Hegeler Institute

IBN SINA AVICENNA AND MALCOLM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Author(s): Parviz Morewedge
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Monist, Vol. 54, No. 2, The Philosophic Proofs for God's Existence—I (April, 1970),
pp. 234-249
Published by: Hegeler Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902176 .
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 IBN SINA AVICENNA AND MALCOLM AND
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
It has generally been assumed that Anselm was the originator of
the ontological argument. Notwithstanding the fact that it has
received much criticism, Malcolm defends its so-called second ver
sion. In this paper we shall examine some features of ibn Sina's
notion of the Necessary Existent which show (1) that prior to
Anselm, ibn Sina formulated a version of this argument which
corresponds in some senses to Malcolm's version, and (2) that a
close examination of ibn Sina's peculiar version enables us to criti
cize Malcolm's version as it has not been done heretofore.
Our chief task is to clarify those features of ibn Sina's contribu
tion to the analysis of the so-called "ontological argument" which
are of significance to contemporary philosophical analysis. The
claim has been advanced that there are two distinct versions of this
argument which was supposedly first formulated by Anselm.1 We
shall mention three of its features which are relevant to our
major
analysis, (a) The argument is said to be "a priori" and "existential"
in the sense that the primary subject of an essential premise of both
versions of this argument is supposedly some a priori truth about
the concept of 'the most perfect being* or the 'Necessary Being*.
An attempt is made by its defenders to establish the Necessary
so
Being as an actual existent.2 (b) An essential feature of the
called first version of this argument specifies that the existence of
an individual
theNecessary Existent (i.e., the existence of existent)
is deduced from the concept of 'the most perfect being* and from
some additional assumption, such as 'it is better to be than not to

1Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's in The

Ontological Arguments," Ontological
Argument, ed. Alvin Plantinga (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 136. (Herein
after all references to The Ontological Argument, edited by Alvin Plantinga, will
be cited as OA and will be preceded name of the individual
by the contributor).
"I believe that in Anselm 'sProslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different
of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another ..."
pieces
2 Richard
Taylor, "Introduction," in OA, p. vii.
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 235
be1.3 (c) In the second version of this argument the Necessary
Existent Itself is of primary importance. In this version, which will
be described in greater detail, knowledge of the existence of the
Necessary Existent is allegedly a priori and is obtained by means of
examining the nature of the Necessary Existent Itself. To justify Its
existence, it is claimed, one needs no criterion or premise, such as
'being is a predicate*. To begin with, let us illustrate why the first
version of this argument cannot be formulated within ibn Sina's
system.

1. Ibn Sina's "Essence-existence" Distinction and theFirst Version of

the Ontological Argument

Historically, the first version has undergone criticism frommany

sides. Kant, for instance, has objected to the so-called "existence is a
predicate" thesis which Malcolm and others have accepted as suffi
cient disproof of the first version of the argument.4 In his criticism
of Collingwood's works Ryle comments on this argument and men
tions the relation of Kant's criticism to the "essence-existence"
distinction.5 Let us accordingly examine those features of ibn Sina's
"essence-existence" distinction which preclude the formulation of
the first version of the ontological argument in his metaphysical
system. It should be noted that ibn Sina not only formulated the
"essence-existence" distinction explicitly, but was also the first to
discuss it extensively.6 In his presentation of the argument he

3Malcolm, OA, p. 142. "Previously I rejected existence as a perfection. Anselm is

maintaining in the remarks last quoted, not that existence is a perfection, but that
the logical impossibility of non-existence is a perfection. In other words, necessary
existence is a perfection. His first ontological proof uses the principle that a thing
is greater if it exists than if it does not exist. His second proof employs the
different principle that a thing is greater if it exists than if it does not necessarily
exist."
4Malcolm, OA, 140.
p.
5Gilbert "Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological in The Many
Ryle, Argument,"
faced Argument, ed. J. Hick (New York: MacMillan, 1967), p. 252.
6A. M. Goichon de Vessence et de l'existence d'apr?s
[La Distinction Ibn Sina

