ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY
IN COOPERATION WITH
THE CENTER FOR ADV ANCED RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY

Volume 18

Editor:
John Drummond, Mount Saint Mary's College

Editorial Board:
Elizabeth A. Behnke
David Carr, Emory University
Stephen Crowell, Rice University
Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University
J. Claude Evans, Washington University
Jose Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University
Joseph J. Kockelmans, The Pennsylvania State University
William R. McKenna, Miami University
Algis Mickunas, Ohio University
J. N. Mohanty, Temple University
Tom Nenon, The University of Memphis
Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universităt, Mainz
Elisabeth Stroker, Philosophisches Seminarium der Universităt Koln
Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University

Scope

The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy through
creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in culture generally, offer
opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that call for creative responses. Al-
though the work of several generations of thinkers has provided phenomenology with many results
with which to approach these challenges, a truly successful response to them will require building on
this work with new analyses and methodological innovations.
 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OFPHENOMENOLOGY

Edited by

LESTER EMBREE
ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
DAVIDCARR
J. CLAUDE EV ANS
JOSE HUERTAS-JOURDA
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS
WILLIAM R. McKENNA
ALGIS MICKUNAS
JITENDRA NATH MOHANTY
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
RICHARD M. ZANER

Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Printed on acid-free paper

ISBN 978-90-481-4429-7 ISBN 978-94-015-8881-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8881-2
All Rights Reserved
© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1997.
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
to the memory of
EDWARD GOODWIN BALLARD,
American Phenomenologist
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................... Xlll

Introduction ...................................................................................... .

ACTION - Bernhard Waldenfe!s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Il

AESTHETICS- J. CIaude Evans, Elizaheth A. Behnke and Edward S. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY- David Woodruff Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

ANTHROPOLOGY, CULTURAL, see ETHNOLOGY

ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHICAL, see PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
ARCHITECTURE- Timothy Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

HANNAH A REN DT- John Francis Burke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE- Hubert Dre;fus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

AUSTRALIA- Purushottama Bilimoria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

AUSTRIA- Barry Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR- Jeffner Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

BEHAVIORAL GEOGRAPHY- David Seaman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

HENRI BERGSON- Pierre Kerszherg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

LUDWIG BINSWANGER- Aaron Mishara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

BODY- Elizaheth A. Behnke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

FRANZ BRENTANO - Dieter Miinch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
BRITISH EMPIRICISM- Richard T. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
BRITISH MORAL THEORY- Da!!as Willard and Barry Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
BUDDHISM- Masako Odagawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
CANADA - Linda Fisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
ERNST CASSIRER- Ernst Wo(fgang Orth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
CHINA- !sa Kern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

COGNITIVE SCIENCE- Oshorne P Wiggins and Manfred Spitzer ............................................. 10]

COMMUNICATION, PHILOSOPHY OF, see PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION

COMMUNICOLOGY- Richard Lea Lanigan .............................................................. ] 04

CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY- Fred Kersten ....................................................... ]] 0

CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE- Lester Emhree ............................. 114

CRITICAL THEORY- Martin W Schnell ................................................................. 116

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, see ETHNOLOGY

CULTURAL DISCIPLINES- Lester Embree ............................................................... 121
CZECHOSLOVAKIA- Jost:f'Moural ..................................................................... 123
DAN CE- Elizabeth A. Behnke and Maureen Connol~y ...................................................... 129

DASEIN-JohnD. Caputo ............................................................................ 133

DEEP ECOLOGY- Mic haei E. Zimmerman ............................................................... 13 7

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

vii
Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS

JACQUES DERRIDA- J. CIaude Evans and Leonard Lawlor ................................................. 141

WILHELM DILTHEY- Rudolf A. Makkree! and Jacob Owensby .............................................. 143
ECOLOGY- Ullrich Melle ............................................................................ 148
ECOLOGY, DEEP, see DEEP ECOLOGY
ECONOMICS- Gmy Brent Madison .................................................................... 152
EDUCATION- Kiite Meyer-Drawe ...................................................................... 157
EGO- James Mensch ................................................................................ 163
EIDETIC METHOD-John Scanlon ..................................................................... 168
EMOTION- Algis Mickunas .......................................•................................... 171
EMPIRICISM, BRITISH, see BRITISH EMPIRICISM
EMPIRICISM, LOGICAL, see LOGICAL POSITIVISM
EPOCHE AND REDUCTJON- William R. McKenna ........................................................ 177
ETHJCS IN HUSSERL- Ul!rich Mel!e ................................................................... 180
ETHICS IN SARTRE - Thomas R. F!ynn .................................................................. 184
ETHICS IN SCHELER- Phi!ip Blosser ................................................................... 189
ETHNIC STUDIES- Stanford M. Lyman and Lester Embree .................................................. 194
ETHNOLOGY -James Weiner ......................................................................... 198
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, see SOCIOLOGY
EVIDENCE - E!isaheth Străker ......................................................................... 202

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY -John J. Compton ..................................................... 205

EXISTENTIALISM - Joseph J. Kocke!mans ............................................................... 209
EXPECTATION- William R. McKenna ................................................................... 213
FEMINISM- Mary Jeanne Larrabee .................................................................... 218
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE- Thomas M. Seehohm ....................................................... 223
FILM- Vivian Sobchack .............................................................................. 226
EUGEN FINK- Rona!d Bruzina ........................................................................ 232
FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY- Gi!bert T. Nul! .................................................... 237
MICHEL FOUCAULT-Stephen H. Watson and David Vessey ................................................. 242
FRANCE- Jean-Fran(ois Courtine ..................................................................... 24 7
GOTTLOB FREGE- J.N. Mohanty ...................................................................... 251
FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY- Theodore Kisie! ........................................................... 253
HANS-GEORG GADAMER- Robert J. Dosta! ............................................................. 258
GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY- Anthony J. Steinbock ................................................... 261

GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY- Donn Welton ............................................................. 266

GEOGRAPHY, BEHAVIORAL, see BEHAVIORAL GEOGRAPHY

GEOGRAPHY, SOCIAL, see SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY
GERMANY- Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Thomas M. Seebohm ................................................. 270
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY- Lester Embree ............................................................... 276
 TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

GREAT BRITAIN- Wo/fe Mays, Joanna Hodge and Ulrich Haase ............................................. 281
ARON GURWITSCH- Lester Emhree ............................................................. ....... 284

NICOLAI HARTMANN- Robert Welsh Jordan ............................................................ 288

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL- Frank M. Kirkland ................................................ 292
MARTIN HEIDEGGER- Thomas Nenon ............................................................. ..... 298
HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY- Graeme Nicho/son ................................................ 304
HERMENEUTICS- Thomas M. Seebohm ............................................................. .... 308
HISTORY- David Carr ............................................................. .................. 312
HUMAN SCIENCES- Lester Embree ............................................................. ....... 315
HUNGARY- Balazs M. Mezei ............................................................. ............ 321
EDMUND HUSSERL- R. Philip Buckley ............................................................. .... 326
HUSSERL ANO HEIDEGGER- Theodore Kisiel ........................................................... 333
IMAGINATION- Edward S. Casey, Elizabeth A. Behnke and Susumu Kanata .................................... 340
INDIA- J.N. Mohanty and D.P Chattopadhyaya .......................................................... 344
ROMAN INGARDEN- Andrzej Przylehski ............................................................. ... 348
INTENTIONALITY- Fred Kersten ............................................................. ......... 350
INTERSUBJECTIVITY- lso Kern ............................................................. .......... 355
ITALY- Car/o Sini and Fu/via Vimercati ............................................................. .... 359
WILLIAM JAMES- Richard Cobb-Stevens ............................................................. .. 363
JAPAN- Hiroshi Kojima ............................................................. ................. 367
KARL JASPERS- Osborne P Wiggins and Michael A/an Schwartz ............................................ 371
IMMANUEL KANT- Frank M. Kirkland ............................................................. .... 377
FELIX KAUFMANN- Harry P Reeder ............................................................. ..... 382

FRITZ LEOPOLD KAUFMANN- Christine Skarda and Fred Kersten .......................................... 385
KOREA- Kah-Kyung Cho and Nam-ln Lee ............................................................. .. 387
ALEXANDRE KOYRE- Karl Schuhmann ............................................................. ... 391
LANGUAGE ANALYSIS, ORDINARY, see ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS
LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL- Arian L. Kelkel .......................................................... 394
LANGUAGE IN HUSSERL- Arian L. Kelkel ............................................................. . 401
LAW- William S. Hamrick ............................................................. ............... 407
EMMANUEL LEVINAS- Adriaan Peperzak ............................................................. . 412
LIFEWORLD, see WORLD
LITERATURE- Michael McDuffie ............................................................. ......... 416
LOGIC- Thomas M. Seebohm ............................................................. ............ 421
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM, see LOGICAL POSITIVISM
LOGICAL POSITIVISM- Lee Hardy ............................................................. ........ 425

GABRIEL MARCEL- Thomas Busch ............................................................. ....... 431

MARXISM- Algis Mickunas ............................................................. ............. 435
 X TABLE OF CONTENTS

MATHEMATICS- Richard Tieszen ............................... ............................... ........ 439

MEANING -J N. Mahanty ............................... ............................... .............. 443
MEDICINE- Richard M. Zaner ............................... ............................... .......... 446
MEMORY- Edward S. Casey ............................... ............................... ............ 452
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY- Hemy Pietersma ............................... ........................... 457

MODERN PHILOSOPHY- Suzanne Cunningham ............................... ........................... 461

MUSIC- Lawrence Ferrara and Elizabeth A. Behnke .............................. ......................... 467

NATURAL SCIENCE IN CONSTITUTIVE PERSPECTIVE- Elisabeth Străker .............................. ....... 474

NATURAL SCIENCE IN HERMENEUTICAL PERSPECTIVE -Jaseph J Kacke/mans .............................. . 477
NATURALISM- Lester Embree ............................... ............................... .......... 480
THE NETHERLANDS ANO FLANDERS- Taine Kortaams .............................. ..................... 485
KITARO NISHIDA- Tadashi Ogawa ............................... ............................... ...... 490
NOEMA - Jahn J Drummand ............................... ............................... ........... 494
NURSING- Jahn R. Scudder Jr. and An ne H. Bishap .............................. ......................... 499
OBJECTIVISM, see NATURALISM
ONTOLOGY, FORMAL ANO MATERIAL, see FORMAL ANO MATERIAL ONTOLOGY
ONTOLOGY, FUNDAMENTAL, see FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS- Suzanne Cunningham .............................. ................... 503
JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET -Jarge Garcia-G6mez ............................... ........................... 507
PERCEPTION AFTER HUSSERL- M. C. Dillan ............................... ............................. 513
PERCEPTION IN HUSSERL- William R. McKenna ............................... .......................... 517
PHENOMENOLOGY, see CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY, CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
THE NATURAL ATTITUDE, EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY,
GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY, HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, and REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY- Ernst Walfgang Orth .............................. ................... 522

PHILOSOPHY, ANALYTIC, see ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY, MODERN, see MODERN PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION- David James Miller .............................. ................... 526
PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY -Jaseph J. Kackelmans .............................. ..................... 531
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL, see POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
PHYSICAL EDUCATION- Maureen Cannally ............................... .............................. 535
POLAND- K1ys(vna G6rniak-Kacikawska ............................... ............................... . 53 7
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY- Bernard P. Dauenhauer .............................. ......................... 543
POLITICAL SCIENCE- Sania Kruks .............................. .............................. ........ 548
PORTUGAL- Antania Fidalga ............................... ............................... ........... 552
POSITIVISM, see LOGICAL POSITIVISM
POSSIBLE WORLDS- J N. Mahanty .............................. .............................. ........ 555
POST-MODERNISM- Hwa Ya!Jung .............................. .............................. ........ 558
 TABLE OF CONTENTS XI

PSYCHIATRY- Osborne P Wiggins and Michael A/an Schwartz ..................... ..................... .... 562

PSYCHOANALYSIS- Hermann Drue ..................... ..................... ..................... .... 568

PSYCHOLOGISM -John Scanlon ..................... ..................... ..................... ........ 572

PSYCHOLOGY- Paul Richer ..................... ..................... ..................... ........... 577

PSYCHOLOGY, GESTALT, see GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF, see PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
READING- Wolfgang !ser ..................... ..................... ..................... ............. 582

REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY- Barry Smith ..................... ..................... .................. 586

REASON- Thomas M. Seebohm ..................... ..................... ..................... ......... 590

REDUCTION, see EPOCHE AND REDUCTION

REGIONAL ONTOLOGY, see FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY
RELATIVISM- Gail Soffer ..................... ..................... ..................... ............. 593

RELIGION -James G. Hart ..................... ..................... ..................... ............ 598

RE-PRESENTATION- Eduard Marbach ..................... ..................... ..................... ... 603

PAUL RICCEUR- Charles E. Reagan ..................... ..................... ..................... ..... 609

RUSSIA - Victor Moltchanov ..................... ..................... ..................... ........... 614

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE- Richard Halmes ..................... ..................... ..................... .. 620

SCANDINAVIA- Dagfinn Follesdal ..................... ..................... ..................... ...... 623

MAX SCHELER- Manfred Frings ..................... ..................... ..................... ....... 629

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING- A lan White ..................... ..................... .... 634

ALFRED SCHUTZ- Fred Kersten ..................... ..................... ..................... ....... 636

SCIENCE, NATURAL, see NATURAL SCIENCE

SCIENCE, POLITICAL, see POLITICAL SCIENCE
SCIENCES, HUMAN, see HUMAN SCIENCES
GEORG SIMMEL -Jahn E. Jalbert ..................... ..................... ..................... ...... 640

SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY- Benna Werlen ..................... ..................... ..................... ... 646

SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY- Martin Endress and !lja Srubar ..................... ..................... ...... 650

SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN- Hisashi Nasu ..................... ..................... ..................... ... 655

SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES- George Psathas ..................... ..................... .......... 659

SOMATICS- Elizabeth A. Behnke ..................... ..................... ..................... ....... 663

SOUTH AFRICA- P S. Dreyer ..................... ..................... ..................... .......... 667

SPACE- John J. Drummond ..................... ..................... ..................... ............ 670

SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA- Raberta Walton ..................... ..................... ................. 675

EDITH STEIN- Kathleen Haney ..................... ..................... ..................... ........ 679

STRUCTURALISM- Richard Lea Lanigan ..................... ..................... ..................... 683

TECHNOLOGY- Dan lhde ..................... ..................... ..................... ............. 690

THEATER- James M. Edie ..................... ..................... ..................... ............. 693

TIME- John B. Braugh ..................... ..................... ..................... ................ 698

Xli TABLE OF CONTENTS

TRAN DUC THAO- Daniel J. Herman .................................................................. 703

TRUTH- Dieter Lohmar .............................................................................. 708
UN ION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS- Mai) a Kiile ................................................... 713
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- Lester Emhree, James M. Edie, Dan lhde, Joseph J. Kockelmans and Ca/vin O. Schrag 718
VALUE THEORY- Rohert Welsh Jordan ................................................................. 724
MAX WEBER- Thomas Nenon ........................................................................ 729
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN- Harry P Reeder ............................................................. 732
WORLD- Donn Welton .............................................................................. 736
WORLDS, POSSIBLE, see POSSIBLE WORLDS
YUGOSLAVIA- Milan Uze!ac ......................................................................... 744

Index ............................................................................................. 751

PREFACE

This encyclopedia presents phenomenological thought and the phenomenological movement

within philosophy and within more than a score of other disciplines on a level accessible to
professional colleagues of other orientations as well as to advanced undergraduate and graduate
students. Entries average 3,000 words. In practically all cases, they include lists of works "For
Further Study." The Introduction briefly chronicles the changing phenomenological agenda and
compares phenomenology with other 20th Century movements.
The 166 entries are abaut matters of seven sorts: ( 1) the faur broad tendencies and periods
within the phenomenological movement; (2) twenty-three national traditions ofphenomenology;
(3) twenty-two philosophical sub-disciplines, including those referred to with the formula "the
philosophy of x"; (4) phenomenological tendencies within twenty-one non-philosophical dis-
ciplines; (5) forty major phenomenological topics; (6) twenty-eight leading phenomenological
figures; and (7) twenty-seven non-phenomenological figures and movements ofinteresting sim-
ilarities and differences with phenomenology.

Conventions
Concern ing persons, years ofbirth and death are given upon first mention in an entry ofthe names
of deceased non-phenomenologists. The names of persons believed tobe phenomenologists and
also, for cross-referencing purposes, the titles of other entries are printed entirely in SMALL
CAPITAL letters, also upon first mention. In addition, all words thus occurring in all small capital
letters are listed in the index with the numbers of all pages on which they occur. To facilitate
indexing, Chinese, Hungarian, and Japanese names have been re-arranged so that the personal
name precedes the family name.
Concerning works referred to, the complete titles ofbooks and articles are given in the original
language or in a transliteration into Roman script, followed by literalistic translations and the
year of original publication in parentheses or, where the date of composition is substantially
earlier than that of publication, by the year of composition between brackets.

History and Support of Project

The project ofthis encyclopedia was initially proposed to the Center for Advanced Research in
Phenomenology, Inc. by Alexander Schimmelpenninck ofKluwer Academic Publishers in May
1992 and work began that Fali. During the editing process, he, Ms. Maja de Keijzer, and her
secretary, Ms. Susan Vorstenbosch, have been of enormous help at every turn.
The basic plan of this work was developed by the directors of the Center listed on the title
page. All entries ha ve been examined by at least two of the team of editors. Other specialists
consulted on difficult cases shall continue to remain anonymous, but are hereby thanked again.
The scores of colleagues called on in various other connections other than the preparation of

Lester Embree, E/izabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Pub/ishers.

xiii
entries cannot ali be listed and thanked, but over a dozen must be for their exceptional efforts:
Edward S. Casey, Kay Kyung Cho, Jean-Fran~ois Courtine, Natalie Depraz, Klaus Held, Fred
Kersten, Hiroshi Kojima, Mary Jean Larrabee, Ullrich Melle, Hisashi Nasu, Karl Schuhmann,
Barry Smith, Ilja Srubar, and Roberto Walton.
The editorial oftice has been under the direction of Lester Embree as the William F. Dietrich
Eminent Scholar and Professor of Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University, where help with
technical editing has been gratefully received from Dr. Mano Daniel, Maj. Charles Pierce, Dr.
Kevin Thompson, and Dr. Theodore Joadvine. Ms. Debbie Eskan cheerfully translated many
computer diskettes. Finally, Dr. Betsy Behnke not only wrote and edited a number of entries,
but also served as the phenomenologically insightful copy editor to whom readers owe far more
than they will imagine.

LESTER EMBREE
Delray Beach, Florida
August, 1996

xiv
Introduction

Although anticipations can be found in the works of HENRI BERGSON, FRANZ BRENTANO, WILHELM
DILTHEY, WILLIAM JAMES, and others, the phenomenological movement began in the reflections of
EDMUND HUSSERL during the mid-1890s and is thus over a century old. It spread from GERMANY to
JAPAN, RUSSIA, and SPAIN and also from philosophy to PSYCHIATRY before World War l; to AUSTRALIA,
FRANCE, HUNGARY, THE NETHERLANDS AND FLANDERS, POLAND, and the UNITED STATES and to EDUCATION,
MUSIC, and RELIGION during the 1920s; and to CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ITALY, KOREA, and YUGOSLAVIA and to
ARCHITECTURE, LITERATURE, and THEATER during the 1930s. Phenomenology then spread to PORTUGAL,
SCANDINAVIA, and SOUTH AFRICA, and also to ETHNIC STUDIES, FEMINISM, FILM, and POLITICAL THEORY right
after World War Il; then to CANADA, CHINA, and INDIA and to DANCE, GEOGRAPHY, LAW, and PSYCHOLOGY
in the 1960s and 1970s; and finally to GREAT BRITAIN and also to ECOLOGY, ETHNOLOGY, and NURSING
in the 1980s and 1990s. Given its spread into other disciplines as well as across the planet,
phenomenology is arguably the major philosophical movement ofthe 20th Century.

WHATISPHENOMENOLOGY?

What are the typical characteristics of phenomenology? How does it re late with other philosoph-
ical movements? What are its tendencies and stages? Negatively speaking, phenomenologists
tend to oppose the acceptance ofunobservable matters and grand systems erected in speculative
thinking. Furtherrnore, they tend to oppose NATURALISM, the worldview generalized from mod-
em NATURAL sciENCE and TECHNOLOGY that bas been spreading from Northem Europe since the
Renaissance. However, opposing naturalism is not the same as opposing natural science, as the
phenomenological tradition within the philosophy of natural science shows.
Unfortunately, opponents of naturalism (including opponents of behaviorism and positivism
in psychology, social science, and philosophy) are often astonishingly eclectic and sometimes
consider any forrn ofnon-naturalistic thought "phenomenology." This goes too far. Altematively,
some consider only Husserl 's transcendental first philosophy to be phenomenology. Given,
however, the non-transcendental tendencies within philosophical phenomenology as well as
the great deal of non-philosophical phenomenology, this does not go far enough. The present
encyclopedia urges a way between these extremes.
There are fi ve positive features accepted by most phenomenologists, regardless of discipline,
tendency, or period:
(1) phenomenologists tend to justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with
reference to EVIDENCE, which is awareness of a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct,
and adequate way possible for something of its kind;
(2) phenomenologists tend to believe that not only objects in the natural and cultural worlds,
but also ideal objects, such as numbers, and even conscious life itself can be made evident and
thus known about;
(3) phenomenologists tend to bold that inquiry ought to focus upon what might be called

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

"encountering" as it is directed at objects and, correlatively, upon "objects as they are encoun-
tered" (this terminology is not widely shared, but the emphasis on a dual problematics and the
refiective approach it requires are);
(4) phenomenologists tend to recognize the ro le of description in universal, a priori, or
"eidetic" terms as prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds; and
(5) phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl calls the transcendental
phenomenological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION is useful or even possible.

EVOLUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL AGENDA

Four successively dominant and sometimes overlapping tendencies and stages can be recognized
within this century-old, international, and multidisciplinary movement. These can be charac-
terized as (a) REALISTIC, (b) CONSTITUTIVE, (C) EXISTENTIAL, and (d) HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY.
Any attempt to summarize the wealth ofviews that fall under these headings would certainly be
inadequate, but an attempt to chronicle the changing set of issues addressed in the movement,
which can be called the phenomenological agenda, may be helpful. Words in ALL CAPITAL
LETTERS name entries in which issues are discussed.
There were later attempts to expand and rearrange the phenomenological agenda, but it was
Husserl himself who originally drafted it. His Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations,
1900-1901) is most famous for its attack on rsYCHOLOGISM, which is the attempt to absorb logic
into empirica! psychology. The phi1osophies of LOGIC and also MATHEMATICS, which Husserl
considered continuous with logic, are then the first items on the agenda. LANGUAGE has also
been an item from the outset, along with PERCEPTION and various types of RE-PRESENTATION (e.g.,
EXPECTATION, IMAGINATION, and MEMORY). Finally, where the question ofmethodo1ogy is concerned,
i.e., how he got his results, Husserl began to refiect from the outset upon what carne tobe called
EIDETIC METHOD.
Because of its refiective, evidentiat, and eidetically descriptive approach to both encoun-
terings and objects as encountered, as well as because of the issues on the agenda that are
thus approached, this inauguration is often called, somewhat redundantly, "descriptive pheno-
menology." The four main tendencies within the ensuing movement are directly or indirectly
branches sprouting from this stern.
(1) REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY emerged in a group of young philosophers at the University
of Munich led by JOHANNEs DAUBERT just after the turn of the century and was then extended
principally by ADOLF REINACH to include students at Gottingen, where Husserl then taught. This
tendency emphasizes eidetic method in the search for universal essences. ALEXANDER PFĂNDER,
HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, and KARL SCHUHMANN and BARRY SMITH have led SUCCessive generations of
realistic phenomenology.
In "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des btirgerlichen Rechts" (The apriori foundations of civil
1aw, 1911 ), Reinach added the philosophy of law to the phenomenological agenda. Furthermore,
inDer F ormalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and nonformal
 INTRODUCTION 3

ethics of vaJues, 1913/1916), MAX SCHELER added not onJy ETHICS but aJso VALUE THEORY tO the
agenda, and in Jater WOrks he added phiJosophy Of RELIGION and PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
Moreover, EDITH STEIN added the phiJosophy of the HUMAN SCIENCES. finally, MORITZ GEIGER and
ROMAN INGARDEN added AESTHETICS, ARCHITECTURE, MUSIC, and LITERATURE during the 192Qs and
1930s; the phenomenology of FILM was initiated by Ingarden in the 1940s.
(2) coNSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY 's founding text is Husserl 's Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philosophie I (ldeas pertaining to a pure pheno-
menology and phenomenological philosophy, 1913). The earlier epistemological focus on logic
and mathematics carne to include the philosophy of NATURAL sciENCE or at least physics, which
!ater predominates in Husserl 's last work, Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und
die transzendentale Phănomenologie (The crisis of the European sciences and transcendental
phenomenology, 1936). Subsequent generations in constitutive phenomenology of the natural
sciences include OSKAR BECKER, ARON GURWITSCH, and ELISABETH STROKER.
Ideen I is, however, largely devoted to demonstrations of and reflections upon phenomen-
ological method. Most constitutive phenomenology relies on transcendental phenomenological
EPOCHE AND REDUCTION. This procedure involves suspending acceptance ofthe pregiven status of
conscious life as in the world and is performed in order to secure an ultimate intersubjective
grounding for the world and the positive sciences concemed with it.
Use of this method places constitutive phenomenology in the transcendental tradition that
goes back at least to KANT within MODERN PHILOSOPHY, although Husserl related himselfprimarily
to BRITISH EMPIRICISM. He differs from his transcendentalist predecessors in holding that conscious
life in its transcendental status does not need to be deduced as the condition for the possibility
of the woRLD because the way in which objects of all sorts are constituted in conscious life can
be reflectively observed and described after the transcendental epoche has been performed. The
other tendencies within phenomenology have not accepted this procedure.
Husserl had reacted to Dilthey and others in his manifesta "Philosophie als strenge Wis-
senschaft" (1911) and had thereby begun to reflect on HISTORY. The concrete demonstration
of constitutive phenomenology, as a tracing of experienced matters, formations, etc., back to
the subjective processes, achievements, etc., in which they are encountered, was presented in
his Ideen II [1912-15], a text that was not, however, published until1952, but was known in
manuscript form to EDITH STEIN, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, LUDWIG LANDGREBE, and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
(but not ALFRED scHuTz, who nonetheless independently developed a convergent coNSTITUTIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE focused on Social Jife). Nevertheless, this esoterically
known text also added the soov to the agenda and showed clearly that the world is originally
cultural.
In Formale und transzendentale Logik (Formal and transcendental logic, 1929) and the
posthumous Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and judgement, 1939), Husserl retumed to logic
and mathematics and thereby the task of the formal unification of all knowledge from the
standpoint of transcendental constitutive phenomenology. GASTON BERGER, JEAN CAVAILLES, ARON
GURWITSCH, EUGEN FINK, and LUDWIG LANDGREBE in the second generation and then J. N. MOHANTY,
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

THOMAS M. SEEBOHM, ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, and ELISABETH STROKER in the third generation have been
leading but not uncritical advocates of constitutive phenomenology after Husserl.
(3) EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. The Second IDOSt influentia} phenomenologist is MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER, Husserl's chosen successor at Freiburg, who published Sein und Zeit in 1927. This
incomplete masterpiece attempted to go beyond the regional ontologies sketched by Husserl to
establish FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY and to place it at the top ofthe phenomenological agenda. Hei-
degger's work was, however, initially appreciated solely for its account ofhuman existence or
DASEIN and thus not as the intended means to uncovering the meaning ofBeing (Sein). Existential
phenomenology was thus inaugurated by a misinterpretation.
HANNAH ARENDT seems to have been the first existential phenomenologist. This is evident in
her dissertation, Die Liebesbegriffe bei Augustin (The concept of love in Augustine, 1929).
Moreover, her essay "What is Existenz Philosophy?" ( 1946) refiects her acceptance during the
1920s of methods from Husserl - not, however, for philosophy of science, but rather for the
problems ofhuman existence already raised in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and KARL JASPERS as well
as in Heidegger.
With the rise to power in 1933 of National Socialism- which Heidegger supported-
German phenomenology was disrupted and the period of chiefiy existential phenomenology
began in FRANCE. GABRIEL MARCEL independently focused on the problem of the BODY and made
it prominent on the existential agenda, but the main figures in FRANCE are SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR,
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Also infiuenced by Alexandre Kojeve (1902-1968)
and Jean Wahl ( 1888-1974), they expanded refiection on problems ofhuman existence to include
issues raised in HEGEL and the recently discovered early MARX. Perhaps EMMANUEL LEVINAS also
belongs to this tendency and, while the problem of INTERSUBJECTIVITY had also been addressed in
Scheler, Husserl, and Schutz, it became central to the agenda for him.
Human freedom was made prominent in L 'etre et le neant (Being and nothingness, 1943) by
Sartre, who had earlier published books on the phenomenology of EMOTION and also IMAGINATION.
He furthermore moved THEATER and urERATURE higher on the agenda. Other existential issues
include ACTION, desire, conflict, the fragility of REASON, historical contingencies, human finitude,
oppression, and death. The inclusion of GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY into phenomenology, which had
been begun by Gurwitsch, was continued in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenologie de la perception
(Phenomenology of perception, 1945). Merleau-Ponty seems also to have made POLITICS an
unignorable item with his Humanisme et terreur (1948). Although Arendt is more famous
for her politica! theory, the problem of ETHNICITY, which first appeared in her articles such as
"Race-Thinking before Racism" (1944) and then in The Origins of Totalitarianism ( 1951 ),
would seem to be her most original contribution to the agenda. Ethnicity was also addressed
in existential perspective by Beauvoir, by Levinas, and by Sartre in Rejlexions sur le question
juive (Refiections on the Jewish question, 1946), and also in constitutive perspective by Schutz
in "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955). Beauvoir independently
and quite infiuentially placed FEMINISM on the agenda in La deuxieme sexe ( 1949), asserting one
is not bom but becomes a woman, although Edith Stein's posthumous Die Frau [ 1930] shows
 INTRODUCTION 5

that Beauvoir was not the first phenomenologist interested in gender. Beauvoir's reflections on
old age appear, however, unprecedented.
Existential phenomenology has been continued by such figures as JOHN COMPTON, MICHEL HENRY,
MAURICE NATANSON, and BERNHARD WALDENFELS. It is not inconceivable that interest in it COUld be
revived through study of Arendt and Beauvoir. And it is also not irrelevant that the phenomen-
ological tendencies in non-philosophical disciplines have tended to find great affinity with
existential phenomenology.
(4) Just as realistic and then constitutive phenomenology chiefly stern from Husserl, not
only existential but also the fourth tendency, HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, chiefly stern from
Heidegger. According to Sein und Zeit, all of human existence is interpreti ve and hen ce there
is no access to anything except through understanding ofthe matters themselves as they appear
within context. The beginning ofthis fourth tendency can be traced back to HANS-GEORG GADAMER 's
phenomenological interpretations ofGreek texts, particularly Platons dialektische Ethik (Plata 's
dialectica! ethics, 1931 ). The tendency reemerged after the Nazi period and World War II with the
publication ofhis Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and method, 1960), which has had a considerable
impact. Other leaders of this tendency are PAUL RICCEUR in France (Le conjlit des interpretations
[The COnflict of interpretations, 1969]), PATRICK HEELAN, DON IHDE, GRAEME NICHOLSON, JOSEPH J.
KOCKELMANS, and CALVIN O. SCHRAG in North America, GIANNI VATTIMO and CARLO SINI in ITALY, etc.
In contrast to existential phenomenology, hermeneutica! phenomenology fully appreciates
Heidegger's central concern with Being. TECHNOLOGY, which was introduced as an issue for
phenomenology in Sein und Zeit, can also be said tobe first widely accepted on the hermeneuti-
ca! version ofthe phenomenological agenda. Otherwise, the issues of hermeneutica! phenomen-
ology include the established concems of aesthetics, ethics, history, language, law, literature,
perception, politics, religion, the philosophy of the natural and especially the human sciences,
etc. What is different is how it approaches them, i.e., the method ofHERMENEuncs. Hermeneutica!
phenomenology has also led to much scholarship on eminent texts of major figures in the history
of philosophy and there has been extensive influence within the human sciences.
The periods and geographical centers of the history of the phenomenological movement
correspond to when and where each of the four tendencies ha ve received the predominance of
attention. Realistic and constitutive phenomenology continue, but their original and strongest
periods were in Germany before and after World War 1. The existential period extended from the
1930s to the 1960s and was centered in France. Most of the attention during the hermeneutica!
period ofthe 1960s through 1980s was in the United States, where phenomenologists numbered
not in the scores, but in the hundreds.
With the COllapse ofthe UN ION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, greater contact with the remarkably
enduring Eastem European traditions of phenomenology, the growing interest in phenomenology
in Latin America and Asia and indeed most nations, and finally, the increase in international
travel and communication, it seems plausible at the time of writing to suppose that the period
of American phenomenology is waning and that a fifth and planetary period is beginning. If so,
how the agenda might be reordered or otherwise altered during the phenomenological move-
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

ment's second century must remain tobe seen. Perhaps there will bea retum to philosophical
anthropology and reflections relating to ecology, gender, ethnic studies, intercultural phenomen-
ology, and religion, as well as ethics, politics, and philosophy of human and natural kinds of
sctence.

CONTRASTS WITH PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology arose in ambivalent interaction with neo-Kantianism and is currently con-

trasted in the Anglo-American world with ANALYnc PHILOSOPHY and intemationally with MARXISM
and rsYCHOANALYSis. Discussion of these connections may shed further light on precisely what
phenomenology is.
(1) Where the neo-Kantians are concemed, as early as 1886 Husserl expressed antipathy
to Hermann Cohen ( 1842-1918) with respect to concepts and principles of mathematics and
higher analysis. In 1908, however, he wrote to Jonas Cohn (1869-1947) that he was himself
working on a critique of REASON in which the transcendental-logica! would be grounded in the
transcendental-phenomenological, and in 1925 he admitted to ERNST CASSIRER that once he had
leamed to see Kant's thought in his own perspective, he was able to recognize the value as well
as the limits of Kant and to profit from reading him and genuine Kantians.
Husserl's correspondence with Paul Natorp (1854-1924) began in 1894 and focused initially
on problems in the philosophy of geometry and SPACE. The latter's review of the Logische
Untersuchungen affected the transition to the transcendental-constitutive phenomenology ofthe
Ideen 1. But there was still a difference between them conceming beginning from the highest
epistemic-critical first principles or, as Husserl advocated, starting at the bottom and advancing,
step by step, to the higher levels.
Hermann Cohen began from the.fact of scientific knowledge. "Experience" for him is given
in the form of science. There is thus no need for intuition. The conditions for the possibility of
the fact of science are also the conditions for the possibility of objects of experience. There is
no need to appeal to consciousness. As Hans Wagner puts it, what we have is pure noematic
"Geltungsreflexion" (reflection on what is accepted or posited).
Also, for Natorp, the most radical grounding, die letzte Begrundung, is not subjective but
objective in terms of the lawfulness that constitutes objectivity. He agrees with Husserl 's purely
objective account oflogic in the first volume ofthe Logische Untersuchungen, the Prolegomema
zur reinen Logik (1900), but suspects him of psychologism when he attempts to give logic a
phenomenological grounding.
Husserl also opposed the tendency of Marburg neo-Kantians to reduce philosophy to the
methodology of the exact sciences. In the absence of a concept of the given, they reduce the
object of inquiry to an X for endless determinations. Husserl 's ramified concepts of intuition
and object and the substantive cognition of essences amount to a protest against this notion of
philosophy.
NICOLAI HARTMANN and Cassirer were in fact influenced by Husserl. Cassirer places great em-
 INTRODUCTION 7

phasis on the concept of Sinn or MEANING; takes the Husserlian hyle-morphe distinction over into
his theory of the "symbolic pregnance" of ali experience; and uses the phenomenological idea
of meaning-fulfillment to discuss the sensuous form of meanings. Hartmann departs from the
neo-Kantian conception of philosophy as methodology of science and works out a phenomeno-
logically-oriented ontology. He recognizes the great value of phenomenological method, but
supplements it with a method of aporia, which recognizes a metaphysical core of insoluble
problems.
Tuming now to Martin Heidegger and the neo-Kantians, there is a detailed critique ofNatorp
in the early Marburg lectures. In particular, Natorp's "allgemeine Psychologie" is characterized
there as "formale Phănomenologie," and WILHELM oiLTHEv's work is said to be close to the
origin (urspriingsnah), while Natorp is far from it (ursprungsfern). Also on Heidegger's view,
Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) is closer to phenomenology than the Marburg school because,
largely under the influence of Emil Lask (1875-1915), Rickert recognizes the undeniable but
ultimately irrational aspects ofthe contents of consciousness, e.g., blue and red as seen patches
of color, which cannot be reduced to concepts.
Of ali the South German neo-Kantians, Lask stood closest to phenomenology, tried to incor-
porate Husserl 's theory of ideal meanings into his own theory of judgment, and seem to ha ve
had a considerable influence on Heidegger's early thinking, especially with his emphasis on
irreducible "historical facticity." Although Heidegger profoundly acknowledges the importance
of Lask for his own thought, Husserl's response to Lask is less clear; he inclines more toward
Rickert.
Basically, transcendental phenomenology and neo-Kantianism had different understandings
of Kant, especially of Kant's theory of consciousness, and also of the Kantian transcendental
deduction. For phenomenology, the subjective deduction is the more valuable part; for the
neo-Kantians, the objective deduction is the core ofthe argument.
Finally, it must be mentioned that there is a different complex relationship in France between
existential phenomenology and especially the neo-Kantianism of Leon Brunschvicg ( 1869-
1943 ), a relationship that has yet to be fully analyzed in the scholarly literature.
(2) While neo-Kantianism is the movement that phenomenology chiefly related to in its
original development, the major alternative at the end ofthe 20th century is ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY.
Neither position has a homogeneous doctrine, but there are shared ways of doing philosophy
within each. In the case of analytic philosophy, the common assumption is that philosophy has
to do with language, while nonlinguistic facts do not belong to its domain, and the treatment of
languagc is often called "analysis"- hen ce the designation "analytic philosophy." It is analysis
either ofusage or of MEANING; its concern is either with ordinary language or with ideallanguage
(which perspicuously reflects the logica! structure of ordinary language ); and its goat is either to
dissolve philosophical problems ("by letting the fly out ofthe fly bottle") and thereby to act as a
kind oftherapy, or to provide, through the analysis of meanings, the foundation for the sciences.
From its inception, phenomenology shared the anti-metaphysical spirit of analytic philosophy,
shared a belief in the importance of logic and mathematics for philosophy, and inspired a sort of
8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

minute, careful, "ground level" fieldwork avoiding large generalizations. In a letter to Natorp of
March 14, 1897, Husserl wrote, "Ich bin ein langsamer Denker und bin nicht zufrieden, solange
die grosse Noten und Wechsel nicht in baarer Miinze in Kleingeld umgesetzt sind" ("I am a slow
thinker, and am not satisfied as long as the large banknotes and bills are not tumed into small
change").
Despite their shared interest in language, meaning, and careful analysis (and in making dis-
tinctions), phenomenology and analytic philosophy go their different ways. What divides them
is, in the first place, a difference in philosophy of language and meaning. Analytic philosophy,
at its inception, subscribed to some variety or other of the verification theory of meaning; then,
with the demise of LOGICAL rosiTIVISM, pursued a theory of meaning as use (such as in a lan-
guage game); and, in its latest phase, has abandoned "meaning" altogether in fa vor of a purely
referential theory or a pragmatist account.
Phenomenology incorporates language into a larger theory of INTENTIONALITY, so that the
meaning of signs is derivative from the meaning of intentiona! acts, the latter being construed
as ideal entities much like the Sinne of GOTTLOB FREGE, but nevertheless as correlates of acts. The
proximity to Frege has created the impression of a more general proximity of phenomenology
and analytic philosophy, the differences notwithstanding. As analytic philosophy abandoned
meanings for split references in rossiBLE woRLDS, interpreters of Husserl found their way to
construe Husserlian "horizons" as "possible worlds." And as Fregeans in England downplayed
the Sinn and carne up with a Russellian reading of Frege, some Husserlians downplayed the
"noema" in favor of a realistic reading of intentionality. Nevertheless, while some thus tried to
relate Husserl and Frege, most ofphenomenology continued on its part to tackle larger problems
of "the transcendental ego," "constitution of the world," "time," "Dasein," etc., in terms that,
for analytic thinkers, were too metaphysical, but for phenomenology were intimately involved
in ali its investigations.
(3) MARXISM is another large, global philosophical movement with which phenomenology,
initially very different in orientation and origin, carne into fruitful contact. Husserl himself does
not seem to have had any interest in Marxism. The materialistic underpinning ofMarx's thinking
provided by Engels must have appeared antithetical to his position, just as the reductionism of
much of Marxism and the naivety of the Marxist theory of knowledge could not be welcomed
by phenomenology. Likewise, the individualistic, ego-centered, transcendental thinking could
not but be opposed to the primacy of nature, society, and economics.
However, points of contact between the two movements soon developed. For this to be
possible, Marx's own thinking, especially in his early works, had tobe separated from the !ater
works and from the ideas of Engels, and the official, dogmatic Marxism of Lenin and Stalin
had to be rejected in fa vor of the hermeneutic strand within phenomenology, the !ater critique
of positivistic science, and the rootedness of science in the lifeworld.
In this Auseinandersetzung, the early work of Gyorgy Lukacs ( 1885-1971 ), the existential
phenomenology of Sartre, and the radical phenomenology of ENZO PACI naturally carne together.
Husserl 's !ater conception of history as a practica! teleology rooted in the bodily-social activity
 INTRODUCTION 9

of the subject and Marx's emphasis upon "sensuous activity" are brought together by LUDWIG
LANDGREBE. The Marxist struggle against the fetishism of commodities and Husserl 's critique of

the objectivism of the sciences are brought together by Paei. If the task of phenomenology is to
reinstate the genuine subjectivity ofhuman beings, freed from every fetishism and every mask,
then the goal of Marxism may be interpreted as restoring to humankind its authentic humanity.
Sartre, in his late work Critique de la raison dialectique (Critique of dialectica! reason, 1960)
regards Marxism as the "untranscendable philosophy for our time" and tries to reconcile it with
his own phenomenological starting point. Simone de Beauvoir characterizes Marxism, at its
best, as a "radical humanism," while Merleau-Ponty recognizes and appropriates the Marxist
discovery of social existence as the most interior dimension ofhuman subjectivity.
It has also not escaped the notice of many disceming critics that Marxism, at its best, has
always been a hermeneutic philosophy that aims at going behind the seeming evidences of
direct "seeing" in order to discover the hidden meaning in the historical and social stratum of
work, need, and labor. Finally, one needs only to look at the two volumes of Phănomenologie
und Marxismus (1977-79), edited by Waldenfels, Broekman, and Pazanin- containing the
papers presented at a conference held in 197 5 in Dubrovnik- to realize the fruitfulness, and
yet variety, of concems generated by that theme.
(4) Phenomenology's relation to PSYCHOANALYSIS is not very different from its relation to
Marxism. However, in this case, one shall mention that Freud and Husserl were fellow students
in Brentano's classes on psychology. Even if Husserl does not speak about Freud, he did
come to recognize "unconscious intentionality," and left much room for phenomenology's
coming to terms with psychoanalysis. This has happened in many different ways - if we
leave aside Sartre's early rejection of the unconscious. Thus one may read psychoanalysis as
an "archaeology of the subject" (Ricreur), or follow its lead to dig beneath language for pre-
objective meaning structures in "expressive flesh" (Merleau-Ponty), or, rejecting a realism of
unconscious intentionalities, one may use the Husserlian idea of giving meaning to hyletic
data to understand the nature of psychoanalytic therapy. Thus a phenomenological reading of
psychoanalysis tends to free psychoanalysis from its self-understanding as a natural science, it
rejects a mechanical account ofmentallife in terms of"repression," and it does not want to posit
the unconscious as a theoretical entity for explanatory purposes. The task then has been to open
an experiential access into the unconscious, by retuming to pre-affective Urassociation within
the hyletic field that "awakens" the ego and stimulates it into activity. The other line of approach
is to find in Freudian thinking a discovery ofthe ontologica! grounding of consciousness, with its
intentionalities, in the pre-conscious being of 'desire' through the process of the hermeneutics
of"suspicion." Thus, in a variety ofways, phenomenology has contributed, especially amongst
French philosophers, to new and creative interpretations and appropriations ofFreud's thinking.
10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

ARTICULATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

The word "phenomenology" not only stands for a substantive philosophy (as in the writings of
Husserl, in some of Heidegger's works, and in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), but for a distinctive
approach that, applied to a specific domain X, gives rise to what may be called the "pheno-
menology of X." Thus we have phenomenology ofreligion, phenomenology of natural science,
phenomenology ofhuman science, phenomenology ofliterature, phenomenology ofperception,
and so forth.
Then again, sometimes an existing discipline or specialty receives the modifier "phenomen-
ological" when the approach, or even some results of phenomenological philosophy (such as
the thesis of intentionality), are adopted or adapted in that discipline. Thus we have phenomen-
ological geography, phenomenological psychiatry, phenomenological sociology, and so forth.
These "phenomenological" disciplines vary according to which component they adopt (eidetic
description, phenomenological epoche, meaning constitution, etc.)
The same sorts ofvariations occur in the "phenomenology of ... " disciplines. Thus the pheno-
menology of religion may be descriptive of the essential structures of ali religious experience
as well as of religious objects; it may be a search for religious meaning and so presuppose
a phenomenological reduction; it may be an inquiry into what religions mean for Dasein 's
being-in-the-world and authenticity, etc.
What is common to these is an experiential approach that does not first decide what the world,
or the nature of things, is like and then seeks to fit phenomena to that conception either by
reductive or explanatory hypotheses. Instead, it first focuses on the phenomena, on how matters
are encountered precisely as they are encountered, and then- if needed- construes the world
so that the phenomena are saved.
And while most ofthe special employments ofphenomenology (both "phenomenology of ... "
and "phenomenological ... ") remain satisfied with a reflective and descriptive approach, be it
eidetic or an empirica!, one should not suppose that the constitutive tendency is a purely
philosophical discipline. Schutz's work shows that it does not need tobe.
Finally, if an important test of the power of a philosophical movement is how fruitful it has
proven infields other than pure philosophy, then the history ofthe phenomenological movement
bears testimony to the enonnous fecundity of phenomenology- compared to which the other
philosophical currents oftoday seem barren.

LESTER EMBREE
J.N. MOHANTY

ACTION Like PERCEPTION and LANGUAGE,
action does not merely take place within the world,
but rather contributes to its constitution. A phenomen-
ological philosophy of action that wants to do justice
to this central phenomenon needs to develop on differ-
ent levels. First, it has to grasp the specific character
of action in contrast to physical processes, biologica!
reactions, or programmed operations, and in contrast
to other forms of human conduct such as work, play,
or pure wishing. Second, it has to locate action within
the context of life or existence as a whole. Taking into
consideration the vital infrastructure as well as the cul-
tural framework of action, the phenomenology of ac-
tion meets not only with HERMENEUTICS, but also with
SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, and PSYCIIIATRY. Finally, the
phenomenology of action opens up to a comprehensive
philosophy of practice. On this last level, phenomen-
ology establishes connections not only with the prac-
tica! philosophy of Aristotle or FJCHTE, but also with
MARX and pragmatism. Without its oscillation between
a narrower and a broader concept of action, pheno-
menology would degenerate to merely one paradigm
among others.
The views of action we find within the phenomen-
ological movement differ considerably. Nevertheless,
there are some main features that are present every-
where, and there are others that have been and remain
especially fruitful. Generally speaking, phenomenolo-
gists have not so much worked on a coherent theory
of action as they have done a great deal to focus on
the phenomenon of action without squeezing it into
ready-made forms.
It was the central theory of MEANING and JNTENTION-
ALITY that gave access to specific forms of phenomen-
ology of action, called Praktik by EDMUND HUSSERL.
Thus the classical theory of will and decision was
taken up in a new way by Husserl himself in the
fifth of his Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ),
in his Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre [ 1908-
14], and in Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 K luwer Academic Publishers.
und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ); it was
unfolded more extensively by ALEXANDER PFĂNDER
in Phănomenologie des Wollens (1900) and by MAX
SCHELER in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die ma-
teriale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and nonformal
ethics ofvalues, 1913/1916), and, severa] decades !ater,
it was enriched by the achievements ofthe philosophy
of existence, by PAUL RICrEUR in his thesis on Le volon-
taire et l 'involontaire ( 1950).
In contrast to the Cartesian and empiricist traditions,
act ion is no longer conceived as a conjunction of psy-
chic volition and physical effect. It appears instead as
"experience of transition" ( Ubergangserlebnis): will-
ing as practica! intention is fulfilled by the executive
action. This transition is initiated by a creative "Jet it
be," afiat as Husserl puts it, following WILLIAM JAMES.
The counterpart of the noesis of action (Handeln) is
the noema of act (Hand/ung). The willed as willed
(Gewolltes als Gewolltes) turns into the done as done
(Getanes als Getanes), into the pragma (Ricreur) or
deed (Tat), which, in terms of being intended, means
more than a pure fact ( Tatsache ). As Scheler in particu-
lar emphasizes, what we will do or intend appears only
in what we do and is not accessible to some kind of
introspection; to that extent, every private intention or
action is excluded. Practica] intentionality includes the
possibility of do ing something other than what we will
to do, as in the case of failure. Furthermore, it means
that we always want to do more than we do. Like per-
ception, action has its open horizons, it is embedded in
practica! contexts. As the following aspects show, this
dynamization ofaction surpasses the level of static and
eidetic descriptions.
Actions that intervene in the course of events sup-
pose the cooperation of our BODY, which roots us in
the world. Action in ali its forms appears as embod-
ied action. At this point Husserl 's phenomenology of
pure consciousness, which tends to found action in
a consciousness of action, reaches its limits. The co-
operation of the body is first shown by the fact that
no action would be set in motion without the moving
forces of motives that appeal, stimulate, or repe! and
deter us, turning the so-called affections into a sort of
"practica! affection." Husserl's theory of original pas-
sivity makes clear that the other side of every action
is passion. Free actions are never achieved by pure de-
cision; they are at least motivated by freedom itself,
11
 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
to which we are "condemned" (JEAN-PAUL SARTRE). EM-
MANUEL LEVINAS has radicalized this aspect by posing
an original passivity, more original than ali our own
do ing and undergoing. In another way, MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER 's notion of Gelassenheit points to a background of
action that escapes every form of activism.
Second, the cooperation of our body depends on
the fact that doing includes practica! possibilities
of being able to do (Tunkănnen, savoir~faire). The
counterpart of being moved by motives is a moving
oneself (Sich-bewegen) whose spontaneity surpasses
the control of the agent. Our own actions may sur-
prise us. As Husserl shows, especially in the anal-
yses of Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie II ( 1912-15), ac-
tions are more staged than produced.
Finally, by repeating the same action we acquire
habits, incorporated in our practica! body and form-
ing a practica! background where practica! sense be-
comes sedimented. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY was the
first to emphasize the radical embodiment of action,
making use of the research results of medical anthro-
pologists such as FREDERIK J.J. BUYTENDIJK, KURT GOLD-
STEIN, ERWIN W. STRAUS, and VIKTOR VON WEIZSĂCKER
and- in GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY- SUCh figures as Wolf-
gang Kohler (1887-1967). Thus in his early book La
structure du comportement ( 1942) he integrates hu-
man action into the larger framework of a kind of
non-behavioristic behavior that creates sense via self-
structuring and self-organizing processes; these analy-
ses were continued by CHARLES TAYLOR in The Expla-
nation of Behaviour ( 1964 ). In his second major book,
Phimomimologie de la perception ( 1945), Merleau-
Ponty bases the orientation and formation of actions in
the spatial motility of our body. Through this approach
the phenomenology of action discovers its own mar-
gins in terms of parapraxes (Fehlhandlungen) whose
own sense escapes them, and in terms of compensatory
actions (Ersatzhandlungen) by which the agent's or-
ganism adjusts to new conditions, as in the case of
construing a phantom limb. Embodied actions are ex-
posed to disturbances and at the same time are capa-
ble of productive deviations from normality. Here the
phenomenology of action reaches the field of PSYCHO-
ANALYSJS and psychiatry.
Ever since MAX WEBER, action oriented to the action
of others has been called social action. Husserl adopts
the sense of this concept as used by ADOLF REINACH in
the latter's writings on "Die apriorischen Grundlagen
des bi.irgerlichen Rechtes" (1913 ). Social acts such as
promising or asking are conceived as intentiona! acts
that need to be perceived, understood, and completed
by others. In this way, intention and fulfillment are
distributed to different interacting persons. But if we
presuppose with Husserl that community is not only
sustained but even created by communication, then
social acts do not consist only in my own act being
completed and confirmed by the Other, but it means that
we are acting together, co-creating a common sense.
However, in Husserl - and especially in ALFRED
SCHUTZ in his fundamental work Der sinnhafte Aufbau
der sozialen Welt ( 1932)- the socialization of action
is checked by the attempt to constitute the otherness of
the Others exclusively on the ground of my own ex-
perience ofthe Other. This egocentric trance is broken
by Merleau-Ponty. Already in Phenomeno/ogie de la
perception he starts off from an anonymous, pre- and
postpersonal existence. In co-perception as well as in
interlocution and interaction the own perspective and
that of the other slide into each other in a sort of syn-
thesis of transition. They refer to a kind of intermonde
(interworld), a world between us that belongs neither
to me nor to the Other. My own speech and action is in-
terwoven with the speech and action of the Other, the
Other acting within myself and myself acting within
the Other by a sort of chiasm. Thus Husserl 's concept
of intersubjectivity is explicitly redescribed in terms
of common corporeity in Merleau-Ponty's !ater work.
The self-reference of our own body, being touched and
touching at once, is extended to the body of Others
as if we were organs of one and the same intercor-
poreite (intercorporeity). Finally, intercorporeity and
interworld are enrooted in the elements of chair (flesh),
which pervades everything and everyone. There are no
individuals given in advance, there are only processes
of individualization and socialization, both intercon-
nected with each other. This view also differs from
the concept of interaction in Ji.irgen Habermas, which
consists in the mere coordination of individual actions,
based on common rules, and oriented on universal va-
lidity claims.
Of special importance is the relation between action
and LANGUAGE, not least of ali with regard to the de-
bate with ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. In this context we lea ve
 ACTION
asi de the general question ofhow to re late the language
in which theorists speak about action to action itself.
What remains is the specific question of the practica]
language in which the agent expresses his or her own
action. Ricreur addresses this question under the ti-
tie of Si?tnantique de l'action ( 1977) by distinguishing
between three levels of practica! speech: the level of
concepts, such as intention, motive, responsibility, with
which the agent describes his or her actions; the level of
sentences, with which, by uttering them, the actor does
something, carrying out certain speech acts; and the
level of arguments, with which the agent explains or
justifies the actions. Furthermore, he tries to combine
phenomenological and analytic approaches by locating
both on two different methodologicallevels, the latter
starting from given expressions, the former trying to
found the linguistic sense in a basic dicibilite du vecu
( expressibility of experience ).
But the relationship between language and action
is not restricted to speech about action, to speech of
action, and to speech as action, for we are further con-
fronted with speech within action. Thus Karl Blihler
(1879-1963), who was perhaps the first to speak of a
Sprechhandlung in his Sprachtheorie ( 1934 ), consid-
ers special forms of "empractical" or "sympractica1"
speech where speaking and acting interpenetrate.
Finally, in opposition to speech as action (Sprech-
handlung), there is the possibility of action as speech
(Handlungssprache), embedded in the larger sphere of
body language. We often respond to a request by doing
what is requested. Such an intertwining of speaking
and doing, which allows for a contradiction between
words and deeds, refers to systems of signs or symbols
or to discourses that encompass speaking and do ing. As
Merleau-Ponty stresses against Sartre in Les aventures
de la dialectique (1955), there is no direct action im-
mediately confronting humans and things, but rather
every action is indirect, traversing an intermonde of
cultural-historical symbols.
The different forms of embodiment, social connec-
tions, and symbolic mediations condense into a world
of praxis or into the world as such. Here the narrow
concept of action is extended to the larger concept
of human praxis. But the way to this general view is
paved by the use of the more modest concept offield,
which was transferred from physics to the analysis of
human behavior by Gestalt theorists like Kurt Lewin
13
( 1890--1947). Taking up this terminology, Husserl, in
his Ideen 1 and II, speaks of a "field of freedom" or
a "field of praxis," and he was followed here by au-
thors such as ARON GURWITSCH and Merleau-Ponty. The
concept of field has a certain affinity to the concept
of miii eu used by Scheler in the context of ETHICS and
sociology ofknowledge and further developed by Gur-
witsch in his book on Mitmenschliche Begegnungen
in der Milieuwelt [Human encounters in the milieu-
world, 1933]. The "field" is defined as a limited whole,
oriented to a certain standpoint, pointing to open hori-
zons, capable ofbeing transformed into another whole.
Action that takes place in a particular field has its sit-
uations, circumstances, paths, accesses, and obstacles,
spread in a "hodological space" (Lewin).
The topology of action is complemented by a
chronology of action. Action as goal-oriented and
partly planned behavior, based on preceding experi-
ences and actions, generates a temporality of its own.
The decidingfiat emerges from surprising or recurrent
events, from acts of hesitation or precipitation. The
temporality of action is articulated by Heidegger under
the aspect of Entwurf and Geworfenheit, interpreted by
Sartre as project and facticity. Schutz in his Collected
Papers I ( 1962) defines act ion as "pre-conceived" con-
duct and distinguishes between "in-order-to" motives"
referring to the fu ture and "because" motives referring
to the past.
The organization of action in terms of space and
time is completed by certain systems of relevance es-
pecially investigated by Schutz and Gurwitsch. Rele-
vance means that from everything that could be done
here and now something is singled out that should
be done. Using distinctions made by Gurwitsch in his
book The Field of Consciousness (1964) drawing on
Gesta1t psychology, one could say that every action
constitutes a thematic field, pushing certain possibili-
ties to the margins.
The global concept of world introduces the total-
ity of spatial, temporal, and thematic references. It is
the primary ground from which every action starts,
and the universal horizon toward which it moves, but
this holds true not only for action. When Husserl re-
lates the possibilities of a world and the possibility
of other worlds to Vermăglichkeiten (abilities) of the
subject, he includes every form of experience and be-
havior. Ultimately, theory itself, including phenomen-
 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ological theory, becomes a special form of"theoretical
praxis" according to Die Krisis der europăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
(1936). Heidegger's analysis of DASEIN points in the
same direction. But beyond that, Heidegger hesitates
to use the concept of Handeln because he goes back
to possibilities of Dasein beyond activity and passiv-
ity, beyond theoretical and practica! capabilities. So in
Sein und Zeit (1927), instead of Handeln or Praxis,
he speaks of besorgende Fiirsorge (concernful solic-
itude) or besorgender Umgang (concernful dealings),
which is endowed with Umsicht (circumspection) as a
specific form of Sicht (sight), irreducible to theoretical
Ansicht (view) or Einsicht (insight).
This indirect valorization of practice, provoking the
claim in the "Brief Liber den Humanismus" ( 194 7) that
"thinking acts in that it thinks" ("das Denken han-
delt, indem es denkt"), brings phenomenology, to a cer-
tain extent, closer to pragmatism and Marxism. Schutz
thus considers the world of working ( Wirkwelt) as a
paramount reality. On the other hand, in his Critique
de la raison dialectique ( 1960), Sartre integrates the
projects ofthe individual existence into the framework
of Marxist praxis. Even the Praxis group organized
in Yugoslavia in the 1960s gives Marxism a certain
Heideggerian flair.
However, for a long time a certain resistance has
been growing against Heidegger's reinterpretation of
action. Thus in Mitmenschliche Begegnungen, Gur-
witsch, referring to the child 's flexible play with things,
argues that the pluriformity and polyvalence of things
get lost when the status of things is derived from the
normal expediency of tools (Zeug). Finally, HANNAH
ARENDT, who in her famous book on The Human Con-
dition ( 1958) tries to renew the Aristotelian concept of
praxis, opposes the widespread confusion ofpraxis and
poiesis. The public place of common act ion disappears
when act ion gets absorbed by needs-fulfilling labor and
by the anonymity oftechnological work. Furthermore,
the relation between TECHNOLOGY and praxis, explained
by authors Jike HUBERT DREYFUS and DON IHDE, remains
an open question.
Finally, the inner divergencies and the outer con-
flicts of phenomenology and especially of the pheno-
menology of action are concentrated in the central and
basic problem of REASON or order of action. Unavoid-
ably, Husserl 's "logos ofthe aesthetic world" resounds
in a "logos of the practica! world." As in the case of
perception, we have to ask if action does not ha ve an
autochthonous character insofar as the order of prac-
tice originates in practice itself and not elsewhere. If
we further assume that the order of practice is incor-
porated in limited fields of action, the question arises
whether we are confronted with one single order or
rather with orders in the plural, excluding each other
and, to some extent, mutually conflicting.
Possible answers to these questions concern prac-
ticality as such, and depend on how action itself is
conceived. With regard to the classical philosophy
of action, we can distinguish at least three different
paradigms. Action is submitted to an order of goals
and values, to an order of norms and rules, or to an or-
der of causality. The phenomenology of action, based
on the assumption of practica! intentions and fulfill-
ments, certainly grants privi lege to the first paradigm,
without completely excluding the others. If we adhere
to Husserl 's initial attempt, the intentionality of action
is, on the one hand, bound to a formal VALUE THEORY
and formal theory of practice, which determine the
general conditions of axiologica! and practica! reason
(see !deen !).
On the other hand, practica! intentions are founded
in the intentionality of individual and social impulses
(Triebintentionalităt) mentioned in the posthumously
published writings. Actions ofthe subject are thus not
only conditioned by trans-subjective rule-structures,
they are also founded in pre-subjective impulses. To
some extent, this resembles the trichotomy of ego, su-
perego and id in Sigmund Freud ( 1856--1939). It should
be considered an advantage of the phenomenological
approach, compared to the rule-orientation of ORDI-
NARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY and COGNITIVE SCIENCE and
the norm-orientation of Continental discourse ethics,
that the genesis of practica! sense, its corporeal initia-
tion and habitualization, its unconscious motives, with
ali its openness and ambiguities, is not overshadowed
by questions of legitimacy. Just as speaking and writ-
ing are always more than correct speaking and writing,
actions are always more than right or wrong actions.
Nevertheless, we have to ask if creativity of action is
not underdetermined when action is based on a pre-
given order of goals or, in Husserl 's term, rooted in a
pervading teleology and rationality (see the Krisis).
Embedded in such a teleological order, action would
 ACTION
be nothing more than a means to an end, whereas within
a normative order it would be reduced to cases of a rule,
and within a causal order, to causal effects. In opposi-
tion to this, the possibility of an autochthonous order
of practice, originating in practice itself, may be un-
folded in two steps. First, action has tobe interpreted in
terms of creativity in its fuli sense, i.e., not only execut-
ing what is possible within a certain order, but making
possible by introducing a new kind of order. Speak-
ing with Alfred Schutz in Reflections on the Problem
of Relevance [ 194 7-51 ], there are things that are not
only new (neu), but of a new kind (neuartig). Foliow-
ing the investigations ofMax Wertheimer ( 1880-1943)
in Productive Thinking ( 1945), we can suppose a sort
of productive acting. As Cornelius Castoriadis ( 1926-
1984) shows in his book on L 'institution imaginaire
de la societe ( 1975), radical creativity is not restricted
to solving pregiven problems, as a certain pragmatism
presumes, but rather consists in posing new questions.
Just as Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between speak-
ing speech (parole parlante) and spoken speech (pa-
role par/ee), we should similarly distinguish between
productive and reproductive, innovative and repetitive
acting, both ranging on a certain scale whose one pole
would be gratuitous acts, the other stereotypes.
Creativity does not mean that everything is possible,
it means that it is always possible to realize more than
what is actualiy realized. With regard to the contin-
gency of variable orders that are always selective and
exclusive, we can state with Merleau-Ponty: "There is
(il y a) sense or rationality but not the sense or the ratio-
nality" or with MICHEL FOUCAULT "There is an order of
things" (Les mots et les choses, 1966), both statements
recaliing Heidegger's remark, "There is truth" (Es gibt
Wahrheit). But pure creativity wili not do. By looking
for what can be dane in a new way we do not find out
what has to be dane, and we do not meet with what
Merleau-Ponty calis verite âfaire. So we have to take
a second step. We can attribute to action what Kurt
Goldstein (Der Aufbau des Organismus, [The struc-
ture of the organism, 1934]) attributes to the healthy
organism - namely, a certain responsiveness. In do-
ing and speaking, we always respond to certain affor-
dances (Aufforderungscharaktere), as Gestalt theorists
stress. So we should take seriously Husserl's attempt,
which can also be found in his posthumously published
writings on intersubjectivity, to reinterpret affectivity
15
as "practica! affectivity," as appeal (Am·un, concern
(Angang), or demand (A ufruf), and finally as interpel-
lation/claim (Anspruch ), transforming ali behavior into
"responding behavior." Here we meet with Levinas's
philosophy ofthe Other, which breaks with ali totality.
Radical response takes the paradoxical form of creative
responding. While creating our response itself- i.e.,
what we respond - we do not at ali create what or
whom we respond to.
Responsive acting, which moves within a certain
order while simultaneously transgressing it, lends its
ear to what is extraordinary, atypical, marginal, anoma-
lous. In this line phenomenology wili on the one hand
renounce the iliusion of a first or last order, but on the
other hand it would resist the trend of normalization
that reduces ali actions to ordinary actions functioning
in a certain order, whatever it may be. Ifwhat bas tobe
done is always more than what we do, our do ing trans-
gresses every given order, stimulated by what exceeds
our intentions without fulfiliing them.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958.
Buytendijk, Frederik J. J. A/gemene theorie der menselijke
houding en beweging. Antwerp: Standaard Boekhandel,
1948; Al!gemeine Theorie der menschlichen Haltung und
Bewegung [1956]. Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 1972.
Dallmayr, Fred R. Polis and Praxis. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1948.
Goldstein, Kurt. Der Aufbau des Organismus. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1934; The Organism. New York: Amer-
ican Book, 1938; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.
Gurwitsch, Aron. Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der
Milieuwelt [ 1931]. Ed. Alexandre Metraux. Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1977; Human Encounters in the Social World.
Trans. Fred Kersten. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University,
1979.
Ihde, Don. Technics and Praxis. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979.
Kojima, Hiroshi, ed. Phănomenologie der Praxis im Di-
alog zwischen Japan und dem Westen. Wlirzburg:
Konigshausen & Neumann, 1989.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. La structure du comportement.
Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1942; The Struc-
ture o{Behavior. Trans. Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1963.
- . Phimomenologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard,
1945; Phenomenology of'Perception. Trans. Calin Smith.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.
Ricreur, Paul. Le volontaire et 1'involontaire. Paris: Aubier,
1950; The Voluntmy and the lnvo!untary. Trans. Erazim
V. Kohak. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1966.
 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
- . La semantique de 1'action. Paris: Editions du CNRS,
1977.
Schrag, Calvin O. Communicative Praxis and the Space
of' Suhjecti1·itr. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
I986.
Schutz, Alfred. Der sinnhafte Aufhau der so::ialen Welt. Vi-
enna: Springer-Verlag, 1932; The Phenomenology of' the
Social World. Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1967.
- . Col!ected Papers 1: The Prohlem of' Social Reality. Ed.
Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
Sokolowski, Robert. Moral Action. Bloomington, IN: Indi-
ana University Press, 1985.
Taylor, Charles. The Explanation of' Behaviour. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1964.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. Der Spielraum des Verha!tens. Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980.
- . Der Stache! des Fremden. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1990.
- . Antwortregister. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994.
BERNHARD WALDENFELS
Ruhr Universitar Bochum
AESTHETICS Although EDMUND HUSSERL wrote
little that was directly concerned with problems in aes-
thetics, a great deal of his work in phenomenology
was relevant to such issues and his work stimulated
a great deal of attention to aesthetic problems. Rather
than focusing on the problems of traditional aesthetics,
such as the question of the validity of aesthetic judg-
ments (Kant), phenomenological work in acsthetics has
more broadly attended to aesthetic experience while
challenging many of the assumptions of traditional
philosophical aesthetics. For example, many pheno-
menological treatments have shifted from an emphasis
on detached contemplation to a focus on more "par-
ticipatory" relations to works of art. This is the result
less of a competing philosophical thesis about aes-
thetics than of the progressive recovery of aisthesis,
the explicating/articulating co-constitution of the per-
ceptual object as opposed to a merely receptive sense
experience.
In 1905 Husserl gave a lecture course on the pheno-
menology of IMAGINATION and the consciousness of
images in which RE-PRESENTATION in general was the
central theme. During the course of these lectures, he
overcame a tendency to think of imagination as the
consciousness of an in ner image, thus opening the way
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
to an authentically intentiona! conception of imagi-
nation. His phenomenology of the consciousness of
images sets the stage for a phenomenology of picto-
rial art. Although these lectures were not published
until 1980, their contents were made available in EU-
GEN FINK 's dissertation, Vergegenwiirtigung und Bild
(Re-presentation and image, 1930).
Aesthetic issues soon attracted attention among
Husserl 's students. WALDEMAR coN RAD applied the de-
scriptive phenomenology of Husserl 's early work to
aesthetic objects such as MUSIC, poetry, and pictorial
art. MORITZ GEIGER, an early member of the "Munich
Circ le" of phenomenologists, had a long-standing in-
terest in aesthetics. His Die Bedeutung der Kunst (The
meaning of art) remained unfinished, and only a frag-
ment of the original project appeared after his death.
Geiger focused on the phenomenon of aesthetic en-
joyment, which he carefully distinguished from both
pleasure and joy as well as from nonaesthetic enjoy-
ment. He was particularly interested in what he called
the "depth effect" of works of art, i.e., the sense in
which a work of art has a deep impact on the self.
The Polish phenomenologist ROMAN INGARDEN stud-
ied in Gottingen and Freiburg from 1912 to 1918, and
Husserl considered him to be a faithful "disciple," al-
though Ingarden was o ne of the most tenacious of thc
critics of his transcendental idealism, which Ingarden
interpreted as a metaphysical idealism. Ingarden did
not write a general aesthetics, prefcrring to deal pri-
marily with ontologica! issues of works of art, and
focusing on the literary work of art, along with MU-
SIC, painting and scu]pture, ARCHITECTURE, and FILM.
He argues that works of art are neither purely real
nor purely ideal, but have a purely intentiona! exis-
tence. The work of art has an enduring identity, but is
not timeless. Ingarden carefully distinguishes the var-
ious strata of works of art as intentiona! objects, from
mere sound through phonemes or musical tones, mean-
ing, the schematized aspects of represented objects,
the "world" represented, up to what he called "meta-
physical qualities." Having distinguished these strata,
Ingarden is in a position to give a phenomenological
analysis ofthe viewer 's/listener's/ reader 's experiences
ofthe work ofart, in which the various strata come to-
gether in a unity of experienced MEANING of the work.
This experienced meaning is never absolute, and Ingar-
den insists that the indeterminacy that is found in any
 AESTHETICS
particular interpretation means that the gap between
interpretation and work can never be closed and that
interpretation is essentially plural, although this does
not mean that one interpretation is as good as any other.
Ingarden 's work has had an influence on the aesthetics
ofreception developed in the 1960s by WOLFGANG ISER
and HANS ROBERT JAUSS.
FRITZ KAUFMANN studied with Husserl, mainJy in
Freiburg after World War 1, and was somewhat
unusual among Husserl 's students of this period
in that he accepted Husserl 's transcendental turn
in the Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ). At the
same time, he was influenced by WILHELM DILTHEY's
view of human experience as an essentially historical
phenomenon. He came under the influence of Heideg-
ger in the early 1920s, though he later distanced him-
selffrom him. Kaufmann studied the consciousness of
works of art as a privileged mode of access to real-
ity, one that transcends the realm of purely individual
meaning. His final work on aesthetics remained unfin-
ished at his death.
OSKAR BECKER studied with Husserl in Freiburg, and
became Privatdozent there in 1922. He worked as
Husserl 's assistant and was el o se to Heidegger. Becker
developed Heidegger's analysis of DASEIN, developing
the concept "Dawesen" as a framework for analyzing
the non-historical features of Dasein, and the concept
of"paraexistence" to supplement Heidegger's concept
of "existence." Becker argued that beauty is "infirm"
(hinfăllig), since it is locked in the moment, while the
artist is "adventurous," since he or she is dependent on
the favor ofnature.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER was Husserl 's assistant in the
1920s and his successor in Freiburg. Although Husserl
thought of Heidegger as his true disciple and as
extending phenomenology into the area of the HU-
MAN SCIENCES, Heidegger developed a HERMENEUTIC AL
PHENOMENOLOGY of Dasein as a preliminary to rais-
ing the question of the meaning of Being. While
Sein und Zeit ( 1927) does not focus on works of
art, the general theory of interpretation developed
there has been seminal for HERMENEUTICS in general
( developed above ali by HANS-GEORG GADAMER and
PAUL RICCEUR) and to a great deal of work more fo-
cused on art. Especially significant is Heidegger's
articulation of the hermeneutic circle, in which the
17
viewer's/reader's/listener's pre-understanding (in the
final analysis, the pre-understanding of Being) consti-
tutes the horizon within which the specific work can
be encountered. Ali encounters with art are interpreti ve
and thus exhibit this structure of anticipation.
Whether Heidegger's work contains a philosophy
of art is a heavily debated question. In an "Addendum"
to his famous essay, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes"
(The Origin of the Work of Art, 1935-36 ), he states
that the essay left several issues unresolved and that in
particular it does not answer the question as to what
art is. ono POGGELER has interpreted this to mean that
the essay on the artwork does not give an outline of
Heidegger's philosophy of art. FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON
HERMANN and WALTER BIEMEL defend the view that Hei-
degger maintained the views in the essay on the work
ofart until the end ofhis life and that they contain the
core of a philosophy of art.
Heidegger tried to overcome classical aesthetics in-
sofar as it is part ofmetaphysics. Ifaesthetics is under-
stood a la Baumgarten and Kant, then Heidegger con-
tributes nothing to it. For example, he is not concemed
with the experiences from which artworks allegedly
flow or with the EMOTIONS they are meant to provoke.
But ifthe term is taken in a broader sense, so as to refer
to ali thoughtful reflections on art and artworks, then
he made at least three very important contributions.
First, he is concerned with the coming-to-pass of
truth in the work of art. The artwork is a privileged
site at which the understanding of Being of an epoch
is disclosed; the work has the power to gather a world
and Being comes to unconcealment in it. His second
great contribution is in his reflections on poetizing and
its relationship to thinking in, for instance, Untenvegs
zur Sprache (On the Way to Language, 1959). Finally,
there are his elucidations of the hymns of Holderlin
and the poetry of Rilke, Trakl, George, and others.
The notion that the work of art gathers a WORLD
has been taken up by subsequent phenomenologists
and applied to works beyond those Heidegger himself
chose as examples. His own interpretations of individ-
ual paintings and poems ha ve nevertheless engendered
some controversy among persons trained in art history
and criticism or in literary scholarship. For Heidegger
and his supporters, however, his challengers are miss-
ing the essential point of his analyses, since he is not
concerned with produc ing defensible interpretations of
 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
concrete works of art, but with a poetic thinking ofBe-
ing.
With the rise of National Socialism in Germany in
the 1930s, the cutting edge ofwork in phenomenology
shifted to FRANCE. One ofthe most brilliant of the new
generation ofphenomenologists, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, fol-
lowed Heidegger in giving phenomenology a strongly
existential turn, but he did not follow Heidegger's turn
away from consciousness. Sartre insisted on the abso-
lute freedom of consciousness, the pour-soi (for-itself),
a function ofthe essentially negative power and tempo-
ral structure of consciousness. Thus Heidegger's focus
on the coming-to-pass of the truth of Being, which is
nota function ofDasein 's act ion or decisi an, is replaced
by an emphasis on unconditioned human choice. Since
the creati an of art is o ne response to the fact of being
condemned to freedom, this freedom is the only proper
theme of art. Sartre thus focused on the act of writing
and on the politica! import of this act. Sartre's impar-
lance for general aesthetics is based on his early work
on the IMAGINATION, and his ma in works of specifically
aesthetic themes concern the philosophy ofLITERATURE.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY became familiar with Ger-
man phenomenology (Husserl, MAX SCHELER, Heideg-
ger) in the 1930s. While he did not write a systematic
aesthetics, he continually returned to the two poles of
expressive LANGUAGE and painting, and his reftections
are significant not only for their insights into the arts,
but also for the way his treatment of modern painting in
particular is interwoven with, and undergirds, his de-
velopment of a new ontology marked by a "mutation"
in the relations ofhumankind and Being. The principal
texts in this re gard are "Le doute de Cezanne" ( 1945),
"Le langage indirect et les voix du silence" ( 1952), and
"L' oei! et 1'esprit" ( 1961 ), with related passages also to
be found in Phenonu!!nologie de la perception ( 1945)
and Le visib!e et l'invisible (1964).
Merleau-Ponty's view ofthe history of art proceeds
from Husserl's late work on HISTORY in general: acul-
tural product can function as an originary establishment
or "institution" (Stiftung) that does not merely assume
a prior tradition, but inaugurates a new one by open-
ing a field of possibilities whose fecundity is not at ali
exhausted by the particular work in question. Such a
work is "productive" in a double sense. On the one
hand, it moves beyond what has already been seen or
said or done and gives birth to something genuinely
new, creating thereby a "perennial acquisition" whose
sense can be recaptured and revived by future genera-
tions. On the other hand, however, the work that founds
a tradition sets forth an expressive task, posing, as it
were, a question that outruns its own answer: creative
expression does not re-produce the responses of its pre-
decessors, but returns anew to the question posed by
the open task itself.
Yet despite this emphasis on the authentic genesis
of meaning (rather than the reproduction of a cultur-
ally pre-established meaning), Merleau-Ponty rejects
the notion of artistic expression as a pure construction
springing from some abso 1ute freedom on the part of an
artist's consciousness. Rather, the painter's gesture re-
sponds to the si lent solicitation ofthe world and things,
and it is "mute Being" that comes to show forth its own
meaning when the artist lends his or her BODY to the
world, answering its caii by releasing and rendering
visible a meaning already latent within the visible it-
self. Such meaning is neither absent from the visible
nor present in it, but "silent" or operative, so that the
artist does not merely copy or re-produce an already
established perceptual meaning, but brings to light, for
example, the usually "invisible" pre-predicative means
whereby the spectacle spontaneously organizes itself
before our eyes prior to any active "bestowing" of
meaning by a perceiving subject upon supposedly in-
choate "sense data." Thus a painting by Cezanne is
not the portrait of a fixed, objective thing, but catches
the world in the act of becoming visible, so that what
is made visible in the work is the anonymous or pre-
personal "coming-to-itself' ofthe visible itself.
Yet though at times Merleau-Ponty roots the
painter's vision in a kind of primordial experience that
is not only pre-scientific but almost "prehuman," other
passages insist that perception is culturally shaped, that
visibility too has its historicity, and that there are essen-
tial links between Cartesian metaphysics and Renais-
sance perspectiva! techniques. Thus though perspec-
tiva! painting claims to represent three-dimensional
space by duplicating artificially what perception does
"naturally," such a painting restricts o ne to a single van-
tage point over against things, dominating the spectacle
and reducing it to a single crystallized order. The per-
ceived world itself, however, neither requires nor con-
forms to classical perspective: we are among things,
not in front of them, and they caii upon our glance in
 AESTHETICS
turn, enfolding us in the inexhaustible reserves of a
"wild Being," an ontologica! depth sustaining a simul-
taneity of perspectives irreducible to any presentation
( or re-presentation) to a "consciousness" or "ego."
Merleau-Ponty accordingly seizes upon remarks
from painters who experience a kind of reversal of
roles so that it is the landscape that looks at them,
thinks itselfin them, rather than they who see and think
it. This radicalizes the Husserlian notion ofreciprocity
of perspectives, which gives the perceived world its
intersubjective depth (and me my full visibility) by
virtue of the exchangeability of standpoints: the other
sees the si de of the thing ( or of myself) that I would
see were I in the other's place. For Merleau-Ponty,
however, not only am I both seer and scen, but it is
as though the things themselves see the other side,
thus effecting a radical decentering of"subjectivity" as
the privileged locus of experiencing. Such reversibil-
ity not only undermines traditional dualisms between
mind and matter, for-itself and in-itself, but explodes
the entire paradigm of an experiencing subject fac-
ing an object over against it; the human-world relation
is no longer frontal, perspectiva!, and marked by an
ontologica! dichotomy. Instead, my own ftesh (chair)
opens upon and belongs to the encompassing depth of
the "ftesh of the world."
Modern painting celebrates this carnal voluminos-
ity, not only by multiperspectival and aperspectival
works, but also, for example, by allowing color to func-
tion as level or dimension rather than as an attribute of
an object and line tobe a way of moving rather than the
edge of a thing. For Merleau-Ponty, then, such painting
has a "metaphysical significance": by abandon ing both
the mcans and the goal of a classical representation of
objects over against subjects and inscribing instead the
genesis ofthe visible among seers who are themselves
visible, it anticipates and ca lis for the ontology ofBeing
as ftesh he was still seeking to articulate at his death.
MIKEL DUFRENNE was the first French phenomen-
ologist to produce a systematic phenomenological aes-
thetics: Phenomenologie de f"experience esthetique
( 1953). In the spirit of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, he
understands phenomenology as the description of the
meaning or sense (le sens) that is immanent in the sen-
suous (le sensible ), to which incarnate perception gives
access. The aesthetic object, which is the work ofart as
perceived, represents the "apotheosis ofthe sensuous,"
19
i.e., the sensuous at its most intense and poignant. In
the presence of the aesthetic object, the appreciator or
spectator of art is conveyed to a unique world with its
own spatiotemporal specificity, its own atmosphere as
revealed by its "affective qualities." These qualities,
which serve as ingredient a priori structures, embody a
depth and expressiveness that solicit feeling (le senti-
ment) on the part ofthe viewer or listener. Tempered by
reftection and disciplined by understanding, this feei-
ing takes the place of the distractions of imagination,
which is delimited rather than unleashed by the aes-
thetic.
Dufrenne emphasizes the ro le of "performance" in
the perception of art ~ not just overtly in music and
THEATER, but in the very process of perceiving ali art,
including painting and sculpture. Distinguishing be-
tween audience (i.e., the immediate perceivers of a
work of art) and public (the total group of those ac-
quainted with the work ), Dufrenne 's Phenomenologie
conceives the aesthetic object as "in-itself-for-us," thus
as a "quasisubject" ~ i.e., it is expressive, and, like
other humans, holds and manifests affective qualities as
does, say, a face. This object is at once autonomous-
having its own structures, world, and truth- and het-
eronomous, being dependent for its full animation as
sensuous on its perceivers. This resolutely phenomen-
ological theory of art gains an ontologica! dimension
in Dufrenne's Le poetique ( 1963), in which the philos-
ophy of art is expanded into a philosophy of "Nature"
wherein the sensuous is grounded in the "great images"
afforded by the natural world. Politica! dimensions of
art are explored in Art et politique ( 1974 ), and many
other aspects of art are taken up in the three volumes
of collected essays entitled Esthetique et philosophie
(1967, 1976, 1981).
Important work in the philosophy of literature has
been done by ALFRED SCIIUTZ and MAURICE NATANSON.
This work, rooted in the CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
of Husserl, focuses on the manner in which literature
can present, against the background of the world of
daily life, an intersubjective expericnce ofthe world.
In addition, phenomenological approaches to art-
works have been an important background, foii, and
participant in the theoretical movements of STRUC-
TURALISM, POSTMODERNISM, and CRITIC AL THEORY. In par-
ticular, JACQUES DERRIDA 's deconstruction, which has
been presented as the great disrupter of phenomen-
20 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ological dreams, is, according to him, a movement that
occurs within phenomenology.
There is a large phenomenological literature de-
voted to DANCE as well as ARCHITECTURE, FILM, LITERA-
TURE, MUSIC, PAINTING, and THEATER. The resources of
phenomenology have thus not only contributed to aes-
thetics in general, but have proven eminently fruitful
in elucidating works of art themselves.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bcckcr, Oskar. Dasein und Dawesen. Pfullingen: Neske,
1963.
Berleant, Arnold. Artand Engagement. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1991.
Conrad. Waldemar. "Der aesthetische Gegenstand." Zeit-
schrifif!ir Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 2
(1908), 71-118:3 (1908), 469-511:4 (1909), 400--55.
Dufrenne, Mikel. Plu!nomenologie de /'experience esthe-
tique. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953;
The Phenomenology of'Aesthetic Experience. Trans. Ed-
ward S. Casey et al. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1973.
Geiger, Moritz. Die Bedeutung der Kunst. Zugdnge zu einer
materialen Wertdsthetik. Ed. Klaus Berger and Wolfhart
Henckmann. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1976.
Heidegger, Martin. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes." In
his Hol:!wege. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
1950, "The Origin ofthe Work of Art." In his Poelly, Lan-
guage, Thought. Trans. and ed. Albert Hofstadter. New
York: Harper & Row, 1971, 15-87.
Hermann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. Heideggers Phi/osophie
der Kunst. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
1980.
Ingarden, Roman. Das /iterarische Kunstwerk. Halle (Saale):
M. Niemeyer, 1931: The Litermy Work of' Art. Trans.
George G. Grabowicz. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
Johnson, Galen A .. and Michael B. Smith, ed. The Merleau-
Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
Kaufmann, Fritz. Das Reich des Schiinen. Bausteine zu einer
Phi/osophie der Kunst. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. Heidegger on Art and Art Works. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1985.
Lyotard, Jcan Fran<;ois. Discours. Figure. Paris: Klincksieck,
1971.
Natanson, Maurice. Literature, Philosophy, and the Social
Sciences: Essm·s in Existentialism ami Phenomeno/ogy.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
Schutz, Alfred. "Sociologica] Aspects of Literature" [ 1955].
In Alfi·ed Schut:: \· "Sociologica/ Aspect of Litera ture":
Construction and Complementm:v Essavs. Ed. Lester Em-
brec. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
1. CLAUDE EVANS
Washington University
ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
Studv Project on Phenomenology of the Body
EDWARD S. CASEY
State University o/New York, Stony Brook
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY Analytic philoso-
phy is a tradition in 20th century philosophy, princi-
pally in English language philosophy. The methods and
phiJosophy of LOGIC, MATHEMATICS, and NATURAL SCI-
ENCE figure prominently in much of the tradition, and
exactness of thought and expression is much prized.
For many decades the tradition focused notably on ex-
plicit analysis ofLANGUAGE and concepts~whence the
name. Indeed, it was often said that prior philosophy
suffered from mistakes and confusions about language
and its logic or grammar. Originally, analytic philoso-
phers sought to do ali philosophy by logica! analy-
sis of language, but this strict methodology has not
been retained. Phenomenology, by contrast, sought to
do philosophy by analysis oflived human experience,
with different schools pursuing different methods, e.g.,
EDMUND HUSSERL 's "transcendental" method of"brack-
eting" mundane existence to describe pure conscious-
ness or MARTIN HEIDEGGER's "hermeneutica!" method
of interpreting human activity in practica!, historical
contexts.
Analytic philosophy always dealt with issues wider
than language, including epistemological and ethical
issues, but the approach was initially and most dis-
tinctively by way of analysis of language. As formal
semantics flourished in the l970s, however, more tradi-
tional concerns of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics,
etc., came to the fore. The relations between language
and mind, society, and the physical world were increas-
ingly stressed, thus separating language itself from ex-
tralinguistic entities and their contributions to mean-
ing in language. Philosophy of mind, in tandem with
philosophy of language, has assumed an increasingly
prominent ro le in analytic philosophy, partly due to the
rise of COGNITIVE SCIENCE. This development has made
possible some convergence with phenomenology, es-
pecially concerning mental representation and INTEN-
TIONALITY. Notoriously, however, phenomenology and
analytic philosophy followed divergent paths, with !it-
tie interaction, throughout the first three quarters ofthe
century.
The tradition of analytic philosophy, like pheno-
menology, took root in the first decade of the 20th
century. Analytic philosophy was born in the work of
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), G. E. Moore (1873-
1958), and the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889-1951 )~in particular, in the reflections of Rus-
 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
sell and Wittgenstein on issues of meaning and refer-
ence raised by seminal work in logic by GOTTLOB FREGE.
In "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung" ( 1892), Frege distin-
guished the sense and referent of an expression, argu-
ing that the terms "the morning star" and "the evening
star" refer to the same celestial body, Venus, but do so
by way of different senses reflecting different cognitive
values or "ways of being given." Russell argued for a
different model of reference, without the Fregean no-
tion of sense, in "On Denoting" ( 1905). Proper names
such as "Bismarck" refer, but definite descriptions such
as "the present king ofFrance" have a misleading form
in everyday English, Russell argued. The logica! form
of the sentence "The present king of France is bald,"
on Russell 's analysis, is that of "Someone is presently
king ofFrance, only one person is, and he is bald." Log-
ica] analysis thus removes the temptation to say that
the definite description refers. The young Wittgenstein
discussed logica! issues of language with Russell and,
in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1923), developed
a semantic system that Russell, expounding in his own
terms, called "logica! atomism." Wittgenstein's "pic-
ture" theory ofmeaning held that a proposition or sen-
tence represents a state of affairs ( or, if actual, a fact)
because both have the same logica! form, the world be-
ing built up from "atomic" states of affairs by logica!
relations such as "and."
In the 1930s the "logica! positivists" of the Vienna
Circle ~ including Moritz Schlick (1882-1936),
Rudolf Carnap ( 1891-1970), and others ~ sought
to make philosophy scientific. They stressed not only
precise expression in formal logic, but also the strict
grounding of ali propositions in empirica! evidence.
The positivists' "verification principle" declared that
a statement is meaningful only if verifiable through
discrete empirica] observations. Carnap's LOGIC AL POS-
ITIVISM, as developed in Der logische Aufbau der Welt
( 1928), sought to use techniques of modern logic to de-
fine language about physical objects in terms of phe-
nomenal ~ in effect phenomenological- language
about sense data. Philosophy of logic, mathematics,
and science thus maintained a central role in the con-
cerns of analytic philosophy.
In the 1950s, however, Oxford philosophers focused
on ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS, as opposed to for-
ma]Janguages in logic and mathematics. Ordinary lan-
guage philosophy drew on Wittgenstein's late work in
21
Philosophical!nvestigations (1953 ), focusing on par-
ticular "language games" defined in concrete situa-
tions. The meaning of a word, Wittgenstein taught, is
given by its use. J. L. Austin ( 1911-1960) offered case-
by-case analyses of the uses of particular expressions
of English, and his theory of "speech acts" classified
the different kinds of"force" a sentence has in use. This
model was developed systematically in John Searle's
Speech Acts ( 1969).
Gilbert Ryle ( 1900-1976) in The Concept of Mind
(1949), following on the !ater Wittgenstein 's work,
helped to launch analytic philosophy of mind. In a fa-
mous analysis Ryle argued that Descartes's mind-body
dualism was the result of a "category mistake." It is a
mistake of categories to ask, after seeing the buildings,
lecturers, etc., where "the university" is; similarly, it is
a category mistake to ask, after seeing the various be-
haviors of a person, where "the mind" is. Ryle defined a
mental state such as beliefas the pure disposition tobe-
have in certain ways in certain circumstances - a view
that has been called "logica] behaviorism." This view
is very different from any view in the phenomenologi-
cal tradition - though Heidegger, like Wittgenstein,
stressed the forms of meaningful behavior that embody
experience.
In the spirit of Russell, W. V Quine used first-order
quantifier logic to "regiment" everyday language, to
specify the proper logica! form of English sentences
such as "Jones believes someone tobe a spy." Quine's
logica! work spread into a wider theory oflanguage and
an empiricist epistemology. In Word and Object ( 1960)
he defines linguistic meaning in terms ofthe empirica!
evidence available to auditors, espousing a somewise
behaviorist view of mind and language. Quine's be-
haviorism is not "logica!" (like Ryle's), but epistemo-
logical: our evidence for attributing meaning to spoken
or written language, Quine holds, !ies solely in our ob-
servations of what people say in what circumstances.
Quine's famous thesis of the "indeterminacy of trans-
lation" holds that there are in principle different ways
of translating any language into o ne 's own tongue, on
the basis of ali possible evidence. Consequently, the
meaning of any piecc of language is indeterminate.
This thesis, Quine has held, undermines the very
significance of phenomenology, as we can attribute
particular forms ofbelief or experience to people only
on the basis of what we observe of their speech and
22 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
other behavior. Indeed, Quine took FRANZ BRENTANo's
thesis that mental phenomena are irreducibly "inten-
tiona!," or directed to objects, to show the baselessness
ofthe "science ofintention," and by implication pheno-
menology. For the idiom of intentionality, and hence
the language of phenomenology, cannot be accommo-
dated in the language offirst-order logic. In the Pursuit
of Truth ( 1990), however, Quine stresses the practica!
importance of the language of the intentiona! along-
side the language of science. Quine's separation be-
tween science and the business of everyday life reca lis
Husserl 's analysis, in Die Krisis der europăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
( 1936), ofthe differences between the "natural world"
as characterized by natural science and the LIFEWORLD
as experienced in everyday life and investigated in the
HUMAN SCIFNCES.
In the 1960s and 1970s analytic philosophers de-
veloped the philosophical foundations of "moda!" or
"intensional" logic, studying logics of "necessarily,"
"believes," etc. - precisely the "intensional" idioms
Quine had rejected as logically and philosophically
unworkable. Jaakko Hintikka, in Knowledge and Be-
lief ( 1962), develops a "possible worlds" semantics
for sentences such as "Jones believes that p": this sen-
tence is true just in case "p" is true in ali cognitively
("doxastically") possible worlds compatible with what
Jones believes. This tautology lays out the conditions
ofreference for terms describing not the actual world,
but states of affairs or worlds projected by the belief
described. This pattern of logica! or semantic anal-
ysis contains an implicit phenomenological analysis,
unfolding in terms of "belief worlds." This structure
ofpossible worlds resembles Husserl's analysis ofthe
"horizon" of an act of consciousness, defined in Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931] as the implicit range of
possibilities left open by the explicit content ofthe act.
In the 1970s and 1980s there were, at last, explicit
areas of convergence between analytic philosophy and
phenomenology. The convergence centered on prob-
lems of intentionality in both philosophy of language
cum logic and philosophy of mind cum cognitive sci-
ence.
The concept of intentionality emerged slowly in
the analytic tradition, despite its high-profile presence
in the phenomenological tradition for half a century
beforehand. In the 1950s Roderick Chisholm revived
Brentano 's notion of intentionality and sought linguis-
tic marks of intentionality. Wilfrid Sellars argued from
Wittgensteinian/Sellarsian principles that intentional-
ity is rooted in language rather than intrinsic to mind,
as Chisholm held with Brentano, Hussserl, and Aris-
totle. Quine then argued, as noted, against the very
logic of the intentiona!. But in the 1960s not only
did Hintikka develop, in effect, a logic of intention-
ality, but DAGFINN F0LLESDAL (Quine's student) recon-
structed Husserl 's own theory of intentiona! ity in a
model parallel to Frege's theory ofreference via sense.
An "analytic" style of phenomenology then developed
through the 1970s in writings of Follesdal, Hintikka,
HUBERT DREYFUS, RONALD MCINTYRE, DAVID WOODRUFF
SMITH, J.N. MOHANTY, and others. As linguistic acts or
expressions refer to things in the world, so acts of con-
sciousness "intend" things in the world: representation
runs para li el in language and in thought. The works of
phenomenologists, especially Husserl and Heidegger,
were thus interpreted in the light of analytic philosophy
of language and mind.
The problem of reference or representation, with-
out the term "intentionality," was present in analytic
philosophy from the earliest days in the logica! atom-
isms ofRussell and Wittgenstein and their background
in Frege 's account of language as expressing thoughts
whose constituents stand for objects in the world. How-
ever, where analytic philosophers were primarily con-
cerned with representation in language as opposed to
mind, phenomenologists were concerned with repre-
sentation in both consciousness and language. In Lo-
gische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ), Husserl explic-
itly studied the foundation of linguistic representation
in the intentionality of conscious "acts." And in Sein
und Zeit (1927), Heidegger saw language as a pri-
mary activity ofthe human being ( or DASEIN), arguably
implying that language grounds intentionality even in
thought and other modes of "comportment," such as
perception and action.
For the most part, analytic philosophers concerned
with the mind did not turn explicitly to intentionality
until the 1980s (the exceptions were Chisholm, Sell-
ars, Follesdal, etc., as noted above). In the 1970s coG-
NITIVE SCIENCE replaced behaviorism as the reigning
paradigm for empirica! psychology, and Jerry Fodor,
in The Language o{Thought( 1975), gave cognitive sci-
ence a notion of mental representation very much like
 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
Husserl 's conception of intentiona! content. Fodor even
proposed "methodological solipsism" as the proper re-
search strategy for cognitive psychology, an exact par-
allel to (at least o ne stage of) Husserl 's phenomenologi-
cal method of epoche: "bracket" everything outside
your own mind and describe the contents of your ex-
perience as such. However, most cognitive scientists,
including Fodor, assumed a materialist, functionalist
theory ofmind uncongenial to most phenomenologists.
On the computer model of mind- the core of ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE- the mind is just software running
on the hardware or "wetware" ofthe brain.
In the 1970s and J980s HUBERT DREYFUS challenged
the model of artificial intelligence, arguing from Hei-
deggerian phenomenology to the conclusion that com-
puters cannot do what human beings do, because they
cannot encode the background ofhuman understanding
and practice that alone gives meaning to human expe-
rience. In the 1980s John Searle further criticized the
computational model of mind, on essentially Husser-
lian lines: computers run on syntactic symbols alone,
he argues, without the intentiona! content found in real
human experiences. In Intentionality (1983) Searle ar-
gues that intentionality is an irreducible property of
mental states caused by and realized in the brain. His
detailed account of intentiona! states and their con-
tents lines up with Husserl's phenomenology on most
points ( apart from Husserl 's transcendental idealism
and Searle's assumption of biologica! NATURALISM).
Philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition has been
driven by the mind-body problem- the metaphysical
problem of how mind and body are related - rather
than phenomenological problems. According to Ryle's
logica! behaviorism, a mental state such as belief is
identica! with a pure disposition to overt bodily behav-
ior, and this is a matter of the logic or meaning of our
talk about the mental. But are behavioral dispositions
not grounded in brain activity, and can this ali bea mat-
ter of logic or semantics? In the 1950s and 1960s the
identity theory- advocated by U. T. Place, J. J. Smart,
and D. M. Armstrong- proposed that mental states
are identica! with states ofthe brain or central nervous
system. But what about organisms different from hu-
mans? If extraterrestrials ha ve nervous systems at ali,
they are different from ours, yet Martians may have
perceptions, beliefs, desires, etc.
Accordingly, in the 1960s and 1970s functionalism
23
- explicated by Hilary Putnam, Fodor, and others-
proposed that a mental state is not a brain state per se
but rather a function of brain states, realizable in dif-
ferent kinds of physical systems. Functionalism thus
allows that computing machines have mental states:
mental states are defined by algorithms that specify the
relations of inputs to outputs for the machine, hence
mind is just software. Functionalism differs from be-
haviorism (logica! or empirica!) because the mind is
said to involve, beyond inputs and outputs, interna! pro-
cessing of representations or infonnation coded in an
appropriate symbol system. These cognitive represen-
tations play the ro le of intentiona! contents, according
to philosophers like Fodor.
But can any of these materialist or functionalist
theories of mind account for the phenomenological
properties of consciousness? Among analytic philoso-
phers, Thomas Nagel, Ned Block, Searle, and Putnam
think not. Indeed, the challenge of phenomenology has
only gradually been recognized in the analytic tradition
of philosophy of mind. Some three phenomenological
properties of mental states are commonly said to resist
reduction to either neural or functional states: inten-
tionality, sensory qualia, and consciousness.
The functionalist assumes that intentionality is a
functional state. In the 1980s Searle pressed his fa-
mous "Chinese room" argument to the contrary. A per-
son who does not understand Chinese could sit in a
ro om, receiving inputs of Chinese writing and return-
ing outputs of other pieces of Chinese writing, follow-
ing purely syntactic rules for transforming one into
the other. Though the person in the room has no un-
derstanding of Chinese (in his own mind), an externa!
observer might think this system - the room with
its inputs and outputs- understood Chinese. A dig-
ital computer, Searle argues, works in just this way:
with no interna! intentiona! states, it behaves as if it
"perceives," "infers," "answers queries," etc. Searle's
conclusion: syntax alone does not yield semantics, or
real intentionality. Putnam argues in a different way to
a similar conclusion: the same software can be realized
in different hardware systems, but the same intentiona!
states can be realized in different software systems.
So, Putnam has held, we must distinguish not only the
physical and functional levels, but also the intentiona!
level.
Consciousness is what makes the mind-body prob-
24 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
lem intractable, Thomas Nagel wrote in his famous
essay "What Is It Like toBe a Bat?" (1973). Yet it
took twenty years for the point to fully register in
the analytic literature. Nagel urges that our "objec-
tive" account of the world in natural science does not
include the "subjective" properties of conscious ex-
perience, notably what it is like to have an experi-
ence, as opposed to what it is, say, in neural structure.
Block notes that the subjective properties ofsensations,
their "raw feels" or qualia, cannot be accounted for in
functional or indeed neural terms. Daniel Dennett, in
Consciousness Exp/ained ( 1991 ), views consciousness
as something of an illusion, substituting "heterophe-
nomenology" for "autophenomenology": from an ob-
jective, third-person perspective, the cognitive scientist
describes mind/brain activity as if it were intentiona!
- this Dcnnett calls "the intentiona! stance"; what's
really happening, though, is neural systems crunching
information. Patricia Smith Churchland, in Neurophi-
losophy ( 1986), and Paul Churchland in other works
recognize consciousness and qualia as part of neuronal
activity, but eliminate the intentiona! states of belief,
desire, etc., as posits of"folk psychology" that will be
discredited as neuroscience advances.
Searle argues to the contrary, in The Rediscove1y of
the Mind ( 1992), that consciousness is a real part ofthe
natural world: it is an irreducibly subjective property
of intentiona! mental states, caused by and realized in
brain activity, but distinct in kind from the objective,
physical properties of the brain -just as the macro-
scopic property of liquidity is caused by and realized
in the microscopic property of water molecules. Searle
then sketches an account of the structure of conscious-
ness, articulating sensory modalities, intentionality,
subjectivity, figure/ground, pleasure/unpleasure, and
more: in short, a broad overview ofphenomenological
structure. Searle's title might have been "The Redis-
covery of Phenomenology." But his biologica! natu-
ralism would speli a different approach to phcnomen-
ology than Husserl 's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY Of
Heidegger's HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY.
In the philosophy of cognitive science, Ned Block
has distinguished three conceptions of consciousness:
( 1) consciousness consists in the subjective or phenom-
enal quality of experience; (2) consciousness consists
in the self-monitoring function of conscious experi-
ence; and (3) mental states are conscious insofar as
they are accessible to conscious thought and action
(so-called blindsight is not). In the phenomenological
tradition, these three properties seem to go together.
Thus Brentano and Husserl described in each con-
scious experience a specific form of inner awareness
of the experience itself. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE called this
structure the "pre-reflective cogito," drawing on the
notion, as old as Leibniz, that conscious experience
includes an "apperception" of itself. The tricky part of
the analysis is to avoid an infinite regress of awareness
of awareness of awareness, and to integrate this in ner
awareness with the phenomenal quality of experience
(in both sensory and nonsensory experience ), whereby
the contents ofthe experience are accessible to further
conscious activities through reflection and memory.
Within the phenomenological tradition, Heideg-
ger's approach to phenomenology has been set against
Husserl 's. For Heidegger, the human subject, rechris-
tened Dasein, is not an autonomous, primarily cogni-
tive, individual mental substance, but rather a being
whose way of being is in a practica! and social world
from which the entities it is concerned with derive their
sense. Husserl made similar points about the embodied
human EGO in Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomeno/ogie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie ll [ 1912-15],
but he is widely misread in a traditional Cartesian
way. In the analytic tradition, the individualist, Carte-
sian approach to intentionality has been criticized in
two lines of argument: one by Dreyfus and Richard
Rorty, drawing on Heidegger, and another by Putnam
and Tyler Burge, drawing on philosophy of language.
Rorty would eliminate the mind as a relic ofCartesian
metaphysics, caii ing on Heidegger and Wittgenstein to
define belief, truth, value, etc., as social-pragmatic con-
structs. Dreyfus, speaking through Heidegger, would
eliminate the Cartesian view of the subject and with it
the subject-object structure ofintentionality. He would
describe more fundamental forms of intentionality in
ACTION, PERCEPTION, etc. These are forms of human
activity ·(resisting the term "consciousness" as overly
Cartesian) that carry no explicit sense ofthe selfand no
explicit cognitive representations ofwhat one is doing.
Such "primordial" activities blend into the background
ofbodily habit or skillful "coping" with the surround-
ing world, and so blend into aur familiar world. In this
way, Dreyfus's Heidegger might say, phenomenologi-
cal content and worldly context blend ontologically.
 ARCHITECTURE 25

