001 ACAYLAR v. HARAYO (Vicencio) possession tolerated by the owners, his parents. In conclusion, since Acaylar Jr.
July 30, 2008 | Chic-Nazario, J. | Rule 70 was in prior physical possession of the subject property, Horayo has no cause of
PETITIONER: Pablo D. Acaylar, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Danilog G. Harayo
SUMMARY: Danilog Harayo filed a Complaint (Forcible Entry, initially) with
the MTCC alleging that he acquired the subject parcel of land from Sps.
Acaylar (Zoila and Acaylar Sr.) by virtue of a Deed of Sale; and that Acaylar
Jr., using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the subject property,
cut the tall grasses in the coconut plantation therein, gathered the fallen coconuts
and other fruits, and pastured his cows and other animals thereon. In his
ANSWER, Acaylar Jr. countered that the subject property claimed by Harayo is
only a portion of the entire property of Sps. Acaylar, that he is in possession of
his parents’ propert since 1979 as administrator, built his house and farmed
thereon, and that he already filed an annulement of the Deed of Sale, presently
pending. He also claimed that because he was in prior possession from the start,
forcible entry is the wrong remedy.
Harayo presented the First Affidavit executed by Zoila Acaylar wherein she
refuted that she gave Acaylar Jr. the authority or designated him as
administrator, and that she already sold such property to Harayo. The MTCC
awarded the land to Harayo. RTC affirmed saying the sale of the property to
Harayo vested ownership and possession to him. Acaylar Jr. used a Second
Affidavit of Zoila for an MR. But RTC denied this also. He filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA saying Harayo failed to follow procedural requirements, but
this was denied for being the inappropriate remedy, as a petition for review
should have been the proper remedy. MR also denied.
The SC held that the Complaint cannot prosper. The MTCC and RTC ruling
harping on the Deed of Sale as proof of ownership and possession violates the
most basic doctrines in resolving ejectment cases. (Read Doctrine No. 1 first
before continuing). The deed of sale should have been irrelevant herein. It was
incumbent upon Horayo to establish by evidence that he took physical
possession of the subject property from the spouses Acaylar on 14 September
2004 and he was in actual possession of the said property when Acaylar Jr.
forcibly entered the same five days later. This he failed to do.
A person would not, for a reason so shallow as a whim, encroach upon another's
property and gather fruits and other agricultural products therefrom, thereby
risking criminal prosecution and civil liabilities. The more plausible and logical
scenario would be that Acaylar Jr. was already occupying the subject property
prior to the sale. Acaylar Jr., in gathering the coconut fruits and other crops,
cutting grasses, and domesticating animals on the subject property, even after its
sale to Horayo on 14 September 2004, was only continuing to exercise acts of
possession over the subject property as he had done in years before, with
action against Acaylar Jr. for forcible entry.
(Read Doctrine No. 2 before continuing). In the absence of an oral or written
demand, Acaylar Jr’s possession of the subject property has yet to become
unlawful. The absence of demand to vacate precludes the SC from treating this
case, originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of unlawful detainer,
since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer.
DOCTRINE: 1. The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property, that is, possession de facto; and they should not involve the question of
ownership or of possession de jure, which is to be settled in the proper court and
in a proper action.
2. The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor
by torelance refuses to comply with such demand.
FACTS:
1. The subject property is a parcel of land designated as Lot 741-B-1 situated
in Tolon, Potungan, Dapitan City.
2. In his Complaint (Action for Unlawful Detainer) filed with the MTCC,
Danilog Harayo alleged that he acquired the subject property from spouses
Pablo Acaylor, Sr. and Zoila Acaylar (Sps. Acaylar) by virtue of a Deed of
Sale.
3. On the same day, Harayo took possession of the subject property.
4. 5 days after, one of the Sps. Acaylar’s sons, petitioner Pablo Acaylar, Jr.
(Acaylar Jr.), using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the
subject property, cut the tall grasses in the coconut plantation therein,
gathered the fallen coconuts and other fruits, and pastured his cows and
other animals thereon.
5. In his Answer, Acaylar Jr. countered that:
a. The subject property claimed by Harayo is a portion of the entire
property owned by Sps. Acaylar.
b. He is in possession of his parents’ entire property since 1979 as
administrator
c. Built his house on the property and farmed the land
d. Harayo cannot definitively claim which portion of the entire
property he was able to buy from the Sps. Acaylar since the same
was not clearly delineated
e. Acaylar Jr., together with his sisters, already filed against Harayo
and his spouse a case for annulment of Deed of Sale, with pryer for
 preliminary injunction and damages, presently pending before the
RTC, Branch 6.
6. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated that:
a. the Sps. Acaylar sold to respondent Harayo only a 30,000-sqm.
Portion of their entire property
b. that there is a pending civil case before the RTC on the validity of
the sale of the subject property.
