DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No.
141524
FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO ' Present :
CABACUNGAN ,
Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s' - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO MORALES,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO ,
namely : FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents . Promulgated :
x-----------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano,
Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe,
Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING, In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed
by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by
CORONA, the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent
CALLEJO, SR.,
Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the
AZCUNA,
TINGA, petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of
CHICO-NAZARIO and Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer,
GARCIA, JJ.
but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial,
and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on
prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial. [1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
September 14, 2005 their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve
the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without
waiting for the trial proper.
In an order [2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners'
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on
the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration.
On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
Page 1 of 24
reconsideration [3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later,
on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal [4] and paid the appeal
fees on August 3, 1998.
 
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it
was filed eight days late. [5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an
order dated September 3, 1998. [6]
 
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the Court of Appeals.
 
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this' was' the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. [7]
 
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March
3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the 'final order
appealable under the Rules. It held further:
 
Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed
for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and
effectively renders the judgment final and executory. [8]
 
 
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.
This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners
ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE
ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES
WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS' APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER
THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET
FEES.
 
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR
ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED OUT
OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR
FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND
FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND
PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
 
III
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS 'FINAL ORDER IN
SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND
FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH
Page 2 of 24
 WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL
ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF
DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE
FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR
TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. [9]
 
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which
petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. [10] The period to
appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, [11] as amended,
provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. ' The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in
all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight
hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice
of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. (emphasis supplied 
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. [12]
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying
their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the 'final order, not the
February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received
their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22,
1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
 
What therefore should be deemed as the 'final order, receipt of which triggers
the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ' the February 12, 1998
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., [13] the trial court
declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to
set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period
to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after
the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was
Page 3 of 24
appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it
was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues
raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.
Haldeman et al. [14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner
Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of
the issues involved in the case.
 
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal
on time?
 
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15 th day of the
original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of
appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the
trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal
period. [15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the
notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15
days from receipt of the 'final order or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining
time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently
applied this rule in similar cases, [16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. [17] The rule is also founded
on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk
of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final at
some definite time fixed by law. [18]
 
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. ' Appeal maybe taken by
serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial
court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a
record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending
shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.
 
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of
the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be
perfected within the day following that in which the party
appealing received notice of the denial of said
motion. [19] (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of
30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the
deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization [20] that drafted BP
129, the raison d etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of
appeal [21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have
since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom
have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, [22] and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
 
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality
of Libmanan, [23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our
Page 4 of 24
judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This
Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not
depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, [24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which
require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing
party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy
appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine
the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in
those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy
balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposition of his cause. [25]
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules
42, [27] 43 [28] and 45, [29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]
Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. [32] The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word 'or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies. [33] Hence, the use of 'or in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the 'final order, which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for
a new trial or reconsideration.
 
