I.

ISSUES ON WHICH APPEAL HAS BEEN GRANTED

Pursuant to the September 17, 2018 trial court’s ORDER, the

issues to be briefed and argued are: “Does the Code of Civil

Procedure §1161a require Plaintiff in the limited Unlawful Detainer

who participated in a Non-Judicial Foreclosure (“NJF”), pursuant to

Section 2924f(b)(8)(A), to perfect title before serving a three-day

notice to quit on the homeowner of the property?”

Should Judge Moss and Judge Stafford disclose to Appellant

payments received from the County of Orange whether they thought

the payments were relevant or not to the case?

II.

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from a Judgment entered in an unlawful

detainer action related to the home of Appellant located in Tustin,

California (the “Premises”) which benefited Respondent and

economically harmed Appellant. Appellant was rightfully in

possession of the premises following the sale of an unproven

mortgage lien to Respondent. Appellant held title and ownership

1
following the sale of an unproven mortgage lien to Respondent

pursuant to Civil Code §2924f(b)(8)(A) and CA Civ. §2888.

On March 22, 2018, an unlicensed California auction entity

Nationwide Posting and Publication and an interloper trustee Affinia

Default Services LLC, held an auction and sold an unproven mortgage

lien to Respondents as noticed in a Notice of Trustee Sale filed on

Appellant’s home on February 6, 2018.

Before the trustee deed upon sale was recorded, Respondent

purported to have served a 3-day notice to quit on Appellant and on

“ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS” ( the “Notice to Quit”). Appellant

refused to leave her home because she had a right of possession, title

and ownership pursuant to CA Civ §2924f(b)(8)(A) and CA §2888.

Appellant noticed Respondent at the March 22, 2018 auction of a

pending lawsuit against alleged beneficiary Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

and interloper trustee Affinia Default Services LLC who refused to

disclose to Appellant upon her 6/6/2011 request the accounting of

“alleged” beneficiary status pursuant to California Code Section 3-

309. On April 4, 2018, Respondent filed an unlawful detainer action

alleging that Respondent was entitled to possession of the Premises

based on that Notice to Quit. Appellant presented in her demurrer,

2
motion for judgment on the Pleadings and at court trial that there

existed no cause of action due Respondents failure to establish “duly

perfected title”. Appellant held that the perfection of title (by

recording the Trustee’s Deed) is a condition of 1161a(b) precedent

that the owner of a lawful unlawful detainer must satisfy before

invoking the statute’s summary eviction proceedings, including

serving a three-day notice to quit.

Here, Respondent served its 3-day notice to quit before the

recording its Trustee’s Deed, and therefore was not entitled to invoke

the summary eviction proceedings set forth in section 1161a(b).

Because of the summary, expedited nature of unlawful detainer

proceedings, the procedural requirements “must” be followed strictly.

Respondent’s notice to quit was, therefore, premature and void, and its

unlawful detainer action, improper.

While a handful of due process and abuse of discretion

violations occurred in this case, Appellant elects to focus on two

issues in this appeal: : Does Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161a

require a purchaser of a mortgage lien to “perfect title” before serving

a 3-day notice to quit on the homeowner of the property?”

Code of Procedure 1161a states :

3
 (b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and

continues in in possession of a manufactured home, mobile home,

floating home, or real property after a three-day written notice to quit

the property has been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant

in actual occupant of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as

prescribed in Section 1161, may be removed therefrom as prescribed

in this chapter.

[…]

(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance to 2924 of

the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust

executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims,

and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.” (Emphasis

added).

Appellant argued throughout the case that the Complaint for

unlawful detainer was fatally defective as title had not been “duly

perfected” as required by Code of Civil Procedure 1 section 1161a at

the time the Notice to Quit was allegedly served. The Notice to Quit

was therefore premature and invalid. Because California law requires

strict compliance with the statutory requirements for an unlawful

detainer action, Respondent’s failure to perfect title before service of

1
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references herein will refer to the California statutes.

4
the Notice to Quit, the unlawful detainer action rendered the

complaint for unlawful detainer improper. Notice served is defective

and incapable of correction. Respondent’s complaint should have

failed. It was as though the complaint had never been made or given.

The trial court rejected Appellant’s argument of defective notice

in her demurrer and forced her to answer on April 30, 2018. On June

21, 2018, the trial court rejected Appellant’s argument of defective

notice in her Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On August 15,

2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s ability to properly cross

examine the process server to confirm the timeline of the defective

post and mail and to establish the 3-day notice was premature for the

unlawful detainer case to commence. At the court trial, the trial court

stated that Appellant was going beyond the scope of the cross

examination as Appellant tried to establish a timeline of events up to

the Three-Day Notice to Quit. On April 30, 2018, June 21, 2018 and

August 15, 2018, the trial court rejected Appellant’s presentation of

defective “duly perfected title”. The trial court determined that

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 2924h, which governs procedures

at Non-Judicial Foreclosure (“NJF”), title was perfected as of the date

of the (“NJF”) on March 22, 2018. On August 15, 2018, the trial court

5
agreed with the opposing attorney that because the ANSWER was

ordered to be filed by Appellant on April 30, 2018, the notice of 3-day

to quit fatal status was “moot”. Both Judge Stafford and Judge Moss

were wrong by not enforcing “duly perfected title “ requirement of

Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a. Judgment was entered on

September 17, 2018. Appellant’s home was relinquished to

Respondent who had no right to wrongfully evict Appellant from her

home on October 28, 2018. Respondent had no legal right of

possession, title or ownership pursuant to Civil Code Section 2924f(b)