7. MTCC rendered a decision: awarding to Harayo the possession of the
subject property.
a. The MTCC gave credence to Harayo’s claim that he took
immediate possession of the subject property after the execution of
the Deed of Sale but was ousted therefrom by petitioner Acaylar Jr.
who invoked the alleged authority granted to him by Zoila Acaylar
as the administrator of the unsold portion of her and her husbands
property.
b. The MTCC referred to the First Affidavit executed by Zoila
Acaylar (wife of Acaylar Sr.) wherein she refuted that she gave
petitioner authority or designated him as the administrator of her
and her husbands property. Zoila Acaylar further admitted therein
that the subject property was already sold to respondent.
c. For lack of any legal right to remain on the subject property, the
MTCC adjudged that petitioner Acaylar Jr.’s possession of the
same was illegal.
8. The RTC promulgated its Decision affirming the award of possesion in
favor of Harayo.
a. The RTC declared that the sale of the subject property by the
spouses Acaylar to respondent Harayo vested ownership and
possession of said property in the latter.
b. Thus, petitioner Acaylar’s acts of entering the subject property,
cutting the tall grasses and gathering the agricultural products
therein, constitute forcible entry, which gave rise to an action for
ejectment
9. Banking on another Affidavit (Second Affidavit) executed by Zoila
Acaylar, Acaylar Jr. moved for the reconsideration of the 20 January 2006
Decision of the RTC.
a. In the Second Affidavit, Zoila recanted the statements she made in
her First Affidavit denying that she designated petitioner Acaylar
Jr. as the administrator of her and her husbands property,
b. This is was denied by the RTC.
10. Acaylar Jr. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the CA.
a. Acaylar Jr. argued in his Petition that the RTC gravely erred in
ruling that respondent Harayo was in prior possession of the
subject property based solely on the Deed of Sale executed by the
spouses Acaylar in respondents favor. Petitioner Acaylar Kr. also
asserted therein that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
did not give credence to the Second Affidavit executed by Zoila
Acaylar.
11. CA dismissed this for failure of Acaylar Jr. to avail himself of the correct
remedy under the law. Petitioner should have filed a Petition for Review,
the proper remedy to appeal the adverse decisions rendered by the RTC.
a. Instead, Acaylar Jr. erroneously filed a Petitioner for Review on
Certiorari.
b. The CA also noted non-compliance by petitioner and his counsel
with several more requirements for filing a petition with the Court
of Appeals, like shortage of payment of docket fees, failure to state
material dates, among others.
12. The CA denied for lack of merit the MR interposed by Acaylar Jr. The CA,
however, excused the mistake of petitioner in the designation of the
pleading as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, since it was clear from
petitioner Acaylar Jr.’s Motion for Extension to file Petition for Review that
he wished to avail himself of the remedy provided under Rule 42.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the case for unlawful detainer will prosper – NO, because the lower
court’s reliance on the deed of sale to prove ownership is improper. In
ejectment proceedings, it is material possession which matters. Also, there
was no demand herein, and demand is jurisdictional in an unlawful detainer
case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 28 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated 30
January 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Complaint of respondent Danilo G. Harayo against petitioner Pablo D. Acaylar
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dapitan City, in Civil Case No. 622, is
DISMISSED, without prejudice. No costs.
RATIO:
1. (Disclaimer: Aside from this is a long case, it is also the first case under this topic;
hence, the general principles might be important. Accordingly, I opted to provide
more, than give less. If in a rush, skip to Ratio No. 12 or read the bold parts.)
2. In this case, the Court finds that petitioners procedural lapses are forgivable and opts
to dispose the instant Petition on its merits rather than remand the case to the
appellate court, a remand not being necessary where, as in the instant case, the ends
of justice would not be served thereby and we are already in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before us.
3. Relevant in the case at bar is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
a. SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives
or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
 bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs.
4. Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of
action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession
of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the
beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful
by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal
when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
5. The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible
entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second, in
forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the
beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively
lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the
possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible
entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the
premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which
is jurisdictional in nature.
6. The above distinctions, more importantly the nature of defendant’s entry into the
property, are material to the present case in order to ascertain the propriety of
Horayos action for forcible entry filed before the MTCC. It bears to stress that it is
the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful
detainer.
7. In the case at bar, Horayo filed an action for forcible entry before the MTCC.
Horayo alleged that he took possession of the subject property immediately
after the spouses Acaylar executed a Deed of Sale thereof in his favor on 14
September 2004, but was forcibly deprived thereof by Acaylar Jr.. A case for
forcible entry, therefore, is proper since Acaylar Jr.’s entry into the subject property
is already illegal at its incipience.
8. Acaylar Jr., on the other hand, harps on the fact that he was in possession of
the subject property since 1979, having built his house thereon and farmed the
land, and it was impossible for him to wrest possession of the subject property from
Horayo, for he was already occupying the same way before its alleged sale to
Horayo. Acaylar Jr., thus, maintains that his possession over the subject
property is lawful from the start, as he was authorized by Zoila Acaylar to
administer the same, making Horayos suit for forcible entry before the MTCC
the wrong remedy.
