I.

JOSHUA

Rule on the constitutionality of the following provision which applies only to Overseas Filipino Workers:

“Section 10. Money Claims. — x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, ​plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services:​ Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, assails the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section
10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042: ​Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, ​plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.

Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII
on labor as a protected sector? ​YES

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court employs the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination
reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs w/ employment contracts of less than 1 year visa-vis OFWs w/ employment contracts of 1 year or
more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-a-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place.
This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment. They were uniformly entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such
limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with
fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the
classification to a strict scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may
possibly serve. The Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest
that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL...
 II. IRISH

The Congress enacted a law which amended the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas which includes a provision that
all employees of the BSP will be covered by the Salary Standardization Law.

After three years, Congress enacted a law which effectively amended the charters of the Landbank of the Philippines, the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Veterans Bank of the Philippines which now exempts their employees from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law.

Aggrieved, the affected employees of the BSP filed a petition before the Supreme Court praying that since BSP supervises
LBP, DBP and VBP, the employees of the BSP should likewise be exempted from the Salary Standardization Law. Is the
legal argument of the BSP employees tenable? Why?

Central Bank Employees Association Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Issue: ​Whether or not the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated upon by exempting BSP officers
(SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law thus violates the equal protection of law clause.

Held: No (Initially). It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable.

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. The
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms
of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result
did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the
discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.

However, ​while RA 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) leeched
all validity out of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653​.

After the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the Land Bank
of the Philippines, Social Security System, Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, Government Service
Insurance System, Development Bank of the Philippines, Home Guaranty Corporation, and Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Thus, 11 years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of 7 other GFIs were granted the
exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. Even the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000. The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653
was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable
because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.

The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, thereby exposing the
proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made
indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other
GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class.

The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences. The disparity of treatment between BSP
rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances
which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.

Thus, the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
7653 was declared unconstitutional​. (partially unconstitutional)
 ​ III. EMMAN

In the case of ​Imbong v. Ochoa,​ the petitioners prayed that the Reproductive Health Law be declared unconstitutional since
public health workers are not allowed any option to administer birth control procedures to their patients. What are the legal
grounds upon which the public health workers may assail the Reproductive Health Law. Explain your answer.

Imbong v Ochoa

Duty to Refer (Conscientious Objector)

Freedom of free speech -

freedom of religion - to do something against his will

ANS:

The petitioners, in this case, assail numerous grounds on the unconstitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law or
the RH Law. As stated in Section 4(n) of the RH Law, it provides for a controlled access policy and requires that the sale,
dispensation or distribution of any contraceptive drug or device should be made only by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company pursuant to a doctor’s prescription. With its thrust of providing universal access to contraceptives,
the law gives the impression that it requires even persons other than doctors of medicine (nurses, midwives, public health
workers, and barangay health workers) to distribute these contraceptives.

Considering the relevant medical issues and health concerns in connection with contraceptives and devices, the
framework of the law where contraceptive drugs and devices are sold, dispensed or distributed only by duly licensed drug
stores or pharmaceutical companies pursuant to a doctor’s prescription is no doubt more in harmony with the principle of
prudence and the precautionary principle than the apparently unrestricted or universal access approach under the RH Law.
This is so as the bodies of women may react differently to said drugs or devices depending on many factors that only a
licensed doctor is capable of determining. Thus, the universal access policy should be read as qualified by the regulated
framework under the law rather than as impliedly repealing the said law.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."

This law is discriminatory and violative of the ​equal protection clause​. Under the ​conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why
they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private
sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise
is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

The test of a conscientious objector is based on the idea that an individual who has claimed the right to refuse to
perform military service based on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who
are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other bene
 IV. KARL

Atty. B.M. serves the Clerk of Court of RTC-Batangas City. The Supreme Court received an anonymous letter informing it
that Atty. B.M. is “moonlighting” and prepares pleadings for clients of his clients in Manila. None of the pleadings involve any
pending case before the RTC=Batangas City where he serves as Clerk of Court. The Supreme Court directed the Executive
Judge of Batangas City to conduct the investigation. During the investigation, Atty. B.M.’s office computer was examined
and all his files were inspected both in his computer and hard copies stored in his office drawers. After an intensive
investigation, the Executive Judge recommended that Atty. B.M. be exonerated because he prepares the pleadings after
office hours and he does the drafting using his personal computer at his residence. Was the recommendation of the
Executive Judge proper? Justify your answer.

The recommendation of the executive judge in exonerating Atty. B.M is correct. As properly cited in Polo v. Constantino,
the government is allowed to search government issued items to its government employees upon having a valid belief that the latter
is related to a government-work-misconduct. This is further supported in the case of O’Connor and Simons where thousands of
pornographic images found in a government issued computer in their office were considered as admissible evidence. However, in
the case, the evidence supporting the belief was found on the personal computer owned by the Atty. B.M hence, should be
inadmissible. In ​A.M. No. P-08-2520, “ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. MIGUEL MORALES, CLERK OF
COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA”, it stated that incriminating evidence found in a personally owned computer
even if found in his government office, should be inadmissible when the search was made without the owner’s consent. This
constitutes a clear violation of the constitutionally protected right against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 3, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. Lastly, the 2 requisites necessary for invoking right to privacy is present in the case. First, that the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
Due to these, the recommendation of the Executive judge based on the inadmissible evidence is proper.
V. MAGS

A. B. C. D and E, all students of Bridgewood College, were found to have violated the Student Manual for posting video clips
where they expressed their support for same sex marriage. The video clips were shared by the President of the Student
Council President to the Guidance Office of the school. After conducting an investigation where the parents of A,B, C, D and
E were summoned, the school administrator said that being a school run by a religious order, the opinion expressed by A,
B, C, D and E is not acceptable as it runs against the very principle that the school espouses. While they were given their
academic credentials, they were not allowed to join the graduation rights. Can the parents of A. B. C. D and E assail the
action of the school for violating their right to privacy of A, B, C, D and E? Why?

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College ​(Basically saying that a public post will not constitute to any violation of one’s right to
privacy coz duh PUBLIC therefore Writ of Habeas Data will not be available)

Issue:​ ​WON there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.

(Habeas Data meaning)

Habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.”

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about
his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
The Supreme Court held that St. Theresa’s College did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the
subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without them challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are,
at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

(No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors)

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort
to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.