Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACTS:
LAWS A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the
BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the
GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The
BALACUIT vs. CFI petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to
FACTS: elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to
Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for
of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes “any person group of the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police
contests or other performances to require children between seven power of the State.
(7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said HELD:
ticket.” The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and
The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
Carcel are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the imprisonment for debt.
Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
by the effect of the said ordinance, they filed a complaint before worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
on June 30, 1969 praying that the subject ordinance be declared obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
declaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by objectives in the following manner:
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed "SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
this in the exercise of its police power. medical education; (b) the examination for registration
of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989 regulation of the practice of medicine in the
DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON Philippines."
this case to be so.
AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle
in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to
right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being
move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll
required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on
way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled
how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’
vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A
right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,
to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll
pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of
way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which
traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap,
petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll
accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open
way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to
Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available
take a bus or drive a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa,
to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the safest
or motorcycle upon using a toll way.
and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies
Petitioners’ reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced.
as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel.
Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies
The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of
to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise
transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The
of police power must first be conclusively justified by research.
obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of
The yardstick has always been simply whether the government’s
(i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not
act is reasonable and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in this
suffered by them alone. 11/30/09
sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious
Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s
government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness,
license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact
though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation.
that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to
Otherwise, no government will be able to act in situations
use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are
demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be
mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary,
tied up conducting studies.
this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is
A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly
allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests
violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal
administered by the LTO. A driver’s license issued by the LTO
protection of the law. Petitioners’ attempt to seek redress from the
merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not
motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail.
a license to drive or operate any form of transportation on any
Petitioners’ contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out
type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand
motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is
merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not
not prohibited.
preclude the government from prescribing which roads are
A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that
accessible to certain vehicles.
is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As explained
Therefore, the petition was partly granted. DOs 74, 215 and 123
by Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio:
of the DPWH and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
x x x To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board were declared void
the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
AO 1 of the DOTC valid.
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if they
124 SCRA 494, 1983
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
ANGLO-FIL TRADING VS. LAZARO
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted
by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
FACTS:
finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate
23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services,
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service,
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves
Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc. ex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte a
[PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due
stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private
when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al.
Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential Decree were operating merely on “hold-over” permits, which were based on
857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permits
ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines
temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient
1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving notice that, at any time, PIPSI’s and Anglo-Fil et.al.’s authorities may
and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management and be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a
Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs’ policy Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and
of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation on the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement in
of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process
which, among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right
recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact
operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order that since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor,
to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it
the President’s memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18 best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not
April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power
stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of
need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory
order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others. In
submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contract general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and
for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among the particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment
existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the or discretion, and to findings of fact.
President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to
award an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980,
PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided, G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005
among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING
services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The AND ARRASTRE INC. (CISAI)
Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On
23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First FACTS:
Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857
the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross and is tasked to implement an integrated program for the
stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with planning, development, financing, and operation of ports and port
preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21 districts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a domestic
August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint corporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, and
in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the porterage business, including cargo handling and hauling services
CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include in Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since 1976, CISAI
Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980, had been granted permits to operate the cargo handling
the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders “in view of operations in Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-year
the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the contract to CISAI to pursue its business endeavor. Upon this time,
countervailing public interest involved.” On 1 September 1980, the CFI PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for the
dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice awarding of cargo handling services through public bidding.
to the Court’s resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able to
preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a continue with its business by virtue of hold-over permits given by
letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to the PPA. During this time, another administrative order PPA AO No.
lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSI’s 03-2000 took effect which amended PPA AO no. 03-90 expressly
holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at South provided that all contract for cargo handling services of more
Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, than 3 years shall be awarded through public bidding. CISAI
therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction initiated an action for specific performance, injunction with
alleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was application for preliminary mandatory injunction, contending that
clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of PPA’s action was I derogation of their vested right over the
jurisdiction. operation of cargo handling enterprise. The lower court granted
CISAI’s prayer for a temporary restraining order. PPA filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial court
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended
setting aside the injunctive writ. CISAI filed a petition for certiorari
on the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations
before the CA, and the CA granted the petition, ordering PPA to
implemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an
desist from conducting the scheduled public bidding for cargo
unlawful deprivation of property rights.
handling operations in the port of Dumaguete. Thus, this instant
appeal.
