POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
IV. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
Section 3 (1), Article 3, 1987 Constitution: The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200 - AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND
PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED
VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing,
or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or
any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Page 1 of 105
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who
shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to
be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the
provisions of the following section or of any order issued
thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than six months or more than six years and with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from
public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the
commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he
shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it
unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized
by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases
involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting
to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to
sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage
and other offenses against national security: Provided, That
such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1)
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That
in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such
authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion
or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or
are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 2 of 105

believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean
of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the
any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
readily available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
person or persons whose communications, conversations, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained
or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, investigation.
conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or
offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
(60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless
extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such Approved: June 19, 1965
extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-
eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order,
be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed
package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace
officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings
made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the
number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and
certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part
thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or
copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with
the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be
opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their
contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall
not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose
conversation or communications have been recorded.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON
ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS,
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to
value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full
respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his
order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any
person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter,
in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services
of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing
by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is
signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does
not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately
explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect
known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such
Page 3 of 105
investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any
of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor,
or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise,
such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver
shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial
investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest
or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-
governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission
on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse,
fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent
or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or
ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer,
except those directly affected by the case, those charged with
conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the
prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall
be entitled to the following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the
suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the
suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave
felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the
suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or
municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted,
provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the
province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee:
Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that
no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by
the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or
employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not
less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or
both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall
also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.
Page 4 of 105
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or
employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating
officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the
latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer,
any member of the immediate family of a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor
or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member
of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and
conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the
day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six
(6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any
security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or
prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as
amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any
daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
*Cases:
1) CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents. [G.R. No.
107383. February 20, 1996.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr09-12_cons2poli-correspondence.pdf
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26
March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
Martin's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers
were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the
action for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment
for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress
and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages
and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Page 5 of 105
Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even
to the spouse of the aggrieved party.
Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband
and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2) SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, v s . HONORABLE
COURT OF
APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondent. [G.R. No.
93833. September 28, 1995.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr09-12_cons2poli-correspondence.pdf
Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D.
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy." In support of her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by Ramirez. As a result of Ramirez's
recording, of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case
before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes." Ramirez was charged of violation of the
said Act, in an information dated 6 October 1988. Upon
arraignment, in lieu of a plea, Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200. In an
order dated 3 May 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to
Quash, agreeing with Ramirez that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the violation
Page 6 of 105
punished by RA 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication
by a person other than a participant to the communication. From
the trial court's Order, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which forthwith referred the
case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of 19 June 1989. On 9 February 1990, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of 3 May 1989 null and void. Consequently, on 21
February 1990, Ramirez filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 June
1990. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the party sought to be penalized by the Anti-
wire tapping law ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication
Held: Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that "It shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using, any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described." The provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under said
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
provision of RA 4200. Further, the nature of the conversation is
immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What
RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of
the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication
by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of RA 4200. Furthermore, the
contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1
of RA 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity.
Page 7 of 105
3) EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents. [G.R. No. L-69809. October 16, 1986.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr09-12_cons2poli-correspondence.pdf
Facts: In the morning of 22 October 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and
his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of Pintor's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, Pintor made a telephone
call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned
Eduardo A. Gaanan, who is a lawyer to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because
his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, Gaanan went to the office of Laconico
where he was briefed about the problem. When Pintor called up,
Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Gaanan
heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault. 20 minutes later, Pintor called up
again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered "Yes." Pintor then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money. Pintor called up
again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at
the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted
that Pintor himself should receive the money. When he received
the money at the Igloo Restaurant, Pintor was arrested by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Gaanan executed on the
following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor demand
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 8 of 105

P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of Gaanan to the complaint for
robbery/extortion which he filed against Pintor. Since Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without Pintor's consent,
Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a
decision dated 22 November 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act 4200. The
two were each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs.
Not satisfied with the decision, Gaanan appealed to the
appellate court. On 16 August 1984, the Intermediate Appellate
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether listening in an extension telephone renders one
liable under the wire-tapping law.
statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent
of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Further, our
lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An extension
telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. Gaanan
thus is acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Held: There is no question that the telephone conversation

between Atty. Pintor and Atty. Laconico was "private" in the
sense that the words uttered were made between one person
and another as distinguished from words between a speaker
and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties
gave Gaanan the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's
message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have
discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in
order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against
Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew
that another lawyer was also listening. However, an extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered
as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension herein was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
4) WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO,
petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents. [G.R. No.
113271. October 16, 1997.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr09-12_cons2poli-correspondence.pdf
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July
1989, Catolico received a memorandum from Waterous Vice
President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the
same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico
warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without
consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the
company's control of purchases and, besides she was not
authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the first
memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but
explained that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow
employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and
through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given
a charge slip by the Admitting Department, Catolico then asked
the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In a
memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, Waterous Supervisor
Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery
of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January
1990, Waterous Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that
he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding
the check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms.
Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that
Page 9 of 105
the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms.
Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms.
Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but
Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears
that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by
Ms. Catolico. Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 31 January
1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within 24 hours, her side of
the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to
give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension
from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she
was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990,
she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the
interests of the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990,
Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice
266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said
letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when
Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter
15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her
counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a
Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred
that the preventive suspension was ill- motivated, as it sprang
from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene
Soliven. On 5 March 1990, Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda
Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her
termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of
the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May
1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair
labor practice against Waterous. Nevertheless, he decided in
favor of Catolico because Waterous failed to "prove what [they]
alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any
investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and
suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not
be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for
every year of service; back wages for one year; and the
additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing
30 days work"; for a total of P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably
appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were
not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her
employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of merit,
but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by
deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was
already included in the computation of the aggregate of the
awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the special
civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one
of its regular suppliers is contrary to the injunction against
unreasonable search and seizure and a person’s right to privacy
of communication.
Held: In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The
Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People
vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives
rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no
violation of the right of privacy of communication, and Waterous
was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
Page 10 of 105
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business
communication in which it had an interest. However, Catolico
was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that
an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity
connotes every kind of assistance that management must
accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for
his defense, including legal representation. Although Catolico
was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed
from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by
her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel.
No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined
through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of
"evidence in [Waterous] possession," which were not, however,
submitted. What the "evidence" other than the sales invoice and
the check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico's dismissal
then was grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can
justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the
valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of
trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not
on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee,
to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is
restricted. Thus, the decision and resolution of the NLRC are
affirmed except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's
decision, viz., that the evidence against Catolico was
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which was set aside.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
5) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ALEXANDER ALBOFERA and ROMEO LAWI-AN, accused-
appellants. [G.R. No. L-69377. July 20, 1987.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr09-12_cons2poli-correspondence.pdf
Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, at about 4:30 p.m.,
Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper
Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the
place of Romeo Lawi-an, when Alexander Albofera called him
and informed him they would run after somebody. Esma
acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once to the
house of Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester
was around making a list of people engaged in "caingin."
Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the
forester. The two were able to overtake the forester, a certain
Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the road. Carancio
was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons were
already gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias
Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated,
Albofera began questioning Carancio about his purpose in the
place. Carancio replied that he was there to inspect the
"caingin" as a forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an, alias Jun, Boy
Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring Carancio to the
forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an's house. Esma did
not join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not
long after the group returned to Lawi-an's house, but without
Carancio. Albofera's hands, as well as alias Jun's hands were
bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera warned everyone,
particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to any
person or the military. The following day, at about 9:00 a.m.,
Efren Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an and Jun Menez
passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two,
Page 11 of 105
Lawi-an told him that the forester was already killed and warned
him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be
killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in
not reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in
June 1981, Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to
his brother Margarito, a CHDF member in Bansalan. Sisneros
asked that his identity be kept secret in the meantime pending
the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police authorities
arrested Albofera on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in July, 1981, the
two, shortly after their arrest, led the police authorities to the
place in Bagong Silang where they buried the slain forester,
specifically in a hilly portion near the forest where the trees were
not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where the authorities
dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera
executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal
Circuit Judge, stating therein that he was forced to join the NPA
movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the
"arrest" of Carancio which sentenced the latter to die by
stabbing. In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented a
letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander Albofera, while
under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before
the latter testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in
Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial evidence sufficient
to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both Albofera
and Lawi-an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered
them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P35,000.00 "by way of moral as well as actual damages" in its
Decision of 5 October 1984. Hence, the mandatory review.
Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be
excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or
invasion of the accused’s privacy.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Held: Section 4, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (substantially
reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution)
implements another Constitutional provision on the security of a
citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The
production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of
an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted
intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy. Albofera admitted
having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma
himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of
his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-
incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma
change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his
(Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his
letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of
his culpability.
Page 12 of 105
6) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, petitioners, vs. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN.
NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ, respondents. [G.R. No. 160792. August 25, 2005.]
Lifted from: https://adrianantazo.wordpress.com/2018/04/26/
alejano-v-cabuay-g-r-no-160792-august-25-2005/
Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers,
led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control
of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The
soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted
explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior
officers publicly renounced their support for the administration
and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the
same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government
emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices
they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their
barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a
directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over
custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The
transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident.
Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with
the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident.
the CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in
charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention
Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04.
The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his
commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the
detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate
court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’
letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of
communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal
restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.
Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter
of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights.
Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and
reading of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’ right to
privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure
as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters
for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have
been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo
was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the
present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If
the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not
read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees. The right to privacy of those
Page 13 of 105
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the
very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The
detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of
leading 300 soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime
punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident
involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of
the financial district of the country. As members of the military
armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk
persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give
the military custodian a wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center.
The military custodian is in a better position to know the security
risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the
suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the
military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
7) BARTNICKI ET AL. v. VOPPER, AKA WILLIAMS, ET AL.
[No. 99-1687. Argued December 5, 2000-Decided May 21,
2001* ]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-cohen/restrictions-on-time-
place-or-matter-of-expression/bartnicki-v-vopper/
Brief Fact Summary. Bartnicki (P) and Kane (P) were union
representatives whose cell phone conversation was illegally
intercepted and recorded at a time when collective-bargaining
negotiations were going on, in which they were involved. Vopper
(D) was a radio commentator who played a tape of the
conversation between the two unionists on his radio show in
connection with his news story featuring the negotiated
settlement. Bartnicki (P) and Kane (P) filed for damages, one
ground being that Vopper (D) with others used the tape on
public media despite knowing or having reasonable grounds to
know that the tape was of an illegally tapped conversation.
Vopper (D) claimed that his disclosure was protected under the
freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The anti-wiretapping laws make it
illegal to disclose the content of a conversation which was itself
illegally intercepted. However, if these provisions are made to
apply to the disclosure of information which has been obtained
in a legal way from the party which intercepted the conversation,
and if the information relates to some matter of public concern,
the said provisions violate the First Amendment.
Facts. Some unknown person tapped and recorded a cell
phone conversation between Bartnicki (P ) who was chief
negotiator for a teachers’ union, and Kane (P) who was
Page 14 of 105
president of the same union. The conversation included a threat
of violent action (perhaps metaphorically) by Bartnicki in the
event the union’s demands were not met. The negotiations
eventually wound up with a settlement in favor of the teachers.
After the settlement, Vopper (D), a radio commentator, aired a
recording of the intercepted conversation on his show along with
his report on the settlement. He was not party to the
interception, and did not know who was responsible for it, and
had obtained the recording by legal means. The two union
leaders filed for damages under federal wiretapping laws, which
under S. 2511(1)(a) prohibits intercepting cell phone calls, and
under S. 2511(1)(c) prohibits disclosure of material obtained by
illegal interception. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review of
the case.
Issue. Do the wiretapping laws which proscribe disclosure of
material obtained by unlawfully tapping communications violate
the First Amendment, if used to conceal information which has
been obtained by legal means from the intercepting party, and
when such information is related to public concern?
Held. (Stevens, J.) Yes. The provisions of federal wiretapping
laws are in violation of the First Amendment if used to suppress
the disclosure of information obtained legally from a party which
illegally intercepted a conversation, and if the information is
such as concerns the public. Since the Court has no doubt of
Vopper’s statement that he was not involved in nor had
knowledge of the illegal interception of the conversation, that he
came into possession of the intercepted communication lawfully,
and that the disclosed information was of public concern. In
such a case, it would be a violation of the constitution if a state
were to make a citizen liable for the publication of true
information. The issue to be determined here is whether a
person who has obtained access to some material in a legal
manner from one who has procured it through illegal means
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
should be punished for publishing the material. The wiretapping
legislation has as its first intent the removing of incentive for any
interception of private communication. This is not served if an
innocent disclosure of public information obtained legally is
punished under that law. The person who performed the illegal
act is the one who merits punishment, and only in such a case
will the punishment have the desired deterrent action. The
second intent the government intends to serve through this law
is to prevent harm from ensuing to the persons whose private
communications were thus illegally intercepted. This is a much
stronger motive, as it is an important essential of government to
ensure privacy of comversation. In this suit, however, the
maintenance of privacy is of less concern than the disclosure of
matters which concern the public. When a person involves
himself in public affairs, he invites some loss of privacy as a
matter of course. This material of public concern cannot be
removed from the protection afforded by the First Amendment
because some unknown person acted illegally in obtaining the
tapped conversation. The decision is affirmed.
Discussion. The issue in this case led to a decision which
expanded the legal precedent in this area. Until this time the
Court’s holding was that under the First Amendment, a person
could not be held liable for publishing private facts provided the
information was legally obtained from public records. The only
justification for liability would be a governmental interest of
highest magnitude. This present case involved communication
of a matter which could be regarded as public in some aspects
so that it could not be treated as a purely private matter, which
might have rendered the publisher liable.
Page 15 of 105
Dissent. (Rehnquist, C. J.) The federal and state government
anti- wiretapping laws were enacted in order to prevent the
privacy of citizens from violation. Under these laws, it is illegal to
intentionally tap into a private conversation and also to disclose
material from electronic communications. The majority view of
the court is that these laws are in violation of the First
Amendment, since the illegally obtained information relates to a
matter of public concern, even though the concept of what
constitutes valid public concern is not a matter the majority even
touch upon. However, it is undoubtedly true that this view as
held by the majority actually reduces the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment, since millions of citizens who use
electronic communication have reason to fear disclosure of their
private conversation under this nebulous view. The anti-
wiretapping statutes are neutral as to the content of the
tappedconversations, and only apply to the fact of illegally
obtaining private information. This definition is extremely precise
to fit the demands of the statute’s object, and therefore it is
against all precedent to review these laws as unconstitutional
under strict scrutiny, the standards of which they already meet.
These laws should be upheld under intermediate scrutiny as
they do further the important governmental interest of protecting
citizen privacy. The constitution should not be a means of
protecting unwilling publication of private conversations.
Concurrence. (Breyer, J.) The Court decision in this case is
intended to be applicable only to the facts of this specific case,
and not to extrapolate beyond this situation. The facts here
considered are that,first, the broadcasters were within the law
up to the time of their publishing the information, and that
secondly, the information disclosed involved a threat of possible
physical harm to others, which is a matter of public concern.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
V. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND OF THE
PRESS AND THE RIGHT TO PEACABLY ASSEMBLE
Section 4, Article III, The 1987 Constitution: No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
1. Freedom of Expression and Of the Press
*Cases:
1. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO
PADRIGANO, RUFINO, ROXAS, MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. [G.R. No.
L-31195. June 5, 1973.]
Lifted from: http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2015/01/
philippine-blooming-mills-digest.html
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights,
Human Right is superior to property rights, Social justice,
jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression,
rights of free assembly and rights of petition
FACTS: • March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered
that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid
exercise of their constitutional right of freedom expression in
general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
Page 16 of 105
agency, the Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police
officers of the municipality of Pasig at Malacañang on March 4,
1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and
third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in
the morning and afternoon where PBMEO confirmed the
demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management.
That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation thus whoever
fails to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed
for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT —
NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO
sent a cablegram to the Company: REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO
answered that there is no violation since they gave prior notice.
Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against
the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and PBMEO officers directly responsible for ULP
losing their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration –
dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE: W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the rights
of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and
reinstate the petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the
dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as
well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs
as the citadel of his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who
have no patience with general principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the
right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by
the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are
not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration
of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription;
but human rights are imprescriptible.
Page 17 of 105
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave
and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression
of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or
strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on
the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for
excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the
mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against
the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to
forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration
would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior
legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the
right to petition for redress.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 18 of 105

o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with
the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which which to pay for competent legal services
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of • enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges
of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law on such human rights. It is an accepted principle that the
"to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self- rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the the purposes of justice require."
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace
Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual
aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair
labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section
Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms.
The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and
exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are
errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to
be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 19 of 105

government. In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute

2. JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ
PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO
ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO
APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL.
ROMAN MADELLA, respondents. [G.R. No. 59524. February
18, 1985.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/83216823/
Salonga-vs-Pano
FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was implicated, along with
other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in
Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the
leader of subversive organizations for two reasons (1) because
his house was used as a contact point ; and (2) because of his
remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He
allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the
Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then
President Marcos.
prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive
organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with
officers or other members of such association or organization in
furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case, there
is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan
to overthrow the government through illegal means. Lovely also
declared that his bombing mission was not against the
government, but directed against a particular family. Such a
statement negates any politically motivated or subversive
assignment. OBITER DICTUM: To withhold the right to
preliminary investigation, it would be to transgress constitutional
due process. However, it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted to satisfy the due process clause.
There must be sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case
or that probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salonga s alleged remarks are

protected by the freedom of speech.

