ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a

party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party
presenting him or her. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein.

FACTS:
1. Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System
(AFPRSBS) filed an application for registration of title over parcels of land
before the RTC of Pasig City
2. The application was file by Mr. Honorio Azuceta (Azuceta) then Executive
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly
authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as evidenced
by a notarized Secretary's Certificate.
3. The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban),
its Vice President and Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified,
inter alia, that:
a. among her main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets of
petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled and freed of liens
and encumbrances;
b. the subject properties were acquired by the petitioner through a land
grant under Presidential Proclamation No. 1218;
c. AFPRSBS after the Republic of the Philippines transferred ownership
of the subject properties to it, assumed open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation, and exercised
control over them in the concept of owner, and likewise assumed the
obligations of an owner;
d. AFPRSBS has been paying the real estate taxes on the subject
properties; and the subject properties are not mortgaged, encumbered,
or tenanted.
4. Trial court then confirms and orders the registration of AFPRSBS’ title.
5. In response, the OSG filed a MR wherein it argued that petitioner failed to
prove that it has personality to own property in its name and the petitioner
failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for
and in its behalf.
6. The trial court subsequently reversed its own decision, dismissing the
Application for Registration of Title on the ground that the petitioner failed to
prosecute its case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it
dismissed petitioner’s application for land registration on the ground that
petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.
2. Whether Ms. Aban lacked authority to be the witness of petitioner.
RULING:
 1. YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides only
three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute:
(a) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or
(b) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or
(c) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court.
Clearly, the basis for pronouncing that petitioner failed to prosecute its case is not
among those grounder provided by the Rules. Thus, it had no reason to conclude that
the petitioner failed to prosecute its case.
2. NO. There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a
party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party
presenting him or her. There is no law or jurisprudence that would support the
conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on
the part of the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a
witness is that the witness possesses all the qualification and none of the
disqualifications provided under Rule 130 of Rules on Evidence.

Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20.Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
Cavili v. Judge Florendo speaks of the disqualifications:
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19
disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age
or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for
disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21
provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of
Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called. DEcTCa
. . .The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of
recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an express
exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. (In Re Estate
of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167) As a general rule, where there are express exceptions
these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other
exception will be implied. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition,
Vol. 2A, p. 90) The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied.)
A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is
qualified to testify as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the
qualifications of being able to perceive and being able to make her perceptions
known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the disqualifications
described above.
MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005.
By: Michelle Ami Aparece

DOCTRINE: The martial disqualification rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions
such as when the relationship of the husband and wife is already strained that the
preservation of the marriage of the two is no longer an interest the State aims to
protect.

FACTS:
1. Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in the case for arson. Accused is Maximo
Alvarez, his wife Esperanza Alvarez is the repsondent’s sister.
2. On June 21, 1999, private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand
as the first witness against the petitioner, her husband.
3. Petitioner and counsel raised no objection.
4. Esperanza testified that she was the wife of the accused, Maximo. When sworn in,
the lawyer referred to her as the estranged wife of the accused.
5. Maximo Alvarez filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying pursuant to
Rule 130 of the ROC on MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION.
6. RTC ordered the disqualification of Esperanza from further testifying and deleted her
testimony from the records. MR was filed, denied.
7. Susan filed certiorari with PI and TRO.
8. CA nullified and set aside the order of the RTC.

Note: The arson was committed by Maximo knowing that Esperanza was inside the
house at that time. They were also already separated de facto prior to the incident.

ISSUE:
WON Esperanza can testify against her husband in the criminal case. YES

RULING:
THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE IS SUBJECT TO SOME EXCEPTIONS
(provisions at the bottom of the digest)

1. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other.
9. The exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule.
10. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which
may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
11. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
 nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
12. In Ordoño vs. Daquigan, the court held that:

‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too
narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic
harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when
an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it
comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against
the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against
the other.’

THE ARSON COMMITTED BY MAXIMO IMPAIRED THE CONJUGAL RELATION

BETWEEN HIM AND ESPERANZA

1. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson 􏰀led against him, eradicates all
the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
13. As observed by the Court of Appeals:

"The act of private respondent in setting 􏰀fire to the house of his sister-in-
law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact
with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the
harmony and confidence of marital relation which the 􏰀disqualification
primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the
marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be
preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-
existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which
the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no longer any reason to
apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."

14. It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained.
In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident.
15. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the
marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.
16. At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth
before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated,
must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the
objection of the accused, because "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants."

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at
the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.
St. Clare’s Realty Co.
G.R.No. L-58164 September 2, 1983

By: Joshua Stefano Z. Baguio

DOCTRINE:

FIRST: MERE WITNESSES WHO ARE NEITHER PARTIES, PLAINTIFF, NOR THEIR
ASSIGNORS, NOR IN WHOSE BEHALF A CASE IS PROSECUTED, ARE NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION ON RULE 130 SEC 20 (A)

SECOND: THE DEAD MAN STATUTE RULE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION WHEN
THE CLAIM IS AGAINST THE PERSONAL CAPACITY AND NOT AGAINST THE
ESTATE OF THE DEAD OR AGAINST AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OR
OTHE REPRESENTATIVE OF A DECEASED PERSON

FACTS:

Spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed
property, which is a parcel of land located in Parañaque. The spouses had six children,
named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero.
Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero
verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to
Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having been
assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero
physically possessed the lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez.
Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the
land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and
to retain the ownerʼs share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister
was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of
the ownerʼs share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Dominador
Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of Andres Guerrero.
Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda
Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero
continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.

Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in
the name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, at about 1971, the petitioners
discovered that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the
basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land” dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt
Cristina. They further alleged that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina,
Manuel was successful in his application of the registration of the land in his favor.
 Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also
cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold the disputed lot to a
St.Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them.

According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently
obtained and that the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective
since the defendants allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero.

Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had been sick for a
long time before she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; and that her mother could walk
only inside their house in Parañaque; that the money spent for the illness of her mother
came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children, Cristina Guerrero could ask
money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres Guerrero had lent to her.
Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes stated that the land was lent by Andres
Guerrero to Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned money to Cristina Guerrero
for quite some time; that shortly after the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero
went to their house, accompanied by Felicisimo Guerrero, and summed up the loans he
had extended to Cristina Guerrero in the total amount of P1,900.00; and that Felicisimo
Guerrero asked Laura Cervantes to sign a piece of paper to attest to the fact that a
certain amount of money had been borrowed from Manuel Guerrero.

After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros
objected to the line of questioning on the ground that the said witness was testifying "on
matters which are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court." The
trial court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes
as well as other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the
case.

ISSUE:
A. Whether or not Laura, Jose as well as other witnesses similarly situated was
disqualified as a under Rule 130 sec. 20 (a)? NO. Mere witnesses who are neither
parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition.

B. Whether or not the “Dead Man Statute Rule” may be applied in this case? NO.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the
deceased Manuel Guerrero.

HELD:
A. NO. Rule 130 Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. —
The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly
or indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such became of unsound mind."

The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the
present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs
aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned
the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina
Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.

B. NO. The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased
Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or
representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in
their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of dead man’s rule. "It has been held that statutes
providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is
dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording,
irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator
or other representative of a deceased person. It should be noted that after the mention
of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which means
that the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the executor or
administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is
emphasized by the law by using the words ‘against the estate of such deceased
persons which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time
the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and
defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of
such representative."
Goñi v. CA
DOCTRINE:
a. Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. - The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
b. The adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with
the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such
person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the
testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent.

FACTS
The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria
were originally owned by Tabacalera.
Villanueva wants to purchase the said haciendas but he did not have enough funds so
he offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to Villegas with Vicente as the latter’s guarantor.
Since the proceeds still felt short for the purchase price, Villanueva contracted or
promised to sell to Vicente Fields no. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as
attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. In consideration of such promise to sell, an amount was
debited from Vicente’s account in favor of Tabacalera.
However, after the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva sold a property
and was able to raise funds and so he went to Vicente to rescind the said promise to
sell. But since an amount was already debited from Vicente’s account they agreed that
Vicente will lease Fields no. 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for 5 years.
Thereafter, a Deed of Sale was executed covering the three haciendas in favor of
Villanueva which he later on mortgaged to RFC. Fields no. 4 and 13 were delivered to
Vicente. Hacienda Sarria was later then sold to Villegas.
When Villanueva died, an intestate proceedings were instituted. Among the properties
included in the inventory submitted to the court were Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Thus, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property (Field no. 3) and damages
against Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Villanueva. He
based his suit on the said contract/promise to sell executed by the Villanueva in his
favor.
Goni on the other hand filed a counter-claim against Vicente.
During the trial, Vicente presented two (2) witnesses: Vicente, himself who testified on
facts occurring before the death of Villanueva, and Equio a clerk of Tabacalera. On the
hand, Goni himself testified on the alleged verbal lease agreement. The presentation of
Vicente as a witness was objected to.
TRIAL COURT
Rendered a decision in favor of Vicente and ordered the heirs to deliver to Vicente and
executed a Deed of Sale covering Field no. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of the latter.

COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming that of the lower court.

ISSUE:
WON Vicente can testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva,
which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate. In violation of Rule 123, Sec, 26,
par. (c), now Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a).
WON not a written promise to sell be novated into a verbal agreement of lease during
the lifetime of the promissor.
RULING:
1. Yes. Although Vicente should have been disqualified to testify pursuant to
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, the heirs waived the protection
of such rule by cross-examining Vicente and by interposing a counter-claim.
Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from
testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides:
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

PURPOSE OF THE RULE

It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the
party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood
and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA IS COVERED BY THE SURVIVORSHIP
DISQUALIFICATION RULE OR DEAD MAN STATUTE
The case at bar, the heirs are still covered by the protection of the rule for the reason
that they are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they
succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly
because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which
they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased
might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have
been interested to establish, if living.
SUCH PROTECTION IS WAIVABLE
Such protection was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined
Vicente.
“A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the
estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to
matters occurring during deceased's lifetime.”
Moreover, petitioners presented a counterclaim against Vicente. Thus, as defendant to
such counter-claim Vicente was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
occurring before the death of Villanueva because such counter-claim is not an action
against the estate/decease person rather it was an action filed by the estate/deceased
person.
TRANSACTIONS WITH THE DECEASED WHICH WERE MADE WITH AN AGENT
The adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the
deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in
cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the
adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were
had with the agent.
Here, the contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as
attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations
made by Vicente with respect to said contract.
Hence, the inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that Goñi could and did not
negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell for he admitted the existence of
the said contract/promise to sell although contending that such was subsequently
novated into a verbal contract of lease.
2. Yes. There is a novation in this case for the heirs was able to clearly and sufficiently
show that the contract/promise to sell was subsequently novated into a verbal lease
agreement.
Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed
or altered. In order, however, that an obligation may be extinguished by another which
substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that
the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
Here, the novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal agreement of
lease was clearly and convincingly proven not only by the testimony of Goñi, but
likewise by the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the
contract/promise to sell. These acts and conduct are: (a) only Fields nos. 4 and 13 were
delivered to private respondent Vicente, (b) Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently
registered in Villanueva's name and mortgaged with the RFC, (c) Villanueva likewise
executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Villegas. And all of these
were known to Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward asserting and/or protecting
his claim over Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 during the lifetime of Villanueva.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed.

TONGCO v. VIANZON
Digest by: Aid

DOCTRINE: The Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to cases that are not claims
against the estate such as (1) claims made by the estate and (2) cadastral proceedings
where there is no plaintiff and defendant.

FACTS:
1. Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon were married on 1894.
2. Marcelino, during his lifetime, presented claims in a cadastral case where he had
several pieces of land named to the conjugal partnership.
3. The said lots were named to the conjugal partnership.
4. He died on 1925. Josefa Tongco, his niece, was named as the administratrix of the
estate.
5. (FIRST CASE) The widow, after his death and within the 1-year period provided by
the Land Registration Law, moved for the retitling of the lot to her name exclusively.
6. On 1926, titles were issued in the name of Anastacia exclusively.
7. Anastacia testified as to the ownership of lots.
8. (SECOND CASE) Josefa sought for the recovery of properties plus damages, the
issue being the same as the cadastral case.
9. Anastacia again testified in this case.

JOSEFA’S CONTENTION:
Anastacia cannot be allowed to testify pursuant to the Civil Code which provides that,
Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose
behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator
 or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person . . .

ISSUE: Whether the Anastacia, the widow, was competent to testify

RULING:
Yes, she is competent to testify.

According to the Old Civil Code, “Parties or assignors of parties to an action or

proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person . . . .” (DEAD
MAN’S STATUTE)

The object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction is question on the part of the surviving party. He
has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in
arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.

The law twice makes use of the word "against."

The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they
brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the
administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same
analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one
sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.

The rule remains that properties are presumed to be conjugal unless proof to the
contrary is presented.

Here, contrary proof was presented (and presumed to be given credence by the trial
courts who are finders of facts). Thus, the lots are the exclusive property of Anastacia.
CASE DIGEST: LICHAUCO VS ATLANTIC GULF

Principle: If the plaintiff, assignor of plaintiff, or person in whose behalf the action
is prosecuted is a juridical entity, Dead Man’s Statute does not apply. Any of the of
the juridical entity’s officers, directors, stockholders, or employees may not be
disqualified from testifying.

Facts:

1. Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of
Atlantic Gulf. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been
fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the
company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450 a share.
2. In 1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the
purchase price of the said 545 share of stock out of bonuses and dividends to
which he was entitled from the company
3. In his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he
die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its
option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning to his
estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the
corresponding number of the company's shares of stock equivalent to the
amount paid thereon at P450 a share.
4. Richard T. Fitzsimmons died in 1944. Company filed a claim against estate of
Richard, and offered to require the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons
upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the
court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the
amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate.
5. Upon the claim of P63,000 the evidence for the claimant consisted of the
testimony of Santiago Inacay and Modesto Flores, chief accountant and assistant
accountant, respectively, of the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila. The
two testified that they knew the account of Richard T. Fitzsimmons due to the fact
that Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president of the company that time and it
was incumbent upon them as accountants to know the current account of such
high-ranking officers in order for them to know what to respond in case such
officers made inquiries regarding their accounts.
6. Aside from Santiago Inacay and Modesto Flores, the claimant also called as
witnesses Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-president-
treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the
status of the personal account of the deceased. But upon objection of the
administrator the trial court refused to admit their testimony on that point on the
ground that said witnesses were incompetent under section 26(c) of Rule 123,
they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors but
also vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant
company.
 Summary of claims of the parties (not relevant in the topic on applicability of Dead
Man’s Statute):
Appellant:
-Claim of the company against the estate for P63,868.67.
-Argued that the P64k liability of the company to the deceased should be setoff with
its P63,868.67 claim.
Appellee:
-counterclaim of P90k

Issue:

1. Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against

an executor or administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person,
under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

1. NO.

Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of

parties, the court held that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an
action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

The trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of Belden and Garmezy.
However, it is not necessary to remand the case for the purpose of taking the
testimony of the said witnesses as it would be merely corroborative with the
testimonies of the chief accountant and the assistant accountant who are in the
best position to testify for the status of the account of the deceased.

(But in this case, SC said that the testimonies of the accountants was not able to
satisfactorily prove the claim of the company. Only P 868.67 out of the P 63, 868.67 of
the claim was deemed proper by the court To quote, “Realizing the frailty and
unreability of human memory, especially with regard to figures, after the lapse of more
than five years, we find no sufficient basis upon which to reverse the trial court's finding
that this claim had not been satisfactorily proven”.)

