1. Vasquez v.
CA
G.R. No. 118971
September 15, 1999
TOPIC: Libel by means of writings or similar means (Art. 355)
PETITIONERS: RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH 40, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
● Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. He and
some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority
(NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo.
● After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his
companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA
compound concerning their complaint.
● The next day, the following news article entitled “38 Pamilya Inagawan ng Lupa”
appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa, a daily newspaper sold to the
public and of general circulation. The article reads:
Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang
38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umano'y
inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul
1980.
Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime
Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo Foreshore Area sa mga
project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng
lupa sa naturang lugar.
"Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na
patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga
project manager at legal officers ng NHA," sabi ni Vasquez.
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng
city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng
pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya "nakalusot" ang mga ginawa
nitong katiwalian.
Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot
din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at
maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. . . .
● Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against
petitioner alleging that the latter's statements cast aspersions on him and
damaged his reputation.
● RTC: Guilty of libel as charged.
● On the main issue whether petitioner is guilty of libel, petitioner contends that
what he said was true and was made with good motives and for justifiable ends.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is guilty of libel – NO.
RULING:
● To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
the following elements must be proved:
(a) The allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(b) Publication of the charge;
(c) Identity of the person defamed; and
(d) Existence of malice
● An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission
of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit
or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
● There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not
required that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark.
What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement,
for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good
opinion which he has of himself."
● To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third
person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory
statement.
● Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 provides:
○ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or security duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
● In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present . The
statements that Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was able to
obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in a number of
illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) were
clearly defamatory. There is no merit in his contention that "land grabbing," as
charged in the information, has a technical meaning in law. Such act is so
alleged and proven in this case in the popular sense in which it is understood by
ordinary people.
○ US v Sotto: For the purpose of determining the meaning of any
publication alleged to be libelous "that construction must be adopted
which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious
1 | TITLE XIII
 in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered.
● Nor is there any doubt that the defamatory remarks referred to complainant and
were published. Petitioner caused the publication of the defamatory remarks
when he made the statements to the reporters who interviewed him.
● The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory,
malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to
overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the
defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the
discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is
shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove
that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
● Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay
official. His allegation was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General
Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioner's counsel which contains that several lands
were awarded to different persons but was sold to either Mr. Olmedo or his
immediate relatives.
● With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it
must be noted that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted
murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the
residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed. The
allegation concerning this matter is thus true. The fact that charges had been
filed against the barangay official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue.
● In denouncing the barangay chairman, petitioner and other residents were
engaged in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is
discharged faithfully.
● For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if
it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the
statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
● This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove
not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner
made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
they were false or not.
● In accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or
concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of
his charge, he should be acquitted.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and

the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

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 2. BRILLANTE v CA
GR NO. 118757 & 121571
19 OCT 2004
TOPIC: Libel by means of writings or similar means (Art. 355)
PETITIONERS: Roberto Brillante
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
1. 1988: Brillante published an open letter addressed to Pres. Cory Aquino
discussing the alleged participation of Atty. Jejomar Binay, candidate for Makati
mayor and Dr. Nemesio Prudente of PUP, in an assassination plot against
Augusto Syjuco another candidate for Mayor of Makati at that time:
a. Claimed to have received reports that these plotters met at Puerto Azul
in Cavite with, among others, a Commander Luming, a Major Rafael
Nieva, and a commander Francis Baloloy. Subject of the meeting was
winning the election at all costs.
b. Discussed operation Dirty Fingers after the ASEAN Summit Meeting
which involves terrorism.
c. Hitmen hired were Anecito (an Iranian mestizo who allegedly has a
perfect score in hit missions) and Major Nieva (personal bodyguard of
Prudente and a notorious killer. Only his employer can control him).
2. 7 January 1988: Brillante was a candidate for Councilor in Makati. He held a
press conference at the Makati Sports Club. Brillante accused Binay of plotting
the assassination of Syjuco and also of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of
the Makati electorate.
3. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of his open letter.
4. Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about
the same. The open letter was subsequently published under the title “Plea to
Cory- Save Makati” in newspapers
5. 5 informations for libel against Brillante were filed with the RTC of Makati:
a. Binay filed with Makati fiscals 4 complaints for libel against Brillante, as
the author among others who published the same in the People’s
Journal and the News Today.
b. Francisco Baloloy likewise filed a complaint for libel against Brillante
and the publisher of Balita and the president of an advertising agency. 
6. Four informations for libel were filed against Brillante and several co-accused
with the RTC of Manila stemming from the complaints filed by Prudente.
Brillantes co-accused in these cases were:
a. Editor-in-Chief of the Peoples Journal; 
b. Publisher, and Editor, of the Malaya;
c. Public Relations Officer and Publisher and Executive Editor of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer;
d. and Public Relations Officer and Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita
7. The RTC-Manila found Brillante guilty of libel on four counts.
8. Brillante appealed to CA. Brillante contended that when the Informations in
Criminal Cases No. 89-69614 to 17 were filed by the prosecutor on January 16,
1989, the offense had already prescribed because more than 1 year had elapsed
since the publication of the open letter on January 10, 11 and 12, 1988. He
argued, among others that:
a. The open letter which he wrote and caused to be published was not
defamatory and was without malice.
b. The publication is considered privileged communication.
9. CA affirmed RTC-Manila. CA held that:
a. Offense of libel had not yet prescribed because the one-year
prescription period should be reckoned from the time Prudente filed his
complaint with the fiscal’s office on January 15, 1988 and not when the
Informations were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989.
b. Under Sec. 1, Rule 110, which took effect during the pendency of the
cases against Brillante, the institution of the complaint before the fiscal’s
office or the courts for preliminary investigation interrupts the
prescriptive period of the offense charged.
c. The RTC-Manila did not err in finding that Brillante had committed libel
against Prudente.
i. The open letter, when read in its entirety, gives the impression
that Prudente is part of a purported criminal conspiracy to kill
Syjuco.
ii. Open letter is not privileged communication - evidence does
not show that Brillante wrote and published it out of a legal,
moral or social duty.
d. There is no double jeopardy for the 4 counts of libel as each and every
publication of the same libel constitutes a separate distinct offense.
e. The accused filed an MR which CA denied.
ISSUES w HOLDING:
1. WON offense of libel had already prescribed when the Informations
were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati - NO.
a. Par. 4 of Art. 90 of RPC provides that the “crime of libel or other
similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.”
b. Computation of prescription of offenses: “The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.”
c. Thus, prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information.
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 d. People v. Olarte: the filing of the complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of
criminal responsibility.
2. WON Brillante is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of libel - YES.
a. Article 353 of RPC: libel is “a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.”
b. Elements of libel:
i. the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another
ii. publication of the charge
iii. identity of the person defamed
iv. existence of malice.
c. Court ruled that the first three present.
d. An allegation against another person is defamatory - if it “ascribes
to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or
defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put
him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who
is dead”.
e. Publication - occurs when material is communicated to a third
person.
f. Art. 354 of RPC says that the GR is that there must be good
intention and justifiable motive otherwise, there is malice, unless
the material is privileged communication.
g. Requisites for privileged communication:
i. the person who made the communication had a legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at
least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either
be his own or of the one to whom it is made
ii. the communication is addressed to an officer or a board,
or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and
who has the power to furnish the protection sought
iii. the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice.
h. Brillante’s statements were based merely on unconfirmed
intelligence reports.
i. There is the absence of the second element of a privileged
communication because it the letter was also published in several
newspapers and made known to the public. He also uttered the
statements In a press conference.
3. WON the penalty imposed upon him is excessive. - NO.
a. Penalty for libel by means of writing or similar means:
i. prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
ii. A single defamatory statement, if published several times,
gives rise to as many offenses as there are publications.
b. There is therefore no legal basis for Brillante’s claim that the
penalties imposed upon him are excessive.
c. But SC agrees with Brillante that the awards of moral damages to
Binay, Prudente and Baloloy are excessive considering the
circumstances surrounding the making and the publication of the
defamatory statements.
d. CA decision affirmed but modified.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are GRANTED
in part.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainant Dr.
Nemesio Prudente in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 is reduced
to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 15174 is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the award of moral damages to private complainants Atty. Jejomar Binay and
Francisco Baloloy is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in
Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721, and Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in Criminal Case No. 88-3060, respectively. SO
ORDERED.
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 3. Alonzo v CA
GR NO. 110088
February 1, 1995
TOPIC: Libel
PETITIONERS: Alonzo
RESPONDENTS: Ca
FACTS:
1. Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was the Field Operations Officer of the Philippine
Medical Care Commission (PMCC) for Region XI.
2. She was directed to conduct inspections of Medicare-accredited clinics and
hospitals
3. She inspected two clinics that were owned by complainant Dra. Angeles
Velasco, married to Judge Dan Velasco of the MTC-Hagonoy, Davao del
Sur. After the inspection, accused submitted her report on her findings to Dr.
Jesus Tamesis, PMCC Vice-Chairman.
4. In her report, it stated “In all, this particular clinic should be closely
monitored because, aside from the above mentioned violations, the husband
is a judge and it gives them a certain amount of "untouchability". In fact, they
make court suits their pasttime.”
5. Complainants were summoned by the PMCC and saw the report of by the
accused.
6. Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a complaint for
libel against the petitioner
7. The trial court found defamatory the statement in the last paragraph which
read
8. The Court of Appeals conceded that the subject report of the petitioner was
a "qualified privileged communication" under the first paragraph of Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code but held that the privilege was lost because
of proof of actual malice
3. However, malice is not presumed and must, therefore, be proved, under the
following exceptions provided for in Article 354
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks; of any judicial legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
4. In this case, the Court said that the petitioner is a public officer and that she
submitted the questioned report after she had conducted the inspection of
the two clinics is no doubt that the petitioner made her report in the exercise
of her official duty or function.
5. Her questioned report was a qualified privileged communication which
negates the presumption of malice or malice in law
6. No publication of the questioned report. The rule is settled that a
communication made by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties
to another with respect to the subject matter of the communication does not
amount to a publication within the meaning of the law on defamation.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 10504 is hereby REVERSED and petitioner DR.
MERLE A. ALONZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ISSUE: W/N Alonzo is guilty of libel - NO