(8)(A) and CA Civ. Section 2888.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision, citing among other

issues, that the Notice to Quit was premature and invalid. A plain

reading of the Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161a and application

of California’s policy of strict compliance in order to obtain the

benefits of the summary unlawful detainer remedy requires title to be

perfected before the service of a three-day notice to quit.

The trial court rejected Appellant’s argument and determined

that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 2924h, which governs

procedures for foreclosure sales, title was perfected as of the date of

the foreclosure sale on March 22, 2018. Appellant’s Demurrer was

6
denied on April 30, 2018; Motion of Judgment on the Pleadings was

denied on June 26, 2018; and Judgment was issued to Respondent on

September 17, 2018 – At all 3 hearings, Appellant cited the -3-Day

notice defect and lack of duly perfected title. Appellant now appeals

the trial court’s decision, citing. Among other issues that the Notice to

Quit was premature and invalid.

Also, Appellant had a right to know that County of Orange is

and was issuing payments to Judge Moss and Judge Stafford which is

in violation of California Constitution Article 6 Sections 17 and 19.

While Appellant attempted to encourage both Judge Moss and Judge

Stafford to recuse themselves, both judges had a difficult time

exercising any objectivity i.e. Judge Stafford allowing the opposing

attorney to serve Appellant opposition of demurrer at 2:00 pm - the

start of the opposing attorney’s 4/30/18 ex-parte hearing to advance

the demurrer hearing; Judge Moss changing the jury trial to a bench

trial on July 30, 2018 [CT 5: 1458] without Appellant’s authorization;

on August 13, 2018 appeal dismissal, Judge Moss’ refused to wait for

the Remittitur and made his own determination that Appellant’s July

10, 2018 appeal was not appealable based on opposing attorney’s

incorrect opinion as to why the appeal should be dismissed.

7
 Judge Moss set for a trial on August 15, 2018 whereby

Appellant was not able to subpoena for County witnesses or her own

witnesses due to the one-day preparation. Appellant was not able to

secure her attorney due to Judge Moss’ short notice to hold a trial one

day after the Appellant’s appeal dismissal of August 13, 2018. Judge

Moss decided to change the bench trial from August 14, 2018 to

August 15, 2018 regardless of the non-receipt of Remittitur. Appellant

planned on filing a Motion for the appellate court to reconsider but

could not due to Judge Moss’ goal to harm Appellant by holding an

unauthorized bench trial. The remittitur was ultimately returned to the

trial court on October 11, 2018. [CT 8:2241]. The County of Orange

agencies profits from foreclosures. Judge Moss and Judge Stafford

were required to disclose the illegal payments from the County of

Orange pursuant to California Constitution Article 6 Sections 19 and

17, Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E2 and 3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346

Intangible Right To Honest Services and Constitution of the United

States of America Article 6 Clause 2 – Judge Stafford and Judge Moss

are required to follow federal law.

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the

lower courts’ ruling on this issue and direct the trial court to enter

8
Judgment in favor of Appellant and request the trial court to reverse

the judgment; dismiss the case with prejudice; and return possession

of the premises to Appellant.

//

//

//

//

III.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Prior to the entry of Judgment in this action, Appellant held

title, right of possession and ownership of her home [CT1:151 Lines

18-27].¶22

On November 7, 2005, Appellant was issued credits from World

Savings Bank FSB, Beneficiary/Lender and owner of negotiable

instrument “the note” and Golden West Savings Association Service

Co., A California Corporation is inserted as the trustee. [CT 2: 339-

340]. In 2010, Appellant learned that World Savings Bank FSB was
2
Citations to Appellant’s Appendix will be in the following format: (Court Transcript[CT]
[Volume][Lines Ref.][Page No.]; or Recorder’s Transcript[RT][Lines Ref.][Page
No.]

9
never licensed to conduct intrastate business in California and never

paid taxes to the Franchise Tax Board. [CT 5: 1348-1349] [CT

7:1993-2004]. Franchise Tax Board advised Appellant to exercise her

right under California Commercial Code Section 3-301(i-iii), Section

3-501(b)(2) and Section 3-602(a) requiring Wells Fargo Bank FSB to

provide the chain of accounting to show its right to enforce the note.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. was purporting to exercise its rights as the

note holder after making a purchase of the note from World Savings

Bank FSB. Under California Commercial Code Sect. 3-501(b)(2), the

law did not require Appellant to pay money to a company that makes

demands but refuses to or cannot prove it is owed Appellant’s credits.