A similar picture is engendered by the "twin Earth" - . The Intentions of Intentionalitv. Dordrecht: D. Reidcl.
thought experiments designed by Putnam and extended 1975.
Linsky, Leonard, cd. Re(erence am{ Modali(v. Oxford: Ox-
by Burge. Suppose there is a distant planet that repli- ford University Press, 1971.
cates Earth in ali ways except that aluminum is replaced Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
there by another material. When we speak or think University Press, 1982.
Putnam, Hilary. Representation and Reality. Cambridge,
ofaluminum pans, our Doppelgăngers think similarly, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
but their thoughts about "aluminum pans" are in fact Quine, W. V. Word and Ohject. Cambridge. MA: MIT Prcss.
about pans made of a different material. The conclu- 1960.
- . Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
sion Burge draws is that the intentiona! content of our Press, 1990; 2nd ed. 1992.
thoughts is dependent on ~ and individuated by ~ the Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept o{ Mind. New York: Barnes &
actual context in which we live, and so is the mean- Noble, 1949.
Searle, John R. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
ing of our language that expresses our thoughts. Hen ce versity Press, 1983.
content is not wholly "in the head" and accessible to - . The Rediscove1y of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT
phenomenological reflection. Press, 1992.
Smith, Barry, ed. Parts and Moments. Munich: Philosophia,
Husserl would presumably argue that such "exter- 1982.
nalist" theories of intentionality face the same prob- - , and David Woodruff Smith, eds. The Cambridge Com-
lems as functionalism and materialism. Where are the panion to Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995.
phenomenological properties of intentionality, sensory Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald Mclntyre. Husserl and
qualia, consciousness, etc.? If these phenomena are Intentionalitv: A Studv o{ Mind, Meaning, and Language.
eliminated, we fly in the face of experience. If we Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982.
identify them with contextual features of conscious-
ness, we misidentify them. What varies with context, DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH
University of California, frvine
from Earth to twin Earth, is not intentiona! content but
the intentiona! relation of content to abject. Thus the
analysis of intentionality, content, and consciousness,
even in relation to language, society, bodily skill, etc.,
requires phenomenology. ANTHROPOLOGY, CULTURAL See ETHNOLOGY.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Block, Ned, ed. Readings in Philosophy ofPsychology. Vols. ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHICAL See PHILO-
1 and 2. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Burge, Tyler. "Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-
SOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
1990." The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), 3-51.
Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1991.
Dreyfus, Hubert, ed. Husserl. Intentionality and Cognitive
Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. ARCHITECTURE Phenomenological ap-
- . Being-in-the- World: A CommentG/y on Heidegger:~ ''Ee- proaches to architecture originale in the classical
ing and Time, Division !. " Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1991. Husserlian critique of logica! formalism and the in-
Dummett, Michael. Origins of Ana~vtic Philosophy. Cam- strumentalization of mathematics. EDMUND HUSSERL 's
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. analysis in Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften
Heidegger, Martin. Die Grundprohleme der Phănomenologie
[1927]. Ed. Friederich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Gesam- und die transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936) of
tausgahe 24. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, Galilean science and of the functionalization of ali
1975; Basic Prohlems of Phenomenology. Trans. Albert knowledge it portends is the historical backdrop for
Hofstadter. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1982. a recognition of the reduction of architectural theory
Hintikka, Jaakko. Knowledge and Belie{. Ithaca, NY: Cornell and practice to a sterile technicism obsessed with effi-
University Press, 1962.
ciency, manipulati an, and control. This transformati an,
which began in the 17th century and culminated two

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 K luwer Academic Publishers.
26 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
hundred years !ater in an architectural vers ion of pos-
itivism or NATURALISM, proved to be ultimately hostile
to questions of either a metaphysical or symbolic bent.
The phenomenology of architecture attempts to combat
this reductionism by effecting an artistic and techno-
logical return to the LJFEWORLD that the !ater Husserl
had already prescribed as a philosophical antidote to
the nihilism and scientism of late modernity.
In general, phenomenological philosophers of ar-
chitecture explicitly reverse the modern priority of
production over use by criticizing and rejecting the
primacy of a formalistic methodology and the indiffer-
ence of technical instrumentalities to the phenomena
oflived experience. Instead, they caii for a rediscovery
of the architectural importance of the lifeworld, in-
cluding its SPACE, TIME, and HISTORY, its rich and varied
emotional and bodily intentionalities, and its layers of
sedimented symbolism long covered over by the func-
tionalization of modern theory and praxis. In this way
phenomenology reinvigorates philosophical questions
concern ing the classical Vitruvian elements of venus-
las, utilitas, and firmitas (beauty, use, and structural
soundness) and so enables meaningful inquiry into the
often hidden and obscure sources ofarchitectural form
and space. Initially, this inquiry entails concrete inves-
tigations into the human BODY and its "geometry of
experience," and eventually broadens into a full-scale
consideration ofthe cultural, social, and natural dimen-
sions of the lifeworld as they enter into the creation
of architectural forms and spaces. ROMAN INGARDEN,
in particular, discusses the "unitary coherence" of the
practica!, artistic, and cultural in authentic works of
architecture, and roots ali three factors in the lifeworld
and its historical character.
The phenomenological focus on the corporeal reso-
nance of architecture can be traced to the work ofMAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY- especially his Phenomenofogie
de la perception ( 1945)- on the perceptual and em-
bodied engagement of our being-in-the-world. There
he uncovers a pre-personal sedimentation of MEANING
in the human body, in effect transferring the inten-
tionality of consciousness to bodily activity. This sedi-
mented meaning, so easily ignored in classical epistem-
ology, consists of pre-predicative, intentiona! threads
that "run out" beyond the body toward its surrounding
situation. These threads are not images or represen-
tations of a thetic consciousness, but rather permeate
legs, arms, hands, etc., in their practica! engagement
with the world. Work and the tasks of everyday life
elicit bodily movements, gathering them into a unified
expression ofspace and world. As a matrix ofhabitual
action, the body both mediates the world as a "com-
monplaceness of established situations" and unfolds an
"oriented space" within it that has more to do with the
goals and concerns of praxis than with objectivity or
exact mathematical measurement. Lived, bodily space,
then, is disclosed as a connector between things and
not primarily as a Newtonian container representable
in objectifying thought.
In this way Merleau-Ponty reopens for architectural
thought and practice the validity of human spaces and
thus legitimates their study and importance relative
to the alleged "one, true objective space" of geome-
try. His prepredicative focus lays bare the constitutive
character ofbodily experience as it brings forth a world
built to human scale and resonant with the instinctive
and habitual movements of the body as it performs
its daily rounds. In identifying the thrust of good de-
sign and building with "the creation of an order reso-
nant with the body's own," the architectural historian
and phenomenologist ALBERTO PEREZ-GOMEZ underlines
the significance for architectural theory of Merleau-
Ponty's retrieval of the lived body and the world of
meaning it constitutes. This is especially true for an
understanding and appreciation of scale and propor-
tion in their capacity to evoke such varied responses as
awe and wonder through monumental architecture or
peace and contentment through domestic structures.
The marginalization of the Vitruvian concern with
beauty, use, and solidity follows inexorably from the
modern architectural turn to formalism and the trans-
formation of both theory and praxis into Cartesian
methodologies more focused on efficiency and cost-
effectiveness than on designing and building from a
vision of how humans ought to live and how they
have Jived in the past. HANS-GEORG GADAMER charac-
terizes this peculiarly modern turn as the problem of
"aesthetic differentiation," by which he means the dis-
connection of aesthetic concerns from life-concerns.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER's investigations into the ontologica!
character of tool use in Sein und Zeit ( 1927) serve as
the background and necessary support for Gadamer's
attempts to link the functional with the beautiful at
the hermeneuticallevel oftruth and Being. In the same
 ARCHITECTURE
vein as Gadamer's, the Yale philosopherofart KARSTEN
HARRIES questions the evolution of an "arbitrary archi-
tecture" that is at best eclectic and theatrical, resulting
in the appearance ofthe "decorated shed." Without an
architectural thinking and practice that is rooted in the
lifeworld, building and design fali prey to aestheticism
or technicism, neither ofwhich can avoid an arbitrari-
ness ultimately lacking in seriousness and conviction,
as is evident, for example, in the so-called historicism
of POSTMODERN architecture.
Ingarden too bemoans aestheticism as arbitrary,
though, writing in 1928, he comes close to endors-
ing the structural technicism inherent in modernism
and the emerging International style of Le Corbus-
ier (Charles Edouard Jeanneret, 1887-1965), Walter
Gropius (1883-1969),and Ludwig Mies Van Der Rohe
(1886-1969).1t is phenomenologists like Gadamerand
Harries who clearly dispute the modernist functional-
ization of architecture ("form follows function") by
raising questions concerning beauty and use, their re-
lation to one another, and, most importantly, the TRUTH
they convey through form and space. The phenomen-
ology of architecture thus represents a return to the
classical notion of techne as a form of episteme or
knowing that is alive to the perennial questions ofhu-
man existence and the place of that existence in the
cosmos. Because an integration of venustas, utilitas,
and firmitas is possible only within a larger architec-
tural vision of the world, phenomenology urges new
and fresh investigations into the phenomena of place,
landscape, region, and world. Only here, in the light
of these transcendental horizons that bestow meaning
and importance on ali human activities, can the inten-
tionalities ofbuilding and dwelling be worked through
and brought to clarity.
Phenomenological investigations into lived time
and space are employed as a necessary groundwork
and starting place for a philosophy of architecture that
rejects the modernist emphasis on ahistorical methods
and building practices in fa vor of an architecture that is
rooted in a recognizable and influential tradition. His-
tory replaces technique as the repository of forms and
spaces that can once again speak to the life-concerns of
humanity. What phenomenology finds in architectural
history are contextualized, and yet essential, structures
whose symbolic and ontologica! power can on acea-
sion rise to the status of world-making. In its spatial
27
and temporal dimensions, world is an "openness" or
clearing within which humans dwell.
Dwelling is traditionally expressed as the ethos of a
people, that animating vision of existence that guides
daily activity from the most mundane to the most ex-
alted. Since architecture is both the backdrop and the
stage for the drama of this existence, its primary task
is to express and comment upon the informing ethos
that supports and lends significance to the drama, to
"fasten" us, as MIKEL DUFRENNE puts it, to the world and
its natural environs. The ethical function of ali archi-
tecture is thus to build in such a way that the building is
also a dwelling, that is, an outgrowth and continuation
ofthe dwelling it is attempting to express through form
and space. Building is not only contextual, as Ingarden
and Dufrenne correctly point out, but, as a "joining" of
spaces, it is also an unfolding of places and, at times,
even worlds. These spaces, moreover, exist for archi-
tecture in history, so that the architect must also engage
in time- as well as space-making in order to reach out
to historical communities past, present, and future.
But in spite of the contextual nature of ali archi-
tecture and its situatedness within horizons that are
historical and regional in character, most phenomen-
ological inquiries into building and dwelling funda-
mentally rely on an EIDETIC APPROACH and seek to un-
cover essential structures such as "natural symbols"
(Harries), "archetypes" (Thomas Thiis-Evensen), and
"pattern languages" (Christopher Alexander) embed-
ded in but not limited to the historical and regional.
Such studies plumb, for example, the lived meaning
of up-down and vertical-horizontal, or the transcul-
tural occurrence of the cross and the pyramid. These
architectural symbols and languages are therefore con-
strued to be more than merely aestheti"c or intellec-
tual phenomena, and yet they are not reduced to the
simply useful or practica!. Rather, originary architec-
tural structures convey specific modes of dwelling and
correlative types of building that help to make such
dwelling possible. Such symbols or languages create
a sense of place that is historically and geographically
bounded while at the same time infused with a sense
of the timeless and the boundless.
Prior to modernity, architecture looked to MATHE-
MATICS and, in particular, to number as a source of
symbolism and meaning. The cosmologica! resonance
ofthe mathematical served as a transcendental seedbed
28 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
out of which form and space seemed almost to grow
organically. But with the modern scientific demythol-
ogization of number and geometry, architecture had
to look to new sources for instruction and inspiration.
Phenomenology offers the lifeworld as such a source,
and believes that even though severed from its tradi-
tional origins, architecture can root itself again in this
new seedbed and avoid becoming a prosaic TECHNOL-
OGY or an increasingly irrelevant decorative art. The
revival ofarchitecture in this sense is nothing less than
a reinstitution of its ethical task to express and rein-
force the ethos of a people in ali its social, natural, and
sacred dimensions.
In the end, a meaningful architecture will engage
in the creation of public spaces wherein humans might
pursue a common destiny arising out of shared be-
liefs and thus a common heritage. Harries characterizes
this creation as architecture's function in EDUCATION,
namely, its obligation to sustain and, in part, to shape
the moral, politica!, and religious ideals of a people.
Significant phenomenological spadework in this area
is tobe found in the thought of HANNAH ARENDT, who
reorients architectural theory in the direction of space
rather than form through her identification of a "space
ofappearances" as the public sphere of politica! praxis.
Such a space makes possible the appearance and recog-
nition of plurality as the authentic condition of any
meaningful POLITICS. The self-effacing character of ar-
chitecture becomes most apparent in this sphere as it
opens up spaces and distances within which differences
can coexist and even flourish.
The architectural clearing of spaces finds its
phenomenological roots in Heidegger's HERMENEUTI-
CAL PHENOMENOLOGY of Being. As earJy as Sein und
Zeit ( 1927), his language draws heavily upon architec-
tural images and metaphors. Concern for "building"
and "dwelling" is obvious in his use of such terms
as "clearing," "house of Being," "work," "enframing,"
"joining," and "destruction" (!ater to become "decon-
struction" in the hands of .IACQUES DERRIDA). This con-
cern is essentially linguistic, since for Heidegger ar-
chitecture, like other phenomena, is a "text" or LAN-
GUAGE expressive of Being and of DASEIN's relation to
Being. (Dufrenne likewise speaks of an architectural
language that "sings" and so expresses itself and the
world to which it belongs.) The concepts of building
and dwelling clarify Dasein's relation to Being as one
of rootedness in place. To "dwell" is not so much to
occupy a house or a lodging as it is to open up and
endure in spaces that are joined together by means of
things. Building is grounded in dwelling and emerges
from a lifeworld that has opened itself to the "four-
fold," a word that is meant to express Dasein 's life on
earth and under the sky, at once in touch with divinities
and yet bound to human community.
Architectural building brings forth such things as
bridges and temples in order to clear a space for the
appearance of the fourfold and thus to preserve and
nurture what originally locates us on earth and gathers
our world into a place fit for human dwelling. Such a
gathering institutes a place or site out of which spaces
are cleared for the human encounter with the fourfold.
Heideggerian space is therefore grounded in place-
in explicit opposition to the Cartesian primacy of an
abstract space that obliterates local difference in favor
of the uniform grid- while place itself is grounded
in those artifacts by means of which a world emerges
and settles upon the earth.
Heideggerian building is a preparation for the ap-
pearance of the fourfold; it secures an "open place"
where such an event can transpire. Such preparation
!ies outside any a priori methodology or technique
used to predetermine architectural spaces or artifacts.
Instead, to build, for Heidegger, is to be on the way to
dwelling, to Jet dwelling- and not a strict formalism
-determine the forms and places that building brings
forth. Architectural building proceeds by the "joining"
of spaces at specific sites in accordance with the ar-
chitectural possibilities inherent in those sites. These
spaces are rooted in the cleared site as site and in no
way exist prior to the establishment of the places in
which they are joined (as, for example, they would for
Newton).
The connection between building and dwelling be-
comes so intimate for Heidegger that he is willing in
the end to collapse building into dwelling. Building,
in other words, is not to be confused with making or
producing, but is rather a special kind of dwelling.
This dwelling roots Dasein in things and allows the
fourfold to emerge and to "install" itself in Oase in 's
pwximity, indeed opening up a vicinity in which prox-
imity as well as distance first makes its appearance.
Building as dwelling makes architecture possible by
opening up to the architect the precincts "suitable" for
 HANNAH ARENDT
his or her designs. Heidegger's ontologica! understand-
ing of architecture also runs para li el to his conception
of modern technology and thus situates building as an
ontologica! event concealed within architecture,just as
poiesis hides itself in the Gestell or enframing essence
of modern techne. Unlike engineering, or for that mat-
ter any type of construction or making, building is a
"poetic taking of measure" used to guide architectural
planning, designing, and construction.
Whether a non-anthropological measure is granted
to builders and architects today remains obscure in
Heidegger's thinking. What is clear, though, is the in-
fluence his thought and poetic language, construed as
a preparation for the arrival of such a measure, has
had on contemporary architects and philosophers of
architecture. One thinks ofGadamer, Harries, and Der-
rida in this regard, as well as architect-philosophers
such as Perez-Gomez, CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ, and
Thiis-Evensen. While their work draws upon Hei-
deggerian themes and motifs, it can be broadly situ-
ated within phenomenology and traditional phenomen-
ological concerns, primarily lifeworld, embodiment,
and historicity. Through its emphasis upon humane and
humanizing norms and standards, the phenomenology
of architecture ~ though a minority view within con-
temporary architectural theory ~ has become an area
where phenomenology continues to exert an influence
and to gain ground against current positivist ideas and
methodologies, not to mention the abstract formalism
that has guided modern architecture for the last two
hundred years.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Alexander, Christopher. A Pattern Language. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1977.
- . The Timeless Way o{Building. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1979.
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1958.
Casey, Edward S. Getting Back into Place: Toward a Re-
newed Understanding of" the Place- World. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Derrida, Jacques. "Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good
Books." In Restructuring Architectural Theory. Ed. Marco
Diani and Catherine Ingraham. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1988, 99-105.
Dufrenne, Mikel. Plu!nomenologie de l"experience esthe-
tique. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaircs de France, 1953;
The Phenomenology o(Aesthetic Experience. Trans. Ed-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
29
ward S. Casey et al. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1973.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tubingen: J.
C. B. Mohr, 1960; Truth and Method. Rev. ed. New York:
Crossroad, 1984.
Harries, Karsten. 'The Ethical Function of Architecture."
In Descriptions. Ed. Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985,
129-40.
- . "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture." In
Dwelling, Seeing, ami Designing: Toward A Phenomen-
ological Ecology. Ed. David Seaman. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1993,41-59.
Heidegger, Martin. "Bauen Wohnen Denken." In his Vortrăge
und Auf~ătze. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954, 145--62; "Build-
ing Dwelling Thinking." In his Poetn·. Language, and
Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper &
Row, 1971, 143--61.
Ingarden, Roman. Untersuchungen ::ur Ontologie der Kunst.
Musikwerk, Bild. Architektur. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer,
1962; Ontology o{ the Work olAri: The Musical Work,
The Picture, The Architectural Work, The Film. Trans.
Raymond Meyer with John T. Go1dthwait. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1989.
Mugerauer, Robert. Interpretation on Behal(ojPiace: Envi-
ronmental Displacements and Alternative Responses. A1-
bany, NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1994.
Norberg-Schulz, Christian. Genius Loci: Towards a Pheno-
menology ofArchitecture. New York: Rizzoli, 1980.
- . The Concept ol Dwelling: On the Way to a Figurative
Architecture. New York: Rizzoli, 1985.
Perez-Gomez, Alberto. Architecture and the Crisis o( Mod-
ern Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.
Thiis-Evensen, Thomas. Arkitekturens uttrvkksformen. Oslo:
Universitetsfer1aget, 1982; Archetypes in Architecture.
Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987; New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1989.
T!MOTHY CASEY
University o( Scranton
HANNAH ARENDT Arendt is o ne of the most
seminal politica! theorists ofthe 20th century. EXISTEN-
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY is integral both to her method-
oJogy and to her politica! theory. She provides a rich
description ofthe fundamental phenomena that distin-
guish politics as the human activity par exce/lence.
Arendt was born into a Jewish family in Konigsberg,
East Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia), in October
1906. She studied with MARTIN HEIDEGGER at Marburg
and KARL JASPERS at Heidelberg. Under Jaspers' tute-
lage she completed her doctoral dissertation on Der
Liebesbegnff bei Augustin (St. Augustine's concept of
30 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
love, 1929). Unfortunately, the rise ofNazism made her
a refugee for the next decade. In 1933 she fled Berlin for
Paris, where she worked for a Jewish refugee agency;
with the establishment of the Vichy regime she fled
to America in 194 1. During World War Il, she wrote
articles primarily on Jewish affairs.
Following the war, she emerged as a rising figure
within POLITIC AL PHILOSOPHY with the publication ofThe
Origins of Totalitarianism ( 195 1) - a staple text on
this topic sti li today. Her masterpiece remains The Hu-
man Condition ( 1958), where she distinguishes politics
as rooted in open-ended, intersubjective human ACTJON
from contemplation, scientific cognition, technological
artifice, and especially the metabolism of labor.
Over the next decade, her texts give very original de-
scriptions ofkey politica] phenomena in a manner dis-
tinct from metaphysical and behaviorist approaches. In
Bet1veen Past and Fu ture ( 1961) she readdresses topics
such as history, authority, freedom, and culture to sal-
vage their meaning, given what she termed the break-
down ofWestern politica! philosophy after Hegel. Her
characterization of Adolf Eichmann in Eichmann in
Jerusalem ( 1963) as manifesting the "banality of evi!"
engendered enormous controversy, especially within
Jewish intellectual circ les. Two years !ater, in On Rev-
olution ( 1965), she distinguishes the American from
the French Revolution in that the former was based on
politica!, not social ends.
Two subsequent anthologies- Men in Dark Times
( 1968) and Crises of the Republic ( 1972)- bring to-
gether articles and essays from the mid-1950s to the
early 1970s. The former portrays 20th century histor-
ical and intellectual figures who exemplified humani-
tas-mos! notably Karl Jaspers. The latter addresses the
calculative mindset of United States foreign policy-
making during the Vietnam War, protest movements as
a revitalization of the American tradition of voluntary
associations, and misleading scientific explanations of
violence. Her final years were devoted to her 1973/74
Gifford Lectures on thinking, willing, and judging. A
heart attack during the 1974 "Willing" lectures forced
an indefinite postponement ofthe series. She died from
a subsequent heart attack on December4, 1975, leaving
behind in her typewriter the first page of what was to
be "Judging." These lectures have been posthumously
published in The Life of the Mind ( 1978) and Lectures
on Kant :S Politica! Philosophy ( 1982).
Arendt's politica! theory focuses upon politics as
an activity that must be understood in its own terms in
contrast to the standpoints ofmetaphysical or scientific
approaches. She pursues an existential phenomenology
of politica! experiences. First and foremost, Arendt
focuses on the human condition - who we are -
as opposed to human nature - what we are. Only a
God, she argues, could possibly define the latter. By thc
same token, she emphasizes that there is a qualitativc
difference between the human and natural spheres of
life. Given that the conditions of human experience
do not condition us absolutely, we must focus upon the
relational character ofhuman interaction to understand
the politica!. Unlike the study ofnature, human beings
cannot be sheer spectators to their own activities.
Second, focusing on politica! "matters themselves"
for Arendt means stressing concrete particulars, not
universals. In this regard she follows existential pheno-
menology's insistence that the conceptual is based on
the pre-conceptual. For instance, she insists that the
risc of totalitarian domination in this century be un-
derstood in terms of specific facts and events, not as
a consequence of sweeping historical influences, such
as the claim ofEric Voegelin (190 1-1985) that the ori-
gins of totalitarianism can be traced back to medieval
Gnosticism.
Third, human reality to Arendt is characterized by
contingency. One of the reasons she studies totalitar-
ianism is because she claims that it is a new politica!
system. Her portraits of ( 1) thinking as a relentless
questioning akin to Karl Jaspers' Existenz and Kant's
pure reason and (2) willing as connected to the ability
to initiale spontaneous new beginnings - action -
also accent contingency in human affairs.
Arendt's stress on particulars and contingency is
integral to her critique of metaphysical approaches to
politics. As much as reality confronts us with the un-
expected, reason is averse to contingency - hence
the unwillingness of philosophers to wrestle with thc
radical open-ended quality ofhuman willing and frec-
dom. Instead, philosophers, she claims, spin metaphys-
ical systems, especially philosophies of History such
as Hegel 's, to counter such uncertainty. By contrast,
Arendt focuses on human histories - the stories of
particular individuals and deeds. In an inductive fash-
ion, great deeds or events manifest exemplary validity:
as opposed to overarching philosophical systems, they
 HANNAH ARENDT
caii attention to the significance of politica! phenom-
ena.
Scientific approaches to politics likewise try to pro-
vide certainty and in turn predictability to human af-
fairs, according to Arendt. In this case, as opposed
to thinking's capacity to explore and dwell upon the
meaning of human events, behaviorism seeks to re-
duce human actions and events to a cognitive, cause-
and-effect framework. For instance, she notes the in-
tellectual eagerness to explain violence in biologica!
terms, instead of understanding it as a legitimate but
destructive human answer to the frustration of genuine
politica! interaction in contemporary times.
Like other existential phenomenologists, Arendt ar-
gues that scientific methods appropriate to the explo-
ration of nature are incapable of dealing with the hu-
man purposiveness that !ies at the heart of politics.
In addition, she stresses that positivist approaches be-
come particularly dangerous when they serve as the
only methodology for public policy. For instance, in
the case ofthe Vietnam War, she argues that the United
States government's policy was based upon calculati ve
models by Washington think tanks, rather than judg-
ments based upon cultural and historical facts: this en-
deavor to remodel reality for the American public only
led to self-deception on the part of the policymakers
themselves.
Fourth and finally, Arendt shares existential pheno-
menology's stress on the primacy ofthe LJFEWORLD, es-
pecially its ineradicable ambiguity. Models or schemes
that package human events as being automatic, uni-
versal, or simply as ready for application- such as
the modern stress on progress or neatly tailored polit-
ica! ideologies - end up petrifying the rich and ever
changing variety of politica! experiences rather than
capturing the intersubjective basis of MEANING. She re-
mains a steadfast critic of any absolutizing of human
experience, especially on the basis of an imposed order
or truth.
Arendt's students comment upon how she would
draw their attention by persistently putting old texts in
a new light. This same inclination is found throughout
her work-such as her worldly rendering of Augustine's
politica! theory, her contention that Jefferson advocated
the pursuit of public over private happiness, and her fre-
quent use of litera ture to exemplify themes. But this is
not arbitrary or capricious interpretation: it is drawn to
31
the manifold character of the lifeworld. By extension,
she shares Heidegger's distinction between matters of
thought vs. matters of scholarship: the former rather
than the latter focuses upon the fundamental questions
that human beings mutually share. Consequently, for
Arendt, politica) theory is an activity that never has a
complete resolution.
Based upon her emphasis on particularity, contin-
gency, and ambiguity as integral facets of the "life-
world," Arendt undertakes to provide phenomenologi-
cal descriptions of phenomena that are integral to hu-
man beings as "politica! animals": labor, work, action,
authority, power, violence, politica! vs. social revolu-
tion, freedom, culture, civil disobedience vs. consci-
entious objection, history, truth vs. meaning, thinking,
willing, judging, and moral responsibility.
Arendt's disclosure of politics as being essential
to the human condition distinguishes her from po-
litica! theorists who ground politics upon a human
nature, based either on metaphysics - be it Pla-
tonic or Hegelian in origin - or scientific causality.
Within American POLITICAL SCIENCE since World War
II, Arendt represents a vital alternative to both Straus-
sian and behavioral methodologies; her existential-
phenomenological orientation enables her to bridge
the former's concern with values and meaning with
the latter's preoccupation with the empirica) realm.
Arendt's politica! theory, as a reftection upon the
situatedness of human beings in the lifeworld, stands
in between theories that either deify the individual as
in ( 1) Lockean individualism or (2) solipsistic types
of existentialism, or extirpate the individual as in ( 1)
behavioral approaches that render politics as the out-
come of environmental structures or (2) communitarian
schemes that strive for homogeneity. Her alternative to
the opposition of the individual and the collective in
the HUMAN SCIENCES centers upon her articulations of
plurality, equality, and natality.
By plurality Arendt means that human beings rather
than Humankind are the basis for the world of politics.
Action, the key category of what she terms the vita
activa, wouid be pointless if we were utterly alike;
then o ne could just rely on predictable behavioral ten-
dencies. Plurality's focus on personal distinctiveness
captures the fact that action ensues among "others."
By equality, Arendt means that despite our differences,
we ali share in the capacity for mutual communication.
32 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
In politics, as exemplified by the pre-philosophical
Greek po!is, citizens engage in nonsovereign relation-
ships with each other, regardless of the station of life
from which they come. If plurality signifies personal
uniqueness, equality enables community. By natality,
Arendt means that just as each human birth inaugu-
rates a new beginning in the world, human beings can
initiate new actions. Consequently, in contrast to de-
terminism, spontaneity is intrinsic to politics; humans
can alter the associations and structures that condition
their lives, and are responsible for the consequences of
these initiatives.
Personal freedom and distinctiveness, then. is real-
ized in speeches and deeds in the company of other
people. As opposed to politica! theories that stress the
pursuit of private interests, interaction between plural,
natal human beings reveals for Arendt the "inter-est"
- the public space- that both binds us together and
distinguishes us one from another. This "web ofhuman
relations" renders politics as a mutual, intersubjective
activity instead ofbeing a conflict between disembod-
ied, isolated egos.
Arendt shifts our attention from strategic or instru-
mental concerns to the performative dimension ofpol-
itics. Just as performing artists need an audience, hu-
man beings need a public space in which to act- to
manifest their virtuosity before others. In turn, politica!
power is nota possession tobe superimposed over oth-
ers, but a consensus that is established through lateral,
not hierarchical relationships. In institutional terms,
Arendt puts forth the council system whereby politics
is centered in participatory neighborhood associations
- what de Tocqueville stressed as the American tra-
dition of voluntary associations. Besides the ancient
Greek polis, Arendt also looks to the Romans, who
understood the need to establish a space in which hu-
man initiatives could happen. Although Arendt does
not employ the term, she articulates politics as praxis.
The human condition of plurality, equality, and natality
means that each human being can not only initiate new
beginnings, but is also responsible for these actions
performed before others.
Opposed to Arendt's outlook is what she terms mod-
els of domination or sovereignty. Plato 's politica! the-
ory, she contends, engenders an "instrumentalization"
of action. Instead of citizens mutually interacting as
equals in the public realm, the philosopher-king rules
over others based upon the blueprint of the ideal state
just as reason commands in the Platonic soul. This
fixation is further compounded when the Christian dis-
covery ofthe will reduces human freedom to being an
inner conflict of choices: the sovereign self replaces
the person disclosed in actions and deeds. Rousseau's
general will, to Arendt, simply magnifies this focus on
willpower into an inalienable, indivisible sovereignty
that will not allow factions or even communication
between citizens, but will force them to be free.
As much as contemporary liberal democracy is re-
moved from Plato or even Rousseau, Arendt's point
is that the legacies of politics as sovereignty persist.
Freedom is understood to be the pursuit of private in-
terests protected from government interference- be-
ing a consumer is more significant than being a citizen.
When government does formulate and enact so-called
public policy, it does so based on positivist forecasting
techniques, such as in her aforementioned discussion
of Vietnam. In general terms, Arendt bemoans the as-
cendency of biologica! and technological determinism
in the contemporary world. Politics as sovereignty has
led logically to the rise of bureaucracy - what she
characterizes as "rule by Nobody" in which the norms
and rules that are "operative" are completely disem-
bodied from human purposiveness. Finally, the rise of
a mass society of individuals without an "inter-est" to
bind them proved to be fertile ground for Nazi and
Soviet totalitarianism.
In particular, Arendt's examination of Adolf Eich-
mann brings an ethical focus steeped in phenomen-
ology to her critique of mass society. At his tria! in
Jerusalem, she was struck by how Eichmann 's testi-
mony was oblivious to the monstrous deeds he had
overseen in the Nazi concentration camps. His utter
lack of any sense of responsibility for his actions-
the "banality of evi!"- thus strikes at the heart of an
intersubjective politics, for it abrogates the centrality
of personal responsibility to others.
If she is critica! of those who refuse to think, like
Eichmann, she is equally leery ofthose who would su-
perimpose moralities or truths without subjecting them
to public discourse. Be it her preference for the public
solidarity of civil disobedients over the solitary moral-
ities of conscientious objectors or her elucidation of
how the faculty of taste, borrowing from Kant's Kri-
tik der Urteilskraft, engenders a sensus communis that
 HANNAH ARENDT
enables citizens to judge what qualities should appear
in the world, she insists that thc meaning of politica!
activities is realized between, not apart from, human
beings.
Given its intersubjective renderings of politica!
foundation, deliberation, freedom, and moral respon-
sibility, Arendt's politica! theory is situated between
individualism and communitarianism, idealism and re-
alism, and moral absolutism and relativism. Overall,
she stresses that the pursuit of public, not private hap-
piness, is the basis for human freedom.
The indebtedness of Arendt's politica! theory to her
mentors, Heidegger and Jaspers, is a complicated mat-
ter, both due to her romantic liaison with Heidegger
and due to the larger conflict between him and Jaspers.
Arendt rejects Heidegger's philosophy in "What is Ex-
istenz Philosophy?" (1946). She claims that Heideg-
ger's notion of DASEIN in Sein und Zeit ( 1927) is an on-
tologica! un ion of the isolated Self with nothingness,
cut off from the shared humanity of human beings.
As an alternative, she dwells upon Jaspers' concept of
communication because it stresses the shared human-
ity ofpossible Existen:: in which human beings realize
freedom.
Yet two decades !ater in "Martin Heidegger at
Eighty" ( 1969), she is much more sympathetic to Hei-
degger, especially to how his notion ofthinking moves
beyond metaphysics and gives fresh meaning to fun-
damental philosophical issues. She adopts the open-
ended, deliberative, noncognitive qualities of his ar-
ticulation of thinking for her rendering of this faculty
in The Life of the Mind. Moreover, Arendt's protests
notwithstanding, ( 1) his notion of Dasein resonates in
her conception ofaction, (2) their critiques ofTECHNOL-
OGY are akin, and (3) they both stress an indeterminate
ontology as the basis for human freedom.
Still, Jaspers' notion of Existenz remains closer to
the core of Arendt's politica! theory. Existenz is a tran-
scendent freedom that defies absolute notions oftruth:
we are free precisely because we do not know the ulti-
mate order ofthings. This notion is implicit in Arendt's
articulation of plurality and natality and is the basis
for her rejection of models of truth - be they meta-
physical, scientific, or otherwise- superimposed on
the worldliness of politics. In turn, her focus on the
diminution of politics in a mass society is linked to
Jaspers.
33
By the same token, Arendt's politica! theory shares
in the drawbacks of Jaspers' Existenz philosophy. Hei-
degger is quite critica! of Jaspers' claim that there
cannot be any conceptual truth or knowledge because
that would limit human Existenz. Contrary to Jaspers,
one cannot move beyond metaphysics by rejecting the
question of Being in the name offostering the freedom
ofhuman beings. Yet that is precisely what Arendt tries
to do by focusingjust on how "who" we are is disclosed
in the company of others, not on how this disclosure
also relates to Being. She compounds matters further
when in The Life of the Mind she articulates a very
speculative but disembodied thinking ego.
These drawbacks could be overcome by sceing MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY's work as a bridge betwcen Arendt
and Heidegger. He certainly shares Arendt's focus on
the contingency and ambiguity of the human condi-
tion, and Arendt would be well served by his account
ofthe BODY. His !ater works, in turn, raise many ofthe
same ontologica! questions that preoccupy Heidegger:
yet unlike Heidegger and like Arendt, Merleau-Ponty
cogently addresses the complexity ofpolitics through-
out his work. Within politica! theory, the notion of a
participatory ontology mutually rai sed by Arendt, Hei-
degger, and Merleau-Ponty is being further developed
in the work of FRED DALLMAYR and IIWA YOL JUNG.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Arendt, Hannah. Die Lieheshegrifl hei Augustin. Berlin: J.
Springer, 1929; Augustine and Love. Eds. Joanna V. Scott
and Judith C. Stark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995.
- . "What is Existen::. Philosophy'J" Partisan Review 8
( 1946), 34--56.
- . The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1951.
- . The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958.
- . Between Pas/ and Future: Eight Exercises in Politica/
Thought [ 1961]. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
- . Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality ojEvil
[ 1963]. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
- . On Revolution [1965]. New York: Pelican Books, 1977.
- . Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt Brace Jo-
vanovich, 1968.
- . Crises of the Repuhlic. New York: Harcourt Brace Jo-
vanovich, 1972.
- . "Martin HeideJ?..e:er at Eighty." Trans. Albert Hofstadter.
In Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. Ed. Michael Mur-
ray. New Haven, CT: Yale Univcrsity Press, 1978, 293--
303.
- . The Life ofthe Mind. Voi. 1: Thinking; Voi. 2: Willing. Ed.
 34 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Mary McCarthy. New York: Harcourt Bracc Jovanovich,
1978.
- . Lectures on Kant:~ Politica/ Philosophy. Ed. Ronald
Bei ner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Burke, John Francis. " 'Thinking' in a World of Appear-
ances: Hannah Arendt Between Karl Jaspers and Martin
Heidegger." Ana/ee/a Husser/iana 21. Dordrecht: D. Rei-
de!, 1986, 293-308.
- . "Voegelin, Heidegger, and Arendt: Two's a Company,
Three's a Crowd." The Social Science Journa/30 (1993),
83-97.
Dallmayr, Fred. "Ontology and Freedom: Heidegger and Po-
litica! Philosophy." Politica/ Theory 12 ( 1984), 204-34.
Gottsegen, Michael. The Politica/ Thought of' Hannah
Arendt. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1993.
"Hannah Arendt." Social Research 44 ( 1977), 1-190. This
entire volume contains essays on Arendt's work by the
following contributors: Jiirgen Habermas, 1. Glenn Gray,
Robert Nisbet, Judith Shklar, Sheldon Wolin, Bernard
Crick, Hans Morgenthau, Dolf Sternberger, Erich Heller,
Ernst Vollrath, and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl.
Hill, Martin, ed. Hannah Arendt: The Recovery oj'the Public
World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
Hinchman, Lewis, and Sandra Hinchman, eds. Hannah
Arendt: Critica/ Essays. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1993.
Jung, Hwa Yol. Rethinking Politica/ Theo1y: Essays in
Phenomenology and the Studv of' Politics. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1993.
Kateb, George. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evi/.
Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983.
Parekh, Bhikhu. "Hannah Arendt." In his Contemporary
Politica/ Thinkers. Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1982, 1-21.
- . Hannah Arendt and the Searchfor a New Politica/ The-
orv. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981.
Ste~. Peter, and Jean Yarbrough. "Hannah Arendt's Teach-
ing." The American Scholar 4 ( 1978), 371-83.
Tlaba, Gabriel Masooane. Politics and Freedom: Human Will
and Action in the Thought of' Hannah Arendt. Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1987.
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Hannah Arendt: For Love of' the
World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982.
JOHN FRANCIS BURKE
University of' Houston
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE In the early
1950s, as calculating machines were coming into their
own, a few pioneer thinkers began to realize that digital
computers could be more than "number crunchers."
At that point two opposed visions of what computers
could be, each with its correlated research program.
emerged and struggled for recognition. One faction
saw computers as a system for manipulating mental
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
symbols; the other, as a medium for mode ling the brain.
One school was the heir to the rationalist tradition in
philosophy; the other viewed itselfas idealized holistic
neuroscience.
By 1955, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon had re-
alized that the strings of bits manipulated by a digi-
tal computer could stand for anything- numbers, of
course, but also features of the real world. Moreover,
programs could be used as rules to represent relations
between these symbols, so that the system could infer
further facts about the represented objects and their re-
lations. This way of looking at computers became the
basis of a way of looking at minds. Newell and Si-
mon hypothesized that the human brain and the digital
computer, while totally different in structure and mech-
anism, had, ata certain level of abstraction, a common
functional description. At this level both the human
brain and the appropriately programmed digital com-
puter could be seen as two different instantiations of a
single species of device- a device that generated in-
telligent behavior by manipulating symbols by means
of formal rules. The rallying cry of the first group of
researchers became that both minds and digital com-
puters were physical symbol systems.
EDMUND HUSSERL 's work on INTENTJONALITY, espe-
cially in Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913), Cartesian-
ische Meditationen [ 1931 ], and Die Krisis der eu-
ropăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phănomenologie ( 1936), anticipates attempts to pro-
duce artificial intelligence (Al) by using the computer
as a physical symbol system. It follows that MARTJN
HEIDEGGER 's criticism in Sein und Zeit (1927) and
Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie ( 1927) of
Husserl 's account of intentionality can be read as an
early critique ofthat research program.
In Ideen J Husserl argued that an act of conscious-
ness or noesis does not, on its own, grasp an object;
rather, the act has intentionality (directedness) only by
virtue of an "abstract form" or MEANJNG in the NOEMA
correlated with the act. In Cartesianische Meditatio-
nen and Er(ahrung und Urteil ( 1939) he explained how
the noema performed its complex task. Since Husserl
rightly thought of inte1ligent behavior as a context-
determined, goal-directed activity, the noema of any
type of object had to provide a context or horizon of
expectations for structuring the incoming data: "a rule
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
governing possihle other consciousness of the object
as identica] - possible, as exemplifying essentially
predelineated types." That is, the noenw must contain
a "strict rule" describing all the features that can bc
expected with certainty in exploring a certain type of
object - features that remain "inviolably the same:
as long as the objectivity remains intended as this one
and of this kind." Moreover, in order to prescribe the
spectrum ofremaining open possibilities offeatures of
this type of abject, the noema must contain "a frame
of empty sense" rcpresenting our "typified world."
In 1973 Marvin Minsky at the AI Laboratory at
the Massachussets Institute ofTechnology proposed a
datastructure for representing everyday knowledge re-
markably similar to Husserl's. In "A Framework for
Representing Knowledge" he described a .frame as a
data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation,
like being in a certain kind of living room, or going
to a child's birthday party. He suggested that the top
levels of a frame should be fixed, and represent things
that are always true about the supposed situation, while
the lower levels should have many terminals-siots that
must be filled by specific instances or data. The "pheno-
menological powcr" of the theory, he said, hinged on
the inclusion of expectations and other kinds of pre-
sumptions.
In Minsky's model of a frame, the "top level" is a
developed version ofwhat in Husserl 's terminology re-
mains inviolably the same in the nocma, and Husserl's
typified predelineations have become "default assign-
ments"- additional features that can normally be ex-
pected. The result is a step forward in AI techniques
from a passive model of in formation processing to o ne
that tries to take account of the interactions between a
knower and the world. The task of Al thus converges
with the task of CONSTITUTIVE PIIENOMENOLOGY. Both
must try to spell out in detail the frames that repre-
sent prototypical objects and situations, i.e., they must
show how such frames or noemata can be constructed
from a set of primitive predicates (Husserl called them
predicate senses) and their rule-like relations.
But there is also an important difference between
the two research programs. The current philosophical
basis ofthe AI research program is Jerry Fodor's com-
putational model of the mind. Fodor argues that the
symbols in which the world is represented in the mind
must beformal symbols. Thus Husserl and Fodor ex-
35
plain the intentionality of symbols in diametrically op-
posed ways. Fodor's brand of cognitivism is precisely
designed to show how mental "symbols" can do their
work on the basis oftheir shape alone without function-
ing as symbols, i.e., independcntly oftheir semantic or
representational properties. When it comes to identify-
ing, classifying, unifying, synthetizing, and in general
manipulating mental contents, Husserl holds the dia-
metrically opposed position, rcjecting formal shapes in
fa vor of noematic meanings.
Still, in Jdeen !, after discussing the difficulties in-
volved in developing a formal axiomatic system to
describe everyday experience, Husserl leaves open
the question of whether our everyday concepts could
nonetheless be formalized, whether as a counterpart to
descriptive phenomenology one might develop "an ide-
alizing method which substitutes pure and strict ideals
for intuited data" and could "even serve as the funda-
mental means for a mathesis of mental processes."
Husserl did not raise the question ofwhether a for-
mal model of experience could contain a formal ana-
logue of intentionality; he did not foreclose the pos-
sibility either. Indeed, while for Husserl a descriptive
account of mental life cannot ignore semantics, a for-
mal model of experience that substitutes syntax for se-
mantics might nonetheless be possible. Thus although
Husserl implicitly rejects the claim that intentional-
ity is just formal manipulation (perhaps plus physical
causality), he leaves open the possibility of a compu-
tational cognitive psychology.
Heidegger was critica! of Husserl 's claim that all
intentiona! activity had to be based on the intentiona]
content of subjects. In Sein und Zeit he pointed out
that there are ways of"encountering" things other than
relating to them as subjects directed toward objects.
When we use a piece of equipment like a hammer, Hei-
degger points out, we actualize a ski il (which need not
be represented in the mind) in the context of a socially
organized nexus of equipment, purposes, and human
ro les (which is nota set of objects and formalizable re-
lations ). Rejecting Husserl 's view, Heidegger says that
equipmental relations "resist any sort of mathemati-
cal functionalization; nor are they merely something
thought, first posited in an 'act ofthinking'." For Hei-
degger, they are rather relations in which concernful
coping "already dwells."
In Sein und Zeit Heidegger adds a more specific and
 36 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
prescient objection to AI. He finds a general problem
rai sed by cognitivism 's attempt to explain our relation
to the world in terms of mental representations. Heideg-
ger's argument is found in his critique of Descartes's
attempt to explain the world in terms ofphysical prim-
itives plus function-predicates like "for-hammering"
(Husserl made this very move in Cartesianische Medi-
tationen ). Heidegger spells out his implausibility claim
in two ways. First, there is the argument from equip-
mental holism. Just adding to the representation of a
table the fact that it is to eat at or to sit at barely scratches
the surface of its interrelations with other equipment
and with the human ro les and goals that determine what
it is to be a table.
Moreover, adding rules for deal ing with tab les does
not capture our familiarity with tab les. Such function-
predicates and rules would not be sufficient to enable a
person from a culture without tab les to cope with them
or even to understand Western stories where tables
played their normal part. AII the propositions speli ing
out tableness would have ceteris paribus conditions
and so would these conditions, etc. AI researchers had
to admit that speli ing out these ceteris paribus condi-
tions would be dauntingly difficult. However, for Hei-
degger, given his claim that our commonsense under-
standing is a kind ofknowing-how, nota propositional
knowing-that, things looked even more discouraging
for cognitivism. Since our familiarity with the world
consists in our skilled activity of responding to situa-
tions in appropriate ways, common sense is not a vast
body of rules and facts. The task of explicitly, i.e.,
propositionally, representing everyday common sense
is thus not just hard but hopelessly misguided.
The second difficulty arises when one attempts to
formalize how we use equipment in specific situations.
Facts and rules are, by themselves, meaningless. So it is
necessary for the programmer to assign them relevance
so as to capture what Heidegger calls equipmental in-
volvement. But for the representationalist, the predi-
cates that must be added to define relevance are just
more bare facts. To compute relevance in a specific sit-
uation a computer would ha veto follow rules to search
through ali its facts for those that could possibly be rel-
evant, then apply further rules to determine which facts
are usually relevant in this type of situation, and from
ali these facts deduce which facts were actually rele-
vant in this particular situation. But in a large database
such a search would be hopelessly difficult and would
get more difficu!t the more rules one added to guide the
search.
Indeed, AI researchers have long observed that the
more a physical symbol system "knows" about a partic-
ular state of affairs, the longer it takes it to retrieve the
relevant information. This presents a general problem
where scaling up is concerned. It has also been noted
that for human beings, unlike databases, the more we
know about a situation or individual, the casier it is to
retrieve further relevant information.
This defines the splitting of the ways between
Husserl and AI, on the one hand, and Heidegger, on the
other. The crucial question becomes: can there bea the-
ory of the everyday world, as rationalist philosophers
have always held and Husserl at least leaves open, so
that by representing this theory the mind can produce
skilled. appropriate comportment? Or is the common-
sense background a familiarity based on a combination
ofskills, practices, discriminations, etc., that are not in-
tentiona! "states" of a mind or subject, and so, a fortiori,
do not ha ve the sort of representational content that can
be explicated in terms of elements and rules?
Husserl tried to avoid the problem posed by Heideg-
ger by making a move that was !ater frequently made
in Al circles. He claimed that the WORLD, the back-
ground of significance, was merely a very complex
system ofbeliefs, which, since they are ways oftaking
things or ofthings counting for someone, he called "va-
lidities" (Geltungen). It followed that in principle one
could suspend one's dwelling in the world and achieve
a detached description of the intentiona! content of
one's background beliefsystem. According to the Kri-
sis, "even the background ... ofwhich we are always
concurrently conscious but which is momentarily irrel-
evant and remains completely unnoticed, sti li functions
according to its implicit validities." Thus what Heideg-
ger calls familiarity with the world became for Husserl
"a complex of performances, which are included as
sedimented hist01y in the currently constituted inten-
tiona! unity ... - a history that o ne can a!ways uncover
byfo!lowing a strict method."
Husserl 's project, then, does more than anticipate
cognitivism. Indeed, once Husserl allows the possibil-
ity of a mathesis of experience, he could only disassoci-
ate himselffrom the computationalist view ifhe could
show that besides the manipulation of mental content
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
on the hasis of its syntactic structure, there are men-
tal operations in which semantics plays an irreducible
causal role. But once he allows the possibility that
the semantic properties of noemata mirror their syn-
tactic ones, and holds that even skilled activities and
background familiarity can be absorbed into noematic
content - i.e., once he has made ali the cognitivist
moves criticized by Heidegger- it looks like he must
allow the possibility of a model ofmentallife in which
meaning and consciousness play no explanatory role.
That is, Husserl can maintain the irreducibility of men-
tal meanings in his transcendental phenomenology but
he has no reason to doubt the possibility of artificial
intelligence. Indeed, he and AI researchers are engaged
in the common task of making ali mental life explicit
as symbolic representations-whether "symbol" is un-
derstood syntactically or semantically turns out not to
be important.
As Heidegger predicted, however, the task of writ-
ing out a complete theoretical account of everyday
life turned out to bc much harder than initially ex-
pected. Husserl 's project ran into serious trouble, and
there are signs that Minsky's has too. During twenty-
five years of trying to speli out the components of
the subject's noematic representation of everyday ob-
jects, Husserl found that he had to include more and
more of a subject's commonsense understanding of
the everyday world. In Cartesianische Meditationen he
lamented that "even the tasks that present themselves
when we take single types of objccts as restricted clues
prove tobe extremely complicated and always lead to
extensive disciplines when we penetrate more deeply.
That is the case, for example, with ... spatial objects
(to say nothing of Nature) as such, of psycho-physical
being and humanity as such, culture as such." In For-
male und transzendentale Logik ( 1929) he spoke ofthe
noema's "huge concreteness" and of its "trcmendous
complication," and he sadly concluded at the age of
seventy-five that he was a perpetua! beginner and that
phenomenology was an infinite task.
There are hints in his frame paper that Minsky has
embarked on the same "infinite task" that eventually
overwhelmed Husserl. In this paper Minsky admits
that just constructing a knowledge base is a major in-
tellectual research problem. He sees that a "minimal"
commonsense system must "know" something about
cause and effect, time, purpose, locality, process, and
37
types of knowledge, and concludes that "we need a
serious epistemological research effort in this area."
Minsky's naivete and faith are astonishing. Transcen-
dental phenomenology was just such a research effort.
In the light of Heidegger's phenomenological cri-
tique of Husserl, HUBERT DREYFUS predicted trouble for
symbolic in formation processing. In his history of in-
tellectual issues in Al Allen Newell notes that "Drey-
fus 's central intellectual objection ... is that the anal-
ysis of the context of human action into discrete el-
ements is doomed to failure." But he adds that this
warning was ignored-that "the answers, refutations,
and analyses that have been forthcoming to Dreyfus's
writings have simply not engaged this issue."
Trouble was not long in coming to the fore, however,
as the everyday world took its revenge on AI as it
had on Husserlian phenomenology. What has come to
be called the "commonsense knowledge problem" has
blocked ali progress in AI for the past two decades.
Terry Winograd, who had written the best AI program,
SHLRDLU, was one of the first to see the limitations of
scripts and frames. Having "lost faith" in AI, he now
teaches Heidegger in his computer science courses at
Stanford, and points out "the difficulty of formalizing
the commonsense background that determines which
scripts, goals and strategies are relevant and how they
interact."
Winograd is not the only AI rescarcher who has re-
alized the relevance of Heidegger. !-le notes that for
those who have followed the history of artificial in-
telligence, it is ironic that the MIT laboratory should
become a cradle of "Heideggerian AI." And he adds
that, nevertheless, some of the work now being done
at that laboratory seems to have been affected by Hei-
degger and Dreyfus.
Winograd is referring to the influential theory of
situated activity developed by Phil Agre and David
Chapman. Agre and Chapman question the need for
an interna! symbolic model of the world. Following
Heidegger, they note that in our everyday coping we
experience ourselves not as subjects with mental rep-
resentations over against objects with fixed properties,
but rather as absorbed in our current situation, respond-
ing directly to its demands. Chapman concludes that
"you don 't need to maintain a world model; the world
is its own best representation."
Agre and Chapman also adapt another Heidegge-
38 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
rian thesis that Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus developed
in Mind Over Machine ( 1986)-namely, that behavior
can be purposive without the agent "having in mind"
a goal or purpose. They note that in a great many situ-
ations it is obvious what to do next given the configu-
ration ofmaterials at hand, and once you've done that,
the next thing to do is likely to be obvious too. Thus
complex sequences of actions result, without needing
a complex control structure to decide what to do.
What is original and important in Agre and Chap-
man 's work is that these ideas are taken out of the
realm of armchair phenomenology and made specific
enough to be implemented in programs. What results
is a system that represents the world not as a set of
objects with properties, but as current functions (what
Heidegger called in-order-to's). Thus, to take a Hei-
deggerian example, 1 experience a hammer I am using
not as an object with properties, but as being an in-
order-to-drive-in-this-nail. Only if there is some dis-
turbance does the skilled performer notice aspects of
the situation such as the hammer being too heavy. Both
of the above ways of being, which Heidegger calls
the ready-to-hand and the unready-to-hand, are to be
distinguished from what he calls the present-at-hand
mode of being, the mode of being of objects. Objects
can be recognized as the same even when they are
used in different contexts or when some oftheir prop-
erties change. Before Agre and Chapman's work such
reidentifiable objects with their changing features or
properties had been the only mode ofbeing represented
in AI models. Heideggerian AI seeks to represent the
ready-to-hand and the unready-to-hand modes. To do
so, Agre and Chapman introduce what they caii deictic
representations. The units of deictic representation are
entities, which are things in a particular relationship to
the agent, and relational aspects of these entities. For
example, the-cup-1-am-drinking~from is the name of
an entity, and the-cup-1-am-drinking~fimn-is-almost­
emptv is the name of an aspect of it.
Heideggerian AI has thus attempted to implement
Dreyfus's account of Heidegger's phenomenology of
everyday coping. It has not, however, attempted to im-
plement Heidegger's account ofthe background famil-
iarity on the basis ofwhich certain equipment is seen as
relevant and certa in courses of action solicita response.
This gap shows up in Agre and Chapman's unsatisfy-
ing account of relevance. For them the relevant aspects
of the situation turn out to be a list of aspects that the
programmer has determined in advance are possibly
relevant at any given moment. So Heideggerian Al is
true to Heidegger's phenomenology in what it leaves
outlong-range planning and interna! representations of
reidentifiable objects with context-frec features-but it
lacks what any intelligent system needs- namely, the
ability to discriminate relevant distinctions in the ski li
domain and to learn new distinctions from experience.
Thus Heideggerian AI, lacking any account of rele-
vance and significance, has turned out to be another
dead end.
The latest work in AI has consequently given up
seeking symbolic representations and has gone back to
the other research program begun in the 1950s-trying
to model the way neurons work. Such models explain,
among other things, why storing more facts makes it
easier to retrieve the relevant ones. Neural net mod-
eling has at last enabled Heideggerian phenomenolo-
gists such as JOHN HAUGELAND and Dreyfus to answer
a perennial objection of AI researchers, viz., that the
mind must be using symbolic representations to pro-
duce intelligent behavior since no one has come up
with any other account. Now there is a model ofbrain
functioning that requires no mentalistic concepts such
as symbols and rules at ali and so avoids the seem-
ing necessity of introducing structured mental repre-
sentations. Once neural networks have freed AI en-
thusiasts and philosophers from having to introduce
symbolic operations that contradict the phenomenon,
researchers can take skillful coping at face value as
a response to the solicitations of the situation as did
EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGISTS such as Heidegger and
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Chapman, David. Vision, Instruction, and Action. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. Husserl, Intentionality. and Cognitive
Science [1982]; rev. as Husserl. lntentionality, Cognitive
Science, and Beyond. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forth-
coming.
~. Being-in-the- World: A Commentmy on Heidegger.~ Ee-
ing anei Time. Division 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Prcss,
1991.
~. What Computers Stil! Can "t Do: A Critique o/Artificial
Reason. 3rd rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
~, and Stuart Dreyfus. Mind Over Machi ne: The Power of'
Human Intuitive Expertise in the Era of' the Computer
 AUSTRALIA
[ 1986]. Rev. ed. New York: Thc Free Press, 1988.
Haugeland, John. Artificial Intelligence: The Very !dea. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.
Mcintyre, Ronald. "Husserl and the Representational Theory
ofMind." Topoi 5 (1986), 101~13.
Minsky, Marvin. "A Framework for Representing Knowl-
edge." In Mind Design. Ed. John Haugeland. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1981, 95-128.
Newcll, Allen. "lntellectual Jssues in the History of Artifi-
cial Intelligence." In The Study olJnformation: Interdisci-
plinary Messages. Ed. F. Machlup and U. Mansfield. New
York: Wiley, 1983, 196-227.
- , and Herbert Simon. "Computer Science as Empirica!
Inquiry: Symbols and Search." In Mind Design. Ed. John
Hagueland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981, 35--66.
Winograd, Terry. "Computer Software for Working with Lan-
guage." Scientific American 25 ( 1984), 130-45.
HUBERT DREYFUS
University of" California, Berkeley
AUSTRALIA European thinking with a strong
Hegelian strain exerted a central influence on the ear-
liest philosophy in English-speaking Australia, which
dates back to the 19th century. Its idealism was rooted
in Scottish-British philosophy, but it also played softly
to the colony's clergy. Interest in European thinkers
was ali ve as is evidenced by articles on Spinoza, HENRI
BERGSON, NICOLAI HARTMANN, and EDMUND HUSSERL in
the early issues of The Australasian Journal of Psy-
chology and Philosophy, founded in 1923 and soon the
mainstream philosophy journal in Australia, "Psychol-
ogy" being dropped from its title in 194 7. A review of
Freud appeared alongside ones ofRussell and Wittgen-
stein and a lively pluralism ranged over psychology, ed-
ucation, anthropology, and other social sciences, none
ofwhich had matured as independent disciplines at this
stage.
The leading link with the European phenomen-
ological movement in this period was in WILLIAM
RALPH BOYCE GIBSON, at The University of Melbourne
1911-35, who earned international recognition with
his translation of Husserl 's ldeen zu ei ner reinen
Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913) as ldeas: General lntroduction to Pure
Phenomenology ( 1931 ). Boyce Gibson had taken an
interest in EDMUND HUSSERL 's phenomenology from the
early 1920s and presented papers on his work. In 1928
he traveled to Freiburg and met with Husserl, MAR-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnk.e, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kock.elmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
39
TIN HEIDEGGER, and EMMANUEL LFVINAS, an immensely
inspiring moment recorded in his diaries that sadly
did not come to light until excerpts were published
in 1971. Among the small circle of philosophers in
Melbourne, there was also Alexander Gunn, who re-
ferred to Heidegger 's Sein und Zeit ( 1927) in The Prob-
lem of Time ( 1929), and J. McKELLAR STEWART, who
reviewed Boyce Gibson 's translation of ldeen 1 and
drew on Husserl's Formale und transzendentale Logik
( 1929) and Meditations cartesiennes ( 1931 ). Boyce
Gibson was earlier on influenced, then dissatisfied, by
Husserl's separation of philosophy as a rigorous sci-
ence from Lebensphilosophie. His role in disseminat-
ing phenomenology in the English-speaking world may
be gauged by the wide use of his translation of ldeen 1
as a text over fi ve decades. However, apart from Boyce
Gibson and McKellar Stewart (who moved to Adelaide
in 1923 ), no philosopher of major significance emerged
in this period to continue phenomenological scholar-
ship in the southern antipodes.
Across the Tasman Sea in 1934, J. N. FINDLAY, who
had developed an interest in FRANZ BRENTANO, attended
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's lectures in Germany, and visited
Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge, arrived in New
Zealand to join the University of Otago, Dunedin,
where he began his book on Meinong. The other
New Zea1and universities were not eager to develop
interest in European philosophy of any kind, except
in Christchurch (with its theological orientation) and
much !ater (the l960s) in Auckland, where K. B. PFLAUM
arrived from Europe to teach Husserlian phenomen-
ology and cuvE PEARSON from Sydney to teach exis-
tentialism and PAUL TILLICH's existential theology.
During the war years, the tradition of ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY became the dominant force in the British
philosophical scene and in the antipodes as well. The
vestiges of European philosophy were ali but eclipsed.
The hiatus was further accentuated in the postwar years
when french EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY emerged
to reframe the concerns of classical phenomenology.
These decades witnessed a hegemonic spread of the
British "style of mind," the hallmark of English uni-
versities, especially Oxford and Cambridge. Australian
philosophers and budding graduates chose this royal
path and destination for research or higher studies, dis-
playing a strident, if a trifle aggressive, tough-minded
disposition to make analytic philosophy the Australian
40 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
orthodoxy with growing American analytic influence.
The phenomenological-European tradition was de-
rided for its obscurity, lack of logica! rigor, and non-
testability by the empirica! yardstick. These bleak years
amounted to a denial of Australia's own history of plu-
ralism, and also of a multiculturalism that was shim-
mering in the popular quarters with the migration to
Australia of European refugees (artists and intellectu-
als among them). J. J. C. Smart arrived in Adelaide in
1949 (after converting from High Anglican idealism
to scientific realism), championing his newfound com-
mitment to Australian materialism, which he shared
with David M. Armstrong; this virtually eliminated
any lingering concerns with phenomenology.
The submerged movement, however, was rekin-
dled in 1958 with the return to Melbourne of MAX
CHARLESWORTH, after completion of doctoral studies
at Leuven. Charlesworth introduced what was prob-
ably the first full course in contemporary Continen-
tal philosophy in Australia: it included an introduc-
tion to Husserl, but had a main foeus on .IEAN-PAUL
SARTRE and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. He forged Jinks
with colleagues in French, German, and Theology
schools where European existentialist wriţings were
better appraised than in philosophy circles. For a
while, his name became synonymous with existen-
tialism in Australia and his courses and lectures (in-
cluding radio broadcasts) attracted a significant fol-
lowing. Charlesworth encouraged severa! students to
base their dissertations on the works ofMerleau-Ponty
and Husserl, as well as on Sartre and SIMONE DE BEAU-
VOIR, Freud, Marx, and Camus.
The 1960s and 1970s spawned other fads in exis-
tentialist thinking, and marginally in phenomenology,
in the wake of student uprisings and the so-called
"countercultural" movement, but more significantly in
critica! and literary studies, in PSYCHOLOGY and PSY-
CHOANALYSIS, and with FEMINISM and the sexual Jib-
eration movement. A growing number of Australian
academics and students outside of philosophy learned
of Heidegger, Husserl, Sartre, and Beauvoir through
these burgeoning fields of study and popular literature.
(An Existentialist Society was founded in Melbourne
in this era and continues to provide a popular forum
for lectures on phenomenology or, say, the latest twist
in the Heideggerian saga.)
While Melbourne had given itself over almost
wholly (barring the Charlesworth moderation) to
Wittgensteinian thought, Sydney was still under the
sway of John Anderson ( 1893-1962), whose system-
atic approach to history ofphilosophy proved less hos-
tile to European thought. Anderson 's students heard
something about European thinkers, although they
were not encouraged to study these thinkers directly.
In 1960 an honors thesis was written on the concept
of INTENTIONALITY in Brentano, and in 1965 a book on
Brentano was published by the Polish born Melbourne
phi]osopher .lAN SRZEDNICKI.
ConcomitantJy, in the 1960s WILLIAM V. DONIELA
joined the University of Newcastle in New South
Wales, having studied in Freiburg for his doctorale fol-
lowing his undergraduate studies in Sydney. His pre-
eminent concern and reputation was in Hegel's philos-
ophy and social theory, but he took a critica! interes!
in Heidegger and Husserl, and he was to become a
prominent figure in the phenomenological movement
in Australia. He is especially known for his perception
of continuity between "Continental" and "analytic" tra-
ditions, while his approach to LOGIC was mitigated
by his work in Hegel's logic and influenced by the
emerging European (e.g., Frankfurt school) critiques
of logica! positivism. Elsewhere in New South Wales,
studies were being made of GABRIEL MARCEL, Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty: for instance, TONY PALMER taught
Sartre at Macquarie University in 1968. WILLIAM GIN-
NANE published a review ofthe 1962 English translation
of Merleau-Ponty's Phbwnu?nologie de la perception
( 1945) in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
By the 1970s courses in phenomenology and exis-
tentialism began to appear across the philosophy de-
partments. Contributing to this growth was the creation
of new, smaller universities based on interdisciplinary
and other innovative practices. In 1977 Charlesworth
moved to Deakin University near Melbourne to spear-
head a cross-disciplinary program in "distance ed-
ucation" (i.e., teaching students in remote locations
through print and audio media), drawing on pheno-
menological and hermeneutica! thinking. His team in-
cluded JOCELYN DUNPHY (now DUNPHY-BLOMFIELD), who
had studied with PAUL RICCEUR in Paris. Her major re-
search is on Ricreur's developments ofphenomenology
through HERMENEUTICS, unique for its analysis of "hu-
man time" as experience and as narrative. Her confer-
ence papers in Australia have included studies ofwill-
 AUSTRALIA
ing and suffering, and reflections on Australian cu !ture
and history inspired by Ricoeur and by Husserl's Die
Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die tran-
szendentale Phiinomenologie ( 1936). The relevance of
phenomenology to the study of RELIGION and "other"
cultures, and to parallel hermeneutica! praxis in non-
Western traditions, have also been pursued at Deakin,
e.g., by PURUSHOTTAMA BILIMORIA with his added exper-
tise in Indian and comparative philosophy. There is also
now keen interest in the phenomenology ofthe BODY,
deriving from Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, among a
younger generation of Australian postmodernists and
social theorists.
Two philosophers at Macquarie University, in Syd-
ney, have given considerable prominence to pheno-
menology. LUCIANA O'DWYER (nee BELLENETTI) came
from ltaly via Oxford where she had worked with
Gilbert Ryle, but locked her preoccupation firmly
in Descartes, Vico, and, more studiously, Husserl.
O'Dwyer has remained in her Australian career the
closest of ali her Australian colleagues to the pheno-
menological mainstream; she is described as a Husserl
scholar in the purest sense, focusing on the transcen-
dental aspects of Husserl 's ideas in Cartesianische
Meditationen and the Krisis with a gallant concern
to recover the radical character of the transcendental
dimension. O'Dwyer has earned thc reputation ofbe-
ing Australia 's leading Husserl scholar, in her effort to
explicate and interpret the exact meaning of the term
"transcendental" in relation to the EGO (the "subject"
in living relationship to the community) in Husserl's
critique. Her colleague MAX DEUTSCHER moved from
the materialism de bate of the !960s toward Continen-
tal philosophy, more especially Husserl 's phenomen-
ology and Sartre, combining this !ater with feminist
thought ( especially Michelle Le Doeuff). Along with
O'Dwyer he generated enthusiasm among students in
phenomenology. Deutscher's own writing tends to-
ward idiomatic "lifeworld"-oriented phenomenology,
which draws eclectically on both analytic and Con-
tinental themes, criticizing the "totalitarianisms" of
Marxism, Christianity, and physicalism. In Subjecting
and Objecting ( 1983 ), he takes his cue from Husserl 's
concern with the crisis caused for human conscious-
ness by the rise of modern science and the attendant
call for return to rigorously investigated subjectivity.
He looks for new ways of conceiving and applying (in
41
the broader arena also of beliefs, attitudes, feelings,
and actions) the notion of "objectivity" wherein the
person as "subject" is not decentered or routed out~
hence the novel idea of"subjecting" in response to the
challenges ofthe world of objects.
As Macquarie was becoming an Australian center
for phenomenology, the Australian National University
in the nation 's capital, Canberra, with GENEVIEVE LLOYD.
WILLIAM GINNANE, and KIM LYCOS, were trying OUt textual
readings ofMerleau-Ponty in the early 1970s, followed
by discussions on Nietzsche, MARX. and Freud. Lycos
was translating a text of Foucault (!ater abandoned),
and giving seminars on DERRIDA and FREGE; Lloyd's
own work extended to Spinoza, FOUCAULT, and phi-
losophy and literature, the latter resulting in her most
recent book, Being in Time ( 1993 ). Here also, RICHARD
CAMPBELL developed a special interes! in Heidegger.
Campbell himself began his philosophical studies un-
der John Anderson in Sydney and made his forays
into Heidegger through a detour into theology, having
published on Kierkegaard and Bultmann in the !960s.
The Australian National University conferred the first
Ph.D. in this new field to ROBIN SMALL for his thesis
on Heidegger:~ Concept of Human Nature, which he
completed in 1974 under the supervision ofCampbell.
Small ]ater extended his work to Nietzsche and has
remained very much a foca! figure in the Australian
phenomenological movement. At the same university
in 1973 :vlAURITA HAR:-.JEY introduced programs in exis-
tentialism and phenomenology and traveled overseas
to speak with practitioners such as Paul Ricceur, while
working on her doctorale on Husserl. She published
the first phenomenologically-oriented work tobe com-
pleted in Australia ( 1984). Harney has since gone on to
work on a phenomenological hermeneutica! approach
to ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE.
The activities just described occurred in no unified
sense; philosophers working in this area were barely
aware of each other's works and met only at main-
stream philosophy conferences. It was not until 1976
that the first phenomenology conference was organized
in Canberra, bringing together over seventy academics
and students. The papers developed ~ put together
in a modest publication by the conference convener,
Harney ~stand as testimony to the growth of pheno-
menology across the island continent.
A second phenomenology conference was held in
42 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Brisbane in 1980, where the Australasian Association
for Phenomenology and Social Science was formed.ln
1981, a decision was taken to hold yearly phenomen-
ology conferences, alternating between Victoria and
New South Wales (and occasionally in Canberra). At
the 1984 conference the name of the association was
changed to the Australasian Association for Pheno-
menology and Social Philosophy (AAPSP), which un-
wittingly alienated the social scientists but made space
for broader aspects of contemporary European philos-
ophy such as poststructuralism, literary theory, femi-
nism, and critica] philosophy. The Newcastle Univer-
sity Philosophy Club under the impetus of Doniela
issued the conference papers in its journal Dialectic.
The practice of bringing out "proceedings" has been
continued by the respective conference organizers. For
a while some pa pers from phenomenology conferences
appeared in the journal Critica! Philosophyco-founded
by PAUL CRITTENDEN with Lycos and LJoyd. The journa]
did not survive the recession of the 1980s. Australian
phenomenologists continue to publish in overseasjour-
nals, notably Journal ofthe British Societyfor Pheno-
mcnology, International Philosophical Quarterly, and
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, although
the Australasian Joumal of Philosophy published its
first paper on Derrida in September 1993. The other
philosophy journal to come out of Australia, Sophia,
also carries phenomenological-hermeneutical discus-
sions.
In 1990 the AAPSP held its first international
conference, in Melbourne; invited overseas speakers
inc]uded J. N. MOHANTY and DON IHDE. The confer-
ence explored the tension between phenomenology
and hermeneutics in the areas of crisis presented by
TECHNOLOGY in contemporary thought and culture.
Some twenty-four papers were presented, pointing in
the main to the continuing practice or "doing" of
phenomenology in Australia. Mohanty's plenary pa-
per on Foucault as well as his active, self-effacing
engagement throughout the conference (with encour-
aging responses to younger participants), along with
Ihde 's work on technology and the LIFEWORLD, facil-
itated a dialogue between Australian and American-
European phenomenology. Mohanty's paper, "Are In-
dian and Western Philosophies radically different?"
and Ihde's on "Multiculturality" linked the conference
with themes explored in the first Asian and Compara-
ti ve Philosophy meeting in Australia that followed. The
idea of internationalizing the phenomenology confer-
ence and dovetailing it with a cross-cultural philosophy
conference was proposed and carried through by Bil-
imoria with the cooperation of Dunphy-Blomfield and
STAN VAN HOOFT. Van Hooft was himself a former stu-
dent of Charlesworth, who had written his thesis in
phenomenology and has been active in teaching Euro-
pean philosophy; in 1995 he published a book entitled
Caring that drew on Heidegger's concept of Sorgc.
So 1990 marked another watershed in Australian
phenomenology, with its internationalization and mul-
ticultural supplement. In the proceedings recording
this conference, one paper was significantly absent,
namely, Campbell's "Truth in Action," which was in-
corporated into the final chapter ofhis important study,
Truth and Historicity (1992). In his historically sensi-
tive philosophizing, Campbell explores the precondi-
tions of a conception oftruth within the broader horizon
of the contingency, cultural relativity, and historicity
( Geschichtlichkeit) ofhuman understanding, grounded
in the lifeworld rather than harkening back to the ab-
solute, eterna! verities of the Platonic conception, or
Augustinian identities. Such a "truth" would find its
te/os in fulfillment or action rather than in linguistic
correctness or correspondence. While this has echoes
in the Heideggerian notion of aletheia, with its con-
notations of revelation and unconcealment, its closest
analogue is in the Hebrew notions of truth and faith-
fulness. In the final chapters Campbell draws together
Hegelian and post-Enlightenment critica] thinking on
truth, passing through the pragmatism of Dewey and
the communicative ethic of Habermas, and nominal-
ing speech acts, rather than statements or assertoric
sentences, as the primary locus oftruth. This is a good
example of the new frontiers into which phenomen-
ological inspiration is heading in Australia.
For a smattering of current work one is best re-
ferred to the anthology of essays entitled Transcen-
dental and Cultural Phenomenology: Australian Per-
spectives (in press). In the preface, its editor, Small,
notes that the contributors represent a diverse cross-
section of Australian philosophy, about half of whom
were born outside Australia, some ofwhom work out-
side ofphilosophy departments (or in interdisciplinary
schools), bringing differences of cultural background
to philosophical discourse. In a curious way, this trend
 AUSTRIA
has slowly tended to return Australian philosophy to
the pluralism of the early days. And diversification
is likely to continue for other reasons, not least the
growing awareness of Australia's proximity to Asian-
Pacific cultures; a declining Anglo-Celtic population
with the cultural distance from Britain~Europe; and
the sustained intervention ofnative Aboriginal primor-
dial cultural articulations and arts. The essays range
from scholarly studies to new developments ofpheno-
menological themes, as well as critiques ofphenomen-
ological research. At least three essays offer criticisms
of Heidegger- O'Dwyer on the traditional problems
of realism, invoking Husserl and Ryle, and Bilimoria
on the open-ended ambiguities of Heidegger toward
Asian thought despite his anxiety about the "Euro-
peanization of the Earth," with MARION TAPPER being
more critica! of Richard Rorty than of Heidegger in re-
duc ing philosophy to literary history and epistemology
to ontologica! presuppositions.
Tapper is a good example of a second genera-
tion "full-fledged" phenomenologist, supervised by
Doniela for her thesis on Heidegger, and in 1983 ap-
pointed to Melbourne to replace BRENDA JUDGE, who
had taught the courses introduced by Charlesworth.
Tapper worked closely with Lycos (un tii the latter 'sun-
timely death in 1995). RUSSELL GRIGG, a former student
of Charlesworth 's who completed his master's thesis
on Rica.:ur and went on to study in Lacan's school
in Paris, combines interests in phenomenology, ana-
lytic philosophy, and psychoanalysis. Other younger
scholars include KEVIN HART (tending toward decon-
struction and atheology), ELIZABETH GROSZ (working
on French feminist theorists and Nietzsche), and KAREN
GREEN (who has also worked on femininity and tran-
scendence ). PETER PARKER ( fonnerly ofRhodes Univer-
sity) with RENUKA SHARMA work on the interface with
psychology, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology, in-
spired by AMEDEO GIORGI. That the project of infusing
phenomenology into Australia is by no means complete
can be illustrated by way ofthe most recent successful
submission of a masterly doctoral thesis on Husserl 's
idea oftemporalization, by DAMIEN BYERS, a young and
promising Husserl scholar who researched in the Bel-
gium archives and now teaches at Sydney.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
43
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Boyce Gibson, William Ralph. "The Problem ofthe Real and
Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl." Mind 34 ( 1925),
311~33.
- . "Does the Ideal Really Exist?" The Australasian Journal
of Psychology ami Phi losophy 3 ( 1925), 159-78.
- . "Freiburg Diaries of 1928." Ed. Herbert Spiegclbcrg.
Journal of the British Sodety for Phenomenology 2
( 1971 ), 58-81.
- , trans. !deas: General Introduc/ion ta Pure Phenomen-
olob_'l', by Edmund Husserl. London: Allen & Unwin,
1931.
Grave, S. A. A Hist01y o{Philosoph1· in Australia. Queens-
1and: Qucensland University Press, 1984.
Harncy, Maurita. "The Contemporary European Tradition in
Australian Philosophy." In Essal'S an Philosoph1· in Aus-
tralia. Ed. J. T. J. Srzednicki and David Wood. Dordrccht:
Kl uwer Academic Publishers. 1991, 125-51 ..
Small, Rabin, ed. Transcendental and Cultural Phenomen-
ology: Australian Perspectives. Forthcoming.
Issues of Dialectic and Proceedings ofthe Australasian As-
sociation for Phenomenology.
PURUSHOTTAMA BILIMORIA
Deakin Universi(v
AUSTRIA Philosophy in the German-speaking
world can usefully be divided into two distinct tra-
ditions, which we might refer to as the German and
the A ustrian (orA ustro-Hungarian) traditions, respec-
tively. The main line of the first begins with KANT,
FICHTE, HEGEL, and SCHELLING and ends with MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, Theodor Adorno (1903~ 1969), and Ernst
Bloch. The ma in line ofthe second, which embraces the
philosophy of Prague, Lemberg (now Lvov), and Cra-
cow as much as that of Vienna and Graz, begins with
Bernard Bolzano ( 1781~1848), Ernst Mach (1838-
1916), and Alexius Meinong (1853~1920), and ends
with Ludwig Wittgenstein ( 1889~ 1951 ), Otto Neurath
( 1882~1945), and Karl Popper ( 1909~1994). Here we
shall concentrate on the comparatively neg1ected tradi-
tion of Austrian philosophy and on the ro1e of pheno-
menology therein. Broadly, we can say that, where
(Protestant) Germans have tended to emphasize in
their philosophies the ro le of "subjectivity," the Aus-
trians have remained faithfu1 to the idea ofphilosophia
perennis that is rooted in the Aristotelian-Scholastic
tradition.
Bernard Bolzano ( 1781~ 1848), the founder of
44 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Austrian philosophy, published his four-volume Wis-
senschafts/ehre in 183 7. The logica! Platonism that is
propounded in this work is present in various forms in
the work ofBolzano's successors, and it can stil! be de-
tected in the Prolegomena to EDMUND HUSSERL's Logis-
che Untersuchungen ( 1900---1901 ). FRANZ BRENTANO,
too, though born in Germany, falls squarely within
the Austrian tradition as far as his philosophy is
concerned, and Brentano 's most important students
- above ali Christian von Ehrenfels ( 1859-1932),
Anton Marty (1847-1914), Alexius Meinong (1853-
1920), Cari Stumpf( 1848-1936), Kasimir Twardowski
( 186&--193 8), and Tomâacs Garrigue Masaryk ( 1850---
1937)- helped to spread the influence of his ideas
and methods throughout the Habsburg Empire. Not the
least important of these students was Edmund Husserl
himse1f, who was born in Habsburg Moravia in 1859.
Husserl helped to spread Brentano's ideas and methods
into Germany proper. The move to "transcendental ide-
alism" in Husserl 's !ater writings implies, however, that
his philosophy must be seen as straddling the boundary
between the two traditions.
Many 19th century philosophers, including Franz
Brentano, accepted a doctrine of immanentism, accord-
ing to which MEANING, TRUTH, VALUE, and sometimes
even the WORLD as a whole are seen as being immanent
to (as real constituent parts or "contents" of) the mind
or "spirit" ( Geist). It was in no small part a result of
the efforts of Brentano 's Austrian disciples, including
Husserl, that this immanentistic mode of philosophiz-
ing was undermined- and phenomeno1ogy itself, as
well as the clarification of the concept of INTENTIONAL-
ITY that it brings in its wake, may be seen as a byproduct
of this effort to turn away from "subjectivity" and go
back to the matters themselves.
Brentano 's thinking is founded on the discipline of
"descriptive psychology," conceived in Cartesian fash-
ion as an epistemologically secure starting point not
only for the discipline of philosophy, but also for scien-
tific knowledge of other sorts. But descriptive psychol-
ogy is also an empirica/ science (a feature ofBrentano 's
thinking that reflects the influence on Austrian philoso-
phy OfBRITISH EMPIRICISM). It is a science built up on the
basis of our capacity to distinguish in experience the
parts and moments of our mental acts and to grasp cer-
tain necessary and intelligible relations between them.
The training in the methods of descriptive psychol-
ogy that Brentano 's students received instilled in them
an attitude of descriptive or taxonomical realism. This
involves the view that description is prior to explana-
tion: an explanation of given phenomena is of value
only to the extent that we "know what we are talking
about" when we refer to the phenomena in question.
Descriptive psychology is therefore prior also to that
sort of experimental ( or "genetic") psychology that
seeks to establish the laws governing the order of men-
tal phenomena as events unfolding intime. Descriptive
realism presupposes that given segments of reality can
be described in a way that is adequate to the matters
on hand. Description proceeds not by building abstract
models of the phenomena, but by concerning itself
directly with the "matters themselves." Moreover, it
involves the view that description should yield a tax-
onomy of the different kinds of basic constituents in
whatever is the relevant domain, and of the different
forms ofrelation between them; hence the ontologica!
theory of part and whole or "mereology" comes to en-
joy a privileged status within the edifice of science as
a whole.
Brentano 's doctrine of intentionality, presented in
the Psycho/ogie vom empirischen Standpunkt ( 1874)
and elsewhere, is stil! resolutely immanentistic. The
objects of our mental acts are seen as immanent as
"intentionally existent in" these acts themselves. The
tricky issue, which was addressed systematically by
Brentano's students, is one of explaining how mental
acts are abie, on occasions, to achieve a directedness to
transcendent objects in the world. The problem turns on
the fact that acts-for example, ofperception or ofha1-
lucination- that seem from the si de of consciousness
tobe exactly alike, may differ radically with regard to
their relation to an object. Yet acts that lack ( existing)
objects may yet be described using the very same terms
that we use for acts that hit their targets- as when we
say that Hans was thinking a boul unicorns or Mary was
dreaming a boul Atlantis. The account ofthese matters
worked out by Brentano's students leans heavily on
his theory of "modified" uses of language. We distin-
guish, first of ali, two sorts ofadjectives: the attributive
and the modifving adjectives. The fonner complete or
enlarge the meaning of the expressions to which they
are attached (as in "good man," "red horse," "genuine
rubies"). The latter completely change these original
meanings (as for example in: "dead man," "cancelled
 AUSTRIA
performance," "declined handshake," "frustrated en-
try," and so on).
For the early Husserl, our talk ofthe objects ofnon-
veridical acts is modified talk, and the correspondingly
"modified acts" are distinguished not by the fact that
there are special objects to which they are dirccted, but
by the fact that they lack abjecte~ entirely: a fictional
object is nota special kind of object, any more than an
averted war is a special kind ofwar. Thus the structure
of modified acts is not in any sense relational. It is
rather to be understood in tenns of special interna]
qualities that the given acts possess. Certainly we find
it convenient to avail ourselves oftalk of"fictional" or
"intentiona!" objects in order to describe such qualities,
but this fact has no ontologica! significance. The view
in question was worked out by Husserl in papers on
Twardowski that date from 1894. Husserl insists quite
commonsensically that to say that the god Jupiter is an
intentiona! object of my act is not to say that there is
something, namely Jupiter, that lacks existence but is
thought about by me. It is simply to say that my act
is structured qualitatively in a certain way, so that it is
describable as a presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter.
Another Brentano student, Christian von Ehrenfels,
was born in the vicinity ofVienna in 1859 and served as
professor of philosophy in Prague for more than thirty
years. Von Ehrenfels was above ali responsible for ini-
tiating the revolution in psychological research that is
associated with the concept of gestalt, a revolution to
which contributions were made also by von Ehrenfels'
teacher Meinong, by the members ofMeinong's school
in Graz; by Karl Buhler (1879-1963) and his asso-
ciates in Vienna, and most importantly by the group
working on GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY around Stumpf in
Berlin, including not only Von Ehrenfels' student Max
Wertheimer ( 1880-1943), but a1so Kurt Koffka (1886--
1941 ), Wo1fgang Koh1er ( 1887-1867),and Kurt Lewin
( 1890-194 7). Wertheimer was a1so influenced by the
writings of Husserl, and particularly by the third ofthe
latter 's Logische Untersuchungen on the theory of part,
whole, and dependence, and he maintained throughout
his life a characteristically Husserlian interes! in the
foundations of LOGIC and in the relations between the
logica! laws and the flux of mental events involved in
thinking. The Gestalt psychologists also influcnced the
thinking ofthe Austrian novelist Robert Musil (1880-
1942), a student of Stumpf and erstwhile assistant of
45
Meinong in Graz, whose novel Der Mann ohne Eigen-
schafien (The man without qualities), is also marked at
crucial points by Husserl's ideas on mental experience.
The university in Prague could look back on a rich
psychological tradition, beginning with the phenomen-
ological work on color vision of J. E. Purkinje ( 1787-
1869) and Ewald Hering ( 1834--1918) and extending
to Stumpf (who was professor in Prague from 1879
to 1884, before moving to Halle, where Husserl came
înt o contact with him ). Anton Marty, too, was for a long
period professor at Prague, and was responsible for ap-
plying Brentano 's ideas in the are a ofthe science oflin-
guistics, where his writings anticipated contemporary
work on linguistic universals. Marty also played a ro le
in the development of Brentanian ideas on LANGUAGF
in the direction of a theory of speech acts, and exerted
an influence in this respect on REALISTIC PHENOME:-.JOL-
OGISTS such as JOHANNES DAUBERT and ADOLF REINACH
in Munich as well as on ROMAN JAKOBSON and other
members of the Prague Linguistic Circle. Marty 's cir-
ele in Prague also included Oskar Kraus ( 1872-1942),
LUDWIG LANDGREBE, and Hugo Bergmann ( 1883-1975)
- the latter a close friend of Franz Kafka, the two
having together attended philosophy lectures of Yon
Ehrenfels and Marty as part oftheir studies at Prague;
Bergmann also initiated Kafka into the mysteries of
the "Louvre Circle," a discussion group devoted to the
study of Brentano 's thinking.
Von Ehrenfels' doctrine of "gestalt qualities," first
put forward in 1891, was a response to a problem that
had arisen within the atomistic framework that had
hitherto dominated the science of psychology. How,
if perception is built up out of "atoms" or "elements"
of sensation, are we to understand the perception of
a complex formation such as a melody? How, above
ali, are we to explain the fact that we can recognize the
"same" melody even though it has been transposed into
a different key? Von Ehrenfels' answer to this question
amounted to a radical overhaul of the atomistic ap-
proach in psychology. It involved the postulation of
sui generic qualities of complex wholes, qualities that
are given immediately in experience and that are in-
variant even through transformations ofthe associated
sensory elements that serve as their bases.
Husserl developed ideas similar to those of Von
Ehrenfels in Philosophie der Arithmetik ( 1891 ). In
chapter Il of this work, he points to certain "figu-
46 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
rai" or "quasi-qualitative moments" whose existence
is implied in, e.g., our talk of a line of soldiers, an
avenue oftrees, a swarm ofbirds. In his Logische Un-
tersuchungen, Husserl refers to dependent objects that
serve to unify other objects in larger unitary wholes as
"moments of unity," a term suggested by Alois Riehl
( 1844-1924). Such moments of unity, Husserl says,
are "nothing other than those contents which were re-
ferred to by Ehrenfels as 'gestalt qualities,' by me [in
the Philosophie der Arithmetik] as 'figura! moments'
and by Meinong as 'founded contents'."
In 1895 Twardowski was appointed professor of
philosophy in Lemberg (Lvov), sti li at that time an Aus-
trian town (formerly the cradle of Polish civilization;
now in Ukraine), where he continued to hold lectures
until his death in 1938. Twardowski's influence on Pol-
ish philosophy extended not only to phenomenologists
such as ROMAN INGARDEN and LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN, but
also to the members of the Lvov-Warsaw school of
logic. The degree of interconnectedness between Pol-
ish logic and Austrian (Brentanian) philosophy is well
illustrated by the case ofthe logician Jan Lukasiewicz
( 1878-1956 ), who not only studied with Twardowski
and with Stumpf in Berlin and Meinong in Graz, but
also published reviews ofworks by Husserl.
Twardowski 's Zur Lehre vom Jnhalt und Gegen-
stand der Vorstellungen (On the content and object of
presentation, 1894) represents a combination ofthe in-
fluence of Brentano's psychology and Bolzano's log-
ica] Platonism. Twardowski here defends a tripartite
ontology of mind that distinguishes, in addition to the
act, also the (immanent) content and the (transcen-
dent) object. (Twardowski 's work in this connection
has been compared to GOTTLOB FREGE's tripartite the-
ory oflinguistic meaning in terms of expression, sense,
and referent.) In his paper entitled "O czynnosciach
i wytworach" ("Actions and products," 1912), Twar-
dowski criticizes the view according to which Platonic
abstracta would serve as guarantors of the objectivity
ofmeaning in a fashion suggested by Bolzano or Frege.
Meanings, Twardowski now holds, are not durable
items of worldly ( or extra-worldly) furniture. Rather,
they exist only so long as there exist mental processes
that produce them. Yet there is a sense in which mean-
ings may be said to exist dispositionally in the corre-
sponding signs. This is because if appropriate back-
ground conditions are satisfied, a sign enjoys an endur-
ing capacity to bring about relevant transient meaning-
acts. This, as Twardowski points out, explains our
tendency to assert that the meaning is somchow "in-
cluded" or "embodied" in the sign, and to speak of a
"fixing" in the sign of a nondurable mental product
in a way that is analogous to the fixing of a sound
by means of a phonograph record. It explains also our
commonsense assumption that our thoughts grow in
complexity in tandem with our acquisition of succes-
sively more sophisticated rules of language.
Systematic complexity in the world of signs may
contribute to - is indeed for Twardowski quite lit-
erally a cause of- a parallel systematic complexity
in the "subjective" realm ofmeaning. Communication
and mutual understanding is possible, on this account,
not because our words and sentences re late to Platonic
meaning cntities capable ofbeing entertained simulta-
neously by different subjects, but because our words
are able to evoke in others mental processes that are in
relevant respects similar to those mental processes that
those words were used to express. These ideas exerted
an influence not least on the theory of language and
meaning put forward by Ingarden in Das literarische
Kunstwerk (The literary work of art, 1931 ).
Twardowski also influenced Meinong, whose "the-
ory of objects" amounts to an ontology ofact-correlates
that is strongly phenomenological in spirit, and the
same holds too of the work of Ernst Mally (1879-
1944), Stephan Witasek ( 1870--1915), Vittorio Benussi
( 1878-1927), and Franc Veber ( 1890--197 5 ), along
with other members ofMeinong's school in Graz. Be-
nussi and his assistant Ce sare M usatti ( 1897-1989)
founded in ltaly a tradition of phenomenological rsv-
CHOLOGY that has been kept alive in our own day above
ali by Gaetano Kanizsa and Paolo Bozzi in the former
Habsburg Imperial harbor city of Trieste.
AII ofthe thinkers mentioned above were inspired,
directly or indirectly, by Brentano 's project of an ontol-
ogy ofmind that would provide an exhaustive account
of the different mental constituents and of the ways
in which these constituents are built up to yield larger
complex wholes. Brentano 's ideas in this connection
can be seen to stand at the beginning of a tradition
that results inter alia in Husserl 's development of the
FORMAL ONTOLOGY ofparts and wholes in the Logische
Untersuchungen; in the theory of objects of Meinong;
in the Graz, Berlin, and Trieste schools of GESTALT PSY-
 AUSTRIA
CHOLOGY; and in the development of mereology and
logica! grammar in Poland.
The idea of a logica! gram mar, of a formal theory
of the categories of linguistic units and of the catego-
riallaws governing the combination ofsuch units, was
first put forward by Husserl in his fourth Investiga-
tion. This work influenced in turn the development of
the theory of semantic (!ater "syntactic") categories by
the great Polish logician Stanislaw Lesniewski ( 1886--
1939), contributions to which were also made by Kaz-
imierz Ajdukiewicz ( 1890--1963 ), who studied with
Husserl at Gottingen in the 1920s. Lesniewski, too,
inherited through Twardowski an interes! in Brentano
and his school, and as a young man he had conceived
the project of translating Marty's Untersuchungen zur
Grundlegungder al/gemeinen Grammatik und Sprach-
philosophie (lnvestigations on general grammar and
philosophy of language, 1908) into Polish. As he him-
selfexpressed it, Lesniewski grew up" 'tuned' to 'gen-
eral grammar' and logico-semantic problems â la Ed-
mund Husserl and the representatives of the so-called
Austrian school."
Para li el to the tradition of Brentano and his disci-
ples is the empiricist school of Austrian philosophy
established by Ernst Mach (1838~1916), the fruits of
whose efforts in Vienna and Prague can be seen not
]east in the growth of the LOGICAL POSITIVIST move-
ment in Central Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The
project of phenomenology- the project of providing
a painstakingly adequate description of what is given
in experience precisely as it is given - can itself be
interpreted as a more comprehensive and more radical
version of positivism in the traditional sense. Indeed,
Hermann Liibbe finds no difficulty in asserting that
"'Ernst Mach and other critica! empiricists, regardless
of their 'positivism,' belong in the tradition of pheno-
menology."
The superficial view ofthe relations between pheno-
menology and the Vienna positivists has long centered
around the attack of Rudolf Carnap (1891~1970) in
the second volume of Erkenntnis on the "metaphys-
ical nonsense" of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit ( 1927).
Thus it has been readily assumed that phenomenology
as a whole appeared to Carnap (who had studied with
Husserl in Gi:ittingen in 1924-25) and to other mem-
bers ofthe Vienna Ci rele as just another example ofthe
bad old metaphysics that they were aiming to destroy.
47
The two camps were certainly at odds with each other
in central points of doctrine. It was Ingarden who pre-
sented one ofthe first formulations ofthe now familiar
criticism of the Vienna ci rele verifiability criterion of
meaning- that the criterion is itself meaningless by
its own lights - at the Prague World Congress of
Philosophy in 1934. Yet FELIX KAUFMANN was ab]e to
retain friendly relations with both camps, and there
are a number ofrespects in which the members ofthe
Vienna Circ le were influenced by Husserl 's phenomen-
ology, even if only in the sense that, as we shall see,
phenomenology provided a stock of problems that the
positivists felt called upon to resolve.
The two (Brentanian and logica] positivist) strands
of Austrian philosophy were indeed at one stage so
closely intertwined that Husserl could be considered
as a potential successor to Mach in the chair in Vienna,
and GUIDO KUNG has defended the view that there are
quite specific parallels between Husserlian phenomen-
ology and the project of"explication" that is defended
by Carnap in Der logische Aufbau der vVelt (The log-
ica! structure of the world, 1928). A view of this sort
was advanced already in 1932 by Ernst Polak, a stu-
dent of Moritz Schlick (1882~1936) and man-about-
town in Vienna- Polak was inter alia the husband of
Kafka's Milena- in a dissertation entitled Kritik der
Phănomenologie durch die Logik (Critique of pheno-
menology by means of logic, 1932). The science of
phenomenology, according to Polak, "is logic (gram-
mar in the most general sense), clarification of what
we mean when we speak; its results are tautologies; its
findings not statements, but explications."
Polak's work is clearly inspired by another Austrian
phiJosopher, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, and more particu-
Jarly by the latter's Tractatus (1921). As is seen from
Wittgenstein's own employment of the term "pheno-
menology," particularly around 1929, it is primarily
in regard to the problem of the synthetic a priori -
of an "intermediary between logic and physics" -
that Husserl 's thinking is crucial to the development
of that of Wittgenstein. Husserl 's account of the syn-
thetic a priori is indeed no less important to the work
of Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle than is that of
Kant, for where Kant sees the realm of the synthetic a
priori as residing in the relatively restricted and cogni-
tively inaccessible sphere of transcendental conscious-
ness, Husserl claims that there is a directly accessible
48 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
a priori dimension across the entire range of everyday
experience ~ so that the family of propositions that
are both synthetic and a priori turns out to be vastly
greater on Husserl's view than on that of Kant. It in-
cludes not least such homely examples as "nothing can
be both red and green ali over" ~an example to which
Wittgenstein and the Vienna positivists devoted agreat
deal oftheir attention.
From the standpoint of the positivists, of course,
synthetic a priori propositions do not and cannot ex-
ist: ali true propositions are either tautologies of logic
or contingent truths relating to empirica! matters of
fact. For Husserl, in contrast, as for the realistic phe-
nomenologists in Munich, there are entire disciplines
of synthetic a priori truths, including the discipline of
phenomenology itself, as well as a range of "regional
ontologies" pertaining to mind, cui ture, animate nature,
and the spatiotemporal world ofphysical things.
As far as contemporary Austrian philosophers are
concerned, phenomenology has been sorely neglected,
though important work in the tradition of Bolzano,
Brentano, and Meinong has been carried out, inter
alia, by Johannes Brandl, Reinhard Fabian, Rudolf
Haller, Johannes Marek, Edgar Morscher, and Peter Si-
mons. The work on Austrian philosophy of Roderick
Chisholm must also be mentioned in this connection, as
must work in the Austrian tradition in the newly freed
countries of Eastern Europe on the part of thinkers
SUCh as WLODZIMIERZ GALEWICZ, TOMASZ LUBOWIECZKI,
JAN PAVLIK, ANDRZEJ POL TAWSKI, ARTUR ROJSZCZACH, JAN
WOLENSKI, and WOJCIECH ZELANIEC.
FOR FlJRTHER STUDY
Chisholm, Roderick M., and RudolfHaller, eds. Die Phi/oso-
phie Franc. Brentanos. Amsterdam: Rodopi (also as
Gra::er Philosophische Studien 5), 1978.
Grassl, Wolfgang, and Barry Smith, eds. Austrian Eco-
nomics: Historical and Phi!osophical Background. Lon-
don: Croom Helm and New York: New York University
Press, 1986.
Kiing, Guido. "The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoche
and as Explication." The Monist 59 ( 1975), 63--80.
Liibbe, Hermann. "Positivismus und Phănomenologie. Mach
und Husserl." In Beitrăge ::ur Philosophie und Wis-
senschafi. Wilhelm Szilasi ::um 70. Gehurtstag. Ed. H.
Hofling. Munich: Francke, 1960, 161-84; "Positivism and
Phenomenology: Mach and Husserl." In Phenomeno/ogy
and Socio/ogy. Ed. Thomas Luckmann. Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1978,90-118.
Nyiri, J. C., ed. From Bolzano ta Wittgenstein: The Tradition
of'Austrian Philosophy. Vienna: Holder-PichlerTempsky,
1986.
Simons, Peter M. Phi/osophy and Logic in Central Europe
from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1992.
Smith, Barry, ed. Foundations of' Gestalt Theory. Munich:
Philosophia, 1988.
- . Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy ofFranz Brentano. La
Salle, IL: Open Court, 1994.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. "The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein 's Phănomeno/ogie ( 1929-?). "American Phi losoph-
ical Quarterly 5 (1968), 244--56, with supplement inJour-
nal of the British Society for Phenomenology 13 ( 1982),
296-99.
8ARRY SMITH
State University of New York, Buff'alo

