IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME. GIL GO vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

G.R. No. L-31760. May 25, 1977

FACTS:

Gil Go was born in Tacloban City where his name in the civil register is Gil Co.
During liberation (Commonwealth, according to petitioner’s counsel), Co Beng Chiong,
following a Chinese custom, allegedly adopted the surname Yao of his godfather and
changed his name to Yao Ka Sin.

When Gil Go was baptized, he was allegedly given the name Gil Yao Eng Hua.
His baptismal certificate was not presented in evidence. He testified that since
childhood, he has been known as Henry Yao among his relatives, friends and business
associates, but in his business and government transactions, he used the name Gil Co.
He did not present any documentary evidence to prove that he is known in the
community as Henry Yao nor baptismal certificate presented in evidence.

In his alien registration certificate (ACR), he is registered as Gil Go due to an

alleged error of an immigration clerk. Because of the confusion generated by those
names, he wants legal authorization for the use of the name Henry Yao.

On March 9, 1965 Gil Go filed the instant petition in the Court of First Instance of
Leyte. He prayed that his name be changed to Henry Yao. During the hearing, the city
fiscal opposed the petition. The lower court granted it (Special Proceeding No. 1042).
The city fiscal appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in allowing the change of name.

HELD:

It was not indicated in the title or caption of Gil Go’s petition that he desired to
change his name to Henry Yao. The published order setting his petition for hearing
reproduced that defective title. Nor was it indicated in his petition that his registered
name is Gil Co, a name which he allegedly used in his official transactions.

The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear

and determine the petition for change of name is acquired after due publication of the
order, setting it for hearing, which order should contain certain data, among which is the
name sought to be adopted, a matter which should be indicated in the title of the petition
(Pabellar v. Republic, L-27298, March 4, 1976, 70 SCRA 16).

The reason for that rule is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the
caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding. Only if
the caption or the title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents of the order.
And the probability is great that he does not at all notice the other names or aliases of
the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The non-
inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or in the
title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication (Republic v.
Tañada, L-31563, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 419).

Inasmuch as the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for
hearing were deficient, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding
(Llerena Telmo v. Republic, L-28549, September 23, 1976, 73 O. G. 39, 43).

Another ground for the reversal of the trial court’s order is that the reasons
adduced by Gil Go and his evidence are insufficient to justify his change of name.

Change of name is a matter of public interest. It is a privilege and not a matter of

right. The court should weigh carefully the consequences of the change of name and
deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. (Ong Peng Oan v.
Republic, 102 Phil. 468). Change of name may entail serious consequences and cause
some complications. It should be authorized only for compelling reasons.

Gil Go (Gil Co)’s assertion that he has used the name Henry Yao was not solidly
substantiated by any documentary evidence or by the testimony of other persons. His
uncorroborated evidence consisted only of his testimony and his birth certificate where
his surname is Co, not Go.

He failed to prove the allegation in his petition that the change of his name to
Henry Yao is justified by "convenience and business reasons." As already observed, he
did not offer indubitable proof that he used the name Henry Yao, or that his father was
known as Yao Ka Sin. He used the name Gil Co in his school records (13 tsn).

 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA, represented by
ZENAIDA SUMERA WATANABE
G.R. No. 186053, November 15, 2010

FACTS:

Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent) was born on in Malolos, Bulacan to her
Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died. On
July 19, 1989, her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.

As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry,
respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname
of her mother’s second husband, "Hakamada." Her mother and Hakamada eventually
divorced.

On May 29, 1996, her mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe,
who later adopted her.

In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos
Civil Registry under the name "Nisaida Sumera Nishina," hence, her filing before the
RTC of her petition praying that her second birth certificate bearing the surname
"Hakamada," issued through late registration in 1993, be cancelled; and that in light of
the decree of adoption, her surname "Nishina" in the original birth certificate be changed
to "Watanabe."

After hearing the petition, granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local

Civil Registry of Malolos "to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera
Hakamada, particularly the surname from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA
SUMERA WATANABE."

A copy of the October 8, 2007 Order was received on December 13, 2007 by the
OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.

Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,

alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on
appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required

only in proceedings where multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the
present case.

By Resolution of September 2, 2008, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s

appeal, holding that since respondent’s petition before the RTC "is classified as a
special proceeding," petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting respondent’s
petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner "never perfected" its appeal.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of December 22,
2008, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition be granted or not.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or
judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz:

SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested

person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a
Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or
judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive
share of the estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a
claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a

deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that
no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial
rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion
for a new trial or for reconsideration.

The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of

special proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the notice of appeal – is thus
required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial
court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.

In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no
other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the
appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and
change of surname in the civil registry.

 
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular
accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the
Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made
inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. On the
annotation of Patrick’s birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowleged by
Pablo (or Pablito) as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of
subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known
as Patrick Titular Braza.

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners (her
three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional
Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the
valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1)
the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3)
the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate
and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of

entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.

Held:

NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is
one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.

The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which
causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy

and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petition Denied.