f d u r a t i o n

w e were i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t . I d o n ' t r e c a l l t h e v o l t a g e , or

you mentioning it.

ALDRIN On t h e main c h u t e s a f t e r we dumped p r o p e l l a n t d u r i n g t h e

purge c y c l e , you could s e e flame coming o u t of t h e t h r u s t e r s

and going by t h e s i d e windows. When we opened up t h e v a l v e s ,

t h e r e w a s a f a i r l y s t r o n g odor of p r o p e l l a n t s . It d i d n ' t

l a s t p a r t i c u l a r l y long. It seemed t o m e we had p l e n t y of

t i m e , and it might b e a d v i s a b l e t o d e l a y t h a t a l i t t l e b i t

longer.

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16-4 C - W Ft DENT IA L
ALDRIN The v i s i b i l i t y out t h e s i d e window coming down w a s q u i t e
( CONT'D)
good and I f e l t t h a t you could look out and almost s e e

impact by l o o k i n g o u t t o t h e s i d e . This would i n v o l v e

some r i s k t o your neck a t t h e t i m e . I t h i n k you could

determine l e v e l s o f 50 f e e t or less and t h e n p u t your

head back on t h e couch. I d i d n ' t s e e any need t o do

t h a t , b u t t h e c a p a b i l i t y does e x i s t .

This b u s i n e s s about h i t t i n g t h e water w i t h o u t p u t t i n g

t h e c h u t e s o u t because of a l t i m e t e r f a i l u r e i s k i n d of a

"Mickey Mouse" .simulator pad.

COLLINS I t h i n k it i s a good t h i n g though. I t h i n k t h e more

answers you can mess up i n s i d e t h e s i m u l a t o r , t h e b e t t e r

it i s . They ought t o t r i c k you i n t o coming i n w i t h your

PYRO c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s o u t , w i t h your ELS c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s

o u t , w i t h your PYRO's n o t armed, w i t h your ELS l o g i c o f f ,

o r w i t h your ELS AUTO switch i n MANUAL. Any one o f t h o s e

t h i n g s can r e a l l y f o u l you up. To g e t a s u c c e s s f u l e n t r y ,

you have t o have t h e ELS c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s i n , t h e PYRO's

armed, ELS AUTO on, and t h e ELS LOGIC on. Those a r e

i m p o r t a n t s t h i n g s i n t h e 1 0 1 c h e c k l i s t items. Most of them

are r e a l l y not c r i t i c a l , b u t t h o s e few items are. I managed

t o f o u l each one of them up at l e a s t once d u r i n g t h e v a r i o u s

simulations. I w a s g l a d t h a t I had because I was darn sure

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COLLINS going t o make p o s i t i v e t h a t each of t h o s e switches were

( CONT' D)
i n t h e proper p o s i t i o n .

ARMSTRONG I agree w i t h t h a t . What Buzz i s s a y i n g i s t h a t t h i s l a c k

of information about how h i g h you a r e i s not r e a l . If

you are i n a l i g h t e d c o n d i t i o n , and we were i n a r e l a -

t i v e l y w e l l - l i g h t e d c o n d i t i o n d u r i n g c h u t e deployment, t h i s

information i s a l o t more r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e i n f l i g h t t h a n

it i s i n s i m u l a t o r . You can s e e t h e clouds coming u p , and

you a r e watching y o u r s e l f go through cloud l a y e r s , and

t h e n you can s e e t h e water down below you. You have a

l o t of cues as t o how high you a r e which a r e n ' t a v a i l a b l e

i n t h e simulator.

ALDRIN mat's true.

. 16.10 SEASICKNESS

COLLINS Nobody got s i c k . We each took a p i i l p r i o r t o e n t r y and

a second p i l l on t h e w a t e r . Those p i l l s a r e c a l l e d

Hyacynth and Dexedrine, and t h e y seem t o work f i n e .

ALDRIN No s i d e e f f e c t s a t .all.

16.11 INTERNAL T W E M T U F E CHANGES

COLLINS There d i d n ' t appear t o be any. We were comfortable on t h e

water, and I guess a t t h e t i m e it probably warmed up a

16-6

COLLINS little. We w e r e n ' t i n it l o n g enough t o r e a l l y f e e l

( CONT'D)
any sudden changes. There w e r e n ' t any.

16.12 STABLE I OR S T A B L E I1 - U P R I G H T I N G PROCEDURES

COLLINS We were i n S t a b l e 11. The f l o a t bags worked f i n e . We

were i n S t a b l e I1 4 or 5'minutes.

ALDRIN It d i d n ' t seem l i k e it w a s anywhere n e a r as long as it

was d u r i n g t h e t a n k or Gulf t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s .

COLLINS I am s u r e t h e reason w a s t h a t we were bobbing around

f a i r l y well.

ALDRIN A s soon as t h e y became almost f u l l , t h e wave a c t i o n t i p -

ped it back over.

COLLINS That's r i g h t .

16.14 I N I T I A L S I T T I N G OR STANDING

COLLINS I d o n ' t t h i n k any o f t h e t h r e e of us had any of t h o s e

symptoms.

16.15 I N T E R N A L P R E S S U R E

COLLINS Internal pressure was f i n e . We used t h e dump v a l v e as

p e r t h e c h e c k l i s t , and it worked o u t w e l l .
 16-7

16.16 RECOVERY OPERATIONS

COLLINS Recovery Operations went very smoothly. The swimmer threw

the B I G ' s i n t o us. We p u t t h e B I G ' s on i n s i d e t h e space-

craft. We p u t them on i n t h e lower equipment bay. Neil

d i d f i r s t , t h e n I d i d a f t e r him. Buzz put h i s on i n t h e

right-hand s e a t . We went o u t ; N e i l f i r s t , t h e n me, a n d

t h e n Buzz. I t ' s n e c e s s a r y , a t l e a s t t h e way w e had prac-

t i c e d i t , for us t o h e l p one a n o t h e r i n s e a l i n g t h e B I G ' s

p e__r was f u l l y c l o s e d .
around t h e head t o make s u r e t h- e z -i p__
-- - -7

16.19 EGRESS

COLLINS As w e crossed t h e t h r e s h o l d of t h e hatch, we i n f l a t e d o u z

w
water wings and jumped i n t o t h e r a f t . The B I G ' s swimmer
i__--------.

had t r o u b l e g e t t i n g t h e h a t c h c l o s e d . I d o n ' t know why.

N e i l went back t o h e l p him, and h e s t i l l had t r o u b l e .

I went b a c k t o h e l p , and when I g o t t h e r e t h e h a t c h g e a r

box w a s on n e u t r a l and t h e h a t c h handle w a s on n e u t r a l .

-
H e should have been a b l e t o c l o s e i t . The h a t c h h a n d l e ,

i n s t e a d of b e i n g up a t i t s d e t e n t , w a s f l o p p i n g f r e e .

I d i d w a s t a k e it and cram it up i n t o t h e d e t e n t . Then

All

he w a s a b l e t o c l o s e t h e h a t c h . He w a s r e a l l y cranking

on i t . With n e u t r a l on t h o s e two pawl s e t t i n g s , t h e r e

should be no impediment t o c l o s i n g t h e h a t c h . Even i f t h e

h a t c h handle i s f l o p p i n g l o o s e , t h e r e i s n ' t anything i n s i d e

16-8

COLLINS which mechanically would i n t e r f e r e w i t h i t . We f i n a l l y

( CONT'D)
h e l p e d him g e t t h e h a t c h c l o s e d .

We sprayed one a n o t h e r down i n s i d e t h e r a f t . There w a s

some confusion on t h e chemical a g e n t s . There were two

b o t t l e s o f chemical a g e n t s . One of them w a s Betadyne,

which i s a soap-sudsy i o d i n e s o l u t i o n , and t h e o t h e r one

was Sodium H y p o c h l o r i t e , a c l e a r chemical 'spray. During

our s i m u l a t i o n s , w e used Betadyne i n b o t h b o t t l e s . They

found t h a t t h e Betadyne broke down t h e waterproofing i n

the s u i t . They made a l a s t - m i n u t e change and used Beta-

dyne f o r scrubbing down t h e s p a c e c r a f t , b u t t h e y used

Sodium Hypochlorite f o r scrubbing us down. I had r e a d

about t h i s and knew t h a t t h e r e w a s a change. While t h e

s w i m m e r w a s scrubbing t h e s p a c e c r a f t , I grabbed t h e o t h e r

b o t t l e and s t a r t e d scrubbing N e i l down. The s w i m m e r g o t

e x c i t e d and d i d n ' t want me t o do t h a t . I found out l a t e r

it w a s because i f you i n h a l e enough of t h i s Sodium Hypo-

c h l o r i t e through your i n t a k e v a l v e you can cause problems

inside t h e BIG. I ' m n o t s u r e whether you g e t n a u s e a t e d ,

you c a n ' t s e e or your eyes w a t e r .

You have t o b e c a r e f u l and n o t s p r a y t o o v i g o r o u s l y around

t h e i n t a k e valve. You have t o s p r a y your glove and wipe

it on r a t h e r t h a n spray it d i r e c t l y on. I am sure f u t u r e

 16-9

COLLINS r e c o v e r i e s w i l l have t h i s worked out d u r i n g t h e i r G u l f

(CONT'D)
egress training.
/
---This i s j u s t a n o t h e r example where changes

made between t h e t r a i n i n g and t h e r e a l t h i n g have t h e poten-

tial o f b i t i n g u s .

ALDRIN I thought t h e B I G w a s a well-designed garment. I was

r a t h e r disappointed i n t h e v i s i b i l i t y . When we had our

t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e i n t h e G u l f , I didn'.t n o t i c e as much fog-

g i n g over on t h e i n s i d e of t h e v i s o r s as I d i d on t h e a c t u a l

recovery. I thought f o r a while it w a s on t h e o u t s i d e .

I dipped down i n t h e w a t e r , b u t c o u l d n ' t seem t o c l e a r it

at all. I d o n ' t know where it came from. It d i d n ' t seem

t o me t h a t I w a s p e r s p i r i n g t h a t much on t h e i n s i d e .

ARMSTRONG I w a s j u s t about t o comment on t h e same t h i n g . If t h e r e

were any disadvantages t o t h e B I G , as t h e y were used i n

t h i s o p e r a t i o n , it w a s t h e l a c k of v i s i b i l i t y 'due t o con-

d e n s a t i o n on t h e i n s i d e of t h e v i s o r . It w a s s o bad as

t o be n e a r l y opaque.

COLLINS I d i d n ' t n o t i c e t h a t it w a s any worse t h a n t h e Gulf. I

c o u l d s e e t h e h e l i c o p t e r s c l e a r l y , t h e s l i n g being lowered,

and t h e swimmers. I could make out enough d e t a i l , f o r

example, t o r e a d t h e f a c e o f a w r i s t watch. I could

see f a i r l y well.
16-10 L

ALDRIN You c o u l d , b u t you would have t o move it around t o a

clear spot.

COLLINS Maybe t h a t ' s t r u e .

ARMSTRONG It may have had something t o do w i t h t h e s e a l between t h e

f a c e and t h e mask.

ALDRIN Yes.

ARMSTRONG How t i g h t t h a t s e a l w a s determined whether o r n o t t h a t

condensation w a s e x c e s s i v e o r n o t . Perhaps you had a

t i g h t e r seal. I t h i n k t h a t my s e a l w a s f a i r l y l o o s e .

COLLINS So w a s mine. You remember, you wanted t o t i g h t e n my mask.

ALDRIN I t i g h t e n e d mine down. Mine w a s p r e t t y t i g h t s o t h a t I

wasn't b r e a t h i n g i n and out of t h e s u i t . Maybe t h a t

f a c t c o n t r i b u t e d t o mine fogging up.

COLLINS C o u l d be. I d o n ' t know

ARMSTRONG I had a l o o s e f i t t i n g mask, t o o . I had t h e same problem.

1 6 . 2 1 CREW PICKUP

COLLINS We g o t i n t o t h e r a f t , did o u r decontamination b i t , and t h e y

picked us up. The h e l i c o p t e r p i l o t w a s r e a l good. You p u t

 16-11

COLLINS one hand or f o o t anywhere n e a r t h a t b a s k e t , though, and

( CONT'D) ---,
- -
they start pulling. They d o n ' t w a i t f o r you t o g e t i n

and g e t a l l comfortable b e f o r e t h e y r e t r a c t . Just like a

- t
fisherman, z
t h e end of t h a t line,*

he s t a r t e d crank-. . Aboard t h e h e l i c o p t e r , we s t a r t e d
*
s t o r i n g h e a t . For t h e f i r s t t i m e I became uncomfortably

w a r m during t h e h e l i c o p t e r r i d e . That.helicopter r i d e was

as s h o r t as we a r e going t o have them during t h i s k i n d of

operation. We d e b r i e f e d t h e recovery people out on t h e

s h i p and t o l d them t h e same t h i n g . When you g e t t h e crew

on t h e h e l i c o p t e r , everybody s h o u l d n ' t s i t back and b r e a t h e

a s i g h of r e l i e f and t h i n k t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n i s a l l o v e r ;

t h e y should keep r i g h t on moving. This i s t h e t i m e when

t h e crew i s r e a l l y s t a r t i n g t o g e t uncomfortable. If t h e

crew h a s t o . s t a y i n t h a t h e l i c o p t e r 1 5 or 20 minutes l o n g e r

t h a n w e d i d , I guess t h e hood on t h e BIG would come o f f .

T h a t ' s a p r e t t y w i l d guess.

ARMSTRONG I agree.

ALDRIN I agree.

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we were approaching t h e l i m i t o f how l o n g you

could expect people t o s t a y i n t h a t garment. 7

b
pd.lL*T\-
fiP
.L"

f--
16-12
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COLLINS It w a s a l l r i g h t i n t h e r a f t .

ALDRIN The roughness of t h e water d i d n ' t b o t h e r me t o o much. The

f a c t t h a t w e were g e t t i n g j u s t . a f e w waves every now and

t h e n cooled you o f f . There w a s no way of measuring what

t h e i n s i d e t e m p e r a t u r e o f t h e chopper w a s except t h a t w e

j u s t s t a r t e d accumulating h e a t i n s i d e t h e s u i t .

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 17-1
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1 7 . 0 GEOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS

COLLINS I thought t h a t t h e maps were more t h a n adequate - t h o s e

t h a t were c a r r i e d onboard t h e command module. The g r i d

system c o u l d be improved on. I t h i n k t h e ground s o r t o f ,

i n r e a l t i m e , came t o . t h e same conclusion we had -t o call

each g r i d t h e l e t t e r d e f i n i n g i t s lower boundary and t h e

number d e f i n i n g i t s l e f t - h a n d boundary.and u s i n g s o r t of

a Vernier s c a l e a c r o s s t h e g r i d s q u a r e . I n o t h e r words,

if you want t o d e f i n e a s p o t i n g r i d square E 9 , you c o n s i d e r

E9 t h e one whose lower l e f t - h a n d c o r n e r i s t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n

of E and 9 . If you want t o g e t s p e c i f i c , you say E . 9 and

9.13 o r something l i k e t h a t ; and t h a t d e f i n e s w i t h i n t h a t

s q u a r e more s p e c i f i c c o o r d i n a t e s .

ALDRIN The numbers, i f yours were t h e same as o u r s , had some p a t -

t e r n t o them; b u t t h e y didn't have as much p a t t e r n as I

t h i n k could have been employed. I n o t h e r words, t h e y

could have j u s t gone s t r a i g h t a c r o s s l e f t t o r i g h t i n each

row.

COLLINS Here's mine. I ' m t a l k i n g about t h e LAM-2 map, and it

w a s okay. I t ' s no jewel of a map, b u t it w a s c e r t a i n l y

adequate.

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17-2 CONFIDENTIAL
ARMSTRONG This s e c t i o n i s going t o b e d i f f i c u l t t o do without t h e

pictures t o describe. We're going t o t a k e an hour t o

t a l k about some of t h e s e t h i n g s t h a t you could t a l k about

i n 30 seconds w i t h t h e p i c t u r e .

[EDITOR'S NOTE]

The remainder of t h e items l i s t e d i n S e c t i o n 1 7 were

covered i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l i n t h e air-to-ground

t r a n s c r i p t i o n and/or S e c t i o n 1 0 (Lunar S u r f a c e ) of t h i s

document.

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 18-1
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1 8 . 0 COMMAND MODUm SYSTEMS OPERATION

1 8 . 1 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION

COLLINS I have no comment about t h e ISS. O p t i c a l subsystem B2,

l i g h t t r a n s m i t t a n c e t e l e s c o p e and s e x t a n t - as we s a i d

p r e v i o u s l y , t h e s e x t a n t w a s a v e r y u s e f u l instrument as

l o n g as t h e p l a t f o r m w a s k e p t i n alignment w i t h i n p l u s o r

minus 0.9 degree. Then s t a r s would b e v i s i b l e i n t h e

s e x t a n t and it w a s very u s e f u l . The t e l e s c o p e , on t h e

o t h e r hand, w a s a very poor instrument because of t h e

l i g h t l o s s through i t , n o t b e i n g a b l e t o d e t e c t s t a r

p a t t e r n s without a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d o f d a r k a d a p t a t i o n .

T h a t ' s a l l I g o t on t h a t .

18.1.3 Computer Subsystem

COLLINS We r a i s e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of making a PTC program. The

computer probably has enough memory t o do t h a t ' if You s t a r t

d e l e t i n g t h i n g s l i k e s t a b l e o r b i t rendezvous, s t a b l e o r b i t

midcourse P30, a P39 perhaps. We had no restarts or any

I
f u n n i e s i n t h e computer.

18.1.4 G&N Controls and Displays

COLLINS G&N c o n t r o l s and d i s p l a y s w e r e a l l without s u r p r i s e s . No

comments.

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. . _ . . I . . _ . ". . _ . . _ _ I . _ I _ _ _ _ _ .. .. .- .-. . - - ... . . .- .. -

18-2
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ARMSTRONG I have one comment on t h e EMS. I t h i n k a review o f t h e

r e s i d u a l s from each b u r n t h a t w a s made would i n d i c a t e t h a t

t h e r e i s something w e d o n ' t understand about p r o p e r l y

computing DELTA-VC, because t h e r e seems t o b e a d e f i n i t e

s i m i l a r i t y between t h e r e s i d u a l s . It does n o t seem t o b e

p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e b u r n s i z e o r burn t i m e or any of t h o s e

things. I always end up w i t h 4 o r 5 f t / s e c of DELTA-VC.

C OLLI NS The o t h e r p e c u l i a r i t y of t h e EMS w a s d u r i n g t r a n s p o s i t i o n

and docking. The EMS f u n c t i o n e d normally d u r i n g t h e

s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB and t h e subsequent a c c e l e r a t i o n ,

b u t a f t e r t h e t u r n around, a f t e r t h e 180 degree p i t c h and

t h e 60 degree yaw, t h e numbers i n t h e EMS d i d not make

sense. I n s t e a d of b e i n g around 1 0 1 or 1 0 0 . 6 t o 1 0 1 , t h e y

were down below 100. Then, i n f a c t , I docked w i t h t h e

EMS r e a d i n g 99.1, which i s completely n o n s e n s i b l e . I

d o n ' t understand how o r why t h e EMS g o t j o l t e d o f f i t s

c o r r e c t v a l u e s d u r i n g t h a t t u r n around.

18.4.1 SM RCS

COLLINS On t h e SM RCS system, w e had one quad t h a t w a s consider-

a b l y n o i s i e r t h a n t h e o t h e r s and I d o n ' t understand

e x a c t l y why t h a t w a s . I d o n ' t even remember which one it

was. I t h i n k it w a s quad A.

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 18-3
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18.4.2 CM RCS

COLLINS I t h i n k t h e r e i s something wrong w i t h t h e AUTO c o i l

f u n c t i o n i n g on t h r u s t e r 16.

18.5 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

ARMSTRONG Any comments?

ALDRIN Worked l i k e a dream. The i n i t i a l b a t t e r y c h a r g i n g w a s a

l i t t l e s u r p r i s i n g i n t h a t t h e v o l t a g e w a s q u i t e h i g h when

t h e b a t t e r y c h a r g e r w a s f i r s t t u r n e d on. It w a s up

around 39.2 o r 39.3. It l a t e r went back on down and t h e

amps went up. I d o n ' t r e a l l y understand what t h e c a u s e

of t h a t w a s . I c a l l e d it t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e ground

and t h e y seem t o t h i n k it w a s normal, b u t I d o n ' t under-

stand it. I got i n t h e h a b i t of u s i n g t h e b a t t e r y bus

i n d i c a t o r whenever I t u r n e d t h e main bus t i e s on and o f f ,

j u s t as a c o n f i r m a t i o n of doing t h a t . I j u s t mention t h a t

f o r any u s e of follow-on crews.

18.6 ENV1RO"TAL CONTROL SYSTEM

COLLINS There w a s one funny i n t h e ECS, and t h a t had t o do w i t h

t h e primary g l y c o l e v a p o r a t o r o u t l e t t e m p e r a t u r e g e t t i n g

l o w e r ' t h a n normal one t i m e d u r i n g l u n a r o r b i t when I w a s

i n t h e command module by myself. I t seemed t o b e a

t r a n s i e n t condition. The system recovered and began

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. . - . .. . . . . .
x .. . ~ . ... . .... - _.. . _- ," _. .. . . _- .- -- - . ._ ... ~..- .. -
18-4 CONFIDENTIAL
COLLINS f u n c t i o n i n g normally. It gave t h e appearance o f t h e
( CONT' D )
bypass v a l v e having malfunctioned and p u t t i n g f l u i d t h a t

should have been bypassed around t h e r a d i a t o r s and through

t h e r a d i a t o r s , r e s u l t i n g i n a RAD OUT temp t h a t w a s t o o

low and a g l y c o l EVAP temp t h a t w a s t o o low. And a f t e r

j u s t s i t t i n g t h e r e f o r a w h i l e watching i t , t h e system

slowly recovered and f o r t h e remainder o f t h e f l i g h t ,

t h e primary g l y c o l l o o p worked p e r f e c t l y normally. So

t h e r e w a s a p p a r e n t l y some t r a n s i e n t t h e r e which I a m

unable t o e x p l a i n .

ALDRIN On t h e ECS, it seems t o me i n t h a t r a p i d REPRESS package

w e would have a b e t t e r gage t h a n t h a t one t h a t goes up

t o 1200 b u t has marks every 300 p s i . That's not a b i g

thing. You d o n ' t r e f e r t o it very o f t e n , b u t i t ' s j u s t

not a v e r y easy one t o r e a d , and i t ' s n o t very s o p h i s t i -

cated.

ARMSTRONG You might mention t h i s i n a d v e r t e n t o p e r a t i o n of t h e

press-to-test valve a couple t i m e s .

COLLINS On t h e oxygen p a n e l , t h e emergency c a b i n p r e s s u r e regu-

l a t o r push-to-test button - we h i t it w i t h our t o e s

several times, and it made t h e ground nervous t o see a

sudden i n f l o w of oxygen t o t h e c a b i n on t h e TM. I don't

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 18-5
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COLLINS know where t h e y p i c k o f f t h e i r TM. We h e a r d a l i t t l e
( CONT D )
h i s s i n g n o i s e t h a t d i d n ' t p a s s more t h a n a second or two.

For some r e a s o n , our f e e t banged i n t o t h a t a r e a d u r i n g

t h e f i r s t day o r two. A couple or t h r e e t i m e s w e d i d

push-to-test t h a t l i t t l e button.

ARMSTRONG Any t r o u b l e with CO ?

2

COLLINS No, I had no t r o u b l e . They wanted a t i m e i n and a t i m e

out recorded on t h e C O canisters. I d i d w r i t e t h e times

2
on t h e s i d e of t h e c a n i s t e r , b o t h i n f e l t - t i p pen and

w i t h a r e g u l a r mechanical p e n c i l . It would b e easy t o

put some k i n d of s t i c k e r or t o provide some p l a c e on t h e

s i d e of t h e c a n i s t e r s t o w r i t e on. They are very dark

metal, and t h e y a r e v e r y s l i p p e r y . I t ' s very d i f f i c u l t

t o w r i t e on, even w i t h t h e f e l t - t i p or p e n c i l s o t h a t

they w i l l be l e g i b l e . I recorded i n and out t'imes on

each of t h e c a n i s t e r s , b u t I ' m not a t a l l s u r e t h e y w i l l

b e a b l e t o r e a d t h a t information.

ALDRIN I t ' s k i n d of s i l l y t o r e c o r d t h o s e i n and o u t times on

t h e ones t h a t you j e t t i s o n with t h e LM.

ARMSTRONG On t h e o t h e r hand, i t ' s n o t much t r o u b l e t o w r i t e t h e

t i m e s down when y o u ' r e making t h e change.

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18-6
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COLLINS Yes, i f we never g o t i n t o t h e LM f o r some r e a s o n , I

suppose t h e y would want a l l t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n .

1 8 . 6 . 2 Cabin Atmosphere

ALDRIN I n o t i c e d o c c a s i o n a l l y when my eyes would w a t e r , t h e r e

would b e a c e r t a i n n o t i c e a b l e burning. This o c c u r r e d

when water would d r i p around, and p a r t o f t h a t I guess

i s due t o z e r o g . I t ' s p r i m a r i l y when you wake up i n t h e

morning. My eyes would j u s t s t a r t t o w a t e r , and I would

n o t i c e t h e burning.

COLLINS Well, something e l s e I n o t i c e d i n t h e way o f eye i r r i t a -

t i o n was t h a t t h e male Velcro t h a t ' s mounted on t h e space-

c r a f t would come a p a r t i n l i t t l e t i n y b i t s and p i e c e s .

That m a t e r i a l would g e t on your s k i n . A couple of t i m e s

I n o t i c e d eye i r r i t a t i o n i n t h e i n n e r p a r t of my e y e , and

I ' d g e t q y f i n g e r and p e e l o f f a l i t t l e segment of t h a t

Velcro. That happened more t h a n once. That s t u f f f l o a t s

around t h e c a b i n and can g e t i n t o your eyes.