(Avicenn?) (Paris: Descl?e de Brouwer, 1937)] and N. Rescher [Studies in the

History of Arabie Logic (Pittsburgh, 1936), pp. 39-42.] claim to have found this
distinction in Farabi, ibn Sina's immediate predecessor, and also in Aristotle's
PosteriorAnalytics 92b3-18. But cf. E. A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham
York: Russell & Russell, 1965) who agrees with Ockham that Aristotle does
(New
236 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

assigns all concepts such as general terms like 'humanity* (an

instance of the so-called secondary substances jawhar-i??m) to the
class of 'essences'. (He resorts to mahiyya, zat, and hagtga to
express 'essence*.) For 'existence* ibn Sina makes use of the term
wuj?d, from which he derives mawj?d, "an existent." In the con
text of these distinctions it becomes apparent that he upholds the
following hypotheses, (i) An individual existent is a determinate
entity realized in a "subject" mawz?0, e e ). Socrates, an
instance of humanity, would accordingly be realized in the matter
substratum, namely in the body of Socrates, (ii) By itself, an "es
sence," such as "the most perfect being," is not a determinate or
concrete subject, and for this reason it is not an individual existent.
A total essence, being a universal, cannot be realized in its entirety
because existents alone are either accidents related to individuals or
they are individual existents. Ibn Sina rejects the realistic doctrine
of universals which claims incorrectly, in his opinion, that "there is
a single universal which exists
independently of mind and things."7
It is literally correct to say, he claims, that "an essence has exis
tence" when there is an actual individual existent of which such an
essence is or in which it "subsists"
predicated (?st?dan). No concept,
therefore, can exist as without related to
concept-qua-concept being
an existent, (iii) It may be crux of this
possible to find the problem
in its epistemological nature which specifies in what way it is
possible to know that an "essence" exists. Ibn Sina takes the posi
tion that "analytics" of "essences" cannot inform us about the
existence of a subject in which the essence has been realized (h?sil,
sudan). At this point it seems proper to introduce a note of clarifica
tion on the well-known observation on the ibn Sinian system that
"existence" represents an addition to "essence." In modern philo

sophical terminology this assertion can be taken to mean that an

inquiry about essences may be no more than a syntactical kind of

not make the distinction because of Post. Ana. II, 8, 93a 18-20. See also the
comments of J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics'
(Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), p. 309. For further
detail see P. Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and ibn Sina's 'Essence-Existence'
Distinction," in Journal of the American Oriental Society.
forthcoming
7
My own unpublished translation of Ibn Sina, D?nii N?me-1 cal?l (Il?hiyy?t),
ed. Mohammed Mocin (Tehran: Tehran Press, 1952). Hereinafter cited as DAI.

(Numbers title refer to respective

following chapters.)
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 237

inquiry. On the basis of such an inquiry alone it is not possible to

deduce that the syntax under investigation is applicable to an
actual domain. Therefore, the thesis that 'existence is not a predi
cate* is to be interpreted in the context of the ibn Sinian system as
follows. Except for one entity, the Necessary Existent, to which we
shall address ourselves next, "existence" is not an essence which can
"be combined" with other essences.

2. On the Second Version of the Ontological Argument

When we take ibn Sina's and recent discussions of the second
version of the ontological argument into consideration, we find
support for the following claims, (i) Ibn Sina offers a variant of the
ontological argument which corresponds in many respects to Mal
colm's "second version" of this argument, (ii) Ibn Sina's formula
tion of the argument is clearer than that of Malcolm, for while ibn
Sina presents his notion of the "Necessary Existent" within the
confines of a carefully structured metaphysical system, Malcolm
proffers the argument as an isolated piece of reasoning. Though the
latter links theNecessary Existent to the vague notion of the God of
religions, he fails to specify satisfactorily the extent of this associa
tion, as we shall demonstrate later, (iii) Some mistake must be
contained in the diverse formulations of this argument, for ibn Sina
and Malcolm reach different conclusions from the same premises of
the argument. Both start with the premise that we do think of the
Necessary Existent. Whereas Malcolm comes to the conclusion that
this Necessary Existent is an individual existent, identical with the
God of religions and the designatum 'God* as it is used in ordinary
language, ibn Sina reaches the opposite conclusion that the Neces
sary Existent is not an individual existent (i.e., It is not a first
substance), but is analogous to the so-called "principle of sufficient
reason" for the contingent world.