9. In a long line of cases, this Court reiterated that the fact of prior physical possession
is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases. The plaintiff must prove that he
was in prior physical possession of the premises long before he was deprived thereof
by the defendant. It must be stressed that plaintiff cannot succeed where it appears
that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had possession antedating his
own. To ascertain this, it is proper to look at the situation as it existed long before
the first act of spoliation occurred in order to intelligibly determine whose position
is more in accord with the surrounding circumstances of the case and the applicable
legal principles. Such determination in this case requires a review of factual
evidence, generally proscribed in a petition like this. However, where the factual
findings of the courts a quo are contrary to each other, this Court may intervene to
resolve the conflict and settle the factual issues raised by the parties.
10. In the instant Petition, the MTCC cited Zoila Acaylars First Affidavit in which she
attested that she did not appoint or designate Acaylar Jr. as administrator of her and
her husbands property, and that she gathered the coconuts and harvested other crops
from the property by employing farm workers. Since Acaylar Jr. was never in
possession of the subject property, then the MTCC concluded that Horayo had taken
possession of the same from the spouses Acaylar right after its purchase.
11. The RTC, on the other hand, expressly recognized that Acaylar Jr. possessed the
subject property, but his possession was merely tolerated by his parents, and that
Horayo, as purchaser of the subject property from the parents, the spouses Acaylar,
had better right to the possession of the same.
12. Thus, as to whether Acaylar Jr. had actual or physical possession of the subject
property prior to Horayo is a factual issue which we are called upon to resolve,
considering that the courts below had contradicting findings.
13. After careful and thorough recalibration and re-examination of the evidence
available on record, the SC finds that Acaylar Jr. had physical possession
of the subject property prior to and at the time of its sale by the spouses
Acaylar to Horayo.
14. It is actually irrelevant whether Acaylar Jr. possessed the subject property
as the administrator thereof. As the son of the spouses Acaylar, he could
very well enter into possession of the subject property either with the
express permission or at the tolerance of his parents who owned the
property.
15. Acaylar Jr. alleged, and Horayo did not dispute, that Acaylar Jr. had entered
into possession of his parents property as early as 1979, and he even built
his house thereon. Although Zoila Acaylar may have attested in her
First Affidavit that she did not appoint or designate Acaylar Jr. as the
administrator of her and her husband’s property, she never claimed
that Acaylar Jr. unlawfully or illegally entered her property when he
built his house thereon.
16. The SC is not persuaded by Horayo’s assertion that after he took
possession of the subject property from the Zoila spouses, Acaylar Jr.
entered the subject property on a whim, for not only does such
postulation lack clear, positive, and convincing evidentiary support, but
also because it is illogical and contrary to common human experience.
17. A person would not, for a reason so shallow as a whim, encroach upon
another’s property and gather fruits and other agricultural products
therefrom, thereby risking criminal prosecution and civil liabilities.
18. The more plausible and logical scenario would be that Acaylar Jr. was
already occupying the subject property prior to the sale. Acaylar Jr., in
gathering the coconut fruits and other crops, cutting grasses, and
domesticating animals on the subject property, even after its sale to
Horayo on 14 September 2004, was only continuing to exercise acts of
 possession over the subject property as he had done in years before.
19. Moreover, we note that the subject property was sold to Horayo and he
supposedly took possession thereof on 14 September 2004; and that Acaylar
Jr. allegedly forced his way into the property on 19 September 2004. This
would mean that Horayo, after taking over possession of the subject
property from Acaylar Jr.’s parents, possessed the subject property for
only five days before being deprived thereof by the Acaylar Jr.
20. The very short period when Horayo purportedly possessed the subject
property renders said possession suspect. It is not clear to the SC how
Acaylar Jr. took actual possession of the subject property on 14 September
2004. Neither is the SC enlightened on the manner in which Horayo
exercised or demonstrated his physical or material possession over the
subject property for the five days before he was reputedly ousted therefrom
by Acaylar Jr.
21. Both the MTCC and the RTC decided in favor of Acaylar Jr. since they
considered him to have been vested with possession of the subject
property by virtue of the execution of the Deed of Sale on 14 September
2004. However, such a ruling violates one of the most basic doctrines in
resolving ejectment cases.
22. The SC had long settled that the only question that the courts must
resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property, that is, possession de facto; and
they should not involve the question of ownership or of possession de
jure, which is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.
As we elucidated in the recent case of Sudaria v. Quiambao:
a. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding
of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior
possession.
b. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has
to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.
23. Hence, the Deed of Sale conferring ownership of the subject property
upon Horayo is clearly irrelevant in the case presently before us. The
Deed of Sale did not automatically place Horayo in physical possession
of the subject property.
24. It is thus incumbent upon Horayo to establish by evidence that he took
physical possession of the subject property from the spouses Acaylar on
14 September 2004 and he was in actual possession of the said property
when Acaylar Jr. forcibly entered the same five days later.
