Republic of the Philippines immediately thereafter,
SUPREME COURT legal grounds, with deliberate intent
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007
July 20, 1987
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ,petitioners,  lock said Armando Valdez inside the
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity
as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN
TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari of an order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Third
Judicial District, in Criminal Case No.
D-529 entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
et al.," granting the motion to quash
the information filed by accused
Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein respondent.
The issue is whether a barrio
captain can be charged of arbitrary
detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information
for Arbitrary Detention was filed
against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in
the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant
Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and
Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of
Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime
of ARBITRARY DETENTION,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of
April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock
in the evening, in barrio Baguinay,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Juan
Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with
the aid of some other private
persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr.,
Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by
hitting with butts of their guns and
fists blows and
without quash the information which was
sustained by respondent Judge, is
to deprive said Armando Valdez of
his constitutional liberty, accused
Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl.
Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo
Mangsat, members of the police force
of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring,
confederating and helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and
municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours. (Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the
R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including
respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a
motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense and that
the proofs adduced at the
investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information.
Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition
thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan
Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer
who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge
Angelito C. Salanga granted the
motion to quash in an order dated
April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by
a public officer who, without legal
grounds, detains a person.1 The
elements of this crime are the
following:
1. That the offender is a public
officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without
legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private
respondent Tuvera for his motion to
that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense,3 that is, that
the facts alleged in the information
do not constitute the elements of
Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a
barrio captain, to have conspired
with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat,
who are members of the police force
of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining
petitioner Valdez for about eleven
(11) hours in the municipal jail
without legal ground. No doubt the
last two elements of the crime are
present.
The only question is whether or not
Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a
public officer who can be liable for
the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for
Arbitrary Detention must be vested
with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a
crime. Such public officers are the
policemen and other agents of the
law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not
consider private respondent Tuvera
as such public officer when the
former made this finding in the
questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was
ever jailed and detained more than
six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has
nothing to do with the same because
he is not in any way connected with
the Police Force of Manaoag,
Pangasinan. Granting that it was
Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez
arrested, it was not he who detained
and jailed him because he has no
such authority vested in him as a
mere Barrio Captain of Barrio
Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of
respondent Judge Salanga, private
respondent Tuvera asserts that the
motion to quash was properly
sustained for the following reasons:
(1) That he did not have the
authority to make arrest, nor jail
and detain petitioner Valdez as a
mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is
neither a peace officer nor a
policeman,7 (3) That he was not a
public official;8 (4) That he had
nothing to do with the detention of
petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not
connected directly or indirectly in
the administration of the Manaoag
Police Force;10 (6) That barrio
captains on April 21, 1972 were not
yet considered as persons in
authority and that it was only upon
the promulgation of Presidential
Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain
and Heads of Barangays were
decreed among those who are
persons in authority;11 and that the
proper charge was Illegal Detention
and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299
was signed into law, barrio
lieutenants (who were later named
barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as
persons in authority. In various
cases, this Court deemed them as
persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio,
a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario
Braganza, a municipal councilor,
arrested Father Feliciano Gomez
while he was in his church. They
made him pass through the door of
the vestry and afterwards took him
to the municipal building. There,
they told him that he was under
arrest. The priest had not
committed any crime. The two
public officials were convicted of
Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo
Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the
help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and
tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas
with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and
delivered him to the justice of the
peace. Sixto was detained during the
whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of
the next day when he was ordered
released by the justice of the peace
because he had not committed any
crime, Gellada was convicted of
Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590,
otherwise known as The Revised
Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the
following: to look after the
maintenance of public order in the
barrio and to assist the municipal
mayor and the municipal councilor
in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such
barrio;17 to look after the general
welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all
laws and ordinances which are
operative within the barrio;19and to
organize and lead an emergency
group whenever the same may be
necessary for the maintenance of
peace and order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio
Government Law and
Administration, Professor Jose M.
Aruego has this to say about the
above-mentioned powers and duties
of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in
the main the maintenance of public
order in the barrio. For public
disorder therein, inevitably people
blame him.
"In the event that there be a
disturbing act to said public order
or a threat to disturb public order,
what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to
peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the
offenders under surveillance and
persuading them, where possible, to
behave well, but when necessary, he
may subject them to the full force of
law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio
considered under the law as a
person in authority. As such, he may
make arrest and detain persons
within legal limits.21 (Emphasis
supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to
be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their
functions, may be guilty of this
crime.22 A perusal of the powers and
function vested in mayors would
show that they are similar to those
of a barrio captain23 except that in
the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and
order, both must be and are given
the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact
that even private respondent
Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a
barrio captain, could have led the
arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no
doubt that a barrio captain, like
private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can
be held liable for Arbitrary
Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr.
contends that the motion to quash
was validly granted as the facts and
evidence on record show that there
was no crime of Arbitrary
Detention;25 that he only sought the
aid and assistance of the Manaoag
Police Force;26 and that he only
accompanied petitioner Valdez to
town for the latter's personal
safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above
allegations can only be raised as a
defense at the trial as they traverse
what is alleged in the Information.
We have repeatedly held that
Courts, in resolving a motion to
quash, cannot consider facts
contrary to those alleged in the
information or which do not appear
on the face of the information. This
is because a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts
alleged in the information.28 Matters
of defense cannot be proved during
the hearing of such a motion, except
where the Rules expressly permit,
such as extinction of criminal
liability, prescription, and former
jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs.
Perez,30 this Court held that a motion
to quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense cannot allege new facts not
only different but diametrically
opposed to those alleged in the
complaint. This rule admits of only
one exception and that is when such
facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31 lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims
that by the lower court's granting of
the motion to quash jeopardy has
already attached in his favor32 on the
ground that here, the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no
water. An order granting a motion
to quash, unlike one of denial, is a
final order. It is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore
immediately appealable. The
accused cannot claim double
jeopardy as the dismissal was
secured not only with his consent
but at his instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Petition for certiorari
is GRANTED. The questioned Order
of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case
No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let
this case be remanded to the
appropriate trial court for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and
Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF   G.R. No. 189093
THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
  
- versus - Present:
 
CHRISTOPHER   of this Honorable Court the above-
BRINGAS y
named accused, conspiring,
GARCIA, BRYAN CORONA,
BRINGAS y Chairperson,
confederating and mutually helping
GARCIA, JOHN one another, while in the process of
ROBERT VELASCO, JR., executing their criminal design to
NAVARRO y CRUZ,
kidnap for ransom a minor child
ERICKSON NACHURA,
PAJARILLO y named PATRICK TENG, with intent
BASER PERALTA, and to gain and with violence and
(deceased), and intimidation, did then and there,
EDEN SY CHUNG, MENDOZA, JJ. take a motor vehicle, Toyota Corolla,
Accused-
Appellants.   with Plate No. TNK-782, owned by
Erick Teng.
Promulgated:
 CONTRARY TO LAW.
 April 23, 2010
The same accused were likewise
DECISION indicted for Kidnapping for
Ransom or violation of Art. 267 of
 VELASCO, JR., J.:
the RPC. The Information[6] in
Criminal Case No. 95-137 reads:
 The Case
In the instant appeal,[1] accused- That at about 1:30 in the afternoon
appellants John Robert Navarro y of December 14, 1994 at Marina
Cruz, Christopher Bringas y Garcia, Subdivision, Municipality of
Bryan Bringas y Garcia, and Eden Sy Paraaque and within the jurisdiction
Chung seek their acquittal by a of this Honorable Court the above-
reversal of the January 3, 2006 named accused, conspiring,
Decision[2] and June 6, 2007 confederating and mutually helping
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals one another, did then and there
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911, take, carry away and kidnap a
which affirmed their earlier minor, PATRICK TENG, against his
conviction by the Regional Trial will and detained him for the
Court (RTC), Branch 258 in purpose of extorting ransom for his
Paraaque City for violation of release which was effected after
Republic Act No. (RA) 6539 payment by his parents of the
(Carnapping) and for violation of amount of TWO MILLION FIVE
Article 267 of the Revised Penal HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2.5
Code (RPC) (Kidnapping for Million) to the damage and
Ransom) in Criminal Case Nos. 95- prejudice of aforementioned victim
and his parents.
136 and 95-137, respectively.
 The Facts  CONTRARY TO LAW.
On April 28, 1995, accused- Jason Rosales, a member of the
appellants Christopher Bringas y group, was not included in both
Garcia alias Jimboy, John Robert indictments as he was utilized as
Navarro y Cruz alias Jun, Dennis state witness and placed under the
Ticsay y Pea alias Peng, Aruel Ross y Witness Protection Program of the
Picardo, Bryan Bringas y Garcia alias Government.
Bobby, Roger Calaguas y Jimenez
 Except for Glen Sangalang and
alias Bronson, Ericson Pajarillo[4] y
Ricky Castillo who remain at large,
Baser alias Erick, Edgardo Sulayao y
the rest of the accused were
Petilla alias Eddie, Eden Sy Chung
apprehended. When arraigned
alias Kim, Glen Sangalang, and Ricky
on September 28, 1995, the
Castillo were indicted for
apprehended accused, assisted by
Carnapping or violation of RA
their respective counsels, uniformly
6539. The Information[5] in Criminal
entered a plea of not guilty.
Case No. 95-136 reads:
 To substantiate the accusations, the
That at about 1:30 in the afternoon
prosecution presented the
of December 14, 1994 at Marina
testimonies of: (1) Rosales (state
Subdivision, Municipality of
witness); (2) Maricel Hipos, house-
Paraaque and within the jurisdiction
helper of Eric Teng; (3) Police Chief
Inspector Gilbert C. Cruz of the
Philippine Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC); (4) Police Chief Inspector
Michael Ray Aquino of Task Force
Habagat; (5) Police Chief Inspector
Paul Tucay of Task Force Habagat;
(6) Eric, the father of the minor
kidnap victim Patrick Teng; and (7)
Antonio Nebrida (Tony) of PTV 4.
 Version of the Prosecution
 Culled from the records, the
Peoples version of the incident is
synthesized as follows:
 That sometime around 11:30 a.m.
on December 14, 1994, Erics house
helper Maricel received a phone call
purportedly from Erics brother-in-
law, Johnson, informing that a gift
will be delivered for Patrick, and she
was instructed to wait for the driver
who will be arriving soon. [7] At
around 1:30 p.m., the doorbell rang
and Maricel went to check the gate.
[8]
 When she asked who it was, the
men outside answered that they
were delivering the gift for Patrick
from Johnson.[9] Peering through the
gate she saw two men, [10] whom she
came to know later on to be Rosales
and Calaguas with the latter holding
a large gift in Christmas wrapper.
[11]
 Since the gift could not fit the
aperture in the gate, Maricel opened
the gate.[12]
 Calaguas then poked a gun at
Maricel and pulled her towards
Erics house.[13] She was made to
knock at the front door which was
opened by Sweeney, the sister of
Eric.[14] Maricel, Sweeney, and the
other house helpers, Dina and
Melanie, were herded by Calaguas to
the childrens room at the second
floor together with Erics children,
Patrick and Mikee.[15] While on the
stairway, Rosales asked for the key
to Erics car.[16] Maricel was then
gagged with packing tape by
Pajarillo,[17] and the three of them
went down.[18] Maricel pointed to
the car key in the kitchen.
[19]
 Thereafter, Maricel was brought
upstairs to the childrens room by
Pajarillo.[20] Already inside the
childrens room were Sulayao and
Calaguas.[21] Pajarillo then tied the
hands and feet of Maricel, [22] while
the others did the same to Sweeney,
Dina and Melanie.[23] However, Dinas
feet were not tied.[24] One of the men
said kunin na ninyo ang bata.
[25]
 Maricel identified Ross as among
those who took Patrick.[26]The
kidnappers also took Erics red
Toyota Corolla (Model GLI 1994).[27]
After the kidnappers left, Dina
looked for a pair of scissors. [28] After
the girls extricated themselves from
their bindings, they immediately
called Kim Teng (Kimbol), the
brother of Eric, who rushed to Erics
house.[29] Shortly thereafter, at
around 2:30 p.m., Kimbol called Eric
to tell him about the kidnapping of
his son, Patrick.[30] Eric rushed
home.[31] At around 3:10 p.m., Eric
received the first call from one of
the kidnappers (negotiator)
demanding a ransom of PhP 10
million for his son and ordered him
not to report the matter to the
police else Patrick will be harmed.
[32]
 A friend of the grandparents of
Patrick, however, reported the
kidnapping to the PACC Special
Operations Task Force Habagat.[33]
While Eric was trying to pool
resources from friends and
relatives, he continued receiving
calls from the same negotiator
urging him to cooperate.[34] At about
4:00 p.m., Eric received a call from
Gen. Panfilo Lacson, then head of the
PACC Special Operations Task Force
Habagat.[35] Eric was only able to
raise PhP 200,000 that afternoon.[36]
Through another call, the negotiator
instructed Eric to produce six
individuals for them to interview
and choose from to deliver the
money, the qualifications given
was kailangang matalik ninyong
kaibigan na mapapagkatiwalan ng
pera, hindi ninyo kamag-anak,
mukhang instik at marunung
managalog.[37] The negotiator gave
his name as Eric.[38] They then called
Racquel Chung, the wife of Eden Sy
Chung (Chung), asking if Chung
could help.[39] Imelda, Erics wife, was
able to talk to Chung who was
willing to help deliver the money if
selected.[40] At around 10:00 p.m.,
Eric again received a call from the
negotiator which was followed by
another call, this time by a different
person.[41]
 The next day, December 15, 1994,
at 8:00 a.m., Chung arrived.[42] Chung
encouraged Eric to pay the ransom
as soon as possible.[43] Thereafter,
Eric received so many calls but was
able to identify the negotiators
voice. Upon query on the six
individuals, he informed the
negotiator that they could only
come up with two: Chung and John
Tuang.[44] The negotiator
interviewed both Chung and John
Tuang on the phone.[45] By
lunchtime, the ransom was reduced
to PhP 8 million,[46] which was
further reduced to PhP 5 million at
4:00 p.m.[47] But Eric still could not
raise the amount. After dinner, the
negotiator instructed Chung and
John Tuang to go home.[48] Chung
borrowed Erics car.[49] Thereafter,
they received another call
threatening, puputulin ko ang daliri
ng anak mo, puputulin ko ang bayag
ng anak mo papatayin ko kayo.[50]
After a while, the negotiator called
again demanding for Chung to come
back, and Chung came back to the
Tengs residence at around 8:00 p.m.
[51]
 Eric was then instructed to have
the ransom money delivered, which
at that time was significantly
reduced to PhP 2.5 million and
which he was able to raise that day.
[52]
 It was to be placed in a box and
gift wrapped.[53] Chung was
instructed by the negotiator to
deliver the ransom money at
the Quezon Memorial Circle near
GSIS.[54]Chung then took Erics two-
door Honda Civic with Plate No. TGH
439.[55]
On the way, Chung called Eric telling
him that he was intercepted by two
cars which he had to follow. [56] The
PACC operatives tailing Chung who
were on radio contact with the
PACC, however, belied Chungs
allegation of interception. [57] The
PACC then suspected Chung to be in
cahoots with the kidnappers.[58] Gen.
Lacson thereafter instructed Eric to
delay Chung upon his return.
[59]
 Eventually, Chung, bringing
Patrick, arrived at Erics place past
midnight.[60] Chung reported to Eric
that hinarang ako inipit ako sa
dalawang kotse at nakita ko si
Johnson sa isa sa mga sasakyan.
[61]
 Five minutes after Chungs
arrival, Gen. Lacson and his men
arrived and arrested Chung.[62]
A few hours thereafter, at around
4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1994, Eric
received a call from Gen. Lacson
informing him that the ransom
money was recovered except for
PhP 100,000 which was given by
Chung to Navarro.[63] At around
noon of December 16, 1994, Eric
again received a call from the PACC
informing him that Chung wanted to
talk to him.[64] Chung apologized to
Eric saying, Sorry, ginawa ko sa inyo
ito, napipilitan lang ako and
[T]utulong naman ako sa PACC
ibinigay ko na yung dalawang
pangalan.[65] Chung named Navarro
and Jimboy Bringas.[66] At 4:00 p.m.
of December 16, 1994, Eric again
received a call from the PACC
confirming the arrest of both
Navarro and Jimboy Bringas.[67] And,
later, at 9:00 p.m., the PACC further
informed Eric that they have
arrested the other kidnappers who
were pointed out by Jimboy Bringas.