HELD:
From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of ISSUE: WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handling
discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the operations at the Dumaguete Port.
temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte.
Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard the HELD:
parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargo
hearing the parties’ evidence and arguments, denied the application for handling operations because the continuance of their business
FACTS:
Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “ Guidelines
in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of Firearms
Outside of Residence” issued by PNP Chief Hermogenes
Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speech
before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a
nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the
issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence
(PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines.
Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his
constitutional right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-
abiding licensed gun-owner is the only class subject to the
implementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF,
hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched. Petitioner also averred that
ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected
property rights which cannot be taken away without due process
of law.
ISSUES:
1. WON the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right
2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed
Guidelines is a violation of right to property
3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Police
power
HELD:
1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision on
bearing arms as a constitutional right. The right to bear arms,
then, is a mere statutory privilege unlike in the American
Constitution which was the law invoked by petitioner. Right to
bear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by the
laws passed to regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importation
of firearms; it cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute
right.
2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. A
license is merely a privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the granting authority and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor
does it create a vested right. Such license may be revoked
anytime when the authority deems it fit to do so, and such
revocation does not deprive the holder of any property, or
immunity.
3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus:
The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning FACTS:
of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and The petitioner sought to expropriate the three (3) adjoining land
navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes. with and area of 1,847 sq. meter registered under the name of the
defendants namely Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, Rodulfo,
HELD: Antonio, and Virginia wherein they constructed residential houses
The Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control all several decades ago which they had leased out to tenants until
navigable airspace. Congress has already acted under that the present. In 1983, the lots were classified by the Board of the
power. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that Housing and Urban Development Council as an Area of Priority
'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercise Development for Urban Land Reform under Proclamation Number
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256, of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the
272] air space (over) the United States.' navigable airspace tenants and occupants offered to purchase the lots but the
which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspace respondents refused to sell. On November 1996, upon petition of
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the
Aeronautics Authority. Airspace, apart from the immediate subject land adopted a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos of the
reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for expropriation of the
subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
The contribution of courts must be made through the awarding of
qualified occupants of the land. On January 1996, Mayor Abalos
damages for injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by the
allegedly sent a letter to the respondents offering to purchase the
granting of injunctions to prohibit their flying
said property at P3, 000.00 per sq. meter; respondents did not
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of
of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market
conformity with this opinion. value of P3, 000.00 per sq. meter.
G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993 ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of property intended for the
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. COURT OF APPEALS establishment of a pilot development center and housing project of the
Province of Camarines Sur is in consonance with the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of HELD: YES.
Appeals. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would insure to the direct benefit and
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property
operational, the center would make available to the community
contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
housing project for provincial government employees.
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461,
cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter
N. San Joaquin. of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
The Province of Camarines Sur then filed a motion for the health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
issuance of writ of possession, but the San Joaquins failed to
appear at the hearing of the motion. 252 SCRA 412, 1996
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground
of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court FACTS:
denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of A petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled
deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the “Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.”)
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for Wherein, Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was
possession. ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo,
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring
their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06
dismiss. Both motions were denied. January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins legality of the measure. Thus the assailment of this petition.
asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for ISSUE: Whether or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a
motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical
take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and Institute (“NHI”) as a national historical landmark.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
HELD:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with respect to
The term “public use,” not having been otherwise defined by the
Lot 1406-A I consideration of the waiver of claim for
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting
damages and lass of income for the possession of said lot
a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of
by private respondent.
the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should
thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that “public 2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No.
use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has T-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to pay
long been discarded. for the lot.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: “The taking to be valid
must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as compromise agreement was signed by private respondent
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not through its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted by
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into compromise agreement9 dated January 4, 1993 is quoted
play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to hereunder:
remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at
cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise 1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order
of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to
requirement of public use.” waive, quit claim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & income which it sustained by person of the possession of
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present.
dynamic instrument and one that “is not to be construed narrowly
or pedantically” so as to enable it “to meet adequately whatever 2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud
problems the future has in store.” Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118
constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has square meters which forms part of the lot registered under
ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the
broad as “public welfare. Petitioners, finally, would fault name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and
respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court’s order exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square
which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila. meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be
alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
petitioners which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic,
could properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in 3. That the swap arrangement recognized the fact that the
accord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the state of
DENIED. defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor
of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court
GR No. 137285, January 15, 2001 dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just
ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall
be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.