25. The conflicting Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, notwithstanding, the SC finds
that Acaylar Jr. was in peaceful possession of the subject property
prior to its sale to Horayo. Even if Acaylar Jr. was not authorized by
Zoila Acaylar to possess the subject property as administrator, his
possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his parents. As
we ruled in Arcal v. Court of Appeals:
a. The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such
possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by
the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to comply
with such demand. A person who occupies the land of another at
the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of the
possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of
lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of
the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
26. In the instant case, there is no showing that either Zoila Acaylar or
Horayo made an express demand upon Acaylar Jr. to vacate the
subject property. In the absence of an oral or written demand, Acaylar
Jr’s possession of the subject property has yet to become unlawful. The
absence of demand to vacate precludes the SC from treating this case,
originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of unlawful
detainer, since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action for
unlawful detainer.
27. In conclusion, since Acaylar Jr. was in prior physical possession of the
subject property, Horayo has no cause of action against Acaylar Jr. for
forcible entry.
28. Neither can the SC treat Horayos case against Acaylar Jr. as one for
unlawful detainer absent the jurisdictional requirement of demand to
vacate made upon Acaylar Jr.
29. However, our dismissal of Horayos Complaint herein against Acaylar Jr. is
without prejudice to Horayos filing of the appropriate remedy under the law
to acquire possession of the subject property, as well as to the resolution of
the civil case pending with the RTC, Branch 6, for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale dated 14 September 2004.
 002 ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. vs. ONG (VARGAS)
August 16, 2005 | Tinga, J. | Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
PETITIONER: Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King
RESPONDENTS: Sps. Gerry Ong and Elizabeth Ong
SUMMARY: Ross Rica filed a complaint for ejectment against Sps. Ong before
MTC Mandaue. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of 3
parcels of land covered by TCTs. Ross Rica also alleged Sps. Ong’s previous
ownership of the land. MTC Mandaue order Sps. Ong to vacate and to turn over
possession of the property to Ross Rica. RTC affirmed MTC. CA reversed both
RTC and MTC based on two grounds: a. the allegations fail to show that Ross Rica
was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth;
and b. no contract, express or implied, between the parties. The issue is WON the
allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer. SC said YES.
The allegation in the Complaint that: “despite demand to vacate, the defendants
have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding
possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their
lots” is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. 
DOCTRINE: An allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession
from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to
imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having
no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a
right and is being withheld by defendant.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Ross Rica Sales and Juanito King [ROSS RICA] filed a
complaint for ejectment against Sps. Ong before MTC Mandaue.
2. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of 3 parcels
of land covered by TCTs. Ross Rica also alleged Sps. Ong’s previous
ownership of the land. In January 1995, Mandaue Prime Estate Realty
[MANDAUE PRIME] wrote Sps. Ong informing them of its intent to use
said lots and asking them to vacate within 30 days from receipt. But Sps.
Ong refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said
lots.
3. In March 1995, Ross Rica had acquired said properties from Mandaue
Prime through a sale. Mandaue Prime acquired said lands from Sps. Ong.
[Chain of ownership: Sps. Ong – Mandaue Prime – Ross Rica] However,
the deed of sale and transfers of title between Sps. Ong and Mandaue prime
were sought to be annulled by Sps. Ong against Mandaue Prime in another
case in RTC Mandaue [which is still pending resolution].
4. Meanwhile, MTC Mandaue resolved the ejectment case in April 1996
which ordered Sps. Ong to vacate and to turn over possession thereof to
Ross Rica. On appeal, RTC affirmed MTC in its entirety.
5.
CA, however, ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there
was no contract between the parties [Ross Rica and Sps. Ong], express or
implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus,
MTC and RTC Orders were set aside. CA based its decision on two
grounds:
a. the allegations fail to show that Ross Rica was deprived of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth;
b. no contract, express or implied, between the parties.
6. Ross Rica filed this Petition for Review.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether RTC Decision has become final and executory at the time
petition for review was filed– NO. Since the unlawful detainer case was
filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed
a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the
timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day.
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdraw.
2. Whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful
detainer properly cognizable by the MTC – YES. An allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
RATIO:
SUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS1
1
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
3.        That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register
of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto
attached as Annexes A, B, and C respectively and made an integral part hereof;
4.        That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5.        That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and
co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;
6.        That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter
informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days
from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex D and made an integral part
thereof;
1. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.
2. The presence of a contract is not a requisite for unlawful detainer case.
a. Javelosa vs. CA: allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful
withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It
is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the
phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a
contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being
withheld by defendant.
b. Rosanna Barba vs. CA: A simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
3. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: “despite demand to
vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus,
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving
plaintiffs of the use of their lots” is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful
detainer case.  day period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April
4. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of
the lots. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former
owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a
letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents
refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the
complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly
sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
5. Sps. Ong would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in Raymundo dela Paz
vs. Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70. The said case
does not provide for rigid standards in drafting a complaint for ejectment. Co
Tiamco vs. Diaz justifies a more liberal approach which said: The principle
underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry
and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order
which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure should be carefully avoided.
6. Sps. Ong insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it
being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that Ross Rica
were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of filing an action
for ejectment.
7.        That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus,
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their
lots;
8.        That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have
suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month.
7. This contention is not tenable. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the
recovery of ownership of real property. In an action for unlawful detainer, the
question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally
unessential. Ross Rica did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of
claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their
pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by Sps. Ong does not constitute a
recognition of Sps. Ong’s present ownership. This is meant only to establish one
of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful
withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to
recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim
ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction
to try the ejectment case.