RULING:
1. The Court ruled in favor of Dra. Alonzo and acquitted her of libel.
2. The Court stated that for their to be libel the following requisites must concur
(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable

5 | TITLE XIII
 4. GONZALES v ARCILLA
GR NO. L-27923
Nov. 18, 1991
TOPIC: Libel
PETITIONERS: Marcela Gonzales
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Gumesindo Arcilla, City Judge of Davao City, Alfredo Celi,
First Asst. City Fiscal of Davao City and Filipinas Ordoñez
FACTS:
● In 1966, Asst. City Fiscal Alfredo Celi filed an information for slander against
Marcela Gonzales after she publicly uttered defamatory words to discredit
Filipinas Ordoñez:
○ “Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa! Tibihon! Putang ina mo!
Walang hiya! Patay gutom”
● Gonzales moved to quash the information by asserting that the City Court
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that Celi had no authority to
file the information
○ Also claimed that the alleged defamation imputed the crime of
adultery and cannot be prosecuted de oficio
○ Complaint must be brought by the offended party
● The records don’t show that Ordonez filed a complaint nor was the
Information shown to have been signed by her
● Nevertheless, the motion to quash was denied by Judge Arcilla. Gonzales
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CFI-Davao
● CFI decision
○ Entire context of the Information should be read together as a
whole
○ “Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa” → imputes crime
of adultery
○ Undisputed that Ordonez has the exclusive right to sign and file the
complaint
○ “Putang ina mo, tibi-hon, walang hiya, patay gutom” →
uttered by slip of the tongue and are intended to describe,
intensify, explain or emphasize the other utterances; does
not impute the commission of any offense that is
independent from that conveyed in the first sentence
● Respondents contend:
○ One slanderous remark should not be given more emphasis than
the other
○ All slanderous statements should be treated as one and taken as a
single offense of slander
○ All the defamatory statements alleged in the information only
impute a vice, defect, act or condition not constituting a crime. As
such, fiscal has the authority to file the information
● Gonzales contends:
○ When the slanderous remarks, uttered on one occasion with one
criminal intent, also imputes the commission of adultery, the charge
can only be brought at the instance of and upon complaint filed by
the offended party
ISSUE: W/N Gonzales is guilty of libel - YES
RULING:
1. Judge Gonzales’ major premise focusing on the purpose and intent of the
speaker is erroneous
2. His literal translation of the first portion of the alleged defamatory utterance
is equally erroneous. At most, it may imply that Ordonez is a flirt or
temptress. As such, it is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or act not
constituting a crime
3. Gonzales’ statement is merely suggestive of a doubt as to the kind of
relationship Ordonez would have with married men -- an imputation of some
kind of moral depravity, immoral conduct or a vice BUT not of a crime
4. Rest of the utterances are not mere accompanying and supporting phrases
used to give more vivid color to the first portion. They were uttered to expose
all the possible vices, defects, status or condition of the offended party --
NOT IMPUTING ANY CRIME
5. Art. 360 of RPC -- No criminal action for defamation which consist in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be
brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly
filed by the offended party → NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
because the slanderous utterances do not impute any crime which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio
DISPOSITIVE: The CFI Decision reversed and decision of City Court of Davao
reinstated.
6 | TITLE XIII
 5. SAZON v COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 120715
March 29, 1996
TOPIC: Libel
PETITIONER: Fernando Sazon y Ramos
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were both
residents of the PML Homes in Marikina, Metro Manila. They were likewise
members of the association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association
had a monthly newsletter, the PML-Homemaker, of which the petitioner was
the editor.
2. The Association held an election for the members of its board of directors.
Among those who ran in the election were the private complainant and the
petitioner. The petitioner was elected as a director. He was likewise elected
by the new board as president of the homeowners' association. The private
complainant lost in said election.
3. Unable to accept defeat, Reyes, wrote a letter to the Estate Management
Office (EMO) of the protesting the election of the petitioner as a director and
president of the homeowners' association.
4. In response to the election protest, the EMO ordered the association to
conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO.
5. Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet entitled "Supalpal
si Sazon," were received by the homeowners.
6. Thinking that only private complainant was capable of these acts, petitioner
Sazon started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-
homeowners, culminating in the appearance in the February 10, 1984
issue of the PML-Homemakers of the following article: "USAPAN NG
BOARD vs. ABDON NAG COLLAPSE SA ESTATE MANAGEMENT
OFFICE”
7. The article (referring to the private complainant) contained words such as
"mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko,"
"may kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit," "patuloy na
kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri,", etc.
8. The private complainant initiated a libel complaint against the petitioner and
the trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the TC.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner Sazon is guilty of libel – YES, HE IS GUILTY OF LIBEL
RULING:
1. "ART. 353. — Definition of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead."
2. For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
a. it must be defamatory;
b. it must be malicious;
c. it must be given publicity; and
d. the victim must be identifiable."
3. Petitioner concedes the existence of the third and fourth requisites (c and d
from Ruling #2). Accordingly, only the first and second elements need to be
discussed herein.
4. Petitioner insists that the allegedly offensive words found in the subject
article are not actually defamatory as the words and phrases used in the
questioned article do not impute to private complainant any crime, vice or
defect which would be injurious or damaging to his name and reputation.
5. The Court does not agree with #4. In libel cases, the question is not what
the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him
mean. The defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner
are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article.
6. According to Jurisprudence, a charge is sufficient if the words are calculated
to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are
sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the
person or persons up to public ridicule.
7. In the case at bar, branding private complainant Reyes "mandurugas," et al .
most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule.
8. Petitioner also maintains that there was no malice in this case.
9. The Court does not agree with #8. When the imputation is defamatory, as
in this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the
defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the
defendant's imputation is malicious (malice in law).
10. The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and
justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the
case.
11. Petitioner however submits that malice should not be presumed in the
instant case, but must be proved as a fact (malice in fact), since the
questioned article is a privileged communication covered under the two
exceptions enumerated under Article 354:
7 | TITLE XIII
 a. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
12. The Court does not agree with #11. According to jurisprudence:
a. As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of
any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his
notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a
communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty
of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional
requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to
some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or
power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or
interest in connection therewith.
b. The rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct
or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their
official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the
truth of the imputation.But any attack upon the private character
of the public officer on matters which are not related to the
discharge of their official functions may constitute libel.
13. In the instant case, none of the homeowners was vested with the power of
supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the
charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing
libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public, as what the petitioner did in this case.
14. Moreover, a perusal of the petitioner's article reveals that it has no reference
whatsoever to the performance of private complainant's position as a public
relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry. The article
attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on
matters completely unrelated to his official functions. It cannot therefore fall
under the protective coverage of privileged communication.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED with the modification that, in lieu of imprisonment and fine, the penalty to
be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
PESOS with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. SO ORDERED.