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR Beauvoir shapes an
account oflived experience that recognizes subjectivity
and situation as radically irreducible, concrete, partic-
ular, and plural and that by means of this recognition
moves EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY beyond impasses
created by subtle, ongoing adherence to impersonal and
falsely universalizing forms ofphilosophy. Beauvoir's
critique of myth - whereby once a single myth is
touched, aii myths are in dan ger- shows that nothing,
not even the most commonplace ofbeliefs, is essential
or natural, and in so doing liberates a dynamic sense
of becoming through which we take up our lives. Her
insistence that it is in the knowledge ofthe conditions
of our lives, in their ambiguity and multiplicity, that
we draw our strength to live and our reasons for act-
ing, makes women and groups marginalized by much
of philosophy emergc as a topic of discourse in pheno-
menology.
Beauvoir was born in Paris, January 2, 1908,
the daughter of Fran~oise Brasseur de Beauvoir and
Georges de Beauvoir. She studied philosophy at the
Sorbonne. After completing the agn?gation in 1931,
she taught philosophy in Marseilles, Rouen, and Paris.
During the German occupation of France her relation-
ship with Natalie Sorokine resulted in her teaching con-
tract being tenninated, and in 1944 Beauvoir decided
to become a full-time writer. With JEAN-PAUL SARTRE,
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and others, Beauvoir co-
founded the journal Les Temps Modernes in 1945. She
traveled widely and was particularly affected by her
visits to China, the Soviet Un ion, Cuba, and the United
States. She took part in numerous politica! demonstra-
tions, among which were the opposition to the German
occupation of France, to French colonial rulc in Alge-
ria, to the war in Vietnam, and to sexism in women 's
lives. Her work inspired in great part the second wave
of FEMil\ISM. Beauvoir died in Paris, on April21, 1986.
In keeping with Beauvoir's belief that it is good
for thoughts to be shaped by experience, as well as
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 49
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyc/opedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
with the notion that existential phenomenology is not
primarily a matter of intertextual reading, but of re-
flection on experience in interaction with the persons,
ideas, values, groups, institutions, etc., around us, her
phenomenology grew significantly out of her friend-
ships. In this regard there should be noted her con-
versations with Sartre, her lifelong companion since
their initial meeting in 1929: with Sylvie Le Bon,
who met Beauvoir in 1960 and who, Beauvoir re-
ports, was thoroughly interwoven in her life by 1964
and remained so up to the time of Beauvoir's death;
and with Beauvoir's friends among whom, at vari-
ous times in her lifc, may be counted Elizabeth Le
Coin ("Zaza" in Beauvoir's work); Helene de Beau-
voir, her sister ("Poupette" in Beauvoir 's writings );
Estepha Gerassi ("Stepha"): Jose Le Core; Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (sometimes "Pradelle" in Beauvoir's
books); Colette Audry: Jacques-Laurent Bost; Violette
Leduc; Nelson Algren; and Richard Wright.
Beauvoir wrote a vast array of philosophical, liter-
ary, and politica] works, as well as letters and note-
books, Lettres a Sartre ( 1990), Journal de guerre
( 1990), which are now beginning to be published and
will ha ve much impact on current understanding ofher
work and of French phenomenology. L 'Amerique au
jour le jour ( 1948) chronicles her trips to the United
States and her encounters with Algren and Wright. ln-
terestingly, Beauvoir was the only European pheno-
menologist of her time actively to connect her de-
scriptive thought with ideas and events in the United
States. Her memoirs document the evolution of her
ideas and the origins and development of phenomen-
ology in FRANCE in vi vid detail. Memoires d'unejeune
fi/le rangee ( 1958) contains compelling descriptions
of her relationship with Zaza, her childhood friend, as
well as discussions of her rejection of religion and of
the family as an institution. La forcr: de l'âge ( 1960)
brings forth Beauvoir's encounter with EXISTENTIAL-
ISM, her life with Jean-Paul Sartre, and her own pro-
cess ofbecoming a writer. Laforce des choses (1963)
highlights her life during the prewar and war years;
Tout comptefait ( 1972) marks her relation with Sylvie
de Bon and moves from the war to the late 1960s; La
ceremonie des adieux ( 1981) traces the years preced ing
the death of Sartre. Une morttres douce ( 1964 ), which
Le Bon encouraged Beauvoir to write upon the death
of Beauvoir's mother, may well be one of her most
50 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
enduring essays. Among her highly acclaimed literary
works are L 'invitee ( 1943 ); Le sang des autres ( 1945);
Tous les hommes sont mortels ( 1946); Les mandarins
(1954), which she considered her best literary resolu-
tion of the problem of the Other and which received
the Prix Goncourt; Les belles images ( 1966); and La
femme rompue (1967).
Beauvoir's best known theorctical works are Pour
une morale de l 'ambiguite ( 1947), Le deuxil?me sexe
( 1949) and La vieillesse ( 1970). Le deuxieme Sexe was
an immediate success in France, with the first vol-
ume selling 22,000 copies in the first week, June 4-9,
and the second volume selling just as many copies,
November 4-9. The cover of Paris Match, in August
ofthat year, featured her photo and the statement that
she was the first woman philosopher in the history of
"man." With the appearance of the second volume, in
which Beauvoir discusses the young gir!, marriage, the
mother, the lesbian, prostitutes, and hetairas, she be-
came not only the center of controversy, but the object
ofrudeness and harassment as she was hounded out of
cafes and the routine ofher daily life was disrupted.
The devastating rise of Nazism in Germany and
the Civil War in Spain shattered the lives of Beauvoir
and her friends. When they found themselves again, re-
bom and radically different, the world around them had
changed. This change, for Beauvoir, was marked by an
awareness ofthe multiple implications ofthe historical
moment. Thus when Beauvoir, like Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty, criticized the philosophies prevalent during their
time- in particular, NATURALISM, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
and MARXISM - her critique, and with that, her exis-
tential phenomenology, was distinguished by its spe-
cific awareness of humanity not as a natural, but as a
historical phenomenon. Naturalistic explanations, she
argues, are inadequate insofar as nothing that happens
to a person is ever natural. For instance, although hu-
man reproduction is founded on biology, it does not
necessitate sexual differentiation, and old age is not
exclusively a biologica! fact, but partakes of history.
Psychoanalysis posits humans not as natural objects,
but as subjects, or lived bodies. Yet the psychoanalyti-
cal criterion ofnormalcy, considered by Beauvoir tobe
identica! to essentialist and prescriptive social custom,
gives rise to an inauthentic picture of humanity. She
claims that Sigmund Freud offers a masculine model
that mistakenly assumes that sexuality is a given and
fails to account for the origin ofmale supremacy. Any-
one who wants to work on women, Beauvoir writes,
has to break completely with Freud. Historical materi-
alism brings to phenomenological analysis the recog-
nition that humanity makes itse1f what it is according
to its material possibilities. A woman is defined not
exclusively by her sexuality, but also by the economic
organization ofthe society in which she lives. Beauvoir
maintains, however, that historica1 materialism rejects
the concept of choice and therefore views the subject
as monolithic and passive. It reduces women to the ca-
pacity for labor and does not consider women 's work
in reproduction and childcare seriously.
Beauvoir was recognized early in her philosophi-
cal studics as an expert on Leibniz, whose philosophy
she !ater carne to find dull. HEGEL's phenomenology
and logic were influential on her work, as they were
on that of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. She often com-
ments on the Hegelian sense ofbeing and describes "to
be a woman" as an instance of the dynamic Hegelian
sense of the verb "to be," that is, a "to ha ve become"
in which the question is: should that state of affairs
continue? She finds a basis for social philosophy in
Hege1ian representations of thc necd for a reciproca!
recognition of consciousnesses. Yet in January 1941,
upon discovering herself delivered from an undue op-
timism, Beauvoir rejects the optimism of Hegel 's his-
torical infinite and its positing ofthe particular only as
a moment of the totality in which it must surpass it-
self. Although she gathers support from Kierkegaard's
opposition to Hegel, in which Kierkegaard affirms the
irreducible character of ambiguity, she considers his
tales of the aloneness of the individual a subjective
game of no use in the creation of authentic re1ations
among people.
Beauvoir read widely the work of her contempo-
raries and developed aspects of her existential pheno-
meno1ogy out of that dialogue. She found fruitful
CI aude Levi-Strauss's conception ofthe mark of other-
ness, which arises in the exchange ofwomen by men,
among men, in marriage. MAX SCHELER 's account of
ressentiment she characterized as very weak, and EM-
MANUEL LEVINAS's account ofthe feminine as the full
flower of otherness, absolutely other and in meaning
opposite to consciousness, she termed an assertion of
masculine privilege.
During the academic year 1932-33, Beauvoir, al-
 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR
ready familiar with Husserl due to her conversations
with Fernando Gerassi, who had studied with ED-
MUND HUSSERL and had been a classmate of Sartre in
Berlin, became extremely interested in Husserl 's work.
This interest, sparked by a con versation with Raymond
Aron concern ing Husserl 's approach to philosophy, led
to her detailed study, in 1934, of Husserl's Vor!esun-
gen zur Phănomeno!ogie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
[ 1905] and to her translation of sections ofthat work for
Sartre, who had read Husserl's work while on leave at
the French Institute in Berlin during the spring of 1933.
Beauvoir describes herself, in Laforce de l 'âge, as ini-
tially being fi !led with enthusiasm by the richness and
novelty of Husserl 's phenomenology. Of particular in-
terest is Beauvoir 's thematization of Husserl 's EPOCHE
ANO REDUCTION in Pour une morale de 1'ambiguite.
There she compares the epoche to existential conver-
sion: Jet a person put the will in parentheses and that
person will come to an awareness ofthe genuine con-
ditions ofher life. Just as the phenomenological reduc-
tion prevents the errors of dogmatism by suspending
all affinnation concerning the mode of reality of the
externa! world- whose existence it does not contest
- existentialist conversion does not suppress a per-
son 's instincts, plans, and passions. It merely refuses
to set them up as absolutes and considers them in their
connection with the freedom that projects them.
Beauvoir read MARTIN HEIDEGGER first in 1936,
when she translated long sections of Sein und Zeit
( 1927) for Sartre to read, and then again more thor-
oughly in 1939. She refers positive1y to Heidegger's
account ofthe future as bound up with the present and
she contrasts that with the dream future posited by re-
ligion and with the tyrant's trick, which encloses a per-
son in the facticity of the present. Yet she experiences
human life not as a gradual being-toward-death, but as
an unstable system in which balance is continually lost
and continually recovered, in which change is the law
of life. The analysis of the tool, given in Le deuxieme
sexe, vividly distinguishes her existential phenomen-
ology from that of Heidegger. There Beauvoir details
the life ofthe married woman as one of endless repeti-
tion, washing, ironing, sweeping, ferreting out rolls of
lint from under wardrobes, and whose high point may
be the preparation of food and getting meals, work
that means marketing, often the bright spot of the day,
gossip on doorsteps while peeling vegetables, etc. The
51
WORLD, Beauvoir claims, when considered from the
perspective of a concrete and particular context, does
not seem to women an assemblage ofimplements inter-
mediate between her will and her goals, as Heidegger
defines it; it is on the contrary something obstinately
resistant, unconquerable. Woman comes to grips not
with matter, but with life, and life cannot be mastered
through the use ofTECHNOLOGY.
Between Sartre and Beauvoir there are major in-
fluences ofvaried sorts. These influences are currently
being re-evaluated in order tobe more accurately deter-
mined. For instance, despite her assertions to the con-
trary, it is now apparent that Sartre had read L 'invitee
by the first week of February 1940, significantly prior
to his completion of L 'etre et le neant ( 1943 ), and
Sartre 's theoretical impasse at combining his belief in
absolute freedom with collectivity and history was not
broken until after the initial publication of Le deuxieme
sexe in Les Temps Modernes in 1948. The divergences
between the existential phenomenologies of Beauvoir
and Sartre are especially evident in regard to their re-
spective representations ofvoluntarism, of oppression
and HISTORY, and of nature. While nature in Sartre's
work appears as mere facticity, 1'etre-en-soi, nature for
Beauvoir is to be considered in relationship with hu-
man being. Such a relationship forms one of the rare
contexts in which woman is no longer mother, wife,
housekeeper, but a human being, in which woman re-
members that she is an irreducible free individual and
Iives not for others, but for herself. The freedom pro-
posed by Beauvoir is individualistic, but not solipsistic.
Each individual is defined only by relationship to the
world and to other individuals; one's freedom is made
by reaching out toward the freedom of others.
From Merleau-Ponty Beauvoir draws an under-
standing of the BODY as historical process. Yet as she
comments, to say "a body is nota thing, it is a situation
in itself," has no significance; rather, this body has this
or that particular structure. For instance, she writes that
woman, like man, is her body and that woman 's body
is something other than herself. Over the years Beau-
voir and Merleau-Ponty grew further apart, separated
by their views ofRELIGION, women's right to abortion,
and family.
Lived experience, Beauvoir relates, was a form of
consciousness she first became aware of from her re-
fusal, as a child, to fit whatever she beheld with her
 52 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
own eyes into a rigid category, and from her desire
to express neutra! tints, muted shades, and the gap
between word and object. Her descriptions oflived ex-
perience are inseparable from her literary reading, and
in particular, from the writing of Kafka, Lawrence,
Woolf, Hemingway, Dos Passos, Faulkner, and Joyce.
In the section "L'etre-dans-le-monde" of La vieillesse
(Old age, 1970), Beauvoir comes to a definition of
lived experience as the inward experience of a sub-
ject, the inwardly experienced meaning of our being-
in-the-world. Lived experience can be communicated
from the standpoint of each individual's uniqueness
but, Beauvoir maintains, it cannot be known as a uni-
versal philosophical concept. The body- that is, our
awareness of ourselves as particular, concrete, and em-
bodied individuals- may offer a way ofunderstanding
lived experience, but it has no mcaning apart from the
relations that shape its context, or situation.
In Le deuxieme sexe, when Beauvoir writes her per-
haps best known and most controversial statement, "On
ne naÎt pasfemme: on le devient" [one is not born a
woman: one becomes one], she attacks the myth of
woman, a transcendent idea that defies 1ived experience
and robs individuals of their self-defined projects and
goals. Woman is a cultural formation that is imposed
on females by the intervention of others in her destiny.
Woman finds herself living in a world where man rep-
resents both the positive and the neutra!, where she is
defined relative to man and as the negative, where man
is the subject, the absolute, and she is the Other. More-
over, Beauvoir observes, just as woman is not deter-
mined by biology, psychology, or economic fate, sex-
uality is in no way determined by matters of anatom-
ical or psychological disposition. Thus for Beauvoir's
phenomenology there is no natural or necessary linkage
between biologica! features, gender, and sexuality, be-
tween women or men, or heterosexuality or homosex-
uality, or femininity or masculinity. There are myriad
possibilities for us to take up and give shape through
our being in the world. Yet for Beauvoir, woman is not
the only Other. She cites, in La vieil/esse, the bourgeois
myths of affiuence that hide the experience of old age.
The awareness gained from analyses oflived experi-
ences was not, for Beauvoir, to bc relegated to a world
of ideas, but was for the purpose of social change:
she signed the Manifeste des 343 and participated in
the French feminist campaign for free abortion. She
publicly testified for Djamila Boupacha, a young Al-
gerian woman illegally imprisoned by French military
forces and tortured in 1960. In 1972 she named herself
a militant feminist and joined the women 's liberation
movement. She worked to actualize a partial response
to her question, who cares for the aged?
Beauvoir's phenomenology needs tobe read in its
entirety and studied, that is, it needs to rcceive the
appropriate scholarly attention. Although there are se-
rious obstacles to studying her phenomenology, these
can be overcome. First, the English translation of Le
deuxieme sexe, the text from which the translations
into other languages have been made, suffers from
the deletion, arbitrary and unindicated, by the trans-
lator (H. M. Parshley), of more than ten percent of
the original. Margaret Simons has shown that the text
has many wrong translations and the translator has of-
ten rendered inaccurately and ignored altogether Beau-
voir's precise use ofphenomenological terms. Second,
Jo Ann Pilardi has shown that philosophers, including
those in Continental philosophy, have with very few
exceptions not even mentioned Beauvoir, and in the
few cases where mention has been made, it is often
woefully inaccurate. Beauvoir herself has not always
facilitated accurate study ofher work. She imposed ma-
jor restrictions on interviewers, biographers, and those
close to her who considered theorizing about her life,
work, and influence. Such restrictions, accompanied
by Beauvoir's frequent knowing misrepresentation of
information, ha ve led in her memoirs and interviews to
the creati an of a fiction. It is interesting, though, that
so many writers and readers ha ve chosen not simply to
represent, but to embellish that fiction. In this context,
it is important to keep in mind Beauvoir's experience
ofthe reception ofher ideas during her lifetime.
To date, new directions in the study of Beauvoir's
phenomenology are indicated by feminist scholars, in-
cluding feminist philosophers, many ofwhom are re-
evaluating her work. Further new directions are emerg-
ing as her notebooks are transcribed and her journals,
letters, and other manuscripts published. The disrup-
tive potential ofthese materials promises to bring about
dramatic shifts in understanding Beauvoir's work in
particular and French phenomenology in general.
 BEHAVIORAL GEOGRAPHY
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Allen, Jeffner, and Iris Young, eds. The Thinking Muse: Fem-
inism and Recent French Thought. Bloomington, IN: In-
diana University Press, 1989.
Beauvoir, Simone de. Pour une morale de 1'amhiguite. Paris:
Gallimard, 194 7; The Ethics ofAmhiguity. Trans. Bemard
Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958.
~. Le deuxieme sexe. Paris: Gallimard, 1949; The Second
Sex. Trans. H.M.Parshley. New York: Knopf, 1953.
~. Memoires d 'une jeune .fille rangee. Paris: Gallimard,
1958; Memoirs of a Dutifit! Daughter. Trans. James
Kirkup. Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959.
~. Lettres a Sartre. Ed. Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir. 2 vols.
Paris: Gallimard, 1989; Letters ta Sartre. Ed. Sylvie Le
Bon de Beauvoir. Trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare. New York:
Little, Brown & Co., 1992.
Butler, Judith. "Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir's
Second Sex." In Women, Knowledge. and Reali(y: Ex-
plorations in Feminist Philosophy. Ed. Ann Garry and
Marilyn Pearsa11. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
Francis, Claude, and Fernande Gontier. Les ecrits de Simone
de Beauvoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1979.
Fullbrook, Kate, and Edward Fullbrook. Simone de Beau-
voir and Jean-Paul Sartre: The Remaking of a Twentieth-
Centwy Legend. New York: Basic Books, 1994.
Marks, Elaine. "Transgressing the (In)cont(in)ent Bound-
aries: The Body in Decline." In "Simone de Beauvoir:
Witness to a Century." Ed. Helene Vivienne Wenzel. Yale
French Studies 72 (1986), 181-200.
Pilardi, Jo Ann. "The Changing Critica! Fortunes of The
Second Sex." History and Theory 32 (1993), 51-73.
Simons, MargaretA. "The Silencing of Simone de Beauvoir:
Guess What's Missing from The Second Sex," Women s
Studies International Forum 6 ( 1983), 559-564.
~. "Sexism and the Philosophical Canon: On Reading Beau-
voir's The Second Sex." Journal ofthe History of1deas 51
( 1990), 487-504.
- . "Lesbian Connections: Simone de Beauvoir and Femi-
nism." Signs: Journal of Women in Cu/ture and Society
18 (1992), 136-161.
Wittig, Monique. "One is notborn a woman." Feminist Issues
1 (1981), 1-11; rpt. in her The Straight Mind and Other
Essays. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992.
JEFFNER ALLEN
Binghamton University
BEHAVIORAL GEOGRAPHY As an academic
discipline, geography is the study of the earth as the
dwelling place of human beings. Behavioral geogra-
phy is one important subfield of the discipline and
examines the role ofhuman behavior, experience, and
meaning in understanding people's relationship with
environments, places, and landscapes. SOCIAL GEOG-
RAPHY is another subfield. In that severa! other dis-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
53
ciplines and professions are also concerned with the
people-environment relationship at varying geograph-
ical scales, research in behavioral geography is often
interdisciplinary and linked with other areas of ex-
pertise that include ECOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY,
environment-behavior research, ARCHITECTURE, land-
scape architecture, and community and regional plan-
ning.
Research in behavioral geography first arose in the
early 1960s as an alternative to the normative, econom-
ically rational approaches used by geographers to ex-
amine the distribution and pattern of human activities
in relation to space and environment. This early behav-
ioral work was positivist in approach and emphasized
such topics as environmental perception, spatial cogni-
tion and leaming, territoriality, and environmental and
landscape preferences. By the early 1970s, however,
some behavioral geographers sought an alternative to
the dominant positivist tradition and turned to interpre-
ti ve philosophical traditions like HERMENEUTICS and
EXISTENTIALISM as a way conceptually to explore hu-
man experience, meaning, and values as the essential
foundation for understanding human behavior and ac-
tion in the geographical world.
Since 1970, when EDWARD C. RELPH published the
first article on the topic in a scholarly geographic jour-
nal, phenomenology has contributed significantly to
behavioral geography, both conceptually and method-
ologically. Although there has been considerable the-
oretical debate by such figures as JOHN PICKLES and
BENNO WERLEN as to what phenomenology can best
offer to behavioral geography and related interdisci-
plinary work, most of the research has moved away
from Husserl's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY and
has drawn instead on the tradition of EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGY pointed to by MARTIN HEIDEGGER
and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY.
In broadest terms, this phenomenological research
has sought to understand human awareness and action
as they both create and are created by such geographi-
cal qualities as place, SPACE, nature, landscape, home,
journey, region, dwelling, and the built environment.
Perhaps the fundamental topic is the geographicallife-
world- the taken-for-granted meanings, experiences,
behaviors, and events in relation to environment, space,
place, and landscape. How, for example, do qualities
of the natural and built environments give and have
 54 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
meaning in people's lives? How do human beings or-
ganize their existence in space? What is a sense of place
and how does it vary among geographical locations?
What qualities of landscape and physical environment
infuse a physical space with a sense of place? Re-
search on the geographicallifeworld can be described
in terms of two interrelated themes: ( 1) a phenomen-
ology of environmental behavior and experience and
(2) a phenomenology of geographical being-in-world.
Each ofthese topics is discussed in turn.
The phenomenology of environmental behavior and
experience considers the ways in which human beings
reach out, make contact with, and behave in a world that
is, in part, geographical. One phenomenological focus
is the ways in which our existence as bodily beings
contributes to our experience of space and place. First
of ali, we are solid bodies, which means we are more
or less fixed in size and shape. Our solid body also
gives a sense of centeredness to the space in which
we li ve and -~in conjunction with binocular vision-
orients us within a sixfold directionat axis ofup-down,
front-back, and left-right.
Beyond bodily structure as lived, there is also a
phenomenological interest in the pre-reflective but
]earned INTENTIONALITY of the BODY, which through
Merleau-Ponty's Phenonz(mologie de la perception
( 1945) has come tobe called body-su~ject- the pre-
conscious intelligence ofthe body manifested through
ACTION. Phenomenological work on the body-subject
in behavioral geography argues that the body-subject
is the bedrock of the habitual, routine aspects of life
in the world and indicates why a large portion of the
person 's typical day can proceed automatically without
a major amount of conscious attention.
For behavioral geographers, the most significant as-
pect of the body-subject is its automatic, taken-for-
granted ability to work in extended ways over TIME
and SPACE, and researchers accordingly ask how rou-
tine behaviors of individuals coming together regularly
in space can transform that space into a place with a
particular dynamic and character. A related research
question is how qualities of the physical environment
and design can isolate people or bring them together in
place.
Another dimension of environmental experience ex-
amined by phenomenological behavioral geography is
the sensible environment that the fi ve senses encounter
and interpret. USA HERSCHONG, for example, uses the
four descriptive themes of necessity, delight, affection,
and sacredness to delimit aspects of a phenomenology
of the thermal environment. Another example is R.
MURRAY SCHAFER, who considers the experience of
the sonic environment, or soundscape as he calls it. He
develops a series of concepts, notations, and exercises
that work to foster sensitization in terms of listening
and hearing.
The phenomenology of geographical being-in-
world recognizes the indissoluble unity between person
and world, or being-in-world, a phrasing that serves to
emphasize a sense of immersion and integral person-
world fus ion. Phcnomenological efforts to maintain the
wholeness of geographical and environmental being-
in-world include research focusing on the emotional
bonds between people and place- for example, feel-
ings of care, sentiment, warmth, or love. YI-FU TUAN
speaks of topophilia as "ali of the human being's af-
fective ties with the material environment." Other re-
searchers, such as BELDEN LANE, drawing on themes
from the phenomenology of RELIGION and spiritual
experience, link emotional involvement with place to
impulses of sacredness and geopiety.
One of the most comprehensive efforts to describe
geographical being-in-world is ERIC DARDEL's discus-
sion of geographicite, or geographicality - a term
he coins to describe the taken-for-granted spatial and
environmental context in which people live, i.e., "the
distinctive relationship that binds man to the earth ...
his way of existence and his fate." Dardel defines geo-
graphicality in terms of three interrelated dimensions:
lived space, landscape, and place. Lived space refers
to space as experienced and has a close relationship to
the bodily dimensions of the geographical lifeworld.
Lived space is not an empty void to which qualities
and meanings are arbitrarily assigned, but rather a nec-
essary and significant context for ali human experience
and action. For OTTO BOLLNOW, each person has a "nat-
ural place" to which he or she belongs, and only this
place "can properly be called the zero point of his [or
her] reference system." Typically, this natural place is
the home, which is part of a larger set of familiar places
and routes that together comprise the taken-for-granted
spatial context ofthe geographicallifeworld.
Oardei also spcaks of landscape, by which he means
the physical environment that provides the material
 BEHAVIORAL GEOGRAPHY
base for a particular Iifeworld. He identifies fi ve inter-
related components of Iandscape: ( 1) material space,
the general, Iarge-scale physiognomy of an environ-
ment that makes it welcoming or threatening for hu-
man Iiving; (2) tel!uric space, the sense of Iandscape
related to qualities of geology and topography; (3)
aquatic space, the ways that water is present and con-
tributes to Iandscape character; (4) the space ofair, the
realm of atmosphere, weather, and climate and their
roles in contributing to the sense of Iandscape; and
(5) constructed space, the human-made elements of
Iandscape and their contributions to Iandscape charac-
ter. One phenomenological aim is to understand how
constructed space might arise from and contribute to
the other four dimensions of landscape, particularly
in terms of quality of Iife and ecologica! viability.
Another, more recent effort to establish a phenomen-
ology oflandscape is the work ofCHRISTIAN NORBERG-
SCHULZ, who argues for the existence of genius loci-
the spirit of place. He contends that the foundation of
genius loci is the natural environment, or natural place,
as he ca Ils it. Natural place is "nota mere flux of phe-
nomena," but "has structure and embodies meanings."
To identify particular types of natural places,
Norberg-Schulz draws on five environmental dimen-
sions: thing, orde1; characte1; light, and time. Thing and
order refer to the spatial qualitics of Iandscape, while
character and Iight relate to overaii quality and atmo-
sphere. Time involves both constancy and change in
the Iandscape as related to daily and seasonal rhythms
ofweather, climate, vegetation, and so forth.
Norberg-Schulz argues that combinations of these
fi ve dimensions Iead to four types of natural places and
a corresponding range of genius loci: romantic land-
scapes, cosmic landscapes, classical landscapes, and
complex landscapes. The romantic Iandscape, for ex-
ample, involves change, diversity, and detail, and is
best characterized by the Scandinavian forests, which
are distinguished by "an interminable multitude ofphe-
nomena." In considerable contrast is the cosmic land-
scape, an environment of continuity and extension best
exemplified by the desert, where "the complexities of
our concrete Iifeworld are reduced to a few simple
phenomena."
One of the most innovative efforts to interpret
geographical being-in-world phenomenologicaiiy is
Relph 's effort to establish a phenomenology of place,
55
which is Dardel's third element of geographicality.
Relph defines places as "fusions of human and natural
order ... and the significant centres of our immediate
experiences of the world." He argues that the experi-
enced crux of place is insideness-the degree to which
people belong to and identify themselves with place.
He suggests that the relationship between insideness
and its experienced opposite, outsideness, is a funda-
mental dialectic of human environmental experience
and behavior.
Through different degrees of insideness and out-
sideness, different places take on different identities
for diffcrent people, and human experience takes on
different qualities ofmeaning and feei ing. What Relph
caiis existential outsideness, for example, involves a
strong sense of alienation, such as the strangeness and
separation that a newcomer to a foreign country often
feels. In contrast, existential insideness is a situation
of unselfconscious immersion in place; it is the expe-
rience of place that most people know when they are
in their own community or region. Existential inside-
ness is the foundation of the concept of place, which,
for the existential insider, "is experienced without de-
Iiberate and self-conscious reflection yet is full with
significances." In designing and setting policy for mak-
ing places where people wiii feei comfortable and at
home, existential insideness should bea main concern.
A key applied question is how elements of the natu-
ral and built environment can contribute to fostering
existential insideness.
The geographical LIFEWORLD clearly has Iinks with
other aspects of the Iifeworld - its psychological,
social, economic, and politica! dimensions - and
in this sense, research in phenomenological behav-
ioral geography should eventuaiiy be integrated into
the Iarger phenomenological literature. Too often, per-
haps, philosophers and human scientists ignore the ge-
ographical Iifeworld, even though spaces, Iandscapes.
places, and built environments are an integral part of
human Iife and contribute to people's sense ofidentity
and well-being. Recent work by EDWARD CASEY is an
encouraging sign.
With the rise of POST-MODERNISM in the Iast severa!
years, a growing rift has developed between pheno-
menological researchers- who continue to empha-
size underlying, generalizable aspects of place, envi-
ronmental experience, and geographical world- and
 56 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
postructuralist thinkers who emphasize relativist and
continually shifting environmental meanings and ac-
tions. Whether these two perspectives can establish
dialogue and areas of common ground is a question
that presently has no clear answer, though Paul Cloke,
Chris Philo, and David Sadler (1991) see commonality
in both phenomenological and post-modern efforts to
use research findings as one means to improve partic-
ular places and the Iifeworlds of particular individuals
and groups.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bollnow, Otto. "Lived-Space." In Readings in Existential
Phenomenology. Ed. Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel
O'Connor. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hali, 1967,
178-86.
Buttimer, Anne. "Grasping the Dynamism of Lifeworld."
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66
(1976), 277-92.
-. Geography and the Human Spirit. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1993.
Casey, Edward S. Getting Back into Place: Toward a Re-
newed Understanding of the Place- World. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Cloke, Paul, Chris Philo, and David Sadler. Approaching Hu-
man Geography: An Introduction to Contemporary Theo-
retical Dehates. New York: Guildford Press, 1991.
Dardel, Eric. L "homme et la terre: Nature de la reali te
geographique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1952.
Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newslet-
ter. Vols. 1,--6 ( 1990--present).
Heschong, Lisa. Thermal Delight in Architecture. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976.
Hill, Miriam H. "Bound to the Environment: Towards a
Phenomenology ofSightlessness." In Dwelling, Place and
Environment. Ed. David Seamon and Robert Mugerauer.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
Lane, Belden C. Landscapes ofthe Sacred. New York: Paulist
Press, 1988.
Mugerauer, Robert. Interpretations on BehalfofPlace: Envi-
ronmental Displacements and Alternative Responses. Al-
bany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Norberg-Schulz, Christian. Genius Loci: Towards a Pheno-
menology ofArchitecture. New York: Rizzoli, 1980.
Pickles, John. Phenomenology, Science. and Geography:
Spatiality and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1985.
Relph, Edward C. "An Inquiry into the Relations between
Phenomenology and Geography." The Canadian Geogra-
pher 14 ( 1970), 193-201.
-.Place and Placelessness. London: Pion, 1976.
Schafer, R. Murray. The Tuning of the World. New
York: Knopf, 1977.
Seamon, David. A Geography of the Lifeworld. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
- , ed. Dwe/ling. Seeing. and Design ing: Toward a Pheno-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
menological Ecology. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1993.
Seamon, David, and Robert Mugerauer, eds. Dwelling. Place
and Environment: Towards a Phenomenology of Person
and World. New York: Columbia Univcrsity Press, 1985.
Tuan, Yi-Fu. Topophilia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1974.
Werlen, Benno. Gesellschaft, Hand/ung und Raum. Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner, 1987; Society, Action and Space. Trans.
Gayna Walls. London: Routledge, 1993.
DAVID SEAMON
Kansas State University
HENRI BERGSON Born of Jewish parents in
Paris in 1859, Bergson graduated from the Ecole Nor-
male Superieure in 1881, after which he was appointed
professor of philosophy at the lycee of Clermont-
Ferrand in 1883. He moved back to Paris in 1888
to teach at three other lycees. He had published the
Essai sur les donm?es immediates de la conscience
(Essay on the immediate data of consciuosness, his
doctoral thesis) in 1889, and Matiere et memoire (Mat-
ter and memory) followed in 1896. In 1898 he became
Maître de Conference at the Ecole Normale. In 1900
he was awarded a chair at the College de France, and
in the following year he was elected member of the
Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. In 1907
he published L 'evolution creatrice (Creative evolu-
tion), which brought him an international reputation. In
1914 Bergson was elected to the Academie Fran(ţaise,
but in the same year, presumably because ofhis popu-
larity among Catholic modernists, his works were put
on the Index of prohibited books by the Holy Office.
A series of essays dealing with the mind-body prob-
lem, written from 1900 to 1914, appeared under the
ti tie L 'energie spirituelle in 1919. In 1922, he engaged
Albert Einstein in a series of discussions concerning
the status oftime in the theory ofrelativity. In 1927 he
received the Nobel Prize for literature. His last major
work, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion,
appeared in 1932. He died in 1941.
At the Bergson Centenary Congress in 1959, RO-
MAN INGARDEN recalled that when in 1917 he recon-
structed for EDMUND HUSSERL Bergson 's description
of pure duration, Husserl, who never met Bergson, lis-
tened attentively and exclaimed: "This is precisely as if
 HENRI BERGSON
l were Bergson." Similarly, when ALEXANDRE KOYRE
brought word ofBergson 's philosophy to the Gottingen
Ci rele in 1911, Husserl is reported to ha ve said: "Wc
are the true Bergsonians."
Husserl formulates his "principle of principles" in
§ 24 of ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913), according
to which the only legitimate source of authority for
knowledge is provided by firsthand intuiting. Intuition
is the operation through which consciousness finds the
plenitude or fullncss of MEANING, a persistence that is
absent in mental images because the latter, being un-
regimented and evanescent, can remain unfulfilled by
any intuition. This position is echoed in Bergson 'sem-
phasis on the immediate data of consciousness in his
first book of 1889. Yet there are fundamental differ-
ences. Bergson was committed to a metaphysical use
of intuition, which is explicitly rejected by Husserl.
Moreover, Husserl's employment ofEIDETIC METHOD,
based on the critique of PSYCHOLOGISM in the founda-
tions of LOGIC, would seem far removed from Berg-
son 's anti-intellectualism and his hostility to the ana-
lytic approach. Bergson himselfwould certainly repu-
diate the Husserlian intuition of essences, because of
the affinities it has- as many early critics of Husserl
were quick to point out- with a form of Platonism.
According to Bergson, no stable philosophical system
could ever exist, because it is exceeded by the very
intuition that gives life to it. Philosophy is thus com-
pelled to abandon the intuition that it seeks to capturc
and describe.
If intuition could be prolonged at will, the philoso-
pher would not only be in agreemcnt with his or her
own thought, but ali philosophers would immediately
agree with it as well. The aim of ali dialectica! sys-
tems is precisely to restore a universal agreement of
this kind, which, however, is impossible from the out-
set because the same effort whereby we connect ideas
with one another is responsible for the vanishing of
intuition. Consequently, there have been and always
will be many dialectica! systems contradicting one an-
other. In order to reach o ne truth, we need a continuous
back-and-forth motion between mind and nature; this
enterprise is itself hampered by our continuai inter-
es! in the usefulness of a present ACTION. Thus even
though they both take intuition as the ultimate touch-
stone of sense, Bergson 's reference to o ne truth differs
57
from Husserl 's recognition ofthe existence of different
kinds of intuition corresponding to different kinds of
essences.
On the other hand, Bergson 's starting point in
Matiere et memoire is an original philosophical point
against associationism, which is not dissimilar to
Husserl 's stance. A dominant theory of the 19th cen-
tury, associationism had already begun to come un-
der serious attack on the part of psychologists in the
1880s. Bergson 's motive is to preserve the spontaneity
and fluidity of mental life. His argument is directed
against what he ca lis the "capital error" of Humean as-
sociationism, namely, its juxtaposition of atomic fixed
psychic states that have no cognitive complexity or
life. For when images and memories are understood
as weak perccptions that are mechanically associated,
the process has been absorbed into the produc!, and
the fluidity of mental life is lost. There is therefore
no way of explaining the transformation of perception
into image and back again that Bergson posits. The
associationists claim that a true sensation would differ
from the image by virtue of its greater intensity: this
would account for its exteriority. But in order to pass
from memory as such to perception as such, a leap is
needed ata certain time. The transformation must take
place at a certain moment, yet associationism cannot
give any reason why this happens at one moment rather
than another.
Images in the bodily sense include ali reality. Berg-
son does not claim that PERCEPTION deals with mere
appearances that represent actual beings behind them.
On the contrary, matter understood as the assemblage
of images is ali there is. Nor are these things images
insofar as they are perceived and imagined in the per-
ceiving consciousness; in fact, they fully remain im-
ages even when they are unperceived. Thus perception
does not take place in us; through perception we are
carried into the world, so that it occurs at the object,
where it seems tobe. Consequently, the difference be-
tween being and being-perceived is not in the nature of
things but only a difference of degree. Consciousness
has no definite correlate; it is simply a character of ali
reality, which is sometimes actual, sometimes virtual.
To be sure, this account leaves no room for any sense
of self-consciousness. But on the other hand, thc ideal
of objective knowledge closed upon itself is also do ne
away with. Following Berkeley, Bergson rehabilitates
58 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the secondary qualities, so much so that the degree zero
ofthese qualities remains the index ofreality: when the
material world is given, a set of images is also given,
which we can never give up.
This critique leads Bergson to a position very close
to what will become, in Husserl 's terms, the transcen-
dental EPOCHE AND REDUCTION ofthe natura] attitude.
Right at the beginning of Matiere et memoire, Bergson
asks us to suspend our belief in any of the theories of
matter and spirit. This enables him to rediscover the
irreducible prerogatives ofthe image ofthe BODY over
ali the other images. He distinguishes between percep-
tions of images from without and affections ofthe body
from within. Whereas perceptions are regulated by the
deterministic Jaws ofnature, according to which the fu-
ture is entirely deployable from the present, affections
lack absolute determination and therefore add some-
thing new at each instant ofthe history ofthe uni verse.
Bergson goes on to proceed to a second reduction,
in which he cuts asunder, in thought, ali the afferent
nerves of the brain. Because perception has vanished,
while the whole of the uni verse has not changed, the
perception of material objects can be defined as images
referred to the possible actions ofmy body. Already in
his early work, Donnees immediates, Bergson distin-
guished the surface EGO from the deep ego. The former
is caught in the anonymity of what Husserl calls the
natural attitude because it sees itself in space, whereas
the latter is wrenched from spatialized time and lives in
conformity with time as pure quality ( duration). What,
then, do we do with our spatially localized brain?
No material phenomenon (such as cerebral modifi-
cation) could be coextensive with the infinite extent of
a state of mind. The most exhaustive anatomy of the
central nervous system will never account for the inex-
haustibility ofthe most humble spiritual fact. Bergson
does not simply abolish ali systems that postulate an
equivalence between the mental (cerebral) and the con-
scious, that is, ali "centripetal" psychological or meta-
physical systems that proceed from the outside to the
inside, from the body to the mind. Rather, he literally
puts them out of play; because he believes that such
a centripetal movement exists, but it has to be rein-
terpreted in terms of part and whole. The empiricist's
prejudice rests on the conflation between perception
and MEMORY: it !ies in the belief that the gray matter
is self-sufficient, as ifthe whole world were contained
in the mind as representation. Such a relation exists
only in the unconscious, because our character, always
present in ali our decisions, is the actual synthesis of
al! our past states. It is thus only in this case of mem-
ory, not perception, that the whole can be said to be
condensed into a part. The brain is merely, as Bergson
puts it, a "central telephone exchange," or an "organ
ofpantomime" that mimics, but does not produce, the
life of the mind. lts ro le is limited to postponing the
response to an externa! stimulus, whereby it is finally
extended into a bodily movement. The delay accounts
for the indeterminacy of our behavior, the basic irres-
olution of my will. The brain is essentially a power of
abstaining, not willing, whichjustifies Bergson's own
original suspension of belief in the current theories of
physics and psychology.
Furthermore, when Bergson deals with cerebral le-
sions, he comes very close to dealing with them as
eidetic variations. The phenomenon ofrecollection re-
veals its essence through partial lesions. The alleged
destruction of recollections by means of such Jesions
only means an interruption of the continuous progress
whereby the recollection actualizes itself. Bergson
cites psychological studies of aphasia (for example,
the Joss of words in a certain fixed order) in support
of his view that memory is not destroyed by local-
ized lesions; only the re-awakening of memories is
affected, not the memories or images themselves. The
brain merely acts an inhibitor, allowing only memo-
ries relevant to action to enter bodily perception. The
lesion, which occurs in space, has thus the effect of
slackening a function, which Bergson refers to as the
"attention to life." Since the awakening itself is not
essential to memory, its essence can be grasped and re-
tained by varying the degrees at which the awakening
alone manifests itself.
The motor element contained in memory can now
be understood properly. If the mind were totally au-
tonomous, it would be impossible to understand how
the slightest disturbance in sensorimotor equilibrium
could produce deep perturbations of attention and
memory. lf, on the other hand, the object begins by
produc ing sensations mechanically, and the sensations
produce the ideas concomitant with them, it is impos-
sible to understand how a purely mechanical process
could change qualitatively. Perception is nota sensory
vibration, but a problem awaiting resolution by means
 HENRIBERGSON
of motor activity. Thus when a perception occurs, it
is automatically translated in terms of movements of
imitation perfonned by the body. The actual function
ofthe body is to generate a sketch, the detail and color
ofwhich are re-created and enlivened thanks to the
projection of more or less remote memories. As Berg-
son tells us in the introduction of Matiere et memoire,
any complex thought, or chain of thoughts unrolled in
time, generates images. The ro le ofthe brain is to draw
the movements whereby these images could be acted or
played in space. These are the possible movements of
the body, which are thus never more than sketched out
or prepared. In so doing, Bergson reverses the classical
hierarchy ofpossibility and actuality.
A possibility, or sketch, does not lead to any actu-
ality, but rather proceeds from it as its past. My past
does not cease to exist when 1 cease to realize it, just
as the objects of the world do not cease to exist when
they are not present to my consciousness. The past has
never ceased to be; it has only, but never completely,
ceased to act. The representation of the past is condi-
tioned by my life force directed toward the future. My
past is that which 1 must leave behind in order to act,
and yet 1 am my past just as much as 1 am my body.
The mind is neither the past nor the body, but it presup-
poses them as two limits within which its own effort
operates. My past is what 1 am "in itself," whereas my
present action adds a new sense to that which already
was. Thus a possibility is ali there is in the present as
action; it distinguishes itself from the pure memory of
the past, which is contemplative, without object. The
past, which is the only thing to exist actually "in it-
self," withdraws completely at each instant so as to
leave room for a possibility existing now in action, a
possibility that has never existed before. Later on, in
L 'evolution creatice, Bergson wi\1 expand this meta-
physics of possibility into a biologica! philosophy by
assigning to each living being the continuous creation
of something absolutely irreducible to the sum total of
past events.
The deepest common ground between Bergson and
Husserl is found in the inner consciousness of TIME
and its unbroken flux. The experimental psychology
that developed in the l9th century showed that in or-
der for consciousness to be accessible to experience,
it must be located in the body. But consciousness does
not by itself possess any limits; the localization in the
59
body can be no more than a methodological require-
ment. How, within my own body's limits, can 1 be
traversed by unlimitation? Bergson 's answer is that
this is possible by means of duration. lf we listen to
a single, continued tone, although the sensory charac-
teristics of the tone (pitch, timbre, intensity) remain
the same, there is an undefinable and elusive change
due to the simple fact that it endures. Its present phase
differs from its antecedent phase by the mere fact of
being older. Because the antecedent phase is stil! re-
membered, its present phase is novel, and therefore
also richer. An immediate reco\lection accounts for the
qualitative difference (a novelty) between the present
and the past. In other words, the novelty ofthe present
requires the persistence ofthe past as a necessary, con-
trasting background, but conversely, the pastness ofthe
previous moment is impossible without the novelty of
the present. The intuitive fact itself is characterized by
an indivisible complexity; the static and discontinuous
features suggested by the nouns "past," "present," and
"moment" are merely artifacts of our inadequate lan-
guage. On the one hand, the former present acquires
the character ofpastness by virtue ofthe emergence of
a new present; buton the other hand, it was the passing
of the former present (that is, the fact that the former
present fades into the past) that brought forth a new and
immediately subsequent moment. There is no novelty
without immediate memory and vice versa. They are
not two different facts, but one single process consid-
ered from two di fferent perspecti ves, prospectively and
retrospectively-or protentionally and retentionally.
Using Husserl 's Ianguage is quite in order at
this point, since when Husserl is supposed to have
exclaimed that phenomenologists are the consistent
Bergsonians, he was referring to the fundamental
points of his own Vorlesungen zur Phiinomenologie
des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905]. According to
Husserl, the special mode of givenness bound up with
the duration of every experience is a certain abiding
form that underlies the succession of the "now" and
the 'just a moment ago." This form always has a dif-
ferent content because of ever new impressions. Even
though I cannot take in ali ofthe experiential stream in
one act of consciousness, 1 can grasp its unity, which
is of such nature that no single experience can be inde-
pendent in the fu li sense. Through a reifying appercep-
tion, however, this immanent phenomenological time
 60 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
can be conceived of as "space-time." Indeed, because
of the link with the body, consciousness retains an in-
direct relation to the time of nature as described in
exact science, that is, the time measured by clocks. But
immanent phenomenological time cannot be measured
by clocks or any other physical means. Husserl's con-
trast between "space-time" and immanent time thus
parallels Bergson 's contrast between "time-space" and
duration. In Bergson 's account, in ner time, or "temps
qualite," is projected by our intelligence into space and
becomes spatialized as "temps quantite." The intelli-
gence considers this duration as extended because it
applies to the habits of consciousness acquired in its
contacts with matter.
Nevertheless, even though the projection of dura-
tion into SPACE distorts the original content of duration,
neither spatial bodily perception nor temporal memory
(or mind) ever exists in pure isolation. Memory is the
mind itself inasmuch as it is not simply a mechanical
reproduction of the past, as if the past would be no
more than a series ofready-made images; rather, it be-
stows sense upon the present by means of an active
relation to the past. What is the mechanism whereby
memory impregnates perception to give it depth and
meaning? How does memory return its images to per-
ception so as to shape action? Bergson 's solution rests
onan analogy between time and space. The represen-
tational image is, so to speak, the space-time intercept,
and stands at the intersection of body and mind. The
intersection is the actual origin of consciousness, preg-
nant with the sketch of an impending future action.
Bergson illustrates this relation in a series of diagrams
anticipating those in Husserl 's studies of inner time-
consciousness. A horizontal space line represents the
world of objective things, which are assumed to ex-
ist indefinitely in their juxtapositions, even beyond the
bounds of our perception. The time line, orthogonal
to it, stands for the unconscious memory images pre-
served for recollection. At the point of intersection
the crossing of the mind with matter occurs, the point
where images enter perception and conscious action
takes place. As an image evolves out of memory into
bodily movement, it assumes more and more the form
of extensional spatiality. The reason for this is that the
adherence ofmemory to our present condition is anal-
ogous to, but not identica! with, the spatial adherence
of unperceived to perceived objects.
When phenomenology appeared in FRANCE,
Bergsonism was stil! the dominating philosophy. JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, in par-
ticular, have made extensive comments on Bergson.
Sartre charges Bergson's theory of IMAGINATION with
being a syncretism of consciousness and thinghood,
since it wavers in perpetua! ambiguity and shifting
from one sphere to the other. The image is left as an
inert thing, a "curdled" entity. Bergson 's conscious-
ness lends something like a substantial form to things.
Sartre's critica! vers ion of Bergsonian perception goes
something like this: it is as if a person looked through
a spyglass at a landscape and then endeavored to carry
offthe glass with the vignette within it.
Merleau-Ponty often returns to Bergson in his !ater
works. Commenting on Bergson 's theory of perception
in Le visible et l"invisible (1964), he denies the possi-
bility that we could ever place ourselves in the object
of perception. Indeed, "in the measure that the thing
is approached, I cease to be; in the measure that 1 am,
there is no thing, but only a double of it in my 'cam-
era obscura."' Concern ing the intuition of essences, he
urges us to put both the essence and the fact back into
the fabric of our life. In opposing himselfto the search
for the essence, however, his aim is not to return to the
immediate in the sense of an effective fusion with the
existent, as ifan original integrity had been lost and had
tobe rediscovered. Rather, the originating breaks up, its
appeal goes in severa! directions; the hiddenness ofBe-
ing must be a characteristic of Being itself. Bergson 's
idea offusion or of coincidence is itselftranscended by
his own refusal to take hold oftime as between forceps
in order to measure it. Ultimately, Bergson substitutes
his own realism for scientific realism, namely, the pre-
existence ofthe total being. The problem ofthe cogito
is therefore not really addressed, since my conscious-
ness is merely a perspective cut out in the totality ofBe-
ing; the being of consciousness, such as its intentiona!
structure, is therefore passed over. Bergson 's concept
ofthe subject is achieved by subtraction: 1 do not have
to think it, because the distance separating the subject
from itself is imperceptible.
On balance, Bergson 's philosophy of mind does not
seem to be fundamentally different from those epis-
temologies that seek to universalize apparently com-
pleted scientific theories, instead of trying to under-
stand them in a radical manner. In L 'energie spir-
 HENRIBERGSON
ituelle, Bergson asked himself what would ha ve hap-
pened if the founders of modern natural science (Ke-
pler, Galileo, Newton) had been psychologists rather
than physicists. He argues that our current psychology
would differ from what it is now, much as Newton's
mechanics differ from Aristotle 's. But could this psy-
chology be so radically different as to avoid a simple
subject-object dualism and the concomitant aporias of
inwardness and representation?
Unlike Husserl, Bergson has left no school that
would develop his ideas; he had no disciples in the
proper sense of the term, though he counted sev-
era) admirers and defenders. Perhaps the clearest case
of a genuine disciple is EUGENE MINKOWSKI. In Le
temps vecu (1933), Minkowski endeavored to rein-
terpret the whole of the foundations of PSYCHIATRY
in terms of time as quality. Undeniably, a filiation
exists from Bergson to French EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY. Marcel Proust, Paul Valery, and Charles
Peguy ha ve vindicated Bergson as the source of their
own insights. But Bergson never speaks ofthe distance
between the two egos, the superficial and the deep, in
terms of a crisis; any sense of anxiety is a false problem
resulting from our intelligence, so that it is absorbed
in the self-transcendence of human Iife. On the other
hand, Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics (the at-
tempt to reconcile continuity and novelty) certainly
owes much to Bergson. The German antirationalist
Lebensphilosophie took up a number of Bergsonian
tenets, mixing them with Nietzsche; this is particularly
true for GEORG SIMMEL, with his view of life as per-
petua) self-transcendence. MAX SCHELER conceived of
phenomenology as the concerted effort to go from the
symbols back to the things, from a conceptual science
and a civilization contented with symbols to intuitively
experienced life. In this he sympathized with Berg-
son: the danger of symbolism lies in the tendency of
symbols to displace and to conceal the phenomena. Fi-
nally, Die sinnhafie Aujbau der sozialen Welt ( 1932),
ALFRED SCHUTZ traced the meaning-structure ofthe so-
cial world to its origin in Bergson 's sense of duration.
He explicitly interpreted the bracketing of the natural
world in terms ofBergson's attempt to turn away from
the world of objects. He also used Bergson's contrast
of the continuity of duration with the spatialized time
of reflection to clarify Husserl 's double intentionality
ofthe stream of consciousness. Criticizing Bergson for
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
61
assigning the psychic states involved in free action to
duration itself, not the reflection that accompanies the
completed act, Schutz went on to extend duration to
intersubjective experience.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les donnees immediates de la con-
science. Paris: Alcan, 1889; Time and Free Will. Trans. F.
L. Pogson. New York: Macmillan, 1919.
- . Matiere et memoire. Paris: Alcan, 1896; Matter and Mem-
ory. Trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer. New York: Zone
Books, 1991.
- . L 'energie spirituelle. Paris: Alcan, 1919; Spiritual En-
ergy. Trans. H. W. Carr. New York: Hcnry Hoit, 1920.
"Bergson et Nous." Bulletin de la Societe Franr;aise de
Philosophie 53 ( 1959) [Special issue ].
Deleuze, Gilles. Le hergsonisme. Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1968; Bergsonism. Trans. H. Tomlinson
and B. Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1991.
Fressin, Augustin. La Perception chez Bergson et chez
Merleau-Ponty. Paris: Societe d'Edition d'Enseignement
Superieur, 1967.
Hering, Jean. "La phenomenologie d'Edmund Husserl il y a
trente ans." Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 ( 1939),
336-73.
Hyppolite, Jean. "Bergson." In his Figures de la pensee
philosophique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1962, 443-98.
James, William. "Bergson and his critique of intellcctual-
ism." In his A Pluralistic Universe. New York: Longman,
Green, & Co., 1919,223-72.
Levinas, Emrnanuel. Le temps et 1'autre. Paris: Arthaud,
1947; Time and the Other. Trans. Richard Cohen. Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Le visihle et 1'invisihle. Ed. Claude
Lefort. Paris: Gallimard, 1964; The Visihle and the lnvisi-
ble. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1968.
- . "Bergson se faisant." In his Eloge de la philosophie
et autres essais. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; "Bergson in the
Making." Trans. R. McCleary. In his Signs. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1964, 182-91.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. L 'imagination. Paris: Gallimard, 1936;
lmagination: A Psychological Critique. Trans. Forrest
Williams. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
1962.
Schutz, Alfred. Die sinnhafie Aufhau der sozialen Welt. Vi-
enna: Springer-Verlag, 1932; The Phenomenology al the
Social World. Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
PIERRE KERSZBERG
The Pennsylvania State University
62 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
LUDWIG BINSWANGER A leading figure
in introducing phenomenology into PSYCHIATRY, Bin-
swanger studied medicine in Lausanne, Heidelberg,
and Zurich. In 1906-7, he interned in the psychiatric
clinic, Burghălzli, in Zurich, which was directed by
Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939), an eminent psychiatrist
who had renamed Emil Kraeplin 's ( 1856-1926) de-
mentia praecox the "group of schizophrenias." Bleuler
was among the first to accept psychoanalysis into aca-
demic psychiatry. He exerted a lasting influence on
Binswanger and also became a close friend. The head
physician at Burghălzli, Cari Jung ( 1875-1961 ), di-
rected Binswanger's dissertation and served enthusi-
astically as an experimental subject for it. During this
time, Jung also took him to Vienna to visit Sigmund
Freud ( 1856-1939). This meeting began a close friend-
ship that lasted until Freud's death and thus well after
Binswanger became critica! of PSYCHOANALYSIS.
During 1907-8, Binswanger studied neurology at
Jena under his unele, Otto Binswanger ( 1852-1929),
who had personally treated Friedrich Nietzsche. Soon
he was forced, due to his father's untimely death in
191 O, to assume the direction of the family-owned
Sanatorium Bellevue in Kreuzlingen. Founded by his
grandfather in 1857, Bellevue was known for its pro-
gressive, "humanistic" attitude in producinga "family"
atmosphere. The clinic also housed - sometimes as
guests, sometimes as patients - many wealthy and
famous people, including Bertha Pappenheim (Freud's
Anna 0.), the Russian dancer Vaslav Nijinskiy, and the
German actor Gustav Grundgens.
Binswanger devoted himself to the search for the
foundations of psychiatry. He first sought these foun-
dations in psychology and following, in part, Bleuler,
he first looked to Freud's psychoanalysis. Although
it penetrated to the depths of the human subject as
an individual, historical being, he considered it un-
able to account for the totality of that being. He had
to turn to phenomenological and existential philoso-
phy to overcome the metaphysical oppositions between
body-mind, inner-outer, self-other, and real-ideal that
were taken for granted in both psychoanalysis and
psychopathology. If the totality affected by the ill-
ness could be clarified, the treatment of the men-
tally ill would become more humane, more ethical,
and more effective. Subsequently, the theme of his
interest remained the same, but the name of his ap-
proach underwent modifications: a "personalist" ap-
proach (ca. 1913-27), a phenomenological PHILOSOPH-
ICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (ca. 1927--43), Daseinsana~vsis
(ca. 1943--{)0), and finally, "empirica! phenomenology"
(1960--{)6).
Binswanger's relationship with KARL JASPERS be-
gan in 1913 when he sent him his critica! review of
a recent article by Jaspers. Although usually conge-
nial, their (unpublished) correspondence and meetings
tended to focus on three points of contention: first,
Jaspers does not give enough credit to the scientific
foundations of psychoanalysis; second, Jaspers does
not adequately appreciate EDMUND HUSSERL 's EIDETIC
METHOD as a way to clarify these foundations; and
third, psychological "understanding" as the basis of
psychiatric cognition. It is not something constructed
by rational thought processes, but rather is based on
an intuitive apprehending of the other as a totality in
whom mind and body, inner and outer, verbal and non-
verbal are still not abstractly separated. The seeing of
"motivational" connections between mental processes
is also not based on a heuristic, constructive under-
standing supported by "ideal types" a la MAX WEBER,
but on a direct seeing of the person in his or her situ-
ation. Binswanger contends that Jaspers uses far more
intuition (in the sense of Husserl 's phenomenology) in
his descriptions ofpsychopathology than he is prepared
to admit theoretically. A fourth point came !ater. After
World War Il, Binswanger increasingly devoted his re-
search to understanding the seemingly private "world"
of schizophrenic psychosis, which he calls the idios
kosmos, and which Jaspers considered ununderstand-
able.
As for psychoanalysis, Binswanger soon objected
to the exclusive reliance on biologica! drives and be-
gan to doubt that it could provide the scientific "psy-
chological" foundations for psychiatry. Einfuhrung in
die Probleme der allgemeinen Psychologie (lntroduc-
tion to the problems of general psychology, 1922)
marks Binswanger's attempt to review the philosophi-
cal problem ofthe person in the history ofpsychology
both in its NATURAL SCIENTIFIC and its HUMAN SCI-
ENTIFIC directions. The phenomenologies of Husserl,
MAX SCHELER, and ALEXANDER PFĂNDER on the one
hand and psychoanalysis on the other resisted this op-
position because they understood the human subject as
a historical being who constitutes meaningful connec-
 LUDWIG BINSWANGER
tions in experience. The "object" of psychiatric cog-
nition is the person given to intuition and not divided
into a mind and a body or interpreted in terms of cul-
tural products. Nevertheless, in contrast to MEDARD
BOSS, Binswanger always used psychoanalytical con-
cepts for the interpretation of dreams and artworks and
in clinica! treatment.
Binswanger had studied Husserl's work at least
as early as 1913. He devoted a considerable part of
the Einfiihrung to Husserl, who copiously marked the
copy sent to him and visited Binswanger the follow-
ing year. Although Binswanger names Bleuler and
Freud as his original "teachers," he thanks Husserl for
the first "decisive turning" in his thought. In "Uber
Phănomenologie" ( 1922), he tries to show the useful-
ness ofphenomenological method for psychiatry, argu-
ing that the phenomenological method offree variation
and eidetic intuition is similar to the work ofthe artist.
Thus Franz Mare did not depict actual horses in
painting blue horses, but he captured something true
or essential about horses in the "abstract" precisely
through this non-realistic or non-actual representa-
tion. Vincent van Gogh was able to paint the wind
"wrestling" with the trees, which reminds us of the
"drama" of human fa te, or a stalk of corn that, due to
some shared, general expressive quality, awakens feel-
ings akin to when we see a sleeping child. This intuiting
of essential structures is a direct apprehension of the
"physiognomic" or expressive meaning encountered
prior to any cognitive "understanding" ( Verstand) in
the sense of KANT or Jaspers, i.e., the ability con-
sciously to reflect, subsequently analyze into parts, and
put meaningful structures into words. Although Bin-
swanger remained skeptical that intuition could secure
an "absolute" basis for cognition in science, he contin-
ued to turn to the IMAGINATION as a special "source"
for detecting basic "anthropological" forms.
Binswanger read MARTIN HEIDEGGER's Sein und
Zeit ( 192 7) when it appeared and gained new impetus
for his thought. DASEIN 's care-structure as being-in-
the-world served as a new way of conceptualizing the
relationship between self and world in mentally ill ex-
istence. Nevertheless, he continued to call his approach
"phenomenological anthropology" until 1943, when he
renamed it Daseinsanalyse. During this period, he also
argued that the psychoanalytical unconscious is to be
rethought phenomenologically in terms of existence
63
in the BODY. On his reading of Heidegger, he identi-
fies the unconscious, i.e., embodied existence, with the
"thrownness and determinateness ofDasein." In his fi-
nal phase, he makes it the subject matter for a GENETIC
PHENOMENOLOGY a la Husserl.
For the expression ofthe imagination in LANGUAGE,
Binswanger turned to the use ofmetaphor in everyday
idioms and proverbs, in poetry, and in dream, but also
in the language of the mentally ill during psychother-
apy or in self-descriptions. The use of metaphor in
language is not merely a linguistically formed pred-
icative meaning attached, after the fact, to our per-
ceptions, but reflects the structures of existence (as
something lived) in our embodied being-in-the-world.
In 1934, he writes that working with the imaginary
in psychotherapy is effective because the "lived bod-
ily and imaginary sphcres (Leib- und Bildsphiire)" are
closely connected. That is, when other channels of
communication have been cut off, the body comes
to expression "metaphorically" in the production of
the symptom, whether this be "hysterical" conversion,
psychosomatic illness, or psychosis.
The upright posture ofthe human "lived body" ~ to
which Binswanger's close friend, ERWIN STRAUS, had
already drawn attention ~ introduces the vertical di-
mension as a "direction of significance" not only in the
construction of a "lived SPACE," but also in the possibil-
ities of existence as such. The terms height and depth,
breadth and narrowness, are descriptors for fundamen-
tal "anthropological" structures of existence. These
may be "seen" phenomenologically in the images used,
for example, in poetic and everday language, as well
as in psychotic expression. The images of ascending
(in self-realization) and falling (along the vertical axis)
and of going forth, encountering obstacles, and being
with others (along the horizontal axis) signify basic
human possibilities of"movement." Using a term nor-
mally applied to the "vertigo" of mountain climbers
(sich versteigen) and "extravagance" ( Verstiegenheit),
Binswanger shows how there can be an "anthropolog-
ical disproportion" between the vertical and horizon-
tal "dimensions" or "directions of significance" in the
projection of existence as a "world-design." This is
even clearer in his Daseins-analytical and !ater pheno-
menological clinica! studies of schizophrenic patients.
Becoming extravagant (sich in etwas versteigen), as it
occurs in schizophrenic psychosis, means to Iose one 's
 64 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ability to transcend (iiber-steigen, Latin, transcendere)
one 's momentary perspective. The tension between the
vertical and horizontal axes that is correlative with our
bodily attitude informs the spontaneous symbolism of
images through which we express our individual exis-
tential situations in art, dreams, or even psychosis.
Binswanger and Straus have both pointed out that
there can be no "inner life history" to the dream ~
no matter how much the dream may be interwoven
with the inner life history ~ because there is an ab-
sence of a temporalizing function du ring dreaming that
would enable transcendence ofthe momentary now in
the continuity of meaning in inner becoming. As in
falling asleep and the dream, so also in the flights into
intoxication of the drug addict, the body becomes a
kind of shell that is only abie to produce present states.
The self-realization of Dasein as being-in-the-world
implies self-transcendence, a becoming other to one-
selfby means of assuming a new perspective in a pro-
cess ofbecoming. This involves an opening up ofthe
self in the challenge of fac ing and encountering oth-
erness. Sometimes, this otherness is in ourselves. For
this reason, narrative acts in psychotherapy may have
a healing effect.
Binswanger had applied Heidegger's analysis of
the care-structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world in
his own anthropological studies of the disproportions
of existence in the mentally ill as well as in his
study of "love" (as opposed to care) as the hasis of
psychiatric cognition in Grund(ormen und Erkenntnis
menschlichen Daseins ( 1942). Following HANS KUNZ,
however, he admits to a "productive misunderstand-
ing" ofHeidegger's strictly ontologica! intentions. Un-
der the increasing influence of his close friend and
collaborator, WILHELM SZILASI ~ and ofthe seeming
attempts ofpsychotic patients to want to communicate
something unknown in their symptoms, the problem of
grounding a psychoanalytical approach to psychoses as
a disturbance ofmeaning, and the need to "formalize"
the "range" and "depth" of such disturbances in differ-
ent mental disorders, as well as Heidegger's preference
for Boss, experienced by Binswanger as a rejection
~ the eighty-year-old Binswanger returned in a final
phase ( 1960--66) to Husserl.
Szilasi, who was the successor during 194 7--62
to Husserl 's and Heidegger's chair at Freiburg, had
been a sympathetic but critica! reader of Binswanger's
work. He found it creative, but not rigorous enough.
It had been unable to offer a precise "method." The
description ofthe different worlds ofpsychopatholog-
ical experience and access to their construction (Au(-
bau) required a more exact concept of "experience."
By means of the genetic, "empirica! phenomenologi-
cal" approach that Szilasi advocated (and that also took
Heidegger's ontology into account), one would be able
to demarcate at what point the dismantling, destruc-
tion, or deconstruction (Abbau) of the constitution of
meaning first occurred as a kind of "denial" or "fail-
ure" in experience. It was not until Binswanger's very
last works, however, that this influence fully emerges.
Many German psychiatrists complained at the time that
Binswanger's work had inexplicably taken a "pheno-
menological turn" away from the Daseinsanalysis. But
these last works, particularly that on schizophrenic
delusion, Wahn ( 1965), may be viewed as a final ef-
fort in which the various problems and directions that
Binswanger attempted to integrate over his lifetime
come to a new level of maturity and resolution in an
admittedly still sketchy form.
Classical psychopathology had described "delu-
sional perception" as an early sign of schizophrenia.
Delusional PERCEPTION is the assigning of a "false
or abnormal belief," which often arises abruptly, to
an otherwise "intact" perception. This belief is rigidly
maintained in spite of obvious proofto the contrary; its
content is impossible, however, from the standpoint of
"normal," everyday experience. Delusions are thereby
thought first to arise in the process ofthinking or judg-
ing about one's perceptions (and not in the perceptual
organization itself). Binswanger's work, however, sug-
gests that the classical view rests in the definition of
"belief' as if it were an intellectual or cognitive act
that accrues or attaches to the perception. Husserlian
phenomenology shows that beliefis much more rooted
in our perceptual experience than the commonsense
oppositions of perception and belief or perception and
judgment in classical psychopathology would lead us
to think.
For example, a patient sees an ordinary scythe and is
absolutely certain that it will be used as a "martyring"
instrument against her family. The "physiognomic"
meaning of threat appears to issue "atmospherically"
from the scythe itself. In beginning schizophrenia, the
patient may have an agitated mood with the feeling
 LUDWIG BINSWANGER
that something very special or terrible is about to hap-
pen. As Binswanger had already pointed out, there is a
disturbance to the natural course of experience. Gaps
appear in the ongoing interconnecting of experience in
the matrix-structure of existence. The matter-of-course
obviousness that the world and situations in it will more
or less proceed with the same "continuity" of"style" as
before is lost. The world starts to come apart in a way
that cannot be "thematized" by the patient. Unable to
transcend his or her own momentary standpoint, certain
features or fragments of experiencing appear to stand
out over others. Certain adumbrations are no longer
synthesized in the continuum of natural experience.
As in dreams, objects are accepted as meaningful
or complete when viewed from only one side, i.e., in
terms of an immediate "physiognomic" adumbration in
sensory awareness; these less complete objects are then
given to "thought" as ifthey were already fully consti-
tuted and impartable to others in everyday discourse.
The delusional object (the martyring "scythe," or, e.g.,
invisible powers or devices that control one's thoughts,
actions, etc.) is given "ready made" to thought. It in-
volves a disturbance in the "passive," automatic pro-
cesses whereby our experience first comes to unity.
The delusional "object" is neither a perception nor a
cognition, but rather a result of a disturbance of how
our perceptions first become translated into thoughts, in
that an adumbration is elevated to an entire or complete
abject "pregiven" with the "presumptive evidence" of
worldexperience.
Binswanger 's work infiuenced an entire genera-
tion of psychiatrists and philosophers. These include
Martin Buber, HENRI EY, MICHEL FOUCAULT, HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, THEADORE HAERING, JACQUES LA-
CAN, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, EDUARD SPRANGER,
HUBERTUS TELLENBACH, and MICHAEL THEUNISSEN.
At present, however, his work is mostly cited for
merely historical interest. Unfortunately, most of his
work is untranslated, and therefore not accessible to
non-German reading philosophers, psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, literary critics, etc. Binswanger was rel-
atively pleased with Jacob Needleman's analysis of
his work in the introduction to Being-in-the- World
( 1963 ), but it nevertheless presents a very truncated
Binswanger. As HERBERT SPIEGELBERG has noted, only
the relations to Freud and Heidegger are emphasized
and this only during specific periods of Binswanger's
65
thought. This restrictive and narrow representation of
his work has led to some misunderstanding of Bin-
swanger, whose work in phenomenology, however, sti li
has a great relevance in many disciplines. For exam-
ple, AARON MISHARA has been working on the appli-
cation of Binswanger's concepts to psychopathology
and diagnostic classification, on the healing power of
narrative in psychotherapy, and on clarifying how his
phenomenological analyses of the psychoses leads to
a rethinking ofthe psychoanalytical unconscious.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
B1ankenburg, Wo1fgang. Der Verlust der naturlichen Selhst-
verstăndlichkeit. Ein Bei trag zur Psychopathologie symp-
tomarmer Schizophrenien. Stuttgart: Enke, 1971.
- . "Grundsătzliches zur Konzeption einer anthropo1ogis-
chen Proportion." Zeitschrifi fur klinische Psychologie
und Psychotherapie 20 (1972), 322-33.
- . "Die Daseinsana1yse." In Die Psychologie des 20.
Jahrhunderts. Band 3: Freud und die Folgen (11). Ed.
Dieter Eicke. Zurich: Kind1er, 1977,941--64.
Foucau1t, Michel. "Introduction." In Ludwig Binswanger. Le
reve et l'existence. Patis: Editions Desc1ee De Brouwer,
1954; Trans. Forrest Williams. Review of Existential Psy-
chology and Psychiatry 19 ( 1984--S5), 29-79.
Freud, Sigmund, and Ludwig Binswanger. Briefivechsel
1908-1938. Ed. G. Fichtner. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fis-
cher, 1992; Eng1ish trans. forthcoming.
Kuhn, Ro1and. "Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966)."
SchweizerArchivfi'ir Neurologie, Neurochirurgie und Psy-
chiatrie. 99 (1967), 113-17.
Mishara, Aaron. 'The Prob1em of the Unconscious in the
Later Thought of L. Binswanger: A Phenomeno1ogica1
Approach to De1usion in Perception and Communication."
Analecta Husserliana 31. Dordrecht: D. Reide1, 1990.
- . "Die phănomeno1ogische Grund1agen der Psychoana1-
yse," Analecta Husserliana 40. Dordrecht: D. Reide1,
1993.413-37.
- . "A Phenomeno1ogica1 Critique of Commonsensica1 As-
sumptions in DSM-III-R: The Avoidance of the Patient's
Subjectivity." In Philosophical Perspectives on Psychi-
atric Diagnostic Classification. Ed. J. Sad1er, Osborne P.
Wiggins and Michae1 A. Schwartz. Ba1timore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1994, 129--47.
- . "Narrative and Psychotherapy - the Phenomeno1ogy
of Healing." The American Journal of Psychotherapy 49
(1995), 180-95.
- . Phenomenology and the Unconscious- The Prohlem o{
the Unconscious in the Phenomenological and Existential
Traditions: E. Husserl, V von Weizsaecker, L. Binswanger.
Dordrecht: K1uwer Academic Pub1ishers, forthcoming.
Spiege1bcrg, Herbert. Phenomenology in Psychology and
Psychiat1y. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1972.
Straus, Erwin. Geschehnis und Erlehnis. Berlin: Springer-
Ver1ag, 1932; "Event and Experience." In his Man. Time,
and World: Two Contrihutions ta Anthropological Psy-
 66 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
chology. Trans. Donald Moss. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Prcss, 19R2, 2-139.
Wiggins, Osborne P., Michael A. Schwartz, and Georg
Northoff. "'Towards a Husserlian Phcnomenology of the
Initial Stagcs of Schizophrcnia." In Philosophv and Psy-
chopathology. Ed. Manfred Spitzer and Brendon A.
Mahrcr. New York: Springer, 1990. 21-34.
AARON MISHARA
Case Westem Reserve University
BODY Though much philosophical reflection
on the body has proceeded in terms of body-soul or
mind-body distinctions, phenomenologists ha ve devel-
oped a distinction often expressed in the German words
"Leih" and "Ko1per." Leih is usually translated "lived
body," sometimes "animate organism," "living body,"
or simply "Body," and is related to the phenomen-
ological use of the French "corps propre." Korper is
usually translated "physical body," sometimes "mate-
rial body," "object-body," or simply "body." EDMUND
HUSSERL uses the distinction in lectures as early as
1907, but the first published discussions of it are in
part two of MAX SCHELER's Der Formalismus in der
Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics
and nonformal ethics ofvalues), which appeared in the
second volume of the Jahrhuch fur Philosophie und
phiinomenologische Forschung in 1916, and in EDITH
STEIN's 1916 dissertation, published in 1917 as Zum
Problem der Einfuhlung (On the problem of empa-
thy). Though this distinction is regularly made, it is
exploited differently by different thinkers. Husserl in
particular also makes use of other related terms (and
his terminology is not always consistent).
Fundamental to the Body-body distinction is that
the turn to the Body involves the turn to experiential
EVIDENCE in contrast to the body as investigated by
such NATURAL SCIENCEs as anatomy and physiology. I
ha ve direct experience of Bodilihood only in the case
ofmy own Body as experienced from within, but 1 also
perceive other Bodies- each uniquely experienced as
Body by the subjectivity concerned and expressive of
this subjectivity for others. However, I may also have
direct experience of my own Body as recalcitrant, inca-
pacitated, alien, so that I experience "it" as a physical
body whose materiality is a burden or impediment to
"me." Thus Korper is not always a scientific construct
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
in contrast to a more primordial experience of Leih,
but can become a directly experienced phenomenon.
Finally, for some thinkers, Bodilihood is pre-reflective
engagement with the world, and any reflection- even
an experientially based one- necessarily misses this
functioning Bodily subjectivity by objectifying it.
The phenomenological turn to the Body - it-
self part of a broader cultural appreciation of Bod-
ily experience and movement emerging during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe and
North America - begins in the work of Husserl.
Though he did not develop a systematic pheno-
menology of the Body per se, relevant descriptions
arise in a number of contexts, notably with regard
to perceiving things in space. His most influential
work on the Body appears in Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phiinomeno!ogischen Philoso-
phie II [ 1912-15], though important passages are
also found in Ding und Rman [ 1907], Ideen fii
[ 1912], Analysen zur passiven Synthesis [ 1918-
26], Phiinomenologische P.1yclwlogie [ 1925], Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931 ], Die Krisis der eu-
ropăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phiinomenologie ( 1936), and the texts collected in the
three volumes entitled Zur Phiinomenologie der Inter-
subjektivitiit [ 1905-20, 1921-28, 1929-35], as well as
in some shorter texts on space-constitution published
in the 1940s. Further relevant passages from the D
manuscripts await publication; many of these are dis-
cussed in ULRICH CLAESGES' Edmund Husserls Theo-
rie der Raumkonstitution (Edmund Husserl 's theory of
space-constitution, 1964).
Since much of this work was not readily available
for some years, the misconceptions arose that Husserl
considered the body externa! to consciousness (albeit
empirically connected with it in a natural unity); thus he
placed the body in brackets in order to reach the realm
of pure consciousness, and only came to appreciate
subjectivity as Bodily at the end of his life. Texts for
lecture courses of 1907 and 1910/ Il show, however,
that phenomenological description of the Body and
motility is an early as well as persistent theme in his
work. One's own Body is always co-given, but not
just as any spatial thing. Rather, it functions as center
of orientation, bearer of felt sensations, and original
capacity for motility, so that it is the primordial "organ"
or means of ali action, perception, and expression.
 BODY
As centeroforientation, my Body is bearer ofthe ul-
timate central "here" from which ali else is "there" for
me, the tacit or explicit center ofreference from which
things are not only "near" or "far," "within reach" or
"beyond reach," but also "in front" or "behind," "to
the left" or "to the right," "above" or "below." (Even
in imagination and memory, the abject or vîsta offers it-
selfperspectivally to a co-implied Bodily standpoint ir-
respective ofthe current physicallocation of my body.)
Moving about, I transform what was a "there" into a
new "here," so that what was "too far" is now "within
grasp," etc., but I can never move out ofmy own central
"hereness." Thus my own Body never becomes anab-
ject I can walk around and see from ali sides; visually
speaking, it is a "remarkably imperfectly constituted"
thing.
But this is not necessarily true in other sensory
modes, for my Body is also the bearer offelt sen-
sations. I can explore the tactile qualities of anything
within reach, including my own body. But my Body
is unlike any other abject in that when I touch myself,
I also simultaneously feei myself touched; thus I ex-
perience my own Body through special sensations-
Husserl sometimes caUs them "Empfindnisse" ("sens-
ings," "feelings") rather than "Empfindungen" ("sensa-
tions")- that pertain to no other phenomenon. Feel-
ings of contact, pressure, weight, warmth, cold, ten-
sion, relaxation, pleasure, pain, etc., are localized on
or in my Body, which functions as a persisting field,
with its own unique spread, depth, and articulation, for
ali such sensings. In addition to specific salient feel-
ings more or less determinately localized within the
somaesthetic field, there can be more general feelings
(e.g., well-being or indisposition) permeating the Body
as a whole. And though 1 may often experience Bodily
feelings ( e.g., a sudden sting) as something I "undergo"
rather than something I "do," in many cases these sens-
ings arise in correlation with my own movements: as
I move in my chair, I sense tactile contact now here,
now there; as 1 make a fist then relax my hand, 1 sense
first tension and then release in my hand and arm, etc.
Finally, though Husserl recognizes the "sensations
of movement" that arise when 1 move or am moved,
he distinguishes such actual Bodily feelings (which are
more or less localized and are intertwined with other
sensings) from our primordial capacity for motility per
se. Perceptual appearances, as "motivated," arise in
67
correlation to the "motivating" kinaestheses: "if' 1 look
in a certa in direction, "then" I see this si de ofthat thing,
etc. However, any particular kinaesthetic situati an (in-
cluding "holding stiU" as one mode of "being able to
move myself') is but one possibility within a "practica/
kinaesthetic horizon" articulated into various kinaes-
thetic fields that can be swung into play separately or
in various combinations ( e.g., 1 can look to the left
by turning my eyes, head, or torso, or some combina-
tion thereof) in kinaesthetic sequences that are freely
repeatable and reversible (and can substitute for one
another to a certain extent). Thus while currently given
appearances are correlative to current kinaesthetic cir-
cumstances, the very explorability of my surrounding
world is correlative to the possibilities of my practi-
ca! kinaesthetic horizon as a whole (moving closer to
perceive more detail, going around to the other side,
touching as well as seeing, etc.), and embarking on a
specific kinaesthetic sequence motivates a correlative
sequence of continuai transitions from "expectations"
to "fulfillments." Moreover, motility is at the root of
ACTION, and Husserl distinguishes a sphere of current
practica! action, comprising objects within immediate
reach, from a sphere of potential practica! action reach-
able only through locomotor kinaestheses- a theme
also taken up by ALFRED SCHUTZ, who uses the notion
of"manipulatory area" worked out by George Herbert
Mead ( 1863-1931) in contrasting the world within ac-
tual, potential, and restorable reach.
Yet motility cannot simply be equated with actively
initiated movement, since it is foundational for vari-
ous modes of responsively being-affected as well. For
instance, within my familiar field of kinaesthetic pos-
sibilities, some gestures may be habitual and some ki-
naesthetic sequences may ari se "involuntarily" (e.g.,
my head turns when something attracts my attention),
while others, like breathing, typically persist "in the
background" and are only occasionally inhibited and
resumed "voluntarily." Husserl nevertheless summa-
rizes ali such movements with the term "I can" (though
the "1 move" developmentally precedes the "1 can"),
since 1 can also deliberately run through the kinaes-
thetic sequences in question and since my ordered sys-
tems ofkinaesthetic possibilities are normally freely at
my disposal. But he also recognizes experiences ofre-
striction, resistance, and failure; while the use oftools
and TECHNOLOGY can expand my kinaesthetic capaci-
68 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ties, injury may truncate them, and though 1 can acquire
new Bodily skills through practice, I can also Iose or
forget them. Thus the kinaesthetic possibilities at my
disposal may vary from infancy to old age and with the
state of my health.
The question of Bodily normality is also a major
theme in Husserl 's treatment ofthe "naturalized" Body.
Here he analyzes not only how perceptual abnormal-
ities may be traced back to abnormalities in the per-
ceiving organism, but also how the Body itselffirst be-
comes a theme for psychophysical investigations and
how the resulting "Leibkărper" serves to localize the
psyche and makes it the abject of real-causal inves-
tigations. But in some passages, he also addresses how
the Body is experienced in a "personalistic" (rather
than "naturalistic") attitude - i.e., as expressive of
the person and personallife and as belonging to social
communities whose VALUEs shape my Bodily habitus.
And the Body plays a key ro le in the genesis of INTER-
SUBJECTIYITY: since 1 not only sense my Body from
within but can perceive it from the outside, a primor-
dial pai ring of "inner" and "outer" takes place in my
own case; then when I perceive another's Body exter-
nally, this motivates the recognition of an associated
"inwardness" for the case ofthe other as well. But since
I will never ha ve direct access to the other's immediate
Bodily experience, and since the other's Body remains
irreducibly "there" in contrast to my "here," the other
remains genuinely "other."
Husserl's work in CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
of the Body has been carried forward in GER-
MANY above ali by ULRICH CLAESGES, who deveJ-
ops Husserl 's notion of "kinaesthetic consciousness"
(which is not a consciousness "of' movement as
present before me, but refers to my own functioning
in the total kinaesthetic system) and by LUDWIG LAND-
GREBE, who distinguishes the Body as constituted (the
Body as apprehended as an abject over against the
experiencing subjectivity) from the Body as constitut-
ing, whose functioning kinaesthetic capacities belong
to transcendental subjectivity itself.
In FRANCE, phenomenology of the Body not only
draws upon a prior tradition that includes Franc;ois-
Pierre Maine de Biran (1766--1824), HENRI BERGSON,
and GABRIEL MARCEL, but is profoundly influenced
by existential concerns. The resulting EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGY of Bodily existence typically in-
volves a critique both of consciousness as disembodied
spectator and of prevalent natural scientific accounts of
sensations; an emphasis on facticity and situatedness,
as well as on horizons and projects; and a contrast
between the "lived" and the "known."
For JEAN-PAUL SARTRE in L 'etre et le neant (1943),
just as anatomy and physiology- which are based on
an outsider's view ofthe body of another- only reach
the body as abject, so also other everyday instances of
experiencing myself as though from another's view-
point only yield an alienated body. Even my own sen-
sations normally reveal the things I perceive, not the
perceiving Body itself, and ifl look at myself or palpa te
my flesh, 1 only perceive a thing among things. How-
ever, my Body is implied, by the perspectiva! givenness
of things, as the point of view from which I see them,
though it is a point of view on which 1 can never take
a point ofview; it is indicated, by the network oftools
referring to one another, as the center of the oriented
space of action opened by the task I am engaged in,
but is not itself a tool 1 use. Thus 1 unreflectively "ex-
ist" my Body by "surpassing" it toward the things 1
perceive and the future possibilities I want to bring
about. Though there can be an affective apprehension
ofmy own Bodily contingency through a kind of gen-
eral "nausea," and though Bodily incapacity ( e.g., eye
pain) can gradually become present to me by way ofthe
things ofthe world (the book pages that become "hard
to read"), the genuinely "lived" Body never becomes
an explicit focus ofmy experiencing, but is continually
"passed over in silence."
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY is often hailed as the
chiefproponent ofphenomenology ofthe Body due to
the emphasis on the Body in Phenomenologie de la per-
ception ( 1945) and his influence in the secondary liter-
ature. He himself was deeply influenced by Husserl's
work on the Body - especially in Jdeen 11, which
he consulted long before it was posthumously pub-
lished in 1952- and was the first to make some key
Husserlian notions ("I can," nullpoint of orientation,
the touching/touched example) widely known. Like
Husserl, he emphasizes the importance ofperception as
a primordial stratum and the fundamental role ofBod-
ily motility in PERCEPTION. But where Husserl traces
the "naturalized" Body back to the "naturalizing" at-
titude of NATURALISM and suspends automatic accep-
tance ofthis scientific view ofthe body in order to de-
 BODY
scribe Bodily phenomena themselves, Merleau-Ponty
criticizes both empiricist and intellectualist styles of
explanation precisely in ordcr to suggest new theo-
retical accounts of the same data they attempt to ex-
plain. And where Husserl uncovers and explicates the
usually anonymously functioning Bodily intentionali-
ties, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the pre-personal, pre-
reflective status of a Bodily anonymity that evades
ali objectification, yet is always already functioning in
everything we do: the Body is not only how we are "an-
chored" in the natural world, but is also our "medium"
for having a world in a Body-world "pact" prior to any
subject-object split.
Since what is at stake is not explicit reflective
thought "about" the Body but Bodilihood as pre-
reflectively lived, Merleau-Ponty often makes use of
what RICHARD M. ZANER calls "prominence by ab-
sence," turning to pathological cases to reveal what
tacitly functioning Bodilihood is normally like. For ex-
ample, the phenomenon of the phantom limb reveals
that our normal Body schema is a habitual system of
possibilities supporting any momentary gesture, and
disruptions in motor functioning reveal that familiar
actions usually flow off as an integrated whole in a
"kinetic melody." Moreover, the Body schema is not
identica! with my physical body, but incorporates the
tools I "inhabit," so that the blind person does not feei
the cane, but feels the world through it, and the musi-
cian does not manipulate the instrument like a separate
abject, but lives in it like a limb and inhabits the ex-
pressive musical space it opens.
Merleau-Ponty also goes beyond the individual
Body per se with his notion of"intercorporeity" (which
has been taken up by, e.g., BERNHARD WALDENFELS,
KĂTE MEYER-DRAWE , HERMAN COENEN, ICHIRO YA-
MAGUCHI, and ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE) as a primordial
solidarity of and between embodied beings - a pre-
personal communality that is never fully effaced, but
sustains a reciproca! interplay of one 's own and others'
comportment prior to any explicit consensus. Finally,
in Le visible et l 'invisible ( 1964), Merleau-Ponty de-
velops an ontologica! notion of "flesh" as a style of
Being such that there is reversibility- but never com-
plete coincidence - between "my" visible, tangible
flesh and the "flesh ofthe world" 1 see and touch.
lncarnate existence is also a key theme in PAUL
RICCEUR 's Le volontaire et 1'involontaire ( 1950): voi-
69
untary Bodily movement as practica! organ of our will
depends on a Bodily docility that can always be dis-
rupted; as a source of motives, values, needs, and the
disorder wrought by EMOTION, the Body is subject to
our concern and control, and is the locus both of our
freedom and of the nature that makes it a finite frec-
dom. And for EMMANUEL LEVINAS, not only is my own
Body passivity and vulnerability, but the other's Body
- paradigmatically (but not exclusively) the face-
calls me to an ethical responsibility based on respon-
siveness and respect.
In JAPAN there also was already a tradition ofphilo-
sophical reflection on the Body prior to phenomen-
ological work on this theme. But here the tradition is
Buddhist rather than Cartesian, and is thus not struc-
tured from the start in terms of mind-body dualism.
The historical origins of a Japanese view ofthe Body
are considered by YASUO YUASA (not to be confused
with SHIN'ICHI YUASA, who is also active in phenomen-
ology ofthe Body) in conjunction with contemporary
Japanese philosophy ofthe Body (TETSURQ WATSU.II, KI-
TARO NISHIDA), existential phenomenology, and such ar-
eas as PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, and psychosomatic
medicine. Detailed phenomenological descriptions of
the Body as lived in concrete everyday experience, as
well as analyses of the multiple meanings of the word
"mi" ("living flesh"), are found in the works ofHIROSHI