18.6.3 Water Supply System

COLLINS The c h l o r i n e i n j e c t i o n p o r t became more and more d i f f i c u l t

t o use. The c h l o r i n e seemed t o c o r r o d e t h e metal, and t h e

c h l o r i n e i n j e c t o r assembly became covered with s o r t of a

b l a c k slushy-looking d e p o s i t . I t h i n k it w a s a chemical

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 18-7
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COLLINS i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e c h l o r i n e and/or t h e b u f f e r and
( CONT'D)
t h e metal. The f r i c t i o n i n t h e system g o t h i g h e r and

h i g h e r , and toward t h e end of t h e 8 d a y s , it was v e r y

d i f f i c u l t t o screw t h e ampule assembly i n t o t h e i n j e c t o r .

COLLINS The f i l t e r s I t h i n k are a good i d e a , b u t t h e y need some

more e n g i n e e r i n g done on them. The b a s i c problem i s t h e

back-pressure c h a r a c t e r i s t i c or t h e range of back pres-

sures which w i l l result i n s a t i s f a c t o r y f i l t e r o p e r a t i o n s .

The back p r e s s u r e s should b e h e l d t o a m i n i m u m , and, of

c o u r s e , as l o n g as you are j u s t s q u i r t i n g w a t e r through

t h e gun i n t o your mouth, f o r example, t h e f i l t e r seemed

t o work p r e t t y w e l l . I t s t i l l allowed some gas t o g e t

through. I t h i n k under all circumstances some gas g o t

through. I c o u l d n ' t r e a l l y measure t h a t , because you c a n ' t

see t h e w a t e r i n your mouth. However, I j u s t had t h e

f e e l i n g when s q u i r t i n g t h e water gun i n my mouth through

t h e f i l t e r t h a t t h e water s t i l l had some gas i n it. But

it w a s a l o t b e t t e r t h a n it would have been without t h e

filter. Hooking a food bag up t o t h e f i l t e r or a d r i n k

bag changed t h i s s i t u a t i o n . It depended upon t h e i n d i v i d -

u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of each bag j u s t how much t h e opera-

t i o n w a s degraded. Some bags had very n i c e , smooth

openings i n them, and some were c r i n k l e d and wrinkled.

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18-8
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COLLINS You r e a l l y c o u l d n ' t open up a s u f f i c i e n t o r i f i c e behind
( CONT'D)
t h e v a l v e s o t h a t t h e w a t e r gun would b e pumping a g a i n s t

t h e back p r e s s u r e . T h i s , I t h i n k , degraded i t s e f f i c i e n c y .

The d i s p e n s e r i n t h e LEB i s a 1-ounce d i s p e n s e r and with-

out t h e f i l t e r a t t a c h e d , every time you d e p r e s s t h e

plunger you g e t a v e r y f o r c e f u l e j e c t i o n of 1 ounce of

water w i t h a v e r y d e f i n i t e beginning and end t o i t . With

t h e f i l t e r a t t a c h e d , you d e p r e s s t h e plunger and you g e t

about a h a l f ounce of w a t e r r a p i d l y e j e c t e d , followed by

a v e r y slow oozing out of a n o t h e r h a l f ounce. In other

words, t h e f i l t e r a c t s as s o r t of an accumulator f o r t h e

system. S i n c e t h a t second ounce appears v e r y slowly over

a long p e r i o d of t i m e and hangs t h e r e as a g l o b u l e on t h e

end of t h e f i l t e r , it s o r t of makes f o r a l e a k a g e problem.

Whenever you t r y t o f i l l a water bag or food bag w i t h

e i t h e r h o t or c o l d water from t h a t s p i g o t down t h e r e , you

have t o w a i t an a w f u l l y l o n g time a f t e r t h e l a s t s q u i r t

t o l e t t h e w a t e r come through t h e f i l t e r . Even so, you

a r e going t o g e t a l o t of l e a k a g e a f t e r you disconnect

t h e water b a g , because a t t h e i n s t a n t you d i s c o n n e c t t h e

bag , t h e <back-pressure c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are changed and

t h e oozing i n c r e a s e s . So, i n g e n e r a l , it w a s j u s t s o r t

of a sloppy o p e r a t i o n t r y i n g t o u s e t h e f i l t e r w i t h a l o t

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..
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COLLINS of s p i l l a g e . You had t o r e a l l y g e t down t h e r e w i t h t h e
(CONT'D)
t o w e l every time you wanted t o f i l l up t h e water bag. On

a couple of o c c a s i o n s , we r e a l l y p u t t h e back p r e s s u r e t o

it. I remember one t i m e , t h e e n t r y p o r t t o one food bag

w a s t o t a l l y blocked and we were t r y i n g t o s q u i r t water

i n t o a deadheaded system. Under t h e s e circumstances, my

preflight briefing indicated that relatively irreversible

damage would b e done t o t h e f i l t e r , and we would have t o

t a k e it up out of t h e l i n e and go through a d r y i n g pro-

cedure of s e v e r a l h o u r s ' d u r a t i o n . W e found t h i s w a s

r e a l l y not t h e c a s e . W e could see t h e membrane d e t e r i o -

r a t e , and t h e n l i t t l e beads would appear on it. Yet if

we j u s t l e t t h e f i l t e r a l o n e f o r s e v e r a l h o u r s , it appeared

t o us t h a t t h e e f f i c i e n c y w a s r e s t o r e d .

ALDRIN It seemed t o b e a mechanical problem, a l s o , of a t t a c h i n g

t h e bags. Without t h e f i l t e r , t h e n o z z l e of t h e gun

would s t i c k i n s i d e t h e bag v a l v e , opening w i t h enough

f r i c t i o n and w i t h t h e O-ring f i t t i n g t i g h t enough s o t h a t

you d i d n ' t have t o push with any a p p r e c i a b l e f o r c e t o

r e t a i n t h e bag on t h e end of t h e gun. You could c o n f i -

d e n t r y squeeze t h e t r i g g e r and s q u i r t t h e water i n t o t h e

bag without f e a r of s q u i r t i n g t h e bag o f f t h e end of t h e

gun. B u t t h a t w a s n ' t t r u e w i t h t h e f i l t e r on t h e r e .

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ALDRIN F i r s t , t h e f i l t e r d i d n ' t have a good l o c k i n g d e v i c e t o
( CONT'D)
keep it on t h e gun. When I p u t t h e end o f t h e f i l t e r

i n t o t h e bag, I found t h a t I had t o c o n t i n u a l l y push t h e

bag t o r e t a i n it on t h e gun.

COLLINS That O-ring i s j u s t i n s u f f i c i e n t .

ALDRIN The opening on t h e end of t h e f i l t e r i s n ' t q u i t e l o n g

enough, e i t h e r . And I found t h a t t o work it b e t t e r I ' d

have t o c u t a good b i t c l o s e r t o t h e n o z z l e end t h a n t h e

l i n e would i n d i c a t e . This would l e t you g e t t h e end of

t h e f i l t e r f a r t h e r i n t o t h e bag without t h e bag i n t e r -

f e r i n g w i t h where t h e n o z z l e of t h e f i l t e r w a s n ' t l o n g

enough.

COLLINS We can g e t t o g e t h e r w i t h A 1 Tucker and show him e x a c t l y .

ARMSTRONG The f i l t e r t o o k some gas o u t , b u t n o t a l l . O f couTse,

e f f i c i e n c y of t h e f i l t e r v a r i e d widely depending on what

t h e back p r e s s u r e s i t u a t i o n w a s .

ALDRIN The problem with t h e gas i n t h e bag i s one of d i f f i c u l t y

i n mixing t h e water and whatever i s i n t h e r e . There i s

some discomfort when you swallow a f a i r amount of g a s ,

b u t t h e b i g g e s t t h i n g , I g u e s s , i s t h e f a c t t h a t you j u s t

more g a s . O f c o u r s e , t h a t ' s a b i g odor problem i n

\/
the spacecraft.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 18-11

COLLINS I beg your pardon.

ALDRIN I beg yours.

18.6.4 Water Glycol System

ARMSTRONG L e t ' s go on t o water g l y c o l system.

COLLINS Water g l y c o l ; no comments. There w a s t h e one funny on gly-

c o l e v a p o r a t o r o u t l e t t e m p e r a t u r e i n Lunar o r b i t being t o o

low. The secondary g l y c o l l o o p check when w e g o t a s m a l l

d e c r e a s e i n t h e accumulator q u a n t i t y i s something t h a t

perhaps should b e explained a l i t t l e b e t t e r p r e f l i g h t

so t h a t it came as no s u r p r i s e .

18.6.5 S u i t C i r c u i t
COLLINS Nothing.

ARMSTRONG J u s t t h e O2 flow s e n s o r i n t h e s u i t c i r c u i t .

, COLLINS Well, t h a t ' s n o t r e a l l y a c i r c u i t . T h a t ' s on t h e 100 p s i

l i n e , b u t I t h i n k t h a t ' s w e l l documented. A l l w e can s a y

i s t h e t r a n s d u c e r w a s s i c k , or somehow t h e 0 flow s e n s o r
2
onboard r e a d i n g w a s out of c a l i b r a t i o n . I t r e a d lower

t h a n ;the flow r a t e s we w e r e a c t u a l l y g e t t i n g , and i t s

degree of accuracy seemed t o change w i t h t i m e .

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18.6.6 Gaging System
COLLINS The flow r a t e a g a i n ; t h a t ' s t h e only t h i n g .

18.6.7 Waste Management System

ALDRIN Yes, I t h i n k t h e r e i s some q u e s t i o n as t o t h e c a p a c i t y of

t h a t waste management c o n t a i n e r and t h e a b i l i t y t o f u l l y

u t i l i z e it. I w a s n ' t convinced t h a t we d i d n ' t have a

good b i t more room t h a n w e thought w e did-, b u t t h e r e

w a s n ' t any r e a l way of knowing how much a d d i t i o n a l volume

b

you had a v a i l a b l e . And I w a s n ' t t o o s u c c e s s f u l i n b e i n g

a b l e t o p u t my a r m i n t h e r e and push t h i n g s down.

C 0LLI N S I had a smaller a r m . I could g e t nly a r m down n o t q u i t e

around t h e c o r n e r . I could g e t it f a r enough down t o

s o r t of t r y t o keep t h i n g s moving t o t h e bottom of t h e

barrel. Again, I guess I d i d n ' t have a p r e c i s e h a n d l e

on how much t h a t would h o l d . I knew t h a t it w a s j u s t a

f a i r l y l a r g e compartment. I t h i n k w e could have s t u f f e d

more t h i n g s i n t h e r e t h a n we d i d . On t h e o t h e r hand, w e

d i d have a p r i o r i t y system of w h a t w e thought should go

i n t h e r e . -1lier a s , t h e more d e s i r a b l e it- w .a s

it w______I----.-/- -

-
t o have it i n s i d e t h a t
----- ment. I thought it worked

out f a i r l y w e l l .

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ALDRIN Yes, b u t I t h i n k i t ' s worthy t o n o t e h e r e t h a t w e d i d use

one of t h e temporary stowage bags as a t r a s h c o n t a i n e r

b e f o r e we got i n t o l u n a r o r b i t , and t h e n dumped t h a t s t u f f

i n t h e LM. On t h e way back, w e had two o t h e r t r a s h con-

tainers. I t h i n k most of t h i s w a s because of OUT l a c k of

confidence i n how much w e could put i n t h e w a s t e stowage

container.

COLLINS I t h i n k t h e r e ' s got t o b e a b e t t e r way o f f e c a l contain--

p-------.
ment or d i s p o s a l . I ' d l i k e t o t a l k t o t h e e x p e r t s on t h a t
%
-. .
some t i m e l a t e r , a p a r t from t h i s d e b r i e f i n g .

18.7 TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COLLINS I thought communications i n g e n e r a l worked v e r y w e l l .

I t h i n k t h e problems t h a t w e had were ground s w i t c h i n g

problems. We d i d have extended p e r i o d s of t i m e without

communications with t h e ground when we were i n ' l i n e of

s i g h t w i t h t h e ground. I d o n ' t q u i t e understand a l l t h e

reasons f o r t h a t . I ' m s u r e somebody e l s e i s worrying w i t h

t h e problem more t h a n we a r e . The VERB 64, I t h o u g h t ,

worked w e l l . The only t r o u b l e with 64 i s t h a t it i s a

continuous computation. It t i e s up t h e computer t o t h e

e x t e n t t h a t t h e y ' v e designed it where you have t o b e i n

PO0 t o r e a d VERB 64. I ' m n o t sure t h a t i f you had t o do it

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COLLINS over a g a i n t h a t would b e t h e b e s t way t o d e s i g n it. I
(CONT 'D)
d o n ' t know why you c o u l d n ' t have VERB 64 a v a i l a b l e i n
P20 , f o r example. But, i n g e n e r a l , a l l t h a t worked w e l l .

Again, we should n o t e t h a t we l e f t t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r

out for t h e t e l e v i s i o n on p a n e l 2 2 5 , and t h a t made t h e

onboard t a p e not a v a i l a b l e d u r i n g e n t r y .

18.8 MECHANICAL

COLLINS Tunnel, p r o b e , drogue, l i g h t i n g , a l l worked b e a u t i f u l l y .

We i n a d v e r t e n t l y a c t i v a t e d t h e lower l e f t - h a n d s t r u t

s o f t e n e r p r i o r t o launch. It w a s done when h a n d - c o n t r o l l e r

number 2 w a s moved and p u l l e d t h e f a b r i c l i n e t h a t

attaches t o t h e s t r u t . We recommend t h a t t h e backup CMP,

or whoever i s i n t h e r e , understand how t o r e s e t t h o s e

s t r u t softeners.

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19.0 LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS OPERATIONS

1 9 . 1 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION

ALDRIN The dimmer c o n t r o l w a s adequate. You could t e l l , as w a s

commented on p r e v i o u s f l i g h t s , t h a t i n t h e dim r a n g e ,

t h e r e i s n ' t a wide range o f c o n t r o l . I f e l t t h a t (for

t h e s e r v i c e alignments anyway) what w a s a v a i l a b l e w a s

adequate. I w a s a l i t t l e disappointed i n t h e a b i l i t y t o

focus t h e r e t i c l e i n t o a s h a r p image. I thought we'd

be able t o g e t t h a t a l i t t l e sharper. It d i d n ' t seem t o

be q u i t e as p r e s s e d a r e t i c l e as I w a s a b l e t o g e t i n

t h e simulator. I c a n ' t e x p l a i n why t h a t w a s .

The rendezvous r a d a r worked as e x p e c t e d , or b e t t e r .

I thought t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h of Borman's on t h e s i d e

l o b e s was j u s t what we expected, v e r y c l o s e t,o what t h e

s i m u l a t o r d e p i c t s , i n r i s e and drop-off.

ARMSTRONG We've commented a l r e a d y on t h e inaccuracy of t h e simula-

t o r line-of-sight needles. That should be changed.

I o n l y have one discrepancy on t h e l a n d i n g r a d a r - t h a t

of t h e alarm on l a n d i n g r a d a r p o s i t i o n - t h a t we

c o u l d n ' t explain.

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.. * . " , .I"... . ~ . . ~ . ., .). I . . .. . ... . . . . ._ __ ._ .- - , .- . . - -.

.-. .
19-2
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ALDRIN T h a t ' s probably a computer problem more t h a n a r a d a r

problem.

ARMSTRONG Yes.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e z e r o Doppler e f f e c t s down around a 100 f e e t

when t h e n o i s e came on and t h e n went back o f f a g a i n should

be f a i r l y w e l l documented. It was a r a t h e r b r i e f p e r i o d ,

on t h e o r d e r o f maybe 5 , 6 seconds, t h a t both a l t i t u d e -

v e l o c i t y l i g h t s came on. Then t h e y went back out a g a i n .

ARMSTRONG I n f a c t , I t h i n k t h e zero Doppler drop-outs were l e s s

t h a n we expected.

Concerning t h e computer, a n y t h i n g on t h i s 56 or 57 h e r e ?

ALDRIN The o v e r l o a d i n g o f t h e computer i s p r e t t y w e l l understood.

I t ' s unfortunate t h a t , because of t h a t , you are n o t a b l e

t o t a k e advantage o f t h e u s e of t h e radar t o d e s i g n a t e

during ascent.

The DSKY, t h e keyboard t h a t i s , we managed t o wear out

i n the simulator. Q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y , it would r e q u i r e

d e p r e s s i n g t h e keys s e v e r a l t i m e s b e f o r e t h e e n t r y would

be accepted. But t h e f l i g h t keyboard worked very w e l l .

I d i d n ' t n o t i c e t h a t it r e q u i r e d any unusual amount o f

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ALDRIN f o r c e t o g e t any of t h e key s t r o k e s t o t a k e .

( CONT'D)

AGS seemed t o work extremely well. The one l i g h t i n g

f a i l u r e t h a t we p r e v i o u s l y mentioned i n t h e middle

c h a r a c t e r ; t h e upper l e f t - h a n d v e r t i c a l s t r o k e w a s n o t

lit. T h i s w a s n o t i c e d on i n i t i a l checkout when a 3 o r 9

would come up. Because t h i s p a r t i c u l a r one w a s b l a n k , it

wouldn't look l i k e any p a r t i c u l a r number. By f i l l i n g i n

one or t h e o t h e r , you c o u l d make it e i t h e r a 3 o r a 9.

Anyway, t h e r e w a s some p o s s i b i l i t y f o r confusion. How-

e v e r , it d i d n ' t appear c r i t i c a l .

19.2 PROPULSION SYSTEM

ALDRIN It seems t o me t h a t , i n monitoring t h e gyro c a l i b r a t i o n s

addresses, I d i d n o t i c e t h a t one of them i n c r e a s e d t o a

l a r g e r number d u r i n g t h e c a l i b r a t i o n t h a n it f i n a l l y

s e t t l e d out at. I'll j u s t a s k t h a t q u e s t i o n o f t h e

Systems people when t h e y g e t t h e r e .

Al3%3TRONG We had no a b n o r m a l i t i e s w i t h t h e d e s c e n t engine o r as-

c e n t engine. We've commented a l r e a d y on t h e a s c e n t

source p r e s s u r e ; t h a t i s , confusion w i t h r e s p e c t t o

whether o r n o t b o t h tanks had p r e s s u r i z e d .

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19.3 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM

ARMSTRONG No problems.

19.4 ELECTRICAL POWER'SYSTEM

ALDRIN Everything worked j u s t as expected. The m o n i t o r i n g , t h e

d i s p l a y s were q u i t e c l o s e t o what we've seen i n t h e

simulator. One s m a l l p o i n t -in checking t h e ED

b a t t e r i e s i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , when you'd push t h e s p r i n g -

l o a d e d s w i t c h , t h e r e i s some d e l a y b e f o r e t h e meter g i v e s

you t h e b a t t e r y r e a d i n g . I n t h e s p a c e c r a f t , t h i s i s not

t h e case. I t ' s almost i n s t a n t a n e o u s . When t h e s w i t c h

i s p l a c e d i n e i t h e r A or B p o s i t i o n , t h e r e a d i n g comes

up immediately.

ARMSTRONG And t h e r e w e r e no d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e ED systems. All

worked w e l l , w i t h i n our a b i l i t y t o monitor i t s o p e r a t i o n .

ALDRIN I n t h e e x p l o s i v e system, w e could h e a r most of t h e ex-

p l o s i v e d e v i c e s when t h e y were a c t u a l l y f i r e d . I can't

r e c a l l any t h a t w e r e used t h a t were n o t a u d i b l e i n t h e

cockpit.

19.5q ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

ARMSTRONG We've.discussed th'e CO s e n s o r abnormality and we've
2

d i s c u s s e d t h e water i n t h e l e f t - h a n d s u i t .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 19-5

ALDRIN W e a l s o mentioned t h e s l i g h t d e l a y w e had i n g e t t i n g t h e

replacement primary c a n i s t e r i n . It w a s a q u e s t i o n of

not being a b l e t o r o t a t e it p r o p e r l y , Then t h e cap would

n o t go on and completely l o c k u n t i l I was a b l e t o j u s t

j i g g l e t h e c a n i s t e r and g e t it t o i n s e r t and r o t a t e pro-

perly. It w a s t y p i c a l o f t h e s o r t o f d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t

many people have been having w i t h t h e c a r t r i d g e r e p l a c e -

ment i n b o t h primary and secondary. We t a l k e d about t h e

temperature l e v e l s i n t h e s u i t on t h e s u r f a c e . We ex-

p l a i n e d t h a t r a t h e r thoroughly. The t e m p e r a t u r e g o t

c o l d b e f o r e we r e a l i z e d it and, by t h e t i m e w e d i d , t h e r e

w a s n ' t much we could do about it t o w a r m it back up i n

t h e cabin.

ARMSTRONG Water supply problems. Concerning t h e s u i t c i r c u i t , we've

t a l k e d about t h e water problem. I believe, i n retrospect,

probably t h e secondary water s e p a r a t o r d i d , i n f a c t ,

s u c c e s s f u l l y keep t h e water o u t of t h e l e f t - h a n d s u i t

a f t e r about 1 5 minutes of o p e r a t i o n .

19.6 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ALDRIN No comment o t h e r t h a n i t s b e i n g a l i t t l e unwieldy i n

s w i t c h i n g from H I G H GAIN t o OMNI j u s t b e f o r e LOS and t h e n

p i c k i n g up communications a g a i n coming on t h e o t h e r

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ALDRIN side. It seemed t o work q u i t e w e l l , w i t h t h e exception
( CONT'D)
o f t h e a t t i t u d e w e were i n approaching powered d e s c e n t .

T h i s produced many drop-outs and r e q u i r e d t h e u s e of

manual r e a c q u i s i t i o n . A c t u a l l y , t h e AUTO would n o t s t a y

on for a good b i t of t h e face-down p o r t i o n o f t h e powered

descent. I had t o make adjustments manually i n b o t h

p i t c h and yaw t o keep t h e s i g n a l s t u r n e d on. On t h e

recorder, I t h i n k t h a t t h e previous f l i g h t s d i d not

spend enought t i m e i n t h e LM t o be concerned about t h e

. c a p a c i t y of t h e r e c o r d e r , whereas w e were going t o be i n

t h e LM f o r approaching 30 h o u r s ; t h i s b e i n g t h r e e t i m e s

t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e r e c o r d e r . So w e d i d have t o a t t e m p t

t o d e v i s e some system of t u r n i n g it on and o f f depending

on our needs. It seems t o me t h a t what i s r e a l l y needed

i s a s e p a r a t e r e c o r d i n g system i n t h e LM ( a n d , for t h a t

matter, i n t h e command module) t h a t i s voice-operated,

t h a t t u r n s i t s e l f on upon r e c e i v i n g t h e f i r s t s i g n a l

and t u r n s i t s e l f back off a g a i n . T h e r e ' s no need for ;

any crew a c t i v i t y t o t u r n s w i t c h e s on or off. It

d o e s n ' t depend on t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l a u d i o

centers.

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20.0 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS, FLIGHT EQUIPMENT, AND GFE

20.2 CLOCKS

ARMSTRONG Want t o comment on t h e LEB'mission t i m e r f i r s t ?

COLLINS I n t h e command module, t h e LEB m i s s i o n timer r a n slow.

The f i r s t time we checked it a f t e r l i f t - o f f , it w a s 1 0 sec-

onds slow. We r e s e t it t o t h e NOUN 65 v a l u e , and t h e n e x t

day it w a s 3 o r 4 seconds slow.

ALDRIN I t h i n k it s l i p p e d a d i g i t . This w a s probably t h e cause

f o r i t s being o f f .

COLLINS No, I t h i n k it j u s t r a n slow. The d i g i t t h a t s l i p p e d w a s

i n t h e t e n s of hours d i g i t . For example, when it w a s sup-

posed t o be 134 h o u r s , it w a s r e a d i n g 1 4 4 hours. That

happened, though, a f t e r you g q r s l e f t t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e ;

and I ' m sure it i s as a r e s u l t of my having manually s e t

it t o LM nominal l i f t - o f f time.

ARMS TRONG I d o n ' t know how t h a t t h i n g runs slow.

COLLINS It did indicate t h a t --

ARMSTRONG It never agreed w i t h t h e o t h e r t i m e ; it w a s a l w a y s o f f by

a v a r i e d amount, on one d i g i t o r a n o t h e r .

COLLINS I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e w a s a small crack i n t h e g l a s s .

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ARMSTRONG O f c o u r s e , t h e LM mission t i m e r f a i l u r e on touchdown was

documented d u r i n g f l i g h t . The next day, we w e r e a b l e t o

reset t h e t i m e w i t h i t ; a 30-second r e s e t .

I.

ALDRIN I t h i n k i t ' s worth n o t i n g t h a t I f e e l t h a t i t ' s extremely

u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t we d o n ' t have clocks t h a t count down t o

z e r o and t h e n r e v e r s e and count back up a g a i n . I t ' s forced

on t h e crew anyway. I t h i n k o t h e r crews a r e doing t h e

same t h i n g ; s e t t i n g c l o c k s t o count up t o a burn and t h e n

r e a c h 59 and 60 a t i g n i t i o n , j u s t s o t h a t you w i l l have a

clock t h a t ' s counting up d u r i n g a burn and p o s t i g n i t i o n

time. I d o n ' t expect t h i s t o be done immediately, I'd

- -
s u r e l i k e t o have it recorded f o r p o s t e r i t y t h a t clocks

would o p e r a t e much b e t t e r i f t h e y counted down t o z e r o and

--_- - _ -_--
__- - - - .----_
t h e n back up a g a i n w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g t h e throwing of a
--- - -%

s w i t c h a t a c r i t i c a l i g n i t i o n t i m e t o g e t t h e clock t o do
i -_ --. ------Y
that.

20.6 CLOTHING

COLLINS The constant-wear garment looks t o me l i k e something t h a t

has more work p u t i n t o i t t h a n i t r e a l l y deserves. The

results a r e less s a t i s f a c t o r y t h a n t h e y ' d be i f w e j u s t

__ -_./-

went f l y i n g i n our r e g u l a r o l d summer f l y i n g s u i t . Summer

-
6-
i-- .---

f l y i n g suits have more pockets i n them and more p l a c e s t o

stow t h i n g s . They are garments i n which w e f e e l completely

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 CONFIDENTIAL 20-3

COLLINS a t home and t h e y a r e more comfortable t h a n t h e two-piece

( CONT'D)
CWG. If t h e CWG has t o be made o u t of a f i r e p r o o f material,

t h e n r e g u l a r o l d summer f l y i n g s u i t s can a l s o b e made out

of t h a t same material. It would save c o n s i d e r a b l e money

j u s t t o d e l e t e t h e custom-tailored CWG and l e t us pack

summer f l y i n g suits made o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m a t e r i a l .