Appellant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila is ordered to pay to the
administrator the sum of P64,500 upon the retransfer by the latter to the former of the
545 shares of stock purchased by the decedent in 1939.
The administrator is ordered to pay to the said company the sum of P868.67
(amount that was only satisfactorily proven, supported with other documents evidencing
the transaction; the 63k was only supported with accountants’ testimonies).
 The claim of the company against the estate for P63,000 and the counterclaim of
the estate against the company for P90,000 are disapproved. The 90k claim of the
administrator/appellee was disapproved by the court on the ground that such amount
was based on a period of time wherein the corporation was not in operation due to the
war.

Razon v. IAC
Digest by: Janzel Borga

Doctrine: The Dead Man’s Statute is not applicable when it is the administrator of the
estate of the deceased which initiated the case or when the case does not involve a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.

Facts:
1. Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the
purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila.
2. On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of
defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian,
however the Stock Certificate was delivered to Razon.
3. When Juan T. Chuidian died, his son, Vicente B. Chuidian filed a complaint
praying that defendants Enrique B. Razon, et. al be ordered to deliver the
certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan
T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc.
4. During trial, Razon testified that the 1,500 shares of stock under Stock
Certificate No. 003 were delivered by the late Chuidian to Razon because
it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock
in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (Razon)
was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession
thereof until such time as he was paid therefor.
5. The RTC ruled that Razon was the owner of the shares of stock.
6. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA applied the Dead Man’s Statute
and disregarded Razon’s testimony.

Issue:
Whether or not Razon’s testimony should be excluded because of the Dead Man’s
Statute.

Ruling:
 No, the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply.
 Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence) states:

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason interest or relationship - The following

persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated.
 (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind.

 The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the
estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the
supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be
tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter
can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties
or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the
law is to ‘guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to
the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.’
 The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an
estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
 In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that
of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon,
Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan
Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was
filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late
Juan T. Chuidian.  
 It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of
the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.  
 Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected
to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was
subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence,
granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section
20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to
have waived the rule.
 However, although the testimony of Razon is admissible, such was not sufficient
to prove that he was the owner of the stocks. For a valid transfer of shares of
stocks, the law requires delivery of the certificates and such must be recorded in
the books of the corporation. Here, the corporation’s books clearly state that
Chuidian was the owner of the stocks.
8. LEONOR MENDEZONA VS. ENCARNACION C. VIUDA DE GOITIA, GR 31739
March 11, 1930
DIGESTED BY: FIDEL CALVO

DOCTRINE: Dead Man’s Statute does not apply if what is being testified against the
executor is a denial of something that happened before the deceased passed away.

KEYWORD: Dead man failed to remit the dividends of the partners. Unpaid partners
claims from the estate of the dead man.
FACTS:

 Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in- fact of the plaintiffs (Leonor
Mendezona and Valentina Izauguirre Nazabal) in the joint-account partnership
known as the "Tren de Aguadas", at that time the manager(Benigno Goitia) of the
aforesaid co-partnership, collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted
to them every year.
 Prior to 1915, the usual dividends which Benigno Goitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor
Mendezona each year were P540, and to plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal,
P216, that from 1915 until his death in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia failed to remit
to the dividends upon their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas".
 Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee of claims and
appraisal of the estate of Benigno Goitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed
from the committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two cases.
 One of the assignment of errors raised by defendant relates to Exhibits A and B,
being the appellees' depositions made before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain,
in accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Counsel for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he did
not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of the committee.
 When these depositions were read in court, the defendant objected to their
admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Her objection referred mainly to the following questions:
1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your partnership in the "Tren de
Aguadas?" Yes, until the year 1914.
2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any report or money on
account of profits upon your shares? He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my
letters.
3. Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account Yes, several times
by letter, but I never received an answer.
4. The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the principals
and their attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to
permit such a question, it would not be reversible error, for that very relationship
is proved by Exhibits C to F, and H to I. As to the other two questions, it is to be
 noted that the deponents deny having received from the deceased Benigno
Goitia any money on account of profits on their shares, since 1915.

ISSUE: WON the deposition violates Dead Man's Statute (NO)

RULING:

Dead Man’s Statute does not apply if what is being testified against the executor
is a denial of something that happened before the deceased passed away.

Dead Man’s Statute covers only the testimony of a witness respecting the occurrence of
a fact. It does not apply if the testimony if that a certain fact did not exist.

We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death
of their attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions
(section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a witness directly
interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of
fact which took place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle of this
prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this protection
should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims
against the decedent's estate

Distinguished from the case of Maxilom

The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotado (9 Phil., 390), differ from those in the
case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased
Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in his favor and
against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was signed by both
Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a
claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37, Mexican currency, alleging that
P750 which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that
therefore instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a
balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of
section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify in
his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the liquidation
made by and between himself and the decedent.

But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and
the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the
rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those of the
other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary estate. We
do not believe that this was the legislator's intention.

The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before their
representative's death, but on the contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they
denied that a liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their
shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It was incumbent
upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true,
either by bringing into court the books which the attorney-in- fact was in duty bound to
keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was
the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence.

The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent showing an
item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of
Valentina Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of Ruperto Santos, who
succeeded Benigno Goitia in the administration of said partnership, to the effect that the
deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the plaintiffs as dividends on
their shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and
P36 for Valentina Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by the deceased to
the plaintiffs.

GARCIA v. ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS

Digest by: Mary Shane E. Capuno
DOCTRINE:
Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party
is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction." Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro
Caparas (Pedro) that he entered into a sharing of leasehold lights with the petitioners
cannot be used as evidence against the herein respondent as the latter would be
unable to contradict or disprove the same.
FACTS:
1. Flora Makapugay owned a 2.5 hectare farm in Bulacan.
2. Under a leasehold agreement, the said land was tilled by Eugenio Caparas as an
agricultural lessee.
3. Both Makapugay and Caparas died.
4. Makapugay was succeeded by her nephews and niece; one of which was
Amanda who was appointed as Makapugay’s attorney-in-fact before she passed
away.
5. Eugenio Caparas (lessee) was succeeded by his 3 children- Modesta, Cristina
and Pedro.
6. Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled “Kasunduan sa Buwisan”
and was followed by an Agricultural leasehold contract wherein in both
agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee
and cultivator of the land.
7. Pedro then passed away and his wife took over as agricultural lessee.
8. Subsequent to Pedro’s death, the owners of the land (Makapugay’s heirs)
entered an agreement (1996 “Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa”) with Cristina and
Modesta (Pedro’s sisters) whereby both of them were acknowledged as Pedro’s
co-lessees.
9. Cristina and Modesta then filed a complaint for nullification of leasehold and
restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s heirs.
THE SISTERS’ ARGUMENT:
10. When their father Eugenio died, they entered into an agreement with Pedro that
they would alternately farm the land on a “per-season basis”
11. They also argued that the landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement and
that when Makapugay passed away, Pedro reneged on their agreement and
cultivated the land all by himself and deliberately excluding them and
misrepresented to Amanda that he was the sole heir of Eugenio (father).
12. When Amanda knew of Pedro’s misrepresentations, she executed an
Affidavit stating among others that Pedro assured her that he would not
deprive his sisters of their “cultivatory rights”.
13. The “Kasunduan sa Buwisan sa Lupa” executed by the now owners and the
sisters corrects such matters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Amanda’s declaration in her affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged
admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is admissible in evidence.
RULING: NO.
 Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and
recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible in evidence for being
a violation of the Dead Man’s statute.
 Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda's declaration which pertains to the
leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which
she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is now the subject matter
of the present case and claim against Pedro's surviving spouse and lawful
successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used
against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being
unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-
declarant Pedro's prior death.
From Atty. T’s discussion in the transcript on expounding Amanda being the assignor:
SC said, Amanda is obviously the source of the right asserted by the two sisters. In
that sense, Amanda is deemed to be the assignor of the plaintiffs. So, being the
assignor of the plaintiff, even if Amanda was not the plaintiff herself, Amanda was
disqualified under the Dead Man Statute.
10. Uy Chico vs. Union Life Assurance Society, Ltd.
G.R. No. 9231, January 6, 1915
Digest by: Zayra Correos

DOCTRINE: When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering
the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon
it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged
communication between the attorney and his client.

FACTS:
1. Uy Chico, the plaintiff, seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies
upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire.
2. Uy Layco, father of plaintiff, owned a business which Uy Chico and his brother
took over when their father died in 1897.
3. Before the date of the fire, Uy Chico purchased his brother’s interest in the
business and continued to carry on the business under his father’s name. At the
time of the fire, the business was heavily indebted; thus, creditors petitioned for
the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Uy Layco.
4. During these proceedings, Uy Chico’s attorney surrendered the policies of
insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance
company for one-half their face value, or P6,000.
5. Uy Chico now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured
belong to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is
not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father’s estate.

UNION LIFE’S CONTENTION:

6. Union Life sought to show that Uy Chico had agreed to the compromise
settlement of the policies and introduced evidence showing that Uy Chico’s
attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding
that such a compromise was to be effected.
7. Uy Chico was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his
attorney’s testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied
in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon,
counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the
plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was
privileged.
8. Union Life alleges that a waiver of the client’s privilege may be withdrawn at any
time before acted upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony in question is privileged

RULING:

NO. Sec. 31, Act No. 190 provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court,
without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to
him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice
upon legal matters."

The evidence in question concerned the dealings of Uy Chico’s attorney with a third
person. The very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made
between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the
information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, but for the purpose of advising
the client as to his rights.

It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express
purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the
confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by
delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter
acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply
occupies the role of intermediary or agent.

It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of Uy Chico’s attorney as to his

authority to compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that
when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there
was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the
surrender of the policies, the plaintiff made no objection whatsoever. The evidence is
sufficient to show that Uy Chico acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the
policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an
action for the recovery of their face value.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment dismissing the complaint is affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Topic: Privileged Communications

Facts:
1. This is an offshoot of the cases filed against Eduardo Cojuangco for the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth which includes shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG
Case No. 33.
2. Among the defendants in that case were the partners of ACCRA Law Firm. In the
performance of their legal services, the members of the law firm delivered to its
client documents which substantiate the client’s stockholdings, and also acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations.
3. The partners admitted that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in said Case.
4. They were included as defendants because it was alleged that they conspired in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate
framework and structures of the named companies (such as UCPB, COCOLIFE)
through the use of insidious means and machinations.
5. During said proceedings, PCGG excluded the other defendant from another law firm,
Raul Roco, on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee-stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case.
No. 33.
6. Consequently, the ACCRA lawyers, in their “Comment and Opposition”, asked that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as
defendants) as accorded Raul Roco.
7. PCGG responded by setting the following conditions precedent: (a) disclosure of
the identity of its clients, (b) submission of documents substantiating lawyer-client
relationship, and (c) submission of the deeds of assignments executed in favor of its
clients covering their shareholdings.
8. ACCRA lawyers refused to comply with the conditions set by PCGG; thus, they
were not excluded by the Sandiganbayan as asked for in their Opposition.
9. Hence, they filed this petition for certiorari.

ACCRA’s Arguments:

Issue:
Whether ACCRA may be compelled to disclose the name of his clients

SC Ruling: NO! Covered by privileged communication

Rules as to Privileged Communication between Lawyers and Clients
1. As a matter of public policy, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client, except:
a. A strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice
b. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability
c. Government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client, unless, by
revealing his client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that
 would from the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime.
d. The content is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
client seeks legal assistance
e. Such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
2. The name is as much “communication” as information revealed directly about the
transaction in questions itself, which is clearly and distinctly privileged.

The instant case falls under two exceptions – First, disclosure of the alleged
client’s name would lead to establish said client’s connection with the very fact in
issue of the case.
1. The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly established by no less than PCGG itself (see PCGG conditions
above).
2. From the conditions, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted
ACCRA regarding the financial corporate structure, framework, and set-up of the
corporations in question.
3. There is no question that the preparation of the documents was part and parcel of
ACCRA’s legal service to their clients.
4. Therefore, ACCRA has a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought.

Second, the client’s name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
1. A case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal
and consults his attorney about it falls within the exception because his name cannot
be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of
the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
2. Revealing the name of ACCRA’s clients would open up other privileged information
which would substantiate the prosecution’s suspicions. This privilege seeks to avoid
the exploitation which may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution. There
are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecution.
3. The prosecution’s case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources, and not from compelled testimony.

In sum, by compelling ACCRA not only to reveal the identities but also to submit
documents to the PCGG would exact from them a link that would inevitably from
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the client of a crime.

Other Issues
1. Not offering ACCRA the same option given to Raul Roco violates the equal
protection clause because it is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant
from prosecution without allowing the same to others.
2. PCGG’s offer also violates the attorney-client privilege (as discussed above).

Dissenting Opinion, might be asked

1. The lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of a client’s
identity where the lawyer and the client are conspirators in the commission of a
crime or fraud.
2. The person claiming the privilege or its exception has the obligation to present the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege, which ACCRA has
failed to show.
3. The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness and may only
be invoked at the appropriate time.
12. PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
By: Dela Torre

DOCTRINE: Lawyer-client privilege communication rule covers only information relating

to past acts not present or future acts. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but extends to information
communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.

FACTS
1. Congressman Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a
parcel of land. A certificate of title was then issued in his name.
2. Several cases were filed against Paredes where he was represented by Atty.
Sansaet as counsel.
A. Director of Lands filed an action for cancellation of the free patent
and certificate of title since the land had been designated as a
school site. The trial court rendered a judgment nullifying said
patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained through
fraudulent misrepresentations.
B. For perjury was filed against Paredes. It was dismissed because of
prescription.
C. For violation of the Anti-Grant and Corruption Practices Act for
allegedly using his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for patent.
3. As a defense, Paredes contends that he had already been charged under the
same facts and evidence where the complaint was already dismissed –
perjury case because he was already arraigned. Hence, double jeopardy has
attached. He presented court records and transcripts as proof of his
arraignment in the perjury case.
4. A taxpayer who had initiated the previous charges against Paredes sent a
letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the respondents
(including Atty. Sansaet) for falsification of public documents. He claimed that
they simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be
a notice of arraignment and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly
taken during arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge; that these
falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes’ motion for
reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of graft charge
against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute
double jeopardy.
5. Informations for falsification of public documents were filed against each of
the respondents including Atty. Sansaet.
6. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, Atty. Sansaet
claimed he did so upon instigation and inducement of Paredes. He then
offered to testify as a state witness.
 7. Paredes argued that Atty. Sansaet is not allowed to be a state witness
because it would violate the privileged communication rule between lawyer
and client.
8. Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of Attorney-Client privilege
since the lawyer could not testify against his own client.

ISSUE

1. W/N the testimony of Atty. Sansaet is barred by the privileged communication

rule
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in not considering the discharge of Atty. Sansaet
as a state witness

RULING

1. No, attorney-client privilege cannot apply in this case.

The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the

client to his attorney but extends to information communicated by the client to
the attorney by other means.

Statements and communications, regarding the commission of a crime already

committed made by a party who committed it, to an attorney consulted as such
are privileged communications. However, communications between attorney
and client having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the privileged communication rule. The
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.

In order that a communication between a lawyer and client may be privileged, it

must be for a lawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
privilege from attaching. Every communication made to an attorney by a client
for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge but
which the attorney may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.

