CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

482 SCRA 233 (2005)

“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional

commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition
to fund releases to it may be imposed. The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of
2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds
released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving
an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by
DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it
seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report, no release" policy upon independent
constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Finally, petitioner's claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than
that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release is constitutional.

HELD:

DBM ‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal
autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the
Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically
and regularly released. The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner; without thought or
conscious intention. ‖ Being ―automatic, ‖ thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing
to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual
appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should
thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is
consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no
report, no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the
Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that
the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would,
to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all
others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught
the distinction established by the Constitution.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced
by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a
similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is
clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations
below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
 G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, July 21, 2006.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President, MARCIAL
A. SANCHEZ, JR., Petitioner,

VS.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent.

FACTS: On 25 November 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision in the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the
petitioner. A Motion for Reconsideration was consequently filed by the respondent to which petitioner filed an
Opposition.

In its Motion, respondent prays in the main that this Court reconsiders its ruling that respondent is not among the
constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy.

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act
of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The
last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.

On the strength of this special provisions, CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998,
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said
resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with
Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process
Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of
the several positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel
Services.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the
body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were:
one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one accounting
Clerk II.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and
Management [DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December 1997,
directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to
implement the Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights Plan and Barangay
Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws.

 Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by
the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be
 given favorable recommendation.
 Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation
Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer
a unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in
the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this
Department has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position
classification system of the National Government.
 Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our
previous stand on the matter.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region
Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association [CHREA], in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency
with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as
well as creation of positions.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of
which reads:

CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.

Petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement
of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR
on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and successfully obtained the favorable action in its Decision
dated 25 November 2004. Respondent then filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

ARGUMENTS:

Respondent defined the assignment of errors for resolution, namely:

i. Supreme Court erred when it ruled that there is no legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy.

ii. Supreme Court erred in stating that the special provision of the RA No. 8522 did not specifically mention CHR as
among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply,
but merely states its coverage to include constitutional commissions and offices enjoying fiscal autonomy;

iii. Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the CHR although admittedly a constitutional creation is nonetheless
not included in the genus of the offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
iv. Supreme Court erred in deciding to reinstate the ruling dated 29 march 1999 of the civil service commission –
national capital region;

v. Supreme Court erred in deciding to disallow the Commission On Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated
September 04, 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 october 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17
November 1998 without the approval of the department of budget and management.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy

HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As already settled in the assailed Decision of this
Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a
constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled “Constitutional Commissions,”
identifies only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The
mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human
Rights. Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional
commissions for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining
to it to support its claim of fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal
autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly.
However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the
Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.

REASONS: Although this Court may have been persuaded to take a second look at this case and partly modify the
assailed Decision, such modification shall not materially affect the dispositive portion thereof.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3. Constitutional
commissions are granted fiscal autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a provision
applied in common to all constitutional commissions. The Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal autonomy by
virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution.

Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly released. The
respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, which provides
that the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.

As compared to Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively,
Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain the first
sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence on the automatic
and regular release of its approved annual appropriations. Question now arises as to the significance of such a
difference in the way the said provisions are worded.
During the drafting of Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, the ConCom members had the following
discussion –

(The original amendment included the first sentence in Art. XIII, Sec. 17(4) on the CHR)

MR. PADILLA. The wording reminds me of the provisions under the judiciary and the constitutional
commissions. Is the intention to elevate the position of this proposed commission which is only
investigative and recommendatory to the high dignity of a constitutional commission, as well as the
independence of the judiciary, by making a positive statement in the Constitution that its appropriation
shall be released automatically and so forth? It seems that we are complicating and also reiterating
several provisions that would make our Constitution not only too long but too complicated. I wonder if
that is the purpose because even other bodies with semi-judicial functions do not enjoy such kind of
constitutional guarantee. It is just an inquiry.

MR. BENGZON. It is not so much the fact that we want to elevate this into a constitutional commission
as it is more of an insurance that the independence of the Human Rights Commission, even though it is
not considered as a constitutional commission as contemplated and as compared to the Civil Service
Commission, the COMELEC and COA, is maintained. And this is as elegant as the other sentences. So, we
submit the same to the body.

MR. BENGZON. It only refers to the release which should be automatic and regular.

The respondent relies on the statement of then Constitutional Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that the first
sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy to the respondent was deleted from Article XIII, Section 17(4)
of the 1987 Constitution because it was a surplusage. Respondent posits that the second sentence, directing the
automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations, has the same essence as the express grant
of fiscal autonomy, thus rendering the first sentence redundant and unnecessary.

This Court, however, believes otherwise. The statement of then Constitutional Commissioner Davide should be
read in full. Referring to the deletion of the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, he explained
that the first sentence “would be a surplusage because the autonomy actually intended is the automatic release of
these appropriations.”