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we've d i s c u s s e d t h e B I G i n some d e t a i l during

recovery.

ALDRIN Under c o v e r a l l s , I t h i n k b o t h you and I n o t i c e d a s l i g h t

i t c h i n g i n t h e forearm. I t w a s probably j u s t a q u e s t i o n

of wearing through t h e Teflon l i n e r .

COLLINS I ' d l i k e t o go back j u s t a second h e r e and i n t e r r u p t . ..- I

P

t a l k i n g about t h e constant-wear garment. I

\
.w a s n ' t /--__ -_
/-- .-/ *I .
was -,

t a l k i n g about, I guessy t h e f l i g h t coveralls. I can't

* . ~ _ ---
even keep t h e names of them s t r a i g h t . The two-piece w h i t e

j o b b e r t h a t you wear. The underwear I w a s n o t c r i t i c i z i n g .

ARMSTRONG I a g r e e w i t h Buzz. There w a s near t h e end of t h e f l i g h t

particularly some i r r i t a t i o n o f t h e forearms and elbows

which I t h i n k i s r e a c t i o n t o t h e F i b e r g l a s . We noted t h i s

b e f o r e i n altitude-chamber runs and s o on; and concerning

t h e Teflon-coated garments, I t h i n k t h a t it w a s j u s t a

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20-4
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ARMSTRONG breakdown through continued w e a r t h a t exposed t h e F i b e r g l a s
( CONT ' D )
through t h e Teflon and caused a t y p i c a l r e a c t i o n .

20.7 BIOMED HARNESS

ARMSTRONG Now i n t h e BIOMED h a r n e s s a r e a , w e had a f e w d i s c r e p a n c i e s .

ALDRIN Yes , I had two t h a t I ' d l i k e t o n o t e . Both of them have

been documented. The c e n t e r c h e s t lead d r i e d o u t , and I

w a s r e q u e s t e d t o make a change i n t h a t , which I d i d . The

r i g h t l e a d on t h e r i g h t s i d e o f my r i b cage e v i d e n t l y

rubbed a g a i n s t t h e s u i t and caused a minor l a c e r a t i o n on

t h e a f t p a r t of my s i d e . I d o n ' t know i f t h e r e i s any way

around t h a t o t h e r t h a n j u s t n o t wearing t h o s e t h i n g s .

ARMSTRONG With r e s p e c t t o s e n s o r s and h a r n e s s e s causing d i s c o m f o r t ,

from about t h e middle o f t h e f l i g h t on, t h e s e n s o r s w e r e

essentially itching. I had a tremendous d e s i r e t o s c r a t c h

them o f f .

COLLINS That's r i g h t .

ARMSTRONG I s c r a t c h e d a l l around every s e n s o r about a thousand times.

That's just an inconvenience and a d i s t r a c t i o n .

COLLINS I t h i n l t p a r t of it h a s t o do w i t h shaving your c h e s t and

t h e n t h e h a i r s t a r t s growing back underneath t h e p l a s t e r e d -

down s e n s o r , That w a s t h e impression t h a t I had of i t .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 20-5

COLLINS The ones t h a t i t c h e d t h e most were t h e ones w i t h t h e most

( CONT'D)
h a i r around them. They l e f t l i t t l e marks t h a t went away

i n a day o r two.

ALDRIN L e t ' s digress t o the lightweight headsets. I ' v e found i t

p r e f e r a b l e t o use t h e l i g h t w e i g h t h e a d s e t s i n s t e a d of t h e

COMM c a r r i e r . It s t i l l d i d n ' t f i t t o o w e l l on your head.

The mike boom and i t s attachment t o the headpiece j u s t

d o e s n ' t seem t o be t h e b e s t arrangement t h a t could be

worked o u t . I t ' s a l o t s u p e r i o r t o o t h e r s t h a t we've

tried ¶ though.

COLLINS I take t h e lightweight headset a p a r t . The p i e c e t h a t goes

around over your head I throw away. Then I a t t a c h t h e

microphone t o my c o l l a r somehow w i t h an a l l i g a t o r c l i p . I

t a k e t h e long-eared t u b e and t a p e it t o my e a r w i t h a p i e c e

of adhesive t a p e . T h a t ' s t h e only way I can s t a n d i t . . _

I f- -
~ ~ _ _ - - _ _ ---
- -
I _

t d r i v e s me crazy a f t e r a couple
_________ I - -
of h o u r s ; n o t t o mention f a l l i n g o f f a l l thc time.
/

ARMSTRONG The only d i f f i c u l t y I n o t e d , because I l i k e t h e l i g h t w e i g h t

headset myself, i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e mike boom and t h e head-

band are a quick-disconnect arrangement ¶ which i s continu-

a l l y disconnecting. I ' m s u r e t h e r e w a s some good reason

for that. It may be d e s i r a b l e f o r some p e o p l e , b u t I would

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20-6
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ARMSTRONG much r a t h e r j u s t have t h a t t h i n g f i r m l y connected i n t h e
( CONT ' D)
p r o p e r l o c a t i o n and l e a v e it l i k e t h a t .

ALDRIN I used t h e molded e a r p i e c e i n s i d e t h e COMM c a r r i e r i n t h e

LM through a c t i v a t i o n and power d e s c e n t , b u t it became s o

uncomfortable t h a t , after w e were on t h e s u r f a c e , I removed

them and continued t h e remainder of LM o p e r a t i o n without

them. They d i d i n c r e a s e t h e volume d u r i n g t h e t i m e t h a t I

had them i n , however.

20.10 F3STRAINTS

ALDRIN I t h i n k I ' v e already mentioned t h a t , i n t h e LM, t h e W ' s

r e s t r a i n t system tended t o f o r c e you forward and t o t h e

r i g h t and r e q u i r e d l e a n i n g back t o t h e l e f t t o m a i n t a i n

balance. This w a s a l i t t l e b i t d i s c o n c e r t i n g .

20.15 CAMERA EQUIPMENT

ALDRIN The only p o s s i b l e malfunction t h a t w a s observed w a s w i t h

t h e LM 16-mm camera. E v i d e n t l y , it worked p r o p e r l y , b u t

it d i d n ' t seem t o g i v e t h e p r o p e r i n d i c a t i o n . Initially

on connecting power, t h e g r e e n l i g h t came on and, a f t e r

10 t o 1 2 seconds, it went o u t . However, once w e s t a r t e d

t a k i n g p i c t u r e s subsequent t o t h e i n i t i a l t u r n i n g on of

t h e camera, whenever t h e power came o n , t h e l i g h t came on

and s t a y e d on throughout t h e t i m e t h e power w a s a p p l i e d t o

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 CONFIDENTIAL 20-7

ALDRIN t h e camera. So it d i d n ' t r e a l l y g i v e an i n d i c a t i o n as t o

( CONT'D)
whether frames were b e i n g t a k e n e x c e p t when you observed

the l i g h t t o be blinking.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 21-1

21.0 VISUAL SIGHTINGS

ARMS TRONG Most of t h e items i n S e c t i o n 2 1 , Visua Sigh i n g s , have

been p r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d . '

21.4 TRANSLUNAR AND TRANSEARTH FLIGHT

ALDRIN There w a s only one minor o b s e r v a t i o n r e t u r n i n g from t h e

Moon. Looking back a t i t , a t a t i m e a f t e r Mars had passed

behind t h e Moon, t h e r e w a s one t i m e p e r i o d where I imagined

t h a t t h e i m a g e o f M a r s w a s coming from a r e g i o n where it

c o u l d n ' t come from, because it w a s i n a dark p o r t i o n of

t h e Moon. This obviously w a s an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n of some

sort.

ARMSTRONG I s u s p e c t t h a t it w a s , i n f a c t , j u s t immediately a d j a c e n t

t o t h e horizon.

ALDRIN We m u s t have looked a t it immediately a f t e r it had come

from t h e back s i d e .

ARMSTRONG Yes.

21.5 LUNAR ORBIT

ALDRIN I n l u n a r o r b i t , following a s c e n t , we d i d n o t e and mention

t o t h e ground t h a t approaching CDH when t h e E a r t h came up

above t h e l u n a r h o r i z o n , I observed w h a t appeared t o be a

f a i r l y b r i g h t l i g h t s o u r c e which w e t e n t a t i v e l y a s c r i b e d

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21-2
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ALDRIN t o a possible laser. That seemed t o be t h e best p o s s i b l e
( CONT'D)
e x p l a n a t i o n u n t i l w e were coming back i n t h e command module

approaching t h e E a r t h and were able t o observe something

t h a t gave about t h e same appearance. When p u t t i n g t h e

monocular on t h e l i g h t s o u r c e , it appeared as though it

w a s t h e r e f l e c t i o n of t h e Sun from a r e l a t i v e l y smooth body

of w a t e r such as a l a k e . I t h i n k we've r e v i s e d our i n i t i a l

conclusion as t o w h a t t h e s o u r c e of t h a t l i g h t w a s t h a t w e

s a w coming from t h e E a r t h . I f no one owns up t o having

beamed t h e l a s e r toward t h e Moon a t t h a t t i m e , it w a s more

probably a r e f l e c t i o n o f f a l a k e . I s t i l l t h i n k i t ' s an

unusual phenomenon, a t t h a t d i s t a n c e , t o see s o b r i g h t a

s o u r c e of l i g h t . I n t h e f i l m , it d i d n ' t appear as though

t h i s w a s going t o show up a t a l l . The E a r t h w a s t o o b r i g h t .

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22.0 PREMISSION PLANNING

22.1 MISSION PLAN

ARMSTRONG F i r s t , we can say t h a t e s s e n t i a l l y t h e e n t i r e f l i g h t w a s

flown on t h e mission p l a n and t h e d e t a i l s of t h e f l i g h t

were, i n f a c t , i n accord w i t h t h e f l i g h t p l a n .

22.2 F L I G H T PLAN

ARMSTRONG ___ w e found

The f l i g h t p l a n w a s r e a l l y very w e l l w r i t t e n , and

very f e w d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n f l i g h t . I n terms o f system

/

o p e r a t i o n , normal housekeeping c h o r e s , p r e and p o s t ,

s l e e p , c h e c k l i s t s , burn r e p o r t s - a l l t h o s e t h i n g s were

i n c l u d e d ; we v e r y r i g o r o u s l y followed a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

day by day i n a l l 135 pages.

COLLINS A good f l i g h t p l a n ; a l o t o f hard work went i n t o i t .

e;____-
22.3 SPACECRAFT CHANGES

ARMSTRONG S p a c e c r a f t changes were r e l a t i v e l y few i n t h e f i n a l 4

.
s t a g e s , a l t h o u g h t h e r e were numerous replacement i t e m s .

F o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e were not t o o many c o n f i g u r a t i o n changes

i n t h e p r e f l i g h t phase.

22.4 PROCEDURES CHANGES

ARMSTRONG There were r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e numbers of p r o c e d u r a l changes

f i l t e r i n g through t h i s system d a i l y , r i g h t up u n t i l and

during f l i g h t . Some of t h e s e p r o c e d u r a l changes were

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22-2
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ARMSTRONG r e l a t i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t ; o t h e r s were v e r y s m a l l . I can't
(CONIT)
s a y how it compares w i t h o t h e r r e c e n t f l i g h t s i n t h e

same t i m e p e r i o d , b u t it w a s our impression t h a t t h e

p r o c e d u r a l changes were e x c e s s i v e and i n d i c a t e d t h a t

g e n e r a l l y w e hadn'% completed OUT p r e f l i g h t p l a n n i n g as

w e l l as w e would l i k e t o have done and i n t i m e l y enough

f a s h i o n f o r a m i s s i o n o f t h i s consequence.

ALDRIN What t h i s means i s t h a t a good b i t of t h e t r a i n i n g had

t o be developed. It had t o be devoted t o t h e development

of t h e s e procedures i n t h e new areas t h a t we had i n our

m i ssion .
COLLINS I t h i n k , i n g e n e r a l , i f t h e crew wants t o m a k e changes

t o t h e i r p r o c e d u r e s , t h e y should be discouraged from

making any unnecessary changes. The t i m e p e r i o d when

t h e crew r e a l l y should be i n t h e change l o o p , I t h i n k ,

i s f a i r l y e a r l y i n t h e t r a i n i n g c y c l e , a couple of

months b e f o r e l a u n c h . During t h i s t i m e p e r i o d , from t h e

w-------., --.

command module view p o i n t , I found it d i f f i c u l t t o pro-

mote changes. I found t h a t t h e r e w a s a c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e

l a g between my r e q u e s t i n g a change and my s e e i n g a new

c h e c k l . i s t o r a new rendezvous p r o c e d u r a l page o r what

have you. It r a n on t h e order of several weeks. This i s

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 22-3
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COLLINS s e v e r a l months b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t t h a t I ' m r e f e r r i n g t o .
(CON'T)
T h i s i s t h e time when I w a s t r y i n g t o g e t t h e rendezvous

procedures optimized. I n t h e c h e c k l i s t world, I w a s

t r y i n g t o g e t obvious mistakes c o r r e c t e d , t r y i n g t o do
-I
t h i s e a r l y i n t h e game. It w a s very d i s c o u r a g i n g , be-

cause t h e r e s u l t s f r e q u e n t l y came back not e x a c t l y w i t h

t h e changes as I had i n t e n d e d them; and t h e r e w a s a

c o n s i d e r a b l e time d e l a y between t h e time t h a t I r e q u e s t e d

t h e change and t h e time t h a t I s a w a new p i e c e of paper

i n my hand - o n t h e o r d e r o f perhaps 3 weeks. Now l a t e

i n p r e f l i g h t , everybody got a l l hyper and t h e y got

____.__I__ - -

g e r a t e l y wanted not t o make _ _ _t h e system w a s a l l

___changes,
_--.
u --

for it. If changes were r e q u i r e d , from t h e day you r e -

--------
q u e s t e d it t o t h e day you had a new p i e c e o f paper i n

your hand w a s more l i k e a day o r t w o . Now, t h a t ' s t h e

kind of s e r v i c e t h a t w e needed months b e f o r e . It would

have saved a l o t o f manhours o f work i n t h e l o n g r u n t o

have a f a s t - r e s p o n s e system e a r l y i n t h e gane; l e t a l l

t h e s e changes r e v e r b e r a t e throughout t h e system, go t o

t h e c o n t r a c t o r s , and come back. It ended up t h a t when t h e

q u i c k response w a s needed it w a s n o t t h e r e , and l a t e i n

t h e game, when we d i d n ' t want t o make changes, everybody

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. . .- . . -..._I- . . . _ . I ^ -. .. I _- .- .- - , . -. .
I- _.____^
22-4
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COLLINS w a s hovering around u s s a y i n g , "Well, how about t h i s ?
( CON' T )

-
D o you want t o change t h a t ? Do you want t o change t h e

others?" I n g e n e r a l , i t ' s t h e same t h i n g I t h i n k w e had

i n t h e Gemini program; t h a t i s , i n t h e f i n a l phases of

t r a i n i n g , we r e a l l y had superb support and h e l p . I f you

c
c__-.

could d r a i n o f f a l i t t l e b i t of t h a t and g i v e it t o t h a t

crew e a r l i e r i n t h e i r t r a i n i n g c y c l e , I t h i n k t h i n g s

would, i n t h e l o n g run, be a l o t more e f f i c i e n t l y handled.

I t ' s a case o f n o t having enough h e l p e a r l y and having

t o o much l a t e i n t h e game.

Well, I ' m sure I o n l y see a v e r y narrow l i t t l e s e c t i o n

of t h e t o t a l o p e r a t i o n . J u s t from my p a r o c h i a l view-

p o i n t , it would appear t h a t i f you have a g l o b of h e l p

t h i s b i g , i n s t e a d of p u t t i n g a l l of it on t h e next f l i g h t

t o f l y , you t a k e a l i t t l e chunk of it o f f and g i v e it t o

t h e following f l i g h t .

ARMSTRONG You wouldn't need s o much h e l p a t t h e end. You wouldn't

have such f r a n t i c f i n i s h e s .

ALDRIN I t h i n k we've a l r e a d y commented on a s p e c i f i c change i n

t h e m i s s i o n p r o f i l e ; namely, t h e change i n t h e CSM o r b i t

from c i r c u l a r t o e l l i p t i c a l and t h e two e f f e c t s t h a t

had t h a t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e r e c e i v e d enought p r e f l i g h t

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 22-5
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ALDRIN attention. One o f them w a s t h e change i n t h e r a d i a l
(CON'T)
component of t h e CDH maneuver from a small value t o a
s i g n i f i c a n t value. O u r burn had an 1 8 - f t / s e c component.

The o t h e r e f f e c t w a s t h e r a n g e - r a t e v a l u e s t h a t we had

d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t it was a nominal i n s e r t i o n and a

nominal t r a j e c t o r y approaching CSI . The r a n g e - r a t e

v a l u e s were o u t s i d e t h e l i m i t s of t h e backup c h a r t ,

rendering t h a t solution useless.

22.5 MISSION RULES

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k t h a t we had a good working r e l a t i o n s h i p d u r i n g

t h e formulation of mission r u l e s ; e s s e n t i a l l y t h o s e r u l e s

are worked out a t t h e working l e v e l s u f f i c i e n t l y e a r l y t h a t

w e had v e r y few head-knocking s e s s i o n s on disagreements

on t h e r u l e s . We f l e w w i t h r u g s t h a t were g e n e r a l l y
- .
t---c--
-

a g r e e a b l e t o everybody.
,-----
i-'

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e F l i g h t Operations people were most c o o p e r a t i v e

i n working t h e s e t h i n g s o u t and e x p l a i n i n g t h e v a r i o u s

p e c u l i a r i t i e s t o us.

ARMSTRONG It i s somewhat of a problem f o r t h e crew t o know t h e

mission rules w e l l enough t o f l y t h e f l i g h t according t o

t o rules. I t ' s a very e x t e n s i v e and d e t a i l e d document,

and, f o r t u n a t e l y , we d i d n ' t have any t r o u b l e . In

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. ..- . . ... - ..I. .._I."._

. ~ . . ... ~ -_ . , I_ I -- - . ..-
22-6
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ARMSTRONG time-critical phases, it's quite a problem to recall
(CON IT)
all the rule combinations that, in fact, have been care-

fully decided preflight. We used some gouges and did

take some short, streamlined versions of the mission

rules (the significant ones) on both the CM and the LM,

should there have been any problem when we did not have

COMM available to discuss the situation.

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23.0 MISSION CONTROL

ARMSTRONG T h e r e ' s very l i t t l e comment t h e r e . It worked w e l l . Data

t r a n s f e r from t h e s p a c e c r a f t t o t h e ground worked w e l l .

W e were w e l l advised o f our s t a t u s and consumables and

s o on. Updates w e n t - a s p e r s i m u l a t i o n . There were some

r e a l - t i m e f l i g h t p l a n changes d u r i n g t h e f l i g h t which I

t h i n k always could be accommodated. ,

COLLINS I j u s t t h o u g h t , i n g e n e r a l , t h a t we got o u t s t a n d i n g support

from a l l f o u r of t h e teams involved. I thought t h a t , i n

.c-Lx--

g e n e r a l , e v e r y t h i n g w a s b e a u t i f u l l y worked o u t , and I

d o n ' t t h i n k we e v e r r e a l l y had any s e r i o u s disagreements

before t h e f l i g h t o r during t h e f l i g h t .

ALDRIN Well, I t h i n k t h e C A P COMM's a r e t o be h i g h l y commended

/-
7-
f o r t h e i r very d e t a i l e d understanding of every p a r t i c u l a r

phase o f t h e mission and j u s t w h a t w a s going on i n s i d e

the spacecraft. I t h i n k t h e y d i d an o u t s t a n d i n g j o b .

COLLINS I do, t o o . I t h i n k t h e y d i d a superb job and s o d i d a l l

t h e r e s t of t h e team. I thought we had j u s t o u t s t a n d i n g

support. I c o u l d n ' t be h a p p i e r .

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24.0 TRAINING

24.f CMS

COLLINS I think the CW, i n g e n e r a i , w a s an e x c e l l e n t s i m u l a t o r .

I t s weak p o i n t i s i t s v i s u a l system. Some improvements

were made during t h e course of our t r a i n i n g . For example,

some o f t h e Apollo 10 photographs were p u t i n t o t h e s e x t a n t

. P
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - ~ ____------------
and t e l e s c o p e v i s u a l t o enhance P22 t r a i n i n g . Various
t
adjustments were made t o t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking,

t h e window d i s p l a y , t h e model w a s tweaked up, and s o f o r t h .

I ' d have t o s a y , though, s t i l l i n g e n e r a l , t h a t t h e v i s u a l

-
-
-,

i s t h e w e a k s p o t i n t h e t r a i n i n g , and P22, P23, t r a n s p o s i -

t i o n docking t r a i n i n g s u f f e r s because of i t . The crew

s t a t i o n w a s w e l l equipped. I t was brought up t o t h e

107 c o n f i g u r a t i o n a f t e r t h e f l i g h t of 106. We i n h e r i t e d

a l l t h e v a r i o u s stowage compartments, o r most of them I

s h o u l d s a y , s o t h a t during t h e l a s t 6 weeks or 2 months' of

t r a i n i n g , t h e crew compartment q u i t e c l o s e l y resembled t h e

i n t e r i o r of t h e s p a c e c r a f t , c l o s e l y enough. If I had afiy

changes t o make t o t h e CMS, I would spend t h e money on

t r y i n g t o improve t h e v i s u a l s i m u l a t i o n . I t h i n k t h e people

who work most i n t i m a t e l y w i t h t h e CMS are t h o s e t h a t a r e

most aware of i t s v i s u a l shortcomings. They understand

t h e changes t h a t have t o b e made. I t ' s j u s t a q u e s t i o n of

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COLLINS g e t t i n g t h e money pumped i n t o t h e system t o m a k e t h e
( CONT D )
n e c e s s a r y design changes. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of
\-
t h e CMS
.__7
c--------c----
w a s q u i t e good. It d i d bomb out a time o r two, i n which
- r

e v e n t t h e CMS 3 w a s u s u a l l y made a v a i l a b l e for OUT train-

ing. I t h i n k t h a t t h e crew of t h e s p a c e c r a f t n e x t t o f l y

s h o u l d have t h e r i g h t t o use t h e o t h e r s i m u l a t o r t o keep

t h e m i s s i o n s i m u l a t i o n schedule on an even k e e l . I don't

t h i n k you should j u s t a r b i t r a r i l y k i c k t h e n e x t crew o f f

on any o l d day when y o u r prime s i m u l a t o r bombs o u t . How-

e v e r , d u r i n g times when Mission C o n t r o l i s on t h e l i n e , I

6 t h i n k e i t h e r s i m u l a t o r s h o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e depending

on which i s working b e t t e r for t h e crew on t h e n e x t

vehicle t o fly. That's about a l l I ' v e g o t t o say about

t h e CMS.

ARMSTRONG Well, I ' d l i k e t o make a couple of comments h e r e , .and it

a p p l i e s b o t h t o t h e CMS, LMS, and a l l our s i m u l a t i o n s i n

general. F i r s t , I ' d c e r t a i n l y agree t h a t t h e s t r o n g e s t

shortcomings of b o t h t h e s i m u l a t o r s i s t h e v i s u a l . It's

a b l e t o do a r e a s o n a b l e job on t h e s t a r s , s t a r p a t t e r n s ,

and t h e t h i n g s n e c e s s a r y f o r o p t i c s for p l a t f o r m a l i g n -

ments. Beyond t h a t , t h e a b i l i t i e s of t h o s e h a l f - m i l l i o n -

d o l l a r window extravaganzas i s n e g l i g i b l e .

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ARMSTRONG There a r e 8 l o t of a r e a s t h a t could very w e l l s t a n d an
( CONT 'D)
improved v i s u a l s i m u l a t i o n f o r t r a i n i n g .

ALDRIN I t h i n k one of t h e biggest.drawbacks of t h e v i s u a l s i s t h e

l a c k of i l l u m i n a t i o n coming i n t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t from t h e

w:?dow
\-
-_--_-- --- -- - - -__ _-/--
____-_
from e i t h e r t h e i l l u m i n a t e d s u r f a c e , o r more impor--

tant, from t h e e f f e c t s of t h e Sun s h a f t i n g coming i n .

---- - ._
_-____----
We're always o p e r a t i n g i n much darker c o n d i t i o n s i n s i d e

t h e simulator than those t h a t a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d i n e i t h e r

t h e CM or LM.

ARMSTRONG Now, t h e second a r e a t h a t s u f f e r s i n f i d e l i t y i s probably

less important, b u t i t ' s f a c t u a l . T h a t ' s t h e a r e a of a l l

L _/----- - -
t h e gas and f l u i d systems i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t . Our simula-
1 / _- - - .

t o r s do a good job of e l e c t r i c a l e l e c t r o n i c s i m u l a t i o n s

b u t do an a b s o l u t e zero job when i t comes t o what do

v a l v e s do; n o t i n how they r e f l e c t i n t h e gages, b u t how

t h e y a c t u a l l y a f f e c t gas flow around t h e s p a c e c r a f t through

v a l v e sounds, w a t e r f l o w s , and how t o o p e r a t e t h o s e d e v i c e s .

Apparently it i s n ' t mandatory, because we mana.ged t o f l y

t h e s p a c e c r a f t and o p e r a t e t h o s e systems w i t h o u t ever look-

i n g a t a s i m u l a t i o n of them. I t h i n k it i s a f a c t t h a t w e

do n o t have a s i m u l a t i o n of anything l i k e t h e g l y c o l l o o p s ,

o r t h e s u i t l o o p s , t h e e f f e c t s on s u i t s , of o p e r a t i n g

valves i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t i n b o t h CMS and LMS; t h i n g s l i k e

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ARMSTRONG RFPRESS, cabin c i r c u i t s , and s o on a r e j u s t a b s o l u t e l y
( CONT'D)
n o t r e p r e s c n t k d except as t h e y a r e r e f l e c t e d on g a g e s ,

which r e a l l y i s a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l p a r t of t h e o p e r a t i n g

of f l u i d and gas systems. You w a n t t o t a l k a l i t t l e b i t c

about t h e s w i t c h ?