FACTS:
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines Export 4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be
Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is
Cavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigated immediately final and executory.
riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of
the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area
of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the
Jimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between
Cavite. the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the
Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trial
More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order court approved the compromise agreement.
dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA
to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the
contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc.
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to
utilized for a public purpose. Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993."
In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court reconsidered In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the
the Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to
maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, private the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court,
respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. respondent PEZA moved13 for its reconsideration. The same
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering proved futile since the trial court denied reconsideration in its
two (2) proposals, namely: Order14 dated November 3, 1997.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner, prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in
making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property
corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3,
to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has
1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and Lot 1406-A that should
been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said
be surrendered and returned to petitioner.
expropriated lot. However, it is high time that the petitioner be
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is high time that the
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is
the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate
court. Petitioner filed its Comment17 on January 16, 1998. expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the
judgment of the court to become final and executory and then
ISSUE: The petition anchored on the following assignment of errors: refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for
the property earlier taken and profitably used. Though the
respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot,
1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals committed grave and however, grant the petitioner's prayer for the return of the
reversible error in giving due course to the special Civil Action filed by expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated
respondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 46112 when it was made July 11, 1991, has long become final and executory.
substitute for lost appeal in clear contravention of the Honorable In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this
Court’s ruling in Sempio v. Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) and case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the
Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 703) . expropriation proceedings on the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to the
2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special Civil Action of petitioner.
Certiorari is proper, the Court of Appeals nevertheless wrongly WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The
interpreted the phrase “Original Demand” contained in Article 2041 of Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed
petitioner estate is the return of the subject lot (Lot 1406-B) which with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings, docketed as
sought to be expropriated and not the determination of just Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding the determination of just
compensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if the interpretation of the compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT No.
court of appeals or the import of the phrase in question is correct, it is T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.
Article 2039 of the Civil Code and not Article 2041 which is applicable
to compromise agreements approved by the courts. GR No. 147511, January 20, 2003
REYES VS. NHA
HELD: FACTS:
This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in In 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
interpreting "original demand" to mean the fixing of just separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands,
compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the
purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation cadastral survey of DasmariÒas, Cavite belonging to the
Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and
petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for docketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417.
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion
petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of private of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the
respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406- squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.
A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the only The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of
subject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993. these lots and the payment of just compensation. This was
Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October
receive respondent's Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B.
When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434, 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero 2 and which became
petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of final on November 26, 1987.
the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of On February 24, 1989, the expropriation court (now Branch 18,
Appeals is in according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City) issued an Order 4 the
of Court. dispositive portion of which reads:
This court holds that respondent has the legal authority to "WHEREFORE, and resolving thus, let an Alias Writ of Execution
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a be immediately issued and that:
valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero41 , this Court has (1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby
ruled that, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the ordered to transfer, in the name of the plaintiff National Housing
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept Authority, the following:
influenced by changing conditions. (a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing an area of
We have rules that the concept of just compensation embraces 79,167 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the DasmariÒas, Cavite;
owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a (b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55702 containing an
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, area of 20,872 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,
compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the DasmariÒas, Cavite;
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being (c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639 and RT-4641
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and 6199 with an aggregate area
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary of 159,985 square meters also situated in Barrio Bangkal,
to cope with his loss. We find that respondent capriciously evaded DasmariÒas, Cavite.
its duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the (2) Plaintiff National Housing Authority is likewise hereby ordered,
expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The under pain of contempt, to immediately pay the defendants, the
compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the amounts stated in the Writ of Execution as the adjudicated
trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present, compensation of their expropriated properties, which process was
respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the received by it according to the records, on September 26, 1988,
segregating therefrom, and in separate check, the lawyer's fees in
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
favor of Atty. Bobby P. Yuseco, in the amount of P322,123.05, as enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
sustained by their contract as gleaned from the records, with no the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
other deduction, paying on its own (NHA) account, the necessary political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
legal expenses incident to the registration or issuance of new diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
certificates of title, pursuant to the provisions of the Property To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use
Registration Law (PD 1529); and disposition of property and its increments."