2.1 Salient features of ibn Sina's version of the ontological argu

ment

An examination of ibn Sina's Persian text, the D?n?s N?me-i

eal?l (Il?hiyy?t), reveals that to his well-known "essence-existence"
distinction corresponds another distinction between "being and
existence" which is more fundamental. Crucial to the last distinc
tion is his use of the Persian term hasti, signifying 'being*. In his
 238 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

Arabic texts ibn Sina does not use hastt, but anniyya and wuj?d,
which ordinarily mean existence. In his major Persian metaphysical
text (DAI), in which he equates anniyya with wuj?d, he draws a
sharp distinction between 'being* and 'existence*. It is in this
context that his formulation of the second version of the ontological
argument is to be found. 'Being* (hastt), is considered the most
determinable sign of his metaphysical terminology. Whatever exists
is a "being," though not everything that is a "being" exists. For
instance, a "round square" (an impossibility) and "the present king
of France" (an improper description) do not exist, though each is a
"being." A "being" may have an essence while lacking "existence,"
such as "a unicorn" (as species) which is an essence though it has no
instances. Since ibn Sina expresses himself in a rather vague manner
on this subject, the following
explanation may aid us in decipher
ing some of itsmeaning. According to ibn Sina, the fact that there is
some being is a transcendental kind of knowledge, to use Kantian
terminology. A necessary condition of experience is that we think of
we know a
something. Hence priori that there is being, although we
not know the more determinate features of we
may being which
shall experience. He assumes also that the "modality of necessity"
applies to "being" and concludes therefrom that the "Necessary
Being" is a legitimate notion. In addition to the Necessary Existent,
he mentions other kinds of being, such as impossible being (mum
tani?) which cannot be realized at any time and contingent being
(mumkin) which may be realized. After describing these three kinds
of being, he states that the essence of the "Necessary Being" is no
other than Its existence wuj?d, anniyya). He affirms subsequently
that the "Necessary Being" is identical with the "Necessary Exis
tent," implying thereby that no criteria are necessary to demon
strate the existence of the latter. At this point it should be observed
that not all existents are individual existents (i.e., first substances).
Ibn Sina, then, does not hold the view that the Necessary Being is
an individual existent. Prima facie, some of his contentions seem
untenable or at least in need of further clarification. For instance, it
is a matter of dispute whether or not it is possible to construct a
satisfactory theory in which modalities can be applied to entities
other than propositions. Since it is not our aim to undertake a
philosophical critique of ibn Sina's system, let us continue our
critique of the modern version of this argument by contrasting it
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 239
with ibn Sina's version, or more specifically, with features peculiar
to his version. In the pursuit of this objective we shall attempt to
clarify themeaning he assigns to the "Necessary Existent" by examin
ing Its use in his metaphysical system.

(i) The Necessary Existent is not an individual existent

That the Necessary Existent cannot be an individual follows

from ibn Sina's assertion that It is not a first-substance (jawhar). His
Necessary Existent is used tomean what may be called "the necessity
of existence," rather than as an entity. For this reason and
others embedded in his system,we differentiate between his Neces
sary Existent and the God of Islam, (i.e., the God of monotheistic
religions) .8

(ii) The nature of the causal relationship between the Necessary

Existent and the contingent realm

In the metaphysical system of ibn Sina each individual existent

is a contingency insofar as there could be a world in which this
individual is not realized. But with respect to its cause it is neces
sary. (In this context ibn Sina applies 'causality* to things rather
than to events.) 9 Given the actual universe with its laws, its indi
viduals, and its set of first events (i.e., properties and relations
involving these individuals), then the individual under considera