8. Even if Sps. Ong claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the
conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in
an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary
jurisdiction. The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject
of a collateral attack.
RTC Decision not yet final and executory [minor issue just in case]
1. Ross Rica asserts that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)
1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997.
According to them, this reglementary period could not have been interrupted by
the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing
one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. Petitioners further argue that, after having
filed the Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an
inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration. Such filing,
therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)day period which started running from the
date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.
2. The RTC justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. CA passed no comment on
this point when it took cognizance of respondents’ position and reversed the RTC.
But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that the
Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no
matter how erroneous the latter mode was.
3. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the
RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been
remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following
day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at
any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Applying
this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed
as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.
4. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and
started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise
filed with the CA. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)day request for additional period, it is
clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
 003 Zacarias v. Acanay (Valle)
24 September 2014 | Justice, J. | Unlawful Detainer v Forcible Entry
PETITIONER: Amada C. Zacarias
RESPONDENTS: Victoria Anacay et al
SUMMARY:
Zacarias filed an ejectment suit of unlawful detainer against Acanay et al after
finidng the latter on their property. Acanay et al had built houses thereon. The
MTC had dismissed the case because the complaint failed to allege the essential
elements for unlawful detainer. Zacarias appealed to the RTC which reversed the
MTC decision. Acanay et al failed to appeal the decision so this became final
and executory. But later on, Acanay filed a petition for certiorari. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC saying that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the case in the first place since the complait didn’t satisfy the requirement for
unlawful detainer. The prescriptive period for forcible entry had lapsed, the
remedy of the parties would then have to be accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria which is in the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The issue in this case is whetehr or not the complaint alleged unlawful detainer
or forcible entry.
The SC held that the complainta lelegd forcible entry. Acanay et al had entered
into the premises without the knowledge and consent of ZAcarias which
qualifies as stealth. There was no tolerance to begin with. The case is of forcible
entry. Since the prescriptive period of one year had lapsed, the case to be filed
should be accion publciiana or accion reinvindicatoria which is in the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
DOCTRINE:
In Cabrera v Getaruela, the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action of
unlawful detainer if it has:
a. Initially, possession of property by defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession
c. The defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of its enjoyment
d. Within one year form last demand on defednat to vacat the property,
plaintiff instituted the complaint
FACTS:
13. The present case stemmed from an Ejectment case with Damages/Unlawful
detainer filed by Zacarias through her son and attorney in fact. The casewas
filed against Acanay and the members of her household.
14. It was alleged that Acanay et al are the occupants of a 769sqm parcel of
land in Silang, Cavite which is in the name of Zacaarias.
15. The parties first proceeded to the Philippine Mediaation Center.
16. The MCTC rendered a decision which dismissed the complaint. It held that
the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements for
unlawful detainer which was the claim of Zacarias.
a. The complaint alleged that Acanay et al entered through stealth,
strategy and in Zacarias’ Sinumpaang Salaysay are more consistent
with forcible entry which should have been fie;d within one year
from the discovery.
b. Zacarias was deprived of the physical possession through illegal
means and the complaint had lapsed one year from discovery.
Which means the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
17. Zacarias appealed to the RTC and argued that unlawful detainer is the
proper remedy since she merely tolerated Acanay et al’s stay in the
premises after demand to vacate was made. Zacarias also pointed out that
she and Acanay et al had entered into an agreement and that she was forced
to take legal action when Acanay et al reneged on their promise t vacate.
18. RTC said that Zacarias didn’t state that Acanay et al entered her property
through stealth and strategy but that she was in lawful possession and
acceded to the request of Acanay et al.
a. The rtc held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because
Acanay et al unlawfully withheld the property from Zacarias after
she allowed them to stay.
b. The RTC found that the complaint was filed within the 1year
period.
19. Acanay et al failed to file a notice of appeal within the reglemantry period
so the RTC decision became final and executory.
20. Zacarias filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the hearing,
Acanay et al were given 10days within which to comment.
21. Acanay et al filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before
the CA. RTC however said that this was tantamount to a comment to the
pending motion and then gave Zacarias 10days within which to file a reply.
22. The CA rendered its decision which reversed the RTC decision.
a. MTC had no jursidction over the case
b. The complaint didn’t satisfy the jurisdictional requirement for a
valid case for unlawful detainer.
c. Prescriptive period for an action for forcible entry had elapsed. So
Zacarias can’t convert her action into one of unlawful detainer. She
may file an accion publiciana or a an accion reinvidicatoria in the
RTC.
23. Zacarias argued that the CA committed GADALEJ. The RTC decision had
 long been final and executory.
24. Acanay et al maintained that they werenta ware of the proceedings of the
RTC and weren’t furnished a copy of the court’s decision. They stressed
that resort to certiorari was proper.
ISSUE/s:
2. WoN the case is one for unlawful detainer – NO. The case is one for
forcible entry since Acanay et al entered the property through stealth and it
cannot be considered as “toleration”.