8 | TITLE XIII
 6. FLOR V. PEOPLE 1. Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
GR NO. 139987 or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
MARCH 31, 2005 circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
TOPIC: Libel dead."
PETITIONERS: Salvador D. Flor 2. The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following
RESPONDENTS: People instances: 1) A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and 2) A fair and true report,
made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
FACTS:
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
- An information for libel was filed before the RTC Naga against Flor and
or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively,
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper
3. The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are
- The article entitled VILLAFUERTE'S DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE, stated
classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits
that Gov. Luis Villafuerte spent government money for his trips to Japan and
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged
Israel by way of cash advances
matters are the qualiAedly or conditionally privileged communications which,
- The information was later amended to include Jose Burgos Jr. who was the
unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a Anding of libel provided
publisher-editor of the Bicol Forum
the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact.
- Prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, the complainant already instituted
4. Clearly, when confronted with libel cases involving publications which deal
a separate civil action for damages arising out of the questioned news article
with public officials and the discharge of their official functions, this Court is
before RTC Naga. due to this, the criminal suit for libel was consolidated w/
not confined within the wordings of the libel statute; rather, the case should
the civil case. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued w/ the accused Burgos being
likewise be examined under the constitutional precept of freedom of the
declared as in default in the civil case due to his failure to attend its pre-trial
press.
conference.
5. As the records reveal, the issue of cash advances against the coffers of the
- Upon being arraigned, Flor and Ramos pleaded not guilty
provincial government of Camarines Sur was a major political topic in said
- The complainant explained that after he clarified over the radio that he never
locality at that time. Even the private respondent himself admitted during his
went to Japan, the issue was never discussed again until the matter was
direct testimony that he went on radio in order to address the matter. It was
included in the news item. He also clarified that his trip to Israel was in his
clearly a legitimate topic to be discussed not only by the members of the
capacity as a cabinet member of the former President Cory Aquino.
media but by the public as what was involved was the dispensation of
- On the other hand, Ramos testified that he wrote the news item on the basis
taxpayers' money.
of a note given to him by a source whom he refused to identify. Ramos also
6. Flor and Ramos had in their possession information relating to the cash
said that he went to his source to ask some question and was told that he
advances and the private respondent’s travels abroad. The information was
would be given authenticated records of the cash advances.
provided by one who worked in the provincial treasurer’s office and had
- Flor admitted that the headline was written by him in accordance w/ the
access to the pertinent financial records of the provincial government. The
policy of their paper to print as headlines matter dealing with public concerns
inference they drew from the note given by their source that the private
and public officials.
respondent prodded some of the provincial government officials to take out
- RTC: Ramos and Flor guilty of the crime of libel
cash advances may have been false but the same does not warrant a
- CA: affirmed RTC
conviction for libel nor support a claim for damages.
7. While substantiation of the facts supplied is an important reporting standard,
ISSUE: W/N the news item is libelous - NO still, a reporter may rely on information given by a lone source although it
reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a
RULING: "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." The prosecution, in this

9 | TITLE XIII
 case, utterly failed to prove that the petitioner and Ramos entertained such
awareness.
8. Finally, the private respondent claims that the banner headline ridiculed him
before the public does not merit consideration as the rule in this jurisdiction
is that "[t]he headline of a newspaper story or publication claimed to be
libelous must be read and construed in connection with the language that
follows." A perusal of the entire news story accompanying the headline in
this case readily establishes the fact that the questioned article dealt with
refutations by the private respondent's critics of his explanation over the
radio with regard to the issues mentioned therein. The wording of the
headline may have contained an exaggeration but the same nevertheless
represents a fair index of the contents of the news story accompanying it.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals of 10 December 1996 which affirmed the Joint Decision dated 18 March
1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur, and its Resolution
of 19 August 1999 denying reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs. SO ORDERED.

10 | TITLE XIII
 7. Borjal v. CA
G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999
TOPIC: Libel by means of writings or similar means (Art. 355)
PETITIONERS: ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO
FACTS:
● SC was asked to reverse the CA for holding that petitioners Arturo Borjal and
Maximo Soliven are liable for damages for writing and publishing certain articles
claimed to be derogatory and offensive to private respondent Francisco
Wenceslao.
● Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of
Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine
Star , a daily newspaper. Borjal runs the column Jaywalker.
● Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao is a civil engineer, etc, and he
served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of
the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy.
● During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis in 1988 undertaken by
the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, they agreed to organize the First
National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to find ways and means to
solve the transportation crisis.
● The objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a
long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The
conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around
P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors.
● Respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director of the FNCLT.
As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the
support of the conference.
● Articles were written and published by Borjal in his column Jaywalker. The
articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a
conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer
to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
● Excerpts from the articles:
○ “Another self-proclaimed 'hero' of the EDSA Revolution goes around
organizing 'seminars and conferences' for a huge fee. This is a simple
ploy coated in jazzy letterheads and slick prose. The 'hero' has the gall
to solicit fees from anybody with bucks to spare.”
○ “A 'conference organizer' associated with shady deals seems to have a
lot of trash tucked inside his closet. The Jaywalker continues to receive
information about the man's dubious deals. His notoriety, according to
reliable sources, has reached the Premier Guest House where his
name is spoken like dung.”
○ “The first information says that the 'organizer' tried to mulct half a
million pesos from a garment producer and exporter who was being
investigated for violation of the rules of the Garments, Textile,
Embroidery and Apparel Board. The 'organizer' told the garment
exporter that the case could be fixed for a sum of P500,000.00.” [See
full text for other excerpts]
● Respondent sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the
"organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns. He refuted the matters
contained in petitioner Borjal's columns.
● He filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven, etc but the
same was dismissed. After this, he instituted a civil action for damages based on
libel subject of the instant case.
● CA ruled that respondent was sufficiently identifiable, although not named, in the
questioned articles; that private respondent was in fact defamed by petitioner
Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference
organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his
closet," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that when Borjal imputed
dishonesty, falsehood and misrepresentation, shamelessness and intellectual
pretensions to Wenceslao, he crossed the thin but clear line that separated fair
comment from actionable defamation.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are guilty of libel – NO.
RULING:
● In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must
be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at
bar.
○ The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private
respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference.
○ Private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person
spoken of in Borjal's columns.
○ Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended
party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is
well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to
came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself
when he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the
editor. Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer"
of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would have
remained in blissful ignorance of his identity.
● On whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications as
to exempt the author from liability:
● Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
11 | TITLE XIII
 1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
any legal, moral or social duty; and, motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, ○ We find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of deception.
their functions. ● To be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to
● A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in
qualifiedly privileged. reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of
○ Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not what is false or not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their
privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are probable falsity.
not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention ● Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error,
or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks." misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate.
○ Borjal’s writings are neither private communications nor fair and true Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to
report without any comments or remarks. However this does not account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the
necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
interest are likewise privileged.
● Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. Appeals of 25 March 1996 and its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying
○ The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages against
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every for lack of merit. No costs.
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If
the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as
it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
○ The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its
members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to
be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with
public interest.
● While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of
malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private
respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner
Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
○ Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an