[68]
 Moreover, Erics red Toyota
Corolla was likewise recovered.[69]
During the December 17, 1994 press
conference at the PACC
Headquarters in Camp Crame, Eric
recognized the voice of the
negotiator among the kidnappers
whom he identified later on to be
that of Navarro.[70] In the same press
conference, Navarro admitted to the
media that he made three calls to
the Teng family regarding the
ransom and that Pajarillo likewise
admitted to the media that Chung
supplied them with handguns
except the ammunition.[71] Eric Teng
was able to tape segments of the
news aired over Channels 2 and 4
covering the admissions of Navarro
and Pajarillo.[72]
Tony of PTV 4 testified[73] that he
was the newscaster of PTV 4 of the
December 17, 1994 evening news
edition that what was taped by Eric
Teng.
Police Chief Inspector Aquino was
the Operations Chief of the PACC
Task Force Habagat who
coordinated the operation,
monitoring and response to the
kidnapping of Patrick Teng; he
assigned Police Senior Inspector
Rolando Mendoza to secure the
house of Eric Teng and monitor the
communications with the negotiator
of the kidnappers.[74] Police Chief
Inspector Cruz was the one who led
a team in arresting Navarro and
Jimboy Bringas at around half past
1:00 p.m. on December 16, 1994 in
the vicinity of Malate.[75] And Police
Chief Inspector Tucay was the team
leader who led the team which
tailed Chung in the evening of
December 15, 1994 to the house of
Chungs mother, the Bowling Inn and
Philippine Westin Plaza; and also
led the team in the afternoon and
evening of December 16, 1994 in
arresting Calaguas, Sulayao, Ross,
Pajarillo, Bobby Bringas and Dennis
Ticsay in Pampanga and in
recovering Eric Tengs red Toyota
Corolla.[76]
Version of the Defense
The fractious defense offered in
evidence the testimonies of: (1) John
Robert Navarro; (2) Sr. Police
Inspector Michael Ray Aquino; (3)
Eden Sy Chung (Chung); (4)
Christopher Bringas (Jimboy
Bringas); (5) Roger Calaguas
(Calaguas); (6)Lourdes Bringas,
mother of Christopher and Bryan;
(7) Bryan Bringas (Bobby Bringas);
(8) Edgardo Sulayao (Sulayao), also
known as Kosa; (9) Ericson Pajarillo
(Pajarillo); and (10) Aruel Ross
(Ross).
The accuseds divergent defenses
uniformly assailed the credibility of
Maricel Hipos and state witness
Rosales, and in assiduously
declaring their innocence they
pointed to each other as the
perpetrator or mastermind of the
kidnapping for ransom.
 
From their testimonies,
Navarro[77] and Chung[78] similarly
asserted being implicated by the
other in the crime and pointed at
each other as the mastermind
thereof. Calaguas,[79] Sulayao,[80] Paja
rillo[81] and Ross[82] uniformly point
to Chung and Navarro as the brains
behind the kidnapping who were
assisted by Rosales and Jimboy
Bringas, and that they were merely
implicated for they were merely
hired as factory workers (Calaguas
and Sulayao), for a driving job
(Ross) or was only doing a favor for
Rosales (Pajarillo). They admitted
the taking of Patrick Teng but
denied doing any violence and the
use of handguns. Calaguas and
Sulayao repudiated their joint
August 21, 1995 Pinagsanib na
Salaysay ng Pagpapabulaan[83]sworn
to before the state prosecutor for
allegedly not being true as their
former counsel, Atty. Gasmen, did
not put therein what they actually
narrated to him.
Jimboy Bringas maintained that he
was only implicated by Chung and
Navarro for he was neither involved
with the crime nor participated in
its commission as he was only
tasked to look for factory workers
by Chung and for tourist guides by
Navarro.[84]
It must be noted that, while all the
accused pinpointed and identified
Navarro as one of the masterminds,
only Pajarillo testified otherwise
that John Robert Navarro is not the
same person as John or Jun Navarro
who was with him and Rosales in
the evening of December 13, 1994 in
Tradewinds Hotel, and on December
14, 1994 when they delivered gifts
and the kidnapping of Patrick was
committed.
Bobby Bringas strongly protested
his innocence as he was in
Pampanga on the days material and
was never involved in the crime but
was merely implicated by
Rosales. His testimony[85] and that of
his mother, Lourdes Bringas,
[86]
 were dispensed with upon the
prosecutions stipulation that he was
in Pampanga from December 14,
1994 until his arrest by PACC
operatives on December 16, 1994.
 
Acquittal of Dennis Ticsay
On July 30, 1997, accused Dennis
Ticsay (Ticsay) filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence[87] which was unopposed
and granted by the trial court.
[88]
 Accordingly, on August 22, 1997,
Ticsay filed his Demurrer to
Evidence.[89] On December 3, 1997,
the trial court granted the demurrer
and acquitted Ticsay.[90]
Subsequently, on June 10, 1998, the
motions to grant bail filed by the
other accused were denied by the
trial court.[91]
The Ruling of the RTC and CA
The RTC, finding the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses more
credible, rendered, on March 26,
1999, its Joint Decision[92] finding
accused-appellants and the other
accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes
charged. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of
the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
In Criminal Case No. 95-136 for
CARNAPPING, defined and
penalized under Republic Act No.
6539, finding accused
CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia;
JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz;
ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER
CALAGUAS y Jimenez; ERICKSON
PAHARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO
SULAYAO y Petilla and EDEN SY
CHUNG GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of nineteen (19)
years as minimum to twenty-seven
(27) years, as maximum.
For failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of BRYAN BRINGAS y
GARCIA, he is hereby ACQUITTED.
In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined
and penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act no. 7659, finding
accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y
Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y
Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo;
BRYAN BRINGAS y Garcia; ROGER
CALAGUAS y Jimenez; ERICKSON
PAHARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO
SULAYAO y Petilla; and EDEN SY
CHUNG guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH.
Likewise, accused JOHN ROBERT
NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed
to pay Eric Teng the sum of
PhP100,000.00 as actual damages
with interest thereon at the legal
rate from December 15, 1994 until
fully paid and all the accused are
directed to pay Eric Teng jointly and
severally the amount of
PhP5,000,000.00 as moral damages;
PhP2,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
Let Alias Warrants of Arrest issued
against GLEN SANGALANG and
RICKY CASTILLO for their
immediate apprehension which
need not be returned until after they
have been arrested.
 SO ORDERED.[93]
Thru its Order of Commitment
(Mittimus),[94] the RTC sent the
accused to the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
[95]
 The RTC also elevated the
records of the case to this Court for
automatic review, docketed
under G.R. Nos. 139115-16.
 In accordance, however,
with People v. Mateo,[96] the Court,
per its September 7, 2004
Resolution,[97] transferred the case
to the CA for intermediate
review, docketed thereat as CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00911.  [102]
Eventually, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision dated January 3,
2006, affirming the trial court. The
dispositive portion reads:  the notices of appeal filed by
 WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the March 26, 1999 Joint Decision of
the Regional Trial Court
or Paraaque City, Branch 258, is
hereby AFFIRMED. However,
considering that the death penalty
was imposed, instead of entering
judgment, We hereby CERTIFY the
case and elevate its entire record to
the Supreme Court for review and
final disposition, pursuant to Section
13 (a & b), Rule 124 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
 SO ORDERED.
Navarro, Pajarillo and Chung filed
their respective motions for
reconsideration[98] of the assailed
decision. As stated at the threshold
hereof, the CA, in the herein equally
assailed Resolution dated June 6,
2007, denied the motions, but,
noting the passage of RA
9346[99] lifting the death penalty,
accordingly reduced the penalty
to reclusion perpetua. In the same
assailed Resolution, however, the CA
further noted that the accused failed
to file their motions for
reconsideration or notices of appeal
as regards Criminal Case No. 95-136
for Carnapping, the lesser offense,
and, citing Sec. 13(b) of Rule 124 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, it pronounced finality of
the affirmed RTC decision as
regards Criminal Case No. 95-136.