HELD Yes. The petition is dismissed. RATIO The petitioner s

opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of
thought and expression. Protection is especially mandated for
political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the
ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments. The constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed
when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. In the case at bar, there is no threat against the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
a. FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP OR RESTRAINT
i) PUBLICATION, ETC.
*Cases:
1) Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc. [No. 303. Argued
January 14, 1936. Decided February 10, 1936. 297 U.S.
233]
Lifted from: http://
philippineconstitutionallawdigests.blogspot.com/2012/02/
grosjean-vs-american-press-co-inc-297.html
I. THE FACTS: The case of Grosjean v. American Press
Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, February 10, 1936, involved a Louisiana
law that imposed on publishing companies a license tax of 2%
of the gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in advertising
in newspapers, magazines or periodicals if their circulation is
more than 20,000 copies per week. Nine Louisiana-based
publishers of newspapers, with circulations of more than 20,000
copies per week each, filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement
against them of the said provision. They assailed the validity of
the act on the ground, inter alia, that it abridges the freedom of
the press in contravention of the due process clause contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
II. THE ISSUE: Did the assailed Louisiana law abridge the
freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment?
III. THE RULING:
[The Court voted unanimously to AFFIRM the decree of the
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana permanently
Page 20 of 105
enjoining the enforcement of the Louisiana state tax on
newspapers.]
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that “the act imposing
the tax in question is unconstitutional under the due process of
law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press,” thus:
The tax imposed is designated a “license tax for the privilege of
engaging in such business” -- that is to say, the business of
selling, or making any charge for, advertising. As applied to
appellees, it is a tax of two percent on the gross receipts
derived from advertisements carried in their newspapers when,
and only when, the newspapers of each enjoy a circulation of
more than 20,000 copies per week. It thus operates as a
restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the
amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its
direct tendency is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough
when we consider that, if it were increased to a high degree, as
it could be if valid, it well might result in destroying both
advertising and circulation. (Citation omitted.)
xxx xxx xxx
xxx. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money
from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly
different question would be presented. It is bad because, in the
light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue
of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of
the great interpreters between the government and the people.
To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2) JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI
SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,
petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents. [G.R. No.
64261. December 26, 1984.]
Lifted from: http://amorlegis.blogspot.com/2015/12/burgos-vs-
chief-of-staff-gr-no-l-64261.html
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño,
Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2
search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were
seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after
6 months following the raid to question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of
the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the
articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the
RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of
subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of search
warrants.
Page 21 of 105
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating
that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or
has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against
a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or
is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3) AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent. [G.R. No. L-32717. November 26,
1970.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/382953879/3-
Mutuc-vs-Comelec
Facts: The petitioner, Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for
delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy
has been given due course by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) but the commission prohibited the petitioner from
using "taped jingles" in his mobile units for campaign purposes
because according to COMELEC, such act is a clear violation
on the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which
made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request
or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin." It was COMELEC's argument that the jingle proposed to
be used by the petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a
singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the
phrase "and the like". Mutuc protested and invoked his right to
freedom of speech.
Issue: Whether or not the said rule which is "prohibiting the use
of taped jingles" denied petitioner of his
freedom of speech.
Decision: YES. COMELEC is restrained and prohibited from
enforcing such rule.
Doctrinally, courts always ruled in favor of the freedom of
expression. Moreover, any act that restrains
Page 22 of 105
speech should be greeted with furrowed brows. COMELEC shall
not exercise any authority in conflict with the law. It must also be
remembered that there is no higher law than the Constitution.
Regarding the petitioner's invocation of his right to free speech,
the Court has constantly held that this preferred freedom calls
all the more for the utmost respect. What respondent
Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on
petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is
directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by
the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped
jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use
his mobile units (loudspeakers). Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be weakened by confining it to a speaker
having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If courts were to
sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be
distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly
done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express
terms assures.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
4) BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent. [G.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992.]
Lifted from: http://juristprudent.blogspot.com/2018/01/adiong-vs-
comelec-gr-no-103956-march-31.html
Facts: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting
the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial
candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform
the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban
on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
Ratio: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers
on “mobile”places whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act
whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is
to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that
which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The
three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
Page 23 of 105
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be
on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either substantive
or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of
the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by
the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of this basic
principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates.
Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.
(Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)
The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local
elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to
speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible
dissemination of information on platforms and programs which
concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the
unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change.
(Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of
candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the
peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot name half or
even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The
public does not know who are aspiring to be elected to public
office.
There are many candidates whose names alone evoke
qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the
voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker
with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is
expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. Our
review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
effects in today's particular circumstances. We are constrained
to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
prohibition.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED
NULL and VOID.
Page 24 of 105
5) United States v. O'Brien [No. 232. Argued January 24,
1968. Decided May 27, 1968391 U.S. 391 U.S. 367]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-sullivan/freedom-of-speech-how-
government-restricts-speech-modes-of-abridgment-and-
standards-of-review/united-states-v-obrien-4/
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, O’Brien (Defendant), was
convicted for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal
statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. His conviction was
upheld after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) found the law constitutional.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. First, a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Facts. The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of
1948, amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that
made it an offense to “alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly
mutilate” a Selective Service registration certification. Defendant
knowingly burned his draft card on the front steps of the local
courthouse. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment
unconstitutional as a law abridging the freedom of speech.
Issue. Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as
applied to Defendant because his act of burning the draft card
was protected “symbolic speech” within the First Amendment?
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 25 of 105

Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed Discussion. This case creates a symbolic speech test that was
only to notify registrants of their registration or classification, to used here to uphold the 1965 Amendment to the UMTSA.
be retained or tossed into the waste basket according to the
convenience of the registrant?
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted
because it was intended to “suppress freedom of speech?”

Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot

be accepted that there is an endless and limitless variety of
conduct that constitutes “speech” whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea. However,
even if the alleged communicative element of Defendant’s
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution (Constitution), it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is
constitutionally protected activity. First, a government regulation
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirement

s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied
to Defendant.

No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the
initial purpose of the draft card is to notify, it serves many other
purposes as well. These purposes would be defeated if the card
were to be mutilated or destroyed.

No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of
Congress is not a basis for declaring this legislation
unconstitutional. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is
constitutional as enacted.



POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
6) MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME
GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE
MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and
GERALD GARY RENACIDO, respondents. [G.R. No. 127930.
December 15, 2000.]
Lifted from: https://legal-opinion.blog/2019/08/04/miriam-
college-foundation-inc-v-court-of-appeals-g-r-no-127930-
december-15-2000/
FACTS: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam
College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after
letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the
publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar,
and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction
to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the
Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so
wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which
they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing
through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary
sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the
defendants.
ISSUE: won the petitioner has the power to discipline and
dismiss the students.
Page 26 of 105
HELD: YES. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms
subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who
may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught,
and (4) Who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to
discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.
e., “how it shall be taught.” A school certainly cannot function in
an atmosphere of anarchy. Thus, there can be no doubt that the
establishment of an educational institution requires rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly
educational program and the creation of an educational
environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations
are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty,
and property. Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise
finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.” Incidentally, the
school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in
its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty. [All
educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop
moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the
State’s power to regulate educational institution: The State
recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions. As may be gleaned from the above provision, such
power to regulate is subject to the requirement
of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely
the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not
the deprivation of their rights.
Campus journalism act (republic act no. 7079); section 7 thereof
construed to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written,
except when such articles materially disrupts class work or
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power
to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a
safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent
part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule that Miriam
College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed
against respondent students..
Page 27 of 105
b) MOVIE CENSORSHIP
*Cases:
1) JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA
FILMS, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q.
SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW
KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.),
and THE BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES
AND TELEVISION (BRMPT), respondents. [G.R. No.
L-69500. July 22, 1985.]
Lifted from: https://somelawnotes.wordpress.com/2015/02/24/
gonzales-vs-katigbak/
Facts: The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim, was
classified “For Adults Only.”
The main objection was the classification of the film as “For
Adults Only.” For petitioners, such classification “is without legal
and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of
artistic expression. The film is an integral whole and all its
portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated
objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a
whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.”
Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in
classifying said film as “For Adults Only.”
Held: No. The Court dismissed the petition
for certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough
votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in
the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only.”
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Principles found:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic
impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits is considerable. Press freedom,
as stated in the opinion of the Court, “may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment.”[12]This is not to say that such freedom, as
is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if
“there be a ‘clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that [the State] has a right to prevent.
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there
is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such
basic rights are emasculated. It is, however, except in
exceptional circumstances a sine qua nonfor the
meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that
equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom
from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from
censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled
principle in our jurisdiction.
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of
expression may be limited is the clear and present
danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State
has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be
clear but also present. There should be no doubt that
what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident.
Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its
imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor
Page 28 of 105
does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is
the requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable.
4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity — and rightly so.
5. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is
obscene. There is persuasiveness to the approach
followed in Roth: “The early leading standard of
obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the
effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible
persons.
6. The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the
duty to be ever on guard against any impermissible
infringement on the freedom of artistic expression calls to
mind the landmark ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United
States v. Bustos,[22]decided in 1918. While recognizing
the principle that libel is beyond the pale of constitutional
protection, it left no doubt that in determining what
constitutes such an offense, a court should ever be
mindful that no violation of the right to freedom of
expression is allowable.
7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion,
Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize that “sex and
obscenity are not synonymous.”[24]Further: “Obscene
material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of
sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press.
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference
was made to respondent Board “applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard,”[26]words which can
be construed in an analogous manner. Moreover, as far
as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it
cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters “shall
be under the patronage of the State.”[27] That is a
constitutional mandate.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
9. This being a certioraripetition, the question before the
Court is whether or not there was a grave abuse of
discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by
respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty
and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa
Patalim was classified as “For Adults Only,” without any
deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what
constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive.
This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of
discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to
maintain that such an abuse can be
considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie.
10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be
limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion
pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where
television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls
for observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of
the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the
adult population.[34] It cannot be denied though that
the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest
an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
Page 29 of 105
2) MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs. MARIA SOTO VDA.
DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. [G.R. No. L-32066. August 6, 1979.]
Lifted from: http://legalpurple.blogspot.com/2014/05/lagunzad-
vsvda-de-gonzales-ca.html
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began
the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story"
portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of
the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a
member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were
tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the
public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt
with his private and family life including the portrayal in some
scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein,
and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s half sister, for and
in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the
"exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain
changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. After some
bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de
Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter
as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for
purposes of producing the picture for consideration of
P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount
of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent
theaters all over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay
any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de
Gonzales instituted the present suit against him praying
for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the
balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the
Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from
the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
from, among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the
episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were
matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same
time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that
private respondent has no property right over those incidents;
that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or
consideration and constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press; and
that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only
because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a
counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the
Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the CA ruled in
favor of Vda. deGonzales.
ISSUES
1) Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises
Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding
that he was a public figure. (YES)
2) Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any
property right over the life of Moises Padilla considering that the
latter was a public figure. (YES)
3) Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press. (NO)
HELD:
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically
destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as
person's privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no
matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar,
while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-
life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a
little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality.
Page 30 of 105
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for
prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray
publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his
mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v.
Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists
for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased.”
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman,
he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life
of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of
expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations.
One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The
principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to
privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3) AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY &
McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
respondents. [G.R. No. 82380. April 29, 1988.]
Lifted from: http://tobicasdigest2.blogspot.com/2014/06/gr-
no-82380-april-29-1988-ayer.html
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his
movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The
Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and
other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his
approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be
viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven
with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that
he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his
family in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted
from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by
Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any reference
to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character
in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears
substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated
Page 31 of 105
HELD : The Court would once more stress that this freedom
includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them
through television The respondent Judge should have stayed
his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining
Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private
respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20)
days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet
uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither
private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what
the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any
right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
The subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the
petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual
life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent
Ponce Enrile The extent of that intrusion, as this Court
understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be
generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably
necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private
respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict
in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of
private respondent or that of any member of his family. His
participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment
of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role
played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The
right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than
that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired
into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to
be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during
which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or
indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in
a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines. The line of
equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement
that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events
b. FREEDOM FROM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
i) LIBEL
*Cases:
1) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [No. 39. Argued January
6, 1964. Decided March 9, 1964. 376 U.S. 254]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-
keyed-to-dobbs/communication-of-personally-harmful-
impressions-to-others/new-york-times-v-sullivan/
Brief Fact Summary. The Alabama Supreme Court of upheld a
judgment awarding the Respondent, L.B. Sullivan
(Respondent), damages in a civil libel action. The Petitioner, the
New York Times (Petitioner), appealed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Constitutional guarantees require a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Facts. The Petitioner newspaper published a full-page ad that
alleged the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s (King) arrest for
perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King’s
efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote.
The Respondent, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a
libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who
Page 32 of 105
were listed as endorsers of the advertisement. The Respondent
claimed that the allegations against the Montgomery police
defamed him personally. The advertisement included
statements, some of which were false, about police action
allegedly directed against students who participated in a civil
rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights
movement. The Respondent claimed the statements referred to
him because his duties included supervision of the police
department. Under Alabama law, the Respondent did not have
to prove that he had been harmed. Also, a defense claiming that
the advertisement was truthful was unavailable since the
advertisement contained factual errors. The jury found for the
Respondent, awarding a $500,000 judgment. The State
Supreme Court affirmed.
Issue. Did Alabama’s libel law, by not requiring the Respondent
to prove that the speech in question was motivated by actual
malice, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment’s
freedom of speech and freedom of press protections?
Held. Yes. The court ruled that the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution) protects the publication
of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public
officials except when statements are made with actual malice
(with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard to
truth or falsity). Specifically, the rule of law applied by the
Alabama courts was constitutionally deficient for failure to
provide the Petitioner the safeguards for freedom of speech and
of the press that were guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution in a libel action brought by a
public official against critics of his official conduct.
Concurrence.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
* Interestingly, Justices Arthur Goldberg (J. Goldberg) and Hugo
Black (J. Black) (with whom Justice William Douglas (J.
Douglas) joined in concurrence) did not feel that the new
standard afforded sufficient protection. As J. Black, taking issue
with the malice requirement stated, “‘Malice,’ even as defined by
the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and
hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved
provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically
to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to
the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.” J.
Black would, in fact grant the press “absolute immunity for
criticism of the way public officials do their public duty.” This is a
point of utmost concern for J. Black, as he asserted, “To punish
the exercise of this right to discuss public affairs or to penalize it
through libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion of
the very kind most needed. This Nation, I suspect, can live in
peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public
affairs and public officials. But I doubt that a country can live in
freedom where its people can be made to suffer physically or
financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its
officials.”
* J. Goldberg, echoing J. Black, states flatly, “In my view, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to
the citizen and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege
to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from
excesses and abuses.” J. Goldberg would dispense with any
litmus test connected with the mindset of those exercising free
speech: “The right should not depend upon a probing by the jury
of the motivation of the citizen or press.” Ominously, J. Goldberg
warns, “If liability can attach to political criticism because it
damages the reputation of a public official as a public official,
then no critical citizen can safely utter anything but faint praise
about the government or its officials. The vigorous criticism by
press and citizen of the conduct of the government of the day by
Page 33 of 105
the officials of the day will soon yield to silence if officials in
control of government agencies, instead of answering criticisms,
can resort to friendly juries to forestall criticism of their official
conduct.”



