Lechoco v.

Civil Aeronautics Board

FACTS:

Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 13(a) and 14 of C.A.
No. 146, jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly
repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares.

On the other hand, respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were, under
both statutes, exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC.

ISSUE:
Whether the authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC.

HELD:

The Court ruled that there is nothing in Republic Act 2677 that expressly repeals Republic Act No.
776. While section 3 of Republic Act 2677 provides that "All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed", the fact is that the derogation was thereby made
dependent upon actual inconsistency with previous laws. This is the very foundation of the rule of
implied repeal. However, there is nothing in Act 2677 that evidences an intent on the part of the
Legislature to set aside the carefully detailed regulation of civil air transport as set forth in Act 776.
Said Act in itself constitutes a recognition of the need of entrusting regulation, supervision and
control of civil aviation to a specialized body.

There is no irreconcilable inconsistency between section 14 of the Public Service Act, as amended
by Republic Act 2677, and section 10(c) (2) of the prior Republic Act 776, above quoted, except for
the fact that power over rates to be charged by air carriers on passengers and freight are vested in
different entities, the CAB and the PSC. Even that will result in no more than a concurrent jurisdiction
in both supervisory entities, and not in the divesting of the power of one in favor of the other.

Montelibano vs. Ferrer

Facts:
In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased a lot to
Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the
Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which rendered a decision ordering him
to eject from the said lot. However, Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to
Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by
Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then
filed to the petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant
of arrest  A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326, section 22
(Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney shall charge of the prosecution of all
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal
Court of Bacolod.

Held:
The Court ruled that the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.

In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received
when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status
originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. It is not
necessary that a statute should be reenacted in identical words in order that the rule may apply. It is
sufficient if it is reenacted in substantially the same words. The rule has been held to apply to the
reenactment of a statute which received a practical construction on the part of those who are called
upon to execute it. 

In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police wherein it was held that
in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive
authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter
found in Section 39 of Act183. The provisions of the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially
identical to that of Manila should then be interpreted the same. Therefore, the decision appealed
is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge shall be annulled.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos
is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away from the reservation.
 The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The
action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro are included in the
contemplation of “Non-Christians” in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intend to establish a distinction based
on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later
would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The term"non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

Even prior to the Administrative Code, there have been policies in place to separate the
primitive "Non-Christians" from the rest of civilized society in order to insulate them from the
destructive influences and abuses of the their more "civilized" counterparts and to promote the
advancement of the Non-Christians.
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of the Government are to
gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals—
is in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-
nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The Manguianes 'have shown no desire
for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government.
Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner

a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City.
Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge
its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however,
that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod."

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates. As a

result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its
permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. 

Petitioner then filed a petition for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 4254.
It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to
regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under
Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the
Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205.

Held:
There is no basis to conclude that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No.
205, either expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that R.A. No.
7160 repealing clause, which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not include E.O.
No. 205.

Neither is there an indication that E.O. No. 205 was impliedly repealed by
R.A. No. 7160. It is a settled rule that implied repeals are not lightly
presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intentions. In Mecano v. Commission on Audit,46 we ruled:
"Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old
one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least,
as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and
not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are
the same from the time of the first enactment."