 Subsequently, on July 16, 2007, the
CA issued a Resolution[100] for the
issuance of a Partial Entry of
Judgment[101] in Criminal Case No.
95-136 as to Ross, Jimboy Bringas,
Calaguas and Sulayao. Undaunted,
accused-appellants Navarro, Jimboy
Bringas, Bobby Bringas and Chung
filed their respective notices of
appeal pursuant to Sec. 13 (b), Rule
124 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In the meantime, on April 8, 2006,
Pajarillo died from aspiration
pneumonia secondary to PTB,
 while Sulayao died on March 10,
2007.[103]
 On June 23, 2009, the CA issued a
Resolution[104] giving due course to
accused-appellants and ordered the
issuance of a (Partial) Entry of
Judgment[105] against Ross who
opted not to take any further appeal
to this Court, and dismissed the
instant criminal case as to Sulayao
on account of his death on March 10,
2007 without prejudice to his civil
liability.
We take notice, however, that the CA
failed to note the May 4, 2009
letter[106] from the Bureau of
Corrections
in Muntinlupa City belatedly
informing it, on May 6, 2009, of the
death of Pajarillo way back on April
8, 2006. Consequently, the
appeal[107] of Pajarillo filed by his
counsel on July 4, 2007 is rendered
moot and academic. Moreover, we
further note that the CA failed to
pronounce an entry of judgment as
regards Calaguas who failed to file
either a motion for reconsideration
or to take a further appeal of the
January 3, 2006 CA
Decision. Consequently, for his
failure to file an appeal as required
by the rules, the instant case has
become final as to Calaguas.
Thus, the instant appeals before us
from accused-appellants Navarro,
Jimboy Bringas, Bobby Bringas and
Chung who prayed for their
respective acquittal from the crime
of kidnapping for ransom.
The Issues/Assignment of Errors
The People of the Philippines,
represented by the OSG, and
accused-appellants Navarro and
Chung chose not to file any
supplemental briefs, maintaining
their respective positions,
assignment of errors and arguments
in their respective briefs earlier filed
in G.R. Nos. 139115-16.
In his appellants brief,[108] Chung
raises the following assignment of
errors: 
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANT CHUNG
HAD CONSPIRED WITH THE OTHER
APPELLANTS CONSIDERING THAT:
 A. There is no clear and sufficient
evidence to establish that Appellant
Chung participated in the planning
of the crime;
B. The evidence of conspiracy
against Appellant fails to establish
his participation in the planning of
the offense beyond reasonable
doubt;
C. There are no overt acts attribu-
table to Appellant Chung which
would establish that he intended to,
or did actually carry out the alleged
conspiracy;
 D. There is no evidence which
would establish Appellant Chungs
presence at the scene of the crime,
or his alleged participation in aiding
his co-appellants in the commission
thereof.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
RELYING ON THE ALLEGED
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSES
EVIDENCE RATHER THAN ON THE
DOUBTFUL STRENGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING, WITHOUT ANY
BASIS WHATSOEVER, THAT
APPELLANT CHUNG IS THE
MASTERMIND OF THE
CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JASON ROSALES, AN
ADMITTED CO-CONSPIRATOR IN
THE PLANNING AND COMMISSION
OF THE OFFENSE.
V First Core Issue: Credibility of
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO
PERFORM ITS DUTY OF RESOLVING
ALL DOUBTS IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE IN
FAVOR OF APPELLANT CHUNG.[109]
Navarro, on the other hand, raises in
his Appellants Brief[110] the sole
assignment of error that: The Court
a quo committed serious error when
it convicted him on the basis of what
may at best be considered
circumstantial evidence despite
clear and direct testimonies of law
enforcers and the other accused that
proved his absence of involvement
in the crimes charged.[111]
In their Accused-Appellants Brief,
[112]
 Jimboy and Bobby Bringas raise
the following assignment of errors:
I negotiator. The undisputed facts
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY AS
PRINCIPALS OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.[113]
Moreover, in their supplemental
brief,[114] Jimboy and Bobby Bringas
additionally raise the assignment of
errors that: (a) The Court of Appeals
gravely erred in finding them guilty
despite the prosecutions failure to
prove it beyond reasonable doubt;
and, (b) that they conspired with the
other perpetrators.[115]
The foregoing issues or assignment
of errors can actually be reduced
and summarized as follows: first, on
the credibility of the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses in general
and, in particular, of Maricel Hipos
and of the state witness Rosales;
and, second, on the finding of
conspiracy.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellants strongly assert
that Maricel Hipos and state witness
Rosales only made up their
respective testimonies relative to
how the kidnapping transpired.
There is no dispute that Patrick
Teng was kidnapped. It is admitted
by the accused that Patrick Teng
was brought to Pampanga on the
day he was abducted and was
released shortly before midnight the
next day or on December 15,
1994. There is likewise no dispute
that a PhP 2.5 million ransom was
raised by the Teng family on
December 15, 1994 and was handed
to Chung in the evening of the same
day for the payment and release of
Patrick Teng as instructed by the
also show that Chung was
apprehended by the PACC shortly
after midnight or very early on
December 16, 1994; while Jimboy
Bringas and Navarro were
apprehended at past 1:00 p.m.
on December 16, 1994; and the
other accused were apprehended in
Pampanga late afternoon and early
evening on December 16, 1994.
Both courts a quo found all accused
guilty beyond reasonable for the
crime of carnapping and
kidnapping. With the instant appeal,
what remains to be resolved is the
respective criminal liability or lack
thereof of accused-appellants
Navarro, Chung, Jimboy and Bobby
Bringas. An assiduous review of the
records at hand, particularly the
testimonies of both prosecution and
defense witnesses, however,
constrains this Court to affirm the
appellate courts decision and
resolution affirming their conviction
except that of Bobby Bringas.
Prosecution Witnesses More
Credible
First. The testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Maricel
Hipos and Eric Teng were
straightforward, cohesive, positive
and credible. More so when they are
corroborated on material points by
the testimonies of both prosecution
and defense witnesses. Besides,
there is no showing that Maricel
Hipos and Eric Teng had any motive
to falsely testify against the
accused. As a rule, absent any
evidence showing any reason or
motive for prosecution witnesses to
perjure, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists,
and their testimonies are thus
worthy of full faith and credit.[116]
The testimony of Maricel was
initially assailed by accused-
appellant Sulayao who testified that
when the kidnapping was carried
out they did not use any weapon or
handgun, that they were let into the
house voluntarily by Maricel and
that it was Rosales who took Patrick
Teng without a struggle. This
assertion was uniformly shared by
Pajarillo, Calaguas and
Ross. However, aside from their
mere assertion, they did not present
any evidence supporting such
contention.
The testimony of Maricel on what
occurred is corroborated by the
testimony of the accused that the
gift Calaguas was holding did not fit
the aperture in the gate. Maricel
never intended them to enter the
Tengs premises but was merely
constrained to open the gate due to
the ruse adopted by the accused.
Very telling are the testimonies of
Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross asserting
that they did not see Maricel. This is
incredulous for Maricel positively
identified them as among the
companions of Rosales during the
extra-judicial line-up conducted by
the PACC in Camp Crame. Aside
from Calaguas, Maricel picked out
Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross from a
line-up of about 15 men. During her
testimony in open court, she again
positively identified them. If indeed
they did not meet her, Maricel could
not have identified them as among
the companions of Rosales and
Calaguas.
Moreover, the mere denials of
Calaguas, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross
cannot prevail over the positive
assertion of Maricel that she was
with Sweeney, the sister of Eric
Teng, and two other helpers, Dina
and Melanie, who were the yayas of
Patrick and Mikee. Pajarillo,
Sulayao, Calaguas and Ross want the
Court to believe that it was only
Maricel who was in the house of Eric
Teng or that aside from her there
was nobody in the first floor of Eric
Tengs house when Rosales
supposedly brought down Patrick
Teng.