12 | TITLE XIII
 8. SANTOS v. CA
GR NO. 45031
21 OCT 1991
TOPIC: Libel by means of writings or similar means (Art. 355)
PETITIONERS: Nanerico D. Santos
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals
FACTS
1. Santos was a writer with the Manila Daily Bulletin who published an article
“Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.”, in which he quoted an
unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) verbatim, adding a last paragraph “investors and
Sison’s fellow brokers are eagerly awaiting developments on these charges”
a. The charge in the complaint was that Carlos Moran Sison,
chairman and controlling stockholder of CMS, and its president,
Luis Sison, engaged in fraudulent practices in the stock market.
2. Carlos Sison got hold of the article and asked Santos to publish his reply in
the same column the very next day, but Santos told them that he could not
since it was past deadline for next day, so they agreed to publish it on
another day.
3. The reply was not published as promised however, but Sison told Santos not
to anymore since it would rekindle the talks and that he would just sue
petitioner for libel. Santos responded: “Well, sue me for libel”.
4. They met a week later by chance in the Hotel Intercontinental lobby where
Santos asked Sison again: “When will you sue me?”.
a. Santos got his answer in an information filed before the CFI of Rizal
(Pasig) on November 16, 1970. - BLEH haha
5. CFI Rizal decided against Santos, ordering him to pay fines and damages. It
held that the article Santos published was not privileged communication.
a. Jurisprudence states that the article was not privileged
communication because there were no judicial proceedings yet.
b. Not being privileged under Art. 354 (2), the article published must
be libelous as it imputed a violation of the Securities Act to the
offended parties such as illegal purchases and sales, manipulations
of securities, etc.
“Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown, except in the following cases: xxx
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.”
6. On appeal, Santos’ main defense was that the article was a fair and true
report of a judicial proceeding and therefore not punishable. He claimed that
It was lifted from a complaint word for word, adding only a last innocuous
paragraph.
ISSUES w HOLDING:
1. WON the article was privileged communication - YES.
a. The rulings in Barreto and Choa Tek Hee are no longer valid and
superseded already in Cuenco v. Cuenco.
i. Cuenco (1976) - pleadings are presumed to contain
allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature,
supported by evidence presented in good faith, and so
publications about them are privileged even before an
answer is filed or a decision is promulgated.
ii. Manuel v. Pano (1989) - publication of a complaint, being
a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in
good faith and w/o comments or remarks, is privileged and
comes under Item 2 of Art. 354.
iii. The complaint itself is a public record and may be
published under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
unless the court directs otherwise in the interest of
morality or decency.
“Sec 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. — The sitting of every court of justice
shall be public, but any court may, in its discretion, exclude the public when the
evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their exclusion in the interest
of morality or decency. The records of every court of justice shall be public records
and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper
business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records,
unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the
interest of morality or decency.”
iv. As the doctrine in the Barreto case is no longer controlling,
current article in question is privileged.
2. WON the prosecution was able to establish malice on the part of
petitioner - NO.
a. While the article is privileged, the defense it affords to petitioner
may be lost by positive proof of express malice.
b. But the court said that there were no embellishments, wild
imputations, distortions, or defamatory comments calculated to
damage the reputation of the offended parties.
c. The article simply informed the public of the complaint by lifting it
word per word.
d. It was the petitioner’s job to inform the public of current news,
hence court declares that there is no libel.
13 | TITLE XIII
 9. Bulletin Publishing Corp vs Noel
GR NO. 76565
November 9, 1988
TOPIC: Defamtion
PETITIONERS: Bulletin Publishing Corp
RESPONDENTS: Noel
FACTS:
- On 3 July 1986 the twenty-one (21) private respondents (plaintiffs below),
claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano, suing on their
own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a
Complaint charging petitioners with libe
- Respondents' action was anchored on a feature article, "A Changing of the
Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama,
a publication of petitioner Bulletin Publishing Corporation
- Respondents objected to the statement in the article that the late Amir
Mindalano, grand patriarch of the Mindalano clan, had lived with an
American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being
absolutely false, "has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society."
Contending finally that petitioners had with malice inflicted "so much damage
upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably injure" the
Mindalano name and reputation
possession of a title of nobility or royalty and the Constitution expressly
forbids the enactment of any law conferring such a title.
5. Personal hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not, however,
automatically equivalent to defamation.
6. The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and
enjoying a reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant," in
the community and it is to community standards-not personal or family
standards-that a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be
defamatory.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. The Order of
respondent Judge dated 30 October 1986 in Civil Case No. 81-86 denying the
defendants' Motion to Dismiss is SET ASIDE, and respondent Judge is hereby
DIRECTED to dismiss Case No. 81-86 forthwith upon notice hereof. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on 4 December 1986 is made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of libel - NO

RULING:
1. The Court finds that libel has not here been committed; the civil suit for
damages must fail.
2. In actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole
3. The Court took notice that the essay is not focused on the late Amir
Mindalano nor his family. he Identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely
illustrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme of the
article .The language utilized by the article in general and the above
excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character,
matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive
implications or nuances appear detectable at all.
4. The Court did not appreciate the arguments of the respondents that the
article falsely and maliciously ascribed to the late Amir Mindalano, and to the
rest of the extended Mindalano family, an inferior status or condition
because no legal rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or