ICHIKAWA. Besides an affinity between Japanese work
on the Body and that of Merleau-Ponty, scholarship
on Husserl 's approach to the Body is not lacking in,
for instance, essays by YOSHITERU CHIDA, YOSHIHIRO
NITTA, TORU TANI, and HIROTAKA TATEMATSU, nor in
new work on specific themes by such scholars as HI-
ROSHI KOJIMA, who takes up the Leib-Korper distinc-
tion in an original way; TADASHI OGAWA, who contrasts
the visual paradigm with the tactile-kinaesthetic con-
stitution of the Body; and KIYOKAZU WASHIDA, who
describes transformations of the Body through cloth-
ing in his work on "fashion."
In ITALY, ENZO PACI brings Husserl's notion of
functioning kinaesthetic Bodilihood into relation with
Marxist concerns in Funzione delle scienze e signifi-
cato dell 'uomo (Function of the sciences and signifi-
cation of the human, 1963 ); the laboring Body must
not be reduced to a thing, yet we must not ignore the
human rootedness in a material base, expressed, e.g., in
the lived experience of fundamental biologica! needs.
70 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
At workshops on phenomenology and MARXISM held
in Dubrovnik in the 1970s, LUDWIG LANDGREBE a]so
emphasized the primordial ro le ofBodily motility. And
in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, .lAN PATOCKA's Te/o, spo/ecenstvi,
jazyk, svet (Body, community, language, world. 1983)
was delivered as university lectures in 1968/69, but
could not be published at that time; here our situated
Bodilihood- which we are horizonally aware of, but
which can never be objectified -!ies at the core ofthe
three "movements of human existence" he describes.
A further important constellation emerges from a
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY that sees Bodilihood
as fundamental to human existence in general, with
such work often taking the form of concrete studies
- e.g., in phenomenological PSYCHOLOGY- that ad-
dress specific themes in both normal and disrupted
Bodily experience. These include, for instance, ERWIN
w. STRAUS's essays on lived spatiality and movement
- originally published in the 1930s and now in his
Phenomenological Psychology ( 1966) - as well as
the work of the Dutch school of phenomenological
psychology (e.g., FREDERIK J.J. BUYTENDIJK, JAN HEN-
DRIK VAN DEN BERG, JOHANNES LINSCHOTEN, DAVID
J. VAN LENNEP). Such work has not only influenced
existential-phenomenological psychotherapy, but also
fi.nds a parallel in qualitative research on the Body in
phenomenologically influenced HUMAN SCIENCES -
e.g., studies of physically handicapped children car-
ried out by HANS BLEEKER and KAREL J. MULDERIJ in
the Utrecht Lifeworld Research Project.
In CANADA, JOHN O'NEILL (Five Bodies, 1985)
traces the social shaping ofBodies and MAUREEN CON-
NOLLY pursues topics in PHYSICAL EDUCATION, and
in the UNITED STATES, Bodilihood is emphasized in
DAVID SEAMON's phenomenological GEOGRAPHY and
EDWARD s. CASEY's phenomenology of place; sexu-
ality and eros are treated by ALPHONSO LINGIS and
MARTIN DILLON; THOMAS J. CSORDAS exp]ores embod-
iment in the context ofETHNOLOGY; LEWIS R. GORDON
studies Bodily elements of racism; phenomenologi-
cal research into transformative somatie practice is a
key element in ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE's work in the
Study Project in Phenomenology ofthe Body; and the
field of SOMATICS itself was given a name and iden-
tity by THOMAS HANNA, who was directly influenced
by existential phenomenology of the Body. Husserlian
and existential work on the Body figure in phenomen-
ology ofMEDICINE as worked out by, e.g., RICHARD M.
ZANER, STUART F. SPICKER, DREW LEDER, and S. KAY
TOOMBS. And EUGENE T. GENDLIN's original work on
the Bodily "felt sense" of the pre-conceptual intricacy
of a global situation-including one's sedimented past,
current concerns, and possible next steps to take -
has been a major influence on such thinkers as DAVID
MICHAEL LEVIN, who offers a HERMENEUTIC AL PHENO-
MENOLOGY of the Body as a way to flesh out MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER's work (which touches directly on the
Body only in a few places, e.g., the Zollikon seminars
with MEDARD BOSS). Relatively little descriptive work
has yet been done on the directly lived experience of
the gendered Body, but a beginning has been made by
phenomenologists working in FEMINISM- e.g., SAN-
DRA LEE BARTKY, LOUISE LEVESQUE-LOPMAN, and IRIS
MARION YOUNG- and SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR's con-
tributions are being retrieved as well.
One question currently at stake in this fi.eld is
whether the Body, as lived, is necessarily "marginal"
(ARON GURWITSCH), if not "absent," or whether Bod-
ilihood can be lucidly lived in a "Bodily reflexivity"
that does not make it an "object" over against "me."
The "anonymity" ofthe Body may also be criticized as
the result of social practices producing "docile" bodies
(in the sense ofMICHEL FOUCAULT) with what Thomas
Hanna has called chronic "sensory-motor amnesia";
in such a setting, the recovery of Bodily sensibilities
has ethical-political implications. Much work also re-
mains tobe done toward a phenomenology of extraor-
dinary embodiment as found, for instance, in outstand-
ing athletes or arising through transformative somatie
practice. In fact, as SHIGENORI NAGATOMO indicates,
such possibilities challenge phenomcnologists to ac-
knowledge and study experiences beyond the "every-
day," whi!e ECOLOGY, FEMINISM, and ETHNIC STUDIES
also remind phenomenologists to take a fuller range
of Bodily experiences into account. Finally, the open-
endedness and intricacy ofBodilihood-which resists
being unequivocally pinned down once and for ali in
any ontologica! account- is a constant invitation to
descriptive phenomenology to return to the experien-
tial evidence ofthe "phenomena themselves."
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Behnke, Elizabeth A. "Edmund Husserl's Contribution to
 FRANZ BRENTANO
Phenomeno1ogy ofthe Body in ldeas //." Studv Project in
Phenomenology o{the Body Nev.·sletter 2:2 (Fall, 1989),
5-18; rev. in /ssues in Hussern "fdeas Il." Ed. Thomas
Nenon and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: K1uwer Academic
Pub1ishers, 1996, 130--55.
B1ecker, Hans, and Kare1 J. Mu1derij. "Motor Disab1ed Chi1-
dren and Corporeality." [Based on material in Wat hehjij
aanje henen ~ De leej}t'ereld van het lichamelijk gehand-
icapte kind (Amersfoort: Acco, 1990).] Study Project
in Phenomenology of the Body Newsletter 5:1 (Spring,
1992), 24--36.
Claesges, Ulrich. Edmund Husserl.1· Theorie der Raumkon-
stitution. The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Gendlin, Eugene T. "Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body, Lan-
guage, and Situations." In The Presence of' Feeling in
Thought. Ed. Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen. New
York: Peter Lang, 1991,27-189.
Levin, David Michael. The Body :~ Recollection of Being:
Phenomenological Psychology and the Deconstruction of
Nihilism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
Lingis, Alphonso. "Intentionality and Corporeity." Analecta
Husserliana 1. Dordrccht: D. Reidel, 1970, 75-90.
Mohanty, J. N. "Intentionality and the Mind-Body Problem."
In his The Possihilitv o/Transcendental Philosophy. Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, 121-38.
Morris, Phyllis Sutton. "Some Patterns of Identification and
Otherness." Journal ofthe British Societvfor Phenomen-
ology 13 ( 1982), 216--25.
Nagatomo, Shigenori. Attunement Through the Body. Al-
bany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.
Pliigge, Herbert. Der Mensch und sein Leih. Tiibingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1967; Eng. trans. by Erling Eng of pp. 34--
42, 57--68, in The Philosophy of the Body: Rejections
of Cartesian Dualism. Ed. Stuart F. Spicker. New York:
Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1970, 293-
311.
Toombs, S. Kay. The Meaning of'/1/ness: A Phenomenologi-
cal Account ofthe Different Perspectives ofPhvsician and
Patient. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
- . "The Body in Multiple Sclerosis: A Patient's Perspec-
tive." In The Bodv in Medical Thought and Practice.
Ed. Drew Leder. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1992, 127-37.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. "Das Problem der Leiblichkeit bei
Merleau-Ponty." In his Der Spielrawn des Verhaltens.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980, 29-54; Eng. trans.
forthcoming, Humanities Press.
Zahavi, Dan. "Husserl's Phenomenology of the Body."
Etudes Phenomenologiques No. 19 ( 1994), 63-84.
Zaner, Richard M. The Prohlem ofEmhodiment: Some Con-
trilmtions to a Phenomenolog1· o{ the Bod1·. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
- . The Context o{Sell' A Phenomenological !nquily Using
Medicine as a Clue. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,
1981.
ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
Study Project on Phenomenologl' of'the Bod1·
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
71
FRANZ BRENTANO Brentano is generally
regarded as the philosopher who reintroduced the con-
cept of INTENTIONALITY into modern philosophy -
a concept !ater characterized by EDMUND HUSSERL as
the principal theme ofphenomenology. It was Brentano
who gave Husserl the idea that philosophy is a "rigor-
ous science" based on the description of the immedi-
ately given. Brentano 's relation to the phenomenologi-
cal movement is, however, quite complex and has still
to be thoroughly examined. For such an endeavor it is
not enough to recognize influences and parallels; one
also has to understand that Brentano 's philosophy is
rooted in a cultural background quite different from
that of Husserl.
Franz Clemens von Brentano ( 1838-1917)was born
into one ofthe most influential German families ofthe
19th century: the romantic lyric poet Clemens Brentano
(1778-1842) was his unele and godfather, the politi-
cally influential romantic Bettina von Arnim ( 1785-
1859) his aunt, and the founder ofthe historical school
of jurisprudence and Prussian minister Karl Friedrich
von Savigny ( 1779-1861) his unele; his brother Lujo
(1844-1931) was a well-known economist, and his
nephew Georg von Hertling ( 1843-1919), who was to
write his doctoral dissertation and Habilitationsschrift
under Brentano's guidance, !ater became president of
Bavaria and the German Imperial Chancellor.
Brentano was educated in a rigid Catholic atmo-
sphere. He studied philosophy in Aschaffenburg, Mu-
nich, Wilrzburg, Berlin, and Milnster. The teachers who
were most important for the development ofhis think-
ing were Friedrich August Trendelenburg( 1802-1872)
in Berlin and Franz Jacob Clemens (1815-1862) in
Mi.inster. Trendelenburg, who started his career with
an influential criticism of Hegel, was an expert in Aris-
totle; he edited a critica! edition of Aristotle's De an-
ima, wrote a history of the theory of categories, and
developed his own system in a work entitled Logische
Untersuchungen ( 1840). Brentano attended Trendelen-
burg's lectures on psychology and it was through him
that he was led to the study of Aristotle.
In 1859, in order to improve his knowledge of me-
dieval philosophy and to write a doctoral dissertation
on Suarez, Brentano moved after only one semester in
Berlin to Mi.inster, where he stayed until 1862. Franz
Jakob Clemens was o ne of the most powerful promo-
tors of neo-Thomism in Germany and aggravated the
72 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tension in the Catholic camp between the so-called
"German" and "Ultramontane" theologians with his
polemic writings. Whereas the former, like Ignaz von
Dollinger and Johannes Evangelist Kuhn, lay a great
emphasis on historical methods and defended a com-
plete independence of philosophy from theology, the
latter were convinced that the foundation ofphilosophy
was laid by Aquinas and that modern philosophy was
a great heap of rubble; philosophy, they held, is only
relatively independent since it has tobe in accordance
with the dogmas of the church, which are regarded as
the philosopher's lodestars. Afterthe death ofClemens,
Brentano received his doctorate in 1862 for a disser-
tation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden
nach Aristoteles (On the manifold senses of being in
Aristotle). In this book, which was dedicated to Tren-
delenburg, Brentano tried systematically to deduce the
Aristotelian categories for which his teacher Trende-
lenburg had sought to give a linguistic explanation.
In the same year Brentano entered the monastery
of the Dominicans in Graz, to which his friend Hein-
rich Denifle (1844--1905), !ater a well-known scholar
in medieval philosophy, belonged. He left the congre-
gation after severa! months, however, having decided
to study theology in order to become a priest and to
pursue an academic career as a philosopher. At the
same time, the Catholic assembly in Germany decided
to found a German Catholic university and Brentano
was conceived as principal candidate for a chair in
philosophy. In 1864 he was ordained a priest and he
habilitated two years !ater in Wurzburg with his Die
Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre
vom NOUS POIETJKOS (The psychology of Aristotle,
in particular his doctrine of the active intellect).
In this work Brentano tries to show that there are no
inconsistencies in Aristotle 's thinking, thereby defend-
ing him against the charges made by Protestant scholars
such as Eduard Zeller (1814--1908). Brentano argued
further that Aristotle was convinced of the immortal-
ity ofthe soul. Brentano 's interpretation of Aristotle in
these early works is inspired by Thomas Aquinas, who
is praised as the one who has best understood Aris-
totle. He thereby followed a program that had been
propagated by the journal Der Katholik, which tried
to lay the foundation for "Catholic science" in the
work of Aristotle as interpreted by Aquinas. Brentano
and his Wtirzburg students - most of them, like
Cari Stumpf ( 1848-1936), Anton Marty ( 184 7-1914 ),
Herman Schell ( 1850--1906), Ludwig Schlitz ( 1838-
1901 ), and Heinrich Denifle ( 1844--1905), were for a
time seminarians-were the only Catholics in Germany
who were working seriously on Aristotle for a long
time. The most important philosophical questions for
Brentano remained throughout his life those pertaining
to the immortality of the soul and to theism, subjects
on which Brentano himself never published in a sys-
tematic way, but on which he lectured repeatedly and
which are implicit in ali his work (cf. his posthumous
Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung and Vom
Dasein Gottes [The doctrine of Jesus and its enduring
signification and On the existence of God]).
In Wtirzburg Brentano was regarded first and fore-
most as a Catholic philosopher and therefore he was
urged by the head of the faculty to lecture only about
history of philosophy. Nevertheless, he gave lectures
on metaphysics, lectures that brought him into conflict
with his department, which supported a professorship
for him only with reservations. Such tensions became
even more problematic as a result of severe politi-
ca! struggles in the Church at that time, culminating
in the doctrine of infallibility - a doctrine rejected
by Brentano. Thus Brentano laid down his office as a
priest; he left Wurzburg in 1874 and accepted a chair
in Vienna. He then married, as a result of which he
once more lost his professorship and was constrained
to teach for severa! years as Privatdozent.
Among his students in Vienna were, besides Ed-
mund Husserl, also Kasimir Twardowski ( 1866--1938),
Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Christian von Ehren-
fels (1859-1932), Alois Hofler (1853-1922) and Sig-
mund Freud ( 1856--1939).
In 1895, after the death of his first wife and
unsucessful attempts to regain his professorship,
Brentano decided to 1eave Austria and to settle in Flo-
rence. He died in Geneva in 1917.
The Catholic background is important in order to
understand the questions Brentano intended to answer
in his psychology, in his ontology, and in his approach
to the history ofphilosophy. The project of going back
to Aquinas or Aristotle makes sense only if there is
some standpoint beyond history that enables the devel-
opment and defense of a philosophia perennis. Such
a standpoint is given by inner perception, which, ac-
cording to Brentano, renders EVIDENCE possible: what
 FRANZ BRENTANO
is evident to me is evident to everybody and at ali times.
The work of philosophers who do not deal with eter-
na! problems or who are not directed by the search for
evident judgments - above ali materialists and Ger-
man idealists- is in Brentano 's eyes of no use for the
needed reconstruction of philosophy. Such ideas led
him to his doctrine of the four phases of philosophy.
He sees the scientific attitude as characteristic for the
first scientific stage. He then tries to show how turning
away from the right scientific attitude and to practi-
ca! questions ( 1st stage of decay) results necessarily in
scepticism (2nd stage of decay), which in turn leads
to an endeavor for a reconstruction ofphilosophy with
non-scientific means (3rd stage of decay). This cycle
then repeats itselfthrough the whole ofhistory.
Brentano thereby introduced the project of"philoso-
phy as a rigorous science," a project that attracted many
ofhis students, including Stumpfand Husserl, and im-
plied in Brentano 's eyes that in the reconstruction of
philosophy, one could not simply obey the dogmas of
the Church and adapt the philosophy of Aristotle or
Aquinas thereto: one also has to take into account the
results of contemporary science. Problematic in Aris-
totle is especially his doctrine of act and potency. In
his Habilitationsschri(t, Brentano had interpreted these
concepts in terms of form and matter. Thus the soul,
which had been defined by Aristotle as the first prînei-
pic of a body capable of being ali ve, becomes a form
that a body has. This facilitates the statement that the
intellective soul is nothing other than a mental sub-
stance, and it suggests a part-whole theory according
to which the living BODY of a human being is a whole,
which conta ins as its parts the body and the soul. If a
person dies, the mental substance continues to exist, but
is "incomplete," mutilated. In this new interpretation
of the doctrine of act and potency, its dynamic char-
acter is lost. Aristotle introduced the soul in order to
explain the phenomenon of self-movement; Brentano,
however, cannot account for this aspect in his interpre-
tation. Accordingly, his metaphysics is Aristotelian in
character but deprived of the aspect of development.
The same is truc of Brentano's descriptive PSYCHOL-
OGY, which he introduces as a Kombinatorik that has
to classify the elements of the mental content and to
determine their possible modes of combination. (What
he calls "genetic psychology" is in fact a physiological
psychology.)
73
It was already clear to Brentano in his Wurzburg
lectures on metaphysics that evidence must be en-
sured as the basis for philosophy. Thus in the first part,
which is entitled "Transcendental Philosophy or Apol-
ogy for Rational Knowledge," Brentano tries to show
that scepticism is untenable and that there is afirm ba-
sis of knowledge to which there belongs much more
than the "Archimedian point" of self-consciousness
discovered by Descartes. Brentano 's major work, his
Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt ( 1874 ), aims
to lay the foundation for psychology as a rigorous sci-
ence, and is thus to be understood in the same episte-
mological context.
The Psychologie contains a discussion of Auguste
Comte, on whom Brentano had given a series of public
lectures in 1869. Comte claims that ali sciences are
concerned with phenomena and not with some meta-
physical things-in-themselves. He thus rejects meta-
physics, and since there is, according to him, no inner
observation, psychology cannot be an autonomous sci-
ence. Brentano accepts the first claim, and accordingly
defines psychology as the science of psychic phenom-
ena, but he denies the other two claims. It is truc that we
cannot observe our psychic phenomena, but Brentano
tries to show that they can be innerly perceived. By
"in ner perception" he refers to a characteristic of psy-
chic phenomena, which are not only directed toward
an object- e.g., a sensory quality- but also always
"on the side" toward themselves - e.g., the psychic
phenomenon of presenting a sensory quality. Thus psy-
chic phenomena ha ve a kind of transparency that ren-
ders possible a science ofthe soul that is in no need of
a special act of inner observation. The central claims
of Brentano 's Psychologie- that psychic phenomena
are evident, that they are "intentionally inexistent" (a
theme discussed below), that they exist just as they ap-
pear tobe and are thus not merely phenomenal as is the
case with physical phenomena, and that there is a unity
of consciousness - are ali related to the claim that
psychic phenomena are always inwardly perceived.
With the published part ofhis Psychologie Brentano
not only tried to lay the foundation ofpsychology as a
science based on inner perception (this science he !ater
called "descriptive psychology"; cf. his posthumous
Deskriptive Psychologie [ 1887-91 ]), but also the "em-
pirica!" basis he needed for do ing metaphysics. In this
respect his Psychologie has some resemblance to the
74 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Meditations of Descartes in that it, too, tries to find a
fundamentum inconcussum. Cartesian doubt, however,
is replaced in Brentano's schema by a kind of"bracket-
ing," since he "makes no use of' the concept ofthe soul
and ofthe other metaphysical concepts that were his ba-
sic interest; he even affirmatively quotes the claim that
we need a "psychology without a soul." That Brentano
nevertheless sti li pursues a version of the program al-
ready mentioned is indicated by the fact that ali of his
fundamental statements about psychic phenomena can
be shown to have an Aristotelian origin. But he tries
to meet the standards of modern science as formulated
by Comte and John Stuart Mi li, who have replaced the
authority of Aquinas.
Of great importance is Brentano's classification
of psychic phenomena. There are three classes: pre-
sentations, judgments, and emotive acts. Of the first
Brentano claims that ali psychic phenomena are either
presentations or involve presentations (a statement ac-
cepted by Husserl in an interpretation ofpresentations
as "objectivating acts"). Judgments are conceived by
Brentano as acts of affirmation or negation; thus he
rejects a propositional theory of judgment. The third
class (Akte der Gemiitsbewegung) contains acts ofvo-
lition as well as EMOTIONs, feelings, etc. These acts
are conceived in analogy to judgments; they are either
positive or negative (love vs. hate) and they are correct
or incorrect (love is correct if its object is intrinsically
worthy of being loved). This led Brentano to a con-
ception of ETHICS as a discipline parallel to LOGIC. His
basic ideas in ethics were first published as a paper he
delivered in Vienna in 1889 (Vom Ursprung sittlicher
Erkenntnis; an English translation, Our Knowledge of
Right and Wrong, already appeared in 1902). His ethics
had a strong influence on MAX SCHELER and on G. E.
Moore (1873~1958).
In his !ater writings Brentano becamc more and
more interested in developing his own ontology and
theory of categories. He developed a position called
"reism" according to which the basic category is that
of res, which comprehends both concrete things and
immaterial souls. This strict objectivistic attitude was
initially not influential within the phenomenological
movement, but it did become important for logic and
ontology in POLAND. In recent years these ideas have
had great influence on philosophers such as RODERICK
CHISHOLM and BARRY SMITH.
Of great influence on Husserl was Brentano 's the-
ory of wholes and parts, which he introduced in his
"ontology," the second part of his Wurzburg lectures
(in the 1870s Brentano inserted a descriptive part
that he called "phenomenology" bctween the above-
mentioned "transcendental philosophy" and the "on-
tology"). Ontology has as its basic distinction that be-
tween collectiva and divisiva, which dichotomy is in
turn classified as physical, logica!, and metaphysical.
The influence on Husserl's FORMAL ANO MATERIAL ON-
TOLOGY as developed in the third ofhis Logische Un-
tersuchungen ( 1900-1901) is obvious, and it is likely
that Husserl knew about these lectures via Stumpf, to
whom he refers in this context and who had an exten-
sive copy ofthese lectures.
The concept ofiNTENTIONALITY is only a problem-
atic link between Brentano and phenomenology. This
is already indicated by the fact that Brentano !ater gave
up the term "intentiona!" because he thought that his
views in this connection had been misunderstood. As a
matter offact Brentano does not talk about intention or
intentionality, but rather uses expressions like "inten-
tiona! inexistence" or "intentionally contain" that he
introduced in order to distinguish psychic phenomena
from physical phenomena. An isolated quality such as
red is a physical phenomenon; red as belonging to con-
sciousness is on the other hand a psychic phenomenon.
Intentiona! inexistence can be regarded as a mereo-
logical concept on two different levels. On the descrip-
tive level, a psychic phenomenon is part of a complex
consciousness to which belong, for instance, inner per-
ception, acts of judgment, and emotive acts; on the
metaphysical level, which also embraces entities that
are not immediately given but inferred, it is conceived
as part of a soul. In contexts like "intentiona! inexis-
tence," the term "intentiona!" does not determine the
related expression "inexistence" ( or "containment")
but modifies it, i.e., it changes its original meaning. lf
these words were used in this original meaning, the fol-
lowing conclusions would be valid: if something exists
in something el se, then both things exist; if something
is contained in something other than it, there is a spatial
relation between them. In the modified context of"in-
tentional inexistence" and "intentiona! containment,"
however, both conclusions are invalid. The intentiona!
relation is thus, as Brentano explains in !ater writings,
only "something relation-like" (etwas Relativliches).lt
 BRITISH EMPIRICISM
is not, as in Husserl 's intentiona] acts, a matter of direct-
edness toward an object transcendent to consciousness
but, in contrast, something immanent to consciousness.
The importance of Brentano for phenomenology
and especially for Husserl !ies in his rigorous scien-
tific attitude toward psychic phenomena. The empha-
sis Brentano places on description paves the way for a
"positive" science of consciousness that was not pos-
sible in the framework of KANT or of psychophysics.
But Brentano was convinced that description of psy-
chic phenomena is possible only in terms of inner
perception, i.e., of psychology. Such a concept was,
however, not acceptable for Husserl since it seems to
indicate PSYCHOLOGISM, which he analyzes as a form
of skepticism. Such an accusation does not do justice
to Brentano 's concept of in ner perception, which he
intended precisely to serve as a bulwark against skep-
ticism. It is, however, true that this concept obstructs
the view toward the intentiona! object, which can be
distinguished by description from that which is im-
manent to consciousness. Husserl 's discovery of the
intentiona! object led him to the question of its con-
stitution, a question that did not (and could not) arise
for Brentano. This, however, is motivated by the dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds. For Brentano the idea of
a (transcendental or psychic) constitution is unaccept-
able because it leads to subjectivism, Protestantism,
or even atheism. Husserl, in contrast, was under the
influence ofthe neo-Kantian Friedrich Paulsen ( 1846--
1908), who had written a philosophia militans against
neo-Thomism and the concept of "Catholic science"
as conceived by Brentano 's nephew Hertling. Husserl,
who converted in the 1890s from Judaism to Protes-
tantism, did not feei bound to the objectivism held by
Brentano. His own philosophy can rather be regarded
as an endeavor to develop a ("Protestant") CONSTITU-
TIVE PHILOSOPHY as a rigorous science with Brentanian
means such as description and part-whole theory.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Albcrtazzi. Liliana, and Roberto Poli, ed. Brentano in Italv.
Una filosofia rigorosa contra positivismo e attualismo.
Milan: Guerini, 1993.
Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Franz-Peter Burkard. Interna-
tional Bihliograph1· o{Austrian Philosoph1·. Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1990.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
75
Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrhuch der Franz
Brentano Forschung. Ed. W. Baumgartner et al.
Wurzburg: Roll, 1988ff.
Chisholm, Roderick. Brentano ami Meinong Studies. Ams-
terdam: Rodopi. 1982.
- . Brentano and lntrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986.
- , and RudolfHaller, eds. Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos.
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978.
Conglione, Francesco, Roberto Poli, and Jan Woleriski, eds.
Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvm•-Warsaw School.
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.
Kraus, Oskar. Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lehens
und seine Lehre. Munich: Beck, 1919.
McAlister, Linda, ed. The Philosophy ofBrentano. London:
Duckworth, 1976.
Miinch, Dieter. "Brentano and Comte." Grazer philosophis-
che Studien 35 ( 1989), 33-54.
- . Intention und Zeichen. Untersuchungen zu Franz
Brentano und zu Edmund Husserls Frz'ihwerk. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993.
- . P.1ychologie und Metaphysik. Historisch-svstematische
Untersuchungen zum Friihwerk Franz Brentanos. Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997.
- , ed. Derjunge Franz Brentano. Materialen zum Verhăltnis
von Philosophie und Katholizismus. Amsterdam: Rodopi,
1997.
Neesen, Peter. Vom Louvrezirkel zum Prozess. Franz
Kafka und die Psvchologie Franz Brentanos. Goppingen:
Kummerle, 1972.
Rancurello, Antos C. A Studv o{Franz Brentano: His Psl'-
chological Standpoint and his Significance in the Histmy
o{ Psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1968.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. "Die Bcgriff der Intentionalitiit in der
Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl." Philosophische
Hefte 5 (!936). 75-91; "'Intention' and 'Intentionality' in
the Scholastics, Brentano, and Husserl." In his The Context
o{the Phenomenological Movement. Thc Hague: Martinus
N ijhoff, 1981, 3-26.
Szaniawski, Klemens, cd. The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-
Warsaw School. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1989.
Werle, Josef M. Franz Brentano und die Zukunfi der
Philosophie. Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte und
Wissenschaftssvstematik im/9. Jahrhundert. Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1989.
DIETER MONCH
Universitat Rostock
BRITISH EMPIRICISM Phenomenology has
often been presented and discussed within the context
ofthe tradition of KANT and Kantianism. Infrequently,
and then usually only in passing, mention is made of
EDMUND HUSSERL 's relationship to the classical British
empiricism ofLocke, Berkeley, and Hume. Yet Husserl
76 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
did state that Descartes and Hume exercised the great-
est influence on him, and that his philosophical inheri-
tance from MODERN PHILOSOPHY was tobe traced, not
from Descartes to Kant, but from Descartes through
Locke and Berkeley to Hume. He did severely and
unceasingly criticize their "sensualism" and "psychol-
ogism," which he thought could lead only into the
bankruptcy ofRELATIVISM and skepticism. On the other
hand, he saw in these thinkers, espccially Hume, the
only authentic forerunners of a "pure" phenomenology.
In order to achieve a better understanding ofHusserl's
development of phenomenology, the cumulative im-
pact of their positive contributions deserves examina-
tion.
Around 1886, when Husserl began his philosoph-
ical career, PSYCHOLOGISM was the defining issue
in German-speaking philosophical circles. In north-
ern Germany, where neo-Kantianism was beginning
to gain ascendancy, most philosophers followed the
Kantian tradition of rational idealism and rejected out-
right any attempt, however minimal, to link LOGIC,
MATHEMATICS, and the NATURAL SCIENCES and the
HUMAN SCIENCES to psychic expericnce. In southern
Germany and AUSTRIA, however, neo-empiricism and
neo-positivism had gained a strong foothold, and at-
tcmpts by such prominent thinkers as Wilhelm Wundt
(1832~1920) and FRANZ BRENTANO were being made
to ground logic and the sciences in general in psychol-
ogy. Husserl and REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY began
in the latter context.
From his undergraduate days Husserl knew and was
favorably inclined toward classical British empiricism.
At the outset, Husserl was influenced by John Stuart
Miii 's psychological investigations into logic, although
he Jost interest in him quickly. Howcver, the work of
Alexander Ba in ( 1818-1903 ), a follower of Miii -
work Husserl knew through citations in Cari Stumpf
(1848-1936)- was of great influence in Husserl's
1907 lectures on the role of kinaesthesis in our ex-
perience of SPACE. In this early period Husserl was
disinterested, even hostile, toward Kant and the ra-
tionalist tradition of German idealism. This initial out-
Jook was strengthened by his encounterwith Brentano,
from whom he acquired the basic concepts of pure
descriptive psychology and INTENTIONALITY. The em-
piricism of WILLIAM JAMES was also ofinterest to him
early on.
In his earliest writings, chief of which is Philoso-
phie der Arithmetik ( 1891 ), Husserl undertook descrip-
tive empirical-psychological analyses ofthe origins of
the concept of number and other notions fundamental
to arithmetic. While Brentano 's influence on Husserl
should not be overlooked, the influence of Locke is
most striking. In Husserl 's opinion Locke was the first
systematically to undertake descriptive psychological
analyses in order to ascertain the certainty and scope
of human cognition. Locke's "extensive descriptions"
aided Husserl in his search for the psychological ori-
gins ofnumber-concepts.
But Husserl had already begun to change. At the
beginning he shared with Brentano the belief that al-
though descriptive psychology was founded in an em-
pirica! intuition ofpsychic phenomena ("inner percep-
tion"), its conclusions were necessary and universal,
i.e., a priori, and hence able to ground mathematics
and logic. He claimed that the years 1886-95 were
crucial in his dissociation from that psychologism and
his breakthrough to a "pure" or "eidetic" phenomen-
ology in which mathematics and logic could legiti-
mately be grounded. Decisive for this breakthrough
was Husserl's equating the a priori with evidentiat
givenness in pure or eidetic intuition. A pure or eidetic
intuition is an intuition of essence. Essence is char-
acterized by invariance. This insight Husserl claims to
have gleaned from Hume 's famous distinction between
knowledge concern ing "relations of ideas" and knowl-
edge concern ing "matters of fact." In Husserl 's inter-
pretation Hume is asserting that reasoning concerning
"matters offact" goes beyond what is purely immanent
and hence intuitively given within consciousness by in-
voking the rationally unjustifiable "belief' in causality.
Reasoning concerning "relations ofideas" is restricted
to "ideas," that is to say, to what is in essence purely
immanent and intuitively given. This sphere of pure
eidetic immanence and intuitive givenness is ideal and
the a priori; it is the sphere ofthe evident. This Humean
separation ofthe ideal and the a priori from the factual
and the empirica! Husserl maintains throughout his ca-
reer. Intentiona! analysis is always ideal and a priori;
it is eidetic. This Humean linkage of the a priori with
evidential immanence and givenness in consciousness
motivates Husserl 's constant preoccupation with the a
priori correlation between objectivity and its subjective
modes of givenness.
 BRITISH EMPIRICISM
The years that followed up to 1900---1901, when the
two volumes of the Logische Untersuchungen were
first published, marked not only Husserl's definitive
breakthrough to eidetic phenomenology but also a shift
in his attention from purely psychological to logica!
and epistemological questions. Psychological analysis
ofthe origins of arithmetical concepts gave way to logi-
ca! and epistemological investigations in terms ofeide-
tic clarification. In using not an empirica! but rather an
EIDETIC METHOO, Husserl moved beyond Brentano's
empiricism and his somewhat passive view of inten-
tiona] consciousness to underscore its teleological dy-
namism and constitutive functionality.
Although more open to Kant and the neo-Kantians,
especially Paul Natorp (1854--1924 ), Husserl 's critique
of the Kantian tradition of German idealism is even
more penetrating. He was deeply interested in the Kan-
tian notion of"pure logic," especially as formulated by
Natorp. But he faults their unquestioning reliance on
Kant's mistaken and misleading version ofthe analytic-
synthetic and a priori~a posteriori distinctions, which
can lead in Husserl 's opinion to a sheer formalistic
logic that lacks the required grounding in that pure
or a priori psychology that is eidetic phenomenology.
In the six investigations that comprise the second part
of Logische Untersuchungen, he attempts to supply
this requisite grounding. The Second Investigation, in
which he rejects the traditional view ofabstraction and
generality to formulate the doctrine of ei dos and eidetic
intuition, is pivotal. This entire investigation grew out
of a sustained and intense confrontation with Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume, and Hume's distinction between
"relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" continued to
play a pivotal role.
During the years 1901 ~7 Husserl came to realize
that in order to establish the ultimate a priori grounding
of logic, mathematics, science, and cognition in gen-
eral, ali unwarrantable presuppositions must be over-
come through a radical consequent skepticism. Husserl
discerns in the British empiricists, especially Hume,
the beginnings of this skepticism, which alo ne will-
paradoxical as it may seem - uncover the desired ul-
timate a priori ground. In his lecture series of 1906/07
and other miscellaneous writings Husserl made clear
that this ultimate a priori must ground both material and
formal objectivities and hence the world's ontic sense
and validity. Not only a formal apophantic but a FOR-
77
MAL ANO MATERIAL ONTOLOGY must be constructed by
analyzing the intentional-constitutive performances of
transcendental subjectivity. Husserl also introduced for
the first time the concepts ofthe "EPOCHE ANO REOUC-
TION," which are central to transcendental phenomen-
ology in this lecture series, published now as Ein!eitung
in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie.
In this breakthrough to a transcendental-static
phenomenology Husserl demonstrates his increasingly
greater affinity and indebtedness to the British thinkers.
He stated explicitly that Kant, Natorp, and others in the
rationalist tradition of German idealism lacked the con-
cepts of"epoche" and "reduction." These concepts can
be uncovered only by practicing Descartes's approach
to the problem of cognition even more rigorously than
Descartes himself. The requisite deepening and con-
cretizing ha ve been achieved to a marked extent by the
classical British empiricists. Despite his empirica! real-
ism and dualism, Locke was the first systematically to
undertake a purely immanent and intuitionistic reflec-
tion on the human cognitive powers. What motivates
Locke, according to Husserl, is the desire to clarify
the "sense" and validity of cognition by investigating
its intuitive evidential origins in concrete conscious-
ness. With his "immaterialism" and phenomenalism,
Berkeley corrected and advanced Locke's insight. But
Husserl credits Hume for the monumental achievement
of countering dogmatic rationalism and objectivism
that culminates in Kant and ofhaving shown that only
in strict immanence and intuitionism can the means be
found, ifthey are tobe found at ali, to overcome skep-
ticism and to establish philosophy as rigorous science.
Yet again Husserl credits Hume's distinction between
"relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" for linking
the a priori to evidential givenness in constitutive intu-
ition and thereby providing the key for overcoming ali
vestiges of dualism and skepticism. As Husserl stated
more than once during this 190 l~7 period, the "British
psychologists" appear to be the authentic forerunners
of phenomenology.
During the period 1908~20 Husserl widened the
scope of his constitutive analyses in order to inves-
tigate the possibility of valid cognition in ali possible
areas but primarily in the area ofperceptual experience.
These analyses can be found chiefly in the three vol-
umes ofthe Jdeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomeno!ogischen Philosophie, which were drafted
 78 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
in 1912. From these analyses initially Husserl carne to
realize that intentiona! constitution occurs on multiple
different levels, and that the ro le ofsynthesis in CONSTI-
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY is crucial. This seems to ac-
count for a much more favorable attitude on Husserl's
part to the Kantian tradition during this period. Kant's
separation ofthe a priori operative on the level of sense
intuition from that operative on the level of pure un-
derstanding and his emphasis on a priori synthesis also
impressed Husserl deeply.
Yet Husserl 's indebtedness to the British empiri-
cists, and especially Hume, remains noteworthy dur-
ing this period. He stated that Hume helped him to see
more clearly the central problem facing transcenden-
tal phenomenology: how can concrete consciousness in
its pure immanence intend and even intuit transcendent
objects? To meet this problem Husserl developed the
notion of a priori intentiona! constitution. This consti-
tutive a priori, in similar fashion to the eidetic a priori,
is grounded in evidential intuition in which essences
are constituted as unities of ontic sense. As he did
to introduce the notion of an eidetic a priori, Husserl
again invokes Hume's distinction between "relations
ofideas" and "matters offact" to show how the consti-
tutive a priori grounds on the transcendental level the
intuitive and hence evidential givenness of transcen-
dent objects as unities of sense.
Reasoning concerning transcendent objects cannot
be factual and empirica!; Hume has shown that al!
such reasoning is vitiated by an unjustifiable "belief."
Valid knowledge of transcendent objects can be had
only insofar as they are ideal unities of sense. Accord-
ing to Hume, "ideas," the purely immanent and intu-
itively given, do not form a unity; they are interrelated
a priori and form an ideal unity through "comparison."
Similarly, for Husserl an ideal unity of sense is not
pre-given; it is constituted a priori in transcendental
consciousness. By uncovering its constitutive a pri-
ori origins in consciousness, that ideal unity of sense
(the transcendent object) is brought to intuitive and
hence evidential givenness. For this reason in Husserl 's
"Nachwort zu meinen 'Ideen'" (appearing in Husserl's
Jahrbuch in 1930 and in the English translation ofthe
first book of the ldeen in 1931 ), Hume 'sA Treatise of
Human Nature is acclaimed as an actual transcendental
phenomenology despite its sensualistic flaw.
In addition, Husserl claims that both Berkeley and
Hume transcended the psychic in the purely natu-
ralistic and realistic sense and had advanced, albeit
in an incomplete and unclear way, toward the con-
cept of transcendental subjectivity. The distinction be-
tween psychological and transcendental subjectivity
was pivotal for Husserl's own advance from eidetic to
transcendental-static phenomenology. Moreover, when
he made his final advance around 1920 from static
to genetic transcendental phenomenology, Husserl re-
stored the British empiricists to their accustomed pre-
eminent place in his thought.
This renewed close affinity from 1920 onward with
the British thinkers resulted from a transformation in
the important notions mentioned above of multilevel
constitution and synthesis. Husserl now saw that the
levels of a priori transcendental constitution are hierar-
chically ordered so that the constitutive levels ofpred-
icative experience, particularly in the are as oflogic and
science in general, are "founded" on the lower levels
of pre-predicative experience and the 1ifeworld. Uni ike
Locke, Berkeley, and above al! Hume, Kant failed to
see the necessity of grounding the world of science in
the LIFEWORLD. Again, while Kant restricted his anal-
ysis to active synthesis, Husserl emphasized passive
synthesis in his GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY, foreshad-
owings of which he found in the associationist psy-
chologies of the British empiricists.
To give a somewhat more detailed account of
Husserl's final stage of genetic transcendental pheno-
menology and its connection to the three British em-
piricists, we shall begin by focusing on 1920--27 when
the theory of "genetic analysis" first surfaced unam-
biguously. We are blessed with a wealth of explicit
references to the British thinkers. Many ofthese refer-
ences are quite critica! of their psychological empiri-
cism, but the positive comments are more frequent and
more significant.
In Husserl 's eyes Locke was an original and cre-
ative thinker, a true pioneer in developing concretely
the Cartesian turn to the ego by a multifaceted reflec-
tion that is strictly immanent since grounded in pure
inner experience. Notwithstanding his naive empirica]
dualism and realism, Locke was the first to attempt to
formulate an immanent and intuitionistic philosophy
based on the direct inner experience of the concrete
EGO and its essential conscious performances in order
to certify the claims ofthe sciences and human cogni-
 BRITISH EMPIRICISM
tion in general to objective validity. Despite the fact that
he failed to develop the concepts of intentiona! consti-
tution and transcendental reduction and fell into tran-
scendental psychologism, Locke's valiant attempt to
ground the objective validity of science and cognition
in general in such a purely immanent and intuitionist
reflection foreshadowed Husserl 's own transcendental-
genetic phenomenology. Moreover, Locke's positive
impact on Berkeley and Hume was immense.
According to Husserl, Berkeley, despite his egre-
gious errors, did advance beyond Locke by rejecting
dogmatic dualism and realism and by locating the an-
tic sense and validity of transcendent objectivity in
the conscious performances of the concrete perceiv-
ing ego. More emphatically than Locke, Berkeley un-
derlined the active constitutive factor involved in the
immanent intuition of a given abject. But during this
period it was Hume's skeptical philosophy that was
the prime catalyst for Husserl 's development of ge-
netic phenomenology.
Husserl saw that to establish philosophy as rigorous
science he must surmount Hume's skepticism by prob-
ing even more radically into human consciousness. In
Hume's thought Husserl saw mirrored his own demand
to seek in the pure immanence of the transitory con-
scious acts the ground of that phenomenal synthetic
unity of sense called "world" to which transcendence
and objectivity are assigned. To resolve the problem-
atic of objectivity and transcendence Hume appealed
to association, Husserl to a priori intentiona! constitu-
tion. Once again Husserl invoked Hume's distinction
between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" to
overcome mathematizing rationalism and to clarify the
distinction between pure rational and causal necessity.
Even if he failed to see that even passive constitution
is eidetic or a priori, still Hume did highlight the pri-
mordial role of passive, pre-predicative synthesis or
association.
There are no radical developments in Husserl's as-
sessment of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in the final
years, 1928-38. What does emerge is a more explicit
and definitive formulation by Husserl of his own rad-
ical transcendental empiricism and subjectivism. That
the British empiricists have continued to play an im-
portant role can be seen in the two major texts from
this last period in Husserl 's career, though, as already
mentioned, the "Nachwort" to Jdeen 1 is also relevant.
79
In Formale und transzendentale Logik ( 1929)
Husserl attacks German rationalism, exemplified by
Kant, for its dogmatism and objectivism. Kant failed
to take into account Locke 's pioneering work, and con-
sequently did not work through the problem of tran-
scendental psychologism. Husserl praises his pioneer-
ing work in turn ing philosophical reflection toward the
pure description ofthe psychic acts ofthe concrete em-
pirica! ego, and credits Hume for building on Locke's
approach in order to demonstrate that objectivity has
its genesis in concrete subjectivity. Thereby Hume
rai sed the fundamental question that drove Husserl to a
transcendental-genetic phenomenology: how can tran-
scendent objectivity be constituted in its ontic sense
and validated in evidential intuition within the pure
immanence ofthe concrete ego? For Hume that spatio-
temporal unity that is the "real" world of experience
is not simply given; it is constructed in my imagina-
tion in accordance with the fundamental principles of
association. These psychologically necessary and uni-
versal principles "are really to us the cement of the
universe." For Husserl the real world of experience is
pre-given but not pre-constituted; it is constituted in
my factually existent ego. But the principles accord-
ing to which this "lifeworld" is constituted are not
psychological and hence merely factual; psychologi-
cal necessity, as Hume plainly saw, cannot assure truth
and certainty. The necessity must be ideal and a priori
in the Humean sense. This ideal and a priori necessity
is verified through an eidetic clarification of the con-
stitutive performances ofthe concrete ego; this eidetic
clarification brings these a priori performances to pure
immanence and evidential givenness.
In Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und
die transzendentale Phanomenologie ( 1936), Husserl
yet aga in credits Hume-and, to a lesser extent, Locke
and Berkeley - for overcoming Kantian rationalism
and objectivism and for showing the necessity of trans-
form ing ali scientific objectivism into an authentic tran-
scendental subjectivism. Rightly interpreted, the skep-
tical empiricism introduced by Locke, continued by
Berkeley, and deepened by Hume revives and radical-
izes the Cartesian turn to the ego so that ali forms of
objectivism, including the mathematizing objectivism
of contemporary science, are shaken to their founda-
tion, and the world comes to be seen as having the
origins of its "ontic sense" and validity in concrete
80 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
empirica! subjectivity. Hume and Berkeley are to be
praised above al! others for placing in question what
seemed obvious to Kant and his followers- the cer-
tainty of the lifeworld in which science and theoreti-
cal cognition are grounded. To have penetrated to the
enigma of a "world" whose ontic sense and validity
have their genesis in the subjective accomplishments
ofthe concrete ego is Hume's magisterial contribution
to the theory of cognition.
At the very beginning Husserl adopted Locke's view
that philosophical reflection must be restricted to a gen-
uinely immanent investigation of acts of conscious-
ness. With Berkeley and Hume he excluded any form
of epistemological dualism. Objectivity was tobe ac-
counted for in the manner ofthese British thinkers: by
seeking its origins in the conscious performances of
the subject. That his analyses are eidetic, and hence
ideal and a priori, Husserl attributes to Hume's influ-
ence. Yet it is precisely the ideal and a priori character
of Husserl's analyses that accounts for his disagree-
ments with these British empiricists. Since their analy-
ses were empiro-psychological, their conclusions were
vitiated by sensualism and both logica! and transcen-
dental psychologism. The outcome of their analyses
can only be relativism and skepticism.
From this survey of the positive impact of Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume it becomes clear why Husserl 's
phenomenology might be entitled a "transcendental
empiricism" rather than a "transcendental idealism."
But it also reveals the huge risk Husserl took in mod-
eling his own approach, especially in the !ater stages
ofhis development, on the tradition of classical British
empiricism. Did he succeed in overcoming the solip-
sism and skepticism that he claimed the British empiri-
cists did not?
RAM A. MALL has compared Husserl to Hume to
show the programmatic similarity of their philoso-
phies. RICHARD T. MURPHY has undertaken to assess
systematically Hume 's impact on Husserl, particularly
in his turn to a genetic phenomenology. He credits
Hume for Husserl 's turn toward radical subjectivism
and questions whether Husserl has overcome skepti-
cism any more that Hume did. J. DOUGLAS RABB has
argued that Locke 's notion of reflection has been mis-
understood and that it is closer to the phenomenologi-
cal notion of reflexive awareness than to introspection.
In explaining the paradox oftranscendence within im-
manence central to intentionality, ARON GURWITSCH
emphasizes Husserl's indebtedness to Hume for the
notion ofimmanence and uses Hume's teaching in his
explanation. DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN links Husserl's the-
ory of evidence to Hume's empirist concept. He also
mentions how Husserl 's notion of immanence, which
he took from Hume, makes his own notion of radical
evidence problematic. DALLAS WILLARD, among oth-
ers, has also emphasized the importance of Hume for
Husserl 's notion of the a priori. Willard states that it
has shaped Husserl's view on logic and cognition in
general. And finally, CHARLES HARYEY, among others,
has connected Husserl 's development of the epoche
and reduction to Humean skepticism.
Many philosophers, especially from ANALYTIC PHI-
LOSOPHY, ha ve ignored phenomenology as being but
another school within the obsolete Kantian tradition
of German idealism. Awareness of Husserl's roots in
classical British empiricism may dispel that illusion.
That Husserl 's phenomenological formulation of cen-
tral philosophical concepts and theories - reflection,
generality, a priori, evidence, intuition, immanence,
etc. - occur within the context of his relationship to
classical British empiricism should help to bridge the
gap between phenomenology and analytic philosophy.
We are convinced that Husserl 's teachings in particu-
lar could contribute to the current "analytic" disputes
on the notion of the a priori, on rational evidence and
intuition, and on immanence and reflection.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Gurwitsch, Aron. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychol-
ogy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
Harvey, Charles W. Husserl:~ Phenomenology ami the Foun-
dation~ o/Natural Science. Athens, OH: Ohio University
Press, 1989.
Kern, Iso. Husserlund Kant. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964.
Levin, David Michael. Reason and Evidence in Husserl:~
Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1970.
Mall, Ram A. Experience and Reason. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973.
Murphy, Richard T. Hume and Husserl: Towards Radical
Subjectivism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.
Rabb, J. Douglas. John Locke on Reflection. Lanham,
MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1985.
 BRITISH MORAL THEORY
Willard, Dallas. Logic and the Ohjectivity of Knowledge.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1989.
RICHARD T. MURPHY
Boston College
BRITISH MORAL THEORY There is an inher-
ent phenomenological tendency in British moral the-
ory, especially from John Locke onward. The purpose
of his Essay ( 1690) was, he said, to consider the dis-
cerning faculties of a human being as they are em-
ployed about the objects they have to do with. This is
language that might serve well in a general description
of the work of EDMUND HUSSERL and other phenome-
nologists.
In carrying out his purpose, Locke developed his
empiricist theory that ali our "ideas," and hence ali
knowledge, originale from "experience," a type of con-
scious act or event that he never adequately character-
ized, but simply divided into sensation (sense percep-
tion) and reflection (the "feeling" of our own mental
acts and states). He and numerous subsequent British
philosophers then made significant application of this
essentially unclarified empiricism to moral judgment,
assuming that our ideas and knowledge about those
states, acts, and powers or dispositions of the self that
are subject to moral assessment must derive from re-
flective awareness of such states and acts. Frequently
the moral judgment itself is treated as something gras-
pable by reflection.
While this phenomenological tendency is never sys-
tematically exploited or methodologically clarified in
the manner of Husserl, etc., it often comes sharply
into play against the speculative and constructionist
claims of moral theorists such as Thomas Hobbes
( 1588-1679) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1842), who
fairly represent thc antiphenomenological tendency in
British moral theory. On occasion it gives rise to what
certainly has the character of "eidetic" analyses of the
moral judgment or experience and its objects.
In his theory ofknowledge Locke lays a foundation
for a phenomenology of the moral life, but does little
to build upon it. The morally central conceptions of
good and evi!, virtue, and law are ali explained by him
with a mixture of stipulation, dogmatism, speculation,
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
81
and unrefined introspection that ha ve almost as little to
do with his announced empiricist methods as it does
with phenomenological o nes. Sti li, the general outlines
ofhis thought, and especially his "ideas ofreflection,"
open the way for the many !ater "psychological" ap-
peals in moral theory to what one "finds" in oneself
upon reflection-especially as they concern the balance
between egoistic, altruistic, and other motives and the
nature and object of the moral judgment.
Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) states that the third
earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper [1671-
1713]) was the first moralist who distinctly took "psy-
chological experience" as the basis of ethics, and
that this approach was carried onward through But-
ler, Hutcheson, Hume, and 19th century utilitarianism.
That is basically correct, though we need to add that the
earlier thinkers on this list were freer from domination
by assumptions about what must be the case in moral
experience and judgment than the !ater ones. Bentham
and John Stuart Miii ( 1806-1873) in particular, the two
main utilitarians, are more characterized, in their writ-
ings on moral theory, by psychological constructions
and dogmatism than by description.
Shaftesbury actually opens his Inquiry ( 1699) with
abstract reasoning about the good in terms of part,
whole, and end. But he soon moves to the descriptive
finding that when actions and affections come before
the mind as objects another kind of affection arises,
one bearing upon those very actions and affections
themselves. They become the object of a new liking or
disliking, based upon their character as benefiting or
harming the human species or public, inclusi ve of the
agent. Moral worth and the virtues of persons consist in
their having a properly balanced and overall inclination
toward the good of the social system of which they
are a part and the individual's good in that system.
While the presence ofthis "new" moralliking or moral
sense seems to be a discovery of reflection, most of
what Shaftesbury presents remains within the domain
of abstract reasoning from concepts.
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) provides what is
essentially a development of Shaftesbury's system.
However, in his Inquiry ( 1725) he flatly identifies
virtue, or thc object ofthe moral affection, with benev-
olence. The kindly affections of rational agents imme-
diately evoke an esteem or perception in us that is dif-
ferent in kind from ali other appreciations of goodness
82 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
that may occur. In particular, it has no connnection
with personal advantage or desire to possess. While
he offers many arguments against opposing views or
moral distinctions, the existence ofthis special "moral
sense" and the determination of what its object is is
clearly something that Hutcheson rests upon reflec-
tion. As he says, "Our hearts must decide the matter,"
and we read our hearts by reflection.
Joseph Butler ( 1692-1752) provides us with some
of the best descriptive points in the history of British
moral theory. He certainly argues, and often from ab-
stract conceptions, such as that of a systematic whole
and the roles of its parts - especially as found in
the human being. But the specifically Butlerian points
usually come to rest upon appeals to descriptive differ-
ences in experiences and their objects and to reflection
upon such differences. The opening paragraphs of his
Dissertation an Virtue ( 1736) make the strongest pos-
sible statements to the effect that we have a specific
capacity for reflecting on actions and characters, or
for "making them an object of our thought," and that
such reflection naturally gives rise to approval or dis-
approval of its peculiar objects; in his Sermons ( 1726)
he says that the existence of the capacity or faculty
"is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves and
recognizing it in each other"- that is, from a certain
metareflection. He proceeds with detailed elaboration
of this faculty and its objects, concluding that there is
a wide range of actions and states that find approval
from the faculty ofreflection, including self-interested
actions and those that arise from particular appetites
and passions, in appropriate circumstances.
Often Butler 's descriptions and inferences are so in-
termingled that one must take great care to sort them
out. But his whole line of argument can be supported
only on what from the phenomenological point ofview
are rightly called descriptions of essence. One of his
retorts to psychological egoism, for example, is that
pain and pleasure have nothing essentially to do with
self-love (egoism), that "the feelings themselves, the
pain ofhunger or shame, and the delight from esteem,
are no more self-love than they are anything in the
world." The famous Butlerian dictum, "everything is
what it is, and not another thing"- so badly used by
G. E. Moore 's ( 1873-1958) association of it with his
own views in Principia Ethica (1903)-walks hand in
hand, as Butler understood it, with the phenomenologi-
cal slogan, "to the matters themselves." The essential
distinctions between conscious states or acts and their
objects that are relevant to moral theory are ultimately,
for Butler, to be determined by an intuitive reflective
awareness that gives us their essences.
David Hume is close to Butler in this respect, and
bases much of his moral theory on reflective analy-
sis. Section I ofhis Enquiry ( 1748) concern ing morals
states his aim of settling the question about "the true
origin of morals," and of finding the universal princi-
ples that form the "foundation ofethics," by analyzing
the complex of mental qualities that form what he calls
"Personal Merit." To settle any doubt as to whether
a given quality enters into Personal Merit is a simple
matter: "One needs only enter his own breast for a
moment" to determine if one would desi re to ha ve the
quality ascribed to oneself. The "experimental" method
that Hume proposes to follow, in imitation of the natu-
ral sciences of his day, proceeds then to establish gen-
eral maxims ofmorals from a comparison of particular
cases. The parallels with the EIDETIC METHOD peculiar
to phenomenology are obvious, though Hume retains
his nominalism.
He takes his "inner observations" to show that all
mental traits that evoke the sentiment of moral ap-
proval are useful or immediately agreeable, either to
oneself or to others. This is his primary generalization
in the foundation of ethics. It obviously presupposes
that the moral sentiment of approval is capable of be-
ing independently identified for what it is in its own
right- perhaps in the manner of redness, sweetness,
and pain. It is similar for the mental qualities that make
up Personal Merit. Ali that is left, then, is to observe,
by reflection on the course of our experience, how that
approval ( or disapproval) does or does not show up
in response to the various mental qualities (e.g., jus-
tice, benevolence) contemplated in people. Needless
to say, such a procedure could never yield a basis for
true generalizations apart from some essentialist frame-
work. Hume's procedure and conclusions suggest that
he is in fact presupposing such a framework in reach-
ing the moral theory he does, regardless of his official
rejections of it.
Descriptive analysis comes into play at many other
points in Hume's discussions ofmorals-for example,
when he gives in the Treatise ( 1739) an explanation
of why people are misled into thinking that reason is
 BRITISH MORAL THEORY
practica! because calm passions, which do influence the
will, resemble reason so greatly that they are mistaken
for it. Description is also at stake when he claims, in
that same work, that you cannot find vice in an act of
willful murder, but do find "it" when you "turn your
reflections into your own breast, and there discover
a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you,
toward this action." In these and multitudes of other
points of detail he shows his reliance upon descriptive
distinctions of essence.
Hume's views have been sharply criticized by con-
temporaries and by successors in British moral theory,
up to the present day, but rarely on the basis of descrip-
tive analyses of moral experience and its objects. Adam
Smith ( 1723-1790) actually does disagree with Hume
about the basic structure of Personal Merit on the bases
of descriptive analyses of moral phenomena. He holds
that there is an underivative sense of propriety that is
more fundamental to moral distinctions than utility is.
Thomas Reid (171~1796) and Richard Price (1723-
1791 ), in opposition to Hume, treat the moral sense or
faculty as a cognitive faculty, nota sentiment, and hold
that our ideas are not confined to what we can derive
from "experience" in Locke's sense. But they, unlike
Smith, really do belong in the earlier Platonist tradition
ofHenry More (1614--1687), Ralph Cudworth (1617-
1688), and Samuel Clarke (16 75-1729), as well as the
!ater tradition of"intuitionism" from William Whewell
( 1794--1866) and Sidgwick to Moore and W. D. Ross
( 1877-1971) in the 20th century.
The essentialist aspect in ali ofthese thinkers is quite
at home in the eidetic atmosphere of phenomenology.
Henry More, in his Enchiridion Ethicum ( 1666), even
uses the term "NOEMA" to apply to the directly evident
axioms of ali ethical reasoning. But this tradition is,
to say the least, not strong on the descriptive analyses
of experience. Reid and Price, however, seem to have
learned something from the practice oftheir empiricist
adversaries. One occasionally finds important passages
in their works where descriptive analysis of moral ex-
perience plays a crucial role- for example, in Reid's
discussions of"the esteem which we ha ve for a man on
account of his moral worth," in chapter 7 of the third
essay On The Active Powers ( 1788), and in Price's dis-
cussion ofwhat sense (sensation) consists of in section
ii ofchapter 1 ofhis Review (1758). Price on occasion
shows astonishing similarities to Husserl 's practice and
83
understanding of the analysis of ei de, but without any
corresponding methodological sophistication.
We ha ve mentioned Bentham and Mi li as paradigm
cases of non-phenomenological moral theorists.
Hume's Treatise was a major influence on the young
Bentham, but only bccause he found Hume's idea of
utili~v to be a core around which he could organize
a theory of morality that would serve as a basis for
the legal and social reforms he saw tobe necessary. He
dropped the subtleties ofHume 's "psychological" anal-
yses and conclusions, specified utility to be the only
moral consideration, and added hedonism as a theory
of value. Bentham is like Hobbes in that he presents
constructions or stipulative definitions as if they were
general truths that have been established and tries to
throw the burden of proof onto those who would say
his views are wrong (see chapter 1 of Principles of
Morals and Legislation [ 1789]). Mi li is certainly a far
more careful thinker, but he is hardly any stronger in
willingness or ability to do justice to the "descriptive
facts" of moral experience and its objects.
Henry Sidgwick ( 1838-1900) began his work as a
disciple (his term) of Mi li, but he was unable to accept
Mill's account of our duty to choose the general happi-
ness. He soon found himselfforced to base that duty on
a special intuition, not on utilitarian considerations. He
adopted much ofButler's account of moral experience,
which allowed various motivations- personal happi-
ness, the general good, as well as "particular appetites
and passions" - ali to be morally acceptable under
appropriate circumstances. In working out a modified
form of utilitarianism in his Methods ( 1893 ), one that
rests on the above and other non-utilitarian intuitions,
he gives an analysis ofthe meaning ofmoraljudgments
that contains significant phenomenological elements.
He provides arguments against the view that "ought"
and "right," and judgments containing them, deal with
physical or psychic facts, "facts ofthe sensible world."
Thus naturalism, including hedonism, is rejected. But
for a positive understanding of what "oughtness" or
"rightness" is, "appeal must ultimately be made to the
reflection of individuals on their practica! judgments
and reasonings." The basic moral concepts are "too el-
ementary" to admit of any formal definition. "Ought"
refers to a relation that must be "taken as ultimate and
unanalyzable." Some clarification of it can be gained
by plotting its relationships to other concepts, but ul-
84 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
timately we can know what it is only by viewing it
reflectively and grasping its essence by abstraction.
Once we know what "ought" refers to, three general
principles-ofJustice, Prudence, and Rational Benev-
olence - exhibit at least a degree of self-evidence,
"immediately cognizable by abstract intuition." But
"direct reflection" also shows us that certain more spe-
cific propositions, such as "I ought to speak the truth,"
are not self-evident and require justification from ap-
propriate premises. The role of direct reflection and
abstractive intuition in Sidgwick's analyses of moral
phenomena and the meanings of moral concepts and
judgments is so great that he stands second only to But-
ler and Hume among British moralists in the weight he
gives to essentially phenomenological considerations.
Although some have regarded the "meaning analy-
sis" characteristic of British moral theory from Sidg-
wick up to the last quarter of the 20th century as
strongly similar to phenomenological analysis in terms
of"INTENTIONALITY ," the actual practice of ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY is radically distinct from phenomenology
in a way that the work of earlier British moralists
clearly was not.
As to the ro le of British moral theory in the pheno-
menological movement, one must note, first of ali, the
degree to which FRANZ BRENTANO and his successors
were aware of an essential affinity between their own
descriptive analyses of experience and the work of the
British empiricists. Brentano's Psychologie vom em-
pirischen Standpunkt (1874) is heavily indebted in its
methodology to the work of Locke, Miii, Sir William
Hamilton (1788-1856), and Alexander Bain ( 1818-
1903 ), and Brentano continues to embrace a psycho-
logical approach in his writings on ethics. The ethical
work of Brentano and his students also evinces, how-
ever, a component that is absent from the British tradi-
tion: a concern with intrinsic value, and with the laws
governing "correct" and "incorrect" emotion. This psy-
chologically based axiologica! approach to ethics and
value phenomena is further elaborated by Alexius
Meinong (1853-1920) and by EDMUND HUSSERL in
his Jectures on ETHICS and VALUE THEORY. In the latter
we find a detailed statement of the parallelisms be-
tween formal axiology on the one hand and formal
LOGIC and formal ontology on the other. Husserl in ad-
dition criticizes what he sees as the PSYCHOLOGISM in
Humean empiricism, because the latter does not allow
the sciences of experience to be grounded in a priori
necessities. He defends instead an "absolutist" ethical
theory, and especially in his politica! philosophy he
comes close to Hobbes and to a view ofthe philosophy
ofthe state as found on a priori principles analogous to
those of geometry.
Perhaps the most systematic treatment of ethical
categories on the basis of the phenomenological de-
scription of experience is put forward by MAX SCHELER
in his Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale
Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and non formal ethics of
values, 1913/ 1916). Phenomeno1ogy, as Sche1er con-
ceives it, is a way of doing philosophy that allows us
to grasp the value and significance that is, in his eyes,
endemic to the world ofhuman experience. We cannot
try deliberately to observe these MEANINGs or values
in intellectualistic fashion, and we cannot try to use the
instruments of logic and science in order to build up
theories about these things. For in order to use logic or
thinking to observe entities ofthe given sort, we would
have to have grasped them already, and the only way
we can grasp them is via feeling and intuition.
Finally, we may note that in his Essay an the Intel-
lectual Powers of Man ( 1785), Thomas Reid ( 1710--
1796) deve1ops a doctrine ofwhat he calls "social op-
erations" or "social acts," which concern the system-
atic ways in which human beings use language non-
descriptively or "non-propositionally." This occurs for
example in questioning, in plighting, threatening, sup-
plicating and bargaining, in acts expressing acceptance
or refusal, in acts of giving testimony, and above ali in
commands and promises.
Similarly, ADOLF REINACH developed a theory of
"social acts" (!ater called "speech acts" or "per-
formative utterances" by John Austin [1911-1960]
and John Searle) in his "Die apriorischen Grundla-
gen des burgerlichen Rechtes," published in Husserl 's
Jahrbuch in 1913. Like Reid, Reinach takes the phe-
nomenon ofpromising as the central object ofhis a pri-
ori descriptive analyses, and he sees the setting out of
the essential connections governing this phenomenon
as the basis of an a priori theory of the entire domain
of social interaction. Reinach criticizes the Humean
analysis of promising as the expression of an act of
will, and he points out that the quasi-legal formations
of claim and obligation associated with every promise
can never be reduced to mere habits, feelings, or be-
 BUDDHISM
liefs. On the other hand, in his 1911 essay "Kants Auf-
fassung des Humeschen Problems," Reinach defends
Hume against common misinterpretations and shows
that Hume had a sophisticated understanding of the a
priori connections governing basic mental phenomena.
In this respect too, therefore, the affinity is maintained
between British empiricism and phenomenology as de-
scriptive analyses of experience.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Becker, Lawrence C., and Charlotte B. Becker. A Histmy of
Western Ethics. New York: Gar1and, 1992.
Chisho1m, Roderick M. Brentano and Jntrinsic Va/ue. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Prcss, 1986.
Dunckcr, Karl. "Pleasure, Emotion, and Striving." Phi/oso-
phr and Phenomenological Research 1 ( 1940), 391-430.
Eaton, Howard O. The Austrian Philosophy o{ Values. Nor-
man, OK: University ofOklahoma Prcss, 1930.
Husserl, Edmund. Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre
1908-1914. Ed. Ullrich Mellc. Husserliana 28. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
Mackintosh, Sir James. On the Progress o{Ethical Philoso-
phv. Chiefly du ring the XV!Ith and XV!Jlth Centuries. Ed.
William Whewell. 4th ed. Edinburgh: Adam & Char1es
B1ack, 1872.
Mande1baum, Maurice. The Phenomeno/ogy of Moral Expe-
rience. G1encoe, IL.: The Frec Press, 1955.
Mulligan, Kevin, ed. Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach
and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology. Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Raphac1, David D., ed. British Moralists 1650-1800. 2 vo1s.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Reinach, Ado1f. "Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Prob-
lems." Zeitschriftfur Phi/osophie und philosophische Kri-
tik, 141, (1911) 176-209. Eng. Trans. J.N. Mohanty.
Southwestern Journal o{Phi1osophy 7, (1976), 161-88.
Schneewind, Jerome 8., ed. Moral Philosophy from Mon-
taigne to Kant. 2 vo1s. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
Schuhmann, Karl. Husserls Staatsphilosophie. Freiburg:
Karl A1ber, 1988.
Se1by-Bigge, L. A., ed. British Moralists: Being Selections
finm Writers Principal il' o{the Eighteenth Century. 2 vo1s.
Oxford: C1arendon Press, 1897.
Sidgwick, Henry. Out li nes of the Histo1:v o{ Ethics, with an
additiona1 chapter by Al ban G. Widgery. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968.
DALLAS WILLARD
Unil•ersity o{Southern California
BARRY SMITH
State Universitv o/New York, Buffalo
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
85
BUDDHISM The teachings ofSakyamuni Gau-
tama (463-383 B.C. or 560-480 B.C.), who lived in
what is now Nepal, gave rise to Buddhism. Despite
various developments, the fundamental truth through-
out its history is Dharma, while the person who expe-
riences the truth and is fully aware of it is called the
Buddha (awakened one).
There is some affinity between Buddhism and ED-
MUND HUSSERL 's phenomenology. For both, truth is
concealed in aur usual daily life. For the truth to be
revealed it is necessary to change aur attitude toward
the world and ourselves. The method to effect this
change, which is called transcendental EPOCHE ANO
REDUCTION in phenomenology, corresponds to "Zen"
in Buddhism. Zen (dhyana in Sanskrit,jhiina in Pali) is
a form of meditation combining a well-ordcred body,
well-ordered breathing, and a well-ordered mind. A
person sits in the correct Zen position, breathes in and
out slowly, deeply, and with awareness, and makes his
or her mind free of ali attachments. When body and
mind become quiet and in harmony, a free, dynamic
insight begins and deepens little by little, leading to
awakening.
Zen is therefore not awakening, but it is a way to
it. In concentrated Zen meditation, humans distance
themselves from their usual preconceived ideas about
the world, which are the basis of ali their attachments
and prejudices about things of the world. On the other
hand, transcendental epoche begins with the "bracket-
ing" (Einklammerung) of the existence of the world,
which is generally accepted in the natural attitude.
Therefore we could say that the transcendental epoche
is parallcl to Zen insofar as it holds that aur precon-
ceived view ofthe world is suspended.
But transcendental epoche and Zen di[fer in the fol-
Jowing respect. In Husserl's epoche the person looks
at the consciousness of the world as the pure stream
of his or her thoughts, on the one hand, and the pure
EGO in the act of thinking, on the other hand. As a
result, the view ofthe existing world usually taken for
granted is suspended, opening the way for analyzing
the constituting activity ofthe pure ego as transcenden-
tal subjcctivity. This ego can be called "transcendental
subjectivity" because it grasps its constitutive accom-
plishments reflectively, and this understanding itself is
the ultimate origin of ali knowledge of the world.
In contrast, in Zen meditation humans will reach
86 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the world as it really is. Going back to transcenden-
tal subjectivity would be for the Buddhist a reflective
abstraction; the world cannot be reduced to the corre-
lating phenomena oftranscendental-subjective accom-
plishments. One's unique experience through medita-
tion leads to finding one's own and the world's real
way of existence. This difference between Husserl's
phenomenology and Buddhism seems to be based on
the understanding of "self." For Husserl, the essential
function of se! fis intellectual or rational, while for Bud-
dhism it is from beginning to end- until awakening
- a unity ofbody and mind.
The essence of Sakyamuni 's awakening or enlight-
enment is "to see Dharma." Dharma (Sanskrit) or
dhamma (Pali) comes from the verb "dh~·" and in the
Hindu tradition means something that holds or sup-
ports. The term has a wide range of meanings: uni-
versal truth or religious norms, social norms, norms
of behavior, etc. In other words, it refers to what is
generally regarded as good or right.
The Buddhist usage ofthe term Dharma is basically
the same as Hinduism 's. In Buddhism Dharma signifies
both the truth realized by Sakyamuni and the nature of
this truth as expounded by him. The essence of this
truth or teaching is in the following verse.
AII things are born of causes, and of these
the Tathagata (= the one who has realized the
truth) has proclaimed the cause,
And their extinction too: thus does the Great
Ascetic speak.
This verse is generally known as "The Verse of[the
Law of] Dependent Co-Arising" (Pratftyasamutpiida-
giithii), since it proclaims the principle of dependent co-
arising (said to have been realized by Sakyamuni under
the Bo tree). This principle states that aii phenomena
are born of various causes and conditions and that if
these causes and conditions disappear, the phenomena
themselves will also disappear.
The Law of Dependent Co-Arising is usually
thought of as Buddha-Dharma, i.e., the truth ofBuddha
Sakyamuni. Thus far, the usage of the term "Dharma"
follows Hinduism. At the same time, it should also
be noted that in the above verse a new usage of the
term "Dharma" appears. The original word for "things"
is dharmiih (the plural of dharma). This usage of
"Dharma" to mean "thing" or "phenomenon" is pe-
culiar to Buddhism and unknown to Hinduism.
It is significant that in Buddhism both truth and an
individual thing are called Dharma. We could interpret
this as follows: what Sakyamuni realized and taught
is truth, but at the same time it is reality inseparable
from this world. In Zen meditation the existence ofthe
world was set aside as invalid, but now it is regained
from the eye of enlightenment as it is and as something
that pertains to truth. In other words, things that exist as
phenomena carry in themselves the character of eterna!
reality or truth. The Buddhist expression "dharmal)aiŢJ
dharmata," i.e., the Dharmaness ofthings, which is the
same as the Law of Dependent Co-Arising, verifies
this. To see Dharma is to discover the true character
or existing way ofphenomena, which are not different
from eterna! reality.
In this understanding of the truth of Buddhism
there is also a certain similarity to phenomenology,
especially to its notion of the "Selbstgebung" (self-
givenness) of things. It means that things show or
give themselves to consciousness. The concept of
"Selbstgebung" corresponds to that of"Evidenz" (EVI-
DENCE) and thus Selbstgebung means from the si de of
consciousness to get evidence, to grasp the "matters
themselves" with complete certainty. For Husserl, that
which belongs to this evidence is first empirica! intu-
ition, because sensuous intuition grasps the empirica!
object "originar" (originarily) in its "leibhafien Selb-
stheit" (bodily selfness). In parallel to it there is also
"Wesensschau" (the seeing of an essence), which is the
grasping of an essence "originar in seiner leibhaften
Selbstheit" (Originarily in its bodily selfhood).
The difference between the intuition of essence and
sensuous intuition consists in the fact that the latter
is carried out in the passive receptivity of the expe-
rience of objects, while the former is "ideation" as a
free activity of consciousness that constitutes the in-
variable essence. This doctrine of Selbstgebung and
Evidenz could be compared with the teaching of Bud-
dhism that Dharma can be seen in things themselves.
But for Buddhism empirica! intuition is usually hidden
by the impurity of the seeing subject, so that humans
cannot see matters "originar" without a fundamental
change in themselves. When our bodies and minds be-
come unencumbered and free from impurities, we can
see things as they are or in "leibhafier Selbstheit." This
cannot be regarded as free activity of the seeing sub-
ject. It happens by itself when the person 's harmony
 BUDDHISM
of body and mind deepens enough. To see Dharma is
given, we could say.
As mentioned above, Dharma has the meaning
of "thing," and when it is used in the plural form
"dharma~," it includes ali things and phenomena. In
Early Buddhism, "dharma~" are constituent elements
of phenomena of human beings and the world. There
are three classifications of dharmah, which can be
traced back to Sakyamuni's own teachings: the five
aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen
realms. The first classification, the five aggregates
(pa nea skandhah; in Pali, P pa nea khandha) originally
signified the congeries of the fi ve elements that go to
make up individual existence. They are form, percep-
tion, conception, volition, and consciousness. Ofthese
five, "form" (rupa) represents the physical body and
denotes the body's sense organs such as the eyes, ears,
and nose. The other four elements are functions ofthe
mind. The five aggregates are regarded not only as
constituent elements of individual existence, but also
as embracing ali phenomena. This means that "form"
comes to signify matter in general, while the term "vo-
lition" covers various functions and powers as well as
abstract concepts.
Ali phenomena ofthe world are thus understood on
the basis ofthe unity ofbody and mind ofthe individ-
ual existence ofhuman beings. This seems in contrast
with the phenomenology of Husserl insofar as for him
things are reduced to phenomena ofthe pure conscious-
ness that constitutes them through its processes. As to
the second classification, the "Twelve Sense Fields,"
the term "sense field" (ayatana = sphere, locus, place)
refers to the "doors" of perception, i.e., those places
through which perception occurs. The first fi ve refer to
the five senses, and the sixth to the mind. Correspond-
ing to them, there are the "six sense objects" (rupa =
color and shape), i.e., objects of sight, hearing, smell,
taste, touch, and mind.
As for the "Eighteen Realms," these consist of
the above twelve sense fields, with their contrast be-
tween internal/external, and sense-organ/sense-object
contrast together with the sixfold consciousness (eye-,
ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-consciousness).
The original meaning of the term "realm" (dhiitu) is
"a place where something is laid" and it here means
sphere or type.
The principle lying behind this classification into
87
eighteen realms is a theory of knowledge based on the
concept of ca-operative interaction between the sense
organs, sense objects, and consciousness. According
to this theory, knowledge of an object requires an ab-
ject of cognition, a sense organ capable of establishing
cognition, and the actual function of cognition. It is
remarkable that knowledge of an object too is thus
thought as something that is under the Law of Depen-
dent Co-Arising. Besides, consciousness in the Eigh-
teen Realms is understood tobe sixfold. Consciousness
is not separated from the senses, but is something that
works in close connection with them.
These classifications ofthe "dharma~" as elements
ofphenomena, especially ofthe "Twelve Sense Fields"
and the "Eighteen Realms," seem to have some affin-
ity with the phenomenology of MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY. For him the subject ofperception is the BODY,
and it is not the objective body that can be seen from
outside, but the "phenomenal body." The phenomenal
body is a system offaculties ofperception. This seems
similar to the teaching ofthe sense fields and realms in
their subjective si de. And for Merleau-Ponty the thing
that is perceived by the body is the correlate of the
unity of the faculties of the sense organs of the body.
This seems to be parallel to the sense objects in the
classifications ofthe dharmh.
The Early Buddhism that has a direct relationship to
the teaching of Sakyamuni is followed by a period of
Schismatic Buddhism in India. This Buddhism is rep-
resented by the Sarvasti-vada school, which produced
very systematic doctrines. According to this school, ali
elements (dharma~) that are more differentiated exist
throughout the three temporal periods of past, present,
and future. To become an element of the "past" does
not mean that the element ceases to exist, but rather
that it merely disappears from our field of vision by
taking up a position behind us. The terms "present"
and "future" also refer only to the relationships exist-
ing between the elements and ourselves. The elements
themselves are said to exist eternally.
In opposition to that Sarvastivadin teaching, a new
doctrine, Mahayana (Great Vehicle) Buddhism ap-
peared in India. It maintains that ali elements must
be without any own-nature (svabhiiva-.~unya = void
of own-nature), claiming that this is the correct in-
terpretation of the Law of Dependent Co-Arising of
the elements. This is the meaning of the statement in
88 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the Heart S11tra that "the five aggregates are empty in
their own nature." Nâgârjuna and his successors (the
Mâdhyamika school) elaborated on this theory, formu-
lating the doctrine of emptiness.
But then another question arose: why is it that the
elements do in fact appear to exist? As a solution to
this problem, the doctrine of"mere representation" was
formulated by the Yogâcâra school. Buddhists of this
school deprive the elements of existence, recogniz-
ing only their functional aspect in relation to the cog-
nizing subject. The significance of the elements was
explained with the basic structure of representation
(vijiiapti-nuitratii =mere representation). Representa-
tion signifies that which is imaged or conceived in the
mind ofthe subject. This school adheres neither tothe
doctrine that ali things exist, because it takes the view
that nothing outside the mind- i.e., outside mental ac-
tivity- exists, nor to the doctrine that nothing exists,
because it asserts that rcpresentation (or conception)
does exist. In other words, the doctrine of"mere repre-
sentation" is at first thc negation ofthe assumption of
ordinary human beings that objects and the surround-
ing world exist independently outside the mind.
This theory of"merc representation" has its ground
in the structure of the mind that the Yogâcâra school
clarified. According to them, ali things are grasped
by the sixfold consciousness in our mind, but this
consciousness is superficial and something of which
one can be aware each time. Behind this sixfold
consciousness there is a deeper consciousness or
under-consciousness that is calied "iilaya-vijiiâna."
First, "âlaya-vijiiâna" means etymologically store-
consciousness because it coordinates ali elements that
have been grasped by the sixfold consciousness and
stores them like a computer. Second, "âlaya-vijiiâna"
means the "seed-consciousness" that brings the sixfold
consciousness into active appearance. According to the
Yogâcâra school, not only the concrete person with his
or her mind and body, but also the externa! natural
world or environment itself is nothing other than a man-
ifestation ofthe activity ofthis seed-consciousness.
It must be noted that "âlaya-vijfiâna" as such a deep
consciousness is tainted by the karma of each person
and of ali beings and as such it obstructs seeing the
truth as it realiy is. A complete transformation of the
basis of consciousness is thus necessary in order to sec
reality as it truly is. The doctrine of "iilaya-vijiiâna"
is therefore in this sense the positive declaration that
the truth is seen properly only from the viewpoint of
the completely transformed consciousness, which can
thus no longer be calied consciousness, but is instead
considered to be Buddha-wisdom.
This theory of "mere representation" is similar to
Schopenhauer's idea of the "world as will and repre-
sentation," insofar as for both, the world that ordinary
human beings see is subjective and iliusory because
it is objectified by the blind imaginati ve power of the
ignorant inner life ofthe subject.
If we compare the theory of the Yogâcâra school
with that of Husserl, we find some affinity. First, wc
could say that the transformation of consciousness is
paraliel to the transcendental epoche. The new view-
point of both is directed to the uncovered reality. Sec-
ond, reality can be known for both only in relation to
the activity ofthe recognizing subject. Third, the inten-
tion ofHusserl's phenomenology as a strict science is
paraliel to the ultimate state of "mere representation"
as Buddha's wisdom that can sec ali things and even
the self equally like a large mirror.
As to the difference, Husserl's investigations are
centered on transcendental subjectivity that is consid-
ered to be the pure ego, while the Yogâcâra school
avoids the terms "subject" or "ego" because for it the
ego has egocentric impulses duc to defilements and
only Buddha-wisdom is frec from such biases. Therc-
fore the student of the Yogâcâra school must practice
Yoga meditation and change his or her whole person-
ality- not only at the inteliectuallevel, but also at the
ethical and unconscious levels ofthe mind as well.
The two schools of Mahâyâna Buddhism gradually
changed into academic forms ofBuddhism at the same
time as Esoteric or Tantric Buddhism was coming to
the fore in India.
Kukai (773-835), one of the most remarkable per-
sons in the history of Japanese Buddhism, founded
an esoteric sect named "Shingon" (true words) on the
esoteric sutras of Indian Buddhism. This sect teaches
that the practitioner receives the blessings ofthe "three
mysteries" (sanmitsu, namely, the secret functions of
the body, speech, and mind) of the universal Buddha
through the power of "mantra" (shingon, true words
or incantations); then the practioner is able to enter
the world of the Buddha. Kukai expresses this as the
"attainment of Buddhahood with this very own-body"
 BUDDHISM
(sokushin:jobutsu) or "the phenomenon is not different
from reality" (sokuji-nishin).
It can be said that this way of thinking was latent
in the doctrine of Dharma of Early Buddhism, for ac-
cording to it, things or phenomena (dharmă~) are not
separated from the truth (dharmată), as we saw above.
But it is usually difficu\t to realize it in this world
with one's own body. Therefore the tenets of Indian
Buddhism demand an incredibly long practice. Kukai
taught the concrete way to realize Buddhahood in the
present life as practice with the body, speech, and mind.
This view can be compared with the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty because for both body and world have
an important ro\e.
In his unfinishcd last work Le visible et l 'invisible
(1964), Merleau-Ponty investigates the compatibility
of my body as visib\e or objective with my phenomenal
body as seeing. This investigation is expanded to the
relation of the seeing body and the visible thing and
further to the correlation between my body and the
world in which the thing is woven. Then he introduces
his original conception of "flesh" (chair). According
to him, my body is made by the flesh that is the same
as the world, and this flesh of my body is shared by
the world, i.e., my body and the world transgress each
other. Such flesh is the primordial visibility that lurks
in things and is o Jder than the function of seeing my
body. In other words, the flesh is primordial simplicity
of being before the division of my seeing or feeling
body from visible or sensible things. Merleau-Ponty
thus calls "flesh" that which has in itself, so to speak,
both subject and object, or what is nature and at the
same time mind; it is then a primordial unity of fact
and essence. Flesh is therefore called the "element" of
being, or the "pre-egological field," or the "vertical or
fleshlike uni verse and its polymorphic matrix."
Now we can come back to Kukai and compare his
thought with Merleau-Ponty's theory. As to the rela-
tion of the objective body, the phenomenal body, and
the thing or world, there is similarity in the classifica-
tions of the dharma~ of early Buddhism, as mentioned
above. Kukai introduced a new view that is somewhat
similar to the idea offlesh. He understands the univer-
sal Buddha (dharma-kăya =corporal realization ofthe
truth) as the ultimate primordial origin of ali beings.
In other words, it is the generative ground of nature,
the world, and ali living beings, including humankind
89
and even holy existence such as bodhisattvas and bud-
dhas. It is remarkab\e that Kukai refers to the universal
Buddha in terms ofthe "Six elements," namely Earth,
Water, Fire, Air, Emptiness, and Mind. The first five
elements were he\d to be the material principles of
the world in traditional Indian philosophy and in Bud-
dhism before Kukai. But for Kukai, these fi ve elements
are penetrated by the sixth element, Mind, and are not
different from it. It seems that both Merleau-Ponty and
Kukai sought for the ultima te and found something that
is prior to the division ofthe material and the spiritual.
As to the difference between the two philosophers,
we could say that the way to the ultimate was not
fully cleared by Merleau-Ponty, while in his mystical
philosophy Kukai develops the method to it in various
ways.
Koshiro Tamaki is a leading representative of
Japanese Buddhism in the present age. Based on his
thorough Zen practice, he interprets the fundamental
experience of Buddhism as the fact that the Dharma
appeared to the whole subjectivity ofSakyamuni. This
subjectivity is a unity of his whole personal exis-
tence and is called by Tamaki "whole personal body."
This word is grounded upon the term "kamma-vipaka"
which Sakyamuni taught in the Early Canons and
means the origin of the self and at the same time
origin of the world. In so far "kamma-vipaka" cor-
responds to the "alaya-vijnana" which was mentioned
above, but whi\e the theory of"alaya-vijnana" empha-
sizes the mental side, because it is the deepest under-
consciousness, "kamma-vipaka" is the body which has
absorbed the mental si de in itself and is more real than
it is. This means, it is the unity of al\ acts ofthe selffrom
the immense past in association with ali other beings
and appears concretely here and now as the foundation
ofthe whole existence ofthe self.
We could say that this relation ofthe Dharma and the
self, or the appearance ofthe Dharma itselfto the self,
is similar to the fundamental relation of knowledge in
phenomenology, namely, the self-givenness of a being
to subjectivity. In addition, the concept of "whole per-
sonal body" can be compared with that of DASEIN in
MARTIN HEIDEGGER. "Dasein" is my real subjectivity
in the "Tatsiichlichkeit" or "Faktizitiit." But the "whole
personal body" seems to include a wider and deeper
field, for it is like the store-consciousness and the basis
ofmy body and mind and at the same time it binds an
90 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
individual, who has an immense karma, with the world
and ali other beings. This concept must enrich pheno-
menology in the future, if it is adopted in the proper
way.
In sum, the question might ari se: is Buddhist pheno-
menology possible? 1 would answer affirmatively, if
we understand phenomenology in a wide sense. As
shown above, there are severa] common points ofview
between Buddhism and phenomenology from Husserl
and Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty. On the basis ofthese
comparisons, new further trials should be made to re-
construct Buddhism phenomenologically. This would
open the heritage ofBuddhism to the non-Asian world.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Conze, Edward. A Short Hist01:v ofBuddhism [1960]. Lon-
don: George Allen & Unwin, 1980.
Hart, James G. "Transcendental Phenomenology and Zen
Buddhism: The Start of a Conversation." Zen Buddhism
Today 5 (1987), 145--{)0.
Inada, K. K., and N. P. Jacobson, eds. Buddhism and Ameri-
can Thinkers. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1984.
Larrabee, M. J. "The One and the Many: Yogacara Buddhism
and Husserl." Philosophy East and West 31 (1981 ), 3-15.
Laycock, Steven W. "Hui-neng and the Transcendental
Standpoint." Journal ofChinese Philosophy 12 (1985),
179-96.
- . "Harmony as Transcendence: A Phenomenological
View." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16 (1989), 177-
201.
- . Mind as Mirror and the Mirroring of the Mind: Bud-
dhist Refiections on Western Phenomenology. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1994.
Lipman, Kennard. "The cittamătra and its Madhyamaka cri-
tique: Some phenomenological ref!ections." Philosophy
East and West 32 ( 1982), 295-308.
Nakamura, Hajime. Indian Buddhism: A Survey of Bihlio-
graphic Notes [ 1980]. Delhi: Motii al Banarsidass, 1987.
Odin, Steve. "Fantasy Variation and the Horizon of Open-
ness: A Phenomenological lnterpretation of Tantric Bud-
dhist Enlightenment." International Philosophical Quar-
terly 21 (1981 ), 419-35.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Husserl and Indian Thought." In Pheno-
menology and Indian Philosophy. Ed. D. P. Chattopad-
hyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty. New
Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research/Motilal
Banarsidess Publishers, 1992, 20-43.
Shaner, David Edward. The Bodvmind Experience in
Japanese Buddhism: A Phenomenological Stuc~v ofKiikai
and Dogen. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1985.
Nichiren Shoshu International Center. A Dictionarv of Bud-
dhist Terms and Concepts. Tokyo: Nichiren Shoshii Inter-
national Center, 1983.
Suzuki, Daisetz. Essays in Zen Buddhism ( 1924-34). 3 vols.
London: Rider & Co., 1970.
Stcherbatsky, Theodor. The Central Conception ofBuddhism
and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma '' [ 1923]. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
Takasaki, Jikido. An lntroduction to Buddhism. Trans. R. W.
Giembel. Tokyo: The Toho Gakkai, 1987.
Tamaki, Koshiro. Bukkyi5 no kontei ni arumono (What forms
the basis of Buddhism). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982.
MASAKO 0DAGAWA
Reitaku Universi~v

