s the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The
equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play.· One of the basic
principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The equal protection of
the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if
the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause. Same; Same; Same; The
concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and
it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective; The equal protection clause is
aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature.·
According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly
constituted authorities. In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and
it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective. The equal protection clause is
aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government
including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise
is taken. Same; Same; Same; Requisites;
Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.·It, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction.
What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
1
equally to all members of the same class.
„Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification
Same; Same; Same; For a classification to
meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class.·For a
classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace
all persons who naturally belong to the class.
„The classification will be regarded as invalid
if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It
is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense
that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and
as long as this is achieved, all those covered
by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the
law to him.‰ Same; Same; Same; The
classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in
the class it must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. The
classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or under include those that
should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974), and reiterated in a long line of cases,
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws
is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does
not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which
it is directed or by the territory within which
it is to operate. The equal protection of the
laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice,
is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; Same; Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations,
not a class of its own. Applying these
precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate
of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth
„concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration
‰ only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are: * * * In this regard, it
must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Same; Same; Same; The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo
administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from
earlier administrations which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of
impropriety. Though the OSG enumerates
several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not
substantial enough to merit the restriction of
the investigation to the „previous
administration‰ only. The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo
administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from
earlier administrations, which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of
impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do
not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration.
As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial
differences do not make for a valid
classification.
2
Same; Same; Same; The fact remains that
Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification·the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC), to be true to its mandate
of searching for the truth, must not exclude
the other past administrations.·Given the
foregoing physical and legal impossibility,
the Court logically recognizes the
unfeasibility of investigating almost a
centuryÊs worth of graft cases. However, the
fact remains that Executive Order No. 1
suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC,
to be true to its mandate of searching for the
truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be
arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Though the
law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the constitution.
Same; Same; Same; While with regard to
equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every
evil that might conceivably have been
attacked, in Executive Order No. 1, however,
there is no inadvertence. The Court is not
unaware that „mere under inclusiveness is
not fatal to the validity of a law under the
equal protection clause Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-
embracing and does not include all the evils
within its reach. It has been written that a
regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational
predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete. In several instances, the under
inclusiveness was not considered a valid
reason to strike down a law or regulation
where the purpose can be attained in future
legislations or regulations. These cases refer
to the „step by step process. „With regard to
equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every
evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.‰ In Executive Order No. 1,
however, there is no inadvertence. That the
previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned
from the fact that it was underscored at least
three times in the assailed executive order. It
must be noted that Executive Order No. 1
does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the
investigative commissions created in the
past. „The equal protection clause is violated
by purposeful and intentional discrimination.
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines.
Separation of power dictates that each
department has exclusive powers. According
to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art
VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution
outlines tasks of the president, this list is not
defined & exclusive. She has residual &
discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people.
She is obliged to protect the people, promote
their welfare & advance national interest.
(Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution
(Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President
(Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times
of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not
absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part
of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
MOSQUEDA v. PHIL BANANA GROWERS
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal
Protection Clause
Equal treatment neither requires universal
application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction,[120] nor intends to
prohibit legislation by limiting the object to
which it is directed or by the territory in
3
which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of
equal protection envisions equality among
equals determined according to a valid
classification.[122] If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may
be treated and regulated differently from
another.[123] In other word, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on
substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue
that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the
rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
reasonable relationship between the
means and the purpose of the ordinance;
and (2) examine whether the means or the
prohibition against aerial spraying is based
on a substantial or reasonable distinction.
A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against
aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience
and harm to the residents and degrades
the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement
that the classification must rest on
substantial distinction?We answer in the
negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not
limited to aerial spraying but results from
the conduct of any mode of pesticide
application. Even manual spraying or truck-
mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged
health risks to the community and to the
environment.[141] A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that
the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the
process, the ordinance suffers from being
"underinclusive" because the classification
does not include all individuals tainted with
the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate.[143] A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to
the purpose or end appears as an irrational
means to the legislative end because it
poorly serves the intended purpose of the
law.
TATAD VS GARCIA
YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII
of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and
unfair competition.
[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream
oil industry is operated and controlled by
an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that.
Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only
major league players in the oil market. All
other players belong to the lilliputian
league. As the dominant players, Petron,
Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries
of various capacities. The tariff differential
of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the
tariff differential. The other edge cuts and
cuts deep in the heart of their competitors.
It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to
equalize the market power of Petron, Shell
and Caltex by building refineries of their
own will have to spend billions of pesos.
Those who will not build refineries but
compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product
cost by 4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will
induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and
they cannot be attracted by burdening
them with heavy disincentives. Without
new players belonging to the league of
Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our
downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the
balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and
Caltex against prospective new players.
Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply
with the inventory requirement of R.A. No.
8180 in view of their existing storage
facilities. Prospective competitors again
will find compliance with this requirement
difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.
The construction cost of storage facilities
and the cost of inventory can thus scare
prospective players. Their net effect is to
further occlude the entry points of new
players, dampen competition and enhance
the control of the market by the three (3)
existing oil companies.
Finally, we come to the provision on
predatory pricing which is defined as “. . .
selling or offering to sell any product at a
price unreasonably below the industry
average cost so as to attract customers to
the detriment of competitors.”
Respondents contend that this provision
works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and
protects new entrants. The ban on
predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in
isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the
barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the
entry of new players. The inquiry should be
to determine whether predatory pricing on
4
the part of the dominant oil companies is
encouraged by the provisions in the law
blocking the entry of new players. Text-
writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative
answer and we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for predatory pricing is the
sustaining of losses today that will give a
firm monopoly profits in the future. The
monopoly profits will never materialize,
however, if the market is flooded with new
entrants as soon as the successful predator
attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market
contains significant barriers to new entry.
As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential
and the inventory requirement are
significant barriers which discourage new
players to enter the market. Considering
these significant barriers established by
R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with
the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL
and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant
player to engage in predatory pricing and
succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’
charge that this provision on predatory
pricing is anti-competitive is not without
reason.
[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability
clause, but the High Tribunal held that the
offending provisions of the law so
permeated its essence that it had to be
struck down entirely. The provisions on
tariff differential, inventory and predatory
pricing were among the principal props of
R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have
deregulated the downstream oil industry
without these provisions.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSN. VS PRADO
Franking Priveleges-Franking privilege
refers to the privilege of sending mail
without payment of postage. This privilege
is exercised in pursuance of personal or
official designations.
Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
violates the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
unconstitutional, thus violates the equal
protection clause. Philippine Judges
Association vs. Prado
In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike.
What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same
particulars.
The Court finds its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things
similarly situated. The distinction made by
the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
PEOPLE vs CAYAT
No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the
equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.
On the first requisite, the classification rests
on real and substantial distinctions. The non-
Christian tribes refer not to the religious
belief, but in a way to the geographical and
more directly to the natives of the Philippines
of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No.