In this case, the communications made by Paredes to Atty. Sansaet by physical

acts and accompanying words were confidential because Paredes would not
have invited Atty. Sansaet to his house to witness the said acts if not under
secrecy and confidentiality. It was for purposes of and in reference to the crime
of falsification which had not yet been committed but which Paredes later
committed. Furthermore, Atty. Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the
commission of the crime of falsification. The reckoning period is not the time the
testimony is given or the filing of the case but at the time the information was
given. The information relates to the meeting of Paredes and Atty. Sansaet
where they planned to falsify records. The plan was not yet committed. Hence, a
future crime.
Having made for purposes of a future crime, it is not covered by the privileged
communication rule.

2. Yes, the Sandiganbayan should have considered the discharge of Atty.

Sansaet as a state witness.

In People vs Ocimor, the Supreme Court provided guidelines to determine the

qualification of a state witness:

a. Necessity
b. No other direct testimony other than his testimony
c. Testimony could be substantially corroborated in its material
points
d. Does not appear to be the most guilty – determined not based on
the penalty but taking into account the degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense
e. No evidence that he has been at any time convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude

Applying to the case at bar:

a. It is necessary because the co-respondents consistently deny the

charge. Furthermore, Atty. Sansaet is the only cooperative
eyewitness to the commission of the crime
b. No other direct evidence is available for the prosecution, hence,
there is absolute necessity for his testimony.
c. His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material
points by reliable witnesses.
d. It does not appear that Atty. Sansaet has at any time been
convicted of any other offense involving moral turpitude

Given the foregoing, the Court is of the view that the other requisites for
the discharge as a state witness are present and should have been
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
US v. Gordon-Nikkar
Digested by: Juliano Luis L. Dimitui

DOCTRINE: Attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an

intended crime.

Facts:
1. Ana Gordon-Nikkar was convicted of three counts of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute approximately four kilograms of cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute and distribution of the cocaine.
2. Her conviction was based on the testimony of a Government witness, Brenda
Marchand. Her testimony allegedly came from a privileged conversation between
Gordon-Nikkar’s counsel (Atty. Estrumsa) and his clients.
3. Marchand was charged as a co-defendant with the crimes for which Gordon-
Nikkar was convicted. She pleaded guilty and testified at trial for the
Government.
4. Gordon-Nikkar, upon appeal of her conviction, contended that her conviction be
reversed because the district court permitted a Government witness, Marchand,
to give testimony regarding allegedly privileged conversations between Gordon-
Nikka’s counsel and his clients.

Factual Background:
1. Marchand had two meetings in the office of Atty. Estrumsa.
2. On the said meetings, several of the co-defendants were present.
3. Marchand was not a client of Atty. Estrumsa and it was not clear whether the
persons present therein were also his clients.
4. There were two conversations related by Marchand.

Contents of the conversation:

a. The second conversation involved Estrumsa’s alleged recommendation that
Marchand leave the country and go to Venezuela.
b. The Government inquired into the substance of the first meeting. Marchand
testified that at this meeting the participants, at Atty. Estrumsa’s suggestion,
agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the effect that none of them
had possessed the cocaine, but instead merely happened to be at a party where
the cocaine was discovered.

Issue:
- Whether or not the statements Attorney Estrumsa’s office were protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
- Whether or not the statements are admissible as evidence.

Ruling:
A. NO. STATEMENTS WERE NOT PROTECTED BY THE PRIVILEGE AND
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.

1. There were at least 5 persons present in the office of Atty. Estrumsa which
included Brenda Merchand. These persons are not clients of Atty. Estrumsa.
2. A communication divulged to strangers or outsiders can scarcely be considered
confidential communication between attorney and client.
3. This communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.

B. YES. THE STATEMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.

1. Even if it appeared that the communication in question were otherwise privileged

(i.e., that the communication was considered confidential despite the presence of
a stranger), the testimony was nonetheless admissible.
2. The conversations in question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to hide
the criminal activity of appellant and the others.
3. It is beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications regarding an intended crime.
4. The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration
of justice.
5. It would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect
communications designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to
conceal past misdeeds.
US v. McPartlin
Digest by: Ebo

Principle:
The client-lawyer privilege rule applies in communications between joint parties with
common interest and their counsels, pursuant to the joint interest privilege or common
defense rule.
Communications to the agent of the lawyer is also communications to the lawyer.

Facts:
This is a criminal case for conspiring to violate the Travel Act and the Wire, Radio,
Television Fraud Act. Libog ni nga kaso daghan facts. Basaha nalang sad ninyo ang
version ani nga gidiscuss ni sir sa transcript.

1. The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with primary responsibility for

disposing of sewage from Chicago and surrounding areas. It operates a sewage
treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois.
2. The sludge produced as a by-product was disposed of by pumping it into nearby
lagoons. The lagoons were rapidly filled and efforts to clean it had failed, so the District
announced plans to have the sludge hauled and solicited bids on the project.
3. (Short facts: Benton (VP of Ingram Corporation), acting with the knowledge and
complicity of Ingram (Chairman of the Board of Ingram Corporation) and through
intermediaries Bull (President of a towing company) and Weber (A businessman),
bribed McPartlin (Illinois legislator) and Janicki (Trustee of the Metropolitan Sanitary
District) to cause the sludge-hauling contract to be awarded to Ingram Corporation and
Ingram Contractors Inc (subsidiary), and later bribed the same officials to secure
favorable treatment under the contract and modifications of the contract.)
4. In a meeting, Bull and Weber told Benton that if Ingram Corporation wanted the
project, it would have to make a $250,000 (later on raised to $450,000 tungod sa
competitors) political contribution. Benton then called Ingram about the matter, to which
the latter agreed. Nangayo sad ug share sa bayad si Bull ug Weber.
5. When McPartlin and Benton met, the former assured the latter that Ingram
Corporation would receive at least $21,500,000 in total revenue from the contract.
6. During the bidding, Oberle (employee of Ingram) bid $16,990,000, and was instructed
by Benton/Webber to go to a bar to meet Janicki, which he did. Janicki told Oberle to
raise the bid to $17,990,000, to which he did.
7. The Sanitary District Board awarded the contract to Ingram Corporation.
8. Janicki and Weber told Benton that the corporation would receive an additional
$2,100,000 by billing the Sanitary District a second time for the construction of a
pipeline. The Illinois Commerce Commission granted Ingram Corporation’s request for a
certificate of convenience and necessity.
9. Ingram Barge Corporation began transporting sludge but was six days delayed, so
the Sanitary District assessed liquidated damages, however was withdrawn.
10. Janicki wanted $100,000 payment asap, however, when Benton informed Ingram of
this request, the latter refused and said that no payments would be made until the
Sanitary District began making payments on the pipeline.
11. Weber called Benton that the Sanitary District would issue a $1,000,000 as partial
payment, however, Janicki disclaimed any knowledge of such. Benton threatened to
“jerk the rug” from under everyone in Chigago.
12. Weber told Benton that there is a difficulty in getting the Sanitary District to pay the
additional $2,100,000 for the pipeline, and Ingram Corporation would have to increase
its contribution to $620,000. Basta after ani detailed na kayo ang contractual facts, pero
puros ra bayad bayad nya lay 9 letters of credit nga drawn and negotiated in a Swiss
bank, nya sige nag larga-larga.
Sugod nang kaso!
13. A federal grand jury commenced an investigation of the events surrounding the
sludge-hauling contract, and it granted immunity to Benton.
14. Throughout the period covered by the indictment, Benton kept diaries, or
appointment calendars, in which he made notes concerning meetings and telephone
conversations, naming the persons involved and often recording the substance of the
conversations. The Benton diaries figured prominently in the government's case, for
they corroborated much of his testimony.
15. It was important for the defense to destroy Benton’s credibility, because their
account of the events in issue differed materially from Benton’s testimony, and the
government’s case is largely hinged on that testimony. Naay content sa entries sa diary
nga di umano nakadawat ug payments si McPartlin.
16. An investigator acting for Ingram’s counsel twice interviewed McPartlin for the
purpose of determining whether there was a basis for challenging the truth of some
diary entries.
17. In the interviews, McPartlin made certain statements (which were made in
confidence), which Ingram argues tend to support his defense and offered these
statements as evidence.
18. McPartlin objected on the ground of the attorney-client privilege.
19. Ingram argued that this privilege communication does not apply because McPartlin
was not the client of Mr. Ingram’s lawyer and the one who received the information was
not a lawyer but an investigator hired by Mr. Ingram’s lawyer.

ISSUE:
WON the attorney-client privilege is applicable. YES

RULING:
1. McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his
statements were made in confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common
purpose related to both defenses.
2. They were made in connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton, a
project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly engaged for the
benefit of both defendants.
3. Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of
common concern is important for the protection of their interest, and is covered under
the privileged communication rule. There is no waiver and such cannot be inferred from
the disclosure in confidence to a co-party’s attorney for a common purpose.
4. This privilege applies even if the position and defenses of the different parties are not
compatible in all respects. The privilege protects pooling of information for any defense
purpose common to the participating defendants.
5. Even if it was made to an investigator and not the attorney himself, the investigator
was an agent of the attorney, and so it is as if the communications made to the former is
also made to the latter.
6. When the Ingram and McPartlin camps decided to join in an attempt to discredit
Benton, the attorney for each represented both for purposes of that joint effort. The
attorney who thus undertakes to serve his client's co-defendant for a limited purpose
becomes the co-defendant's attorney for that purpose.
STATEMENTS MADE BY MCPARTLIN TO THE AGENT OF INGRAM’S LAWYER
ARE INADMISSIBLE.
Nelly LIM vs COURT OF APPEALS & (PR: Juan Lim)
By: Epibelle M. Eder
Doctrine: PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE: The physician may be
considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient"
are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the
communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated.”
Facts:
1. Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other. Private
respondent filed a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia
"before, during and after the marriage and until the present." private respondent’s
counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor
of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the
motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
2. Petitioner’s claim (loser): Having seen and examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on
the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship.
3. Private Respondent’s claim (1st placer): Dr. Acampado would be presented as
an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. 
4. he information given by Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach
to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court and the
public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called
schizophrenia — which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the
name and reputation of petitioner and her family.
5. Trial court: denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado
thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private respondent as
an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of
expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the
petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she
had prescribed.
6. Petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.  The Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3
denying due course to the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr.
Acampado, thus, no grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned as an expert witness and not as
an attending physician of petitioner.’ (AS AN EXPERT WITNESS)
 2. Whether or not there was violation of the privileged communication. (NONE)

Ruling:
1. As an Expert witness
Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. The physician may be
considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient"
are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the
communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."

2. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden.

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of four (4) fundamental
conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
certain communications, to wit:jgc:chanrobles

"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.

2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory

maintenance of the relation between the parties.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered

4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."

In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She
did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment of the petitioner. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem
did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor
obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr.
Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical
problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise
stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about
the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. 
Furthermore, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the
information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s "character".
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum  the petitioner makes no claim in any of
her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege.  Even granting ex gratia
that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to
seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

Dispositive portion:
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
KROHN (MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN)
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., 
Digest by: Alyanna Fuego
DOCTRINE: Doctor-Patient Privileged Communication does not apply if person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
FACTS:
1. Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married and had three children.
However, the relationship became sour.
2. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease
the marital strain, but this proved to be futile. In 1973, they finally separated in
fact.
3. In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on
Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes.
4. Presenting the report among others, Edgar obtained a decree ("Conclusion")
from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church
marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." 
a. On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and
Definite."
5. In 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz
before the trial court. 
a. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
irrelevant." 
6. At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents
of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
a. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient.
7. Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any
evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient privileged
communication rule,"  and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record
asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for
Edgar to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground
being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought."
8. Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential
psychiatric report as evidence, and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz'
Statement for the Record.
9. However, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence for the following reasons:
a. The very issue is whether or not the respondent had been suffering from
psychological incapacity;
b. When the said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the
respondent did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed
privileged communication between patient and physician. What was raised
by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was irrelevant;
 c. In the interest of justice and for the purpose of determining whether the
respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering from psychological
incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very material and may be testified
to by Edgar without prejudice on the part of Ma. Paz to dispute the said
report or to cross-examination first the petitioner and later the psychiatrist
who prepared the same if the latter will be presented.
10. CA denied petition for certiorari; sided with CFI’s decision.
11. Ma. Paz now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of
the psychiatric report.
MA. PAZ’S CONTENTIONS:
1. She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits
a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending
to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third
person (like Edgar) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings
or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of
his confidential and privileged relation with a patient."
2. To allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation
report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets
circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and
confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 
EDGAR’S CONTENTIONS:
1. "The rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician.
a. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable where the person
sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the
husband and not the physician of the petitioner." 
2. The Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify against
his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
a. Privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled thereto,
and this Ma. Paz expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent
to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to
the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account
among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and
void.
3. Ma Paz also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to
the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described the
evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." Failure to interpose a timely
objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged
matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
ISSUE: WON the rile on Privileged Communication applies in this case – NO, because
Edgar is an ordinary person, NOT a doctor.
HELD: Petition DISMISSED; CA ruling UPHELD.
RATIO:
1. Statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged are
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full
disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 
 a. This prevents the physician from making public information that will result
in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient.
b. Certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-
patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy,  including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records
confidential.
c. It has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded
upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented
by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to
secure the services of a psychotherapist.
2. HOWEVER, successful invocation of the privilege has requisites, as per
Lim v. Court of Appeals, namely:
a. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
b. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
c. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
d. The information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity;
and,
e. The information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
3. In this case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
a. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners.
b. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of
the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
4. Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
respondent on the ground that it was privileged.
a. In his Manifestation before the trial court, he invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay.
b. It was a fatal mistake, because in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such
objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC, vs. NEOMI and DANILO OLIVARES

Facts:
1. Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with Blue Cross Health
Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm for the period October 16, 2002 to October
15, 2003, in the amount of P11, 117.
2. In the health care agreement, ailments due to "pre-existing conditions" were
excluded from the coverage. (Take note!!)
3. Barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance, she suffered from a
stroke and was admitted to the accredited hospital of the respondent (Medical
City) and incurred medical expenses amounting to 32K
4. She then requested petitioner to settle her medical expenses but the same was
denied pending the submission of a certification from her attending physician that
the stroke she suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition.
5. When Blue Cross still refused to pay, she filed suit in the MTC for collection of
sum of money and the petitioner rebutted by saying that the physician didn’t
disclose the condition due to the patient’s invocation of the doctor-client privilege.
6. The MTC dismissed for a lack of cause of action because the physician didn’t
disclose the condition.
7. In the RTC, reversed the ruling and awarded the spouses in the amount of the
hospital bill plus 60K in damages stating that it was the burden of petitioner to
prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from the coverage of
the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing condition and failed to
do so.
8. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Bluecross

Issues:
(1) Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by
a pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health
care agreement
(2) Whether it was liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees

Ruling:
1. NO. In Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a health care
agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance. It is an established rule in
insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability, they
should be construed strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion
the terms of which must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the
insurer which prepared the contract. This doctrine is equally applicable to health
care agreements.

Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi’s stroke
was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely speculated that Dr. Saniel’s report
would be adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient
privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best.
 Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are satisfactory

if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the
disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Here, respondents’ refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel’s
report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and
patient. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict
standard required under our jurisprudence.