(3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay the corresponding THEREFORE, The appealed judgment is modified as follows:
capital gains tax on the subject properties, directing them 1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay
additionally, to coordinate with the plaintiff NHA in this regard, in petitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest
order to facilitate the termination of this case, put an end to this thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the
controversy and consign the same to its final rest." expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have
been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and
ISSUE: The petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided a question of
Housing Authority the owners' duplicate certificates of title of the
substance not in accord with justice and equity when it ruled that,
expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.
as the judgment of the expropriation court did not contain a
condition that should the expropriated property be not used for
268 SCRA 368
the intended purpose it would revert to the condemnee, the action
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
to declare the forfeiture of rights under the expropriation judgment
*repeated case*
can not prosper;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of substance
not in accord with jurisprudence, justice and equity when it ruled GOVVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL
that the non-payment is not a ground for forfeiture;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003
judgment of expropriation forfeited in light of the failure of NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
respondent to use the expropriated property for the intended
purpose but for a totally different purpose." FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu City,
HELD: an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against respondents.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the It alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the
power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of claimant of a Lot located in Banilad, Cebu City; that defendant
just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states Engracia Urot was the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the same
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just area; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were claimants of
compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and lots in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are in the
just compensation. urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent housing project.
domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Guivelondo filed a
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public Manifestation waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to
use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no expropriate their properties. Thus the RTC issued an order to that
longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the effect. Thereafter, the RTC appointed three Commissioners to
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by ascertain the just compensation of the properties of respondents.
the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now The Commissioners submitted their report recommending the just
been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public compensation be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter, which
benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." was favored by the RTC.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered
concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public impossible because the value of the land sought to be
lands that obviate the need to take private property for public expropriated was too high, and the intended beneficiaries cannot
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We afford. The Motion was denied since the prior case was decided
have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which on already.
impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in After petitioner’s appeal was denied by the CA, the Landbank
areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. executed garnishment proceedings against the funds of NHA.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real
estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the ISSUES:
expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries 1. WON THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED BY THE COURTS TO
cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER
purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a 2. WON JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private AND IF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;
homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service 3. WON WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE
companies, and other private concerns. ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for
the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a HELD:
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The
will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. The second is
resettlement areas.11 The expropriation of private property for concerned with the determination by the Court of the just
the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in compensation.
furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article The outcome of the first phase is final since it disposes of the
XIII of the Constitution which provides that: case. On the other hand, the second phase fixes the amount of
"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the just compensation. Both orders, being final, are however,
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal previously expropriated and paid for;
thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can 3. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial
no longer be questioned. court at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 1979 until
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the RTC, fully paid, is just and fair;
which declared the lawful right to expropriate the properties hence 4. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at
the Order became final. P25/sqm only as what had been previously agreed upon;
Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for
purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The need to HELD:
provide housing to the urban poor was not lost by fact that the Even before the first case, Pobre had established his property as
land cost more than petitioner had expected. The public purpose a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the
of is not diminished by the amount of just compensation the court property that it made it uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision.
has fixed. Questions of facts are beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for
On the issue of the garnishment against petitioner’s funds, there review may only raise questions of law. NPC points out that it did
is a need to determine if it is a government entity. Generally, not take Pobre’s 68,969 sqm property. NPC argues that assuming
funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that it had
garnishment proceedings. successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCC excluded from the 68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPC
with a personality of its own, then its funds are not exempt from had damaged.
garnishment. It was clearly established that the property originally had a total
Hence, it is clear that NHA is not exempt from garnishment. area of 141,300 sqm. Pobre identified the lots forming the 68,969
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for sqm property that comprised the undeveloped area. NPC had the
review is DENIED. opportunity to object to the identification of the lots, but failed to
do so. Thus, the trial and appellate courts’ finding on the total
GR No. 106804, August 12, 2004 land area NPC had damaged cannot be disturbed.