8 Ibn Sina's Necessary Existent has been identified with the God of Islam by S.
Nasr, Introduction to Cosmological Doctrines, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni

versity Press, 1964), p. 214., E. Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New
Ybrk: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), and L. Gardet, La pens?e religieuse d'Avi
cenne note at least the following differences between
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1951). But
ibn Sina's philosophy and Islamic doctrines: (i) His Necessary Existent emanates
the world and does not create it. (ii) He denies the immortality of the body and
and reward after death. (See G. F. Hourani, "Ibn Sina's on the
punishment 'Essay
Secret of Destiny'," BSOAS, 29 (1966), 25-48. Incorrect is the view of F. C.
Medieval Philosophy (New York:
Harper & Brothers,1961), p. 64.
Copleston,
has no knowledge of particulars.
(iii) His Necessary Existent [See M. Marmura,
"Some Aspect of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars," JAOS, 82
(1962), 299-312],and (iv) He depicts the lifeof themystic as being differentfrom
wa
and superior to that of the believer. [See the last two chaps, of his al-ttarat al

Tanblh?t, 3 vols., ed. Sulim?n Duny? (Cairo: Dar al-mac?rif, 1959).]

9 a between events, whereas
'Causality* designates usually relationship 'agent*
and are to analogous between individuals. Ibn Sina
'patient' applied relationships
does not make such a distinction.
240 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

tion must necessarily be an actual existent in the history of this

universe. With respect to this context, the cause of any entity is
considered its "source of necessity." All causes are ultimately related
to the Necessary Existent, according to ibn Sina, for all necessities
that the lat
originate from the Necessary Existent. On the grounds
ter is not an individual, It resembles in his system the principle of
sufficient reason, or the necessary origin of every being.

(Hi) Necessity and thought

uses of the
With respect to thought ibn Sina makes two different
of as it concerns 'being*, and, second, as it
concept 'necessity*?first,
concerns 'the self-soul* (nafs). In the context of being it becomes
clear that epistemically the notion of 'being* (hasti) is necessarily
presupposed in experiencing any entity. It follows that "being is the
most common as well as the most well-known (macr?f)
(??m)
notion." (DA.I., Chap. 3). Further, it is immediately and a priori
recognized by reason since "being" has neither differentia, genus,
nor distinguishing mark. Hence, 'being*, as it was stated, is the
most general determinable sign in ibn Sina's system. When he
asserts, therefore, that exists necessarily, he does not mean
"being"
that one can have a priori knowledge of any determinate being;
but, rather, that it is impossible to think of nothing because any
thought presupposes being. Some insight into this problem might
be gained from the following analogy. We note that a language
cannot exist without having "some signs." Accordingly, 'being a
ismore determinable than the of a
sign* particular signs language,
such as 'Socrates* or '2*. But even though it is possible to assert that
there is no language if there are no signs, it is false to say that any
a
given language under consideration requires particular sign. Simi
a of the fact
larly, ibn Sina's claim that there is priori knowledge
that "there is does not of a
being" imply knowledge particular
an individual existent).
being (i.e., of
The second necessary entity is the "self-soul" (nafs). This notion
is fully depicted in the famous passage of the "Psychology" of al-Sif?'
in which he presents his argument for necessary knowledge of the
"self-soul" by means of the example of the flyingman.

Let us that one of us is created in an instant, and created

suppose
But his eyes are blindfolded and cannot see any external
perfect.
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 241

objects. He is created floating in the air, or rather in the void,

so that the resistance of the air which he might feel, does not
affect him. His members are and therefore do not meet
separated,
or touch one another. Then he reflects and asks himself if his
own existence is proved. Without any hesitation he would
reply
that he exists, he could not prove the existence of his
although
feet or his hands, of his entrails, his heart or his brains, or any
exterior thing; but he would nevertheless affirm that he exists,
without establishing the fact that he has length, breadth or thick
ness.10

In this argument he appeals not to the syntactical aspects of any

sentence, such as think', but the pragmatics of the act of making
an utterance which necessarily implies that there is an agent. Fur
thermore, unlike Descartes, he does not deduce from this utterance
that he is merely a soul or a determinate existent; instead, he
an act. The refer
implies that there is an agent wherever there is
ence he makes does not specify a determinate entity. Keeping the
discussion in mind, let us uncover some presuppositions
preceding
ofMalcolm that are implicit in his version of the argument.