14 | TITLE XIII
 10. AGUSTIN v PAMINTUAN
GR NO. 164938
August 22, 2005
TOPIC: Libel
PETITIONERS: Victor Agustin
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of RTC-Baguio, Anthony De
Leon and People of the Philippines
FACTS:
● Victor Agustin was a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist who was charged
with libel after he wrote a column about Anthony De Leon, the acting general
manager of the Baguio Country Club
○ The subject of the column was a bungalow on Northwestern Street
that was said to be the “trysting place of Ferdinand Marcos and
Hollywood actress Dovie Beams”
○ BIR initiated a high level tax evasion investigation after the
bungalow’s ownership was hastily changed: first sold to Anthony
De Leon who then sold it to a Chinoy couple
○ BIR found that the transfer to Anthony De Leon was spurious
because the original owner (cook De Leon -- not related) had been
missing for 8 years. The transfer was made to look like it had been
an intra-family transfer despite the two not being related
○ All these years, the bungalow had been rented to third parties even
though De Leon made it appear that he and his family had been
using it
● Agustin pleaded not guilty and then filed a Motion to Quash on the ground
that RTC-Baguio had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged
○ Alleged that the Information did not contain any allegation that
Anthony actually resided in Baguio City or that the articles were
printed and first published in Baguio
● RTC denied Agustin’s Motion to Quash since De Leon was the general
manager of the Baguio Country Club, it was reasonable to infer that he was
actually a resident of the city at the time the articles were published
● Agustin filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. CA
dismissed his petition
○ Although true that the Informations do not allege De Leon’s
residence, such defects were merely of form and not of substance
ISSUE: W/N Agustin is guilty of libel? - NO
RULING:
1. Art. 360 of RPC -- Persons responsible -- Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of
a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof
a. Rules on venue
i. Offended party = public official or a private person
→ action may be filed in the CFI of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first
published
ii. Offended party= private individual → filed in the
CFI of the province where he actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense
iii. Offended party = public officer whose office is in Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, action may be
filed in CFI-Manila
iv. Offended party = public officer holding office
outside of Manila → action may be filed in the CFI
of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense
2. Under the old rule, offended party could harass the accused in a libel
case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place
3. To obviate controversies as to the venue, the complaint or Information
should contain allegations as to whether the offended party was public
officer or a private individual at the time of the offense, where he was
actually residing; whenever possible, place where the defamation was
printed and first published
4. Here, the Informations did not allege that De Leon was actually residing in
Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offense (substantial
defect). It cannot be inferred from the fact he was the Acting GM of Baguio
Country Club
5. Residence = actual bodily presence + freely exercised intention of remaining
there permanently or for an indefinite time
6. Although possible that De Leon may have been actually residing in Baguio
City, the Infos did not state so. As such, it could have been possible also that
he may have been actually residing elsewhere
7. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time
there does not render him a resident
DISPOSITIVE: Petition was granted and RTC was directed to quash the Informations
and dismiss the cases against Agustin
11. Victorio vs Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 32836-37
May 31, 1989
15 | TITLE XIII
TOPIC: Slander
PETITIONERS: Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals
FACTS:
1. Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practicing lawyer since 1926, one-time Justice of the
Peace, a member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law
and the former president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the
attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases.
2. Petitioner Victorio decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty
Castillo, when he filed an administrative complaint against Judge Guiang,
which was assigned to Judge Avancena.
3. During the hearing, Atty Castillo was the counsel for the Victorios, while
Atty. Ruiz was the counsel for respondent Judge Guiang.
4. After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down
the corridor leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge Avancena, they were
overheard by a policeman saying:
a. Daniel Victorio (son of Exequiel):Kayabang ng putang-inang
abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at
estapador.
b. Exequiel Victorio: Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na
iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.
5. Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio were separately charged with the
crime of Serious Oral Defamation in the City Court of Cabanatuan City, in
identical Informations.
6. The Trial Court convicted them of GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION. CA
Affirmed.
ISSUE:
W/N the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation? – Serious/Grave Oral Defamation
RULING:
1. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined
as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice
another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.
2. To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral
defamation:
a. Words are based not only upon their sense and grammatical
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship
between the offended party and the offender, which might tend
to prove the intention of the offender
3. In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the
defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others, he called Atty.
Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious
and insulting imputation.
4. According to US Jurisprudence:
a. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when
touching on his profession are libelous per se.
b. Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false
charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or
profession of a person charged, are 'slanderous per se.'
5. In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa
against a prominent lawyer. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into
the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the
defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation.
6. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such
words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed
against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper
practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.
7. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was no reason for the
petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was merely performing his
duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Thus, Petitioner's anger was not
lawfully caused.
8. As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the
respondent court to have been uttered in a loud voice, in the presence
of at least 10 persons, taken seriously by the offended party and
without provocation on his part.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision
Affirmed in toto.
16 | TITLE XIII
 12. GONZALES V. ARCILLA RULING:
GR NO. L-27923 1. Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing. In both, there
NOV 18, 1991 is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
TOPIC: Slander cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or
PETITIONERS: Marcela N. Gonzales to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
RESPONDENTS: HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, City Judge of Davao City (Branch 2. In determining whether the offense has been committed, the defamatory
III), ALFREDO M. CELI, First Assistant City Fiscal of Davao City, representing the words are to be construed in their entirety, and should be taken in their
People of the Philippines, and FILIPINAS ORDOÑEZ plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by persons reading or hearing them, unless it appears that they were used
and understood in another sense. In short, the language used must be
FACTS:
understood "in its plain and popular sense — to read the sentences as would
- This is an appeal from the Decision of CFI Davao in a petition for certiorari
the man on the street." The intent or purpose then of the speaker or writer is
and prohibition which granted the petition and enjoined permanently both the
not relevant.
City Judge and City Fiscal from taking further cognizance of a criminal case
3. We agree with appellants that "mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa ,"
for slander in the City Court of Davao because said case was not brought at
even if translated as "one who grabs another's husband," does not
the instance and upon the complaint of the offended party, respondent City
necessarily mean an adulteress. At most, it may imply that the person to
Fiscal had no authority to file the information, and the City Judge had no
whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a temptress, or one who indulges in enticing
jurisdiction over the case.
other husbands;" hence, it is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or
- An information for slander against Gonzales was filed before the City Court
act not constituting a crime.
of Davao by Assistant City Fiscal Alfredo Celi.
4. On its face, her statement is merely suggestive of a doubt as to the kind of
- Gonzales uttered in public w/in the hearing of several persons and to cast
relationship the offended party would have with married men. It is thus an
dishonor upon one Filipinas Ordonez: MANG-AAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY
imputation of some kind of moral depravity, immoral conduct or a vice, but
ASAWA! TIBIHON! PUTANG INA MO! WALANG HIYA! PATAY GUTOM'
certainly not of a crime.
- Gonzales moves to quash the information asserting that the City Court has
5. The other remarks are by themselves defamatory and are not at all related
no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Officer who filed the
to the first portion. They were uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or
information had no authority to do so. She claims that the alleged
vice intended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the offended party.
defamation imputes the crime of adultery and cannot be prosecuted de
"Tibihon" means a person suffering from tuberculosis, and not "consumptive"
oficio. The other remarks, however, do not charge a crime. The complaint
as translated by the fiscal. "Putang Ina Mo ," although referring to a mother,
must be brought at the instance of the offended party
was meant to suggest that the offended party is not a legitimate daughter of
- On the other hand, respondents maintained that the slanderous words
her mother. "Walang-Hiya," which means "shameless," could relate to the
alleged in the information contain imputation not only to one crime but to
offended party's being a flirt, seducer, or a daughter of a prostitute. "Patay-
other offenses like vice, defect and condition which are distinct from and
Gutom" is a derogatory remark connoting abject poverty entirely unrelated to
independent of each other; one, admitted to be of adultery and others are
the first portion. In short, the other imputations did not give color and
public crimes which can be prosecuted de oficio
importance to the first portion; they were uttered merely to expose all the
- Judge Alfredo Gonzales: entire context of the information should be read
possible vices, defects, real or imaginary, status, or condition of the
together as a whole and not to pick up particular words and phrases and
offended party. None of these, however, imputed any crime.
then detach or isolate them from the rest so as to give them different
6. Accordingly, the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
meaning that is desired by the one who may use it for his own convenience
which provides that: "No criminal action for defamation which consist in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought
ISSUE: W/N a criminal action for Gonzales’ alleged defamation can be brought de
except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended
oficio - YES
party." which has specific reference to the crimes against chastity, and the
second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
17 | TITLE XIII
 provides: "The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. . . ." are not
applicable in this case since, as above discussed, the alleged slanderous
utterances subject of the assailed information do not impute any crime which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from in SP Civil Case No. 5270
of the court below dated 7 June 1967 is hereby REVERSED. The Order of the City
Court of Davao City of 27 July 1966 in Criminal Case No. 2273-B denying the motion
to quash is hereby REINSTATED and said court is directed to proceed with the
arraignment, if one has not yet been had, and the trial of the case on its merits. Costs
against petitioner-appellee. IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 | TITLE XIII
 13. Balite v. People RULING:
G.R. No. L-21475. September 30, 1966 ● Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line between
serious and slight oral defamations in this wise: "Oral defamation shall be
TOPIC: Slander (Art. 358) punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
PETITIONERS: AMANCIO BALITE minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
● Defamatory words will constitute either grave or light slander depending not only
upon their sense and grammatical meaning, judging them separately but also
FACTS:
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between
● The Democratic Labor Association declared a strike against the Cebu
the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of
Stevedoring Company. Delfin Mercader, union president, was offered by Richard
the offender at the time.
Corominas & Co., a copra exporter affected by the strike, P10,000.00 as aid to
● In the case at bar, the scurrilous words impute to the offended party the crime of
the union and presumably to pave the way for the amicable settlement of the
estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the
labor dispute. Petitioner was with Mercader when that offer was made.
victim. No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of
● At the union meeting, it was decided that the amount be accepted and spread
grave oral defamation. They are serious and insulting.
amongst all the members. However, at a subsequent meeting attended by
Mercader and petitioner. Petitioner proposed that the amount thus offered be
given solely to the officers of the union, leaving out the members thereof. DISPOSITION: Conformably to the foregoing, the judgment under review is hereby
● His proposal was opposed by the union members, and so he walked out of the modified. Petitioner, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave oral defamation,
meeting, threatened to destroy the union and to expose president Mercader. is hereby sentenced to serve a prison term ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor, as
Petitioner then pursued a smear campaign against Mercader. For these, he was minimum, to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional , as maximum. The civil indemnity
expelled from the union. of P5,000.00 is deleted from the judgment under review. Costs against petitioner. So
● Long after, petitioner had a meeting with the officers of the Marine Officers Guild. ordered.
He uttered the following words in the Cebu Visayan dialect,
○ ”Mr. Mercader sold the Union, the money of the Union was swindled in
the strike staged by the Democratic Labor Association against the Cebu
Stevedoring Company. Atty. Mercader received bribe money in the sum
of P10,000.00 from the copra exporter Richard Corominas & Co. and
another P6,000.00 from the Cebu Stevedoring Company . . . Atty.
Mercader is engaged in racketeering and that he is enriching himself
with the capitalists. The money of the Union was spent by him to his
own personal benefit.”
● Delfin Mercader was legal counsel of the Marine Officers Guild. The quoted
imputation apparently affected the guild's feeling and attitude towards Atty.
Mercader. For subsequently, he was eased out as the guild's legal counsel.
● Mercader filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against petitioner.
● Petitioner pleads prescription. The complaint, he insists, is merely one for slight
oral defamation punishable by arresto minor or a fine not exceeding P200.00.
This offense lapses in two months. The incident took place on May 21, 1959; the
complaint was filed on August 29, 1959. Three months and eight days having
elapsed, petitioner submits that the crime is time-barred.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation or grave oral defamation –
Grave oral defamation.