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case
Page 5 of 24

and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we
aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be counted ' from receipt of notice of judgment
(March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of 'final order appealed from (July 22,
1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the 'final order') denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed
of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days,
as already discussed. [34]
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines),
Inc. v. IAC [35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its
assailed decision.
WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records
of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-2352            July 26, 1910
ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.
J. C. Knudson, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain
articles taken from a Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of
Placer, and the rental value of the church and its appurtenances, including the
church cemetery, from the 11th day of December, 1901, until the month of
April, 1904. After hearing the evidence, the court below gave judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6 per cent from the date of
the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up of two items, one of
which, P741, was for the value of the articles taken from the church, and the
other, P840, the rental value of the premises during the occupations by
defendants. From this judgment the defendants appealed to this court.
It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of December, 1901,
members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and that they on
that date addressed to the plaintiff in this case, who was the priest in charge of
the church, its appurtenances and contents, the following letter:
          PLACER, 11th December, 1901.
R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.
ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take the liberty of writing
you that in the municipality of which we have charged we have
received an order from the provincial fiscal, dated the 5th instant,
which says: "The cemeteries, convents, and the other buildings
erected on land belonging to the town at the expense of the town and
preserved by it belong to the town, and for this reason the municipality
is under the obligation of administering them and of collecting the
revenues therefrom, and for this reason we notify you that from this
date all of the revenues and products therefrom must be turned into
the treasury of the municipality in order that the people may properly
preserve them.
Page 6 of 24
 In the same way we notify you that the image of St. Vicente which is
now in the church, as it is an image donated to the people by its
owner, by virtue of said order is also the property of said people, and
therefore the alms which are given it by the devotees thereof must be
also turned into the municipal treasury for the proper preservation of
the church and for other necessary purposes. We hope that you will
view in the proper light and that you will deliver to the bearer of this
letter the key of the alms box of the said image in order that we may
comply with our obligation in conformity with the dispositions of said
order.
We beg to remain as always by your spiritual sons. Q. B. S. M.
(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.
TOMAS VILLAMOR.
ANDRES CALINAUAN.
BERNARDINO TANDOY.
EUSEBIO LIRIO.
ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.
MAXIMO DELOLA.
SEGUNDO BECERRO.
ONOFRE ELIMANCE.
On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church
and its appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained
therein. The plaintiff, as priest of the church and the person in charge thereof,
protested against the occupation thereof by the defendants, but his protests
received no consideration, and he was summarily removed from possession of
the church, its appurtenances and contents.
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff
was not the real party in interest, was that the church and other buildings had
been erected by funds voluntarily contributed by the people of that municipality,
and that the articles within the church had been purchased with funds raised in
like manner, and that, therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.
The question as to the ownership of the church and its appurtenances,
including the convent and cemetery, was before this court on the 23rd day of
September, 1908, in an action entitled "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
against the municipality of Placer."1 Substantially the same facts were
presented on the part of the defendants in that case as are presented by the
defendants in this. The question there litigated was the claim upon the part of
the municipality of ownership of said church and its appurtenances on the
ground that according to Spanish law the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
was not the owner of such property, having only the use thereof for ordinary
ecclesiastical and religious purposes, and that the true owner thereof was the
municipality or the State by reason of the contributions by them, or by the
people, of the land and of the funds with which the buildings were constructed
or repaired. The court decided in that case that the claim of the defendants
was not well founded and that the property belonged to the Roman Catholic
Church. The same question was discussed and decided in the case of Barlin
vs. Ramirez  (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of The Municipality of Ponce vs.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico  (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off.
Gaz., 1213).
We have made a careful examination of the record and the evidence in this
case and we have no doubt that the property sued for was, at the time it was
taken by the defendants, the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that
the seizure of the same and occupation of the church and its appurtenances by
the defendants were wrongful and illegal. We are also convinced, from such
examination, that the conclusions of the court below as to the value of the
articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church for the time of its
illegal occupation by the defendants were correct and proper. While some
objection was made on appeal by counsel for the defendants that the value of
the articles taken and of the rent of the church and its appurtenances had not
been proved by competent evidence, no objection to the introduction of the
evidence of value was made at the trial and we can not consider that question
raised for the first time here.
We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel for
defendants on this appeal. We find none of them well founded. The only one
which deserves especial attention at our hands is the one wherein the
defendants assert that the court below erred in permitting the action to be
brought and continued in the name of the plaintiff instead of in the name of the
bishop of the diocese within which the church was located, or in the name of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest.
It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic
Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest
in the cause of action. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that
every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The
plaintiff is not such party.
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:
SEC. 110. Amendments in general. — The court shall, in furtherance
of justice, and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party
to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in
either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or
Page 7 of 24
 striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or
inadequate allegation or description in any other respect so that the
actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without
regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and inexpensive
manner. The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other
pleading to be made after the time limited by the rules of the court for
filing the same. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to
the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Section 503 of the same code provides:
SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. — No
judgment shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such
error as has not prejudiced the real rights of the excepting party.
We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power, apart
from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process,
pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting, as party
plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are we confident that we may do so,
but we are convinced that we should  do so. Such an amendment does not
constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff asserts in
his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is
engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of
the diocese—not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to
do for the bishop what the bishop might do for himself. His own personality is
not involved. His own rights are not presented. He claims no interest whatever
in the litigation. He seeks only the welfare of the great church whose servant
he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly swallowed up in that of his
superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the diocese, or
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso, as party
plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one identity for another, of one party
for another, but is simply to make the form express the substance. The
substance is there. It appears all through the proceedings. No one is deceived
for an instant as to whose interest are at stake. The form of its expression is
alone defective. The substitution, then, is not substantial but formal. Defect in
mere form can not possibly so long as the substantial is clearly evident. Form
is a method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly appear.
It is the means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and
still the substance shows plainly through no, harm can come by making the
form accurately expressive of the substance.
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we
should by reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial,
there would be on the retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same
defense, the same interests, the same witnesses, and the same evidence. The
name of the plaintiff would constitute the only difference between the old trial
and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in a name to justify such
action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents.
Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate
and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing
itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed
as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a
means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the
other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly
remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other
purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its
presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys
the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial
and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won
by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities.
No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these Islands
for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the best judicial thought.
(McKeighan vs. Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs.
Kimball, 49 Ia., 577; Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed,
101 Mass., 378; Bowden vs. Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752; Phipps and Co. vs.
Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep., 202; McDonal vs. State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171;
Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600; Costelo vs. Costelo vs. Crowell, 134
Mass., 280; Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no. 17528; Miller vs.
Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilson vs. Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga., 554;
Wood vs. Circuit Judge, 84 Mich., 521; Insurance Co, vs. Mueller, 77 Ill., 22;
Farman vs. Doyle, 128 Mich., 696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R.
R. Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145; Hume vs. Kelly, 28 Oreg., 398.)
It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings
and decision in this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by