Further, the testimony of Maricel is
not only credible but cohesive as
well considering the events that
transpired from the phone call
received at around 11:30 a.m. to the
arrival of the kidnappers at 1:30
p.m., the time Dina was able to find
scissors to cut their bindings and
being freed therefrom and calling
Kimbol, who rushed to Erics place;
then Kimbol calling Eric at around
2:30 p.m. with the latter rushing
home. The testimony of Eric would
show how he received the call from
his brother, his rushing home and
receiving the first call from the
negotiator [kidnappers] at
around 3:10 p.m.
As to the use of violence and
intimidation, it is abundantly clear
from Maricels testimony that the
accused indeed used guns to
threaten and intimidate them. At the
very least, Maricel positively
identified Calaguas as the one
holding the gift and poking her with
a gun when she opened the gate,
and her being herded together with
Sweeney and the other house
helpers to the childrens room at the
second floor. The use of guns to
threaten and intimidate is not only
plausible but well nigh credible
considering the crime
involved. Besides, it must be noted
that during the press conference
on December 17, 1994, caught on
camera and shown during the
evening news on the same day was
Pajarillo uttering words to the effect
that Chung provided them with a .45
caliber and a .38 caliber handguns.
It must be noted that there is no
showing that Maricel simply made
up the details of her testimony or
that she was coached. Both courts a
quo found her testimony credible,
cohesive and straightforward. We
find no cogent reason to substitute
the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the appellate
court. Besides, the trial court is in
the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of their unique
opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand, and to note
their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grueling
examinationsignificant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses, in the process of
unearthing the truth.[117]
Furthermore, the testimony of Eric
supplies what transpired after he
received the call from his brother
Kimbol on December 14, 1994 until
the morning of December 17, 1994
when the PACC held a press
conference presenting the alleged
kidnappers and his being able to
tape segments of the evening news
showing footages of the press
conference. His testimony is
likewise straightforward, cohesive
and credible, which was not at all
rebutted by the defense.
Second. The testimony of state
witness Rosales was likewise
straightforward, cohesive and
credible. And it was likewise
corroborated on some material
points by the officers of the PACC
Task Force Habagat.
Rosales was among the six arrested
on December 16, 1994 in
Pampanga. Jimboy Bringas
pinpointed them to PACC operatives
led by Police Chief Inspector
Tucay. He was not included in the
two Informations since he was
utilized as a state witness and
placed under the witness protection
program of the government. It must
be noted that prosecutorial powers
include the discretion of granting
immunity to an accused in exchange
for testimony against another.
[118]
 And the fact that an individual
had not been previously charged or
included in an Information does not
prevent the prosecution from
utilizing said person as a witness.[119]
In People v. Bohol, the Court held
that the fact that an accused has
been discharged as a state witness
and was no longer prosecuted for
the crime charged does not render
his testimony incredible or lessen its
probative weight.[120]
The testimony of Rosales was not
rebutted by the accused. His
narration of the events transpiring
from December 7 to 13, 1994
leading up to the actual kidnapping
on December 14, 1994 cohesively
showed the specific roles of the
other accused relative to the instant
crime. Although the Court believes
that he had a greater role than what
he testified to as being merely
coerced. Be that as it may, it would
not change the fact that in his
participation of the crime, he knew
and clearly pointed out the specific
roles of the accused in the
conspiracy and actual execution of
the kidnapping and the carnapping.
The testimonies of police officers
from the PACC corroborated the
transfer of the Patrick to Chung at
around or shortly before midnight
of December 15, 1994 in the parking
lot of Philippine Westin Plaza.
It bears stressing that prosecution
witnesses Maricel Hipos, Eric Teng
and state witness Jason Rosales
never wavered in their testimonies
under rigorous cross-examination
by the various counsels
representing the accused during
trial. The same holds true with the
testimonies of the PACC police
officers.
In fine, when the credibility of
witnesses is in issue, the trial courts
assessment is accorded great weight
unless it is shown that it has
overlooked a certain fact or
circumstance of weight which the
lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated
and which, if properly considered,
would alter the results of the case.
[121]
 In the instant case, we find no
fact or circumstance of substance
overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated by the courts a quo,
except as to that of Bobby Bringas.
Third. The prosecution witnesses
PACC police officers gave clear,
credible and straightforward
testimonies on what transpired on
their end regarding the
kidnapping: their monitoring of the
negotiation, the surveillance of
Chung and the arrest of the
accused. Their testimonies were not
at all rebutted. In fact, as aptly
narrated by Police Chief Inspector
Tucay, accused-appellants Chung
and Navarro could not deny seeing
each other in the evening of
December 15, 1994 in the vicinity of
their houses in Paco, their
subsequent meeting at the Bowling
Inn and at the Philippine Westin
Plaza. After his arrest in the house of
Eric Teng, Chung supplied to the
PACC the names and identities of
Jimboy Bringas and Navarro which
led to their arrest at past 1 p.m. on
December 16, 1994 in Malate. And,
after his arrest, Jimboy Bringas in
turn pinpointed to the PACC
operatives led by Police Chief
Inspector Tucay the other accused
who were arrested in Pampanga late
in the afternoon and early evening
of December 16, 1994.
Fourth. From the defense
testimonies of Jimboy Bringas, Ross,
Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguasupon
the backdrop of the testimonies of
prosecution witnessesthey
collectively point to Chung and
Navarro as the brains of the
kidnapping. Pajarillo, however,
asserted that his co-accused
Navarro is not the same person as
the mastermind Navarro. This
assertion, however, fails vis--vis the
testimony of Rosales and other
accused who testified that Navarro
worked closely with Chung.
Second Core Issue: Presence of
Conspiracy
Kidnapping for ransom proven
beyond reasonable doubt
The crime of Kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, under Art.
267[122] of the RPC, has the following
elements:
(1) the offender is a private
individual; not either of the parents
of the victim or a public officer who
has a duty under the law to detain a
person;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another,
or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts
for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating
public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are
made or
(d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a
public official.[123]
It must be noted that when the
victim is a minor and the accused is
any of the parents, the crime
is Inducing a minor to abandon his
home defined and penalized under
the second paragraph of Art. 271 of
the RPC. While if it is a public officer
who has a duty under the law to
detain a person but detains said
person without any legal ground is
liable for Arbitrary detention defined
and penalized under Art. 124 of the
RPC.
 
The essence of the crime of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation
of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the
accused to effect the same.
[124]
 Moreover, if the victim is a
minor, or the victim is kidnapped
and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention becomes
inconsequential.[125] Ransom means
money, price or consideration paid
or demanded for the redemption of
a captured person that will release
him from captivity.[126]
In the instant case, all the elements
of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused are
all private individuals. The
kidnapping of Patrick Teng, then
three years old, a minor is
undisputed. That ransom was
demanded and paid is
established. The only issue to be
resolved is whether the accused are
equally guilty of kidnapping for
ransom having conspired with each
other.
Duly-Proven Conspiracy
Accused-appellants uniformly assail
the court a quos findings of
conspiracy in the commission of the
kidnapping for ransom of Patrick
Teng. Our assiduous review of the
records of the case shows the
presence of conspiracy. However,
we fail to appreciate the direct
participation of Bobby Bringas in
the conspiracy. Thus, accused-
appellants Jimboy Bringas, Chung
and Navarro together with the other
accused Pajarillo, Sulayao, Ross and
Calaguas are equally guilty and
liable for the crime charged for
having conspired to commit and did
commit kidnapping for ransom of
Patrick.
Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it. It
may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting
of acts, words or conduct of the
alleged conspirators before, during
and after the commission of the
felony to achieve a common design
or purpose.[127]
 
Proof of the agreement need not
rest on direct evidence, as the same
may be inferred from the conduct of
the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the
offense. Corollarily, it is not
necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered
into an explicit agreement setting
out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out.
[128]
To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused
must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicitymere
presence when the transaction was
made does not necessarily lead to an
inference of concurrence with the
criminal design to commit the crime.