2.2 An examination of some presuppositions implicit in the second

version of the argument

It should be mentioned at the outset that upholders of the

second version of the argument often assume an implicit identity
between that entity which must exist necessarily and the God of
case in point is
religions who is thought to be an individual. A
Malcolm's assertion concerning the proof for the second version:

Anselm is maintaining in the remarks last not that exis

quoted,
tence is a perfection, but that the logical impossibility of non
existence is a perfection. In other words, necessary existence is
a
perfection.11

'God* to this
Malcolm subsequently relates the ordinary notion of
Necessary Existent without introducing further justification for this
association except his notion of "dependence" which we shall exam
ine in the course of this discussion. After expressing his agreement

io Ibn Sina, al-Sif?, I, 281, tr. A. M. Goichon, "The of Being," in

Philosopher
. 109-110.
Avicenna Commemoration Volume (Calcutta, 1956) ,
Malcolm, OA, p. 142.
242 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

with Findlay's notion that God is "either impossible or necessary,"

Malcolm adds:
Now I am inclined to hold the 'modern' view that logically
truth reflects our use of words' I do
necessary 'merely (although
not believe that the conventions of are arbi
language always
trary).12

But from this inclination alone, Malcolm asserts, he does not derive
support for the ontological argument, for

the correct reply is that the view that logical necessity merely
reflects the use of words cannot
possibly have the implication that
existential must be That view re
every proposition contingent.
us to look at the use of words and not manufacture a
quires priori
theses about it.13

A philosopher who advocates the ibn Sinian type of argumentation

may concur with Malcolm in that some Necessary Being is experi
enced which must necessarily exist; nevertheless, he is not com
to conclude therefrom that this Necessary Being is the God
pelled
of religions. One might accuse Malcolm of referring to the cluster of
numerous references to God which are specified by ordinary usage
or to his own religious views and of constructing subsequently a
concept of a "Necessary Being" on philosophical grounds which
may have little bearing to the God of religions and ordinary usage.
However, such an argument ad hominum is definitely invalid and
cannot be used to reject Malcolm's ontological argument. Nonethe
less, from an examination of ibn Sina's theory it has become evident
that it is not logically necessary that the Necessary Being be iden
tical with theGod of religions. Ibn Sina obviously does claim that it
is necessary to have a priori knowledge of the Necessary Being. He
fails to regard It as an individual existent but considers It instead as
what might be called "the necessity of being." To say the least,
then, the identity of God and the Necessary Existent is not some
thing to be assumed, but something to be established.
Let us now turn toMalcolm who, in the
pursuit of his objective
to equate the two, relies on his peculiar interpretation of 'depen
dence.'

12Malcolm, OA, p. 152.

13Malcolm, OA, 152-153.
pp.
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 243
Some remarks about the notion of dependence may help to make
this latter principle intelligible. Many things depend for their
existence on other and events. house was built a
things My by
its into existence was on a certain
carpenter: coming dependent
creative Its continued existence is dependent on many
activity.
that a tree does not crush it, that it is not consumed
things: by
fire, and so on.14

Later on in his discourse on dependency, he mentions that depen

dence and independence are ordinarily associated with notions of
inferiority and superiority. Malcolm's attempt to identify the Nec
essary Existent with God by an exposition of his views on "de
pendency" is not satisfactory, for what he regards as a relation of
a we cannot
dependence consists, in fact, of series of privations. But
refer to any notion and claim conclusiveness for our argument by
means of listing privations in the manner Malcolm proposes, for
there is no criterion by means of which these privations can be
distinguished. Malcolm's examples are a case in point. A given
house is regarded by him as being "dependent" on factors such as
fire and wind which are capable of destroying it. But a logical
a
difficulty is encountered when we attempt to formulate such
reference precisely, for we find ourselves unable to differentiate
between privations, such as 'the northerly wind* which can destroy
a house and 'the wind that blows at a given time', for both may be
identical. Or, how can we distinguish between these winds and the
breadth of a ten-headed monster which can set the house aflame? Is
the house also "dependent" on such a being? It follows from Mal
colm's formulation of the problem that the existence of any entity
may depend on infinitelymany other entities, because he makes no
allowance for the presence of any "principle of individuation" to
distinguish between these entities.
By contrast, ibn Sina, who like Malcolm explains the Necessary
Existent in terms of a "dependency," does not explain this depen

dency in terms of "privations," but depicts it instead in terms of a

special notion of causality. The first feature of ibn Sina's explana

tion is that in his metaphysical system causality is connected to
in the following sense. An individual existent is necessary
necessity
with respect to a context in which its cause has been actualized. In

14Malcolm, OA, p. 143.