ALDRIN There were s e v e r a l changes made between LM-4 a n a LM-5, and

I t h i n k t h e LMS w a s a l i t t l e b i t l a t e i n g e t t i n g some o f

t h e s e modific:z%ions such as some changes i n c i r c u i t b r e a k e r

l o c a t i o n s , t h e LCG pump c i r c u i t b r e a k e r , t h e r a d a r GYRO

switch. We d i d g e t t h e s e i n , I ' m n o t s u r e t h e e x a c t

t i m i n g , something on t h e o r d e r of 3 weeks, something l i k e

t h a t , before f l i g h t . It would have been n i c e t o have had

t h a t package of m o d i f i c a t i o n s completed sooner.

ARMSTRONG They were i n s t a l l e d e s s e n t i a l l y c o i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e time

p e r i o d when you s h o u l d e s s e n t i a l l y have s i m u l a t i o n s com-

p l e t e d and j u s t b e b r u s h i n g up on t h a t one. I think,

g e n e r a l l y , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of b o t h s i m u l a t o r s , w i t h t h e

e x c e p t i o n o f a few days when t h e y were u n a v a i l a b l e , was

good. We could g e n e r a l l y depend on having one of t h e two

CMS's and t h e LMS a v a i l a b l e t o us f o r t r a i n i n g . Very s e l -

cs,__- ~

dom d i d we have t o s i t around and w a i t for t h e s i m u l a t o r

---- -----_-- ----
- -. - 1
. _ t o be ready. The f i d e l i t y wasn't as good as you'd l i k e ,
/ _ - - - -----^-__q
\-
, b u t t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y w a s goo%
-c
L.

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COLLINS A high degree of a v a i l a b i l i t y w a s a b s o l u t e l y mandatory on

our t r a i n i n g c y c l e . I f we had poor t o bad l u c k with t h e

( c - . . __ - --- - - - __
a s i m u l a t o r a v a i l a b i l i t y , I d o n ' t b e l i e v e we could have
I. __-- --
flown t h e mission of t h e 1 6 t h o f J u l y . I t h i n k i t would
w
~

heve been unwise f o r us t o a t t e m p t f l y i n g t h e mission on

t h e 1 6 t h of J u l y w i t h much l e s s s i m u l a t o r time t h a n we
r- -- - .- -
a c t u a l l y had.
- --\
ALDRIN What w e ' r e r e a l l y s a y i n g i s t h a t b o t h t h e LMS and t h e CMS

were t h e key items of t r a i n i n g , and s o much of a l l t h a t we

d i d depended on t h e i r o p e r a t i o n .

COLLINS That's r i g h t . When t h e system r e a l l y committed t o a J u l y

------
l a u n c h , I ' m n o t s u r e when t h a t w a s
- -_
, but
"
my impression w a s

t h a t t h a t d e c i s i o n w a s made f a i r l y e a r l y , although n o t

o f f i cia l l y .

ARMSTRONG I t w a s soon a f t e r t h e 1 0 t h .
N
ALDRIN Yes.

COLLINS When t h a t d e c i s i o n w a s made, a very v i t a l p a r t of i t w a s

t h e f a c t t h a t t h e assumption w a s made t h a t t h o s e s i m u l a t o r s

would work p r o p e r l y and t h a t w e would have a high degree

o f a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r t h e remainder of our t r a i n i n g c y c l e .

If w e had stubbed our t o e s a . f e w times along t h e way, I

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COLLINS d o n ' t t h i n k we'd have been p r e p a r e d t o launch i n J u l y . I
( CONT'D)
t h i n k we were lucky. The s i m u l a t o r a v a i l a b i l i t y w a s up,
P
and w e were a b l e t o g r i n d away hour a f t e r hour of good

f r u i t f u l t r a i n i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e m i s s i o n SIM's w i t h

MCC .
ALDRIN I think the visual-we may be knocking it a b i t t o o

much and not p o i n t i n g out some of t h e good f e a t u r e s . I

t h i n k it d i d q u i t e a good j o b i n t h e pre-PDI o b s e r v a t i o n

out t h e window of making uses of f i l m s t h a t were t a k e n on

Apollo 1 0 . I thought t h i s w a s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e sys-

tem i n a v e r y , very e f f i c i e n t and very well-reproduced

fashion.

ARMSTRONG The new L a , w i t h t h e new model of l a n d i n g s i t e 3, c e r -

t a i n l y w a s a g i g a n t i c improvement o f t h e p r e v i o u s l u n a r

surface visual.

ALDRIN Yes. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , it l o s t i t s u s e f u l n e s s a t about

100-foot a l t i t u d e . I s n ' t that right?

AFNSTRONG Yes.

ALDRIN So i t could n o t b e used f o r t h e very f i n a l manual phases

o f t h e touchdown. Again, most of t h e f i n a l phase o f

d e s c e n t w a s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n made i n t h e

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ALDRIN l e f t window, t h e one t h a t was i n t h e r i g h t window was
( CONT'D)
n o t a c o r r e c t p r e s e n t a t i o n , because it e s s e n t i a l l y w a s

t h e same view t h a t w a s out of t h e l e f t window, which p u t

it o f f t h e a n g l e by some 50 or 60 d e g r e e s . Now, it would

have been n i c e t o kiave had a b e t t e r v i s u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n

i n t h e r i g h t window. I wouldn't put it i n t h e mandatory

c a t e g o r y because a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e game I d o n ' t t h i n k

t h a t t h e r o l e s employed by t h e crew members r e q u i r e d a.

h i g h - f i d e l i t y v i s u a l i n t h e descent phase for t h e LMP. I

t h i n k h i s t a s k s w e r e more occupied monitoring Gnboard

systems, r e l a y i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t w a s d i s p l a y e d by

t h e computers, and by t h e r a d a r system as an a s s i s t a n t t o

t h e Commander.

24.3 INTEGRATED SIMULATION

ALDRIN When t h e y worked, t h e r e was no doubt t h a t t h e y were

extremely v a l u a b l e . We d i d l o s e a f a i r amount of time

because of computer problems ; n o t t h e s p a c e c r a f t computers ,

b u t t h e computer t h a t t i e s t h e two t o g e t h e r .
w.
/
/

ARMSTRONG I n t h i s t y p e of a mission p l a n , of c o u r s e , t h e i n t e g r a t e d

s i m u l a t i o n s are a very v i t a l p a r t of t h e t r a i n i n g and not

just the training. They a r e a v i t a l p a r t of t h e proce-

dural development and c h e c k l i s t development t h a t ' s r e q u i r e d

t o g a i n t h e confidence l e v e l t h a t you have t o have t o

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ARMSTRONG b e g i n a f l i g h t of t h i s t y p e . I n g e n e r a l , I t h i n k t h a t we
( CONT'D)
performed a l o t of i n t e g r a t e d s i m u l a t i o n s , and t h e y were,

i n general, very beneficial.

COLLINS I d o n ' t t h i n k we performed t o o many, I t h i n k we had about

a minimum number. I t h i n k , p e r h a p s , we s p e n t a l i t t l e

more t i m e t h a n w e should have on launch/launch-abort SIM's

and maybe not q u i t e as much as w e should .have on l u n a r

a s c e n t SIM's.

ALDRIN Yes. I a g r e e t h a t it w a s s a t i s f y i n g minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s ,

and w e c e r t a i n l y c o u l d have u s e d up t o double t h e number

of i n t e g r a t e d s i m u l a t i o n s .

ARMSTRONG I n g e n e r a l , t h e s i m u l a t i o n s where b o t h v e h i c l e s were a i r -

borne were p r e t t y good. S i m u l a t i o n s where we had one on

t h e ground and one on t h e s u r f a c e were probably l e s s

p r o d u c t i v e and l e s s l i k e t h e r e a l c a s e . I doubt t h a t

P22's and t h i n g s l i k e t h a t e v e r r e a l l y worked w e l l enough

i n t h e si.mulator t o g i v e you a good understanding of t h a t

p a r t of t h e problem.

COLLINS Yes. That's true.

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24.4 TJETWORK SIMULATIONS

ARMSTRONG When we t a l k e d about i n t e g r a t e d s i m u l a t i o n s , we've been

a l s o t a l k i n g about network s i m u l a t i o n s because f a r and

away t h e m a j o r i t y of our i n t e g r a t e d s i m u l a t i o n s were

k-
performed as a p a r t of t h e network s i m u l a t i o n s . As a
-- -

m a t t e r of f a c t , i n t h e f i n a l months, p r i o r t o launch o r

___--------- -
perhaps s i x weeks p r i o r t o l a u n c h , t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y of
\
---_
our t i m e w a s s p e n t on network s i m u l a t i o n s . Such a l s r g e
%-- ---\_

p e r c e n t a g e w a s s p e n t on s i m u l a t i o n w i t h t h e network, as

a m a t t e r of f a c t , t h a t we had d i f f i c u l t y f i n d i n g t i m e t o

do s i m u l a t i o n s t h a t were n o t covered by t h e network simu-

l a tion.

COLLINS That ' s t r u e .

ARMSTRONG I would guess t h a t about 60 p e r c e n t of t h e days were

covered w i t h s i m u l a t i o n s P
w i t h t h e Mission Control Center.
---.-__---_I___ ~

-----_ _____.
COLLINS Again, t h i s i s t h e s o r t of t h i n g where we seem t c ; f i g h t

our way through t h e s e f l i g h t s one by one and t h e SIM's

come v e r y l a t e i n t h e t r a i n i n g c y c l e . It would appear

t o b e v e r y v a l u a b l e t h a t some of t h e s e f i r s t SIM's could

b e moved up i n t i m e s o t h a t we d o n ' t have t h i s l a s t minute

c l u s t e r of them. I t makes you nervous from a number of

viewpoints.' F i r s t , you d o n ' t r e a l l y have as nuch time

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COLLINS a v a i l a b l e t o p u t t e r around w i t h t h o s e t h i n g s which you
( CONT D)
know y o u ' r e r u s t y on and you need t r a i n i n g on. Second,

t h e monkey's r e a l l y on t h e back of a l l t h e e l e c t r o n i c s

people t o keep t h o s e t h i n g s r u n n i n g , and you r e a l l y have

t o keep them running, and you've got t o go through success-

f u l ds,y a f t e r s u c c e s s f u l day or r e a l l y you w i l l not meet

what you s e t as minimum t r a i n i n g requirements. I think

t h e r e i s a l o t of p r e s s u r e t h e r e on a l o t of people a t

t h e end t o keep t h o s e s i m u l a t o r s running. There's pressure

on t h e crew and on t h e maintenance p e o p l e , and t h e p r e s s u r e

a l l around because we d e l a y t h o s e SIM's t o o l a t e i n t h e

game. The r e a s o n we do d e l a y them i s t h a t t h e t o t a l system,

t h e C e n t e r , i s r e a l l y only capable of f a c i n g up t o one

f l i g h t at a t i m e .

24.5 DCPS

ARMSTRONG The DCPS w a s used only f o r l a u n c h , launch a b o r t , and T L I

simulations. Although we were unable t o a f f o r d t h e t i m e

t o do many of t h e s e as we l i k e d , t h e s i m u l a t o r worked

r e l i a b l y , and t h e procedures developed t h e r e were v e r y

usefil. I t h i n k i t ' s probably a p p r o p r i a t e t o say t h a t

as t h e f l i g h t s have p r o g r e s s e d , t h e launch a b o r t proce-

dures have f o r t u n a t e l y become more and more s t r e a m l i n e d

and s i m p l i f i e d . I t h i n k a t t h e present time they a r e i n

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ARMSTRONG v e r y , v e r y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e and r a t i o n a l form. I t ' s an

( CONT D )
easy j o b f o r t h e l e f t - s e a t man d u r i n g launch t o under-

s t a n d t h o s e procedures and b e a b l e t o implement t h o s e

i r r e s p e c t i v e of o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s .

24.6 LMPS
ALDRIN Well, I w a s a l i t t l e d i s a p p o i n t e d i n t h e v a r i e t y of

a b o r t c a s e s t h a t t h e LMPS could handle. We looked a t

the DO1 aborts. P r i m a r i l y , it w a s a rendezvous t r a i n e r .

S t a r t i n g a t i n s e r t i o n and f o r nominal rendezvous c a s e s

and t h e n a good b i t l a t e r i n t h e gmLe, we were a b l e t o

p i c k up c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d a b o r t c a s e s . But, as I s a y , I

w a s a l i t t l e d i s a p p o i n t e d i n not being a b l e t o r u n through

a wide v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t c a s e s . There were p o t e n t i a l

c a s e s t h a t could have a r i s e n .

24.7 CMPS

COLLINS The good t h i n g about t h e CMPS w a s t h a t it could i n v e s t i g a t e

a number of d i s p e r s e d rendezvous c a s e s . The bad t h i n g

about it was, f i r s t , as f a r as Apollo 11 w a s concerned,

we g o t caught i n t h e middle of a move from one b u i l d i n g

t o a n o t h e r , and t h e t i m i n g w a s extremely poor. It made

t h e CMPS not a v a i l a b l e e a r l y i n t h e t r a i n i n g c y c l e when

we could have made v e r y good u s e of it. A t that time,

t h e CMS's were r e a l l y not a v a i l a b l e . Late i n t h e t r a i n i n g

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24-12
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COLLINS c y c l e when t h e CMPS became a v a i l a b l e , it w a s of l i t t l e
( CONT'D)
o r no v a l u e t o t h e crew i t s e l f . It w a s of v a l u e t o o t h e r

p e o p l e , b u t t o t h e crew i t s e l f w a s of l i t t l e or no v a l u e ,

because we w e r e t h e n spending a l l o u r t i m e on t h e CMS

and had no t i m e t o devote t o t h e CMPS. So it w a s j u s t a

m a s t e r p i e c e of poor t i m i n g f o r Apollo 11, and Apollo 11

comments I am sure won't c a r r y over t o o t h e r f l i g h t s .

The bad t h i n g from a t e c h n i c a l viewpoint about t h e CMPS i s

t h a t t h e computer i s a s o r t of an i d e a l i z e d s i m p l i f i e d

mechanization of t h e r e a l computer, and it w a s always

s e v e r a l i t e r a t i o n s behind t h e l a t e s t MIT math flow. It

never q u i t e worked l i k e t h e r e a l computer worked. I

guess d u r i n g t h e rendezvous t h i s i s an important f a c t o r .

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e same t h i n g a p p l i e s t o t h e s i m u l a t i o n of t h e
LGC. It w a s c o n s i d e r a b l y l i m i t e d , and t h e r e were many

l i t t l e t r i c k s t h a t w e employed t h a t you could e x e r c i s e

i n t h e LMS. When you t r y and work them i n t h e LMPS, t h e

computer wouldn't respond p r o p e r l y , and t o t h a t degree ,

t h e r e w a s a c e r t a i n amount of n e g a t i v e t r a i n i n g because

we'd have t o e s t a b l i s h o t h e r procedures, o t h e r work

around t e c h n i q u e s t o come up w i t h t h e same information.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 24-13

COLLINS I ' d l i k e t o emphasize t h a t what I ' v e s a i d about t h e CMPS

and i t s shortcomings i s n o t t h e e n t i r e s t o r y . I was

t a l k i n g about t h e a c t u a l crew t r a i n i n g on t h e CMPS. Now,

above and beyond t h e crew t r a i n i n g , t h e CMPS w a s used as

a procedures development s i m u l a t o r , and t h e McDonald

L,ouglas people s p e n t a l o t of hours l o o k i n g a t v a r i o u s

t r a j e c t o r i e s and v a r i o u s d i s p e r s e d c a s e s and a l s o on

v a r i o u s a b o r t modes. The t h i n g w a s of g r e a t v a l u e

i n p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r m y s o l o book w i t h a l l t h e d i s p e r s e d

c a s e s and a l l t h e a b o r t p o s s i b i l i t i e s . So I'm s u r e it

w a s of g r e a t v a l u e . It w a s j u s t t h a t because of poor

t i m i n g it was of v e r y l i m i t e d v a l u e as d i r e c t crew t r a i n i n g .

24.8 CENTRIFUGE

ARMSTRONG LMP and CDR had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n c e n t r i f u g e t r a i n i n g i n

p r e p a r a t i o n for Apollo 8 and chose n o t t o r e p e a t t h a t .

- ~ _
---
COLLINS I thought t h a t h a l f a day on t h e c e n t r i f u g e w a s u s e f u l .
1
I d o n ' t t h i n k i t ' s mandatory, - T t h i n k you could go &ead

and f l y t h e f l i g h t s a f e l y without any c e n t r i f u g e t r a i n i n g

a t a l l , b u t I t h i n k t h a t t o do a couple of e n t r i e s i n it i s

worth t h e t i m e . I t ' s w e l l worth t h e t i m e s p e n t t h e r e .

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24-14 CONFIDENTIAL
ALDRIN That was good t h a t w e had done t h a t on Apollo 8. I

thought t h a t w a s w e l l worth t h e t i m e .

ARMSTRONG The launches were never s i m u l a t e d i n e i t h e r c a s e and I

d o n ' t s e e any requirement f o r launch a c c e l e r a t i o n .

COLLINS The o n l y hooker t h e r e i s i f you g e t i n t o t h e s e a b o r t

c a s e s where y o u ' r e p u l l i n g h o r r i b l y l a r g e numbers of g ' s

f o r g r e a t l e n g t h s of time. We j u s t i g n o r e t h o s e , and I

suppose t h a t ' s probably a l l r i g h t . Somewhere i n a l l our

background, we've had J o h n s v i l l e c e n t r i f u g e runs up t o

1 5 g ' s and t h i n g s l i k e s u s t a i n e d peaks over 1 0 g ' s , and

I ' m n o t sure t h a t t h e crews t h a t are coming i n now have

had any e x p e r i e n c e l i k e t h a t . I t h i n k one t i m e i s worth

it t o see a very high g s p i k e and t o s e e a f a i r l y l o n g

p e r i o d of t i m e a-t P E 4 2 . u t s -

T h e r e ' s no doubt about it t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n L i t t l e

t r i c k s about b r e a t h i n g t h a t would b e n i c e t o know and t o

remember i n t h e u n l i k e l y event t h a t you d i d have one of

these high g aborts. So I ' d say t h a t a g e n e r a l back-

ground t r a i n i n g i s worthwhile. Having t h a t under your

b e l t , I t h i n k h a l f a day for a s p e c i f i c mission t r a i n i n g

of e n t r y would be more t h a n adequate.

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24.9 THE DOCKING SIMULATOR

ARMSTRONG The docking s i m u l a t o r was used very l i t t l e . Some s i m u l a t e d

.
I
_ "

LM dockings were performed i n t h a t s i m u l a t o r , and i n as

much as t h a t i s a secondary docking method, we f e l t t h a t

w a s adequate. Had I more time a v a i l a b l e t o p r e p a r e , I

probably would have s p e n t somewhat more time on t h a t t h a n

I did. A s mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h e d e b r i e f i n g , t h e s h o r t -

coming o f t h a t s i m u l a t o r i s t h a t it d o e s n ' t provide any

of t h e s i m u l a t i o n of p o s t c o n t a c t dynamics. That i s , of

c o u r s e , t h e a r e a where we r a n i n t o a l i t t l e problem, s o

s c h e d u l i n g of t h a t by t h e t r a i n i n g people i s probably

warranted.

COLLINS I t h i n k t h e docking t r a i n e r should be command module

- - _ /

a c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n LM a c t i v- e-. I d o n ' t know how much it

__c__--
/-
would c o s t t o convert i t , b u t t h e t h i n g i s going t o s i t

over t h e r e and c o s t money f o r i t s upkeep and people t o

run it and a l l t h a t . I t ' s probably worth a l i t t l e e x t r a

t o make it command module a c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n LM a c t i v e .

24.10 RDS

COLLINS Well, I f e e l t h e same way a f t e r t h e f l i g h t t h a t I d i d

b e f o r e about Langley. T h a t i s , i f Langley i s up and

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. . __.. . ". .. ___ _-.I. . . .. 1 -. . .

I. . . .. ~ . - -. .~ .,
24-16 CONFIDENTIAL
COLLINS r u n n i n g , i t ' s w e l l worth t h e t r i p t o Langley t o make u s e
( CONT'D)
of i t . But I d o n ' t r e a l l y t h i n k t h a t you can p u t t h a t

s i m u l a t o r i n t o mandatory c a t e g o r y . Once i t ' s d i s m a n t l e d ,

I would say l e a v e it dismantled. There i s no f i r m re-

quirement; i t ' s n o t mandatory t o l o o k at t h e Langley

simulator. I t ' s useful, i t ' s real, i t ' s full-size, it

g i v e s you a good out-the-window display. Although it i s

h y d r a u l i c a l l y o p e r a t e d , i t s c o n t r o l system r e s p o n s e i s

v e r y c l o s e t o t h e r e a l t h i n g , and i f it w e r e i n e x i s t e n c e ,

I ' d s u r e t a k e advantage of it a g a i n as I d i d i n t h e p a s t .

You guys flew t h a t , d i d n l t you? What do you t h i n k ?

ALDRIN No, I d i d n ' t f l y it.

.c7
ARMSTRONG Not r e c e n t l y .

24.11 FMES\
ARMSTRONG W e d i d n ' t have t h e t o participate. I ' m quite

s u r e t h a t t h e r e were many areas of i n t e r e s t , t h a t would

have been v a l u a b l e f o r t h e crew t o l o o k a t i n t h e FMES.

We could n o t a f f o r d t h e t i m e , and w i t h t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e

schedule o f t h e FMES, it w a s j u s t i m p r a c t i c a l f o r us t o

t r y t o incorporate t h a t i n t o t h e t r a i n i n g period.

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COLLINS T h a t ' s t h e same w i t h t h e North American evaluator. I

t r i e d up u n t i l several weeks b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t t o f i n d

t i m e t o go o u t t o t h e e v a l u a t o r and look a t s o r t of a

summary of what t h e y found i n t h e i r Apollo 11 v e r i f i c a -

t i o n work. But it j u s t d i d n ' t work o u t , and I p u t it

i n t h e " n i c e t o have" c a t e g o r y r a t h e r t h a n t h e "mandatory"

category. I t h i n k you'd l e a r n some t h i n g s from i t , and

it would be a good crosscheck on t h e CMS, b u t I d o n ' t

t h i n k i t ' s mandatory t h a t t h e crew p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e

evaluator.

24.12 EGRESS T R A I N I N G

ALDRIN I d o n ' t f e e l t h a t t h e t a n k e g r e s s e x e r c i s e i s worth t h e

time. It seems t o m e it can go r i g h t t o t h e Gulf. We

understand t h e procedures w e l l enough, and t h e r e are no

d i f f i c u l t i e s from a s a f e t y s t a n d p o i n t t h a t r e a l l y warrant

exposing t h e crew t o b o t h t h e t a n k and t h e Gulf.

ARMSTRONG The Gulf e x e r c i s e i s r e l a t i v e l y p r o d u c t i v e f o r t h e amount

of time it t a k e s . I t ' s a h a l f day e x e r c i s e , and I t h i n k

1
L _-- ---- --
:
I
t h a t it was w e l l organized f o r u s . For t h e couple of
y, __--
hours ' work t h a t it t a k e s , you probably g e t a good bit

of confidence i n your a b i l i t y t o handle t h e s p a c e c r a f t

i n t h e w a t e r , and y o u ' r e o b l i g e d t o do something i n t h a t

regard.

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. . .\ . . . "--"...-I.._.." I... .. _. "_ .- ..- - , ~ I ..- .-

24-18
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COLLINS Yes, I a g r e e . You probably d e l e t e t h e t a n k , and I t h i n k ,

o h , i t ' s a p l e a s a n t r i d e o u t on t h a t b o a t . You're s l e e p -

i n g or s i t t i n g around doing n o t h i n g . I t h i n k probably if

y o u ' r e going t o g e t t h e most out of i t , you could precede

t h e Gulf work w i t h a couple of Lectures and b r i e f i n g s on

t h e b o a t on t h e way o u t on what you a r e going t o do and

how t o run through a l l t h i s s t u f f and t h e whole schematic '

on t h e p o s t l a n d i n g e v e n t s system and maybe a f e w words

on t h e s u r v i v a l k i t .
c If you d e l e t e t h e S t a b l e I1 t r a i n -
c
-

i n g i n t h e t a n k , t h e n t h a t t i m e could b e s p e n t on b r i e f -

i n g , on some o t h e r p r e c a u t i o n s , such as t h e no-no's

\
involved i n S t a b l e I1 e g r e s s . 3think t h a t would b e a
/
more p r o d u c t i v e day i f it were arranged t h a t way. On

t h e o t h e r hand, I enjoy s i t t i n g around i n t h e b o a t . It's

relaxing.

ARMSTRONG Pad e g r e s s and mockup e g r e s s have t o do w i t h p r e p a r i n g

f o r an emergency i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t on t h e pad. This i s

r e q u i r e d f o r the. chamber o p e r a t i o n f o r s a f e t y i n t h e

chamber. By t h e t i m e you g e t through t h a t , not very much

a d d i t i o n a l i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e s p a c e c r a f t , i t s e l f , on

t h e pad. I don't t h i n k w e spent excessive t i m e i n t h a t

area , though.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 24-19

ALDRIN I do t h i n k you w a n t t o accomplish some of t h e s e exercises

w i t h f l i g h t gear because t h e t r a i n i n g s u i t s are used so

much, and f a s t e n e r s and connectors always seem t o work

a l o t easier. I t ' s a good e x e r c i s e t o run through a t

l e a s t once under requirements t o move q u i c k l y with t h e

f l i g h t hardware.

24.13 FIRE T M I N I N G
ARMSTRONG I t ' s v a l u a b l e , i f you do have a f i r e and have t o use it.

Other t h a n t h a t , i t ' s l i k e buying i n s u r a n c e . If you

never use i t , of c o u r s e , i t ' s j u s t a t i m e e x p e n d i t u r e

t h a t w a s nonproductive. I ' v e no o b j e c t i o n t o t h a t f i r e

training.