Appellant exercised her rights of protection against any interloper

under California Commercial Code Sect. 3-501(b)(2) on June 6, 2011

and defaulted Wells Fargo Bank N.A. for non-response on June 29,

2011 - first default and July 14, 2011 - second default for non-

response.

Appellant exercised her right of rescission due to Franchise Tax

Board confirmation that the contract is voidable due to World Savings

Bank FSB never licensed to do business in California. Consequently,

the contract never consummated between Appellant and World

10
Savings Bank FSB. Appellant had a right to rescind pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 1635(f) [CT6:1707]. See Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A., 851 F.3d 851, 59 (9th Cir. 2017) (remanding with instructions to

allow plaintiff to amend complaint to plead a TILA rescission claim).

Franchise Tax Board advised Appellant status of contract is

voidable pursuant to Revenue and Tax Codes 23304.1, 23304.5 and

23305.1 with review of state court. [CT 7:1995].

Because Wells Fargo Bank N.A. refused to comply with

California Commercial Code Sect. 3-301(i-iii), Section 3-501(b)(2)

and Section 3-602(a), Appellant had no other choice but to file a

Federal Law Suit on March 21, 2018 to force Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

to disclose its right to enforce “the note” pursuant to California

Commercial Code Sect. 3-301(i-iii), Section 3-501(b)(2); Section 3-

602(a) [CT 4:1080-1200] and [CT 5:1201-1264]. Wells Fargo Bank

N.A. knew violating California Commercial Code Sect. 3-301(i-iii),

Section 3-501(b)(2) and Section 3-602(a) would deem their efforts to

file foreclosure documents on Appellant’s home – a wrongful

foreclosure. Upon information and belief, the alleged trustee initiated

the foreclosure for the purpose of delivering the “NJF” sale proceeds

or title to Appellant’s home to a person other than the true beneficiary

11
of the Note, contrary to the terms of the Note, the deed of trust, and

California’s non-judicial foreclosure law. [CT 2:343-344].

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and stranger to subject Deed of Trust

acting as trustee Affinia Default Services LLC held an auction on

March 22, 2018 for the purpose of selling an unproven mortgage lien

as noticed in the Notice of Trustee Sale [CT 6:1706 Exhibit 4] via the

power of sale contained in the last recorded Deed of Trust filed on

Appellant’s home[CT 2: 339-340]. Appellant warned all attendees at

the auction of lack of beneficiary status of Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

who illegally activated the Statute of Limitation status by reporting to

Internal Revenue Service a new loan number and claimed Appellant

paid Wells Fargo Money $2000 for this new account in 2018.

Appellant handed Respondent a copy of the Federal Lawsuit filed on

March 22, 2018. Rather than being amendable to the warning,

Respondent threw the complaint on the ground and proceeded to

purchase the unproven mortgage lien pursuant to CCP§2924f(b)(8)(A)

and CC§2888.

The Respondent purchased the unproven mortgage lien via a

trustee’s deed upon sale[CT 6:1706 Exhibit 6]. The trustee deed upon

12
sale was not recorded until April 2, 2018. [RT Vol. 1: 32-36 Lines 2-

21of page36] and [CT 6:1706 Exhibit 6].

On March 31, 2018, 9 days after the Respondent’s purchase of

unproven mortgage lien pursuant to CCP§2924f(b)(8)(A) and CC§

2888 but before trustee’s deed upon sale was officially recorded

April 2, 2018, Respondent purported to serve a 3-day notice to quit on

Appellant (“Notice to Quit”) on March 31, 2018. [CT 6:1634

Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 9] [CT1:215-218] [ RT Vol. 1: 25-27 – lines 1

thru 26 of page 26 and lines 1-26 of page 28]. The Notice to Quit [CT

6:1634 Exhibit 7] was signed by “Steve Silverstein, Esq.” without any

indication what capacity Mr. Silverstein was acting. (Id.).

Respondent commenced unlawful detainer action on April 4,

2018.[CT 1: 57-69]

IV.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 4, 2018, the Respondent filed a Complaint for

Unlawful Detainer after the Non-Judicial Foreclosure sale of an

unproven lien to Respondent and memorialization of the sale with a

trustee’s deed upon sale (“Complaint”) [CT 1: 57-69]. On the caption

page of the complaint, Respondent states that it is “ An Action Based

13
on “CCP §§1161/1161a(b)(3) Possession under $10,000.” [CT 57

Lines 11-15].

The Complaint alleged that Respondent acquired ownership,

right of possession and title to Appellant’s home on March 22, 2018

via a trustee deed upon sale recorded April 4, 2018. Respondent

claimed that the trustee deed upon sale granted Respondent 100%

ownership interest in Appellant’s home. Respondent asserts that title

was duly perfected on March 22, 2018 [CT 1:58 Lines 7-11].