Discussion. In its landmark ruling in Sullivan, the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court) uses the case as an
opportunity to examine the parameters of free speech and First
and Fourteenth Amendment protections. Until Sullivan,
defamation law was entirely defined by the law of the states with
no constraints imposed by the Constitution. Since Sullivan
defamation law has been “constitutionalized” with the Supreme
Court expanding and refining the boundaries of free speech.
At immediate issue in Sullivan was the question of libel, and the
court noted, “Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful
acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of
expression that have been challenged in the Supreme Court,
libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations.” The court flatly concludes, “The Constitution does
not protect libelous publications.” There was thus a requirement
to explore more fully what constitutes libel. The Supreme Court
quickly dispenses with the primary defense, “Authoritative
interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of
truth — whether administered by judges, juries, or
administrative officials — and especially one that puts the
burden of proving truth on the speaker.” Such a test would
create liability simply on the basis of error, as the Supreme
Court explained, “Erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the breathing space that they need to survive.”
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Nevertheless, another important distinction had to be drawn in
Sullivan in that the Respondent was a public official. Thus the
delineation between the rights of a public figure and those of a
private citizen needed to be drawn. With regard to the former,
the court chose to adopt a standard of “actual malice”, and
explained, “Constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.” Reinforcing the point, the court
states, “Any one claiming to be defamed by a communication
must show actual malice or go remediless. This privilege
extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of
public concern, public men, and candidates for office.” The
court’s rationale was that no less than the citizenry’s right to
criticize government was at stake: “The Constitution delimits a
state’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by
public officials against critics of their official conduct.” Thus,
under the new Federal standard, the evidence presented in
Sullivan was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment
for the Respondent, since it failed to support a finding that the
statements were made with actual malice or that they related to
him.
Page 34 of 105
2) DR. MERLE A. ALONZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JUDGE DAN
VELASCO, and DR. ANGELES VELASCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 110088. February 1, 1995.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/303868326/
Alonzo-v-CA
FACTS: From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was
the Field Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care
Commission (PMCC) for Region XI. On June 13, 1985,
accused was directed by Executive Officer of the PMCC, Rossi
Castro, to conduct inspections of Medicare accredited clinics
and hospitals. Among the Medicare-accredited clinics inspected
by accused were the Sto. Niño Medical Clinic in Astorga, and
Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in Guihing, Hagonoy. The
clinics were owned and managed by complainant Dra. Angeles
Velasco, married to Judge Dan Velasco of the MTC-Hagonoy,
Davao del Sur. After the inspection, accused submitted her
report on her findings to Dr. Jesus Tamesis, PMCC Vice
Chairman, which reflected negative findings and indicated
therein the following statement: In all, this particular clinic
should be closely monitored because, aside from the above-
mentioned violations, the husband is a judge and it gives them a
certain amount of "untouchability." In fact, they make court suits
their pastime.
Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a
complaint for libel against the petitioner with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Davao City and, after preliminary investigation;
Assistant City Fiscal Raul Bendigo filed the corresponding
information for
libel against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court.
After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 19 November 1990
its decision finding the petitioner "guilty beyond reasonable
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
doubt of two (2) crimes of libel, penalized under Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found defamatory the statement in the last
paragraph, which read: “the husband is a judge and it gives
them certain amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make court
suits their past time." The trial court said that this statement
"conveys the meaning that Judge Velasco abuses his powers
and authority as a judge thus enabling him and his wife to
violate the law with impunity and even 'make court suits their
past time [sic].'" Regarding the requirement of publication, it
held that there was sufficient publication of the petitioner's
subject report when she sent it to Dr. Tamesis.
In its decision of 29 January 1993 affirming the trial court's
judgment, the Court of Appeals conceded that the subject report
of the petitioner was a "qualified privileged
communication" under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code but held that the privilege was lost
because of proof of actual malice. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned report of the petitioner to
is libelous.
HELD: NO
RATIO: There can then be no doubt that the petitioner made her
report in the exercise of her official duty or function. She
rendered it in due course to her superior who had a duty to
perform with respect to its subject matter and which the latter
faithfully did by filing the appropriate complaint against Dr.
Velasco after an evaluation of the report. We thus fully agree
with the Court of Appeals that the report falls within the first
paragraph of Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the privileged
character of the report negated the presumption of malice or
Page 35 of 105
malice in law. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice
in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged
communication
should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would
defeat the protection, which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides."
Finally there was, in law, no publication of the questioned report.
The rule is settled that a communication made by a public
officer in the discharge of his official duties to another or to a
body of officers having a duty to perform with respect to the
subject matter of the communication does not amount to a
publication within the meaning of the law on defamation.
There was also no publication when Atty. Balasabas, a third
person, read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the report of
the petitioner attached thereto. The private respondents
entrusted these documents to Atty. Balasabas with the request
that he give
them to their counsel, Atty. David Montana. Where the plaintiff
himself communicated or by his acts caused the communication
of the libelous matter to a third person, there was no actionable
publication.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3) LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA
TIMES PUBLICATION CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN,
MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ and
CONSORCIO BORJE, defendants-appellees. [G.R. No.
L-16027. May 30, 1962.]
Lifted from: http://tobicasdigest2.blogspot.com/2014/06/gr-no-
l-16027-may-30-1962-lumen.html
Facts : Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover
P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as moral damages,
P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and P20,000,
as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the
publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the
Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items
which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false,
and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity,
good name and business and official transactions, and caused
her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental
and physical anguish and incalculable material, moral,
professional and business damages. The defendants are The
Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday
Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel
V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the
reporter or author of the first article and the managing editor, the
associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of said
newspapers
Issue : WON Manila Times committed libel in this case?
Held : YES. It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy
a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in
which a given event should be presented to the public, and the
importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its
Page 36 of 105
presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal.
Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the
truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and
non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy
immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must
be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good
faith and without any comments or remarks.
In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory
to the plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956,
presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in
fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true
report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its
sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" — is a
comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the
defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed
to be malicious". We note that the news item published on
August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the
first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had
filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office.
It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in
said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification does not
wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first
article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs.
Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of
justice and of all parties concerned would be served if the
defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the sums of P3,000, by way
of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 37 of 105

elections and from the style and tone of writing employed by

Afable.
4) BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioner, vs. there was malice in publishing the article about Mr Labo.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SP, 6TH DIVISION)
AND RAMON LABO, JR., respondents. [G.R. No. 107566. Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision. The
November 25, 2004.] elements of libel are: 1) The imputation of a discreditable act or
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/327811535/ condition to another; 2) publication of the imputation; 3) identity
Courrier-v-CA of the person defamed; and 4) existence of malice. The law
presumes that every defamatory imputation is malicious.
Facts: Petitioner Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada) was the president However, malice is not presumed when the information is for
and general manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., public interest.
Inc., which publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly
newspaper published and circulated in Baguio City and other Mr. Labo was unable to prove that Afable’s column was tainted
provinces within the Cordillera region. Petitioner Cecille Afable with actual malice. Afable’s article constituted a fair comment on
(Afable) was Baguio Midland Couriers editor-in-chief and one of a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of private
its columnists who ran the column In and Out of Baguio. On the respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio
other hand, private respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among City. The column provided the public with information as regards
the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January 1988 Labo’s financial status which was still unknown at that time.
local elections. Before the 18 January 1988 local elections, Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of
petitioner Afable wrote in her column a series of articles dealing the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but
with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio such is the inevitable result of the application of the law.
City. Respondent Labo alleged that in Afable’s column on
January 3, 1988 and January 10, 1988 made it appear that he
(private respondent) could not comply with his financial
obligations of Php27,000.00, yet, he will be donating millions to
the people.
Mr. Labo filed criminal and civil actions for libel. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The article in question
was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of
public interest. The decision, was, however, reversed by the
appellate court. It declared that the malicious nature of the
article may be deduced from the fact that it was published in the
Baguio Midland Courier a few days before the scheduled local
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
5) EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the "MANILA
CHRONICLE" and JUAN T. GATBONTON, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ,
respondents. [G.R. No. L-26549. July 31, 1970.]
Lifted from: http://liberlegis.blogspot.com/2014/03/digest-lopez-
vs-ca-1970.html
Facts: o January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila
Chronicle à Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to the
Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes
which forwarded such message to Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance
kits on the beach of the island which contained, among other
things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to
the authorities in Manila that the locals were living in terror due
to a series of killings committed on the island since Christmas of
1955.
o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately
deployed to the babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story
about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted
transportation home to Manila.
o Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” à the
same word to be used by the newspapers who covered the
same
o January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila
Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It
claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to
light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost
everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and
food and clothing being scarce
o January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazineà in the "January
News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as “a health inspector who
suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story
Page 38 of 105
about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that
he could be ferried back to civilization.” à Called it “Hoax of the
year”
o In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both
photos were of a different person of the same name à Fidel G.
Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria,
Bulacan
o January 27, 1957 à published statements correcting their
misprint and explained that confusion and error happened due
to the rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline
o Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won
and was awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k
attorney’s fees)
o CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue: o WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in
printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in relation to the “hoax of
the year”?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to
prosper?
Held: Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is
reduced to P1,000.00
Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel
is harmful on its face by the fact that it exposes the injured party
to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is
irrelevant.
o Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is "malicious
defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one
who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 39 of 105

o Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and 4. Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction of error in publishing
Libel à "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication
an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person of the original article
whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article o Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying
are imputed to such person." circumstance!
o In this case à 3rd person was Cruz à his picture being
published beside the article imputes him as the purveyor of the Dissent: Dizon, J.
hoax of the year o Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:
o No evidence of actual malice
2. Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it o The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral
also can not claim any talismanic immunity form constitutional turpitude to Cruz
limitations o The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case
o State interest in press freedom à citing Justice Malcolm: Full should be considered “excusable negligence”
discussion of public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of
good governance… “Public officials must not be too thin-
skinned with reference to comments on official acts”…”of course
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be
born for the common good.”
o So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have
the legal right to have and express their opinions on legal
questions. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon
freedom of the press.
o “Last word on the subject” à Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez:
Press should be given leeway and tolerance as to enable them
to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy
o Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal
values
o TEST of LIABLITY à must prove there was actual malice in
publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this
case)
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
ii) OBSCENITY
*Cases:
1) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant.
[G.R. No. 20569. October 29, 1923.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/77169519/
CRIM-2-People-vs-Kottinger
Quick Summary: Pictures depicting native inhabitants in their
native attire and in poses showing how they live in real life is not
obscene or indecent.
Held: The Court disagrees with the appellant on his technical
argument but agrees with him on his main contention. 1. While
the information is lacking in precision, and while the content of
section 12 of the Libel Law is not as inclusive as it might be, the
information is not fatally defective and covers the alleged facts.
Act. No. 277, section 12 states: “Any person who writes
composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for
sale, distributes, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing,
paper, book, or other matter, or who designs, copies, draws,
engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene picture or
print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any
obscene or indecent figure, who writes, composes or prints any
notice or advertisement of any such writing, paper, book, print,
or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a
fine of not exceeding 1000 dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both.” The law provides punishment for
the sale or exhibition of any obscene/indecent writing, paper,
book, or other matter. “Or other matter” is added as a catch-all
phrase, intended to cover kindred subjects as its antecedent.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not a universal rule, and should
be applied in order to carry out the legislative intent. While it
Page 40 of 105
may be conceded that section 12 does not cover the present
case, article 571, no. 2 of the Penal Code and section 730 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila may be applied.
Section 730 states that not person shall “exhibit, circulate,
distribute, sell […] any lewd, indecent, or obscene book, picture
[…] or any other thing” 2. Pictures portraying the inhabitants of
the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen
in the regions in which they live are not obscene or indecent
within the meaning of the Libel Law. Not one parallel case could
be found, so the Court perforced reason from the general to the
specific, from universal principle to actual fact. “Obscenity” is
defined as something offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy.
“Indecency” is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy.
The test for obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.
Another test is whether or not it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. The Libel Law does not
define what constitutes obscene or indecent writings, pictures,
etc. but the words “obscenity” and “indecency” are themselves
descriptive, words in common use and every person of average
intelligence understands their meaning. Whether a picture is
obscene/indecent must depend on the circumstances of the
case.
Facts: On November 24, 1992 detective Juan Tolentino raided
Camera Supply Co. located at 110 Escolta, Manila where he
found and confiscated postcards depicting non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines in their native attire and in poses
showing how they live. The six pictures are as follows: Exhibit A
A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 Legend Philippines, Bontoc Woman.
Greetings from the Philippines (depicting five young boys)
Ifugao Belle, Philippines Igorrot Girl, Rice Field Costume.
Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Moros, Philippines.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
J.J. Kottinger, the manager of the company, was charged of
having kept for sale in the store, obscene and indecent pictures
in violation of section 12 of Act. No. 277 (The Philippine Libel
Law). The prosecution produced no evidence proving the
obscenity and indecency of the postcards as they believed the
postcards themselves are the best evidence of that. Dr. H. Otley
Beyer, a UP professor, and corroborated by other witnesses,
testified that none of the pictures showed anything that he did
not see on various occasions in his studies. The defendant
interposed a demurrer based upon the ground that the facts
alleged therein do not constitute an offense and were not
contrary to law. The trial court overruled the demurrer. The
defendant was found guilty of the offense. The question was
one of first impression not just in the Philippines, but also in the
US, Great Britain and elsewhere, which is why the case was
submitted en banc for decision.
Issue: 1. (technical argument) WoN section 12 prohibits the
taking, selling, and publishing of alleged obscene and indecent
pictures and prints. 2. (decisive issue) WoN the pictures
portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as
they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live,
are obscene or indecent.
1. an objection that an opponent's point is irrelevant or
invalid, while granting the factual basis of the point. The Court
turned to Federal Laws prohibiting the use and importation of
obscene materials into the Philippines in order to shed light on
what constitutes as obscene or indecent. “Obscene” as used in
the Federal statutes makes it a criminal offense to place in the
mail any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, signifies that
form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, has the
same meaning given at common law in prosecutions for
obscene libel. In the case of U.S. vs. Harmon (regarding a
Page 41 of 105
violation of the Postal Law), the Court held that the word
“obscene”, in the absence of a definition in the statute, is
presumed to be employed by the lawmaker in the ordinary
sense of the word and cannot be said to have acquired any
technical significance. A standard dictionary defines “obscene”
as “offensive to chastity and decency; expressing or presenting
to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, and
decency forbid to be exposed. ” In Rex vs. Hicklin, the Chief
Justice said “The test of obscenity is this: […] and where it
would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even
to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the most
impure, causing lewd thoughts of an immoral tendency.” Laws of
this character are made for society in the aggregate, and not in
particular. So while there may be some individuals or societies
whose moral sense would neither be depraved or offended,
such cannot be allowed to be a standard which obscenity/
indecency is to be tested.
The test, rather, is what is the judgment of the aggregate sense
of the community reached by it? What is the probable effect on
the sense of decency, purity and chastity of society, extending to
the family (the foundation of the state)? It appears that a
national standard has been set up by the Congress of the US.
There are copies of reputable magazines which circulate freely
throughout the US and other countries and admitted in the
Philippines which contain illustrations similar to the pictures in
questions. Publications of the Philippine Government (“Ifugao
Law”, “Philippine Journal of Science”, Reports of the Philippine
Commission for 1903, 1912, 1913) have also been offered in
evidence. The pictures in question merely depict persons as
they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the
Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the
Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type.
The Court is convinced the postcards cannot be characterized
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy. The Court notes the
statement of the proprietor of the photos that he would on his
own initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the
pictures so that no one may be misled and may even withdraw
from sale certain pictures that may be offensive to the
sensibilities of his customers.
Dispositive: Judgment reversed. Information is dismissed.
Defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de oficio.
Dissenting Opinion (Romualdez) While the pictures cannot
strictly be termed obscene, they must be regarded as indecent.
Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and as such, is
indecent. This is shown by common sense as no woman
claiming to be decent would stand before the public in Manila
(where the pictures where exhibited) in the same fashion as the
pictures. In non-Christian regions, such pictures may not be
offensive, but in Manila, where they were exhibited, they are.
Page 42 of 105
2) MILLER v. CALIFORNIA [413 U.S. 15 (1973). No. 70-73.
Argued January 18-19, 1972. Reargued November 7, 1972.
Decided June 21, 1973.]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-stone/freedom-of-expression/
miller-v-california-3/
Brief Fact Summary. This is one of a group of “obscenity-
pornography” cases being reviewed by the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) in a re-examination of the
standards, which must be used to identify obscene material that
a State may regulate.