1639 was designed to insure peace and
order among the non-Christian tribes. The
experience of the past and the lower court
observed that the use of highly intoxicating
liquors by the non-Christian tribes often
resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which
hamper the efforts of the Government to
raise their standard of life and civilization.
Third, the said act is intended to apply for all
times as long as the conditions exist.
Legislature understood that civilization of a
people is a slow process and that hand in
hand with it must go measures of protection
and security. Fourth, the act applies equally
to all members of same class.
LIM vs FELIX
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and
5
recommendation that a probable cause
exists.
NO. If a Judge relies solely on the
certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are
in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement
has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a
grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate
and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were
still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal
issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the
respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.
He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but
a certification. Significantly, the respondent
Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that
the mere certification and recommendation
of the respondent Fiscal that a probable
cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a
warrant of arrest.
Hence, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary. He should call
for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances of the
case so require.
LUZ vs PEOPLE
ISSUE #1: Can Luz be considered lawfully
arrested based on traffic violation under the
city ordinance, and such arrest lead to a
valid search and seizure?
HELD #1: NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested.
When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody
in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be
an intention on the part of one of the parties
to arrest the other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3
Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest.
There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during
which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3
Alteza himself testified that the only reason
they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down almost in
front of that place. Hence, it was only for the
sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
This ruling does not imply that there can be
no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
when there is an intent on the part of the
police officer to deprive the motorist of
liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the
former may be deemed to have arrested the
motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for
the same violation.
ISSUE #2: Assuming that Luz was deemed
arrested, was there a valid warrantless
search and seizure that can still produce
conviction?
HELD#2: NO. Even if one were to work under
the assumption that Luz was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements
for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person
is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons
shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could
be used against them. It may also be noted
that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
6
[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. The subject items seized during the
illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are
the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.
GABO vs people
PEOPLE VS ANDAN
Accused –appelant extrajudicial oral
admission to the mayor is admissible
because it was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In addition, his
confessions to the media were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not
by police or any investigating officer. What
the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions.
EQUIPOISE RULE
Petitioner’s main argument hinges on the
propriety of the RTC’s use of the equipoise
rule in dismissing the case which was
affirmed by the CA. Specifically, petitioner
contends that the equipoise rule cannot be
used by the RTC merely after the filing of the
information, thus:
Since there must be a proper determination
of the presence or absence of evidence
sufficient to support a conviction, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the equipoise rule
shall properly come into play when the
parties have already concluded the
presentation of their respective evidence. It
is only at this stage, not at any prior time
and certainly not merely after the filing of
the information, can the trial court assess
and weigh the evidence of the parties and
thereafter determine which party has the
preponderance of evidence. If both parties
fail to adduce evidence in support of their
respective cases, an adverse decision would
be rendered against the party which has the
burden of proof.38
Under the equipoise rule, where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise,
or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden
of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not suffice to produce a
conviction.
ERROR OF JUDGEMENT
While the use of the equipoise rule was not
proper under the circumstances of the case
at bar, the same, however, does not equate
to an abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC, but at most, merely an error of
judgment. More importantly, this Court finds
that the RTC had in fact complied with the
requirement under the rules of personally
evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence and that the
assailed Order was arrived at after due
consideration of the merits thereto.
The sole office of writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, including
the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does
not include correction of public respondent’s
evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings based thereon.48 An error of
judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible
through the original special civil action of
certiorari.49
In any case, the dismissal of herein petition
does not preclude petitioner from availing of
any other action it deems appropriate under
the premises. Double jeopardy cannot be
invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express
motion that the case was dismissed.50
Moreover, while the absence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is a ground for the dismissal of the case, the
same does not result in the acquittal of the
said accused.
SYDECO
Violation of traffic law is not a crime and
search predicated upon such infraction is not
considered a Search indent to a lawful arrest.
LAUD VS PEOPLE
WON Human Remains are personal property
thus subject of a warrant.
Under the scope of Sec 3, Rule 126, a search
warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
a. Subject of the offense;
b. stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense or used or intended to be
used as a means of committing an offense
considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place to place
and considering further that they qualify
under the phrase “subject of the offense”
given that they prove the crime’s corpus
delicti, it follows that they may be valid
subjects of a search warrant under the
criminal procedure provision.
7
While probable cause should first be
determined before an information may be
filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated
to require the respondent to submit his
counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In
the determination of probable cause, the
prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint,
affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant. If he does not
find probable cause, the prosecutor may
dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds
probable cause or sufficient reason to
proceed with the case, he shall issue a
resolution and file the corresponding
information (TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR.
ET AL. VS. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, ET AL. G.R.
NO. 143591, MAY 5, 2010, SECOND
DIVISION, PEREZ, J.)
PEOPLE V. MARRA
custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. The
safeguards during custodial investigation
begin to operate as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into a still
unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then
focused on a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory
questions that tend to elicit incriminating
statements. The situation contemplated is
more precisely described as one where –
After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or
police headquarters and there questioned
and cross-examined not only by one but as
many investigators as may be necessary to
break down his morale. He finds himself in a
strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and
every person he meets he considers hostile
to him. The investigators are well-trained
and seasoned in their work. They employ all
the methods and means that experience and
study has taught them to extract the truth,
or what may pass for it, out of the detainee.
Most detainees are unlettered and are not
aware of their constitutional rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and
coercive presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence x x x.
MESINA VS PEOPLE
The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his
constitutionally guaranteed rights during the
investigation. He posits that a custodial
investigation was what really transpired, and
insists that the failure to inform him of his
Miranda rights rendered the whole
investigation null and void.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the fact
that he was one of those being investigated
did not by itself define the nature of the
investigation as custodial. For him, the
investigation was still a general inquiry to
ascertain the whereabouts of the missing
patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry
had to involve persons who had direct
supervision over the issue, including the City
Treasurer, the City Auditor, the
representative from different concerned
offices, and even the City Mayor. What was
conducted was not an investigation that
already focused on the petitioner as the
culprit but an administrative inquiry into the
missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of
then in the custody of the police or other law
enforcement office.
PEOPLE VS CABANADA
he OSG argues that although Cabanada's
confession may have been obtained through
PO2 Cotoner's interview, the same was given
freely and spontaneously during a routine
inquiry and not while she was under
custodial investigation. She made the said
admission in her employer's residence
wherein she was neither deprived of her
liberty nor considered a suspect. The OSG
emphasizes that since the investigation had
just begun, it was entirely within the
authority and discretion of the police officers
to question any person within the household
who could have related any unusual events
that occurred on the day the Victoria family
went to Bulacan.
The subsequent confession of Cabanada at
the CIU office can be considered as having
been done in a custodial setting because (1)
after admitting the crime, Cabanada was
brought to the police station for further
investigation; (2) the alleged confession
happened in the office of the chief; (3) PO2
Cotoner was present during Cabanada's
apology and admission to Catherine. The
compelling pressures of custodial setting
were present when the accused was brought
to the police station along with Catherine.