RULING: Judgment in question is affirmed.
RATIO:
30. What determines the nature of the action as well as the jurisdiction of tehc
ourt over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases,
the complaint should state facts as to bring the party clearly within the class
34.
of cases and must show enough on iyts face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence.
31. Such remedy is either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible
35.
entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds possession after the expuration or termination of his
right under any contract, express or implied.
32. In Cabrera v Getaruela, the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
36.
of unlawful detainer if it has:
a. Initially, possession of property by defendant was by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff
37.
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession
c. The defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of its enjoyment
d. Within one year form last demand on defednat to vacat the
property, plaintiff instituted the complaint
33. In this case, the complaint alleged:
a. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay
Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor
of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto attached as
Annex "B";
b. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject
property. She had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing
trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the
same;
c. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises.
The defendants requested for time to leave and she acceded to said
request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject property
by the end of May, 2008;
d. Inspite of several repeated demands, defendants unjustifiably
refused to vacate the subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to
seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and
FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable
compensation for their illegal use and occupancy of the subject
property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as
Annex "C";
e. Platinff also referred this matter to the Lupon
The above complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer
as it didn’t descrive possession by Acanay et al being initially legal or
tolerated. And which became illegal upon termination.
Zacarias’ insistence that she actually tolerated the occupation after
discovery of their entry is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered that
Acanay et al’s occupation. Such possession couldn’t’ have been legal from
the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based
on any contract, express or implied.
The court stresses that possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of
the right to possess.
In Valdez v. CA, (this is a similar case and court ruled based on the facts of
this case).
a. Where the complaint didn’t satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
for unlawful detainer, the mTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
b. It is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is
later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, fi the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be
improper.
c. Where the possession is by tolerance of the owners, still,
distinction should be made. If right at the incipiency defednant’s
possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the
latter may require him to vacate the premises.
d. Tolerance confirms the view expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorise a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer, not of
forcible entry.
e. Forcible entry into the land is an open challemge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress —
in the inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from
 the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court
f. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be
that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how
long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him
out of the land.
38. It is the nature of defedan’t entry into the land which determines the cause
of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is
illegal, then the acton is forcible entry. If the entry is legal and possession
after becomes illegal, case is unlawful detainer.
39. To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the the ejectment of an occupant, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody the facts that brings the case
within the class of cases for which the statutes provides a remedy. In short,
the complaint must show enough on its face.
40. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it doesn’t state how entry was affected or how
and when dispossessions tarted, ther emedys hould either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in the RTC.
41. In this case, it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare
allegation that sometime in May 2006, she discovered Acanay et al have
entered the property and occupied the same, would show that Acanay et al
entered the land and built on their houses clandestinely and without
Zacarias’s consent. This constitutes forcible entry not unlawful detainer.
42. Consequently, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction and not the MTC.
43. The court also said that since the issue is of jurisdiction, it can be raised at
any time. This answers the allegation of ZAcarias that the RTC decision had
attained finality.
004 ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES v. HEIRS OF
MANUEL ABELLA (CHIQUI c/o BALISONG)
November 23, 2005 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
PETITIONER: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres
RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Manuel Abella, represented by Mercedes N. Abella
SUMMARY: Archbishop was claiming that a property was donated to the Church
by Don Abella in exchange for prayers. The Heirs of Abella denied the donation and
said that Archbishop fenced the property without their consent (check ratio 4a).
Because of this, the Heirs filed an action for forcible entry. They lost in the MTC,
RTC, and the CA. However, when the case was still pending in the CA, the Heirs
filed an action for quieting of title which involved the same property. Here, the Heirs
won in the RTC, CA and SC. Both the forcible entry case and the quieting of title
case became final and executory.
Archbishop moved for the execution of the forcible entry decision in the MTC. This
was denied in the MTC, RTC, and the CA. CA explained that the forcible entry
decision was affected by the finality of the quieting of title case. This supervening
event made the first case unenforceable. W/N the final and executory judgment in
the case for quieting of title justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final
judgment in the previous case for forcible entry — YES, the finding in the case for
quieting of title resolved with finality the issue of ownership and right of possession.
In a case for ejectment, any finding of the court regarding the issue of ownership is
merely provisional and not conclusive – it is the ruling in a case for quieting of title
which is conclusive. In the case of Umpoc v. Mercado, it said that “on the issue of
ownership in ejectment cases, it is only provisional to determine who between the
parties has the better right of possession. It is not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case of annulment of title.”
Hence, the finding in the case for quieting of title prevails over the ruling in a
forcible entry case.
DOCTRINE: In a case for ejectment, any finding of the court regarding the issue of
ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive – it is the ruling in a case for
quieting of title which is conclusive. The finding in the case for quieting of title
prevails over the ruling in a forcible entry case.
FACTS:
25. The property in dispute ia a parcel of land located beside the Peñafrancia
Basilica in Naga City.
26. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres (ARCHBISHOP) alleged that
the property was donated to him by the Heirs of Abella in exchange for
masses to be offered once a month in perpetuity for the eternal repose of the
soul of Don Manuel Abella.
