Randolf S. David vs.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

G.R. No. 171396, May 3,2006 (and other consolidated cases)

I. THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state ofnational emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were
arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25,
2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid. [S]earches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of
valid warrantless arrests]: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest.
During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and
their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor
ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a
house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
MAYOR BAI ABDULA, et.al, vs HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, G.R. No. 118821, February 18, 2000, THIRD DIVISION
(Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)

Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent Japal guiani,
then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of Cotabato City, was filed before the Supreme Court.

A complaint for murder was filed but was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor on the ground that there was no prima
facie case for murder again a number of accused (6). However, he recommended the filing of an information for murder
against one of the respondents (accused) only before the sala of the respondent judge Guiani. The latter returned the
case to the provincial prosecutor for further investigation since there was no necessary resolution required under the
Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion (charging only one of the 8
respondent-accused). Upon the return of the records of the case, it was assigned for reinvestigation to another prosecutor
who then recommended the filing of charges against 5 accused, 2 of whom are herein petitioners.

On January 2, 1995, an information was filed against petitioner-spouses and 3 others. The following day, January 3,
respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. On January 4, petitioners filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion
for the setting aside of said warrant of arrest. On January 11, a petition for review was filed with the DOJ. Despite said
filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioner’s pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying the warrant of Arrest be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Issue: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge by virtue of he said information was legal.

Held: NO, the warrant of arrest was not legal.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

"Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a requirement
which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of
the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions.
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt
the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that
probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that
respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those
charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own.

Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated
duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer.

Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable
cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order we issued on 20 February 1995 in favor of petitioners insofar as it enjoins the implementation and execution of the
order of arrest dated 3 January 1995 is made permanent. Criminal Case No. 2376 is REMANDED to Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City for a proper determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued and for
further proceedings.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants to search the premises of of the “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum”. Various equipment, paraphernalia and written documents were searched. Written literature alleged to be in
the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of “We Forum” newspaper were seized. 

The validity of these warrants were questioned through a petition for certiorari and so that the articles and equipment may
be returned to the petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the items.

Supreme Court Ruling:

The law provides that  “…no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.”

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. In the case, the reason for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the
specifications and the particularities of the alleged subversive material that the petitioner has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because they
are in the nature of general warrants.

The search warrants were declared null and void. 

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 206 SCRA 138/GR No 101837, Feb 11, 1992
FACTS

An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila.
Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being
hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he
executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for
immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of
his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the
fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed
against petitioner

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following:

1. whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and

2. whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING:
The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are
instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at
the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has
been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In
view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner
has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and
aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived
of.

On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim.
The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation
before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were
afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the
appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that
failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the
crime of murde

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago,162 SCRA 840/G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988 

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh
Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with
two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after
Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
sometime now. 

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown
in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes
were also found. 

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close
surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One
released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable
aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. 

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and
sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail
was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. 

Issue:  Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of
existence of probable cause. 

Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. 

Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. 

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote
and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the
probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are
admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). 

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence
in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. 

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from
questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special
Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. 

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall
be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are
administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific
charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired. 

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police
measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and tranquility of the people.
22 SCRA 857/GR No. L-27360, feb 28, 1968

Constitutional Law: PAPA VS. MAGO

PAPA VS. MAGO

Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was intercepted by the
BOC, questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made without any search warrant and whether
the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.

Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held:

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.  16 But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a
judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant
in the enforcement of customs laws.

In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should
suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the
country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.
Title: PEOPLE vs BARROS, GR 90640, 29 March 1994

FACTS

On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province
Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at
the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton
under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they
alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao
inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton
was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited
Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. Upon
entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton
of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of
marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After
trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.

ISSUES: Whether or not the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to
his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver?

RULINGS: NO.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose
in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search
of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. —
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out
warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are
neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being
limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving
vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the
Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from
informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3)
Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be
brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and
other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a
woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana.

Herein, there is nothing in the record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted
probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony of the law
enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused, and who had searched the box in his possession, simply did not
suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause.
 The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless
arrest "simply because he failed to object."

To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.

The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein. As the constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely
a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly,
the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non permissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and
seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against Barros.
 P E O P L E V. D E G R A C I A ( 1 9 9 4 ) | S E A R C H E S A N D   S E I Z U R E S

February 8, 2017

G.R. No. 102009, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994

Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being committed, and had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the same constituted an exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches.

Facts:
1. Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in
December 1989 against the Government.
2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a surveillance
of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989, which surveillance actually started
November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that
the said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.
3. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a
group of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to
start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them,
which resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that
civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
4. Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and
confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.
5. Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain Col. Matillano, holding a
C-4 and suspiciously peeping though door.
6. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
Issue:
 Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Held:
 YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
 It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant at that time. It was
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the
raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of
men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused
to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office.
 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles.
The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained.
 In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The
courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
 Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this
case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with
PEOPLE v GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993.

FACTS:

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking
liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to
kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace . Reyes, testified that she
witnessed the killing as follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren
and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a
hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the
hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and
heavy object.
Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a
piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes, that she
saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house
and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket
which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the
police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and

2. Whether or not the arrest was lawful.

RULING: SEARCH and SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This
is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers
to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed

ARREST

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece
of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991 193 SCRA 57

VERSION 1:

LawPhil’s Full text link:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_81561_1991.html
 
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She
refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
 
Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor),
following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box
and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
 
The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of search
and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
 
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
 
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
 
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
 
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning
in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs People’s Court.
 
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing
appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be
admitted.
  
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and
seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
 
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof
  
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection
against the STATE.

VERSION 2:
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being
sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made
him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect
the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana
leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo.
Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the
evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI
agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

VERSION 3:
Facts :

Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with them four gift wrapped packages to
be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if she could inspect the
packages, however, Marti refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his friend.

Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened
the boxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom and he soon found out
that the boxes contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI who acknowledged custody of the
incident. Marti was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Constitutional Issues :1. Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable seach and siezure and privacy of communication.

Ruling :

1. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmental interference, the
libertied guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

2. Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure. Merely to look at that which is plain
sight is not search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed is not search.

Commissioner Bernas :

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy...is a protection against the State. The
Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.