19 | TITLE XIII
 14. LAROBIS v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 104189 DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
30 MAR 1993 the modification that the petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from three (3) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
TOPIC: SLANDER correccional. In all other respects, the civil liabilities imposed by the Regional Trial
PETITIONERS: AMELIA LAROBIS Court are affirmed.
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
1. Within hearing distance of several persons, Amelia shouted words
calculated to humiliate and to cast aspersions on complainant. She shouted:
a. "LIMBONGAN, MARO NGA MATUTUDLO, PATAY GUTOM,
TIGULANG GIUBAN NA, BOGOK, HUGAWAN, IPASALBIDS
KANAKO NI DODONG AMORA." ('You are a cheat, a dishonest
teacher, you are dead hungry, an old person with gray hair, dull,
dirty, I will have you salvage(d) by Dodong Amora.")
2. MCTC: found Amelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral
defamation
3. RTC: affirmed MCTC’s decision in toto
4. CA: affirmed RTC’s decision with modification of penalty imposed
5. Amelia claims that the CA and lower courts erred in finding that her
defamatory utterances were:
a. “calculated if not wholly premeditated” to insult the complainant
b. there was no provocation on complainant, and
c. that utterances were not made in the heat of anger and obfuscation

ISSUE: WON Amelia is liable only for slight oral defamation and not grave oral
defamation. - NO. She is liable for grave oral defamation.

RULING:
1. Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends
not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the
advanced age of the offended party.
2. In this case, the elements that qualify the oral defamation to the graver
offense are extant. Amelia disregarded the respect due to the age and status
of the complainant, who was 61 years old and has been a public school
teacher for the past 32 years.
3. The offense, having been qualified to grave oral defamation by the special
circumstances mentioned, cannot be reduced to simple oral defamation by
the claim that the slanderous words were said in the heat of anger. Besides,
slanderous words were deep into the character of the victim.

20 | TITLE XIII
 15. REYES v PEOPLE
GR NO. L-21528 & L-21529
28 MAR 1969
TOPIC: SLANDER
PETITIONERS: Rosauro Reyes
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
1. Rosauro was a former civilian employee of Navy Exchange, Sangley Point,
in Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961.
2. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20-30 persons in a
demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the US Naval Station at
Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing states such as:
a. “Agustin, mamamatay ka”
b. “To, alla boss con Nolan";
c. "Frank do not be a common funk";
d. "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin";
e. "Agustin, Nolan for you";
f. "Agustin, alla bos con Nolan";
g. "Agustin, dillega el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting"; and others.
3. Base commander McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main
gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place
and talked to Rosauro and Luis. Upon learning that the demonstration was
not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and Frank
Nolan for allegedly dismissing Rosauro, he suggested for them to
demonstrate in Hallare’s residence. They told him that they would like the
people at the station to know how they felt against Hallare and Nolan and
assured him that they did not intend to use violence as they just wanted to
blow off some steam.
4. At that time, Hallare was in his office at the naval station. Upon learning
about the demonstration, he became apprehensive about his safety and
sought Col. Monzon’s protection. Monzon escorted Hallare outside the
station and told him to take a good look at the demonstrators. When the
demonstrators saw him, they shouted “Mabuhay is Agustin”. They boarded
their jeeps and followed the car.
5. Upon arrival at Hallare’s residence, Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and
posted himself at the gate and shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."
6. Thereafter, Rosauro boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises.
Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other
demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
7. Rosauro Reyes was charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation
before MTC Cavite. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges
8. CA affirmed. Rosauro moved for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in affirming Rosauro’s conviction of grave threats and of
grave oral defamation when he could be convicted of only one offense, which
was light threats only. - NO. Rosauro is liable for grave threats only. He is acquitted
for the charge of oral defamation.
RULING:
1. As to the charge of grave threats : the threats were made “with deliberate
purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the
threat would be carried into effect.”
2. Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection
of Col. Monzon. The threats were indeed made deliberately and not merely
in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by Rosauro one month
before the incident.
3. As to the charge of oral defamation: The charge of oral defamation stemmed
from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo." This is a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander
but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its
literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reIection on the virtues of a mother.
4. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by
appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more
emphatic
5. Case of Yebra: the libelous remarks express the heat of passion which
engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the
letter culminates into a threat. Offense committed therein is clearly and
principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the
person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the
writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be
considered as part of the more important offense of threats."
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
petitioner is acquitted, with costs de o3cio , insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the
Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal
Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.
16. People v Pelayo
GR NO. 05152
Sept 20, 1966
21 | TITLE XIII
TOPIC: Slander
PETITIONERS: People
RESPONDENTS: Pelayo

FACTS:
- Pelayo was a city counsilor of Davao City.
- Pelayo while in the office of Atty. Clapano that while he was investigating the
existence of gambling in the community, a Chinese operator, Lim Peng, told
him that Gov. Almedras used to receive from him 500 pesos for protection
money.
- Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in the regular session of the City
Council of Davao although Pelayo didn’t mention that Gov. Almendras was
receiving bribe money, it became obvious through the interpellations and his
and his answer.
- Pelayo admits to have said it to Atty. Clapano however invokes that the
utterances made were in confidence, subject of privileged communication
and was done in self-defense.

ISSUE: W/N Pelayo is guilty of light oral defamation - YES

RULING:
1. The Court found him guilty of light oral defamtion
2. The Court did not accept his defense of that the utterances were made in
confidence because when Pelayo said it to Atty. Clapano there were people
who heard it as well. Therefore, it was not in confidence.
3. The Court stated that it is not subject of privileged communication because
the Court saw that it was unnecessary for Pelayo to reveal it to Atty. Clapano
who was a fellow City Counsilor. Pelayo owes no legal or moral duty to
Clapano.
4. The Court said that the crime is slander not intriguing against honor because
the source of the information can be pin-pointed and definitely be
determined.
5. The Court did not accept Pelayo’s claim of self-defense because for self-
defense to exist in libel or slander the defendant should not go beyond
explaining what was previously said of him for repairing or minimizing the
effects of the damage caused to him. The only time that one can use
slanderous remarks is if it is necessary for him to do so in order to explain
the imputation against him.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, judgment is affirmed but the sentence is modified.

22 | TITLE XIII
 17. PEOPLE v PRIETO possible for the public to know it, even if actually only one person happens to
71 OG 3251 learn of it
June 20, 1974 3. There is oral defamation even if other persons and not the offended party
heard the slanderous words. This is because his reputation is affected if
TOPIC: Slander such words were heard by persons whose opinions regarding his honesty
PETITIONERS: People of the Philippines and integrity may be lowered
RESPONDENTS: Florentino Prieto 4. The rule is settled that for an utterance or remark to be considered
slanderous or defamatory, it should be made publicly or at least be heard by
persons other than the speaker and the addressee
FACTS:
● Esterlita Vicente filed a complaint for serious oral defamation against
Florentino Prieto after the latter publicly ridiculed her womanhood before her DISPOSITIVE: Appealed judgment was affirmed.
friends, neighbors and community
○ “Ester had sex with me, I took advantage of her womanhood
without her father knowing anything. We enjoyed our date.”
(paraphrased)
● Prieto uttered defamatory statements against Vicente’s honor on at least 2
occasions
○ Gullerma Orboc encountered Prieto and told him that the previous
night, his mother-in-law was looking for him to which he replied that
he was on a date with Esterlita and asked why they would get
married when they enjoy the pleasure of dating without the parents
knowing anything. Realizing that he was casting aspersions upon
the honor of Esterlita, Orboc told Esterlita’s father about it
○ Prieto approached Sinda Linda and told her that Esterlita is badly
damaged and he will just make use of her. He also asked her to tell
Esterlita that he wants to talk in the kitchen so they can have sex.
Linda conveyed the message to Esterlita who got angry. Linda
reported back to Prieto who said that he would only make use of
her but he will not marry her
● Prieto denied that he uttered such defamatory remarks and that he stayed
home take of the small children
● Municipal Court of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental found him guilty of
Serious Oral Defamation

ISSUE: W/N Prieto is guilty of slander? - YES

RULING:
1. Prieto’s blanket denial of the defamatory remarks, without any evidence, is
devoid of merit especially in view of the positive and unbiased testimonies of
the prosecution’s witnesses
2. The requirement that the imputation must be public is fully satisfied when the
defamatory statements were uttered or delivered in a manner that makes it

