MOTION TO QUASH - RULE 117

Motion to Quash
- a motion requesting that a criminal complaint or information be dismissed on grounds specified
by law or rule

When may be availed of?

GR: At any time before entering a plea or before arraignment
XPN:
- Section 9, Rule 117: Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor— The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs:
(a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense
(b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused
(g) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
(i) that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
- XPN on Summary Procedure: on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings in Section 18 of the 1991 Rule on
Summary Procedure



Section 18: Referral to Lupon — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under
the provisions of PD 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall
be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have
been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was
arrested without a warrant.

- A motion to quash is not improper even after the accused had been arraigned of the same is
grounded on failure to charge an offense, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty, and jeopardy (Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, 326 SCRA 473,
477, 2000)

What form is required?

- Section 2, Rule 117: Form and Content — The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the
accused and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no
ground other than those stated in the motion, except of lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged.

What are the grounds?

Section 3, Rule 117: Grounds — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
(a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) that the officer who filed the information has no authority to do so;
(e) that it dies not conform substantially to the prescribed form
(f) that more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) that it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent

Grounds not cited in the motion

- the only ground the Court will consider (even if it is not stated in the motion to quash) is lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged(?)

Guidelines on Continuous Trial (AM No. 15-06-10-SC)

Prohibited Motions. - Prohibited motions shall be denied outright before the scheduled
arraignment without need of comment and/or opposition.
iv. Motion to quash information when the ground is not one of those stated in Sec. 3, Rule
117.
Meritorious Motions. - Motions that allege plausible grounds supported by relevant documents
and/or competent evidence, except those that are already covered by the Revised Guidelines,
are meritorious motions, such as:
ii. Motion to quash warrant of arrest;
v. Motion to quash information on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of criminal action or liability, or double jeopardy under
Sec. 3, par. (a), (b), (g), and (i), Rule 117;
vii. Motion to quash search warrant under Sec. 14, Rule 126 or motion to suppress
evidence;

Panaguiton v. DOJ
Facts: The complaint against Tongson for violation of BP 22 was dismissed because it was held
that it had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that
violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-
year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18
March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years
had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.

Doctrine: The Supreme Court ruled that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of
his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

Antone v. Beronilla (Double Jeopardy on Quashal)

Facts: Beronilla, pending the setting of the case for arraignment) moved to quash the Information
(Bigamy) on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

Doctrine: Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order sustaining a
motion to quash. More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.”

Remedy if information is defective

- Section 4, Rule 117: Amendment of complaint or information — If the motion to quash is based
on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.



If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion
shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
- Once the court issues an order granting the motion to quash the information and such order
becomes final and executory, there is nothing more to amend (Gonzales v. Salvador, G.R.
168340, December 5, 2006)

a. Facts do not constitute an offense as a ground

- whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined in the law

Resolution of a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense
- GR: A motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute
the offense charged, or any offense on that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of
said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted
- XPN: Additional facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the
prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash

b. Lack of preliminary investigation as a ground

- the absence of a preliminary investigation or inability to participate in a preliminary investigation
is not a proper ground for a motion to quash but for a petition for reinvestigation

c. Basis of sufficiency of information as a ground

- Section 6, Rule 110: Sufficiency of complaint or information — A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

Effect if motion is granted

- Section 5, Rule 117: Effect of sustaining the motion to quash – If the motion to quash is
sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as
provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be
discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new
information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court
may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in
custody of another charge.
- When a motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information
be filed. However, another complaint or information cannot be filed when the ground relied
upon for sustaining the motion is either (a) extinction of the criminal liability, or (b) double
jeopardy

When double jeopardy attaches?

Double Jeopardy — It means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

Requisites of Double Jeopardy

(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first

Legal jeopardy attaches only:

(a) upon a valid indictment
(b) before a competent court
(c) after arraignment (of the accused)
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(Canceran v. People, GR 206442, July 1, 2015)

Two Tests in Determining the Existence of Double Jeopardy

a. Same Offense Test

- Section 7, Rule 117: Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.



However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under
any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea
was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and
of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.



In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

- the offenses charged in the two prosecutions must be for the same offense. The term “same
offense” was held to mean identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof or any offense charged which necessarily includes or is included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.

b. Same Evidence Test

- the test for determining whether or not a prosecution for one crime constitutes an obstacle to a
subsequent action for another distinct crime upon the same facts, is to inquire whether the
facts alleged in the second information, if proven, would have been sufficient to support the
former information, of which the accused may have been acquitted or convicted.

When no double jeopardy?

1. When the accused appeals from the sentence — when an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he waived the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy,
and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to
render a judgment as the law and justice dictate.
2. When the civil aspect is appealed — where what was elevated to the appellate court was
the civil aspect of the criminal case , and the appellate court did not modify the judgment of
acquittal nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against the accused for the same
offense, there is no double jeopardy.
3. When the action is dismissed with the express consent of the accused — the dismissal of
a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon
his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. 