CANADA The connection of Canada to pheno-
menology was established early, when a Canadian,
WINTHROP BELL, travelled to Germany to study with
EDMUND HUSSERL. Originally from Nava Scotia, Bell
had dane graduate work at Harvard and Cambridge
and then studied at Gottingen from 1911 to 1914, com-
pleting his doctorale under Husserl with a dissertation
on Josiah Royce. But although Bell was at Găttingen
during a particularly interesting time in Husserl's de-
velopment and while Husserl 's collected correspon-
dence shows a substantial subsequent correspondence
with him, there is no real indication that Bell, who
became a distinguished historian of Nava Scotia, did
a great deal to further the cause of phenomenology
in Canada after his return. This contrasts with cases
where foreign students or visitors attempted, upon re-
turning to their home countries, to introduce pheno-
menology to their local intellectual context in various
ways, ranging from their own research to founding
societies for the study of phenomenology. For exam-
ple, in the UNITED STATES, phenomenologywas not only
successfully introduced by people like MARVIN FARBER
and DORION CAIRNS, but was also developed as a new
national tradition of phenomenology. By contrast, no
Canadian school ofphenomenology has developed.
Canada has far fewer universities and colleges than
the United States, and because these schools tend for
the most part to be scattered over a vast geographi-
cal area, scholars working in various disciplines do not
usually tind colleagues in their field nearby. The excep-
tions to this would be found in the few larger centers
in the country, i.e., Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver.
Given this general geographical separation, many aca-
demics found themselves working in relative isolation.
This situati an has improved, of course, with more ex-
tensive use of telephones and with the advent of fax
machines and electronic mail.
This state of affairs is ali the more true for those
working in phenomenology. When there are fewer
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 91
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
schools and quite often smaller departments and when
phenomenology has not gained a great deal of recog-
nition, it has had to work hard to gain and maintain a
foothold. In Canada, phenomenology- as with Con-
tinental thought in general - has had to exist in the
long shadow of the dominant Anglo-American ANA-
LYTIC PHILOSOPHY. ]n contrast to other philosophical
movements (such as the neo-Hegelian), which have
on occasion managed to gaina respectable foothold in
the face ofthe Anglo-American influence, phenomen-
ology has never been widely represented. It is not really
possible to speak of a "school" of phenomenology in
Canada, and even less o fa tradition. Rather, while there
are certain clusters of activity, phenomenology by and
large tends tobe represented at the individuallevel. So
where there is a phenomenologist, he or she tends to
be an isolated representative.
Having said ali this, it must be acknowledged that
phenomenology is, nevertheless, well represented in
Canada, and that there is a present and energetic level of
activity, organizati an, and research. That is, despite the
minority status of phenomenology, it shows no signs
of fading away and continues to thrive, albeit some-
what quietly, as evidenced by the keen interes! often
manifested by students (even in predominantly Anglo-
American departments) and the consistently strong
scholarship from Canadian phenomenologists.
Indeed, the same survival instinct can be seen in the
situati an of Continental thought in general in Canada:
while clearly subsisting in a marginal state as com-
pared to the dominant mainstream tradition, it contin-
ues tobe a factor. Thus there are currently a number of
centers, institutes, and societies with a focus on pheno-
menology, or Continental thought in the wider scape.
The Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmod-
ern Thought concentrates not only on hermeneutics
and POSTMODERNISM, but on Continental thought gen-
erally, including phenomenology. Founded in 1984 by
GARY MADISON with a group of his graduate students at
McMaster University, the CSH was originally started
to provide a forum for those working in Continental
thought in Canada to meet and present their work, with
the annual meetings taking place in conjunction with
the Leamed Societies Congress. The Canadian Philo-
sophical Association meetings tended to be dominated
by work in analytic philosophy. But that has changed
in recent years, and there is now more and more repre-
92 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
sentation ofphenomenology and Continental thought.
The same is true of Dialogue. the official journal
of the CPA, which has been increasing the number of
articles on phenomenology that it publishes. There is
also the Bul/etin of the CSH, which publishes short
articles and book reviews. And it is frequently possi-
ble to find articles in phenomenology or Continental
thought in a variety of other journals, such as Eidos,
Lava! theologique et philosophique, Philosophiques,
and Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences. Indeed, both Ei-
dos and Philosophiques have recently published spe-
cial issues on topics in phenomenology, demonstrat-
ing an ongoing interest in both the Anglophone and
Francophonc scholarly communities. Finally, with re-
spect to centers, it is important to mention the Archival
Repository of the Center for Advanced Research in
Phenomenology long maintained by JOSE HUERTAS-
JOURDA at Wilfrid Laurier University. In addition, for a
period of time the Toronto Semiotic Ci rele organized
the International Summer Institute for Semiotic and
Structural Studies, which featured JACQUES DERRIDA,
MICIIEL FOUCAULT, and PAUL RICCEUR, among others.
Despite these various venues and contexts focused
on or receptive to phenomenology, to a large ex-
tent Canadian phenomenologists still define their in-
tellectual contexts and establish their networks in
extra-Canadian terms, i.e., in relation to Europe and
the United States. Indeed, for most Canadian phe-
nomenologists, the "local" context is not Canada, but
North America, with societies such as the Society
for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, So-
ciety for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences,
the International Association of Philosophy and Liter-
ature, the Husserl Circle, the Heidegger Conference,
the Merleau-Ponty Circle, and the Sartre Society con-
sidered mainstays for phenomenologicallife in Canada
as much as in the United States (perhaps more, con-
sidering the aforementioned geographical considera-
tions). Many of these societies have had occasion to
meet in Canada. SPEP had its first Canadian meet-
ing in Ottawa in 1980 and a second in Toronto in
1960. An international phenomenological conference
was organized by ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA with the
assistance of Lawrence Haworth and RICHARD HOLMES
at the University of Waterloo in April 1969. The In-
ternational Husserl and Phenomenological Research
Society was founded on that occasion and the papers
from that meeting became The Later Husserl and the
/dea ofPhenomenology, which is volume 2 of Analecta
Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomeno/ogica/ Re-
search. Canadian phenomenologists have participated
in the international scene as well: they have been rep-
resented at the Collegium Phenomenologicum in Pe-
rugia and the Summer Program in Phenomcnology at
The Pennsylvania State University held by the Center
for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.
It is difficult to designate Canadian university de-
partments as having a particularly phenomenological
emphasis. Once again, phenomenology is more typ-
ically represented by one or perhaps two phenome-
nologists, but it is often not enough to comprise a
significant concentration in the context of a large de-
partment. There are, however, some departments -
usually those where Continental philosophy was tra-
ditionally quite strong- with more significant dus-
ters of people working in phenomenology. For exam-
ple, the University of Toronto, which has an cxtremely
large philosophy department, has always enjoyed good
representation in many areas, including phenomen-
ology. While Toronto's non-analytic component might
be more properly classified in terms of German philos-
ophy, Hegel studies, or Continental thought generally,
phenomenology has been represented by THOMAS LAN-
GAN's The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critica! Study of
an Existential Phenomenology (1959) and Merleau-
Ponty s Critique of Reason ( 1966); GRAEME NICHOL-
SON's Seeing and Reading ( 1984) and Illustrations
of Being: Drawing upon Heidegger and upon Meta-
physics ( 1992); HENRY PIETERSMA, who specializes in
MAURICE MERLEALJ-PONTY, Husserl, and epistemology;
and REBECCA COMAY, who works in MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
Benjamin, and post-Heideggerian French philosophy.
The McMaster/Guelph joint doctoral program is
also well represented in the areas of Continental phi-
losophy and phenomenology. On the McMaster side,
Gary Madison works in Merleau-Ponty, hermeneu-
tics, and POSTMODERNISM, looking at the interrelations
among these areas in The Phenomeno/ogy of Merleau-
Ponty ( 1981) and The Hermeneutics of Postmoder-
nity: Figures and Themes ( 1988), and BARRY ALLEN
on Heidegger and JACQUES DERRIDA. At thc Univer-
sity of Guelph, JAKOB AMSTUTZ, now a professor emer-
itus, taught phenomenology and Continental philoso-
phy to generations of students, while current repre-
 CANADA
sentatives include JEFF MITSCHERLING, who writes on
German philosophy, hermeneutics- especially HA:\S-
GEORG GADAMER- and aesthetics.
Another important - and Francophone - con-
centration is found in the philosophy department at
the Universite de Montreal. This concentration was
strengthened with the relatively recent arrival of JEAN
GRONDIN, whose extensive writings on Heidegger,
Gadamer, and hermeneutics examine a broad range of
historical and thematic issues, e.g., Le tournant dans
la pensee de Martin Heidegger ( 1987) and L 'horizon
hermeneutique de la pensee contemporaine ( 1993 ).
Also in the department are CLAUDE PICHE, whose re-
search interests include HERMENEUTICS, CRITICAL THE-
ORY, Husserl, and AESTHETICS, and GARBIS KORTIAN,
who has written on Habermas and critica! theory. As
is clear, the interests and work in phenomenology and
continental thought at Montreal are currently focused
more on German, rather than French thought: French
phenomenology is now less well represented follow-
ing the retirement of BERTRAND RIOUX, who worked on
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and Merleau-Ponty. The Continental
component ofthe department also maintains close ties
with Europe, and has traditionally sent many students
abroad for study, particularly to Germany.
The University of Ottawa, once quite strong in
phenomenology, has lost a certain amount of this
strength with the departures of DAVID CARR to Emory
University and Grondin to Montreal. Nevertheless,
there is still a small core of faculty working in pheno-
menology. THEODORE GERAETS has had a long career
of teaching and writing in German philosophy and in
Merleau-Ponty, including Vers une nouvelle philoso-
phie transcendantale: la genese de la philosophie
de Maurice Merleau-Ponty ( 1971 ), as has PETER MC-
CORMICK, whose work encompasses figures such as
Husserl, Heidegger, and ROMAN INGARDEN and topics
such as philosophy and literature and aesthetics, e.g.,
Heidegger and the Language ofthe World (1976). DE-
NIS DUMAS, a recent arrival to the department, works in
German philosophy and critica! theory.
The philosophy department at Brock University
has had traditional concentrations in Heidegger, Ni-
etzsche, and Indian and Eastem thought. The late ZYG-
MUNT ADAMCZEWSKI was well known for his teaching
and writing on Heidegger and Nietzsche (The Tragic
Protest, 1963 ). Another long-time member of the de-
93
partment is DEBABRATA SINHA, whose work includes
Husserl and Indian phiJosophy. DAVID GOICOECHEA spe-
cializes in EXISTENTIALISM and Nietzsche, frequently
organizing conferences on related themes; RAJ SINGH
writes on Heidegger; and MARK MULDOON also writes
on Heidegger, as well as Merleau-Ponty and Ricceur.
At York University, JOHN o'NEILL has had a dis-
tinguished career in SOCIOLOGY and in the Social and
Politica! Thought Program, specializing in studies on
Merleau-Ponty, critica! theory, and the relationship be-
tween phenomenology and sociology (Perception, Ex-
pression, and History: The Social Phenomenology of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1970). A1so at York in phi-
1osophy are MILDRED BAKAN, who works on HANNAH
ARENDT, Heidegger, and Husserl, and DAVID JOPLING,
whose research centers on ethics and theories of the
self, especially in Sartre and EMMANUEL LEVINAS.
At the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education
(O.l.S.E.), DIETER MISGELD has worked extensively in
Gadamer, hermeneutics, social theory, and Habermas,
sometimes in collaboration with Graeme Nicholson.
Also working in phenomeno1ogy at O.I.S.E., and fre-
quent collaborators, are RONALD SILVERS in sociology
and VIVIAN DARROCH-LOZOWSKI in applied PSYCHOLOGY.
Back in Quebec, Concordia University in Montreal
has a small critica! mass with DALLAS LASKEY, who
works in Husserl and on empathy; DENNIS o'CONNOR,
whose areas include hermeneutics, Merleau-Ponty, and
PAUL RICCECR; and ERNEST JOOS, who wrote Dialogue
with Heidegger on Values: Ethics for TI'mes of Crisis
(1991).
McGill University now has R. PHILLIP BUCKLEY, who
comes from the Husserl Archives in Leuven and spe-
cializes in Husserl, and of course CHARLES TAYLOR, who
has recently moved from politica! science to the phi-
losophy department. While not identified specifically
as a phenomenologist, Tay1or is known for his ability
to weave together and synthesize varied discourses and
philosophical traditions, and works such as Sources of
the Self' The Making of the Modern Jdentity ( 1989)
draw significantly on phenomenological and hermen-
eutica! insights.
Finally, although a small department, philosophy at
the University of Windsor has a small concentration
currently with DEBORAH cooK - whose areas of spe-
cialization include post-structuralism and critica! the-
ory, hermeneutics, and contemporary French thought
94 ENCYCLOPEDJA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
-and UNDA FISHER, who works on Husserl, Heidegger,
Gadamer, and hermeneutics.
Although the foregoing concentrations of interest
and specialization in phenomenology are usually found
in the context oflarger departments where the main fo-
cus and profile is not Continental thought, Jet alone
phenomenology, they remain vital and significant. In
addition to these clusters, and somewhat more iso-
lated, are those phenomenologists working in a con-
text where there is less concentration or where in
many cases they represent the sole phenomenologist or
Continental philosopher in their departments. MONIKA
LANGER, from the University of Victoria, has written on
Merleau-Ponty, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, and Sartre; MAR-
GARET VAN DE PITTE, at the University of Alberta, works
in epistemology and Husserl; Jose Huertas-Jourda, at
Wilfrid Laurier University, was a founding member of
the Husserl Circle and wrote originally on Miguel de
Unamuno; CONSTANTIN BOUNDAS, at Trent University,
has worked widely in phenomenology, Gilles Deleuze,
and contemporary French thought, and also organizes
frequent conferences in these areas at Trent; RICHARD
HOLMES writes on Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre and
teaches at the University of Waterloo; DENIS FISETTE is
at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal and works
on Husserl; JAMES MENSCH, at Saint Francis Xavier
University in Nova Scotia, has broad research inter-
ests and expertise, including Husserl, ETHICS, Sartre,
and PSYCHIATRY (/ntersubjectivity and Transcendental
Idealism, 1988]; PHILIP DWYER, at the University of
Saskatchewan, works on Merleau-Ponty and Sartre;
and BRUCE BAUGH, at the University College of the
Cariboo in British Columbia has published widely on
Sartre, Heidegger, and French philosophy.
It should not be forgotten, of course, that although
most phenomenologists are in philosophy, there is a
great deal of phenomenological work in other disci-
plines. Some of that work and severa! of these phe-
nomenologists ha ve already been mentioned above in
the context ofvarious clusters at the different universi-
ties. It is important, however, to mention also the work
of MARIO VALDES, at the Centre for Comparative Lit-
erature at the University of Toronto, who, along with
work in phenomenological hermeneutics, Unamuno,
and other Hispanic authors, has sought in particular
to conjoin phenomenology and LITERATURE (Pheno-
menological Hermeneutics and the Study of Litera-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ture, 1987). MORNY JOY in Religious Studies at the
University of Calgary, who studied with Rica:ur and
works on Rica:ur, French philosophy, and hermeneu-
tics; ROBERTA IMBODEN in English at Ryerson Polytech-
nic University, who writes on Sartre and contemporary
french phi]osophy; JOHN VAN DEN HENGEL at the fac-
ulty of Theology of Saint Paul University in Ottawa
whose areas include hermeneutics and Rica:ur; ADRIAN
VAN DEN HOVEN in French at the University ofWindsor,
who has worked extensively on Sartre and is one of
the Executive Editors of Sartre Studies Intemational;
DAVID REHORICK in sociology at New Brunswick; MAU-
REEN CONNOLLY in PHYSICAL EDUCATION at Brock, and
MAX VAN MANEN in PSYCHOLOGY at Alberta.
In sum, despite the relative minority sta tus ofpheno-
menology in Canada, and despite its not infrequent ne-
glect and marginalization on the part of mainstream
Anglo-American discussions as well as newer post-
modern discourses, there has long been and continues
to be a steady interes! and representation of pheno-
menology in Canada. The scale may be smaller than
the United States, but not the interest; and given the
current levels of activity, and the promise of continued
interest and involvement on the part of students and
younger academics, a solid future for phenomenology
in Canada is assured.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Eidos 7 ( 1989): Husserl.
Eidos 11 (1993): Special Double lssue on Hermeneutics and
Critica! Theory.
Madison, Gary B., with the collaboration of J. R. King. "Con-
temporary Status of Continental Philosophy in Canada: A
Narrative." Eidos 4 ( 1985), 63-81.
Melillo, Rita.Indagine su Ka-Kanata: P!uralismo Fi!oso(ico.
Pro Press Editrice, 1990.
Nicholson, Graeme. "Hermeneutics and Critica! Theory in
Canada." Eidos 11 (1993), 131-41.
Phi!osophiques 20 ( 1993): La phenomenologie
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomeno!ogica! Movement: A
Historica! !ntroduction. 3rd rev. and enl. ed., with the
collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982.
LINDA FISHER
University al Windsor
 ERNST CASSIRER
ERNST CASSIRER Cassirer was born in
Breslau on July 28, 1874, and died in New York on
April 13, 1945. He first studied with GEORG SIMMEL,
among others, at Berlin and was then sent by Simmel
to Hermann Cohen ( 1842-1918) at Marburg, where
he completed his doctorate in 1899 with a dissertation
on Descartes' Kritik der mathematischen und natur-
wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis (Descartes 's critique of
mathematical and natural scientific knowledge), which
appears as the introduction to Leibniz' System in seinen
wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (Leibniz's system in
its scientific foundations, 1902). As a member of the
Marburg nea-Kantian school, Cassirer published, be-
ginning in 1906, a faur-volume work on the history of
the Erkenntnisprob!em (The problem of knowledge).
He habilitated at Berlin in 1906 with the first volume of
this work; the fourth volume appeared posthumously
and at first in English in 1950. In 1919 he became pro-
fessor at the University ofHamburg, where hc was also
rector during 1929-30. Emigration led him after 1932
to England, Sweden (Goteborg), and the United States
(Yale and Columbia Universities).
In his work on the problem ofknowledge, Cassirer
attempts to connect the systematic and historical points
ofview to the nea-Kantian theme oftheory ofknowl-
edge by tracing and analyzing the origins of Kantian-
ism from the Renaissance up to the methods ofthe spe-
cial sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries. With this
"Kantianizing" history of philosophy and science and
through the retroactive influence of this history upon
Kantianism, he always presents his work on scientific
and philosophical history in connection with the whole
ofthe history of culture. He thus prepares the way for a
concretization of the problem of knowledge by taking
into account the most subtle forms of actual human un-
derstanding ofthe world. In Substanzbegriffund Funk-
tionsbegriff Untersuchungen uber die Grundfragen
der Erkenntniskritik (Substance and function: Inves-
tigations into the fundamental questions ofthe critique
ofknowledge, 191 0), he lays down a philosophy ofthe
modern mathematical sciences in the manner of KANT,
and in Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen Geis-
tesgeschichte (Freedom and form: Studies in German
cultural history, 1916), he uses the example of the de-
velopment of German cu !ture from Luther to Hegel to
develop a conception of the history of the sciences of
mind - the cultural Or HUMAN SCIENCES - that will
95
serve at the same time to provide foundations for the
totality of modern scientific culture.
Cassirer attempts to unify the variety of systematic-
theoretical and historical-contextual motives, and also
to mediate the sharp confrontation set up between the
NATURAL SCIENCES and the human sciences, in an an-
tisubstantialist mode of thinking oriented around the
concept of (spiritual) function. The results of these
efforts are the concepts of"symbolic form" and "sym-
bolic formation." These are to be found in the full
sense beginning around 1920, e.g., in Zur Einstein-
schen Relativitiitstheorie. Erkenntnistheoretische Be-
trachtungen (Einsteinian relativity theory: Epistemo-
logical considerations, 1920), where he sees "the task
of systematic philosophy, which reaches far beyond
that of the theory of knowledge" to consist in "appre-
hending ... the totality of symbolic forms, from whose
application the concept of a reality that is organized in
itself arises for us." By virtue of the concept of "sym-
bolic forms," which he determines in the sense of a
"symbolic formation" as ways ofworld-understanding,
"subject" and "abject" are first distinguished for us, and
'T' and "world" emerge "in definite forms" as opposed
to each other. Every specific symbolic form, that is to
say, every cultural domain as a dimension of active
world-understanding- such as LANGUAGE, HISTORY,
myth, RELIGION, art, science, TECHNOLOGY, etc.- is "in
the account relativized as opposed to the others;- but
since such relativization is entirely reciproca], since
no specific form, but only the systematic totality can
claim to express 'truth' and 'reality,' the limit which
arises from it appears on the other si de as a thoroughly
immanent constraint, as a constraint that is eliminated
as soon as we relate the specific form to the totality and
consider it in the context ofthe whole."
If one wants to compare this concept of "sym-
bolic form" with phenomenology, one should refer
to HEGEL 's Phiinomenologie des Geistes ( 1807) rather
than to Husserl 's phenomenology. As a matter of fact,
Cassirer relates himself to phenomenology, and then
he connects to two quite different forms of i t - i.e.,
to Hegel and to Husserl. But in both cases this con-
nection is not a dogmatic one. When Cassirer holds
out the promise in his article "Die Begriffsform im
mythischen Denken" ( 1922) for his Phi!osophie der
symbolischen Formen ( 1923/25/29), he speaks of a
"phenomenology of symbolic forms" that is to be-
96 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
gin with a "phenomenology of linguistic forms." It is
Hegel 's Phanomenologie des Geistes that fulfills that
which was in Vico only a demand, namely, to represent
the "concrete totality of spirituallife" in the "fullness
of its appearances." Later on, Hegel is cited again and
again in this context, to be sure not without criticism
of his speculative-dialectica! method.
Cassirer's proximity to Husserl is clearly tobe seen
when it is a question of the concrete determination of
the symbolic forms. Symbolic formation shows itself
to be an intentiona! process that is always related to
intuitability (Anschaulichkeit), a process that is car-
ried by an experiencing consciousness as "originary
phenomenon." At any rate, this consciousness, whose
transcendental function is recognized as with Husserl,
is not understood as an abstract entity. It is rather seen
as connected to the BODY as the source-point of orien-
tation and reference. That is why Cassirer calls the tra-
ditional problem of the "body-soul relation" the "first
model and example for a symbolic relation." What is
important is that according to Cassirer, the symbolic
relation (body-soul/spirit) "originally" does not know
of the "inner" and the "outer," the "acting" and the
"acted upon," but is primarily "a meaningful whole
that interprets itself." The original phenomenology of
expression that "shows" itself and that we "phenomen-
ologically interpret" is contrasted with the subsequent
"ontologica! questioning" that always goes beyond the
pure phenomenon of expression.
Husserl 's distinction and correlation between hyle
and morphe possesses for Cassirer, already quite early,
a decisive methodical function. Not knowing about
Husserl's own self-criticism, Cassirer raises the objec-
tion that hyle and morphe should not be hypostatized
into entities, since every living human experience al-
ready connects both elements. This original experien-
tial predicament, which has to be dealt with through a
"phenomenology of perception," is brought out in the
discovery of the so-called "symbolic pregnance," for
which the body-soul relation is an original and irre-
ducible paradigm: "under 'symbolic pregnance' shall
be understood the manner in which a perceptual ex-
perience as sensuous experience contains within itself,
at the same time, a determinate non-intuitive 'mean-
ing' and brings it to immediate concrete representation.
One is not concerned here with merely 'perceptual'
givenness to which some 'apprehensive' acts are sub-
sequently affixed, through which they are interpreted,
judged, and restructured. It is rather the perception
itself, which by virtue of its immanent structuring, ac-
quires a sort of spiritual 'articulation'." Or, to put it
another way, "there are for us no detached, in-itself-
subsisting intuitive 'experiences,' which are not al-
ready 'filled' with any theoretical meaning-function
and not accordingly structured, just as, on the other
hand, there is nothing merely ofthe nature ofmeaning
which does not search for and find its fulfillment some-
how in something intuitive." This does not mean "that
the symbolic in our knowledge splits itself up, that it
separates itself, in a certain manner, into an 'imma-
nent' and a 'transcendent' component. The symbolic
is rather immanence and transcendence in one: insofar
as a content that is in principle non-intuitable expresses
itself in intuitive form."
The core of Cassirer's philosophical interrogation,
therefore, is increasingly the problem ofMEANING. Cas-
sirer recognizes Husserl's distinction between mean-
ingful signs (as expressions) and mere indicating signs
as an important discovery. The question about truth is
subordinated to the question of significance and mean-
ing. This means that what is true can open itself up
only through the phenomena ofmeaning. The concept
of symbol is the expression of this thesis, namely, that
"meaning-fulfillment" takes place in the "sensuous,"
just as the sensuous can be manifested in experience
only in the framework of"meaning," of"ideation," and
of a "point ofview." This means that it is about the "in-
carnation of meaning," by which Cassirer anticipates
a formuJation ofMAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. In the sym-
boJic formation as understanding ofreality, one has to
set out from a correlation between the act of working
and the work, in which the latter serves as paradigm
for laying bare the act of working, while the working
serves as the horizon for understanding the work that
is effected-entirely in the sense ofHusserl's distinc-
tion between noesis and noema. Sometimes Cassirer
uses the term "HERMENEUTic" for the elementary de-
termination ofthe signification ofworks. For him, the
intentiona!, world-opening relatedness to the "other"
is primarily relatedness to the you or the helshe, not to
an it. Relatedness to the it is nothing but the never-to-
be-reached limiting concept ofrelatedness to you. The
concept of a full "I," i.e., of the full personal subjec-
tivity, is acquired, in the first place, through reciproca!
 ERNST CASSIRER
arrangement between ''1''-"you" structures.
An explicit recourse and connection to Husserl's
phenomenological method, as a philosophy of mean-
ing, is to be found in Cassirer's philosophy of myth,
which at the same time is striking in its affinity to
Husserl's problem ofthe LIFEWORLD: "It belongs to the
fundamental merits of Husserlian phenomenology, that
it has again sharpened the ability to see the diversity of
spiritual 'structural forms,' and has pointed out a path,
diverging from the psychological problem and method,
for their consideration. Especially decisive here is the
sharp separation of psychic 'acts' from the 'objects'
intended in them. In the path that Husserl himself has
traversed, from the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-
1901) to the Jdeen zu ei ner reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie (1913), it becomes
clearer that the task of phenomenology, as he under-
stands it, is not exhausted by the analysis ofknowledge,
but that one has to investigate the structures of quite
different domains of objects purely in accordance with
what they 'mean' and without any consideration of
the 'actuality' of their objects. Such an investigation
must also include in its domain the mythical 'world'
in order to apprehend its peculiar distinguishing con-
ten!, not through induction from the diversity of eth-
nological and ethnological-psychological experiences,
but rather by grasping it in pure ideational analysis.
An attempt in this direction, as far as 1 can see, has
been undertaken neither from the side of phenomen-
ology itself nor from the si de of concrete research into
myths, in which the genetic-psychologically oriented
questioning still remains unchallenged in the field."
In any case, Cassirer 's concept of phenomenology
reaches its highest point in his Philosophie der sym-
bolischen Formen III, neither in his relation to Hegel
nor in his relation to Husserl, but in connection with
an argument in the Allgemeine P.1ychologie nach kri-
tischer Methode (1912) of Paul Natorp ( 1854-1924).
This work contains, in the best sense of the word, "a
truly universal program of a phenomenology of con-
sciousness," which is "exhibited in strictly 'critica!'
reflection." For Natorp, psychology is thematized in
a sense that is completely free from the limitations
of the special discipline that goes by that name and
from the psychologism that has been justly criticized
by Husserl. Thus the concern is not with some kind
of psychology, but with that which is fundamental for
97
every psychology and for philosophy- namely, the
"being-conscious" or "consciousness" that underlies
ali understanding ofreality and ali objectivation. Con-
sciousness cannot be "described as an analogue of ob-
jective reality." The "fact ofbeing-conscious" is rather
"an irreducible ultimate that lets itself only be shown,
but does not Jet itselfbe 'explained' ... in accordance
with the categoria] forms ofknowledge ofthings. Here
one is concerned not with 'an appearing thing,' but
with 'the pure fact of appearing itself.' That such an
'appearing' takes place ... this originary fact here
constitutes the only problem."
Cassirer agrees with Natorp's formulation of the
problem, but he criticizes Natorp 's attempt to de-
termine consciousness by the so-called "Minus-
Richtung," i.e., the determination ofthe subjective out
of the objective. Nevertheless, he recognizes positive
ideas in Natorp, especially how, according to Natorp,
consciousness has tobe brought to expression in some
way or other, e.g., in its linguistic culture. As con-
trasted with Natorp, Cassirer seeks for this expression
not in the formed, scientific structures, not even ifthese
law-governed sciences, as with Natorp, are sciences of
mind. Cassirer finds the "sources" for the opening up of
consciousness rather in the themes of such sciences-
in language, art, religion, etc.- as the "original modes
of relatedness and structuring of consciousness."
That this orientation toward "objective spirit" and
its shapes can no longer be reached methodically
through Hegel 's phenomenology of spirit, but only
through Husserl's phenomenology, becomes clear in
relation to Cassirer's analysis ofTIME. As with Husserl,
time is the pervasive fundamental structure of con-
sciousness. The "symbolic" is conceivable only against
the background of the inalienable temporality of
consciousness. The function of temporality is RE-
PRESENTATION, i.e., "presence" is, according to Cas-
sirer, a case of "re-presentation." This presentifying
re-presentation that makes every shaping ofreality and
apprehension of reality possible in the first place ex-
plicitly operates, according to Cassirer, intentionally.
This means that the unifying interconnection of past
and future (in a respective present) is accomplished
not in the sense of a causal or thinglike connection,
but rather by virtue of the temporal INTENTIONALITY of
consciousness. In this, the temporal dimension of the
fu ture plays, for Cassirer, a decisive ro le, because it first
 98 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
makes possible, in and through the anticipation ofpos-
sibilities, something like idealization, internalization,
ethos, and historical consciousness. With the thought
that the problem of time, in this sense, leads beyond
the cultural phenomenon of "generating the shapes of
time" to the demand for a cultural-philosophical eval-
uation oftemporality, Cassirer goes beyond Husserl~
although in the spirit of Husserl ~ and opens up the
possibility of a phenomenology of cui ture that is only
suggested in the late works of Husserl.
In the last book Cassirer published during his life,
Essay on Man ( 1944 ), something that is merely indi-
cated in his works after the middle 1920s first comes
strikingly to expression: the "philosophy of symbolic
forms" becomes a sort of phenomenological philos-
ophy of culture and a philosophical anthropology.
An important stage in this is Cassirer's lecture of
1929 along with the well-known meeting between
him and MARTIN HEIDEGGER at Davos. In this Jecture,
MAX SCHELER 's characterization of phenomenology as
"desymbolization of the world" undergoes a revision,
without phenomenology being thereby rejected. For
the "animal symbolicum," which is the core of the
Essay on Man, is throughout capable of phenomen-
ology, if one interprets "symbolic formation" as be-
ing a formula that is parallel to "intentiona! consti-
tution," i.e., for the inter-intentional process ofworld-
and self-constitution. Cassirer understands both pheno-
menology and symbolic formation in precisely this
manner.
Cassirer's relation to phenomenology is, tobe sure,
not determined solely by the a1ternatives of Hegel and
Husserl. His historical consciousness forbids such al-
ternatives in any case. He is also related in his views to
authors such as Cari Stumpf (1838-1936) and FRANZ
BRENTANO, but above ali to GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY, includ-
ing such figures as Kurt Koffka (1886--1941) and the
psychopathologists Adhemar Gelb ( 1887-1936) and
Kurt Goldstein ( 1878-1965). Cassirer was in personal
contact with ARON GURWITSCH during their American
exile, and a course on phenomenology in Cassirer was
repeatedly taught at the New School for Social Re-
search by Gurwitsch. Cassirer's relations to Gestalt
psychology in the 1930s in FRANCE, where Paul Guil-
laume ( 1878-1962) was active as a translator and in-
terpreter, also influenced younger phenomenologists
such as Merleau-Ponty to study his work. References
to Cassirer in the Phenomimologie de la perception
( 1945) play a significant ro le and thus aga in he can be
related to phenomenology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Braun, Hans-Jiirg, Helmut Holzhey, and Ernst Wolfgang
Orth, eds. Uher Ernst Cassirers Philosophie der symhol-
ischen Formen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988.
Cassirer, Ernst. Leibniz· System in seinen 1Nissenschaftlichen
Grundziigen. Marburg, 1902; rpt. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961.
- . Das Erkenntnisprohlem in der Philosophie und Wis-
senschafi der neueren Zeit. Voi. I. Berlin, 1906; rpt.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgescllschaft, 1974;
Vot. Il. Berlin, 1907; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1974; Vot. III: Die nachkantischen S:vs-
teme. Berlin, 1920; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1974; Voi. IV: Van Hegel.~ Tod his zur
Gegenwart (1832-1932). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1973; The Prohlem ofKnowledge: Phi-
losophy, Science, and History since Hegel. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1950.
- . Suhstanzhegriff und Funktionshegriff Untersuchungen
uher die Grundfi·agen der Erkenntniskritik. Berlin, 191 O.
-. Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen Geistes-
geschichte. Berlin, 1916.
-. Zur Einsteinschen Relativitătstheorie. Erkenntnistheo-
rische Betrachtungen. Berlin, 1920.
- . "Die Begriffsform im mythischen Denken." Studien
der Bihliothek Warhurg I ( 1922); rpt. in his We-
sen und Wirkung der S:vmholhegriff~. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche, Buchgesellschaft, 1956, 1-70.
- . Philosophie der symholischen Formen. Part !: Die
Sprache. Berlin, 1923; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1956; PartII: Das mythische Denken.
Berlin, 1925; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaft1iche Buchge-
sellschaft, 1958; Part III: Phănomenologie der Erkenntnis.
Berlin, 1929; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 1958.
-. An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of
Human Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1944.
- . S:vmhols, Myth, and Culture: Essays and Lectures of
Ernst Cassirer 1935-1945. Ed. Donald Phillip Verene.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979.
-. Symhol, Technik, Sprache. Auf~ătze aus den Jahren 1927-
1933. Ed. Ernst Wo1fgang Orth and John Michael Krois.
Hamburg: Meiner, 1985.
-. Geist und Lehen. Schrifien zu den Lehensordnungen von
Natur und Kunst, Geschichte und Sprache. Ed. Ernst Wolf-
gang Orth. Leipzig: Reclam, 1993.
Eggers, Walter and Sigrid Mayer. Ernst Cassirer: An Anno-
tated Bihliography. New York: Garland, 1988.
Graeser, Andreas. Ernst Cassirer. Munich: Beck, 1994.
Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. "Zum Zeitsbegriff Ernst Cassirers."
Phănomenologische Forschungen 13 ( 1982), 65-89.
- . "Zum Begriff der Technik bei Ernst Cassirer und Martin
Heidegger." Phănomeno/ogische Forschungen 20 ( 1987),
91-122.
 CHINA
- . "Einheit und Vielheit der Kulturen in der Sicht Ed-
mund Husserls und Emst Cassirers." In Phănomenologie
im Widerstreit. Zum 50. Todestag Edmund Husserls. Ed.
Christoph Jamme and Otto Poggeler. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1989, 332-51.
- . "Ernst Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen Formen
und ihre Bedeutung fUr unsere Gegenwart." Deutsche
Zeitschrţfi.fiir Philosophie 40 ( 1992), 119-36.
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy oj'Ernst Cassirer.
New York: Tudor, 1958, (includes a bibliography ofCas-
sirer's writings).
Seidengart, Jean, ed. Ernst Cassira De Marbourg a New
York. L 'itim?raire philosophique. Actes du colloque de
Nanterre 1988. Paris: Passages, 1990.
ERNST WOLFGANG 0RTH
Universităt Trier
(Transl. J.N. Mohanty)
CHINA N umerous works of Western philoso-
phy have been translated into Chinese since 1898, but
the reception of phenomenological philosophy began
only relatively recently. While in the 1920s and 1930s
severa! young Japanese studied in Germany with ED-
MUND HUSSERL and MARTIN HEIDEGGER and thus prepared
the introduction ofphenomenology into Japan, only the
names of three Chinese are known to me who studied
phenomeno1ogy in Germany before the Communists
seized power on the mainland. These are YOUDING SHEN,
who !ater taught at Qinghua University in Beijing; WEI
XIONG, who !ater taught in Nanjing and afterwards until
his death, in 1994, at Beijing University; and SHIYI XIAO
(Paul Hsiao ), who helped Heidegger with the transla-
tion of Dao de }ing [Tao te Ching] (see "Wir trafen
uns auf dem Holzmarktplatz" in Erinnerung an Martin
Heidegger, 1977) and !ater taught at Fujen University
in Taipei. But phenomenological works were not pub-
lished in China and Taiwan until the early 1960s.
A partial translation of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's Cri-
tique de la raison dialectique ( 1960) appeared in 1963
(Shangwu yinshuguan). In the same year a part of
Heidegger 's Sein und Zeit (1927), translated by Wei
Xiong, and Sartre's L'existentialisme est un human-
isme ( 1946) were published in Chinese in a collection
entitled Cunzaizhuyi zhexue (The philosophy of ex-
istentialism) published by the Academy of Sciences.
Also in 1963 a translation of ISO KERN's article "Die
drei Wege zur phanomenologischen Reduktion in der
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
99
Philosophie Edmund Husserls" appeared in Number 3
ofthe series Zhexue yicong (Collection oftranslations
in philosophy). In 1964 partial translations of Heideg-
ger's Sein und Zeitand Sartre's L 'etre et le neant( 1943)
appeared in a collection edited by QIAN HONG entitled
Xţfang xiandai zichanjieji zhexue lunzhu xuanji (Selec-
tion ofphilosophical works ofthe contemporary West-
ern capitalist class). In Taiwan a monograph entitled
Husaier Xianxiangxue (Husserl 's phenomenology), by
GUILIANG LI, appeared in 1963.
But these translations did not ha ve a wider influence
on the mainland. for in 1966 the "cultural revolution"
set in and made any serious discussion of non-Marxist
philosophy impossible for more than ten years. Nev-
ertheless during those years YOUZHENG LI studied the
Husserliana volumes very privately in the Beijing li-
brary to which the editor of the series, Father HERMAN
LEO VAN BREDA, had sent them gratis.
A significant reception of phenomenology on the
Chinese mainland began after 1978. At first some
phenomenological articles by Chinese and Western
authors appeared in journals. The earliest article on
Husserl published after 1964 that is known to me is
by KEDING LUO, a professor at Zhongshan University in
Canton, entitled, to trans1ate it, "Husser1's Phenomen-
ology is a Reaction against the Modern Sciences" and
published in Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophical research).
But chapters on phenomenology and EXISTENTIALISM
were also included in textbooks on contemporary West-
ern philosophy ~for example, in the workXiandai xi-
fang zhuming zhexuejia shuping (Commentaries on fa-
mous contemporary Western philosophers), published
by Renzhi Du, 1980. The chapter on Husserl is by
YOUZHENG LI, the one on Heidegger and Sartre is by
Xiong Wei. A chapter on MAX SCHELER by BINGWEN
WANG and one about MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY by FANG-
TONG LIU appeared in a subsequent volume in 1983.
Another large work, Xiandai xifang zhexue (Contem-
porary Western philosophy, 1981; 5th ed. 1987), edited
by Fangtong Liu, a professor at Fudan University in
Shanghai, contains a chapter on phenomenology by
MINGSHENG FAN and one about existentialism by Fang-
tong Liu.
Since 1986 Chinese translations of phenomen-
ological classics have appeared every year. Among
these are the following works of Husserl: Idee der
Phănomenologie [ 1907], translated by LIANGKANG
100 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
NI (Shanghai 1986, Taipei 1987); "Phi1osophie a1s
strenge Wissenschaft" ( 191 1) and "Die Krisis des
europăischen Menschentums und die Philosophie"
[Vienna Lecture, 1935], translated from the Eng1ish
translation by XIANG LO (1988); Die Krisis der eu-
ropiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phiinomenologie, Parts 1 and 2 ( 1936), translated
by QINGXIONG ZHANG ( 1989); fdeen ZU einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913), with Husserl's "Nachwort" of 1930,
translated by Youzheng Li (1992); Logische Unter-
suchungen, voi. I (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik,
1900), translated by Liangkang Ni ( I 994 ).
The works of MAX SCHELER that have been trans-
lated are Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos ( 1928),
transiated by BOYE LI ( 1989), as well as Zur Rehabili-
tierung der Tugend ( 1915); Die christliche Liebesidee
und die gegenwiirtige Welt ( 192 I ), transiated by XI-
AOFENG LIU ( 1990) and Ordo am oris ( 1933 ), translated
by KE LIN (1994). Heidegger's Sein und Zeit was trans-
lated by QINGJIE WANG and .IIAYING CHEN ( 1987). further
works by Heidegger translated are the English edition
of Poetry, Language, Thought ( 1971) by FUCHUN PENG
( 1990) and Untenvegs zur Sprache ( 1959) by ZHOUX-
ING SUN (1993). Works by Sartre that have been trans-
lated are L 'etre et le neant, translated by XUANLIANG
CHEN and others, supervised by XIAOZHEN DU ( 1987);
L 'existentialisme est un humanisme, translated by xu-
LIANG ZHOU and YONGKUAN TANG ( 1988); and Les mots,
trans]ated by PEIQING PAN ( 1989).
Sartre appears to be the best-known phenomen-
ologist in China. On the one hand, this is connected
with his closeness to MARXISM, and on the other, with
his idea of freedom, which after 1978 aroused great
interest among many young intellectuals. Heidegger
(up to now nearly only the early Heidegger) also be-
came known in China especially through Wei Xiong,
who taught at Beijing University. Husserl's phenomen-
ology was also taken up with interest. For example, the
1986 translation of the Idee der Phiinomenologie was
quickly reprinted three times and attained a total edi-
tion of 130,000 copies. Scheler has received notice
because of a growing interest in religion sin ce 1990.
Phenomenology has been taught in China at severa!
important philosophy departments, mainly by young
professors who were educated in Europe: at South-
east University in Nanjing by Professor Liangkang Ni;
at Beijing University by Professor Xiaozhen Du and
Professor XIPING JIN; and at Fudan University in Shang-
hai by Professor Qingxiong Zhang. At present, pheno-
menology in China is chiefly in a stage of reception.
but there is hope for creative and original work. es-
pecially since phenomenology can become connected
with Chinese traditions of the analysis of conscious-
ness, for example Weishi BUDDHISM (a Chinese form of
Vijnanavada).
In October I 994 the first national phenomenology
conference took place in China, organized by Pro-
fessor Liangkang Ni of Southeast University in Nan-
jing. Forty-eight philosophers participated. At this con-
ference a Chinese Society for Phenomenology was
founded. This society started publishing a phenomen-
ological annual, Zhongguo xianxiangxue yu zhexue
pinglun (Phenomenological and philosophical research
in China), with its first issue appearing in 1995, and
will organize more translations of phenomenological
works. An international conference on phenomenology
was held in Hong Kong for the first time in A prii 1996.
Its focus was on the theme of "Interculturality and
Lifeworld." It was jointly organized by the Depart-
ment of Philosophy, the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, The Chinese Society for Phenomenology, and
the German Society of Phenomenological Research.
Ten internationally renouned phenomenologists from
Germany, Belgium, the U.S.A., and Japan, together
with a number of younger phenomenologists from
Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong discussed
philosophical issues of intercultural understanding in
this three and a half day conference.
A note on the phenomenological movement in Hong
Kong should be added. Though phenomenology was
not widely known in Hong Kong before the 1980s,
two important Chinese philosophers Junyi Tang ( 1909-
1978) and Zhongsan Mou (1909-1995), themselves
founders of contemporary Neo-confucianism, showed
critica! interest in the existential philosophy of Hei-
degger against the background of Chinese philosophy.
Neither, however, was attracted by phenomenologu
as such. In the mid-J970s, TZE-WAN KWAN and CflAN-
FAI CHEUNG went to Bochum and Freiburg, Germany,
and finished their doctoral dissertations on Heidegger
and Husserl in the early 1980s. Both are now teach-
ing phenomenology at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong. They are joined by a younger scholar, KWOK-YING
 COGNITIVE SCIENCE
LAU who had written a doctoral thesis on Merleau-
Ponty at the Sorbonne (Paris). They have published,
mostly in Chinese, on various areas ofphenomenology.
There is an increasing interest in phenomenology both
for itself and for its relations to other tendencies among
scholars in local universities. In April 1996 the Hong
Kong Society of Phenomenology was founded with
Cheung as the first president.
ISO KERN
Universităt Bern
(Transl. William R. McKenna)
COGNITIVE SCIENCE The latest name being
applied to the study of the mind is cognitive science.
The new name arose in order to denote the increasing
overlap of a number of disciplines (psychology, com-
puter science, linguistics, anthropology, evolutionary
biology, philosophy, and neuroscience), thus making it
in effect a multidiscipline. When neuroscience is em-
phasized, the new multidiscipline is called "cognitive
neuroscience." Researchers who work in these fields
assume that they can benefit from the methods, con-
cepts, and data provided by the others and that the ques-
tions asked by researchers in different fields are closely
related. We shall illustrate this cross-disciplinary ap-
proach by sketching one discussion central to cogni-
tive science. In the field oflinguistics much inquiry has
been devoted to the nature ofthe mental representation
ofthe rules of gram mar. According to Noam Chomsky
and others, the general rules of gram mar can be formu-
lated only by analyzing LANGUAGE at an abstract level.
The Chomskian school maintains that such abstract
grammatical rules cannot be acquired through learn-
ing. Their argument may be roughly reconstructed as
follows. The rules of gram mar, unlike the meanings of
words, cannot be learned through experience. This can
be shown by briefly examining how children learn the
meanings ofwords. In order to learn the names ofthe
various colors children need to make mistakes that are
then corrected. The child does not learn the meaning
of "yellow" by merely pointing to a lemon or banana
while uttering "yellow," but also by being corrected
when he or she points to a ripe plum and says "yel-
low." Learning, in short, requires the use of negative
evidence. The child does not learn the rules of grammar
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
JOI
through such negative evidence, however, because we
very rarely observe the use of negative evidence in the
actual learning of grammar. Hence, the Chomskians
conci ude, these rules cannot be learned but must rather
be "innate." From this conclusion the question natu-
rally arises ofhow we are to understand this innateness
biologically: where are these rules stored in the brain?
Such rules were first conceived as operating on
symbols. The symbols, like the rules themselves, were
thought to be stored in the brain. "Cognitive theories"
postulated rule-governed operations on symbolic rep-
resentations. These theories were obviously modeled
on the information flow charts that were used in com-
puter programming, and therefore the operations were
viewed as identica! with or analogous to computing
algorithms.
About ten years ago cognitive theories were chal-
lenged by the so-called connectionist approach to in-
formation processing. Connectionism grew out of the
recognition of severe limitations that plagued the appli-
cation of traditional ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Al) mod-
eJs to the actual workings ofthe brain: biologica! neu-
rons are too slow and too unreliable tobe able to carry
out the algorithms postulated by AI theories of men-
tal functions. Connectionist models of the brain take
these biologica! limitations into account and do not
presuppose stored rules or symbolic representations.
These theoretical models consist of layers of artificial
neurons and their connections. In the models there is
a layer of artificial neurons to which a certain input
(i.e., a string ofsymbols) is given, the input-layer. The
symbols in this input-layer are mapped onto a specific
output (another string of symbols), the output-layer. A
rule may be used to describe the input-output relation,
but this rule does not actually exist somewhere in the
neural nctwork. In other words, the network "follows"
the rule in the same sense that the moon "follows" the
rule of gravitation.
In order to clarify this we shall refer to one of the
most prominent and hotly debated examples. When
children learn the past tense of English verbs, they
progress through various stages. They first learn the ir-
regular verbs ("go-went"). They then follow the rule for
regular verbs ("wipe-wiped"). The idea that they are
following this rule is supported by the fact that they
make mistakes through over-generalization ("come-
comed") and by their ability to form the past tense of
102 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
non-existent verbs ("rick-ricked"). At the third stage
the children follow the rule with the exceptions; they
have consequently fully mastered the past tense of
both regular and irregular verbs. Although these facts
ha ve been taken as evidence for the rule-learning view,
David Rumelhart and Jay McClelland and others have
been able to demonstrate that the same behavior can
be produced by a neural network that learns to map a
particular input (the verb stem) onto a specific output
(the past tense). These authors have therefore demon-
strated "that a reasonable account of the acquisition
of past tense can be provided without recourse to the
notion of a 'rule' as anything more than a description
ofthe language .... There is no induction problem. The
child need not figure out what the rules are, not even
that there are rules. The child need not decide whether
a verb is regular or irregular.... A uniform procedure
is applied for producing the past tense form in every
case."
During the past decade neural network models ha ve
been explored in their own right. This has led not only
to a wide range oftechnical applications, but also to the
discovery of a number of general principles of opera-
tion that fit the biologica! facts very well. According
to Teuvo Kohonen, neural network models resemble
the human brain in at least three respects: (1) Neural
networks appear to work better in modules. (2) Func-
tions in neural networks degrade "gracefully" when
connections are severed or parts of the network are
rendered mal functional. ( 3) Some types of network are
capable of self-organization, i.e., of produc ing orderly
mappings of any kind of coherent input pattern without
an externa! "teacher."
Neuroscience is currently one of the most rapidly
advancing fields. Within its framework computational
models, such as the neural networks described above,
are already receiving validation from biology. For ex-
ample, some very specific and very plausible features
of computational neurons ha ve been discovered in the
human brain. These advances have given rise to the
field of"computational neuroscience."
Cognitive scientists have devoted much attention to
the topic of "representation." They ha ve studied rep-
resentations of various sorts- for instance, language,
perception, memory, and mental images. Phenomenol-
ogists address the same topic when they examine the
"intended object," "noematic aspects" of an object,
etc. Cognitive scientists differ from phenomenologists
in that cognitive scientists usually consider representa-
tions tobe mental while most phenomenologists deem
them transcendent to consciousness.
Cognitive scientists and phenomenologists never-
theless tend to address the same questions regarding
this topic. With respect to visual perception, to take
just one example, cognitive scientists have asked how
the different qualities of a percept come to be repre-
sented, how a thing is identified throughout different
representations of it, how we perceive a thing as ha v-
ing a particular color although it may reflect light of
various colors, etc. The same issues were addressed
by EDMUND HUSSERL, MAX SCHELER, ARON GURWITSCH,
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and other phenomeno]ogists.
For example, computational neuroscientists are now
contending that perception is not simply a mirroring of
externa! reality. Perception consists rather of a recon-
struction ofthose features ofreality that ha ve proved to
be important for the organism in the process of adap-
tation. In phenomenology a somewhat similar position
was taken by Scheler. He argued that the "milieu" of
each kind of living being is "existentially relative" to
it and to its biologica! organization. From the point of
view ofthe neuroscientist, the fact that this reconstruc-
tion is adaptive for the organism and is at the same
time accomplished by a finite information processing
system leads to new questions, such as whether certain
perceptual phenomena, like optica! illusions, are the
result of adaptive processes or rather of the limitations
of specific computations. In other words, data from
neuroscience and computational model ing can provide
constraints for our attempts to formulate adequate con-
cepts ofhow the mind works.
One such constraint, the human BODY, has recently
been explored by cognitive scientists such as George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Summarized in the sim-
plest fashion, these cognitive scientists maintain that
the mind does not first emerge as "pure reason" but
rather as embodied, i.e., as spatiotemporally, biolog-
ically, socially, and situationally constrained. Such
"constraints" pertaining to the body should not be
viewed as limitations imposed on humans, however.
Rather, as phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty have
claimed, they should be seen as providing the neces-
sary conditions for the possibility ofthe higher reaches
ofhuman knowledge, art, and imagination.
 COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Lakoff's view, which he calls "experiential real-
ism," includes among others the following theses: ( 1)
Thought is embodied, that is, the structures used to put
together our conceptual systems grow out ofbodily ex-
perience and make sense in terms of it. (2) Thought is
imaginative in that those concepts that are not directly
grounded in experience employ metaphor, metonomy,
and mental imagery. With this thesis Lakoff si des with
that growing body of cognitive scientists who reject the
traditional view that language and perception involve
a literal mirroring of externa! reality. Lakoff contends,
moreover, that it is this imaginati ve capacity that allows
for "abstract" thought and thus takes the mind beyond
what we can see and feei. (3) Thought has gestalt prop-
erties and is thus not atomistic. Mark Johnson shows
how the embodied subject constitutes image schemata
through bodily activity and projects those schemata
onto other situations. Such projection means that the
new situation is understood "metaphorically."
In order to illustrate the crucial ro le of the human
body in shaping experience, we cite a final example
from neural network research. Jeffrey Elman has de-
signed a biologically plausible neural network that he
trained with grammatically complex sentences. In or-
der to model not merely single words but also their
contextual order, the network was designed to con-
tain an extra layer that represented the in formation that
passed through it (in terms of biologica! function, this
layer can be viewed as the frontal labe of the brain).
Sentences with complex grammatical structure were
fed to the network. Despite its own intricate organiza-
tion the network remained unable to capture complex
grammar. It became able to capture complex grammar,
however, if either ( 1) the in put was at first restricted
to simple sentences and only subsequently made more
complex, or (2) the additionallayer ofthe network was
designed to have at first a very limited capacity and
had its capacity increased only !ater (while the input
remained unchanged and complicated from the begin-
ning).
As Elman points out, it is unlikely that children
are exposed to restricted language input and therefore
alternative ( 1) above is unlikely to occur in real life.
Alternative (2) is highly plausible. It is known that the
human frontal lobe is immature at birth and develops
connections to itself as well as to the other parts ofthe
brain during the first decade of life. In other words,
103
this computer simulation suggests that an immature
brain does not impose a restriction on the human baby.
To the contrary, such immaturity is a necessary con-
dition for the child's gradual learning of what can be
modeled on complex rules and representations (input-
output functions). lf the human brain were neurolog-
ically mature at birth, i.e., already equipped with a
complex organization, it could never learn complex
grammar. The child can learn increasingly complex
linguistic structures only because its brain structure
gradually grows more complex while it is being ex-
posed to language, however complex. This biologica!
"constraint" on learning serves as the necessary prereq-
uisite for the child's progressive mastery of complex
grammatical structure.
When summarized, the various views of cognitive
science may be formulated as follows:
( 1) The centrality of the body, both as lived body
and as biologica! organism. The experiencing mind is
an embodied mind. The human mind is shaped by ex-
perienced interactions between the body and the world.
It is also shaped by the brain. A full understanding of
subjectivity must take into account the biology of the
brain as well as the fact that the human brain and body
are products of evolution.
(2) ?re-conceptual experience asfundamental. ?re-
conceptual experience forms the basis for the devel-
opment of structured experience. The practica!, pre-
conceptual activities of everyday life provide the "co-
herent input" that is a necessary condition for the ac-
quisition of any kind of experiential order, including
the forms and rules of language and possibly the cate-
gories of abstract thinking.
(3) Mutual dependency of brain and experience.
Ongoing experience shapes our brains just as our brains
shape ongoing experience. Because of neuroplasticity,
actual experience can alter brain structure. Because of
the adaptation of the brain through evolution, brain
structure shapes experience.
(4) The embodied subject as a se!f-organizing sys-
tem. A self-organizing system like the human brain
can achieve increasing complexity through interaction
with its environment without being taught any rules.
(5) The construction of reality. Reality as we ex-
perience it is the product of and thus dependent upon
mental and neurological processes as well as actions
ofthe lived body.
 104 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Because cognitive science remains firmly within the
"natural attitude" shared by most present-day empir-
ica! scientists, it may appear alien to the more "tran-
scendental" attitude of phenomenologists. In the past,
however, significant developments in phenomenology
have emerged from confrontations between it and nat-
uralistic disciplines. The uses that Merleau-Ponty and
Gurwitsch made of Gestalt and Piagetian psychology
stand out as obvious examples. Recent discussions in
cognitive science offer phenomenologists much new
material regarding precisely the province within which
they claim tobe most at home, namely, the province of
human experience. This new scientific material would
therefore seem to demand serious phenomenological
consideration.
Moreover, the evolving theories of cognitive sci-
ence are actually proving to be cogenial to positions
in phenomenology. Cognitive science is beginning to
show how much of the experienced world depends
upon the productive capacities of mental processes. It is
also substantiating, as we noted above, the functioning
of pre-conceptual prototypes, metaphorical mappings,
imagination, and gestalt wholes at the most basic levels
of awareness. Neuroscience is even demonstrating the
central role of the lived body in shaping experience.
In its own naturalistic fashion, then, cognitive science
is confirming the primacy of perception and the life-
world in the development of human consciousness. It
is tobe hoped that the fu ture will see fruitful exchanges
between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Churchland, Patricia S., and Terry 1. Sejnowski. The Com-
putational Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
Dougherty, Kim, and Mark S. Seidenberg. "Rules or Con-
nections? The Past Tense Revisited." Proceedings of the
Fourteenth Annual Conf'erence of' the Cognitive Science
Society. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992, 259--64.
Elman, Jeffrey L. "Incremental Learning, or The Importance
ofStarting Small." Proceedings of'the Thirteenth Annual
Conf'erence of' the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum, 1991,443-8.
Goldman, Al vin !. Philosophical Applications of Cognitive
Science, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.
- , ed. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
Gurwitsch, Aron. Die Mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der
Milieuwelt [ 1931]. Ed. Alexandre Metraux. Berlin: Wal-
ter de Gruyter, 1977; Human Encounters in the Social
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
World. Trans. Fred Kersten. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 1979.
Hoeffner, James. "Are Rules a Thing of the Past? The Ac-
quisition of Verbal Morphology by an Attractor Network."
Proceedings of'the Fourteenth Annual Conference of'the
Cognitive Science Socie(v. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992,
861--6.
Kohonen, Teuvo. SelrOrgani::ation and Associatil'e Mem-
oty. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1989.
Johnson, Mark. The Bodv in the Mind: The Bodilv Basis of'
Meaning, lmagination. and Reason. Chicago: University
ofChicago Press, 1987.
Lakoff, George. Women, Fire. and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal ahout the Mind. Chicago: Univcrsity
ofChicago Press, 1987.
Miinch, Dieter. "The Early Work of Husserl and Artificialln-
telligence." The Journal of'the British Societyfi:Jr Pheno-
menology 22 ( 1990), 107-20.
Pinker, Stephan, and Alan Prince. "On Language and Con-
nectionism: An Analysis of a Parallel Distributed Pro-
cessing Model of Language Acquisition." Cognition 28
(1988), 73-193.
Rueckl, Jay, Kyle Cave. and Stephen Kosslyn. "Why Are
'What' and 'Where' Processed by Separate Cortical Sys-
tems? A Computational Investigation." Journal of' Cogni-
tive Neuroscience 1 ( 1989), 216-71.
Rumelhart, David, and Jay L. McC1elland. "On Learning
the Past Tense of English Verbs." In their PDP Research
Group: Parallel Distrihuted Processing: Explorations in
the Microstructure ofCognition. Voi. 2. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1986, 216-71.
Scheler, Max. Die Wissensfi:Jrmen und die Gesellschaft.
Leipzig: Der Neue-Geist Verlag, 1926.
Wiggins, Osborne. "Phenomenology and Cognitive Sci-
ence." In Phenomenology of'the Cultural Disciplines. Ed.
Mano Daniel and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1994, 67-83
0SBORNE P. WIGGINS
University of'Louisville
MANFRED SPITZER
Universităt Heidelherg
COMMUNICATION, PHILOSOPHY OF See PHI-
LOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION.
COMMUNICOLOGY Communicology is the
study of human discourse in ali its embodied forms
ranging from speech and LANGUAGE to gesture and
signs. It is a HUMAN sciENCE that includes various forms
of semiotic mediation beginning with the conscious ex-
perience ofthe human BODY and ending with the many
forms of extension by TECHNOLOGY, such as cellular
 COMMUNICOLOGY
telephones, fax machines, radio, television, and FILM.
Phenomenology in the context of communicology is an
approach associated with the geisteswissenschaftlich
approach to the study of human conscious experience,
especially in the semiotic performance of communica-
tion (la parole) and in language (la langue) as semiotic
competence. The human sciences, including commu-
nicology, narratology, and rhetoric, use an analytic and
critica! method of depiction or description grounded in
a logic of discovery. Following the medieval tradition,
the evidence of discovery is capta, i.e., that which is
"taken" in perception. It is the Q.E.I. method (quod
erat inveniendum).
By comparison, the NATURAL SCIENCES USe a math-
ematicaJ method of invention for prediction or as-
cription, e.g., control in measurement. In this phys-
ical case, the evidence is data of invention, or that
which is "given" in expression. This is the Q.E.D.
method (quod erat demonstrandum). The methodolog-
ical conjunction of ( 1) capta or data and (2) acta, the
embodiment of perception and expression that is the
Q.E.F. method (quod erat .faciendum), characterizes
phenomenology as a human science, which is a theme
that, for example, we find in MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's Sein
und Zeit ( 1927). The immediate European forerunner
of phenomenological theorists in the human sciences
was FRANZ BRENTANO. Brentano 's Psychologie vom em-
pirischen Standpunkt (1874) divides the phenomena
of consciousness into ideas or representations ( Vorstel-
lungen ), judgments, and emotive phenomena, such as
love and hate. Brentano's account is directly aimed
at revising Aristotle's account of reasoning logically,
understanding human character, and understanding the
emotions, as noted in the Rhetoric.
Communication theory in its modem sense became
associated with phenomenology in June of 1922 when
EDMUND HUSSERL gave a series oflectures in German at
the University of London on the topic of "Phenomen-
ological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy."
The earliest report in English ofthese lectures is in C.
K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaningo{Meaning:
A Study ofthe lnfiuence o(Language upon Thought and
the Science ofSymbolism ( 1923). (Note that during this
period "communication" was known, as the "science of
symbolism.") Husserl 's explicit purpose in the lectures
is to explain "transcendental sociologica! phenomen-
ology having reference to a manifest multiplicity of
105
conscious subjects communicating with one another."
These lectures were given following the second edition
( 1913) ofhis Logische Untersuchungen, which formed
the basis for another connection to communicology.
The Logische Untersuchungen ( 190().-190 1) had a
dramatic influence on young linguists in the Prague
Linguistic Circle, who were studying the structure of
language and speech and developed STRUCTURALISM.
Along with other students ofHusserl-including LUD-
WIG LANDGREBE, HENDRIK J. POS, and DMITRJ TSCHIZEWSKIJ
- there was a gifted linguistic scholar named ROMAN
JAKOBSON. On November 11, 1935, Jakobson invited
Husserl to address the Prague circle on the topic of
"Phanomenologie der Sprachc." As ELMAR HOLENSTEIN
suggests, Jakobson became one of Husserl's most in-
fluential students by formulating the EIDETIC METHOD in
relation to the empirica! basis for a phenomenology of
communication grounded in linguistics and semiotics.
Jakobson's lifetime offoundational work in communi-
cology led to the formulation ofthe theory ofcommu-
nication.
At virtually the same time, another major exten-
sion of Husserl 's philosophy of communication oc-
curred with the publication of Karl Biihler's ( 1879-
1963) Sprachtheorie (1934). Biihler's explicit inten-
tion is to build on the conjunction of Ferdinand de
Saussure's Cours de linguistique generale ( 1916) and
Husserl 's Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931 ], which
he considers to be a major correction to the Logis-
che Untersuchungen. Biih1er's organic model of hu-
man communication explicates the constitution ofthe
concrete acoustic phenomenon we know as a sign in
language or speaking. The model consists of symbols
in language that are a representation for objects and
states of affairs; symptoms in language that are the ex-
pression of the inner states of the sender; and signals
in language that appeal to the hearer and direct the per-
son's inner and outer behavior. These are ali semantic
concepts for Biihler, and they bear a striking similar-
ity to both Brentano's categories for perception and
Aristotle's categories for expression.
While Husserl 's orginal work on language and com-
munication was highly accessible in Europe, he was
not so well known in the United States. Wilbur Mar-
shall Urban published his The lntelligible World: Meta-
physics and Value ( 1929) to set forth the philosophical
thesis that there are certainly three necessary presup-
106 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
positions of intelligib1e communications, name1y, that
"I exist and others like me, inhabiting a world." This
postu1ate is remarkably similar to MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY's ontology ofthe Self-Other-World relationship
of embodiment. Urban argues that the possibility of in-
telligible communications is the ultimate postulate of
ali thought and knowledge. While the postulate cannot
be explained here, it is the presupposition for advanc-
ing ali philosophy and science.
He undertakes to explore this problematic in his
second major work, Language and Reality: The Phi-
losophy of Language and the Principles of Symbol-
ism ( 1939). Here he also quotes Husserl 's London lec-
tures as focusing philosophy and science on the pheno-
meno1ogy of communication. Following Husserl, Ur-
ban lists the fundamental meaning-functions of lan-
guage as "representative or symbolic," which also in-
cludes the "intuitive" as a subcategory; "indicative";
and "emotive." In his general phenomenology of com-
munication, Urban distinguishes "behavioral commu-
nication" from "inte11igible communication." The be-
havioral form is simply what we observe uncritically
in others. The intelligible form displays the two cri-
teria of being "referenial" and "systemic," i.e., there
is a "similarity of referend" and a "similarity of con-
text or of universe of discourse" between addresser
and addressee. In short, Urban was responsible for the
first explication of, and commentary on, Husserl 's un-
translated work, including the London 1ectures and Lo-
gische Untersuchungen, for the American intellectual
community.
Prior to Urban's presentation of Husserl's phi1os-
ophy of communication in the UNITED STATES, Husserl
had been discovered in 1904 by Charles Sanders Peirce
( 1839-1914 ). In a fascinating historical parallel, Peirce
is also known for his conjunction of semiotics and
phenomenological philosophy as presented in his Col-
lected Papers ( 1931-58). Howcver, Peirce's philo-
sophical orientation is fundamentally different from
that of Husserl. For Peirce, philosophy is a subclass of
the science of discovery. Discovery is a logic in which
the relation of signs to their objects (i.e., conscious-
ness) combines with "phenomenology" (!ater changed
to "phaneroscopy"), which for Peirce is the experi-
encc of the objective actual world. In this Peircean
contest, logic is the science of symbols and, with allu-
sion to the medieval trivium, has three parts: "formal
or speculative grammar," which concerns the mean-
ing or reference of symbols in general; "formal logic,"
which concerns the formal truth conditions ofsymbols;
and "formal or speculative rhetoric," which studies the
force ofsymbols in appealing to the mind.
In !ater writings, Peirce renames the third category
"objective logic" in order to expand its scope to in-
clude ali the general conditions under which a problem
presents itself for solution or in which one question
leads to another. For Peirce, signs consist of an ini-
tial consciousness called a "representamen" or "first-
ness"; an "object" in experience ("secondness"); and
the resulting relationship ("thirdness") arising between
them, which is called an "interpretant" of the mean-
ing of conscious experience, i.e., a sign phenomenon.
His typology of sign categories consists of three tri-
chotomies following the order offirstness, secondness
and thirdness respectively: Tone, Token, and Type;
Icon, Index, and Symbol; and Rheme, Dicent, and Ar-
gument. Ali these terms are part ofthe standard vocab-
ulary of communicology in contemporary usage.
As an emigre, Jackobson is part of both the Amer-
ican and the European traditions in phenomenology.
His theory of communication is internationally and in-
terdisciplinarily recognized as a definitive statement of
systematic and systemic theory, a theory that is both
"exhaustive and solid" according to PAUL RICCEUR. The
complete theory is based in the phonology of "dis-
tinctive fcatures" and the semantics of "redundancy
features." First, for Jakobson, distinctive features in-
dicate a logica] criterion of opposition in speech that
is the presence of an attribute ("markedness") in con-
traposition to its absence ("unmarkedness"). Take, for
example, the sentence "The mayor put on her coat." We
do not know the gender ofthe "mayor" until we get to
the word "her" and discover reflexively that the origi-
nal unmarked work "mayor" is now marked (gendered
as female).
Second, redundancy features in language involve
the phenomenological apposition of "variation" and
"invariance." In our example, there is maximum vari-
ance as between "mayor" and "her" (i.e., neutra! noun
versus gendered pronoun), yet the reference is invari-
antly redundant, and predictable as such, by the idea of
nomination (person named). In short, there is a combi-
nation of both distinctive features in opposition (log-
ica! signification) and redundancy features in apposi-
 COMMUNICOLOGY
tion (phenomenological signification) to create MEAN-
ING. Husserl anticipates this fact in his famous dictum
that "subjectivity is intersubjectivity." Ali languages
and communication systems may be described accu-
rately with these communicological features, but their
combination as necessary and sufficient conditions es-
tablishes the uniqueness of human discourse in com-
parison to animal and machine systems.
The theory is illustrated by Jakobson 's well-known
graphic model ofhuman communicative elements and
(functions):
CONTEXT
(referential)
MESSAGE
(poetic)
ADDRESSER - - - - ADDRESSEE
(emotive) ( conative)
CONTACT
(phatic)
CODE
(metalinguistic)
In brief, communication occurs when an addresser
speaks with an addressee. Normally, we assume an in-
terpersonal situation between two embodied persons,
although the theory and model hold true with the in-
trapersonal, group, social, and cultural levels of com-
munication as well.
The speaker's message establishes distinctive fea-
tures by creating a referential "context" for the code's
metalinguistic function, e.g., speaking American En-
glish te lis a listener to use the code "English" to under-
stand what is being said. Both persons in the conver-
sation are taking advantage ofthe "poetic function" of
language in which a pardigmatic (vertical) category of
words is interchangeable with the syntagmatic (hori-
zontal) category ofwords. That is to say, the addresser
expresses the utterance "The mayor put on her coat"
by choosing each word in the sentence from a vertical
category on the basis of ( 1) selection, (2) substitution,
(3) similarity, which together form the process of (4)
metaphor. For example, "mayor" is a noun and the
vertical column category simply consists of ali other
nouns known to the addresser. So when the addressee
misunderstands the utterance as "The major put on her
coat," the error is paradigmatic.
When the addressee \istens more carefully and hears
the correct utterance (mayor), he or she is choosing
107
each word in the sentence form a horizontal category
on the basis of ( l) combination, and (2) contexture,
(3) contiguity, which together form the process of
(4) metonymy. This is to say, the listener is forming
the linear string of"the+mayor+put+on+her+coat ." Of
course, both persons in the conversation know what
the other is do ing, so that the addresser encodes a mes-
sagelcode into a horizontal word string by selecting a
message from a series of context (code) word groups
("vertical columns") in memory. Yet the reverse is
true for the addressee, who decodes a codelmessage
by arranging (code) a combination (message) ofword
groups (vertical columns) into a perceived sentence
or horizontal word string. In short, utterances are a
very complex condition in which an addresser and an
addressee establish "contact" physically and psycho-
logically, empirically and eidetically, by using a mes-
sage, code, and context that are phenomenologically
reversible, reflexive, and reflective.
Within the domain of discourse, Jakobson extends
certa in fundamental notions of Husserl 's methodol-
ogy as found in the First Investigation, called "Ex-
pression and Meaning," in the Logische Untersuchun-
gen. Husserl's phenomenology of meaning creates a
reversible methodological triad of the order of expe-
rience or constitution of meaning: sense; sign-vehicle
or "name-thing"; and object, from the point of view of
sign production by the addresser. Thus the addresser's
"expression" creates "meaning" (Bedeutung). By com-
parison, the order of analvsis from the point ofview of
the interpreter or addressee is sign-vehicle, sense, and
referent. Here the addressee's perception of an "indi-
cation" constitutes a "manifestation" (Kundgabe).
Husserl further specifies the fact that the MEANING
of conscious experience has four domains of commu-
nicative reference as a sign process of expression and
perception. First, "meaning" is what an expression sig-
nifies (the signifier), while "manifestation" refers to the
perception ofthe speaker by the listener (the signified).
Second, the same "meaning" may refer to different "ob-
jects" and conversely. Third, "symbolic meanings" are
a product of informed perception in contrast to "intu-
itive meanings," which have a common "ideal mean-
ing" in a logica!, not psychological, sense. He suggests
that in conscious experience there is a phenomenon
and its constituting logic, hence a "phenomenology."
The phenomenon is the object-referent (NOIMA) ofthe
 108 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
constituting act directed toward it (noesis). The who1e
process is called " JNTENTJONALITY" whereby a person
is "conscious of ... [experience]."
Among the more important interpreters of Husserl
is the French philosopher and psychologist, MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, as well as his equally notable student,
MICHEL FOUCAULT. Merleau-Ponty's major work on ex-
pression, Signes ( 1960), as well as his Phimomenologie
de la perception ( 1945), re1ate semiotics, the theory of
signs, to phenomenology. In his explication ofboth per-
ception and expression, he suggests that there are two
levels of discourse: ( 1) existential discourse in which a
person expresses his or her speaking in an original and
perceptive speech, i.e., a "speech speaking" (la parole
parlante) that proffers an authentic message and (2)
empirica! discourse where a person merely expresses
what has already been said by others, i.e., a "speech
spoken" (la parole par/ee) that legitimizes the social
cade. In the speech speaking case, there is a rhetorical
function of identity where consciousness of experi-
ence is an original reference to existential meaning,
i.e., the authentic act of expression that is the linguistic
message embodied in the person as addresser. First,
Merleau-Ponty corrects Saussure's static notion of la
parole by making it the dynamic la parole parlante
or what Jakobson called the "message" in his parallel
correction of Saussure. Second, Merleau-Ponty cor-
rects the concept of la langue by the more existential
la parole par/ee or what Jakobson in agreement calls
the "code." In this second category of speech spoken,
the rhetorical function is banal and evokes an experi-
ence of consciousness, i.e., the commonplace meaning
that is the linguistic code discovered by the addressee.
Michel Foucault's Les mots et les choses ( 1966),
intentionally retitled by him for its English transla-
tion as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the
Human Sciences, and L ·archeologie du savoir (The ar-
chaeology of knowledge, 1969) add a methodologica1
dimension to Merleau-Ponty's view. He argues that the
second, empirica! code level of discourse (enonciation)
that we know (connaissance) as the cultural code of
social power hides the first, existential message leve1
of "stating" discourse (enon ce) that we understand
(savoir) as desire. This agonistic or contested process
of rhetorical levels forms a "rupture" or ongoing dis-
continuity of discourses constructing and deconstruct-
ing one another in apposition to the embodied person.
By using the method of "archaeology" (connaissance
or knowing as the experience of consciousness; Jakob-
son 's "horizontal" syntagmatic category of code) and
the method of"genealogy" (savoir or understanding as
the consciousness of experience; Jakobson 's "vertical"
paradigmatic category of message ), Foucault engages
his third level, which he names "critica! methodo1ogy"
in his L 'ordre du discours ( 1971 ).
Note that Foucau1t's archaeology is a method of
"oppositions" or "exclusions" (Jakobson 's distinctive
features), whi1e genealogy is a method of"interstices"
or "ensemb1e" (Jakobson 's redundancy features ). This
critica! model subjects both archaeology and geneal-
ogy to one another as a dialectic of both opposition and
apposition as Foucault's "reversal-principle" (Jakob-
son's poetic function). Foucault is following Merleau-
Ponty's prescription that the first step of analysis is
a "phenomenology of phenomenology." That is, the
conjunctions of both consciousness and experience in
discourse are seen as reversible, reflexive, and reflec-
tive in judgment. Hence Foucault offers a critica! ap-
proach to discourse viewed as a phenomenological
semiotic (Husserl's order of anaylsis) that completes
Merleau-Ponty's approach of a semiotic phenomen-
ology (Husserl's order of experience). In short, while
Merleau-Ponty examines the place of personal per-
ception in public expression (intentionality as a mes-
sage/code), Foucault critically studies the reverse, i.e.,
the place of public expression in personal perception
(embodiment as a code/message) as illustrated, for ex-
ample, in the narratology ofhis Herculine Barbin, dite
Alexina B. (Herculine Barbin; Being the Recently Dis-
covered Memoirs of a Ninetheenth Century French
Hermaphrodite, 1978).
Tuming now to the contemporary scene, the pheno-
meno1ogical theory of communication was adopted un-
cler the name communicology in the late 1950s in the
United States and is associated with the ear1y founders
ofthe International Communication Association- es-
pecially Franklin H. Knower (1901-1993) and Elwood
Huey Allen Murray (1978-1988) and with Wendell
Johnson ( 1906--1965), a major scholar in the theory
of general semantics, founded by Alfred Korzybski
( 1879-1950), whowrote Scienceand Sanity(1933) as a
reformation of Aristot1e's philosophy oflanguage with
much of the same intent as Brentano. It is also impor-
tant to note that GEORGES GUSDORF's La parole [Speech]
 COMMUNICOLOGY
was published in 1950 and then translated into English
in 1965 as the inaugural volume of the Northwestern
University Press series "Studies in Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy." This volume is largely an ex-
position of Merleau-Ponty's thought about communi-
cology and was followed by Remy C. Kwant's Pheno-
menology of Language ( 1965) and Phenomenology of
Expression ( 1969). RICHARD LANIGAN's Speaking and
Semiology: Maurice Merleau-Ponty sPhenomenologi-
cal The01y of Existential Communication appeared in
1972.
Among communication scholars in recent years,
the disciplinary term "communicology" has expanded
from its original focus on interpersonal communica-
tion to the other phenomenological levels. ( 1) Intra-
personal communicology now includes the study of ah-
normal as well as normal communication in the realm
of cognitive, affective, and conative meaning; the study
ranges from speech pathology and audiology problems
to cognitive dysfunction in the therapeutic settings of
medici ne. (2) Social communicology now includes the
study of mass media arts and sciences; the discipline
ranges from radio, television, and the publishing in-
dustry at one end ofthe spectrum to FILM, THEATER, and
DANCE at the other end. And (3) cultural communicol-
ogy focuses on the dynamic inftuence of intercultural
contact and cross-cultural exchange, especially in the
areas of LANGUAGE, kinship, and ECONOMICS; this area
ranges from semiotics ( code theory) to ETHNOLOGY (the
study ofpeople's practices) and to what is now called
the "new in formation order" (informatics) in the world.
At the interculturallevel, we should note that "com-
municology" is now widely used as an appropri-
ate translation for the French communicologie (and
its Italian and Spanish equivalents) and the German
Kommunikationswissenscha(t. This shift in labels to
communicology and communicologist is duc in large
part to a systematic effort to avoid misunderstanding.
The confusion was encouraged by the historical am-
biguity of the "communication theory of in formation"
proposed in 1949 by Shannon and Weaver as com-
pared to Jakobson 's proposal in 1960 to distinguish
communication theory from in formation theory on the
basis of the phenomenological connections to what
he calls the "rhetorical branch of linguistics" inher-
ent in communication theory. Clarity of usage was
not achieved, although a serious effort was made at
109
the First World Congress on Communication Science
held in Berlin in 1977. Communicology is now clearly
distinguished from information theory on the ground
that communicology studies the fui! range of semiotic
levels in discourse, i.e., the semantic (meaning), syn-
tactic (patterning), and pragmatic (practicing) forms of
discourse. By comparison, information theory is con-
cerned only with the syntactic parameters of physical
signal systems, e.g., the electrica! impulses that make
up telephone transmission or computer memory. In-
deed, "information theory" as a name is quickly being
replaced by signal theory. Thus the awkward phrase
"communication theorist" has been replaced by com-
municologist, a fact acknowledged by the proceedings
at the First World Congress on Communication and
Semiotics in Monterey, Mexico, in 1993.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Biihler, Karl. Sprachtheorie. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1934; rpt.
1982; Theory of Language: The Representational Func-
tion ofLanguage. Trans. Donald R. Goodwin. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins, 1990.
Devito, Joseph A. Communicology: An Introduction to the
Study ofCommunication. New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
Foucault, Michel. Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard,
1966; The Order ofThings: An Archaeology ofthe Human
Sciences. Trans. anonymous. London: Tavistock, 1970.
Gusdorf, Georges. La parole. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1953; Speaking (La Parole). Trans. Paul
T. Brockelman. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1965.
Holenstein, Elmar. Jakohson ou le structllralisme
phenomhwlogique. Paris: Editions Seghers, 1974; Ro-
man Jakohson :~ Approach to Language: Phenomenologi-
cal Structuralism. Trans. C. and T. Schelbert. Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976.
!Jsseling, Samuel. Retoriek en Filosofie. Bilthoven: Am-
boboeken, 1975; Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An
Historical Survey. Trans. Paul Dunphy. The Hague: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1976.
Jacques, Francis. Difference et suhjectivite: Anthropologie
d'un point de vue relationnel. Paris: Editions Aubier Mon-
taigne, 1982; Dijference and Suhjectivity: Dialogue and
Personal Identitv. Trans A. Rothwell. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1991.
Jakobson, Roman. "Verbal Communication." Scienti/ic
American ( 1972), 37-44; rpt. in book form as Commu-
nication. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman Co., 1972.
Kwant, Remy C. Phenomenology of Language. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1965.
-. Phenomenology of Expression. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969.