Synopsis of Rule of Law. The basic guidelines for a trier of fact
in an obscenity matter must be: (a) whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Facts. In this case, the Appellant, Miller (Appellant), conducted
a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated
adult material books. The Appellant’s conviction was specifically
based on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising
brochures to be sent through the mail. The brochures consist
primarily of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men
and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of
sexual activities, with genitals often predominantly displayed.
This case thus involves the application of a state’s criminal
obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 43 of 105

materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon
unwilling recipients.
Issue. Whether the obscenity presented in this case is
prohibited by the applicable state statute?
representative of their communities. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court noted that the publication at issue in this case had no
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The Supreme Court
found that hard-core portrayal of sexual conduct, for its own
sake and for the ensuing commercial gain, does not fit the
articulated standard.

Held. In sum, the Supreme Court: (a) reaffirmed the Roth

holding that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), (b)
held that such material can be regulated by the States, subject
to specific safeguards, without a showing that the material is
“utterly without redeeming social value and (c) held that
obscenity is to be determined by applying “contemporary
community standards.” As a result, the majority determined that
the material at issue in this case was not protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution and that the California state
statute could regulate the matter. Furthermore, the requirement
that a California jury evaluate the materials with reference to
“contemporary standards” is constitutionally adequate.



Dissent. Dissenting opinions were offered by both Justice
William Douglas (J. Douglas) and Justice William Brennan (J.
Brennan).

J. Douglas: It should not be the role of the court to define
obscenity.

J. Brennan: The state statute in this case is unconstitutionally
overbroad.



Discussion. The Supreme Court focused much of its decision
on the role of a jury in this type of matter. The Supreme Court
found that, despite the guidelines that it established, it is nearly
impossible to articulate a national obscenity standard. As a
result, the Supreme Court noted that each state should be free,
through state statute, to construct obscenity laws that are
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3) Ginsberg v. New York [No. 47. Argued January 16, 1968.
Decided April 22, 1968. 390 U.S. 629]
Lifted from: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/47
Facts of the case:
Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and
Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They
had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-
called “girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-
old boy entered the store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr.
Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay
the grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965,
Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and
“Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the
magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and
“Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal descriptions and
narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct.
Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to
persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or
sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or
sexual excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It
defined “harmful to minors” as that quality of any description or
representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the
prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with
respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was
utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau
County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of
violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second
Page 44 of 105
Department of the New York Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction.
Question:
1. Did Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments on its face because it restrained
expression?
2. Was Section 484-h of the Penal Law unconstitutionally vague
and uncertain on its face, in violation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Sort: by seniority by ideology
6–3 DECISION
MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.
No and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William Brennan,
the Court held that Section 484-h did not violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on expression. Justice
Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area of
protected speech or press. He acknowledged that the
magazines were not obscene for adults, but emphasized that
Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg from selling the
magazines in question to persons seventeen years of age or
older.
Justice Brennan focused on Ginsberg’s argument that the scope
of the constitutional freedom to read material concerned with
sex did not depend upon whether that person was an adult or a
minor. He rejected Ginsberg’s contention that Section 484-h
was a violation of minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms,
characterizing Section 484-h as New York’s attempt to adjust
the assessment of obscenity in terms of the sexual interests of
minors. Justice Brennan wrote that New York had an interest in
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
the well-being of its children, and that this subject was within
New York’s constitutional power of regulation.
Justice Brennan also held that Section 484-h was not
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He rejected Ginsberg’s
argument that Section 484-h failed to give adequate notice of
what was prohibited. The New York Court of Appeals previously
read Section 484-h to prohibit knowingly selling obscene
material to minors, and the Court also read a knowledge
requirement into other similar state statutes. Justice Brennan
also rejected Ginsberg’s argument that the statute was
impermissibly vague, as Section 484-h expressly stated that a
defendant must be acquitted if he proved that he made a
reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the
minor in question.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred. He argued that while the First
Amendment protected men’s freedom to decide what they will
read and listen to, government regulation could extend to
settings where a person lacked the capacity to make a choice.
New York was free to determine that children were not
possessed of a full capacity for individual choice.
Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo
Black. He acknowledged that the act was not a violation of
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
disagreed that obscene material was excluded from First
Amendment protection.
Justice Abraham Fortas dissented, arguing that the majority
avoided the essence of the case’s problem by failing to define
obscenity for the purposes of the censorship of material sold to
minors.
Page 45 of 105
4) LEO PITA, doing business under the name and style of
PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA,
respondents. [G.R. No. 80806. October 5, 1989.]
Lifted from: http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/pita-vs-court-
of-appeals-178-scra-362_08.html
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut
Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon
D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated
from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members
of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo
Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and
Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District
of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their
agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which
is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by
the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 46 of 105

temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition
for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of
the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of
expression of the petitioner.
warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for
the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion
an obscenity seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and
present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are
indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-
case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state

has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that
is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing
the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications.
However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures
here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather
for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of
obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication
or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is
whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the
question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it." The government
authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof
to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First
of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing
them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
iii) CRITICISM OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT
*Cases:
1) THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE
BUSTOS ET AL., defendants-appellants. [G.R. No.
L-12592. March 8, 1918.]
Lifted from: http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/us-vs-
bustos-37-phil-731-gr-l-12592-8.html
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the
Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication)
through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific
charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation
of money from persons who have pending cases before the
judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing
which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous against him.
Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional
protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press.
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration
of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is
wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or
a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any
alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any
Page 47 of 105
official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act
of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of
the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons
can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or
office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest
in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public
affairs. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration
of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were
believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance
or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of
a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did
they abuse the privilege. In the usual case malice can be
presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SALVADOR ALARCON, ET AL., accused. FEDERICO
MAÑGAHAS, respondent-appellant. [G.R. No. 46551.
December 12, 1939.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154357/
Case_Digests_on_Freedom_of_Expression
A columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his
article. The letter is about the conviction of 52 tenants of a
hacienda.
Facts:
1. A letter signed by one Luis Taruc was addressed to his
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and a copy of
which, having found its way to a columnist of the Tribune, was
quoted in an article of the said newspaper in its September 23,
1937 issue.
2. The letter is about the charging and conviction of 52
tenants in Flroridablance, Pampanga for robbery in band
because “they took each a few cavans of palay for which they
issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the
hacienda where they are working.” The letter furthers that the
tenants have the right to take the palay for their food as the
hacienda owner has the obligation to given them rations of
palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid with
their share of their crop.
3. For this purpose, respondent was required to show cause
on grounds of contempt of court.
Ruling:
Page 48 of 105
1. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are
well-defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other
jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule
is otherwise after cause has ended. It must clearly appear that
such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications
should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-
important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when
and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost
control either to reconsider or amend it. That, the Court
believes is the case at bar, for here the Court has a concession
that the letter complained of was published after the CFI of
Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery
in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order
confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently
filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it
was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which
it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have
been influenced by the question publication.
2. It is suggested that “even if there had been nothing more
pending before the trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish
the accused for contempt, for the rule that the publication
scandalized the court.” The rule suggested, which has its origin
at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern
English law and in the United States, “the weight of authority,
however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded
cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the
liberty of the press.” Other considerations argue against our
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported
into this jurisdiction is that “newspaper publications tending to
impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts;
that the rule is otherwise after the case has ended.” In at least
two instances, this court has exercised the power to punish for
contempt “on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle” (Villavicencio v. Lukban), “on the corrective and not on
the retaliatory idea of punishment” (In re: Lozano and Quevedo).
Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense, and in
considering the probate effects of the article alleged to be
contemptuous, every fair and reasonable interference consistent
with the theory of defendants’ innocence will be indulged, and
where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt
of one of the constructive contempt for interfering with the due
administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his
favour and he must be acquitted.
3. Respondent was acquitted.
Page 49 of 105
3) OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No.
L-2990. December 17, 1951.]
Lifted from: http://queenkwin.blogspot.com/2018/07/consti-2-
case-digests.html
FACTS: Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing
copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, not
only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines
and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter,
wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide stating his dismay with the administration of President
Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte,
and directing his wife to write to President Truman and Churchill
of US and tell them that in the Philippines, the government is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
ISSUE: WoN the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art.
142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?
HELD: YES, the accused is liable of seditious libel against the
Government of the Philippines. The freedom of speech secured
by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak
or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is
not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use
of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse
this freedom. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to
persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false
claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. The
appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide
because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Roxas people now in power. It is clear that the letter suggested
the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials.
c. TESTS AND VALID GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
i) CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE
*Cases:
1. Schenck v. United States [Nos. 437, 438. Argued January
9, 10, 1919. Decided March 3, 1919. 249 U.S. 47]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-sullivan/freedom-of-speech-why-
government-restricts-speech-unprotected-and-less-protected-
expression/schenck-v-united-states-3/
Brief Fact Summary. The distribution of leaflets using
impassioned language claiming that the draft was a violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) and encouraging people to “assert your opposition
to the draft” was held not to be protected speech.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The character of every act depends
on the circumstances in which it is done. The question in every
case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to protect.
Facts. This case is based on a three count indictment. The first
charge was a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917.
The second alleges a conspiracy to commit an offense against
the United States. The third count alleges an unlawful use of the
Page 50 of 105
mails for the transmission of unlawful matter. The document in
question claims that the draft is a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution and encourages people to
“assert your opposition to the draft.” The Defendants, Schenck
and other publishers of the leaflets (Defendants), were found
guilty on all of the counts.
Issue. Whether the words used in the leaflets are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to protect?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In many places
and in ordinary times, the Defendants in saying all that was said
in the leaflets would have been within their constitutional rights.
However, the character of every act depends on the
circumstances in which it is done. The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to protect. When a nation is at war, many things that might be
said in a time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that
no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right. Therefore, the words used in the leaflets are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to protect.