[129]
 Moreover, the same degree of
proof necessary to prove the crime
is required to support a finding of
criminal conspiracy.[130]
The testimony of state witness
Rosales is the lynchpin by which the
conspiracy is proven. Jimboy
Bringas brought together Rosales,
Calaguas and Sulayao from
Pampanga, while Rosales brought in
Ross and Pajarillo from
Laguna. They thus formed the team,
although Jimboy Bringas did not join
the team but was in on the sharing
of the ransom. Together with Chung,
Navarro and two others (Glenn
Sangalang and Ricky Castillo), they
proceeded to Erics house on
December 14, 1994 and kidnapped
Patrick. Verily, a conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a
fellow criminal than by any other
method.[131]
Together with Ricky Castillo and
Rosales, accused Ross, Pajarillo,
Sulayao and Calaguas actively partic
ipated in the kidnapping. Ross drove
one of the cars. Pajarillo, Sulayao
and Calaguas entered the house
with Rosales. Calaguas poked a gun
at Maricel. Pajarillo gagged and
bound Maricel. The others herded
the house helpers, the kids and
Sweeney to the second floor. They
took Patrick after binding everyone
except Mikee Teng. Then they
brought Patrick to Pampanga. In all,
they carried out a concerted plan of
kidnapping and detaining Patrick
until they were given word to bring
back the child to Manila which they
did the very next day shortly before
midnight at the Philippine Westin
Plaza.
Then they went back to Pampanga,
apparently to await their share of
the ransom money. Clearly, Ross
testimony that he is employed as a
driver who can earn so much as
PhP5,000 in a day and can ill afford
to be absent is belied by his
accompanying the others to
Pampanga after they delivered
Patrick Teng to Chung on December
15, 1994 shortly before
midnight. And he continued to stay
in Pampanga with the others until
his arrest on December 16, 1994
while on a drinking spree. In all, he
was absent from work from the
14th until the 16th of December 1994.
Jimboy Bringas evidently
participated in the planning and the
subsequent execution of the
conspiracy by bringing in Calaguas
and Sulayao from
Pampanga. Together with them, he
met with Chung and Navarro. And
together with Rosales he went to
Laguna to fetch Pajarillo and
Ross. In effect, he recruited or
brought in the team that would
carry out the kidnapping. He knows
the other accused and was the one
who went with the PACC team led
by Police Chief Inspector Tucay to
Pampanga in the late afternoon of
December 16, 1994 and identified
them to be arrested.
Rosales actuations, first in ringing
the doorbell at the gate and urging
Maricel to open it and in asking for
the car key and taking the Toyota
Corolla of Eric do not tend to show
that he was merely coerced. This is,
however, academic considering his
turning state witness.
Accused-appellant Navarros
assertion that he was only
implicated fails to persuade. His
direct involvement in the conspiracy
is clearly shown in that: (1) the
testimony of Rosales shows
Navarros involvement with Chung;
(2) the unanimous testimonies of
Calaguas, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross
to the effect that Navarro was
together with Chung in their
meetings before the kidnapping and
Navarro was with them when they
went to Eric Tengs place on
December 14, 1994; (3) Navarros
admission caught on camera during
the December 17, 1994 press
conference that he made calls to
negotiate the ransom which bolsters
Erics testimony that he recognized
the voice of Navarro as the
negotiator calling his residence; (4)
Navarro received PhP100,000 from
Chung in the evening of December
15, 1994 at the Bowling Inn; (5)
Navarro was with Chung when
Patrick Teng was delivered by the
other accused in the parking lot of
Philippine Westin Plaza.
Similarly, accused-appellant Chungs
assertion that he was only
implicated flies from logic given that
not only Rosales pinned him as the
mastermind but that the other
accused testified to the effect that
together with Navarro he
orchestrated the kidnapping. The
foregoing clearly shows his
involvement: (1) per Pajarillos
admission during the December 17,
1994 press conference, Chung
provided the guns; (2) Chungs
admission to Eric through a phone
call he made at noon on December
16, 1994 asking pardon and
forgiveness; (3) Chung gave
misleading information to Eric
about his being intercepted when he
was supposed to deliver the ransom
money; (4) Chung proceeded to his
parents place in Paco and gave
PhP50,000 from the ransom money
to his mother; (5) Chung left the
remaining PhP2.35 million in his
parents place without telling Eric
about it; (6) Chung took Patrick
from the other accused at the
parking lot of Philippine Westin
Plaza shortly before midnight of
December 15, 1994 without paying
the ransom; (7) Chung brought
Patrick back home without telling
Eric upon their arrival about the
ransom money.
Where the acts of the accused
collectively and individually
demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the
accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident, and all the perpetrators will
be liable as principals.[132]
Bobby Bringas participation
either as accomplice or as co-
conspirator not established
As to Bobby Bringas, it is
undisputed that he did not
participate in the actual
kidnapping. He was in Pampanga
from December 10, 1994 until he
was arrested together with the
others on December 16, 1994. It
may be true that the other accused
brought Patrick to Bobby Bringas
place but it was not shown that
Bobby Bringas took care of Patrick
as the group moved to different
places. It was neither clearly shown
that Bobby Bringas recruited the
other accused to carry out the
kidnapping. It was only Rosales
testimony that Bobby Bringas asked
him to drive. Aside from that, the
fact alone that the other accused
went to his place does not point to
his direct involvement in the
conspiracy considering that he
knows them. He worked as driver
for the mother of Rosales and
Pajarillo is his kumpare. There is
therefore no clear and convincing
evidence of Bobby Bringas direct
involvement either in the
kidnapping of Patrick or in the
conspiracy to its commission.
In the absence of evidence showing
the direct participation of the
accused in the commission of the
crime, conspiracy must be
established by clear and convincing
evidence in order to convict the
accused.[133] Given our observation
that the involvement of Rosales was
not merely of a person under
coercion, there is reasonable doubt
as to Bobby Bringas involvement for
it was Jimboy Bringas who brought
or recruited Sulayao and Calaguas
from Pampanga. There is therefore a
palpable reasonable doubt of the
existence of conspiracy on the part
of Bobby Bringas. The presence of
reasonable doubt as to the existence
of conspiracy suffices to negate not
only the participation of the accused
in the commission of the offense as
principal but also, in the absence of
proof implicating the accused as
accessory or accomplice, the
criminal liability of the accused.
[134]
 Consequently, Bobby Bringas
must be acquitted from the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
The penalty for kidnapping for
ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC,
as amended, would have been the
supreme penalty of death. However,
the passage of RA 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty has banned the death
penalty and reduced all death
sentences to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for
parole.[135]
Award of damages modified
Anent the award of damages, we
find proper the award of actual
damages against Navarro in the
amount of PhP 100,000 with legal
interest of 12% from December 15,
1994 until fully paid. We, however,
find the award of PhP 5 million as
moral damages and PhP 2 million as
exemplary damages to be exorbitant
and not in accord with
jurisprudence.
In line with current jurisprudence,
[136]
 an award of PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity is proper. An award of
PhP 200,000 as moral damages is
likewise proper considering the
minority of Patrick.[137] Moreover,
when the crime of kidnapping is
attended by a demand for ransom,
by way of example or correction,
PhP 100,000 exemplary damages is
also proper.[138]
With the affirmance of the
conviction of accused appellants
Jimboy Bringas, Navarro and Chung,
they are jointly and severally liable
together with Ross, Pajarillo,
Sulayao and Calaguas for the
payment of the damages awarded.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeals of
accused-appellants Christopher
Bringas, John Robert Navarro and
Eden Sy Chung are DENIED; while
the appeal of accused-appellant
Bryan Bringas is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the January
3, 2006 Decision and June 6, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICA
TION insofar as the amount of the
damages awarded and the acquittal
of Bryan Bringas. As modified, the
dispositive portion of the March 26,
1999 Joint Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 258
in Paraaque City, pertaining to
Criminal Case No. 95-137,
for Kidnapping for Ransom, shall
read:
In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined
and penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act no. 7659, finding
accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y
Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y
Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo;
ROGER CALAGUAS y Jimenez; and
EDEN SY CHUNG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346.
The instant criminal charge is
DISMISSED as to accused ERICSON
PAJARILLO y Baser and EDGARDO
SULAYAO y Petilla on account of
their death pursuant to Article 89, 1
of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused JOHN ROBERT
NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed
to pay Eric Teng the sum of
PhP100,000.00 as actual damages
with interest thereon at the legal
rate of 12% from December 15,
1994 until fully paid.