substituting the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of
Eladio Alonso as party plaintiff, that the complaint be considered as though
Page 8 of 24
originally filed by the Catholic Church, the answer thereto made, the decision
rendered and all proceedings in this case had, as if the said institution which
Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the party plaintiff, and that
said decision of the court below, so amended, is affirmed, without special
finding as to the costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 197582               June 29, 2015
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal
application of procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in the
Decision1 dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City, Branch 67, in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had
already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure to timely file an appeal.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation.
As partial payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank
Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six checks have a uniform face value of
₱6,667.00 each.
Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee
bank for payment. However, all the checks were dishonored on the ground that
they were drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of
the face value of the dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The cases were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174, and were raffled off to
Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.
In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner criminally
and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks. For each count of
violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, the MeTC
meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in
the total amount of ₱40,002.00. The fallo of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay n. fine of
₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She is
likewise ORDERED to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance
Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal interest
from September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated
April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not suspend the running of the period
to perfect an appeal.
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for
having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying her
appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules
which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch 61,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC dismissed 7 the petition for
certiorari. The Motion for Reconsideration8 filed by petitioner met the same fate
of dismissal.9
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for
review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an
ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct
remedy under the circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction.11
Page 9 of 24
On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011
Resolution12 of the CA denying her Motion for Reconsideration, 13 petitioner filed
a motion for extension of time to file the instant petition.14
On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on
Certiorari15 within the period of extension granted in our Resolution16 dated
September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a sole error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING
ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE
SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER
DESPITE A CLEAR PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS
DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH COULD HAVE MERIT
A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17
Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the
CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects of her erroneous filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration to challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six
counts of violation of BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already attained
finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation of the rules of procedure so that the
alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to make it in
accord with existing law and jurisprudence.
Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory privilege
can only be exercised in accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal cannot
be resurrected through the present remedial recourse of a petition for review
on certiorari.
The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC
Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory, may
still be modified.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009
in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of BP 22. For every
count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00,
petitioner was meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the penalty for being out of
the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and the subsidiary
imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-
2001, and the holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that
the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in each count of
violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the dishonored
check only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus
excessive. She further implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment
contravened Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes
imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an
accused found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less
than 30 days, but not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than
double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or
(3) both such fine and imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single
(imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains
to the court.
If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount
of the face value of the rubber check which in no case should exceed
₱200,000.00.
Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00.
Under Section 1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on
petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the amount double the face value of each
check. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond
the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of
₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount of the face value of each check
that was dishonored.
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the MeTC
incorrectly computed the amount of fine using the total face value of the six
Page 10 of 24
checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in Abarquez v. Court of
Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the
consolidated cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-8137) to only double the
amount of the face value of the subject check.
Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and
executory after petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the
doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.22 Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.23
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The
Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a
case from their operation if and when justice requires it.24 After all, procedural
rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application
of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice,
the former must yield to the latter,25 as specifically mandated under Section 2,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest
of substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons
called for such actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we declared as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the
land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent,
New Bilibid Prison28 when the Court corrected the minimum and maximum
periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused which
exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the
interest of justice and only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in
accordance with law and nothing else.29
Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and inherent
power of the Court to correct the erroneous penalties meted on the accused in
a final and executory judgments, and make it conform to the penalty prescribed
by law.
The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the
reasons anchored upon in Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is befitting to
modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though the notice of appeal was
belatedly filed.
In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is
outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it
was already final on the ground of substantial justice, thus:
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of
petitioner.1awp++i1 If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it
would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the
range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable
penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should
only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to
13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend
our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its
own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a
grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice." Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage
thereof." After all, the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to render
justice x x x."34 All the accused in Almuete v. People,35 People v.
Page 11 of 24
Barro,36 Estrada v. People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid
Prison,38 failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of
conviction, but the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the
finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty
prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in the
present case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a
sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a
penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to
impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want
or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39
Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in
Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is
based on the total amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent to
the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the
rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court,40 if petitioner is insolvent,
she will suffer a longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the
penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of
fine of ₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
321174 for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face
value of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.
Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 41 and Administrative
Circular No. 12-200042 that supposedly limited to fine the imposable penalty for
violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary imprisonment, suffice it to quote
the clarifications in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February
14, 2001:
x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who
is found guilty of violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to
pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering that
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo
Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298
SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No.
130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the
matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big. 22,
without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted
to in case of the accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Big. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative
intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith
or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment
is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that
1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22;
xxxx
3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine,
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of
the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying
a debt was already settled in the negative in Lozano v. Martinez. 44 Pertinent
portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt? x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
Page 12 of 24
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.

xxxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power

and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the
interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
321174 is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a
FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest
per annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 24
G.R. No. 198172
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari  filed by petitioner Regulus
Development, Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the November 23, 2010
Decision1 and August 10, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-
G.R. SP No. 105290. CA Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the
rulings, concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Fiorito S.
Macalino.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments)  located at
San Juan Street, Pasay City. Antonio dela Cruz (respondent) leased two units
(Unit 2002-A and Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in 1993 and 1994.
The contract of lease for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period
of one (1) month, subject to automatic renewals, unless terminated by the
petitioner upon written notice.
The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two
subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner
filed a complaint3 for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Pasay City, Manila, on May 1, 2001.
The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the
respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due until the
respondent actually complies.4
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal,
the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the
petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals.
The RTC affirmed5  the decision of the MTC  in toto and denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the respondent.
CA-G.R. SP No. 69504: Dismissal of Ejectment Case
In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower
courts’ decisions and dismissed the ejectment case.6 On March 19, 2003,
the dismissal of the case became final and executory.7
Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 for payment of rentals
due under lease contracts
The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-
appellant as lessee)8 praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the
respondent with the RTC.
In an order dated July 25, 2003,9 the RTC granted the petitioner’s motion.
The RTC explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would mean that
there was no complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the
amount of rentals for the use and occupation of the subject units, as provided
in the executed contracts of lease and on the basis of justice and equity.
The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration10 in an order
dated November 28, 2003.11
On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on December
18, 2003, to cause the enforcement of its order dated July 25, 2003.12
CA-G.R. SP No. 81277: Affirmed RTC Orders
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 before the CA to
assail the RTC Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC
orders), which granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds.
The CA dismissed13 the petition and held that the assailed RTC Orders were
issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 39,14 and Rules 515 and 616 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent’s motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.
G.R. SP No. 171429: Affirmed CA Ruling on RTC Orders
The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari  before this Court to
assail the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 81277. In a resolution dated
June 7, 2006,17 we denied the petition for insufficiency in form and for failure to
show any reversible error committed by the CA.
Our resolution became final and executory and an entry of judgment18 was
issued.
Page 14 of 24
Execution of RTC Orders
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution to allow it to proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent
posted, representing rentals for the leased properties from May 2001 to
October 2001, and to withdraw the lease payments deposited by respondent
from November 2001 until August 2003.19 The RTC granted the motion.20
The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated April 26, 2007, allowing the
withdrawal of the rental deposits and the value of the supersedeas  bond.
The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas  bond, and
payments directly made by the respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to
cover rentals due for the period of May 2001 to May 2004. Hence, the
petitioner filed a manifestation and motion22 dated October 23, 2007, praying
that the RTC levy upon the respondent’s property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 136829 to satisfy the judgment credit.
The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30,
2008.23 The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the RTC in an order dated August 26, 2008.24
CA-G.R. SP No. 105290: Assailed the levy of the respondent’s property
On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari25 with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order. The
petition sought to nullify and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy
of the respondent’s real property. The CA dismissed the petition. Thereafter,
the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration26 dated November 3, 2008.
Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a public auction for the
respondent’s property covered by TCT No. 136829 was held on November 4,
2008,27 where the petitioner was declared highest bidder. Subsequently, the
Certificate of Sale28 in favor of the petitioner was registered.
Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent redeemed the property with
the RTC Clerk of Court, paying the equivalent of the petitioner’s bid price with
legal interest. The petitioner filed a motion to release funds29 for the release of
the redemption price paid. The RTC granted30 the motion.
On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a manifestation and
motion31 before the CA to withdraw the petition for the reason that the
redemption of the property and release of the price paid rendered the petition
moot and academic.
Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision dated November 23, 2010,
which reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the
respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s
motion to withdraw the consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond
was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the
respondent’s real property.
The CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real
property could not be considered as a case pending appeal, because the
decision of the MTC had already become final and executory. As such, the
matter of execution of the judgment lies with the MTC where the complaint for
ejectment was originally filed and presented.
The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution. The
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied32 by the CA.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the
CA ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 which held that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release of the consigned rentals and
levy were ordered in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction; second, that the
respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 was already moot and
academic with the conduct of the auction sale and redemption of the
respondent’s real property; third, that the petition in CAG. R. SP No. 105290
should have been dismissed outright for lack of signature under oath on the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
The respondent duly filed its comment33 and refuted the petitioner’s
arguments. On the first argument, respondent merely reiterated the CA’s
conclusion that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the levy on respondent’s
real property as it no longer falls under the allowed execution pending appeal.
On the second  argument, the respondent contended that the levy on execution
and sale at public auction were null and void, hence the CA decision is not
moot and academic. On the third  argument, the respondent simply argued that
it was too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an issue.
THE ISSUE
The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy
on the respondent’s real property.
Page 15 of 24
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
Procedural issue: Lack of notarial seal on the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping is not fatal to the petition.
The petitioner alleged that the assailed CA petition should have been
dismissed since the notary public failed to affix his seal on the attached
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
We cannot uphold the petitioner’s argument.
34
The lack of notarial seal in the notarial certificate  is a defect in a document
that is required to be executed under oath.
Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served.35
Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in
the case of a verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction, unless the covering Rule is relaxed on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or based on the presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons."36 Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is
deemed obligatory, it is not however jurisdictional.37
In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
were in fact submitted. An examination of these documents shows that the
notary public’s signature and stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial
seal, all the requirements for the verification and certification documents were
complied with.
The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do
not really impair the proper administration of justice. The higher objective of
procedural rules is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits
and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities.38
The CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the
petition as it substantially complied with the requirements on the Verification
and Certification against Forum Shopping.
An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from becoming "moot and
academic."
The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed
because the subsequent redemption of the property by the respondent and the
release of the price paid to the petitioner rendered the case moot and
academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy because of supervening events, rendering the
adjudication of the case or the resolution of the issue without any practical use
or value.39 Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
the ground of mootness except when, among others, the case is capable of
repetition yet evades judicial review.40
The CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the orders directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The issue on
jurisdiction is a justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition
from becoming moot and academic.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot
be conferred or waived by the parties. "Even on appeal and even if the
reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is
not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
case."41
Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s
redemption of the property, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue
since it poses a situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the
petition.
Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is
perfected.42
Page 16 of 24
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases
where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law
is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution.43
The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the
use and occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s
equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
81277.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate
jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to
execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and
cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.
44
This Court takes judicial notice  that the validity of the RTC Orders has been
upheld in a separate petition before this Court, under G.R. SP No. 171429
entitled Antonio Dela Cruz v. Regulus Development, Inc.
The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction.
The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders
issued in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent  of the ejectment
case originally filed with the MTC.
An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the
respondent’s real property shows that it was based on the RTC order dated
July 25, 2003. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the
amounts due under the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision in
the ejectment case.
The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction in the ejectment case when it directed the levy of the respondent’s
property.
Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondent’s real property was consistent
with the first writ of execution issued by the RTC on December 18, 2003, to
implement the RTC orders. The writ of execution states that:
xxx In case of [sic] sufficient personal property of the defendant cannot be
found whereof to satisfy the amount of the said judgment, you are directed to
levy [on] the real property of said defendant and to sell the same or so
much thereof in the manner provided by law for the satisfaction of the
said judgment and to make return of your proceedings together with this Writ
within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. (emphasis supplied)
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was
merely a reiteration and an enforcement of the original writ of execution
issued.1âwphi1
Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question
that needs to be resolved is which court has jurisdiction to order the execution
of the RTC orders.
The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the
respondent's real property.
Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section
1,45 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which
issued these orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the
execution of the issued RTC orders.
Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution
and levy of the respondent's real property before the RTC as the court of
origin.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The
decision dated November 23, 2010, and the resolution dated August 10, 2011,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated June 30, 2008, and
August 26, 2008, of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, are
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent Antonio dela Cruz.
Page 17 of 24