Appellant filed a Demurrer due to the fatal notice of the 3-day

pay or quit; the complaint being verified by Respondent’s attorney

without the proper filing of written authorization from the Respondent

with the court pursuant to CCP Sections 283, 284 and 285 [CT1:94

lines 4-8]. After the April 30, 2018 ex-parte demurrer hearing initiated

by Respondent’s attorney and denial of Appellant’s ability to reply to

the demurrer opposition, Appellant was forced to file an answer on

May 7, 2019. Appellant was required to forfeit her right to a proper

demurrer hearing and ability to take advantage of her right to respond

to Respondent’s opposition to her demurrer pursuant to CCP Section

1005 [CT1-Page 146]. Appellant was served the opposition to

Demurrer at time the Respondent’s Ex-Parte Demurrer commenced at

14
2:00 p.m. on April 30, 2018 - a violation Appellant’s due process

rights. The court stated at the April 30, 2018 hearing that he did not

see that not permitting Appellant time to respond to Respondent’s

opposition to the demurrer as a problem.

Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate the April 30, 2018 order

which denied Appellant’s demurrer based on Judge Stafford’s denial

of due process rights of Appellant by allowing Respondent’s attorney

to serve Appellant the opposition to demurrer 2:00pm at the start of

the April 30, 2018 hearing and ignoring the lack of personal and

subject matter jurisdiction due to Respondent’s fatal act of not

establishing duly perfected title prior to opening the unlawful detainer

case as noted in Appellant’s demurrer [CT 1:95 lines 10-28]. Judge

Stafford denied the Motion to Vacate in error regardless of the lack of

Respondent establishing duly perfected title prior to opening the

unlawful detainer case.[CT 4:1007-1008] as presented in the demurrer

[CT 1:94-95 lines 10-28].

On June 19, 2018, Appellant filed a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings3 [CT3:646-653]. Attached as Exhibits to the Motion for

3
“A Motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at
the trial itself.” Stoops v. Abbasi, 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650 (2002)(citing Ion Equip.Corp.V.
Nelson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 868,877 (1980);see also Smify v. Citibank(South Dakota) N.A., 11 Cal.4th
138, 145(1995). As such, it is established that a motion for the judgment on the
pleadings(“MJOP”) can also be made in limine/ Lucas v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th
277, 284-285 (1996. This is due to courts having inherent power to control litigation and conserve

15
Judgment on the Pleadings filed on June 19, 2018, Appellant filed

Exhibit 1 Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale showing document was recorded

on April 2, 2018 and Exhibit 2 which was the 3-day Notice to Quit

showing 3-Day Notice to Quit was improperly served on Appellant on

March 31, 2018– [CT 6:1634 Exhibit 7]. 3-Day Notice to Quit should

show following page 652. It is unknown why the 3-Day Notice to

Quit is not lodged into the docket and made apart of this court

transcript. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings argued that among

other issues, Respondent did not properly serve its Notice to Quit

under California Code of Civil Procedure §1161a(b)(3), as it had not

perfected title at the time it served the Notice to Quit. Respondent

opposed the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that title

was deemed perfected as of the date of the sale under Section

1924h(3) because the trustee deed upon sale was recorded within 15

days of the sale.

On June 26, 2018, the trial court heard the motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings. The trial court ruled that the deed was “deemed

recorded as a matter of law.”[CT4:1007-1008].

When Judge Stafford denied the Motion to Vacate on June 26,

2018 [CT 4: 1007-1008], Appellant filed an appeal on July 10, 2018

judicial resources through whatever procedural vehicle reaches that result. Id.

16
[CT 5: 1433-1455] based on Judge Stafford displaying due process

violations upon Appellant at the April 30, 2018 hearing. Appellant

filed the appeal pursuant to Section 904.1 or 904.2 . The reviewing

court may review the verdict or decision and any intermediate ruling,

proceeding, order or decision which involves the merits or necessarily

affects the judgment or order appealed from or which substantially

affects the rights of a party. The Appeal was filled based on the

abusive behavior of Judge Stafford whereby Stafford permitted the

opposing attorney to violate ex-parte Rules i.e. serving Appellant the

opposition right when the April 30, 2018 hearing was starting and

denying Appellant’s right to reply to the Opposition to Demurrer

pursuant to CCP Section 1005. Judge Stafford ignored the elephant in

the room – defective Notice of 3-day Notice to Quit prior to the

recording of the trustee deed upon sale as presented in Appellant’s

demurrer [CT 1:94-95 lines 3-28]. The appellate panel in error

dismissed the appeal on August 13, 2018 because the opposing

attorney told the appellate panel that Appellant had filed the appeal

based on the decision of Demurrer hearing which was false

presentation. Appellant filed the appeal due to the abusive behavior of

the opposing attorney and Judge Stafford inflicted upon Appellant at

17
the April 30, 2018 hearing. The Demurrer should have been sustained

as nothing can correct the failure of not perfecting the title prior to

filing the unlawful detainer case as presented in the demurrer. [CT

1:92-95 Lines 27-28]. Judge Stafford should have permitted Appellant

to Reply to the Demurrer opposition pursuant to CCP Section 1005.