23 | TITLE XIII
 18. PEOPLE v MENDOZA 4. It has been settled that the person slandered may be justified to hit
GR NO. 18759-CR back with another slander, only if his reply is made in good faith, without
FEBRUARY 8, 1977 malice and is not necessarily defamatory of his assailant.
5. Moreover, retaliation or vindictiveness cannot be a basis of self-defense in
TOPIC: Slander defamation.
PETITIONERS: People of the Philippines 6. To repel an attack on one’s reputation, the defendant may make an
RESPONDENTS: Cristina Mendoza explanation of the imputation, and it is only where, if by explaining, he must of
necessity have to use scurrilous and slanderous remarks, that he may legally be
allowed to do so without placing himself under criminal prosecution.
FACTS:
7. Thus, the decision of the lower court is affirmed. Accused Cristina Mendoza
1. Victoria Jamelo and Cristina Mendoza were both public school teachers and
is guilty of the crime of slander.
neighbors. Jamelo heard her neighbor Mendoza saying “Waray is backbiting me
when I am not around and teaching her maid to be mad at me”. Jamelo knew
that Mendoza was referring to her when she mentioned “Waray”
2. Jamelo went to the porch of her house and she saw Mendoza standing
facing the provincial road and said “Why will you interfere in my house helper
when we have a separate family”
3. Mendoza shouted “You, when you were still single many has sexual
intercourse with you because you are confident that you will not bear a child.
Your vagina is odorous, a woman with leukorrhea and your husband is
homosexual, uncircumcised, he is under you command, henpecked” Jamelo
simply countered “is yours perfumed”
4. The incident happened with many persons around, particularly the husband
of Jamelo and some pupils as the place was near the school premises.
5. Accused was charged with and prosecuted for grave oral defamation, but
after trial, the Court of First Instance found Mendoza guilty of the crime of simple
slander under Article 358 of the RPC.
6. On appeal, the accused contends that the lower court erred in not acquitting
the accused as her act was based on the ground of self-defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Slander – YES

RULING:
1. On the plea of self-defense, the defense contends that it was the
complainant who provoked the accused and it was the complainant who uttered
first highly slanderous statements to the accused.
2. However, the evidence of the prosecution is clear that the accused was the
one who slandered the complainant and the latter did not retaliate, for she never
uttered the slanderous words attributed to her.
3. Even if it is true that it was the complainant who uttered first slanderous
statements to the accused, the latter would not be justified in slandering the
former.

24 | TITLE XIII
 19. PEOPLE V. ORCULLO 4. It is alleged by accused-respondent that the remarks imputed adultery,
GR NO. L-57103 because the word `paramour' was mentioned, thereby implying complainant
JAN 30, 1982 to be a married woman who was carrying on an affair with a man not her
husband. It must be pointed out that since the information does not
TOPIC: Slander allege the civil status of complainant as married, she should be
PETITIONERS: People presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood
RESPONDENTS: HON. ANTONIO A. ORCULLO, as Acting City Judge of Cagayan as imputing prostitution, and not adultery. Assuming arguendo that
de Oro City, and VENIDA PERALTA alias EDAT PERALTA complainant is married and that the remarks, while imputing acts of
prostitution to her and in effect charged her with adultery, the information
can still be filed without her complaint.
FACTS:
5. The essential element in prostitution is not simply a woman's entering into
- This is a petition for certiorari filed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City
marital relations with a man other than her husband, if she happens to be
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro praying that the order of the respondent Judge
married, but the existence of pecuniary or 9nancial gain as inducement to, or
Orcullo, dismissing criminal case be set aside and that said case be ordered
consideration for, that woman's engaging in sexual activities. Thus, to call a
reinstated and tried on the merits.
married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her an adulteress, a
- The petition alleges that on Sept 4 1978, a special counsel of the City Fiscal
violator of her marital vows: it is to charge her of having committed an
of CDO filed an information w/ the City Court of CDO, charging Venida
offense against public morals, of moral degeneracy far exceeding that
Peralta w/ oral defamation for shouting the ff words against Lydia Flores:
involved in the maintenance of adulterous relations.
Hostess ug nangabit, bisan unsa lang oten and nakapaslak / A hostess and
6. It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged
has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina
defamatory remark by the accused specifically imputed upon the
- Peralta pleaded not guilty
offended party the commission of prostitution, which is a public crime
- Peralta filed a motion to quash on the ground that the crime alleged
that can be prosecuted de officio, the information filed under the
constituted an imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
signature of the Assistant City Fiscal duly conferred jurisdiction upon
- Judge Orcullo dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the offense is
the lower court to try the case.
a private crime which can be filed only by the offended party
- City Fiscal filed an MR, Judge Orcullo denied the MR
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, the order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 40117 of the City Court of Cagayan de Oro City is set aside, and the
ISSUE: W/N the remarks impute adultery or prostitution - PROSTITUTION. So can be
respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, is ordered to reinstate said criminal case
tried without complainant’s consent/complaint
and to try the same on the merits. SO ORDERED.
RULING:
1. It is an imputation of the crime of prostitution which can be prosecuted de
oficio.
2. it is clear that, while the utterance in effect also imputed on her the
commission of adultery, the offended party being a married woman, the
disreputable conduct she was particularly charged with was the crime of
prostitution, not adultery.
3. The word `hostess' has acquired a notorious connotation. It has a peculiar
reference to one who works in nightclubs and ministers to the pleasures of
men for fee. The expression `any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina'
definitely describes and only refers to the work of a prostitute, and not that of
a mere adulteress.

25 | TITLE XIII
 20. People v. Alagao
TOPIC: Incriminating innocent person (Art. 363)
PETITIONERS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: MARTIN ALAGAO, ET AL.
FACTS:
● The City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees
charging them of having committed the complex crime of incriminatory
machinations thru unlawful arrest.
● The contention of the defense in the motion to quash is that there would either be
only the singular crime of incriminatory machinations or unlawful arrest.
● The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash, contending that "A perusal of the
information will readily conclude that it is a complex crime in the sense that
unlawful arrest was used as a means for incriminatory machinations."
● Trial Court: The information alleges the commission of two distinct crimes, one,
for unlawful arrest, and, the other, for incriminatory machinations
machinations thru unlawful arrest, and also the allegation that the act of planting
the incriminatory evidence took place during the supposed investigation after the
unlawful arrest, are basis for the logical assumption, in the absence of evidence,
that the two acts imputed to the accused — that of unlawfully arresting and that
of planting incriminatory evidence — had closely followed each other, and that
the former was a necessary means to commit the latter.
● We, therefore, hold that the information in question in the present case contains
allegations properly charging the commission of the complex crime of
incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and the court a quo committed
error when it ordered its dismissal.
DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed and set
aside, and this case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.
So ordered.

ISSUE: W/N there is a complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful

arrest – YES.

RULING:
● We find that the information in the present case specifically alleges that the
accused did "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate and impute to one
Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery thru unlawful
arrest . . ."
● The information further alleges that ". . . the said accused...without reasonable
ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos
to the proper authorities did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y
Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was
supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then
and there place or commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken
from the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos . . .”
● It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the
information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a
necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby
incriminating him.
● We agree with the Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to
resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the
money taken from the offended party.
● The investigation, during which the incriminating evidence was planted, had
taken place immediately after the arrest or long after the arrest. The allegation in
the information that the accused committed the complex crime of incriminatory