Lanigan, Richard L. The Human Science of Communicol-
ogy: The Phenomenology of Discourse in Foucault and
Merleau-Ponty. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1992.
11 o ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
O'Neill, John. The Communicative Body: Studies in Com-
municative Philosophy, Politic.~. and Sociology. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989.
Ogden, Charles K., and 1. A. Richards. The MeaningofMean-
ing: A Study ol the Jnfluence olLanguage upon Thought
and the Science al Meaning [1923]. New York: Harcourt,
1946.
Ricceur, Paul. Main Trends al Research in the Social and
Human Sciences: Part //. New York: UNESCO, 1978;
rpt. as Main Trends in Philosophy. New York: Holmes &
Meier, 1979.
Ruesch, Jiirgen, and Gregory Bateson. Communication: The
Social Matrix al Psychiat1y. New York: W. W. Norton,
1968.
Urban, Wilbur Marshall. Language and Reality: The Philos-
ophy ofLanguage and the Principles o/Symholism [ 1939].
New York: Books ofLibraries Press/Arno Books, 1971.
RICHARD LEO LANIGAN
Southern Illinois Uni1•ersity
CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY It is
obvious that we are, at the same time, in and part ofthe
world into which we are born, that we have an "idea"
of the world in and for itse1f once we are in it, and
also that we are aware of and act upon the world, that
we "make" or "constituie" ourselves and the world of
which we are aware. Despite the many variations and
themes rung on the term over more than four decades,
most generally "phenomenology" signifies for EDMUND
HUSSERL a description and clarification ofhow the world
is "made" as the only way to make sense of how we
ha ve an "idea" of the world in and for itself once we
are in it. To express the matter in another way, what
Husserl started out to show in his first publications was
how the world in and for itself acquires certa in forms
that purport tobe valid for any world you please. Yet,
he realized, ali he had shown was that the forms are
valid for a world as a possible world for consciousness,
thus for what is "made," "constituted." But what about
the world existing in and for itself with which he had
started? Husserl 's strategy was to hold this whole ques-
tion in "suspension," to maintain what DORION CAIRNS
called an "officially neutra! attitude" toward it - a
strategy that in no way degrades, oral ters or elevates or
reassigns the status ofthe world in and for itself. When
set into self-conscious exercise, this strategy consists
of examining the ways in which a "making" or "con-
stituting" consciousness and its objects are relevant for
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
the analysis of what is in and for itself. How can the
analysis of what is "ma de" be relevant for the "idea"
of the world in and for itself? What Husserl will caii
by the time of ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913) "con-
stitutive phenomenology" has as its task to describe and
clarify how.
1 begin with the assumption of a world in which
there exists, as one minor item, myse1f, with my con-
sciousness, awareness. 1 then consider just my con-
sciousness and its objects "as such," describing them as
"clues" to how they are "made," "produced," or "gen-
erated" in and through my consciousness of them ( or:
in and through the "constituting" ofthem). The pheno-
menological result is the discovery that the world and
its things are nothing but "intentiona! objects" COIJSti-
tuted as "poles of identity" and "intersecting lines of
intentionality," to use Husserl 's !ater expressions for
this broadest meaning ofthe term "constitution." The
world and its things and forms are essentially noth-
ing but intentiona! objects, some of which exemplify
necessary structures and characteristics for conscious-
ness of them either as immanent or as transcendent
to consciousness- it being evidentially false that ali
immediately given, constituted intentiona] objects are
ipso fac ta immanent to consciousness. Finally, 1 then
go on to say that this is the on(v world that 1 can mean
and intend to in any way, that it is the only world 1
have, and that to speak of any "other" world would be
self-contradictory.
But how can such a conclusion be reconciled with
the starting point of myself as but one minor item in
the world when, as a matter of empiricalfact, 1 am the
(efficient) "maker" of the world, am "constitutive" of
the world?
In terms of the actual course of Husserl 's think-
ing from the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901)
to Ideen 1 and then to the revisions for the second edi-
tion of Logische Untersuchungen ( 1913), this dilemma
proves to be the motive for the increasingly self-
conscious exercise of the phenomenological EPOCI lE
and for the analysis of its result, the phenomenologi-
cal reduction. The exercise of the epoche with respect
to the world in and for itself, while not removing that
fact, allows for changing the de facto course of my
consciousness into a "pure possibility, one among the
quite 'optional' pure possibilities"- pure of "every-
 CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
thing that restricts to this fact or to any fact what-
cver"- that then, by means of EIDETIC ;."1ETHOD, can
be thought of as exemplifying a pure possibility (again
to use Husserl's !ater expressions). The significance of
Husserl 's thought is that it is not only actual and de
facto but equally in its reftexivity dejure purely pos-
sible and therefore not confined to its own factuality
and to its own "making." As such, it is a variant ofthc
thought and ofthe "making" of anyone you please. To
clarify this conclusion we need to develop further the
idea of constitutive phenomenology.
By the time of "Philosophie als strenge Wis-
senschaft" ( 1911 ), 1deen 1, and the second edition of
the Logische Untersuchungen, "phenomenology" is so
defined as to examine how the analysis of "making,"
of"constituting," can be relevant for the analysis ofthe
idea ofthe world by re(rainingfi"om acceptingthe sensc
that consciousness has for itselfas part ofthe world-
i.e., as a minor item in the idea of the world that we
ha ve once we are in the world- and considering the
effect of that refraining. One can discriminate a sta tus
of o ne 's consciousness as a primary (or: "transcenden-
tal") status of"making" or "constituting" ofthe world;
it is primary in the sense of being more fundamental
than the sta tus of its actuality or possibility in a world.
(By extension, phenomenology, with the epoche, and
reduction are also called "transcendental.") Phenomen-
ology, accordingly, now has a dual theme: the primary
or transcendental sta tus of consciousness "making," or
"constitutive" of, the world, and consciousness neces-
sarily and validly self-apperceived as "in" the world.
The relation of"making" or "constituting" to the world
is an intrinsic one, sui generis, explored underthe head-
ing of the problem of INTENTIONALITY, and is not to be
confused with the relation that consciousness consid-
ered as in the world has to the world. Expressed in these
terms, constitutive phenomenology has a dual theme.
It consists of describing the sui generic character of
any actual consciousness as constitutive of the world
of the natural attitude intended to and posited, and it-
self as intended to and posited (as self-apperceived)
in the world with respect to those determinations any
actual consciousness must have so as to be an essen-
tially possible exemplification of "constituting," and
of being "constituted" as in some possible world- a
narrower meaning ofthe term "constitution."
By the time of 1deen 1, Husserl also made a sharp
III
contrast between consciousncss as it is regardless of
its self-apperception in the world (as "transcenden-
tal") and consciousness as "mundane" or "worldly" (as
self-apperceptive, as "psychic"). At the same time, he
sharply distinguished between (pure) phenomenology
as an eidetic science of transcendental consciousness
and psychology as an empirica! or factual science of
individual worldly consciousness. These distinctions
are likewise taken up in constitutive phenomenology
now in a broader meaning of the term, "constitutive
phenomenology." Within psychology, for example, a
distinction is made between an empirica! psychology
and an eidetic pure psychology: by exercising a psy-
chological epoche we can describe the constituting by
psychic consciousness as to its kinds ofstructures of in-
tendings and positings and, inseparably connected with
them owing to their intrinsic intentionality, the kinds of
noematic, intentiona! objects constituted not only in the
broader and narrower meanings of "constitution," but
also those constituted in the most original ways (a sti li
narrower meaning of"constitution") and those actively
produced by spontaneous acts in Husserl 's pregnant
meaning of the term "act" - the narrowest meaning
of the term "constitution." 1 can now proceed to con-
sider an actual case ofpsychic constituting as a purely
possible example of consciousness in a possible world,
describing just the constituting of empirica! kinds as
before but also essential psychic constitutive possibil-
ities and impossibilities and necessities, and that not
only in connection with the constituting ofthe psychi-
cal, but also ofthe physic, the psychophysical, and the
cultural-social. We then ha ve the foundation for devel-
oping eidetic sciences of material regions, of formal
regions, (FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGIES, (ogics of
possible being), and the like for any essentially possible
concrete woRLD.
There is a further epoche that can be exer-
cised by refraining from participating in and pasit-
ing the "natural attitude" that presupposes the world
and psychic self-apperception as in the world. The
result is the "phenomenological" ("transcendental-
phenomenological") reduction, which discloses the
world, and whatever else is or may be intended to
and posited, as primarily a NOEMA, an intentiona! ob-
ject as transcendental (i.e., as correlative to "transcen-
dental subjectivity" cum "transcendental intersubjec-
tivity"). Just as the constituting of o ne 's actual psy-
 112 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
chic consciousness can be described, so too can the
constituting of one's actual transcendental conscious-
ness, producing an empirica! transcendental constitu-
tive phenomenology. And just as in the case of the
purely psychic, a further use of eidetic method yields
an eidetic transcendental phenomenology, the noe-
matic correlate of which is the whole world and ali
possible variants of the whole world. The chief task
of transcendental-constitutive analysis is to examine
and clarify the structures of transcendental constituting
consciousness in which the concrete individual world
is "built up" as an intersubjectively valid meaning
for constituting consciousness. Husserl then introduces
specific methodological strategies ofwhat he calls "un-
building" (Abbau) and "building up" (Aufbau) analysis
appropriately fashioned to a given scope ofsteps ofthe
transcendental-phenomenological reduction.
If we include "constitution" in its broadest to its
narrowest meanings, then transcendental eidetic con-
stitutive phenomenology may be defined as the de-
scription and clarification of ali actual and possible
originary and non-originary intentionalities in which
the concrete individual world, and whatever else may
be intended to in it, are evidentially intended to and
posited as self-identica! and mutually distinct unities
built up as having a valid intersubjective sense in and
through a multiplicity of stratified similar and differ-
ent transcendental processes of consciousness in the
natural attitude.
In !ater writings, especially Cartesianische Med-
itationen [ 1913], these analyses are also tailored to
the distinction between " GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY"
and "static" phenomenology, introducing explicitly
what Husserl calls "oriented constituting" according to
which the task is then to discover how what is "primar-
ily" constituted enters into and acquires the "appear-
ance" of the "secondarily" constituted in a particular
order at the next highest level of stratified constituting
and as a horizon ofbeing accessible from the primarily
constituted. In the broadest meaning of "genesis" in
Husserl, the constituting of something intended to and
posited as self-identica! is a "generating" (a "making"
in the narrower and narrowest meanings of constitut-
ing), membered and articulated at different strata or
stories of experience.
There is, however, in the last publications a con-
trasting and strict meaning of "genesis" that pre-
supposes constitutive ( or in this contrast and con-
text, "static") analysis. In Cartesianische Meditatio-
nen (§§ 36f.) "genesis" in the strict sense refers to
those features ofthe "monad" that are "einmalig," "for
the first and uniquely only time," and essentially irre-
versible in time. In the case of transcendental consti-
tutive phenomenology, the fundamentally immediate
phenomenological datum is just that temporal moment
comprised of retending to what was previously pro-
tended to (the present retention of the previous pro-
tention in the stream of the "inner TIME" of constitut-
ing consciousness). Thus the founding-founded lay-
ers of experience constituted in simultaneity point to
genetic relations in irreversible succession. "Genetic"
phenomenology (and in some manuscripts "GENERATIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY"), clarifying the latter datum ofreten-
tional irreversible succession ("history"), is then con-
trasted with "constitutive" phenomenology, clarifying
the former datum ofretending to what was previously
protended to, a datum of simultaneity.
In !ater publications Husserl also analyzes cases of
"pre-constitution," which signifies not unconstituted
or non-constituted, but instead "objects" constituted in
so-called "primary passivity," such as retentions and
protentions, as well as cases of affective and cogni-
tive intentionality that do not presuppose involvement
by the EGO. Here, too, he speaks of constitution by
"passive" and "active" genesis of intentiona! unities of
sense--presumably in a narrower, but not the narrowest
or strict sense ofthe term "genesis." In any case, con-
stitutive phenomenology also includes the domain of
"pre-constitution" as well.
In Jdeen 1 and afterwards Husserl insists that ev-
ery genuine philosophical problem must have its solu-
tion in transcendental constitutive analysis, so that for
every valid proposition in transcendental constitutive
phenomenology there is a corresponding valid propo-
sition in philosophy, although of necessity the con-
verse is not the case. There are some limits, however,
set in the view of what Husserl called "transcenden-
tal phenomenological idealism" according to which
( l) it is spurious in philosophy that there is a rela-
tion between objects of consciousness and things in
themselves that are not such objects; (2) it is plainly
false that ali immediate objects of consciousness are
in the mind; and (3) any proposition in philosophy ex-
pressing the concept of anything that is not constituted
 CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
is a self-contradictory proposition. Thus transcenden-
tal eidetic constitutive analysis produces knowledge
that rules out a considerable number of philosophical
ideas from Platonic realism to Berkeleyian idealism to
Hegelian dialectics. On the other hand, transcendental
phenomenological idealism can provide foundations
as much for Lockean empiricism as for Kantian criti-
ca! philosophy. (1so KERN has compared the notions of
constitution in Husserl and KANT.)
A sti li broader meaning of constitutive phenomen-
ology must be mentioned and which appears only
in Husserl's !ater writings, such as in the revisions
and drafts of the Cartesianische Meditationen. One
might even speak of this as a "metaconstitutive pheno-
menology" where, in virtue of yet further refraining,
there is analysis of the constituting of transcenden-
tal consciousness constitutive of the world in the nat-
ural attitude as the noematic correlate of the phe-
nomenologizing consciousness. Some suggestions in
late manuscripts would indicate that even a "meta"-
metaconstitutive phenomenology is possible, where
the noematic correlate is the phenomenologizing con-
sciousness constitutive of transcendental conscious-
ness in the natural attitude.
Transcendental constitutive phenomenology, as
does phenomenology generally for Husserl, purports
to be a science: a transcendental eidetic constitutive
phenomenology. As an eidetic science, transcendental
constitutive phenomenology describes, clarifies, and
produces a body of knowledge about the constituting
of"essences" (formal and material, from "universals"
to "verbal expressions"), establishing in eidetic uni-
versality those laws that "prescribe for every factual
statement about something transcendental the possi-
ble sense" of that statement. The eidetic science of
essences establishes the laws of pure possibility that
make possible a science ofthe actual as a science.
The inftuence of Husserl 's transcendental constitu-
tive phenomenology has been diverse, and the vari-
ous phenomenological questions raised in the devel-
opment ofthe idea ofconstitution have taken different
directions. Some phenomenologists whose work has,
in one way or another, continued the development of
Husserl 's constitutive phenomenology in various fields
are EUGEN FINK, especially in his articles from the 1930s
(with critica! stock-taking in "Les concepts operatoires
dans la phenomenologie de Husserl" in 1957); LUD-
113
WIG LANDGREBE in articles dating from the 1930s and
1940s ("The World as a Phenomenological Problem,"
"Husserls Phanomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer
Umbi]dung"), DORION CAIRNS ("1dea]ity of Verbal Ex-
pressions," 1941 ); ARON GURWITSCH ("Phenomenology
ofThematicsandofthe Pure Ego," 1929, "The Problem
of Existence in Constitutive Phenomenology," 1961 ),
ALFRED SCHUTZ (Der sinnhafie Aufbau der sozialen
Weft, 1932); ROMAN INGARDEN (Das literarische Kunst-
werk, 1931 ); HANS REINER ("Sinn und Recht des
phanomenologische Methode," 1959); OSKAR BECKER
("Beitrage zur phanomenologischen Begriindung der
Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen,"
1923); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (L 'imaginaire, 1940); and
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY (Phenomenofogie de fa per-
ception, 1945).
Because of its ostensible association with "ide-
alism" (even in Husserl's sense), constitutive
phenomenology has, on occasion, been contrasted
with HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY (HANS-GEORG
GADAMER), Of with REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY (from the
ontoJogy OfHEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS and the epistemo]-
ogy of ALEXANDER PFĂNDER to the "Daseinsanafytik"
of MARTIN HEIDEGGER). However, there would seem to
be no reason why constitutive phenomenology should
preclude a realism or not be amenable to the results
of a hermeneutica! philosophy (or even a "hermeneuti-
callogic" such as that of HANS LIPPS). Husserl himself
called for a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NAT-
URAL ATTITUDE in his "Nachwort zu meinen 'Ideen'"
( 1930), which was explicitly pursued by Schutz. Con-
stitutive phenomenology can be extended to include
"personalistic," "naturalistic," and scientific attitudes
as well as the "phenomenological" attitude itself. Fi-
nally, examples of eidetic constitutive phenomenology
can be found in the writings of JEAN HERING ("Be-
merkungen iiber das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die
Idee," 1926) and ROMAN INGARDEN ("Essentia]e Fragen.
Ein Beitrag zu dem Wesensproblem," 1925).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Boehm, Rudolf. Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phănomenologie.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
Celms, Theodor. Der phănomenologische ldealismus
Husserls. Riga: Latvian Academy, 1928.
Kersten, Fred. Phenomenological Method: Theol)' and Prac-
tice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
114 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Gurwitsch, Aron. The Field of" Consciou.l·ness. Pittsburg:
Duquesne University Press, 1964.
Mohanty, J. N. The Possihi/ityof"Transcendental Philosophy.
The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Secbohm, Thomas M. "Transcendental Phenomenology." In
Husserl:~ Phenomenology: A Texthook. Ed. J. N. Mohanty
and William R. McKenna. Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of
America, 1989, 345-85.
Schuhmann, Karl. Die Fundamentalhetrachtung der
Phănomenologie. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
Sokolowski, Robert. The Formation o/Husserl :1 Concept of
Constitution. The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
- . Husserlian Meditations. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1974.
FRED KERSTEN
Universi(v of Wisconsin, Green Bay
CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NAT-
URAL ATTITUDE AJthough CONSTITUTIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY primarily signifies the transcendental
first philosophy that was developed beginning with ED-
MUND HUSSERL 's ldeen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie
und phanomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913 ), there
is a secondary signification. ldeen 1 compared and
contrasted phenomenological philosophy with empir-
ica! psychology such that while both relied on re-
flection in the forms of self-observation and empathy
(Einfuhlung), the former was to be specifically tran-
scendental and EIDETIC, while the latter was tobe specif-
ically empirica] or factual and also mundane, worldly,
or "in the natural attitude." This position was subse-
quently refined such that the posthumously published
lectures on Phănomenologische Psychologie [ 1925]
minimize the purposes of first philosophy and the
Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on "Phenomenology"
(1929), Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929),
and Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931] make the sys-
tematic place within phenomenology for a worldly and
eidetic intentiona! psychology clear and distinct.
For Husserl, this phenomenological PSYCHOLOGY
would focus on the various modes of INTENTIONALITY.
It would be a positive or special science rather than
first philosophy and would thus require, like ali spe-
cial sciences, a transcendental grounding. The recog-
nition of such a special positive science is presup-
posed in the late philosophical issues of transcendental
PSYCHOLOGISM and of the way to phenomenological
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
philosophy from psychology discussed in Die Krisis
der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzenden-
tale Phănomenologie ( 1936). At the same time, the
analyses of, e.g., perceptual syntheses, that are pre-
sented in philosophical writings can be taken as mun-
dane psychological analyses, i.e., as analyses pertain-
ing to psyches without their being-in-the-world being
suspended by transcendenta] EPOCHE AND REDUCTION,
which is how Husserl proceeds in Phanomenologische
Psychologie. In his "Nachwort zu meinen 'ldeen zu
einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomenologische
Philosophie"' (1930), he then asserts that "there is
a thoroughgoing parallelism between a correctly ex-
ecuted phenomenological psychology and a transcen-
dental phenomenology" and that "pure inner psychol-
ogy, the genuine psychology of intentionality ... , re-
veals itself through and through as the constitutive
phenomenology ofthe natural attitude."
Other constitutive phenomenologists, particularly
ARON GURWITSCH in The Fie/d o(Consciousness (1964),
recognized this non-transcendental version of consti-
tutive phenomenology, but ALFRED scHUTZ, beginning
in Der sinnhafie Aufbau der sozialen Welt ( 1932), was
the first, most explicit, and most emphatic developer
ofthe "constitutive phenomenology ofthe natural atti-
tude." Schutz's project offounding the HUMAN SCIENCES
in a phenomenological psychology is as philosophical
as the long-standing naturalistic efforts to found the
natural sciences in physics. He drew on various works
of HENRI BERGSON as well as Husserl 's Vorlesungen zur
Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905]
for his analysis of ACTION in general as projected, exe-
cuted, and retrospectively interpreted and then its spec-
ification as social action, a central category for Austrian
ECONOMICS as well as for the interpretive SOCIOLOGY
of MAX WEBER. Especially in "On Multiple Realities"
(1945) and "Symbol, Reality, and Society" (1955) he
ventured further and on his own into the phenomen-
ological psychology ofworking, imagining, dreaming,
and scientific theorizing. In the latter respect, there is
a rich description ofthe processes by which models of
personal and communal selves, actions, and products
are constructed in psychological, social, and historical
sciences are idealized.
Schutz was also concerned with how worldly oth-
ers can become constituted for a worldly EGO and then
how an 'T' and a "thou" can forma "we" in contrast to
 CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE
a "he," "she," or "they." Furthermore, while "consoci-
ates" can understand and act upon one another directly,
"contemporaries," who are also ali ve at the same time,
can only do so indirectly. Then again, "predecessors"
can be understood but not acted upon by the living per-
sons, and "successors" can be acted upon, e.g., through
the writing of a will, but not understood. In these and
other ways Schutz accounted for not only social action
but also the social world by reflecting upon and ei-
detically describing the processes of act ing and under-
standing in which objects of ali sorts- fellow humans
living, dead, and unborn and individually and in groups
included -are constituted as having, in a broad sig-
nification, MEANING for subjects. A specification ofthe
human or cultural sciences follows: predecessors make
up the subject matter of the historical sciences, while
contemporaries are investigated in the various social
sciences -living individual subjects are subject mat-
ters for psychology, and consociates are presumably
parts of the subject matter of social psychology.
Husserl emphasized phenomenological psychology,
but it would seem, on the basis ofSchutz's thought, that
a phenomenological sociology is also possible that at-
tempts to describe the constituted structures ofworldly
communal or intersubjective life. Constitutive pheno-
menology of the natural attitude in COMMUNICOLOGY,
ECONOMICS, EDUCATION, ETHNIC STUDIES, FILM STUDIES, GE-
OGRAPHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, NURSING, PSYCHIATRY, and
other CULTURAL DISCIPLINES is equally quite possibJe,
although the disciplinary purposes of each of these
are different from those of first philosophy. Interest-
ingly, while phenomenological social science, for ex-
ample, might be begun or advanced by treating some
of Husserl 's descriptions of transcendental INTERSUB-
JECTIVITY as worldly, ifthere is a thoroughgoing paral-
lelism, as he asserts, then sociologica! and psycholog-
ical analyses of a constitutive-phenomenological sort
conducted in the natural attitude should yield parallel
descriptions pertaining to conscious life in its transcen-
dental status. Husserl himself does seem to transpose
mundane historical analyses of MODERN PHILOSOPHY
and the natural and human sciences from the natural
attitude to the transcendental in the Krisis and else-
where.
Psychological and other types of constitutive pheno-
menology ofthe natural attitude required, for Husserl,
transcendental grounding and Gurwitsch, for exam-
115
ple, followed him in this. Schutz, however, ultimately
tended instead toward a PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
as the fundamental (and worldly) philosophical disci-
pline. This would be a type of what might be called
"mundanism" in that a non-worldly ground is not
sought for the world and the sciences of it. It would not
be a NATURALISM because the world, being cultural, is
more than nature. Nevertheless, insofar as objects are
constitutively accounted for in terms of the processes
ofperceiving, expecting, remembering, thinking, feei-
ing, working, etc., in which they are intended to as
meaningful- i.e., they present themselves with val-
ues and purposes or cultural characteristics- then it
would be a constitutive phenomenology even if not
transcendental.
Especially the earJy work of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE on
IMAGINATION and EMOTION is constitutive phenomen-
oJogy of the natural attitude implicitly, as is much of
the rest of EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, which can be
said to rely on a reflective and eidetic but not transcen-
dental approach and to adapt Husserlian concepts and
analyses, but to pursue not transcendental philosophy
but EXISTENTIALISM, which is also mundanism. Some
constitutive analyses ofthe natural attitude may also be
discerned in REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY and HERMENEU-
TIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY when intentiona! experiences
and correlative objects as they present themselves are
reflected upon in self and others. Constitutive pheno-
menology ofthe natural attitude appears widely shared
within the phenomenological movement, whether the
Husserlian title and authorization for the worldly con-
strual ofhis transcendental descriptions are recognized
or not.lt is likely that much fu ture phenomenologywill
continue to be conducted as mundane, worldly, or "in
the natural attitude." How consciously constitutive it
will be is, however, difficult to say.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Embree, Lester. "The Natural Scientific Constitutive Pheno-
menological Psychology of Humans in the Earliest
Sartre." Research in Phenomenology Il ( 1981 ), 41-60.
- , ed. Worldly Phenomenology: The Continuing lnfluence
ofAlfred Schutz on North American Human Science. Lan-
ham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1988.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Rezension von Edmund Husserl, Nach-
wort zu meinen 'Ideen' .... " Deutsche Literaturzeitung
(February 28, 1932); "Critica! Study of Husserl 's Nach-
 116 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
wort." Trans. Fred Kersten. In his Studies in Phenomen-
ology and Psvchology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1966, 107-15.
~. "Edmund Husserl 's Conception of Phenomenological
Psychology." In his Phenomenologv and the Theorv of
Science. Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1974,77-112.
Husserl, Edmund. "Nachwort zu meinen 'ldeen'ldots"
[ 1930]. In ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologische Philosophie III. Ed. Marly Biemel.
Husserliana 5. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952, 138-
62; "Epilogue." In ldeas Pertaining to a Pure Pheno-
menology and ta a Phenomenological Philosophy. Sec-
ond Book. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andrc Schuwer.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989, 405-30.
Schutz, Alfred. Der sinnhafte Aufhau der sozialen Welt. Vi-
enna: Springer-Verlag, 1932; The Phenomenology o{ the
Social World. Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
~. Collected Papers. 1: The Prohlem of Social Realitv. Ed.
Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
LESTER EMBREE
Florida Atlantic University
CRITICAL THEORY The relationship be-
tween the phenomenology founded by EDMUND HUSSERL
and the critica! theory that was set in motion by Max
Horkheimer (1895-1975) is not the kind of relation
one finds in a genuine dialogue between two philo-
sophical schools that are in an open exchange of ideas
with one another. What we have is a one-sided at-
tempt on the part of critica! theory somehow to re-
late to phenomenology. This manifests itself in three
steps: approximation, taking distance, and incorpora-
tion. Phenomenology adopted a wait-and-see attitude
in re gard to these three forms of treatment; yet in the
final analysis this appeared not to be the weaker at-
titude. What Husserl said in 1935 to the effect that
he, the alleged reactionary, is really much more radical
and revolutionary than those who take themselves tobe
revolutionary already indicates that phenomenology is
not willing to subordinate itself under schemas others
attempt to impose on it.
The first steps of critica! theory were formed phe-
nomenologically. Horkheimer and his !ater collabora-
tor, Theodore W. Adorno ( 1903-1969 ), came as stu-
dents in contact with phenomenology through their
mentor in philosophy, Hans Cornelius (1863-1947),
who, starting from KANT, had developed a pheno-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
menological psychology and theory of knowledge on
the hasis of Husserl 's work. In addition, both studied
the principles of GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY under Adhemar
Gelb (1887-1936)~ principles that in the 1940s and
1950s played an inftuential part in phenomenology in
FRANCE via ARON GURWITSCH. On the advice of Cor-
nelius, Horkheimer went in 1921 to Freiburg, where
he took courses with Husserl and MARTIN HEIDEGGER.
In 1923 he received his Ph.D. under Cornelius's guid-
ance with a thesis on Kant, after an attempt concern ing
Gestalt psychology had failed. Adorno 's dissertation
on Husserl followed only one year !ater. Another en-
trance into phenomenology was found by Herbert Mar-
cuse ( 1898-1979), who became Heidegger 's assistant
in 1928. In "Beitrage zu einer Phanomenologie des
historischen Materialismus," which was published in
the same year, Marcu se explored the possibilities of a
synthesis of Heidegger and MARX.
We must also mention here Siegfried Kracauer
( 1889-1966), who was close to the circ le around
Horkheimer and who already in 1922 presented a soci-
ology that is oriented toward phenomenology. On the
whole, the inftuence of phenomenology on the early
critica! theory has been of various intensities. Particu-
larly in the case of Adorno it is clear that Husserl is the
philosopher whom he most often made the theme of
a separate investigation. Husserl 's phenomenology re-
mained for Adorno a challenge against which he tested
his own ideas on severa! occasions.
Let us briefty recall the state of the problem from
which Adorno took his point of departure in his disser-
tation on Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen und Noe-
matischen in Husserls Phanomenologie (The transcen-
dence of the thinglike and the noematic in Husserl 's
phenomenology, 1924 ). Adorno 's teacher, Cornelius,
had assumed that everything is to be proved before
the court of appeals of a knowing consciousness. Even
things that are alien to us can be reduced to known
facts of consciousness. Reftection begins in experi-
ence, but it transcends this in the direction of a do-
main of concepts. In Husserl the situation is com-
pletely different: ali knowledge is related to things
that remain transcendent to consciousness. Adorno in-
tended to clarify this opposition, and this led him fi-
nally to the view in which he defended the pure phi-
losophy ofimmanence ofhis teacher Cornelius against
Husserl's ldeen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und
 CRITICAL THEORY
phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913). In his apol-
ogy A dom o comes to the conclusion that things arenei-
ther transcendent entities nor immediate experiences,
but rather laws for immediate experiences that are con-
stituted solely through the connection or continuity
of our personal consciousness. The concept ofNOEMA
disintegrates and Husserl is criticized: because of his
assumption that things ha ve a meaning of their own,
he misses the true sense of transcendental idealism.
Adorno wanted to outdo Husserl intellectualistically;
we do not yet find a trace here of his !ater criticism of
the dominination of identifying thinking.
The fundamental change in critica! theory,
which co-determined Adorno 's !ater materialistic and
ideology-critical perspective on Husserl, carne about
through Horkheimer's programmatic paper "Tradi-
tionelle und kritische Theorie" ( 193 7). Here theories
are taken to be traditional if they strive after a confor-
mity between facts and the conceptual order; following
the natural sciences, this order takes the form of a uni-
versal system of signs that is tobe taken as the key to the
order of the world. Horkheimer objects to traditional
theory on the ground that it does not take into account
that facts are socially preformed and that a conceptual
classification is not a domain that is isolated from so-
ciety. Finally, he also claims that the relation between
concepts and facts is not achieved in the head of the
researcher, but rather in industry.
Since the sociologies of Durkheim and MAX
SCHELER, the positivists and the pragmatists are classed
with traditional theory in empirica! science. Then it is
shown that sociology has a social function that it is not
at ali, or not sufficiently, willing to admit. Its function
consists in the production ofuseful knowledge, which
serves the reproduction of capitalist society. By ap-
pealing to HEGEL and MARX, critica! theory overcomes
traditional dualism in a critica! attitude that is guided by
its concern to eliminate society's injustice as well as by
its concern to organize society rationally. This goal can
be attained because the world is made through human
praxis and is thus also changeable.
Husserl 's work stands diagonally opposite to the
distinction between "traditional" and "critica!" theory.
The doctrine of INTENTIONALITY prohibits a dualism as
a starting point. Husserl opposes a complete reduc-
tion of a theory of things to a theory of signs, which
only have the meaning of a game empty of mean-
117
ing; he shows that the sciences have their foundation
in the LIFEWORLD; and finally, he hopes to be able to
attain a new humanity through phenomenological in-
sights. This does not mean that Husserl was a critica!
theorist, but only that he was not just a traditionalist.
This notwithstanding, Horkheimer nonetheless asso-
ciates him with those who belong to the domain of tra-
ditional theory. As proof for this Horkheimer merely
cites some passages from Formale und transzenden-
tale Logik ( 1929) in which Husserl in positive terms
speaks about the scientific ideal of a closed system of
statements. In the book Dialektik der Aufkliirung (Di-
alectic of the enlightenment, 194 7) that Horkheimer
and Adorno wrote conjointly while in exile in Califor-
nia, they quote Husserl 's characterization of Galileo 's
mathematization of nature in an ambiguous manner,
without letting Husserl speak in his own words.
This way of reading phenomenology, which in
the final analysis is selective and simplifies mat-
ters, has a prehistory that has been documented in
Horkheimer's lectures, which have meanwhile been
published from manuscripts. In 1926 Horkheimer, who
then was just promoted to university lecturer, recon-
structed Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-
1901 ), sti li in the style of an academician who pro-
cedes strictly immanently. Only two years !ater we
find an indication of what finally in 1937 would lead
to the characterization of phenomenology as a tradi-
tional theory. Horkheimer accuses Husserl of a lack
of dialectic, which would result from an untenable,
static ontology. Husserl 's doctrine of EVIDENCE would
make a specific position ofknowledge into an absolute
one because it would refuse to take into consideration
any conditions that mediate a form of knowledge and
change it. In a lecture of 1954 we find a milder tone
being used; Husserl 's criticism of NATURALISM is rec-
ognized as a great achievement. The !ater Horkheimer
no Ion ger displays the radicality of his early phase.
The politica! aspect ofthe confrontation with pheno-
menology is strengthened when Herbert Marcuse dis-
tanced himselffrom Heidegger. Although Marcuse was
occupied since the 1950s with an effort to integrate PSY-
CHOANALYSIS and Marxism, we still find motifs from
Heidegger and Husserl operative in his last great work,
One-Dimensional Man (1964). And yet Marcuse did
not Jet Heidegger's behavior and theory construction
during the time of National Socialism pass by without
118 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
comment. Already in 1934 he pointed to the common-
alities between the politica! and philosophical EXISTEN-
TIALISM ofCarl Schmitt and Heidegger. In an exchange
of letters from the 1940s that has not yet been pub-
lished, Marcuse calls Heidegger to account, who, also
in this case, persisted in silence, although he used many
words in his response.
The orientation that is at once a critique of ideol-
ogy and a critique of knowledge, which critica! the-
ory adopted in the mid-1930s, offered Adorno an op-
portunity to determine anew his position in regard to
Husserl. It was prepared in two manuscripts written
in 193 7 and completed in his Metakritik der Erkennt-
nistheorie (Metacriticism of the theory of knowledge,
1956). He again accuses Husserl of failing to meet the
matters themselves. And this time he makes this claim
not because Husserl is too little attached to idealism,
but rather because he is too much attached to it.
Adorno turns his own position of 1924 exactly into
its opposite. Husserl would go beyond the doubt of
Descartes, while he pursues the ideal of a transcenden-
tal EGO that is free of ali facts and is completely by
itself in the sphere of its own ownness. By this move,
phenomenology would come into contradiction with
itself, for the transsubjective "matters themselves" are
articulated only as covering images (Deckbilder) of
consciousness; in this way the proximity to the mat-
ters, free from ali construction, is thus missed. Adorno
develops his arguments in the direction of a critique of
ideology; he reproaches Husserl because the reduction
to immediate experiences immanent in consciousness
would have been formed through a reifying thinking
that, in addition, thinks in terms ofpossessions, which
is analogous to the attitude of the owners of private
property who are afraid of dispossession. In this we
see the restorative and bourgeois character of pheno-
menology, which lacks the capacity for social critique.
Adomo's alternative to these epistemological and po-
litica! acts of violence, which appropriate something
that is alien, would result from the insight that it is
impossible to be able to conceive matters in concepts
without a surplus in non-identity. In this way it is not
only the case that the question of how the "matters
themselves" are to be grasped is posed in a new way,
but also the decisive keyword is given for Adomo's
philosophy of the 1960s.
In his Negative Dialektik ( 1966), Adorno runs into
a fundamental paradox. There is no immediate access
to reality, but only one that is mediated by concepts.
Yet concepts bring matters to expression while at the
same time they fail them. From this the paradoxical
task arises of going beyond concepts in order to attain
the utopia of an unconstrained interaction with what is
other and alien, which for Adorno is the central theme
of a critica! AESTHETICS. Even ifwe take the formulation
of this utopia by itself, we see that Adorno comes
closer and closer to French phenomenology (MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, EMMANUEL LEVI NAS). Adorno 's thought
maintained a phenomenological tenor to the end, even
though it is true that in his official exchange of ideas
he was never able to fully come to grips with the basic
content of Husserl 's philosophy.
In the 1960s a new chapter of critica! theory and
its involvement with phenomenology was opened by
Jiirgen Habermas. Husserl is here associated again with
traditional theory, but Habermas determines this type
oftheory differently than Horkheimer. Traditional the-
ory is now identified with ancient metaphysics, whose
guiding clue Husserl appears to follow insofar as here-
peats the claim ofancient theeria, namely, that notwith-
standing its alienation from everyday life, it can make
available a form of knowledge that would be relevant
to action and life. In Husserl 's case this claim must
fail because phenomenology is no longer able to count
on the cosmos and its ideal measures to which the soul
could approximate itself. No practica! norms for action
will follow from phenomenological descriptions. The
effort to secure these norms under postmetaphysical
conditions has been the main concern of Habermas's
efforts up to the present.
With his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns
(Theory of communicative action, 1981 ), Habermas
completes a "linguistic turn" to the paradigm of
communicative understanding and agreement through
which he distances himself from the foundations of
the older critica! theory; he follows the normative idea
that linguistic efforts to come to an agreement are ori-
ented toward actual agreement. Any time we speak, we
simultaneously make three validity claims (namely, re-
garding truth, correctness, and truthfulness) that can be
accepted by the partners of our con versation. If it comes
to that, an agreement will follow that has validity. If
it does not come to that, those who speak can exam-
ine the validity of their claims in a discursive process
 CRITICAL THEORY
of argumentation, in order to work toward a lasting
knowledge. In this new critica! theory that appeals less
to Hegel and Marx, but rather more to Kant, pheno-
menological insights are taken into account only in a
limited way. What is rejected here is the transcendental
egology, because it is unable to explain the founda-
tions of INTERSUBJECTIVITY, the normative claims made
by phenomenology, and the conception of an open and
productive action that was defended by Merleau-Ponty.
Habermas did integrate the theory ofthe lifeworld that
is contained in the publications of ALFRED scHUTZ and
THOMAS LUCKMANN; yet here too, he objects to its cul-
tural abridgment insofar as it is above ali not able to
say much about the dimensions of society.
For Habermas the lifeworld is a concept that is com-
plementary to communicative action. Every situation
that involves speaking and action is part of the life-
world, which is the all-encompassing horizon within
which linguistic understanding comes about. In the
light of this specific - and for Habermas relevant
-aspect of understanding and agreement, he defines
the lifeworld as a stock of unshaken patterns of inter-
pretation that are linguistically organized and that can
commonly be used by those who take part in com-
municative action for the purpose of ca-operative pro-
cesses ofinterpretation. For the newer phenomenology,
this effort to narrow the conception of the lifeworld,
in part already predelineated by Schutz, became an oc-
casion in Germany for a far-reaching discussion that
originated from an alternative reading of Husserl. In so
do ing, the newer phenomenology appealed not only to
the programmatic works published by Husserl himself,
but also to the manuscripts that he left behind and that
have been published in the Husserliana edition.
This criticism begins with the thesis that Habermas
is unable to explain satisfactorily how the stock oflin-
guistic and symbolic patterns to which those engaged
in communicative action appeal has originated. The
result of the insight that Habermas neglected this ge-
nealogical question anticipates recognition ofthe inno-
vations, productions, and institutions that come about
from various incidents. Because the lifeworld origi-
nates in this way and is a field of the art of living that
works on tradition, it is more than a mere warehouse.
Actions and utterances are embedded in a bodily form
of orienting behavior and cannot be limited to the in-
trahuman domain. Every form of praxis responds to
119
mute experiential claims and invitations that flow from
the things and that withdraw from complete technical
control. Because the new phenomenology asks about
the foundational relation between language and expe-
rience, one is now able to delineate the possibility of
a genuine dialogue between phenomenology and criti-
ca! theory. Such a dialogue should start from how the
turn toward the intersubjective dimensions of action
brought to light by Habermas has led to the insight
that the relation between agents and the world of ex-
perience is conceived in too onesided a manner. Such
a dialogue could perhaps lead to the problematic for
which we could use the labels LANGUAGE and POLITICS.
Already severa! years ago some representatives of
critica! theory have pointed out that the !ater philoso-
phy of Adorno was by no means transcended by Haber-
mas's turn to the theory oflanguage. For Adorno him-
selfhad developed an implicit philosophy oflanguage
whose assumptions concern ing the formation ofmean-
ing that is linguistically available were not taken into
account by Habermas. According to Adorno, the man-
ner in which significations that are linguistically com-
municable are constituted consists in how phenomena
that are not yet linguistically available are brought to
language. Yet through this achievement oflanguage, no
agreement between language and reality is yet brought
about, because in linguistic understanding reality with-
draws from a full linguisticization through its perma-
nent surplus in non-identity. Here Adorno is in agree-
ment not only with Husserl 's insight that because of
an abundance in what is given, one can find an in-
adequation in adequation, but above ali with the !ater
philosophy of the French phenomenologist, Merleau-
Ponty.
In a manner that is not dissimilar to the o ne followed
by Adorno, Merleau-Ponty begins with the assumption
that there is no immcdiate access to reality. Whatever
is given never appears purely as it itself, because it
is always also a production of a significative achieve-
ment. The linguistic expression that is involved in the
constitution of MEANING and that moves between the
pure reproduction of an experience and a fu li construc-
tion ofreality is characterized by an essential paradox:
it translates an experience that nonetheless itself first
becomes a text through the word that awakens it. The
achievement by speech breaks the silence of an ex-
perience, which already in and from itself pushes in
120 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the direction of language and attains in this way what
keeping silent meant to say, but could not achieve.
Yet this realization is nota complete one, because lan-
guage speaks insofar as it always also conceals certain
experiences that as a surplus of possibilities push fur-
ther in the direction of language. The relation between
language and experience is therefore discontinuous.
Speaking does not just pursue the lines indicated by
experience, but brings experience over into another
order. It breaks silence open and in doing so assumes
violent traits. Speech at the same time remains a source
for creations, because it lets something enter into being
that previously could not yet be encountered as being
ready-at-hand. These determinations ofMerleau-Ponty
have left traces in French philosophy in the publica-
tions ofMICHEL FOUCAULT, JACQUES DERRIDA, Corne]ius
Castoriadis ( 1926-1984 ), and Pierre Bourdieu.
Already Husserl himself had made an effort to free
phenomenology from the weakness of allegedly be-
ing unable to make a positive contribution to politica!
philosophy. In the 1950s Merleau-Ponty examined the
possibilities of a dialogue between phenomenology and
Marxism, which in the 1970s was developed further on
an internationallevel. There are convergences between
phenomenologists and Marxists in the conviction that
the lifeworld and life-praxis is the place where change
in the social realm occurs. Every changing praxis is
mediated by reinterpretations of a dominant interpre-
tation ofreality that itself is practica! in nature because
it springs from a process of interpretation. By proceed-
ing along this way oflooking at things phenomenology
enters the field of language and politics.
Modern POLITIC AL PHILOSOPHY takes its point of de-
parture from the idea that many interpretations of a
social event are possible and therefore, since Hobbes,
it asks the question ofwhich interpretati an is the legiti-
mate one. Insofar as one now begins from the perspec-
tive of phenomenology with the conviction that each
interpretation is always also to be verified in regard
to the matters to be interpreted, a majority decision
concern ing which interpretation of a politica! speaker
is the legitimate one, which received the greatest ap-
proval on the part ofthe social world, is excluded. The
same is also true for the solution by sheer power ac-
cording to which any optional interpretation could be
accepted insofar as it can be carried through by vio-
lence. In the final analysis the search for TRUTH, too,
runs into limits because every interpretation is selective
and a matter can never be comprehended adequately.
Should it turn out to be the case that the pluralism of
interpretations is unavoidable, then at the moral level
the question must be asked under what conditions a
coexistence of interpretations of different kinds would
be possible. In this situation a coalition of REASON and
power is predelineated whose form, however, needs
further clarification.
Phenomenology is not a critica! theory. Yet it is a
critica! philosophy that asks the question of how far a
practica! interpretation exhausts a situation, what this
interpretation says, and what it conceals. By reinterpre-
tation a dynamic is kept alive in the social world that
opens up new possibilities and perspectives in regard
to the creative transformation of situations, structures,
and institutions.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Adorno, Theodore W. Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen
und Noematischen in Husserls Phănomenologie [ 1924].
Gesammelte Schriften 1. Ed. Ro1f Tiedernann. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973.
- . Zur Philosophie Husserls [ 1937]. Gesammelte Schriften
20:1. Ed. Ro1fTiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1986,46-118.
-.Husserl and the Prohlem ofIdealism [ 1937]. Gesammelte
Schriften 20:1. Ed. Ro1f Tiedemann. Frankfurt am Ma in:
Suhrkamp, 1986, 119--34.
- . Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Studien iiher
Husserlund die Phănomenologischen Antinomien [ 1956].
Gesammelte Schriften 5. Ed. Ro1f Tiedemann. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970.
-.Negative Dialektik [1966]. Gesammelte Schriften 6. Ed.
Ro1fTiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973.
Bernstein, Richard J. The Restructuring of Social and Politi-
ca/ Theory. New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1974.
Evans, J. C1aude. "Husserl und Haberrnas." In Materialien
zu Hahermas' "Erkenntnis und Interesse. " Ed. Winfried
Dallmayr. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974, 268-94.
E1ey, Lothar. "Zum Begriff des Transzendenta1en. Eine
kritische Studie zu Theodor W. Adorno: Zur Metakri-
tik der Erkenntnistheorie. Studien iiber Husserl und
die phănomeno1ogischen Antinomien." Zeitschrift .flir
philosophische Forschung 13 (1959), 351-7.
Habermas, Jiirgen. "Erkenntnis und Interes se" [ 1965]. In his
Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie. " Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1969, 146-68.
-. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 2 vo1s. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981.
- . "Edmund Husserl iiber Lebenswelt, Phi1osophie und Wis-
senschaft." In his Texte und Kontexte. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1991.
Horkheimer, Max. "Husserls Logische Untersuchungen"
[ 1926]. Gesammelte Schriften 1O. Ed. A1fred Schmidt and
 CULTURAL DISCIPLINES
Gunzclin Schmid Nocrr. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1990,299-316.
- . "Phănomenologie (Husserl, Schclcr)" [1928). Gesam-
me!te Schrifien 1O. Ed. Alfred Schmidt and Gunzelin
Schmid Noerr. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, 377-
99.
--. "Traditionelle und kritische Thcoric" [1937). Gesam-
me!te Schriften 4. Ed. Alfrcd Schmidt and Gunzelin
Schmid Noerr. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987, 64--
102.
- . "Kritik des Positivismus. Die Phănomenologie" [ 1954).
Gesamme!te Schri/ten 13. Ed. Alfred Schmidt and Gun-
zelin Schmid Noerr. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989,
349--96.
- , and Theodore W. Adorno. Dia!ektik der Aufklărung
[1947].
Gesamme!te Schrifien 5. Ed. Alfrcd Schmidt and Gunzclin
Schmid Nocrr. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985.
Kiwitz, Pcter. Lehenswe!t und Lehenskunst. Perspektiven
einer kritischen Theorie des so::.ia!en Lehens. Munich:
Wilhelm Fink, 1986.
Kracauer, Sigfried. So::.io!ogie a!s Wissenschajt. Ei ne erken-
ntniskritische Untersuchung [ 1922). Schrifien 1. Ed.
Karsten Witte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978, 8-
122.
Marcuse, Hcrbert. "Beitrăge zu ciner Phănomenologie des
historischen Materialismus" [ 1928). Schriften 1. Ed. Al-
frcd Schmidt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978, 82-
122.
- . "Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalităren
Staatsauffassung" [ 1934]. Sclmften 3. Ed. Alfred Schmidt.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979, 7-48.
Matthiesen, Ulf. Das Dickicht der Lehenswelt und die Theo-
rie des kommunikativen Handelns. Munich: Wilhelm Fink,
1983.
Merlcau-Ponty, Maurice. Le visih!e et l"invisihle. Ed. Claude
Lefort. Paris: Gallimard, 1964; The Visib!e and the Invisi-
hle. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1968.
Schmidt, Alfrcd. "Heidegger und die Frankfurter Schule-
Herbert Marcuses Heidegger-Marxismus." In Martin Hei-
degger~ Faszination und Erschrecken. Die politische Di-
mension einer Phi!osophie. Ed. Peter Kemper. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, 20-46.
Schuhmann, Karl. Husserls Staatsphi!osophie. Freiberg:
Karl Alber, 1988.
Schutz, Alfred and Thomas Luckmann. Strukturen der
Lebenswe!t. 2 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979-
84.
Waldenfels, Bcrnhard. "Rationalisierung dcr Lebcnswelt-
ein Projekt. Kritische Oberlegungen zu Habermas' Theo-
rie des kommunikativen Handelns." In his In den Netzen
der Lehenswelt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985, 94--
119.
- , Jan Broekman, and Anle Pazanin, eds. Phănornenologie
und Man;ismus. 4 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1977-79.
MARTIN W. SCHNELL
Universităt zu Kă!n
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
121
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY See ETHNOLOGY.
CULTURAL DISCIPLINES In this ti tie the word
"discipline" connotes an advanced degree of prepara-
tion, one that is beyond the crafts and tends today to
be received in professional schools and institutions of
higher learning. Being disciplined is being highly ed-
ucated or highly trained. The word "science" shares
this connotation of advanced preparation, but "disci-
pline" can readily cover not only cognitive disciplines
but also axiotic disciplines (e.g., LITERATURE) that ulti-
mately foster enjoyment and practica! disciplines such
as MEDICINE. As for the use of "cultural" instead of
"human" to differentiate the genus of disciplines in
question, there is increasing recognition that various
species of nonhuman animals, first of ali chimpanzees
and bonobos, ha ve basic culture, that primate ethology
is therefore a cultural science, and that ethology can be
used in a comparative way to help clarify what human
culture is. (Already in the 1930s the phenomenologists
ARON GURWITSCH and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY reftected
on the GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY ofWoJfgang KohJer ( 1887-
1967) regarding chimpanzees and, given the great re-
cent advances in primate ethology, more phenomen-
ological reftection in this respect is called for.)
"Cultural disciplines" is thus first of ali proposed as
a replacement for "HUMAN scJENCES," which is widely
used as an English translation of the tit le Geisteswis-
senschafien made prominent by WILHELM DILTHEY as an
equivalent to John Stuart Miii 's "moral sciences" (there
are equivalents in other languages). Sometimes "so-
ciocultural sciences," "history, social science, and psy-
chology," or simply "social sciences" (when construed
broadly enough to include history and psychology) are
also used in English. This is not merely a question ofthe
administrative structure of the university, as it might
seem to participants in specialized disciplines. Against
positivism, whereby ali other sciences ha ve been urged
to imitate modern mathematical natural science, sev-
era! 20th century European philosophical schools of
thought, including phenomenology, contend that the
general sut>ject matter, perhaps best called the cultural
WORLD, determines a distinct genus of science, a genus
with severa! species and a number of particular cultural
sciences under it.
 122 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Even more interesting is the Continental thesis ofthe
ontologica! and epistemological priority ofthe cultural
to the natural and formal sciences. The cultural sci-
ences differ from NATURAL SCIENCE and a]so MATHEMAT-
ICS and LOGIC in that their approaches necessarily and
concretely involve emphasizing rather than abstracting
from the cultural characteristics of value and purpose
that ali objects of conscious life originally ha ve. Then,
ifthe concrete precedes the abstract and the contentual
the formal, the cultural sciences have primacy. What
consequently seem best called the "cultural sciences"
are not, however, the only ways in which historical,
personal, social, economic, linguistic, technological,
etc., aspects and thus cultural worlds can be encoun-
tered and related to in disciplined ways.
When the doxic stratum predominates in a disci-
plined approach, the cultural discipline, e.g., HISTORY,
can be called, specifically, a cognitive discipline or
science. When the evaluative or "pathic" stratum pre-
dominates in what a discipline, e.g., THEATER, fosters,
the cultural discipline can be called, specifically, an
axiotic discipline. And when the "praxic" or volitional
stratum predominates, there is a practica! discipline,
e.g., PSYCHIATRY. Undergoing advanced preparation in
a particular discipline involves acquiring an attitude
that belongs to a species and genus, e.g., a sociologica!
attitude is a specifically social scientific attitude and a
generically scientific attitude or an archaeological atti-
tude is a specifically historical scientific attitude. The
subject matters or fields ofthe particular disciplines and
their species and genera correlate with such attitudes.
Techniques involving advanced preparation are es-
sential to cultural disciplines ofthe practicat sort, e.g.,
NURSING, inasmuch as the functions or uses of objects
as ends and means in practica! life are not abstracted
from but emphasized in them. As the using of equip-
ment, TECHNOLOGY is not necessarily science-based, but
often it can be based on cultural, natural, and/or for-
mal science and, when it is, then the cognitive results
attained in sciences ofthose sorts become parts ofthe
means employed in the disciplined form of practicat
life. The same is the case when axiotic disciplines,
e.g., ARCHITECTURE, rely on history, mathematics, biol-
ogy, physics, etc., but foster valuing and value. This
notion of a "science-based discipline" thus goes be-
yond and has more balance than "applied science,"
which can misleadingly intimate that ali practica! disci-
plines must be scientific technologies or that a practice
is based on but one science. The connotation that the
applied is derivative and thus somehow inferior to the
pure is also avoided; cognitive efforts plainly derive a
great deal from practicat ones and, in any case, action
is not ali that can be founded upon cognition.
Phenomenologically considered, cultural objects,
situations, and worlds are fundamentally constituted
in secondarily passive positional (or thetic) life, which
is to say, with EDMUND HUSSERL, that reflection on the
NOEMA can disc Iose positional characteristics in objects
as they present themselves and as they are intended to
in the habitual strata of believing, valuing, and will-
ing that occur within personal and communallife. It is
preferable to call the characteristics that objects have
as believed in, as valued, and as willed cultural charac-
teristics rather than "MEANING" because confusion with
the significations of words and also the odd view that
culture is entirely linguistic are evaded, and because
specification in terms ofbelief-characteristics, values,
and uses is invited.
As secondarily passive, the strata of conscious life
in which cultural objects are pre-linguistically and pre-
predicatively constituted are, in a broad signification,
leamed. The learning in question is not primarily a
result of deliberate instruction, but rather occurs in
the main through imitation and the indirect influences
one necessarily undergoes from others in sociohistori-
callife. This is how there can bea diversity of cultural
worlds, lives, situations, and practices. The reflectively
observable and describable noematic positional char-
acteristics can be called doxic or belief characteristics,
intrinsic and extrinsic values, and ends- and means-
uses. In these terms, systems of values and uses and
also belief systems ofvarious scopes can be recognized
as constituted in basic cultural life. Value-objects and
use-objects can be objectivated and called goods, bads,
and positively and negatively useful equipment,just as
belief objects can be objectivated and called beings and
nonbeings.
The "cultural disciplines" have already in effect
- but not under this title - been reflected upon to
some degree throughout phenomenology. In CONSTI-
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE the
foundations in commonsense thinking for the terms,
the methods, and the conceptual component ofthe sub-
ject matter ofthe social sciences ha ve been emphasized
 CZECHOSLOVAKIA
by ALFRED SCHUTZ; THOMAS M. SEEBOHM has attempted
to ground the methodology of the historical sciences
transcendentally; RICHARD M. ZANER has reflected on
MEDICINE; and LESTER EMBREE has reflected on archae-
oJogy. The HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY ofthe cui~
tura! disciplines has been extensively developed, al-
though yet again not under this new title, in the work
of HANS-GEORG GADAMER, DON IHDE, and JOSEPH J. KOCK-
ELMANS. The EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY of HANNAH
ARENDT, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY,
and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and aJso the REALISTIC PHENOMEN-
OLOGY of MAX SCHELER contain many insights of rele-
van ce especially regarding evaluational and practica!
life in cultural situations and worlds. The phenomen-
ological theories of ACTION and VALUE are plainly also
relevant.
That the genus of discipline entitled cultural disci-
plines, with its three species and various subspecies
and particulars, proves to be the most populated genus
of discipline may help explain why it has been diffi-
cult previously to recognize, but this ignorance too can
be overcome and the benefits of conscious affiliation
gained. The relevance of the cultural disciplines for
multidisciplines such as ETHNIC STUDIES is conspicuous.
It can also be asked if phenomenological philosophy
is itselfultimately a cognitive discipline, an evaluative
discipline, ora practica! discipline. DORION CAIRNS, for
example, held the latter tobe the case.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cairns, Dorion. "Philosophy as a Striving toward Universal
sophia in the Integral Sense." In Essays in MemoryofAran
Gurwitsch. Ed. Lester Embree. Lanham, MD: Center for
Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press
of America, 1983, 27-43.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaf-
ten. Versuch einer Grundlegung fiir das Studium der
Gesel!schaft und der Geschichte [ 1883]. Ed. Bcrnard
Groethuysen. Gesammelte Schriften 1. Stuttgart: 8. G.
Teubner, 1959; Introduction to the Human Sciences. Trans.
Michael Neville. In his Selected Works. Voi. 1. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989.
Schutz, Alfred. "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences."
In his Col!ected Papers, Voi. 1: The Problem of' Social
Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1962, 118-39.
Gurwitsch, Aron. Phenomenology and the Theory ofScience.
Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1974.
Embree, Lester. "Reflection on the Cultural Disciplines." In
Phenomenology of' the Cultural Disciplines. Ed. Mano
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
123
Daniel and Lester Embree. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1993, 1-37.
Husserl, Edmund. ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch:
Phănomenologischen Untersuchungen zur Konstitution.
Ed. Marly Bicmel. Husserliana 4. The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1952; Jdeas Pertaining to a Pure Pheno-
menology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Sec-
ond Book: Studies in the Phenomenology ofConstitution.
Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
Nenon, Tom, and Lester Embree, eds. !ssues in Husserl :s
"Ideas Il. " Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1996.
LESTER EMBREE
Florida Atlantic University
CZECHOSLOVAKIA The history of pheno-
menology in Czechoslovakia, strictly speaking, be-
gins only in 1929, but three issues related to its pre-
history should be mentioned. The fact that EDMUND
HUSSERL was born on Czech territory and spent his pre-
university years there (except for one school year in
Vienna) does not imply much of specifically Czech
influence, since both his and his wife's families be-
longed to the German-speaking Jewish population of
the multinational Austrian empire. More significant is
his friendship with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 1850--
1937), who became a prominent Czech philosopher
and politician. He recommended that Husserl study
with his own former teacher FRANZ BRENTANO, initially
oriented him in phi1osophy in Leipzig ( 1876-77), and
probably influenced Husserl 's religious development
in Vienna (1881-82), which culminated in Husserl's
conversion to Protestantism in 1886.
Meanwhile, an important group ofBrentano 's disci-
p1es was gaining influence at the German university in
Prague, gradually replacing the influence of the hith-
erto dominant Herbartism. The leading figures were
Cari Stumpf (active in Prague 1879-84), Anton Marty
(active 1880--1913 ), the more independent Christian
von Ehrenfels (active 1896-1929), and the ma in edi-
tor of Brentano's writings, Oskar Kraus (active 1902-
38). On the other hand, Brentanism was not particu-
larly strong at the Czech university in Prague (estab-
lished 1882), since Masaryk (professor there 1882-
1915) ceased to work in theoretical philosophy in the
mid-1880s and concentrated on problems of society,
 124 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
culture, and politics. Also, Masaryk's view ofBrentano
was formed in 1874-76, and located him perhaps closer
to John Stuart Miii than to phenomenology.
Finally, in the 1920s Prague became an impor-
tant center of theoretical linguistics, with the cele-
brated Prague Linguistic Circle established in 1926.
The old generation of Czech participants ( e.g., Vilem
Mathesius [ 1882-1945], president of the Ci rele) was
influenced by Brentano, mediated by Masaryk and
Marty, in rejecting the previously standard primacy of a
historical approach and, independently ofFerdinand de
Saussure, stressing STRUCTURALISM, i.e., the necessity
of inquiry into the structural relations within a cur-
rent state oflanguage. Roman Jakobson (1896--1982),
another prominent member of the Circle, professed
that he was influenced by studying Husserl earlier in
Moscow, but the extent and exact nature ofthis influ-
ence remains a matter of dispute.
However, the reception of phenomenology (in the
strict sense) before the 1930s was rather superficial
both in the German- and Czech-speaking philosophi-
cal communities. Misrepresenting comments adopted
from contemporary German textbooks and surveys
were basically repeated. The turn ing point was Febru-
ary 1929, when JAN PATOCKA, a Czech student spending
the 1928-29 year in Paris, was deeply impressed by
Husserl's Paris lectures and decided to study pheno-
menology seriously. He wrote a doctoral dissertation,
Pojem evidence a jeho vyznam pro noetiku (The con-
cept of evidence and its significance for epistemology,
1931 ), and in 1932-33 he went to Germany as a Hum-
boldt scholar, worked intensively with Husserl and his
assistant EUGEN FINK, and attended MARTIN HEIDEGGER's
lectures.
Back in Prague, Patocka worked closely with
Husserl's previous assistant LUDWIG LANDGREBE, who
had moved to Prague and prepared his habilitation
at the German university (achieved in 1935 with the
book Nennfunktion und Wortbedeutung, an interpreta-
tion of Marty's philosophy of language). This nucleus
of a phenomenological community was joined by Emil
Utitz ( 1883-1956 ), who became professor at the Ger-
man university in 1934. He had studied in Prague un-
der Marty and was somewhat influenced by pheno-
menology; his approach, far less sectarian than that of
Husserl 's direct disciples, greatly facilitated commu-
nication with other philosophers. As a result, the Cer-
ele philosophique de Prague pour les recherches sur
1'entendement humain was established late in 1934.
The Circle was not professedly phenomenological,
but was soon perceived as such. Among its mem-
bers- besides Utitz, Landgrebe, and Patocka- were
Brentano's follower Oskar Kraus ( 1872-1942), Franz
Kafka's friend Max Brod ( 1884-1968), an eclectic but
temporarily prominent professor, Jan Blahoslav Kozak
(1888-1974), and Jan Mukafovsky (1891-1975), an
important structuralist literary theoretician and another
link to the Linguistic Circle. A collection of pa pers read
at the Circle's meetings in spring 1935 appeared in the
new, Belgrade-basedjournal Philosophia (founded and
edited by the former editor of Kant-Studien, Arthur
Liebert). More importantly, the Circle, aware of the
hostility towards Husserl in Nazi Germany, decided on
three measures: to give him opportunity to lecture in
public again, to publish his new writings, and to secure
his manuscripts for posterity.
Meanwhile, the organizers of the 8th International
Philosophical Congress in Prague, September 1934, in-
vited Husserl to make a major address. It is likely that
the proposed topic, "the significance ofphilosophy for
life," was a motive for Husserl to give the problematic
of Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phiinomenologie ( 1936) the highest
priority after the Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931]
project was abandoned. Husserl wrote the paper, was
not allowed to come, and arranged for his paper to be
read by Patocka, but finally decided to withdraw it and
to send merely a briefformal statement. After the fail-
ure of the first attempt, the Circle invited Husserl to
come to lecture in Prague independently. Husserl ac-
cepted, then postponed the date (incidentally, the post-
ponement was not communicated to Vienna, which
meanwhile hadjoined Prague's invitation, and Husserl
was forced to improvise the "Vienna Lecture" in May
1935); he finally came to Prague in November 1935
and made what turned out to be his last public ap-
pearance. Besides the formal, two-lecture series on the
Krisis, he gave informal talks in the Philosophical Cir-
ele, the Linguistic Circle, and the Brentano Society.
The revised and enlarged Prague lectures appeared in
1936, also in Philosophia, and form Parts 1 and II of
the Krisis.
In winter 1934-35, the project ofsecuring Husserl 's
manuscripts was started quietly (since the manuscripts
 CZECHOSLOVA KIA
had tobe smuggled from the Nazi Germany) and with
financial support from the Czechoslovak nation, the
president of which was Husserl 's old friend Masaryk.
Fink in Freiburg and Landgrebe in Prague worked on
the cataloguing, and while Fink was busy working with
Husserl on the continuation of the Krisis, Landgrebe
worked according to Husserl 's directions on another set
ofmanuscripts and prepared them for publication. The
result ofhis work was Erfahrung und Urteil, published
in Prague in 1939 as a second volume of the series
published by the Circle (the first being two Memo-
rial Addresses on the occasion of Husserl 's death, Ed-
mund Husserl zum Gedachtnis [1938], by Landgrebe
and Patocka). By that time, however, it became clear
that Prague was no more secure a place for the Husserl
archive than Germany itself, and thanks to HERMAN LEO
VAN BREDA's energetic intervention, it was possible to
modify the plan and to establish the archive in Louvain.
In sum, during 1934-39 Prague was the world
capital of Husserlian phenomcnology. No wonder,
then, that it was Patocka who published the standard
Husserl bibliography in 1939. But the war ruined fur-
ther prospects. Oskar Kraus fled to England before the
German invasion; Landgrebe, expelled from the uni-
versity by the Nazis, soon followed the manuscripts
to Louvain; Utitz survived a concentration camp only
to be expelled (with ali remaining Germans) from the
renewed Czechoslovakia after the war. The Czech uni-
versities were closed in 1939 and the Circle was dis-
solved.
Nevertheless, the brief activity of the Circle
made phenomenology influential also among non-
phenomenologists, and some ofthe leading figures of
Czech philosophy of the time confronted their views
with Husserl and Heidegger studies at first hand. These
included the eclectic neo-Kantian Ladislav Rieger
(1890-1958), writing on the method and purpose of
philosophy, and the Marxist influenced by WILHELM
DILTHEY, Jifina Popelova (1904-1985), writing on the
problem of time and of historiography. Phenomen-
ology was also influential among literature and art the-
orists- e.g., Jifi Veltrusky used Husserl's theory of
TIME-consciousness for his theory of context in LJTER-
ATURE.
After the war, the new interest in EXISTENTIALISM
in FRANCE stimulated severa! articles and three small
books. The leading Czech literary critic Vaclav Cerny
125
( 1905-1987) wrote two Sesity o existencialismu (Note-
books on existentialism, 1948), explaining what exis-
tentialism is in both its philosophical and literary con-
texts in the first notebook and applying the concept to
the interpretation of the new Czech poetry in the sec-
ond. In a polemic pamphlet against JEAN-PAUL SARTRE,
Existencialismus neni humanismus (Existentialism is
not humanism, 1948), V.T. Miskovskâ asks for more
philosophical rigor and deplores Sartre's abstract sub-
jectivism in the light of Christian humanist values.
The Czech universities reopened in summer 1945
(while the German ones were closed, naturally), and
Patocka's lectures concentrated on Greek philosophy,
providing a brilliant phenomenological reinterpreta-
tion ofSocrates and the pre-Socratics. Some ofhis sem-
inars dealt with Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen
( 1900-1901 ). However, the Communists took power in
February 1948 and made it impossible to teach or pub-
lish phenomenology for sixteen years, until the "thaw"
ofthe mid-1960s.
The leaders ofthe new generation ofthe 1960s were,
of course, oriented toward MARXISM (a conditia sine qua
non at that time) and their relation to phenomenology
had to be rather cautious. The first step was to smug-
gle some phenomenology ( often ofFrench provenance
- Sartre visited Czechoslovakia during his Stalinist
period in 1954, and then again in 1964) into their pro-
fessedly Marxist essays. By 1965 it became possible to
publish scholarly articles on more technical aspects of
Husserl (but not Heidegger) and to write phenomen-
ological studies without referring to phenomenology,
and in 1967--fJ9 ali barriers were removed. Then, from
1970, when the new regime established by the Soviet
military occupation of 1968 became strong enough, a
new period of banishment followed un tii 1989.
The main figure ofthe 1960s generation was KAREL
KOSiK, and his book Dialektika konkretniho: Studie o
problematice cloveka a sveta (Dialectic ofthe concrete:
A study in the problematics of man and world, 1963 ),
was recognized internationally as an example of non-
dogmatic and relatively erudite Marxism. The book
was an attempt to make "praxis" the place where the
solutions to the main problems ofphilosophy are tobe
found. About phenomenology, Kosik says that it was
TRAN ouc THAO who discovered the authentic meaning
of Husserl 's phenomenological method and the relation
ofits "rational core" to the current philosophical situa-
126 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tion of alienation, etc. In the 1970s Kosik was working
on another philosophical book, but his large manuscript
was seized by the poli ce and never retumed. Except for
that manuscript, most of Kosik 's post -1963 production
consisted of essays commenting on cultural and polit-
ica! issues and made him an important public figure in
the 1960s.
Kosik was not alone: the concept of praxis in the
context of HEGEL and Marx was in the focus of the lo-
cal discussions in 1959--65 and some ofthe participants
were susceptible to phenomenological inftuence more
clearly than Kosik, notably IVAN oussd, proceeding
from Marxism to phenomenology inftuenced by Hei-
degger, Patocka, and WALTER BIEMEL. Unlike Kosik, he
continues to write phenomenological essays from time
to time, with a particular interest in problems of time
and literature. Somewhat similar was the progress of
KAREL MICHNĂK, culminating in his emphatically Hei-
deggerian and Patockian book Ke kritice antropolo-
gismu ve filosofii a teologii (Towards a criticism of
anthropologism in philosophy and theology, 1969). A
blend of phenomenology with humanist Marxism was
popular in Czechoslovak philosophy during 1965-70
(soon differentiated intemally because of a Heidegger-
inspired criticism of the humanist element, as, e.g.,
in Michfuik's book mentioned above), with about ten
books published and many teaching positions held. Its
proponents included JIRi PESEK, working on Heidegger
with an emphasis on time; JAROSLAVA PESKOV;.. (philoso-
phy of EDUCATION); JOSEF CIBULKA (Husserl); JIRI CERNY
(Fink); MILAN PRLJCHA (MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY); MILAN
SOBOTKA, JAROMIR LOUZIL, and LADISLAV MAJOR (post-
Kantian German philosophy).
A more technical and scholarly approach with no
reference to Marxism characterized severa! articles
published in 1965--69 by MARIE BAYEROVĂ, main]y on
Husserl's method. Her translation of Husserl's Carte-
sianische Meditationen remains the main textbook on
phenomenology in Czech. Another Marxism-free au-
thor was JAROSLAV KOHOUT, Patocka's student in the
1940s and a politica! prisoner in the 1950s. ANTONiN
MOKREJS's Fenomenologie a problem intersubjektivity
(Phenomenology and the problem of intersubjectivity,
1969) is a relatively sound and well-informed mono-
graph (it quotes over thirty Western phenomenologists,
most frequently ALWIN DIEMER, Ludwig Landgrebe, and
GERD BRAND) focusing on the problem of INTERSUB-
JECTIVITY, confronting Husserl's own methodological
requirements, the early Heidegger, and Sartre. An in-
formal group gathered around JIRi NEMEC, a psycholo-
gist ofwide cultural and religious interests and guided
by phenomenology, who was active in informal study
groups and in translating, e.g., Heidegger's Vom Wesen
der Wahrheit (On the essence oftruth, 1943). Art histo-
rian v ĂCLAV RICHTER, after being inftuenced by Husserl
in the 1940s, developed a Heidegger-inftuenced theory
of ARCHITECTURE and urban space in the 1960s.
Ali ofthis activity was, however, overshadowed by
the towering figure of Patocka. Allowed to publish on
phenomenology again in 1965, he published a series
of rather dry, technical, and difficult articles collec-
tively entitled Uvod do studia Husserlovyfenomenolo-
gie (An introduction to the study of Husserl 's pheno-
menology, 1965--66 and published as a book in 1966),
considered by ERAZIM KOHĂK Patocka's finest text on
phenomenology. They combine an erudite, focused,
and penetrating historical exposition with a care fu! and
sharp criticism. At the same time, Patocka's article "K
prehistorii vedy o pohybu: svet, zeme, nebe a pohyb
lidskeho zi vota" (Toward a prehistory of the science
of movement: World, earth, sky, and the movement
of human life, 1965) betrayed his own philosophical
ambitions and introduced the earliest version of his
theory of three basic movements of human existence.
The combination of critica! scholarly articles mainly
on Husserl (some in French or German), which gradu-
ally culminated in Patocka 's conception of an asubjec-
tive phenomenology, with less scholarly, more Heideg-
gerian philosophical texts (besides many texts on the
history of ideas, on art, and on history) remained the
pattern ofPatocka's writing until his death in 1977-
except that he was forbidden to publish in his country
after 1970. But before that, in 1968, he was allowed
to return to the university and his 1968-72 teaching
(extra-curricular after 1970) was formati ve for a new
generation of phenomenologists.
To complete the picture, a few more transla-
tions should be mentioned: Husserl 's Vorlesungen zur
Phănomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905],
and some marginal and often not directly phenomen-
ological seJections from MAX SCHELER, KARL JASPERS,
GABRIEL MARCEL, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer,
Landgrebe, and Fink were translated into Czech and
selections from Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre
 CZECHOSLOVAKIA
were translated into the Slovak language.
The Czechoslovak cultural and academic life was
badly hurt by the measures adopted by the new an-
tidemocratic leaders. Books were removed from li-
braries according to centrally issucd lists, professors
were expelled, and those remaining were under super-
vision and censorship (rather strict in the 1970s, grad-
ually softening in the 1980s). A rich intellectual scene
gradually emerged, however, in the dissent. Typewrit-
ten "samizdat" texts were circulated, teaching went on,
there were even some international contacts. Finally,
in 1989, many ofthe underground intel\ectuals became
prominent in dismantling the old regime and building
the new one.
On the official scene, phenomenology was nearly
dead. What remained was a chapter in the "criticism
of bourgeois philosophy" in the university courses,
or anonymous phenomenology-inspired expositions
within the Marxism courses (by .11R.i PESEK and others).
Within the "criticism" geme, one rather weak book on
Husserl by Jozef Piacek was published in Slovak, and
there were some translations from Polish and Russian
on existentialism.
The underground phenomenology was dominated
by Patocka again until his death in 1977. He taught
seminars on specific texts and offered lecture series
on broader topics, many of which were recorded and
published after his death, e.g., Platân a Evropa (Plato
and Europe, 1983), and wrote a few significant texts
in both German and Czech, including Kacifske eseje
ofilosofii dejin (Heretical essays on the philosophy of
history, 1975), considered the final statement of his
philosophical endeavor.
11R.i NEMEC was the main center of gravity of the
new generation of Patocka 's students. He continued
organizing translation and study groups, and after his
emigration in 1979, he was a pioneer in propagating
Patocka's work abroad. Due to illness he has been less
productive recently. Nevertheless, the combination of
a friendly, supportive, and collaborative atmosphere in
Nemec's circle with the demanding, brilliant, but per-
haps ali too dominant presence of Patocka provided a
fertile environment, which gave rise to work ofsome-
what higher standard than that ofthe 1960s (except for
Patocka's).
PETR REZEK was considered the most promising of
the group. Besides his work on PSYCHOLOGY and art
127
and his continuous teaching activity (on Greek, mod-
em, and even ANALYTJC PHJLOSOPHY), he wrote severa!
analytical and critica! papers on Patocka and used
some phenomenological ideas in his psychological
work. JVAN CHVATiK 's main field is translation and text
scholarship, and his fine Heidegger translations include
Sein und Zeit ( 1927) (with Kouba and Petficek), Was
ist Metaphysik (1929), selections from Vortrăge und
Aufsătze (1954), etc. He also organized the preserva-
tion and edition of Patocka's work (twenty-seven vol-
umes of "underground" text of 1979-89) and is cur-
rently the head ofthe Jan Patocka Archives in Prague.
Less active as teacher and organizer and more con-
centrated on study is PAVEL KOUBA, perhaps the best
Czech phenomenology scholar today, recently work-
ing mainly on Nietzsche. An active teacher and a very
productive essayist and translator (e.g., Husserl, Hei-
degger, JACQUES DERRIDA), MJROSLAV PETRiCEK JR. is in-
terested in the French scene and in literature and art
theory.
The doyen of another group of Patocka 's students,
also connected with Nemec (and of a Catholic back-
ground), was RADJM PALous, Patocka's student in the
1940s, who specialized in philosophy of education.
ZDENEK NEUBAUER turned to philosophy as a success-
ful biologist, and works mainly on phenomenology
of nature, of NATURAL SCIENCE, and of myth. MAR-
TIN PALOUS, influenced by HANNAH ARENDT and Eric
Voegelin (190 1-1985), deals mainly with POLJTJCS.
ZDENEK KRATOCHViL, an accomplished theologian who
studied under KAROL WOJTYLA in Cracow, studies early
thought with a focus on Heraclitus (he has recently
published a new trans1ation with a commentary), Hel-
1enistic philosophy, and Christian gnosis. Another the-
o1ogian, TOMĂS HALiK, combines Patocka with Jungian
psychology. DANIEL KROUPA led severa! very success-
ful introductory seminars on Husserl, Heidegger, and
Patocka before he turned toward POLITIC AL PHILOSOPHY
and subsequently toward politics itself.
JAN SOKOL wrote and taught on phenomenology of
RELIGION and HJSTORY; trans]ated, e.g., EMMANUEL LEV-
INAS; and currently writes on time and rhythm. Other
important Patocka students of 1968-77 include v ĂCLAV
BELOHRADSKY, current1y engaged in antifoundational-
ism, rhetoric, and liberal politics; ZDENEK PINC, the
founder and the head of the new (1992) liberal arts
college of Charles University; .11R.i MICHĂLEK, persis-
128 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tently working on early and especially late Heidegger;
JJRi roLÎVKA, combining phenomenology with an in-
teres! in Scholastic and analytic philosophy; MILOSLAV
BEDNĂR (politica! philosophy), etc.
Among Czechoslovak phenomenologists working
abroad, the most notable are ERAZIM KOHĂK, profes-
sor at Boston University, who has translated Ricceur
and Patocka, commented on Husserl and Patocka, and
done original work on values and ECOLOGY, and lUA
SRUBAR, professor of soCIOLOGY at Konstanz, who has
commented on ALFRED SCHUTZ and Patocka. JOZEF SIV ĂK
returned to Slovakia after graduale research in FRANCE
(with Ricceur among others), and writes mainly on
Husserl. American-horn ERIKA ABRAMS is an excellent
translator ofPatocka into French (roughly ten volumes
published) and a true Patocka expert. KLAUS NELLEN
is the head of the Viennese branch of the Patocka
Archives and a ca-editor of the five-volume selection
from Patocka in German.
Among the younger Czech phenomenologists, JOSEF
MOURAL and FILIP KARFiK were trained mainly in under-
ground circ]es, whi]e JĂN PAVLJK, LA OI SLAV BENYOVSZKY,
and IVAN BLECHA studied with Professor Pesek.
Within the plurality of schools in the contemporary
Czech Republic, including a particularly quick growth
ofinterest in the hitherto almost unknown analytic phi-
losophy, the influence ofphenomenology stil! remains
strongest. There are also a number of people more or
less influenced by phenomenology working in psychol-
ogy, education theory, anthropology, and in literature,
theater, and art theory and history.
It may be of some interest that sin ce philosophy was
an important part ofthe Czech cultural underground, a
number ofphilosophers played a ro le in dismantling the
Communist regime in 1989 and in laying foundations
for democratic politics since then. From the early days
of the Civic Forum (the movement that took power
from the Communists), severa! of the people men-
tioned worked as volunteers. In 1990, Radim Palous
became the new rector ofthe Charles University, Mar-
tin Palous because the deputy minister of foreign af-
fairs, Daniel Kroupa was a co-founder and currently
the number three figure of the second strongest party
in the country (after the split of the Civic Forum), Jan
Sokol was the deputy chairman of one of the federal
parliament chambers, etc.
Petr Pithart, Czech prime minister 1990-92, was
formerly involved in Patocka-influenced work in po-
litica! theory and history and ca-editor of Schrţften zur
tschechischen Kultur und Geschichte volume (Writ-
ings on Czech culture and history, a volume in the
German Patocka edition). vĂCLAV HAVEL, the president
ofCzechoslovakia 1989-92 and ofthe Czech Republic
beginning in 1993, was an admirer ofPatocka from the
late 1950s and a friend from the 1960s on, and wrote a
few essays on him. After Patocka's death, he remained
philosophically influenced by phenomenologists, par-
ticularly by Belohradsky, Radim and Martin Palous,
and Neubauer.
JOSEF MOURAL
Charles Universitv