In People v. Javar,28 it was ruled that any
statement obtained in violation of the
constitutional provision, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Even if the
confession contains a grain of truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it
becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.29
Cabanada's confession without counsel at
the police station, which led to the recovery
of the other items at her house, is
inadmissible.
Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of
Cabanada's admission made in CIU does not
necessarily entitle her to a verdict of
acquittal. Her admission during the general
inquiry is still admissible.
PORTERIA VS PEOPLE
8
PEOPLE VS PEPINO
In resolving the admissibility of and relying
on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure.31
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test,
we find Edward's out-of-court identification
to be reliable and thus admissible.
PEOPLE VS LUVENDINO
Issue: Whether the re-enactment of the
accused of a crime he was charged of
without the presence of an independent and
competent counsel can be admitted as
evidience in the court.
Held: No, Clearly, the trial court took into
account the testimony given by Panfilo
Capcap on what had occurred during the re-
enactment of the crime by Luvendino. We
note that the re-enactment was apparently
staged promptly upon apprehension of
Luvendino and even prior to his formal
investigation at the police station. The
decision of the trial court found that the
accused was informed of his constitutional
rights “before he was investigated by Sgt.
Galang in the police headquarters” and cited
the “Salaysay” of appellant Luvendino. The
decision itself, however, states that the re-
enactment took place before Luvendino was
brought to the police station. Thus, it is not
clear from the record that before the re-
enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had
been informed of his constitutional rights
including, specifically, his right to counsel
and that he had waived such right before
proceeding with the demonstration. Under
these circumstances, we must decline to
uphold the admissibility of evidence relating
to that re-enactment. That the
“demonstration” or re-enactment and the
accused extrajudicial confession were
effected and secured in the absence of a
valid waiver by him of his constitutional
rights and that the re-enactment and the
confession should be held inadmissible in
evidence because they had been
involuntarily made.
HOFFA VS US
Issue. “Whether evidence obtained by the
Government by means of deceptively placing
a secret informer in the quarters and
councils of a defendant during one criminal
trial so violates the defendant’s Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights that
suppression of such evidence is required in a
subsequent trial of the same defendant on a
different charge[?]”
Held. The majority first observed that Partin
was a government informant as soon as he
arrived in Nashville and that the government
compensated him for his services as such.
The majority then observed that a hotel
room can clearly be the object of Fourth
Amendment protection as much as a home
or an office. Further that “[i]n the present
case, however, it is evident that no interest
legitimately protected by the Fourth
Amendment is involved. It is obvious that the
petitioner was not relying on the security of
his hotel suite when he made the
incriminating statements to Partin or in
Partins’ presence. Partin did not enter the
suite by force or by stealth. He was not a
surreptitious eavesdropper. Partin was in the
suite by invitation and every conversation
which he heard was either directed to him or
knowingly carried on in his presence. The
petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the
security of the hotel room; he was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that Partin
would not reveal his wrongdoing.” As such,
no right protected by the Fourth Amendment
was violated.
Hoffa’s Fifth Amendment claim that he was
compelled to be a witness against himself
was also without merit. There was no type of
compulsion or coercion.
Hoffa also made two Sixth Amendment
arguments found to be without merit. First,
Hoffa argued that his “lawyers used his suite
as a place to confer with him and with each
other, to interview witnesses, and to plan the
following day’s trial strategy.” Accordingly,
he argued that “Partin’s presence in and
around the suite violated the petitioner’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
an essential ingredient thereof is the right of
a defendant and his counsel to prepare for
trial without intrusion upon their confidential
relationship by an agent of the Government,
the defendant’s trial adversary.” In
discounting this argument, the majority
observed “it is far from clear to what extent
Partin was present at conversations or
conferences of the petitioner’s counsel.”
Also, the majority distinguished two cases by
observing “[Hoffa’s] statements related to
the commission of a quite separate offense.
DELA RAMA VS PEOPLE’S COURT
Whether or not the People's Court has acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's petition for bail.
The fact that the denial by the People's Court
of the petitioner for bail is accompanied by
the above-quoted order of confinement of
the petitioner in the Quezon Institute for
treatment without the latter's consent, does
not in any way modify or qualify the denial
so as to meet or accomplish the
humanitarian purpose or reason underlying
the doctrine adopted by modern trend of
court's decisions which permit bail to
prisoners, irrespective of the nature and
merits of the charge against them, if their
9
continuous confinement during the pendency
of their case would be injurious to their
health or endanger their life.
Considering further that the said People's
Court has adopted and applied the well-
established doctrine cited in our above-
quoted resolution, in several cases, among
them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No.
3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527),
in which the said defendants were released
on bail on the ground that they were ill and
their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the People's Court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to release the petitioner on bail.
Therefore, the order of the People's Court
denying the petition for bail is set aside, and
said court is hereby ordered to render within
a reasonable time a new decision in
conformity with the said doctrine applied by
the same court in the cases above
mentioned.
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,[4] which was
promulgated on July 19, 2016.
The Court in that case reversed the
Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to
evidence in the plunder case against former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
based on the prosecution's failure to specify
the identity of the main plunderer, for whose
benefit the ill-gotten wealth was amassed,
accumulated, and acquired. According to
Napoles, the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo
should have been applied to her case.[5]
In a demurrer to evidence, as in the case of
Macapagal-Arroyo, the accused imposes a
challenge on the sufficiency of the
prosecution's entire evidence. This involves a
determination of whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution has
established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Should the trial court find
the prosecution's evidence insufficient in this
regard, the rant of the demurrer to evidence
is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused.
[6]
The stage at which the accused may demur
to the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence is during the trial on the merits
itself-particularly, after the prosecution has
rested its case.[7] This should be
distinguished from the hearing for the
petition for bail, in which the trial court does
not sit to try the merits of the main case.
Neither does it speculate on the ultimate
outcome of the criminal charge.[8] The Court
has judiciously explained in Atty. Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan[9] the difference between
the preliminary determination of the guilt of
the accused in a petition for bail, and the
proceedings during the trial proper.

NAPOLES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE/S: Did the Sandiganbayan commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Petition for Bail?
RULING: No.
Right to Bail
As a rule, bail may be granted as a matter of
right prior to conviction.
Except (1) when it involves a capital offense
and the evidence of guilt is strong; or (2)
when the accused is a flight risk. In such
cases, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion.
How should a trial court exercise such
discretion? The following are the duties of
the trial court in applications for bail:
(1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application or require him to submit his
recommendation, whether the application for
bail is a matter of right or discretion; (2)
where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct
a hearing on the application regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence, to enable the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (3) decide
whether the evidence of guilt is strong; (4) if
so, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond; otherwise, petition should be
denied.
In this case, Napoles was charged with
Plunder which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. She cannot, thus, be admitted to
bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong.