2. YES. The court quoted the CA and RTC decision stating that “ the refusal of
petitioner to pay respondent Neomi's bills smacks of bad faith, as its refusal [was]
merely based on its own perception that a stroke is a pre-existing condition. The
RTC and CA found that there was a factual basis for the damages adjudged
against petitioner.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 29, 2005 decision and
September 21, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84163 are
AFFIRMED.

(‘Bout that bass, No) Treble costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN
Digest by: Garrido
Doctrine:
 The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a
physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in
a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latter’s reputation.

 The time to object to the admission of evidence would be at the time they are
offered. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall
become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed
by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

 The right to compel the production of documents (a discovery procedure) has a

limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

 The rule that if a part of a transaction, writing or record is given in evidence, the
remainder is admissible, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence,
applies only when the trial has already started and the party presenting such is
already bound to adduce evidence.

Facts:
1. Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her.
2. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs.
3. Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely
duties. He agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the
hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an
injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained
Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her
ended.
4. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim
Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined
at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital.
5. In support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity, Josielene filed
with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was
 there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to
submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
6. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege citing Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence.
7. RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari
before the CA.
8. CA denied Josielene’s petition.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
1. The privilege does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the
physician at the trial.
2. Since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had
been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have
waived the privileged character of the records.
Issue:
1. WON the request for subpoena duces tecum and the subsequent objection are
premature.
2. WON the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
3. WON Johnny should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of his
medical records since he admitted in his answer that he had been confined in a
hospital against his will and he attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form
covering that confinement.
Ruling:
1. YES. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a
civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a

physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in
a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latter’s reputation.

The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they
are offered. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request
 for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination
at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence
quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

2. NO. It is possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena

duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of
documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial.

Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party
showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a)
order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control;
xxx

The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the
examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital

records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the
patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would
be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

3. NO. Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may
be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given
in evidence.

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that
Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act
contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into
the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his
hospital records would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying
Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
The Court DENIES the petition.
NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

DOCTRINE
Rule 130 Sec 24 (e): A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court
finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.

FACTS
1. On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of (approximately P16 Billion). The Project
was to be financed by the People's Republic of China.
2. In connection with this NBN Project, various resolutions were introduced in the
Senate to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal.
3. Petitioner Romulo Neri was among those invited to appear and testify.
4. In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
5. On Sept 26, 2007 hearing Petitioner Neri disclosed that then COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project.
6. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
7. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
Neri refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on
a. whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
b. whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
c. whether or not she directed him to approve.
8. Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring
him to appear and testify on Nov. 20, 2007.
9. However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's
testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
10. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause
Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
a. On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only
remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege
11. In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R.
Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was
 upon the order of the President; and(2) his conversation with President Arroyo
dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating
to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the
possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner's request that he "be furnished in
advance" as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare
for the hearing.
NERI’S CONTENTIONS
12. Neri filed with the SC a petition for certiorari assailing the show cause letter and
contempt order:
a. They were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
b. His conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions” which "dwelt on the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country's
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines."
c. His claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within
the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita and United States v. Reynolds.
d. He is precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official
confidence under Section 7 12 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
and Section 24 13 (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES
1. Are the communications elicited by the subject (3) questions covered by
executive privilege? YES.
2. Whether the claim of executive privilege is properly invoked. YES
3. Did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order? YES.

RULING
THERE IS A RECOGNIZED CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
1. In Chavez v. PCGG, SC held that there is a "governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other security matters." In Chavez v. PEA, there is also a recognition of the
confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions
in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE:
a. The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power."
b. The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President.
c. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
 sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE SUBJECT (3) QUESTIONS ARE
COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
2. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China."
3. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
4. ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE MET:
a. First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable
power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
b. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet.
c. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
5. Nixon vs. Sirica, where it was held that presidential communications privilege are
presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by
mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
6. Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the (3)
questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards
the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI
rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that "the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation."
7. Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard
against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing.
a. in United States v. Nixon that "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in
pending criminal trial" outweighs the President's "generalized interest in
confidentiality."
b. Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita
stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not
only on the ground invoked but, also, the procedural setting or the context
in which the claim is made.
 8. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
a. SC might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear
before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
b. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Some of these are Section 7 of (R.A.) No. 6713, Article 229 of the
Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24 (e)
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information
9. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it
does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its
power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
10. The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in
their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general.
THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS PROPERLY INVOKED
11. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter." A
formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain
reason" for preserving their confidentiality.
12. The Letter of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There he expressly states that "this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in
Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly."
13. With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason", SC found the
grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to
leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged."
14. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made "whether
the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive." The following statement
of grounds satisfies the requirement:
a. The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.
 15. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-
equal department.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE CONTEMPT ORDER
16. Respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and
precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass
upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead,
they curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" and simultaneously
issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and
detention.
LEE v. CA

Doctrine:
 The rule on parental and filial privilege applies only to "direct" ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.
 The stepmother cannot invoke parental and filial privilege because she has no
common ancestry with her stepchildren.

FACTS:
1. Spouses Lee (father) and Keh (mother), both surnamed Cheng, entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China with their 11 children.
2. In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. However, the Lee-Keh children later learned
that Tiu had a relation with their father and had 8 children.
3. Upon Lee’s death, Tiu’s children claimed that they were also children of Lee and
Keh.
4. Upon a request for NBI investigation by the Lee-Keh children, it was found that
the hospital records of Lee-Tiu children listed Keh as their mother. However,
Keh's declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other 8 children.
5. Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions: (1) a special proceeding for the
deletion of the name Keh from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma
Lee, one of Lee's other children, and replace the same with the name Tiu to
indicate her true mother's name; (2) an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed mother, to
testify in the case.
6. Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
the rule on parental privilege under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
she being Emma Lee's stepmother.
7. Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and
testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to
harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right
not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

ISSUE:
 WON Tiu may be compelled to testify in the correction of entry case that
respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of
petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter

RULING:
1. Yes, Tiu may be compelled to testify against Emma Lee.
2. Tiu cannot invoke filial privilege on the claim that she is the stepmother of
petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
 3. Article 965 of the Civil Code provides: The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend
from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

--- Collateral Matters:

4. The Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in
the certificates of birth of Lee's other children, Emma Lee included. The ultimate
object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee's other children were not
children of Keh. Obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the
mother of Lee's other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and
so could not give testimony that Lee's other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh
children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu's testimony.
5. Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering
by adverse counsel. The trial court's duty is to protect every witness against
oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness
is of advanced age.
Estrada v Desierto, GR Nos 146710-15, 4/3/2001, Puno, J
By Larena, Rehne Gibb

HEARSAY; INAPPLICABLE. A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that

we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they
do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class.

Facts
1) Motion for Reconsideration on the Decision of SC declaring Estrada as resigned
and installing Arroyo as the new President on January 20, 2001.
2) In this Resolution, the Court focussed on its use of the Angara Diary which was
heavily disputed by Estrada in this MR.
Issue
1) WON the SC erred for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and
occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned.
2) WON the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule.

Held
(1) NO. SC used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned.
SC referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to
the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are
well-established and cannot be refuted.
All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was
no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers
reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being
hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud
protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false.
(2) YES. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara
Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity
to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

ANGARA DIARY NOT COVERED

UNDER THE HEARSAY RULE
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its
use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative
force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for
excluding hearsay evidence:
(1) absence of cross examination;
(2) absence of demeanor evidence, and
(3) absence of the oath.
Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a
huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether
the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a
party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that
"the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him." It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible
even if they are hearsay.
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as
admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not
be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief
of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second
envelope would be opened by Monday and "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na,
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I don't want any more of this - it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go.

ADOPTIVE ADMISSION
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An
adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of something stated
or implied by the other person. Jones explains that the "basis for admissibility of
admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party
of the statements which the other person had made." To use the blunt language of
Mueller and Kirkpatrick, "this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common
sense."
In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed
forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner
to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation." Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioner's silence
on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.

EXCEPTION TO THE
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule
on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, viz: "The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided."
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several
exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to
admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours
and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace.
Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: "Mula umpisa
pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa
rin." (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I've listened to.
And now at the end, you still are.)"
Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the
acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on
the principal (petitioner).

INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS

NOT COVERED BY THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are
true or not. They belong to two (2) classes:
(1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
The second class includes the following:
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of
mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of
the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind
and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of
Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner's intent to resign.
They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long
been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioner's attempt to foment a belated
tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.

THE RULES ON AUTHENTICATION OF

PRIVATE WRITINGS AND BEST EVIDENCE
WERE NOT VIOLATED
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best
evidence were violated in our Decision. It is true that the Court relied not upon the
original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best
evidence rule.

Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section
20 of Rule 132.

However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not
object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence.

In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the
admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memoranda. He was therefore not
denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had "been given an
opportunity to inspect" the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is
already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the
Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis
thereof.

Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15
and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.
22. PEOPLE vs. GODOY

DOCTRINE:
 No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement
outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations.
 For handwritten documents, resort to handwriting experts, is not mandatory.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting. This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.

FACTS:
1. Accused-Appellant Danny Godoy (Godoy) was charged with two separate
informations before the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City for;
a. Rape
b. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
2. According to the complainant Mia Taha (Mia) 17 years old, at around 7:00 pm of
January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan.
3. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a
knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was
then forced to lie down on the floor and Godoy started raping her.
4. Though it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, as
accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
5. Throughout the ordeal she was so frightened as the knife was continually pointed
at her and she was threatened that she and her family will be killed.
6. A day after, she went home to her parents at Ipilan but likewise, did not tell her
parents about the incident out of fear.
7. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, Godoy arrived at the house of her parents
and asked permission from the latter if Mia could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot."
8. They proceeded to Sunset Garden, appellant check in and brought her to a room
where they stayed for 3 days.
9. During that duration, Mia was not allowed to leave the room and was forced to
have sex as Godoy was always carrying a knife.
10. On Jan. 25, 1994, Godoy brought her to a house of a friend (Fernando Rubio) at
Edward’s Subdivision where Godoy allegedly raped her for three times.
11. After 2 days, they left the house after finding out that the Mia was already
declared a missing person. They went to Naem (an Imam) from whom Godoy
asked for help.
12. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle
the case with Godoy (wow).
 13. The next day, Helen (Mia’s mother) and her husband Adjeril went to PNP Station
to have the incident blottered.
14. Later that day, they were informed by Naem that Godoy was willing to marry Mia
and settle the case. Helen acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
15. On Jan. 27, Helen brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and
then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and
kidnapping. They also executed sworn statement before the PNP.
16. Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant Godoy, went to their house and
offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. all three of them, Adjeril,
Helen and Mia, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met
with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. They then executed
an affidavit of desistance.

Version of Defense (Godoy)

17. Godoy first met Mia at school, he said that he fell in love with her because she
often told him " Sir, I love you" (HAHA)
18. He stated that there was no rape and kidnapping that was done as they were in a
serious relationship.
19. Godoy denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset
Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994. Appellant knew that what they were
doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that
she would commit suicide if he left her. 
20. During Godoy’s detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to
appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant dated
February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher,
appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the
handwriting in said letters as that of Mia.
21. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance
was reportedly executed by Mia’s parents. However, he claims that he never
knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court,
that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father in order to settle the case.
22. However, pursuant to a joint resolution issued on March 11, 1994 by the
Prosecutor two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious
illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no
bail recommended in both charges (Too late na ang settlement).

RTC – Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum
penalty of DEATH in both cases. By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed,
these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.

ISSUE:
 Whether the offer of compromise is an admission of Godoy’s guilt? NO
 Whether Godoy is guilty of both charges. NO
RULING:

THE COMPROMISE/ SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PARTIES DID NOT

CONSTITUTE AS ADMISSION OF GODOY’S GUILT.

1. prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to

be an admission of guilt.
2. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence
against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one
of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which
directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into
as regards the penal action.
3. However, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience
of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt.
4. A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly
proves appellant's innocence of the offense charged.
5. As to Godoy’s offer of marriage, he said that it did not come from him but from
Naem who was an Imam who likewise informed appellant that he could be
converted into a Muslim so he could marry Mia.
6. Further, Helen Taha, Mia’s mother, testified that the only persons present during
the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and Godoy’s mother. Godoy
himself was never present in any of the meeting for settlement.
was never present in any of said meetings.
7. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn
from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations.

THE LETTERS OF MIA ADDRESSED TO GODOY ARE ADMISSIBLE.

1. The trial court erred in refusing to give any probative value to these two vital
pieces of evidence (the letters), on the dubious and lame pretext that no
handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.
2. Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document
examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts, is not mandatory.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting.72 This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person.
3. The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the
basis of the examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective
subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined and compared the
 handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing on the test papers
as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions
of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one
and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically
admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.

GODOY IS NOT GUILTY OF RAPE AND KIDNAPPING & SERIOUS ILLEGAL

DETENTION.

1. In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and
ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged
date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
afterthought, rather than a truthful complaint for redress of an actual wrong.
2. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that
appellant had sexual congress with complainant against her will. According to
complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was
already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant
could have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that
time, considering that she does not even live there.
3. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and
intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of
force was not sufficiently established. In rape of the nature alleged in this case,
we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical
evidence showing use of force.
4. Further, Godoy's claim that he and Mia were lovers is fortified by the highly
credible testimonies of several witnesses for the defense (to cite a few);
i. Filomena Pielago - who saw Godoy and Mia sitting on a bench
outside the boarding house were the sexual allegedly occurred.
ii. Fernando Rubio - acquaintance of Godoy, who asked Mia why
she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man.
Mia answered that she really loves him. He heard her call appellant
"Papa". The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.
5. As to the kidnapping, Godoy declared that when they left the house of the Taha
family, Mia was bringing with her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain
her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision. Again, we
cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first
allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a
pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of
her parents who passively looked on without comment.

FINAL NOTE: This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of Godoy.
Indisputably, he took advantage of Mia’s feelings for him and breached his vow of
fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to
complainant and helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her.
Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as an instrument of
human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure
of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal
options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GENER DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 117217 | December 2, 1996 | DAVIDE, JR., J
Digest by GMM

Doctrine: A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to

compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 

Facts: Gener de Guzman raped the sales clerk, Gilda Ambray. The accused followed
her in his blue tricycle (named “Dimple”) when the latter was on her way home that night
from the department store where she worked at. De Guzman offered Gilda a ride home
to which she accepted. When they reached her subdivision near an unfinished house,
the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle
and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she had
taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and
held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused
then dragged her to a vacant lot where he was able to consummate his dastardly desire
despite Gilda’s struggle.

After his consummation, he threatened Gilda not to say anything and that she was his
third victim but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants
and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back. When she got
home, she told her mother and her husband.

Three days after, the parents of the accused, the wife, his children, sister-in-law and a
Resurreccion Quiocho (the accused's kumadre) went to Gilda’s house. Gilda met them,
but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that should not be tolerated."

Issue: WON the plea of forgiveness by the family of the accused can be admissible
against him

Ruling: Yes. The plea for forgiveness is an indication of guilt. Any scintilla of doubt both
as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures
of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda.
The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre and Gilda
herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal
pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of
his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her
forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and
conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon.

Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had
prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and
ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may
be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel
resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or
retribution upon (an offender).
SAN MIGUEL v KALALO
“beer dealer”
Digest by: Nagamora-ne

FACTS:
1. Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products.
2. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with SMC whereby prior to the delivery of
beer products,
-she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner.
- (1)a blank check and (2) a check to be filled up with an amount
corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered.
-At the end of the week, the actual amount due to SMC would be
computed by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and
cases from the value of the goods delivered.
Value of goods delivered – Value of returned empty bottles = Amount due
to SMC
-The amount due to SMC would be written on the blank check and
respondent would fund her account accordingly.