Following the appeal dismissal in error on August 13, 2018,

Judge Moss set the trial for Aug 14, 2018 regardless of knowing he

held no jurisdiction. Appellant had a right to ask the Appellant court

for reconsideration [CT 8: 2241 item 289]. Due to calendar issues for

Judge Moss, the trial was set for August 15, 2018. Judge Moss

violated Appellant’s right to reply to the Appellate court’s dismissal of

the appeal on August 13, 2018 by failing to wait for the Remittitur to

be returned to the trial court. Appellant had a right to challenge the

Appellate panel’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s July 19, 2018

Appeal. The appeal was filed based on Judge Stafford’s refusal to

admit to the due process violations at the Ex-Parte April 30, 2018

hearing and refusal to Vacate the order because of the due process

violations i.e. inability for Appellant to reply to the demurrer

opposition and being served the opposition at time the hearing began

– violation of CCP Section 1005. While lacking jurisdiction, Judge

18
Moss claimed that Appellant’s appeal based on the Motion to Vacate

Order which cited due process violations was not an appealable order.

So, Judge Moss felt he did not need to wait for the Remittitur. Judge

Moss set the bench trial for August 14, 2019 giving appellant only 1

day to notify witnesses, Appellant’s attorney, Appellant ADA advocate

and stomping over Appellant’s right to request from the Appellant

Panel reconsideration about the August 13, 2018 appeal dismissal.

July 10, 2018 appeal was filed due to the foundation violations of

Appellant’s 14th Amendment right violations at the April 30, 2018

ex-parte hearing. On August 14, 2018, Judge Moss had to re-schedule

his bench trial to August 15, 2018 due to a conflict on his calendar. At

the August 15, 2018 bench trial, Appellant was not able to see what

was going on in the court room due to her eyesight problems –

Appellant sees double and could not decipher what was going on

between Judge Moss and the Respondent’s attorney. Regardless of the

unfair bench trial held on August 15, 2018, the trial court adjudicated

the matter in favor of the Respondent. Judgement was entered in favor

of Respondent on September 17, 2018.

The Notice of Entry of Judgment was filed on September 17,

2018.

19
 Remittitur was returned to the trial court on October 11, 2018.

Appellant was unable to respond to the appeal dismissal due to the

illegal trial conducted by Judge Moss when he did not have

jurisdiction. The remittitur is the final step in the appellate process. If

neither rehearing nor review is granted, the Court of Appeal will issue

its remittitur about 61 calendar days after the opinion has been filed.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272.) The issuance of the remittitur signals

the end of the appellate court’s jurisdiction. The matter is now

properly back before the trial court, which must carry out the higher

court’s decision.

The trial court awarded a judgment to the Respondent on

September 17, 2018.

Appellant requested a Motion for Reconsideration which was

denied on 11/16/2018. Appellant filed a Motion for a New Trial and

disclosed fact that Wells Fargo Bank N.A. did not have a right to

direct an auction. The hearing for the Motion for a New trial was held

on November 16, 2018 and denied on November 16, 2018. On

November 16, 2018, the Appellant filed her notice of appeal.

V.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

20
 A. The Summary Remedy Provided by the Unlawful

Detainer Statutes Requires Strict Compliance

As a preliminary matter, it is well established under California law

that in order to take advantage of the summary remedy of unlawful

detainer, a “landlord must demonstrate strict compliance with the

statutory notice requirements contained in section 1161a (b) et

seq.”Culver Ctr. Partners E. No. 1, L.P. v. Baja Fresh Westlake Vill.,

Inc., 185 Cal.App. 4th 744, 749 (2010) (“Culver Ctr. Partners”)

( denying unlawful detainer remedy where service of notice to quit

was not proper even though defendant had actual notice); accord

Borsuk v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court, 242 Cal. App. 4th

607, 609-10 fn. 1 (2015). “The remedy of unlawful detainer is a

summary proceeding to determine the right to possession of real

property. Since it is purely statutory in nature, it is essential that a

party seeking the remedy bring himself clearly within the statute.

“Baugh v. Consumers Associates, Limited, 241 Cal.App.2d 672, 674-

75 (1966) citing Rankin v. Superior Court, 157, Cal. 189, 106 P.718

(1910). California law has long held that Forfeitures are not favored

by courts; every intendment and presumption is against the person

seeking to enforce the forfeiture; statutes creating forfeitures must be

21
strictly construed; and one who seeks the summary remedy of

unlawful detainer allowed by the statute must bring himself clearly

within its terms.” Horton-Howard v. Payton, 44 Cal.App. 108, 112

(1919) citing Savings &L. Soc. V. McKoon, 120 Cal. 179 (1898);

Opera House Ass’n v. Bert, 52 Cal. 471 (1877); Lacrabere v. West,

141 Cal. 554 (1904). Without adherence to the strict requirements of

the unlawful detainer statutes, including code of Civil procedure

section 1161a, a landlord’s remedy is an ordinary suit for breach of

contract with all the according delays. Culver Ctr. Partners at 750.

