51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.

MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO,

Appellant. G.R. No. 179943 June 26, 2009

Facts:

Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo along with his companions employed upon Energex
Gasoline Station and thereby declared a hold-up. At the height of the incident, the appellant
poked a gun at one of the gasoline boys, took latter’s wallet and wrist watch and hit the latter on
His nape with a gun. The other four members took the money from the cashier along with the
cashier’s bag and jewelry and thereafter took the security guard’s service arm and shot the said
security guard in his trunk directly causing his death

ISSUE:

1. WON the trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant a co-conspirator in the
commission of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
same and guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. WON the appellant was guilty of one count of robbery with homicide meted with a single
penalty.

3. WON the use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating

circumstance in the case at bar.

RULING:

1. NO. When two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an
implied conspiracy. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. Furthermore, appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt act
neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery from
taking place.

2. YES. The CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery
with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from
one criminal resolution, which is to rob. Although there is a series of acts, there is only
one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.

3. NO. Republic Act No. 8294 affirms that the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or
homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic
aggravating circumstance. However, the Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm
was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the
existence of the firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant
was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to
present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to
carry or own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance cannot be appreciated.
52. LILY SY, Petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MA. MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, BENITO FERNANDEZ GO, BERTHOLD LIM, JENNIFER SY, GLENN
BEN TIAK SY and MERRY SY, Respondents. G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Lily Sy claimed that respondents forcibly opened the door of her
residence, destroyed and dismantled the door lock then replaced it with a new one,
without petitioner's consent. She alleged that she saw some of the respondents took
from her residence numerous boxes containing her personal belongings without her
consent and, with intent to gain, load them inside a family-owned van/truck.
Respondents on the other hand, contended that act of replacing the door lock appeared
to be authorized by a resolution of Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation’s Board of
Directors. They also claimed that petitioner’s accusations were brought about by the
worsening state of their personal relationship because of misunderstanding on how to
divide the estate of their deceased father in a pending estate proceeding before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,. Furthermore, they explained that the claimed
residence was actually the former residence of their family (including petitioner) and that
they changed the unit’s door lock to protect their personal belongings and those of the
corporation as petitioner had initially changed the original lock.

ISSUE: WON probable cause exist to warrant the filing of an Information for Robbery
against respondents.

RULING: NO. The Court of Appeals held that assuming that respondents indeed took
said boxes containing personal belongings, said properties were taken under claim of
ownership which negates the element of intent to gain. Considering the very same
properties that are involved between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding,
the respondents cannot, as co-owners, be therefore charged with robbery. The fact of
co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as they cannot steal properties which they
claim to own. Furthermore, one who takes the property openly and avowedly under
claim of title offered in good faith is not guilty of robbery even though the claim of
ownership is untenable.
53. AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA v. PEOPLE. GR No. 197562, Apr 20, 2015

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Fransdilla along with her companions went to the house of Lalaine Yreverre,
who was the private complainant, and her sister Cynthia Yreverre. Upon pretending to be an
employee of POEA, the petitioner gained access to the house. Her alibis enabled her
companions to enter the house as well. When the petitioner and other four men who were the
petitioner’s companions were all inside the house, one of the four men announced a hold-up
and poked a gun at Lalaine's neck. The other members of the household were herder inside the
bodega of the house. Thereafter, Lalaine’s hair was pulled and she was dragged to the room
where the accused slapped her and tied her hands and took the vault containing the money
together with the set of jewelry belonging to the house owners Lalaine and Cynthia.

ISSUE:

1. WON the conspiracy of Fransdilla with her co-accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. WON the crime committed was the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by
armed men under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

1. YES. Fransdilla’s overt acts must evince her active part in the execution of the crime
agreed to be committed. She was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive
co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by
representing herself as an employee of the POEA as clearly stated in Lalaine's direct
and circumstantial testimony against Fransdilla. Once conspiracy is established, the act
of each conspirator is the act of all.

2. YES. Applying article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons) the accused, after entering the residential house of the
complainants took away valuables, including the vault containing Cynthia's US dollar
currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of
persons during the robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and
herding the other members of the household inside the bodega of the house. On the
other hand, as regards art Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code (Robbery in an
inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship ), relevant are paragraph
(a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA) and paragraph (b)2 (because
the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs bedroom and forced it open
outside the place where the robbery was committed).
54. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff –Appellee vs. MARLON BELMONTE y
SUMAGIT, MARVIN BELMONTE y SUMAGIT, ENRILE GABAY y DELA TORRE a.k.a
"PUNO", and NOEL BAAC y BERG ULA, Accused MARLON BELMONTE y
SUMAGIT, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 220889 July 5, 2017

FACTS:

Marlon Belmonte and his cohorts went to a birthday party of a certain Hiroshi Zorilla.
While at the party, the accused armed with guns and a knife tied the hands of all the
persons inside the house and ordered them to lie down on the floor as they took their
personal belongings. Meanwhile, one of the maids of the Spouses Teodora and Robert
was raped by Noel, one of the accused. Thereafter, the accused Noel and Marvin broke
into the room of the spouses through the window. At gunpoint, they ordered the
spouses to lie on the bed while they searched the room; then they took away some
pieces of jewelry, laptop, ATM card and cash.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULINGS: YES. There is no basis to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed by
the CA respecting accused-appellant's criminal culpability. The testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, Teodora and Hiroshi are sufficient and credible to sustain the
conviction of accused-appellant defeating accused appellant's lone defense of alibi. As
regards to the crime of rape, this is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the
RPC which contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to
take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed
on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.

The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape even if he did not rape AAA, as accused-appellant
Marlon Belmonte had the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop accused Noel Baac
from raping AAA. x x x The accused's failure to prevent his co-accused from committing
rape despite an opportunity to do so made him liable for the rape committed. x x x.
55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CESAR CONCEPCION y BULANIO,
Appellant, G.R. No. 200922 July 18, 2012

FACTS:

While private complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother Ignacia Street,
Quezon City and at another street which she could not remember and seemed to be deserted, a
motorcycle came from behind her. A male person riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle
whom she later identified in open court as accused Cesar snatched her bag which at that time,
was placed on her left shoulder. The motorcycle sped away, the accused even raised and
waved the bag that he snatched from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just cry and
look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the process. Prosecution witness,
Joemar de Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity and witnessed the subject
snatching incident. Felipe gave a chase and kept on blowing his horn. Eventually, Ogardo lost
control of the motorcycle and it crashed in front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the
pavement which caused the death of Ogardo, the motorcycle driver.

ISSUE:

1. WON the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the highly
inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convicting the accused-
appellant despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

2. WON Concepcion should be held liable for simple theft only.

RULING:

1. NO. Despite the inconsistencies in some parts of the testimonies, the RTC declared
that all elements of the crime of robbery were duly proven. The prosecution
sufficiently established the identity of Concepcion as the person who snatched
Acampado’s bag because Concepcion was positively identified by the victim
Acampado and Joemar de Felipe (de Felipe), who both had no ill-motive to falsely
testify against Concepcion.

2. YES. By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in three ways, by using: (a)
violence against any person; (b) intimidation of any person; and/or (c) force upon
anything. Robbery by use of force upon things is provided under Articles 299 to 305
of the RPC. The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching Acampado’s shoulder bag as clearly stated in her
testimony. Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s shoulder bag
constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.

As regards homicide, based on the RTC Decision’s statement of facts which was
affirmed by the CA, Concepcion’s co-conspirator, Rosendo Ogardo, Jr. y Villegas
(Ogardo), who was driving the motorcycle, died because he lost control of the
motorcycle and crashed in front of de Felipe’s taxi. Since Concepcion, as passenger
in the motorcycle, did not perform or execute any act that caused the death of
Ogardo, Concepcion cannot be held liable for homicide.
56. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CHARLIE OROSCO, Accused-
Appellant. G.R. No. 209227

FACTS:

The factual scenario states that there was a verbal tussle between the victim Lourdes Yap and
two male customers, namely accused-appellant and John Doe, because they claim that they
were given insufficient change. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store. Doe
placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while
accused-appellant was at her back restraining her hands. Doe stabbed Yap at the center of her
chest. When they released her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of
bills from the base of the religious icon or "santo" at the altar in front of the store’s window, after
which he and Doe fled together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Yap was
brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival.

ISSUE:

1. WON the trial court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of
Arca.
2. WON the criminal charge/s that may be imputed should only be robbery and not the
complex crime of robbery with homicide.

RULING:

1. NO. It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony
of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused.
The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, both the trial
and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing
notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he
initially desisted from physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands
from behind and took her money at the store after she was stabbed by appellant’s cohort
(John Doe).

2. NO. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take
place before, during or after the robbery. In the case at bar, homicide was committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and John Doe had to kill Yap to
accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. Applying the basic principle in
conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-
conspirator. Having acted in conspiracy with his co- accused, appellant is equally liable
for the killing of Yap.
57. RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, ROY BERNARDO, and JOMER MAGALONG, Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 181138 December 3, 2012

FACTS:

The pertinent facts stated that a Rice-in-a-Box store owned by Sonia Valderosa located at the
corner of U.E. was robbed by herein petitioners and the accused Ryan Benzon. One of the
petitioners, Ricky Marquez suggested to rob the store. They destroyed the padlock of the store
with a lead pipe, entered the store and carried away all the items inside it. They then brought
the stolen items to the house of Benzon’s uncle. Apprehensive that Marlon Mallari, who was the
look-out might squeal, the group promised to give him a share if they could sell the stolen items.
Eventually, Mallari informed his older brother of his involvement in the said robbery and
confessed it to Valderosa.