DANCE FDMUND HUSSERL, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE,
and \1Al:RICE M!ORLEAU-PO'JTY mention dance on]y
in passing. For example, in ldeen zu einer reinen
Phdnomeno/ogie und phdnomeno/ogischen Phi/oso-
phie II [ 1912-15], Husserl refers to the dancing body
in a discussion of the way the apprehension of a hu-
man being is not the apprehension of a mind fastened
to a body, but of a whole person, animated through and
through so that every movement is "fui! of soul." In his
discussion of desi re in L 'etre et le neant ( 1943), Sartre
alludes to the dancing body as a soov that cannot be
appropriated as sheer contingency, facticity, or flesh,
for even if nude, the dancer is stil! a situated, acting,
moving body. And in Phenomenologie de la perception
( 1945), Merleau-Ponty uses a dance as an example of
an acquired motor habit, pointing out that learning a
dance is not a matter of analyzing it into its compo-
nent parts, but of "catching on to" the movement in a
thoroughly bodily way.
Though MARTIN HEIDEGGER turns more exp\icitly to
dance in severa! texts- for example, in his 1950 !ee-
ture "Das Ding" and in his 1959 lecture "Holderlins
Erde und Himmel"- the dance he is concerned with
is the "round dance" ofthe "fourfold" (earth, sky, mor-
tais, divinities) in their mutually mirroring play; as a
reciproca! joining, gathering, or belonging-together in
which the world "worlds." This ontologically accented
dance is only loosely connected with the ritual dance
forms in ancient Greece to which Heidegger alludes.
ROMAN INGARDEN's Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der
Kunst (lnvestigations in the ontology of art, initially
drafted in 1928 but not published until 1962) engages
actual works of art more directly, but he focuses on
MUSIC, painting, ARCHITECTURE, and FILM. Thus here too
there is only passing reference to dance, amounting
to a recommendation that "artistic dance" be clearly
distinguished from such "extra-artistic phenomena" as
ritual dances. However, Sibyl S. Cohen 's "lngarden 's
Aesthetics and Dance" ( 1984) draws upon his Das /it-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 129
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
erarische Kunstwerk (The literary work of art, 1931 ),
applying his notion ofthe stratified, schematic nature of
the literary work of art to the case of dan ce- which,
for example, has a lived-body stratum rather than a
phonetic stratum for its foundational element.
Dancc is mentioned more frequently
in MIKEL DUFRENNE's Phenomenologie de 1'experience
esthetique (1953 ), though it is given no special treat-
ment of its own. Dufrenne- who, like Ingarden, is
concerned only with dance as an art form meant to be
viewed by spectators rather than with dance forms in
which pcople participate, and who draws nearly ali of
his examples from ballet- stresses that although there
is no dance without the dancer, the dancer must submit
to the dance in such a way that the dance "possesses"
the dan cer and movement that has in fact been very pre-
cisely determined in advance is nevertheless brought
to life with spontaneity as well as grace at the moment
ofperformance. But although the body is the "organ of
performance" and provides the "sensuous material" for
the dance, the particular dancing body is transcended
in favor of the work itself. And the aesthetic object
that the dancer thus incarnates is comprised of "pure
movements" with their own sensuous, bodily logic;
even moments of repose are never mere static poses,
but the "apotheosis" of movement just completed and
the "promise" of movement about to unfold.
Dufrcnne 's work is, of course, meant as a contribu-
tion to phenomenological AESTHETICS in general, not as
a phenomenological description of any particular art
form. He nevertheless notes in passing that when the
dancer "dedicates" his or her body to the dance, his
or her movements "proceed from the trunk"- a de-
scriptive detail already emphasized by ERWIN w. STRAUS
in "Die Formen des Răumlichen" ( 1930). But whereas
Dufrenne remarks on the highlighted ro le of the trunk
or torso from the spectator's point ofview, Straus sug-
gests that the dancer's own lived experience of dancing
involves a sense of 'T' or "self' as being centered in
the trunk (rather than, say, somewhere in the head,
behind the eyes). For Straus, this shift to vital move-
ment emanating from the body's center is linked with
the dancer's shift from the "optica!" space oftheoret-
ical knowledge, practica! aetion, and purposive, goal-
directed movement to an "acoustic" space sustaining a
pre-reflcctive dissolution ofthe 1-world, subject-object
dichotomy- a realm of "symbolic spatial qualities"
 130 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
rather than measurable distances. Here, however, dan ce
is only important to Straus's phenomenological PSY-
CHOLOGY insofar as the contrast between everyday bod-
ily movement and pure dance movement sheds light
on the differences between the distinctive spatialities
proper to the vi sua! and to the aud ia! modes of experi-
encing.
Yet despite the relatively sparse treatment of dance
in the classic texts and authors mentioned, there is a
small but growing body of literature in which phe-
nomenologists have focused on dance in its own right
(rather than as exemplifying some other theme or phe-
nomenon). Moreover, persons initially trained in dance
ha ve turned to phenomenology in order to elucidate the
essential structures and aesthetic aims of Western the-
atrical dancing. In so doing, they are carrying forward
two trends already emerging from the dance world it-
self: a concern for a compelling, non-reductive way of
giving voi ce to the subjective experiencing of dane ing,
and a concern for the precise, evocative verbal descrip-
tion of seemingly ephemeral and ineffable dan ce works
as they are experienced from the audience's point of
view. Thus a phenomenological turn to lived experi-
ence and to the "how" of the appearing phenomena
already resonates with autobiographical and historical
writing by dance "insiders" (dancers and choreogra-
phers) on the one hand and 20th century dance criticism
on the other.
The Phenomenology of Dan ce ( 1966), by MAXINE
SHEETS (!ater Sheets-Johnstone), was the first book-
length study to apply phenomenological tenns and con-
cepts to the experience of choreographing, performing,
and perceiving theater dance works. Drawing upon EX-
ISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY - especially its portrayaJ
of ecstatic time, along with its emphasis on the pre-
reflective ways in which "consciousness 'exists' its
body" and thereby constitutes lived space - as well
as upon the notion of dance as "virtual force" worked
out by Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985) in Feeling and
Form ( 1953), Sheets characterizes dan ce movement as
pure dynamic "form-in-the-making," as a "sheer dy-
namic flow of force" such that the dancer's body is a
center of force in a textured, "diasporatic" space. Like
Dufrenne, she emphasizes the oneness of dancer and
dance and appeals to a certain "logic" governing the
development of a choreographed movement sequence:
to compose a dan ce is to discover the bodily logic of its
distinctive "dynamic line." But as she also points out,
the emerging organic continuity of this dynamic line
can be clarified for choreographer and dancer alike by
vocalizing it, since the dynamic line itselfis essentially
a "dynamic interplay" of qualities or energies that can
be "mirrored" audially (whether "actually vocalized"
or "inwardly heard") as well as executed bodily and
perceived visually. This concern for artistic creativity
is also pursued in her "Thinking in Movement" ( 1981 ),
an essay on dance improvisation that emphasizes the
pre-rational "kinetic intelligence" of a situated, "mind-
ful" body.
DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN focuses on dance in a series of
publications in the 1970s and 1980s. In "Balanchine's
Formalism" {1973) he suggests that although ballet
has historically been a representational form with plot,
setting, characters, etc., some of Balanchine's works
demonstrate that the classical ballet idiom itself re-
veals essential bodily possibilities of lightness, poise,
and grace as the dancer visibly transcends the con-
straints of the body's own weight and makes weight-
lessness appear in its place. In "The Embodiment of
Performance" ( 1975-76) he examines the avant-garde
performance genre as a medium in which the sensu-
ous body is shown to be the primitive source of sig-
nificance as well as the bearer of already sedimented
historical-cultural meaning. In "Philosophers and the
Dance" (1977-78) he links the lack of serious consid-
eration of dance in much of the Western philosophi-
cal tradition to a general hostility toward the bodily,
and the feminine principle, on the part of a patriarchal
civilization whose emphasis on mastery and control
has suppressed - but not destroyed - a primordial
connectivity embodied in sacred dance. And in "On
Heidegger: The Gathering Dan ce of Mortals" ( 1980)
he pursues and deepens Heidegger's ontologica! ap-
propriation of dan ce.
Levin continues his HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY of dance in The Body :S Recollection of Being:
Phenomenological Psychology and the Deconstruction
o( Nihilism (1985), whose aim is to retrieve a "body of
understanding" kept in concealment by the dominant
tradition. He accordingly turns not only to Heidegger,
Nietzsche, and Merleau-Ponty, but also to aboriginal
teachings and traditions concerning the body. The re-
sulting FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY not onJy focuses on
gesture and motility, but culminates in a presentation of
 DAN CE
dance as a "bearing ofthought in which we are granted
an experience of Being"; he suggests that "when dan ce
is thoughtful, it is a fundamental form of poetizing
(Dichtung)" and that as ontologica! movement, dance
arises from and discloses our deep and originary attune-
ment to the Being, ground, or origin that it celebrates
in its ecstatic and earth-affirming leaps and circles.
SONORA HORTON FRALEIGH's Dance and the Lived
Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics ( 1987) is similarly con-
cerned with the mythopoetic and ontologica! signif-
icance of dance, which she explores by way of the
notion of polar tension (be it the archetypal tension of
the masculine and the feminine, the strife ofworld and
earth in Heidegger's portrayal ofthe bringing-forth of
truth in the work of art, or the tension between the
individuality of the dancer and the "universalizing"
impulse ofthe dance). Yet her project as a whole is to
make the inherent qualities and aesthetic properties of
dan ce intelligible in a way that does justice to insiders'
experiences of dance as the existential art par excel-
lence. She emphasizes that although dance celebrates
and affirms the vital, pre-verbal movement sensibility
ofthe lived body-subject, dance movement is not ordi-
nary, habitual, or automatic, but is consciously struc-
tured for an aesthetic purpose; grace in dance consists
in a "fit" between such movement and the energy or
effort needed to incarnate it. Her descriptions-which
focus for the most part on modern dance rather than
balle!- include analyses of specific dances and chore-
ographic styles as well as references to more general
experiential structures such as moving with another
(or others) in unison and moving against another (or
others) in counterbalancing, mutually facilitating, con-
trasting, and oppositional ways.
Fraleigh 's interviews with modern dancers indicate
that connections between modern dance and EXISTEN-
TIALISM are not limited to endeavors such asher own
attempt to work out a phenomenological aesthetics
of dance: rather, dancers themselves also report be-
ing directly inftuenced by the writings of Nietzsche,
Kierkegaard, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger's
"thinking of Being" is similarly the inspiration for
Gelassenheit Arts Presenters, a nonprofit organization
recently founded in San Francisco under the leadership
of dancer and choreographer Philip Jones. This orga-
nization is devoted to sponsoring dance/theater/music
events where what is at work in the work of art can
131
come to unconcealment- i.e., to fostering occasions
for releasement (Gelassenheit), aletheia. and letting-
be. In other words, the organization deliberately sets
out to bring together performing artists who work on-
tologically, conveying the being of human being by
making present the truth of Being in a movement of
"showing" that gathers us into a revelatory event of
"seeing."
In Australia, PHILIPA ROTHFIELD also works toward
building bridges between phenomenological philoso-
phy and contemporary dance, not only by using pheno-
menology to help articulate movement and dan ce prac-
tice, but also by allowing movement and dance experi-
ence to inform phenomenological writing. Her essays
on dance deal with such issues as the transgression of
individual bodily boundaries in the dance form known
as Contact Improvisation, which she discusses in terms
of Merleau-Ponty's notions of "fiesh" and "reversibil-
ity," and the "corporeal connectivity" arising between
dancer and audience such that the sensuous pleasure of
moving can spread by a kind of contagion from the per-
former's body to the bodies of audience members. Yet
in addition to the general kinaesthetic resonance ofthe
dancer's movement in the spectator's body- a theme
mentioned by many writers on dance- Rothfield ac-
knowledges the possibility of a specifically erotic di-
mension to the intercorporeal performance situation.
She also recognizes the social and cultural inscription
ofbodies, linking this with issues in FEMINISM. But she
contends that dance practice can itself shift and rene-
gotiate historically produced codes and modes of rep-
resentation. Her work thus supplements POSTMODERN
accounts such as Susan Leigh Foster's Reading Dane-
ing: Bodies and Subjects in Contemporwy American
Dance ( 1986) and "Dancing Bodies" ( 1992), which
follow MICHEL FOUCAULT in describing the disciplinary
procedures creating the trained bodies (and correla-
tive "selves") appropriate to various dance styles and
techniques.
However, the very project of elucidating how dane-
ing bodies are shaped in institutional settings also
points to the larger field of movement education and to
the implicitly phenomenological elements in the work
ofRudolfLaban (1879-1958), including a turn to the
"how" of lived movement and a concern for invariant
features of movement experience. Dialogue between
phenomenology and Laban movement education was
 132 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
already underway in the 1970s, as is evident in a 1974
symposium on "The Significance ofMovement" bring-
ing together members ofboth traditions. More recently,
Vera Mal etic 's Body- Space- Expression: The De-
velopment of Ruda!( Laban s Movement and Dance
Concepts (1987) includes some explicit comparisons
of Laban 's work on body, perception, motility, spa-
tiality, temporality, and expression with the treatment
of these themes in Merleau-Ponty, Straus, and FRED-
ERIK J. J. BUYTENDIJK. Comparisons between Laban and
Merleau-Ponty have also been discussed in a paper
co-authored by MAUREEN CONNOLLY and Anna Lathrop.
It is interesting to note that Heidegger's extended
notion ofthe "round dance" is anticipated to some ex-
tent in Laban 's Die Welt des Tanzers (The world ofthe
dancer, 1920), where the term "Gedankenreigen" or
"round dances of thought" refers to moving, multidi-
mensional "interrelationships of concepts and thought"
irreducible to merely logica! connections, while the
round dance itself is taken as the form of ultimate
communion and unity. Moreover, Laban 's discussions
of dan ce in terms of inseparably intertwined elements
of "time-space-force" in the same work (and other
texts) provide a precedent for Sheets's presentation
of dance as "forcetimespace" in her 1966 book. That
Laban takes the mover's body (rather than some fixed
point of the surrounding space) as the point of refer-
ence for the directional orientations used in his system
of movement notation is reminiscent of Husserl 's de-
scriptions of the body as the nullpoint of orientation.
And Husserl 's remarks on the sphere of objects within
reach - as well as ALFRED SCHUTZ's more sustained
treatment ofthe notion ofthe world within my actual,
potential, and restorable reach - finds a parallel in
Laban 's development of the notion of the reach space
or "kinesphere." Such similarities need not imply ac-
tual influences between the individuals concerned. But
they do indicate that the phenomenological turn to lived
body, lived space, lived movement, and lived relations
with others and objects is situated within a broader
historical-cultural context characterized by an increas-
ing theoretical and practica! concern with these themes
in other disciplines as well, including not only dance,
but a]so PHYSICAL EDUCATION and SOMATICS.
Work yet to be done in the encounter between
phenomenology and dance might include studies of
the transforming and community-building aspects of
dance, including social dance, ethnic dance, ritual or
sacred dance, and so on. Moreover, in addition to the-
matizing specific dance styles or traditions in the con-
text ofphenomenologically oriented ETHNIC STUDIES or
ETHNOLOGY, there is room for further work on dance
as a fundamental way of being human that is to be
honored and developed in EDUCATION at alllevels. Here
"dan ce" is not the ti tie of a specialized activity reserved
for professionals and subject to the reigning aesthetic
criteria of a given cui ture, but names a dimension of
human motility per se, a primordial human possibil-
ity. Finally, there is also room for further discussion of
dance as "world-generating"- a theme emerging in
ALGIS MICKUNAS 's "The Primacy of Movement" ( 197 4)
and in the chapter on dance in ARNOLD BERLEANT's Art
and Engagement ( 1991 ), where the bodily engagement
binding performers and spectators not only epitomizes
sociality, but also has cosmologica! implications.
Throughout, however, we would do well to ac-
knowledge that dance has an evolving, constantly
changing character; dance experience is multifarious
and plurivocal, and dan ce itself can never be fully con-
tained by any single attempt to discipline, define, or
describe it. Yet although seeking a uni vocal expression
of"the" essence of dance may bea counter-productive
research aim, giving voice to a "chorus eidetics" of
dance-and of the impulse toward dance whose heart
beats within ali movement- is sti li a worthwhile and
timely task.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cohen, Sibyl S. "Ingarden's Aesthetics and Dance." In Il-
luminating Dance: Philosophical Explorations. Ed. Max-
ine Sheets-Johnstone. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell Univer-
sity Press, 1984, 146--66.
Foster, Susan Leigh. "Dancing Bodies." In !nc01porations.
Ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter. New York: Ur-
zone, 1992, 480--95.
Levin, David Michael. "On Heidegger: The Gathering Dance
ofMortals." Research in Phenomenology 1O ( 1980), 251-
77.
Maletic, Vera. 'The Lived Body-Space-Expression." In her
Bodv- Space- Expression: The Deve/opment ojRudoll
Laban:~ Movement and Dance Concepts. Berlin: Mouton
de Gruyter, 1987, 189--201.
Mickunas, Algis. "The Primacy of Movement." Main Cur-
rents in Modern Thought 31 (special Laban issue) (1974),
8--12.
Rothfield, Philipa. "Performing Sexuality, The Scintillations
of Movement." In Pe1jorming Sexua/ities. Ed. Michelle
 DASEIN
Bou1ous Wa1ker. Brisbane: Institute of Modern Art, 1994,
57-fJ6. .
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. "Thinking in Movement." Jour-
nal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (1981), 399-407.
ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
Study Project on Phenomenology of"the Body
MAUREEN CONNOLLY
Brock University
DASEIN In ordinary German, dasein means
existence, especially human existence, but it is used by
MARTIN HEIDEGGER in Sein und Zeit ( 1927) as a technica)
term to signify that being whose very mode ofBeing is
to understand Being and hence to raise the question of
Being. Heidegger is exploiting the root meaning ofthe
word "there-being" (da-sein): it is up to Dasein "tobe"
(zu sein) the "there" (da) ofthe WORLD, i.e., tobe the
place or locus where the world is disclosed or becomes
phenomenally manifest. The thrust ofthe word "there"
is not to signify one place as opposed to another, there
as opposed to here, but rather the essential disclosed-
ness, manifestness, or phenomenality of things as a
whole; sein in turn has a verbal and infinitival sense,
"to be" the there. Hence the force of the term is to
emphasize that Dasein must itself be the "there," the
disclosedness of Being and world, that Dasein brings
its "there" along with it.
Heidegger thus is innovating upon a fundamental
theme in EDMUND HUSSERL 's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY. Like Husserl, Heidegger agrees that the phe-
nomenality ofthe world must be traced back (reducere)
to the "subject" that "constitutes" the world, a subject
that thus enjoys a certain "transcendental" primacy.
Like Husserl, who distinguishes between the transcen-
dental and the worldly EGo, Heidegger distinguishes
between Dasein and human beings. But Heidegger ar-
gues that the very Being of this subject, when ques-
tioned more radically, is to be determined not as a
transcendental subject but as Dasein, and that its work
of "constitution" is a matter of Dasein 's "understand-
ing ofBeing." The latter, in turn, !ies at the hasis ofthe
way Dasein understands itself and other beings of the
same sort as itself, as well as worldly entities.
The notion of Dasein thus serves to free pheno-
menology from the influence of a Cartesian and pure
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
133
transcendental subject and to reconceive it in more rad-
ically ontologica! terms by raising the question of the
being of the sum or cogito. Rather than an epistemic
subject that knows ( erkennen) the world, Dasein is con-
ceived as a being actively engaged in various worldly
projects and ultimately in the task ofbeing a "self." It
is up to Dasein "tobe" (zu sein) this being, actively to
take over the task of being itself, of being the "there"
ofworld and self.
The "analytic" of Dasein is the explication of the
defining features of such a being. Since the Being of
this entity is "existence," the analytic ofDasein is said
to be an "existential analytic" and its defining fea-
tures are said tobe "existentialia," as opposed to "cate-
gories," which are the defining features ofbeings other
than Dasein. As the explication ofthe Being ofDasein,
the analytic of Dasein is an ontologica! analysis, and
can be called an existential-ontologica! analytic, as op-
posed to the ontologies of beings other than Dasein.
But the existential-ontologica! analytic is not simply
one among many ontologies; it is the first, primary,
Of FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY of the being that bears an
ontologica! primacy over ali other beings, and this in
virtue of Dasein's understanding of Being. The aim
and upshot of the analytic of Dasein is to lay bare the
horizon within which Being itself can be understood.
This analytic is not be confused with other inves-
tigations of human existence; it is not a psychologi-
cal, anthropological, biologica!, ethical, or theological
investigation of human beings, but a strictly ontolog-
ica! study of the being that raises the question of Se-
ing. This discrimination corresponds, analogously, to
Husserl 's separation of a purely transcendental science
of consciousness from empirica! psychology. As an
ontologica! investigation, the existential analytic is not
an essay in EXISTENTIALISM, i.e., an existential PHILO-
SOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY that for Heidegger is properJy
to be attributed to KARL JASPERS and that belongs to
the field of existential anthropology. Heidegger does
not dismiss existential anthropology in Sein und Zeit
( 1927), but insists that it must take its lead from the
analytic of Dasein.
The analytic of Dasein is divided into two stages:
a preliminary or preparatory stage, and a more pri-
mordial stage that builds upon and radicalizes the first
stage; this division corresponds to the two published
divisions of Sein und Zeit. A third division, never pub-
134 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
lished, was to address the formal features ofthe "mean-
ing" of Being in terms of time, the horizon for which
was tobe established by the analytic ofDasein. These
three divisions were to compose the "First Part" ofthe
book, which was to be followed by a "Second Part''
dedicated to a historical "destruction" of the history
of ontology. Inasmuch as the first two divisions ofthe
book, which comprise the two stages ofthe ana1ytic of
Dasein, were the only sections of the book ever to be
published, Heidegger's entire project as an author was
for a long time identified with the analytic of Dasein
itself. The latter was in turn, despite the warnings to the
contrary in the text itself, further identified with an ex-
istential anthropology. Only his publications after the
war, beginning with the famous "Brief liber den Hu-
manismus" ( 1947), were able to dispel this long held
interpretation ofhis work, although it is now clear that
by 194 7 Heidegger 's views had undergone a funda-
mental shift from those developed in the analytic of
Dasein.
The work of the analytic of Dasein is carried out
by way of a HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY. That is,
the basic traits of Dasein are not simply read off Da-
sein, as if Dasein simply lay in plain view before the
phenomenological investigator. They are instead in-
terpretively set free by means of a projection of the
fundamental character of Dasein's being, which al-
lows Dasein to show itself as it is. The initial pro-
jection ofDasein is set in terms (borrowed from Soren
Kierkegaard and Jaspers) of "existence," which Hei-
degger claims is the "essence" of Dasein, the scare
quotes signifying an unorthodox sense of "essence"
(hen ce the "existential analytic"). Existence is nota hy-
pothesis or assumption whose deductive implications
the analytic will explore, but a disclosive projection
that frees up Dasein in its phenomenality, a projection
whose worth is proven by the phenomenological work
it makes possible. The initial projection of Dasein in
terms of existence makes possible a "preparatory fun-
damental analysis ofDasein," which will itselfneed to
be radicalized and repeated in a second, more primor-
dial projection of Dasein 's being.
The preparatory analysis turns on the notion that Da-
sein is characterized by "being-in-the-world,"which is
taken tobe Dasein 's nearest but most easily overlooked
characteristic. As an inquiry into something that is in-
conspicuous by its conspicuousness, something onto-
logically near but phenomenologically far, phenomen-
ology itself is conceived in the analytic of Dasein as
the cultivation of a sensitivity to what !ies nearest but
unobserved in experience. Being-in-the-world is ex-
pounded in terms ofthree ingredient elements: world,
being-with others in the world, and being-in as such.
The analysis of the woRLD, which bears a sim-
ilarity to Husserl's investigations into the lifeworld
(Lebenswelt), is o ne of the most famous parts of Sein
und Zeit. Starting out from an analysis ofthe surround-
ing world ( Umwelt), Dasein is described as a being
concerned with the most immediately pressing every-
day affairs. The Umwelt is taken tobe a world ofuten-
sils, each linked to the next to form a systematic con-
catenation in which Dasein always finds itself already
immersed. Breaking sharply with the primacy of the
epistemological subject, Heidegger says that Dasein
does not primari1y "know" this world ( Welterkennt-
nis), but deals with it concernfully, and so there can
be no question ofneeding to establish how a worldless
subject crosses over to the transcendence ofthe world.
Being-in-the-world is always already transcendent. In
an analytic of Dasein it would make no sense to ask
how the existence ofthe world can be proved, since that
is a question raised by a being characterized by being-
in-the-world. In one of the most famous descriptions
the phenomenological movement has known, Heideg-
ger says that Dasein does not look at a hammer and
observe its properties; Dasein does not wa1k around
the hammer and actively synthesize its changing per-
spectiva] variations (Abschattungen) into the unity of
a hammer-object. Rather, Dasein hammers. The world
itself is the totality of involvements within which Da-
sein works out its everyday worldly concerns, a world
within which Dasein a1ways finds itselfand a1ready sit-
uated and toward which Dasein reaches out in projec-
tive understanding. "World" is a feature not of things,
but ofDasein 's being-in-the-world, of Dasein 's world-
understanding, so that Dasein can be thought of as
bringing its wor1d along with it.
Being-in-the-wor1d is also being-with others in the
world. IfDasein is nota world1ess subject, neither is it
a solitary ego. Far from needing to prove the existence
of others, others are those among whom Oase in finds
itself already there. Others are not those whom one is
not, but those among whom one is there "also." So far
are we from needing to establish the existence of others
 DASEIN
that the real task is to find oneselfin the midst of others,
tobe oneselfin the midst ofthe pregiven, constant, and
quietly imperious rule that others exert over us. This
leads to the famous account of "authenticity" and "in-
authenticity," the ma in phenomenal features of which
are taken from Kierkegaard but recast by Heidegger in
the terms of an analytic ofDasein. He is often criticized
by interpersonal thinkers like GABRIEL MARCEL and EM-
MANUEL LEVINAS for regarding the other person as a
threat to, rather than a condition of, authenticity; the
usual Heideggerian rejoinder is to distinguish being-
with, as an ontologica) structure of Dasein, from the
"ontic" and ethical question of interpersonal relations.
The third and pivotal element ofbeing-in-the-world
is that of being-in as such. Here Heidegger makes it
plain that in an analytic of Dasein, being-in does not
ha ve the sense of being contained in the world but of
disclosing the world or, to use Husserl 's Ianguage, of
constituting the world. In a series of crucial and fa-
mous analyses, Heidegger identifies being-in as a tri-
partite process. Oase in is a being that runs ahead into its
possibility-to-be (projection), while ali along finding it-
self always already in a situation not of its own choos-
ing that scts the terms and fixes the parameters ofwhat
is possible for Dasein (thrownness). This movement
ahead into possibilities that in a certain way comes
from behind is, likewise, ali along liable tobe drawn off
course, to fali by the wayside, to be scattered and dis-
sipated by idle and empty curiosities (fallenness). That
the tripartite process of projection, thrownness, and
fallenness is at bottom but one unitary process is dis-
closed by the phenomenon of"anxiety" (Kierkegaard),
in which Oase in finds itself overtaken (thrownness) by
an indefinite anxiety about its possibilities (projection)
and inclined to take flight from (fallen) its freedom.
"Anxiety" in turn discloses the unitary being of Da-
sein as "care," which is defined almost by way of a
summary of the preceding discussion, in a long hy-
phenated expression, as ahead-of-itself-being-already-
in-the-world-alongside-others. With this determination
of the Being of Dasein, the first stage of the existential
analytic is completed.
As a HERMENEUTIC inquiry, the existential analytic
of Dasein is able to press forward only by deepening
and radicalizing its initial projection ofDasein's being
as "existence," and thereby determin ing the "meaning"
ofDasein 's being (care). That is the task ofthe second,
135
"more primordial" stage of the analytic. The initial
projection in terms of existence, which turned on Da-
sein's everyday being-in-the-world, is insufficient on
two counts. First, it failed to take into account the total-
ity of Dasein, the whole of its being, having contented
itselfwith Dasein's being from day to day while omit-
ling the end ofDasein, its ultimate possibility, its death.
Second, it failed to probe the primordial authenticity of
Oase in and was content to take up Oase in in its average
everydayness. The first shortcoming is remedied by a
famous analysis of"being-toward-death" in which the
reach of Oase in 's projective structure is extended to
Dasein 's final possibility, its possibility not-to-be, or
not to "be-there." The second failing is remedied by
introducing the phenomenon of resoluteness in which
Dasein, called back to itself from everydayness by the
caii it hears in running forth into its own death, seizes
upon its own most proper possibility to be the being
that it is called upon to be.
This resoluteness that runs forth into Dasein 's own
deepest and most unique possibility is then determined
in terms ofDasein 's "TIME." The time ofDasein is taken
to be the "meaning" of care, i.e., the more primordial
projection of its being and the more radical working
out of the initial projection of "existence." The tem-
porality of Dasein is determined as a primarily fu tura)
being-toward, running forth toward possibilities that
come to Dasein from behind, from what Dasein "has
been" ali along. For Dasein to move forward to its fu-
ture is to return to what has always and ali along been
possible. Unlike the notion of an unfettered freedom
in the early work of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, the freedom and
futural Being of Dasein is to seize upon possibilities
that are tied to what Dasein has been ali along. For au-
thentic, futural Dasein the past is not over, not "past,"
nor is it a dead weight, but a simmering potentiality
whose latent possibilities are seized upon, opened up,
and disclosed by authentic resoluteness. These possi-
bilities are precisely closed off to inauthentic Dasein
and this just because its irresoluteness fa ils to disclose
the possible in what has been. The past of inauthen-
tic Dasein weighs it down, forecloses possibilities, and
contracts it to the passing immediacies ofthe moment.
The existential analytic of the "temporality" of Da-
sein is extended and completed by an analytic of its
"historicality." Dasein is not a being "in" HISTORY but
a primordially historical being, a being that institutes
136 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
historical happening, a being that happens by histori-
cizing. Authentic historicizing, rooted in the authen-
ticity of Dasein, is the process by which Dasein hands
down to itself possibilities from the tradition, seizing
upon and appropriating what was implicit, forgotten,
latent, or repressed by the historical tradition, and this
by going back to the originary, founding sources that
set the tradition in motion. The possibilities that are
handed down to a "generation" (collective rather than
individual Dasein) are said to comprise that genera-
tion 's "destiny" ( Geschick). The analysis of histori-
cality makes plain what a "destruction" of a historical
tradition would mean, viz., a recuperating and unleash-
ing of its energies, not a razing. The analysis also fi lis
in a gap in the existential analytic by providing a clue
as to how the existential resoluteness ofDasein would
acquire "existentiell" (concrete, determinate) definite-
ness, viz., by settling into the particularities ofthe his-
torical "situation" in which it finds itself. This might be
compared to the way the concrete historical Sittlichkeit
of HEGEL aimed at making definite and correcting the
purely formal Moralităt of KANT.
The last task that remains for the analytic ofDasein
is to explicate the "temporal" meaning ofDasein's ev-
eryday being and the meaning of ordinary time, tasks
that are taken up in two of the final chapters of the
published sections of Sein und Zeit.
The categories of the analytic of Dasein were re-
visited in the 1930s, during Heidegger's notorious Na-
tional Socialist years, where they were rehearsed in the
form of a heroic and hyper-voluntaristic nationalism
that intensified and exaggerated certain tendencies of
the 192 7 text. He unabashedly invoked the language of
authenticity, resoluteness, and historicality in his Na-
tional Socialist speeches and writings. According to a
report of KARL u5wiTH, Heidegger himself personally
regarded the notion of historicality as the most im-
portant link to his politica! vision in the 1930s. The
National Socialist Party was conceived to be the in-
strument by which the people of Germany could seize
upon the possibility that their historical tradition sent
their way, which was the "destiny" ofthis people tobe
the metaphysical and spiritualleaders of the West. To
resolve upon this destiny was to choose the new mind,
to affirm the new order, and to follow the Fiihrer.
After the war, both the notion and the language of
an "analytic ofDasein" disappeared. In "Briefiiber den
Humanismus," Heidegger subjected the analytic to a
radical reinterpretation that amounted to a farewell to
the existential analytic and to hermeneutic phenomen-
ology and that set the course of his path of thought
firmly in the direction of the "thought of Being." This
course had in fact been set many years earlier, as early
as the Beitrăge zur Philosophie (Contributions to phi-
losophy, [1936-38]), but it was unknown to anyone
who had not followed the wartime lectures. Partly in ac-
cord with motives that are present in the original ques-
tion ofBeing itself and partly because ofthe foundering
of the extreme voluntarism of the early 1930s, he re-
described "Dasein" as the "there" of"Being" (das "da"
des "Se ins"). Human beings- Heidegger stopped us-
ing the term "Dasein" except to mention or interpret it
-are to serve as the place (the "da") in which Being
makes a clearing for itself, in which Being reveals-and-
conceals itself. Unlike Sein und Zeit, in which Dasein
means to take over and "be" the "there" (so that the
sein in Da-sein had an infinitival force) he now says
that human existence must open itself to the advance
or advent of "Being" (Sein), which clears a space for
itself(a "there," da) in human beings. The "essence" of
"Dasein" !ies, accordingly, in ek-sisting, ec-statically,
in the openness of Being.
With that radicalization and transformation of the
original problematics, the analytic ofDasein undergoes
a sea change. A new wave of Heideggerian thinking
would then sweep post-war Europe, a wave that would
recei ve a particularly favorable reception- ironically,
in view ofthe politica! situation ofthe two countries-in
France, and then in the United States.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Caputo, John D. Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Decon-
struction and the Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1987.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the- World: A Commentary on
Heidegger s Being and Time, Division !. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1992.
Guignon, Charles. Heidegger and the Problem ofKnowledge.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.
Heidegger, Martin. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeit-
begriffs. Ed. Petra Jaeger. Gesamtausgabe 23. Stuttgart:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1979; History ()[ the Concept of
Time. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1985.
- . "Briefuber den Humanismus." [ 194 7]. In his Wegmarken.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967, 145-94.
"A Letter on Humanism." Trans. Frank A. Capuzzi with
 DEEP ECOLOGY
1. Glenn Gray. In Heidegger: Basic Writings. Ed. David
Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1972, 193~242.
Kaelin, Eu gene. Heidegger:~ "Being and Time ": A Read-
ing.for Readers. Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University
Press, 1988.
Kisicl, Theodore. The Genesis al Heidegger:~ "Being and
Time." Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Kocke1mans, Joseph, ed. A Companion ta Martin Heideg-
ger's "Being and Time." Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomeno1ogy/Univcrsity Press of
America, 1986.
- , ed. Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays.
Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Pheno-
menology/University Press of America, 1986.
Schrag, Calvin O. Existence and Freedom: Towards an On-
tology of Human Finitude. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1961.
Van Buren, John E. The Young Heidegger. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1994.
Waelhens, Alphonse de. La philosophie de Martin Hei-
degger. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain,
1942.
JOHN D. CAPUTO
Villanova University
DEEP ECOLOGY (See also ECOLOGY). Deep
ecology has been related to the thought of MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER, who took phenomenology down a different
road than his mentor, EDMUND HUSSERL. For Heideg-
ger, the major issue for phenomenological investiga-
tion was not the intentiona! structures and correlates
of absolute consciousness, but rather the being of en-
tities and the nature of Being (Sein) itself. Convinced
that human experience and knowledge are finite and
historical, he maintained that people living in different
historical epochs ha ve differing ways ofunderstanding
what it means for entities "tobe." In our technological
epoch, for instance, people understand nature as little
more than raw material that is valuable solely because it
can be used to enhance human power. Because he crit-
icized technological modernity's domineering attitude
toward nature and because he envisioned a POSTMODERN
era in which people would "let things be," Heidegger
has sometimes been read as an intellectual forerunner
oftoday's "deep ecology" movement. His understand-
ing of Being, and how Being has become constricted
in technological modernity, can be reviewed before the
plausibility of this reading is examined.
In traditional metaphysics, Being often refers to the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
137
ultimate ground or foundation for entities. According
to Heidegger, Plato initiated this tradition by defining
Being as eidos, the eterna! form or blueprint that gives
intelligibility to entities in the mutable spatiotemporal
realm. For Plato, eidos is ontologically superior be-
cause it is the eterna! and unchanging foundation for
ali entities. Heidegger uses the term "constant pres-
ence" (Anwesenheit) to describe Being as an eterna!
foundation.
He offers at least two criticisms ofthe "metaphysics
of presence." First, Being involves finitude, not eter-
nity. Indeed, the reference to the present in "constant
presence" indicates a concealed temporal dimension
even in the traditional metaphysical conception ofbe-
ing. Second, Being cannot be adequately understood
as a foundation or ground, for such an understanding
regards Being as a superior entity, such as the supreme
being, or God. For Heidegger, FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
is not a matter of "telling a story" about where things
carne from, or how they were produced, but instead is
an account ofhow entities can manifest themselves in-
telligibly as entities, that is, as things that are. "Being"
names the self-manifesting or presencing (Anwesen)
by virtue ofwhich an entity reveals itselfas such. For
such presencing to occur, he postulated that there must
be an "absencing," "clearing," or "opening," which he
called TIME. Neither Being nor time "are" entities; in-
stead, they are ontologically potent "nothingness": the
conditions necessary for entities "tobe" in the sense of
becoming manifest.
Presencing and temporality, Being and time, are
mediated through DASEIN, Heidegger's term for the
ontologica! capacity defining human existence. Hu-
man Dasein exists as the three-dimensional "there"
(da) through which Being as presencing (Sein) can
take place. In his !ater writings, he maintained that the
clearing is also opened up through LANGUAGE. Dasein's
complex linguistic and temporal structure enables hu-
mans not only to understand the intelligible structure of
entities, but also to grasp the fact that entities "are" at
ali. Animals may encounter other entities, but they do
not encounter them as things that are, for animals can-
not open up the temporal-linguistic clearing in which
entities can "present" themselves and thus "be." Hen ce
Heidegger criticized Aristotle 's influential definiti an of
humans as "rational animals."
In everyday existence, Dasein conceives of itself
138 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
not as the temporal-linguistic clearing for entities tobe
manifest, but rather as just another type of entity, for
instance, a "person" or an "intelligent animal." By dis-
closing itself in this way, Dasein manages to conceal
its own nothingness, finitude, mortality. When anxiety
threatens to reveal the truth about Dasein 's mortality, it
can choose to exist either inauthentically by disowning
itself and fleeing into distractions, or authentically, by
affirming its finitude and thus by inviting its tempo-
rality to become more expansive, so that entities can
reveal themselves in richer and more variegated ways.
As authentic, then, Dasein can "Jet things be" instead
oftreating them merely as instruments or objects.
The !ater Heidegger argued that concealment ofBe-
ing results not because of denial of mortality, but rather
because Being has increasingly concealed itself since
Plato's time. As a result, people have focused on en-
tities, not on the disclosive event (Being) by which
they are revealed as entities. Instead of understand-
ing Being as the non-thinglike presencing of entities,
then, metaphysicians defined Being as a superior type
of entity, for example, God or the Absolute. At the
start of the modern age, Descartes executed an anthro-
pocentric shift when he proposed that human reason
provides the ground for the truth, reality, and Being
of entities. For him, for something "to be" means for
it to be re-presented as an idea whose clarity and dis-
tinctness matches that ofthe cogito, that is, the rational
subject's certainty about its own existence. Since only
phenomena studied by a quantitative NATURAL SCIENCE
such as mathematical physics can meet this standard,
however, science carne to play a preeminent role in
defining truth and reality in modern times. Scientific
reason discloses things in a powerful but limited way:
as complex forms of matter in motion.
Modern humanity began defining itself in terms of
scientific NATURALISM. Blind to the fact that human ex-
istence offers the ontologica! clearing in which entities
can manifest themselves, modern humanity views it-
self instead as an elaborate mechanical entity, or as a
"clever animal." For Heidegger, then, Western meta-
physics leads not to human "progress," but rather to
technological nihilism in which everything-including
humankind - stands revealed as raw material for
the goal of greater power and security. According
to Heidegger, this arrogant anthropocentric humanism
(whether capitalist or communist) not only diminishes
humankind, but also wreaks havoc on nature. Human
efforts to reform existing practices cannot succeed and
in fact will make matters worse, because widespread
cultural, social, and ecologica! crises are symptoms
of modern humanity's obsession with control. Hence,
Heidegger concludes, humankind can be saved only
if there arises an alternative to modern technology's
one-dimensional disclosure of the being of entities. In
1966, he said that "only a god can save us now."
What is the possible kinship between Heidegger
and deep ecology? Deep ecologists, who represent one
branch of the radical ecology movement, are said to
be "deep" because they purportedly ask profounder
questions about the origins oftoday's ecologica! crisis.
Like Heidegger, deep ecologists insist that this crisis is
not accidental, but instead a symptom ofthe arrogance
of anthropocentric humanism, which diminishes hu-
mankind while wantonly destroying nature. He would
agree with deep ecologists that attempts by "shallow"
environmentalists to "reform" technological modernity
(e.g., by passing pollution controllaws) only serve to
further its quest for total control over nature. Like Hei-
degger, deep ecologists believe that only a basic shift in
humanity's self-understanding and its attitude toward
nature will prevent social and ecologica! catastrophe.
According to deep ecology, for humanity to realize
its genuine potential, and thus to be authentic, people
must Jet other things "be" what they are, instead of
treating them merely as resources for human ends. For
Heidegger and deep ecologists, existing authentically
does not mean achieving ever greater technical power
and security at the expense of everyone and everything
else, but rather existing in a manner that lets things
manifest themselves in ways that are appropriate to the
things themselves. Modernity's interconnected social
and ecologica! crisis will end, then, only when human-
ity sheds its dissociative attitude toward nature and
begins instead to identify more widely with ali things.
Neither deep ecologists nor Heidegger, however, con-
vincingly explain how such a radical transformation of
modern human existence might occur.
There are good reasons for thinking ofHeidegger as
a predecessor of deep ecology. He loved ski ing and hik-
ing in his native countryside; he often described Being
and thinking in metaphors referring to the character-
istics of farmland and trees, mountains and animals;
and he criticized modernity's constricted disclosure of
 DEEP ECOLOGY
Being, which has led to such reckless destruction ofna-
ture. Attempts to portray him as a forerunner of deep
ecology, however, have encountered at least two dif-
ficulties. For one thing, whereas deep ecologists tend
to portray humans as living beings that arose as a con-
sequence of billions of years of terrestrial evolution,
he rejected ali naturalistic accounts of humankind and
claimed that the "history of Being" began only about
2,500 years ago. Does not Heidegger's antinaturalism
preclude efforts to interpret him as an "ecologica!"
thinker?
The second difficulty is that Heidegger (both the
man and his thought) has been far more implicated
with National Socialism than most commentators (the
present writer included) previously believed. And sin ce
there are certa in parallels between his thought and deep
eeology, does this mean that deep ecology tends to-
ward a type of "ecofascism"? The early Heidegger's
antinaturalism, including his sharp distinction between
humans and every other type of entity (including an-
imals ), was so strong that o ne of his students, Hans
Jonas (1903~ 1993 ), considered him to be a gnostic,
that is, someone who holds that humankind has been
"thrown" into a meaningless material world by an in-
scrutable divine power. Another of his students, KARL
LăWITH, maintained that his mentor was a Cartesian du-
alist and an anthropocentrist who tended to ignore the
wider cosmos that gave birth to humankind. Heideg-
ger's apparent antinaturalistic anthropocentrism would
seem difficult to reconcile with deep ecology's appar-
ent naturalistic ecocentrism.
Yet Heidegger would have warned deep ecologists
against adopting crucial aspects ofmodernity's natural-
istic conceptions ofhumankind and nature, even while
simultaneously criticizing modernity for destroying
wild nature and diminishing humankind. The concept
of "ecology" itself, which is so important for deep
ecologists, arose from scientific attempts to explain
the relation between organisms and environment. The
science of ecology discloses ecosystems as complex
energy ftows, yet such a disclosure can be used not only
for protecting nature from abuse, but also for justifying
exploitative agribusiness practices. Modern science is
closely tied to the naturalistic worldview of modern hu-
manism. Naturalists regard humans as clever animals
competing for survival with other life forms. Human-
ists portray people as the highest form of life because
139
they are endowed with REASON. Such reason allegedly
gives humans the "right" to use lower life forms in
whatever ways that humans see fit. When naturalism
combines with humanism to form "naturalistic human-
ism," violence against nature ensues, for naturalistic
humanism says that humanity's struggle for survival is
not only biologically necessary but morally justified.
Many deep ecologists maintain that by achieving
a wider sense of identification with nonhuman enti-
ties, people would spontaneously care for those enti-
ties just as they care for their own bodies, families, and
friends. For deep ecologists, humans are only one life
form among many, each of which has a right to ftour-
ish. Because Heidegger seems to privi lege humankind
and to deny its connection with other life forms, how-
ever, he seems to reproduce the very anthropocentrism
that deep ecologists hold responsible for ecologica!
violence. Heidegger would reply that insofar as deep
ecologists conceive of humans as animal organisms,
they reproduce the very naturalism that is partly re-
sponsible for modernity's violence against nature. The
leading deep ecologist, Arne Naess, however, appreci-
ates Heidegger's attempt to redefine both humankind
and nature, so as to recognize humankind's uniqueness
and to affirm the inherent worth of nature.
Naess reads Heidegger as saying that humanity is
destined to be not the scourge of nature, but rather
the open awareness that bears witness to nature and
participates in its creative activity. For Naess, as for
Heidegger, this open awareness cannot be adequately
understood in terms either ofnaturalistic materialism or
of anthropocentric humanism. Moreover, nature can-
not be comprehensively defined as a totality ofphysical
processes. Inftuenced by Mahayana BUDDHISM, Heideg-
ger, and Spinoza, Naess regards entities not as solid ma-
terial objects, but rather as phenomena, that is, as tem-
porary manifestations that arise and disappear within
an open realm. Like Heidegger, Naess says that human
awareness takes place within this open realm, but is
not identica! with it. Far from being the "possessors"
of such awareness, humans are themselves appropri-
ated as the clearing through which entities can manifest
themselves. According to Naess, humans realize their
highest possibility by compassionately allowing phe-
nomena to occur without unduly restricting or harming
them. Naess and Heidegger would agree, then, that
the science of ecology says something true about hu-
 140 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
mankind and nature, but overlooks important aspects
ofboth.
Despite the early Heidegger's relative lack of in-
terest in nature, his !ater meditations on pre-Socratic
thinkers such as Heraclitus offered him a way of com-
bining his personallove for nature with his ontologica]
concerns. He carne to interpret physis- a Greek word
usually translated as "nature" - not as a totality of
material entities, but rather as the ontologica! power
that gives rise to ali phenomena and appropriates hu-
man Oase in as the clearing for their self-manifestation.
Since he defined "nature" in what was for him an on-
tologically more satisfying manner, Heidegger can be
viewed as antinaturalistic only in the sense of opposing
modern science's generally reductionistic and materi-
alistic view of nature, a view also opposed by deep
ecology. Hen ce his critique of naturalism does not au-
tomatically disqualify attempts to see connections be-
tween his thought and deep ecology.
The second difficulty involved in interpreting Hei-
degger as a forerunner of deep ecology is his involve-
ment with Nazism. Though deep ecologists oppose
fascism, some critics tend to detect "ecofascist" ten-
dencies in deep ecology. Apparent parallels between
Heidegger's thought and deep ecology provide ammu-
nition for such critics. Here it is important to recall that
because Nazism so emphasized the relation between
healthy nature and pure racial blood, widespread envi-
ronmental movements could not begin in Europe until
decades after World War II. Many progressive thinkers,
whether socialist or liberal democratic, have sus-
pected that radical environmentalism promotes reac-
tionary, antihumanistic, and possibly racist views. Such
thinkers fear that deep ecologists will caii for authori-
tarian politica! measures (e.g., draconian birth control
measures for Third World countries, or widespread sus-
pension of politica! rights) to "save" the Earth from
alleged ecocatastrophe, just as the Nazis maintained
that only authoritarianism could "save" Germany from
polluted blood and degraded landscapes. These fears
do not seem justified, however, for deep ecologists are
far more influenced by democratic ideals than Heideg-
ger was. Also, deep ecologists have the advantage of
hindsight regarding the dangers posed by Heidegger's
critique of modernity. Nevertheless, deep ecologists
and Heidegger scholars alike must explicitly address
the dangers of fascist authoritarianism.
Heidegger became involved with Nazism in 1933
because he thought Hitler would save Germany from
the twin evils of capitalism and communism by ini-
tiating a new beginning to Western history. Though
eventually disillusioned by the historical reality of
Nazism, Heidegger never disavowed its "inner truth
and greatness." But what he regarded as this "inner
truth" seems inconsistent with what most people under-
stand by Nazism. For instance, Edward Pois describes
Nazism as a "religion of nature," but Heidegger did
not promote nature worship of any sort. Further, he
defined "nature" in a way foreign to the naturalism
adopted by many Nazi ideologues. Whereas Nazism
portrayed the German Volk as clever animals compet-
ing for survival against subhuman "parasites," Heideg-
ger condemned such racist ideas, because he rejected
the view that humans could be uriderstood in biologi-
cal terms. Given the centrality of such violent racism
for Nazism, one wonders why the antinaturalistic Hei-
degger could have supported that movement. JACQUES
DERRIDA has suggested that even if Heidegger was not
guilty of biologica! racism, perhaps he was still guilty
of a type of "metaphysical" racism, insofar as he em-
phasized German 's linguistic superiority.
Deep ecology has benefited from the fact that Hei-
degger, one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th cen-
tury, condemned technological modernity's heedless
exploitation of nature. Heidegger also warned against
uncritically adopting the powerful, but limited, under-
standing ofnature provided by modern science, includ-
ing the science of ecology. By his wholesale renuncia-
tion of modernity, however, Heidegger helped to pa ve
the way for his affi.liation with a violent, reactionary
movement. A task for deep ecologists is to learn from
Heidegger's thought in the struggle to protect wild na-
ture, but also to avoid repeating his politica! mistakes.
A central issue for deep ecology, then, is how to criti-
cize the dark si de of technological modernity, includ-
ing its mistreatment of nature, while simultaneously
furthering and transform ing modernity's emancipatory
politica) aims.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Devall, Bill, and George Sessions. Deep Ecology. Salt Lake
City, UT: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985.
 JACQUES DERRIDA
Foltz, Bruce V. "On Heidegger and the lnterpretation ofEn-
vironmental Crisis." Environmental Ethics 6 ( 1984), 323-
38.
Fox, Warwick. Toward a Transpersonal Eco!ogy. Boston:
Shambhala, 1990.
Haar, Michel. La chant de la terre. Paris: L'Herne, 1987;
The Song of'the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of'the
Histor1• of' Being. Trans. Reginald Lilly. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1993.
McLaughlin, Andrew. Regarding Nature: Jndustria!ism and
Deep Ecology. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1993.
Taylor, Charles. "Heidegger, Language, and Ecology." In
Heidegger: A Critica! Reader. Ed. Hubert Dreyfus and
Harrison Hali. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, 247-
69.
Thiele, Leslie Paul. "Nature and Freedom: A Heideggerian
Critique of Biocentric and Sociocentric Environmental-
ism." Environmental Ethics 17 (1995), 171-90.
Westra, Laura. "Let it Be: Heidegger and Future Genera-
tions." Environmental Ethics 7 (1985), 341-50.
Zimmerman, Michael. E. "Toward a Heideggerian ethos
for Radical Environmentalism." Environmental Ethics 5
(1983), 99-131.
- . "Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship."
Environmental Ethics 15 (1993), 195-224.
- . Contesting Earth :~ Fu ture: Radical Eco!ogy and Post-
modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN
Tulane University
JACQUES DERRIDA Born in A1geria in 1930,
Derrida studied EDMUND HUSSERL and phenomeno1ogy
in general under Maurice de Gandillac and then Jean
Hyppolite in Paris at the Ecole Normale Superieure.
His studies of Husserlian phenomenology were also
formed under the infiuence ofTRAN ouc THAO and JEAN
CAVAILLES, and in opposition to the views of JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY.
Derrida introduced the term "deconstruction" in La
voix et le phenomene ( 1967), but its historica1 and
philosophical roots are to be found in Husserl and
MARTIN HEIDEGGER. In the ear]y 1920s Husserl intro-
duced the term "Abbau" to designate the proper method
for analyzing the genesis of experience. This method
of GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY invo]ves a structura] dis-
mantling or unbuilding (abbauen) of the intentiona!
experiences under analysis, and Husserl distinguishes
the method ofunbuilding (Abbau-Analyse) from a cor-
relative method ofupbuilding (Aufbau-Analyse). Both
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
141
moments are required for a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGIC AL inquiry into the validity of experience.
Heidegger apparently began using the term Ah-
bau at about the same time, giving Husserl's genetic-
structural approach a strongly historical turn. In Sein
und Zeit ( 1927) Heidegger calls for a destruction (De-
struktion) or critica! deconstruction (Abbau) of tradi-
tional concepts, tracing them back historically to their
original sources. The aim is to retrieve and restore a
more fundamental- specifically temporal- experi-
ence of Being than that ofthe Western tradition, which
determines the sense of Being as presence. It would
then be necessary to show how the multiple senses of
Being-Being and Becoming, Being and Appearance,
Being and Thought, Being and the Ought-derive from
this common root.
In the 1960s, Derrida took up the Heideggerian
project, but radicalized it. Important for him were
Heidegger's Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
(1929) and Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Introduc-
tion to metaphysics, 1935). The moment of continuity
is found in Derrida 's project of deconstructing what he
calls the "metaphysics ofpresence." According to Der-
rida, Husserl 's phenomenology, with its commitment
to the "principle of ali principles"- namely, the prin-
cip le stated in Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) "that
every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing
source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to
speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intu-
ition' is tobe simply accepted as what it is presented as
being, but also only within the limits in which it is pre-
sented there"- is committed to presence as the source
ofvalidity, and is thus a prime object for a "deconstruc-
tive" reading. The moment of radicalization is found
in Derrida's charge that Heidegger himself was un-
able to free himself from the metaphysics of presence.
Derrida argues that the search for a more fundamen-
tal experience conceals a commitment to presence. For
Derrida, if the "common root" truly accounts for the
entire diversity of senses ofBeing, then it itself must be
structured such that ali the senses are combined there
unhierarchically or "undecidably."
As opposed to Husserl 's early treatment oflanguage
as the instrument and achievement of thinking, Derrida
tries to show that LANGUAGE, the sign, and in particular
writing are the very medium ofthought and the condi-
142 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tion of possibility of science. The result is a radicaliza-
tion of Husserl 's analysis of the crisis of modern NAT-
URAL SCIENCE: for Derrida the crisis is not an accident
that can be undone, but rather a structural necessity.
Influenced primarily by Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-
1900), Ferdinand de Saussure ( 1857-1913 ), Sigmund
Freud ( 1856---1939), and Heidegger, Derrida decon-
structs the phenomenological commitment to the meta-
physics of presence under severa] interrelated rubrics,
primarily phonocentrism and logocentrism. Any philo-
sophical position that claims a primacy and autonomy
for cognition, LOGIC, and science over MEANING, poetry,
and LITERATURE is said to be logocentric. Any philo-
sophical position that privileges voice ( or speech) over
writing is said to be phonocentric.
Husserl provides a classical formulation of a logo-
centric position in Formale und transzendentale Logik
( 1929) and the phenomenological discipline of tran-
scendental logic is to be the accomplishment of the
self-grounding ofREASON. Derrida argues that Husserl 's
attempt to isolate an instance of pure presence in the !iv-
ing present demonstrates, against Husserl's intentions,
that presence is a function of absence, that prima! im-
pression is made possible by retention, by a trace ofthe
past that makes the presence of the present possible,
and not vice versa. Crucial here is his interpretation of
retention: it is not a mere modification of prima! im-
pression or presence. Rather, like secondary memory,
a type of RE-PRESENTATIO'J, it resembles a sign. Reten-
tion is what Derrida calls a "trace" or "arche-writing."
Given this interpretation of retention, Husserl 's delin-
eation ofpresence seems to deconstruct itself, and this
undermines the logocentrism of the principle of ali
principles by deferring in principle the ideal of ful-
fillment. Without an origin in pure presence, reason
cannot ground itself.
Derrida also argues that logocentrism necessarily
manifests itself as phonocentrism, the position (said
to be found in explicit form in such thinkers as Plato,
Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, Husserl, and Saussure) that
meaning (Bedeutung), what a speaker wants to say
(vouloir-dire), is immediately present to the mind only
in voice (or speech) as opposed to writing, which is
classically defined in coMMUNICATION as the sign of
a sign. According to Derrida, in the Logische Unter-
suchungen (1900-190 1) Husserl radicalizes this pri-
macy of speech by focusing on the inner speech of
monologue in solitary mental life as a way of thema-
tizing the expressive essence of language purified of
any contamination with indication. His deconstructive
reading aims to show that this strategy fails, that the
differential structure oflanguage, which Derrida refers
to as writing, reappears, contaminating the expressive
purity of inner speech. Derrida thus claims that the tra-
ditional distinction between speech and writing loses
its metaphysical significance.
Husserl 's transcendental phenomenology thus ap-
pears to Derrida as the very height of modern meta-
physics. The deconstructive reading of phenomen-
ological texts, above ali in his La voix et le phenomene,
proceeds in two phases. The first phase examines hier-
archies in order to find a way of reversing them. This
reversal takes place by finding contradictions within
the argumentation that established the hierarchy. The
second phase, which is not necessarily second tempo-
rally, then "re-inscribes" or redefines the previously
repressed term in order to designate what made the
opposition possible in the first place, in order to desig-
nate, in other words, the opposition 's "common root."
Thus in La voix et le phenomene, Derrida argues that
indication, writing, and absence turn out to be more
fundamental than expression, speech, and prcsence. In-
stead ofthe principle of ali principles, one then has the
"ultra-transcendental" (non- )principle of"dif(erance,"
Derrida's neologism that brings together "difference"
(as opposed to identity) and "deferral" (as opposed
to presence). He insists that this does not amount to
an abandonment ofphenomenology; rather, it amounts
to a sort of "phenomenology of phenomenology." If
phenomenology attempts to describe how ali the dif-
ferent sorts of objects we know ari se from the phenom-
ena, then deconstruction attempts to penetrate the very
"gap" within the phenomena that divides thcse differ-
ent regions ofbeing from o ne another and nevertheless
joins them together. The result of deconstruction is thus
the claim that presence and absence, TRUTH and false-
hood, are re-inscribed within this larger, differentiated
context, diffi~rance.
Derrida insists that deconstruction must continue
to strive to satisfy the strict requirements of a tran-
scendental phenomenology. Moreover, he insists that
deconstruction is not a method that is applied to texts,
but is rather the violence that any logocentric text, with
its commitment to its own truth and thus to presence,
 WILHELM DILTHEY
inflicts upon itself: the logocentric text deconstructs
itself. He also insists that the result is not a new rel-
ativism, skepticism, or nihilism, arguing rather that
it is the very undecidability of di[(t?rance that makes
genuine ethical responsibility possible. Along with the
principle of ali principles, Husserl 's conception of re-
sponsibility as self-responsibility is deconstructed.
Derrida was very influential in France in the 1970s,
and he remains an important figure. His initial influence
in the UNITED STATES was in literary criticism, where
he stimulated the movement known as deconstruction
that has carne to be associated with POSTMODERNISM.
During the last decade he has been increasingly read
by American philosophers. His deconstructive reading
of phenomenological texts has been criticized by 1.
CLAUDE EVANS and defended by LEONARD LAWLOR.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cavailles, Jean. Sur la /ogique et la theorie de la science.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947; "On Logic
and the Theory of Science." Trans. Theodore Kisiel. In
Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences. Ed. Joseph J.
Kockelmans and Theodore J. Kisiel. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1970, 353-409.
Derrida, Jacques. Le probleme de la genese dans la philoso-
phie de Husserl. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1990.
- . Edmund Husserl :s L 'origine de la geometrie. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1962; Edmund Husserl s
Origin of Geometl)': An lntroduction. Trans. John P.
Leavey Jr. Stony Brook, NY: Nicolas Hays, 1978.
- . '"Genese et structure' et la phenomenologie." In his
L 'ecriture et la difference. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967,
229-51; '"Gcnesis and Structure' and Phenomenology."
In his W!·iting and Dijference. Chicago: University of
Chicago Prcss, 1978, 154-<58.
- . La voix et le phenomene. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
Francc, 1967; Speech and Phenomena. Trans. David Alli-
son. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- . "La forme et le vouloir-dire: Note sur la phenomenologie
du langage." In his Marges de la philosophie. Paris: Mi-
nuit, 1972, 185--207; "Form and Meaning: A Note on the
Phenomenology of Language." In his Margins of Philos-
ophy. Trans. Al an Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982, 155--73.
- . "Ponctuations: le temps de la these." In his Du droit a la
philosophie. Paris: Galilee, 1990, 439-59; 'The Time of
a Thcsis: Punctuations." Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin. In
Philosophy in France Today. Ed. Alan Montefiore. New
York: Cambridge, 1983, 34-50.
- . Limited !ne. Trans. Sanuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988.
Evans, J. Claude. "Phenomenological Deconstruction:
Husserl's Method of Abbau." Journal ofthe British Soci-
ew_for Phenomenology 21 ( 1990), 14-25.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
143
- . Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth o{
the Voice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1991.
Lawlor, Leonard. "Navigating a Passage: Deconstruction as
Phenomenology." diacritic.1· 23 ( 1993), 3-15.
- . The Basic Problem of Phenomenology: A Study of Der-
rida's Jntetpretation ofHusserl. Forthcoming.
McKenna, William, and J. Claude Evans, cds. Derrida and
Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 1995.
Tran Duc Thao. Phi:nomenologie et materialisme dialec-
tique. Paris: Editions
Minh-Tan, 1951; Phenomenology and Dialectica/ Materi-
alism. Trans. Daniel J. Herman and Donald V. Morano.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.
J. CLAUDE EVANS
Washington University
LEONARD LAWLOR
University o{Memphis
WILHELM DILTHEY Born in Biebrich (now a
suburb ofWiesbaden) on November 19, 1833, Dilthey
initially studied theology at Heidelberg and Berlin, but
increasingly devoted his attention to HISTORY and phi-
losophy. Influenced both by the historical school and by
Friedrich Trendelenburg ( 1802-1872), Dilthey became
critica! of HEGEL 's metaphysics and his dialectica! phi-
losophy of history. After teaching at Basel, Kie1, and
Breslau, Dilthey was appointed in 1882 to the chair
in philosophy at Berlin that Hegel had once occupied.
His more empirica! approach to the understanding of
history departs from Hegel in being radically multidis-
ciplinary. Dilthey's contributions to cultural and social
history, to literary criticism, and to the history of the
HUMAN SCIENCES in general found their philosophical
grounding in a major, although unfinished, theoretical
work, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (lntro-
duction to the human sciences, 1883 ).
In 1883, Dilthey published the first of a projected
two volumes of this work. In his dedication to Yorck
van Wartenburg, he refers to his task as a "critique of
historical reason." Book One ofthe Einleitung was de-
voted to an overview ofthe human sciences, Book Two
to a history ofthe rise and fali ofmetaphysics in relation
to the project of founding the natural and human sci-
ences. At the end ofthis history Dilthey maintains that
both metaphysics and the modern NATURAL SCIENCES
have established false models for the human sciences
144 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
by constructing abstract intelligible worlds indepen-
dent of lived experience. What is necessary is a new
epistemology that will show that the modern scientific
conception of nature is a mere phenomenal abstrac-
tion from the more inclusive reality of life. Dilthey
introduces the idea of a life-nexus (Zusammenhang
des Lebens) as the source of reality, not only for the
human sciences, but also the natural sciences. If the
natural sciences tind it useful to explain phenomena by
means of elemental entities and universal mechanistic
laws, this does not entail that the natural sciences pos-
sess a more ultimate reality than the human sciences
or that they should constrain the latter to drop the idea
of teleology from their understanding ( Verstehen) of
history and society. Since EDMUND HUSSERL carefully
underlined his own copy of the part of the Einleitung
where the natural sciences are criticized from the per-
spective of the life-nexus, it is possible that his own
views of the LIFEWORLD and the rise of the natural sci-
ences in Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften
und die transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936)- as
well as in earlier texts not published during his lifetime
- were influenced by Dilthey.
The epistemological work was left for the second
volume of the Einleitung, but Dilthey did not publish
it during his lifetime. He did, however, produce two
drafts ofthis volume that first appeared in 1982 in vol-
ume 19 ofthe Gesammelte Schriften. The draft written
in Breslau, immediately before his move to Berlin, is
of most interest to phenomenology. Here Dilthey ex-
amines the conditions of consciousness involved in
our prescientific awareness ofreality. He begins Book
Four with the principle ofphenomenality, according to
which everything real is accessible as a fact of con-
sciousness without being reduced to a mere represen-
tation of consciousness. Dilthey shows how the facts
of consciousness possess a primordial reality that al-
ready contains a reference to things beyond conscious-
ness. When we are aware of something as a fact of
consciousness we possess what Dilthey calls Innewer-
den or reflexive awareness. This reflexive awareness is
pre-reflective and involves a self-givenness but no ex-
plicit sense of self. Innewerden is thus not tobe equated
with an objectifying self-consciousness, for it precedes
any subject-object, act-content distinction. Reflexive
awareness is proto-intentional in that it is oriented to-
ward the world even ifthe world is not yet thematized
as an externa! objective domain. It is this sense of be-
ing already a part of the world (cf. MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's
being-in-the-world) that is lost in the natural sciences,
but must be preserved in the human sciences. These
initial descriptions of the facts of consciousness com-
prise an empirica! phenomenology and are at the level
ofprescientific Wissen or immediate knowledge. They
are not yet the descriptions of psychic structure at the
level of scientific Erkenntnis or conceptual knowledge
that will become predominant in the Jdeen iiber eine
beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie (1894 ),
where Dilthey presents his descriptive PSYCHOLOGY as
a human science.
One could argue that in Books Two and Four ofthe
Einleitung Dilthey worked out views of consciousness,
reality, and science that carne closest to Husserl and
Heidegger. Moreover, he goes on in Book Fi veto artic-
ulate the prescientific life-nexus in terms of categories
for which he explicitly rejects a psychological deriva-
tion. Dilthey calls his categories "life-categories" and
contrasts them to KANT's formal categories, which are
the purely intellectual conditions of our experience of
nature. By contrast, the life-categories bring out the
structures ofthe cognitive-affective-volitional breadth
of life itself. We are practica! agents enmeshed in a
factical context, and the life-categories articulate the
very structure ofthis I-world relation.
Although Heidegger distances his existential ia from
categories in general, there is an important connec-
tion to Dilthey's categories of life. Heidegger con-
tends that categories rest on a concept of being as
present-at-hand, while existentialia lay out DASEIN's
dynamic ways of being, that is, the structures of
its being-in-the-world. But the existentialia are rem-
iniscent of Diltheyan life-categories such as MEANING
through which "life grasps life." Indeed, Heidegger
himselfuses related language in an early lecture course,
Phănomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles.
Einleitung in die phănomenologische Forschung (Win-
ter Semester 1921/22), where he invokes Grundkate-
gorien des Lebens in ways that anticipate his discus-
sions of existentialia in Sein und Zeit ( 1927), and at the
same time remind us ofDilthey by claiming that "they
come to life from life itself."
Nevertheless, Heidegger carne to view Dilthey's
project as too limited. In his estimation, Dilthey suc-
ceeded in deepening and broadening the use of his-
 WILHELM DILTHEY
torical method but failed to ask the central question,
namely, the question about the temporal being of his-
torical beings. But this is not entirely true, as Dilthey
devoted considerable energy to analyzing TIME as a
fundamental category of life itself.
Time is characterized by the inexorable advance or
Fortriicken of the present that participates in the full
being of our life. Dilthey shows that the distinctions of
time - past, present, and future - are not products
of reflection, but are already available to our reflexive
awareness of the present. It is representational or sci-
entific consciousness that is responsible for isolating
the past and future from the present.
Dilthey's ldeen develops a program for a descrip-
tive psychology as the first ofthe human sciences. Here
Dilthey's viewpoint becomes narrower in scope, being
concerned to delimit the relative methods ofthe natu-
ral and the human sciences. Ifpsychology is to provide
a stable foundation for the human sciences, it may
not begin with the explanatory hypotheses that char-
acterize the natural sciences and traditional associative
psychologies. Whereas hypotheses are easily testable
in the mathematical sciences of nature, in the domain
of human and historical experience they are relatively
untestable and therefore unstable. By describing what
is given in lived experience, Dilthey's human scien-
tific psychology will be able to locate and build on
the recurrent structures of experience. Whereas tradi-
tional explanatory psychologies speculated about basic
elements of consciousness - whether they be sense
impressions or ideas - which, like the hypothetical
atoms of physics, then need to be connected by general
laws, descriptive psychology finds that in lived experi-
ence the connectedness ofpsychic life is already given.
The task of psychology is to describe the continuum
of our lived experience and then to analyze it into its
component parts. It is this aspect of Dilthey's ldeen
that Husserl saw as a genial anticipation of his own
phenomenological psychology.
Since our lived experience comprises a meaning-
nexus, the parts must always be understood in relation
to this nexus. Although Dilthey abides by the Kantian
distinction between the cognitive, the affective, and the
volitional aspects of consciousness, they cannot be sep-
arated into different faculties. Every psychic act will
display ali three aspects, although in different propor-
tions. Only to the extent that we have isolated parts of
145
experience from their original meaning-nexus do they
become subject to explanation. Moreover, since our
psychic life is related to our body, Dilthey is willing
to allow naturalistic explanations a limited role within
his descriptive psychology.
Dilthey's "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik" (The
rise of hermeneutics, 1900) begins to sketch out an
understanding of HERMENEUTICS that was to character-
ize his work until his death in 1911. While he does
not abandon descriptions of lived experience, Dilthey
comes to view their ability to capture the meaning of
our life as more limited. Much of the meaning of our
experience remains unconscious until it is expressed.
Thus the description of the life of the subject cannot
be do ne without the interpretation of its expressed ob-
jectifications. Dilthey resumed the task of a "critique
of historical reason" from this hermeneutica! perspec-
tive, publishing the Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt
in den Geisteswissenschaften (The construction of the
historical world in the human sciences, 191 0).
There is a further problem that occasioned Dilthey's
move to hermeneutics and underscores the limitations
of description. The descriptions of psychology seem to
function primarily on the scientific level of represen-
tational consciousness, which - however well inte-
grated- stands apart from the world. How do we deal
with our ordinary prescientific or reflexive awareness
according to which we are already part of the world?
Can description also be applied to its more inclusive
life-nexus? Here Dilthey found inspiration in Husserl's
Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901) and theory of
INTENTIONALITY. Dilthey had given a seminar on the
second volume of this work in the winter semester
1904/05. Husserl in turn visited Dilthey's home the fol-
lowing winter and !ater wrote that this meeting inspired
him to occupy himselfwith the problems ofthe human
sciences in his Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie ll [ 1912-15]
and !ater writings.
It should be noted, however, that Husserl's attempts
to ground understanding in empathy are not Diltheyan
because Dilthey clearly separated the two processes.
Despite the impression to the contrary, Dilthey hardly
dealt with empathy and did not regard it as essential to
understanding. For Husserl empathy was important as
a way for the solipsistic EGO to get beyond itself and
admit the existence of INTERSUBJECTIVITY. By contrast,
 146 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Dilthey's self is not a transcendental starting point,
but a product of development. This acquired self is
radically historical and already incorporates many in-
tersubjective or public features.
In his descriptive psychology, Dilthey had devel-
oped a conception of an acquired psychic nexus that
accumulates an individual 's lived experiences of the
world. The acquired nexus embodies the overall cogni-
tive impression an individual has formed ofthe world,
the evaluation of it based on feeling, and the volitional
strivings engendered by both. This acquired psychic
nexus is not fully conscious and therefore cannot be
represented, but it exerts an inftuence on every con-
scious psychic act that we do try to describe. By reftect-
ing our sense of reality, it brings the objective sphere
into the subjective sphere. As important as this is to
understanding individuality, in the Aufbau Qilthey be-
comes equally concerned to conceive the inverse way
in which individual subjects are intentionally related to
objective and public spheres. To do so Dilthey appro-
priates the Hegelian term Objektiver Geist, (objective
spirit), to describe the overall historical context for
understanding. He rejects Hegel's particular definition
of objective spirit as the sociohistorical stage of the
self-realization of absolute Geist in fa vor of a concept
consistent with a reinterpretation of Geist as human
activity. Objective spirit designates the whole range of
human objectifications, whether they be expressions in
LANGUAGE and other media meant to communicate, or
ACTIONs and works meant to inftuence. This objective
spirit is not only the embodiment of human behav-
ior and practices, but the medium within which they
occur. It includes the contexts we share to make inter-
action possible: not only the sociopolitical institutions
originally considered by Hegel, but also the cultural
institutions of art, RELIGION, and philosophy, which he
had classified as absolute spirit.
Objective spirit provides the kind of overall frame-
work for Dilthey's hermeneutics that tradition carne
to provide in HANS-GEORG GADAMER 's hermeneutics.
But objective spirit is not as dominant as tradition is
in Gadamer, for Dilthey articulated it into more spe-
cific Wirkungszusammenhange (systems of inftuence ),
whether they be historical epochs or social and cul-
tural systems. This is relevant to Dilthey's distinction
between elementary and higher understanding. The for-
mer considers an expression within the common con-
text of objective spirit. That is, the elementary under-
standing of a sentence focuses only on what it explicitly
asserts and is commonly assumed to mean. Problems
concerning the implicit meanings of expression caii
for higher understanding, which requires us to refer to
more specific systems ofinftuence. Thus we attempt to
determine any ambiguous expressions in a legal doc-
ument by considering the particular legal system of
the period in which it was drawn up. Only after we
have exhausted what the appropriate public contexts
of expressions can do to clarify their objective mean-
ing does Dilthey turn to the subjective or psychological
context. Now psychology is no longer the first of the
human sciences, but the last. The highest or last mode
of understanding is the Nacherleben or reexperienc-
ing of an expression of lived experience. Of course,
Dilthey does not expect us to reproduce the state of
mind of the author. Hermeneutics allows us to under-
stand authors not as they understood themselves, but
better.
Although his hermeneutics ultimately focuses on
the relation between lived experience, expression, and
understanding (Erlebnis, Ausdruck, and Verstehen ),
Dilthey admits that many expressions such as math-
ematical formulas and handshakes expressing agree-
ment can be understood apart from relating them to
lived experience. But when an expression does artic-
ulate our lived experience, as in a work of art, it can
enrich our understanding oflife in immeasurable ways.
This is why Dilthey's writings on the JMAGINATION of
artists, particularly poets, bear importantly on his the-
ory of interpretation. Like philosophers and religious
thinkers, certain great poets also have the capacity to
express a comprehensive wor1dview.
One of Dilthey's last essays was on the Typen der
Weltanschauung ( 1911 ). Because he analyzes three
mutually exclusive types of worldview that recur -
NATURALISM, the idealism of freedom, and objective
idealism- he is often considered a relativist. In the
Logos essay "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft"
( 1911 ), Husserl quotes some passages from this essay
that seem to 1ead Dilthey down the path of histori-
cism as well. In one of them, Dilthey uses the "de-
ve1opment ofthe historical consciousness" to question
the universal validity of any metaphysical worldview
claiming to comprehend conceptually how everything
in the wor1d is interconnected. By appealing to histori-
 WILHELM DILTHEY
cal consciousness, he is not, as Husserl thinks, merely
making a factual claim about the inability ofpast spec-
ulative metaphysical systems to gain universal accep-
tance. Historical consciousness is for Dilthey a broad-
ening perspective that takes claims out of their actual
local contexts and locates them in the sphere of uni-
versal history. It is a product ofthe Enlightenment and
could even be considered the counterpart of the tran-
scendental point ofview. lndeed, Dilthey's stance here
is analogous to Kant's in rejecting metaphysical spec-
ulation and is no more relativistic or historicistic than
Kant's standpoint. Dilthey initiated a correspondence
with Husserl to defend himself. In response Husserl
wrote: "It truly seems to me that there are no seri-
ous differences whatsoever between us," and offered
to publish a note in Logos to avoid any further mis-
understandings caused by his essay. Because Dilthey
died soon thereafter (October 1, 1911 ), Husserl did not
publish such a note.
Dilthey's historical consciousness makes possible a
critica! analysis of worldviews and it is this kind of
analysis that shows that metaphysical worldviews can
only provide us with pseudoscience. Any effort to pro-
vide a comprehensive account ofreality would have to
synthesize the results of the natural sciences and the
human sciences. But the approaches ofthese two kinds
of science are so different that they cannot be synthe-
sized. Dilthey's appeal to historical consciousness is
thus not at ali a challenge to the objective validity of
science. It is instead an attempt to preserve the ob-
jectivity of scientific Erkenntnis. If worldviews are to
have any value for Dilthey it is as refiective articula-
tions of the meaning of our own life-nexus as given in
prescientific Wissen.
The first attempts to bring Dilthey's contribu-
tions into the phenomenological tradition were made
by LUDWJG LANDGREBE and GEORG MISCH. Landgrebe's
"Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften
(Analyse ihre Grundbegriffe)" ( 1928) was an effort to
reformulate the basic concepts of Dilthey's theory of
the human sciences in light of the work of Husserl
and Heidegger. Landgrebe stressed that Dilthey was
never concerned with a mere theory of scientific
methods, but used concepts such as understanding
and meaning to provide a transcendental clarifica-
tion of the human sciences. Misch's Lebensphiloso-
phie und Phiinomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung
147
der Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl
(1930) explicates Dilthey's efforts to work out the cat-
egories of life as a way to show points of agreement
and contrast with both Husserl and Heidegger.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Gesammelte Schriften. 20 vols. Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1914--90.
- . Selected Works. Ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof
Rodi. 6 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1985-.
- . Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding.
Trans. Richard Zaner and Kenneth Hciges. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- . "Der Briefwechsel." Man and World 1 ( 1968), 428-
46; "The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence." Ed. Walter
Biemel. Trans. Jeffner Allen. In Husserl: Shorter Works.
Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston. Notre Dame,
IN: University ofNotre Dame Prcss, 1981, 203-9.
Ermarth, Michael. Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique o/Histori-
cal Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Makkreel, Rudolf A. Dilthey: Philosopher of' the Human
Studies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975,
rpt., with afterword, 1992.
- . "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenological
Hermeneutics: Part 1: Heidegger's Use of Dilthey." Man
and World 23 ( 1990), 305-20.
- , and John Scanlon, eds. Dilthey and PhenomenoloJ.,>y.
Lanham, MD: Center for Advanccd Research in Pheno-
menology/University Press of America, 1987.
Misch, Georg. Lebensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richtung mit
Heidegger und Husserl, mit einem Nachwort zur 3.
Auflage. Darmstat: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
1967.
Orth, Emst W., ed. Dilthey und die Philosophie der Gegen-
wart. Freiburg: Alber, 1985.
Owensby, Jacob. Dilthey and the Narrative ofHistOJ)'. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Rodi, Frithjof. Morphologie und Hermeneutik: Zur Methode
von Diltheys Aesthetik. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969.
- . Dilthey-Jahrbuch jur Philosophie und Geschichte der
Geisteswissenschaften 4 ( 1986-87).
Rodi, Frithjof, and Hans-Ulrich Lessing, eds. Materialien
zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1984.
Van Kerckhoven, Guy. "Die Grundsătze von Husserls Kon-
frontation mit Dilthey im Lichte der geschichtlichen
Selbstzeugnisse." Phănomenologische Forschungen 16
(1984), 130--60.
RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL
Em01y University
JACOB 0WENSBY
Jacksonville University