The accused CHRISTOPHER
BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN ROBERT
NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y
Picardo; ROGER CALAGUAS y
Jimenez; ERICSON PAJARILLO y
Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla
and EDEN SY CHUNG are directed to
pay Eric Teng jointly and severally
the amount of PhP50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, PhP200,000.00 as moral
damages; and PhP100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.
Accused BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA
is hereby ACQUITTED for
reasonable doubt as to his
involvement.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18,
1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  into the water, whereupon, the said
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM
KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-
appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the
decision of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D.
Rasul as ponente, imposing the
death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the
aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,
OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI
were accused of qualified piracy
with triple murder and frustrated
murder said to have been
committed according to the
information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of
July, 1979, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of
Lantawan, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above named
accused, being strangers and
without lawful authority, armed
with firearms and taking advantage
of their superior strength,
conspiring and confederating
together, aiding and assisting one
with the other, with intent to gain
and by the use of violence or
intimidation against persons and
force upon things, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, fire their guns into the
air and stop the pumpboat wherein
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio
de Guzman were riding, traveling at
that time from the island of Baluk-
Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the
said pumpboat and take, steal and
carry away all their cash money,
wrist watches, stereo sets,
merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total
amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine
Currency; that the said accused, on
the occasion of the crime herein
above-described, taking advantage
that the said victims were at their
mercy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, ordered them to jump
accused, fired their guns at them
which caused the death of Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio
de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the
accused have performed all the acts
of execution which would have
produced the crime of Qualified
Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but
which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said
Antonio de Guzman was able to
swim to the shore and hid himself,
and due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim,
Antonio de Guzman which
prevented his death. (Expediente,
pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued
against all of the accused but only
Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam
Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered
a decision with the following
dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore
going considerations, this Court
finds the accused Omar-kayam
Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple
Murder and Frustrated Murder as
defined and penalized under the
provision of Presidential Decree No.
532, and hereby sentences each one
of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH. However,
considering the provision of Section
106 of the Code of Mindanao and
Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused who
are members of the cultural
minorities, under a regime of so
called compassionate society, a
commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram
make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-
KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH
HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is
as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman
engaged in selling dry goods at the
Larmitan Public Market, in the
province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On
July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979,
Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen,
Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de
Guzman received goods from his
store consisting of mosquito nets,
blankets, wrist watch sets and
stereophono with total value of
P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn).
The goods were received under an
agreement that they would be sold
by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value
of said goods to Aurea and keep part
of the profits for themselves.
However these people neither paid
the value of the goods to Aurea nor
returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7,
tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was
informed by Antonio de Guzman
that his group was held up near
Baluk- Baluk Island and that his
companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn).
On July 16, 1979, the bodies of
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen
and Anastacio de Guzman were
brought by the PC seaborne patrol
to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29,
tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman
survived the incident that caused
the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979,
Antonio de Guzman together with
his friends who were also travelling
merchants like him, were on their
way to Pilas Island, Province of
Basilan, to sell the goods they
received from Alberto Aurea. The
goods they brought with them had a
total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37,
tsn). They left for Pilas Island at
2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner
and slept that night in the house of
Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island
(pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de
Guzman's group, together with
Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started
selling their goods, They were able
to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On
July 12, 1979, the group, again
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh,
went to sell their goods at another
place, Sangbay, where they sold
goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
again slept at Kiram's house.
However that night Kiram did not
sleep in his house, and upon inquiry
the following day when Antonio de
Guzman saw him, Kiram told the
former that he slept at the house of
Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group
of Antonio de Guzman went to
Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by
Kiram. They were able to sell goods
worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn).
They returned to Pilas Island for the
night but Kiram did not sleep with
them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the
group again went to Baluk-Baluk
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh
(pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the
pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and
Siyoh were at that time armed with
'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-
Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and upon arrival at the
place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead
of the group went to a house about
15 meters away from the place
where the group was selling its
goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and
Siyoh were seen by the group
talking with two persons whose
faces the group saw but could not
recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After
selling their goods, the members of
the group, together with Kiram and
Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas
Island. They rode on a pumpboat
where Siyoh positioned himself at
the front while Kiram operated the
engine. On the way to Pilas Island,
Antonio de Guzman saw another
pumpboat painted red and green
about 200 meters away from their
pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly
after" Kiram turned off the engine of
their pumpboat. Thereafter two
shots were fired from the other
pumpboat as it moved towards
them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were
two persons on the other pumpboat
who were armed with armantes. De
Guzman recognized them to be the
same persons he saw Kiram
conversing with in a house at Baluk-
Baluk Island. When the boat came
close to them, Kiram threw a rope to
the other pumpboat which towed de
Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja
Island. On the way to Mataja Island,
Antonio de Guzman and his
companions were divested of their
money and their goods by Kiram
(pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram
and his companions ordered the
group of de Guzman to undress.
Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio
de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With
everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It
was good to kill all of you'. After that
remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen
while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de
Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped
into the water. As he was swimming
away from the pumpboat, the two
companions of Kiram fired at him,
injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn).
But he was able to reach a mangrove
where he stayed till nightfall. When
he left the mangrove, he saw the
dead bodies of Anastacio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo
de Castro. He was picked up by a
fishing boat and brought to the
Philippine Army station at Maluso
where he received first aid
treatment. Later he was brought to
the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68,
tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for
the dead bodies of his companions
at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh
and Kiram. He pointed them out to
the PC and the two were arrested
before they could run. When
arrested, Kiram was wearing the
pants he took from de Guzman and
de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas
at the Provincial Jail to get back his
pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically
examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial
Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and
findings showed: 'gunshot wound,
scapular area, bilateral, tangenital'
(Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136,
tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined
the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro
and Danilo Hiolen and issued the
corresponding death certificates
(Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp.
137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp.
5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone
assignment of error, the issue is the
credibility of witnesses. Who should
be believed Antonio de Guzman who
was the lone prosecution eye-
witness or Siyoh and Kiram the
accused-appellants who claims that
they were also the victims of the
crime? The trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and how
they testified assigned credibility to
the former and an examination of
the record does not reveal any fact
or circumstance of weight and
influence which was overlooked or
the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a
reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the
following claims of the appellants
are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they
could have easily robbed their
victims at the Kiram house or on any
of the occasions when they were
travelling together. Suffice it to say
that robbing the victims at Kiram's
house would make Kiram and his
family immediately suspect and
robbing the victims before they had
sold all their goods would be
premature. However, robbing and
killing the victims while at sea and
after they had sold all their goods
was both timely and provided safety
from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately
reported the incident to the PC. The
record does not support this
assertion. For as the prosecution
stated: "It is of important
consequence to mention that the
witness presented by the defense
are all from Pilas Island and friends
of the accused. They claimed to be
members of retrieving team for the
dead bodies but no PC soldiers were
ever presented to attest this fact.
The defense may counter why the
prosecution also failed to present
the Maluso Police Daily Event book?
This matter has been brought by
Antonio not to the attention of the
PC or Police but to an army
detachment. The Army is known to
have no docket book, so why take
the pain in locating the army
soldiers with whom the report was
made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And
Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is
puzzled, assuming the version of the
defense to be true, why the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman as
having been allegedly helped by the
accused testified against them.
Indeed, no evidence was presented
and nothing can be inferred from
the evidence of the defense so far
presented showing reason why the
lone survivor should pervert the
truth or fabricate or manufacture
such heinous crime as qualified
piracy with triple murders and
frustrated murder? The point which
makes us doubt the version of the
defense is the role taken by the PC
to whom the report was allegedly
made by the accused immediately
after the commission of the offense.