Discussion. This case gave birth to the “clear and present
danger” test.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2. IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF RE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880.
ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. L-27833. April 18, 1969.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154357/
Case_Digests_on_Freedom_of_Expression
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 4880 on the
grounds that it violates their rights such as freedom of speech,
of assembly, to form associations or societies. More so, they
question the forms of election campaigns enumerated in the act.
Facts:
1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was
“designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral
process” and “calling a halt to the undesirable practice of
prolonged political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious
evils not the least of which is the ever-increasing cost of seeking
public office.”
2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4th district of
Manila and the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for
the position of Vice Mayor. He was subsequently elected to that
position. Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private individual, a
registered voter in the City, and a political leader.
3. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880 would
prejudice their basic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom
of assembly and right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law. Specifically, they challenge the
validity of two new sections included in the Revised Election
Code under RA 4880 which was approved and took effect on
Page 51 of 105
June 17, 1967. The said sections prohibit the too early
nomination of candidates and limit the period of election
campaign and political activity. More so, after defining the terms
“candidates” and “election campaign/partisan political activity,”
the acts which constitute election campaign were specified, and
that simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the
election was not to be considered as part of an election
campaign. This prohibition was furthered by a proviso which
provided that nothing stated in the Act “shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of
the candidates for public office whom he supports.”
4. The acts deemed included in the terms “election
campaign” of “partisan political activity” are: (a) forming
organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups
of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar
assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate; (c) making speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of
any party or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or
distributing campaign literature or materials; (e) directly or
indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (f) giving,
soliciting, or receiving contribution for election campaign
purposes, either directly or indirectly.”
Ruling:
1. The Court held that the challenged statute cannot be
declared unconstitutional on several grounds. First, it is
premature to challenge the statute’s validity. Second, the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
required number of votes was not met when the Court
deliberated on the scope of election campaigns or partisan
political activities. Precisely, the Court declared that RA 4880
could have been narrowly drawn and practices prohibited be
more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present
danger doctrine.
2. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional
system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press. What does it embrace? At the very
least, free speech and free press may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then
to previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages or contempt proceedings unless
there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
3. The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of
expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing
participation by the people in social including political decision-
making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and
change. The trend as reflected in Philippine and American
decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and assure the
widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issue
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. It is not going too
far, according to another American decision, to view the function
of free speech as inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
Page 52 of 105
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger.”
4. Freedom of speech and of the press thus means
something more than the right to approve existing political
beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on
any matter of public consequence.
5. From the language of the specific constitutional provision,
it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation.
“No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of
the press.” The realities of life in a complex society preclude
however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not
an absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and
under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition.
6. As for freedom of assembly, the Bill of Rights as thus noted
prohibits abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the
press. The Bill of Rights likewise extends the same protection
to the rights of people peaceably to assemble. As pointed in US
v. Bustos, this right is a necessary consequence of our
republican institution and complements the right of free speech.
7. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
8. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking
for the majority in Thomas v. Collins, it was not accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the
press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government
for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical,
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
are inseparable. They are cognate rights and assurance
afforded by the clause of this section of the Bill of Rights,
wherein they are contained, applies to all. As in the case of
freedom of expression, this right (right of people peaceably to
assemble) is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
9. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form
association for purposes not contrary to law. With or without a
constitutional provision of this character, it may be assumed that
the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or
society exists. With the explicit provision, whatever doubts
there may be on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of
other guarantees, which are mostly American in origin, this
particular freedom has an indigenous cast and could be traced
to the Malolos Constitution.
10. In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of
association should be on its political significance. If such a right
were non-existent, then the likelihood of a one-party
government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may
become unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease to
exist; minority groups may be outlawed, constitutional
democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a
thing of the past.
11. Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom
in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to
form associations or societies when their purposes are “contrary
to law.” It is submitted that the phrase “for purposes not
contrary to law” is another way of expressing the clear and
present danger rule for unless an association or society could
be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is
Page 53 of 105
no justification for abridging the right to form associations or
societies.
12. In considering whether Republic 4880 is violative of the
rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association, the Court cannot ignore the legislative
declaration – that its enactment was in response to a serious
substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in
danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to
continue unless curbed or remedied. To asset otherwise would
be to close one’s eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor can
we ignore the express legislative purpose apparent in the
proviso that “simple expressions of opinion and thoughts
concerning the elections shall not be considered as part of an
election campaign,” and in the other proviso that “nothing herein
stated shall be understood to prevent any person from
expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office
whom he supports.” Such limitations qualify the entire provision
restricting the period of an election campaign or partisan
political activity.
13. According to the act, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any political
party, political committee or political group to nominate
candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier
than 150 days immediately preceding an election, and for any
other elective public office earlier than 90 days immediately
preceding an election.” This provision affects the right of
association. Political parties have less freedom as to the time
during which they nominate candidates; the curtailment is not
such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right.
Their scope of legitimate activities, save the above cited, is not
unduly narrowed. Neither is there such an infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such
purpose. Thus, the Court sustained its validity unanimously.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
14. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the limitations
thus imposed on the constitutional rights of free speech and
press, of assembly, and of associations cut deeply into their
substance. On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils,
substantial in character, taint the purity of the electoral process.
The justification alleged by the proponents of the measures
weighs heavily with the members of the Court, though in varying
degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to which
such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not unaware
of the clear and present danger that calls for measures that may
bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished rights of
expression, of assembly and of association.
15. The Court, with five justices unable to agree, is of the view
that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the
formation of organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against
a candidate or party is restricted and that the prohibition against
giving, soliciting or receiving contribution for election purposes,
either directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional
infirmity.
16. The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to
holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of
soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or
both for or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all
other legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the contention that this should
be annulled.
17. The other acts, likewise deemed included in “election
campaign” or “partisan political activity” tax, to the utmost, the
Page 54 of 105
judicial predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to
regulate election practices deemed inimical because of their
collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. From
the outset, such provisions did occasional divergence of views
among the members of the Court. Originally, only a minority
was for their being adjudged as invalid. It is not so any more.
This is merely to emphasize that the scope of the curtailment to
which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed
by the recognition of the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral
process.
18. The majority of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the
solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or propaganda,
whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the making of
speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding
interview for or against the election for any party or candidate
for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, suffers from the corrosion of invalidity.
However, to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality, it lacks
one more affirmative vote to that effect.
19. It is understandable for Congress to believe that without
the limitations set forth in the challenged legislation, the
laudable purpose of RA 4880 would be frustrated and nullified.
Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed
to elicit the assert of a majority of the Court. This is not to say
that the conclusion reached by the minority that the above
portions of the statute now assailed has passed the
constitutional test is devoid of merit. It only indicates that for the
majority, the prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
directly or indirectly, or that undertaking of any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party, is repugnant
to a constitutional command. To that extent, the challenged
statute prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by any law
be abridged.
20. In terms of the permissible scope of legislation that
otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger
doctrine, it is considered opinion of the majority, though lacking
the necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the
challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and
the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine.
21. It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, they
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so
closely related to our most precious freedoms.
22. It is of the opinion that it would be premature, to say at
least, for a judgment of nullity of any provision found in RA
4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in the
implementation of the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional
application of its provisions.
Page 55 of 105
3. ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondents. [G.R. No.
79690-707. February 1, 1989.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154357/
Case_Digests_on_Freedom_of_Expression
Facts: Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. He was
found guilty of contempt of court and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Ruling:
1. The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by
respondent’s counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves
all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which
compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the
doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The
clear and present danger doctrine has been an accepted
method for making out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however,
the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts.
2. Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the
“balancing-of-interest test,” the Court believes that the
statements here made by Gonzales are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as
to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. It is
important to point out that the “substantive evil” which the
Supreme Court has a right and duty to prevent does not, in the
instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt
violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at
stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
prevent a “substantive evil” consisting not only of the obstruction
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of
professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the court. The “substantive evil” here involved, in
other words, is not as palpable as a threat to public disorder or
rioting, but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching
in its implications for society.
4. IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW
FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and
HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ, respondents. [G.R.
No. 119673. July 26, 1996.]
Lifted from: http://
philippineconstitutionallawdigests.blogspot.com/2012/02/iglesia-
ni-cristo-vs-court-of-appeals.html
I. THE FACTS: Several pre-taped episodes of the TV
program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
“offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s
controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against
contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of
respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to
Page 56 of 105
grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs.
But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the
RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on
TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground
that the materials constitute an attack against another religion.
The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to
law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review
petitioner’s TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely
abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA
sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating
petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also
voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the
jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV
program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review
petitioner’s TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3
of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
review and classify] should not include religious programs like
its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is
urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution
which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s
public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of
the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule
that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of
some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of
public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez
faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the
liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of
concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to
subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of
religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its
rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion
divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand
still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption.
Page 57 of 105
If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated
petitioners TV series for “attacking” either religions, especially
the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will
show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of
the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they
were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by
the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict
such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . .
In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous
church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no
difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of
religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The
bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is
best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas.
When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the
spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can
fan the embers of truth.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents
failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can
be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.”
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled
that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.”
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft
of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video
tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of
the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but
only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
Page 58 of 105
5. VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND HUBERT J.P. WEBB, respondents. [G.R. No.
123881. March 13, 1997.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/129086461/Viva-
Production-vs-Court-of-Appeals-Hubert-Webb
FACTS: Assailed in the petition before us are the decision and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals sustaining both the
order of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
JudicialRegion (Parañaque, Branch 274 —hereinafter referred
to as the Parañaque court) restraining "the exhibition of the
movie 'The Jessica Alfaro Story' at its scheduled premiere
showing at the New Frontier Theater on September 11, 1995 at
7:30 in the evening and at its regular public exhibition beginning
September 13,1995, as well as to cease and desist from
promoting and marketing of the said movie. writ of preliminary
injunction "enjoining petitioner from further proceeding,
engaging, using or implementing the promotional, advertising
and marketing programs for the movie entitled 'The Jessica
Alfaro Story' and from showing or causing the same to be
shown or exhibited in all theaters in the entire country UNTIL
after the final termination and logical conclusion of the trial in
the criminal action now pending before the Parañaque Regional
Trial Court. Ma. Jessica M. Alfaro the star witness of the
Vizconde massacre was offered a movie contract by Viva
Productions, Inc. for the filming of her life story, she inked with
the latter the said movie contract while the said case (I.S.
95-402) was under investigation by the Department of Justice.
The private respondent sent separate letters to Viva
Productions, Inc. and Alfaro, warning them that the projected
showing of subject movie on the life story of Alfaro would violate
the sub judice rule, and his (Hubert J.P. Webb's) constitutional
rights as an accused in said criminal case.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not private respondent committed forum
shopping by filing two (2) cases with exactly the same factual
set-up, issues involved and reliefs sought before two (2)
different courts of coordinate jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the Parañaque Court can totally disregard and
indiscriminately curtail the petitioner’s constitutional right to
freedom of expression and of the press without presence of a
clear and present danger.
HELD: 1.The private respondent has committed forum
shopping. It is found that a shrewd and astute maneuverings of
private respondent ill-advised. It won’t escape anybody's notice
that the act of filing the supposed action for injunction with
damages with the Makati court, albeit a separate and distinct
action from the contempt proceedings then pending before the
Parañaque court, is obviously and solely intended to obtain the
preliminary relief of injunction so as to prevent petitioner from
exhibiting the movie on its premiere and on its regular showing.
The alleged relief for damages becomes a mere subterfuge to
camouflage private respondent's real intent and to feign the
semblance of a separate and distinct action from the contempt
proceedings already filed and on- going with the Parañaque
court.
2. The assailed decision and order of respondent court are SET
ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring null and void all orders
of Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Makati City in its Civil Case No.
95-1365 and forthwith dismissing said case, and declaring the
order of the Regional Trial Court of the same National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Parañaque (Branch 274), functus
officio insofar a sit restrains the public showing of the movie
"The Jessica Alfaro Story”.
Page 59 of 105
ii) DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE
*Cases:
1) APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff, vs. GEMINIANA MARIA
FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants. APOLONIO
CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V.
MERRERA, respondents-appellants. [G.R. No. L-8974.
October 18, 1957.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154357/
Case_Digests_on_Freedom_of_Expression
Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his case
pending at the CFI of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that
Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for a line in his
letter.
Facts:
1. Petitioner (Apolonio Cabansag) sought for the ejectment of
Geminiana Fernandez from a parcel of land who, on the other
end, filed their answer and a motion to dismiss. Even though
pleadings were submitted, the hearings were suspended
several times from 1947 to 1952.
2. Upon President Magsaysay’s assumption in office and
creation of Presidential Complaints and Action Commission
(PCAC), Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he
furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of
the CFI of Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had
been long been pending be decided already. The Secretary of
Justice indorsed the said letter to the Clerk of CFI Pangasinan.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3. Counsel for defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a
motion before Judge Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared
in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in
his letter to the PCAC when he wrote “thru the careful
manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.”
Ruling:
1. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies
a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances. The First Amendments of the Federal expressly
guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But
mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is
one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil
and political institutions – principles which the 14th Amendment
embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.
2. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an
independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of
assuring judges their independence is a free press.
3. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the
determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt
to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of
expression and the independence of the judiciary. These are
“the clear and present danger” rule and the “dangerous
tendency” rule.
4. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
“extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high” before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
Page 60 of 105
guarded against is the “substantive evil” sought to be prevented.
And this evil is primarily the “disorderly and unfair administration
of justice.” This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional
law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be
abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The US
Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this
rule “is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality
of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought
to prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or
invasion of the right of privacy.” The Court furthers “clear and
present danger of substantive evil as a result of indiscriminate
publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high… A public utterance or publication is
not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in
such a case, it must be necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly
and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering
disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism
of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
press.”
5. As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said
that the “[f]reedom of speech and press should not be impaired
through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless
there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge
may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that
tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him… The
vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
concerning a judge’s decision is not alone the measure of the
power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must
constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice.” Furthered in Pennekamp v. Florida,
“[a]nd in weighing the danger of possible interference with the
courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to
determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be
punished as contempt, it was ruled that ‘freedom of public
comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a
possible tendency to influence pending cases.’” Thus, the
question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree.
6. The second, which is the “dangerous tendency” rule, has
been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in
determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right
of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a
remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule
lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as
the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed
by the Constitution, are not absolute. As held in Gilbert v.
Minnesota, “[t]hey are subject to restrictions and limitations, one
of them being the protection of the courts against contempt.”
7. As furthered by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New
York, the dangerous tendency rule may be epitomized as
follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the State has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
Page 61 of 105
incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be
to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.
8. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the
freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the
Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of those
who abuse this freedom. Reasonably limited, it was said by
story in the passage cited, this freedom is an inestimable
privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might
become the scourge of the Republic.
9. The Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansag’s
mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or
degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was
addressed for. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein,
in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to
his feeling when he said that he “has long since been deprived
of his land thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.”
Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever
criticize, “the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing
counsel whose tactical manoeuvres” has allegedly caused the
undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is
addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference
in transcribing their notes.
10. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has
been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge
is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President,
asking for help because of the precarious predicament of
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Cabansag. Such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be
so, the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can the Court infer that such act
has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court or undermine
the administration of justice for Cabansag merely exercised his
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a
legitimate grievance.
2) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No.
21049. December 22, 1923.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154357/
Case_Digests_on_Freedom_of_Expression
Perez uttered phrases which called for the beheading of Wood
in a discussion on political matters.
Facts:
1. Respondent (Isaac Perez), while holding a discussion with
several persons on political matters in Pilar, Sorsogon, uttered
the phrases: “Asin an mangna Filipinos na caparejo co,
maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo no Wood
huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot can Filipinas (and
the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines).”
2. Leonard Wood was the Governor-General during that time,
April 1, 1922. For said phrases, Perez was accused for
violating Article 256 of the Penal Code.
Ruling:
Page 62 of 105
1. It is our course fundamentally true that the provisions of
Act No. 292(Treason and Sedition Law) must not be interpreted
so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the
people peaceably to assembly and petition the Government for
redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even
to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act
is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and
the existence of the State.
2. In the case at bar, the person maligned by the Accused is
the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the presidency of the US and other high offices,
under a democratic form of government instead of affording
immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite
abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the
Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech
and common decency. More than a figure of speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency of feeling incompatible
with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws. Being the representative of the executive
civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power, a
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the
rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
3. As a matter of fact, Section 8 of the same act contemplates
the said situation. For such reasons, Perez has uttered
seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and one an act
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 63 of 105

which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, which
tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, which
tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or
order of the Government.
iii) BALANCING OF INTERESTS TESTS
*Cases:
1) American Communications Assn. v. Douds [No. 10.
Argued October 10-11, 1949. Decided May 8, 1950*. 339 U.S.
382]
Lifted from: https://uscivilliberties.org/cases/3088-american-
communications-association-v-douds-339-us-382-1950.html
viewed as only an indirect effect on speech, the Court applied
a balancing test, rather than the clear and present danger test,
to determine the requirement’s constitutional validity. After
considering the competing interests, the majority concluded that
protecting the national economy from disruptive political strikes
outweighed any burden on the ability of a ‘‘relative handful’’ of
union members to express their political views. The holding’s
precedential value today is questionable. While not explicitly
overruling Douds, the Court invalidated a later version of
Section 9(h) as an unconstitutional bill of attainder in United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).

In 1947, Congress added Section 9(h) to the National Labor

Relations Act; this section required all labor union officers to
sign annual affidavits stating that they did not belong to
the Communist Party or support the unlawful overthrow of the
U.S. government. Unions whose officers refused to sign
noncommunist affidavits were denied access to the National
Labor Relations Board for relief from unfair labor practices.
Congress justified the affidavit requirement as necessary to
protect the free flow of Interstate Commerce from political
strikes. In American Communication Association v. Douds, the
Supreme Court upheld the statute despite noting that it
‘‘discourag[ed] the exercise of political rights protected by the
First Amendment.’’

In an opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson, the Court

concluded that the affidavit provision was designed by Congress
to regulate harmful conduct in the form of political strikes, but
not harmful speech. Because the statute had what the Court
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2) ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondents. [G.R. No.
79690-707. February 1, 1989.]
Lifted from: http://www.pinoycasedigest.com/2012/10/zaldivar-
vs-sandiganbayan-case-digest.html
Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme
Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases
involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that
since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s
powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation
of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the
Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent wherein he included statements which were
unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That
he had been approached twice by a leading member of the
court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be
too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to
refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass
the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of
the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two
Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying
that the SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over
the justice system in this country, especially because the people
have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big
fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.
Page 64 of 105
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in
writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
making such public statements reported in the media.
Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to
inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for
alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect
asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for
this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the
ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this
Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him
impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of
contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice
of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this
Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear
and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of
speech/expression.
Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to
announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct
including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements
made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were
made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to
transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at
stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but
also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the
judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards
of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts, which has some implications to the
society.
2. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880 - AN ACT ENSURING THE
FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT
PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public
Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and
stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to
life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a
lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on
any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of
affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the
government for redress of grievances.
Page 65 of 105
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public
meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be
faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and
other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the
Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue,
road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square,
and/or any open space of public ownership where the people
are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint
that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall
observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the
same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place
and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or
street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and
similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A
written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However,
no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done
or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance
or in private property, in which case only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or
in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for
by law are not covered by this Act.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a
permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or
streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public
address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility
of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of
the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity
is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of
the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
Page 66 of 105
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on
the application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-
eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and
record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall,
be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided
within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge
for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed
public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of
time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street,
the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent
grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is
convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to
another direction so that there will be no serious or undue
interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly
to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in
accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but
not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the
permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent
non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the
public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law
enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held
peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go
beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any
person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other
persons not participating in the public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities -
Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of
a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety,
a law enforcement contingent under the command of a
responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a
place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of
activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be
imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance
is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties
always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper
protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble
and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end,
Page 67 of 105
law enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with
the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and
must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein
defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not
carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or
riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots
or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar
anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or
deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public
assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of
the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the
leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any
possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other
harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or
at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to
such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the
disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the
preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a
warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately
order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be
made during the public assembly unless he violates during the
assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act.
Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace
during the public assembly shall not constitute a group for
dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When
the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is
required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute
violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by
any leader or organizer without having first secured that written
permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or
the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than
those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person
can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or
attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in
violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other
official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or
acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the
exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law
enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
assembly;
Page 68 of 105
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred
(100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or
on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such
as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or
thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement
unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a
public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and
loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of
any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding
Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4,
subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g)
shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the
country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable,
shall be centrally located within the poblacion where
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without
the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act
be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of
instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
Page 69 of 105
*CASES:
1) JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES
COALITION (ABC), petitioner, vs. RAMON BAGATSING,
as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent. [G.R. No.
L-65366. November 9, 1983.]
Lifted from: https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2013/04/17/reyes-
vs-bagatsing-g-r-no-l-65366-november-9-1983/
FACTS: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the
Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to
hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00
to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park,
to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks
away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a
short program would be held. There was likewise an assurance
in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to
free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be
taken by it “to ensure a peaceful march and rally.” Petitioner
filed suit for mandamus unaware that permit was denied,
because it was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusal of
permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this
time and at the place applied for.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct
peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may be
validly enforced.
HELD: NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.
RATIO: [T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the
cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising
from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances.”. There can
be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as
the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can there
be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of
the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas
Boulevard.
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel
aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be confined within the
limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions
is, on the whole, a safe guide, So it has been here. While the
General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their
choice, another place may be designated by the licensing
authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil if no such change were made.
By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were
a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required. Such application should be
filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
1) TEEHANKEE, concurring
The salutary desire on the part of respondent to prevent
disorder cannot be pursued by the unjustified denial and
Page 70 of 105
suppression of the people’s basic rights, which would thereby
turn out to be mere paper rights.;
2) MAKASIAR, concurring
With the justification that in case of conflict, the Philippine
Constitution — particularly the Bill of Rights — should prevail
over the Vienna Convention;
3) ABAD SANTOS, concurring
To add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief Justice is
like bringing coal to Newcastle, I just want to state for the record
that I voted for the issuance ex-parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction;
4) PLANA, concurring
In my view, without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per
se to the constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its
application would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right
such as freedom of assembly and/or expression, as in the case
at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any foreign
embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally
or demonstration.
5) AQUINO, dissenting
Voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of
the rally in front of the US Embassy violates Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 71 of 105