The burden of proof to show such is on the
prosecution.
The prosecution can discharge its burden by
proving that the evidence shows evident
proof of guilt or a great presumption of guilt,
which the Court defined in People v. Cabral
as follows:
“Proof evident” or “Evident proof’ in this
connection has been held to mean clear,
strong evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion
that the offense has been committed as
charged, that accused is the guilty agent,
and that he will probably be punished
capitally if the law is administered.
“Presumption great” exists when the
circumstances testified to are such that the
inference of guilt naturally to be drawn
therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to
an unbiased judgment and excludes all
reasonable probability of any other
conclusion. Even though there is a
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused,
if on an examination of the entire record the
presumption is great that accused is guilty of
a capital offense, bail should be refused.
10
No grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan scheduled hearings to
allow the parties to submit their respective
pieces of evidence. The prosecution
submitted numerous testimonial and
documentary evidence. Napoles, on the
other hand, opted not to submit any
evidence on her behalf and relied instead on
the supposed weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. The evidence of the prosecution
was summarized accordingly, effectively
complying with the due process
requirements. It even extensively discussed
the available evidence in relation to the
elements of Plunder, which the prosecution
intended to prove point by point for purposes
of demonstrating Napoles’ great
presumption of guilt.
ALTOBANO-RUIZ VS PICHAY
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2)
situations. First, the accused is arrested in
the same province, city or municipality
where his case is pending. Second, the
accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is
pending. In the first situation, the accused
may file bail in the court where his case is
pending or, in the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, with another branch of
the same court within the province or city. In
the second situation, the accused has two (2)
options. First, he may file bail in the court
where his case is pending or, second, he may
file bail with any regional trial court in the
province, city or municipality where he was
arrested. When no regional trial court judge
is available, he may file bail with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge
or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
ndeed, the only circumstance where Judge
Pichay can exercise authority to rule on
Paran's bail application is if the latter, who
was detained in Parañaque City, was not yet
charged with a criminal offense in another
court, pursuant to Section 17(c),9 Rule 114
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However,
in the instant case, there was already a
pending criminal case against Paran before
the MTCC, Trece Martires, Cavite as shown in
the Certificate of Detention10 attached in
Paran's application of bail. In fact, Paran's
arrest was by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Mapili of the MTCC, Trece
Martires City. More importantly, Judge Pichay
likewise failed to prove that there was no
available judge to act on Paran's application
of bail in the said respective courts. Clearly,
Judge Pichay's approval of Paran's bail
constituted an irregularity arising from
his lack of the authority to do so.
PEOPLE VS ESCOBAR
ISSUES: Whether Manuel Escobar's second
petition for bail is barred by res judicata; and
whether respondent should be granted bail.
Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not
barred by res judicata as this doctrine
is not recognized in criminal
proceedings.
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res
judicata settles with finality the dispute
between the parties or their successors-in-
interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res
judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and
"has no bearing on criminal proceedings.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law
and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.
But even if petitioner's arguments were to be
expanded to contemplate "res judicata in
prison grey" or the criminal law concept of
double jeopardy, this Court still finds it
inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
An interlocutory order denying an application
for bail, in this case being criminal in nature,
does not give rise to res judicata. As in
Trinidad, even if we are to expand the
argument of the prosecution in this case to
contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or
double jeopardy, the same will still not apply.
Double jeopardy requires that the accused
has been convicted or acquitted or that the
case against him or her has been dismissed
or terminated without his express consent.
Here, while there was an initial ruling on
Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not
been convicted, acquitted, or has had his
case dismissed or terminated.
Even assuming that this case allows for res
judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's
Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as
there is no final judgment on the merits.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the
following elements:
The judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final;
The decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter;
The disposition of the case must be a
judgment on the merits; and
There must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action.
In deciding on a matter before it, a court
issues either a final judgment or an
interlocutory order. A final judgment "leaves
nothing else to be done" because the period
to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal
has already ruled on the case. In contrast, an
order is considered interlocutory if, between
the beginning and the termination of a case,
the court decides on a point or matter that is
not yet a final judgment on the entire
controversy.
An interlocutory order "settles only some
incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter
arising in an action in other words,
11
something else still needs to be done in the
primary case—the rendition of the final
judgment. Res judicata applies only when
there is a final judgment on the merits of a
case; it cannot be availed of in an
interlocutory order even if this order is not
appealed.
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE GRANTED BAIL.
Appellate courts may correct "errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to
the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments would involve the sacrifice of
justice for technicality."[130] Thus, an
accused may file a second petition for bail,
particularly if there are sudden
developments or a "new matter or fact which
warrants a different view."[131]
Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
states:
Section 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The same evidence used by the trial court to
grant bail to Rolando was not used similarly
in Escobar's favor. As the Court of Appeals
found:[135]
We cannot ignore the allegation of
conspiracy and that the other accused were
all granted bail except him. Specifically,
[Rolando] was granted bail due to the
weakness of Cubillas' testimony against him.
[136]
In light of the circumstances after the denial
of Escobar's First Bail Petition, his Second
Bail Petition should have been given due
course. It should not be denied on the
technical ground of res judicata.
YAP VS COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
141529, JUNE 6, 2001
1. Whether the proposed bail of
P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's
right against excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA
violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel.
Held:
1. Right to Bail
The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00
is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes
an effective denial of petitioner’s right to
bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The
amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but
no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression
that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of
the civil liability that accused is charged of;
this we cannot allow because bail is not
intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court.
2. Liberty of abode and right to travel
The right to change abode and travel within
the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above
provision. The condition imposed by the
Court of Appeals is simply consistent with
the nature and function of a bail bond, which
is to ensure that petitioner will make himself
available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Besides, a closer look
at the questioned condition will show that
petitioner is not prevented from changing
abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.
SALES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the
procedure in conducting preliminary
investigation.
(2) WON the 15-day period to file MR is
mandatory.
Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation was not followed
because of the following reasons. Firstly, the
preliminary investigation was conducted by 3
different investigators, none of whom
completed the preliminary investigation
There was not one continuous proceeding
but rather, cases of passing the buck, the
last one being the OMB throwing the buck to
the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of
murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity
of the offense alone should have merited a
deeper and more thorough preliminary
investigation. The OMB did nothing of the
sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft
investigator. He did a worse job than the
judge, by actually adopting the resolution of
the graft investigator without doing anything
and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan
for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under
preliminary investigation by the OMB is
entitled to a motion for reconsideration,
as maintained by the Rules of
Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration is an
integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper. The denial thereof
is tantamount to the denial of the right
12
itself to a preliminary investigation.
This fact alone renders preliminary
investigation conducted in this case
incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error
for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely
on the OMB’s certification of probable cause
given the prevailing facts of the case much
more so in the face of the latter’s flawed
report and one side factual findings.