Taking into account the requirement for strict compliance with

the unlawful detainer statutes and strict construction of such statutes,

as discussed below, Respondent’s failure to record its trustee’s deed

upon sale prior to service of the Notice to Quit rendered the Notice to

Quit invalid and the unlawful detainer complaint defective as a matter

of law. The lower courts therefore erred in finding in favor of the

Respondent on this issue, and the Judgment should be reversed.

B. Code of Civil Procedure §1161a Requires That Title Be

Duly Perfected at the Time the Notice to Quit Is Served

22
 Code of Civil Procedure §1161a, the governing statute upon

which Respondent based its unlawful detainer action and under which

it served the Notice to Quit, provides in pertinent part:

(b) In any of the following cases, a person who

holds over and continues in possession of a manufactured

home, mobilehome, floating home, or real property after a 3-

day written notice to quit the property has been served upon

the person, or if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of

the premises, also upon such subtenant, as prescribed in

section 1161, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in

this chapter:

(3) Where the property has been sold in

accordance with §2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of

sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or

a person under whom such person claims, and the title

under the sale has been duly perfected.

Code of Civ. Proc. § 1161a(b)(3) (emphasis added). Requires

good record title prior to the service of the notice to quit is not

“rewriting” § 1161a. California Supreme Court December 17, 2018 6

23
Cal.5th 474 (2018) DR. LEEVIL, LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.

WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER, Defendant and Appellant.

The statute is clear in a series of required events. First, the

circumstances described in subsection 1161a(b)(3) must take place,

i.e. the property must be sold to § 2924h and title under the sale must

be duly perfected. Second, the 3-day notice to quit must be validly

served. Then, and only then, the new owner may avail themselves of

the unlawful detainer statues in order to evict the holdover occupant

on the basis that sale at a legal foreclosure of a lawful negotiable

instrument. Indeed, the statute is clear that eviction may only occur

where there has been a sale pursuant to § 2924h and title has been

duly perfected. The sale and duly perfected title are required

conditions before a holdover tenant can be evicted and notice to quit

may be given.

Duly perfected title includes, but is not limited to, good record

title. “[T]itle is duly perfected when all steps have been taken to make

it perfect, i.e., to convey to the purchaser that which he has purchased,

valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt, which includes good

record title, but is not limited to good record title, as between the

parties to the transaction. The term ‘duly ‘implies that all of those

24
elements necessary to valid sale exist, else there would not be a sale at

all. “Bank of New York Mellon v. Preciado, 224 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1,

9-10(2013)(emphasis added) (citing Kesslerv. Bridge, 161 Cal. App.

2d Supp. 837, 841(1958)); accord Stephens, Partain & Cunningham

v. Hollis, 196 Cal. App. 3d 948, 952-53 (1987).

The facts here are not disputed and are a matter of judicial

admission by Respondent. Respondent alleged in its complaint that it

purchased the unproven mortgage lien at a (“NJF”) on March 22,

2018 [CT 1:58 lines 6-8], and that it served its Notice to Quit on

March 31, 2018 [CT 1:58 lines 24-28 CT1:59 lines 1-8].* However,

Respondent admitted in that same unlawful detainer case that title was

not recorded until April 2, 2018 [CT 1:210-213]. Therefore, at the

time Respondent purported to give its Notice to Quit, title had not

been perfected, as it had not yet been recorded. The Notice to Quit

was therefore defective and premature and the unlawful detainer

action was improper.

For these reasons, the trial court’s determination that

Appellant’s Demurrer and her Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

were wrong in stating that 3-Day to Quit Notice was defective. The

court’s determination that 1161a only requires perfect title prior to

25
filing the complaint is incorrect. As the California Supreme Court

explained in Mclitus, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151-52, the strict

requirement of 1161a that title must be recorded prior to serving the

Notice to Quit makes sense as without good record title, a tenant

would have no way of verifying who is the owner of record:

A defective notice cannot support an unlawful

detainer judgment for possession. Respondent’s

interpretation, on the other hand, would suggest that a post

foreclosure plaintiff could routinely prematurely issue a

three-day notice that includes legal and factual

misstatements ( e.g. that the purchaser has already duly

perfected title when it had not yet done so). And as argued

by Appellant such a practice would practically prevent a

defendant from effectively verifying the identity of the

alleged purchaser of a property as a search of recorded

documents would prove futile.

Absent a sale in accordance with §2924 of the

Civil Code and a duly perfected title prior to the issuance of

the notice, a post-foreclosure purchaser cannot avail itself of

a summary unlawful detainer eviction proceeding,

26
 Respondent’s prematurely issued notice was fatally

defective, and the unlawful detainer judgment must be

reversed.

