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CARNAPPING

People v. Dela cruz

FACTS:
Dela Cruz, Beloso and Salvador were acquaintances. Dela Cruz claimed to be a 1st lieutenant of the Army as well as a customs broker
while Beloso and Salvador were unemployed.

-April 1984: Beloso met Dela Cruz and had stayed in Dela Cruz’s house for several months thereafter
-November 1984: Dela Cruz met Salvador, Beloso met Salvador
-Nov.29, 1984: Beloso caused the placing of an advertisement in the Bulletin Today posing as a person who wanted to buy a car.
-Dec.1984: The 3 gathered together at a restaurant to discuss a car deal that would take place the following day.
-Anthony Banzon was among those who responded to the advertisement
-Dec.5, 1984: the mother of Anthony received a call from “Mike Garcia” who said that he was the buyer of her son’s car. Anthony
was informed of this and they both left for “Garcia’s” office at the Centrum Condominium, Makati on board the car (a Telstar). Beloso
posed as “Mike Garcia”, the person interested in buying the car. Anthony was then left at the Centrum by his mother.

Anthony and Beloso discussed the price of the car. Beloso told Anthony to wait for Dela Cruz as he would be the one to decide WON
to buy the car. When Dela Cruz arrived, he and Anthony left to go to Dela Cruz’s house where Anthony brought with him an envelope
containing the certificate of registration, official receipt and other papers. Upon arriving at the house, Salvador was already there.

Thereafter, a shot was released and Anthony was sprawled on the floor surrounded by blood.

Beloso, who was still at the Centrum, was instructed by Dela Cruz to proceed to Dela Cruz’s house where he was handed the key to
the car and instructed to drive Salvador to Mr. Hernandez who was interested in buying the car. However, it was only Salvador who
was able to go to Hernandez since Beloso was hungry and had to eat.

At Hernandez’, Salvador introduced himself as Anthony and Hernandez brought him to Patrolman de la Rosa, who is the brother of
the owner of the pawnshop interested in buying the car. Salvador offered to sell the car for 130,000 which left de la Rosa suspicious
due to the low price. When told that he would be paid the next day, Salvador insisted that they pay 100,000 in advance and he even
left the car behind. De la Rosa reported his suspicions to Sgt. Roldan who dispatched patrolmen to P.Campa St. where they waited for
Salvador to arrive. When he did, he arrived with Beloso who started shouting that he was Anthony Banzon. Thus, the policemen took
the two the the Police HQ for questioning.

Meanwhile, a boarder of the house of De la Cruz found the body of Anthony and thought it was her landlord, Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz
went to the Makati police station and reported that his house was ransacked by someone where he was held for further questioning.
Beloso and Salvador were later turned over to the same police station where the victim’s identity was straightened out.

Dela Cruz, Beloso and Salvador were tried and convicted for the crime of carnapping with homicide with the sentence of reclusion
perpetua. This is an appeal by Beloso and Salvador.

(other facts to be noted: when the police went to Dela Cruz’ house, all his things were in proper order contrary to his claim of being
ransacked, Beloso and Salvador confessed their modus operandi as follows: 1) blank residence certificates were secured and kept by
the three accused; 2) their "business" of buying of cars was advertised in the newspapers; 3) the ads yielding fruitful results,
prospective sellers would be asked about their respective certificates of registration and other documents; 4) when the portion for the
signature of the owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend to test the car, demand the certificate of registration, and fill in
the signature space with their own signature; 5) present the same certificate of registration bearing their own signature, along with the
residence certificate supplied by Dela Cruz which is made to coincide with the name and signature appearing in the certificate of
registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend to test the car although, in fact, just waiting for the opportunity to leave the
owner of the car behind so that the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime.

ISSUE: WON Beloso and Salvador were in conspiracy with Dela Cruz in the crime of carnaping with homicide

RULING: The facts clearly show that there was conspiracy.Beloso and Salvador shared the same purpose with Dela Cruz in
carnapping the vehicle with a view of selling it at a low price and making money which they badly needed. There were united in its
execution. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a
number of indefinite acts, condition and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished.

With regard to the killing of Anthony, there is no question that he was killed in the commission of the carnapping. The physical
evidence show that Beloso and Salvador were found positive for nitrates which means that they were within the vicinity when the gun
was fired. The gunman, being Dela Cruz, tested negative for nitrates which only meant that he knew how to protect himself since he
was a member of the Army. Beloso and Salvador claim that the nitrates found on them were due to their being chain smokers.
However, the physical evidence shows that nitrates from cigarettes are different from nitrates of powder burns. It is of no moment that
the participation of Beloso and Salvador in the killing is not clearcut. Conspiracy having been proven, all the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because the act of one is the act of all. The degree of actual
participation by each of the conspirators is immaterial.