ISSUE:

1. WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the uncorroborated state witness
testimony of the co-conspirator Mallari.
2. WON the petitioners committed the crime charged and acted in conspiracy.
3. WON the applicable provision in this case is Article 302 and not Article 299 of the RPC.

RULINGS:

1. NO. The prosecution merely availed of its legal option to immediately utilize Mallari as a
state witness instead of undergoing the judicial procedure of charging him as a co-
conspirator then moving for his discharge as a witness. Mallari’s positive identification of
petitioners as the perpetrators of the robbery and the absence of any ill motive on his
part to testify falsely against them prevail over petitioners’ denial and alibi. "The
testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if
given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the
result of deliberate afterthought."
2. YES. It is clear from the testimony of Mallari that petitioners acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the robbery. In conspiracy essential is that all conspirators "performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably
common purpose or design to commit the crime.” The responsibility of the conspirators
is therefore collective rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their
respective participations.
3. YES. Article 299 refers to robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship. In the case at bar, the store doesn’t fall under the places mentioned.
When committed in an uninhabited place or a private building with the circumstance,
among others, that any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken, the
same is penalized under Article 302.
58. JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr, a police investigator of Metro Manila Western Police
District and an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals was suspected to be mastermind of
the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. He admitted his involvement in the crime and
identified his military companions, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr.
y Retino and Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo in the commission of the crime. The
petitioner executed a sworn statement before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P.
Espero. He adhered to his belief that the law should favor him as an accused as he later sought
that his confession be an inadmissible evidence.

ISSUE:

WON Article III Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect and
petitioner’s extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence.

RULNG:

NO. Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given
retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what is being
construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is
obviously not a penal statute. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a
waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with
the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Petitioner claims that such
proscription against an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him
retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 — long before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.
59. HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No.
182648 June 17, 2015

FACTS:

Henry Lim engaged the services of the petitioner Herman Medina, a mechanic, to have the
former’s jeep repaired. Apart from the damage to its roof and door, the jeep is still in running
condition and serviceable. A reasonable time elapsed but it was not repaired. Lim’s sister
instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement
that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to
get the jeep since its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims were missing. Medina
contended that he took and installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up.

ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the conviction of
the petitioner despite the fact that the prosecution only presented one circumstantial evidence in
their attempt to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

RULINGS:

NO. Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter, battery,
and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the pick-up
owned by Lim. With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the
missing parts were indeed lawfully taken of which burden was unsatisfactorily discharged by
Medina. The petitioner informed Beltran that the jeep’s missing parts were actually installed to
Lim’s other vehicle which was also being repaired at the time. However, Beltran, in his definite
and straightforward testimony, did not know or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at
Medina’s shop.
60. LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, Petitioner, vs. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES&
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents. G.R. No. 155076
February 27, 2006

FACTS:

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the holder of a legislative franchise to
render local and international telecommunication services under Republic Act No. 7082. PLDT
alleged that Baynet stole and used the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) and effectively stole this business from PLDT
while using its facilities. Herein petitioner Luis Laurel an officer of Baynet, assailed the
allegations by maintaining that business or revenue is not considered personal property, and
that the prosecution failed to adduce proof of its existence and the subsequent loss of personal
property belonging to another.

ISSUE:

WON international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDT’s business of
providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

NO. International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are
not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the
respondents of Article 308of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid
international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter
and intent of the law. Business, like services in business, although are properties, are not proper
subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be "taken" or
"occupied.”
61. EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014

FACTS:

Ernesto Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land located in

Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by Engr. Menandro Avanzado, saw the four accused, along
with seven others, cutting down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned
the felled trees into coco lumber. Two days later, the coco lumber from about thirty three (33)
coconut trees were no longer in the area. Accused, herein petitioners, Eduardo Magsumbol and
Bonifacio Ramirez, claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land owned by
Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant and with his permission together with a permit
secured from the Brgy. Captain, were cut down. Other accused denied participation therein.

ISSUE:

1. WON there is competent evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that the coconut
trees were cut were beyond the property owned by Atanacio Avanzado.

2. WON malice and intent to gain, as elements of the crime of theft, are present in the case
at hand.

RULING:

1. NO. In the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused
encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable
boundary between the two lots and cut down some of Menandro’s trees, such act merely
constituted mistake or judgmental error.

2. NO. That quantum of proof has not been satisfied. The prosecution miserably failed to
establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-accused,
damaged the property or Menandro with malice and deliberate intent and then removed
the felled coconut trees from the premises. It was done openly and during broad
daylight. Furthermore, it defies reason that the accused would still approach the
barangay captain if their real intention was to steal the coconut trees of Menandro.