3. The business grew and the delivery increased from 200 to 4000 cases a week.
4. It became difficult for her to keep track of the transaction so she requested for a
regular statement of accounts from petitioner but it failed to comply.
5. To cope up with the increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, SMC
further required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks without informing her of
the breakdown of the balance.
6. She complied but after making several cash payments, she noticed that she still
owed petitioner a substantial amount.
7. She insisted for a detailed statement of account but SMC failed to do so.
8. To protect her rights, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven
checks she had issued to petitioner. The total value of those checks amount to
921,215.
9. SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the dishonored checks.
10. In the face of threats by agents of SMC, Kalalo wrote an Offer of Compromise
wherein Kalalo (1) acknowledged the receipt of statement of account
demanding to pay a sum of money and by way of proposal (2) submitted a
Compromise Agreement to settle the obligation.
11. SMC did not accept the proposal. Instead, it filed a complaint against Bouncing
Checks Law.
12. During the trial and after tallying all cash payments, the net balance was found
out to be 71,009 only.
13. Thereafter, she recanted her Offer of Compromise. She said that the offer was
only because SMC agents threatens her with imprisonment and that she did not
know how much she actually owed petitioner.

SMC’S ARGUMENT:
 1. SMC argues that, in her letter of Offer of Compromise, Kalalo unequivocally
admitted her liability to private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her
counsel. SMC wants the entire value of checks na almost wanmelyon.
Ambisyosa.

ISSUE:
1. Can the Offer of Compromise be considered as evidence against Kalalo?
NO.
2. Is the Offer of Compromise an implied admission of guilt? NO.

RULING:
1. The fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC
cannot be considered as an admission of liability.

-The letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. The

respondent merely acknowledged the receipt of the statement of account and not
the existence of her liability to the petitioner.
-The reasons why compromise offers MUST NOT be considered as evidence
against the offeror are as follows:
1. The law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is
entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in
case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that
end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace
could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many
settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result,
since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his
or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of
weakness.

2. Offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as
admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does
not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a
defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that
his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view
to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively,
hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions.

2. The fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC

cannot be considered as an admission of liability.
 In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)
or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

HERE…
-The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint
against her for violation of Bouncing Checks
-The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal
proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of
guilt.
- Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the
Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of
Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the
final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was
constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioner’s agents. The court give
weight to this justification.
PEOPLE v. YPARRAGUIRRE
Digest by: Laurence Obaob
Doctrine(s):
- SC said that the testimony of witness (Rosita) was credible, reliable, and
trustworthy because she testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The
inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than
weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.
- The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect Rosita's credibility.
She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three
months after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too
long a period to file a complaint for rape.|
Facts:
1. Crispin Yparraguirre was charged for raping Rosita Bacaling (housemaid of
Crispin and his wife Mary Ann in Davao)
2. One evening, while Rosita was cooking porridge for the sps’ 2 children, Crispin
arrived and found the 2 children asleep
3. He gave Rosita a small white envelope containing medicine for her skin disease
(kay nagka rashes ni sya on her thighs and stomach allegedly contracted from
one of the children)
4. Envelope contained 15 tablets; Rosita took all tablets as instructed by Crispin
5. She felt week after a few minutes and fell down
6. Crispin dragged her to the sps’ bed, pointed a hunting knife at her neck, ordered
Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Thereafter, he raped Rosita. Afterwards,
he pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. The latter lost consciousness.
7. Rosita woke up and saw blood on her private parts. Crispin threatened to kill her
should she report the incident to her parents.
8. After a month, Rosita returned to her mother’s house.
9. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. Rosita could not eat, nor function
ordinarily such as dressing herself
10. She underwent physical exam and was confined at the Davao City Mental
Hospital. Physical exam revealed no abnormal findings, but found old lacerations
and that the hymen was not intact.
11. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped
by Crispin.
12. Crispin pled not guilty. He claimed that on the night of the alleged incident, he
was selling fish from 4am until 8pm because of his many customers.
13. RTC found Crispin guilty and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WON the evidence which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita is
credible, reliable, and trustworthy
HELD: YES!
- Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never
wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her
testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion
that her testimony was not contrived.
The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect Rosita's credibility.  
 - She was afraid of Crispin’s threat to her life. The complaint was filed 3 months
after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and 3 months is not too long a period
to file a complaint for rape.
- Rosita was a 17-yr old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family.  It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story
of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on
her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. Rosita
suffered psychologically from the incident.
Other discussions unrelated to the topic:
- The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of
Crispin is not important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the
disease and that Crispin gave her tablets for treatment of the disease.
- Crispin's allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting
the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping
tablets. They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her from making any
resistance to Crispin’s lewd acts. 
Note: there was an issue as to the admissibility of the Offer to Compromise even
before the filing of the complaint. SC said it is admissible.
- No criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made.
Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife.
- An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed
before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required
is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an
offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
- There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, Mary Ann
offered the mother 15k to dissuade her from filing the complaint. Mom refused,
Mary Ann increased the offer to 25k. Still, Mom refused.
Positive identification prevails over Crispin’s defense of alibi
- The positive identification of Crispin as the rapist prevails over his defense of
alibi. It was not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime as the public market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room
and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his
children
3_26_Bank of Commerce v Manalo_Omamalin

BANK OF COMMERCE vs. MANALO

Digested by: Omamalin

DOCTRINE:
1. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.
2. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts.
Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of
habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of
specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere
tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in
nature.

FACTS:
1. The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (“XEI”) owned Xavierville Estate Subdivision (“The
Subdivision”), offering residential lots to individual buyers.
2. 1967, XEI was under negotiations to sell to The Overseas Bank of Manila (“OBM”)
the Subdivision, pending approval of the sale by OBM’s board of directors.
3. In the meantime, XEI continued selling residential lots
4. Here comes Emerito Ramos, XEI’s president. Ramos contracted the services of
Engr. Carlos MANALO for some personal stuff for a professional fee of some P34K.
5. As payment of the P34K, it was proposed that MANALO will buy a some lots in the
Subdivision, and the P34K will be deducted from the downpayment due to XEI.
MANALO (and his wife) chose Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2 of the Subdivision.
6. 1972, thru a LETTER, XEI wrote to Sps. MANALO that (“XEI-LETTER”):
a. Their preferred lots were reserved; total price quoted at P348,060.00.
b. “Upon resumption of sales operations” (since supposedly, they were halted
whilst XEI was under negotations with OBM), Sps. MANALO must pay 20%
downpayment then sign a Contract of Conditional Sale. (TN: they just
agreed on the price and downpayment amount)
7. Thereafter, Sps. MANALO immediately took possession of the property and
introduced improvements (they were allowed to in the XEI-LETTER)
8. 1979, OBM now acquired the Subdivision, TCTs over the subdivision lots were
issued in OBM’s name. Early 1980, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) (herein
PETITIONER) acquired the Subdivision from OBM.
9. 1986, CBM demanded Sps. MANALO to vacate since the latter did not own the lot
(TN: remember the XEI-LETTER? The downpayment and contract signing
never happened lol, so MANALOs have been living in the lot without paying a
single centavo). Of course, Sps. MANALO refused.
10. CBM eventually filed an unlawful detainer case, but after some efforts for amicable
settlement, CBM withdrew the case.
11. THEREAFTER, Sps. MANALO filed a complaint for Specific Performance
demanding that a DOAS be executed in their favor to facilitate transfer to title to
them –
a. Sps. MANALO presented as evidence some Sales Contracts of XEI with
certain buyers Soller, Aguila and Roque to show that “sales operations
had resumed” thus Sps. MANALO are now entitled to sign the Contract of
conditional sale promised in the 1972 XEI-LETTER.
12. CBM DEFENSE: There was never an us! We never perfected a sale! At most XEI
only confirmed the reservations. XEI-LETTER failed to lay down the MANNER OF
PAYMENT, a requirement for meeting of the minds as to the price.
13. RTC/CA – found that a sale was perfected.

CBM ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SC:

14. Manner of payment must also be agreed on to perfect a contract of sale. Since this
was not provided in the XEI-LETTER, there was never a perfected sale. Thus, Sps.
MANALO has no cause of action to demand specific performance.
MANALO ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SC:
15. Just like the Soller, Aguila and Roque Contracts which contracts give installment
plans of 120-180days (IOW, a “manner of payment”), they (Sps. MANALO) also
enjoy the same terms. Thus, contract was perfected.

ISSUE: WON, by proving that the Soller, Aguila and Roque contracts provided for 120-
180day installment plans, Sps. MANALO was also deemed to have been extended the
same terms by XEI

RULING: NO
- The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase
price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not
constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give Sps. MANALO the same mode and
timeline of payment.

SIMILAR ACTS OR PREVIOUS CONDUCT RULE

- Under Section 34 [now 35], Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: Similar acts as
evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

(1) SPECIFICITY AND (2) FREQUENCY: HOW TO PROVE HABIT/CUSTOM

- Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts.
Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of
habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of
specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere
tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in
nature.
- The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might
constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or
pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic
conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
- In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular,
the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit
means a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances.

HERE, SPS. MANALO FAILED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE HABIT OR PATTERN

- Sps. MANALO failed to allege and prove, that as a matter of business usage, habit
or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the
purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts, and that XEI and
Sps. MANALO intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the
two lots in question.
- Sps. MANALO adduced in evidence the three contracts of Soller, Aguila and Roque
merely to prove that XEI “continued to sell lots in the subdivision”; not to prove
usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the
subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months.
- There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision,
including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by
them in the form of service, had executed contracts of conditional sale containing
uniform terms and conditions.

CONCLUSION: No proof of habit = no manner of payment can be inferred = lacking

element to perfect sale = no contract = no cause of action for specific performance

---

SHORT REVIEW ON SALES, AS TO “MANNER OF PAYMENT”

- For a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there must be an
agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the
manner the price is to be paid by the vendee. It is not enough for the parties to agree
on the price of the property. The parties must also agree on the manner of payment
of the price of the property to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract of sale
or contract to sell. This is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment
goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is
tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
- HERE, it is not not enough that the parties agree on the price as well as the amount
of downpayment, they must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the
balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the
sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment
cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale
between the parties.
27. THE LEARNING CHILD v. AYALA ALABANG (G.R. NO. 134268, 7 JULY 2010)
By: June Irekka Orcullo

DOCTRINE:
An admission by any person jointly interested with a party is an exception to the
res inter alios acta rule.

FACTS:
1. Ayala Land sold a parcel of land to Sps. Yuson who in turn sold the same to Sps.
Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso.
2. A Deed of Restriction was annotated on the title of the Sps. Alfonso which
indicated that the property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance of a preparatory school.
3. Sps. Alfonso opened The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC) on the same
property. Later the school expanded to include a grade school program in the
School of Holy Cross.
4. Ayala Alabang wrote several letters to Sps. Alfonso, protesting that they violated
the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions and ordering them from operating the
school.
5. Hence, Ayala filed for an injunction against TLC and Sps. Alfonso, contending
that they violated the following:
● Deed of Restrictions
● MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 or Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region- which classified Ayala Alabang Village as a low-
density residential area, thereby limiting the use of the subject property to the
establishment and operation of a nursery and kindergarten school, which
should not exceed two classrooms.
● Barangay Ordinance No. 3, series of 1991- prohibited the parking on both
sides of the road measuring 8 meters in width.

RTC RULING
6. It ruled in favor of Ayala, ordering TLC to cease and desist from operating
beyond nursery and kindergarten school beyond 2 classrooms.
7. After the Sps. Alfonso filed a Motion for reconsideration, the RTC set aside its
earlier decision.

CA RULING
8. It set aside the decision of the RTC, and reinstated the RTC’s earlier decision in
favor of Ayala.
9. The students of TLC (Aquino et al), alleging that they are minor children who
suffer from various learning disabilities and behaviors benefiting from TLC’s full-
 inclusion program, filed a motion for intervention and a motion for
reconsideration.
10. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration.

ZONING AMENDMENT
11. While the MR was pending in the RTC, Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang
Bayan, passed Resolution 94-179 correcting a typographical error in the
description of the land, adjusting the description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala
Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang." The latter is the subject
property wherein TLC is located.
12. Muntinlupa filed a petition for approval of the resolution before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
13. HLURB ruled that the resolution is not a mere correction of error but an actual
rezoning of property into an institutional area, and remanded the same before the
Sangguniang for the conduct of the required public hearings.
14. After an appeal was filed, the Office of the President ruled that the resolution is a
mere correction of error; hence, it does not require public hearings.
15. The CA upheld the decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Resolution 94-179 is a mere correction of error
2. Whether or not Aquino et. al. may validly file a Motion to Intervene
3. Whether or not Ayala Alabang Village Association is already estopped from
enforcing the Deed of Restrictions

RULING:

1. RESOLUTION 94-179 IS A MERE CORRECTION OF ERROR

The purpose of the resolution was clearly set in the whereby clause which states
that the resolution aims to correct a typographical error. Moreso, both of the Official
Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village shows that the subject
property, described as "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang” as “institutional”. The
official zoning map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance, without
which said ordinance would be considered void. Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-
39 expressly provides that the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa shall be made an
integral part of said ordinance.

2. AQUINO ET. AL CANNOT VALIDLY FILE A MOTION TO INTERVENE

Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is
apparent that Aquino, et al., would not still be in grade school at this time, thus
rendering their alleged interest in this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al., claim to
represent other special children since the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
Motion for Leave to Intervene bore no indication that it was intended as a class action;
they merely sought to represent themselves. Since the interest of Aquino, et al., in the
instant case is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm the denial of their Motion for
Leave to Intervene before the trial court.

Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that Aquino, et al.'s, interest in the
injunction suit had not yet been mooted, their motion will still be denied. Under Sec. 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, the Motion for Leave of Intervention shall be
filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court”. The intervention
cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much
less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own
Decision on appeal.

3. AYALA ALABANG IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE DEED OF

RESTRICTIONS
The Deed of Restrictions which was annotated at the back of the Title merely
limits the use of the subject property for preparatory (nursery and kindergarten school),
without regard to the number of classrooms. The two-classroom limit is actually
imposed by the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for
the National Capital Region which classified Ayala Alabang Village as a low-density
residential area.

TLC and Sps. Alfonso’s main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) had
already abrogated said restrictions by its own acts:
1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had
previously approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24
classrooms, which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on
the Site Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA,
through its president Jesus M. Taסedo, authorized through a letter the
construction of a new "school building extension.”
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as
allegedly proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development
Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar.
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional.
In numbers 1 and 2 above, TLC and the spouses Alfonso claim that the previous
approvals by AAVA of the construction of additional classrooms allegedly constitute a
revocation of the Deed of Restrictions. However, as we have previously discussed, the
two-classroom restriction is not imposed in the Deed of Restrictions but rather in MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01. The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of additional
classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions,
which merely limit the use of the subject property "exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may
include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage
school vehicles."
 There was no intention on the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions
nor to waive its right to have said restrictions enforced. Frank Roa's signature in the Site
Development Plan came with the note: "APPROVED SUBJECT TO STRICT
COMPLIANCE OF CAUTIONARY NOTICES APPEARING ON THE PLAN AND TO
RESTRICTIONS ENCUMBERING THE PROPERTY REGARDING THE USE AND
OCCUPANCY OF THE SAME.”

Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these
acts cannot be considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is
not a party to the case. The general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which
was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly
state that: "2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and
conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by
any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association.”

As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an

action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following
exception to the res inter alios acta rule:

Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. -- The act or declaration of a

partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner,
joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. (Emphasis
supplied.)

However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act
in number 1 concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject
property as institutional which, as have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification
of the Deed of Restrictions. As to the act in number 2, the statement in the letter that
the expansion of TLC is a “worthy undertaking”, such purported assent came with
restrictions: concurrence of AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of
the village. Such requirements were not met when the AAVA Board voted to ratify the
Board of Governors’ resolution that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:

1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November
11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22,
1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease
and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and
kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2)
the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child School's
 grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said
school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to
the grade school shall no longer be permitted.

2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998,
insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V.
Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S.
Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby AFFIRMED.

3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a
Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a
zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
28) Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated
Digest by: Joshua Ouano
Principle: Admission by a Co-partner or agent as exception to Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
FACTS:
1. Respondent Redmont, a domestic corporation, took interest in mining certain
areas of Palawan.
2. After inquiring with DENR, it learned that said areas were already covered by
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra,
Tesoro, and McArthur.
3. Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) petitions for denial of the
MPSA applications on the ground that:
a. at least 60% of the capital stock of petitioner corporations are owned and
controlled by MBMI Resources, a Canadian corporation
b. Petitioners are disqualified under the Constitutional requirement that mining
activities are reserved only for corporations deemed Filipino Citizens (60%
PH – 40% foreign rule)
4. In their Answer, petitioners averred that:
a. 60% of the capital stocks are owned by Filipinos
b. POA has no jurisdiction, and
c. Redmont has no standing to sue since it has no present application over the
areas.
POA: issued a resolution disqualifying petitioners, since they are effectively controlled
by MBMI.
5. Petitioners appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), stressing that:
a. they are qualified; and
b. their MPSAs were converted to Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreements (FTAAs).
6. Pending resolution, Redmont filed a complaint before the SEC for the revocation
of the petitioners’ respective certificates for registration.
7. Redmont also filed with the RTC a complaint praying for the deferral of the MAB
proceedings pending resolution by the SEC.
MAB: issued a resolution finding the appeals meritorious. (prior to RTC decision)
RTC: issued an order granting the injunction prayed for by Redmont to defer the MAB
ruling
MAB MR: denied Redmont’s MR
8. Redmont went to the CA assailing the MAB orders.
CA: reversed the MAB orders and upheld the POA decision that petitioners are
disqualified on the grounds that:
a. There is doubt as to the nationality of petitioners because they had a common
major foreign investor, MBMI.
b. the conversion of their MPSAs to FTAAs were suspicious.
c. POA was declared to have jurisdiction over petitioners, with the capacity to
ascertain their nationality.
9. Prior to resolution by the CA, Redmont filed with the Office of the President a
petition for the cancellation of petitioners’ FTAAs.
OP: canceled and revoked the FTAA’s
 a. petitioner’s misrepresented that they were Filipino corporations.
b. the filing of the conversion to FTAA by petitioners while the case was pending
is indicative of their lack of qualification.
10. Hence, the present petition assailing the orders of the OP and CA.

ISSUES:
1) WON the CA erred in not dismissing the case on the ground of mootness because
the MPSAs were already converted to FTAAs
2) WON petitioners are Foreign corporations
3) WON the CA correctly applied the exceptions to res inter alios acta rule (relevant
topic)
4) WON POA has jurisdiction

RULING: petition without merit.

1. NOT MOOT
Exception to Mootness principle (all must concur)
a. grave violation of the Constitution – petitioners misrepresented that they were
Filipino corporations
b. exceptional character and paramount public interest involved – the intricate
corporate layering made by MBMI greatly affects the exploitation of PH resources
c. to guide the bench, bar, and the public (BBP) – a ruling on this case will guide
the BBP
d. capable of repetition yet evading review – MBMI can keep utilizing dummy
Filipino corporations
All requisites are present.
Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA applications
a. The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement application is a
clear admission that the respondents are not capable of conducting a large scale
mining operation and that they need the financial and technical assistance of a
foreign entity in their operation that is why they sought the participation of MBMI
Resources, Inc.
b. The participation of MBMI in the petitioner corporations only proves the fact that it
is the Canadian company that will provide the finances and the resources to
operate the mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the same and not
the Filipino stockholders who only have a less substantial financial stake in the
corporation.
c. In their last attempt to prove that they are Filipino corporations, petitioners
alleged that they have already sold/assigned their shares and interest to DMCI
Mining Corp, a Filpino Corp. This only proves that they were in fact not Filipino
corporations from the start.

2. THE GRANDFATHER TEST APPLIES SINCE THE OWNERSHIP OF

PETITIONER CORPORATIONS IS DOUBTFUL
There are two acknowledged tests in determining the Nationality of a Corporations, the
NATIONALITY TEST and GRANDFATHER TEST
 a. CONTROL TEST (LIBERAL RULE): shares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens
shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, (1st par. DOJ Opinion 020)
- Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the
ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing
Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is
considered as Filipino.
b. GRANDFATHER TEST (STRINGENT RULE): If the percentage of the
Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the
number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as
Philippine nationality (2ND par. DOJ Opinion 020)
- Under this rule, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the
Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine
the total percentage of Filipino ownership.
- this rule applies ONLY when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is
in doubt
In this case, it is quite safe to say that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not
Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity
interests.
- Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate
owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC.
- Furthermore, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
statement– –regarding the "joint venture" agreements that it entered into
with the "Olympic" and "Alpha" groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC
and Narra.
- The ownership of the "layered" corporations boils down to MBMI which
has joint venture agreements while practically exercising majority control
over the corporations mentioned.
- Whether looking at the capital structure or the underlying relationships
between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino
nationals and must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their
capital stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.

3. EXCEPTION TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE APPLIES – Sec. 29 Rule

130 ROC – ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT and ADMISSION BY
PRIVIES
Petitioners:
a. question the CA’s use of the exception of the res inter alios acta   or
"admission by co-partner or agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the
Rules of Court by pointing out that statements made by MBMI should not be
admitted because MBMI is not a party to the case and that it is not a "partner"
of petitioners.
b. the CA erred in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro
and McArthur. 
A partnership is akin to a joint venture
 - A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
- On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to
partnerships since it is difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and
partnerships.
- The relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their
association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is
ordinarily held that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by
rules which are closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not
exactly the same, as those which govern partnership.
- The trend in the law has been to blur the distinctions between a
partnership and a joint venture, very little law being found applicable to
one that does not apply to the other.
The relationships entered between the petitioners and MBMI are considered to be
partnerships
- Corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership agreements;
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other
corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form
"pseudo partnerships."
- However, it is clear that the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and
among petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal
prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the
relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on
partnership should be applied.
- Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may
be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are
present.
- Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI
are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec.
29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture,
MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
4. POA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS
a. The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas. This
includes any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for mineral
agreement.
b. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the
concerned Regional Office of the MGB.
c. Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction
d. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an
administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.
DENIED
PEOPLE V. BOKINGO
Digest by: Steffi Kay Pantino

DOCTRINE: In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence
other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object;
and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.

FACTS:

As shown by prosecution’s evidence

1. The victim (Pasion) and his wife (Elsa) were residing in a house at the back of which
were two rows of apartment units.

2. The first row was leased to the victim’s brother (Dante) while the second row was still
under construction.

3. The appellants (Bokingco and Col) were among the 13 construction workers
employed by the victim.  

4. Dante was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion passed by him
and went out of the back door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from the
other side of the apartment.

5. Dante peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the
floor.

6. Upon seeing Dante, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked
him with a hammer in his hand.

7. A struggle ensued but Dante managed to push Bokingco away.

8. Dante proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead.

Elsa’s Version

9. Elsa was in the master’s bedroom when she heard banging sounds and her
husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed.

10. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way.

11. Elsa asked Cal why he was inside but the latter sprayed tear gas on her eyes and
poked a sharp object under her chin.
12. Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and hear him tell Col: “tara, patay na
siya.”

13. Col and Bokingco ran away.

14. Elsa saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.

Bokingco’s Version

15. Bokingco was sleeping when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be
intoxicated.

16. Pasion wanted to know why Bokingco why he wasn’t at the construction site the
other day.

17. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head.

18. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion.

19. During the cross-examination, Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings
towards Pasion.

20. It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s
plan to kill Pasion.

Col’s Version

21. Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers but he resigned 3 days
before the incident.

22. Bokingco pointed to Col as the person who killed Pasion.

23. Col insisted that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well.

24. Charged as co-conspirator, Col asserts that Bokingco’s uncounseled testimony that
appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was
no other evidence which will prove the conspiracy.

ISSUE: Whether Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is admissible against Bokingco.

RULING: NO

 As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.
 - The acts of Bokingco and Cal did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill
Pasion.
- Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col.
- Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing
Pasion, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

 RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another.Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them.
- An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act
or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration.
- In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved
by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to
the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
CITY OF MANILA v. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO | G.R. No. 1284 | November 10, 1905

DOCTRINE: Where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act,
or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only
when made while the latter holds the title.

FACTS:
1. This is an action to recover the possession of 2 lots (building lots), located in Calles
Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, presently occupied by del Rosario
2. Del Rosario moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the City of
Manila failed to establish the allegations in the complaint
• CFI of Manila ruled in favor of City of Manila
3. Del Rosario now puts in issue the trial court’s finding that City of Manila was entitled
to the ownership and possession of the land in question

ISSUE: WON Lorenzo del Rosario’s statements are binding upon Jacinto del
Rosario

RULING: NO
(NOTE: Case is really about who owns the lots, whether it’s the City of Manila or Jacinto
del Rosario. I included all the facts, but the most important part that is relevant to our
class in Evidence is the documentary evidence presented by Lorenzo del Rosario.)

City of Manila introduced both documentary and oral evidence to establish that it
owns the 2 lots and not del Rosario
A. Oral Evidence
1. John Wilson — testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land
in question belonged to the City
2. Eduardo Timoteo — testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central
Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs
• this witness referred to the land included in the Calles, and not to the lots in
the complaint
3. Juan Villegas — testified that the land in question was formerly included in
the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the City
• this testimony is in conflict with Timoteo (who said that the land belonged to
the Central Government)
• Villegas’ testimony is hearsay — he only knew of this fact from some of the
oldest residents in that section of the City
• City of Manila introduced Villegas’ testimony for the purpose of proving that
the City was “generally” considered the owner of the land —> in order to
establish presumption of actual ownership
• Court: testimony not sufficient to establish such presumption
- Sec. 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires common reputation
that is equivalent to universal reputation
 - testimony from “some of the oldest residents” do not constitute common
reputation
4. Sotera Roco — testified that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid P100 to her
brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information
as to the property abutting on Calle Clavel
• it appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco
and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the defendant in this case
• hearsay testimony
• Court: even if the hearsay testimony is admissible, we do not see how it
can be inferred from her testimony that the City of Manila is the real owner
of the property
5. Modesto Reyes (City Attorney) and Lorenzo del Rosario (brother of
defendant) — testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary
evidence introduced by City of Manila
B. Documentary Evidence
1. Petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the City of Manila mayor
(September 26, 1891) + letter written by him to the Municipal Board of Manila
(October 9, 1901) —> contained an offer to the Municipality of Manila to
purchase the land of Calle Clavel
• Lorenzo admitted the authenticity of both documents
- admitted that he signed the first document (petition to the city mayor)
because he thought the land belonged to the city —> he had been
informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to
the municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera
- stated that he signed the second document (letter to the municipal
board) because the President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera,
advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with the City
• Court: provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of
compromise is not admissible in evidence
- Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document BEFORE he acquired
from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land, the second
document being signed AFTER he had transferred the land to Jacinto
del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered,
as City of Manila admits, on February 23, 1893
- Therefore, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have
made in the documents (petition + letter) mentioned, they are not
binding upon Jacinto del Rosario, because, under section 278 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, “where one derives title to real property
from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation
to the property, is evidence against the former only when made while
the latter holds the title.”
1. Map of the City of Manila
• Court: no value since the reliability of the map was not proven during the
trial
 2. 2 public instruments executed on March 7, 1900 between defendant Jacinto
del Rosario and Telesfora Apostol y Perea
• Court: such show that Jacinto was in possession of the land under good
title and with the status of owner of the land

City of Manila itself admits in the complaint that Jacinto’s possession of the land
in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March 1901, and his possession of that in
Calle Clavel since February 1893
• this shows that Del Rosario had been in the adverse possession of the land
• Article 448 of the Civil Code states that he must be presumed to hold under a just title,
unless the contrary is shown

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss.
GEVERO VS IAC
Digest by: Duane Po

FACTS:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365
containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. Said Lot was acquired by purchase from Luis Lancero in Sept. 15 1964 whom in
turn issued TCT 4320 to plaintiff (DELCOR). Luis Lancero acquired such parcel of land
from Ricardo Gevero on Feb 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which
was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No.
7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica
Babangha — 1/2 share and her children the other undivided share of the whole area.
Teodorica Ddief long before WW2 and was survived by 6 children namely Maria,
Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquiop and Ursula all surnamed Gevero.

The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial

Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots,
among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition
executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive,
under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration
Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was
then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.

Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis
Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica
Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot
2476.

RTC rendered judgement declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute
owner of that portion of Lot. 2476. From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo
Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.

ISSUE:
1. WON the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Lancer is valid,
2. WON the 1⁄2 interests of Teodorica Babangha in one of the lots under Lot 2476
is included in the deed of sale and
3. WON the respondents action is barred by Laches

RULING:
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto,
such as that the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact and
that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed
the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation. However, it will be
observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities of
a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the
notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the
regularity of the notarized document. It has the presumption of regularity and to
contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.

As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952
deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation", it is
a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular
rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under
Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the
property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of
the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in
order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner. Hence, Lanceros'
declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR,
the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

Lastly, Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the
petitioners have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession
thereof until at present. ). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered
a sufficient delivery of the property. Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is
the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. If the property is a
registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title
and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws.

The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and checked the title in the
name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding
technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis
Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis
Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR
had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question.
US v. Pineda

Doctrine: Exception to the Res Inter Alios Rule.

Facts:

 Santiago Pineda, a registered pharmacist was the owner of a drug store located
at Calle Santo Cristo, City of Manila.

 Thereafter, a certain Feliciano Santos presented a prescription to purchase 120

grams of potassium chlorate (to be used to treat the sick horses of Santos) from
Pineda’s pharmacy.

 Under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate, Santos placed
two of these sick packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses.

 The 2 horses that took the packages died. Thus, Santos proceeded to the
Bureau of Science to have the remaining sick packages inspected. The samples
were examined by Drs. Peña and Darjuan where it was discovered that what was
given was not potassium chlorate but rather barium chlorate.

 Because of this, Drs. Peña and Darjuan went to the drug store of the defendant
and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium
chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is
not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horse, and
found that death was the result of poisoning.

 Because of the poisoning, a complaint for the violation of the Pharmacy law was
filed against Pineda.

Pineda’s defense:

 The testimonies of Drs. Peña and Darjuan should not be allowed under the
doctrine of res inter alios act rule.

 The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of
violating the Section 17 of the Pharmacy law.

Trial Court: Defendant Pineda is guilty of violation the Pharmacy law.

Issue:

a. Whether the testimonies of the chemist should be allowed.