It is evident in the case that the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the commission of the carnapping obviously to gain
possession of the car, its registration certificate and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and thus facilitate its sale to a
3rd party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the perpetrators.
Izon v. People

FACTS:
That on or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and by means of violence and
intimidation applied upon the person of Reynaldo Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y
Batero who were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing him and the accused
Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon said Reynaldo Togorio physical injurie and did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) motorized tricycle with motor No. B100-25-648 with
Chasis No. B120-05589 and Plate No. MCH Q4102 or with a total value of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency belonging to Reynaldo
Togorio to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of Pll,000.00. However, the motorized tricycle
Zukurmi 120, Motor No. B1OO-25-648 with Chasis No.B-120-05589 was recovered. 

Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Car-
napping Act of 1972 which defines motor vehicle as follows: 

Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the  public highways, but excepting road rollers,
trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used
on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively
for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor
vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating. 

Contending that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of that prescribed
in the Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the information did not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen
was using the public highway, so as to make it a motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and therefore failed to
inform them that they were being charged under the cited statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against the petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the tricycle in question is not a "motor vehicle" as the anti-carnapping law defines the term because it is not
licensed to operate on the "public highways."

The Solicitor General contends otherwise with the following argument: 

The word "public" means "common to all or many; general; open to common use" (Black's Law Dictionary 1393 [Revised 4th Ed.].
On the other hand, 'highway' refers to a 'free and public road way, or street; one which every person has the right to use (idem. at p.
862). lt is clear that a street within a town is a public highway if it is used by the public. To limit the words "public highways" to a
national road connecting the various towns, as petitioners' suggest (Reply dated January 25, 1980) would create a distinction which the
statute itself does not make. Under petitioners' proposition, a distinction should be made between motor vehicles operating within a
town like the motorized tricycle involved herein, and those using roads connecting towns. This, however, goes against the well known
maxim that where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., 104 PhiL
688). It is also to be pointed out that to limit the application of the Act to motor vehicles travelling between different towns, may lead
to absurd results. For example, privately owned motorcycle used by its owner in travelling from one province to another would be
covered by the law. Upon the other hand, a motorized tricycle (with sidecar) which is more expensive than the former but operated
within towns would not be protected by the law. No unreasonable intendment should be read into a statute so that an injustice may be
worked or an absurb result produced (In re Moore's Estate, N.Y.S. 2nd 281, 165 Misc. 683). It can be concluded, therefore, that the
motorized tricycle involves in this case is a 'motor vehicle' within the ambit of section 2 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. The
lower court correctly imposed the penalty for violation of said Act on herein petitioners. 

ISSUE: Whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
YES

RULING:
We perceive no reason not to accord full validity of the Solicitor General's argument, not even on the petitioner's submission that a
motorized tricycle, not having licensed to use a public highway, is not a motor, vehicle under the provision of the anti-carnapping act.

From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as authoritative, highways are always public, free for the use of
every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within
the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by
the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or
unregistered as when they have just beet bought from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of
the anti-carnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously,
could not have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.

Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any vehicle which is motorized using the streets
which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the
exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running in droves along highways admittedly public, as those
going to the north like Baguio City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within the definition of the law, even under the
restricted construction that petitioners would want given to it. If these tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to
treat the tricycle in question differently.

People v. Aquino

FACTS:

As indicated in the Appellee’s Brief, the following narration constitutes the prosecution’s summation of this case:

On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita, accompanied by his ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out
aboard the former’s black Kawasaki tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino together
with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the
victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by appellant.

Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his companions had a shabu session while Jefferson was watching TV. After
using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00), but the victim said that he had no
money. Appellant shouted at the victim demanding him to pay. Bing suggested to her companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus,
the victim mounted his tricycle and started the engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while
appellant and Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a
knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the victim’s side. After the victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside the
tricycle while appellant drove the tricycle to his friend’s house where they again stabbed the victim using the latter’s own knife. Then
they loaded the victim to the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where appellant and his companions dumped the body of the victim.
Thereafter, they returned to appellant’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of appellant about the death of his father but the sister of
appellant only told him to sleep.

The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma.
Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father.

In the meantime, SPO3 Servillano Lactao Cabading received a call from Barangay Captain Danilo Rogelio of Barangay San Rafael
IV, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan thru the two (2) way radio, that the body of a male person with several stab wounds was found
dead on a grassy area beside the road of the said barangay. Immediately, SPO3 Cabading together with a police aide proceeded to the
area. Thereat, they found the dead body whom they identified thru his Driver’s License in his wallet as Jesus Lita, the victim. Also
recovered were a big stainless ice pick about 18 inches long including the handle and a tricycle key. The police officers brought the
body of the victim to the Sapang Palay District Hospital. Thereafter, they proceeded to the address of the victim.

Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met SPO3 Cabading outside their residence.
SPO3 Cabading informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found in Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told SPO3
Cabading that he was with his father at the time of his death and he brought the police officers to the place where his father was
stabbed and to the hut owned by appellant. Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of the
victim.

Appellant was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does not know anything about the incident.
The police officers were able to obtain a picture of appellant which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as
"Akong" one of those who stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was shown to Jefferson
and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also stabbed his father.

However, appellant held a different version of the events of this case. In his Appellant’s Brief, the succeeding account is entered:

[Appellant] denied the accusations against him. On September 6, 2002, he was working as a laborer/mason in the construction of his
uncle’s (Rene Cendana) house located at Area C, Acacia Homes, Cavite, together with Paul Maglaque, Eman Lozada, Raul Lozada
and Lorenzo Cendana. They worked from 7:30 x x x in the morning until 4:30 x x x in the afternoon, with lunch and "merienda"
breaks from 11:30 x x x to 12:00 o’clock noon and 3:00 o’clock to 3:15 x x x in the afternoon, respectively. After work, they just
stayed in their barracks located within their workplace. They would prepare their food and take supper at around 7:00 o’clock to 7:30
x x x in the evening, after which, they would smoke cigarettes. They would go to bed at around 8:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the
evening.

He goes home to Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan every Saturday. During Mondays, he would leave their house at
around 4:00 o’clock to 5:00 o’clock in the morning and would arrive at his workplace at around 8:00 o’clock or 9:00 o’clock in the
morning.

[Appellant] does not know either Ma. Theresa Lita, his son Jefferson, or the victim Jesus Lita. Also, he does not know a certain
Noynoy Almoguera and alias Rodnal. Likewise, he denied using illegal drugs (i.e., shabu).

Paul Maglague (Paul) corroborated [appellant’s] testimony. On September 6, 2002, a Friday, [appellant] was working with him,
together with Roldan Lozada and Oweng Cendana, at Area C, Dasmariñas, Cavite, in the construction of Boy Cendana’s house, Paul’s
brother-in-law. Paul was the cement mixer while [appellant], being his partner, carries it to wherever it is needed. Their work ends at
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. After their work, they just stayed in their barracks located within their workplace. [Appellant] was their
cook. They usually sleep at around 8:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the evening. They get their pay only during Saturdays. Hence, they
would go home to Bulacan every Saturday.

At around 6:00 o’clock to 7:00 o’clock in the evening of September 7, 2002, they left Cavite and went to their respective homes in
Bulacan.
On the night of September 5, 2002, [appellant] slept together with Paul and their other co-workers inside their barracks. Paul woke up
in the middle of the night to urinate and was not able to see whether the accused was there, as there were no lights in the place where
they were sleeping. The following morning, [appellant] was the one who cooked their food.7 (Citations omitted.)

At the conclusion of trial, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court on both criminal charges (MURDER AND FOR
VIOLATING THE ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW)

The RTC sentenced him to life time imprisonment for violating the Anti-carnapping law.

Insisting his innocence, Aquino appealed. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications with respect to the penalties.
Instead of life time imprisonment for the violation of Anti-Carnapping Law, it lowered down to imprisonment of 14 years and 8
months, as minimum and 17 years and 4 months as maxiumum.

ISSUE: W/n the RTC erred in imposing the penalty of life time imprisonment to Aquino for his violation of Anti-Carnapping Law.

RULING:
Yes. we concur with the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the penalty of life imprisonment for
carnapping originally imposed by the trial court. Life imprisonment has long been replaced with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659. Furthermore, the said penalty is applicable only to the special complex
crime of carnapping with homicide which is not obtaining in this case. Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex
crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was
the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof.26 The appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a
special complex crime because the carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim’s death was already fait accompli.
Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping.

It is enshrined in jurisprudence that when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.27

There being no aggravating circumstance since, as discussed earlier, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the award of ₱75,000.00 as moral damages should be decreased to ₱50,000.00. Such an amount is granted
even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. 28

Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 29 and exemplary damages in the amount
of ₱30,000.0030 is correct. The amount of actual damages duly proven in court in the sum of ₱60,100.00 is likewise upheld. Finally,
we impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from the date of finality of this ruling until fully paid.31

With regard to appellant’s conviction for simple carnapping, we affirm the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the Court of Appeals
which is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. Likewise,
we uphold the order upon appellant to pay the sum of ₱65,875.00 representing the total amount of the installment payments made on
the motorcycle.