24.14 PLANETARIUM
ARMSTRONG .We had a v e r y l i m i t e d p l a n e t a r i u m t r a i n i n g exposure.
I

-1.
-- --___ _^-----

I t ' s p r i m a r i l y due t o t h e f a c t t h a t w e j u s t d i d n ' t have

t h e t i m e t o look i n t o it i n more d e t a i l . W e had rela-

t i v e l y e x t e n s i v e p l a n e t a r i u m f l i g h t r e l a t e d work on

previous f l i g h t s . O u r work w a s l i m i t e d s t r i c t l y t o

t h e f l i g h t p l a n i t s e l f and work i n t h e f l i g h t : things

t h a t could be l e a r n e d i n t h e p l a n e t a r i u m t h a t would

apply t o t h e mission p l a n , stars s e l e c t e d for a l i g n m e n t s ,

what could be seen from t h e lunar s u r f a c e , what con-

s t r a i n t s due t o c e r t a i n l i g h t i n g c o n d i t i o n s and l o c a t i o n s

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T . . ._.. -. -. . .._I... . . . . - . . " ._ .. . .. . ~ .- __ .- -. ._ . -

...- . -.
24-20
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ARMSTRONG of p l a n e t s , t h o s e s o r t s of t h i n g s . We d i d it r e l a t i v e l y
( CONT'D)
e a r l y i n t h e t r a i n i n g c y c l e t o g e t a b a s i c understanding

of what our geometric s i t u a t i o n w a s , and t h a t w a s prob-

a b l y worthwhile.

ALDRIN I t h i n k it w a s . I t ' s u s e f u l i n a g e n e r a l s e n s e , because

you might be a b l e t o g e t some e a r l y information on t h e

planets. The s i m u l a t o r d o e s n ' t have any . r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

of t h e p l a n e t s . I t h i n k most of t h e s p e c i f i c n a v i g a t i o n a l

u s e o f t h e stars and t h e star f i e l d can b e s t be done w i t h

t h e e x i s t i n g CMS.

COLLINS &think one t r i p t o Chapel H i l l f o r a t r a i n i n g c y c l e i s

useful.

ARMSTRONG T h a t ' s what I t h i n k . The geometry f o r f i x e d mission

launch time i s p r e t t y w e l l f i x e d on a l u n a r mission.

That i s , once e s t a b l i s h e d i n a launch d a t e , t h e e n t i r e

a s t r o n o m i c a l geometry i s f i x e d . A good understanding i s

very u s e f u l . It i n f l u e n c e s a l o t of t h i n g s l a t e r i n t h e

p r o c e d u r a l developments , s o t h a t s e s s i o n i s probably

worthwhile. It can be improved by having a mission

p l a n n e r t h a t understands t h e geometry and t h e c o n s t r a i n t s

of t h i s launch d a t e involved i n t h e planning of t h a t

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 24-21
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ARMSTRONG training session. We tried to do that, and we really
(CONT'D)
didn't get as much out of that aspect of it as we would

have liked.

24.15 MIT

ARMSTONG I want to talk about MIT and, in general, in our flight,

this was restricted to understanding of the programs and

program changes, as in the software end. The hardware

was pretty firm at the time and we all had a fairly good

understanding of the hardware prior to this training

cycle. The understanding of the program and program

changes, however, is one that unfortunately takes a lot

of time. It takes a number of separate sessions in

smaller groups throughout the cycle. I really think that

rather than one big 3-day session of a review of the

programs and so forth, it would be better to have a

number of smaller sessions interspersed at various times

in the training cycle so you could limit yourself to just

one phase of the mission at a time.

COLLINS I spent as long as 5 days, not on this flight but on

others, sitting in a chair at MIT listening to a chrono-

logical description of the math flow, and it drives me

---.--
----__
.- _n

crazy. By about the second or third day, I'm just satu-

c

'rated; it's like filling up a teacup with a fire hose.

- ---___.c- - - -

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24-22
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COLLINS There has to be a better way of doing that than just going
( CONT 'D)
to MIT and sitting f o r days. Maybe if they are broken

up like you say, it will help.

ARMSTRONG This is a difficult area because various people assimilate

information differently. I get absolutely nothing from

2 hours of going through logic diagrams, while other

people find that very informative. I much prefer going

through the operator's checklist and trying to understand

each step in the operating checklist, what that does,

what information is being displayed, and how it's being

processed, than going through endless software loops on

a diagram.

ALDRIN Yes. Until you're related to specific-use situations,

it doesn't mean very much.

ARMSTRONG You have to understand the basic thing and go do it in the

simulation; then you can understand better some of the

details, why it's done this way, and what options are

available to you. Just to spend long days in reviewing

hoards of GSOPS and things like that, in my view, is a

very unproductive session.

ALDRIN We've gone over programs such s P20 m ny times, and I '

still can't recall all the logic

D o f different paths

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 24-23
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ALDRIN that the computer is taking in acquiring radar lockon.
( CONT 1 D )
I think, in a sense, our checklist may suffer somewhat
in that it doesn't help too much either in this respect,

in covering the various ways that you handle abnormalities

in acquiring radar lock. Certainly, the time sgent i.n

c_-

going over all the logic flows wasn't particularly pro-

-. -- -

ductive.

24.16 SYSTEMS BRIEFINGS

ARMSTRONG In general, we didn't have long courses of systems

briefings. We chose to have an expert on a particular

system come in periodically and review that system on

an available basis. This worked all right, but in my

own case, I felt that by the time we got within 2 months

of the flight, we still didn't understand some of the

systems or hadn't gotten around to understanding them in

the depth that was required. I don't know how to get

around this. This was the problem in our flight that

was just due to the very tight training schedule that we

were on. There just wasn't time to do all the things in

the order and in the depth that you wanted.

COLLINS I have one concrete suggestion for these systems that

centers around CMS-1. CMS-1 is the simulator where the

crews get most of their systems training, because they're

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24-24
/ CONFIDENTIAL
COLLINS
(CONT'D) L-.
on CMS l ' b e f o r e t h e y go down t o t h e Cape and g e t t h e

more mission-oriented t r a i n i n g . CMS-1 has some_yPry m o d

instructors. It u s e s a d i f f e r e n t system t h a n CMS-2 and -3.

w
CMS-2 and -3 have people who a r e t r a i n e d a c r o s s t h e board

i n a r a t h e r shallow f a s h i o n . CMS-1 h a s people who are

t r a i n e d i n a narrow a r e a b u t i n d e p t h , and t h e y have some

good people. One f l a w i s t h a t t h e CMS-1 i n s t r u c t o r s

know how t h e system i s designed and of what it i s c a p a b l e ,

b u t t h e y have no more i d e a t h a n a r a b b i t of how t h e

equipment i s a c t u a l l y used i n f l i g h t . On a f e w o c c a s i o n s ,
c

I have had people from FOD EECOM's t o come over and s i t

i n on CMS-1 b r i e f i n g s e s s i o n s , and it ended up b e i n g --..

?-ore of a b r i e f i n g s e s s i o n f o r t h e CMS-1 i n s t r u c t o r t h a n

it w a s f o r e i t h e r me or t h e FOD people. I think there

rc,

should b e some way a t MSC t o g e t t h e r i g h t hand and t h e

l e f t hand t o g e t h e r , t o g e t t h e CMS-1 i n s t r u c t o r s up t o

speed n o t o n l y on t h e b a s i c s of t h e i r system and i t s

c a p a b i l i t y . b u t t o go one s t e p f u r t h e r and g e t them i n t o

t h e C o n t r o l C e n t e r , g e t them t o know t h e EECOM's, and

g e t them t o f u r t h e r understand how t h e equipment i s

a c t u a l l y used d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of a f l i g h t . Then I t h i n k

t h e y ' d . b e much b e t t e r p r e p a r e d t o p r e s e n t t o t h e crew

t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t are r e a l l y important and n o t t r i v i a

a l o n g w i t h t h e important d e t a i l s . Maybe t h e r e are p i t f a l l s

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COLLINS t h e r e , b u t I have t h e f e e l i n g t h a t I got a h e l l of a l o t
(CONT'D) e
-

out of CMS-1. I l i k e d CMS-1 and t h e i n s t r u c t o r s . It w a s

*

s o r t of t h e backbone of my systems t r a i n i n g . But I t h i n k

it could have been a h e l l of a l o t b e t t e r i f it could

have been i n t e g r a t e d i n t o more of a real-world approach.

If t h o s e people were familiar w i t h t h e everyday o p e r a t i o n s

of Mission Control: t h e downlink; what t h e y have on

u
t e l e m e t r y ; how you use t h e water b o i l e r , not how you

could use it but how you r e a l l y a r e going t o use i t , t h a t

would have enhanced t h a t t r a i n i n g a l o t .

ARMSTRONG We had only a f e w hours on t h e launch v e h i c l e , which i s

probably about r i g h t . I t ' s f o r t u n a t e t h a t , because of

- r e l i z b i l i t y of
- t h e high t h e launch v e h i c l e , w e haven't

had a requirement t o know i n depth a l o t of a l t e r n a t e

switches. I n most c a s e s , t h e y are a v a i l a b l e t o you anyway.

ALDRIN Not t o o much you can do about them.

ARMSTRONG There are some t h i n g s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e S-IVB r e l i g h t ,

that itls important t o understand v e r y w e l l . I f it works

p e r f e c t l y , i t ' s going t o run r i g h t i n s p i t e o f you. But

i f t h e r e are a b n o r m a l i t i e s , i t ' s very good t o understand

what t h e e f f e c t of t h o s e are. So some amount of time i s

required t h e r e . I t h i n k w e h i t t h a t about r i g h t .

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ALDRIN I think the DCPS did a very good j o b in relaying launch-

vehicle peculiarities to us.

ARMSTRONG They did. The DCPS people do a good job in that area.
.
They understand. They have kept very close to the launch-

vehicle changes, and I think they have really been able

to keep us better informed on important things to know

in the launch vehicle than our formal Saturn briefings.

24.17 LUNAR SURFACE TRAINING

ALDRIN I think there were enough uncertainties about the

n r
one-sixth g environment to warrant the degree to which

-
we used b o t h m a n d the KC-135.
r
Looking back on it now,

I don't think the followon crews will need as much as

we did. I believe that the more productive training

would be with the KC-135. It would be nice to have a

better simulation of the surface characteristics. That

is the big shortcoming, I believe, of the KC-135. But

one-sixth g is relatively easy to operate in. It doesn't

take too much detailed training, I don't believe.

ARMSTRONG As far as the use of POGO, I think it's worthwhile. It

takes very little time to go over there and train. From

the viewpoint of the directorate maintaining the POGO and

-
what its cost of operation is in terms of money, staff,
-
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ARMSTRONG e t c e t e r a , I c a n ' t say w h a t t h e balance i s t h e r e . If it
( CONT'D)
d i d n ' t c o s t anything, t h e r e would be no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e

l i t t l e b i t of t i m e t h a t it t a k e s t o go over t h e r e and

g e t t h a t kind of experience i s worthwhile. I t ' s not

mandatory. The KC-135 i s unquestionably t h e b e s t simu-

l a t i o n of one-sixth g. I t ' s got c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s as

w e a l l know. You c a n ' t do very much, and i t ' s v e r y

expensive i n terms of t h e amount of t i m e it t a k e s you t o

get a l i t t l e practice.

ALDRIN You're probably not going t o remember them. I think the

b e s t t i m e t o do t h a t i s j u s t a t t h e beginning of t h e EVA.

ARMSTRONG The one-g walkthroughs, of course, were t h e basis of our

t i m e l i n e planning. I d o n ' t see any way of g e t t i n g away

from t h a t . You're going t o do a number o f t h o s e one-g

walkthroughs, and y o u ' r e going t o develop your t i m e l i n e

and t h e procedures. There i s n ' t another way t o do it

r i g h t now t h a t ' s a good way.

ALDRIN Yes. T h a t ' s t h e only way t o do it. You c a n ' t s i t down.

ARMSTRONG I t ' s w e l l worth it. We would l i k e t o have been a b l e t o

d o - a f e w more had w e had t h e t i m e . I t h i n k t h a t we do

need t o improve our f a c i l i t y f o r t h a t j o b . We need t o

have a b e t t e r LM, more a c c u r a t e s i m u l a t i o n of t h e LM.

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..I - . . . . . . .. . ... ..-
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ARMSTRONG We need a b e t t e r and l a r g e r area t o work i n . We need
( CONT ID)
more topography and v a r i a t i o n s of environment t o . w o r k i n

so t h a t t h e s i m u l a t i o n s can b e as good as you can reason-

a b l y a f f o r d on t h e ground. I think ours w a s less accurate

i n terms of i t s f i d e l i t y t h a n we should have had t o

properly plan t h a t . W e should have as much f l i g h t - t y p e

equipment as we can i n t h o s e e x e r c i s e s . I t ' s going t o

r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e time you

spend i n EVA.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e Sun p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t i s

extremely important. There are so many t h i n g s i n t h e EVA

t h a t are completely dependent upon t h e l i g h t i n g c o n d i t i o n s

t h a t you have, such as placement of experiments and t h e

photography. We were prepared t o do it i n one f a s h i o n ,

assuming l a n d i n g s t r a i g h t ahead. With l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n s

of t h a t , w e g e n e r a l l y knew how we were going t o approach

them, b u t it w a s going t o be a real-time d e c i s i o n f o r t h e

most p a r t . With t h e s m a l l amount of yaw t h a t we had, it

d i d p e r t u r b our o p e r a t i o n t o some degree. I think t h a t

t h e one-g walkthroughs ought t o look a t s p e c i f i c v a r i a -

t i o n s i n LM o r i e n t a t i o n and touchdown.

ARMSTRONG We d i d n ' t do much i n t h e way of f i e l d t r i p s . We d i d one

_c____

geology f i e l d t r i p . We never could a f f o r d one which w e

----
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ARMSTRONG thought might be p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e for i t s s c i e n t i f i c
( CONT'D) .--------__ --- __ ____ - --- _- -
7
return.

ALDRIN I f e l t f o r t h e most p a r t t h a t t h e t r i p s w e went on

s u f f e r e d a good b i t from l a c k of r e a l i s m . Maybe w e j u s t

d i d n ' t g e t i n t o t h i s l a t t e r one, t h a t w e missed, soon

enough. I t h i n k , based on some of t h e information t h a t

we've acquired on t h i s f l i g h t , w e ' l l ' b e a b l e t o make many

of t h e f i e l d t r i p s a good b i t more productive.

I think and t h e 8-foot chamber a r e v a l u a b l e .

they a r e required. They do g i v e

you t h a t a d d i t i o n a l confidence i n t h e f l i g h t equipment.

It would be n i c e t o be able t o o p e r a t e i n b o t h of them,

f o r example, w i t h t h e OPS, and n o t have r e s t r i c t i o n s as

w e had i n t h e SESL i n not being able t o use i t . I'm

not s u r e t h a t t h e thermal a s p e c t of t h e SESL t e s t s i s

needed.

ARMSTRONG Yes. It proved t o be noninformative, which I guess w a s

good, because it s a i d we d i d n ' t have any problems. I

agree w i t h Buzz. The confiderlee t h a t we got out of t h a t

____-- --I_I _-- - -- - __ -
w a s v e r y good. I ' m g l a d we d i d i t . I ' m glad t h a t we
7
worked w i t h t h e f l i g h t equipment i n t h e r e and, i n a

cursory f a s h i o n a t l e a s t , as t e s t s r a t h e r t h a n walking

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ARMSTRONG up and down on a box. Not t h a t it r e a l l y t a u g h t us a l l
(CONT'D)
t h a t much. Again, it w a s j u s t a confidence b u i l d e r , and

I t h i n k t h a t w e could probably do l e s s i n t h e f u t u r e . It

i s important, however, f o r anybody i n a s u r f a c e a c t i v i t y

t o have a high degree of confidence i n h i s a b i l i t y t o

o p e r a t e h i s equipment. That i s what t h a t g i v e s you.

ALDRIN t h i n k it w a s more important t o be exposed

t h a n t o t h e thermal environment. It w a s

t h e only p l a c e t h a t came f a i r l y c l o s e t o d u p l i c a t i n g t h e

wide v a r i a t i o n of l i g h t i n g c o n d i t i o n s .

ARMSTRONG O u r b r i e f i n g s on l u n a r s u r f a c e t r a i n i n g w e r e more give-

and-take s e s s i o n s on planning t h e v a r i o u s procedures and

d e c i d i n g t h e most e f f i c i e n t way t o use our s u r f a c e t i m e .

T h a t ' s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h many o t h e r areas of t h e f l i g h t ,

I guess.

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24.18 CONTINGENCY EVA T R A I N I N G , KC-135

ARMSTRONG W
0 WIF ONE-g WALKTHROUGHS

e d i d contingency t r a n s f e r i n t h e WIF and went through

some procedures w i t h t h a t group. Since w e d i d n ' t have

t o u s e it a g a i n , it f i t s i n t h e insurance category.

ALDRIN There i s such a wide v a r i e t y of contingency s i t u a t i o n s

t h a t can come up. You c a n ' t t r a i n for a l l of them, and

I t h i n k you have t o c u t s h o r t a few af t h e a v a i l a b l e

p o s s i b i l i t i e s and j u s t say t h a t i f you have t o f a c e t h a t

one, y o u ' r e going t o t a k e t h e time and work it out i n

r e a l time. There are a wide v a r i e t y of e x e r c i s e s -

one PLSS; one OPS; two PLSS, sometimes with OPS and some-

t i m e s without; and t r a n s f e r of hoses through t h e t u n n e l .

You j u s t c a n ' t t r a i n f o r a l l of them. Somebody has t o

s i t down and t r y t o work out procedures. I t h i n k you

do need t o t a k e a good s e t of i n f l i g h t contingency pro-

cedures t h a t w i l l handle t h e c a s e s t h a t may come up.

COLLINS You need a t l e a s t one good long s e s s i o n i n s i d e t h e com-

mand module with a l l t h r e e crewmembers s u i t e d t o go

through where a l l t h e hoses a r e going t o be; who's going

t o plug i n t o w h a t , when, and where; who's going t o h e l p

who; and what t h e COMM s i t u a t i o n i s going t o b e .

ALDRIN T h a t ' s t r u e , but doing t h a t i n one g i s r a t h e r u n r e a l i s t i c . '

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. ... . . . . ? - . . . . . . . ~
.. -. . -
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COLLINS That may b e , but i n s t e a d of j u s t g e t t i n g a b r i e f i n g on

where t h e t h i n g s are going t o b e , you ought t o see them

w i t h your own eyes, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e geometry of t h e

t h i n g without t h e c e n t e r couch i n t h e r e , t h e l o c a t i o n s of

t h e h o s e s , and a g a i n , who's going t o s t a n d where and

whq's going t o h e l p who plugs i n t o which hose when /

\\
Three

men i n t h e r e w i t h p r e s s u r i z e d s u i t s who d o n ' t understand

what's happening and c a n ' t t a l k t o one another would be

one h e l l a c i o u s mess.
7
24.19 MOCKUPS AND STOWAGE TRAINING EQUIPMENT
ARMSTRONG The mockups and s t o r a g e equipment were used e x t e n s i v e l y

and, i n g e n e r a l , t h e y were s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r developing

t h e procedures. I t h i n k t h e p l a c e where t h e y a r e s h o r t

i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e area where y o u ' r e making connec-

t i o n s t o and from t h e s p a c e c r a f t , o p e r a t i n g s e v e r a l

different life-support systems such as t h e EMU, OPS,

spacecraft s u i t l o o p s , and t h i n g s l i k e t h i s . I t ' s very

important t h a t you o p e r a t e a l l t h o s e valves per e q u i t y

and know why you are o p e r a t i n g them i n t h a t manner. Our

mockups do not do t h a t . They are j u s t knobs and you

j u s t do them. I t ' s important t o know why you are doing

them.

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ALDRIN I t ' s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t o p e r a t i n g gear weighs s o much i n

one g . I t ' s v i r t u a l l y unbearable t o have t h a t p i e c e o f

___-
hardware on your back f o r a long p e r i o d of t i m e .
~ . - - .- --- -

ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we have a l o t of complex f l i g h t s ahead o f us i n

main-line Apollo and I t h i n k t h e r e a r e enough of them,

enough p o s s i b l e c o n t i n g e n c i e s , and enough t r a i n i n g y e t i n

f r o n t o f u s t h a t it would pay t o upgrade t h i s area. Many

people s t i l l have t o l e a r n a l l t h a t hardware; i t s whys

and wherefores.

24.20 PHOTOGRAPHY AND CAMFRA T R A I N I N G EQUIPMENT

COLLINS I j u s t t h i n k t h a t gear ought t o be a v a i l a b l e e a r l i e r .

I t ' s one of t h e t h i n g s you can g e t done or a t l e a s t g e t

s t a r t e d on 3 o r 4 months b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t , and y e t i t ' s

not a v a i l a b l e . I t ' s another one of t h o s e l a t e - a r r i v a l

categories. I ' m not s u r e whether it has t o do w i t h t h e

q u a n t i t y of t h e t r a i n i n g equipment o r t h e f a c t t h a t w e

have t o g e t one f l i g h t down b e f o r e w e can g e t around t o

providing f o r t h e next one, I think the familiarization

w i t h t h e cameras ( t a k i n g them home and t a k i n g p i c t u r e s

L

while y o u ' r e f l y i n g around t h e country i n T38's) should

c
be done e a r l y and not t h e l a s t couple of weeks. From\

t h e f l i g h t s t h a t I have been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h , it seems t o

me t h a t i t ' s always been t h e l a s t month when t h a t s t u f f

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. . .. . . . .... . . 7 - '.. . . .. .
I
' . - - .
I

-.
24-34
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COLLINS magically appears and t h e y want t o t a l k t o you about it
( CONT D )
and a l l t h a t ; it should be done e a r l i e r , I t h i n k .

ARMSTRONG That gear should a l s o i n c l u d e f l i g h t f i d e l i t y . It should

have d e c a l s on i t ; w e should be used t o s e e i n g t h e kinds

of d e c a l s , exposure gui-des, and t h i n g s l i k e t h a t t h a t

w e a r e going t o b e u s i n g i n f l i g h t . Those t h i n g s never

show on any of t h e t r a i n i n g equipment. That should b e

included as mandatory.

ALDRIN The LM photography i s t i e d t o o p e r a t i n g i n t h e v e h i c l e i n

many cases;such as t h e s u r f a c e photography w i t h t h e

16 m i l l i m e t e r a t t a c h e d i n v a r i o u s ways t o t h e window b a r ,
t o t h e m i r r o r mount. It looks t o m e l i k e t h e r e i s room

f o r s i g n i f i c a n t improvement i n t h i s area. I t h i n k w e got

/-

. i n t o t h i s a l i t t l e l a t e i n t h e game.
- So much of t h e

documentation of a f l i g h t depends on t h e photography.

It looks t o m e l i k e we could use some p a r t i c u l a r t r a i n -

i n g s e s s i o n s t a k i n g r e a l f i l m w i t h f l i g h t cameras and

t h e h i g h e s t f i d e l i t y mockup you can c r e a t e . I don't

know how you would do it r e a l l y - g e t t h e proper l i g h t i n g

conditions.

ARMSTRONG We had' a camera s e s s i o n a f t e r w e had moved t o t h e Cape,

-
maybe a month b e f o r e launch or s o , where it w a s q u i t e

c l e a r t h a t a l l t h e photographic d e t a i l s had s t i l l not

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ARMSTRONG been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e f l i g h t p l a n , t h a t i s , a l l t h e
( CONT'D)
t h i n k i n g t h a t ' s involved i n planning camera placements,

t h e t h i n g s you want t o t a k e p i c t u r e s of i n t h e f i e l d o f

view p o s s i b l e i n t h a t a t t i t u d e , and l i g h t i n g on t h e sub-

j e c t so t h a t you're getting t h e d e t a i l s . A l l that sort

of t h i n g needs t o be worked out by t h e photo people r a t h e r

t h a n t h e crew. It should be done much e a r l i e r i n t h e

c y c l e t h a n it i s now. I suspect t h a t when w e look a t a l l

our f i l m s , many of them w i l l show t h a t w e s u f f e r e d from

% 2 _

-.
1L-
'6 /
not r e a l l y understanding exposure or l i g h t i n g w e l l enowh

-
over a l l s i t u a t i o n s .
- T h a t ' s a weak area.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e photography for power d e s c e n t , power a s c e n t ,

t h a t s o r t of t h i n g , should be worked r i g h t i n t o t h e simu-

lations. You ought t o a c t i v a t e t h e camera i n t h e LMS;

take f i l m s . You're not going t o come up w i t h anything,

b u t you g e t i n t h e h a b i t of doing t h i s .

COLLINS Somebody w i t h a f a i r amount of experience and background

should r e a l l y be concerned t h a t t h e p i c t u r e s we b r i n g back

are o f t h e c o r r e c t e v e n t s , and t h a t t h e y have been prop-

e r l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t h e procedures. I am sure t h a t there

a r e probably people over t h e r e i n t h e photo l a b t h a t are

vitally interested i n that. Yet t h e y ' r e not i n any way

r-' 7

i n t h e loop and probably p r o p e r l y so. They a r e not any

t 7

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COLLINS way i n t h e f l i g h t - p l a n n i n g loop. If we d o n ' t f e e l l i k e
(CON"'D )
t a k i n g a p i c t u r e o r something, o r i f it d o e s n ' t occur t o

u s t o g e t it w r i t t e n i n t o t h e f l i g h t p l a n , it j u s t never

happens. I mean t h e r e i s r e a l l y nobody who's r e s p o n s i b l e

f o r t h e o v e r a l l photographic e x c e l l e n c e o r t h e photo-

graphic planning of t h e f l i g h t .

If w e happen t o t h i n k about it and i f we,happen t o per-

s o n a l l y i n k it i n t o t h e f l i g h t p l a n , t h e n it w i l l g e t

done. And if we d o n ' t , t h e n it d o e s n ' t g e t done.