Even in the latter discussion between Constitutional Commissioners Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and Serafin V.C.
Guingona, wherein Constitutional Commissioner Guingona asked for clarification whether respondent shall also be
extended priorities in the preparation of the national budget, Constitutional Commissioner Bengzon replied that “x
x x the sentence means what it says and it is clear,” and that “[i]t only refers to the release which should be
automatic and regular.”
Therefore, after reviewing the deliberations of the ConCom on Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution,
in its entirety, not just bits and pieces thereof, this Court is convinced that the ConCom had intended to grant to
the respondent the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations automatically and regularly released,
but nothing more. While it may be conceded that the automatic and regular release of approved annual
appropriations is an aspect of fiscal autonomy, it is just one of many others.

This Court has already defined the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon, as follows
–

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed
by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control.

The foregoing excerpt sufficiently elucidates that the grant of fiscal autonomy is more extensive than the mere
automatic and regular release of approved annual appropriations of the government entity. It is also worth
stressing herein that in Bengzon v. Drilon, this Court, ruling En Banc, only recognized the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary; the constitutional commissions, namely, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, and the
Commission on Elections; and the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent is conspicuously left out of the
enumeration.

Moreover, the ConCom had the following deliberations on the meaning of the fiscal autonomy extended to the
constitutional commissions in what is to become later Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution –

MR. DE CASTRO. May I just say one sentence, Mr. Presiding Officer? If the Committee’s stand is that fiscal
autonomy means the automatic release of the appropriations, then I say that the first sentence – “The
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy” -- should be deleted because it is a repetition of the second
sentence.

Thank you.

MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, the position of the Committee is that fiscal autonomy may include
other things than just the automatic and regular release of the funds.
 MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I think at the beginning of this exchange, we already told the
honorable Commissioner that the Chairman of the Committee had not meant to make it an all-inclusive
definition. And if he was misled into thinking of another meaning, we apologize for it. But our position is
that fiscal autonomy would include other rights than just merely automatic and regular disbursement.

MR. DE CASTRO. Does it include exception from preaudit?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, it would include the imposition of certain preaudit requirements for release, because
if the preaudit requirements are inserted into the process of release, it would defeat the objective of
automatic and regular release.

Based on the preceding exchange, it can be derived that the first sentence of Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the
1987 Constitution, expressly granting fiscal autonomy to constitutional commissions, does not have the same
meaning as the second sentence, directing the automatic and regular release of their approved annual
appropriations, hence, the resistance of Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod to the suggested
amendment of Constitutional Commissioner Crispino M. De Castro to just delete the first sentence.

In addition, the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), to which respondent avers membership,
defined the term “fiscal autonomy” in its Joint Resolution No. 49, dated 24 July 1998, as follows –

1. Fiscal Autonomy shall mean independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside
control and is characterized by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere automatic and
regular release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such power in a very real sense, the
fiscal autonomy contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons, after
the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy encompasses, among others, budget preparation and
implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of
receipts. x x x

Consequently, this Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal
autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and
regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to
the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or in this
case, the ConCom) would not have made specific enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution) had the intention
not been to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Respondent asserts that it is granted fiscal autonomy by Book VI, Chapter 1, Section 1, paragraph 9, of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which reads –

SEC. 1. Constitutional Policies on the Budget. –

(9) Fiscal autonomy shall be enjoyed by the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, Office of the
Ombudsman, Local Government and Commission on Human Rights.

As its title suggests, the afore-cited provision is supposed to merely re-state the policies on budget as declared by
the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, cannot grant or extend to the respondent a privilege not found in the 1987
Constitution. Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987, under which the said provision is found, pertains to
National Government Budgeting. Respondent may have been included in the enumeration of fiscally
autonomous government entities because it does enjoy an aspect of fiscal autonomy, that of the automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations from the national budget. The general declaration of fiscal
autonomy of the respondent in Section 1, paragraph 9, of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 on National
Government Budgeting, must be qualified and limited by Section 6 of Book V, Title II, Subtitle A of the same Code
specifically pertaining to respondent. It should be borne in mind that the general rule is that a word, phrase or
provision should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law.

To reiterate, under the Constitution, as well as the Administrative Code of 1987, respondent enjoys fiscal
autonomy only to the extent that its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released, but nothing more.

On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is a
condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the CHR, this Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks
discussed in length in the assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.

Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that
the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law.

This Court shall no longer belabor the point it has already delved upon in length in its Decision that Congress has
delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law, which power is part of the system
of checks and balances or system of restraints in the Philippine government.
DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and
upgrading scheme proposed by the respondent lacks legal rationalization. This view of the DBM, as the law’s
designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation
of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, the Court
echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.

As exhaustively expounded in the assailed Decision and the herein Resolution, only the DBM has the authority and
the technical expertise to determine compliance by respondent to the provisions of the Salary Standardization
Law.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of this Court dated 25
November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal
autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire
reclassification scheme remains subject to the approval of the DBM.
 Gaminde vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000||

FACTS:
The President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993,
the Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. On February 24, 1998,
petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to
her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998, opined that petitioner's term of
office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner
remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon; wrote the
Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February
02,1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional intent." Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of
disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and
her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on
Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No. 99-090 dismissing petitioner's
appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's
term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration
date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term,
not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration;
however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or
on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.

HELD:
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an
appointment extended to her expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith
until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.

The term of office  of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution, as follows:
"SECTION 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
 predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity." 