The court cannot accept the
Sandiganbayan’s assertion of having found
probable cause on its own, considering the
OMB’s defective report and findings, which
merely rekied on the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution and
disregarded the evidence for the defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering
the Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of
arrest and remanding the OMB for
completion of the preliminary investigation.
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN
PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B.
JOSON, G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015, J.
Peralta
Arraignment was suspended pending the
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost
1 year and 7 months warranted the
application of the limitation of the period for
suspending arraignment. While the pendency
of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of
the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office. It follows, therefore,
that after the expiration of said period, the
trial court is bound to arraign the accused or
to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
While they are correct in stating that the
right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right,
petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the
respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution,
is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that
since filing of a motion for reconsideration is
an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper, an Information filed
without first affording the accused his right
to a motion for reconsideration, is
tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a
preliminary investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on
Sales42 as misplaced. A closer look into said
case would reveal that the accused therein
was denied his right to move for a
reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an
adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation under the Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman before the filing of an
Information. In contrast, petitioners in this
case were afforded their right to move for
reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation when they filed
their “Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for the Withdrawal of Information
Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, City of Manila, pursuant to
Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution
Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)44 and Section
56 of the Manual for Prosecutors.
GWENDOLYN GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
In this case, the Sandiganbayan acted within
its jurisdiction when it issued the HDOs
against the petitioner. That the petitioner
may seek reconsideration of the finding of
probable cause against her by the OMB does
not undermine nor suspend the jurisdiction
already acquired by the Sandiganbayan.
There was also no denial of due process
since the petitioner was not precluded from
filing a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the OMB. In addition, the
resolution of her motion for reconsideration
before the OMB and the conduct of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan may
proceed concurrently.
Moreover, the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman expressly provides
that the filing of a motion of reconsideration
does not prevent the filing of information.
Section 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No.
07 reads:
Section 7. Motion for reconsideration
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or
resolution shall be allowed, the same to be
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof
with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the
proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in
cases where information has already been
filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar
the filing of the corresponding information in
Court on the basis of the finding of probable
cause in the resolution subject of the motion.
(As amended by Administrative Order No. 15,
dated February 16, 2000) (Emphasis ours)
As can be understood from the foregoing, an
information may be filed even before the
lapse of the period to file a motion for
reconsideration of the finding of probable
cause. The investigating prosecutor need not
wait until the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration before filing the information
with the Sandiganbayan especially that his
findings and recommendation already carry
the stamp of approval of the Ombudsman. In
any case, the continuation of the
proceedings is not dependent on the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration
by the investigating prosecutor. In the event
that, after a review of the case, the
investigating prosecutor was convinced that
there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a
belief that the accused committed the
13
offense, his resolution will not result to the
automatic dismissal of the case or
withdrawal of information already filed
before the Sandiganbayan. The matter will
still depend on the sound discretion of the
court.
INORDINATE DELAY
Following Tatad, the right to speedy
disposition of cases was once again invoked,
albeit unsuccessfully, in Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan (Gonzales).33 The denial of
the petition therein was grounded on the
finding that the delay was irremissibly
imputable to petitioner's own conduct,
barring him from be benefitting from both
the constitutional protection and his
numerous motions that sought affirmative
relief. Nevertheless, recognizing the
similarity between the right to speedy
disposition of cases and the right to speedy
trial, the Court imposed the same criteria as
in Barker in determining whether or not
there is a violation of the constitutional right:
It must be here emphasized that the right to
a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed, and such factors as
length of the delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the delay, are considered.
(emphasis added)
PEOPLE VS ROMY LIM
CAGANG VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Whether or not inordinate delay exists in this
case.
RULING:
What may constitute a reasonable time to
resolve a proceeding is not determined by
“mere mathematical reckoning.” It requires
consideration of a number of factors,
including the time required to investigate the
complaint, to file the information, to conduct
an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-
trial, trial proper, and the submission of the
case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances,
such as unavoidable postponements or force
majeure, must also be taken into account.
Determining the length of delay necessarily
involves a query on when a case is deemed
to have commenced.
In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized
that the right to speedy disposition of cases
does not only include the period from which
a case is submitted for resolution.
Rather, it covers the entire period of
investigation even before trial. Thus, the
right may be invoked as early as the
preliminary investigation or inquest.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the
resolution and termination of a preliminary
investigation violates the accused’s right to
due process and the speedy disposition of
cases, and may result in the dismissal of the
case against the accused. The burden of
proving delay depends on whether delay is
alleged within the periods provided by law or
procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred during the given periods, the
burden is on the respondent or the accused
to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the
delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the
given periods, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the delay was
reasonable under the circumstances and that
no prejudice was suffered by the accused as
a result of the delay.
Courts should appraise a reasonable period
from the point of view of how much time a
competent and independent public officer
would need in relation to the complexity of a
given case. If there has been delay, the
prosecution must be able to satisfactorily
explain the reasons for such delay and that
no prejudice was suffered by the accused as
a result. The timely invocation of the
accused’s constitutional rights must also be
examined on a case-to-case basis.
Every accused has the rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and
termination of a preliminary investigation will
result in the dismissal of the case against the
accused. Delay, however, is not determined
through mere mathematical reckoning but
through the examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case.
Nonetheless, the accused must invoke
his or her constitutional rights in a
timely manner. The failure to do so
could be considered by the courts as a
waiver of right.
Admittedly, while there was delay,
petitioner has not shown that he
asserted his rights during this period,
choosing instead to wait until the
information was filed against him with
the Sandiganbayan.
The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan,
Fifth Division that factfinding
investigations are included in the
period for determination of inordinate
delay is ABANDONED.
14
The Barker balancing test provides that
courts must consider the following factors
when determining the existence of
inordinate delay: first, the length of delay;
second, the reason for delay; third, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his
or her right; and fourth, the prejudice to the
defendant as a result of the delay.
CASE BUILD-UP (DELAY)
This period for case build-up cannot likewise
be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as
unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its
investigation takes too long, it can result in
the extinction of criminal liability through the
prescription of the offense.
Considering that fact-finding investigations
are not yet adversarial proceedings against
the accused, the period of investigation will
not be counted in the determination of
whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases was violated. Thus, this Court now
holds that for the purpose of determining
whether inordinate delay exists, a case is
deemed to have commenced from the filing
of the formal complaint and the subsequent
conduct of the preliminary investigation. In
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,132
the ruling that fact-finding investigations are
included in the period for determination of
inordinate delay is abandoned.
RAZON VS TAGITIS
HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN WRIT OF AMPARO
CASES
At this point, we need not go into another full
discussion of the justifications supporting an
evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of
Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to
adhere to the substantial evidence rule that
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with
some adjustments for flexibility in
considering the evidence presented. When
we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually
considered inadmissible under the general
rules of evidence) may be admitted as the
circumstances of the case may require, we
did not thereby dispense with the substantial
evidence rule; we merely relaxed the
evidentiary rule on the admissibility of
evidence, maintaining all the time the
standards of reason and relevance that
underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we
did, by considering the totality of the
obtaining situation and the consistency of
the hearsay evidence with the other
available evidence in the case.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced
in their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all the other pieces of
adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this
minimum test.