ALDRIN T h a t ' s t h e way most of t h e photographic e n t r i e s are, pen

and i n k .
- -
COLLINS Maybe w e d i d n ' t spend t h e amount of t i m e we should have

studying t h a t photo p l a n , b u t , again, I say i f t h e crew

d o e s n ' t t a k e a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n it and make s u r e

t h a t i t ' s i n t h e r e , t h e n somehow it j u s t d o e s n ' t g e t i n

there.

ARMSTRONG Maybe t h e r e should b e a r e s p o n s i b l e person f o r each

particular flight. Maybe t h e r e i s , but I c a n ' t t e l l you

who it i s on our f l i g h t .

Helmut' Knehnel has t o run h i s shop, though.

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ARMSTRONG What I ' m saying i s t h e p r o j e c t engineer should be over
( CONT'D )
a t t h e l u n a r - s u r f a c e s i m u l a t i o n s ; h e ' s up a t t h e CMS, h e ' s

over a t t h e f l i g h t - p l a n n i n g s e s s i o n s , and h e ' s t r y i n g t o

integrate a l l these things t o assure that the right f i l m

and t h e r i g h t camera's i n t h e r i g h t v e h i c l e a t t h e righ-t

t i m e and it a l l p l a y s .

\
ALDRIN J u s t as an example, it d o e s n ' t seem t.o be a very profes-

s i o n a l approach t o t h e handling o f t h e 1 6 - m i ~ i m e t e r

camera t o t a p e it with a p i e c e of t a p e i n t h e focus t o

the infinity position. If you want t o g e t it t o s t a y i n

t h a t p o s i t i o n , put some screws i n t h e r e t o make it r e t a i n

that position.

COLLINS I t h i n k i t ' s r i d i c u l o u s t h a t we d o n ' t have some sort of

automatic exposure c o n t r o l or automatic l i g h t c o n t r o l ,

L-

o r whatever you c a l l i t . Commercial cameras a r e a v a i l a b l e

--
where a l l you do i s p o i n t and c l i c k and t h e t h i n g i s in

t h e r i g h t exposure v a l u e . And t h e r e a r e even camera?

a v a i l a b l e t h a t have switches where you can have e i t h e r a

wide f i e l d o r an average exposure value t o give you a

broad coverage. For example, i f you took b l a c k sky a g a i n s t

a white b o o s t e r , it would average out t h e black sky and

t h e white b o o s t e r . It would g i v e you t h e average va.lue

t h a t might not be optimum f o r e i t h e r one, but it would be

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. .. 7 . ' ' . . . , . . .- -.
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24-38
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COLLINS a n average panorama. Then i f you wanted t o be s p e c i f i c
( CONT'D)
and throw a l i t t l e s w i t c h , which zonks a l i g h t m e t e r down

t o a spotmeter kind of t h i n g , you can e i t h e r p o i n t it a t

t h e dark sky or p o i n t it a t t h e b o o s t e r . These t h i n g s

exist. I t ' s easy t o s a y , w e l l , you c a n ' t q u a l i f y them,

or thi: r i g h t company d o e s n ' t make them, or t h e y ' r e not

rugged enough, or t h e y won't pass t h e s a l t s p r a y , and

otherwise r a i s e b a r r i e r s . I f t h a t had been a g g r e s s i v e l y

pursued, we would have r i g h t now i n our hands an automatic

camera t h a t would t a k e a h e l l of l o t b e t t e r p i c t u r e s t h a n

we are capable of t a k i n g , and we could have q u a l i f i e d t h e

t h i n g by now. I t h i n k t h a t should be done, I r e a l l y do.

.---
<I t h i n k t h e y a r e pursuing it with Hasselblads, b u t , my

Lord, t h e y have been pursuing it w i t h Hasselblads f o r

y e a r s , ever s i n c e t h e s u b j e c t f i r s t came up, and I j u s t

'7"
d o n ' t s e e any r e s u l t s e t we do c a r r y g r e a t huge spot-

meters whose u t i l i t y i s q u e s t i o n a b l e , and we manage t o

develop and c a r r y t h o s e frapping t h i n g s .

t
That Minolta

spotmeter w a s not used during t h e f l i g h t . I d o n ' t know

what f l i g h t s have used it b u t I ' d g l a d l y swap it f o r an

automatic l i g h t c o n t r o l i n a camera. T h a t 2-pound b a t t e r y

i s nothing more or l e s s t h a n a handle crank; I ' d g l a d l y

swap it for an automatic l i g h t m e t e r b u i l t i n t o t h e camera.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 24-39

COLLINS I t h i n k we r e a l l y spend our time and o w money going down

( CONT 1 D )
t h e wrong road i n t h a t camera shop. There may be very

r e a l reasons why what I propose i s impossible, b u t from

what l i t t l e I know of i t , you ought t o have t h e c a p a b i l i t y

j u s t t o p o i n t and c l i c k and g e t t h e r i g h t exposure.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e importance o f documenting events w a s extremely

w e l l brought out i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f l i g h t i n t h a t we

were t o o busy doing o t h e r t h i n g s t o t e l l e x a c t l y where we

were i n powered d e s c e n t . The f i l m w a s a b l e t o do t h i s ,

b u t I t h i n k it d i d it i n a marginal way. I don't believe

t h a t t h e mounting and t h e f i e l d o f view t h a t i t g e t s i n

t h e r i g h t window i s anything near what it should be t o

g e t documentation of t h e powered descent and t h e powered

ascent. Another example i s t h e problems t h a t we had i n

docking. I t h i n k that, t h a t should have been documented

u s i n g high-speed motion f i l m from t h e LM. There i s j u s t

no way o f doing i t .

COLLINS I never used t h e spotmeter ir, t h e command module. Did

you ever use t h e spotmeter?

ALDRIN I looked through it f o r some i n t e r i o r s e t t i n g s . I put it

on t h e E a r t h , but I d o n ' t t h i n k anything s i g n i f i c a n t was

learned.

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ARMSTRONG We decided, based on t h e spotmeter r e a d i n g , t h a t we were

probably one f - s t o p o f f when w e got p r e t t y f a r away. We

had t o open up one f - s t o p t o f : 8 from f : l l .

-
COLLINS When w a s t h i s ?

ARMSTRONG When we were halfway out t o t h e Moon, I guess. That's

what your measurements i n d i c a t e d . I never used t h e spot-

meter .

ALDRIN I t a k e it back, I never used i t . T h e r e ' s no doubt t h a t

a n automatic device would be far s u p e r i o r t o anything you

g e t out of t h e spotmeter. I t a k e it back, I never used

it.

2 4 . 2 1 LUNAR-SURFACE EXPERIMENT T R A I N I N G

ALDRIN I t h i n k w e d i d q u i t e a good j o b i n having f a i r l y high-

f i d e l i t y equipment ( s o l a r wind, EASEP package) a v a i l a b l e .

The only improvement I would suggest i s t h a t we t r y and

gear it t o t h e t y p e of s u r f a c e environment. The l i t t l e

problems t h a t we r a n i n t o were a s s o c i a t e d with t h e i n t e r -

f a c e of t h a t gear t o t h e s o i l c o n d i t i o n s ; examples a r e

p l a n t i n g t h e s o l a r wind and attempting t o l e v e l t h e

seismometer.
- .__- -
This i s going t o be very t r u e -__ start
when we _---

g e t t i n g i n t o more compiex e x e r c i s e s with t h e ALSEP. To

..-.I_
-____c------
-
do t h i s on a linoleum floor i s almost a waste of t i m e ;

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ALDRIN -1 t h i n k you've got t o do it i n r e a l i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s by
( CONT D )
s i m u l a t i n g both l i g h t i n g and s u r f a c e t e x t u r e .
---I---

ARMSTRONG It would have probably been b e t t e r p r a c t i c e t o be on a

more r e a l i s t i c s u r f a c e . You probably would have consciously

looked i n t o t h o s e a s p e c t s more t h a n we d i d on t h e l e v e l

s u r f a c e t h a t we d i d most of our work on.

ALDRIN Like t h e LEC o p e r a t i o n , t h e b i g d i f f e r e n c e t h a t you noted

w a s t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e dust g e t t i n g a l l over t h e t a p e s

and c l u t t e r i n g up t h e c a b i n .

24.22 LUNAR LANDING - LLTV, LLRF, LLTV'S, AND LMS

ARMSTR ONG For t h e t y p e of t r a j e c t o r y t h a t was r e q u i r e d f o r us t o f l y

( w i t h a long manual f l i g h t a t t h e e n d ) , t h e LLTV w a s a

------__.-

most valuable t r a i n i n g experience. Like a l l s i m u l a t i o n s ,

I

i t ' s p r i m a r i l y a confidence b u i l d e r t o d e r i v e t h e r e q u i r e d

information from t h e information t h a t ' s a t hand. In t h e

f l i g h t s i t u a t i o n , t h e information t h a t I used i n t h c

landing w a s p r i m a r i l y v i s u a l . It w a s augmented by ii-f'or-

mation i n s i d e t h e cockpit t h a t Buzz r e l a y e d t o me. I did

very l i t t l e gage monitoring during t h e f i n a l d e s c e n t , t h a t

i s , below 300 f e e t . It i s p r i m a r i l y an out-the-window

job, p i c k i n g a s u i t a b l e landing spot and g e t t i n g i n t o i t .

The f u l l - s c a l e s i m u l a t i o n s a r e t h e only o c e s that do this -

t h e LLTV and t h e LLRF. I would have t o recommend continufng

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ARMSTRONG them b o t h , a t l e a s t u n t i l w e have a f e w more landings under
( CONT'D)
our b e l t .

I would suggest t h a t more a t t e n t i o n be given i n t h e LLTV

t o changing your l a n d i n g s p o t w h i l e y o u ' r e i n t h e t r a j e c -

tory .
ALDRIN And how t o d e v i a t e from an automatic t r a j e c t o r y and

smoothly p i c k up what you want t o do i n t h e way of devia-

tions.

ARMSTRONG I b e l i e v e t h e -- L L T L c a n - & it ~s a f e l y . That

--- \

means t h a t you probably have t o do a few mcre t o t a l t r a -

j e c t o r i e s than we d i d i n preparation f o r t h i s f l i g h t . I

suggest t h a t a dozen i s a d e s i r a b l e number - a dozen

lunar t r a j e c t o r i e s i n t h e LLTV. It t a k e s about h a l f a

dozen b e f o r e y o u ' r e comfortably f l y i n g on a l u n a r t r a -

j e c t o r y , and a f t e r t h a t , a couple of d i f f e r e n t d e v i a t i o n s

t o d i f f e r e n t touchdown a r e a s . The LLRF l i g h t i n g simula-

t i o n w a s q u i t e i n t e r e s t i n g , but i n r e t r o s p e c t , i t ' s not,

a very good s i m u l a t i o n of t h e l u n a r l i g h t i n g s i t u a t i o n .

I n t h e f l i g h t , you see much more d a y l i g h t , a t l e a s t a t

our Sun angle (10-degree Sun a n g l e ) . It w a s -

much more of
-/

a d a y l i g h t landing s i t u a t i o n t h a n t h e sirnula- was

-------- - - - - - - --
"
-I

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 C 0NF IDENTIA L 24-43

ARMSTRONG p o r t r a y e d by t h e n i g h t l i g h t i n g s i m u l a t i o n a t Langley
( CONT'D) \ _ _ ~ - .

Research Center.

ALDRIN They e s s e n t i a l l y s e t up a . s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e w a s no

a v a i l a b l e horizon. That c e r t a i n l y w a s a v a i l a b l e i n t h e

-..ctual c a s e .

ARMSTRONG The LMS new model i s r e a l l y a f i n e a d d i t i o n t o t h e simu-

u -
lator. If you could a f f o r d b u i l d i n g a model f o r Apollo 1 2 ,

s o t h a t t h e i r l a s t 2 months o f s i m u l a t i o n would be going

i n t o t h e Surveyor s i t e , t h e n I t h i n k you would g e t a

s u b s t a n t i a l improvement i n your confidence l e v e l t o g e t

t o t h e d e s i r e d touchdown s i t e .

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e if t h e y s t i c k t o t h e

o b j e c t i v e of going t o t h a t s p e c i f i c a r e a . We have enough

a v a i l a b l e information from t h e Surveyor i t s e l f t o b u i l d

t h a t model.

ARMSTRONG I know t h a t ' s an expensive item t o p r o v i d e , b u t our

experience w i t h looking a t t h e L&A of S i t e 3 i n d i c a t e s

t h a t you r e a l l y can g e t a good understanding of t h a t l o c a l

a r e a i n your many landing s i m u l a t i o n s i n t h e LMS.

ALDRIN 1 n . l o o k i n g back on t h e choices t h a t I made with regard

t o my p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n landing s i m u l a t i o n s , I t h i n k t h e y

were g e n e r a l l y c o r r e c t . I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t I s u f f e r e d by

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ALDRIN not being exposed any more t o t h e LLTV. I t h i n k one s e s s i o n
( CONT ID>
a t Langley was worth t h e e f f o r t . I concentrated on manual

u s e o f t h e t h r o t t l e and I t h i n k t h a t ' s probably what f u t u r e

LMP's should c o n c e n t r a t e on, a l s o . I t h i n k N e i i agrees

t h a t i f w e d i d have t o execute a complete manual l a n d i n g ,

-
j;t would probably b e s t be done by t h e Commander concen-

t r a t i n g on a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l and v o i c i n g t o t h e LMP what

t-- --
r a t e of descent and what changes he wanted. It appeared
9 2 _

t o be a very d i f f i c u l t t a s k f o r one person t o accomplish

--_______I__---

__---
a l l of t h e s e . Whereas, when t h e t a s k s were s p l i t , and
/ -
use w a s made of t h e instruments t o manually c o n t r o l t h e

t h r o t t l e , and a f a i r amount of p r a c t i c e was made, u s e of

t h a t good performance could be a n t i c i p a t e d by a manual

t h r o t t l e landing. For t h e most p a r t , t h i s can be done

i n t h e LMS.

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24.23 GENERAL SUPPORT: PROCEDURES, SUITS, CHECKLISTS,

ONBOARD DATA, ET CETERA

COLLINS A s a g e n e r a l comment, our support w a s i n v e r s e l y propor-

t i o n a l t o t h e number o f days remaining b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t .

We had poor support a t f i r s t and l a t e r w e had s u p e r l a t i v e

___------- --_I_

support. I would have t r a d e d some of t h a t last-minute

support f o r some e a r l i e r support. To be more s p e c i f i c ,

e a r l y i n t h e game, t h e f l i g h t - p l a n n i n g people, and t h e

c h e c k l i s t people, and t h e command-module rendezvous-

procedures people worked f o r t h r e e d i f f e r e n t bosses and

l i v e d i n t h r e e d i f f e r e n t worlds. - not u n t i l l a k z u ~ ,
It was
-.-

t h e game t h a t John O'Neill was given t h e o v e r a l l power

and you could go t o John o r somebody he designated and s a y ,

t

"Look, I ' v e got t h i s problem. The c h e c k l i s t says one t h i n g

L --I-_.

--
and t h e f l i g h t p l a n says something e l s e and t h e North
-
Americans have neker heard of e i t h e r one of them." That
9.

would g e t squared away. But e a r l y i n t h e g m e , it seems

t o me t h a t t h e c h e c k l i s t people s o r t of p o i n t e d t h e f i n g e r

at t h e f l i g h t - p l a n n i n g people who responded by p o i n t i n g

f i n g e r s i n r e t u r n , and a l o t of time was s p e n t , you know,

looking f o r a left-handed monkey wrench. ._You s o r t of

-.

..wandered up and down t h e second f l o o r of b u i l d i n g 4 tryins -

- t o f i n d somebody who would r e a l l y t a k e t h e time and be

i n t e r e s t e d i n r e s e a r c h i n g t h e problem and coning up with

SL

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 24-46 CONFIDENTIAL
COLLINS a procedure technique. L a t e i n t h e game, it w a s a l l
( CONT'D) -I, - I_..---

amalgamated under John O'Neill and it worked as I t h i n k

/- --- - --- - I
- -- -
it should have worked from t h e beginning. I - . & n ' t
f- -,, -__-__ - ---.
-

understand t h e breakdown i n FCOD; I d o n ' t understand

c_I_--.-^.-.
-____-I___

as opposed t o t h e f l i g h t - p l a n n i n g
-_- - - - --- __ - - -
of t h e t i m e , t h e y were
/ - - - _ -
working a t cross-purposes and it seemed l i k e - I guess

t h e y g e t n e g a t i v e v i b r a t i o n s from t h e c h e c k l i s t world.
9
I guess I have t o s a y t h a t I d o n ' t understand t h e i r

problems f u l l y and perhaps t h e y d o n ' t understand my

problems, b u t I d o n ' t enjoy making changes t o procedures.

It seems l i k e t h e crew only does t h a t when t h e y f e e l t h e r e ' s

some good need f o r it. And y e t t h e c h e c k l i s t people seem

t o have t h e f e e l i n g t h a t o t h e r f l i g h t s have g o t t e n by w i t h

t h i s procedure and why c a n ' t you.

ALDRIN It seems t o me t h a t t h e y were u n w i l l i n g t o meet us half'way.

--__ -_--
We had a d i f f e r e n t j o b t o do, d i f f e r e n t hardware changes

i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t , and d i f f e r e n t uses t o make of t h e

equipment.

COLLINS Maybe i t ' s an u n f a i r comment, b u t I had t h e i d e a t h a t

t h e i r viewpoint w a s t h a t it w a s good enough f o r previous

f l i g h t s and i t ' s good enough f o r t h i s f l i g h t , s o d o n ' t

bug us with changes.

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 24-47
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ALDRIN
-
I a g r e e w i t h what y o u ' r e s a y i n g , Mike.
--.__ --. c -
I t h i n k i t ' s un-

-
f o r t u n a t e t h a t t h e r e was a d i v i s i o n between t h e c h e c k l i s t

people, t h e procedures-development people, and t h e onboard

-
b-

- -_
d a t a . It seems t o m e t h a t t h e procedures-development people

should be t h e ones who a l s o work w i t h t h e handbook. They

snould s t a r t it and c a r r y r i g h t on through completion,

which includes onboard d a t a . The sooner t h e crew can s t a r t

t r a i n i n g w i t h d a t a books t h a t r e p r e s e n t t h e b e s t of your

a b i l i t y a t t h a t s t a g e of t r a i n i n g , t h e m3re t h e y a r e going t o

t o g e t out of i t . W e had s e v e r a l new a r e a s , and it appeared

as though we were pioneering much of t h i s i n t h e a r e a s

of procedures development, and a l s o i n determining j u s t

how t h i s w a s going t o be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e crew and how

you make use of i t , and i n d i s t r i b u t i n g it around t h e

spacecraft. We had t o make c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s , and. we

t r i e d one form and t h e n a n o t h e r . I ' m sure there are

.
b e t t e r ways of dcing it t h a n what we s e t t l e d on, had
.--------_ -- ~
-

many t h i n g s been done b e f o r e we got on t h e scene. I

1 _- - __

s u r e hope t h a t followon crews won't f i n d it necessary

t o make b i g changes.

ARMSTRONG We had f i v e s t r a i g h t f l i g h t s h e r e on very c l o s e c e n t e r s .

q
2 .

1"
I
, Each crew has been o b l i g e d t o g e t some procedures t h a t
<-I 1 - 3
--ffP- work and s t i c k w i t h them, t o s e t t l e on them c l o s e
( I

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. . .. . .. - . ~" ... . . . .. . . -. .-
24-48
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ARMSTRONG
( CONT'D) . ._
enough b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t s o t h a t t h e y could remember what
---- --I_-- --- -- -- - _I I_
--
t h e y were. That meant t o each and every f l i g h t , I ' m s u r e ,
-- --
-

t h a t t h e r e wasn't time t o s i t around and f i g u r e out which

-- ____-- - .
of s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t approaches w a s t h e b e s t . We
-- - -- _- -- - __ ---
/

t a k e one t h a t worked and s t i c k with i t , and i n many c a s e s -

,
I -
t h i s r e s u l t e d i n choosing one t h a t c l e a r l y wasn't t h e
\----- - ---_I-

e s t , b u t it
.b---
- - __-
w a s one t h a t worked.
--
The next f l i g h t t h a t

came along w a s o b l i g e d , wherever p o s s i b l e , t o t a k e

everything t h a t t h e previous f l i g h t had been a b l e t o work

out and t o go w i t h t h a t . They had enough of t h e i r own

new t h i n g s t o be concerned w i t h ; t h e y had t o choose one

e a r l y t h a t worked and go w i t h i t , and n o t spend t o o much

t i m e deciding which one w a s b e s t . A t t h e end of f i v e

f l i g h t s h e r e , t h e r e s u l t i s , I t h i n k , t h a t w e have t h e

are not t h e b e s t ones t o use.

--
procedures f o r a l u n a r mission, about 60 percent of which

They a r e ones t h a t work,

-
b u t t h e y a r e a long way from being i d e a l . We have a

l i t t l e more t i m e b e f o r e t h e next f l i g h t , and I hope t h a t

- change t h o s e t h a t are r e a l l y marginal

-
during t h a t p e r i o d , w e can t a k e t h e ones t h a t a r e good

and do t h a t work and use t h o s e , b u t not h e s i t a t e t o

- procedures.
going t o t a k e everybody's cooperation t o p i c k out t h e
-- That's

marginal procedures and t o improve t h o s e t o t h e l e v e l

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ARMSTRONG you would l i k e t o o p e r a t e with for t h e r e s t of t h e l u n a r
( CONT'D)
p.r ogr a m .
It w a s -@-inevitable
- c o n c h i o n of t h e schedule t h a t we
*-. -\

were forced t o meet. Everybody had h i s nose t o t h e grind-

-
- t o n e t o make t h e t h i n g work. Now we j u s t have t o accept

t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n e v i t a b l e consequences of t h a t s i t u a t i o n

are t h a t we d o n ' t , i n P a c t , have t h e b e s t of everything

at t h i s point. This t e n d s t o be a l o t of adverse comment,

\
-.
and it r e a l l y s h o u l d n ' t r e f l e c t t h a t , because t h e f a c t s

are t h a t when you l o o k a t it i n t h e o v e r a l l s e n s e , it

d i d t h e job. It got us ready t o f l y and, e s s e n t i a l l y ,

we d i d n ' t have any b i g open a r e a s . In the overall sense,

it i s damn good. I t h i n k we t e n d t o be very s e l f - c r i t i c a l

i n t h i s area, though, because we've a l l had our h e a r t s

and souls i n it for a y e a r o r s o .

COLLINS I t r y t o put it i n p e r s p e c t i v e myself and say t h a t I

- - - I_-__ -

thought it w a s , a l l i n a l l , an e x c e l l e n t t r a i n i n g cycle
c- - -- e-
--
and very good use w a s made of our time. We had wonderful
7--
- ____------
support. I n some c a s e s , t h a t support came very l a t e , b u t

w e had, I t h i n k , b e a u t i f u l support - and I thought it

was extremely w e l l worked o u t , c o n s i d e r i n g t h e complexity

of t h e t h i n g s w e had t o l e a r n . I t h i n k t h a t , j u s t from

t h e C M P viewpoint, t h e p r o f i c i e n c y of t h e CMP ( a l l o t h e r

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COLLINS t h i n g s being e q u a l and t h e y probably a r e n ' t ) i s j u s t
( CONT'D)
p r o p o r t i o n a l t o how much CMS time he g e t s . _--
I thought
c-
t h a t I w a s adequately t r a i n e d b u t t h a t I. -r e a l l y wasn't
.* - - , ~ --- -7

p a r t i c u l a r l y p o l i s h e d i n any one area.-- -

I just didn't
_.----__ . -.
_.,-
._e -____I__-

have t -h e-_ t i m e t o devote t o each and every l i t t l e s l i c e

- - __. ._.
.-- .. I_
~

of > h i ~ . = . I t r i e d t o l e a r n a l l t h e systems; I t r i e d
,/- --
t o l e a r n a l l t h e procedures f o r b u r n s , a l l t h e rendezvous

.-
procedures, and t h e n a v i g a t i o n , b u t I w i l l be t h e f i r s t
.----

t o admit I w a s f a r from being a n e x p e r t i n any one o f ,

i
these fields.
/~
_l_ll.. -I d o n ' t s e e how you r e a l l y can be an

e x p e r t u n l e s s you have more t i m e , more s i m u l a t o r t i m e ,

t o devote t o it t h a n I had. I t h i n k 400 hours .should be-.

d--- -_ ._.-

a minimum. The only reason I b r i n g t h i s up i s t h a t I

/--
z

t h i n k some of our t r a i n i n g p l a n s say something around

200, 250 hours i s s u f f i c i e n t . I don't r e a l l y t h i n k

__c_
that's true. Speaking from t h e command-module viewpoint,

I d o n ' t t h i n k you ought t o be launching CMP's w i t h l e s s

t h a n 400 hours of s i m u l a t o r time. I r e a l l y don't.

SLAYTON A l o t of your t i m e w a s spent developing procedures.

COLLINS There's a l o t of t r u t h i n t h a t ; t h e r e were some areas

t h a t I had t o work b u t t h a t had not been worked out

before. Even if you d e l e t e d a l l t h o s e , however, I s t i l l

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COLLINS t h i n k a l o t more t h a n 200, 250 hours i s r e q u i r e d . You

( CONT'D) I
j u s t t a k e t h e p i e and s t a r t s l i c i n g up t h e lunar mission;

you t a k e a l l t h o s e systems; a l l t h e malfunctions; t h e

various mission phases; and t h e i f ' s , a n d ' s , and b u t ' s

of t h e v a r i o u s rendezvous. I d o n ' t t h i n k you could cram

t h a t i n t o 200, 250 hours.

ARMSTRONG I would guess t h a t i f you would l o o k a t t h e i n t e g r a t e d

s i m u l a t i o n s w i t h MCC and t o t a l up t h e hours t h e r e , I

would b e t i t ' s a s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r number t h a n w e

used t o t h i n k about per f l i g h t . I t ' s because of t h e

many phases of t h i s complex m i s s i o n ; t h e r e a r e j u s t

so many phases and each has t o be covered i n f a i r l y

l a r g e amounts of time. I t ' s good t i m e , b u t you r e ___

ally -
_-_---.-.-.____--- - -- - -
basic t-
c a n ' t count it towards your ____-- r a_.
in
- i n g f.o_
-r the
___________ __--
mission.
... ---

COLLINS You should go i n t o t h o s e i n t e g r a t e d s i m u l a t i o p having-

a l l t h e b a s i c s behind you; t h a t ' s j u s t s o r t o f t h e

graduation e x e r c i s e i n a p a r t i c u l a r phase of t h e f l i g h t .