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners’ exercise of their right to

2) LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, TERESITA freedom to assembly and petition were valid.
EUGENIO, CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA,
ROSALINA JINGCO, LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a
PIZARRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL rule that public teachers in the exercise of their right to
SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, redress should be done within reasonable limits so as not to
respondents. [G.R. No. 126183. March 25, 1999.] and [G.R. prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass protests
No. 129221. March 25, 1999.] during
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/doc/236216115/Dela-Cruz- school days while abandoning classes is highly prejudicial to the
vs-CA-Case-Digest best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers
are penalized not because they exercised their right to
Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which
schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and
preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various
October 1990 by the Secretary of the Department of schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with upon the students for whose education the teachers were
the administrative complaints filed before its office by their responsible.
respective principals for participating in a mass action/strike
and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by DECS
constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and
reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty,
gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in
violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they
are
merely participating in a peaceful assembly to petition the
government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of
their constitutional right and insist their assembly does not
constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of
classes.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3) ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY
OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES,
BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY
MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS
SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners, vs. HON.
SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge
of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte;
and MABINI COLLEGES, INC.,represented by its president
ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of
Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents. [G.R. No. 89317.
May 20, 1990.]
Lifted from: http://thebattybarrister.blogspot.com/2018/02/non-v-
judge-dames-case-digest.html
FACTS: Petitioners (Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura,
Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares,
Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani
Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel
Torres), students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.
They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet
(Branch 38) seeking their re-admission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order
dated 8 August 1988.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by
the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waived-
their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment
form for the first semester of school year 1988-89.
Page 72 of 105
In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to
abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by
competent authorities in the College Department or School in
which I am enrolled."
Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the students’ right to
freedom of speech and assembly.
HELD: YES. The contract between the school and the
student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment
to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a
term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be
justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and
enrollment of students as a major component of the
academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic
standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against
students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and
assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection.
Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 73 of 105

However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline

or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of
his contractual right; and the court should not review the respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989
discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is
of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of
them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its
only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito
the basic tenets of fair play. Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown
by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the
Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be school's prescribed academic standards.
considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the
academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of
the school due to an insufficiency of information. Herein, the
students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings
in connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could
have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense
committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements
of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph
145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools).

But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of

administrative sanctions have become moot and academic.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-
enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from
respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been
more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they
might have committed when they led and participated in the
mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the
disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only
further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and
the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted
from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and
before the trial court.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
4) CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER
LUCAS, SOTERO LEONERO, and JUNE LEE, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, in his
capacity as the Director of the National Capital Region of
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, THE
GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION; CESAR
MIJARES, in his capacity as the President of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation, GONZALO DEL ROSARIO,
in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; TOMAS B.
MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean of Student Affairs of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY.
LEONARDO PADILLA, in his capacity as Chief Legal
Counsel & Security Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation; ATTY. FABLITA AMMAY, ROSENDO
GALVANTE and EUGENIA TAYAO, in their capacities as
members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation, respondents. [G.R. No. 62270. May
21, 1984.]
Lifted from: https://abegailpguardian.wordpress.com/
2013/10/14/malabanan-v-ramento-case-digest/
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council
of respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile
school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along
with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same
day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and
Page 74 of 105
continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their
permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to
language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance
of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees,
within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise
created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they
should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for
one academic year for their failure to explain the holding of an
illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages
against private respondents.
Issue: WON the suspension of the students for 1 academic
year was violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of
peaceable assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v.
Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free
speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in
the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public
interest without censorship or punishment and which “is not to
be limited, much less denied, except on a showing … of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent.”
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of
Reyes v. Bagatsing, for this Court to lay down the principles for
the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights
to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise
to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear
and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a
right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances
made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be
held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Petition Granted. One week suspension had been served.
Page 75 of 105
5) CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. TOMAS
EARNSHAW, Mayor of the City of Manila, defendant-
appellee. [G.R. No. 36453. September 28, 1932.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/372261022/
Evangelista-v-Earshaw-docx
Facts: The plaintiff, president of the Communist Part of the
Philippine Islands, requested the necessary permission to hold
a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the
afternoon of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade
through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal,
Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the
Governor-General a message from the laboring class; that on
the 3rd of March, 1931, the
mayor of the city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his
subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of meetings
held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he
had revoked their permits and licenses.
Issue: Whether or not, the prohibition made by respondent
violated the constitutional right to assembly by the petitioner.
Ruling: No. In the case of People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599, 605),
this court said, “. . . when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and
the existence of the State.”
In this case, the respondent mayor should be praised and
commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm
stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines
before the latter could do more damage by its revolutionary
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of
its members.
6) CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of
Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner, vs. VALERIANO E.
FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent. [G.R. No.
L-1800. January 27, 1948.]
Lifted from: https://pdfslide.net/documents/digest-primicias-vs-
fugoso.html
FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by
petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor,
Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16,
1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful
public meeting. However, the respondent refused to issue such
permit because he found that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public
order. Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances
of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a
riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119,
Free use of Public Place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to
issue permit hence violating freedom of assembly.
Page 76 of 105
HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that
the freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not
absolute. They can be regulated under the states police power
that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or
society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of
Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession
in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and
2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with
the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and
to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder. The court favored the second construction since the
first construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to
any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued
is for the use of public places and not for the assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one .
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
i) CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OR DANGEROUS
TENDENCY RULE
*Cases:
1) JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES
COALITION (ABC), petitioner, vs. RAMON BAGATSING, as
Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent. [G.R. No. L-65366.
November 9, 1983.]
Lifted from: https://www.scribd.com/document/140646060/
Reyes-vs-Bagatsing
Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold
a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to
5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of
the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space
of public property, a short program would be held. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a
petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session
of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in
the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken
by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request
was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence
reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested
that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the
participants themselves and the general public may be ensured.
An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was
Page 77 of 105
granted on the ground that there was no showing of the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino
dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the
City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of
five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery
and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right
to peaceably assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the
right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is
settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks
and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally
would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the public
places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. With regard to the
ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and
even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it
does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did.
The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants
for the denial.
2) HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo
Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner, vs.
RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent. G.R. No. L-65695. December 19, 1983.]
Lifted from: http://thedigester.blogspot.com/2012/04/ruiz-v-
gordon-gr-no-l-65695-december-19.html
Facts: Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo
Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, filed a petition for
mandamus against Richard Gordon to be allowed to hold a
parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting
at 1:00 P.M. The Court required the respondents to answer.
Respondents replied by stating the request for a prayer rally
was received in the Office of the Mayor and that respondent had
repeatedly announced in his regular program on Sunday over
the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony
before hundreds of government employees that he would grant
the request of any group that would like to exercise their
freedom of speech and assembly. When interviewed on the
matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned the
fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which
interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the
said newspaper. Given these, the respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. This was complied with.
Page 78 of 105
Issue: Can the petition be granted?
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio: The Reyes case was given some discussion in the
course of this petition as to the role of the judiciary in petitions
for permits to hold peaceable assembles.
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter.”
Thereafter, his decision must be transmmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. They can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along
with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other
departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of
assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights.
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action
for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took
the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not
a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the
right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested
in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 79 of 105

Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was (b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful
designated for the decision on the request, such party or his assembly has to make use of public places like parks, plazas,
representative should be at the office of the public official and streets, the public authority charged with the duty of
concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, granting or denying the permit should also consider the
whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and
petitioner. enjoy these same facilities.
Teehankee concurring: (c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be
The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent carefully considered and precautionary steps taken to prevent
danger that would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from
the licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, turning into a violent one what otherwise should be a peaceful
not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such demonstration,
clear and present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution
of October 25, 1983 in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential
for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a
previous restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does
not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare,
peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there
must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear
and present danger test. The possibility that subversives may
infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise
of the right of peaceable assembly is not to be 4 abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place" (at paragraph
6) and "It is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper
police protection to those exercising their right to peaceable
assembly and freedom of expression" (at paragraph 7).
J. Conception concurring opinion
9 In order that public officials may not be charged,
rightly or wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in
the granting or denying of such permits, the
following guidelines are deemed necessary:
(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot,
house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the place is
necessary. No permit from the government or any public officer
is required.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 80 of 105