ESTRADA VS OMBUDSMAN
HEARSAY EVIDENCE – PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
While a warrant may issue only upon a
finding of "probable cause," this Court has
long held that "the term ‘probable cause’ . . .
means less than evidence which would
justify condemnation," Locke v. United
States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U.S. 348, and that a
finding of "probable cause" may rest upon
evidence which is not legally competent in a
criminal trial. Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 358 U.S. 311. As the Court stated
in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
173, "There is a large difference between the
two things tobe proved (guilt and probable
cause), as well as between the tribunals
which determine them, and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof
required to establish them." Thus, hearsay
may be the basis for issuance of the warrant
"so long as there . . . [is] a substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. United
States, supra, at 362 U.S. 272. And, in
Aguilar, we recognized that "an affidavit may
be based on hearsay information and need
not reflect the direct personal observations
of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is
"informed of some of the underlying
circumstances" supporting the affiant’s
conclusions and his belief that any informant
involved "whose identity need not be
disclosed . . ." was "credible" or his
information "reliable." Aguilar v. Texas,
supra, at 378 U.S. 114. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
However, in administrative cases, where
rights and obligations are finally adjudicated,
what is required is "substantial evidence"
which cannot rest entirely or even partially
on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not
the same as substantial evidence because
substantial evidence excludes hearsay
evidence while substantial basis can include
hearsay evidence. To require the application
of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in
preliminary investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required in determining
probable cause from evidence of likelihood
or probability of guilt to substantial evidence
of guilt.
COLD NEUTRALITY OF THE JUDGE
Respondent's contentions were merely a
rehash of the issues already taken into
consideration and properly resolved by the
Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of bias
15
or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to
be shown.3 Verily, for bias and prejudice to
be considered sufficient justification for the
inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere
suspicion is not enough.
Moreover, as discussed in the main Decision,
respondent's allegations on the grounds for
inhibition were merely based on
speculations, or on distortions of the
language, context and meaning of the
answers given by the concerned Justices as
resource persons in the proceedings of the
Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives. These matters were
squarely resolved by the Court in its main
Decision, as well as in the respective
separate opinions of the Justices involved.
Indeed, the Members of the Court's right to
inhibit are weighed against their duty to
adjudicate the case without fear of
repression. Respondent's motion to require
the inhibition of Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-
De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M.
Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Samuel R.
Martires, and Noel Gimenez Tijam, who all
concurred to the main Decision, would open
the floodgates to the worst kind of forum
shopping, and on its face, would allow
respondent to shop for a Member of the
Court who she perceives to be more
compassionate and friendly to her cause,
and is clearly antithetical to the fair
administration of justice.
TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
This Court has acknowledged the right of a
trial judge to question witnesses with a view
to satisfying his mind upon any material
point which presents itself during the trial of
a case over which he presides. 44 But not
only should his examination be limited to
asking "clarificatory" questions, 45 the right
should be sparingly and judiciously used; for
the rule is that the court should stay out of it
as much as possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of the trial.46
Here, these limitations were not observed.
Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression
that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with,
or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels
for the prosecution in proving the case
against Tabuena and Peralta when the
Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their
cross- examinations supplementing those
made by Prosecutor Viernes and far
exceeding the latter's questions in length.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
requirement of due process was certainly
denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court,
with its overzealousness, assumed the dual
role of magistrate and advocate. In this
connection, the observation made in the
Dissenting Opinion to the effect that the
majority of this Court was "unduly disturbed"
with the number of court questions alone, is
quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the
TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion
not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more
importantly to show that the court questions
were in the interest of the prosecution and
which thus depart from that common
standard of fairness and impartiality.
LIGOT VS REPUBLIC
The silence of the law, however, does not in
any way affect the Court’s own power under
the Constitution to "promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights xxx and procedure in
all courts."41 Pursuant to this power, the
Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting
the effectivity of an extended freeze order to
six months – to otherwise leave the grant of
the extension to the sole discretion of the
CA, which may extend a freeze order
indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of
time – carries serious implications on an
individual’s substantive right to due
process.42 This right demands that no
person be denied his right to property or be
subjected to any governmental action that
amounts to a denial.43 The right to due
process, under these terms, requires a
limitation or at least an inquiry on whether
sufficient justification for the governmental
action.
he Ligots’ case perfectly illustrates the
inequity that would result from giving the CA
the power to extend freeze orders without
limitations. As narrated above, the CA, via its
September 20, 2005 resolution, extended
the freeze order over the Ligots’ various
bank accounts and personal properties "until
after all the appropriate proceedings and/or
investigations being conducted are
terminated."45 By its very terms, the CA
resolution effectively bars the Ligots from
using any of the property covered by the
freeze order until after an eventual civil
forfeiture proceeding is concluded in their
favor and after they shall have been
adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are
suspected of committing. These periods of
extension are way beyond the intent and
purposes of a freeze order which is intended
solely as an interim relief; the civil and
criminal trial courts can very well handle the
disposition of properties related to a
forfeiture case or to a crime charged and
need not rely on the interim relief that the
appellate court issued as a guarantee
against loss of property while the
government is preparing its full case. The
term of the CA’s extension, too, borders on
inflicting a punishment to the Ligots, in
violation of their constitutionally protected
right to be presumed innocent, because the
unreasonable denial of their property comes
before final conviction.
BURDEN/QUANTUM OF PROOF
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned
statutory provisions violate the Constitution
and thus, should be declared null and void
16
Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of
the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. One class
can be treated differently from another class.
In this case, employees 65 years of age are
classified differently from younger
employees. The purpose of the provision is
to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the
workplace. In regards to the second
paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared
null and void for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the
constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to
the fundamental law, is not synonymous with
guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes
the constitutional presumption of innocence,
as a candidate is disqualified from running
for public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a
civil or military tribunal. It condemns before
one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except
as to the degree of proof, no distinction is
made between a person convicted of acts of
dislotalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of
them would be ineligible to run for public
office. A person disqualified to run for public
office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted
of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which
carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during
the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code).”
And although the filing of charges is
considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is
"clear and present danger" that because of
the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with
acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof
to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and
con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative
body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of findings between two government
bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed
to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a
partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is
separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of
Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid and that portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void,
for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an
accused.
REPUBLIC VS SERENO
DOBLADA DOCTRINE
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service
in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed.
Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as
to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted
SALNs by presenting them before the Court.
Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such
information or such evidence, if at all, for no
clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by
Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the
Doblada case, there was a letter of the head
of the personnel of the branch of the court
that the missing SALN exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the OCA as the
repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the
missing SALNs are neither proven to be in
the records of nor was proven to have been
sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The
existence of these SALNs and the fact of
filing thereof were neither established by
direct proof constituting substantial evidence
nor by mere inference. Moreover, the
statement of the Ombudsman is categorical:
“based on records on file, there is no SALN
filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to
2009 except SALN ending December 1998.”
This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno
did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to
discharge its burden of proof with the
certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman,
and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno
to discharge her burden of evidence. Further,
the burden of proof in a quo warranto
proceeding is different when it is filed by the
State in that the burden rests upon the
respondent.
MELGAR VS PEOPLE
Variance Doctrine
In this case, while the prosecution had
established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA
and BBB of support, no evidence was
presented to show that such deprivation
caused either AAA or BBB any mental or
emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot
be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of
RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking
into consideration the variance doctrine
which allows the conviction of an accused for
a crime proved which is different from but
necessarily included in the crime charged33 -
the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar
of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the
deprivation or denial of support, by itself and
even without the additional element of
17
psychological violence, is already specifically
penalized therein.
PEOPLE VS FELICIANO
ISSUES:
Whether or not accused-appellants’
constitutional rights were violated when the
information against them contained the
aggravating circumstance of the use of
masks despite the prosecution presenting
witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly
ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that
accused-appellants were sufficiently
identified.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court held that an information is
sufficient when the accused is fully apprised
of the charge against him to enable him to
prepare his defense. The argument of
appellants that the information filed against
them violates their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them holds no water. The
Court found no merit on the appellants’
arguments that the prosecution should not
have included the phrase “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the
information since they were presenting
testimonial evidence that not all the accused
were wearing masks or that their masks fell
off.
It should be remembered that every
aggravating circumstance being alleged
must be stated in the information. Failure to
state an aggravating circumstance, even if
duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated
as such
It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of “wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise” in the information in
order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating
circumstance because, like nighttime, it
allows the accused to remain anonymous
and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of
testimonial evidence that tends to prove that
the accused were masked but the masks fell
off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance.
What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the
offense they were being charged with, they
tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows
that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be
informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among
the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that
“the act of one is the act of all.” This would
mean all the accused had been one in their
plan to conceal their identity even if there
was evidence later on to prove that some of
them might not have done so.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that the accused were
sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution. It was held that the trial court,
in weighing all the evidence on hand, found
the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible. Slight
inconsistencies in their statements were
immaterial considering the swiftness of the
incident.
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be
admissible but have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police
Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the
scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all
told him that they could not recognize the
attackers since they were all masked. This, it
is argued, could be evidence that could be
given as part of the res gestae.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a
group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence.
Considering that the statements of the
bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact,
admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
The statements made by the bystanders,
although admissible, have little persuasive
value since the bystanders could have seen
the events transpiring at different vantage
points and at different points in time. Even
Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the
time of the attack, testified that the
attackers had their masks on at first, but
later on, some remained masked and some
were unmasked.
When the bystanders’ testimonies are
weighed against those of the victims who
witnessed the entirety of the incident from
beginning to end at close range, the former
become merely corroborative of the fact that
an attack occurred. Their account of the
incident, therefore, must be given
considerably less weight than that of the
victims.
18
Accused-appellants were correctly charged
with murder, and there was treachery in the
commission of the crime
The victims in this case were eating lunch on
campus. They were not at a place where
they would be reasonably expected to be on
guard for any sudden attack by rival
fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also
attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats.
The only way they could parry the blows was
with their arms. In a situation where they
were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be
impossible for them to fight back against the
attackers. The attack also happened in less
than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to
help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the
attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves.
Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case.
PEOPLE VS SOLANO
CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE-RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE
"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."16 In this case, it is
beyond doubt that all the circumstances
taken together point to the singular
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of
all others, committed the crime. As found by
the trial court and affirmed by the appellate
court, the victim was last seen in the
presence of the appellant.1âwphi1 Edwin Jr.
saw appellant chasing the victim. Nestor also
saw appellant dragging the motionless body
of "AAA." The body of the victim was
eventually found buried in the mud near the
place where she was last seen with the
appellant. Appellant admitted holding a
grudge against the family of "AAA" because
he believes that a relative of "AAA" had
raped his [appellant’s] sister. The autopsy
report showed that "AAA" was raped and
strangled. Likewise, appellant could not
ascribe any ill-motive on the part of
prosecution witnesses Edwin Jr., Edwin Sr.
and Nestor whom he even considered as
friends.
We agree with the appellate court’s
ratiocination that -
x x x while no direct evidence was adduced
by the prosecution, We, however, agree with
the trial court that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to hold [appellant]
for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide. As proven by the prosecution, AAA
was last seen in the company of [appellant]
as the person chasing the victim on a grassy
area located at the outskirts of their
barangay. Contrary to the [appellant’s]
supposition, We find that the distance of
about 50-60 meters is enough for one person
to recognize another person’s face. This is
especially true since it had been established
by one witness that [appellant] turned his
face towards him x x x and that he was able
to see him before AAA ran towards the knee-
high cogon grass.
MALABANAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Variance between the allegation contained in
the Information and the conviction resulting
from trial cannot justify a conviction for
either the offense charged or the offense
proved unless either is included in the other.
Comparing the two provisions and the
elements of falsification respectively
enumerated therein, it is readily apparent
that the two felonies are different.
Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172
goes beyond the elements of falsification
enumerated under Article 171. The former
requires additional independent evidence of
damage or intention to cause the same to a
third person.42 Simply put, in Article 171,
damage is not an element of the crime; but
in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification
of a private document, damage is an
element necessary for conviction.
Since Alid was not specifically informed of
the complete nature and cause of the
accusation against him, he cannot be
convicted of falsification of a private
document under paragraph 2 of Article 172.
To convict him therefor, as the
Sandiganbayan did, violates the very
proscription found in the Constitution and
our Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this
ground alone, we find that the court a quo
erred in its decision.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO
ISSUES:
 Whether the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on
petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus was appealable to the Court of
Appeals; and
 Whether petitioner Salibo's proper
remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his
Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable
to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig
City. The trial court then heard respondent
Warden on his Return and decided the
Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the
trial court "acquired the power and authority
to determine the merits"74 of petitioner
Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition
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for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the
decision of the trial court, not of the Court of
Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the
court with appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of trial courts,75 respondent
Warden correctly filed the appeal before the
Court of Appeals.
2. Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the
writ of habeas corpus "was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and
as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom."77 The remedy of habeas
corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in
nature, consistent with the law's "zealous
regard for personal liberty.
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to
this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested
by virtue of any warrant charging him of an
offense. He was not restrained under a lawful
process or an order of a court. He was
illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a
Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant
of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a
Motion to Quash Information apply to him.
Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to
Quash, the defect he alleged could not have
been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant
of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to
"Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the
lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the
defect of lack of preliminary investigation.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest
were issued on the premise that Butukan S.
Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the
same person. There is evidence, however,
that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but
another person named Datukan Malang
Salibo.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are
prejudging neither his guilt nor his
innocence. However, between a citizen who
has shown that he was illegally deprived of
his liberty without due process of law and the
government that has all the "manpower and
the resources at [its] command"157 to
properly indict a citizen but failed to do so,
we will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute
petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper
remedies against him as provided in our
Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner
Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His
Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
MAYOR MAMBA VS BUENO
Whether or not the CA erred in issuing the
writ of amparo in favour of the respondent.

HELD
The petition is devoid of merit.
After a thorough review of the records of the
case, the Court affirms the factual findings of
the CA, which is largely based on
respondent’s evidence. The totality of the
evidence presented by the respondent meets
the requisite evidenciary threshold. His
allegation were corroborated by the
testimony of Haber who further testified to
their torture. He added that he and the
respondent were brought to the guardhouse
where they were suffocated by placing
plastic bags on their heads, and that a wire
was inserted to their penises.
The respondent’s claim was further
corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who that she
examined the respondent and found that he
suffered several injuries and multiple second
degree burns. It also attested that
respondent had scars on his head, arms and
back. What is clear is that the respondent
was able to prove by substantial evidence
that he was apprehended by the members of
the Task Force, illegally detained, and
tortured.
The fact that the respondent, after four days
of detention, had been released, however,
does not negate the propriety of the grant of
writ of amparo.
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still be
issued in the respondents favour
notwithstanding his release. Verily, the
petitioners failed to point to any specific
measures undertaken by them to effectively
investigate the irregularities alleged by the
respondent and to prosecute those who are
responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal
detention and torture suffered by the
respondent were perpetrated by the
members of the Task Force themselves.
Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this
case that would warrant the conclusion that
the respondent’s right to security, as a
guarantee of protection by the government,
was violated.
Accordingly, the CA correctly issued the writ
of amparo in favour of the respondent. The
petition is denied and the decision and
resolution of the CA are affirmed.
WRIT OF AMPARO
PADOR VS ARCAYAN
The writ of amparo was originally conceived
as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended
to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing
20
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.31 x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion
upon petitioners’ ampalaya farm is an
insufficient ground to grant the privilege of
the writ of amparo.
The records show that Barangay Captain
Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual
basis for his actions. Moreover, the records
are bereft of any evidence that petitioners
were coerced to attend the conference
through the use of force or intimidation. On
the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse
to attend the conference, as they have in
fact done in this case.1âwphi1
The fourth allegation of petitioner – that,
following these events, they can anticipate
more harassment cases, false accusations
and possible violence from respondents – is
baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely
on pure speculations and conjectures. As
such, this allegation does not warrant the
consideration of this Court
PASCUAL VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS, G.R. NO. L-25018, MAY 26, 1969
Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with
malpractice in administrative case can avail
of the constitutional guarantee not to be a
witness against himself.
Held:
Yes. The case for malpractice and
cancellation of the license to practice
medicine while administrative in character
possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An
unfavorable decision would result in the
revocation of the license of the respondent
to practice medicine. Consequently, he can
refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends
not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on
witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to
remain silent and refuse to take the witness
stand when called by as a witness by the
prosecution. The reason is that the right
against self incrimination, along with the
other rights granted to the accused, stands
for a belief that while a crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objective should not
be accomplished according to means and
methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded to the human personality.
OCA VS JUDGE ELIZA B. YU
The respondent's argument that she was
deprived of the guarantee against self-
incrimination has no basis. As a judge, she
was quite aware that the constitutional
guarantee only set the privilege of an
individual to refuse to answer incriminating
questions that may directly or indirectly
render her criminally liable. The
constitutional guarantee simply secures to a
witness - whether a party or not - the right to
refuse to answer any particular incriminatory
question.28 The privilege did not prohibit
legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At
any rate, the rule only finds application in
case of oral testimony and does not apply to
object evidence.
The respondent's correspondences were
outside the scope of the constitutional
proscription against self-incrimination. She
had not been subjected to testimonial
compulsion in which she could validly raise
her right against self-incrimination.
LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional
provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise
of the police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can
very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
IVLER VS JUDGE MODESTO SAN PEDRO
Whether petitioner’s constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband.
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The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied
to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused
facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or
light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying
a lower rung of culpability, should cushion
the effect of this ruling.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
Aglipay v. Ruiz - commemorative postage
stamp – Act. No. 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose. What it gives is the
discretionary power to determine when the
issuance if special postage stamps would be
advantageous to the government. The only
purpose of the commemorative postage
stamps was to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists
PERALTA VS PHILPOST
It said the costs for the printing and issuance
of the 50,000 stamps were all paid for by
INC. “Any perceived use of the government
property, machines or otherwise, is de
minimis [about minimal things] and certainly
do not amount to a sponsorship of a specific
religion,” the SC said.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is not
convinced that PhilPost has actually used its
resources to endorse, nor encourage
Filipinos to join INC or observe the latter’s
doctrines. On the contrary, this Court agrees
with the respondents that the printing of the
INC commemorative stamp was endeavored
merely as part of PhilPost’s ordinary
business,” the Court said.
CITING its principle of “benevolent
neutrality” in resolving disputes between the
State and the Church, the Supreme Court
(SC) has ruled that the Philippine Postal
Corp. (PhilPost) did not violate the
Constitution when it allowed the printing and
sale of more than 1.2 million postage stamps
to commemorate the 100th founding
anniversary of Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) in 2014.
IN RE: VALENCIANO
Issue:
underscored the rule that the only
justification for relief is the existence of clear
and present danger, both grave and
imminent, which is of serious evil to public
interest. In the case at bar, the Court held
that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
nonparticipation in the flag ceremony in no
way poses a clear and present danger to
society. Thus, restraint on the part of the
government would be unjustified. Moreover,
the petitioner’s right to quality education, as
granted by the Constitution was likewise
violated by effecting the expulsion.

Whether or not the holding of masses at the

basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice
violates the constitutional principle of
separation of Church and State as well as the
constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public money or property for
the benefit of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution or system
of religion.
The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of
Justice does not amount to the union of
Church and State. The 1987 constitution
provides that the separation of Church and
the State shall be inviolable; if further
provides that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to
the principle of separation of Church and
state. In fact, these two principles are in
perfect harmony with each other. The Roman
Catholic express their worship through the
holy mass and to stop these would be
tantamount to repressing the right to the
free exercise of their religion.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario
where the appropriation is primarily intended
for the furtherance of a particular church.
The aforecited constitutional provision “does
not inhibit the use of public property for
religious purposes when the religious
character of such use is merely incidental to
a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general.
Thus, the basement of the Quezon City Hall
of Justice has remained to be a public
property devoted for public use because the
holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere
incidental consequence of its primary
purpose.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Ebralinag v. Superintendent – saluting the

flag; pledge – abandoned the ruling in
Gerona. The 2-fold aspect of religious
freedom, (1) the absolute freedom to believe
as long as such is limited within the realm of
thought, (2) the freedom to act on one’s
belief, which may be regulated. It
22