 244 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

this special sense, therefore, "causality" is related to "necessity." In

the presentation of his notion of dependency ibn Sina mentions also
that the cause of an individual existent need not be an individual
but can be a principle. For instance, in the preceding example of
the house we observed that ibn Sina attributes the "dependency" of
the house not fire, or other privations, or even to the
to wind,
builder. On the contrary, the cause of the house is identified by him
with the elements of the house and the laws which bind its constitu
ents and function, therefore, as supporters of the house. The Nec
essary Existent is the upholder of the contingent realm in the sense
that the necessity of the existence of contingent existents is ex

plained ultimately in terms of the Necessary Existent. Notwith

standing the fact that both ibn Sina and Malcolm explain the

Necessary Existent in terms of dependence, Malcolm bases his

analysis on a confused notion of the Necessary Existent, an indepen

dent entity explained by him by means of privations, while ibn Sina
presents the Necessary Existent as the principle of dependence

operative in the realm of contingent individuals.

Our argument should not be construed to mean that ibn Sina's
argumentation is correct and that Malcolm is wrong in his views.
We do wish to point out, however, that the Necessary Existent can
be interpreted in more than one sense. Moreover, for the reasons
stated we regard Malcolm's presentation of what may be called his
as unsatisfactory. On account of
"privation theory of dependence"
ibn Sina's mystical views a link has often been established between
him and Neo-Platonism. Scholars, such as Henle for instance, have
made a case for an affinity between Neo-Platonic metaphysics and
the ontological argument.
This [Malcolm's acceptance of the second version of
acceptance
the argument] is the more remarkable because Mal
ontological
colm does not base his contention on any Neoplatonic identifica
tion of existence with reality and fullness of being. Granted such
a metaphysics, the argument would seem to follow, but Malcolm
does not take this approach and indeed professes to have difficulty
in comprehending the doctrine of negation and privation charac
teristic of it (p. 157 of this volume). Without such metaphysical
buttressing, the argument is quite weak, but itmay be well first
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 245
to show that something is wrong with it before going on to con
sider what is wrong.15

Many philosophers have pointed to usages in which the Necessary

Existent is not used to mean an individual existent, but what
appears to be more like the so-called God of the mystics. Leibniz,
for instance, points out:

Certain ancient and more recent thinkers have asserted, namely

that God is a spirit diffused throughout the whole universe, which
animates bodies wherever it meets them, as the wind
organic just
produces music in organ pipes. The Stoics were probably not averse
to this opinion, and the active intellect of the Averroists, and
perhaps of Aristotle himself, reduce to it, being the same in all
men. to this view souls return to God in death, as
According
streams to the ocean.16

Since there ismuch evidence for this different use of 'God', we

may ask: Why should the Necessary Existent be viewed as an
individual rather than as this particular aspect or feature of the
world mentioned by Leibniz? But whether or not the Necessary
Existent is ultimately to be reduced in ibn Sina's system to such a

mystical aspect of the world is disputable.17 Apart from the God of

15 Paul Henle, "Uses of the Ontological in OA, p. 172.

Argument,"
16G. Leibniz, "On Explaining the Laws of Nature," in Great Thinkers on Plato,
.Gross
ed. (New York: Capricorn Books, 1969), p. 55.
17 differ on whether or not ibn Sina was a mystic. Against this view is,
Opinions
e.g., A. M. Goichon, 'Le R?cit de Hayy ibn Yaqz?n' comment? par des textes
.
d'Avicenne (Paris: Descl?e de Brouwer, 1959) Favoring this position, e.g., R. A.
Nicholson, The Idea of Personality in Sufism (Lahore: S. H. Muhammad Ashraf,
as a mystic
1964), pp. 100-101, who regards ibn Sina in the Muslim traditional
sense, and J. J. Houben, "Avicenna and Mysticism," in Avicenna Commemoration
as a mystic in a non traditional
Volume (Calcutta, 1956), p. 221., who views him
sense. Some features of ibn Sina's system which corroborate the view that his