NPC & POBRE vs. CA When possession of the land cannot be turned over to the
landowner because it is not anymore convenient or feasible to do
FACTS: so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to
Petitioner NPC is a public corporation created to generate demand payment of just compensation.
geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to In this case, the property is no longer habitable as a resort-
transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to subdivision. The Property is worthless is now only useful to
exercise the right of eminent domain. NPC. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the
Private respondent Pobre is the owner of property located in Tiwi, second expropriation on the ground that it had found an
Albay. alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort- abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had
subdivision, which he named as “Tiwi Hot Springs Resort already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has
Subdivision.” demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre’s property rights.
On August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute
thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for
Property. The commission found it suitable for domestic use and Pobre’s 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared
potentially for commercial or industrial use. any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from
NPC then became involved with Pobre’s Property in three NPC. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.
instances. The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent
First was on February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one domain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen’s
year eleven lots frof the subdivision. Second was sometime in property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary
1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for
Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property. On procedural requirements.
1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon
NPC’s payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling operations and
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
construction of steam wells. While the first case was pending,
NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by
NPC with Pobre. It altered the topography o the Property. No
RECOVERY OF EXPROPRIATED LAND
action was done on Pobre’s complaints, dumping continued.
Third was on September 1979, when NPC filed its second GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005
expropriation case. NPC needed more lots for the construction ATO vs. GOPUCO
and maintenance of a Well Site. NPC immediately deposited
P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit
represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by FACTS:
the second expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot upon Respondent was the owner of lots consisting of 995 sqm located
the trial court’s issuance of a writ of possession to NPC. in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. The airport had
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint and claimed been turned over by the U.S. Army to the Philippines sometime in
that NPC damaged his Property. He prayed for just compensation 1947 through the Surplus Property Commission. In 1947, the
of all the lots affected. Commission was succeeded by the Bureau of Aeronautics, which
On April 1987, the trial court decided in favor of Pobre, ordered was supplanted by the National Airport Corporation (NAC). The
the whole property to be paid off by NPC. NAC was then dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics
NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was Administration (CAA).
denied by the trial courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the various lot-owners
trial court’s decision and denied NPC’s motion for reconsideration. surrounding the Lahug Airport, including respondent, that the
government was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion.
ISSUES: WON, CA erred: Some landowners sold their properties on the assurance that they
1. In holding that NPC had “taken” the entire Property of Pobre; would be able to repurchase the same when these would no
2. In not excluding from the Property portions of which NPC had longer be used by the airport. Others, including respondent,
refused to do so.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Thus, on April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) for the expropriation of the lots, which the CFI
decided in favor of CAA. No appeal was made. GENUINE NECESSITY
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport began
operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then
President Aquino. On March 1990, respondent wrote the manager G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005
of the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offered to REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM
return the money previously paid. This letter was ignored.
On 08 May 1992, ownership of the Lahug lots were transferred to FACTS:
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
Respondent filed recovery of ownership of his Lot with the RTC of The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
Cebu and maintained that since the Lahug Airport has been action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
closed, the purpose of the property had ceased and title to the Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and
property had therefore reverted to him. 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the
Respondent however failed to present evidence on entering the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
previous compromise agreement made. Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon
Lastly, Gopuco asserted that there were several announcements under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of
that the Lahug Airport was soon to be developed into a 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
commercial complex, which he took to be a scheme of the Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164
Province of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his square meters.
property. After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank,
The RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent to pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the
pay exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs. Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14,
Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to CA, which 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay
overturned the RTC decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey lots the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
to respondent upon payment of the reasonable price as
determined by it, and deleted the costs of damages.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it
was dismissed
ISSUES: For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzons’
1. WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and
THE RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT. Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
2. WON THE CA ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and
LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of
PETITIONERS. the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
HELD:
In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and
939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
phrase “subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous
public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a
payment of a reasonable market value.”
