FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored
by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee
on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary
General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,
Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment
complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting
as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other
hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since
there was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no
impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.
1
ISSUE/S
1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment
complaint valid?
HELD
1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or
facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records
to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really
intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee
on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the
U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment
complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
The "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such
evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused.
IMBONG VS FERRER Case Digest
MANUEL B. IMBONG VS. JAIME FERRER AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-32432
SEPTEMBER 11, 1970
FACTS:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed
pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M.
Gonzales to impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the
oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.
On March 16, 1967, the Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed
Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of
Congressmen.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections
of that year Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No.
4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in
toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.On June 17, 1969, Congress, also
acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the
aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention
"shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing
representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants:
Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates,
who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the
2
House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the
Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation:
Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution."
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act
No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
No. 4914.
ISSUE: 
1. Whether or not RA No. 6132 is constitutional? 
2. Whether or not Section 2, 5, and 8 is valid and does not prejudice the rights of
individual embodied in the constitution?
HELD:
Issue 1: In sustaining the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4914 and R.A. No. 6132,
the court explained the following:
1.    Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional
amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of
each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-
fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to
call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary
implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal
power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of
funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of
the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody
the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly,
the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain
to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are
matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive
legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit
of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any
specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to
provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention,
Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing
legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of
Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
Issue 2 – Validity of Section 2, 5 and 8
Section 2: Apportionment of delegates
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates
is not in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the
Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific
provision of the Constitution with which it collides. 
3
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly
conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and
implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed
in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be
apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number
of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for
a representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest
available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to
Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation
to effect the desired proportional representation.
Section 5: Deprivation of Liberty
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of
liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws.
Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in
any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch
of the government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional
Convention."
As observed by the Solicitor General in his answer, the overriding objective of
the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected
delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the
convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people;
otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be
deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to
prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is
a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the
convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in
L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a
valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is
reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional
Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction
which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and
applies to all members of the same class. A delegate shapes the fundamental law
of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic
organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all
other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be
changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses such a power, not
even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional
amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to
the sense of justice of the community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which
is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our
people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption,
or injustice.
Section 8: Prohibition from organization and political party support
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as
violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of
the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are
neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive
and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve
appropriate and important public interests.
4
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party
or any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious,
professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise,
favorable to or against his campaign for election.
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is
equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can
declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the
times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a)
which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained
by banning all organization support."
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the
laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any
hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor
or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to
all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or
professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which
are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of
chances among individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with
others or join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his
own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association
for support. And he, as much as any candidate whose candidacy does not evoke
sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal
chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure
equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as
nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.
Section 1, Article XVII of the Philippine Constitution provides two ways to amend
the Constitution:
By: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A
constitutional convention.”
This provision does not specify whether Congress is to vote jointly or separately.
At the celebration by Philconsa of the Constitution Day on Feb. 12, Solicitor
General Jose Calida spoke on the nuances and ramifications of this provision, and
whether voting should be jointly with the Senate as a single body, or separately,
with the Senate voting by itself.
The SolGen came to Philconsa with considerable gravitas. He has never lost a
Supreme Court case, he told his jampacked audience. He sent Senator Leila de
Lima to jail. He got SC approval to extend martial law until the end of 2018. He
got 100 in Criminal Law, 90 in two other subjects. He would have landed in the
Top Ten but he was very sick during the bar exams.
5
The Senate insists on separate voting. The House of Representatives prefers joint
voting, and thinks it can proceed without the Senate and still obtain the needed
supermajority.
Some even believe that the question is political in nature, hence cannot be settled
using a legal framework.
In his Philconsa speech, SolGen Calida narrated a credible, reasonable and
thoughtful interpretation of both sides.
While conceding that the issue of voting jointly or separately could be a political
question, Calida said his position “is that it is actually a legal one or, at the very
least, a justiciable question.” Meaning, the Supreme Court should vote on it, for or
against.
The arguments for voting separately:
• Voting separately is the norm for Congress.
In all but one of the provisions where the manner of voting is specified, Congress is
made to vote separately. This may lend credence to the argument that the two
houses of Congress should vote separately when it comes to other matters as well,
such as when they propose Constitutional amendments or revisions.
• The general rule is that the Houses of Congress should vote separately, in line
with the bicameral nature of our Legislature.
• It is more appropriate to turn to the three principles of constitutional
construction in the attempt to arrive at an answer.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Guided by the plain meaning rule, it may be argued that the term Congress under
Article XVII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted as referring
to the two separate bodies of Congress.
Second, where there is ambiguity, resort to ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. It
appears that the intent of the framers was for Congress to vote separately when
proposing amendments and revisions to the Constitution. In Chavez v. Judicial and
Bar Council, the Supreme Court ruled,
[T] he exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and House
of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of
Congress’ role under the constitutional scheme.
Further, in Sanidad v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the power to
propose amendments and revisions to the Constitution, is but a part of legislative
powers. Hence, inasmuch as the manner of voting in the exercise of legislative
powers is done separately, the exercise of constituent powers should likewise be
voted on separately.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution reveals that it is only in Section 18, Article VII
that Congress was expressly allowed to vote jointly, that is, in revoking or
extending the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. By the maxim of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it
is therefore, only under said section that Congress votes jointly, not separately.
The arguments for voting jointly (that is the Senate vote of 24 being diluted by
more than 200 members of the House:
• The words employed by Section 1, Article XVII are unambiguous. It states “any
amendment to, or revision of this Constitution may be proposed by the Congress,
upon a vote of three-fourth of all the Members.”
The word “Congress” plainly means both houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
A “vote of three-fourths of all its Members” pertains to both houses of Congress. It
does not need any further interpretation. Calida says requiring “a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members” signifies “joint” voting. There is nothing there which
even remotely suggests voting separately. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution
6
employs precise language in laying down the functions and duties of the two
houses of Congress.
Even if the present Constitution had been initially drafted with a unicameral
legislature in mind, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution as ratified by the
Filipino people have been sufficiently adjusted to reflect the shift to bicameralism
where it is relevant. Several provisions in Article VII demonstrate this, such as
Sections 4, 9, and 18 which all specify the manner of voting.
• The omission of the phrase “voting” separately” in Section 1, Article XVII, when
other provisions in the Constitution specify such requirements, indicate the intent
of joint voting.
• The bicameral nature of Congress is principally meant for its legislative
functions. Per Justice Isagani Cruz, when Congress convenes as a “Constituent
Assembly,” it is performing a function not legislative in nature.
In Gonzales vs. COMELEC , when members of the Senate and the House exercise
their powers to propose Constitutional amendments or revisions, they act not as
members of Congress doing legislative work but as members of a Constituent
Assembly drafting proposals to amend or revise the Constitution.
Acting therefore as members of the Constituent Assembly and not as legislators,
Congress should vote jointly, as in implied from the phrase “all members of
Congress,” insists Calida.
JOSE   AVELINO,   petitioner,   vs.   MARIANO   J.   CUENCO, respondent. 
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; SUPREME COURT HAS  NO JURISDICTION OVER SENATE
CONTROVERSY FOR SELECTION OF PRESIDING OFFICER.—The subject matter of this quo warranto
proceeding—to declare petitioner the rightful President of the Philippine Senate and oust
respondent—is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil., 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. The selection of the presiding officer of the
Philippine Senate affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; WHEN MAY SUPREME COURT
ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER SENATE CONTROVERSY FOR SELECTION OF PRESIDING OFFICER.—The
Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over this quo warranto proceeding", in the light of
events subsequent to the original resolution.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUORUM OF PHILIPPINE SENATE.—The Court held that there was a quorum in the
session of the Philippine Senate (composed of twenty-four Senators) in which twelve
Senators were present, one Senator being in the United States.  majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will
be against the doctrine of separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time
to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies
in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required
by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate, because, firstly,
the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at
least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because
in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall
constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority
of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority
of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
7
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful
President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the
body being amenable at any time by that majority.
2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and
for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
 
Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground as it
involved a political question. The Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at
any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine
the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position
to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP.
VINUYA VS EXEC SEC
8
Constitutional Law; Foreign Relations; The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive
Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot
interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department.—The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department,
either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain
manner.
REPUBLIC VS SERENO
Appointment is Political Question but the Court can resort to it because of their
supervisory powers.
The surrender to the JBC of the details as to how these qualifications are to be determined is
rendered necessary and in keeping with its recommendatory function which is nevertheless
made expressly subject to the Court's exercise of supervision.
As an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court has the authority to insure
that the JBC performs its duties under the Constitution and complies with its own rules and
standards. Indeed, supervision is an active power and implies the authority to inquire into
facts and conditions that renders the power of supervision real and effective.   Under its
57
power of supervision, the Court has ample authority to look into the processes leading to
respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's
contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin with.
The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the reqms1te qualifications is
determined based on facts and as such, generates no exercise of discretion on the part of the
nominating body. Thus, whether a nominee is of the requisite age, is a natural-born citizen,
has met the years of law practice, and is of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence are to be determined based on facts and cannot be made dependent on
inference or discretion, much less concessions, which the recommending authority may
make or extend. To say that the determination of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity"
is a task absolutely contingent upon the discretion of the JBC is to place the integrity
requirement on a plateau different from the rest of the Constitutional requirements, when
no such distinction is assigned by the Constitution. As well, to treat as discretionary on the
part of the JBC the question of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is to render the
Court impotent to nullify an otherwise unconstitutional nomination unless the Court's
jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Such severely limiting
course of action would effectively diminish the Court's collegial power of supervision over
the JBC.
According to the Principle of AUTO-LIMITATION:
Sovereignty is the property of the state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of
legal self-determination and self-restriction.
Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper
business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass
upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. [44] "Majority," when required to
constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of
any total. [45] In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in
computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the
constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the "majority
of all members of the sanggunian.elected and qualified" shall constitute a
quorum.cralaw
People vs Vera
undue delagation of power; equal protection of the
law
Caption:          PEOPLE VS VERA
9
G.R. No. L-45685      65 Phil 56       November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.
 