G.R. No. 139596             January 24, 2006
CHARLES CU-UNJIENG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and UNI0N BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-Unjieng seeks the
reversal of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 8177-B-UDK,  entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng, plaintiff-appellant vs. Union
Bank of the Philippines, et al., defendants-appellees, to wit:
1. Resolution1 dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for non-payment of
docket and other lawful fees, petitioner’s appeal from an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan which
dismissed his complaint for specific performance and damages
against respondent Union Bank of the Philippines and others; and
2. Resolution2 dated July 30, 1999 which denied petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration and ordered expunged the appeal brief thereto
attached.
The facts:
Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) is the owner of a parcel of
agricultural land with an area of 218,769 square meters situated in Barangay
Sta. Maria, San Miguel, Bulacan and registered in its name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. TC-1062 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Sometime in January 1994, UBP caused the posting on the bulletin boards of
its branch offices of a three-page list of acquired realty assets available for sale
to interested parties. Included in said list was the aforementioned parcel of
land, offered to be sold for P2,200,000.00.
Petitioner, through a letter3 dated April 11, 1994 and addressed to Joselito P.
Valera, manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department, offered to buy the
subject property for a lesser amount of P2,078,305.50, payable as follows:
50% as down payment with the balance to be paid in equal monthly
installments over a period of two (2) years. Petitioner explained that his offer
for an amount lesser than UBP’s asking price was on account of five (5)
tenants occupying the subject land who were allegedly
demanding P500,000.00 to voluntarily vacate the same.
As proof of his interest to buy the property, petitioner tendered PCIB Check No.
565827 for P103,915.27, purportedly representing 10% of the 50% down
payment as earnest money or deposit. UBP acknowledged receipt thereof by
way of Union Bank Receipt No. 495081 dated April 11, 1994.
On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter to UBP inquiring on the
status of his offer to buy the subject premises.4
Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBP’s Acquired
Assets Department advised petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to be
acted upon because the bank was still awaiting the opinion of its legal division
regarding the sale of "CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the bank.5
As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioner’s offer as shown by the fact that in
another letter6 dated December 19, 1994, the bank informed petitioner that his
offer could not be favorably acted upon on account of the legal division’s
opinion that sales of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law without prior Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approval are
considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP advised petitioner to pick up the
refund of his P103,915.27 "earnest money" at the bank’s disbursing unit.
Unable to accept UBP’s rejection of his offer, petitioner, through counsel, made
a formal demand7 for the bank to comply with its obligation to transfer and
deliver the title of the subject property to him by executing the proper deed of
conveyance, under the terms and conditions set forth in his April 11, 1994
offer.
Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a letter8 dated July
19, 1995, reiterated the bank’s rejection of petitioner’s offer as "the land
being carpable could only be disposed of by the bank either thru Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) or compulsory acquisition, the procedure of which is
outlined in Sec. 16" of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that, on February 6, 1997, in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner filed his
complaint9 in this case for Specific Performance and Damages against UBP,
Page 18 of 24
impleading as co-defendant in the suit the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 80-M-97 and raffled to Branch 9 of the court, the
complaint principally sought UBP’s compliance with an alleged perfected
contract of sale between it and petitioner relative to the parcel of land in
question. More specifically, the complaint prays for a judgment ordering UBP
to:
a) accept payments from the plaintiff [petitioner] for the sale of the
Property in accordance with the terms and conditions of the letter
dated 11 April 1994;
b) execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Property covered by TCT
No. TC 1062 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan upon
the plaintiff’s full payment of the amount of Two Million Seventy Eight
Thousand Three Hundred Five & 50/100 (P2,078,305.50), failing in
which, the deputy sheriff should be ordered to execute such deed and
the Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the Bank and issue a new
one in favor of the plaintiff;
c) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moral damages;
d) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
e) pay plaintiff the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00)  as attorney’s fees; and
f) pay the costs of the suit.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise respectfully
prayed for.
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated September 1,
1998,10 upon a finding that no perfected contract of sale transpired between the
parties, dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action,
thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the
laws/jurisprudence applicable thereon, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint in the above entitled case for want of sufficient
cause of action as well as the defendant’s counterclaim for damages and
attorney’s fees for lack of proof to warrant the same.
However, defendant Union Bank of the Philippines is ordered to reimburse
plaintiff Charles Cu-Unjieng the amount of P103,915.27 representing the face
value of PCIBank Check No. 565827 tendered by the latter to the former as
purported "earnest money", with interest thereon at the prevailing rates of
interest periodically bestowed by UBP to its savings depositors from April 11,
1994, through the succeeding years, and until the full amount thereof shall
have been delivered to the plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with the
trial court a Notice of Appeal11 therein making known that he is taking an
appeal from the adverse decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial court
issued an Order12 directing the elevation of the records of the case to the CA,
whereat petitioner’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-UDK.
As things would have it, in the herein first assailed Resolution dated May 10,
1999, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for nonpayment of the required
docket and other lawful appeal fees, to wit:
For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the docket and other lawful fees
(Sec. 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto his appellant’s
brief. However, in a subsequent Resolution dated July 30, 1999,14 the
appellate court denied the motion and even expunged from the record the
appellant’s brief thereto attached:
Acting on the motion of the plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] for a reconsideration
of the Resolution of May 10, 1999, which dismissed the appeal for the reason
stated therein, and considering the opposition interposed thereto by defendant-
appellee [respondent] Union Bank of the Philippines and it appearing that the
filing of the notice of appeal of November 5, 1988, was not accompanied by the
full and correct payment of the corresponding appellate court docket and other
lawful fees, and for such tardiness of more than four (4) months, the Court
resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration and the attached brief thereto
ordered EXPUNGED.
Page 19 of 24
In Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, the Supreme Court, citing Rodillas vs.
Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702 aptly said:
xxx the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be
accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. In other
words, the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal
within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the
final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. This requirement of an
appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become
final and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via  the present recourse seeking a
relaxation of procedural rules and ultimately the reversal and setting aside of
the assailed twin resolutions of the appellate court.
Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the appeal docket fees
on time as a non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the CA should
have ignored in order to attain substantial justice. Further, petitioner passes the
blame to the RTC clerk of court who allegedly made the erroneous
computation of docket fees.
We are not persuaded.
Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to appeal is merely
statutory and a party seeking to avail of that right must comply with the statute
or rules.15
Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or
the record on appeal.
Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional,16 noncompliance
with which is fatal to an appeal. For, to stress, appeal is not a matter of right,
but a mere statutory privilege.17
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be
made within fifteen (15) days from notice.18 And within this period, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the
clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full payment of docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby rendering the
decision sought to be appealed final and executory.19
For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within
the reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a
ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by
the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided
in section 4 of Rule 41; xxx
This Court has invariably sustained the CA’s dismissal on technical grounds
under the aforequoted provision unless considerations of equity and
substantial justice present cogent reasons to hold otherwise. True, the rules
may be relaxed but only for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure.20 So it is that in La Salette College vs. Victor Pilotin, 21 we
held:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by
the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should
be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal
of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances
Page 20 of 24
Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs.
Mangubat,22 we held that late payment of docket fees may be admitted when
the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying the
required fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for herein
petitioner. For there, the appellate docket fees were paid six (6) days after the
timely filing of the notice of appeal. Unlike in Mactan,  payment of the appellate
docket fees in this case was effected by petitioner only after four (4) months
following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an appeal.
With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees
was belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it
appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s
appeal except to order its dismissal,23 as it rightfully did. Thus, the September
1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became
executory by operation of law.
We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not a magical
incantation that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed. So it must be here.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated May
10,1999 and July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 105294 February 26, 1997
PACITA DAVID-CHAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the
requirements of law but fails to provide factual support to show her entitlement
thereto. Since findings of facts by the Court of Appeals affirming those of the
trial court are binding on the Supreme Court, the petition must thus fail. Even
petitioner's plea for equity becomes unavailing because resort to equity is
possible only in the absence, and never in contravention, of statutory law.
The petition assails the Decision1 of respondent Court2 promulgated on April
30, 1992. The Decision of respondent Court affirmed the decision dated July
26, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44,
in Civil Case No. 8049. The dispositive portion of the affirmed decision of the
trial court reads:3
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and
finding plaintiff's petition to be without merit, the same is, as it
is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against plaintiff.
On defendant's (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is
hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition
with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private
respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to the
highway. Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635 square
meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT
No. 57596-R, was delineated on its northern and western sides by various
business establishments. Adjoining her property along its southern boundary
was the land of the Pineda family, while along the east-northeastern boundary,
and lying between her property and the MacArthur Highway, was another lot
with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by private
respondent. In short, petitioner's lot was almost completely surrounded by
other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access to the
highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide
through the aforementioned property of private respondent. Petitioner believed
she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through the
said property of private respondent. The prospective subservient estate was a
portion of a bigger lot consisting of 7,239 square meters and covered by TCT
No. 163033-R, which was formerly owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation
hereinafter referred to as ("Singian Brothers") and was sold to private
respondent without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, who was thereby
allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-emption or right of
redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was about to complete
the construction of its concrete fence on the said lot which would result in
depriving petitioner of the only available right of way, and that therefore, she
was constrained to petition the trial court to enjoin private respondent from
fencing said lot. The petition likewise prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot and to pay the
damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit.
Page 21 of 24
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and
relatives of petitioner were never tenants or lessees of the former owner,
Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally occupying the property
as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
4865. The dispositive portion the judgment of ejectment reads:4
WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-
Chan and Primo David including their agents/representatives
and, any and all persons given access by them to the
disputed premises claiming any right under them, are hereby
ordered to immediately vacate the area in question, remove
all the improvements that they have constructed thereon; to
pay the plaintiff corporation jointly and severally the sum of
P2,000.00 pesos — as Attorney's fees and the costs of this
suit.
The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen
Hermidia is hereby dismissed as the action has become
moot.
The defendants' counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and
Eduardo Mangune is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale. The
land sold by the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and encumbrances as
stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Private respondent was not selling the
161 square-meter lot because it needed the property. Also, petitioner had
another access to the highway without passing through the lot in question.
The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they
alleged that they did not authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed
lot. As their affirmative and special defenses, Defendant Singian Brothers