27. Respondent Heirs of Manuel Abella (HEIRS OF ABELLA) deny having
made the donation and counter that ARCHBISHOP encroached and fenced
off the property without their consent.
28. HEIRS OF ABELLA instituted an action for forcible entry against the
ARCHIBISHOP. The MTC ruled in favor of ARCHIBISHOP, dismissed
the complaint, and ordered the HEIRS OF ABELLA to respect the
ownership and possession of the donated lot by the ARCHBISHOP. The
Forcible entry Decision was affirmed by the RTC, and the CA.
29. During the pendency of the HEIRS OF ABELLA’S appeal to the CA, the
HEIRS OF ABELLA instituted an action for Quieting of Title in the RTC
against the ARCHBISHOP involving the same property. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the HEIRS OF ABELLA, recognizing them as the
rightful owners of the land. The ARCHIBISHOP appealed the Quieting of
Title Decision before the CA and the SC. However, both affirmed the
RTC’s Decision in favor of the HEIRS OF ABELLA.
30. Both the Forcible entry Decision and the Quieting of Title Decision are now
final and executory.
31. The ARCHBISHOP moved for execution of the Forcible entry Decision but
was denied by the MTC. The Denial was affirmed by the RTC and the CA.
The CA opined that the finality of the Decision in the Quieting of Title case
is a supervening event that renders the judgment in the Forcible entry case
unenforceable by execution. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/s:
3. Whether the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title is
a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the
final judgment in the previous case for forcible entry — YES, the finding in
the case for quieting of title resolved with finality the issue of ownership
and right of possession. This ruling prevails over the provisional finding of
ownership and right of possession in the forcible entry case.
RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated February 4, 2000 and its Resolution dated May 29,
2000 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
44. The ARCHBISHOP argues that the resolution of the issue of ownership is
not conclusive upon the issue of possession. He theorizes that the what the
HEIRS OF ABELLA actually gave him is perpetual usufruct over the
subject property, thus, his possession thereof cannot be disturbed.
45. The ARCHIBISHOP cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. Points
of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the
 attention of the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal
because his would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and
due process. The usufruct theory of the ARCHBISHOP is contradictory to
his original donation theory. While in the donation theory his right of
possession is anchored on his acquired ownership, in the usufruct theory,
his right of possession is rooted in the grant of the right to use by the actual
and legal owner of the property.
46. In a case for ejectment, any finding of the court regarding the issue of
ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive. In the case of
Umpoc v. Mercado, it said that “on the issue of ownership in ejectment
cases, it is only provisional to determine who between the parties has
the better right of possession. It is not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case of annulment
of title. As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the purpose of determining
who is entitled to the possession de facto.”
a. The finding in the forcible entry case that ARCHBISHOP had
become the owner and rightful possessor of the disputed
property because HEIRS OF ABELLA had donated the
property to the former is only provisional.
terminates when the judgment becomes final, except only in certain cases.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court TO EXECUTE its judgment
continues even after the judgment has become final FOR THE PURPOSE
OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT.
50. One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of judgments is the
existence of SUPERVENING EVENTS, which refer to facts which
transpire AFTER THE JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL and executory
or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired
finality, including matters which the parties were not yet aware of prior to
or during the trial as they were not yet in exisence at that time.
51. The new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in
the forcible entry case is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of
title had also attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of
ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of possession
thereof. To grant the execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case
would work injustice on the HEIRS OF ABELLA who had been
conclusively declared as the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed
land.

47. It is the ruling in the case for quieting of title, adjudging HEIRS OF
ABELLA to be the absolute owners, which is conclusive. The finding in
the case for quieting of title that HEIRS OF ABELLA never consented to
the occupation of ARCHBISHOP has now become final and immutable.
The finding in the case for quieting of title prevails over the ruling in
the forcible entry case.

a. The record shows that Mrs. Abella was not aware of the fencing
done by Msgr. Balce because she was abroad; when she found out
she went to the property but the fence was already destroyed.
When Msgr. Balce tried to reconstruct the fence, Mrs. Abella came
with the police to have the construction stopped. These show that
the ARCHBISHOP’s possession was without consent and that no
donation was actually effected. Since the HEIRS OF ABELLA
never made the donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual
basis for the ARCHBISHOP to claim the right of possession over
it.

48. The finality of the decision in the quieting of title case constitutes a
supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in
the forcible entry case.

49. Under the PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT, the

jurisdiction of the court TO AMEND, MODIFY, OR ALTER its judgment
 005 SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD v. CA (TIMBOL)
September 3, 2003| Corona, J. | Rule 70
PETITIONER: Sunflower Neighborhood Association, represented by Floro
Aragan
RESPONDENTS: CA, Hon. Judge Lorifel Lacap Phimna of MeTC, and Elisa
Maglaqui-Caparas
FACTS:
SUMMARY: ELISA, as the executrix of the parcels of land of Macaria
Maglaqui [her mother] filed a case of unlawful detainer against MOGAR. The
MeTC ruled in favor of ELISA, which decision became final and executory;
thus a writ of demolition was issued. However, the writ was not implemented,
because as to the first issuance of the writ, the case was transferred to another
branch; as to the second issuance of the writ, the judge issued an ex parte
injunction in relation to an expropriation case filed by the Municipality against
the estate of Maglaqui. Meanwhile, SUNFLOWER filed a complaint for
prohibition/injunction against ELISA, arguing that the parcels of land that they
occupy should not be included in the demolition because they were not made
parties to the unlawful detainer case. The RTC granted this, but the CA, on
appeal by ELISA, ruled in favor of ELISA because the unlawful detainer case
had already become final and executory, thus could no longer be enjoined.