Instead of helping the accused, the
PC law enforcement agency in
Isabela, perhaps not crediting the
report of the accused or believing in
the version of the report made by
the lone survivor Antonio de
Guzman, acted consistently with the
latter's report and placed the
accused under detention for
investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-
128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de
Guzman, wife of the deceased
Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva
de Castro, wife of the deceased
Rodolfo de Castro, state that
Antonio de Guzman informed them
shortly after the incident that their
husbands were killed by the
companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The
thrust of the appellants' claim,
therefore, is that Namli Indanan and
Andaw Jamahali were the killers and
not the former. But this claim is
baseless in the face of the proven
conspiracy among the accused for as
Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as
alleged in the information is
sufficiently proved in this case. In
fact the following facts appear to
have been established to show
clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14,
1979, while peddling, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman noticed
that near the window of a
dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed
strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk
Island; B) When the pumpboat was
chased and overtaken, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman recognized
their captors to be the same two (2)
armed strangers to whom the two
accused talked in Baluk- Baluk
Island near the dilapidated house;
C) The two accused, without order
from the two armed strangers
transferred the unsold goods to the
captors' banca; D) That Tony de
Guzman and companion peddlers
were divested of their jewelries and
cash and undressed while the two
accused remained unharmed or not
molested. These concerted actions
on their part prove conspiracy and
make them equally liable for the
same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16
SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA
130). The convergence of the will of
the conspirators in the scheming
and execution of the crime amply
justifies the imputation of all of
them the act of any of them (People
vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp.
128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence
Anastacio de Guzman was killed
together with Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen because his remains
were never recovered. There is no
reason to suppose that Anastacio de
Guzman is still alive or that he died
in a manner different from his
companions. The incident took place
on July 14, 1979 and when the trial
court decided the case on June 8,
1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still
missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers
qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, as a
special complex crime punishable
by death regardless of the number
of victims.
5. That the death certificates are
vague as to the nature of the injuries
sustained by the victims; were they
hacked wounds or gunshot wounds?
The cause of death stated for
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen
is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked
wounds, possible gunshot wounds."
(Exhs. D and E.) The cause is
consistent with the testimony of
Antonio de Guzman that the victims
were hacked; that the appellants
were armed with "barongs" while
Indanan and Jamahali were armed
with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision
under review to be in accord with
both the facts and the law, it is
affirmed with the following
modifications: (a) for lack of
necessary votes the penalty
imposed shall be reclusion perpetua;
and (b) each of the appellants shall
pay in solidum to the heirs of each of
the deceased indemnity in the
amount of P30,000.00. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela
Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death
sentence.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26,
1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS,
JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.
BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,  subalterns, subordinates, substitute
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF
LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET
AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E.
Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto
Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar
Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General
respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for
certiorari prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory
injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City],
under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ
of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents, "particularly the
Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants,
or successors" be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in
Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos,
Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21,
1983, respondents were required to
answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset
to July 7, 1983, on motion of the
for Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the
Solicitor General, while opposing
petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will
not use the aforementioned articles
as evidence in the aforementioned
case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With
this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court
dismiss the petition on the ground
that petitioners had come to this
Court without having previously
sought the quashal of the search
warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the
warrants before this Court, should
have filed a motion to quash said
warrants in the court that issued
them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of
the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to
mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised
in Channel 7 and widely publicized
in all metropolitan dailies. The
existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to
suspend its rules. In the words of
the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos
in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court]
to suspend its rules or to except a
particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice
require it...".
Respondents likewise urge
dismissal of the petition on ground
of laches. Considerable stress is laid
on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December
7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only
on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6]
months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert
it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated
Reply, explained the reason for the
delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
Respondents should not find fault,
as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the
Petition was filed on June 16, 1983,
more than half a year after the
petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given
petitioners no other choice. If they
had waited this long to bring their
case to court, it was because they
tried at first to exhaust other
remedies. The events of the past
eleven fill years had taught them
that everything in this country, from
release of public funds to release of
detained persons from custody, has
become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could,
petitioners, upon suggestion of
persons close to the President, like
Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to
President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return
at least of the printing equipment
and vehicles. And after such a letter
had been sent, through Col. Balbino
V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal
Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter
would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5]
months, petitioners finally decided
to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]
Although the reason given by
petitioners may not be flattering to
our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them
for an error in judgment. On the
contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite
evidently negate the presumption
that they had abandoned their right
to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the
charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory
that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
had used and marked as evidence
some of the seized documents in
Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the
validity of the search warrants. We
do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents
lawfully belong to petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever
he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used
them as evidence does not and
cannot in any way affect the validity
or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have
been advanced by petitioners to
nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge
for his alleged failure to conduct an
examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the
above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court . 6 This
objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as
petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had
indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla
and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and
No. 20- 82[b] were used to search
two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, respectively.
Objection is interposed to the
execution of Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] at the latter address on the
ground that the two search
warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
was allegedly keeping and
concealing the articles listed therein,
i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City. This assertion is based
on that portion of Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are
being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885
as amended and he is keeping and
concealing the same at 19 Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a
typographical error. Precisely, two
search warrants were applied for
and issued because the purpose and
intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd
and illogical for respondent judge to
have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides,
the addresses of the places sought to
be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it
was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the
search warrants, the ambiguity that
might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more
apparent than real. The fact is that
the place for which Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was
728 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which
address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same
place that respondent judge had in
mind when he issued Warrant No.
20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a
search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been
held "that the executing officer's
prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant.
This would seem to be especially
true where the executing officer is
the affiant on whose affidavit the
warrant had issued, and when he
knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building
described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing
officer may look to the affidavit in
the official court file to resolve an
ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to
annul the search warrants is the fact
that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles b belonging to his co-
petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media
Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, enumerates the personal
properties that may be seized under
a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be
seized. — A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled
and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an
offense.
The above rule does not require that
the property to be seized should be
owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is directed. It
may or may not be owned by him. In
fact, under subsection [b] of the
above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is
stolen property. Necessarily, stolen
property must be owned by one
other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of
the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and
it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is
directed has control or possession
of the property sought to be seized,
as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the
articles and property seized under
the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in
petitioners' assertion that real
properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article
415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or
implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works"
are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not
so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not
claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being
the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants
were issued by respondent judge
upon application of Col. Rolando N.
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the
P.C. Metrocom.10 The application
was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez
and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of
the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla
which conducted a surveillance of
the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search
warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners,
however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in
accordance with Section 3, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis
impressed with merit. Probable
cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for
is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus,
the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents
which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause.
Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it
was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the
determination of probable cause is
the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez
and Pedro U. Tango, "that the
evidence gathered and collated by
our unit clearly shows that the
premises above- mentioned and the
articles and things above-described
were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities
in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations
such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and
April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution
requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or
his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. In Alvarez
v. Court of First Instance, 15 this
Court ruled that "the oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint
affidavit filed before respondent
judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court
in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the
search warrants under
consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The
search warrants describe the
articles sought to be seized in this
wise:
1] All printing equipment,
paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
(equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording
equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE
FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents communication, letters
and facsimile of prints related to the
"WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents,
pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the
subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the
distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow
with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white
with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No.
NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored
white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck
with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the
search warrant which authorized
the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in
Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions
to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC
13-3703 or otherwise" have been
held too general, and that portion of
a search warrant which authorized
the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec.
54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with
the crime of conspiracy]" was held
to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to
be seized under the search warrants
in question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S.
Supreme Courts calls to mind a
notable chapter in English history:
the era of disaccord between the
Tudor Government and the English
Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to
search where they pleased in order
to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan Reference herein to
such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises
searched were the business and
printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of
previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes
a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and
even militant press is essential for
the political enlightenment and
growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the
continued sealing of the printing
machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes
"the sequestration of the property of
any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities
against the government and its duly
constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules
and regulations as may be issued by
the Secretary of National Defense."
It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of
any implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982
issue of the Daily Express, it was
reported that no less than President
Marcos himself denied the request
of the military authorities to
sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982.
Thus:
The President denied a request flied
by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM
newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister
Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders,
government agents went to the We
Forum offices in Quezon City and
took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the
premises.
Cendañ a said that because of the
denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of
the owners, subject to the discretion
of the court. 19
That the property seized on
December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by
the reply of then Foreign Minister
Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall
addressed to President Marcos,
expressing alarm over the "WE
FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo
stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President
Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities
to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the
equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and
20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and
are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory
injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and
all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to
petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.