Ruling:

A. YES. THE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE ALLOWED.

As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is

inadmissible (under res inter alios acta rule) . But appellant has confused this maxim as
it is subject to certain exceptions, namely: when: a) the effort is not to convict the
accused of a second offense or b) when is there an attempt to draw the mind
away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case.

The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence
and fraudulent intent may even be evidence of negligence than the frequency of
accidents. Citing Moore v. US, the Court said:

On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain
testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular
person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors
will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate
bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it
tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.

In the present case, the Court allowed the testimonies of the chemist as it was covered
by the exception under the res inter alios acta rule.

B. YES. PINEDA IS GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE PHARMACY LAW.

The relevant provision provides that: it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to
manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or
poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug,
chemical, or poison so used, sold , or offered for sale.

In interpreting this provision the Supreme Court noted that as a pharmacist, Pineda is
made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. Because of the
poisoning the court ruled that it was unlawful for Pineda to sell any drug or poison under
any "fraudulent name”.

The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the

druggist to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a specially
high degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men. The skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Thus, where a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a
poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden
on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances consistent with the
exercise of due care.

The druggist cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate
give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package
labeled "potassium chlorate" , and expect to escape responsibility on a plea of mistake.
His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for himself, was negligence.

Hence, defendant is liable for violating the Pharmacy law. |||

PEOPLE V. IRANG

PRINCIPLES:

INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER CRIME, EXCEPTION:

While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for
robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify
defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.

ADMISSION UNDER OATH BEFORE A DEPUTY CLERK IS NOT INVOLUNTARY:

An admission made under oath before a deputy clerk of court cannot be considered
involuntary merely because the person who made it alleged having done so under
threat, the persons supposed to have threatened him having denied such fact.
Consequently, such admission is admissible against the person making it.

FACTS:

THE ASSAULT AT PERFECTO AND MAXIMINIANA’S HOUSE:

1. Between 7 and 8 o'clock on the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals
with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two
with bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and
Maximiniana Vicente, where three lights were burning, one at the balcony,
another in the room and another on a table.
2. Some of said individuals went up and others remained on guard downstairs.
3. Those who went up approached Perfecto Melocotones immediately and ordered
him to bring out his money.
4. Melocotones answered in the affirmative but before he could do what was
ordered him he was attacked with bolos until he fell to the floor.
5. Later another armed with a gun went up and approaching Maximiniana Vicente,
wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck her in the face with the butt of his gun,
making her lose consciousness momentarily.
6. When she regained consciousness she saw her husband already dead.
7. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry."
8. Maximiniana Vicente turned over to the man who had struck her with the butt of
his gun P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200, which she had kept in a trunk.
During the short space of time that she was turning over the money and jewelry,
she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his
left eyelid.

THE ASSAULT AT JUANA DE LA CRUZ’ HOUSE:

1. That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by
malefactors who had been firing shots before arriving at and going up the
house.
2. All of them had white stripes upon their faces.
 3. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on
the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who
opened her trunk.
4. After the malefactors had left Perfecto Melocotones' house, the latter's son
Toribio Melocotones, who had seen the assailants arrive but without recognizing
them, immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to the
constabulary, who went to the scene of the crime without loss of time.
5. Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary
that the person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and taken her money
and jewelry was a man of regular stature, with a lead body and pockmarked face.
With this description, said lieutenant went in search of said individual.
6. Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana Vicente's
house so that the latter might identify among them the one who had struck her
with the butt of his gun, but she did not find such man.
7. Later another group was presented to her but neither could she find therein the
man who had robbed her. Finally another group was presented to her and in it
she identified the herein accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had
struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and
jewelry.
8. He was likewise the same man arrested by Lieutenant Alejandre at midnight on
November 9, 1935, in the barrio of Tampac which is five or seven kilometers from
Maturanoc to which he was taken and brought to the house of the deceased.
9. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks and
scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to her house that
same night.

BENJAMIN’S AFFIDAVIT SWORN BEFORE THE DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT:

1. Once under arrest, the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang made an affidavit in
Tagalog (Exhibit B), stating:
a. That, while he was in the barrio of Tampac, municipality of Guimba,
Province of Nueva Ecija, on November 9, 1935 at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian arrived;
b. That, Fidel Estrella invited him to go to the house of Ignacio Sebastian's
brother-in-law named Angel Talens because Estrella had something to tell
him; that upon arriving at Angel Talens' house, Fidel Estrella invited him to
go to Maturanoc to look for business;
c. That, the appellant asked Fidel Estrella why he wanted to bring him and
the latter told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would slash him
with his bolo; that Fidel Estrella carried a bolo and Ignacio Sebastian an
unlicensed firearm; that they went to the house of Perfecto Melocotones in
the barrio of Maturanoc, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and upon arriving there
Fidel Estrella, who acted as the ringleader, assigned to each and every
one of them his corresponding place, designating those who should
assault the house of Perfecto Melocotones and those who should assault
that of Ursula Cabigon;
 d. That, Benjamin Irang was in the group formed by Fidel Estrella and
Ignacio Sebastian, which assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones,
having been assigned to stand guard on the stairs of said house;
e. That, Fidel Estrella, once inside the house, slashed Perfecto Melocotones
thrice with his bolo;
f. That, Fidel Estrella later told him that they had succeeded in taking money
and a shotgun; and that after the assault they dispersed, each returning to
his own home.
2. This affidavit (Exhibit B) was sworn to by Benjamin Irang before the deputy
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in the presence of
Graciano Pingol, the constabulary soldier who accompanied him.
3. Before Irang affixed his thumbmark and took his oath, the deputy clerk of court
asked him if he understood Tagalog and when he answered in the
affirmative said deputy clerk read the contents of the document to him.
4. Asked whether he had anything else to add thereto, the appellant answered that
he had nothing more to say.

BENJAMIN’S ALIBI:
1. The defense of the accused-appellant is an alibi to the effect:
a. That in the afternoon of the day of the commission of the crime, he was in
his rice field washing a fishing basket. There he met Roberto Alcantara.
Later he went to the house of Buenaventura Javier to return the fishing
basket in question and to exercise on the rings (jugar a las argollas) with
the latter's son Pedro, and two unmarried sons of the appellant's uncle, in
the presence of several persons, returning home at 8 o'clock that night.
b. When he was arrested the constabulary soldiers opened his box but found
nothing in it.
c. They later took him in a jitney to the victim's house in the barrio of
Maturanoc and upon being brought face to face with the widow
Maximiniana Vicente, Lieutenant Alejandre told the widow: "This is the one
who slashed your husband and punctured your face." The widow
answered saying: "Is it that man, sir."
d. As Benjamin Irang answered that he had not left his house, the lieutenant
gave him a blow which made him lose consciousness. Then the lieutenant
said to the widow: "He is the same man. It was he to whom you delivered
the money and jewelry. Look at him well. Identify him well."
e. In the constabulary barracks in Cabanatuan the soldiers and a sergeant
manhandled him from the night of November 9, 1935, until 4 o'clock in the
morning of the 11th of said month and year, for having denied all
knowledge of the crime, making him lose his breath and punching him in
the stomach. When he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he agreed
to tell what they wanted him to tell.
f. Upon being taken for investigation, the constabulary soldiers told him to
agree to all that the clerk of court might read to him, otherwise they would
again manhandle him at the barracks.
 g. He was not present when the affidavit Exhibit B was prepared. Neither are
the contents thereof true. He merely affixed his thumbmark upon said
document for fear of the soldiers. Lieutenant Alejandre as well as
Sergeant Lubrico denied that the accused had been maltreated in the
least.

ISSUE:

1. The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether the accused-
appellant Benjamin Irang was identified as one of those who assaulted the house
of Perfecto Melocotones, killed him and robbed his wife Maximiniana Vicente of
money and jewelry.

RULING: Yes, Benjamin Irang assaulted the house of Perfecto, killed him, and
robbed his wife Maximiniana.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF BENJAMIN IRANG BY MAXIMIANA VICENTE:

2. Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the
face with the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money
and jewelry, scrutinized the latter's face and noticed that he had pockmarks
and a scar on his left eyelid.
3. When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the
description given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person who
might have maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry, and
presented a group of persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man
who had maltreated her was not among those who composed that first group.
4. Said lieutenant later presented another group to her but neither did the widow
find in it the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun.
5. In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned
out to be the herein accused-appellant.
6. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had
struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant became silent.
7. The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only
about one hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that
same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one
of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a
maongcolored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant,
opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony
that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and
demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be
the herein accused-appellant.

INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER CRIME, EXCEPTION:

1. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a
prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery
 charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the
crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
2. Maximiniana Vicente's identification of the herein accused-appellant is likewise
corroborated by the latter's own admission under oath that on the night of the
crime he had been invited to assault the house of Perfecto Melocotones, which
they in fact assaulted, although against his will.

BENJAMIN SAYS HE WAS TORTURED TO ADMIT. COURT SAYS, BENJAMIN’S ADMISSION

BEFORE THE DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT CANNOT BE REJECTED, BASED ON HIS OWN
TESTIMONY, WHICH WAS DENIED BY THE ALLEGED TORTURERS:
1. The rejection by the lower court of the appellant's admission under oath upon the
assumption that it was not made voluntarily, is erroneous, inasmuch as the only
evidence that it was not voluntary is the accused appellant's own testimony
that he had been manhandled by the constabulary soldiers and threatened
with further maltreatment if he did not testify as they wished.
2. This imputation of torture was categorically denied by Lieutenant Alejandre and
Sergeant Lubrico of the Constabulary, before whom the accused- appellant
made the admission and who caused it to be put in writing.
3. The imputation is likewise contradicted by the deputy clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija before the accused-appellant swore to his admission
and who testified that before he administered oath to said accused-appellant, he
asked him whether he understood Tagalog and, having been answered in the
affirmative, he read said document to him and asked him whether he had
anything to add, the appellant affixing his thumbmark upon it after answering that
he had nothing more to say (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308).
4. There is no doubt that an admission made under oath under such
circumstances cannot be considered involuntary and therefore is
admissible against the person making it.
5. This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the accused- appellant's identity as
one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones and robbed
Maximiniana Vicente of her money and jewelry, is established conclusively
beyond reasonable doubt.
6. The defense of the accused is an alibi and has for its purpose to show that he
could not have been at the scene of the crime between 7 and 8 o'clock at night
because he was in another place about seven kilometers away at that time.
7. This defense of alibi is contradicted by the abovestated testimony of Juana
de la Cruz and by the accusedappellant's own admission under oath
Exhibit B.

THE DISPOSITIVE:
1. The facts established at the trial as committed by the accused- appellant beyond
reasonable doubt constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide defined
in article 293, in connection with article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code, and punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
 2. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial judge is in accordance with the evidence
and with law.
3. It is not so, however, with the pecuniary liability because, taking into account the
gravity of the offense, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be
P1,000 and that for the stolen goods not restored P390. Wherefore, with the sole
modification that the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang is sentenced further to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to restore to
Maximiniana Vicente the sum of P70 and the stolen jewelry and gun, or to
reimburse the value thereof in the amount of P390, the judgment appealed from
is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of this instance to the appellant.
So ordered.

THE DISSENT OF JUSTICE LAUREL CONCURRED BY JUSTICE CONCEPCION:

1. The evidence presented by the prosecution consists in the main of (a) Exhibit B,
which is the alleged confession of the appellant herein, (b) the testimony of
Toribio Melocotones, son of the deceased, (c) the testimony of Juana de la Cruz,
(d) that of Lieut. Roman Alejandre of the Philippine Army, and (e) that of
Maximiniana Vicente, widow of the deceased.
2. In his affidavit, marked Exhibit B, the appellant admitted his participation in the
commission of the crime charged. This written confession was not given any
value by the trial judge.
3. According to the appellant, it was obtained from him by an unknown soldier,
through force and violence, under circumstances which makes it involuntary and,
therefore, inadmissible as proof of guilt (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308; People vs.
Buda Singh, 45 Phil., 676; People vs. Takeo Tabuche, 46 Phil., 28; People vs.
Guendo Nishishima, 57 Phil., 26; People vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 418).
4. Toribio Melocotones testified that he saw the band of seven robbers on their way
to his father's house; that at that time he did not know who they were but that he
now knows Dve of them to be the accused Fidel Estrella, Jacinto Sebastian,
Ignacio Sebastian, Juan Levaste (alias Juan de Caste), and the appellant herein,
Benjamin Irang; that he saw the seven men enter the yard of his father's house,
where he had planted himself; that the seven men entered the house, one at a
time, the smallest in the group, Fidel Estrella, first followed by a bigger man, the
appellant Benjamin Irang, then by Juan Levaste (alias Juan de Caste), by Jacinto
Sebastian, by Ignacio Sebastian and, finally, by the two members of the band
who were unknown to him; that as soon as they all had entered he followed them
but saw one of them standing guard and firing several shots, as a result of which
he heard his brothers and sisters shouting; that it was on that occasion when he
came nearer the house but was seen by the guard who pointed a gun at him, and
he ran away.
5. The trial judge brushed aside the testimony of this witness as unworthy of
credence and belief.
6. Juana de la Cruz testified that her house had also been assaulted by tulisanes
on the same night and that she had recognized the appellant as one of them.
7. The testimony of this witness refers to an event wholly distinct and separate from
the criminal act imputed to the appellant in the case at bar, during the
commission of which she stated she was at her house about five meters away.
8. The testimony of Lieut. Alejandre refers to the investigation conducted by him
and to posterior occurrences, of scarcely any importance in proving the identity
and guilt of the appellant.
9. Lieut. Alejandre arrested the appellant on the strength of the description
furnished him by the widow of the deceased. How good the description is may be
judged from the fact that prior to the appellant's arrest, Lieut. Alejandre had
arrested three other persons, later to release them as "wrong parties!"
10. The only remaining basis for the conviction of the appellant by the lower court is
the testimony of the widow, Maximiniana Vicente.
11. In the opinion of the trial court, this witness has sufficiently identified the
appellant herein.
12. Alejandre testified that when this witness, Maximiniana Vicente, confronted the
defendant she recognized him as one of the assailants. This the appellant
denied, stating that the widow identified him "in obedience to Lieut. Alejandre's
orders."
13. On cross-examination, the witness stated that she was able to identify the
appellant. When called again to the witness stand she retracted this
statement.
14. I am reluctant to join the trial judge in attributing this contradiction on her part
merely to her ignorance. Two important details in this case deserve more than
passing mention. It appears that soon after the band of robbers had departed,
Lieut. Alejandre at the scene of the crime and conducted an investigation. The
widow, on that occasion, referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks.
About one month later, she testified that she recognized him besides by a scar
on his left eyelid. A scar identifies a man more effectively than mere pockmarks,
these being common. But I do not know why it took the witness one month
to discover this important descriptive detail. The widow also testified that she
recognized the appellant, Irang, because of the light, because it was he who hit
her with the butt of his gun and because it was to him that she delivered money
and jewelry. It should be observed, however, that the assailants were
disguised when they committed the crime. This makes identification difficult, if
not impossible, and probably accounts for the fact that the widow made no
reference to the appellant's scar in the beginning. It is true that the findings of fact
made by the trial judge are entitled to great weight and credit and should not be
overturned unless grave considerations warrant the taking of such a course. But I
am not convinced that appellant has been satisfactorily identified in the case at
bar (U. S. vs. Asiao, 1 Phil., 304).
15. The defense interposed by the appellant is an alibi. While alibis are easily
concocted and, for this reason, are received by courts with great caution, I
express the opinion that conviction should be predicated on the sufficiency of the
evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant is entitled, like his six
co-accused in the court below, to an acquittal.
16. Justice Concepcion concurs with the dissent.
PEOPLE V BABIERA

“While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted
in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a
quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be
of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and
specific acts.”