26 | TITLE XIII
 21. IN RE: TAK NG
GR NO. L-13017 RULING:
23 Dec. 1959 1. In respect to the petitioner’s contention against the 1st ground, it is hard to
believe that the Tak Ng would suffer to have his name stained by pleading
TOPIC: Intriguing against honor (Di siya connected sa topic errr) guilty to profiteering if he was, in fact, innocent. It is not, as well, easy to
PETITIONERS: Tak Ng believe that petitioner did not know that he was selling over the price fixed by
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines authorities, as these price limits are made known to stores.
2. The contention of Tak Ng against the 2nd ground deserves no serious
consideration, for he could have married Cabacungan when she turned 18,
FACTS:
since under Art. 62 of the Civil Code, only the advice of parents is required.
1. Tak Ng, also known as Teddy Ng, was single when he filed his petition for
3. Instead, he chose to live with her openly for 6 years and bore 3 children out
naturalization, although since 1951, he had been cohabiting extra-maritally
of wedlock. It was only almost a year after he filed the petition when he
with Leonarda Cabacungan, with whom he had 3 children, namely, Adelaida,
decided to marry her, which according to the Solicitor General was evidently
Anthony, and Alfred. He married her in 1957. However, Tak Ng was
entered into merely “for convenience and with the avowed purpose of
convicted by the CFI of Manila and sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00 and
circumventing the provisions of our naturalization laws regarding
was reprimanded and warned by the Deportation Board.
irreproachable character and good moral conduct.”
2. Tak Ng contended that he has intention in good faith to become a Filipino
4. The act of petitioner in cohabiting with Leonarda for 6 years without the
citizen and presented witnesses who testified about knowing him as one
benefit of marriage clearly indicates his bad moral character [Section 2 (3).
who believes in the principles underlying the Constitution and as a person of
Com. Act No. 473]. Declaring that he was single and did not have any child
good moral character with a fixed income (P150 a month). His conviction by
is a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury, as he concealed his true
the CFI of Manila for profiteering should not be taken against him because
status under oath and shows disregard for truth, hence, lack of good moral
he was a mere employee of the St George Grocery and Cold Store, Inc. at
character.
the time; that he had nothing to do with the fixing of the selling price of
commodities sold therein; and that having pleaded guilty to the information
charging him of the offense, was upon the advice of his lawyer and manager DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment of the court a quo, the
of said establishment. same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
3. For the second ground, Tak Ng claims that he failed to marry Leonarda
Cabacungan in 1951, because she was only then 17 or 18 years old, and
her parents objected to their marriage because he was a Chinese citizen.
4. After reception of evidence, the court rendered a decision denying the
petitioner’s application for naturalization, on the grounds that: (1) he was
convicted of profiteering by the CFI of Manila; (2) he falsely stated in his
declaration of intention that he had no children, when in fact he had already
3 at the time with Leonarda.
5. Profiteering, an offense which is severely and heavily penalized with
imprisonment of not more than 10 years or by a fine of not more than
P10,000.00 or by both involves moral turpitude, inasmuch as it affects the
price of prime commodities and goes to the life of the citizens, especially the
poor. Having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, petitioner
is disqualified from naturalization as a Filipino

ISSUE: WON profiteering involving moral turpitude is a crime that disqualifies

petitioner from admission to Philippine citizenship - YES.

27 | TITLE XIII
 22. Betguen vs Masangcay the records of C.A.-G.R. No. 10643 and stated that it should be Atty.
A.M. No. P-93-822 Betguen who should be held accountable for the loss of the records, and not
DATE respondent, since he is the custodian of the court records. In her comment,
respondent likewise imputed several accusations against her co-employees
TOPIC: Intriguing against honor and even against her superiors..
PETITIONERS: Betguen
RESPONDENTS: Masangcay ISSUE: W/N accused be dismissed from service - YES

FACTS: RULING:
- Jovita G. Cabanag and Luz Ancheta filed separate criminal complaints for 5. Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing against honor" as
grave oral defamation against respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor and
Cabarroguis, Quirino reputation of a person.
- The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed respondent's conviction. The records 6. Respondent, having been found guilty of willfully and maliciously causing
of the case (C.A.-G.R. No 10643) were then remanded to the Clerk of Court intrigue against a person for the purpose of tainting his honor and reputation,
of RTC, Quirino, on November 18, 1991, through registered mail with is consequently guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude. On this score
Registry Receipt No. P-5007. These records are the subject of the present alone, her dismissal from the service is warranted
controversy. 7. It should be noted that before respondent was confronted with her signature
- Masangcay, allegedly received from a certain Betty Nasto, an employee of on the registry book, she absolutely denied receiving the parcel containing
the Post Office of Cabarroguis, Quirino, a parcel from the Court of Appeals the missing records but after the registry book was presented to her,
with Registry Receipt No. P-5007, which as later discovered, contained the however, she altered her posture and admitted having received the records
records of C.A.-G.R. No. 10643 but denied having opened or concealed the same
- The loss of the records and its alleged receipt by respondent was only 8. For committing the act complained of, respondent displayed gross or serious
discovered when complainants Cabanag and Ancheta, tired of awaiting the misconduct in office deserving of the extreme penalty of dismissal
outcome of the appeal
- After a thorough investigation, all evidence pointed to respondent as the last DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, respondent Dominga P. Masangcay is hereby
person in possession of the records. DISMISSED from the service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits
- Atty. Betguen, Clerk of Court of RTC Cabarroguis, Quirino, issued a and retirement benefits and disqualification to hold office in any public office including
memorandum to respondent requiring her to explain why she should not be government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent's dismissal is without
held administratively liable for concealment of the records. In her answer, prejudice to any other liability. SO ORDERED.
respondent denied any responsibility for the loss of the records.
- Respondent had already been continuously absent from work. Despite a
memorandum from Atty. Betguen requiring her to explain why she should
not be administratively charged for being absent without leave, respondent
failed to reply or report back for work.
- On May 3, 1993, Executive Judge Gregorio Buenavista of RTC,
Cabarroguis, Quirino, informed the Court Administrator that respondent has
already been declared absent without leave (AWOL) and, coupled with her
conviction for a criminal offense, recommended her dismissal and/or
separation from service
- When directed to comment on the complaints against her, respondent
admitted her conviction, not for grave oral defamation, but for intriguing
against honor. However, she vehemently denied responsibility for the loss of

28 | TITLE XIII
 23. GAANAN v IAC
GR NO. L-69809
Oct. 16, 1986
TOPIC: Wiretapping
PETITIONERS: Edgardo Gaanan
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines
FACTS:
● In 1975, Atty. Pintor and his client, Manuel Montebon, were in the living
room of Montebon’s residence. They were discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against
Leonardo Laconico
● Montebon made a telephone call to Laconico with the proposed conditions
● Laconico then made a phone call to Edgardo Gaanan (a lawyer) to come to
his office to advise him on the settlement because his regular attorney, Leon
Gonzaga, was on a business trip
● Gaanan went to Laconico’s office where he was briefed about the problem.
Pintor called again and Laconico requested that Gaanan secretly listen to
the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so that he can
personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement
○ Pay Montebon P8k = 5k for Pintor in persuading Montebon to
withdraw the case
○ Public apology
○ P1k to Don Bosco Faculty club
○ Transfer of Laconico’s son to another school or section
○ Allow Montebon to continue teaching at the school
○ Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the case
● Laconico agreed to the conditions and was instructed to give the money the
next day
● Laconico followed the instruction but was subsequently arrested
● Gaanan filed an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor’s demands which
prompted the latter to file a complaint against Gaanan and Laconico for
violating the Anti-Wiretapping Act
● TC found both of them guilty
● IAC affirmed the decision
○ Communication between Pintor and Laconico was private in nature
and therefore covered by RA 4200
○ Gaanan overheard such communication without Pintor’s knowledge
and consent
○ Extension telephone which was used is covered in the term
“device” in RA 4200
ISSUE: W/N Gaanan is guilty of violating the Anti-Wiretapping Act? - NO
RULING:
1. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 -- It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph or dtectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described;
2. No question that the telephone conversation between Pintor and Laconico
was private and that only Laconico gave Gaanan authority to listen to and
overhear the message with the use of an extension telephone line
3. However, telephone extension is not covered by the term “device” because it
is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a
separate device.
4. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a device or
arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording the communication
5. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept or record the spoken words
6. The extension telephone was not installed for such purpose and happened
to be there for ordinary office use
7. It cannot be classified to be the same nature or similar to a dictaphone or
other instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone
8. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling probably has an
extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening
9. Penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. As such,
RA 4200 must be construed such that an extension telephone is not
included in the phrase “device or arrangement”
DISPOSITIVE: Petition was granted. IAC decision annulled and set aside and
Gaanan was acquitted
29 | TITLE XIII
 24. Ramirez vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93833
September 28, 1995
TOPIC: Wiretapping
PETITIONER: Socorro Ramirez
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Ester Garcia
FACTS:
1. A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile
and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
2. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event, culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
3. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes."
4. Petitioner vigorously argues that:
a. the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation as the provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those
involved in the communication.
b. the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200
c. R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly
taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal
under the said act.
ISSUE: W/N Ramirez is guilty for violating the Anti WireTapping Act – YES
RULING:
1. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
a. SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
2. First, the aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication
to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
3. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication.
4. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any." Thus, the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications.
5. Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in
the information.What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of
the devices enumerated therein.
6. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
7. Lastly, the word communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation,or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols. These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts".
8. Moreover, the terms “conversation" and "communication" were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
30 | TITLE XIII