I j u s t wanted t o mention a minor p o i n t . I did f l y a

couple of e n t r y s e s s i o n s on t h e FOD's e n t r y s i m u l a t o r ,

which i s an awful-looking l i t t l e t h i n g on t h e t h i r d

floor over i n b u i l d i n g 30 w i t h a bunch o f o l d Gemini

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COLLINS components and make b e l i e v e DSKY's. However, it comes
( CONT'D)
Harpold, who understands t h e e n t r y math flow

,
/probably
/ .___--
--
b e t t e r t h a n anybody e l s e t h a t I know
I
-_
-_
._
--
-
- _--
- around
-- -
- ____I

here. I t h i n k it i s worthwhile t o schedule j u s t as

--
I d i d , maybe two 2-hour s e s s i o n s on t h a t t h i n g , and I

don't understand why t h e CMS cannot do

crank failures, accelerometers, s t u c k accelerometers

out o f SPEC, and l i t t l e i n t e r n a l f a i l u r e s i n t o t h a t

s i m u l a t o r and show you how t h e computer would handle

k

them - i n most c a s e s , how it would f a i l t o handle

them - and he has f a i l u r e modes i n h i s s i m u l a t o r t h a t ,

so far a t l e a s t , t h e y have been unable t o crank i n t o t h e

consider t h a t a worthwhile e x e r c i s e . It would

be even b e t t e r t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h o s e f a i l u r e s

somehow i n t o t h e CMS - he has t r i e d t o do it b u t has

been unable t o do so. I .am n o t s u r e whether it i s t h e

l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t o r or what it i s , b u t I

t h i n k t h a t t r a i n i n g was worthwhile.

ALDRIN We h a v e n ' t covered one category about s u i t e d o p e r a t i o n s .

We d i d a f a i r amount of s u i t e d t r a i n i n g i n both simu-

l a t o r s , and I am c e r t a i n l y glad t h a t we had t h a t amount

of t i m e . I c a n ' t r e a l l y i d e n t i f y many areas where s u i t e d

o p e r a t i o n s i n f l i g h t proved t o be a b i g hindrance, b u t I

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 CONFIDENTIAL 24-53

ALDRIN t h i n k t h e sooner you can begin t o i n t e g r a t e t h e t o t a l

( CONT'D)
mission package with t h e d a t a , t h e t y p e of pens and p e n c i l s

you are going t o be u s i n g , where you a r e going t o put them,

and where you l o g all t h e d a t a under s u i t e d c o n d i t i o n s ,

means a h i g h e r f i d e l i t y t r a i n i n g , and I w a s g l a d t h a t we

d i d as much s u i t e d o p e r a t i o n s as we d i d .

ARMSTRONG Did you keep t r a c k of our s u i t e d o p e r a t i o n s o v e r a l l ? We

F

spent much more time i n t h o s e s u i t s than I e v e r thoii@.

__ __-___ - -
anybody could spend i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r one f l i g h t . Almost
_---_
every day for 3 months b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t , w e were i n t h a t

s u i t sometime during t h e day. It would be c i c e i f you

d i d n ' t have t o spend t h a t much time i n t h e s u i t , and

perhaps w e d i d n ' t , b u t I guess w e had a high degree of

1

-
confidence i n our a b i l i t y t o o p e r a t e i n t h- e_ s- u i t s In t h e -
-_ _--
v a r i o u s environments. I t h i n k we probably s p e n t more
_- -_ __ -__
time i n t h e s u i t s t h a n w e had t o . We d i d spend much more
---
time i n EMU CCFF, fit checks, and s t u f f l i k e t h a t t;han

we should ever have had t o . Seems l i k e we d i d about 1 0

of t h o s e e x e r c i s e s , and every time t h e y wculd change a

l i t t l e something on t h e underwear; oresomething, t h e y would

want another f i t check. We bowed t o most of t h o s e and d i d

them, but I would hope t h a t f u t u r e f l i g h t s won't have t h a t

much i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e i r c o n f i g u r a t i o n .

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.. I . , I . .I ... . . . , _.. ..-

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ARMSTRONG I t h i n k we have a tendency t o r e f l e c t on what w e d i d and

t o say t h a t we made t h e r i g h t d e c i s i o n t h e r e . I'm n o t

s u r e t h a t we're i n a good p o s i t i o n t o r e a l l y judge.

There are s e v e r a l s i m u l a t i o n areas t h a t should be improved,

some of which we've mentioned b e f o r e . There i s one o t h e r

area I d o n ' t t h i n k w e d i s c u s s e d , t h a t o f , o p t i c 3 and I

t h i n k i t ' s t r u e i n both v e h i c l e s , c e r t a i n l y i n t h e LM.

-'I The AOT o p t i c s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l i m i t a t i o n s and c o n s t r a i n t s ,

\

such as l i g h t i n g and sun s h a f t i n g h e r e and t h e r e , a r e n o t

.covered at a l l i n any of our s i m u l a t i o n s , nor a t any t i m e

do we a c t u a l l y g e t a very good o p p o r t u n i t y t o look

through r e a l o p t i c s and understand t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s . I

r e a l l y t h i n k t h a t we need some optics. someplace t h a t look

a t t h e r e a l sky, t h e r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s , the r e a l illumina-

t i o n s , s i d e l i g h t i n g i n t o t h e o p t i c s and t h i n g s l i k e t h a t

s o t h a t w e can a p p r e c i a t e what you can and c a n ' t s e e .

I ' m not even s u r e t h a t anybody agrees w i t h m e i n t h i s

area.

ALDRIN

-I agree with t h a t . I t h i n k t h a t f o r t h e s u r f a c e alignment,

I w a s q u i t e s u r p r i s e d t o f i n d t h a t f o u r out of t h e s i x

d e t e n t s were unusable f o r t h e s u r f a c e alignment.

wouldn't have thought t h a t beforehand.

I

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ARMSTRONG They become very s i g n i f i c a n t on some f l i g h t s when you

s t a r t t a l k i n g about p a r t i c u l a r l i t t l e d e t a i l s of t h e

flight. Ox- mission s i m u l a t o r s j u s t d o n ' t cut t h e

mustard i n t h i s a r e a ; t h e y ' r e going t o t e l l you---------.

answers
'
i
t h a t are wrong. I can understand; I j u s t t h i n k i t ' s an
__---
i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n t h e way t h o s e s i m u l a t o r s a r e b u i l t ,
and I t h i n k we need t o augment t h a t somehow w i t h some

r e a l o p t i c s with r e a l l i g h t i n g . I ' m not q u i t e s u r e what

t h e b e s t way t o do t h a t i s , b u t I t h i n k you could do it

with e x i s t i n g hardware, p r o t o t y p e o r t e s t hardware. You

could g e t some of t h a t s t u f f t o g e t h e r and b u i l d a s p e c i a l

s i m u l a t i o n t h a t would g i v e people t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o work,

b e f o r e launch, w i t h some r e a l o p t i c s and t o mark on some

r e a l s t a r s or something.

COLLINS We've done t h a t a t MIT t o a very s l i g h t degree. From t h e

comand-module viewpoint, I ' d have t o say t h a t t h a t s u r e

would be n i c e t o have b u t I c a n ' t t h i n k of any s i t u a t i o n

where a l a c k of t h a t high f i d e l i t y t r a i n i n g would make

you come t o a dangerous conclusion - maybe a wrong

conclusion or maybe you might g e t t r i c k e d i n t o t h i n k i n g

you could see t h e LM f a r t h e r away t h a n you r e a l l y could

or t h a t you could s e e more s t a r p a t t e r n s t h a n yoa r e a l l y

could .

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ALDRIN I t h i n k i f we had t o do P5l's where your i n i t i a l i z e d

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n would have t o be done by t h e t e l e s c o p e ,

it would have pointed o u t many of t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s .

COLLINS That's right. I thought about saying t h a t t h e y ought

t o ch-nge 'the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e t e l e s c o p e i n t h e

CMS b u t I t h i n k i f you had t o do a P5l, what you'd do

i s t u r n out a l l t h e l i g h t s i n s i d e t h e command module

and, i f necessary, put a bag over your head and t a k e t h e

20 o r 30 minutes t o dark adapt. Now, you can t w e a k t h e

CMS t e l e s c o p e t o t h a t same l e v e l b u t t h e n a l l you've

r e a l l y done i s wasted a l o t o f s i m u l a t o r t i m e , because

t h a t means everytime you look out through t h e t e l e s c o p e ,

you have t o w a i t 20 minutes b e f o r e you can s e e anything.

T h a t ' s r e a l l y a l l it means. So I d o n ' t know.

i n r e g a r d t o t h e t e l e s c o p e p a r t of i t , t h e s i m u l a t o r
/
____-
should be l e f t l i k e it i s . Concerning v i s u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n
-.--
of t h e LM as a l i t t l e pinpoint of l i g h t i n t h e s e x t a n t ,

f o r example, during t h e rendezvous sequence, t h a t i s

c
u n r e a l , b u t I ' m damned i f I know how you make t h a t r e a l .

I j u s t don't know how you'd do t h a t . Maybe i t ' s doable

b u t t h a t LM as it goes o f f a g a i n s t t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e

background g e t s s m a l l e r and s m a l l e r . It i s one problem

a t 50 m i l e s , a d i f f e r e n t problem a t 100 m i l e s , and a

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COLLINS l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t problem a t 1 2 0 miles. To have high-
( CONT'D)
r e s o l u t i o n o p t i c s of t h a t t y p e seems t o me t o be beyond

our c a p a b i l i t y . I d o n ' t know how you'd

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- . ..- .. . .. .. ... . __._ .- ... ~ . .. . . - . ... . _. ...-

 CONFIDENTIAL. 25-1

25.0 HUMAN FACTORS

25.1 PREFLIGHT

ARMSTRONG I guess our only a c t i v i t i e s t h a t f i t i n preventive medical

P ~ . - - - - - - - - _ - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - -

procedures were d i s i n v i t i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d _ t @ n A t Q - - -
-_ -_ -
slow down t o a reasonable o r , a t l e a s t , acceptable pace
r - - - __ -. ---_ _- -

i n t h e l a s t week o r s o . The Cape doctors kept an eye on

us t h a t l a s t couple of weeks and I guess we d i d n ’ t have

any complaints t h e r e . They d i d a good job. We got through

medical b r i e f i n g .

ALDRIN I had a couple of c o n d i t i o n s come up i n t h e category of

d e n t a l c a r e and I thought t h e r e ’ d be p l e n t y of time t o

g e t them taken c a r e of b u t t h e r e were t h i n g s t h a t came

up a t t h e l a s t minute and we were h a r d pressed t o schedule

those i n . I would h i g h l y recommend t h a t people r e a l l y

t a k e a r e a l c l o s e look a t t h e i r own s t a t u s as f a r as

t h o s e t h i n g s go and g e t t h o s e t h i n g s taken c a r e of as

e a r l y as p o s s i b l e .

25.2 FOOD AND WATER

ARMSTRONG Comparing hunger s e n s a t i o n s i n f l i g h t versus two weeks

p r e f l i g h t , I ’ d j u s t s a y , i n g e n e r a l , t h a t I d i d n ‘ t have

as l a r g e an a p p e t i t e i n f l i g h t as I would on t h e ground,

b u t I thought it w a s adequate and I w a s a b l e t o e a t enough.

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ARMSTRONG The food w a s p a l a t a b l e and a l l t h r e e of us kept our
( CONT'D)
l e v e l s up s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , I t h i n k .

COLLINS My a p p e t i t e w a s o f f on t h e f i r s t 2 or 3 days of t h e

f l i g h t , I would say. After t h a t , it w a s c l o s e , i f not

e q u a l , t o my u s u a l ravenous ground a p p e t i t e .
/

ALDRIN I d i d n ' t f i n d any d i f f i c u l t y i n g e n e r a t i n g a d e s i r e t o

eat.

ARMSTRONG I agree with t h a t .

ALDRIN I t h i n k ( l a u g h i n g ) i n comparison with Gemini, it w a s good.

There were t i m e s i n Gemini when, of c o u r s e , we d i d n ' t

have enough t i m e t o do t h i s because food p r e p a r a t i o n i s

a very time-consuming task. During t h e t r a n s l u n a r and

t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t s , t h e r e ' s p l e n t y of t i m e t o t a k e c a r e

of i t ; b u t , no k i d d i n g , it t a k e s a long t i m e t o g e t

t h e s e t h i n g s ready. If you do have a l a c k of a p p e t i t e ,

t h e tendency i s j u s t t o f o r g e t about doing a l o t of t h a t

stuff. But I d i d n ' t experience a l a c k of a p p e t i t e a t

' -- --- ------- --
-- __
a l l on t h i s f l i g h t .
.. __-- -- --..

ARMSTR ON G Comments on t h e t a s t e .

C 0 LL INS I n comparing food during p r e f l i g h t e v a l u a t i o n and i n f l i g h t

t a s t e , I n o t i c e d no d i f f e r e n c e .

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 CONFIDENTIAL 25-3

ARMSTRONG A c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e foods. Well, j u s t f i r s t make an

o v e r a l l comment t h a t t h e new foods a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y

improved and welcome a d d i t i o n s t o t h e menu. I think, in

-. -\
g e n e r a l , i t ' s a r e a l a i d t o t h e normal day-to-day opera-
- t i o n s i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t t o have p l e a s a n t menus and

p a l a t a b l e meals.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h a t most people a r e aware t h a t during t r a n s l u n a r

c o a s t we d i d , f o r t h e most p a r t , make use of t h e prepack-

aged meals. I guess p a r t i a l l y because we knew t h e y were

more of a low r e s i d u e and we wanted t o avoid any compli-

b-
c a t i o n s with waste e l i m i n a t i o n t h a t might i n t e r f e r e with

t h e LM a c t i v i t i e s .

COLLINS I n g e n e r a l , I thought t h e food w a s a t l e a s t e x c e l l e n t

or better. I thought a l o t of hard work went i n on

c- .
t h e food s e l e c t i o n . I n g e n e r a l , I thought t h e q u a l i t y

o f t h e food w a s extremely good. My c r i t i c i s m of t h e food

revolves around t h e packaging. I t h i n k we waste t o o much

time f i x i n g i t ; and, f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f l i g h t , t h e r e

-
w a s more food t h a n t h r e e people could have eaten
__--
i n>.
\ / --
3 weeks. They r e a l l y gave us a l o t o f food. I think

t h e y probably d o n ' t need t o provide n e a r l y as much. We

had our normal t h r e e packages of food, plus t h i s l i t t l e

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_. . ... .- . . ._ .~ -. .... .. . . .. . .-- . . ..- . . -. . -.. .. . , - I.._

25-4
CONFIDENTIAL .

COLLINS p a n t r y arrangement which i s very convenient and n i c e ,

( CONT'D)
p l u s w e had a bunch o f w e t packs. I ' d say w e probably

a t e h a l f t h e food onboard - We had good a p p e t i t e s and

3'
we a t e -I'd h a t e t o say 'how many c a l o r i e s p e r day,

b u t p l e n t y p e r day.

ALDRIN The one d i s a p p o i n t i n g package, I g u e s s , w a s i n t h e wet

packs. The t u r k e y and gravy I thought w a s o u t s t a n d i n g

because it w a s moist. That wasn't t h e case with t h e ham

and p o t a t o e s , nor t h e beef and p o t a t o e s . I thought t h a t

both of t h o s e were t o o dry and t h a t t h e p o t a t o e s w e r e

Y
not a p p e t i z i n g a t a l l .

COLLINS I n g e n e r a l , I found t h a t t h e sweet t h i n g s were not as

good as t h e o t h e r s . This a p p l i e d t o t h e d r i n k s as w e l l

as d e s s e r t s . I touched very l i t t l e i n t h e way of d e s s e r t s .

On t h e d r i n k s , I f e l t t h a t something t a r t , maybe l i k e

limeade, would have been a n i c e a d d i t i o n -or iced tea

or something l i k e t h a t .

ARMTRONG I agree. In general, t h e beverages w e r e t o o sweet.

- -- -----

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h a t w e can go s t i l l f u r t h e r t h a n we have i n t h e

l i n e of t h e canned spreads going on e i t h e r bread or t o a s t .

I j u s t d i d n ' t experience any d i f f i c u l t y a t a l l i n zero g

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 CONFIDENTIAL 25-5

ALDRIN t a k i n g a spoonful of t h i s and spreading it o u t . As

-.-----
( CONT'D)

- -- A .
long as t h e m a t e r i a l t h a t y o u ' r e using i s r e l a t i v e l y m o i s t ,

it s t a y s t o g e t h e r . It does,n't have a tendency t o run o f f

\

and go a l l over t h e c o c k p i t . We had t u b e spread i n t h e

LM, and I t h i n k we could have used t h a t t y p e of a prepa-

r a t i o n i n t h e command module, along with more of t h e

canned v a r i e t y . O f course, t h e canned v a r i e t y p r e s e n t s

a problem of d i s p o s a l a f t e r w a r d s . I t ' l l c e r t a i n l y have

t o be reckoned w i t h . I ' m not s u r e how you make use of a

p i l l o r d i s i n f e c t a n t w i t h cans.

ARMSTRONG The spoon-bowl items were f i n e ; intermediate-moisture

f r u i t s , sandwich s p r e a d s , and breads were a l l used exten-

sively. In g e n e r a l , I l i k e d t h e p a n t r y approach. I

thought t h e approach where you went i n and s e l e c t e d t h o s e

items t h a t you would enjoy f o r t h a t meal and assembled

your own menu w a s a very p l e a s a n t o p e r a t i n g mode. I

enjoyed t h a t , i f you could handle your d i e t s a t i s f a c t o r i l y

-.
t h a t way.

ALDRIN I t h i n k it would be a good i d e a t o package t h e p i l l s

along with t h e spoon-fed packages - either that, or

have some d i f f e r e n t , more convenient way of dispensing

them. A f t e r meals, you g r a d u a l l y d i s p o s e of t h i n g s as

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25-6
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ALDRIN y o u ' r e consuming them, and you d o n ' t want t o have t o
( CONT' D)
g e t up a t t h a t p o i n t and f l o a t down t o t h e p a n t r y t o g e t

t h e p i l l s o u t t o pop one of them i n t h e bag.

--

COLLINS I don't know. The b u s i n e s s of disposing of a l l t h e waste

packaging, p u t t i n g p i l l s i n , and a l l t h a t i s very time-

consuming and c r e a t e s a huge volume of waste. Really,

t h e way t o do it i s t o u s e t h e p i l l , t h e n w a d everything

t o g e t h e r , t i e t h e l i t t l e packet as t i g h t l y as you p o s s i b l y

can, and wrap some t a p e around s o t h a t it s t a y s i n a s m a l l -

<
volume, high-density package; however, t h i s i s time- (

consuming. It would r e a l l y be n i c e i f you could have some-

t h i n g l i k e a commercial garbage d i s p o s a l where you could

j u s t t a k e a l l t h i s s t u f f and cram it i n , t u r n a crank,

p u l l a switch, and have it a l l s o r t of ground up and d i s -

ALDRIN
i n f e c t e d and s p i t i n t o a stowage compartment.
>
E i t h e r t h a t or some s o r t of an a i r l o c k where you could

t a k e t h i s r e f u s e and put it i n t h e a i r l o c k and dump it

overboard.

COLLINS Right. But the packaging, g e t t i n g t h e food r e c o n s t i t u t e d ,

and t h e n doing something with t h e o t h e r packages were t h e

-
b i g g e s t drawbacks. Breakfast would have been improved,

I t h o u g h t , i f t h e y had some scrambled eggs, which I know

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 CONFIDENTIAL 25-7

COLLINS t h e y have i n t h e l a b . I j u s t d o n ' t t h i n k t h e y have g o t t e n

( CONT' D)
around t o p u t t i n g them on t h e f l i g h t menu, b u t it would

s u r e be a good i d e a i f t h e y d i d have some of t h a t . It

would b e a welcome a d d i t i o n t o b r e a k f a s t .

ALDRIN I n t h e right-hand s e a t , I found it convenient t o t a k e some

of t h e Velcro t h a t w a s on t h e food packs and put it on

the scissors. I j u s t found t h a t with t h e s c i s s o r s a t t h e

end, t h e cord w a s j u s t a l i t t l e b i t t o o unwieldy. That

b r i n g s up another p o i n t . When you put t h o s e s c i s s o r s and

t h i n g s l i k e t h a t i n t h e pockets where you have t h e dosimeter

and a f e w o t h e r t h i n g s t h e pocket j u s t d o e s n ' t s e a l r i g h t .

You move around a l i t t l e b i t and p r e t t y soon y o u ' r e missing

a f l a s h l i g h t , y o u ' r e missing a p a i r of s c i s s o r s , and t h e

dosimeter i s o f f somewhere.

COLLINS That's exactly r i g h t . Now, t h e s e i n f l i g h t c o v e r a l l s a r e

c a r e f u l l y t a i l o r e d garments and a l o t of engineering has

gone i n t o them and t h e y a r e almost h a l f as good as t h e

summer f l y i n g s u i t . You d o n ' t have t h e problems l i k e t h a t

w i t h t h e summer f l y i n g s u i t because t h e y have zippers i n

a l l pockets and you a r e accustomed t o u s i n g them.

ALDRIN Do you c a r e t o say a f e w words about snaps, Neil?

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." . .". .I.". II. - - . ... . . . . .

25-8
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ARMSTRONG There ought t o be a l a w a g a i n s t snaps. I think t h a t if I

were p r e p a r i n g f o r t h i s a c t i v i t y , f o r f u r t h e r f l i g h t , I

would t a k e j u s t a p i e c e of c l o t h and s e w a bunch of l i t t l e

pockets and s e p a r a t o r s i n , and t h e n have a p l a c e f o r a l l

t h e l i t t l e odds and ends t h a t you l i k e t o keep handy, l i k e

,
your s c i s s o r s , t o o t h b r u s h , spoon, p e n c i l , and a bunch of

things l i k e t h a t - keep it i n one pocket.

ALDRIN One f o r each i n d i v i d u a l and a reasonably convenient p l a c e

f o r each crew s t a t i o n t o mount t h a t s o r t of t h i n g . There

i s one now i n t h e LEB and i t ' s a l i t t l e b i t t o o l a r g e .

ARMSTRONG That would have helped keep t r a c k of a l l t h o s e l i t t l e l o o s e

items t h a t are j u s t p e r s o n a l n e c e s s i t i e s . A s recorded on

previous t a p e s , w e were p e r i o d i c a l l y l o s i n g some p i e c e of

equipment , a toothbrush would be gone; a camera back, a

monocular, or some t a p e r e c o r d e r would be d r i f t i n g around

t h e s p a c e c r a f t somewhere and it would be a matter of going

on a b i g s e a r c h t o f i n d it.

COLLINS The a r e a behind or above your head i n t h e l e f t - h a n d couch

and t h e right-hand couch i s a convenient area, because it

i s an u n i n t e r r u p t e d bulkhead space very s p a r s e l y covered

by l i t t l e patches of Velcro; t h a t w a s t h e p l a c e where we

wanted our cameras, monoculars, and t a p e r e c o r d e r s . If

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 2 5-9
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COLLINS t h e r e were a couple of s p r i n g c l i p s up t h e r e , b u i l t t o
(CONT'D)
be t h e width of t h e Hasselblad o r i f t h e r e were more Velcro

i n t h a t a r e a , it would be a l o t more h a b i t a b l e . The

I
doggone camera w a s always f l o a t i n g around, because t h e r e

w a s never enough Velcro r e a l l y t o p l a s t e r it up a g a i n s t

the w a l l .

ALDRIN How about a comment on t h e coffee?

COLLINS The c o f f e e w a s a l i t t l e d i s a p p o i n t i n g ; I d o n ' t know what -

--,
w a s wrong w i t h t h a t c o f f e e .
- It wasn't
-1
a good brand o r

t h e c o f f e e w a s very t a s t e l e s s - not t a s t e l e s s , b u t it

j u s t had a p e c u l i a r t a s t e . It d i d n ' t t a s t e l i k e c o f f e e .

I l i k e i n s t a n t c o f f e e ; I d r i n k it a t home a l l t h e t i m e .

ALDRIN It w a s p r e t t y h o t .

COLLINS The w a t e r w a s h o t ; now I d o n ' t know what it w a s , b u t t h e

c o f f e e j u s t wasn't very good.

ARMSTRONG In g e n e r a l , t h e water wasn't t h a t good. There w a s a

\

,+i\ "%
L&< ,' J
-
l i t t l e chlorine taste t o it. I found t h a t I drank a l o t

6 of c o l d water i n s t e a d of t h e o t h e r beverages t h a t were

a v a i l a b l e and I enjoyed i t . There w a s some gas i n i t .

There a r e some engineering improvements t h a t can be made

i n the filters, but I think t h a t ' s possible.

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. - . . .. 1 .- "' ~ - . . . . . ..
25-10
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COLLINS I t ' s w e l l worth c a r r y i n g t h o s e f i l t e r s . You need them.

You might put on t h e t a p e t h a t it would be n i c e t o have

a f i n g e r n a i l c l i p p e r onboard t h e s p a c e c r a f t . I d o n ' t know

-5-

where t h e b e s t p l a c e f o r it i s , b u t it would be very con-

v e n i e n t t o have i n c a s e you r i p o f f your f i n g e r n a i l o r

g e t hangnails. A t p r e s e n t , t h e r e i s no t o o l a v a i l a b l e t h a t

w i l l reach t h a t a r e a .

25.3 WORK-REST CYCLE

ARMSTRONG I guess o v e r a l l , with a f e w exceptions t h a t were j u s t

d i s c u s s e d , t h e work-rest c y c l e on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f l i g h t
*---__

./-
w a s reasonably good. We were e s s e n t i a l l y o p e r a t i n g on
I -
Houston time. We w e r e g e t t i n g our simultaneous s l e e p
- 7

p e r i o d s and e s s e n t i a l l y it w a s during t h e s l e e p period

h e r e i n Houston.

