RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088.          July 19, 1996.

Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga
despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a
marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. in relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by
stating that he merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph I of
the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

Held:
In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration  of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was also
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and
the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack
of understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court finds respondent to
have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a period of six months.

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage  license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from
obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

Tenchavez v. Escano
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic
chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live together
after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the
same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired
American Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
husband.

RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound
since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife
in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States
in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce.
A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs
of his child and the absence of rights in a tranger to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her
spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives.
Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s independent decisions, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of
affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives.

Republic v. Court of Appeals Molina

G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son,
Andre O. Molina was born.After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.

Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couples best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be
an incompatible marriage from the start.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:
No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and
gentleness on Reynaldo’s part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:

 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations
of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO MENDOZA

G.R. No. L-5877
September 28, 1954
Facts:
On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the
subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943,
Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba,
Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent,
having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third
marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place
after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second
marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of
said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited. The cited case was essentially
different therefore the decision invoked by the Solicitor General is not controlling.
Issue: Whether or not there is a need for a judicial annulment of a bigamous marriage
Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of
his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant
contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema
was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.

Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a  British subject, in
a bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded  belief for such
declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-
founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of
a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby
nullified and set aside.

REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780
FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their
marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In
its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did
not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to
be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void. The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”