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and
It was ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s
contract which is the law between the parties. Indeed, anyone failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on
its terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since respondent was not their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in
a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke favor of the Republic. In view of “the differences in money value
the same. from 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value
Eminent domain is generally described as “the highest and most at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5,
exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full
acquired for public purpose through a method in the nature of a payment.
forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and
expropriation or condemnation, it is, like police power and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be controversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No.
clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision
our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio
than to grant, the exercise of the power. are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that “private been no payment of just compensation by the Republic.
property shall not be taken for public use without just Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that
compensation.” This prescription is intended to provide a the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest
safeguard against possible abuse. In this case, the judgment on according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of
the propriety of the taking of the compensation received have long P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however,
become final. Neither has respondent, in the present case, the payees could not be ascertained.
adduced any evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in
his favor. Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
The trial court was thus correct in denying respondent’s claim. Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For
However, the petitioner’s claim of harassment or that the their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage
respondent acted in bad faith is unfounded, the imposition of foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in
litigation expenses and costs has no basis. WHEREFORE, the lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.
petition is GRANTED. Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the
G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988 ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exercise
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for
depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and
just compensation
2. Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be ordered to continue
paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of
25% of its internal revenue allotments to Zamboanga del Norte.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic
Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties, consisting of 50
HELD:
PURPOSE OF GUARANTY The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does
not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to
110 US 516, 1884 him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
HURTADO VS CALIFORNIA reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
*no case digest submitted* slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2)
431 SCRA 534 the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was
CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
*no case digest submitted* General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes;
(4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
233 SCRA 163 One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
*no case digest submitted* considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.
“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases.
86 SCRA 275, 1978
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
VILLEGAS VS. HU CHONG TSAI PAO HO
process of law.
*no case digest submitted*
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained
of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
39 Phil 660; No. 14078; March 7, 1919
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
VOID FOR VAGUENESS/OVERBREADTH
FACTS:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be 292 SCRA 141 (1998)
directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES
lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan FACTS:
Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit Administrative Order 308 entitled “Adoption of National and
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead Computerized Identification Reference System”. The purposes of
applications are previously recommended by the provincial the said order are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and foreign
governor. residents with the convenience to transact businesses with basic
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised service and social security providers and other government
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan instrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulent
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including transactions and misrepresentations because it will require a
those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, computerized system to properly and efficiently identify person
were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, seeking basic services on social security.
Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for two
with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in vital constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power of
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Congress to legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenry’s protected zone
Administrative Code. of privacy.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional for
Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they being overbreadth?
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not HELD:
fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that the broadness,
to be punished. vagueness and overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the people’s right
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of to privacy in clear and present danger.
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what specific
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at biological characteristics will be gathered (b) what particular
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be biometrics technology will be employed (c) whether data is limited
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at to use for identification purposes only (d) how data will be handled
Calapan for having run away form the reservation. (e)who shall control and access the data.
Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
ISSUES: expectation of privacy because, as technology advances, the
1. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives level of reasonable expected privacy decreases.
a person of his liberty?
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
FACTS: differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant
The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President Joseph Ejercito to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
Estrada together with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan, notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
and Delia Rajsas of the crime of plunder defined and penalized unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec. 12 R.A. No. 7659. arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does
During the term of President Estrada, he together with the not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
individuals mentioned above wilfully, unlawfully and criminally imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard
amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ill-gotten wealth amounting to four billion ninety seven million ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The
eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge
and seventeen centavos (4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustly may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
Under RA 7080 “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of ambiguity, as in this case.
Plunder” as amended by RA 7659 Section 2, the crime of plunder The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself or in uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
through a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
value of at least fifty million pesos (50,000,000) and shall be Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes: GR No. 171390, May 3, 2006
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, DAVID VS. ARROYO
or malversation of public funds or raids on the public *no case digest submitted*
treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or FACTS:
project or by reason of the office or position of the public Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint against
office concerned; petitioner Ong, a former Commissioner of the BIR claiming that
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or petitioner has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than
disposition of assets belonging to the National his lawful income. The Director of the Fact Finding Committee of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or office of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of investigation on the
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled matter; of which petitioner was required to submit counter affidavit and
corporations and their subsidiaries; controverting evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submitting
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or his Statements of Assets and Liabilities, income tax return, bank
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of certificates showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking
interest or participation including the promise of future Corporation, certificate from SGV and company and other documents
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or assets. Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery of ill-gotten
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or wealth under Ra 1379, in relation to RA’s 3019 and 6770 against Ong
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit and all other person’s concerned.