averred that the complaint of petitioner stated no cause of action because,
being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription. Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she
was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Finally,
petitioner had another access to the National Highway which, however, she
closed during the pendency of the case at the trial court when she extended
the construction of her fence.5
The Issues
Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now
submits the following issues for consideration of this Court:
I. In its reaffirmation of the lower court's decision, the Court of
Appeals missed to temper with human compassion of the Art.
649 and 650 of the New Civil Code of the Phil. which requires
the presence of four requisites for a compulsory easement of
way.6
II. (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all
technical and legal niceties to favor respondents, violating
time-honored and deeply-rooted Filipino values.7
III. With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding
this case in favor of the respondent despite the facts existing
at the background.8
IV. The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had
an outlet measuring two (2) feet and four (4) inches to the
national highway without passing through respondent's
property as per the commissioner's report.9
In her Memorandum 10 dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one
issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of
right of way over that portion of the property of respondent
Rabbit?
On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues: 11
1. Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from
the private respondents?
2. Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way
of "pakikisama" and "pakikipagkapwa-tao"?
After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds
that the issues can be condensed into two, as follows:
(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent's
property?
(2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the recognition and
application of the Filipino values of pakikisama and  pakikipagkapwa-tao?
Page 22 of 24
 The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, 12 petitioner submits that "the
owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she)
has established the existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate out-let to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. 13
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and
650, she nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their
requirements. Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner
is not "without adequate outlet to a public highway" as follows: 14
1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete
fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it
from the property of the Pineda family. Worse, during the
pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance
which she could use as a means to reach the National
Highway without passing through the property of defendant. If
plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy
a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass
through the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on
the attached sketch on the Commissioner's Report, has an
open space on the southern boundary of plaintiff's land.
2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off
their lot, plaintiff has no more way to the National Highway.
Plaintiff's apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family
could no longer fence off their property because plaintiff (had)
already constructed a fence to separate the two properties.
And even granting that the Pineda family would eventually
fence off their land, then plaintiff could ask for an easement of
right of way from the Pineda family.
The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third
requirement because she caused her own isolation by closing her access
through the Pineda property, thus: 15
1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a
fence to separate her property from that of the Pineda family
on the southern boundary. And she even closed the small
opening causing her property to be isolated and losing one
access to the National Highway. Plaintiff thus failed to meet
the third requisite for the grant of an easement of right of way.
As held by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Francisco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 52,.534-535:
"The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to
the effect that the private respondent had
been granted an adequate access to the
public highway (Parada Road) through the
adjacent estate of Epifania Dila even as he
was trying to negotiate a satisfactory
agreement with petitioner Francisco for
another passageway through the latters'
property. If at the time he filed suit against
the petitioner, such access (through the
property of Epifania Dila) could no longer be
used, it was because he himself had closed
it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the
point where the passageway began for no
reason to which the record can attest except
to demonstrate the isolation of his property
alleged in his complaint. But the law makes
it amply clear that an owner cannot. as
respondent has done. by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway and then
claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited
requisites; that the claimant of a right of way
has not himself procured the isolation of his
property had not been met-indeed the
respondent had actually brought about the
contrary condition and thereby vitiated his
claim to such an easement. It will not do to
assert that use of the passageway through
Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the
evidence being to the contrary and that it
was wide enough to be traversable by even
a truck, and also because it has been held
Page 23 of 24
 that mere inconvenience attending the use
of an existing right of way does not justify a
claim for a similar easement in an alternative
location." (Emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid
tender of the proper indemnity, to wit: 16
2. The second requisite — that there was payment of the
proper indemnity was likewise not met by the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs complaint contained no averment that demand for
the easement of right of way had been made after payment of
the proper indemnity. There was no showing that plaintiff ever
made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the
right of way. As the lower court said, "The fact that plaintiff
prays that defendant Rabbit be ordered to sell to her the
disputed premises hardly satisfies the requisite regarding the
payment of the proper indemnity."
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant
estate before they may be granted with easement of right of way. These
standards must be strictly complied with because easement is a burden on the
property of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the Court,
applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of
law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the
latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of
such choice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the
Decision dated April 30, 1992, of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the
public highway, or (2) she caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in fact, a
tender of the proper indemnity are all issues of facts which this Court has no
authority to rule upon. 17 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 18

It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of

the trial court are binding upon this Court. 19 While there are exceptions to this
rule, 20 petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.

Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values

Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims
to be an "ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources" pleads that "those
who have less in life should have more in law" and that the Court should apply
the Filipino values of pakikisama and  pakikipag-kapwa-tao in resolving the
case.

Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as
"justice outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. 21 As found by
respondent Court, petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on the
property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail
over the legal findings.

Page 24 of 24