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he
was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the
power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated
that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation
of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the
executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as
in pardon.
 
Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in
the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by
the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as
mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By
section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for
the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The
classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.
 
 
 
Rulings:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on
how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected
by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
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now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of
the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of
Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The
resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This
means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to
enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated
in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their
respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason
that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
An arbitration clause is a section of a contract that deals with the parties' rights
and options in the event of a legal dispute over the contract. In most arbitration
clauses, the parties agree not to sue each other, and instead will resolve their
disputes through arbitration.
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)

Facts:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting
the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court
denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled
that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in
the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not
for an ordinance to be enacted first.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant
to its regulatory and police powers?
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Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police
power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can
delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking
bodies.
LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body
empowered to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the province/city/municipality.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its
functions are administrative in nature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by the MMDA is illegal.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Same; Same; By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a
set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of
preserving and protecting the environment.—Under this Rule, the precautionary
principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases before the
courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific
certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By applying the precautionary
principle, the court may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial
action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment.
This may be further evinced from the second paragraph where bias is created in
favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. exercise of such authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue delegation of the powers
In effect, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away of Congress.
from those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status
quo. An application of the precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will
enable courts to tackle future environmental problems before ironclad scientific
consensus emerges.
Same; For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural and
unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be
disastrous and irreversible.—Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the
country and grown by small-scale farmers, majority of whom are poor and
marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is
laudable, independent scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled
economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the environment
associated with use of GE technology in agriculture, and serious health hazards
from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the
Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and
genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.
CAN PRES. EXPROPRIATE?
ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN
 EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.—For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small
and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to
prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and
deplete the supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in
order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. In so far as the protection of fish fry or
fish eggs is concerned the Fisheries Act is complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into
effect the legislative intent. Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor
of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay,
he ,did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said
coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Section 63, Revised
Administrative Code) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. The
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