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, ISSUE/S:
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich 1. WON, the right to preliminary investigation is withheld by RA 1379
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage from a co-respondent Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officer
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the or employee.
Philippines. 2. WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that the office of the
Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for Ombudsman is disqualified to file a petition for forfeiture
vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the considering of the duality of function, as investigator and
statutory definition of the terms and “combination” and “series” in prosecutor of the case.
the key phrase “a combination or a series of overt or criminal 3. WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that RA1379 is
acts” found in Section 1 par. d, and the word “pattern” in Section unconstitutional since it violates the presumption of innocence
4. and the right against self incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for it suffers HELD:
from the vice of vagueness? 1. No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the
public officer or employee who has acquired during his
HELD: incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may be said to be proportion to his salary and his other lawful income and the
RATIO:
In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one
semester and contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is
deemed terminated.
However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing
HELD:
In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to
plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila,
as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-
appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff
Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair
plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations,
We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing
HELD: ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become
The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued
were hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person operation would violate the equal protection of the law
who is in present possession of an office.
Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the HELD:
prior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws
only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of
him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious
incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
correct in contending that by extending the assailed benefits to The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held
respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting that that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the
the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions
privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes
government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of
illegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment
those benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other
interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that — as a seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
private entity — it could legally do so. discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper, exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly — not withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised in without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal
the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to this protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it
Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
challenge the very basis of their arguments? liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed to or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it in same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is
seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is that equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantial
courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the
advance of the necessity of deciding it. rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the
[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.] equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES an outlaw.
ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the last
the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is held
unconstitutional.
FACTS:
Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the New [G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.]
Central Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc., UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSION
filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Bangko Sentral ng ON ELECTIONS
Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso in FACTS:
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter-
unconstitutional because the classification of BSP employees provided requests to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.# The Court has explained the nature of
the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- THE NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE - constructed thereon,… The BUYER shall not erect…any sign or
billboard on the roof…for advertising purposes… restrictions
shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants
until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate…
EMERGENCY POWERS These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the
certificate of title issued to Emilia.
93 PHIL 68, 1953 In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-
*no case digest submitted* 01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the
National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a
commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to
ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is
located.
154 SCRA 142, 1987 On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the
VILLANUEVA VS CASTANEDA lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The
*no case digest submitted* lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story
commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988 company.
SANGALANG VS IAC
ISSUES:
FACTS: 1. Whether or not the restrictions must prevail over the ordinance,
Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before the
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01?
Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential 2. Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot
subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus
(hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with barred from questioning the conditions of said deed
appellant Ayala
The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and HELD:
spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, The legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a
1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,#
certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene “law,
which formed a part of each deed of sale morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Non
The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield
be and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police
must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the order, safety, and general welfare of the people.# Moreover,
general welfare statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every
On April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its contract.
ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati . Under A real party in interest is defined as “the party who stands to be
this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the avails of the suit.” It is noted that the lessee who built the
center line of Jupiter Street commercial structure, it is he and he alone who stands to be
There is a perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of either benefited or injured by the results of the judgment in Civil
Jupiter Street the destruction of which opened the street to the Case No. 64931. He avers he is the party with real interest in the
public. subject matter of the action, as it would be his business, not the
Hermosos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MMC Ordinance represents a legitmate
exercise of police power?
HELD :
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of
police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of AURELIO TIRO vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS
the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been
shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the FACTS:
reversal of the judgments so appealed. In Civil Case No. 11616 of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official
[G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000] capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears
ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu
and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, respondents. City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and
special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect
FACTS: their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of
Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated
with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools.
Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of
Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro
the lot: be used exclusively…for residential purposes only, and pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the
not more than one single-family residential building will be prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the