Necessary Existent resembles the mystical views illustrated in Leibniz' remarks are
the following: The ultimate happiness of persons is supposedly found in a
(i)
mystical union (paivand) with the Necessary Existent. (DAI, chap. 37) Since all
entities are ultimately derived from the Necessary Existent, and since the world is
emanated in series, this "union" can then be interpreted as a "return" in Leibniz'
sense, (ii) The love of the divine is embedded in every soul found in the world
"
on Love'," tr. Emil L. Fackenheim), Medieval
[See 'Risalah fil-cishq (A Treatise
Studies, 7 (1945), 208-228.] because ibn Sina considers the ultimate Good, i.e., the
Existent, as the perfection of the world. In this sense "God" is a kind of
Necessary
 246 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

religions, the Necessary Existent can be and has been identified

with that designatum to which the mystics refer. Though there is
strong evidence that ibn Sina's views are Neo-Platonic and "mysti
cal" in nature on account of the stress he places on concepts such as
emanationism (padtd) and mystical union (paivand), we shall not
pursue this point here, except to clarify ibn Sina's position with
reference to some of the remarks we have quoted from Henle.18
The latter's phrase, "the identification of existence with reality and
fullness of being" seems puzzling and in need of explanation. In the
framework of ibn Sina's system "fullness of being" might be taken
to mean that "the notion of nonbeing" ismeaningless. Consequent
ly, that of which we can think must be a being. According to ibn
Sina, however, 'existence* is not to be identified with 'being', for in
all instances 'existence* refers to a determination of being. It is
difficult to convey the meaning of the term 'reality* in this context
because 'nonreality* cannot be correlated with 'reality* in his
system, though one may speak of "a being with an essence which has
not been realized in a subject." (DAL, Chap. 25). Having made an
attempt at explicating the sense in which ibn Sina's system can be
said to correspond to Henle's "Neoplatonic metaphysics," let us
now turn to another point which recurs in the arguments of up
holders of the ontological argument, namely the thought of the
Existent.
Necessary
In arguments supporting the second version of the ontological
argument it has been customary to appeal to the "thought of the
Necessary Existent." Such a reference is already found in Anselm's
remarks on "the understanding," as well as in recent defenses of this
argument. It is in this vein that Hartshorne asserts:

It is often said (and with an air of great wisdom) that a 'mere idea'
cannot reach existence, that can do that. But
only experience
there is no absolute disjunction between thought and experience.
A thought is an experience of a certain kind, it means through
experience, even when it reaches only a possibility. A thought

spirit (i.e., the cause of motion which is "diffused" throughout the world).
Therein ibn Sina's theories resemble Leibniz* remarks. For further detail see P.

Morewedge, "Ibn Sina's Concept of the Self," forthcoming in Philosophical Forum,

and "The Logic of Emanationism and S?fism in ibn Sina," forthcoming in Journal
of the American Oriental Society.
is Henle, OA, 172.
p.
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 247
which ?oes not mean by virtue of an experience is simply a thought
which does not mean. Therefore, if we have a for our
meaning
of God, we also have of him, whether expe
thought experience
rience of him as possible or as actual
being the question.19

Malcolm's formulation of this argument follows a similar pattern:

I believe we may rightly take the existence of those religious sys
tems of thought in which God figures as a necessary being to be a
disproof of the dogma, affirmed by Hume and others, that no
existential can be
proposition necessary.20

In one sense or another Descartes seems to have asserted a related

proposition in the second meditation when he states:
At this point I come to the fact that there is consciousness (or
experience: cogitatio); of this and this only I cannot be deprived.
I am, I exist; that is certain.21