“clear and present danger” test or the “balancing-of-interest

3) ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE test,” we believe that the statements here made by respondent
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. Gonzalez are of such nature and were made in such a manner
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan- and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents. limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per
[G.R. No. 79690-707. February 1, 1989.] curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out
Lifted from: https://aninolex.blogspot.com/2017/01/case- that the “substantive evil” which the Supreme Court has a right
doctrines-in-legal-ethics-part-i.html and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to
threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clear and present danger rule; The disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority
clear and present danger test is not the only test which has of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a “substantive
been recognized and applied by courts for making out the evil” consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly.—The hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the
“clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by respondent’s broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a
counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems country and the destruction of the standards of professional
and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the
legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court courts. The “substantive evil” here involved, in other words, is
to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is
absent proof of impending apocalypse. The “clear and present certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
danger” doctrine has been an accepted method for making out implications for society.
the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in
certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. In Lagunzad v. Vda. de
Gonzales, this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-
Herrera said: x x x The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and
present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press,
which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the ‘balancing-of-interests
test’ (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando of the Bill of Rights,
1970 ed., p. 79). The principle ‘requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation’ (Separate
Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).” Under either the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
4) APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff, vs. GEMINIANA
MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants. APOLONIO
CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V.
MERRERA, respondents-appellants. [G.R. No. L-8974.
October 18, 1957.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr21-38_cons2poli-freespeech.pdf
Facts: Apolonio Cabansag filed on 13 January 1947 in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the
ejectment of Germiniana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land.
The case was set for hearing on 30 July 1947. The hearing was
postponed to 8 August 1947. On that day only one witness
testified and the case was postponed to 25 August 1947.
Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: (1) a claim for
damages, (2) issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was set for hearing on 23 March 1948, and (3) alleged contempt
for violation of an agreement of the parties approved by the
court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these incidents.
Partial hearings were held on various dates. On 9 December
1952 when the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued an
order suggesting to the parties to arrange with the
stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe their
respective notes and stating that the case would be set for
hearing after the submission of the transcript. From 9 December
1952 to 12 August 1954, no further step was taken either by the
court or by any of the contending parties in the case. On 30
December 1953, when President Magsaysay assumed office,
he issued Executive Order 1 creating the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was later
superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on 17 March
1954. And on 12 August 1954, Apolonio Cabansag, apparently
irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his
Page 81 of 105
case, wrote the PCAC a letter copy of which he furnished the
Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan. Upon receipt of the letter, the
Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court, Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, instructing him to require the
stenographers concerned to transcribe their notes in Civil Case
9564. The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on 27
August 1954, referred the matter to Judge Jesus P. Morfe
before whom the case was then pending informing him that the
two stenographers concerned, Miss Illuminada Abelo and Juan
Gaspar, have already been assigned elsewhere. On the same
date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of Justice informing him
that under the provisions of Act 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, said stenographers are not obliged to
transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since
the parties are not poor litigants, they are not entitled to
transcription free of charge, aside from the fact that said
stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction. Meanwhile,
on 1 September 1954, Atty. Manuel Fernandez filed a motion
before Judge Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in
contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in
his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long
been deprived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a
tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a
counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared
in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by
him in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter-
charges, on 14 September 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both
charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within
10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for
sending the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade
the court in the eyes of the President and the people. Cabansag
filed his answer stating that he did not have the slightest idea to
besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the court nor was
he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
PCAC; that there is not a single contemptuous word in said
letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong
impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was any
inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the same was committed
by the judges who previously intervened in the case. Appearing
that the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V.
Merrera, had a hand in the writing and remittance of the letter to
the PCAC, Judge Morfe, on 29 September 1954, issued another
order requiring also said attorneys to show cause why they
should not likewise be held for contempt for having committed
acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. After due hearing, the court rendered
decision finding Cabansag and the Merreras guilty of contempt
and sentencing them to pay a fine as stated in the early part of
this decision. Cabansag, et. al. appealed.
Issue: Whether Cabansag should be cited for contempt due to
the letter he sent to the Office of the President, the language of
which may undermine the reputation and independence of the
Courts.
Held: Courts have the power to preserve their integrity and
maintain their dignity without which their administration of justice
is bound to falter or fail. This is the preservative power to punish
for contempt. This power is inherent in all courts and essential
to their right of self- preservation. In order that it may conduct its
business unhampered by publications which tend to impair the
impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it
regardless of who is affected. For, "as important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of
the judiciary." The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
Page 82 of 105
foundation. However, the freedom of speech and press should
not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in
question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration
of justice. A judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures
to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to
belittle him. The vehemence of the language concerning a
judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish
for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of
justice. Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by
Cabansag to the PCAC which has given rise to the present
contempt proceedings, it was far from his mind to put the court
in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of
those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he
was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no
other way of obtaining the early termination of his case. This is
clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and
courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he
said that he "has long since been deprived of his land thru the
careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer"; that the case which had
long been pending "could not be decided due to the fact that the
transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed by the
stenographers who took the stenographic notes"; and that the
"new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the
transcription of the said notes." Analyzing said utterances, one
would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to
the court, but to opposing counsel whose "tactical maneuvers"
has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The
grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the
stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their
notes. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has
been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge
by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office
of the President asking for help because of the precarious
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had
taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had
he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the
Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To
be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a
dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or undermine the
administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a
legitimate grievance. On the other hand, while the conduct of
Cabansag may be justified considering that, being a layman, he
is unaware of the technical rules of law and procedure which
may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution,
such does not obtain with regard to his co-appellants. Being
learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have
acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client
to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or unnecessary
interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their
duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court
and defend it against unjust criticism and clamor. Had they
observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided
the unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is
bereft of any proof showing improper motive on their part, much
less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be warned that
a commission of a similar misstep in the future would render
them amenable to a more severe disciplinary action.
Page 83 of 105
ii) BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST
*Cases:
1) AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY &
McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
respondents. [G.R. No. 82380. April 29, 1988.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr21-38_cons2poli-freespeech.pdf
Facts: Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company,Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd., envisioned,
sometime in 1987, the filming for commercial viewing and for
Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue). McEleroy discussed this project with local movie
producer Lope V. Juban, who advised that they consult with the
appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V.
Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major
roles in the events proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the
other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos
also signified his approval of the intended film production. In a
letter dated 16 December 1987, McElroy, informed Juan Ponce
Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis
of it. On 21 December 1987, Enrile replied that "he would not
and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/
or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further
advised McElroy that "in the production, airing, showing,
distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference
whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
made to him or any member of his family, much less to any
matter purely personal to them." It appears that McElroy
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted
from the movie script, and McElroy proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. On 23 February 1988, Enrile filed a
Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Civil Case 88-151; Branch 134), seeking to enjoin
McElroy, et. al. from producing the movie "The Four Day
Revolution." The complaint alleged that McElroy, et. al.'s
production of the mini-series without Enrile's consent and over
his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of
privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial court issued ex-parte a
Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application
for preliminary injunction. On 9 March 1988, McElroy filed a
Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary
Injunction contending that the mini-series film would not involve
the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and
that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on
their right of free expression. Ayer Productions also filed its own
Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-
series had not yet been completed. In an Order dated 16 March
1988, the trial court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the McElroy, et. al. On 22 March 1988, Ayer Productions
filed a Petition for Certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent
prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order with the
Supreme Court (GR L-82380). A day later, or on 23 March 1988,
McElroy also filed a separate Petition for Certiorari with Urgent
Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated
22 March 1988 (GR L-82398). By a Resolution dated 24 March
1988, the petitions were consolidated.
Issue: Wnether depiction of Enrile, as part of the events in the
1986 People Power Revolution and not as to his personal life
Page 84 of 105
nor his family, in the film “The Four Day Revolution” requires his
prior consent.
Held: The freedom of speech and of expression includes the
freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally utilized
vehicle of communication and medium of expression. Along with
the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a
principal medium of mass communication for information,
education and entertainment. This freedom is available in our
country both to locally-owned and to foreign- owned motion
picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for
availing of freedom of speech and of expression. In our
community, as in many other countries, media facilities are
owned either by the government or the private sector but the
private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be
sustained by being devoted in whole or in part to revenue
producing activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the
bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to
exclude commercially owned and operated media from the
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of
expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such
constitutional liberties in our country. The counter-balancing
claim of Enrile is to a right of privacy. Our law, constitutional and
statutory, does include a right of privacy. It is left to case law,
however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right
in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or
"the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not
an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has
long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The
interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right
to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern."
Herein, there is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the
respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of
expression by McElroy, et. al. The Judge has restrained them
from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture.
The Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an
ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a
complaint by Enrile and issuing a Preliminary Injunction 20 days
later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted
and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither Enrile nor the
trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look
like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy that Enrile could lawfully
assert. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates
to the non-bloody change of government that took place at
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train
of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such
subject matter is one of public interest and concern, and also of
international interest. The subject relates to a highly critical
stage in the history of this country and as such, must be
regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by
any form of mass media. The subject matter does not relate to
the individual life and certainly not to the private life of Ponce
Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is
it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is compelled,
if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce
Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the
change of government in February 1986. The extent of the
intrusion upon the life of Juan Ponce Enrile that would be
Page 85 of 105
entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day
Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent
of that intrusion may be generally described as such intrusion as
is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical
account. Enrile does not claim that McElroy, et. al. threatened to
depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life
of Enrile or that of any member of his family. The line of
equilibrium in the specific context of the present case between
the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement
that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other
words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting
the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution.
There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the
unwilling individual (Enrile) and certainly no revelation of
intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion
picture should not enter into a "matters of essentially private
concern." To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits
itself in portraying the participation of Enrile in the EDSA
Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion
into Enrile's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and
actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a
license from Enrile.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2) MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs. MARIA SOTO VDA.
DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. [G.R. No. L-32066. August 6, 1979.]
Lifted from: https://berneguerrero.files.wordpress.com/
2012/09/2005nr21-38_cons2poli-freespeech.pdf
Facts: Sometime in August 1961, Manuel Lagunzad, a
newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business outfit,
the "MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted
but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled
"The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla
Story," the rights to which Lagunzad had purchased from Atty.
Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00. The book narrates the
events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla
sometime between November 11 and November 17, 1951.
Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party
(then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental, during the November 1951 elections. Governor
Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and
his men were tried and convicted for that murder in People vs.
Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a
martyr in contemporary political history." Although the emphasis
of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the
portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de
Gonzales, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. The movie was
scheduled for a premiere showing on 16 October 1961, or at the
very latest, before the November 1961 elections. On 3 October
1961, Lagunzad received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly
Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of
the movie and the "exploitation" of his life. Shown the early
"rushes" of the picture, Mrs. Amante and her sister, Mrs.
Page 86 of 105
Gavieres, objected to many portions thereof notwithstanding
Lagunzad's explanation that the movie had been supervised by
Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., based on his book "The Long Dark Night
in Negros." On 5 October 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf
of her mother, demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. Lagunzad contends that
he acceded to the demands because he had already invested
heavily in the picture to the extent of mortgaging his properties,
in addition to the fact that he had to meet the scheduled target
date of the premiere showing. On the same date, 5 October
1961, after some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which
was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, Lagunzad
and Soto vda. de Gonzales, represented by her daughters and
Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and
Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement." Lagunzad takes the
position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement
because of Soto vda. de Gonzales' demand, through Mrs.
Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of
Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference
declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and
would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television
and that they were going to Court to stop the picture." On 10
October 1961, Lagunzad paid Soto vda. de Gonzales the
amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant
to their Agreement but just to placate the latter. On 14 October
1961, the filming of the movie was completed. On 16 October
1961, a premiere showing was held at the Hollywood Theatre,
Manila, with the Moises Padilla Society as its sponsor.
Subsequently, the movie was shown in different theaters all over
the country. Because Lagunzad refused to pay any additional
amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on 22 December 1961,
Soto vda. de Gonzales instituted the suit against him praying for
judgment in her favor ordering Lagunzad (1) to pay her the
amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the
Complaint; (2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom;
(3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts
claimed; and (4) to pay the costs. By way of counterclaim,
Lagunzad demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared
null and void for being without any valid cause; that Soto vda.
de Gonzales be ordered to return to him the amount of
P5,000.00; and that he be paid P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages, and P7,500.00 as attorney's fees. On 30 June 1964,
the trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Soto vda. de
Gonzales. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter Court
affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having been denied by
the Court, Lagunzad filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Initially, or on 16 June 1970, the Supreme Court denied the
Petition for lack of merit, but resolved subsequently to give it
due course after Lagunzad moved for reconsideration on the
additional argument that the movie production was in exercise
of the constitutional right of freedom of expression, and that the
Licensing Agreement is a form of restraint on the freedom of
speech and of the press.
Issue: Whether the Licensing Agreement infringes on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in
that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, Lagunzad had the
right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises
Padilla without prior restraint.
Held: The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however,
without limitations. As held in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections (27 SCRA 835, 858 [1969]), "From the language of the
specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is
not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities
of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
Page 87 of 105
would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition. The
prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such
vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies,
is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation." Herein, the interests observable are the right to
privacy asserted by Soto vda. de Gonzales and the right of
freedom of expression invoked by Lagunzad. Taking into
account the interplay of those interests, the COurt holds that
under the particular circumstances presented, and considering
the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by Lagunzad, the validity of such agreement will have to be
upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression
are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern. The court denied the petition for
review.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3) Gitlow v. People [No.19. Argued April 12, 1923. Reargued
November 23, 1923. Decided June 8, 1925. 268 U.S. 652]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-cohen/governmental-control-of-
the-content-of-expression/gitlow-v-new-york-2/
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Benjamin Gitlow, a member of
the left wing, wrote and published two papers that promoted the
violent overthrow of the government. He was indicted on two
counts of anarchy and advocacy of criminal anarchy. Defendant
contends that the New York statutes, under which he was
convicted, unconstitutionally restricted his rights of free speech
and press as protected by the First Amendment, and applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the freedom of speech and
press are protected liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state may restrict these freedoms if it feels that it is in the best
interest of public safety and welfare. Nor does the state need to
wait until the threat presents a clear and present danger to
public safety or welfare before it takes action. But, it must do so
through a means that is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
Facts. Defendant was indicted for the statutory crime of criminal
anarchy and advocacy of criminal anarchy. This indictment
contained two counts. The first charged the Defendant had
advocated, advised, and taught the duty, necessity and
propriety of overthrowing and overturning organized government
by force, violence and unlawful means, by certain writings
therein set forth entitled, “The Left Wing Manifesto.” The Second
Page 88 of 105
count charged Defendant with printing, publishing, and
knowingly circulating a paper called “The Revolutionary Age.”
This second paper also called for a violent overthrow of the
government. Defendant admitted that he signed a card
subscribing to the Manifesto and program of the left wing, that
he went to different parts of the state to speak to branches of
the Socialist Party about the principles of the left wing and
advocate their adoption. He also stated that he know of the
Manifesto’s publication and is responsible for its circulation.
Issue. Whether New York Penal Law Section:Section:160-161
is an unreasonable exercise of the State of New York’s police
power by infringing on freedom of speech or press?
Held. No. Conviction affirmed. Although the Court holds that
freedom of speech and freedom of the press are protected by
the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the states, the Court further holds that this
statute is not an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police
power of the state unwarrantably infringing the freedom of
speech or press; and therefore sustains its constitutionality. For
the statute does not penalize the utterance or publication of
abstract doctrine or academic discussion having no quality of
incitement to any concrete action. The Court feels that a single
revolutionary spark may kindle a fire, that smoldering for a time,
may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.
Therefore, a state does not need to wait until the threat presents
a clear and present danger to public safety and welfare, but can
act whenever there is a presumed threat. It cannot be said that
the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonable when in the
exercise of its judgment that is uses the measures necessary to
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 89 of 105

protect the public peace and safety. In the exercise of its

judgment the state can suppress the threatened danger in its
infancy, and this statute not being an arbitrary means of doing
so is constitutional.

Dissent. Feels the judgment should be reversed, as there was

no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government
by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared
the Defendant’s view. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way. The dissent believes this to be the case unless this
document was to induce an uprising against the government
immediately and not at some indefinite future time then it would
have presented a different question to the Court.



Discussion. This case explains how the federal government or
a state may limit certain liberties guaranteed in the Constitution.
The states can place limits on individual rights if certain
exercises of those rights threaten public safety and welfare. This
case must also be considered in the light of the era in which it
was decided. It was decided in an era where many believed that
an internal communist overthrow of the government was a real
threat. It is possible that if this case was decided in a different
era that it could have been decided differently. But, nonetheless,
this case carves out a very important way in which states can
limit individual liberties. This case also holds that the clear and
present danger test is an irrelevant concept when a law
criminally punished certain categories of speech.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
VI. FREEDOM OF RELIGION / NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION CLAUSE
Section 5, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution: No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 6, Article 2, The 1987 Constitution: The separation of
Church and State shall be inviolable.
Section 2(5), Article 9-C, The 1987 Constitution: The
Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions: Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
Page 90 of 105
Section 5(2), Article 6, The 1987 Constitution: The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Section 29(2), Article 6, The 1987 Constitution: No public
money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
Section 28(3), Article 6, The 1987 Constitution: Charitable
institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
Section 4(2), Article 14, The 1987 Constitution: Educational
institutions, other than those established by religious groups
and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The
Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity
participation in all educational institutions. The control and
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
citizens of the Philippines.
Section 3(3), Article 14, The 1987 Constitution: At the option
expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall
be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public
elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by
instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of
the religion to which the children or wards belong, without
additional cost to the Government.
1. NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF CLAUSE
*Cases:
1) Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing
[No. 52. Argued November 20, 1946. Decided February
10, 1947. 330 U.S. 1]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-cohen/religion-and-the-
constitution/everson-v-board-of-education/
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Everson (Petitioner), in his
status as a taxpayer, filed suit challenging the ability of the
Respondent, Board of Education (Respondent), to reimburse
funds to parents of parochial school students for the
transportation of their children to and from school.
 and Justice Wiley Rutledge (J. Rutledge) stand for strict


Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition
that, while no law respecting an establishment of religion will
stand under the United States Constitution (Constitution),
neutral laws, which afford benefits to children will be upheld.
 the fact that funds cannot be commingled when they are


Page 91 of 105
Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit
challenging the ability of the Respondent to reimburse funds to
parents of parochial school students for the transportation of
their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit
alleging that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects
the establishment of religion, by allowing the parents of
parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement
scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute
did not violate the Constitution and the Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider the
issue.
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial
school children can benefit from the same services afforded to
the parents of public school children.
Held. Affirmed.

In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court found the statute was not unconstitutional because it was
designed to provide a benefit to the parents of all school
children, distinct from any religious function in which the
children engaged.



Dissent. The dissents of Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson)
adherence to the establishment clause.



Discussion. It is important to understand, in striking down the
Establishment Clause challenge, the Supreme Court highlights
reimbursed only for transportation costs already expended.
Thus, because there is no possibility of funding parochial
activities in themselves, the statute is allowed to stand.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2) Lemon v. Kurtzman [No. 89. Argued March 3, 1971.
Decided June 28, 1971*. 403 U.S. 602]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-chemerinsky/first-amendment-
religion/lemon-v-kurtzman/
Brief Fact Summary. The state reimburses parochial schools
for certain expenses associated with the education of its
children.
 depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion


Synopsis of Rule of Law. To be valid, a statute must have a
secular legislative purpose, must not advance or inhibit religion,
and must not excessively entangle church and state.
Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious
schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other instructional
materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the
state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.
Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial
assistance to religious schools for the cost of teaching secular
subjects?
Held. No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement
between the government and religion. Excessive entanglement
is determined by the character and purpose of the institution
benefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting
relationship between the government and church.
 state law authorizing the school district to direct the use of the