ALDRIN All of us e l e c t e d t o have Houston time on our watches

<'
/

and I t h i n k ' t w a s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t w e d i d n ' t have t h e

>
f l i g h t p l a n a l s o geared t o C e n t r a l Daylight i n s t e a d of

E a s t e r n Daylight. A t t h e t o p o f each page, w e had t h e

,
corresponding time f o r Eastern. It would have been an

improvement ,I t h i n k , i f t h a t had been C e n t r a l .

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 25-11
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COLLINS Yes, I t h i n k t h e y f i g u r e d t h a t t h e crew w a s on Cape t i m e

s o p r i n t l o c a l Cape t i m e ; b u t , r e a l l y , we were on Houston

time i n our minds.

ICI-
It ' s mo i n t
-_ \
.

ALDRIN I ' m s u r e t h e Control Center would have p r e f e r r e d it t h e

c
o t h e r way, t o o .

COLLINS Sure.

ALDRIN I had a n t i c i p a t e d considerably more d i f f i c u l t y with

g e t t i n g adequate r e s t , e s p e c i a l l y t h e f i r s t day. But it

d i d n ' t t u r n out t h a t t h e r e w a s much o f any problem a t all.

I thought t h e s l e e p s t a t i o n s were very comfortable and t h e

temperatures seemed t o m e t o be very p l e a s a n t . I think

coming back w e n o t i c e d t h a t it w a s g e t t i n g a l i t t l e c o o l e r .
- -.._

ARMSTRONG I t w a s a l i t t l e w a r m i n t h e daytime. -
,
It w a s a l i t t l e ~

cool. D a r t i c u l a r l y a t n i g h t , on t h e way back.

COLLINS I t h i n k it i s important somehow on t h e s e l u n a r f l i g h t s t o

g e t y o u r s e l f i n t h e frame o f mind where you r e g a r d t h e

f i r s t couple o f days o f f l i g h t as j u s t preliminary t o

t h e l u n a r a c t i v i t i e s and somehow you t a l k y o u r s e l f i n t o

r e l a x i n g , t a k i n g t h i n g s easy, and g e t t i n g adequate s l e e p __

' .-
t h e f i r s t 2 o r 3 n i g h t s s o t h a t you d o n ' t a r r i v e a t t h e
'i- ---.
Moon a l r e a d y t i r e d when t h e peak a c t i v i t i e s b e g i n .
L
.
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25-12
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COLLINS Maybe t h i s i s belaboring t h e obvious, and maybe all
(CONT'D)
crews know t h i s and w i l l t h i n k about i t , b u t t h i s i s

something t h a t w e t a l k e d about; I t h i n k it i s kind of a

frame-of-mind thing. I t h i n k you can t a l k y o u r s e l f i n t o

e i t h e r g e t t i n g a l l e x c i t e d and burn up a l o t of energy i n

a n t i c i p a t i o n or, on t h e o t h e r hand, you can t a l k y o u r s e l f

i n t o r e l a x i n g and t a k i n g t h i n g s easy. Personally, I f e l t

t h a t having flown once b e f o r e w a s very h e l p f u l t o m e . I

had been up t h e r e i n zero g b e f o r e and I wasn't spending

a l l my time pondering t h e wonder of it a l l . I was i n a

familiar p l a c e and I w a s w i l l i n g t o p r e t e n d t h e f l i g h t

h a d n ' t s t a r t e d u n t i l along about t h e t i m e o f LM s e p a r a t i o n .

I t h i n k t h i s i s important f o r t h e s e f l i g h t s with extended

l u n a r - s t a y t i m e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h e crew i s f l y i n g

a f l i g h t f o r t h e f i r s t time. Somehow t h e y ought t o t a l k

-
-
themselves i n t o a proper frame of mind and g e t good s l e e p

and a r r i v e at t h e Moon i n a r e s t e d c o n d i t i o n .

25.4 EXERCISE

ARMSTRONG We all d i d a l i t t l e b i t o f . e x e r c i s e almost every day. We

used e i t h e r i s o m e t r i c s o r c a l i s t h e n i c s i n p l a c e or t h e

Exer-genie. The Exer-genie worked a l r i g h t . It got a

l i t t l e hot and s t o r e d a l o t of h e a t , b u t it w a s acceptable.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 25-13

COLLINS If you g o t a good workout on t h e Exer-genie, it g o t s o

hot t h a t you c o u l d n ' t r e a l l y touch it. I don't t h i n k

t h a t i s any kind o f problem; I just mentioned i t .

ARMSTRONG Any o t h e r comments on e x e r c i s e ?

COLLINS
-I. had t_h-e i d e a t h a t it w a s worth e x e r c i s i n g on
.
t h e way
__-
home and maybe not worth e x e r c i s i n g on t h e way o u t .
. . -- I

ALDRIN During t h e lunar-surface a c t i v i t i e s , it d i d n ' t appear

t o me t h a t p r e c o n d i t i o n i n g i n any e x t e n s i v e degree w a s

required. Now, i f you w e r e going t o t a k e 7 days t o g e t

t h e r e , it might be a d i f f e r e n t s t o r y . Certainly, with

t h e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t you have i n one g , you are not going

t o d e t e r i o r a t e t h a t appreciably i n 3 days.

COLLINS Well, I f e l t b e t t e r i n t h e water when I w a s f i r s t back

i n one g and s t o o d up i n t h e lower equipment bay. I felt

a l o t b e t t e r on t h i s f l i g h t t h a n I d i d on t h e Gemini

flight. I am n o t s u r e what t o a t t r i b u t e t h a t t o . If I

had t o guess, I would say maybe having t h e s u i t on i n

L /---

Gemini and having it o f f on Apollo -having already

-_ - -_..___ -..--.--------- -- -
s t o r e d a l o t of h e a t when I a r r i v e d a t t h a t p o i n t on

Gemini and being cool and comfortable on Apollo; maybe

it had something t o do w i t h e x e r c i s e or t h e i n c r e a s e d

volume i n s i d e t h e s p a c e c r a f t -I d o n ' t know. But I

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.. . .. . . .. . "_ . . .._ .I.

, ". . .. ... . - , . . . . , . .,
25-14
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COLLINS f e l t a l o t b e t t e r and I f e l t i n much b e t t e r shape t h i s
( CONT'D)
f l i g h t than I d i d on t h e Gemini f l i g h t .

ALDRIN It goes back t o what you s a i d b e f o r e . I think t h e f a c t

t h a t you have been t h e r e and have been exposed t o a

l a n d i n g on t h e water and seas t h a t are n o t calm as can

be - I t h i n k having been through it once - t h e second

t i m e does make it a good b i t e a s i e r .

COLLINS Maybe t h a t ' s it. But I can remember a heaviness i n t h e

l e g s on Gemini. I could j u s t v i s u a l i z e t h o s m
P
,
w 4'?
p8oled w i t h blood. It seems l i k e t h e o l d h e a r t j u s t
-
wasn't capable of pumping t h i n g s u p h i l l as it u s u a l l y

was. I f e l t heavy i n t h e l e g s , and s o r t of loggy, and I

d i d n ' t f e e l very good. This f l i g h t , I d i d n ' t n o t i c e it

at all.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e space a v a i l a b l e i n s i d e t h e
-
cockpit enabled you t o move i n a f a i r l y r e g u l a r sense

and t h a t j u s t wasn't t r u e i n Gemini, where you were s i t t i n g

and d i d n ' t g e t t h e opportunity t o s t r e t c h your l e g s o u t .

COLLINS I c o u l d n ' t s t r e t c h a l l t h e way out i n Gemini. My head

h i t , o r my f e e t h i t f i r s t .

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 25-15
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2 5 . 5 INFLIGHT ORAL HYGIENE

ARMSTRONG Generally, I can say t h a t we d i d n ' t have any problem t h e r e .

The toothbrushes and t o o t h p a s t e worked f i n e . Essentially,

w e followed t h e normal p a t t e r n j u s t as w e would on t h e

ground. A s a matter of f a c t , not i n j u s t t h a t a r e a , b u t

i n as many a r e a s as w e could -eating, s l e e p i n g , normal

h a b i t s , workdays, and s o on. We t r i e d t o follow a normal

p a t t e r n as we would on t h e s u r f a c e . I t h i n k t h a t contrib-

u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t w e f e l t good t h e whole t i m e , f e l t

r e s t e d , and w e r e a b l e t o do a good job.

ALDRIN ste was pleasant.

I thought t h e t o o t h p a -_
--_._
-f-
COLLINS Yes. I brushed my t e e t h twice a day and everything w a s

normal i n t h a t r e g a r d .

25.6 EYE-PROTECTIVE DEVICES

ALDRIN I n t h e category of s u n g l a s s e s , I found t h a t t h e y were

of considerable use i n Gemini; however, i n t h e command

module, I d i d n ' t see any use for them a t a l l . Now, t h e y

may have been of more use i n l u n a r o r b i t . I n t h e LM,

t h e r e were times when we had our helmets on most of t h e

time .
ARMSTRONG I used t h e sunglasses f o r a w h i l e , e a r l y i n t h e f l i g h t ,

and t h e n chose n o t t o u s e them anymore.

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-. , . . " - - . .........
" . . . . . -.
25-16
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COLLINS Yes, I t h i n k t h e y a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . I would not suggest

d e l e t i n g them. Some people use sunglasses e x t e n s i v e l y .

I know some p e o p l e , whenever t h e y go outdoors, clamp sun-

g l a s s e s on t h e i r eyes and maybe t h o s e people would do t h e

same t h i n g i n s p a c e c r a f t . I d o n ' t use them very much on

t h e ground. I only use them when d r i v i n g a c a r , b u t

o t h e r t h a n t h a t , I r a r e l y use them.

I would l i k e t o go back t o l i g h t a t t e n u a t i o n under sun-

glasses. On Gemini, w e had a window shade w i t h a

_------------- ----
Polaroid__ciKc.ularf i l t e r i n it. I thought it w a s a l i t t l e
/---------

jewel. I t r i e d t o g e t t h a t added one time t o Apollo and

t h e CCB t u r n e d it down. I n retrospect, I certainly

c o u l d n ' t say t h a t t h a t ' s something t h a t you a b s o l u t e l y

have t o have, b u t t h a t would s u r e l y b e n i c e f o r window

number 2. I d o n ' t know i f you a l l remember; b u t , during

rendezvous, you have t o look a t something b r i g h t . It's

g r e a t because you have t h i s l i t t l e c i r c u l a r P o l a r o i d

s e c t i o n t h a t you j u s t r o t a t e t o any angle you want t o g e t

any degree of l i g h t you want. It would b e a very useful

addition, I think, t o t h i s storage list. Now, I c a n ' t

s a y t h a t i t ' s necessary o r mandatory, b u t i n a nice-to-

l i g h t a t t e n u a t o r any day. The reason i s t h a t , when you

CONFIDENTlAL
 25-17
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COLLINS p u t t h e sunglasses on, you not only attenuate t h e o u t s i d e
( CONT'D)
l i g h t (which i s d e s i r a b l e ) b u t a l s o a t t e n u a t e t h e i n s i d e

l i g h t , which i s u n d e s i r a b l e . With t h e s c r e e n on t h e

window, you can f i l t e r as much l i g h t as you want and

s t i l l read a l l your gages w i t h complete c l a r i t y . If you

p u t sunglasses on t o block t h e o u t s i d e view, it a l s o

blocks your i n s i d e view. So I guess t h a t ' s my l i t t l e

speech i n f a v o r of t h a t s o r t of l i g h t f i l t e r . It would

b e n i c e t o have. Speaking of window shades, t h i s may n o t

b e t h e b e s t p l a c e t o b r i n g it up under human f a c t o r s , b u t

I l i k e t o have my s l e e p i n g accommodations d a r k , as dark

as I can g e t them. C e r t a i n l y t h e window covers were good,

b u t t h e y weren't as good as t h e y could have been. They

were q u i t e d i f f i c u l t t o i n s t a l l and I d o n ' t know what t h e

l" i7 .L t
1
--I
reason f o r t h a t w a s . We fit-checked them and I d o n ' t
.1(1:
r e c a l l any d i f f i c u l t y f i t - c h e c k i n g them on t h e ground.

They were very t i g h t , b u t not n e a r l y as t i g h t as they

were on f l i g h t . We got more e x e r c i s e w r e s t l i n g with

t h e window shades t h a n we d i d out of t h e e x e r c i s e r , I

believe.
<
scream-and-swear
Every n i g h t , w e had a 10-minute yell-and-

s e s s i o n , and jump up and down t r y i n g

t o f o r c e t h e window shades i n t o

ALDRIN And t h e y s t i l l ended up l e a k i n g a c e r t a i n amount.

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25-18
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ARMS TRONG It looks l i k e it might be advantageous t o have a cinch-
down mechanism on t h o s e window shades t h a t had a h i g h e r

mechanical advantage t h a n t h e ones t h a t a r e on t h e r e now.

ALDRIN Yes.

ARMSTRONG The ones t h a t are on t h e r e now r e q u i r e a'tremendous

amount of f o r c e t o engage.

COLLINS They r e q u i r e a tremendous amount of f o r c e t o jockey i n t o

p o s i t i o n where t h e l e v e r would f i t over t h e t o p of them.

Then t h e y r e q u i r e an awful l o t of a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e t o

g e t t h e l e v e r over c e n t e r .

ALDRIN It might be i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t , i n

r e g a r d t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t l i g h t i n g , I t h i n k while we were

a l l a s l e e p w a s t h e only t i m e that we r e a l l y made use of

(7
c
enough reason f o r it t o Q
t h e back l i g h t i n g and t e EL l ' g h t i n g . Maybe t h i s i s

it r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e , s o

t h a t you d o n ' t have t o f l i c k on t h e f l o o d l i g h t s , b u t

other than t h a t use, I don't think i t ' s required.

COLLINS The EL l i g h t ?

ALDRIN Yes.

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 CONFIDENTIAL 25-19

ALDRIN Very n i c e , v e r y p l e a s a n t t o look a t , b u t we j u s t d i d n ' t

need i t , I thought.

COLLINS Block I used t o have f l o o d l i g h t i n g alone. You'd have t o

l o o k a t a v e h i c l e w i t h f l o o d l i g h t i n g alone under a l o t

of d i f f e r e n t circumstances. If I remember, Block I used

t o have shadow areas where t h e s t r u t s would g e t i n t h e

w a y between t h e l i g h t source and t h e gage and t h i n g s l i k e

that. I ' d sure h a t e t o go back t o t h a t kind of a l i g h t i n g

scheme. It's n i c e t o have t h e EL.

25.7 UNUSUAL OR UNEXPECTED VISUAL PHENOMENA

ARMSTRONG Okay, v i s u a l phenomena have a l r e a d y been discussed.

25.8 MEDICAL KITS

ARMSTRONG One comment h e r e i s t h a t it w a s p r e t t y c l e a r t h a t t h e

medical k i t s were not c a r e f u l l y packed. The p i l l con-

*_ .
-
t a i n e r s blew up as i f t h e y had been packed a t atmospheric

p r e s s u r e_ ._ The e n t i r e box w a s o v e r s t u f f e d and swollen.

---
,--
It w a s almost impossible t o g e t it out of t h e medical

k i t container.

COLLINS I r i p p e d t h e handle o f f as a m a t t e r of f a c t , t r y i n g t o

pull it out.

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25-20
CONFIDENTIAL .

ARMSTRONG That was even a f t e r we c u t one s i d e o f f t h e medical k i t

s o it would be l e s s bulky so.we would be a b l e t o put it

in the slot. I t h i n k t h a t ' s j u s t evidence of l e s s t h a n

t h e r e q u i r e d amount of p r e c a u t i o n i n packing.

ALDRIN
-.- I guess w e have never r e a l l y covered t h e d i s t a s t e f u l a r e a
--- -_- ---\

of bowel movements.
--

COLLINS Why d o n ' t you cover t h a t ?

ALDRIN I* Well, from rry s t a n d p o i n t , I had a n t i c i p a t e d having a

bowel movement b e f o r e t h e LM a c t i v i t i e s . And t h e n i g h t

b e f o r e , I spent an hour - 2 hours t r y i n g t o squeeze out

something and it w a s almost u s e l e s s . What I accomplished

w a s such a s m a l l q u a n t i t y it c e r t a i n l y wasn't worth t h e

effort. Mike s o r t of i n d i c a t e d t h a t we probably should

d i s c u s s t h i s a r e a f u r t h e r and t h e r e may be some b e t t e r

way of handling waste m a t e r i a l t h a n w i t h t h e bags. It

c e r t a i n l y i s messy and i t ' s d i s t a s t e f u l f o r everybody

involved t o do it i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r f a s h i o n .

25.9 HOUSEKEEPING

ARMSTRONG I n g e n e r a l , i t ' s a c o n t i n u a l load. There a r e a l w a y s

t h i n g s t o be done, equipment t o be stowed, windows t o be

cleaned, a i r f i l t e r s t o be cleaned. There i s a c o n t i n u a l ,

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 CONFIDENTIAL. 25-21

ARMSTRONG never-ending bunch of chores t o be done, which i s d e s i r -

( CONT'D)
a b l e i n some ways, I guess. It keeps you busy on t h e

t r a n s l u n a r and t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t s . A l o t of t h o s e a r e a s

are r e q u i r e d j u s t because of t h e approach taken toward

t h a t p a r t i c u l a r design, as a l o t of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n

t h e cockpit - a l l t h e stowage equipment - g e t s put

t o g e t h e r and assembled i n E r e c t o r S e t fashion. That

t a k e s a l o t of t i m e and l e a v e s a l o t of s t u f f out. In

g e n e r a l , I t h i n k i t ' s an a r e a t h a t can s t i l l use a l o t

of improvement.

ALDRIN I t h i n k t h e i d e a of having an i n d i v i d u a l k i t where you

can p l a c e t h i n g s i n i n d i v i d u a l packages i s much b e t t e r

t h a n t h a t l a r g e one. And I ' d l i k e t o see continued e f f o r t

along t h i s l i n e t o come up w i t h b e t t e r w a y s of i n t e r i m

stowage.

ARMSTRONG We used t h e new stowage t h a t was devised a f t e r Apollo 10

and it worked okay. There i s probably more equipment

a v a i l a b l e t h e r e t h a n you r e a l l y need, b u t it worked.

25.10 SHAVING

ARMSTRONG We d i d shaving onboard and d i d n ' t have a l o t of r e a l good

luck with t h a t . For some reason or o t h e r , w e l e t our

whiskers g e t p r e t t y long b e f o r e we t r i e d t h a t and found

o u t it w a s an h o u r ' s job t o shave.

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, .
25-22
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ALDRIN It t a k e s a l o t more water t h a n you'd t h i n k ahead of t i m e ,

and g e t t i n g water on your f a c e i s n o t t o o easy a t a s k .

You can g e t some t o accumulate on your f i n g e r s i n a t h i n

f i l m and t h e n g e t it on your f a c e , b u t i n v a r i a b l y-,

Y
it's

-
going t o s t a r t b u b b l i n g m d g g
6-

i n various places.

ARMSTR ONG The only d i f f i c u l t y r e a l l y was c o n d i t i o n i n g t h e beard

f o r shaving. Handling t h e equipment w a s no problem and

t h e r e w a s no problem w i t h shaving cream g e t t i n g away from

you. It wasn't t h a t kind of a problem.

ALDRIN Well, it d i d use up a f a i r number of t i s s u e s t o keep

wiping it o f f .

COLLINS N o w , i n one g , what you do when you g e t all through

shaving i s t o bend over t h e bowl, you t a k e w a t e r , wipe

it a l l over your f a c e , and a l l t h e b i t s and p i e c e s of

h a i r go down t h e s i n k . But t h e way we were doing i t ,

when you got through, t h e y were a l l over your f a c e ; t h e n

you had t o wipe each and every one o f f . It w a s s o r t of

h a r d t o g e t them o f f . For hours a f t e r w a r d s , t h e y were

s c r a t c h i n g and i t c h i n g .

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 25-23
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f
ALDRIN I t h i n k i f I had it t o do over a g a i n , I would have shaved

once before t h e l u n a r o p e r a t i o n s .
.\

ARMSTRONG Yes, I t h i n k i t ' s b e t t e r t o shave more o f t e n .

.- 4

ALDRIN It was a l i t t l e bothersome p u t t i n g t h a t COMM c a r r i e r

back on a g a i n and having a c h i n s t r a p ' g o i n g a c r o s s under-

neath.

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. . . . ... .. . . . . . . . . - . -. ...
 26-1
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26.0 MISCELLANEOUS

26.1 MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS

ARI'GTRONG We had some and I ' m not q u i t e s u r e khy.

COLLINS What do you mean?

ARMSTRONG Well, we had t o keep t h e s e n s o r s on and t r y t o g e t d a t a .

COLLINS I don't see any requirement f o r t h a t i n t h e command

module. , --I r e a l l y don't see any requirement far s e n s o r s

___.__-
- ~

at all. You j u s t have a bunch o f extra c l a p t r a p , com-

p l e x i t y , and power d r a i n , -

ARMSTRONG I n g e n e r a l , I t h i n k each person should f e e l l i k e he un-

d e r s t a n d s h i s r e a c t i o n t o v a r i o u s kinds of medications

t h a t might be r e q u i r e d b e f o r e f l i g h t . I t h i n k i t ' s un-

f o r t u n a t e when you have t o do t h a t kind of s t u f f i n t h e

l a s t week or two b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t . That should a l l be

done very e a r l y i n t h e t r a i n i n g c y c l e s o t h a t ' s no prob-

l e m o r concern t o you a t t h a t l a t e d a t e .

COLLINS I agree. Another t h i n g i s t h a t , it appears t o m e , w e

should have p i l l s i n t w o - c a t e g o r i e s -those t h a t w e can

t a k e without o b t a i n i n g permission, and t h o s e whose u s e

r e q u i r e s i n f l i g h t permission. And I ' d p u t t h e motion-

s i c k n e s s p i l l s i n t h e former category. I n o t h e r words,

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.. . .. . . . ." . . .~ .. .. . ..
26-2
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COLLINS t h e p o i n t where t h e motion s i c k n e s s i s . According t o

( CONT ID)
t h e d o c t o r s , at t h e f i r s t onset of any symptoms, you

should be t a k i n g p i l l s . I f t h a t ' s t r u e , I t h i n k you

should j u s t go ahead and t a k e one without having t o go

- 4
.--
through t h e r a i n dance of c a l l i n g t h e ground, g e t t i n g per-
/

mission, and t h e n having a b i g c o n v e r s a t i o n go out t o

* -----.
t h e world about how you a r e ; i n f a c t , a r e you going t o
c
-_ --.
.
1

throw up o r a r e n o t ? If t h e p i l l s a r e s a f e , t h e n I

t h i n k w e should be given c r e d i t f o r having t h e judgment

t o d e c i d e whether t o t a k e one or n o t .

26.2 PA0 FCEQUIREMENTS

ARMSTRONG I d o n ' t guess we had any comment t h e r e . We thought our

c -_R

p r e f l i g h t requirements s h o r t l y b e f o r e launch were exces-

"-

\
sive .
ALDRIN I t h i n k we a l l f e e l about t h e same way about having t h a t

p r e s s conference conducted h e r e through t h e g l a s s . It

would have been f a r b e t t e r t o have done t h a t s o r t of t h i n g

earlier. I would t h i n k t h a t , that l a t e i n the training

i s t o o l a t e t o b e conducting t h a t s o r t of p r e s s a c t i v i t y .

I d o n ' t t h i n k w e c r e a t e d a good impression, p a r t i c u l a r l y

by t h e way we went about t h e p r o t e c t i o n .

COLLINS I f e l t like a l l three of our p r e s s conferences were bombs.

Y F
I r e a l l y did. I guess we have nobody t o blame f o r t h a t

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 26-3
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COLLINS except o u r s e l v e s . I j u s t f e l t l i k e t h e y were d u l l and
(CONT'D) - . - . - - - - - .<

b o r i n g , and t h a t v e r y l i t t l e u s e f u l information was i n t e r -

-_I__

change d .
ALDRIN I agree w i t h t h a t . r f t h i n k t h a t t h e TV i n f l i g h t should
-7

b e something t h a t depends on t h e crew's d e s i r e a I think

I

t h e more s u c c e s s f u l ones t h a t w e had were ones t h a t were

spontaneous, where w e j u s t s t a r t e d showing t h i n g s around.

Then t h e ground, I guess under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of people

i n our o f f i c e , can monitor what i s r e c e i v e d and t h e n

-\,

-
r y - e r a t h e r t h n n av i n a TV sched- \
-_
u l e d a t cer- nd going out l i v e . I prefer not
r I_-
------.
t o handle it t h a t way.

26.3 MQF OPERATIONS

ALDRIN Put wheels on t h e t h i n g , s o you d o n ' t have a l l t h e s e

problems of people p u l l i n g it around from one p o s i t i o n

on t h e c a r r i e r t o another. I guess t h e y ' r e i n t h e pro-

c e s s of t h i n k i n g about t h i s anyway.

ARMSTRONG W e recorded a l o t of comments on t h e MQF design while we

were t h e r e . B a s i c a l l y , t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h a t p i e c e of

equipment w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y w i t h f e w people a t hand.

ALDRIN We noted t h a t t h e t a b l e w a s awkward i n i t s l o c a t i o n . It

w a s awkward t o move around and took up a l o t of a d d i t i o n a l

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...~... .. . . ~ ~ . . ... -. . . .. . ~.. , ._ . - .. - -. .. __ . I -..-

26-4
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ALDRIN space. The windows need t o b e enlarged i f t h e y ' r e going
( CONT 'D)
t o be used f o r t h a t type of p u b l i c - a f f a i r s a c t i v i t i e s .

I guess t h e communications t o t h e o u t s i d e were r e l a t i v e l y

good.

26.4 LRL OPERATIONS

COLLINS I want o u t .

ARMSTRONG I guess we d o n ' t have any comment t h e r e . So f a r , t h e y ' v e

been going as w e l l as you can expect.

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 27-1
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27.0 CONCLUDING COMMENTS

"r,,,, ,,'

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. , . .f .. .I_ - . .. . , . . .. . . . .. . . . . ._. _ _ _-