G.R. No.
119995 November 18, 1997
CARLOS SINGSON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAY,
INC., respondents.
FACTS:
On 24 May 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin
Crescentino Tiongson bought from Cathay Pacific Airways,
Ltd. (CATHAY), at its Metro Manila ticket outlet two (2)
open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets for
the purpose of spending their vacation in the United
States.
Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons
corresponding to this itinerary:
flight coupon no. 1 — Manila to Hongkong;
flight coupon no. 2 — Hongkong to San Francisco;
flight coupon no. 3 — San Francisco to Los Angeles;
flight coupon no. 4 — Los Angeles back to San Francisco;
flight coupon no. 5 — San Francisco to Hongkong;
and, finally, flight coupon no. 6 — Hongkong to Manila.
The procedure was that at the start of each leg of the trip
a flight coupon corresponding to the particular sector of
the travel would be removed from the ticket booklet so
that at the end of the trip no more coupon would be left in
the ticket booklet.
On 6 June 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and Crescentino
Tiongson left Manila on board CATHAY's Flight No. 902.
They arrived safely in Los Angeles and after staying there
for about three (3) weeks they decided to return to the
Philippines. On 30 June 1988 they arranged for their return
flight at CATHAY's Los Angeles Office and chose 1 July
1988, a Friday, for their departure. While Tiongson easily
got a booking for the flight, SINGSON was not as lucky. It
was discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight
coupon no. 5 corresponding to the San Francisco-
Hongkong leg of the trip. Instead, what was in his ticket
was flight coupon no. 3 — San Francisco to Los Angeles —
which was supposed to have been used and removed from
the ticket booklet. It was not until 6 July 1988 that CATHAY
was finally able to arrange for his return flight to Manila.
 
Singson commenced an action for damages based on
breach of contract ofcarriage against CATHAY before the
Regional Trial Court.
CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet
existing such that CATHAY’s refusal to immediately book
him could not be construed as breach of contract of
carriage.
TC: rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein
holding that CATHAY wasguilty of gross negligence
amounting to malice and bad faith for which it
wasadjudged to pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual
damages with interest at thelegal rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from 26 August 1988 when thecomplaint
was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral
damages,P400,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and, to
pay the costs.
CA:
reversed the trial court’s finding that there was gross
negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and,
accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards
for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorney’s
fees as well.
 ISSUES:
1. Whether a breach of contract was committed by
CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of
petitioner Singson?
2. Whether the carrier was liable not only for actual
damages but also for moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees?
 
RULING:
1. YES. The round trip ticket issued by the carrier to
the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by
and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the
elements of a complete written contract, to wit:(a) the
consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact
that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier
to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong
back to the Philippines, and the carrier’s acceptance to
bring him to his destination and then back home;(b) cause
or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger
as statedin his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the
transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination and back, which are
also stated inhis ticket.In fact, the contract of carriage in
the instant case was already partially executed as the
carrier complied with its obligation to transport the
passengerto his destination, i.e., Los Angeles.The loss of
the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAY’s
agents and was the proximate cause of the non-
confirmation of petitioner'sreturn flight.
2. YES. Although the rule is that moral damages
predicated upon a breach of contractof carriage may only
be recoverable in instances where the mishap results inthe
death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith,there are situations where the negligence of
the carrier is so gross and recklessas to virtually amount to
bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewisebecomes
entitled to recover moral damages.Thesecircumstances
reflect the carrier’s utter lack of care and sensitivity to the
needs of its passengers, clearly constitutive of
grossnegligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the
rights of the latter, actsevidently indistinguishable or no
different from fraud, malice and bad faith. Asthe rule now
stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the
defendantairline is shown to have acted fraudulently, with
malice or in bad faith, the
G.R. No. L-12191             October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-
appellee.
FACTS:
Jose Cangco was an employee of
Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He
lived in San Mateo which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad
company. He used to travel by trade to
the office located in Manila for free.
On January 21, 1915, on his way home
by rail and when the train drew up to the
station in San Mateo, he rose from his
seat, making his exit through the door.
When he stepped off from the train, one
or both of his feet came in contact with a
sack of watermelons causing him to slip
off from under him and he fell violently
on the platform. He rolled and was
drawn under the moving car. He was
badly crushed and lacerated. He was
hospitalized which resulted to
amputation of his hand.
He filed the civil suit for damages
against defendant in CFI of Manila
founding his action upon the negligence
of the employees of defendant in placing
the watermelons upon the platform and
in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passengers
alighting from the train.
The trial court after having found
negligence on the part of defendant,
adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to
use due caution in alighting from the
coach and was therefore precluded from
recovering, hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Is the negligence of the employees
attributable to their employer whether
the negligence is based on contractual
obligation or on torts?
HELD
YES. It cannot be doubted that the
employees of defendant were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the
platform in the manner stated. It
necessarily follows that the defendant
company is liable for the damage
thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory
negligence.
It is to note that the foundation of the
legal liability is the contract of carriage.
However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual,
as the Court cleared on the case of
Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf.
It is not accurate to say that proof of
diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant relieves the
master from liability fro the latter’s act.
The fundamental distinction between
obligation of this character and those
which arise from contract, rest upon the
fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligations it is the wrongful or negligent
act or omission itself which creates the
vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual
relation.
When the source of obligation upon
which plaintiff’s cause of action depends
is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to
prove negligence.
On the other hand, in contractual
undertaking, proof of the contract and of
its nonperformance is suffient prima
facie to warrant recovery. The
negligence of employee cannot be
invoked to relieve the employer from
liability as it will make juridical persons
completely immune from damages
arising from breach of their contracts.
Defendant was therefore liable for the
injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the
breach of the duty were to be regarded
as constituting culpa aquiliana or
contractual.
As Manresa discussed, whether
negligence occurs as an incident in the
course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or is itself the
source of an extra-contractual
obligation, its essential characteristics
are identical. There is always an act or
omission productive of damage due to
carelessness or inattention on the part
of the defendant. The contract of
defendant to transport plaintiff carried even before his raised right foot had reached
with it, by implication, the duty to carry the flatform, the motorman applied the power,
him in safety and to provide safe means with the result that the car gave a slight lurch
forward. This sudden impulse to the car
of entering and leaving its trains. caused the plaintiff's foot to slip, and his hand
Contributory negligence on the part of was jerked loose from the handpost, He
petitioner as invoked by defendant is therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot
untenable. was caught and crushed by the moving car.
The next day the member had to be
amputated in the hospital.
In determining the question of
contributory negligence in performing
such act- that is to say, whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly-
age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. It
is to be noted that the place was
perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his
daily routine.

G.R. No. L-29462             March 7, 1929

IGNACIO DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., defendant-
appellant.

Manila Electric Company, is engaged in

operating street cars in the City for the
conveyance of passengers.

On November 18, 1925, one Teodorico

Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in
charge of car No. 74 running from east to west
on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the
accident being at a point near the intersection
of said street and Mendoza Street. After the
car had stopped at its appointed place for
taking on and letting off passengers, just east
of the intersection, it resumed its course at a
moderate speed under the guidance of the
motorman. The car had proceeded only a
short distance, however, when the plaintiff,
Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street to
catch the car, his approach being made from
the left. The car was of the kind having
entrance and exist at either end, and the
movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he
arrived at the front entrance of the car at the
moment when the car was passing.

that the plaintiff, upon approaching the car,

raised his hand as an indication to the
motorman of his desire to board the car, in
response to which the motorman eased up a
little, without stopping. Upon this the plaintiff
seized, with his hand, the front perpendicular
handspot, at the same time placing his left
foot upon the platform. However, before the
plaintiff's position had become secure, and