Discussion. The framers of the United States Constitution
specifically and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a
state church because of the inherent problems. The
Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.”
Page 92 of 105
3) Engel v. Vitale [No. 468. Argued April 3, 1962. Decided
June 25, 1962. 370 U.S. 421]
Lifted from: https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/
casebrief-engel-v-vitale
RULE: The Establishment Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I, unlike
the Free Exercise Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I, does not
and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an
official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
non-observing individuals or not. In using its public school
system to encourage recitation of a daily classroom prayer, the
State of New York adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause.
FACTS: The Board of Education of Union Free School District
No. 9, New York, adopted a program of daily classroom prayers
in public schools. The prayer was brief, denominationally
neutral, and its observance on the part of the students was
voluntary. Shortly after the adoption of the program, the parents
of ten pupils brought an action in mandamus in the New York
Supreme Court, Nassau County, asserting that the official
prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs,
religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their
children. They also challenged the constitutionality of both the
prayer in public schools and the school district's regulation
ordering the recitation of the prayer, on the ground that these
actions violated that part of the First Amendment, which
commanded that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. The request for mandamus was
denied by the trial court, but the matter was remanded to the
Board of Regents for amending its regulations with a view to
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
protecting voluntariness of participation in the prayer. The
Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the order.
ISSUE: Does a New York state program of daily classroom
prayers in public school violate the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the respondent’s decision to
use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official
prayer constituted the adoption of a practice entirely
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, U.S. Const.
amend. I. The Court held that respondent's use of the
prayer in public school classrooms breached the
constitutional wall of separation between church and state.
According to the Court, the constitutional prohibition of
laws establishing religion meant that government had no
business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its
population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious
program. Thus, the Court found that respondent's provision
of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause.
Page 93 of 105
4) School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v.
Schempp [No. 142. Argued February 27-28, 1963. Decided
June 17, 1963. 374 U.S. 203]
Lifted from: https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-
law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-rotunda/freedom-of-religion-
constitutional-law-keyed-to-rotunda/school-district-of-abington-
township-v-schempp/
Brief Fact Summary: The United States Supreme Court
consolidated two cases to address the constitutionality of
legislation mandating readings from Christian scripture at the
start of each school day.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: Legislation mandating the reading of
religious scripture as part of a public school curriculum violates
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Facts: The United States Supreme Court consolidated two
cases to address the constitutionality of legislation mandating
readings from Christian scripture at the start of each school day.
In one case, Schempp (Plaintiff) sought an injunction against
the enforcement of a Pennsylvania state law. In the second
case, an atheist couple petitioned for a writ of mandamus to
rescind a rule imposed by the Board of School Commissioners
of Baltimore City.
Issue: Whether legislation mandating the reading of religious
scripture as part of a public school curriculum violates the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Held: Yes. The Free Exercise Clause is not a vehicle for the
majority to employ state authority to promote the public
exercise of religious practices.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Dissent.
(Stewart, J.): I believe that the conduct of religious exercises in
public schools would not violate the First Amendment if
structured in such a fashion as to avoid coercion. For example,
readings could be conducted outside regular classroom hours or
students could be offered the choice to attend alternative
activities. In that case, the state would simply be offering a
voluntary opportunity for the exercise of individual religious
freedom.
Concurrence.
(Brennan, J.): Our primary inquiry should be whether the laws at
issue promote the type of interrelationship between government
and religion that the Founding Fathers intended to prevent
through the adoption of the First Amendment. Today’s decision
does not prohibit using religious scriptures in the context of
academia. It would be difficult to teach history and the social
sciences without some reference to Christian ideologies. There
are many instances in our society in which religious themes are
so regularly invoked as to have lost much of their religious
significance. Those common references, such as recital of the
phrase “under God” during the pledge of allegiance, do not
implicate the consequences of entanglement between
government and religion that the First Amendment seeks to
avoid.
Discussion: The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First
Amendment applicable to the states. The Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from manufacturing its own religion,
and it also forbids the government from passing any law that
affords a preference to one religion over any other. In order to
Page 94 of 105
avoid violating the Establishment Clause, legislation must serve
a secular governmental purpose and the primary effect of the
legislation must not be to advance or inhibit religion. The Free
Exercise Clause prohibits the government from imposing any
restrictions upon the individual freedom to engage in religious
practices. Legislation violates the Free Exercise Clause if it
imposes coercive limitations upon the practice of religion. By
contrast, coercion is not a necessary element for legislation to
violate the Establishment Clause. The legislation before us does
not necessarily require students to participate in religious
practices, but it does require students to endure the exercise of
religion as part of the regular public school curriculum. The
readings take place in public facilities under the oversight of
public employees. The readings are religious in nature and the
laws in both cases make these religious exercises mandatory.
The argument that these exercises seek to advance the secular
goals of promoting moral values and the teaching of literature is
belied by admissions of the religious character of the exercises.
The states argue that forbidding religious exercises in schools
works the result of imposing a state-sponsored religion of
secularism. Although we agree that the government may not
impose laws hostile to the exercise of religion, we do not agree
that invalidating these laws amounts to a state-sanctioned
preference for those who do not endorse religion over those
who embrace a particular ideology. Study of religious scriptures
may be presented as a secular aspect of an academic
curriculum, but the laws at issue here impose a mandatory
exercise of religion. The doctrine of state neutrality does not
infringe upon the free exercise of religion by its prohibition
against laws that mandate its public exercise, irrespective of the
fact that the majority may support its public exercise.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
5) IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO,
deceased. MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant, vs. CHEONG
SENG GEE, opponent-appellant. [G.R. No. L-18081. March 3,
1922.]
FACTS: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in
Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left
property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased
was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who
alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted
by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was
claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that
she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in
Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married
to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were
ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial
judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence
presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference
to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not
sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands
as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a
natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora
Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge
reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora
Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that
under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to
be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and
Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial
judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a
Page 95 of 105
partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between
the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties
perfected appeals. As to the facts, we can say that we agree in
substance with the findings of the trial court. As to the legal
issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of
error, these can best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1)
The validity of the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the
Mohammedan marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the State recognises the existence of
Mohammedan marriage as well?
RULING: We regard the evidence as producing a moral
conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage.
We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law
as validating marriages performed according to the rites of
the Mohammedan religion.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be
solemnized by either a judge of any court inferior to the
Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the
Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take
account of the word "priest," and only considering the phrase
"minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the
meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. We
believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the
lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the
service of a divinity and considered as the medium through
whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered
to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance,
etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of
Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is
a religious sect having a particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin
[1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441;
Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a
"priest or minister of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a
"denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that
"No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but
the parties must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband
and wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise
ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the
marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are
capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from
the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or
repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do
we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true
that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the
priest were addressed more to the elders than to the
participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora
woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and
did thereafter live together as husband and wife.
(Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two
sections of the Marriage Law which have just been quoted and
discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in our
opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No
marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to
have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority
or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it
was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them,
that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married."
Page 96 of 105
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did
not believe that the legislative intention in promulgating it was to
validate marriages celebrated between Mohammedans. To
quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the
provisions of the Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to
solemnized marriages, and it is not to be presumed that the
legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages
celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws
which then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive.
To our mind, nothing could be clearer than the language used in
section IX. Note for a moment the all embracing words found in
this section:
"No marriage" — Could more inclusive words be found?
"Heretofore solemnized" — Could any other construction than
that of retrospective force be given to this phrase? "Before any
person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for
want of such authority" — Could stronger language than this be
invoked to announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any
informality, irregularity, or omission" — Could the legislative
mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the
marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with
the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority
and that they have been lawfully married" — What was the
purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the
marriage, if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he
had authority to perform the same, and if either of the parties
thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of
any word which would restrict the curative provisions of section
IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages? By what system
of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
precise language the curious idea that it was restricted to
marriages performed under the Spanish law before the
revolutionary authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to
stop here but would ascertain from other sources the meaning
and scope of Section IX of General Order No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan
population of the Philippines has, time and again, been
announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law, and executive
proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that
"The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the
Philippine Commission imposed on every branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no
form of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon
any community or upon any citizen of the Islands; that, upon the
other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or
molested in following his calling, and that the separation
between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute."
The notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the
Commission, "to bear in mind that the Government which they
are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that,
therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to conform to
their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The
Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main
constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and
equality.
Page 97 of 105
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United
States followed in the same path. For instance, in the Treaty of
April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain General of the
Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government
guaranteed "with all solemnity to the Sultan and other
inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their religion, with which
it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect
their customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of
January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine
Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the Court of
First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in
which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such
action is deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of
the Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States
applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local
laws and customs. . . ." (See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act
No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative Council
amended and approved by the Philippine Commission;
Cacho vs. Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil.,
616.) Various responsible officials have so oft announced the
purpose of the Government not to interfere with the customs of
the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make
quotation of the same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law
undoubtedly were inspired by the governmental policy in the
United States, with regard to the marriages of the Indians, the
Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is,
that a marriage between two Indians entered into according to
the customs and laws of the people at a place where such
customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a valid
marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will
be left to their own customs and that their marriages will be
recognized although they use no solemnization. The rule as to
Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
before a proper official by members of that Church competent to
contract marriage constitutes a valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte
and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916],
34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative
provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior
marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the
legislative power the right to remove impediments to an
effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what
shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which,
when they took place, were against the law. Public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts
intended to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington
[1822], 4 Conn, 209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
Page 98 of 105
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in
favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the
public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences,
entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the
deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan
religion and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in
disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least
one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married
according to local custom. We then have it within our power
either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to
make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to
make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to
sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled
governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the
decisions of this court in the cases of United States vs. Tubban
([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33
Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these decisions to be
controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and
two Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case,
the marriage in question was a tribal marriage of the Kalingas,
while in the Verzola case, the marriage had been performed
during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil.
In neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused
should be given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law, was
any consideration given to the provisions of section IX of
General Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary,
we would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced in the
two cases above mentioned.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
2. RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP
*Cases:
1) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant. [G.R.
No. 45892. July 13, 1938.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154426/
Case_digests_on_freedom_of_religion
Zosa and Lagman sought that they be exempted from military
enlistment, having reached the age of 20 years.
Facts:
1. Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Zosa reached the
age of twenty years and were thus required to register in the
military service between April 1 and 7 of the said year. This
compulsory military enlistment is in consonance with section 60
of CA 1 (National Defense Law).
2. Zosa claimed that he was fatherless and a mother and a
brother of 8 years old to support, while Lagman also had a
father to support, had no military learnings and does not wish to
kill or be killed.
Ruling: As declared in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, “[w]ithout
violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force,
if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests and
even against his religious or political convictions, to take his
place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance
of being shot down in its defense.”
Page 99 of 105
2) In re Summers [No. 205. Argued April 27, 30, 1945.
Decided June 11, 1945. 325 U.S. 561]
Lifted from: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/
325/561/ and https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/tag/
constitutional-law-chapter-vii-the-non-establishment-of-religion-
clause/
RULING: The act of the Illinois Supreme Court denying
admission to the bar because of his refusal to take in good
faith an oath to support the Constitution of the State of
Illinois which requires mandatory service in the military in
times of war was reversed by the US Supreme Court stating
that this constitutes a violation of the 1st Amendment
which guarantees religious freedom.
SYLLABUS:
1. The Illinois Supreme Court's refusal, on the merits, of
petitioner's application for admission to the practice of law,
although the matter was not regarded by that court as a judicial
proceeding, held to involve a case or controversy within the
judicial power under Art. III, § 1, cl. 1 of the Federal Constitution.
P. 325 U. S. 566.
2. Refusal of an application for admission to the practice of law
in a State on the ground that the applicant would be unable in
good faith to take the required oath to support the constitution of
the State, because of conscientious scruples resulting in
unwillingness to serve in the state militia in time of war, held not
a denial of any right of the applicant under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. P. 325 U.
S. 571.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
Affirmed.
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 705, to review the action of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in refusing petitioner's application for admission
to the bar. chanrobles.com-red
3) ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by
their parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO EBRALINAG;
JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father AMOS
TANTOG; JEMIL OYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO; JANETH DIAMOS &
JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS.
GODOFREDO DIAMOS; SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUSTO OSTIA;
IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO; NAPTHALE
TANACAO, represented by his parents MR. & MRS.
MANUEL TANACAO; PRECILA PINO, represented by her
parents MR. & MRS. FELIPE PINO; MARICRIS ALFAR,
RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
HERMINIGILDO ALFAR; FREDESMINDA ALFAR &
GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents ABDON
ALFAR; ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented
by their parents MR. & MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR; MARTINO
VILLAR, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. GENARO
VILLAR; PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA;
ALVIN DOOP, represented by his parents MR. & MRS.
LEONIDES DOOP; RHILYN LAUDE, represented by her
parents MR. & MRS. RENE LAUDE; LEOREMINDA
MONARES, represented by her parents, MR. & MRS.
FLORENCIO MONARES; MERCY MONTECILLO,
Page 100 of 105
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL
MONTECILLO; ROBERTO TANGAHA, represented by his
parent ILUMINADA TANGAHA; EVELYN, MARIA & FLORA
TANGAHA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
ALBERTO TANGAHA; MAXIMO EBRALINAG, represented
by his parents, MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG; JUTA
CUMON, GIDEON CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON,
represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON; EVIE
LUMAKANG & JUNAR LUMAKANG, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG; EMILIO SARSOZO, PAZ
AMOR SARSOZO & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO, represented by
their parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO; MICHAEL
JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH, represented by parent ANNIE
JOSEPH; EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU
TABLASON, represented by their parent EMERLITO
TABLASON, petitioners, vs. THE DIVISION OF
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, respondent.
[G.R. No. 95770. March 1, 1993.]
Lifted from: https://www.academia.edu/8154426/
Case_digests_on_freedom_of_religion
For refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge, petitioners were expelled from their
classes by the public school authorities in Cebu.
Facts:
1. Petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required
by RA 1264 and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955
of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions.
2. There were a total of 68 students who were expelled from
various public schools in Cebu.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 101 of 105

Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will

3. According to petitioners, “while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external acts’
or behaviour that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceeding. Since they do
not engage in disruptive behaviour, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.”
Ruling:
1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's’ job or of being
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights
which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free
exercise of religious profession and worship.
bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona case. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities.
4. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the
free exercise of their religion, this should not be taken to mean
that school authorities are powerless to discipline them if they
should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If
they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while
their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, the Court does not see
how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a
grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent.

2. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled

to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.

3. The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the

Jehovah’s Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group
which admittedly comprises a “small portion of the school
population” will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly
produce a nation “untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued
with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and
admiration for national heroes.” After all, what the petitioners
seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion
from public schools where they may learn and be trained.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
3. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST
*Case: ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,vs.SOLEDAD
S. ESCRITOR, respondent. [A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4,
2003.] (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
Lifted from: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/
2006junedecisions.php?id=614 and https://lawphil.net/judjuris/
juri2003/aug2003/am_p-02-1651_2003.html
FACTS: In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000,
complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of respondent
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a
man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act.2 Consequently,
respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and
immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)
(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.3
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the
judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having
died in 1998.4 She admitted that she started living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty
years ago when her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a
son.5 But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of
her congregation.6 In fact, after ten years of living together, she
Page 102 of 105
executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness."7
For Jehovah's Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of
the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the
resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all
over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. As
laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah's congregation
requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the
couple cannot secure the civil authorities' approval of the marital
relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who
have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the
congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the
declarants and their respective spouses' commission of adultery
are investigated before the declarations are executed.8 Escritor
and Quilapio's declarations were executed in the usual and
approved form prescribed by the Jehovah's Witnesses,
9 approved by elders of the congregation where the declarations
were executed,10 and recorded in the Watch Tower Central
Office.11
Moreover, the Jehovah's congregation believes that once all
legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the
declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their union.
In Escritor's case, although she was widowed in 1998, thereby
lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her mate was
still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
remained valid.12 In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation
is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain
members in good standing in the congregation.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards
of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement
does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which
she should be held administratively liable,13 the Court had to
determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
ISSUE: Whether the compelling state interest test may be
applied in the case at bar?
RULING: YES, the compelling state interest test may be
applied in the case at bar.
B. Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the
 immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued to
Compelling State Interest Test to the Case at Bar
The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject
the respondent’s claim of religious freedom to the "compelling
state interest" test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e.
entertaining the possibility that respondent’s claim to religious
freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil
Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will
be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating
a more compelling state interest.
Page 103 of 105
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s
right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt
that choosing between keeping her employment and
abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the
one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden
on her free exercise of religion. In Sherbert, the Court found that
Sherbert’s religious exercise was burdened as the denial of
unemployment benefits "forces her to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand." The burden on
respondent in the case at bar is even greater as the price she
has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept
but also her family which, by the Declaration Pledging
Faithfulness, stands "honorable before God and men."
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for
immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and
defined, much less only after an administrative case for
her by her congregation after ten years of living together with
her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the
judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the
authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing a
Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a
practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not
whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct
but to make the "union" of their members under respondent’s
circumstances "honorable before God and men." It is also
worthy of notice that the Report and Recommendation of the
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests
investigating judge annexed letters453 of the OCA to the
respondent regarding her request to be exempt from attending
the flag ceremony after Circular No. 62-2001 was issued
requiring attendance in the flag ceremony. The OCA’s letters
were not submitted by respondent as evidence but annexed by
the investigating judge in explaining that he was caught in a
dilemma whether to find respondent guilty of immorality
because the Court Administrator and Deputy Court
Administrator had different positions regarding respondent’s
request for exemption from the flag ceremony on the ground of
the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ contrary belief and practice.
Respondent’s request for exemption from the flag ceremony
shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
beliefs and not using them merely to escape punishment. She is
a practicing member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member in good
standing. Nevertheless, should the government, thru the
Solicitor General, want to further question the respondent’s
sincerity and the centrality of her practice in her faith, it should
be given the opportunity to do so. The government has not been
represented in the case at bar from its incipience until this point.
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent’s
evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality
in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the
"compelling state interest" test. The case at bar is one of first
impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of
proof they should discharge in the Court’s use of the
"compelling state interest" test. We note that the OCA found
respondent’s defense of religious freedom unavailing in the face
of the Court’s ruling in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al., viz:
It bears emphasis that the image of a court of justice is mirrored
in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work
thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
Page 104 of 105
personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity
of the courts of justice.
It is apparent from the OCA’s reliance upon this ruling that the
state interest it upholds is the preservation of the integrity of the
judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the OCA’s
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is
so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of
religious freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by
the government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious exercise.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person,
to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government
should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s
stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise
protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct
where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s
action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom.454 We cannot therefore simply take a passing
look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must
instead apply the "compelling state interest" test. The
government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given
an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the
state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s
religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first
impression where we are applying the "compelling state
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 2 March 17 Reading Assignment & Digests Page 105 of 105

interest" test in a case involving purely religious conduct. The

careful application of the test is indispensable as how we will
decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the
respondent who stands not only before the Court but before her
Jehovah God.