But in what sense can necessity be derived from mere thought in

ibn Sina's system? From the point of view of this system, Hart
shorne's assertion that "thought means something" would be re
garded as being essentially correct, for according to ibn Sina, it is

impossible to experience no thought. But from his description of

the experience of thinking, we can be sure at best that that which is
experienced is something (i.e., in ibn Sina's own language, that it is
the "being-qua-being" aspect of some individual existent which is
.Hartshorne's claim that we can deduce 'experience of
experienced)
him* from the 'meaning of our thought* should be questioned.
Since he displays generally great awareness of the various senses of
'God*, our criticism does not apply to his entire philosophy of God.
Nevertheless, this particular quotation illustrates an unwarranted
inference from mere thought to a particular God. The invalidity of
such an implication arises out of the fact that a vague reference,
such as a variable, can have a meaning. For example, it can be said
in mathematics that we know a certain equation has a solution

though we do not claim to know what the solution is. Now, from a
"Necessary Existent" the existence of an individual existent does

19 Charles "The 134.

Hartshorne, Necessarily Existent," OA, p.
20Malcolm, OA, p. 153.
21 R. Descartes. Descartes' ed. E. Anscombe & P. T.
Philosophical Writings,
Geach (London: Nelson, 1953), p. 69.
 248 PARVIZ MOREWEDGE

not necessarily follow, and we have not seen sufficient proof that it
leads also to "God." In sum, from knowledge of the general feature
of being we cannot deduce the existence of a particular individual
existent which corresponds to the God of religions.
Up to this point we have objected to the defenders of the
ontological argument by means of the validity of their
questioning
inferences, by means of a conceptual analysis of the distinctions
between individual existents and other existents, and between de
terminables and determinates. Now let us approach their arguments
by employing the very tool of which Malcolm and others have made
such extensive use?ordinary usage. Plantinga states with regard to
the argument:

It is doubtful, I think, that any person was ever brought to a

belief in God by this argument, and unlikely that it has played
the sort of role in strengthening and confirming religious belief
that, for the argument has To the
example, teleological played.
unsophisticated, Anselm's argument is (at first sight at least) re
markably unconvincing, if not downright irritating; it smacks too
much of word magic.22

We have already observed some differences between themethods

of ibn Sina and Malcolm. For ibn Sina, the concept of the Necessary
Existent (wajib-al-wuj?d) is purely a philosophical concept which is
used only in his metaphysical system. In his mystical nonanalytical
works, in which he concerns himself chiefly with mystical aspects of
the relationship between a disciple and his teacher, the sage (p?r),
he makes extensive use of stories and allegories but not of the
Necessary Existent. Malcolm, on the other hand, advances from a

sophisticated, purely philosophical concept in a philosophical argu

ment, proceeds thereafter to what we regard as an unsatisfactory
notion of "dependence," and equates his philosophical concept
finally with what is allegedly the designatum of the rich cluster of
references to God in ordinary discourse.
The meaning of the Necessary Existent as It is used in tradi
tional, classical philosophy is related to a cluster of other philosoph
ical terms, such as 'an individual existent', 'emanation', 'various

22Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1967),
p. 26.
 AVICENNA AND MALCOLM 249
causal concepts', 'modal terms', 'essence', as well as other terms. In
this context Its meaning is determined by examining how It is used
in an entire philosophical system. By contrast, in ordinary religious
discourse, the term 'God' is associated with a cluster of divers
emotive terms, performative acts, and multifarious
experiences.
Prima facie, Malcolm's attempt to equate a classical, metaphysical
concept with a concept taken from ordinary usage has been found
highly questionable. Further investigation of his argument has dis
closed particular difficulties with his explanation of the
"privation
theory of dependence" and his equation of the Necessary Existent
with a determinate individual existent. Apart from the critical
remarks we have brought to bear on this problem, we have put
forward some data in support of the thesis that Anselm was not the
first to formulate the ontological argument, for ibn Sina's version of
it, which we have construed as a variation of the so-called second
version of this argument, predates that of Anselm. To ascertain,
however, whether or not ibn Sina was the first to formulate this
argument is beyond the scope of our present investigation.

Parviz Morewedge
State University of New York
AT BlNGHAMTON