In Republic  vs. Imperial, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both
indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should  start on a common
date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only
be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term."|||

Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and
three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.|

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate  starting point of the
terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be
on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure." "The term of an
office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during the officer may
claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not
affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent."|

Given the foregoing common starting point, we compute the terms of the first appointees and their
successors to the Civil Service Commission under the 1987 Constitution by their respective lines, as follows

First line: Chairman — Seven-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 01, 1994.||

Second line: Commissioner — Five-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1992.||| 
Third line: Commissioner — Three-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1990.|||

Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first
Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner, and February 02, 1990, for the first three-
year term Commissioner. Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for
Chairman; February 02, 1999, for Commissioner Thelma P.  Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner
Ramon P. Ereñeta, Jr.||
 ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC
GR No. 142527 March 01, 2001

Doctrine: Election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the
date of submission for decision. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to
minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to
treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might
induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our
view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow
procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters
in numerous cases.

Facts: Arsenio Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Dona Aurora, Quezon City. He
received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private
respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and mis appreciation of
ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the
MTC ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently
rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner
got 550 votes after the recount.

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that Sarmiento won over petitioner. Sarmiento
filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for
resolution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of
the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC when:

(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;

(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and

(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory and
not appealable.

Petitioner’s argument: the COMELEC violated its mandate on preferential disposition of election
contests as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus
Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from
the date of submission. He points out that the case was ordered submitted for resolution on November
15, 1999 but the COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four months and
four days after November 14, 1999.

Issue: WON the COMELEC violated its mandate on “preferential disposition of election contests”?

Held: Petition is dismissed. The court is not unaware of the Constitutional provision cited by petitioner.
The court agrees with him that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively.
The court is also not unaware of the requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that
election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
submission for decision. The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) election
precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling,
authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where
attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is
sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to
deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of
material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict
construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to
disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.

Court finds NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION by the COMELEC. Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its
discretion when it failed to treat the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258
of the Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the preferential disposition applies to cases before
the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.

Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time. As private
respondent pointed out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was
pending before it. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early
Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active participation of a party coupled with
his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is
tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case
and will bar said party from later impugning the court or the body’s jurisdiction.
 Fetalino & Calderon v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191890: December 4, 2012
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the
COMELEC who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. The petitioners
obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-
year term of office. The retirement benefits granted to petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are
purely gratuitous in nature. Thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as
provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred
compensation for services performed. In a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus,
employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation.

FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Fetalino and Calderon
as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress, however, adjourned before
the Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on
presidential appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed.
Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as COMELEC Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
COMELEC, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The COMELEC initially approved the claims but in a subsequent
resolution, on the basis of its Law Departments study, completely disapproved the claims, stating that
one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to
fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five
years’ salary.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to the full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A.
No. 1568. (NO)

RULING: The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions
are met: (1) when the conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 15688 are fulfilled;
and (2) when an actual retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement
entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and
takes effect by operation of law. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the
Chairman or any Member of the COMELEC who has retired from the service after having completed his
term of office.

1) Retirement from the

service for having
completed the term of
office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge
the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the
service; and
1) Retirement from the
service for having
completed the term of
office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge
the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the
service; and
1) Retirement from the
service for having
completed the term of
office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge
the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the
service; and
To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the
following events must transpire:
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the service; and
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term of
office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
government at the time of retirement.

The foregoing is not present in this case. The petitioners’ appeal to liberal construction of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1568 is misplaced since the law is clear and unambiguous. Death during the service obviously
does not need to be considered in the present case, thus leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation
as the event that must transpire in order to be entitled to the lump sum gratuity.

We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be
considered as incapacity since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them
incapable of performing the duties of a Commissioner. Thus, incapacity is likewise effectively removed
from active consideration.

"Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation,
the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied
by the act of relinquishment."30 In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable as a
ground because the petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish them position as Commissioners; their
termination was merely a consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on
their ad interim appointments.

This eliminative process only leaves the question of whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad
interim appointments amounted to retirement from the service after completion of the term of office.
We emphasize at this point that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are
met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are
fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement takes place.31 This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law
and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law. While we characterized an ad interim
appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo36 "as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office," we have also
positively ruled in that case that "an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. “To hold otherwise would mean that
the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile
the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments

Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be considered to
have retired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more
importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No.
1568, as amended.

We are not unmindful of the Court’s ruling in Ortiz v. COMELEC which Barcelona cites as basis for his
claim of retirement benefits. A close reading of Ortiz reveals that it does not have the same fact
situation as the present case and is thus not decisive of the present controversy. We note that the
impact of the principle of stare decisis that Barcelona cited as basis is limited; specific judicial decisions
are binding only on the parties to the case and on future parties with similar or identical factual
situations. Significantly, the factual situation in Ortiz is totally different so that its ruling cannot
simply be bodily lifted and applied arbitrarily to the present case.

No vested rights over retirement benefits

As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted to the
petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested
right over these benefits. 58 Retirement benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be
distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services
performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire
contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation.