Sec. 5 – Sexual Abuse
However, he admitted
G.R. No. 208469 August 13, 2014
People of the Philippines v. Samuel "Tiw-Tiw"
Sanico
FACTS:
AAA was 12 years old when the acts complained of
were allegedly committed by Samuel Sanico
(Sanico), who was a pig butcher and ice cream
vendor, but was already 15 years of age at the time
she testified in court. She claimed that the accused-
appellant raped her in 2005, but she could not recall
the exact month and date. She remembered though
that she was raped at around 2:00 p.m.while she
was washing dishes in the kitchen. There was
nobody else in the house except her and Sanico.
The latter approached and held her hands tightly.
She boxed him, but he pushed her. Thereafter, he
threatened to kill her if she would shout. AAA was
overcome by fear. He then succeeded in removing
her clothes and undergarments and pushing her
against the wall. He took off his short pants and
briefs and inserted his penis into her vagina for two
to three minutes. AAA alleged that she was again
raped for six or seven times, but she endured the
harrowing experiences in silence due to Sanico’s
threat to kill her.
On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was
napping in a room with her niece. AAA woke up
when she felt that the accused-appellant was
touching her. AAA rose and repeatedly boxed him,
but the latter held her tightly, pulled up her clothes
and mashed her breast. AAA’s father, CCC, was
just in another room at that time, but out of fear, she
kept quiet. When the accused-appellant took off his
short pants and inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina, the latter resisted. Being merely built out of
wood, the house shook which caused CCC to wake
up and caught Sanico performing lascivious acts on
AAA. Sanico then seized the opportunity to flee.
On the same day, Dr. Orais performed a medico-
genital examination on AAA and found the latter to
have suffered from sexual abuse. No human
spermatozoa were found in AAA’s vagina. Dr. Orais,
however, explained that even in the presence of
seminal fluid, there are cases when no sperm can
be found. Dr. Orais likewise noted no physical or
extra-genital injuries on AAA, but found ample
evidence of sexual intercourse having occurred
more than one but less than four month/s ago.
Two separate Informations were filed against
Sanico before the RTC, one for the violation of
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended in relation to
R.A. [No.] 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness) and one
for Rape.
The accused-appellant was the lone witness for the
defense. He testified that he had never inserted his
penis in AAA’s vagina.
touching AAA on April 19, 2006 but he did so only
because the latter initiated it. He also claimed that
he was very close to AAA and he treated her as if
she were his own child.
The RTC convicted Sanico of both crimes charged,
finding AAA’s testimony of what had transpired as
sincere and truthful, noting though that a specific
allegation as to the exact date and month of the
commission of rape in 2005 was absent. Further,
the court found no ill-motive from AAA which could
have induced the latter to fabricate such grave
charges.
The CA affirmed RTC’s verdict of conviction against
him but amended the penalty imposed on the crime
of violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended in relation to R.A. [No.] 7610
(Acts of Lasciviousness). CA explained that during
the trial, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of the requisites of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610. Hence, imposing a
higher penalty than what was ruled by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused–appellant is guilty as
charged for both crimes?
HELD:
Yes. The Court affirmed the conviction of Sanico
for both crimes charged against him but modified
the same by reinstating the penalty and damages
for lascivious conduct imposed by the RTC.
As to the crime of violation of Article 336 of the
RPC, as amended in relation to R.A. No. 7610 (Acts
of Lasciviousness)
Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse.- Children, whether male or female,
who for money or profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape
 and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the RPC for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x.
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit, but also where one –
through coercion, intimidation or influence –
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child.
The definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious
conduct under Section 2(g) and (h) of the IRR of RA
7610, particularly on child abuse, are as follows:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement
or coercion of a child to engage in, or
assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional
touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same
or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or [pubic] area of
a person. x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 are the following: (1) the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
Indubitably, Sanico is guilty of acts of lasciviousness
under the provision cited after having admitted the
lascivious conduct he made with AAA. It is
undisputed that AAA was still 12 years old when the
crime happened and as admitted by himself, he was
touching AAA because AAA was looking for money
inside his pocket and he told AAA to remove her
short pants for him to see her private part. x x x. It is
important to note however that a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when the child
indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult.
As to the crime of Rape
The following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction to be had in the
crime of rape,: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is twelve years of age, or is demented.
Sanico’s contention that the rape allegedly
committed on April 19, 2006 was highly implausible
because of the absence of fresh lacerations and
spermatozoa in AAA’s vagina is untenable.
Repetitive as it may be, the rape was committed in
2005 and not shortly before the medical
examination conducted upon AAA on April 19, 2006.
Further, the Court ruled that it is unimaginable for a
young girl like AAA to concoct a tale of defloration,
drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of
shame, and make them the object of gossip among
their neighbors and friends if the accusation was
indeed untrue.
Application of RPC vs. RA 7610
G.R. No. 214497 April 18, 2017
Eduardo Quimvel vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the
incident, is the oldest among the children of XXX
and YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in
Batangas while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who
derived income from selling vegetables. AAA and
her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with
YYY in Palapas, Ligao City.
On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the
caretaker of the ducks of AAA's grandfather. He
lived with AAA's grandparents whose house was
just a few meters away from YYY's house.
It was around 8pm when YYY (father) went out of
the house to buy kerosene since there was no
electricity. AAA was left in the house together with
her siblings BBB and CCC. Quimvel arrived with a
vegetable viand. AAA requested Quimvel to stay
with them because they were afraid. Quimvel
agreed to accompany them. When AAA and her
siblings went to sleep, AAA was arose because she
felt Quimvel’s right leg on top of her body and was
caressing his vagina. She removed his hand.
Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived.
When asked what he was doing in their house, he
said that he was merely accompanying YYY’s
children.
Few days later, XXX (mother) arrived from
Batangas. She asked her children what they were
doing while she was away. BBB told their mother
that Quimvel touched her Ate. AAA, then, recounted
what Quimvel did to her. XXX and YYY immediately
reported the incident to the police station.
Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for
medical examination.
When arrested, Quimvel denied all allegations. He
said that he never went to AAA's house that
evening. He was charged of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(a) Art. III of RA
7610.
The RTC found Quimvel guilty as charged. CA
affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.
One of the issues raised by Quimvel is that
assuming that he was guilty, Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) should be applied and
not Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA correctly convicted Quimvel
under Section 5(b) of RA 7610?
HELD:
Yes. Quimvel should be charged and convicted
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
The Court finds that the Information has sufficiently
alleged the existence of all the elements constituting
the violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Quimvel
alleged that the element that “the victim is exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse”
was absent in the case at bar.
Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or
connected with child prostitution wherein the child is
abused primarily for profit. Section 5(b) of the RA
7610 punishes sexual intercourse or
lasciviousness conduct committed on a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not
only situation where a child is abused for profit
but also one in which a child, through coercion,
intimidation or influence, engages in sexual
intercourse or lasciviousness conduct. Hence,
the law punishes not only child prostitution but also
other forms of sexual abuse against children.
Further, based on the deliberation of the Senate, the
original wordings of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 was
expanded so as to cover abuses that are not
characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise. The
abuse suffered by AAA clearly falls under the said
expanded scope and the lasciviousness conduct
was committed through use of force and
intimidation.
Lascivious conduct RA 7610 v. Art. 336
G.R. No. 229861 JULY 2, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Ejercito
FACTS:
At around six (6) o'clock in the evening, AAA, then a
fifteen (15) year old high school student, was
cleaning the chicken cage at the back of their house
located when suddenly, she saw Francisco Ejercito
(Ejercito) pointing a gun at her saying, "Ato ato Zang
ni. Sabta Zang ko. Ayaw gyud saba para dili
madamay imo pamilya. ''AAA pleaded, "'Tang, don't
do this to me'' but the latter replied, "Do you want
me to kill you? I will even include your mother and
father." Thereafter, Ejercito dragged AAA to a
nearby barn, removed her shorts and underwear,
while he undressed and placed himself on top of
her. He covered her mouth with his right hand and
used his left hand to point the gun at her, as he
inserted his penis into her vagina and made back
and forth movements. When he finished the sexual
act, Ejercito casually walked away and warned AAA
not to tell anybody or else, her parents will get killed.
Trying to forget her harrowing experience, AAA
moved to the city to pursue her studies. However,
Ejercito was able to track her down. She became
his sex slave and was forced to use shabu. AAA
eventually became drug dependent and Ejercito’s
paramour from 2002 to 2005.
Upon discovery of Ejercito’s wife and AAA’s mother,
AAA was taken from Ejercito, and the latter was
charged of the crime of Rape. Accused-appellant
averred that during the existence of their affair from
2002 to 2004, he and AAA frequently had
consensual sex and the latter even abandoned her
family in order to live with him in various places.
RTC found Ejercito guilty as charged, and CA
affirmed the decision but with modification, applying
the Old Rape Law or the Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The CA did not give credence to his
sweetheart defense, pointing out that
assuming arguendo that he indeed eventually had a
relationship with AAA, their first sexual encounter in
2001 was without the latter's consent and was
attended with force and intimidation as he pointed a
gun at her while satisfying his lustful desires.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is correct?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Ejercito is guilty
for the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the
RPC as amended by RA 8353, and not of Article
335 of the same Code. Section 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353 was also not applied
in this case.
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation
to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12
years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted
for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article
266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other
hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-
A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal
Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of
both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced.
The elements of Rape under Section 266-A of the
RPC are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; or when the victim is under twelve years
of age. The gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse
with a woman against her will.
Article 335 of the RPC was already amended by RA
8353 in 1997. RA 8353 re-classify the crime of Rape
from being a crime against chastity to a crime
against persons, it also provided· for more
particularized instances of rape and conjunctively, a
new set of penalties therefor.
The Court further explained why Article 266-A
applies in this case rather than Section 5 (b) of RA
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which
also penalizes rape committed against a minor. The
prosecution was able to establish the fact that
Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse
against and without the consent of AAA, who was
only 15 years old at that time, as such, she is
considered under the law as a child who is
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse;" hence, may as well be classified as a
violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. However, it is
a rule in statutory construction that when there are
two penal laws which may both theoretically apply to
the same case, then the law which is more special
in nature, regardless of the time of enactment,
should prevail.
The Court observes that RA 8353 amending the
RPC should now be uniformly applied in cases
involving sexual intercourse committed against
minors, and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Indeed,
while RA 7610 has been considered as a special
law that covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA
8353 has expanded the reach of our already
existing rape laws. These existing rape laws should
not only pertain to the old Article 335 of the RPC but
also to the provision on sexual intercourse under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Apart from the fact that
RA 8353 was passed later than RA 7610, the former
is a more comprehensive law on rape. Therefore, in
rape cases involving minors, RA 8353 should be
uniformly applied.
G.R. No. 218970, June 28, 2017
RICHARD ESCALANTE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Escalante was charged with the crime of child abuse committed
against AAA, who was then a twelve (12) year old minor. When
arraigned, he pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.
At around midnight of December 24, 2006, AAA accompanied his
classmate Mark in going home. On his way back from Mark's
house, AAA was called by Escalante and was pulled into a comfort
room at the Divine School in Parada, Valenzuela City. Once inside,
Escalante pulled down AAA's shorts and sucked the latter's penis
for about ten (10) minutes. Shortly thereafter, he forcibly inserted
AAA's penis into his anus.
Four (4) days after the incident, AAA complained to his mother that
he was experiencing pain in his penis and had difficulty in
urinating. He divulged the incident to his mother, who then brought
him to the Fatima Medical Center for examination. In the course of
the examination, it was determined that he was afflicted with
gonorrhoea, a sexually-transmitted disease and urinary tract
infection.
The defense of Escalante was alibi.
The RTC found Escalante guilty of violating Section 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610. It ruled that the totality of the prosecution's evidence was
sufficient to establish that he physically and sexually abused AAA.
Aggrieved, Escalante appealed before the CA. In his Appellant's
Brief, he contended that he was not positively identified by AAA as
his abuser. The CA affirmed Escalante's conviction for the crime of
child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. It held that
AAA's testimony was credible because there was no reason for
him to fabricate such a story, considering that he was only a child
and it was unlikely that he would place himself in such a
humiliating experience.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING
HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY DESPITE REASONABLE DOUBT
OWING TO THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
REALLY POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
RULING:
NO.
Escalante was sufficiently and appropriately identified
In People v. Pineda,12 the Court laid down the guidelines in
identifications of accused through photographs, to wit:
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that
a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely of that of
the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown
a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no
way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.1
The said guidelines are necessary considering that the out-of-court
identification of an accused is susceptible to suggestiveness.
These paramaters are in place to make the identification of the
accused as objective as possible.
In the case at bench, there is no reason to doubt AAA's
identification of Escalante. It is noteworthy that the identification
was done in open court. Further, the trial court adopted a similar
manner with out-of-court identifications through photographs. As
culled from the records, AAA was presented with several pictures
in open court from which he was asked to pinpoint who was his
abuser. He was able to identify Escalante without any leading
question which clearly suggests that the picture identified was that
of the latter.
Thus, AAA's identification was objective enough to be credible
because it was done under court supervision and with the added
parameters usually observed in out-of-court identifications.
Significantly, no objections were raised over the manner in which
Escalante was identified, which, it must be noted, was only
resorted to because he failed to appear in court for identification.
Further, AAA positively identified Escalante. Alibis and denials are
worthless in light of positive identification by witnesses who have
no motive to falsely testify.16 The RTC and the CA found no cogent
reason for AAA to fabricate his allegations against Escalante.
Child Abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, not Section
10(a) thereof
Escalante was convicted by the RTC of child abuse under Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The correct provision, however, should be
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which imposes a higher penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse . — Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse: xxx
On the other hand, Section 10(a) thereof states
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation
and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions, Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 specifically applies in case of sexual abuse
committed against children; whereas, Section 10(a) thereof
punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by other
provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Parenthetically, the offense will not fall
under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 if the same is specifically
penalized by a particular provision of the law such as Section 5(b)
for sexual abuse.
G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NOEL GO CAOILI
ALIAS "BOY TAGALOG", Respondent.
G.R. No. 196848, August 8, 2017
NOEL GO CAOILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
FACTS:
The victim, AAA, testified that on October 23, 2005, at 7:00p.m.,
her father, Caoili, sexually molested her at their house located in
Barangay JJJ, Municipality of KKK, in the Province of LLL. Caoili
kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth
finger of his left hand into her vagina, and made a push and pull
movement into her vagina with such finger for 30 minutes. AAA felt
excruciating pain during and after the ordeal. Against her father's
harsh warning not to go out of the house, AAA proceeded to the
house of her uncle, BBB.
On October 26, 2005, AAA disclosed to Emelia Loayon (Loayon),
the guidance counselor at AAA's school, the sexual molestation
and physical violence committed against her by her own father.
Loayon accompanied AAA to the police station to report the sexual
and physical abuse. AAA also executed a sworn statement 13
regarding the incident before the Municipal Mayor.14
AAA underwent a medical examination conducted by Dr. Ramie
Hipe (Dr. Hipe) at the [KKK] Medicare Community Hospital. Dr.
Hipe referred AAA to a Medical Specialist, Dr. Lucila Clerino (Dr.
Clerino), for further Medico-Legal examination and vaginal smear.
Dr. Clerino issued a Supplementary Medical Certificate indicating
that AAA's hymenal area had lacerations complete at 6 o'clock and
9 o'clock superficial laceration at 12 o'clock.17
For his defense, Caoili denied molesting AAA.
The RTC rendered its Decision declaring Caoili guilty of rape by
sexual assault.
The CA SET ASIDE the assailed decision. The CA held that
although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the
trial court should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to
file a new Information charging the proper offense, and after
compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF
CAOILI ON THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION;
RULING:
YES. The prosecution has established rape by sexual assault.
R.A. No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" amended Article
335, the provision on rape in the RPC, reclassifying rape as a
crime against persons and introducing rape by "sexual assault," as
differentiated from rape through "carnal knowledge" or rape
through "sexual intercourse."31 Incorporated into the RPC by R.A.
No. 8353, Article 266-A reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is
committed -
1) By a man who shall havecarnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; [and]
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present[.]
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.32 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, rape under the RPC, as amended, can be committed in two
ways:
(1) Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual
intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape." The
central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal
knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also
called "instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape." It must be
attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.33 (Emphasis ours)
Through AAA's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that
Caoili molested his own daughter when he inserted his finger into
her vagina and thereafter made a push and pull movement with
such finger for 30 minutes,34 thus, clearly establishing rape by
sexual assault35 under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC.
Caoili, however, questions AAA's credibility, arguing that her
testimony lacked veracity since she harbored hatred towards him
due to the latter's strict upbringing.36
The Court however, oppugns the veracity of Caoili's claim.
It is settled that ill motives become inconsequential if there is an
affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which
clearly establishes the liability of the accused.
Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse,
exploitation or discrimination are children or those "persons below
18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition."
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious
act, AAA was fourteen (14) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days
old. This calls for the application of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 66
which provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any oer
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. (Emphasis ours.)
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
are as follows:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 67
(Emphasis ours)
The prosecution's evidence has sufficiently established the
elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.
In the case at bar, AAA was a little over 14 years old when the
lascivious conduct was committed against her. Thus, We used the
nomenclature "Lascivious Conduct" under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.
Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts,
the Court takes this opportunity to prescribe the following
guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating
or charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature
of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than
twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen
(18) years old or older but is unable to fully take care of
herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as
"Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 219889
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
EDWIN DAGSA y BANTAS @ "WING WING", Accused-Appellant
On October 11, 2004, the victim, AAA, a young girl who was then
four (4) years old, was walking home with two of her classmates
after having been dismissed from their class in Kapangan,
Benguet. While they were on their way home, herein accused-
appellant, who is the cousin of AAA's father, blocked their path and
told AAA's classmates to go ahead as he would be 'giving AAA a
candy. AAA's classmates left her and, after walking a little farther,
they looked back and saw accused-appellant remove AAA's panty
and proceeded to fondle her vagina. The following day, while BBB
was giving AAA a bath, the latter refused that her vagina be
washed claiming that it was painful. Upon her mother's inquiry,
AAA replied that accused-appellant played with her vagina and
inserted his penis in it. They then proceeded to the police station to
report the incident. A criminal complaint for rape was eventually
filed against accused-appellant. In an Information dated November
25, 2004, the Provincial. Prosecutor of Benguet charged accused-
appellant with the crime of rape as defined under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6(5),
both of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act No. 83533 (RA 8353), in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 4 (RA
7610).
After trial, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused-
appellant guilty as charged. In convicting accused-appellant, the
RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses finding them to be straightforward, categorical,
convincing and bearing the hallmark of truth.
Accused-appellant appealed8 his case with the CA contending that
the testimonies of AAA's mother and the police officer who took the
statement of the mother are not circumstantial evidence but, in
fact, are hearsay evidence.
The CA found that the evidence of the prosecution failed to
establish that [accused-appellant] had carnal knowledge of AAA."
The CA, nonetheless, held that accused-appellant may be
convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness as the said crime is
included in the crime of rape, and the elements of which were
sufficiently established during trial.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
RULING:
NO. The CA did not commit error in finding accused-appellant not
liable for rape. In the present case, the combination of all the
circumstances presented by the prosecution does not produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt against Edwin for the crime of
rape.
Here, the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish that Edwin
had carnal knowledge of AAA. Michael's testimony did not show
that Edwin had carnal knowledge with AAA. He only testified that
he saw Edwin holding AAA's vagina.
Clearly, Michael and Jomie's testimonies failed to prove that Edwin
inserted his penis [into] AAA's vagina. What they saw was only his
act of fondling AAA's private part which is not rape.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, 18 in relation to
Section 5,19 Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
affirmed by settled jurisprudence,20 even though the crime charged
against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he
can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is
included in the crime of rape.
The ruling of the CA finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness is based on the testimonies of the two
classmates of the victim, AAA, who saw accused-appellant fondle
the latter's vagina. Witness, Michael, clearly narrated the details of
the fondling incident and positively identified accused-appellant as
the perpetrator. In a simple, spontaneous, and straightforward
manner.
The CA found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section
5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which defines and penalizes acts of
lasciviousness committed against a child, as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
x x x           x x x          x x x
The essential elements of this provision are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.32
As to the first element, paragraph (h), Section 2 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7 610 defines
lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional
touching, either directly or through the clothing of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, among others. Records show that the prosecution duly
established this element when the witnesses positively testified
that accused-appellant fondled AAA's vagina sometime in October
2004.
The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be
committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. 33 This second element requires
evidence proving that: (a) AAA was either exploited in prostitution
or subjected to sexual abuse; and (b) she is a child as defined
under RA 7610.34
Anent the third element, there is no dispute that AAA was four
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. 1âwphi1 Thus,
on the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA correctly
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016
VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Facts:
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were: Lin J. Bito-on
(Lin), the minor victim; Dr. Rosita Muñoz (Dr. Muñoz), the
physician who examined Lin; Ray Ann Samson (Ray Ann), the
classmate of Lin who witnessed the incident; and Aileen Bito-on
7 and saw the latter seated on the desk. Thereafter, she brought Nova to
(Aileen), the mother of Lin.
chanrobleslaw
Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of
Cawitan Elementary School. At around 9:00 a.m. of December 13,
2000, he was playing "langit lupa" during recess with Ray Ann,
Marco, Nova and another classmate. During the course of their
game, he touched the shoulder of Nova, Jabalde's daughter,
causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then
helped Nova to stand while one of his classmates called Jabalde.
Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building,
which was near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde
arrived and slapped him on his neck and choked him. Lin was able
to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck.
He immediately ran towards their house some 500 meters away
from the school. He told his mother Aileen about the incident.
Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for treatment
8
and a medical certificate was then issued to him. chanrobleslaw
Dr. Muñoz testified that she was the physician who issued the
medical certificate to Lin on December 13, 2000 for the physical
examination conducted upon the latter. Dr. Muñoz stated that Lin
sustained abrasions: two (2) linear abrasions 1 cm in length at
the base of the right mandibular area; one (1) linear abrasion 1
inch in length at the right lateral neck; two (2) linear abrasions 1
cm in length at the back of the neck; and four (4) minute circular
abrasions at the left lateral neck. According to her, the abrasions
could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted and
that these linear abrasions were signs of fingernail marks.
Moreover, the abrasions were greenish in color signifying that
they were still fresh. She did not notice other injuries on the body
9
of Lin except those on his neck.
chanrobleslaw
Ray Ann, the classmate and playmate of Lin, testified that she
knows Jabalde because she was a teacher at Cawitan Elementary
School. At about 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she was playing
"langit lupa" with Lin, Nova, Ryan and Rhea. Nova, who was
standing on top of an unstable stone fell on the ground and
thereafter hit her head on the stone. Then, somebody called
Jabalde, Nova's mother. When Jabalde came to see her daughter,
she struck Lin on his neck then squeezed it. Lin cried and was able
to free himself and ran towards their house. Jabalde then
shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I
10
should have killed you."  Ray Ann saw Lin again after their class
dismissal at 11:00 a.m. when she went to their house. Lin did not
return to school again because he was afraid of Jabalde. During
cross examination, Ray Ann testified that Lin did not run into the
dilapidated building after the incident and that she was near them
11
when Jabalde struck Lin. chanrobleslaw
Aileen testified that Lin is her son who was born on September 4,
1993, and at the time of the incident, he was still 7 years old. That
at about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, Lin came home crying
and trembling. Lin told her that he was strangled by Jabalde, who
happens to be Aileen's aunt and Lin's grandmother. Lin was
running back and forth crying but Aileen noticed his neck with
scratches. Thereafter, she went to see his teacher-in-charge
whom she asked for details of the incident. While in the school
campus, she did not see Jabalde. She also testified that they went
to Dr. Muñoz for the examination of her son's injuries. Afterwards,
they went home. Her son no longer returned to the school
because of fear but they let him pass on that school year. During
cross-examination, she testified that Jabalde's house is just
adjacent to their house in Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. Aileen also filed
two cases against her for stealing and physical injuries in the year
2002 in Sta. Catalina. After she filed two cases, she then filed the
instant complaint in the Provincial Prosecution's Office in
Dumaguete City. She said it took her until 2002 to file the present
charges against Jabalde because she was still pregnant during the
time of the incident and that her husband was still assigned in
Surigao. She admitted that when she was still a child, she already
feared Jabalde. She also initiated the filing of the present case
because she heard that if she will not file a case against Jabalde,
12
the latter instead will file a case against them.
chanrobleslaw
The defense, on the other hand, presented Jabalde herself She testified
that she is a school teacher at Cawitan Elementary School for 18 years.
Lin is her grandson and that his mother Aileen is her niece. She
remembered that it was about 10:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, she
was teaching Mathematics when some children went to her classroom and
shouted "Mam Jabalde, Ma'm Jabalde, Nova's head was punctured
13
(nabuslot)".  Thinking that her daughter was dead, her vision got
blurred and she fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat
on her chair in front of the board for about 5 to 10 minutes. The children
then came again and shouted that her daughter's head got punctured.
She ran towards her daughter's classroom while at the same time,
looking for a gathering of people in the hope of finding her daughter. But,
before reaching the place of the incident, she saw her grandson Lin
crying. She asked him the whereabouts of Nova but he just kept on
jumping and so she held him still. Lin said, "Lola[,] forgive me, forgive
14
me"  and immediately ran. Jabalde proceeded to her daughter's room
her own classroom and applied first aid. Then she resumed teaching. She
believed that there was a motive in filing the instant complaint which has
15
something to do with a family grudge because of inheritance. chanrobleslaw
Another defense witness Rhealuz Pedrona, playmate of Nova and Lin,
testified that Nova got injured while they were playing "langit lupa"
during their recess on December 13, 2000. She went to Jabalde to inform
her that Nova's head was punctured. Jabalde immediately ran to the
place of incident. She, however, did not see Jabalde slap or choke
 16
Lin. chanrobleslaw
17
In its Judgment  promulgated on May 31, 2006, the RTC found
Jabalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610. The dispositive portion of the
judgment reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of [Jabalde]
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (a), Section
10, Article VI of R.A. 7610, as amended, [Jabalde] is Convicted.
Appreciating in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obluscation, and applying the provisions of the indeterminate
sentence law, [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum
period, as maximum
The bond posted for her temporary liberty is hereby ordered
release.
SO ORDERED.18
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Naturally dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Jabalde
appealed to the CA.
On August 12, 2010, the CA dismissed Jabalde's appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision with modification.
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2006 Decision, of the [RTC], Branch 63,
Bayawan City, Negros Oriental, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that [Jabalde] is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.20 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jabalde filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
CA on January 4, 2011
Issue:
1. Whether or not Jabalde is guilty of violation of Section 10 (a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610?
Ruling:
No. The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and
found guilty of violating is Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No.
7610, which states:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis ours)
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, as follows:
SEC.3. Definition of terms. -
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such
as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
35
In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,  the Court expounded the
definition of "child abuse" being referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case,
therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by the lower
courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The
Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the
RPC, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the
CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with
his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their
holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of
the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of
hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment
and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his
Ruling of the CA fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and
Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
19 intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
 The dispositive dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary crime of child abuse.36 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter
on his nape, and immediately thereafter, choking the said
37
offended party causing the latter to sustain injuries.  However,
the records of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin
as a human being.
Black's Law Dictionary defined debasement as "the act of
reducing the value, quality, or purity of
38
something."  Degradation, on the other hand, is "a lessening of
39
a person's or thing's character or quality."  Webster's Third New
International Dictionary defined demean as "to lower in status,
40
condition, reputation, or character." chanrobleslaw
The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's
emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter's head
was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact,
her vision got blurred and she fainted. When she returned into
consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about
41
five to ten minutes.  Moreover, the testimony of the examining
physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied the accusation that Jabalde, with
cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin, to
wit:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he abrasions could have been caused by a hard object
but mildly inflicted. She also testified that the linear abrasions
were signs of fingernail marks. She did not notice other injuries
on the body of the victim except those on his neck. Moreover, the
abrasions were greenish in color, signifying that they were still
fresh.42 (Emphasis ours)
It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when
prosecution's witness herself testified that the abrasions suffered
by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to
abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-
year-old boy with heavy blows.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her
blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the most excruciating idea that
a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde
against Lin is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother
to rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested only
by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus,
negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost
the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In
fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the
prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution
under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
What crime, then, did Jabalde commit?
Jabalde is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of
the RPC, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment - The crime of
slight physical injuries shall be punished:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary x x x x
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure
when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not
prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical assistance.
xxxx
As found out by Dr. Muñoz, Lin only sustained abrasions namely:
two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the base of the right
mandibular area; one linear abrasion of 1 inch in length at the
right lateral neck; two linear abrasions of 1 cm in length at the
back of the neck; and four minute circular abrasions at the left
43
lateral neck.  When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of
the offended parly for labor or of the required medical attendance;
or when there is no proof as to the period of the offended party's
incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, the
44
offense is only slight physical injuries. chanrobleslaw
Although it is found out, as discussed hereinabove, that Jabalde
lacked the intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being as required under
Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, her acts of laying hands
against Lin showed the essential element of intent which is a
prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin
49
that Jabalde slapped him on his neck and choked him,  and that
of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck, squeezed
it and then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself
50
because if not I should have killed you,"  deserve more credit
than Jabalde's own statement that she merely held Lin still
51
because the latter kept on jumping.  The laying of the hands and
the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin established the
fact that Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause or inflict physical
injuries on, much less kill, Lin.
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which
52
ranges from one (1) day to thirty (30) days of imprisonment.  In
imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider
the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under
53
Article 13(6). of the RPC,  because Jabalde lost his reason and
self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
54
power.  There is passional obfuscation when the crime was
committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by
prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so
55
powerful as to overcome reason.  For passion and obfuscation to
be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that:
(1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation
was committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was
committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in
the accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose
from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or
56
revenge.  With her having acted under the belief that Lin had
killed her daughter, Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1]
day to ten [10] days) when only mitigating circumstance is
57
present in the case.  Accordingly, with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
58
exceeding one year,  Jabalde shall suffer a penalty of one (1)
day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 12, 2010 and Resolution
dated January 4, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00424 are SET ASIDE; and a new judgment is ENTERED (a) finding
petitioner Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph
2, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) sentencing her
to suffer the penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto
menor.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 235071, January 07, 2019
EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
During arraignment, Patulot, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charges. Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued
wherein the prosecution presented CCC, mother of minors AAA
and BBB, three (3) years old and two (2) months old,
respectively; DDD, father of the minors; and Dr. Francis Jerome
7
Vitales as its witnesses and offered documentary evidence  to
establish the following facts:
At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, CCC gathered clothes
from the clothesline outside her house. As she was about to enter
the house, she was surprised to see Patulot who was holding a
casserole. Without warning, Patulot poured the contents of the
casserole - hot cooking oil - on her. CCC tried to dodge, but to no
avail. AAA and BBB, who were nearby, suddenly cried because
they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly
brought AAA and BBB to her three neighbors who volunteered to
bring the children to the Polyclinic at South Signal, Taguig City,
for treatment. She then went to the barangay hall also at South
Signal, Taguig City, to report the incident. Accompanied by
barangay personnel, she went to Patulot's house, but Patulot was
not there. She instead returned to her children at the Polyclinic.
While there, she learned from a neighbor that Patulot had been
arrested. Consequently, having been assured that her children
were all right and that medication had already been given, they
returned to the barangay hall, where DDD met them. At the
barangay hall, CCC noticed that her children were shivering. Thus,
she asked her neighbors to bring them to Pateros-Taguig District
Hospital while she stayed behind to give her statement.
Afterwards, she proceeded to the hospital where she was likewise
treated for injuries. While she and BBB were able to go home, AAA
needed to be confined but was discharged the next morning.
Before going home, however, CCC proceeded to the Taguig Police
8
Station where she executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Subsequently, Dr. Vitales of the Pateros-Taguig District Hospital,
who examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that the
injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average
period of thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that he incurred
9
P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and children.
Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations
against her. She recounted that prior to the alleged incident, she
was on her way to the market to sell her merchandise when CCC
bumped her on the arm, uttering foul words against her. Due to
the impact, Patulot's merchandise fell. Because of this, she cursed
CCC back who, in turn, merely laughed and repeated the
invectives as she moved away. Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.
on November 14, 2012, she was repacking black pepper at her
house when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, "Bakit hindi
ka pa sumama sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka na para pareha
kayong paglamayan." Because of this, Patulot proceeded to
Barangay Central Signal, Taguig City, to file a complaint against
CCC, but she was ignored. So she went instead to the Barangay
South Signal, Taguig City. But upon reaching said location, she
was apprehended by the Barangay Tanod and brought to the
10
Barangay Hall of South Signal, Taguig City for questioning.
On November 19, 2014, the RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse and
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 149971, the Court finds accused Evangeline
Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum.
 Accused is further ordered to pay the offended party the amount of
Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702), as actual
damages, and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) by way of moral
damages;
2) In Criminal Case No. 149972, the Court finds accused Evangeline
Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum.
Accused is further ordered to pay the offended party the amount of
Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702), as actual
damages, and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) by way of moral
damages; and
3) Finally, accused is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000) in each case, conformably with section 31 (f) of R.A. 7610.
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC found that while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm
on AAA and BBB, her negligence nonetheless caused injury on them,
which left visible scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and
bodies for the rest of their lives. Besides, the trial court added that R.A.
No. 7610 is a special law such that intent is not necessary for its violator
12
to be liable.
In a Decision dated July 13, 2017, the CA affirmed Patulot's conviction,
but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, the 19 November 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 163 (Taguig City Station) is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that:
1) in Criminal Case No. 149971, Evangeline Patulot y Ga1ia is
SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine
(9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor,
as maximum; and
2) in Criminal Case No. 149972, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is
SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine
(9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor,
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.13 (Italics supplied, underscoring in the original.)
According to the appellate court, there was no reason to deviate from the
trial court's findings of guilt for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand. It, however, ruled that the RTC was amiss in finding it unnecessary
to determine intent merely because the act for which Patulot stood
charged is punishable by a special law. The CA clarified that the index of
whether a crime is malum prohibitum is not its form, that is, whether or
not it is found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal
statute, but the legislative intent. Nevertheless, this reasoning still cannot
help Patulot's case because even if she did not intend on inflicting harm
on the children, there was still intent to harm CCC. Thus, criminal liability
is incurred although the wrongful act done be different from that which
Patulot intended. For the same reason, the mitigating circumstance of "no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" cannot be
appreciated in Patulot's favor. Thus, Patulot must still be held guilty of the
offense charged.
Issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF VIOLATING SEC.
10(A) R.A. 7610 DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HAD NO INTENT TO
DEGRADE AND DEMEAN THE INTRINSIC WORTH AND DIGNITY OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S CHILDREN.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to
the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following: (1) psychological and physical
abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being; (3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs
for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to
immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
In conjunction with this, Section 10(a) of the same Act provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation
and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Italics supplied.)
Corollarily, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases defines the term
"child abuse" as the infliction of physical or psychological injury,
cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. In
turn, the same Section defines "physical injury" as those that
include but are not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, burns,
internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by
a child.
Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement
in Bongalon, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because it
was not proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings.
Her reliance on said ruling, however, is misplaced. In Bongalon,
the Information specifically charged George Bongalon, petitioner
therein, of committing acts which "are prejudicial to the child's
development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
22
the said child as a human being."  Thus, we ruled that he can
only be held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child
abuse in the absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or
23
"debase the 'intrinsic worth and dignity'"  of the victim.
A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however,
reveals no similar allegation that Patulot's acts debased,
degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and
BBB as human beings. Instead, they charged Patulot for willfully
committing acts of child abuse on AAA and BBB "by throwing on
[them] a (sic) boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor
physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the
24
child's normal growth and development."  Accordingly, the RTC
and the CA duly found that this allegation in the Informations was
adequately established by the prosecution. It bears stressing that
Patulot did not even deny the fact that she threw boiling oil on
CCC which likewise fell on AAA and BBB. Clearly, her actuations
causing physical injuries on babies, who were merely three (3)
years old and two (2) months old at the time, are undeniably
prejudicial to their development. In the words of the trial court,
Patulot's acts, which practically burned the skin of AAA and BBB,
left visible scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and
bodies for the rest of their lives. She cannot, therefore, be allowed
to escape liability arising from her actions.
In the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is not wanting for as
she expressly admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil
on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not her intention to
harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she
threw the hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot,
therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled
doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal
liability although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse charged
against Patulot is physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. To the Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and
BBB falls squarely within this definition. Thus, in view of the fact
that her acts were proven to constitute child abuse under the
pertinent provisions of the law, she must be held liabletherefor.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that AAA and BBB are children
entitled to protection extended by R.A. No. 7610. Time and again,
the Court has stressed that R.A. No. 7610 is a measure geared
towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program
for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the
population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2,
that "[t]he State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
27
and other conditions prejudicial to their development."  This
piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws
treating crimes committed against children, namely, the RPC and
Presidential Decree No. 603 or The Child and Youth Welfare Code.
As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law
has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which
child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also,
the definition of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only
those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but includes
also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and
28
other conditions prejudicial to the child'sdevelopment."
As regards the penalties imposed by the courts a quo, we find no
compelling reason to modify the same for being within the
allowable range. To conform to recent jurisprudence, however,
the Court deems it proper to impose an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on the actual damages in the amount of Three
Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702) and moral damages
in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000), to be computed
29
from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated July 13, 2017 and Resolution dated
September 25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
37385 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the P3,702.00 actual
damages and P10,000.00 moral damages awarded in each
Criminal Case No. 149971 and Criminal Case No. 149972 shall be ESG — Ito and (sic)
subject to an interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned
masasabi ko sa 'yo,
from the finality of this Decision until full payment.
ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako
ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-
aaply ka sa States, nag-
aaply ka sa review mo,
kung kakailanganin ang
Republic of the Philippines certification mo,
SUPREME COURT kalimutan mo na kasi
Manila hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
FIRST DIVISION
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am.
  Kasi ang ano ko talaga
noon i-cocontinue ko up
to 10:00 p.m.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

ESG — Bastos
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, ka, nakalimutan mo na
vs. kung paano ka pumasok
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. dito sa hotel.
GARCIA, respondents. Magsumbong ka sa
Union kung gusto mo.
KAPUNAN, J.: Nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you
Facts:
think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. hindi ako.
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging Panunumbyoyan na kita
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a (Sinusumbatan na kita).
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
na M'am sana ang duty
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

ko.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim

ESG — Kaso ilang
transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
beses na akong
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
binabalikan doon ng
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
mga no (sic) ko.
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by ESG — Nakalimutan mo
petitioner.  The transcript reads as follows:
2
na ba kung paano ka
pumasok sa hotel, kung
on your own merit alam
Plaintiff Soccoro D.
ko naman kung gaano
Ramirez (Chuchi) —
ka "ka bobo" mo.
Good Afternoon M'am.
Marami ang nag-aaply
alam kong hindi ka
Defendant Ester S. papasa.
Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba
ang nangyari sa 'yo,
CHUCHI — Kumuha
nakalimot ka na kung
kami ng exam noon.
paano ka napunta rito,
porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ESG — Oo, pero hindi
ano ang gagawin ko sa ka papasa.
'yo.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka ang nakuha ni Dr.
duty ako noon. Tamayo

ESG — Tapos iniwan ESG — Kukunin ka kasi

no. (Sic) ako.

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, CHUCHI — Eh, di sana

pero ilan beses na nila —
akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon — ESG — Huwag mong
ipagmalaki na may utak
 ka kasi wala kang utak.
Akala mo ba makukuha
ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-
eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi
ako mag-papa-explain
sa 'yo, makaalala ka
kung paano ka puma-
rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong
pakialam, dahil nandito
ka sa loob, nasa labas
ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka
doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am,
binbalikan ako ng mga
taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin
ako, pero huwag mong
kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung
hindi ako. Kung hindi
mo kinikilala yan okey
lang sa akin, dahil tapos
ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko
m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang,
hindi mo utang na loob,
kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita
nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa
lumabas ka na. Hindi na
ako makikipagusap sa
'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6,
1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal
Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd
day of February, 1988, in
Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the
above-named accused,
Socorro D. Ramirez not
being authorized by Ester
S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with
said accused, did then
and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously,
with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record
the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in
writing the contents of the
said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila,
September 16, 1988.
MARIA
As
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In
an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to
Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication
by a person other than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the
First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3,
1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an
offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. In thus quashing the information based
on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense, the respondent judge
acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari.
5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution  dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
6
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct in arguing that R.A.
4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not
a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of
secretly taping her conversation with private respondent
was not illegal under the said act.
Ruling:
No. First, legislative intent is determined principally from
the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible   or
11
absurb or would lead to an injustice.  12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes
it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as
a violator"   under this provision of R.A. 4200.
13
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover,
supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons.
Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only
"overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted
or recorded, the element of secrecy would
not appear to be material. Now, suppose,
Your Honor, the recording is not made by all
the parties but by some parties and involved
not criminal cases that would be mentioned
under section 3 but would cover, for example
civil cases or special proceedings whereby a
recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to
show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose
there is such a recording, would you say,
Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it
within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the
purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be
used not in the prosecution of offense but as
evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special
proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is
a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization
of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be
reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable
because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and
then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not
sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is
to record the intention of the parties. I believe
that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility
of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was
to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken,
there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take
statements of persons, we say: "Please be
informed that whatever you say here may be
used against you." That is fairness and that is
what we demand. Now, in spite of that
warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to
take a recording of the observations and
remarks of a person without him knowing that
it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584,
March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr.
Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a
public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but
the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect
is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and
another person — not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p.
626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to devise was neither among those "device(s) or
penalize even those privy to the private communications. arrangement(s)" enumerated therein,   following the
19

Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in
distinguish. favor of the accused."  The instant case turns on a different
20

note, because the applicable facts and circumstances

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not
be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting
or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice
to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed."  14
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with
the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation,   or signifies the "process
15

by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)"   These definitions are broad
16
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have
nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable
fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do
not wish to expose.
Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views
not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution
must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and
the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They
must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to
be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between
individuals — free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,   a case which
18
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office
and advise him on the settlement of the direct
assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty.
Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the
office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as
to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer
the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization acceptable, and that the figure had
 been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had
been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no
longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor
himself in persuading his client to
withdraw the case for Direct
Assault against Atty. Laconico
before the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by
Atty. Laconico before the students
of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don
Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico
to another school or another
section of Don Bosco Technical
High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty.
Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office, whereas Montebon's
affidavit of desistance on the
Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to
continue teaching at the Don
Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about
the settlement of the Direct
Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for
Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26,
1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up
again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant
then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.
Complainant called up again and instructed
Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of
the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money.
(tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an
affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case
for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit
of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, found
both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were
each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with
costs. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is
covered by the term "device or arrangement"
under Rep. Act No. 4200.
RULING:
NO. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable or by using
any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or
spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person,
be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken
word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or
to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to
furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the
use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of
 offenses mentioned in Section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or
the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must
be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate  installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in
the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
It is a rule in statutory construction that in order
to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any
of its parts.
The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1
of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of
a telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because, by
their very nature, they are not of common usage
and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is
very common especially now when the extended
unit does not have to be connected by wire to the
main telephone but can be moved from place ' to
place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A
person should safely presume that the party he is
calling at the other end of the line probably has
an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a
third party listening as in the case of a party line
or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another.
G.R. No. 121087           August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
At around 8:40 in the evening of February 4,
1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike"
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario
Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following
reports that it was showing the nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table
and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer
appeared on stage and began to perform a strip
act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena
brought out his camera and took a picture
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin,
with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached
Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he
would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the
joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police
station to report the matter. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between the victim
Lingan and accused Navarro who wa sthen
having drinks outside the headquarters. The
victim was hit with the handle of the accused’s
gun below the left eyebrow, followed by the
fistblow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. \
The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navaroo after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Jalbuena, the other media men, testified.
Presented in evidende to confirm the testimony
was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station betweent he
accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge
of the two.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tape is admissible in
evidence under RA No. 4200.
RULING:
YES. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record
 such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as
dictaphone or dictagraph of
dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person,
be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited
by this law; or to replay the same for any
other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete
or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken
word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private,
its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly
authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the
conversations; (2) that the tape played in the
court was the one he recorded; and (3) that
the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong. In the
instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
personally made the voice recording; 31 that
the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by
Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a
heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter
of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2)
that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter
getting the worst of it.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110            June 25, 2001
CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, et al. vs.
JUDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA, MTC, TUAO,
CAGAYAN, respondent.
FACTS:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession
of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato
Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial Police
Command before the sala of respondent Judge
Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial
Court, Tuao, Cagayan.
Respondent set the preliminary investigation on
September 4, 1996, but the same was
subsequently postponed and reset to October 23,
1996 as respondent was not present, although
the complaining officer, P/Sr. Inspector Danny F.
Salvador, appeared in court. On October 23,
1996, the preliminary investigation was again
reset to October 30, 1996. On October 29, 1996,
the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the
NBI that at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on September 4, 1996, P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00 from
him in consideration of the withdrawal of the
criminal case against him. According to Bulatao,
the demand was reiterated by Salvador and
respondent judge on October 23, 1996. As
Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the
amount was reduced to P6,000.00.
Based on Bulatao's report, the NBI set out to
entrap Salvador and respondent judge. The NBI
gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00 marked bills
amounting to P6,000.00, which the latter would
give to Salvador and respondent the next day.
Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of
the following day, October 30, Bulatao met the
NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba,
Sr., former representative of the 3rd District of
Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned.
Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his
conversation with whoever will receive the money.
At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial
Court and waited for his case to be called. At
10:30 a.m., respondent went out of his chambers
and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4
Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr. Inspector
Salvador in the preliminary investigation.
Respondent then called Bulatao and led him and
the two police officers to the office of the MTC
court personnel. Inside, respondent asked
Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he
answered in the affirmative, respondent took
them to his chambers and left them there as he
proceeded to his sala. After handing the money to
the police officers, Bulatao went out of
respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI
operatives waiting outside respondent's court
then rushed to the judge's chambers and
arrested the two police officers after recovering 11
pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their
possession.
After the matter was referred by this Court to
Executive Judge Orlando Beltran for
investigation, the latter scheduled several
hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that hearings were
set on different dates (but respondent did not
appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was
deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence and the case was submitted for
decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit was
considered, in which respondent claimed that it
was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the
two police officers. He denied that he took the
three to his chambers.
The investigating judge cannot help but refer to
the taped conversation between the two (2)
policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the
chamber of the respondent Judge. A portion of
the translated dialogue between Poli and Bulatao,
which was in Ilocano, tends to show that the
P6,000.00 pay-off handed by Bulatao to the
policemen was not intended for the respondent
Judge but solely for the policemen and their
superior, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador. However, it is
not easy to disregard the implication obvious
from the said conversation that the respondent
Judge was privy to the entire transaction. SPO IV
Poli pointedly told Bulatao "to take care of the
Judge" which implies that the Judge knew of the
pay-off being made and was willing to abide by
the "deal" provided he would be "taken care of" by
Bulatao.
The Investigating Judge recommended that the
respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia be found
guilty of improper conduct.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the investigating judge’s
reliance on the tape-recorded
conversation between Bulatao and the
two police officers is correct; and
2. Whether or not the crime of Bribery was
committed.
RULING.
1. No.
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-
recorded conversation between Bulatao and the
two police officers is erroneous. The recording of
private conversations without the consent of
the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep.
Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same
inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding. The law covers even those recorded
by persons privy to the private communications,
as in this case.  Thus, the contents of the tape
recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the
culpability of respondent judge.
2. Yes.
It is clear that the crime of bribery was
committed. Although the evidence may not be
sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal
case, it is adequate for the purpose of these
proceedings. To constitute bribery, the
following must be shown: (1) the offender is a
public officer within the scope of Art. 203; (2)
the offender accepts an offer or a promise or
receives a gift or present by himself or
through another; (3) such offer or promise is
accepted, or gift received by the public
officer, (a) with a view to committing some
crime; (b) in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime, but
which is unjust; or (c) to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do;
and (4) the act which he agrees to perform is
connected with the performance of his official
duties. 
 From the records, it is evident that P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador, a public officer, solicited
money from Bulatao in consideration of the
withdrawal of the case against the latter. The
former categorically told the latter that he would
withdraw the criminal case against Bulatao if
Bulatao gives him P30,000.00, which was later
lowered to P6,000.00. The fact that two of his
men came for the preliminary investigation and,
without hesitation, followed respondent judge to
his chambers after hearing that Bulatao had the
money, bears out Bulatao's allegations. Although
these circumstances do not show conclusively
that respondent judge was privy to the crime of
bribery, there is substantial evidence showing
that he was at least an accomplice to the crime
who cooperated in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts. 