XPN: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence; or (2) the case is dismissed for
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial
4. When the judgment is void — the GR is that where the assailed judgment is void, no double
jeopardy results from the re-filing of the criminal case. A judgement rendered by the trial court
which was based on void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to
 have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its
inception; as such, double jeopardy will not lie (People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517, 2000)
5. Where the prosecution is denied due process — it is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against the Supreme Court’s setting aside of the trial court’s judgment of
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. The remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
6. When the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion — When the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to
evidence, there is no double jeopardy (People v. Laguio, Jr., GR 128587, March 16, 2007)
7. When the court had no jurisdiction — There can be no double jeopardy where the accused
entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.
8. When the information is defective — Jeopardy does not attach when the accused pleads
guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
9. When two offenses are different — the prohibition of double jeopardy refers to the same
offense, not to the same act. The offense charged in the two prosecutions must be the same in
law and in fact. Where the same act constitutes violations of two or more penal laws,
prosecution under one such penal law will not bar prosecution in the other law.
10. When the case is dismissed on preliminary investigation — a dismissal of the charges as
a result of thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal, a converso, the
finding of a prima facie case to hold the accused for trial is not equivalent to a finding of guilt.

Proper remedy when denied

GR: NOT petition for certiorari under rule 65 

XPN: if the court, in denying the motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies

Remedy against denial of motion

GR: the appropriate remedy is to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
involved in said motion, and if, after trail on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authroized by law
XPN: an interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that
the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Provisional Dismissal
- Section 8, Rule 117: Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. 



The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Provisional Dismissal — the dismissal of a criminal action with the express consent of the
accused and without prejudice to its revival within the period prescribed by the rules.

Requisites
1. the accused must have given his consent to the dismissal
2. there must be a notice to the offended party
3. the dismissal must be without prejudice to its revival

Purpose of notice to parties

a. Offended party — if the dismissal is made without notice to the offended party, the
reglementary period does not begin to run
When dismissal becomes permanent?
1. offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived
2. offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived

MTC
RTC

Reckoning Date (Cases)

1. People v. Lacson
Facts:

Doctrine:

2. William Co. v. New Prosperity Plastic Products

Facts: William Co posits that the provisional dismissal became permanent one year after the
issuance of the June 9, 2003 order, not after the notice to the offended party.

Doctrine: The Supreme Court ruled that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel
the better rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private
counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal.

Remedy of the offended party

Effect of permanent dismissal

- the effect is to bar the refiling or revival of the criminal action as well as the prosecution of the
accused for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.
Antone v. Beronilla (double jeopardy on motion to quash)

Facts: Myrna Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla,
alleging that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the
latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.

Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Beronilla moved to quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He informed the court that his
marriage with the petitioner was declared null and void by the RTC Biliran on April 26, 2007 and
that the decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007 and the decree registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar on June 12, 2007. He argued that since his marriage had been declared
null and void from the beginning, there was actually no marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid
marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.

The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent in 1978 has not yet
been severed when he contracted a second marriage in 1991, hence bigamy has already been
committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void in 2007. The prosecution also
invoked the previous SC rulings holding that a motion to quash is a hypothecial admission of the
facts alleged in the information, and that facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may
be raised only during presentation of evidence.

The trial court quashed the Information. The prosecution moved for a reconsideration but was
denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that the Pasay Trial Court
action without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for
reconsideration.

CA dismissed the petition, stating: “There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the
dismissal of the subject criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial court’s
finding that the first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage contracted by
private respondent is wanting.”

Supreme Court Ruling: The Court did not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

For double jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must occur:

(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a
valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the
case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.


The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not
yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the
case was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance.

We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of
an order sustaining a motion to quash. More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash
anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.”
William Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products (reckoning date)

Facts: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a
complaint for violation of B. P. 22 against petitioner William Co. 


In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 

2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of criminal Procedure. Uy
received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a
copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal
Cases which was granted.

Co filed a petition challenging the revival of the criminal cases. He argues that the June 9, 2003
order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be considered as a final dismissal on the
ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. Assuming that the criminal cases were only
provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after
the issuance of the June 9, 2003 order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that
both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival
must be within the one-year period. Even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal
cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 order, Co asserts that the
motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year. 


Issue: Whether or not the one-year time bar of the revival of the case is computed from issuance
of the order of provisional dismissal

Ruling: NO

Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph thereof:
(1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
(4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon
which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The fact is that it was only in open court that Co
moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any
interest to pursue her complaint."

The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly
explained in People v. Lacson:
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule
requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given
adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim
through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who
in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing.
The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will
enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably
and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a)
 the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process;
(b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the
case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him
to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee
from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended
party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment against his property.

There is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the cases
became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to
the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent
one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally
interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process; thus, said in one case:

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case
having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal
on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal
case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply
with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the
better rule is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private
counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is
represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the
latter at his/her given address.

The contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it
must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation
is not found in the Rules.

The fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s
motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy
is represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3,
2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a
motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise
the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
Panaguiton v. Department of Justice

Facts: Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00
from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson
(Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency
of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of
the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

The petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP 22. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit — claiming that he
had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in the petitioner’s personal capacity.

City Prosecutor III Lara only found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges
against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while the case against
Cawili was filed before the proper court. The DOJ found that it was possible for Tongson to co-
sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and
to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint
against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution.
In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after
four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering
that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as
yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not the offense has prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326

Held: The Supreme Court agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of
a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement
of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since
there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there
is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.