McLitus, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151-52,

Under the trial courts interpretation, A Notice to Quit could

arguably be served even prior to the foreclosure sale itself, so long as

it is prior to the service of the unlawful detainer complaint. Such a

construction certainly cannot be what was intended by the legislature

and violates the paramount principles under California law that

unlawful detainer statutes are to be strictly complied with and strictly

construed.

Without perfected title, the tenant cannot know whether or not

the Notice to Quit is from the correct owner of the mortgage lien, who

properly opened the unlawful detainer case, or to who is claiming

right to possession or payment. This is particularly true, as the Notice

to Quit did not even identity via signature the purported new owner of

the mortgage lien who is claiming right to possession of Appellant’s

home and ownership and title of Appellant’s home.

Moreover, the notice period set forth in Respondent’s Notice to

Quit expired before Respondent’s title had even been perfected.

27
Appellant could not even verify the correct owner of the mortgage

lien in the county records in the time given.

As acknowledged by the California Supreme Court December

17, 2018 6 Cal.5th 474 (2018) DR. LEEVIL, LLC, Plaintiff and

Respondent, v. WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER, Defendant

and Appellant.

We conclude that an owner that acquires title to property

under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust must

perfect title before serving the three-day written notice to

quit required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a(b).

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is

reversed.

“[s]ervice of the notice to quit is an element of the

[unlawful detainer] action that must be alleged in the

complaint and proven at trial. Borsuk v. Appellate Division

of the Superior Court, 242 Cal. App, 4th 607, 612-13 (2015).

At the bench trial on August 15, 2018, Respondent

demonstrated that his 3-Day Notice to Quit was fatal because the 3-

Day Notice to Quit was served upon Appellant prior the recording of

the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale [CT 6:1706 Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7].

28
 The California Statutes require perfected title prior to the

service of a notice to quit which are in accordance with the statutes of

unlawful detainer which must be strictly complied with or risk

forfeiture. The McLitus decision and the recent December 17, 2018

WESTLAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER 6 Cal.5th 474 (2018)

California Supreme Court decision should be affirmed and the

Judgment in the underlying action should be accordingly be reversed.

C. Section 2924h (c ) Does Not Excuse Compliance With

Section 1161a

2924h(c ) does not support Respondent’s opposition to

Appellant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Respondent

argues in its opposition that “Pursuant to Civil Code, sect. 2924h(c ),

for title obtained by trustee sale under a power of sale in a deed of

trust, title is perfected as of the date of the trustee sale so long as the

trustee’s deed upon sale is recorded within 15 days of the sale, which

it was in this case.” [CT 1:58 lines 12-24]. This argument was

expressly rejected by the McLitus Court and the Westlake Health Care

Center California Supreme Court most recently on December 17,

2018.

29
 § 2924h(c ) is clear that it applies only for the purposes of that

particular subdivision: “For the purposes of this subdivision, the

trustee’s sale shall be deemed final upon the acceptance of the last and

highest bid, and shall be deemed perfected as of 8 a.m. on the actual

date of the sale if the trustee’s deed is recorded within 15 calendar

days after the sale….” Moreover, by its very terms of the statue

applies to the sale and not the title to property. In this case, the

Respondent’s never had a right to title, ownership or right of

possession pursuant to CCP §2924f(b)(8)(A) and CC § 2888.

As the McLitus Ca Supreme Court explained:

In this case, the sale was perfected at the time the 3-day

notice was served, but not the title. Thus, the plaintiff could provide

defendant with a valid 3-day notice. The court below mixed the issues

of sale and title., but perfecting title is not interchangeable with

perfection of the sale under this statutory scheme.

McLitus, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151. In Fact, contrary to Respondent’s

arguments below, a review of the full text of subdivision ( c) confirms

that the provision applies only to the foreclosure sale and not the title

to the property.

30
 (c ) In the event the trustee accepts a check drawn by a

credit union or a savings and loan association pursuant to this

subdivision or cash equivalent designated in the notice of sale, the

trustee may withhold the issue of the trustee’s deed to the successful

bidder submitting the check drawn by a state or federal credit union

or savings and loan association or the cash equivalent until funds

become available to the payee or endorsee as a matter of right.

For the purposes of this subdivision, the trustee’s sale shall be

deemed final upon the acceptance of the last and highest bid, and shall

be deemed perfected as of 8 a.m. on the actual date of sale if the

trustee’s deed is recorded within 15 calendar days after the sale, or the

next business day following the 15th day if the county recorder in

which the property is located is closed on the 15th day. However, the

sale is subject to an automatic rescission for a failure of consideration

in the event the funds are not “available for withdrawal” as defined in

Section 12413.1 of the Insurance Code. The trustee shall send a notice

of rescission for a failure of consideration to the last and highest

bidder submitting the check or alternative instrument, if the address of

the last and highest bidder is known to the trustee. If a sale results in

an automatic right of rescission for failure of consideration pursuant to

31
this subdivision, the interest of any lienholder shall be reinstated in the

same priority as if the previous sale had not occurred.