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office
and advise him on the settlement of the direct
assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty.
Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the
office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as
to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer
acceptable, and that the figure had
been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had
been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no
longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor
himself in persuading his client to
withdraw the case for Direct
Assault against Atty. Laconico
before the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by
Atty. Laconico before the students
of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don
Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico
to another school or another
section of Don Bosco Technical
High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty.
Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office, whereas Montebon's
affidavit of desistance on the
Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to
continue teaching at the Don
Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about
the settlement of the Direct
Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for
Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26,
1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up
again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant
then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.
Complainant called up again and instructed
Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of
the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money.
(tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an
affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case
for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit
of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, found
both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were
each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with
costs. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is
covered by the term "device or arrangement"
under Rep. Act No. 4200.
RULING:
NO. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable or by using
any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or
spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person,
be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken
word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or
to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to
furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the
use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in Section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or
the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must
be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate  installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in
the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
It is a rule in statutory construction that in order
to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any
of its parts.
The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1
of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of
a telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because, by
their very nature, they are not of common usage
and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is
very common especially now when the extended
unit does not have to be connected by wire to the
main telephone but can be moved from place ' to
place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A
person should safely presume that the party he is
calling at the other end of the line probably has
an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a
third party listening as in the case of a party line
or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another.
G.R. No. 121087           August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
At around 8:40 in the evening of February 4,
1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike"
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario
Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following
reports that it was showing the nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table
and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer
appeared on stage and began to perform a strip
act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena
brought out his camera and took a picture
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin,
with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached
Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he
would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the
joint followed by his companions.6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police
station to report the matter. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between the victim
Lingan and accused Navarro who wa sthen
having drinks outside the headquarters. The
victim was hit with the handle of the accused’s
gun below the left eyebrow, followed by the
fistblow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. \
The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navaroo after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Jalbuena, the other media men, testified.
Presented in evidende to confirm the testimony
was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station betweent he
accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge
of the two.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tape is admissible in
evidence under RA No. 4200.
RULING:
YES. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as
dictaphone or dictagraph of
dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person,
be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited
by this law; or to replay the same for any
other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete
or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken
word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private,
its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly
authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the
conversations; (2) that the tape played in the
court was the one he recorded; and (3) that
the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong. In the
instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
personally made the voice recording;31 that
the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by
Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a
heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter
of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2)
that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter
getting the worst of it.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110            June 25, 2001
CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, et al. vs.
JUDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA, MTC, TUAO,
CAGAYAN, respondent.
FACTS:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession
of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato
Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial Police
Command before the sala of respondent Judge
Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial
Court, Tuao, Cagayan.
Respondent set the preliminary investigation on
September 4, 1996, but the same was
subsequently postponed and reset to October 23,
1996 as respondent was not present, although
the complaining officer, P/Sr. Inspector Danny F.
Salvador, appeared in court. On October 23,
1996, the preliminary investigation was again
reset to October 30, 1996. On October 29, 1996,
the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the
NBI that at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on September 4, 1996, P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00 from
him in consideration of the withdrawal of the
criminal case against him. According to Bulatao,
the demand was reiterated by Salvador and
respondent judge on October 23, 1996. As
Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the
amount was reduced to P6,000.00.
Based on Bulatao's report, the NBI set out to
entrap Salvador and respondent judge. The NBI
gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00 marked bills
amounting to P6,000.00, which the latter would
give to Salvador and respondent the next day.
Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of
the following day, October 30, Bulatao met the
NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba,
Sr., former representative of the 3rd District of
Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned.
Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his
conversation with whoever will receive the money.
At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial
Court and waited for his case to be called. At
10:30 a.m., respondent went out of his chambers
and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4
Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr. Inspector
Salvador in the preliminary investigation.
Respondent then called Bulatao and led him and
the two police officers to the office of the MTC
court personnel. Inside, respondent asked
Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he
answered in the affirmative, respondent took
them to his chambers and left them there as he
proceeded to his sala. After handing the money to
the police officers, Bulatao went out of
respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI
operatives waiting outside respondent's court
then rushed to the judge's chambers and
arrested the two police officers after recovering 11
pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their
possession.
After the matter was referred by this Court to
Executive Judge Orlando Beltran for
investigation, the latter scheduled several
hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that hearings were
set on different dates (but respondent did not
appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was
deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence and the case was submitted for
decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit was
considered, in which respondent claimed that it
was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the
two police officers. He denied that he took the
three to his chambers.
The investigating judge cannot help but refer to
the taped conversation between the two (2)
policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the
chamber of the respondent Judge. A portion of
the translated dialogue between Poli and Bulatao,
which was in Ilocano, tends to show that the
P6,000.00 pay-off handed by Bulatao to the
policemen was not intended for the respondent
Judge but solely for the policemen and their
superior, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador. However, it is
not easy to disregard the implication obvious
from the said conversation that the respondent
Judge was privy to the entire transaction. SPO IV
Poli pointedly told Bulatao "to take care of the
Judge" which implies that the Judge knew of the
pay-off being made and was willing to abide by
the "deal" provided he would be "taken care of" by
Bulatao.
The Investigating Judge recommended that the
respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia be found
guilty of improper conduct.
ISSUES:
3. Whether or not the investigating judge’s
reliance on the tape-recorded
conversation between Bulatao and the
two police officers is correct; and
4. Whether or not the crime of Bribery was
committed.
RULING.
3. No.
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-
recorded conversation between Bulatao and the
two police officers is erroneous. The recording of
private conversations without the consent of
the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep.
Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same
inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding. The law covers even those recorded
by persons privy to the private communications,
as in this case.  Thus, the contents of the tape
recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the
culpability of respondent judge.
 4. Yes.

It is clear that the crime of bribery was

committed. Although the evidence may not be
sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal
case, it is adequate for the purpose of these
proceedings. To constitute bribery, the
following must be shown: (1) the offender is a
public officer within the scope of Art. 203; (2)
the offender accepts an offer or a promise or
receives a gift or present by himself or
through another; (3) such offer or promise is
accepted, or gift received by the public
officer, (a) with a view to committing some
crime; (b) in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime, but
which is unjust; or (c) to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do;
and (4) the act which he agrees to perform is
connected with the performance of his official
duties. 

 From the records, it is evident that P/Sr.

Inspector Salvador, a public officer, solicited
money from Bulatao in consideration of the
withdrawal of the case against the latter. The
former categorically told the latter that he would
withdraw the criminal case against Bulatao if
Bulatao gives him P30,000.00, which was later
lowered to P6,000.00. The fact that two of his
men came for the preliminary investigation and,
without hesitation, followed respondent judge to
his chambers after hearing that Bulatao had the
money, bears out Bulatao's allegations. Although
these circumstances do not show conclusively
that respondent judge was privy to the crime of
bribery, there is substantial evidence showing
that he was at least an accomplice to the crime
who cooperated in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.