Facts:
1. Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands.
2. On October 19, 1922 Justo Babiera executed a contract of sale with the
right of repurchase in favor of BasilioCopreros whereby he sold the two
parcels of land to the latter for the sum of P124 with the condition that if
the vendor did not repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, the sale
would become absolute and irrevocable (Exhibit F).
3. The period for repurchase having expired, BasilioCopreros took
possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made
application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the
registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels.
4. On the 26th of the said month, BasilioCopreros leased said parcels to
SeverinoHaro, municipal president of Oton (Exhibit G and G-1).
5. In view of this, on March 31, 1927, Justo Babiera filed a complaint against
BasilioCopreros in the justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery
of the possession of said two parcels of land. The complaint having been
dismissed on April 19, 1927 on the ground that it did not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On several occasions, Justo
Babiera confronted Fermin Bruces, the person plowing the lands for Haro,
threatheningBruces and Haro.
6. On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the
barrio of Bita, accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon and Pedro
Tauro. On arriving there Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him
that the day before he had found Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that
land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores
were passing by. Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what
his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better care of
his cow in future and not to let it run loose.

7. In the evening, Haro and his companions were making their way back to
town using a torch, as it was already dark. Haro was walking ahead, while
Pedro Tauro followed behind carrying the torch, followed by Gregorio
Torrija and Benito Carreon. Suddenly, Babiera sprang from the cogon
grass and struck Haro with a bolo. On turning his head to see who had
attacked him SeverinoHaro received another bolo blow in the forehead
near the right eyebrow. In trying to defend himself with his hand he was
 wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then tried to grasp
his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo
Babiera appeared and placing himself upon SeverinoHaro's stomach, held
the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene and held
both knees of the wounded man. When Justo Babiera arrived, a voice was
heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at the same time, SeverinoHaro's
voice was heard saying: "Help! help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in
order to help SeverinoHaro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the
air and kept on brandishing it to warn everybody off. Pedro Tauro, in fear,
stepped back, dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were also
Buenaventura Gabalfin and Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill
SeverinoHaro's companions if they helped him. After the torch had been
extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as SeverinoHaro's
saying: "Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have done no wrong."
Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores, which said: "Here
is the revolver; let us return." Before the assailants left two or three
revolver shots were heard. When Severino Haro's companions saw that
their assailants had already departed, they drew near to where Severino
lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. SeverinoHaro told
them not to fear for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling
his copartner on shares, FerminBruces, directed him to bring a cot and
take him to town. Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as SeverinoHaro
wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica, they by chance
came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place the
wounded man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in
the City of Iloilo. When SeverinoHaro was taken to the town he did not
have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the holster, was found by
Gregorio Torrija near where the incident took place.

8. On the same morning, August 22, 1927, and in the same hospital,
SeverinoHaro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal, Edmundo
S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons
who were present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the
same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the said month and year when he had
given up all hope of recovery.

Issue:
Whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the appellants guilty

Ruling:
YES. It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant,
Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and property, having been obliged to
resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted
in that after Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused,
the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack
consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the
right hand, and that Severino Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several
shots at him. Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's
alleged attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to
accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its
owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain
this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable.

With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and Severino Haro began
the attack, inasmuch as it has not been proved that they were the instigators, it cannot
be conceived that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has no reason
to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully. The defense also attempted to prove
that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of
starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it. While
it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may
prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition,
the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and
specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused
Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting
such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased
was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow
the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the
deceased.
US v Mercado
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and
CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-8332         
November 13, 1913
Case Digest by Taborada, Shaira Mae

PRINCIPLE:
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except
by showing:
(a) that he has made contradictory statements; or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
342, Act No. 190.)

FACTS:
 The defendants in this case were charged with the crime of coaccion (translates
to coercion):
 That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag,
Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority
therefor, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro
Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that
Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in
violation of law."
 They were then found guilty of the crime charged. During trial, Mr. Ricardo
Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the
defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint
presented in said cause, the following question:
“How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other
persons?"
 To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the
question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by
saying:
 "I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had
occasion to defend him in various causes for assault."
Defendant’s Argument:
 The defendants contended that the character of the witness, Santiago Mercado,
has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being
investigated in the present cause,” but this objection was overruled.
 The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of
error is that the question had no relation to the question which was being
discussed by the court and did not tend to show that the defendants were either
guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the
character of a witness are immaterial.
In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-General contends that the
question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the
witness and that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will be
remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged crime
was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one
Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had
been presented against him for the offense of assault and battery.

ISSUE: Whether the witness should be impeached due to the character of the witness.

SC RULING:

NO. The prosecution, to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here
was actually committed, showed that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted
and illtreated Maria R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint. That
was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take place, then the theory of
the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no
occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it,
and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened.

If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had assaulted other persons and
had been prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the
proof and in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to prove that
Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or
attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, to show that there was occasion for the
interference of Claro Mercado.

A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except
by showing:
(a) that he has made contradictory statements; or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
342, Act No. 190.)

The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the
witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness,
except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an
examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)

In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a
high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime,"
as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally
defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to
felonies.
We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should
have been sustained. If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause,
excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants
are guilty of the crime, then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon
the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by
the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be
disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness
committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause.
Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the
present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such
question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.

After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that the same shows,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and
that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
REPUBLIC VS. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Digest by: Tomaneng, Emma Rose R.

DOCTRINE: Principle of adoptive admission: A party may, by his words or conduct,

voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement.  Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him.

FACTS:

1. Kenrick Development Corp. (Kenrick) constructed a fence around parcels of land

located behind Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) who was, in effect, disposed of some part of prime land.
2. Kenrick justified its action with a claim of ownership, presenting TCTs issued in
its name.
3. ATO verified authenticity of titles with the Land Registration Authority.
4. RD of Pasay City had no record of TCTs. The land allegedly covered by
Kenrick’s titles were found to be within the Villamor Air Base

REPUBLIC’S CONTENTIONS
The OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of
title against Kenrick.

KNERICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION’S CONTENTIONS

1. Kenrick filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty Garlitos.
2. During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted
a hearing, looking into the issuance of fake titles.
3. During the congressional hearing, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos,
Kenrick’s former counsel. He testified that he prepared the answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Mr. Ong. The signature
appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his
behalf, and he did not know who signed it.
4. A motion to declare Kenrick in default was filed by the Republic, based on the
former’s failure to file a valid answer which was technically an unsigned pleading,
a mere scrap of paper which produced no legal effect.

ISSUE: Should Kenrick Development be declared in default for its failure to file a valid
answer?

RULING: Yes.

ESSENCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ADOPTIVE ADMISSION

1. A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s
statement.  Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to
 or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible
against him.
2. It may occur when a party expressly agrees or concurs in an oral statement
made by another, hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it, utters and
acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another, replies by way of rebuttal to
some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she
has heard the other make or reads and signs a written statement made by
another.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT’S ADOPTIVE ADMISSION CONSTITUED A JUDICIAL

ADMISSION WHICH WAS CONCLUSIVE ON IT
1. At no instance did it deny or contradict Atty. Garlitos’ statement.
2. Kenrick made mention that although the person who signed the pleading was
neither known nor authorized by Atty. Garlitos, the important thing was that it
bore a signature.
3. Kenrick further explained that despite the requirement under the law stating that
a pleading must be signed by a party of his counsel, such does not prohibit a
counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him.

COUNSEL’S AUTHORITY AND DUTY TO SIGN A PLEADING ARE PERSONAL TO

HIM
1. He may not delegate it to any person.
2. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, there is good ground to support it.

PROVISIONS UNDER THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which, by law, may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing
2. The blanket authority which Atty. Garlitos entrusted to anyone was void and
cannot be cured or ratified by his subsequent acts.

PROCEDURAL RULES SHOULD BE FOLLOWED ECEPT ONLY WHEN, FOR THE

MOST PERESUASIVE OF REASONS, THEY MAY BE RELAXED TO SERVE
JUSTICE.
1. Here, Kenrick failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted
from strictly abiding by the rule.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs.. ALLYSON BELAGAN respondent.
FACTS:
1. Two (2) separate complaints were filed.

2. Magdalena, founder of the "Mother and Child Learning Center, charged Allyson from
DECS with sexual indignities and harassment,

3. Ligaya, a public school teacher, accused him of sexual harassment and various
malfeasances.

4. Magdalena alleges that she filed an application with the DECS for a permit to operate
a pre-school.

5. Allyson volunteered to conduct the inspection and in the course thereof, he suddenly
placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she
muttered, "Sir, is this part of theinspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng
values?"

6. Fearful that her application might be jeopardized, Magdalena just kept quiet.

7. Several days later, Magdalena went to follow up her application. His reply was "Mag-
date muna tayo." She declined, left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant
Superintendent.

8. Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application.

9. Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain
female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging Allyson with sexual
harassment. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment.

10. On the part of Ligaya , she alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions,
Allyson touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from
behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back.

11. The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and
Ligaya.

12. In his defense, Allyson denied their charge of sexual harassment.

 Ruling of DECS Secretary Ruling - Allyson is Guilty
 Ruling of Civil Service Commission - affirmed the Decision with respect to
Magdalena but dismissed the complaint of Ligaya.
 Allyson filed a motion for reconsideration. He submits that:

He has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By
contrast, Magdalena was charged with 22 cases before the MTC and 23 complaints
filed at the the barangay, such as:
Light oral defamation, slight physical injuries, grave threats, malicious mischief, unjust
vexation, grave oral defamation, habitual trouble maker, rumor mongering among
others.
These cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility.

 CSC denied MR.

The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of
having committed the offense.

This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill repute may become a victim of
said offense.
 Court of Appeals via petition for review - reversed the CSC Resolutions and
dismissed Magdalena's complaint.

Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given her

aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, "she is not one whom any male would
attempt to steal a kiss.

ISSUES:
Whether Magdalena's derogatory record is sufficient to discredit her credibility. NO.
RULING:

Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a

controversy.

One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;
exceptions. —
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses.

Assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot
sustain respondent's posture.

Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this
provision. The character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics
involved in the type of offense charged.

1. Thus, on a charge of rape — character for chastity;

2. on a charge of assault — character for peaceableness or violence, and
3. on a charge of embezzlement — character for honesty.
In the present case for sexual harassment, Allyson did not offer evidence that has a
bearing on Magdalena's chastity.

What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, unjust vexation, malicious
mischief, etc. These pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision
because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.

Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is
Magdalena's lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.

In this regard, a different provision applies.

"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. —
A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record
of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."
This leads us to the ultimate question — is Magdalena's derogatory record sufficient
to discredit her credibility? NO.

1. Settled is the principle that evidence of one's character or reputation must be

confined to a time not too remote from the time in question.
The cases filed before the MTC were committed in the 80's, while complained of took
place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the instant case was
committed in 1994.

To say that Magdalena's credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation

existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. Certainly, every person is capable to
change or reform.

2. Respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
cases mentioned.
(a) A mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his
credibility,
(b) Innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime,
(c) One accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally
established, and
(d) A witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of
misconduct.

3. Magdalena’s credibility is supported by substantial evidence.

Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her
testimony is replete with details (such as the number of times she and respondent
inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her,
their conversations etc..)

We cannot debunk Magdalena's positive testimony simply because of the outdated

characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation.
Thus, the petition is GRANTED. Allyson Belagan is suspended from office without pay
for one (1) year.
PEOPLE VS NOEL LEE
Digest by: Vega, Angelika U.

DOCTRINE: Between testimony in open court and a sworn statement, any

inconsistency therein does not necessarily discredit the witness. Affidavits are generally
considered inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and
are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.

FACTS:

1. Herminia Marquez, and her son, Joseph, were in the living room of their house
watching television. Herminia was seated across Joseph who sat on a sofa against the
wall and window of their house.
2. Herminia looked away from the TV and casually glanced at her son. To her complete
surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph.
She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and
holding the gun aimed at Joseph.
3. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and
simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head where he was hit twice.
4. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-
appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Joseph was brought
to the MCU Hospital where he later died.
5. At the trial, Herminia Marquez was presented as a witness by the prosecution.
Whereas, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a
neighbor; and (b) himself. He denied the killing of Joseph Marquez.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CONTENTION:

1. He claims that at the time of the crime, he was in his house having some drinks with
his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of
the following day and learned that Joseph Marquez, a neighbor, was shot to death. To
appellant’s surprise, he was tagged as Joseph’s killer.

2. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six
days before his death, he caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. As
proof of the victim’s bad reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten by his
mother, Herminia, addressed to the Mayor stating that Herminia was surrendering her
son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug,
and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill
her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.

3. The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in
1984 and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the
victim’s desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared
and admitted his crime.
4. Accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ testimony. In her
affidavit given before the police, Herminia declared that while she and Joseph were
watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her son. The hand and the
gun came out of a hole in the window, i.e., “butas ng bintana.” On cross-examination,
Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., “bukas na
bintana.”

5. Accused-appellant argues that since Herminia declared in her affidavit that she saw a
hand coming from the window, she did not see the person holding the gun, let alone
who fired it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Herminia Marquez is a credible witness

RULING: YES

 Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and
the gun coming out of the open window, not from a hole in the window.
 Herminia’s testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her
narration of the shooting incident, neither did she waver in recounting her son’s
death. She was subjected by defense counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross
examinations and yet she stuck to her testimony given in the direct examination.
 She readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the physical arrangement
of the sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa, the wall and the window,
because the crime happened right in her own living room. She explained that she
was unable to warn Joseph because she was shocked by the sight of accused-
appellant aiming a gun at her son.
 Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any
inconsistency therein does not necessarily discredit the witness. Affidavits are
generally considered inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are taken
ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.
 Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that
transpired. They are usually not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who
suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own language in taking the affiant’s
statements.
 Herminia’s declarations are based on her actual account of the commission of the
crime. She had no ill motive to accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify
falsely against appellant. Accused-appellant himself admitted that he and Herminia
have been neighbors for years and have known each other for a long time.
Appellant is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap plastic and
Herminia used to work for him as an agent. She would not have pointed to appellant
if not for the fact that it was him whom she saw shoot her son.
ON CHARACTER EVIDENCE (Extra Topic sa Case)

 The Solicitor General points out that it was appellant himself who had strong motive
to harm or kill Joseph. He caught Joseph inside his car attempting to steal the
stereo. The alibi that appellant was drinking with his friends does not rule out the
possibility that he could have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. The victim’s house is merely two blocks away from appellant’s house
and could be reached in several minutes.
 Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He
alleges that the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have
been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen. As proof of Joseph’s
bad character, appellant presented Herminia’s letter to the Mayor. On rebuttal,
Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything
about her son’s thievery.
 Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz: “Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;
exceptions:-- (a) In Criminal Cases: (1) The accused may prove his good moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. (2)
Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. (3) The good or bad
moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. ”
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind
and morals, distinguishing him from others.
 Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character
evidence of the accused. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to
the character of the offended party. Such evidence is most commonly offered to
support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent
in a rape case.
 In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to
determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not
alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-
defense. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and
thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the
positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character
he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure
and simple speculation.
 Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of
murder committed with treachery and premeditation The proof of such character
may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it has produced a reasonable
belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that
a prompt defensive action was necessary.