Hence this petition [only SUNFLOWER filed a petition for certiorari, because
MOGAR’s petition was dismissed for failure to submit Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping] on whether or not SUNFLOWER may be ejected from the
subject land, when it was not made party to the unlawful detainer case.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court held that although an
unlawful detainer suit or an ejectment suit is an action in personam, meaning
binding only upon the parties to the case, the decision may also bind any person
who were not impleaded, provided that they fall under the exceptions (see
doctrine). And in the case at bar, it was undisputed that ELISA was the owner of
the parcels of land, and SUNFLOWER or any of its members were not able to
establish any right to occupy the land in any capacity. In fact, they were
trespassers or squatters, falling under the exception, and such judgment is
binding on them. Moreover, their argument that the parcels of land they occupy
were not part of the unlawful detainer case is untenable, because Lots I-F and I-
G were indeed subjects of the case.
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in
personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding
on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is:
a. A trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment;
b. A guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of
the defendant;
c. A transferee pendente lite;
d. A sublessee;
e. A co-lessee; or
f. A member of the family, relative, or privy of the defendant
1. Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas (ELISA), in her capacity as executrix of the testate
estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Alfreo Mogar and 46 other persons (MOGAR) who were occupying several
parcels of land in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision, Metro Manila
a. These parcels of land are covered by individual TCT registered in
the name of Macaria Maglaqui, ELISA’s mother
2. MeTC eventually decided in favor of ELISA, which was affirmed by the
RTC and the CA. After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was
issued by the MeTC.
a. The writ, however, was not immediately implemented because the
case was transferred to Branch 77 (from Branch 88) of the same
court (MeTC).
3. MOGAR field a petition with the RTC to enjoin the implementation of the
writ of demolition, but was denied and subsequently an alias writ of
demolition was issued by Judge Lirio of MeTC Branch 77.
a. The alias writ was, again, not executed, this time due to the ex
parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge
Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case filed by the
Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria
Maglaqui
4. Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of
land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case, organized
themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood Association (SUNFLOWER)
5. SUNFLOWER, represented by Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for
prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against ELISA also with
the RTC
a. Argued that its members should be excluded from the demolition
order as they were not parties to the unlawful detainer case
b. To include their houses in the demolition would be to deprive them
of due process
6. This time, Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of
the houses belonging to SUNFLOWER from demolition
7. ELISA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the
CA assailing both the injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino in the
expropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition case
8. The CA ruled in favor of ELISA because the judgment of the unlawful
detainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined;
thus a writ of demolition was issued.
 9. In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, SUNFLOWER filed
an urgent motion for the issuance of a status quo order
a. This was granted, but prior to the resolution, however, the writ of
demolition was implemented
10. SUNFLOWER thus filed a motion to allow its members to return to the
premises, which we granted in another resolution Thereafter, we required
both parties to submit their memoranda
11. MOGAR filed a petition for review of the decision of the CA (Fact #8) but
was dismissed on the ground of failure to submit certificate of non-forum
shopping; SUNFLOWER assailed the same decision under a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45
a. NOTE: Any issue relating to the expropriation case filed by the
Municipality of Paraaque (Fact #3(a)) has been rendered moot by
the dismissal of that case
6. SUNFLOWER failed to establish any right which would entitle its
members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants
and the like
7. SUNFLOWER’s only defense against the eviction and demolition
orders is their supposes non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This
defense, however, has no legal support since its members are
trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment
8. SUNFLOWER’s argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members
were not included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis.
9. The compliant ELISA filed with the MeTC clearly included Lots I-F and I-
G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the unlawful detainer case.
Thus, SUNFLOWER, together with all the parties in the unlawful detainer
case, must vacate the disputed land

ISSUES:
1. WoN Sunflower, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may
be ejected form the land subject of this case – YES, although a case for
unlawful detainer is an action in personam, wherein it only binds the parties
to the judgment, it can also bind persons not parties to the case when as for
this case, they are trespassers or squatters.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CAGR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED.
.
RATIO:
2. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in
personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the
judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he
or she is:
a. A trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
b. A guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
defendant;
c. A transferee pendente lite;
d. A sublessee;
e. A co-lessee; or
f. A member of the family, relative, or privy of the defendant
3. In the case at bar, the records show that SUNFLOWER are trespassers
or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the property of
ELISA
4. SUNFLOWER does not dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in
question
5. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria
Maglaqui, mother of ELISA