Code of Civ. Proc. 2924h (c )

Thus, the subdivision (c ) makes clear that the purpose of the

statute is to make conclusive the date of the foreclosure sale even if

the funds are not immediately available so long as the recording

occurs within 15 days. The statute is limited to that provision in the

Code, and certainly not on the provisions of §1161a.4

As Respondent failed to duly perfect title prior to service of the

Notice to Quit, its Complaint was fatally flawed and incapable of

correction in this action. Appellant pointed out failure of “duly

perfected title” due to the defective Notice in her Demurrer, in her

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings brief, in her Motion to Vacate

Demurrer order brief and finally at the trial held on August 15, 2018.

Finally, Judge Stafford and Judge Moss were not obscure in

violating Appellant’s due process rights. Neither judge had any ability

to be objective in this case due to the payments being paid by the

County of Orange which are illegal. It is public knowledge that the

County of Orange benefits from the foreclosures whether legal related

4
It is also worth noting that perfected title is required under all five scenarios under section
1161a(b) and not just upon a foreclosure sale under Section Code Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and .
Section 2888.

32
to houses or illegal and pertaining to “unproven liens”. The court

lacked jurisdiction due to Judge Stafford and Supervising Judge for

Unlawful Detainer Courts Robert receiving illegal payments from

County of Orange. Payments deemed illegal by California

Constitution Article 6 Sections 19 and 17, Code of Judicial Ethics

Canon 3E2 and 3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346 Intangible Right To Honest

Services and Constitution of the United States of America Article 6

Clause 2 – Judge Stafford and Judge Moss are required to follow

federal law, and they chose not to. Appellant tried to encourage Judge

Stafford and Judge Moss to correctly recuse themselves from the case

[CT 5:1427-1428]. SBX211 is proof of the status of the payments. De

Novo Review: The Unlawful Detainer court lacked complete

jurisdiction and the judges committed judicial error by conferring

such jurisdiction.

The trial court accordingly erred in awarding the judgment in

favor of Respondent, and the Judgment should be reversed and

remanded back to the trial court for dismissal with prejudice.

VI.

CONCLUSION

33
 For all the reasons presented, Appellant respectfully requests

that the Appellate Panel reverse the trial court’s September 17, 2018

ruling and resulting Judgment thereon, and direct that the Judgment be

entered in favor of Appellant. Order Respondent’s attorney to return

$499.98 to Appellant [CT 7:1953] which Judge Moss ordered

Appellant to pay to Respondent’s attorney [CT 7:1888]. Respondent

opened this eviction case when Respondent knew he had no right of

possession, ownership or title to Appellant’s home pursuant to Civil

Code§2924f(b)(8)(A) and CA Civ.§2888. Appellant prays for reversal

of the trial court’s September 17, 2018 ruling, judgment, and direct

that Judgment be entered in favor of Appellant and remand to the trial

court for dismissal with prejudice and restored to possession of

premises pursuant to California Supreme Court Case Schubert vs.

Lucille Bates 1944.

Dated: February 24, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

By:____________________

Self-Represented Valerie A. Lopez

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Cal. Rule of Court 8.294 (c )

34
Pursuant to rule 8.204(c) of the California Rules of Court, I hereby
certify that this brief contains 6,668 words, including footnotes. In
making this certification, I have relied on the word count of the
computer program used to prepare the brief.
Dated: February 25, 2020

_________________________
VALERIE LOPEZ

35
 PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF ORANGE
I am employed in the San Bernardino, State of California. I am
over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my address is
6228 Sundown Drive California.
On February 26, 2020, I served the foregoing document
described as:
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

on all parties in this action by placing true copies thereof enclosed in

sealed envelopes with postage thereon fully prepaid addressed as
follows:

See attached “Service List.”

______ I caused such envelopes to be deposited in the mail at Phelan,

California.
I am "readily familiar" with the practice of collection and processing
of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it is deposited with
U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully
prepaid at Santa Ana California in the ordinary course of business. I
am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed
invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than
one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the above is true and correct. Executed on February
26, 2020, at Phelan, California.

-------------------------------------
Patricia Long

36
 SERVICE LIST

Superior Court of California

Orange County
Appeals Division
700 Civic Center Drive West Personal Delivery:
Santa Ana, CA 92701 Original plus 4 copies
OCSC Local Rule 500

Superior Court of California

County of Orange
Judge Robert Moss
Judge Timothy J. Stafford D C66
700 Civic Center Drive West
Santa Ana, CA 92701 Via US Mail: 2++ . copy

Steven D. Silverstein Attorneys for Plaintiff

14351 Redhill Ave. #G The Sunningdale Trust #2328, Vecchio Real
Tustin, CA 92780 Estate Corp., as Trustee
Via US Mail: 1 copy

37