ECOLOGY EDMUND HUSSERL was just seven
years old when the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel
( 1834--1919) coined the term Oekologie in 1866, using
it to refer to the new science of the relations between
the organism and its environment. The systematic sci-
entific investigation of the household of nature starts
at approximately the same time as Western humanity
was intervening into this household on an unprece-
dented scale with industrial mass production based on
the extensive use of fossil fuel. Paradoxically, just as
humanity breaks out of nature for good and starts to
nest in a world of iron and concrete, it is completely
reinserted into nature and its evolution by the newly
emerging scientific disciplines of evolutionary biology
and ecology.
"Ecology" is also often called "environmentalism"
because it is more than a branch of natural science.
Only two years before Haeckel coined the term Oekolo-
gie, the American George Perkins Marsh had published
his book Man and Nature ( 1864), a radical critique of
the destruction ofnature by humans, ofthe unremitting
war humanity wages against nature in its risc to civi-
lization. According to Marsh, humanity is threatening
the balance nature has brought about between its or-
ganic and inorganic components. Nature will revenge
itself, he predicts, with natural disasters, an unsettled
climate, eros ion, etc. Marsh himselfwas nota scientist
but a lawyer and politician- in today's terms, he was
a politica! ecologist. His book became a sacred text of
the conservation and ecology movement.
From its very beginning, though, ecology was
strongly motivated by pragmatic and technocratic mo-
tives. It promised new possibilities of more efficient
use of natural systems and of an in crease in their pro-
ductivity. A classical example is the applied ecologica!
research of the German Karl August Mobius ( 1825-
1908) into the possibilities of raising oysters along the
German coast in Die Auster und die Austernwirtschaft
(1877).
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Thus from its very inception, the new science ofthe
household ofnature stands at the crossing between the
romantically inspired revolt against the destruction of
nature by the machine age, on the one si de, and modern
technocratic pragmatism, on the other side.
It was the book of a courageous woman - Silent
Spring by Rachel Carson ( 1907-1964)- that when it
appeared in 1962 sparked off the present widespread
concern called "environmentalism" that is focused on
the "ecologica! crisis." Her book on the "elixirs of
death," as she calls synthetic insecticides, is dedicated
to Albert Schweitzer, whose somber forecast opens the
book: "Man has lost the capacity to foresee and to
forestall. He will end by destroying the earth."
Ten years after the publication of Silent Spring, the
first report to the Club of Rome, entitled Limits ta
Growth, reinforced the apocalyptic message: further
unchecked exponential growth of industrial produc-
tion, of capital, of consumption of energy and nonre-
newable resources, ofpollution, and ofpopulation will
lead to a catastrophic breakdown of the world-system
in the not too distant future. Since 1972, a series offur-
ther reports on the development ofthe ecologica! crisis
have been issued based on an ever increasing amount
of data and on ever more sophisticated mathematical
models. The conclusion of ali of these reports is more
or less the same: the global human household in its
growing numbers, in its production and consumption
patterns, in its use of nonrenewable resources, in its
aspiration to more material growth and wealth, is eco-
logically unsustainable; in otherwords, it is on a course
to self-destruction.
Recently, however, politica! ecology or ecologism,
with its critique of the destruction of nature, appears
to be based on an outdated holistic and teleological
paradigm of ecology that was built around the cen-
tral idea ofthe ecosystem. According to this paradigm,
nature, if not hindered by human intervention, always
tends toward equilibrium, harmony, stability, and order.
A radical shift from the old ecology of order towards a
new ecology ofnon-equilibrium and chaos has recently
taken place. Nature, according to this new paradigm
of ecology, is characterized by incessant and erratic
change, constant disturbances, discontinuity, and un-
predictibility. Ifnature in itselfis chaotic, then ofcourse
the consequences ofhuman intervention into nature can
be regarded as less dramatic and disruptive. One irrup-
148
 ECOLOGY
tion of a volcano, it can be argued in the framework of
this new paradigm, causes much more environmental
and atmospheric disturbances than our whole global
industrial machine.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER's thinking has been related to en-
vironmentalism underthe heading ofDEEP ECOLOGY and
connections can be ma de with the work ofMAX SCHELER
and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY as well, but at first sight,
Husserl 's transcendental phenomenology seems of \it-
tie relevance, be it for the pressing problems of global
environmental destruction or be it for the foundational
problems ofthe science of ecology. There are no critica\
reflections in Husserl on the destructive consequences
of large-scale intervention into and transformation of
nature by industrial technology and production. As
the remarkable Mensch und Erde (Man and earth,
1913) by Ludwig Klages (1872-1956) shows, these
dire consequences were, however, already clearly vis-
ible when Husserl published his first blueprint of tran-
scendental phenomenology, the Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913). Klages complains about the global de-
struction of nature, about agricultura\ monoculture,
about excessive urbanization, about the extirpation of
animals and plants, and even about the harmful effects
oftourism.
Nor did Husserl reflect on the foundational prob-
lems of ecology. There is in general a remarkable
omission in Husserl's theory of science of a pheno-
menological grounding of the biologica\ disciplines.
There can be no question, then, ofturning Husserl into
an environmental philosopher avant la lettre. However,
since Husserl 's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY offers a
unique and fruitful philosophical approach to the foun-
dational problems of science as well as to the axio-
practical problems of human life, it has rich implica-
tions for the foundational problems of ecology and for
a philosophical understanding of the ecologica\ crisis
and environmentalism.
It is well known that Husserl 's whole philosophy
from its early beginnings until its very end is moti-
vated and driven by a sense of crisis and urgency. Un tii
World War I, Husserl 's ma in concern is the founda-
tional crisis of the sciences, especially of the formal
sciences of LOGIC and MATHEMATICS and the NATURAL
SCIENCES, more precisely the physical sciences. The ex-
periences of the Great War and its aftermath broaden
149
and intensify Husserl's sense of crisis.lt is the whole of
European culture, the cultural project of Europe, that
is in deep crisis and can be helped, if not cured, by
phenomenologically grounded HUMAN SCIENCES.
The cultural project of Europe is the universal hu-
man project of REASON, of an enlightened life and a
cu \ture of reason. Since reason, according to Husserl,
comes into its own in science and philosophy, the life
and cui ture of reason is a scientific and philosophical
life and culture. The crisis of European culture that
shows itself in widespread alienation, loss of purpose,
disorientation, nihilism, and cynicism, as well as in
violence and destruction, has its roots, according to
Husserl, in a crisis of science and philosophy.
Not reason and rationality as such are to blame for
the crisis, but rather a fundamental lack of reason and
rationality in the one-sided rationalism of modern sci-
ence. According to Husserl, there is a certain tragic
element involved in the development of modern nat-
ural science. The impressive modern progress of nat-
ural science and scientific TECHNOLOGY is grounded in
the mathematization, the specialization, and the tech-
nical method ofresearch. But exactly these conditions
of success are responsible for a dangerous blindness,
a lack of rationality in modern science and technol-
ogy. The ultimate foundation of this blindness is, ac-
cording to his diagnosis, NATURALISM and objectivism.
What modern science takes tobe objective nature puri-
fied from ali subjective appearances and apperceptions,
ali values and purposes, are only mathematical ideal-
izations and constructions. Ali scientific theories and
models, as well as the technical devices built with their
help, are rooted in the LIFEWORLD and its primordial
nature.
Thus the first step toward a lasting solution to the
crisis of European science and cui ture is the rediscov-
ery ofthe lifeworld as that which grounds and encom-
passes the sciences and their idealizations. A theory
and phenomenological foundation of science has to
start with an ontology of the lifeworld, a descriptive
account of its essential characteristics. The lifeworld
as the world of our everyday life is a historical and
cultural world. Its a world of natural and of artificial,
human-made objects, of real objects, like trees, chairs,
animals, and people, and of ideal objects like works of
art and scientific theories, but above ali it is a world
of human, cultural MEANING. There is nothing in the
150 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
lifeworld that does not ha ve human meaning. The life-
world is an eminently axio-practical world, a world of
human interest.
The lifeworld encompasses nature as that which is
not human-made but which is nevertheless clothed with
and soaked in human meaning. Lifeworldly nature is
not yet the abstract, objective nature of mathematical
natural science, but it is an abstract layer of our con-
crete lifeworldly experience. It is the first nature out
ofwhich we matured into the second nature ofhuman
culture. What we witness today as a global ecologi-
ca! crisis is the destruction of our biologically natural
lifeworld and, together with it, the destruction of the
naturallifeworlds of countless other species. Following
Husserl 's diagnosis, we can say that these naturallife-
worlds are ultimately destroyed by ontologica! neglect.
The prevailing naturalist and objectivist ontology that
regards the mathematical abstractions and idealizations
of modern physics as the only true objective reality le-
gitimates the project of a radical transformation of our
lifeworldly nature into a technosphere, which would
be a cultural lifeworld on a par with the lifeless and
unintuitive world of mathematical science. But is not
the nature we encounter biologica! before the physical
nature is extracted from it?
The return to the lifeworld and the threefold dis-
tinction between the concrete historical-cultural life-
world, its underlying lifeworldly nature, and the ide-
alizations of mathematical natural science is the first
important step toward breaking the speli of the reduc-
tionist paradigm of naturalism and objectivism. Nature
and culture, first and second nature, both have to be
saved from the destructive grasp of this paradigm and
its material manifestation in the form oftechnological
expansion and technocracy.
The return to the lifeworld, however, must not be un-
derstood in the sense oflife philosophy, i.e., as a return
to irrational life as opposed to reason and rationality.
The return to the lifeworld is rather an intermediate
step toward a radical renewal of science, reason, and
cultural Iife. For Husserl there is no way back to a
prescientific religious or mythical rootedness. It is true
that positivist science and its technology has deprived
us of an overall sense of meaning and purpose, alien-
ating us from ourselves, from each other, from history
and tradition, and from nature. But to overcome this
alienation we do not need new gods or goddesses to
sa ve us, but a radical critique and renewal ofreason and
science in the form of a rigourous scientific philosophy.
The lifeworld is not an objective, but a subject-
relative world. The historical-culturallifeworld is rela-
tive to the cultural practices ofhumans in their different
communities, cultures, and traditions. These practices
include acts ofknowledge and of evaluation as well as
volitions and practica! acts. Our primordially natural
lifeworld is relative to the need-structured perceptions
and behavior of humans as natural beings; in other
words, it is what ecologists caii an environment, but
with the recognition that environments always already
have values and purposes in them for animals, humans
included. It can even be asked whether in this stratum
oflife ali things in nature are animate, so that there are
thus rudimentary intersubjectivities discernible there
too.
A universal and rigorous scientific philosophy pre-
supposes, according to Husserl, a radical subjective
turn. Such a turn consists in attending to and giving a
descriptive account ofthe constitution ofworldly being
in ali the different forms it takes in the acts and concate-
nations ofacts of transcendental consciousness. This is
achieved by the method of a transcendental EPOCHE ANO
REDUCTION that opens up the new field of research of
transcendental-constitutive phenomenology, the radi-
cal and universal science of transcendental conscious-
ness in which the world and ali sciences of it, ecology
clearly included, can be grounded.
The bracketing and reduction of the world and of
worldly being includes my human selfthat lives in this
world, my world-life. The newly discovered realm of
transcendental consciousness is a non-worldly subjec-
tivity, which, however, includes everything worldly, its
own worldliness included, as a senseformation, an ap-
perceptive stratum or a capacity arising out of its con-
stitutive performances. Ultimate rational justification
of our theoretical, axiologica!, and practica! position-
takings can only be achieved by and in the frame-
work of patient, detailed, and diligent transcendental-
constitutive analysis.
The present ecologica! crisis is a crisis in the rela-
tionship between human eul ture and nonhuman nature.
What used tobe only patches ofhuman eul ture in a vast
surrounding miii eu ofwild nature has become a kind of
planetary crust of material and immaterial human arti-
facts and activities with wilderness areas within it. The
 ECOLOGY
different historical-cultural lifeworlds are merging into
one global industrial lifeworld, the capitalist-industrial
world-city. In the near future, this world-city will be
inhabited by at least ten billion mostly young people
who will almost all aspire to well-paid jobs, mobility,
and a high material standard of living. Only partially
to fulfill these aspirations, if it is even possible, would
require a sharp further increase in the consumption of
renewable and nonrenewable natural resources. The
human species would have to colonize and exploit as
effi.ciently as possible all land, water, and air, as well
as everything that lives on and in it. Life forms that are
of no use to the reproduction and growth of our human
numbers and to the fulfillment of our aspirations have
to go. A few ofthem may be kept in zoos or their genes
stored in gene banks for possible fu ture use.
lfthis course ofthe development ofhuman culture
is taken for granted, then the ecologica! crisis seems
nothing more than a technical problem pertaining to
the maxima! sustainable exploitation of the earth 's re-
sources. This, in fact, is the ecologica! crisis defined
in terms of modem science and technology. What is
the carrying capacity of the earth and how can this
carrying capacity be maximized by technology? How
many people can live on earth with such and such a
level of material consumption? Because of the enor-
mous amounts of data that have to be gathered and
processed as well as the complexify of the equations
involved, answers to these questions will be, for the
foreseeable future, only preliminary and highly con-
troversial.
There is a widespread feeling, however, that the
ecologica! crisis is more than a scientific and techno-
logical problem, that it rather confronts us with fun-
damental questions about ourselves as humans, about
our destiny in the larger scheme of cosmic and natural
evolution, about our responsibilities toward the non-
human other, about our genuine aspirations, and about
the essential ingredients of a good, fulfilled, and re-
warding human life. We are, it seems, at the threshold
o fan unrestricted one-dimensional utilitarian approach
to nonhuman nature. The question is whether the fur-
ther self-realization and self-perfection ofhumankind,
the becoming more fully human, requires that we cross
this threshold or whether by crossing it we shall rather
destroy ourselves- if not physically, then spiritually
and morally.
151
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology offers a
fruitful philosophical approach to these questions. The
critique of modem mathematical natural science and
the return to the underlying lifeworld and its historical-
cultural and ecological-natural aspects are the first
steps. The radically subjective turn to transcendental
consciousness as constituting the entirety of worldly
being opens up the ultimate ground on which these
questions can be precisely articulated and, by way of a
careful constitutive analysis, can find an answer.
Does the intuitive and descriptive transcendental-
constitutive analysis point then to a different view
of the relationship between human culture and na-
ture than the utilitarian resource view? Is nature in
a transcendental-constitutive perspective more than an
externa] object of use, exploitation, or touristic attrac-
tion? The self-mundanization of transcendental sub-
jects, the constitution of other persons and of com-
munities of persons, and the constitution of the life-
world, including the constitution oflifewordly ecolog-
ica! nature, form an intrinsic and inseparable unity. For
Husserl, however, the telos of transcendental life and
constitution is spiritual self-perfection, which leads to
the rule of reason in individual and common life and
which has its objective correlate in a cui ture of genuine
truth, beauty, and goodness. What is the place and ro le
ofnature in this process of self- and world-perfection?
Husserl 's !ater analyses of constitution and reason
show that transcendentallife is suffused by analogous
forms of empathy, trust, respect, and love. Spiritual
self-perfection is more than intellectual self-perfection.
It must rather be conceived as a kind ofharmonious and
integrated perfection of our transcendental-spiritual
faculties, in particular of the mind and the heart, of
reason and love. Conscious life is then at once and in-
seperably an intellectual, an appreciative, an empathic,
a respectful, and a loving relationship to its object.
The community of reason is a community of love, the
cui ture of reason is a cu !ture of love. This means that
the life of spirit cannot ftourish in dis trust, disrespect,
and hate, nor on heartless utilitarian calculation and
neglect. Nature then is not originally constituted as
mere substrate and resource for the economic and cul-
tural activities ofhumankind, nor does the teleological
vector in this primordial constitution point to such a
purely utilitarian relationship in the community and
culture ofreason. This transcendental-constitutive and
 152 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
te1eological conception of human growth and matura-
tion and the corresponding concept ofworld-formation
will therefore be critica! ofthe further expansion ofthe
industrial-capitalist world-city, which can hardly form
such a community ofreason and love.
To sum up: Husserl 's transcendental-constitutive
phenomenology offers a unique approach and method
for reftecting on the metaphysical, ethical, anthro-
pological, axiologica!, epistemological, and socio-
economic implications of the ecologica! crisis. lts cri-
tique of modern mathematical natural science and the
return to the li feworld are of great significance for the
foundational problems of ecology, in particular the de-
termination and delimitation of that science's proper
research field and method. Further constitutive anal-
ysis will help to clarify its fundamental concepts as
well as reveal their tacit, often ideologica!, presup-
positions. Like ali sciences, the science or sciences
of ecology, and beyond them, environmentalism will
ultimately receive their systematic place in the teleo-
logical ecology of transcendental subjectivity and its
adventurous odyssey to our true home, a community
and world of reason and !o ve. Transcendental pheno-
menology may help us to resist the powerful song of
the sirens with its false promises of freedom, comfort,
and wealth in the capitalist-industrial world-city. What
has been sketched here, though, is hardly more than
an outline that has tobe fi !led in by extensive, system-
atic, concrete, and detailed transcendental-constitutive
analyses.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Deleage, Jean-Paul. Histoire de l"ecologie. Une science de
f"homme et de la nature. Paris: Editions La Decouverte,
1991.
Drouin, Jean Mare. Reinventer la nature. L "ecologie et son
histoire. Paris: Desclee De Brouwer, 1991.
Embree, Lester. "Phenomcnology of Action for Ecosystemic
Health or How to Tend One's Own Garden." In Environ-
mental Philosophy and Environmental Activism. Ed. Don
Marietta Jr. and Lester Embree. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1995, 51-66.
Hart, James. The Person and the Common Lif'e. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
Kohak, Erazim. The Emhers and the Stars. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1984.
Langer, Monika. "Merleau-Ponty and Deep Ecology." In On-
tology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty. Ed. Galen A. John-
son and Michael B. Smith. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1990, 115-29, 192-97.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Naess, Arne. Ecology. Community. and Lif'estyle: An Outline
al an Ecosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989.
Worster, Donald. 'The Ecology of Order and Chaos." Envi-
ronmental Hist01y Review ( 1990).
ULLRICH MELLE
Husserl Archief. Leuven
ECOLOGY, DEEP See DEEP ECOLOGY.
ECONOMICS Phenomenologists have always
shown a strong interest in the social or HUMAN SCIENCES.
EDMUND HUSSERL was of course greatly concerned with
PSYCHOLOGY and sought to lay the groundwork for a
phenomenological psychology. Inspired by Husserl's
phenomenology, ALFRED scHUTZ devoted the greater
part ofhis energies to founding a phenomenological so-
CIOLOGY, i.e., a phenomenology ofthe sociallifeworld
(Lebensweft). In France, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY ap-
pJied Husserlian insights to a wide range ofhuman dis-
ciplines, including psychology, linguistics, sociology,
and ETHNOLOGY. Leaders ofHERMENEUTICAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY SUCh as HANS-GEORG GADAMER and PAUL RICCEUR
have also devoted much oftheir attention to the human
sciences. In fact, phenomenological hermeneutics as
they ha ve defined it is essentially a philosophy of the
human sciences. Only recently, however, has the sci-
ence of economics become a subject of major interest
for phenomenological hermeneutics. The attempt cur-
rently under way at working out a "hermeneutica! eco-
nomics" is nevertheless not without historical prece-
dent. Although it carne to fui! fruition only recently,
an exchange between phenomenology and economics
dates back to the earlier decades ofthis century.
It is interesting to note that this earlier exchange was
a genuinely two-way con versation between economists
and phenomenological philosophers. The linkages are
complex and of different degrees of intimacy and im-
portance, and remain stil! to be explored in a thor-
oughgoing fashion. Key interlocutors in this multi-
faceted conversation included ALFRED SCHUTZ and FE-
LIX KAUFMANN and, on the economics side, Ludwig
von Mises (1881-1973), Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-
1992), and Fritz Mach lup ( 1902-1983). The conver-
 ECONOMICS
sation centered largely on (in Hayek's words) "the
method and philosophical character of the social sci-
ences," the stage for this discussion having been set
by the HERMENEUTICS of WILHELM DILTHEY, the verste-
hende method ofMAX WEBER, and the subjective theory
of value first advanced by Cari Menger ( 1840-1921 ),
the founder ofwhat came tobe known as the Austrian
school of economics.
Schutz was a pivotal figure in this complex con-
versation concerning the status ofthe human sciences,
which unfolded during the 1920s. Before the publica-
tion ofhis first work, Der sinnhafte Aufhau der sozialen
Welt ( 1932), Schutz had in fact studied economics in
Vienna with Mises and Friedrich von Wieser (1851-
1926), two leading members of the Austrian school
of economics, both ofwhom were likewise teachers of
Hayek, who was to become the foremost representative
ofthis school ofthought in the early 1930s. Although a
great many ofthe details concerning their relationship
remain yet to be clarified, it is a matter of record that
Schutz and Hayek (both of whom received their Dr.
juris degree at Vienna in 1921) were in close personal
contact during the 1920s (they both participated on a
regular basis in the informal discussion group known
as the Mises-Kreis). One of Schutz's major concerns
at the time was to provide Austrian economics with a
suitable philosophical foundation.
The fact remains, however, that for whatever rea-
son, there are only passing references to Schutz in
Hayek's writings (he also refers in passing to Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty). In any event, the philosophical
horizon of Hayek's own work underwent a general
shift after his move to England in 1932 (Schutz em-
igrated to the United States in 1939). The contextual
shift away from phenomenologicallyoriented or "Con-
tinental" philosophy on Hayek's part to Anglo-Saxon
modes ofthinking was no doubt to a significant extent
a consequence of the clase association that developed
in London between Hayek and a fellow Austrian ex-
patriate, Karl Popper ( 1902-1994 ), himself no friend
of phenomenology (Hayek's endorsement of Poppe-
rian philosophy of science was objected to by LUDWIG
M. LACHMANN). Although for his part Schutz frequently
refers to economics, as we11 as, on occasion, to Hayek,
his published writings contain no systematic treatment
of economic matters (even though he pursued a lifelong
career as a specialist in international banking law), and
153
this is perhaps yet another reason why ~ unlike, for in-
stance, psychology or sociology~ economics did not
succeed in capturing the fu11 attention of phenome-
nologists. Thus this first encounter between pheno-
menology and economics in the persons principally
of Schutz and Hayek did not, at the time, produce any
lasting results. After an initial frequentation, the two
disciplines drifted apart, just as in the prewar years,
Schutz and Hayek themselves drifted from their com-
mon home in Vienna, the one to America, the other to
England.
It may be noted as well that this rendezvous manque
between Husserlian phenomenology and Austrian eco-
nomics coincided not only with the diaspora of Central
European intellectuals characteristic of the 1930s, but
also with the beginning of a swift decline in prestige of
the Austrian school of economics itself. In economics,
positivism was on the rise, and the objectivism (as
Husserl would ha ve called it) characteristic of the in-
creasingly popular mathematical and formalistic ap-
proach to economic issues was soon totally to eclipse
the "subjective" or phenomenological approach advo-
cated by Austrian economics. Although in the 1940s
Hayek mounted a valiant (albeit rear-guard) attack on
what he called the "scientism" and "physicalism" (cf.
Husserl's NATURALISM) that was becoming so fashion-
able in the discipline, his criticisms fell on deaf ears at
the time.
In an attempt to transform economics into a "hard"
science, economists had resolutely hitched their dis-
cipline to the rising star of purely instrumental, cal-
culative rationality, to Paretian modeling techniques
and general equilibrium analysis ~ to which a pheno-
menological type of orientation could, by the nature
of things, have nothing positive to contribute. Un-
like phenomenology (also of Austrian origin, it may
be recalled, insofar as Husserl was born in Habsburg
Moravia), which found a new homeland and a renewed
life in America, Austrian economics pretty much died
in exile in England. (Hayek's subsequent fame was
based not on his original contributions to the method-
ology of economics as a human science ~ these were
altogether ignored by the economics establishment, his
Nobel Prize in 1974 notwithstanding ~but, like Mii-
ton Friedman, for instance, on his more politica! or
"ideologica!" views, often, though erroneously, taken
to be of a conservative or "right-wing" nature.) It is
154 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tempting to wonder ifHayek might not ha ve succeeded
in articulating his critique of scientistic objectivism
(and his defense of an alternative methodology for eco-
nomics) in a philosophically more forceful manner had
he cultivated his phenomenological contacts more as-
siduously (this seems to have been Lachmann's view).
Be that as it may, Hayek was to some extent vin-
dicated when in 1989 socialism collapsed on a grand
scale in Eastern Europe- as he had long predicted it
inevitably must (Hayek died in 1992 but, due to fail-
ing health, was apparently not able to appreciate the
magnitude ofthe dramatic events taking place around
him). Hayek's concrete policy recommendations are
now looked to as guiding principles in the economic
and social restructuring of former Communis! coun-
tries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and even the former Soviet Un ion itself, while those of
his erstwhile victorious rival, John Maynard Keynes
(1883~ 1946), ha ve, along with Marxism, been con-
signed to the dustbin of history. While these develop-
ments amount to a belated recognition of the valid-
ity of Hayek 's economic views, they do not of them-
selves amount to a recognition of the philosophical
significance of Austrian economics considered from a
methodological point of view (i.e., from the point of
view ofthe philosophy ofthe social sciences).
On the methodological level, mainstream eco-
nomics continues to adhere to the positivist ideal and to
view itselfas a would-be science in the Galilean, math-
ematized sense that Husserl spoke of in Die Krisis der
europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phiinomenologie ( 1936 ). Given this situation, it is not
surprising that, the earlier encounter between pheno-
menology and economics notwithstanding, phenome-
nologists to date have not been greatly motivated to
elaborate a phenomenology ofthe economic lifeworld
(parallel to that ofthe sociallifeworld). On the face of
it, economics in its present state would seem to have
precious little to do with human reality (the proper
object of phenomenology). Increasingly, however, in
the wake ofthe breakdown ofthe Keynesian synthesis,
mainstream economics is finding itselfin methodologi-
cal disarray. Indeed, the beginnings (however small) of
a postpositivist or "interpretive" (i.e., hermeneutica!)
turn in the discipline are becoming visible. The time is
thus ripe for a renewed dialogue between phenomen-
ology and economics.
Such a dialogue is in fact already under way- and
on a renewed methodological hasis. What could be
called the second encounter between economics and
phenomenology centers no longer, as in the case of
Schutz, on the philosophy of science dominant earlier
in this century (and reflected as much in Husserlianism
as in logica! positivism) buton the postmodern philos-
ophy of the social sciences elaborated by HERMENEU-
TIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY. it was initiated by LUDWIG M.
LACHMANN, who also played a major ro le in the revival
of Austrian economics in the United States that began
in the early 1970s. After leaving Germany in 1933 fol-
lowing Hitler's ascension to power, Lachmann stud-
ied with Hayek at the London School of Economics
and subsequently taught in Johannesburg until his re-
tirement in 1972. From 1975 to 1987 he was then a
visiting professor at New York University, and it was
there that he introduced a new generation of Ameri-
can economists to the (by then) forgotten phenomen-
ological background of Austrian economics, Schutz in
particular.
Among this generation ofyoungereconomists, ooN
LAVOIE of George Mason University has been espe-
cially active in fostering an interchange between Aus-
trian economics and hermeneutica! phenomenology,
and a number ofyounger economists trained at George
Mason (e.g., PETER BOETTKE, STEVEN HORWITZ, DAVID
PRYCHITKO, and RALF RECTOR) ha ve deve]oped the philo-
sophica] dialogue even further. This renewed encounter
between economics and phenomenology on the part
of a younger generation of scholars was, as it were,
made official when in 1986 Lavoie, under the aus-
pices of the Center for the Study of Market Processes,
organized a conference at George Mason University
on economics and hermeneutics (lnterpretation, Hu-
man Agency, and Economics, 1990) to which both
economists and philosophers were invited.
One of the points stressed by Lachmann in the
"Hermeneutics Club" he organized while at New York
University was the need for economists to give care-
fui consideration to, as he put it, "general ideas" -
over and beyond the standard requirements of the dis-
cipline of mastery in formalized, quantitative measur-
ing techniques. (While adept at measuring this or that
economic parameter, most students graduating in eco-
nomics would be hard put to explain exactly what it
is that they are supposed to be measuring in the first
 ECONOMICS
place, i.e., just what an "economy" is.) From the point
of view of the phenomenological philosophy of eco-
nomics, the most "general" of ideas in this regard is
no doubt that of"objectivism," the critique thereof and
the alternatives thereto.
In its present state, economics is, as was mentioned
above, very much of a (would-be) Galilean, mathema-
tized science, a purely objectivistic discipline oblivious
to its foundations in lived experience and the realm
of human praxis (the lifeworld). Indeed, ever since
the 19th century economists, in the pursuit of what
in the Krisis Husserl termed "abstraction" and "ide-
alization," have sought to model their discipline af-
ter physics (whence the "physicalism" denounced by
Hayek), seeking to make of economics a kind of so-
cial physics, a Newtonian mechanics ofhuman affairs.
Since Menger first articulated his "subjective theory
of value" in 1871, however, Austrian economists ha ve
defended, in opposition to ali forms of scientistic ob-
jectivism, what they refer to as "subjectivism." This
was a properly phenomenological move on their part
(having, it should be noted, little or nothing to do with
the "subjectivism" denounced !ater on by phenomen-
ology).
Austrian "subjectivism" (though sometimes misun-
derstood by defenders and opponents alike) is essen-
tially of a Husserlian sort, in that it insists that in order
to be understood properly, value (the key concept of
economics) must not be viewed as something "natu-
ral," an inherent property of goods considered from a
merely objective or naturalistic point ofview; "value"
is rather something "constituted" by human subjects,
or, to speak somewhat more in the manner of EXIS-
TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, it is the byproduct ofhuman
action (Mises called his majorphilosophical-economic
treatise Human Action [ 1933]). More specifically, Aus-
trian "subjectivism" views value as the expression of
preferences on the part of individual subjects, ofthe sat-
isfaction they expect to derive from the incremental use
of goods; this "subjective" theory ofvalue was the form
in which Menger for his part articulated the famous
"marginalist revolution" in economics effected simul-
taneously in 1871 by him, Leon Walras (1834-1910),
and William Stanley Jevons ( 1835-1882), which inau-
gurated what is now referred to as neoclassical eco-
nomics.
It is above ali in their respective methodological
155
critiques of objectivism that Austrian economics and
phenomenology come together in a kind of natural
symbiosis. The kindred nature ofthese two disciplines
does not stop there, however. Both set forth alterna-
tive approaches of a "positive" sort to both the theory
and the practice of the human sciences, economics in
particular, and these are congruent to a remarkable de-
grec. Ifphenomenological hermeneutics is defined, in a
Gadamerian fashion, as a general theory ofhuman un-
derstanding in ali its various forms (i.e., as a universal
theory of understanding), Austrian economics for its
part could be said tobe a theory ofhuman understand-
ing as it manifests itself in that realm called the "eco-
nomic." And the theory of economic understanding it
sets forth is itself hermeneutica! in the most proper
sense ofthe term. To speak like Husserl, economics as
practiced by the "Austrians" amounts to nothing less
than a "regional" hermeneutics. Or, as Lavoie puts it,
"Austrian economics is the hermeneutica! mode of neo-
classical economics." In what follows an attempt will
accordingly be made to delineate some of the main
characteristic issues and themes of a "hermeneutica!
economics."
The hermeneutica! task in regard to economics is no
different from what it is in regard to ali other realms
of human activity, from the production of texts to the
generation of cultural forms of life. In ali such in-
stances hermeneutics sets itself the task of explicat-
ing (interpreting) the "logic" of the order in question
(text, culture, economy). For hermeneutics, an "econ-
omy" is not, as neoclassical economics seeks to view
it, a self-contained realm (a "system") of determinate,
cause-and-effect relations subsisting somehow inde-
pendently of flesh-and-blood human beings and ex-
plainable in purely "objective" terms (cf. the analysis
oftexts in STRUCTURALISM). Economics, it insists, ought
tobe viewed not as an empirica! (by which economists
usually mean "statistica!") science in search of nomo-
logicallaw, but as a human science in search of general
patterns of existential meaning (an "economy" being
nothing other than a web of significance spun by act-
ing human beings in their day-to-day dealings with one
another).
The proper object of a hermeneutica! or interpreti ve
economics is market processes, viewed as an expres-
sion of human subjectivity and agency. Hermeneuti-
ca! economics maintains that the logic of market pro-
 156 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
cesses that it seeks to explicate is not an instance of in-
strumental, means-end or technological rationality (as
mainstream economics - as well as Frankfurt CRITI-
CAL THEORY- views it). The order that characterizes
a market economy as a whole is not (as in the case
of intra-economic entities such as the firm) the resul!
ofplanning (technological or instrumental rationality);
rather, it is what Hayek called a "spontaneous order,"
i.e., one that is the self-generated outcome of indepen-
dent action on the part of a myriad of human agents,
each seeking to better his or her own life (this, it could
be said in a Rica:urian fashion, is the "existential" ba-
sis of economic reality) and interacting through market
exchanges, themselves viewed on the model of what
hermeneutics calls communicative understanding or
rationality. (As Hayek would say, an "economy" is not
a constructed order, a taxis, but a "catallaxy.")
This means hermeneutics insists- in opposition to
mainstream, positivistic economics (see, for instance,
Lachmann, The Market as an Economic Process, 1986)
- that the activity of economic agents is thoroughly
misunderstood when it is viewed solely on the model
of homo economicus (a robot-like entity that, as in
standard rational expectations theory, is nothing more
than a calculating utility maximizer). In its attempt to
elaborate an economics having as its foca) point not the
rationalist construct "economic man," but the actually
existing human subject, moving about (as Merleau-
Ponty would say) not in the ideal world ofneoclassical
economics, arbitrarily defined as one ofperfectly com-
petitive market equilibrium, but in the real world as
described by EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, one ofrisk,
uncertainty, and ignorance, hermeneutica) economics
signals the death of "economic man" Uust as pheno-
menology itself signals the death ofthe Cartesian sub-
ject).
Hermeneutics insists that market processes are best
viewed on the model ofhuman LANGUAGE, as a kind of
dialogue or con versation in the Gadamerian sense. The
unique feature of a market or self-regulating economy
(a "spontaneous order") is that prices, as established by
the give-and-take offree trade, communicate cssential
information to economic agents, "telling" them, in ef-
fect, how best to allocate their limited resourccs. That
self-organizing, intersubjective order that is an "econ-
omy" is what MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY called an "inter-
worJd;" it is also a kind of"soov" and is like Merleau-
Ponty's "lived body" (corps propre) in that it too is
synergic and possesses a spontaneite enseignante, one
that speaks in the language of prices. Prices are there-
fore a form of embodied meaning (meaning, it will
be recalled, is the essential object of any phenomen-
ological analysis); prices represent, as Merleau-Ponty
again would say, a kind of objective logos. In contrast
to technological-instrumental rationality, however, the
economic MEANINGS conveyed by prices (the knowl-
edge that prices communicate about the saleability of
commodities and other valuations attached to them
by consumers) are not "theoretical" but "practica!."
That is, they are inextricably embedded in economic
praxis itself and are thus, like Merleau-Ponty's percep-
luai meanings, never fully thematizable (this forms the
philosophical basis for hermeneutics' rejection of the
idea of central planning). The "message ofthe market-
place" is, as Merleau-Ponty would say, a "meaning that
is not the work of a universal constituting conscious-
ness, a meaning that clings to certain contents." The
economic world itself is, to borrow yet another phrase
from Merleau-Ponty, "a system of meanings whose
reciprocities, relationships and involvements do not
require tobe made explicit in order tobe exploited."
Hermeneutica! economics provides an answer to the
central problem of market economics, viz., coOJ·dina-
tion, by showing how-out ofthe multifarious activity
of a myriad of independent agents, each pursuing his or
her own ends in a world of Merleau-Pontyan ambigu-
ity and hermeneutica! uncertainty- an order emerges
("spontaneously") that, while manifestly the result of
human agency, is also, as Hayek ever insisted, not the
result of human design (resembling in this way tex-
tual meaning as hermeneutics understands it, i.e., in
a nonpsychologistic fashion). Hermeneutics views the
market as a unique and irreplaceable means for dis-
covering knowledge, knowledge that, paradoxical as it
might sound, does not preexist its discovery (this des-
ignates a problem that, in its general forms, greatly pre-
occupied Merleau-Ponty; it is likewise what "Austri-
ans" refer to as a "creative discovery procedure"). This
is what leads hermeneutica! economists to concentrate
much oftheir attention on the role ofthe entrepreneur,
conceived of, phenomenologically, as o ne instantiation
ofthe "acting person." A task remaining tobe accom-
plished in this regard is that of a full-fledged pheno-
menological analysis of entrepreneurship, for which
 EDUCATION
the work ofMerleau-Ponty could serve as an extremely
valuable source of philosophical inspiration.
More generally, a wealth of fascinating research
projects- ones having to do with the real-world situ-
ation of economic actors and with the institutions and
spontaneous orders of ali sorts that emerge in a civil or
self-regulating society as the sedimented outcome of
interactive human agency (extending even to issues in
ECOLOGY)- has been opened up by the renewed en-
counter between phenomenological hermeneutics and
Austrian economics. It is tobe hoped that this particular
conversation will not, like the earlier one, be allowed
to lapse but that, to the contrary, it will continue to
grow and to deepen, contributing thereby to the ad-
vancement of both a genuinely humanistic economics
and a truly universal hermeneutics.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Boettke, Peter. "Interpretive Reasoning and the Study of So-
cial Life." Methodus 2 (1990), 35--45.
- , ed. The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics. Alder-
shot: Edward Elgar, 1994.
- , and David Prychitko, eds. The Market Process: Essays on
Contemporary Austrian Economics. Aldershot: Edward
Edgar, 1993.
Ebeling, Richard. "Cooperation in Anonymity." Critica/ Re-
view 1 (1987).
Helling, Ingeborg K. "Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufman, and the
Economists of the Mises Circle: Personal and Method-
ological Continuities." In Alfred Schutz. Neue Beitrăge
zur Rezeption seines Werkes. Ed. E1isabeth List and Ilja
Srubar. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988, 43-68.
Horwitz, Steven. Monetary Evolution, Free Banking, and
Economic Order. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
Kirzner, Israel M, ed. Subjectivism, Inte/ligibility and Eco-
nomic Understanding: Essays in Honor of Ludwig M.
Lachmann on his Eightieth Birthday. New York: New
York University Press, 1986.
Lachmann, Ludwig M. Market as an Ecomomic Process.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Lavoie, Don. "The Accounting of Interpretations and the In-
terpretation of Accounts: The Communicative Function of
'The Language of Business. "' Accounting, Organizations
and Society 12 ( 1987), 579-604.
- , ed. Economics and Hermeneutics. New York: Routledge,
1990.
Madison, Gary B. "Hermeneutica! Integrity: A Guide for the
Perplexed." In The Market Process, 201-11.
- . "Hayek and the Interpretive Turn." Critica/ Review 3
( 1989).
- . "How Individualistic Is Methodological Invidualism?"
In Individuals, Institutions, Interpretations: Hermeneutics
Applied to Economics. Ed. David Prychitko. Aldershot:
Avebury, 1995,36-56.
- . "Getting Beyond Objectivism: The Philosophical
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
157
Herrneneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur." In Economics
and Hermeneutics, 34-58.
-. "The Primacy of Action and Its Scientific Consequences:
On the Hermeneutics ofthe Human Sciences." Paper pre-
sented at the international symposium, "Phenomenology
and the Foundations of the Human Sciences" (National
Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C., 1990).
-. "Between Theory and Practice: Hayek on the Logic of
Cultural Dynamics." Cultural Dynamics 3 ( 1990).
-. "Phenomenology and Economics." In The Edward Elgar
Companion, 38-47.
Prendergast, Christopher. "Alfred Schutz and the Austrian
School of Economics." American Journal of Sociology 92
( 1986), 1-26.
Prychitko, David. "Toward an Interpreti ve Economics: Some
Hermeneutic Issues." Methodus 2 (1990), 69-72.
Srubar, Ilja. "On the Limits of Rational Choice." Rationali~v
and Society 5 (1993), 32-46.
GARY BRENT MADISON
McMaster University
EDUCATION Phenomenological theories of
education have not so far achieved a consistent def-
inition of their methodology and basic concepts. Not
only do these theories originate from different philoso-
phies, but their guiding questions and procedures are
diverse and sometimes contradictory. On the one hand,
this explains the difficulties of any attempt at a com-
prehensive account ofthese theories, and on the other
hand, this is also the reason why phenomenological
theories of education are open and flexible enough to
draw upon a variety oftraditions and to co-opera te with
other disciplines.
Phenomenological thinking in pedagogy cannot be
described as a homogeneous movement. The begin-
nings, which date back to the first decades of our cen-
tury, can be found in the works of ALOYS FISCHER and
RUDOLF LOCHNER, who were mainly influenced by the
early philosophy of EDMUND HUSSERL. They outlined a
descriptive pedagogy or pedagogy as a factual science
(Tatsachenwissenschaft). Pedagogy is to be modeled
on philosophy as strict science (strenge Wissenschaft).
Strict science in its turn refers to a scientific ethos
allegedly at work in disciplines such as physics. Edu-
cation is to be described as far as possible without any
prej udices so that its essential characteristics can be
defined in a complete and well-ordered fashion. This
ambitious attempt to provide a consistent basis for ali
158 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
approaches within pedagogy by the help of EIDETIC
descriptions did not succeed in forming a specifically
phenomenological tradition. Only empirically oriented
approaches within pedagogy received fruitful stimuli
from this program.
Occasionally the inftuence of phenomenology can
be found in the so-called human scientific pedagogy,
among others in the works of Friedrich Copei ( 1902-
1945) and Theodor Litt ( 1880--1962). This "geisteswis-
senschaftliche Piidagogik" developed under the in-
ftuence of WILHELM DILTHEY and his disciple Herman
Nohl (1879-1960). Litt admired the way phenomen-
ology could convey pure forms of ideas and of life as
such. He is mainly inftuenced by Husserl's method.
Copei takes up the phenomenological retrieval and
revalorization of the sta tus of lifeworldly experiences
insofar as lifeworldly experience forms the hasis for
scientific knowledge. He interprets the processes of
education, learning, and self-realization as the history
of the crises in the experience of concrete individu-
als. These crises are caused by the conflict between
LIFEWORLD experience and scientific analysis, e.g., the
altitude one has to climb to reach a mountain top differs
from the altitude's mathematical definition. The pheno-
menological way of thinking enables one to bring to
light the opinions and the taken-for-granted options
on which not only our everyday but also our scien-
tific knowledge rests. The phenomenological way of
thinking can thus be compared to the Socratic maieu-
tic. Those who take part in a Platonic dialogue become
aware of their habits of thinking through failures on
problems they were sure they would be able to solve.
One achieves a new perspective not only on the world,
but also on oneself.
The affinities ofthis elevation ofthe status ofpresci-
entific ways of experiencing to a popular theory of"Bil-
dung" related to Nazi ideology had fatal consequences.
One of these was a reactionary aversion to science.
Only after World War II did some phenomenological
theories within pedagogy attract more than temporary
attention. Following mainJy MARTIN HEIDEGGER's Sein
und Zeit ( 1927), OTTO FRIEDRICH BOLLNOW worked on
an anthropological and pedagogica! theory with un-
derpinnings in EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. He tried
to draw attention to dimensions of education - e.g.,
the so-called "pedagogica! atmosphere"- that are not
accessible to scientific procedures. That is to say he un-
dertook to elaborate on the "geisteswissenschaftliche"
tradition of pedagogy via phenomenological analyses
of experience, SPACE, TIME, moods, and concrete inter-
active communication. Some of Bollnow's disciples
thematized education as a process in which one in-
evitably undergoes crises, and which is therefore partly
uncontrollable and cannot be projected (JAKOB MUTH).
Others thematized the problems of a context-bound
identity (FRIEDMANN MAURER). A third group thematized
the event-character (ereignishaft) of the encounter be-
tween educator and pupi!.
The phiJosophers HEINRICH ROM BACH and EUGEN FINK
developed an independent phenomenological peda-
gogy. Rombach focused on ontologica! structures in
order to overcome the traditional metaphysics of sub-
stance. He was inftuenced by Heidegger's critique of
the metaphysics of subjectivity. According to Rom-
bach, pedagogy is to thematize the human being as a
person, as a structural unity of the fundamental pos-
sibilities of DASEIN. Following Husserl and Heidegger,
Fink mainly looked into the co-existential characteris-
tics of pedagogica! acts. According to him, education
has to be considered a primordial phenomenon of so-
cial and human praxis. It is of the same sta tus as !o ve
and death, power, and labor, and cannot be derived
from other phenomena. Pedagogy becomes a doctrine
for life (Lebens/ehre) that picks up and reftects the
sense produced by a concrete communicative praxis
interpreted as a deliberative community (Beratungsge-
meinschaft).
Following in Fink's footsteps, EGON scHOTz works
on an existential-critica! pedagogy. The focus is on
the existential relationship to Being within formative
processes. This existential relationship to being is char-
acterized by historicity, by the importance of the BODY,
and above ali by LANGUAGE. Moreover, it conveys a
perspective in which freedom and REASON appear as
paradoxical potentialities. The fundamental relation-
ship to Being of the human being can be called para-
doxical because the impossibilities of absolute freedom
and of completely transparent reason together entail a
concrete praxis permeated by reason and freedom. This
paradoxical situation indicates human finitude. This re-
striction is brought about by the resistance ofthe things
dealt with and above ali by coexistence with others.
In working out the philosophical hasis of his peda-
gogy THEODOR BALLAUFF draws upon Heidegger's crit-
 EDUCATION
ical reflections concern ing the sta tus of the subject in
order to ward off an overrating of the self in the de-
scription of pedagogica! acts. Any pretensions to have
thought or the self at one's sovereign command are
rejected sharply. Hence pedagogica! action becomes
risky; although it can prepare for the event of think-
ing, it cannot produce it voluntarily. Ballauff's disciple
KLAUS SCHALLER also develops his pedagogy of com-
munication on the basis, among other influences, of
phenomenological ideas. The concrete intersubjective
production of sense relativizes the dominant ro le ofthe
educator and concedes an important degree of partic-
ipation to the pupi!. Schaller also received influences
from .lAN PATOCKA and BERNHARD WALDENFELS that led
him to attribute an original potentiality to the concrete
processcs of communication, a potentiality that is ca-
pable oftransforming traditional patterns of communi-
cation.
Existential-phenomenological ideas are particularly
influential in pedagogica! thinking, e.g., in souTH
AFRICA (CAREL KRUGEL OBERHOLZER), Brazii (PAULO
FREIRE), SPAIN (JOAN-CARLES MELICH), and in the UNITED
STATES (DAVID E. DENTON, CLINTON COLLINS, and MAX-
INE GREENE). The reception of the phenomenology of
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE focuses on the dimension of free-
dom in human existence. It emphasizes the ultimate
autonomy ofthe human being. On this basis the peda-
gogica! reformer Freire criticizes cultural colonization
and approaches that conceive of education as monetary
investment that has to pay off in due course (educaci6
bancaria). Under the influence of Sartre and EDMUND
HUSSERL 's conception of consciousness, which explains
the ability of consciousness to achieve a critica! rela-
tionship to its own tacit knowledge, Freire fuses his
dialogi cal conception of a joint and responsible educa-
tion with the materialistic theories of society of Karl
Marx and Erich Fromm ( 1900-1980).
A truely humanistic education means neither domi-
nation nor monetary investment, but to provide the stu-
dent, in mutual respect, with critica! thinking. Freire's
critique of the deposit theory of education is also ap-
proved by Juan-Carles Melich. Strongly influenced by
Heidegger's phenomenology, Sartre's existentialism,
and ALFRED SCHUTz's phenomenology of intersubjectiv-
ity, Melich propagates an existential pedagogy offini-
tude that emphasizes the creativity and uniqueness of
the human being as a person-a person who could be
159
called on by truth. Similar to Oberholzer, who worked
in South Africa, Melich draws upon the therapeutic
conception ofvrKTOR FRANKL. The nature ofthe human
being is freedom. Personality in this sense has to be
respected in every humane education.
The influence of authors from THE NETHERLANDS who
ha ve worked in a phenomenological manner is shown
mainly in an increased interes! in thc patterns of chil-
dren 's experience. While MARTINUS J. LANGEVELD works
rather intuitively and only occasionally explicitly in the
phenomeno]ogica! field, STEPHAN STRASSER explicitly
wants to clarify fundamental questions in the pheno-
menological analysis of experience. Langeveld's an-
thropological studies of the child interpret the child's
specific way of perceiving the world as an "open pro-
duction of sense," which responds to the stimuli of
the child's LIFEWORLD. His main objections are to those
conceptions, such as Piaget's, that treat childhood as
only a pre-stage offull-fledged adulthood. Ali forms of
the child's expression, e.g., playing and drawing, indi-
cate a multifarious and original perception ofthe world
that becomes stunted rather than developed further in
the process of growing up.
Such studies strive to free the child 's way of experi-
encing from the image of deficiency that it has to bear in
famous theories of child development. Moreover, they
are interested in the question ofhow things, taking into
consideration their characteristic appeal, contribuie to
the shaping of the specific organization of children's
experience. Links to phenomenologically inspired PSY-
CHIATRY (lAN HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG) and to phenomen-
o!ogical PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (FREDERIK .1 • .1.
BUYTENDIJK) focus attention on the concrete, the presci-
entific, and the pre-conventional, i.e., pre-conventional
in the sense of moral behavior that is not yet shaped by
any explicit rule.
Strasser's attempt to draw up a critique ofthe scien-
tific reductions ofthe conception ofhuman beings from
an anthropological viewpoint owes much to pheno-
menological methods. While his influence on others is
rather inconspicuous, Langeveld's thinking led to the
formation of a school. The so-called "Utrecht school"
has developed a broad research program concern ing the
investigation of mii ieus of children and adolescents.
The first noteworthy breakthrough to phenomen-
ological self-confidence within pedagogy occurred in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Right after World War
160 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
II pedagogy and education were dominated by pro-
cesses of intense bureaucratization and confidence in
the scientific analysis and planning of teaching. As
time passed, however, the suspicion arose that such a
strategy would lead to a technical reification of social
action. The worry grew that there was not enough at-
tention paid to the particular situations of children and
adolescents. The critique of the alienation of scien-
tific rationalization from concrete life led to a renewed
appreciation ofphenomenology as a philosophy of ex-
perience. Now not only are Bollnow's contributions
to a pedagogica! anthropology read anew but also the
studies ofLangeveld. The "Utrecht school" took shape
under the influence of TON BEEKMAN. Numerous multi-
faceted investigations within the concrete life-milieus
of adolescents and of, e.g., people using wheelchairs
wcre carried through with the help of participant ob-
servation (tei!nehmende Beobachtung) (HANS BLEEKER,
KAREL MULDERIJ). Investigators share a common situa-
tion with the children, adolescents, and others whom
they observe. This opens up the possibility of under-
standing and describing the shared experiences. In this
way phenomenologicai analyses are clearly different
from Iaboratory research. Phenomenological investi-
gators try hard to see the world from the viewpoint of
thc other.
MAX VAN MANEN has developed his phenomen-
ological pedagogy in CANADA in connection with the
"Utrecht school." His version of phenomenoiogical
pedagogy was stimulated by a specific interpretation of
Heidegger and can be characterized as holistic and po-
etic. It can be called holistic where its guiding concep-
tion ofthe human being is concerned. This conception
bears certain similarities to the humanistic psychology
of Cari R. Rogers (1901-1987). Van Manen's approach
presents itself as poetic because, being aware of the
limits ofthe logica! reconstructions of pedagogica! ac-
tion, it remains sensitive to what cannot be verbalized
and to what makcs itself heard only via silence.
In the course of an increasing self-clarification of
the status and the strategies ofphenomenological anal-
ysis within pedagogy, similar undertakings may be no-
ticed and assimilated. After a first phase consisting
of mere criticism of science, a broad field of com-
mon interests and approaches opened up. This devel-
opment made it possible to realize that the analysis of
thc unconscious and preconscious in psychoanalysis
and Husserl 's thematization ofthe pre-structures of our
experience have certain concems in common (wERNER
LOCH). This has led to an increased awareness of the
difficulties that arise when one tries to return to pre-
scientific and primordial perceptions and to describe
concrete action in such a way that its obliquencss is re-
tained. Anthropological and socio-phenomenological
theories are fused (WILFRIED LIPPITZ) so that the re-
searchers are able to pay more attention to the con-
crete reality of education that has long been neglected.
Moreover, this approach has made it much easier to
overcome the naive view that holds that educational
processes can be understood independently oftheir so-
cietal circumstances.
There is a variety of phenomenologically minded
conceptions. Loch deals, among other things, with the
problems arising from the systematic study of concrete
biographies. He is looking for possibilities of describ-
ing the child's concrete consciousness of being able
to do something (Kănnensbewusstsein) in its genetic
dimension. Lippitz reconstructs the notion of the life-
world not only in the Husserlian sense, but also with
respect to the transformations the notion underwent
in the works of MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. He USeS the
results of this reconstruction for a fundamental expla-
nation of pedagogica! ACTION and combines different
phenomenological traditions in pedagogy to clarify our
lifeworldly experience. Moreover, he interprets the in-
tricate phiJosophy of EMMANUEL LEVINAS in order to
bring the humanism via the other human being to bear
for a reformulation of difficult ethical questions that are
of extraordinary importance to pedagogica! discourse.
There are certain links to the studies of the Belgian
pedagogue MARIETTE HELLEMANS who tries, on the ba-
sis of Levinas's ethical theory, to interpret anew the
notion of responsibility, which is of great importance
to pedagogica! thinking. Educational relationships are
tobe understood as a response to the needs ofpupils in
order to come to a conceptualization ofthese relation-
ships that is not restricted solely to the aspect ofpower.
Her disciple JAN MASSCHELEIN starts from there. In his
studies, which interpret pedagogica! action as com-
municative action, he draws upon HANNAH ARENDT's
investigations concerning the implications of the fact
that we are born. He points out aspects of the educa-
tional process that are fundamentally beyond the reach
of the people involved in the process. Concrete action
 EDUCATION
is characterized as a response to the new beginning
caused by birth and hence, in an ethical perspective, as
the obligation to respond.
KĂTE MEYER-DRAWE analyzes the fact that we each
are a living BODY (Leib) and the consequences aris-
ing from it for our intersubjective experience. This is
do ne in order to widen the notion of rationality and to
prepare the ground for an understanding of forms of
experience in children that does not project concepts
onto these forms that pertain, if at ali, only to certain
patterns of adult rational ity. At the same time, a pheno-
menology of the living body, as it is developed after
Merleau-Ponty, also allows for a critique of traditional
pedagogica! concepts of personality. Such a critique
strives to do justice to the intersubjective structures of
educational action and to point out the fact that the
concepts of personality and identity are only deriva-
tive. The rehabilitation of the fact that we are living
bodies and the recognition that this fact is part of our
rational faculty prepare the ground for the reception
of phenomenological thinking in the subdiscipline of
pedagogy that deals with handicapped people (e.g.,
WILHELM PFEFFER, URSULA STINKES). from the viewpoint
of our bodily existence, not only different possibilities
of communicating with people who suffer from severe
mental handicaps, but also the limits of such commu-
nication come into focus. The handicapped person ap-
pears as a stranger in close proximity whose difference
has a right to be respected.
In addition, the renewed turn to the sensuous nature
(Sinnlichkeit) of the human being (HORST RUMPF) has
entailed lasting attention toward lifeworldly forms of
experience. Learning and teaching in institutions can
be deciphered and criticized as disciplinary measures
that not only ignore the sensuousness inherent in the
forms of knowing of children, but even suppress its
creativity. Manners, methods of teaching, and seating
plans- as well as, say, commands in classes of PHYSI-
CAL EDUCATION- produce teaching and learning habits
that have incorporated a scientific attitude long before
it can explicitly present itself as a certain attitude of
knowing. Concentrating on how learning takes place
opens up the possibility of combining phenomenologi-
cal theories of learning with Norbert Elias's (1897-
1990) critique of the process of civilization as well as
with MICHEL muc AULT's analyses of disciplinary power.
GONTHER BUCK develops a phenomenologically in-
161
spired theory of leaming that brings the act of leaming
into focus. In critica! contrast to theories that inter-
pret learning only via its results, Buck points out that
leaming is a process fu li of confticts, that learning also
always implies forgetting something, and that leaming
has tobe described as anat times rather painful reinter-
pretation of one 's own history of experience. The myth
of leaming as the steady progress from certa in begin-
nings to anticipated ends, as the path on which a steady
accumulation ofknowledge takes place, is severly criti-
cized. Numerous applications ofthe theory oflearning
as a disruptive restructuring of operative cxperience
have alrcady turned out to be successful with regard to
understanding the concrete learning processcs.
Concordantly, BRUNO REDEKER emphasizcs the rele-
vance of primordial sensuous experience in the !cam-
ing of physics. This learning comes about only if
one realizes the original character of the preknowl-
edge of the lifeworld as opposed to the perspective
of the NATURAL SCIENCES. There is no continuity in the
transformation of prescientific experience into objec-
tive knowledge. The latter is achieved in a confronta-
tion with mostly tacitly guiding opinions. A difficulty
of the phenomenological perspective !ies in the fact
that adults remember what they ha ve learned, but ha ve
mostly forgotten how they learned it. The rcsults that
are available to us obscure the way that led to them.
The Jinks to MARTIN WAGENSCHEIN's theory of genetic
leaming are obvious.
GOTTFRIED BRĂUER opens up new possibilities ofaes-
thetic education by showing the creativity of sensu-
ous perception phenomenologically. And again, what
is characteristic about this approach is that it takes
the child's perceptions of the world seriously. More-
over, it appreciates the attitude of the educator who
respects the specific forms of understanding of adoles-
cents and who does not merely strive to make the pupi!
overcome these forms of understanding. Related to the
phenomenological conceptions of teaching and !cam-
ing are attempts to criticize traditional stage theories of
moral and intellectual development (Jean Piaget) and
to break up their one-sidedness by drawing upon the
child's potentialities of experience (BERNHARD CURTIS
and WOLFE MAYS).
Despite the diversity ofphenomenological theories
of education, there are certain family rescmblances.
Common to ali trends is the doubt about thc omnipo-
162 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ten ce of scientific investigation. These doubts can lead
to an aversion to science, but they can also motivate
a productive collaboration between the sciences and
philosophy. Within phenomenological theories of ed-
ucation this collaboration shows itself as an openness,
e.g., to psychoanalytical and sociologica! explanations.
In such a context, phenomenological analysis seeks
primordial patterns operative in processes of learning,
education, and formation. Experiences are to be taken
up where they occur and they are to be described and
explained, taking into consideration the specific cir-
cumstances under which they have come about. With
respect to thinking and perceiving as well as to ac-
tion, it is the act as such that stands in the foreground.
Nevertheless, one has to avoid the common prejudice
that phenomenological investigation within pedagogy
coincides with the attempt, devoid of ali theory, to
grasp "authentic experiences." To return to the matters
themselves does not mean to collect merely what one
encounters accidentally in one's lifeworld, but rather
demands the theoretical effort to break through the
walls oftaken-for-granted opinions. This fundamental
feature and, along with it, the attention toward dis-
continuity, crisis, and the negative are what qualifies
phenomenological investigation as critica!. Turning to
the prescientific acts of experience, the archaeology of
primordial opinions and attitudes must not be exagger-
ated so that it is hypostatized as a myth of immediacy.
This is a specific danger of endeavors that strive to
widen the scope ofthe dominant concepts ofrational-
ity by recalling the fact of our bodily existence, that
undermine adult habits by refering to children 's ways
of perceiving, and that thematize the operative sense
of concrete act ion instead of restricting themselves to
the mere results of such an action.
There is no sense behind the things, there exists no
order beyond our concrete world, and there is no night
of identity and no sunshine state of reason that we can
reach. Thus if we learn to listen to the expressions of
children in their productive sense, we do learn some-
thing about our adult selves. To acquire something like
imagination in listening to other orders of reason means
to tind a remedy against a special problem of Western
reason, which has forgotten how to dream because of
its insomnia. This insomnia is caused by the ideal of a
sunshine state of reason. But this is no humane ratio-
nality- neither for a child nor for an adult.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bleeker, Hans, Bas Levering, and Karel Mulderij, eds.
"Phenomenology and Ordinary Life: Essays Presented to
Ton Beekmann." Phenomenofogy & Pedagogy 4 ( 1986).
Buck, Giinther. Lernen und Erf"ahrung. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989.
Curtis, Bernhard, and Wolfe Mays, eds. Phenomenofogy and
Education. London: Methuen, 1978.
Denton, David E., ed. Existentia!ism and Phenomenofogy in
Education: Coffected Essays. New York: Teacher's Col-
lege Press, 1974.
Freire, Paulo. Educar;iio coma Pratica da Liherdade. Rio de
Janciro: Paz e Tcrre, 1967.
Greene, Maxine. Teacher as Stranger: Educat iona! Philoso-
phyfor the Modern Age. Belmont, MA: Wadsworth Pub-
lishers, 1973.
Langeveld, Martinus Jan. Studien zur Anthropologie des
Kindes. Tiibingen: Max Nicmeycr, 1968.
Lippitz, Wilfried. "Lehensweft ·· oder die Rehahili-
tierung vorwissenschaft!icher E1fahrung. Ansdtze eines
phdnomenofogisch hegnlndeten anthropofogischen und
sozia!wissenschaft!ichen Denkens in der Erziehungswis-
senschafi. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz, 1980.
Lippitz, Wilfried, and Kăte Meycr-Drawc, eds. Lernen und
seine Horizonte. Phdnomenofogische Konzeptionen men-
sch!ichen Lernens - didaktische Konsequenzen. Frank-
furt am Main: Skriptor, 1986.
Lippitz, Wilfried, and Christian Rittelmeyer, eds. Phdnomene
des Kinderfehens. Beispiele und methodische Prohfeme
einer pddagogischen Phdnomenofogie. Bad Heilbrunn:
Klinkhart Verlag, 1990.
Loch, Werner. Lebens!auf und Erziehung. Essen: Neue
Deutsche Schu1e, 1979.
Melich, Joan-Charles. De! extrano a! c6mp!ice: La edu-
cacion enfa vida cotidiana. Barce1ona: Editorial Anthro-
pos, 1994.
Meyer-Drawe, Kăte. Leih!ichkeit und Sozia!itdt. Phdnomen-
ofogische Beitrdge zu einer pddagogischen Theorie der
Inter-Suhjektivitdt. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1987.
- . lffusionen van Autonomie. Diesseits von Ohnmacht und
Affmacht des lch. Munich: Peter Kirchheim Verlag, 1990.
Rumpf, Horst. "Dic Fruchtbarkeit der phănomenologischen
Aufmerksamkeit fiir Erziehungsforschung und Erzieh-
ungspraxis." In Sinn und E1.fahrung. Phdnomenofogische
Methoden in den Humanwissenschajien. Ed. Max Herzog
and Cari F. Graumann. Heidelberg: Roland Asanger, 1991,
331-35.
Schiitz, Egon. Machi und Ohnmacht der Bildung. Weinheim:
Deutscher Studien Verlag, 1992.
Stinkes, Ursula. Spuren eines Fremden in der Ndhe. Das
"geistighehinderte" Kind aus phdnomenofogischer Sicl1l.
Wiirzburg: Konighausen & Neumann, 1993.
KĂTE MEYER-DRAWE
Ruhr Universitdt Bochum
 EGO
EGO (lch, ego) Generally speaking, the "I"
or "ego" refers to oneself, to what one is. It can have
as many meanings as the notion of the self. In a broad
sense, this can include your possessions, social posi-
tion, physical and psychological being. It can also, in
a narrower sense, be used to refer to your innermost
being, to the selfthat has, but is not identica! to, its pos-
sessions, its social position, etc. Phenomenologically,
ali of the senses must be correlated with the phenom-
ena. Each, if it is to pass beyond empty signification
and intend something real, must be linked to modes
of appearing- e.g., the appearing of the body, of the
psychological state, etc. With this the question arises as
to whether the ego in its narrower sense can be posited
phenomenologically. EDMUND HUSSERL answered this
question in various ways throughout his career. His an-
swers are instructive since most ofthe current views on
what the ego is stern from positions originally sketched
out by him.
Initially, in the Logische Untersuchungen {1900-
1901 ), Husserl did not believe that one could speak
of the ego in any narrower sense than that given by
the various states of consciousness. With re gard to the
ego, the dominant inftuence in this work is clearly that
of WILLIAM JAMES- specifically, his doctrine that "the
states of consciousness are ali that psychology needs."
Following James, he asserts that the "phenomenolog-
ically reduced ego" is "identica!" with the "intercon-
nected unity'' of such states. Its unity is the unity of
its experiences. It is founded on their "contents and
the laws they obey." The context ofthese assertions is
Husserl 's express opposition to the position ofthe nea-
Kantian Paul Natorp ( 1854--1924). Contrary to James,
Natorp stresses the irreducibility of the ego to its· con-
tents. Natorp's reason for this is that tobe a content is
to stand over against an ego. It is to be an abject- a
Gegen-stand- for an ego. Contrariwise, "tobe an ego
is not to be an abject, but to be something opposed to
ali objects." Such an ego is necessarily anonymous. It
cannot be named or grasped in any objective manner. In
the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl quotes Natorp
only to dismiss him. A non-appearing ego cannot be
phenomenologically justified. Phenomenology is thus
"quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, neces-
sary center ofrelations." However, in a footnote to the
second edition ofthis work, which appeared the same
year as the ldeen zu einen reiner Phănomenologie und
163
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913), he does ad-
mit: "I have since managed to find it."
What exactly has he found? Husserl's terminology
is often nea-Kantian, yet the descriptive analysis points
to something quite different. In Jdeen !, he asserts that
the ego is not the changing acts (the cogitationes) of
consciousness. Rather, it is something self-identica!,
something that, in its self-identity, must be distin-
guished from the real, changing "contents" (the acts,
objects, impressions, etc.) of consciousness. The acts of
consciousness, when successful, may allow transcen-
dent objects to appear through its shifting impressions.
When I successfully "see" a pattern of shadows under
a bush as a crouching cat, the cat becomes intuitively
present to me. We thus have the division, ego--cogito--
cogitatum, where the act (the cogito) working on the
given impressions yields the perceptual cogitatum (the
intuitively present abject). Distinguished from the act,
impressions, and appearing abject, the ego, Husserl
asserts, has no material content of its own. It is quite
empty of such. Yet this emptiness does not point to
the ego as a Kantian noumenal (non-appearing) agent.
Rather, the ego becomes, for Husserl, aform or struc-
ture for such experiences. It is a structure that is individ-
ualized- made unique- by the particular contents
of a particular experiential stream. This is why Husserl
can assert, as he does in the Cartesianische Medita-
tionen [1931], that the "ego [is] inseparable from the
processes making up his life," that it "is what it is solely
in relation to intentiona! objectivities," and that it is, in
fact, "only concrete" in relation to them, ali the while
maintaining the identity and purity ofthis ego. The pu-
rity in question is a purity.finm the changing contents
of experience. It is the purity of a self-identica! form.
What particularizes this structure is the actual contents
making up a particular ego-life.
ldeen zu einen reiner Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie Il [ 1912-15] fi lis
out this doctrine in much greater detail. The pure ego,
taken as a structure or form, is the "center" of experi-
ence. It is, in fact, the centering that makes experience
ego logica!. The best way to describe this is to note that
each ego is at the center of its surrounding world. In
lived SPACE, each subject by virtue ofits BODY is always
at its "here," at the zero point of the coordinate axes
of its space. It is from the ego that distances radiate
out. It is about it that perspectiva! series unfold, their
 164 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
relative rates of unfolding giving it the sense of ob-
jects' being near or far. Thus as you walk through a
park, trees close by match your progress by receding
at the same speed, objects ata middle range glide by at
a more stately pace, while objects marking the distant
horizon scarcely seem to move. Each, in fact, has its
rate of showing its different aspects, and each rate is
coordinated to the ego taken as a spatial center. The
same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the ego as a center
of TIME. For such an ego, it is always now. It always
occupies the point of passage between the anticipated
future and the receding but sti li retained past.
Two forms oftranscendence appear in this analysis:
the spatial o ne of physical distances and the temporal
one that marks the temporal remove from my now-
ness. The first, according to Husserl in Analysen zur
passiven Synthesis [ 1918-26], "is a second level tran-
scendence." The original transcendence is temporal. It
is a feature ofthe stream of consciousness whose tem-
poral sequencing of contents results in the relative rates
of perspectiva! unfolding. These give you your sense
of the "near" and the "far," and hence give you your
sense ofyourselfas a spatial center. Such a sense, with
its transcendence, depends on the temporal departure
of contents, but this departure into pastness is what
creates the first transcendence. The implication, then,
is that what is originally transcendent is simply the
past over against your nowness. As your own appear-
ances depart into pastness, this transcendence becomes
a se/(-transcendence.
Two conclusions follow from this doctrine. The first
is what Husserl, in the C manuscripts of the 1930s,
among others, will !ater caii the ego's "anonymity."
Here Husserl repeats the assertions of Natorp that ev-
ery objective name or sense we could apply to the ego
misses the mark since "to be an ego is not to be an
object, but to be something opposed to ali objects."
The descriptive analysis. however, is not neo-Kantian.
Anonymity is posited on the basis of a particular set of
phcnomena; it is the result ofyour appearing to remain
now as a "central ego," even while the experiences that
just now particularized you appear to depart into past-
ness. Grasping yourselfthrough their objective synthe-
sis, you apprehend yourself not as you presently are,
but as you were. Every object you grasp is, in other
words, already transcendent by virtue of the pastness
of the retained contents through which it is grasped.
As transcendent, it is other than what you are in your
central nowness.
The second conclusion that follows from the prior-
ity of temporal over spatial transcendence concerns the
constitution of the self. Such constitution begins with
the institution of temporal transcendence. It is, in the
first instance, the constitution of a temporal center as a
point from which such transcendence is measured. One
can also think of it as the specification ofthe anonymity
ofthis center by ( 1) the constitution ofthe temporal en-
vironment that makes it a center and by (2) the filling
ofthis environment with the contents that particularize
it. The description of the temporal constitution is car-
ried out, first, in the Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie
des inneren Zeitbweusstseins [ 1905) and, second, in,
among others, the C manuscripts of the 1930s. Basi-
cally, Husserl 's position is that our sense of ourselves
as a central now depends on our sense of pastness and
futurity. The sense of pastness, in turn, depends on a
process that, in retaining a content, tags it as past. Thus
the sense of the increasing pastness of the content is
the result of its being retained, then this retention be-
ing retained, and so on. Each addition to this chain of
retentions of retentions marks the content as having
departed further into pastness. A similar analysis hav-
ing to do with protentions of an anticipated content is
used to describe our sense of the approaching future.
The result ofthis dual constitution is, as indicated, our
sense of ourselves as nowness toward lvhich the future
approaches,.from which the past departs, and in which
time in its moments seems to well up present and ac-
tual. For Husserl, this structure is the ego understood
as a temporal form. Given that its constitution involves
contents, i.e., contents tobe retained or protended, we
cannot speak of it without also considering the contents
that particularize it.
To speak of such contents is, however, to move be-
yond the notion of a pure ego- the ego as an "empty"
or abstract temporal form- to what Husserl comes to
caii a "personal" ego. Once aga in, Jdeen Il is an impor-
tant source fiii ing in the details ofthe insights advanced
in the first volume. It concerns itself with what may
be called the Husserlian version of a "transcendental
aesthetic." The term refers to the passive syntheses
that first allow the ego to "find itself as identica! in
its course" - to find itself as the same ego with the
same characteristics. The fact that the ego, as a tempo-
 EGO
rai form, is particularized by the stream of its contents
means that its identity demands the stream 's identity. In
Husserl 's words, "it could not be constituted as a last-
ing and remaining ego if a lasting and remaining stream
of experience were not constituted." This constitution
is based on the same retentional processes that help
position the ego as a central nowness. Thus the stream
could not ha ve any persistence ifwhat transpires within
it-e.g., a perception-vanished the moment after its
occurring. Ifthe perception is tobe something that can
be returncd to again and again, its content-filled mo-
ments, as well as the synthesis that originally bound
them together, must be retained. To form an identica]
unit located within departing time, their retention must
preserve them with a distinct temporal referent. When
the retentional process fulfills these conditions, then,
as Husserl says, "that which is posited by an act ofthe
cogito, the theme, is ... something lasting." It becomes
one of the "possessions" of the ego. It is there for us
even when we do not regard it, do not reproduce it
by actively remembering it. The result ofthe temporal
syntheses by which experiences are retained and fixed
in their temporal positions is thus not just your central
nowness. It is also the basis for your finding yourself(if
you really are consistent) as the same position-taking
self. The ego "finds itself as identica] in its course"
of position takings if, having performed some act, it
recalls having performed the same act in the past.
This account can be extended to ali the features that
make up the "personal ego"- e.g., to our judgments,
beliefs, attitudes, etc. Insofar as what I have done is re-
tained, the same "inertia" occurs. An interesting point
here is that the reproduction ofthe remembered is also a
reproduction ofthe doxic attitude that accompanied it.
Given that nothing has intervened, the latter must reoc-
cur. If it did not, MEMORY would not really re-produce
what had gone before (and analogously for EXPECTA-
TION). This means that notjust my experiences but also
my beliefs become part of my "lasting possessions."
They are part of the environment that defines me as a
central ego.
The transcendental aesthetic includes more, of
course, thanjust the laying down of self-identica] tem-
poral unities. In Husserl's words, it involves the "reg-
ularities grouped under the tit le of 'association' which
pertain to everything present in the stream of expe-
riences." As such, it includes the gestalt qualities of
165
fusion, contrast, and pairing. "Fusion" designates the
merging of similar contents. By virtue of it, the quali-
ties ofthe similar contents "stand out." Like a series of
overlapping transparencies, they reinforce each other,
and hence distinguish themselves from the heteroge-
neous qualities of the contents whose un ion does not
result in their reinforcement. This merging gives us the
object's "noematic nucleus." It provides the material
for the cogito's presentation ofthe object's connected,
relatively stable features. Insofar as the qualities of
the merged contents are, constitutively, those of the
object, the object stands out. The "contrast" arises be-
tween it and the heterogeneous qualities of its back-
ground. "Pairing" comes in the linking of similarities.
By virtue of it, a present perception recalls a past one
with a similar content. Togetherthey may reca li a third.
The ultimate result can be a whole horizon of acts,
ali with similar contents. Once again the phenomenon
of merging can occur, though this time its focus can
be on acts, rather than on objects and their contents.
The result can be the prominence ofthe relatively sta-
bie features that characterize me as a personal ego. In
Husserl's words, the consequence of these "regulari-
ties" is my "pregivenness" as a personal ego, i.e., my
givenness before I reftect on my behavior.
As a personal ego, 1 am nota solitary self, but rather
a person among persons. This means that my objects
are not just present to me but to others as well. They
form part of our common world. As there for others,
a layer of their sense-structures is intersubjective. In
the Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl asks whether
this layer is primordially given. Ifit is not, then it must
be founded upon a level of phenomena that is avail-
able prior to the givenness of other subjects. Consti-
tuted out ofthe phenomena ofthis prior level, both the
"objective common world" as well as the others who
share it can, in this alternative, be considered to be
"transcendentally constituted in me." If 1 accept this,
then I move from a view of the ego as a constituted
( essentially temporal) formation to a view that takes
it as "ultimately constituting." In Husserl 's words, it
becomes the "subjectivity which constitutes both the
sense and actuality of being." lts constitutive activity
includes "every conccivable sense, every conceivable
being." Husserl's attempt to work out this alternative
leads repeatedly to assertions ofthis kind.
Husserl 's remarks ha ve brought a number of corn-
166 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
mentators, incJuding PAUL RICCEUR, ALFRED SCHUTZ, and
THEODOR DE BOER, to assert that Husserl ultimately carne
to position the ego as "creative" in its constitution.
Such a view raises the question of the identity of this
ego. Is it the ego of an individual person or is it, as
both Schutz and EUGEN FINK affirm, a uniquely singu-
lar, pre-individual "prima! ego"? The assertion of the
latter does not contradict the view that sees the indi-
vidual ego as a constituted formation, since the two
egos (the individual and the prima!) exist on differ-
ent levels. The question, however, remains as to the
possible phenomenological evidence for this prima! or
"Ur-ego." Studies by JAMES MENSCH and KLAUS HELD
of the manuscripts written in the period following the
Cartesianische Meditationen indicate that the individ-
ual ego, on the level ofits anonymity, exists in a kind of
coincidence with the prima! ego. The evidence for the
latter is provided by a "reduction to the living present"
understood as a "reduction to the sphere ofprimal tem-
poralization in which the first and originary sense of
time comes forward." This reduction strips my ego of
the environment that individualizes it into a particular
temporal center. So reduced, it appears as the "living
present [taken] as the prima! ground and source ofev-
erything." "This present," Husserl adds, "is not mine
as opposed to that of other human beings." Within it,
"my ego and the other ego do not have any extensive
distance in the community of our being with each other.
Also my life, my temporalization, has no distance from
that of the other person." In our coincidence, we are
the prima! ego. This is the ego that functions in and
through the nowness of each individual ego. lts func-
tioning is that of temporalization; it is the production
of ever new content-filled moments whose retention
and protention yield the individual ego as a temporal
form.
Reactions to Husserl 's answers to the question ofthe
ego vary. For some, his assertion that "there are tran-
scendentally constituted in me, the transcendental ego,
both other egos and ... an objective, common world
... " is an expression of an unacceptable idealism. As
Husserl expresses this objection, a phenomenology that
begins with the "ego of the phenomenological reduc-
tion" remains restricted to this. As such, it either "falls
into transcendental solipsism" or engages in a "spec-
ulative idealism." Some phenomenologists attempt to
avoid this unpalatable alternative by returning to the
egoless phenomenology ofthe Logische Untersuchun-
gen. This is the position of ARON GURWITSCH and JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE. In his "Phănomenologie der Thematik und
der reinen Ich" ( 1929), Gurwitsch takes a minimalist
position. His claim is that the "phenomenologically re-
duced pure ego is nothing but the chain along which
ali experiences are ordered and which terminates in
the present now continuously gliding forward." The
ego is not the "now" itself, but rather the "chain" end-
ing in the now. The "chain," understood as a "con-
catenation of ali the mental states belonging to one
consciousness," forms the "thoroughgoing context in
which every mental state is related to every other one."
To ascribe a mental state to the ego is simply to in-
clude it in the chain. Directly regarded, the states of
the chain do not in their "unity and order" constitute
transcendent objects; hen ce it is "by way of contrast to
transcendence" that the "order in question" comes to
be taken as "subjective."
In contrast to Gurwitsch 's view that "the ego is the
flux [of consciousness] itselr', JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, in
his seminal work, "La transcendence de 1'ego" ( 193 7),
gives an account of its constitution. Rather than simply
being the "totality" of our states, the ego, he claims, "is
the spontaneous, transcendent unification of our states
and our actions." This unification or constitution takes
place in layers: "consciousnesses (Erlebnisse) are first;
through these are constituted states; and then, through
the latter, the ego is constituted." In each case, the con-
stituted, which is a result ofthe elements constituting it,
is naively assumed tobe their source. Thus I ascribe my
feelings of disgust when I see Peter to the fact that I ha te
him. This state ofhatred is taken as a source ofmy feel-
ings. Similarly, I take myself as the person responsible
for my various states. In Sartre 's words, "refl.ection ...
gives the me as the source ofthe state." In reality, I am
no such thing. lfl were to "plunder" the ego ofits states
and qualities, 1 would not uncover it as a source or an
actor. Rather, "at the end of this plundering, nothing
would remain; the ego would have vanished." What
we take to be the spontaneity or freedom of egologi-
cal action is actually the spontaneity of the "absolute
consciousness" that supplies the elements for egolog-
ical constitution. Our actions surprise us because they
are not our own, but rather ari se from the "impersonal
spontaneity" of this consciousness. In Sartre 's words,
regarding it, we re gard a "tireless creation of existence
 EGO
ofwhich we are not the creators." The phenomenologi-
cal description of its spontaneity "renders impossible
any distinction between action and passion or any con-
ception of an autonomy of the will." As for the ego, it
is phenomenologically a kind of fiction, an inevitable
yet illusory contruct born on the crest ofthe impersonal
spontaneity whose presence it masks.
If we accept this view, the problem of INTERSUB-
JECTIVITY, which is that ofrecognizing other persons as
transcendental, constituting egos, vanishes. Along with
the world they inhabit, they are constituted entities. In
Sartre's words, both the "world" and "the me ... are
objects for absolute impersonal consciousness; it is by
virtue of this consciousness that they are connected."
Solipsism, then, is avoided through an appeal to this
absolute. This solution bears a certain resemblance to
Husserl 's attempt in the late manuscripts to describe
the founding of an intersubjective community through
the action of a prima! ego. For Husserl, however, the
point of connection is not an absolute spontaneity of
experiences, but rather a pre-plural "living present." A
few phenomenologists ha ve attempted to work out this
so]ution. Others, such as THOMAS M. SEEBOHM and ISO
KERN, adopt the position of the Husserl who wrote the
three volumes of the Jdeen, the Cartesianische Medi-
tationen, Formale und transzendentale Logik ( 1929),
etc. They accept the claim ofthe Meditationen that the
adoption of"transcendental idealism" does not lead to
a solipsism.
Another alternative is also possible. It begins by
observing that the different concepts Husserl advances
for the ego correspond to the different stages of the
ego 's self-objectification. In Husserl 's description, the
process originates in the anonymity of pre-egological
functioning, exfoliates in the streaming life of a particu-
lar consciousness, and ends in the world of constituted,
objective sense. Corresponding to these, we have the
concepts of the ego as a "prima!" pre-individual func-
tioning; the ego as a temporal streaming of particular
acts, states, and contents; and the ego as a personal,
fully concrete self. Combining these, we are led to
take the ego, not as a particular stage, but as the pro-
cess itself. Insofar as this process is temporal, it has an
essential neutrality with regard to the contents it em-
bodies. The latter, or rather the senses they sustain, de-
termine what counts as intersubjective and what counts
as private. The view that the ego is a temporal process
167
is thus compatible with the assertion of the primor-
diality of intersubjective sense-structures. It allows us
to assert that parents (and, generally, "others") help a
child to "make sense" of his earliest experiences and
still embrace Husserl's view that phenomenology and
egology imply each other.
EOR FURTHER STUDY
Broekman, Jan. Phănomenologie tmd Egologie. The Haguc:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.
Ce1ms, Theodor. Der phănomenologische ldealismus
Husserls. New York: Garland, 1979.
De Boer, Theodore. De Ontwikkelingsgang in het Denkm
van Husserl. Asscn: Van Gorcum, 1966; The Develop-
ment o{ Husserl:~ Thought. Trans. Theodore P1antinga.
Thc Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
Fink, Eugen. Studien ::ur Phănomenologie 1930--1939. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
~. "Die Spătphilosophie Husserls in dcr Freiburger Zeit."
In Edmund Husserl. 1859--1959. Recueil comnuhnorati/".
[Ed. Herman Leo Van Breda and Jacques Taminiaux.] Thc
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, 99-115.
Gurwitch, Aron. Studies in Phenomenology and Psvchology.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
Held, Klaus. Lehendige Gegenwart. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1966.
Husserl, Edmund. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus
Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918-1926).
Ed. Margot Fleischer. Husserliana Il. The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1966.
~. Zur Phănomenologie der Jntersuhjektivităt. Texte aus
dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929-1935. Ed. Iso Kern.
Husserliana 15. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
Ingarden, Roman. On the Motives Which Led Husserl to
Transcendental Idealism. Trans. Arn6r Hannibalsson. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.
James, William. Psychology: Brie{er Cow·se. Cleveland, OH:
World, 1948.
~. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Longman's
Green, 1947.
Kern, Iso. Husserlund Kant. Thc Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964.
Marbach, Eduard. Das Prohlem des lch in der
Phănomenologie Husserls. The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff,
1974.
Mcnsch, James. The Question ofBcing in Husserl's Logica!
Investigations. Thc Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
~. lntersuhjectivity and Transcendental Idealism. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1988.
--. Afier Modernity: Husserlian Reflections on a Philosoph-
ical Tradition. Albany, NY: State University ofNew York,
1996.
Ricreur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis o{his Phenomenology.
Trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "La transcendence de !'ego." Recherches
Philosophiques 6 ( 1936---3 7), 85-123; The Transcendence
 168 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
al the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirk-
patrick. New York: Noonday Press, 1957.
Schutz, Alfred. Collected Papers 1: The Prohlem al Social
Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1973.
--. Collected Papers /1: Studies in Social Theory. Ed. Avid
Brodersen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
-. Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Phi-
losophy. Ed. Ilse Schutz. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1966.
]AMES MENSCH
Saint Francis Xavier University
EIDETIC METHOD "Eidetic" is used as syn-
onymous with such traditional terms as "a priori," "es-
sential," and "universal and necessary" in qualifying a
distinctive sort of objects, propositions, truths, cogni-
tions, and sciences. The substantive is "ei dos"; the plu-
ral, "eide." At the most generallevel, phenomenology
distinguishes between formal and materially determi-
nate eide, with correspondingly distinct methods of
arriving at insight into them. Discussion ofthe method
of formalization, belonging specifically to considera-
tions of formal LOGIC and FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOL-
OGY, will be omitted here. Accordingly, "eide" should
be read throughout as a convenient abbreviation for
"materially determinate (not formal) ei de." Phenomen-
ology is itself an eidetic science. It has also developed
a distinctive approach to eidetic science in general. Ac-
cordingly, the claim both to be an eidetic science and
to defend the possibility of eidetic science in general
involves phenomenology in traditional issues of logic,
theory of MEANING, epistemology (see EVIDENCE), and
formal and material ontology. The introduction of the
term "eidetic" is meant to signal a distinctive approach
to those issues, rather than the continuation of any tra-
ditional philosophical position regarding them.
Clarity about any science involves setting forth
and justifying an appropriate method of establishing
truths and examining knowledge claims. Sin ce no such
method for eidetic science has been generally accepted,
reflection upon phenomenological method has to in-
volve an explicit discussion of the steps involved in
the method appropriate to establishing eidetic knowl-
edge in general.
The first step in any method involves a preliminary
understanding of its terminus a quo and its terminus
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ad quem. Phenomenology takes the starting point of
ali scientific endeavors tobe the pre-philosophical and
prescientific experience of the WORLD, accepted as ac-
tually existing independently of any thought about it.
Further, phenomenological reflection finds that such
experience encounters individual objects, facts, and
relations, taken as actually existing particulars grasped
in PERCEPTION and MEMORY. finally, phenomenologicaJ
theory holds that although eide or universal essences
are not themselves particular facts, any theoretical
knowledge of facts involves an implicit comprehen-
sion of essences, in accordance with which the facts
are structured and classified.
Hence the attempt to discover eide requires, as its
first step, a deliberate effort to redirect attention from
the usual focus upon the domain of particular facts to
an explicit articulation of essences and essential struc-
tures. That first step is called the "eidetic EPOCHE AND
REDUCTION." Since the natural world is normally ac-
cepted not only as actually existing but as the compre-
hensive context of ali that actually exists, the eidetic
epoche and reduction involves a suspension of belief
with regard to the actual existence of any objects to
be considered from the eidetic perspective. In conse-
quence of its noncommittal attitude toward actuality,
eidetic knowledge implies no metaphysical position re-
garding essences as existing in a Platonic heaven, in the
mind ofGod, in the minds ofhumans, in an Aristotelian
uni verse of real natural kinds, or anywhere el se.
The eidetic reduction, with its relevant epoche, is
distinct from the transcendental phenomenological re-
duction and epoche of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY.
The latter suspends acceptance of the existence of thc
world of experience in order to reflect upon how "the
WORLD," as a complex unity of sense, comes tobe con-
stituted for consciousness. Accordingly, it retains the
world of experience within its focus, but in a modified
form, taken as phenomenon of transcendental pheno-
menology. The eidetic reduction, by contrast, involves
a turning of interest away from the actual world en-
tirely, since it, as the comprehensive domain of per-
ceived, reflected, expected, and inferred actual par-
ticulars, is not the context within which eide can be
discovered.
Geometry, in its descriptive phase (i.e., disregard-
ing its formalized and axiomatized aspects), provides
an illustration for such an eidetic epoche and reduction.
 EIDETIC METHOD
That is, one doing geometry has to disregard the fac-
tual details of any actually existing concretely shaped
objects provided by sensuous experience in order to
discover the rational properties and relations of such
ideally considered objects as circles, squares, and the
like. At best, actually perceived shaped objects can
serve as merely imperfect models for the geometri-
cally understood shapes. One's inability to tind or to
draw a straight line having length without any depth or
breadth is not due to limitations oftechnique, but is an
eidetic impossibility.
The second step is to select any instance of the ei-
dos one is attempting to articulate- any instance of
green, for example. In consequence ofthe first step, it
does not matter whether the instance selected is taken
from experience, such as the color ofthe lush tall grass
calling for my lawn mower, or from sheer phantasy,
such as the color of some extraterrestrial 's skin ap-
pearing to my reverie. The eidetic epoche requires that
any experienced instance be stripped of any preferen-
tial consideration and treated as if it were an object
of mere IMAGINATION, i.e., as a merely possible object
for quasi-sensuous intuition, situated neither in actual
space nor in actual time, nor in any actual causal con-
text.
The third step is to employ phantasy to subject the
selected model to a series of arbitrary variations. Thus,
for example, if 1 begin with contemplating the green
skin of a three-foot-tall, eggplant-shaped alien sitting
at a harp, 1 might first arbitrarily vary the imagined
size, shape, and posture of the fictitious creature in
severa! directions. 1 might then go on to vary the model
further by imaginatively contemplating, in a series, the
color ofthe Green Hornet, the color ofmy truc love's
blouse, the color of a lagoon at Atlantis, and so on. In
principle, the "and so on" extends ad infinitum. The
variations are to be kept completely arbitrary, as long
as they are ali restricted to imagined instances of, in
this case, green. But the project is not to compile a list
of possible instances. It is to contemplate an ei dos.
Hence the next and fourth step involves relying on
the overlapping synthesis of identity that establishes
itself across the varying instances and actively noting
the green they ali have in common, despite ali other
imaginable variations. That green itself can then finally
be isolated for a non-sensuous intuition as something
identically repeatable in indefinitely many possible sin-
169
gular instances, as "one over many."
Once grasped intuitively, an eidos can finally be in-
tuitively compared and contrasted with other eide, at
varying levels of specification and generalization, so
that o ne may see, for example, that green is a color; that
yellow is not green, but is also a color; that the scent of
a rose is nota color, but that scents and colors are sen-
suous qualities; and that color is a visible quality that
can qualify any imaginable shape, but cannot itself be
intuited except as visually qualifying some extension.
Some obvious objections may serve further to clar-
ify the above method. Any adherent to NATURALISM or
nominalism would be expected to refusc, in principle,
to go along with the very first step on the grounds
that there can be no possible objects of knowledge
except sensed particulars. To that objection, a pheno-
menologist has two responses. The more polemic one
is to point out the theoretical inconsistency involved in
a nominalist's or empiricist's claiming to know some-
thing that cannot possibly be itself a matter of sense
perception - namely, the alleged principle holding
for ali possible objects of knowledge. Though polem-
ica!, that rejoinder points to the serious responsibility
of accounting for one's basic scientific or philosophi-
cal principles in a non-paradoxical manner, a task for
which eidetic method is eminently suited.
The more friendly response is to suggest that the
empirica! principle of accepting the given as an in-
dispensible basis for knowledge is admirable, but that
such acceptance should not be arbitrarily limited to
what can be given to sense perception. In fact, the
eidetic method seeks to extend the principle from ac-
cepting particular objects as they present themselves
to sense intuition to accepting essences as they present
themselves to eidetic, non-sensuous intuition.
As to the second and third steps, it is easy to imagine
a latter-day Meno's objection. lfthe method is meant to
achieve knowledge of ei de, how can anyone be asked,
in advance, to select an instance of an ei dos and then
to imagine a series ofarbitrarily varied instances ofthe
same eidos? 1f 1 do not know what green is, 1 cannot be
expected to select an instance of green and then to vary
additional instances arbitrarily, while remaining stead-
fastly within the scope of green. On the other hand, if
1 already know what green is, I do not require a cum-
bersome method to acquire the knowledge 1 already
enjoy.
170 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
This objection serves to highlight an important as-
pect of eidetic method. The method assumes that we
do indeed have an implicit acquaintance with essences
to begin with, but that this preliminary acquaintance is
likely tobe defective in severa! respects. First, sin ce our
interest is ordinarily focused upon experienced partic-
ulars to the neglect ofthe eidetic features and structures
they instantiate, our implicit knowledge of essences is
likely to remain so vague, confused, and unnoticed that
it is possible, in good faith, even to accept nominalism
as a rational philosophical position. Taking pains to
achieve a clear, intuitive grasp of eidetic features and
structures of possible objects of thought and knowl-
edge can serve to bring to light unnoticed obscurities
and confusions that mar our implicit eidetic knowl-
edge. And it certainly enables us to see for ourselves
that eide can indeed be objects of direct givenness.
Second, even when we are confident of our pre-
liminary acquaintance with essences, such confidence
may, in fact, be reducible to our ability to use common
names correctly and consistently. The eidetic method
seeks to move beyond such verbal virtuosity, however
valuable in its own right, beyond knowledge oflinguis-
tically formed meanings to the direct intuition of the
objects and states ofaffairs intended thereby, wherever
possible. The attempt to do so may, of course, yield
a negative outcome. Instead of arriving at a clearly
seen eidos, we may achieve the insight that we have
no essential knowledge of the object of our conceptual
interest. We may even come to see that appropriate
knowledge of such objects is, in principle, not suscep-
tible to strict eidetic conceptualization. Such is the case
for the comprehensive category of objects encountered
in common everyday experience of the surrounding
world of ordinary life. For such objects, familiarity in
terms of types - i.e., of rough generalizations that
are inherently vague and circumstantially indexed-
suffices for the practica! purposes of life. As Aristotle
has noted, "square" means one thing for a geometer,
something else for a carpenter.
A third line of objection would be to dismiss the
results of the eidetic method as too trivial to matter.
Who needs a step-by-step method to justify proclaim-
ing such truisms as "a color is essentially distinct from
a scent''? Aga in, two responses. First, truisms may well
be too trivial to proclaim. However, the denial that they
can be objects of genuine knowledge can be mislead-
ing in its consequences. Basic principles of logic and
mathematics, like the principle of non-contradiction,
may also be regarded as mere truisms. Skepticism con-
cerning them can result from regarding ali truisms as
merely conventional matters. A particular merit ofthe
eidetic method is its clear showing of the difference
between achieving such eidetic knowledge, however
trivial, and the acceptance of such truisms as merely
conventional in character. Mere conventions could not
pass the test of resisting arbitrary variation in phantasy.
In our culture, generally speaking, the convention of
hospitality, for example, clearly involves the obligation
to treat guests with kindness, or at least nonviolently. It
does not take much creativity to imagine instead a eul-
ture in which conventional rules of hospitality would
regularly require that the last invited guest to arrive
for dinner be carved up, cooked, and served to ali the
previously arrived guests, in equal portions.
Second, trivial points serve conveniently as clarify-
ing examples simply because oftheir familiarity. Their
mention does not indicate any intrinsic limits of eidetic
method. The method, in fact, is important to phenomen-
ology because it opens up phenomenological reflection
to essential structures instantiated in various fonns of
consciousness, under such general essential categories
as INTENTIONALITY and TEMPORALITY. Accordingly, the
method provides the means for developing a novel,
rich, and varied articulation of the themes involved in
theory of knowledge and, more generally, theory of
REASON, since it is not stymied by anti-essentialist prej-
udices ingrained in the tradition of modern philosophy.
Another objection might balk at such confidence in
our powers ofimagination. Eidetic truths are supposed
to be a priori, universal, and necessary. Imaginative
ability is limited, often severely so, by our prevailing
and unnoticed historical and social prejudices, among
other factors. The fact that 1 cannot intuitively imagine
something is no guarantee of its a priori impossibil-
ity. This objection deserves to be taken seriously, as a
reminder that eidetic method, like any other method,
is corrigible. Specifically, as imaginative powers de-
velop in the course ofincreased practice and as a result
of new discoveries and even of novel approaches to
thought and knowledge, it is tobe hoped that the actual
practice of eidetic method may be refined accordingly.
One may reasonably ask of any cognitive method such
questions as the following: is it logically and practi-
 EMOTION
cally consistent with its goal? ls it more likely to lead
an unbiased practitioner to the desired insight than non-
methodical consideration might do? Does it provide a
critica) check against dogmatic knowledge claims? It
would not be reasonable to expect any method to be
an infallible safeguard against the ignorance or other
limitations of its practitioners.
Finally, it should be emphasized that explicit artic-
ulation of the eidetic method also serves to disclose
its intrinsic limits. Eidetic method is necessary to es-
tablish eidetic knowledge and eidetic sciences. But it
cannot substitute for either observational or experi-
mental science. Indifferent to empirica! facts, it cannot
claim to yield knowledge of contingent facts about
either natural or cultural aspects of the world. What
it can do is clarify the basic concepts that guide and
shape empirica! observations. In that respect, it can
also disclose unwarranted limitations of traditional ap-
proaches to experiential sciences, such as the commit-
ment of mainstream PSYCHOLOGY to the concepts and
procedures that have proved successful in physics and
chemistry. In that respect, the eidetic method, together
with substantive phenomenological results, has proved
to be of value in reconsiderations of the fundamental
concepts of such non-philosophical disciplines as PSY-
CHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, and various HUMAN SCIENCES. In
ali such contexts, pure eidetic method has tobe appro-
priately supplemented by discussing, on the basis of
relevant experience, what purely essential structures
are applicable to the discovery of impure, experien-
tially restricted, essences in that non-eidetic, empirica!
domain ( e.g., what ideally possible forms ofperception
are, in fact, humanly possible).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Edmund
Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix
Meincr, 1989, chap. 2, §2; Anlntroduction to Husserlian
Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwcstcrn University
Press, 1993, chap. 2, §2.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Problems of Ideation." In his The Field
o(Conscioit.mess. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1964, 189-97.
Husserl, Edmund. "Die Wessensschau als gcnuine Methode
der Erfassung des Apriori." In his Phănomenologische
Psvchologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Ed.
Walter Biemel. Husserliana 9. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1962, 72-87; "Seeing Esscnces as Genuine Mcthod
for Grasping the A Priori." In his Phenomenological Psy-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
171
chology. Trans. John Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1977, 53-65.
- . E1.fahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie
der Logik [ 1939]. Ed. Ludwig Langrcbe. Hamburg: Fe-
lix Meiner, 1972, §§ 80--92; Experience and Judgment:
Jnvestigations in a Genealogy o( Logic. Trans. James S.
Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1973, §§80--92.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Les sciences de l'homme et la
phenomenologie." In Cours de Sorhonne. Paris: Centre de
Documentation Universitaires, 1961; rpt. 1975; "Pheno-
menology and the Sciences of Man." Trans. John Wild.
In his The Prima(V o( Perception. Ed. James M. Edie.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 43-
95.
Patocka, Jean. "Thc Husserlian Doctrine of Eidctic lntuition
and Its Recent Critics." Trans. Frederick A. Elliston and
Petcr McCormick. In Husserl: Expositons and Appraisals.
Ed. Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick. Notre
Dame, IN: University ofNotrc Dame Press, 1977, 150--9.
Schutz, Alfred. "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philos-
ophy." In Co/lected Papers. III: Studies in Phenomen-
ological Psychology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966,
92-115.
Zaner, Richard M. "The Art of Free Phantasy Variation
in Rigorous Phenomenological Science." In Phenomen-
ology: Continuation and Criticism. Essays in Memorv of
Dorion Cairns. Ed. Fred Kersten and Richard Zaner. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, 192-219.
- . "Examples and Possibles: A Criticism ofHusserl's The-
ory of Free Phantasy Variation." Research in Phenomen-
ology 3 (1973), 29-43.
JOHN SCANLON
Duquesne University
EMOTION Most phenomenologists ha ve some-
thing to say about affectivity, feeling, or emotion and
often do SO in reJation to ETHICS and VALUE THEORY.
The positions of major representatives of coNSTITUTIVE,
REALISTIC, EXISTENTIAL, and HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY will be sketched here as an introduction to the
phenomenology of emotion itself, i.e., emotion apart
from its role in those disciplines and tendencies.
EDMUND HUSSERL offers no sustained treatment of
emotion for its own sake, but does refer to the
sphere of "feeling" ( Gefiihl) or "emotion" ( Gemiit)
in Logische Untersuchungen (1900-190 l) and espe-
cially in ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ), where the
concern of his constitutive phenomenology is more
epistemological than axiologica!. In the natural atti-
tude, 1 tind myself feeling, perceiving, willing, judg-
172 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ing, etc., in a wor1d of things that are simply "there"
for me. These things, however, are not "mere" things,
but ha ve such emotive tinges as "pleasant" or"unpleas-
ant," "agreeable" or "disagreeable," and so on. As with
other types of experience, the major structural feature
is INTENTIONALITY: the "gladsome" (das Erfreuliche) is
intended to in "being glad" (Sich~freuen) and "valuing
consciousness" constitutes value and is distinct from
the willing that is of central concern in his theory of
ACTION.
Within emotion or valuing Husserl recognizes non-
intentive feelings, e.g., pleasure and pain, on the model
of the hyletic "stuff' in sensuous perception. Then
again, there can be a "performed" or "effected" ("voll-
zogen") liking or disliking such that the EGO is "liv-
ingly busied" in the act; similarly, in sorrow, the I can
actionally "undergo suffering." Finally, the affective,
emotional, or valuing stratum is founded upon PERCEP-
TION, RE-PRESENTATION, MEMORY, IMAGINATION, etc. Such
strutures can still be found and described using EIDETIC
METHOD after transcendenta) EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION has
been performed.
MAX SCHELER correlates the a priori of values and
their hierarchical relationships to the immediacy of
feelings. Values are neither arbitrary constructions nor
results of goods, but, in contrast to the latter, they are
a priori. Values are given; they are not made but seen.
The acts through which they are seen are emotions
such as love and hate, yeaming, desire, and wishing,
as well as comparative emotions such as preferring.
There is, according to him, a region of genuine objec-
tivity and correlatively of emotional states in their own
essential relationships. The order of values appears in
emotional life. In this sense, as stated already in Zur
Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefiihle
und van Liebe und Hass (On phenomenology and the-
ory ofsympathy-feelings and oflove and hate, 1913),
emotions are "intentionally" correlated to a priori val-
ues.
There is then a logic of the heart in contrast to the
formal logic ofBeing. This suggests that the intentiona!
correlation between emotions and values comprises a
phenomenological field of investigation independent
of both the psychological and the material worlds. In
acts of facing and pursuit, values are felt in their hier-
archy of higher and lower, absolute and relative. For
example, the latter contrast is recognized only when it
appears in the a priori feelings oflove and hate, i.e., in-
dependently of any empirica!, material, psychological,
and vital human needs.
In Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materialen
Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and nonformal ethics of
value, 191311916) Scheler relates emotions to a hierar-
chy of values. The lowest values belong to something
as agreeable or disagreeable, which correspond to sen-
sory feelings of enjoyment and endurance; in turn they
correspond to states of feelings in impressions (sensi-
ble pleasure and pain). Ali these values are aspects of
sense awareness and are relative. The second modality
belongs to the domain of vital feelings. This domain in-
cludes what is nob le and common, vigorous and deca-
dent, wholesome and ill, courageous and fearful. The
third modality belongs to the region of spiritual values.
These are completely independent of other values and
appear in pure feelings. Thus in the pure domain of
AESTHETICS there is the beautiful and the ugly, values
of truth and falsehood in epistemology, and also joy
and sadness, the appealing and the unappealing, and
approval and disapproval. The fourth domain of the
holy and the unholy and thus passion and doubt, belief
and unbelief, can be added.
Emotions that are mental states or moods are to
be differentiated from value-feelings. The former are
states of consciousness and are neither essentially nor
immediately related to anything objective; they are
feelings or affects in the sense of moods. The latter
are acts, are essentially related to something objective,
as is the case with ali feelings ofvalues. In such cases,
values are the sort of objects proper and peculiar to the
feeling acts; such feelings encounter value originally.
They include comparative feelings such as preferences.
Preferring is an emotional intentiona! act the correlate
of which is a relation ofbetter to worse or of higher to
lower between members of a hierarchy of values. Pre-
ferring is not choosing; it belongs to the class of emo-
tions rather than that ofvolitions. Nor can preferring be
reduced to or derived from intellectual functions such
as judging and reasoning. Relations between members
of the value hierarchy, the ordo amoris, can be given
only emotionally. On the other hand, love and hate are
not states but acts. As intentiona! acts, love and hate
respectively extend or restrict the range ofvalues that,
having been disclosed to the person, are accessible to
his or her comparative feeling acts.
 EMOTION
For Scheler, feelings are ofbasically four types.
( 1) Physical feelings are local and extended within
the limits of the BODY and are subject to conscious
intervention and removal by material-medical means.
These feelings offer no intentiona! direction toward
values, yet they can be objects of intentiona! regard
like organs that are relevant for the entire body.
(2) Vital feelings are not restricted to an organic lo-
cation and hen ce cannot be regarded as extended. Thus
vigor, strength, health, and weakness do not belong to
any function, although they are organic in nature. Vital
feelings are present throughout the body and the body
appears to us through such feelings. The value-content
of vital feeling extends to others and to one's own sur-
rounding world rather being limited to the ego's own
life.
(3) Psychic feei ing states are direct qualities of the
EGO. They are related to objects in our surroundings and
to others, and can be shared. They are intentiona! and
can be relived and participated in through sympathy.
Such feelings do not change in correlation with bodily
changes, since they include imaginary content that is
relatively independent of corporeal conditions.
(4) Spiritual feeling states stem directly from the
core ofthe person and "radia te" through ali other states.
Thus despair or blissfulness, or pangs of conscience,
fi li the entire person and cannot be a result of willful
intentions. In turn, they are intentiona! states and corre-
late to values. The latter become apparent in the acts of
preferring and its opposite and in loving and hating. In
other words, emotional acts are the acts through which
a priori value contents are given. Yet love is the basic
spiritual act. and is independent of changing feelings,
such as sympathy. As an act, love is not a feeling. The
pursuit of !o ve is expressed through joy, bliss, etc., as
feei ing variations. Moreover, as revelations of value,
acts oflove ( and ha te) correlate to and guide the acts of
preference and rejection. We prefer what we love and
reject what we hate.
finally, it may be noted that MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY's first published work dealing with phenomen-
ology- "Christianisme et ressentiment" ( 1935), a re-
view of Scheler's work on ressentiment, which was
originally published in 1912- upholds the possibility
of a "phenomenology of the emotional life" and ap-
peals to the phenomenological critique of NATURALISM
173
as well as to the phenomenological notions of INTEN-
TIONALITY and EVIDENCE.
MORITZ GEIGER, whom EDMUND HUSSERL judged to
be "one quarter phenomenologist," has contributed to
the phenomenological explication ofthe emotions and
specifically those that re late to aesthetics. His complex
analyses distinguish between emotions as interpreted
from a psychological orientation and emotions consid-
ered from the phenomenological orientation toward an
aesthetic object. In his "Beitrăge zur Phănomenologie
des ăsthetishen Genusses" ( 1913) Geiger offers investi-
gations into various distinctions among emotions such
as enjoyment and its related feelings of pleasure, joy,
etc.
Thus while enjoyment is pleasurable, not every
pleasure is enjoyment. Yet enjoyment is correlated to
objects: formal objects cannot be enjoyed, while ob-
jects possessing intuitive fullness of content can. With
respect to activity, enjoyment is a passive receptivity,
a lack oftaking a stand, a self-surrender to the object.
Yet the experience of enjoyment appears within the
sphere of the self and not in the abject, and it usually
pervades and envelops the self, as is well manifested in
such modes of enjoyment as being carried away, being
gripped, entranced, or moved.
This context provides for the analyses of aesthetic
enjoyment. This requires a specification: the self must
assume a certain distance from itself and experience
various objects- even non-aesthetic objects, such as
foods and one's own emotions- as enjoyable. The
aesthetic object, experienced from this distance, must
offer "intuitive plenitude," and must be regarded by
se1f-forgetfulness and total focus on the object. This
"objectcenteredness" is different from the self-centered
interest in objects for the self-enjoyment they generate.
Music, for example, can make one "feei good." But so
can many other things, from wine to eroticism. How-
ever, interest in an object for the sake ofbeing titillated
is an altogether different matter from enjoyment of an
object in its own right. Here Geiger would agree with
Kant's notion of"disinterested pleasure."
This leads Geiger to articulate depth phenomena
in contrast to surface feelings. The 1atter belong to
such phenomenon as thrillers invented for our amuse-
ment, immediate gratification, and pleasant feelings.
The depth emotions, in contrast, require complex, al-
 174 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
though well-founded, phenomena- founded in their
very structure. First, such emotions are closest to the
subject; second, they originate at the primordial lay-
ers ofthe subject; third, they are touched by artworks;
fourth, the subject can become completely immersed in
these emotions; and fifth, these emotional experiences
are regarded as significant to the subject. As depth
phenomena, these emotions are correlated to aesthetic
objects. Geiger's analyses of the emotions proper to
aesthetic experience influenced ROMAN INGARDEN's Das
literarische Kunstwerk (The literary work of art, 1931 ).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER treats emotion in a general frame-
work of DASEIN as being-in-theworld and specifically
as Befindlichkeit. This term covers the domain that tra-
ditional thought had relegated to subjective feelings,
i.e., psychic phenomena, below such epistemic require-
ments as representation and volition. Such phenom-
ena are, at the outset, theoretically redundant. Heideg-
ger rejects, in principle, this prejudgment of emotions
and begins initially with the notion ofrNTENTIONALITY.
Emotions are intentiona! because they disclose some-
thing and thus are not states closed upon themselves.
Thus we are pleased with, sad about, or overjoyed
with something. In Sein und Zeit ( 1927) Heidegger
articulates two major emotions, anxiety andfear. Yet
as aspects of Befindlichkeit they are more than forms
of intentionality. Befindlichkeit is finding oneself in a
situation and in a particular state, such as well-being,
anxiety, or being gripped by fear. But these emotions
are nota state of mind (even though Befindlichkeit has
sometimes been translated as "state-of-mind").
We do not project, as ifby some magic, what is "in
our minds," some subjective emotion, onto an other-
wise indifferent sum of objects. Rather, it is through
emotions that we find ourselves in a WORLD in which we
care about things and how we relate to them. Emotion
is thus a way ofuncovering our position in the context
of possibilities and facticities of our world. In the emo-
tion of joy something is opened in the world, not with
an objective property ora subjective projection, but as
moving me to engage with it in positive ways and plac-
ing it in a context ofpossibilities, projects, and choices.
This suggests that our involvement in the world (Be-
wandtnis) is primordially enveloped in emotions. The
latter, as an aspect of Befindlichkeit, is no less basic as
a way of being-in-the-world than understanding is; it
is just as crucial to FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY. For Hei-
degger, this way does not yet presume a distinction
between the state of the individual and the state of the
world.
For Dasein, as Befindlichkeit, things matter. In our
care for the world and ourselves, some things are ad-
vantageous, open horizons of possibilities, others are
detrimental and closed. Thus Heidegger finds no jus-
tification in treating specific emotions such as fear, or
more general ones such as mood (Stimmung), as inner
psychological states. While traditional thought would
have relegated moods such as boredom, depression,
and exuberance to subjective states below even such
emotions as fear, moods are equally worldly. Moods
reveal how the world is for Dasein. Even dctachment
is a mood that exposes the world as objective and in-
different to us, and this indifference is of fundamen-
tal concern for Dasein. The argument is pushed by
Heidegger to the limit in terms of anxiety. The latter
singularizes Dasein by revealing Dasein's temporality
as being-toward-death and hence the impossibility for
anyone, in the final analysis, to die for another. Yet
this extreme singularity reveals the temporality of ali
worldly events. For Heidegger, emotions, as modifica-
tions of Befindlichkeit, must be read ontologically as
modalities of Dasein and world.
Against ali forms of positivistic PSYCHOLOGY and
PSYCHIATRY, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE explores the emotions
from the si de of consciousness. In L 'etre et le neant
( 1943) he accepts the self-reflective transcendental
phenomenology of Husserl and also the Heideggerian
notion ofself-understanding. Emotion, for Sartre, must
be understood in the context of consciousness as a
whole in order to decipher the extent to which pure
psychology could delineate modifications of this very
consciousness. Moreover, emotions are also regarded
in the anthropological totality of the human, i.e., self-
understanding in the world. The task that Sartre sees
is the demonstration ofhow the emotions are tobe ex-
tricated from the causal preconceptions of ali forms of
positivistic thinking and their intertwining with con-
sciousness.
While, on one level, Sartre accepts the intentionality
of consciousness as including the emotions (e.g., fear
does not appear as a psychic state, but exhausts itself
in the fearsome abject), on another level the emotions
have a spontaneous capacity for instant transforma-
tion of our relationships to ourselves and the world.
 EMOTION
Such transformations occur in situations that cannot be
resolved instrumentally and hence require a magica!
recoloration of consciousness and its relationship to
the world.
In his Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions ( 1939),
he articulates emotions such as fear, anger, joy, or
sadness appear as spontaneous degradations of con-
sciousness toward the world. Such emotions are tied
directly to or blend with bodily expressivity and activ-
ity. Here, for Sartre, such metaphysical notions as the
unconscious play no role. It is consciousness itselfthat
thickens and darkens in a synthesis of spontaneity and
passivity. What releases us from this modification of
consciousness is a purifying reflection and the disap-
pearance ofthe emotional situation. This means that a
person is a master ofher or his emotions both in being
flooded by them and in dispelling them. Causality, for
Sartre, does not add any relevant understanding, since
causality also requires consciousness as projecting the
future and the past.
It must be emphasized that for Sartre, emotions are
not to be confused with "inner states" as if conscious-
ness had some sort ofinteriority. Rather, emotion is at-
mospheric; it floods an entire region and breaks down
ali materiality, e.g., fear already pervades our flight
from the fearsome. The flight itself feeds on the en-
veloping emotion; the emotion permeates ali objects;
it is expressed through their looks. A terrifying appari-
tion is no mere physical body but its horrible config-
uration that haunts the surface of the body and floods
ali, including my own body, with terror. One intensifies
the other. This means that the emotions are not moved
by some physiological state but by other emotions. A
description of pure bodies may function in instrumen-
tal consciousness, but an experience of emotion will be
moved by the correlative emotional expressivity. The
look of erotic desire does not demand a body, but calls
for reciproca! erotic desi re for the expressed desire.
PAUL RICCEUR articulates emotion as the central ex-
perience in both the epistemic and practica! domains.
In L 'homme .fallible (Fallible man, 1960) he regards
knowledge as a result of transcendental syntheses, ar-
ticulated by transcendental reflection in the mode of
deciphering objective conditions of awareness in cor-
relation to its object. This reflection leads to the discov-
ery of a disproportion between finite perspectivity and
infinity. The latter is not a transcendent moment, but
175
one that transposes any perspective toward universal-
ity, toward signitive intentionality. Yet this movement
is directly tied to objectivity and belongs to awareness
in general. Personal consciousness appears only with
practica! synthesis. It opens the concrete wholeness of
reality, including its affective domain.
The site of synthesis is no Ion ger the thing, but the
human person. Here a practica! split appears between
a finite character and infinite happiness. The former
shows the limitations of our open existence, while the
latter is an aim of ali our strivings. The interioriza-
tion ofthis disproportion appears in the emotional do-
main regarded as affective fragility. This conception
of emotion as a central place of personal synthesis is
also designed to test the viability ofthe transcendental
formation of awareness.
For Ricceur, knowledge and emotion are mutually
enlightening. Emotion gives rise to the intention of
knowledge. The emotional qualities are experienced on
things, others, and world, and in turn, reveal the man-
ner in which the subject is touched intrinsically. Such
an indissoluble synthesis between emotion and inten-
tion intimates human belonging to the world named in
various ways as hyper-predictive, hyper-objective, and
even hyperreflexive.
Conversely, knowledge constitutes emotional gra-
dations in correlation to the gradations of objectivities.
Emotional gradations belong to two main domains. The
first is sensory striving, which ends in a finite momen-
tary joy; the second is the spiritual striving that reaches
for an encompassing happiness. These emotional fac-
tors, the bios and the logos, comprising another dis-
proportion, require another emotional mediation by the
heart. These emotions appear in the strivings for pos-
session, rulership, and values. Yet these strivings ofthe
heart are not independent of universal happiness. This
is to say, the economic, politica!, and cultural aims are
not yet rigidified into greed, but comprise a schema-
tization of happiness. The heart is an indeterminate
representation of infinite happiness. This domain is
therefore one of continuous emotional turbulence and
inner conflict.
Emotion has also been approached within phe-
nomenologically influenced PSYCHIATRY and pheno-
menological PSYCHOLOGY - e.g., by ERWIN W. STRAUS,
who was particularly interested in the expressive
dimension of emotional life - and within pheno-
 176 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
menologica( PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, e.g., by
FREDERIK .1..1. BUYTENDIJK and HELMUTH PLESSNER. In Das
Gemiit ( 1956)- published in English as Phenomen-
ology of Feefing ( 1977) - STEPHAN STRASSER inves-
tigates the treatment of emotion in the works of phe-
nomenologists (especially Scheler and Sartre) and psy-
chologists; distinguishes various levels and phases per-
taining to the life offeeling; and contributes a series of
descriptions ofvarious typical forms ofhappiness.
In a number ofbooks and essays, EUGENE T. GENDLIN
has developed the notion of a bodily "felt sense" that
is neither merely a state ofthe physical body (Kărper)
nor a sensation pertaining to the lived body (Leib),
but is distinctively intentiona!. lts correlate, however,
is not some simple "object," nor is it simply some-
thing "perceptual"; rather, it is a felt sense or global
fecling of a situation as a whole in its pre-conceptual
intricacy, including its sedimented meanings and its
implications and possible transformations as well as
its current affective tone. Such a felt sense is broader
and richer than an already named "emotion" such as
anger, though such specific emotions are also situa-
tional. Yet a felt sense can interact with LANGUAGE in
a productive way: when words succeed in explicating,
articulating, or lifting something out from the com-
plex texturc of a felt sense, the felt sense itself shifts
in response. Phenomenologists inftuenced by Gendlin
include DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN, who a(so discusses the
ethical and ontologica! significance ofbeing moved to
te ars.
More recently, GLEN MAZIS's Emotion and Embod-
iment ( 1993) emphasizes that emotions are modes of
bodily attunement to, and emeshment with, the lived
world. Here the world is no longer something to con-
front, comprehend, and control; rather, the ebbing and
ftowing emotional tones of a landscape or figure, the
swirling affective currents of an interpersonal situa-
tion, and so on, pul! us in or repe! us, engaging us in the
primordial movement of being emotionally "moved"
and revealing the ftuidity and fragility ofthe emotional
world.
Finally, phenomenological approaches to emotion
ha ve also inftuenced more general philosophical works
on this topic. for exampJe, DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND
was inftuenced by Scheler's approach not only in such
early phenomenological writings as "Die Idee der sit-
tlichen Hand! ung" ( 1916) and "Sittlichkeit und ethis-
che Werterkenntnis" ( 1922), but also in Das Wesen der
Liebe (The essence oflove, 1971 ); Robert C. Solomon
emphasizes the intentionality of emotion in The Pas-
sions ( 1976), which is couched for the most part in
terms of EXISTENTIALISM; and Quentin Smith critically
confronts phenomenological work on emotion in The
Felt Meanings of the World ( 1986), where he argues
that a "metaphysics of feeling" must replace a "meta-
physics of reason."
The phenomenology of emotion, exemplified in the
writings of the phenomenologists discussed above,
possesses one common feature: emotions are not psy-
chological states in the immanence of the subject, but
rather correlate to objectivities ofvarious types and lev-
els. In other words, they are traces ofintentionality. No
doubt, the extrication of such traces requires method-
ological precision and subject-matter differentiation,
specifically a differentiation between both metaphysi-
cal and ontologica! positionalities on the one hand and
signitive intentionalities on the other. This is evident
even among the phenomenological authors who pro-
pose to ground intentionality in fundamental ontology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Buytendijk, Frederik J.J. "The Phenomeological Approach to
the Problem of Feelings and Emotions." In Feelings and
Emotions. Ed. Martin L. Reymert. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1950, 127-41; rpt. InPhenomenological Psychology:
The Dutch School. Ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, 119-32.
Geiger, Moritz. "Beitrăge zur Phănomenologie des
ăsthetischen Genusses." Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie nd
phiinomenologische Forschung 1 ( 1913), 567--684.
- . "Oberftăchen- und Tiefenwirkung der Kunst." In his
Zugiinge zur Ăsthetik. Leipzig: Der Neue-Gesit Verlag,
1928, 43--66.
Gendlin, Eugene T. "A Phenomenology of Emotions:
Anger." In Explorations in Phenomenology. Ed. David
Carr and Edward S. Casey. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1973, 367-98.
- . "Befindlichkeit: Heidegger and the Philosophy of Psy-
chology." Review of Existential Psychology and Psychia-
try 16 (1978-79), 43-71.
Husserl, Edmund. Vorlesungen iiher Ethik und Wertlehre
1908-1914. Ed. Ullrich Melle. Husserliana 28. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
Mazis, Glen. Emotion and Emhodiment: Fragile Ontology.
New York: Peter Lang, 1993.
Metraux, Alexandre. "Edmund Husserl und Moritz Geiger."
In Die Munchen Phiinomenologie. Ed. Helmut Kuhn,
Eberhard Ave-Lallemant, and Reinhold Gladiator. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, 138-57.
Pfandcr, Alexander. "Zur Psychologie der Gesinnun-
 EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION
gen." Jahrbuch jur Philosophie und phănomenologische
Forschung 1 (1913), 325-404,3 (1916), 1-125.
Plessner, Helmuth. Lachen und Weinen. Amheim: van
Loghum Slaterus, 1941; rpt. Bem: Francke, 1950, 1961;
Laughing and Crying: A Study of the Limits of Hu-
man Behavior. Trans. James Spencer Churchill and Mar-
jorie Grene. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1970.
Richir, Mare. "Phenomenologie et psyhciatrie: D'une divi-
sion interne il la Stimmung." Etudes Phenomenologiques
15 (192), 81-117.
Riccrur, Paul. L 'hommefaillible. Paris: Aubier, 1960; Fa/li-
bie Man. Trans. Charles A. Kelby. New York: Fordham
University Press, 1956.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions. Paris:
Hermann, 1939; The Emotions: Out line ofa Theory. Trans.
Bemard Frechtman. New York: Wisdom Library, 1948;
Sketchfor a Theory ofthe Emotions. Trans. Philip Mairet.
London: Methuen, 1962.
Scheler, Max. "Ordo Amoris" [1914-15/1916]. In his
Schriften aus dem Nachlass: 1, Zur Ethik und Erkennt-
nislehre. 2nd rev. ed. Ed. Maria Scheler. Bem: Francke,
1957, 347-76; "OrdoAmoris." In his Selected Philosophi-
cal Essays. Ed. and trans. David R. Lachterman. Evanston,
IL: Northwestem University Press, 1973, 98-135.
Strasser, Stephan. Das Gemut. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spec-
trum, 1956; Phenomenology o[Feeling: An Essay on the
Phenomena (){ the Heart. Trans. Robert E. Wood. Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne Universty Press, 1977.
Straus, Erwin W. "The Sigh: An Introduction to a Theory of
Expression." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 14 (1952), 1-22;
rpt. In his Phenomenological Psychology. Trans., in part,
Erling Eng. New York: Basic Books, 1966, 234-51.
Sweeney, Robert D. "The Affective 'A Priori."' Analecta
Husserliana 3. Dordrecht D. Reidel, 1974, 80-97.
Waldenfels, Bemhard. "Die Fremdheit des Eros." In Liebe
und Leidenschaft. Ed. Gerhard Binder and Bemd Effe.
Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 1993, 9-24.
ALGIS MICKUNAS
Ohio University
EMPIRICISM, BRITISH See BRITISH EMPIRICISM.
EMPIRICISM, LOGICAL See LOGICAL POSI-
TIVISM.
EPOCHE AND REDUCTION "Epoche" and
"reduction" are names of methods used in Husserlian
phenomenology. Although EDMUND HUSSERL seems to
have only become aware of these methods in 1905,
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
177
he considered them to have been already implic-
itly at work in his Logische Untersuchungen (1900-
1901 ). While other major phenomenologists ha ve em-
ployed these methods, the treatment here will focus on
Husserl.
The word "epoche," from a Greek word that means
"check" or "cessation," has a wider denotation than
"reduction." It is used by Husserl to name severa! dif-
ferent operations ali of which involve suspending be-
lief in something, or at least not operating with some
belief, so as not to rely on that item in the conduct of
research. For example, Husserl writes in Die Krisis der
europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phănomenologie ( 1936) of an "epoche of the objec-
tive sciences" that entails not accepting the results of
those sciences as something phenomenology can build
upon in developing its own results. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
writes of an epoche for ETHICS, and in "On Multiple
Realties" (1945) ALFRED SCHUTZ, perhaps developing
remarks in Husserl's Vienna Lecture [1935], describes
the epoches and reductions required for adopting the
theoretical, the practica!, and other attitudes. Rather
than the various other epoches, the "transcendental-
phenomenological epoche" will be the concern here. It
will be referred to as "the epoche."
Husserl describes the epoche as a suspending or
"bracketing" ofthe "general thesis" ofthe natural atti-
tude. This thesis is a beliefthat pervades our conscious-
ness of the world. It is sometimes said to be a belief in
the "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) ofthe world and at other
times a belief in the "being on hand" ( Vorhandenheit)
ofthe world.
In the Krisis Husserl writes of the "accomplish-
ment of a reduction of 'the' world to the transcenden-
tal phenomenon 'world,' a reduction thus also to its
correlate, transcendental subjectivity, in and through
whose 'conscious Iife' the world, valid for us straight-
forwardly and naively prior to ali science, attains and
always has attained its whole content and ontic valid-
ity." In Cartesianische Meditationen [1931] he writes
that the "method of transcendental epoche, because
it leads back to this realm [of transcendental being],
is called transcendental-phenomenological reduction."
In remarks like these, he seems to be using "reduc-
tion" in the sense ofthe Latin word "reducere" (to lead
back).
The epoche, then, is a way of making the transition
 178 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
from our more normal way of considering conscious-
ness and the world to the properly phenomenological
way of considering them. Insofar as it discloses to us
a dimension of our consciousness that was previously
unnoticed, it is a way of attaining the subject mat-
ter of research. The reduction, on the other hand, is
what the epoche allows us to gain: reftective aware-
ness ofthe subject matter in the way the subject matter
is to be regarded in the conduc! of phenomenologi-
cal research. As such, "the reduction" refers to the
institution of the goal of phenomenological research
as operative in the consciousness of the researcher. It
points ahead to the transition into the constitutive inten-
tiona! analyses that make up the ma in work of transcen-
dental phenomenology. Thus Husserl and others speak
of "performing" the epoche, but of working "under"
the phenomenological reduction. The transcendental-
phenomenological epoche and reduction, then, is a
method of bringing the world-constituting dimension
of consciousness into the purview of reftective intu-
ition, so that the manner of its functioning can be elu-
cidated through constitutive analysis.
There is a question as to whether the epoche and the
reduction are the same or different methods. In gen-
eral, as the discussion above indicates, the terms "the
epoche" and "reduction" seem tobe used by Husserl
to refer to distinguishable stages ofthe same approach,
where "reduction" refers to something achieved by the
epoche. The question, then, is whether there can be the
epoche without a transcendental reduction and whether
that which is achieved under the name "the reduction"
can be achieved in ways other than by the epoche. In
regard to the former issue, inquiry could be directed
to the "psychological" (as opposed to a "transcenden-
tal") epoche that Husserl has also discussed. As for the
other issue, the following discussion may shed some
light, for it shows that the reduction, as achieved by the
epoche, brings a certain interest into the conduct ofre-
search and defines the research goal in a particularway.
That interes! is epistemological. It seems possible for
the interest that governs phenomenological research
to be different, which may be the case for phenome-
nologists SUCh as MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY and MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, insofar as these thinkers can be said to ha ve
worked under the reduction.
Husserl points out in ldeen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913) that the "bracketing" or "suspending"
that is the epoche is "closely related" to the "neutrality
modification" to which any doxically positing or be-
lieving consciousness is subject. In general, certainty
of belief can change into any one of a series of modi-
fications that run from near certainty through doubt to
utter disbelief. Neutralization is not a member of this
series, but is something to which they are ali subject. It
is a way of not participating in any of these modes of
belief concern ing the object of awareness. An example
would be when we uncritically listen to a lecture and
merely grasp the thoughts of a speaker for the purpose
oftaking notes. We may neither agree nor disagree, but
merely understand what is being said.
The epoche is like neutra! consciousness ofthis sort,
but differs from it in an important way. The example
just given is one of a neutra! "straightforward" act of
awareness, an act in which we are caught up in experi-
encing something and do not attend to this experienc-
ing itself. The epoche, however, is the neutralization of
rejfective consciousness, consciousness through which
we attend to our experiencings of objects and to how
objects are present to us in these experiencings. Since
the epoche is the neutralization of a reftective act of
consciousness, in addition to being neutra] in the same
sense as any other act, i.e., lacking a position-taking,
the effect of the neutralization on that which presents
itself to the neutra] awareness is different from what it
is in a straightforward act due to the way the reftective
neutralization is brought about.
Let the straightforward act being reftected upon be
a perceiving and contain a believing in the actuality
of its object. The epoche involves refraining from per-
forming that position-taking or any modalization of it.
However, the epoche is not a neutrality modification
of the perceiving (something that, as Husserl notes,
is perhaps impossible to perform at will). It is not a
neutralization of that act. But the epoche does involve
the neutralization of some act. Any neutra] act is a
neutrality modification with respect to a correspond-
ing positional act, an act that, among other things, has
the same object as the neutra] act. A neutra] reftection,
then, is a neutrality modification with respect to a non-
neutra] or doxically positing refiection that grasps the
same mental process as the reftection. Thus the epoche
brings about a neutra] reftection that lacks the specific
doxic positing contained in its non-neutra] reftective
 EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION
counterpart. But the epoche also involves refraining
from performing the position-taking ofthe underlying
grasped act.
Let us now see how these three acts - the per-
ception bcing reftected upon, the doxically positional
reftection upon it, and the latter's neutra! counterpart
-are related to one another.
The object of a non-neutra! reftection in "noematic"
reftection is the object of the straightforward act as
it appears in that act. Unless there are motives to do
otherwise, the reftecting contains a believing in the
actuality of the object and contains that believing by
participating in the position-taking of the perception.
The reftecting, of course, need not so assent, but could
take onan opposing or other moda! variant ofthe po-
sition. It could, for instance, disbelieve in the actuality
of the object. If it did this, that would not alter the
ontic character with which the reftected upon object
appears to the reftecting act, which continues to be
in force since the originally constituting pcrception
has not bcen altered in its positional modality. Rather,
there is a certain overlapping of the two senses, ac-
tual and inactual, the result ofwhich is that the former
appears to the reftecting act as a mere claim to actu-
ality. Neutralized reftection is different from this. The
neutra! reftective act does not contain the same posit-
ing as its non-neutra! counterpart. Hence it does not
contain the same positing as the act reftected upon nor
any ofthc possible positings that are modalizations of
the original positing. It has no such positionality and
thus lays down no such overlapping character. This
does not mean that it is not positional in any sense.
It is lacking only the positing of the underlying act or
any of its variants. However, a neutralized reftection
does not merely not so posit, it precisely refrains from
so positing, and it is for this reason that an epoche is
involved. The refraining has its effect, but its effect is
not the same as that achieved by the overlappings that
have just been discussed. The effect is that the ontic
character correlative to the positing ofthe act reftected
upon appcars to the reftecting act as a claim (to actu-
ality, in the case of the perceiving), but not as a mere
claim as in the case of a disbelieving reftection. This is
because refraining, as such, is an act of a subject who
feels a pull toward something, and thus acknowledges
its value, but precisely resists that pull.
Phenomenology is a science carried out in pursuit
179
of certain interests. One of those interests, and the one
that governed much of Husserl 's work, is to understand
how cognition, knowledge ofthe world, is "possible."
For Husserl, this interest took the form of an inquiry
into the grounds of the EVIDENCE of worldexperience.
This interest becomes operative within the conduct of
phenomenological research through the epoche. The
proper orientation of reftective acts in pursuit of this
interest requires the refraining that is the epoche. The
epoche involves a rcfraining that is brought about in
conscious awareness and acknowledgment of the evi-
dence of PERCEPTJON and is precisely a refraining from
taking a position with respect to that evidence. This
refraining exhibits a respect for the evidence of per-
ception, while at the same time it orients itself toward
seeking the grounds of that evidence, of its validity,
and of the natural acceptance of its validity in sources
that do not presuppose any of these. Thus the bulk of
Husserl's concrete constitutive analyses aims at dis-
closing the subjectivc accomplishments that allow us
to experience a WORLD that has various ontic "validi-
ties." These investigations are not just of the constitu-
tion of the sense of the world and its objects, but of
their constitution as valid senses, as accomplishments
of evidential processcs.
Ifthere is tobe a reduction without an epoche, then
other interests come to play whereby the constitutive
intentiona! analyses yield quite different sets ofresults
than did Husserl's. It can be left to future research
to Jook at the work of MARTIN HEIDEGGER, MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, and others from this point ofview.
It should be mentioned that there is a broader sense
of epoche than the one discussed above. The epoche in
the sense discussed occupies a central ro le within a total
attitude of research and has, through its central ro le, a
certain effect on the non-reftective acts (like judgings)
that help make up the total research performance. It is
in this respect that the epoche takes on a wider and even
different sense than neutralization of reftective acts.
Phenomenology is carried out "in reftection." But
this "in reftection" has two meanings. Taken in its nar-
row sense, reftection is the intuitive grasping of one's
own mental process, i.e., reftective acts. But the pheno-
menologist also makes judgments about what is intu-
itively grasped. Judgings are straightforward and not
reftective acts. Thus the phenomenologist does not al-
ways work through reftective acts. But in a sense one
180 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
cou1d say that the phenomeno1ogist's work is carried
out "in reflection" in that the judgments are made with
an orientation toward reflective acts. The objects about
which the judgments are made are made available ex-
clusively through acts of reflection and reflective acts
are resorted to for the ultima te verification of mediate
judgments. The judgings must respect the neutrality of
the reflective acts by not asserting any ofthe positions
that the reflective acts refrain from taking. The judg-
ings assert other positions, though, and thus are not
themselves neutra] acts. Thus in a derivative sense, the
epoche is also carried out in these acts.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Edmund
Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1989, chap. 2; An Introduction to Husserlian
Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, I 993, chap. 2.
Bossert, Philip. "The Sense of 'Epoche' and 'Reduction' in
Husserl's Philosophy." Journal ofthe British Society for
Phenomenology 5 (1974), 243-55.
Kern, Iso. "Die drei Wege zur transzendental-phanomenolo-
gischen Reduktion Edmund Husserls." Tijdschrifi voor
Filosofie 24 (1962), 303-49; "The Three Ways to the
Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Phi-
losophy ofEdmund Husserl." Trans. Frederick A. Elliston
and Peter McCormick. In Husserl: Expositions and Ap-
praisals. Ed. Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick.
Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1977, 126-49.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. "Phenomenologico-Psychological
and Transcendental Reductions in Husserl's 'Crisis' ."
Analecta Husserliana 2. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972, 78-
89.
McKenna, William R. Husserl:~ "lntroductions to Pheno-
menology. " The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, chap. 5.
Schmitt, Richard. "Husserl 's Transcendentai-Phenomenolo-
gical Reduction." Phi!osophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 20 ( 1959-{)0), 238-45.
Schutz, Alfred. "On Multiple Realities" [1945]. In his Col-
lected Papers !: The Problem of Social Reality. Ed. Mau-
rice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 207-
59.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. "Is the Reduction Necessary for Pheno-
menology?" Journal ofthe British Societyfor Phenomen-
ology 5 (1973), 3-15.
~. "Epoche without Reduction: Some Replies to My Crit-
ics." Journal ofthe British Societyfor Phenomenology 5
(1974), 256-{i 1.
WILLIAM R. MCKENNA
Miami University
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ETHICS IN HUSSERL UnJike MAX SCHELER and
NICOLAI f!ARTMANN, but Jike JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EDMUND
HUSSERL himself published almost nothing on ethics.
An exception is the third article in the series of arti-
cles on "renewal" that he published in the Japanese
journal The Kaizo. This article deals with "renewal as
a problem of individual ethics" and summarizes part
of Husserl's !ater thought on ethics. It originally ap-
peared only in Japanese. The ma in source of Husserl 's
ethics is the manuscripts of his courses on axiology
and ethics. There are manuscript notes from his ear-
lier Jecture courses on axiology and ethics from 1902,
1908-9, 1911, and 1914. The extensive notes of his
newly conceived !ater Jecture course on ethics from
1920 have not yet been edited; of the ]ater sources,
only the Kaizo material has been published so far. Be-
sides the rather systematic expositions in the form of
lecture courses, he produced a considerable number of
research manuscripts that deal with various aspects and
problems of a phenomenological foundation of ethics.
Husserl's main concern in his earlier, prewar
Gottingen ethics is the refutation of ethical relativism
and skepticism. Ethical relativism and skepticism seem
unavoidable if ethics is founded in feelings, because
feelings are supposedly radically subjective. There
would beat most a purely factual and therefore acci-
dental agreement in emotional responses. David Hume
grounds ethics in such a factual agreement of how we
feei and emotionally respond to the character and be-
havior of others. But such a factual agreement is no
guarantee for objective validity. Can the moral dissi-
dent, Husserl asks, not be right in the face of the pre-
vailing moral consensus? From this failure of Hume
and the moraJ-sense-ethics of BRITISH MORAL THEORY
to secure the strict universality and objectivity of the
morallaw, KANT drew the conclusion that ethics has to
be grounded in pure practica! reason and its a priori
law, which is indifferent to the subjective feelings and
inclinations. According to Husserl, however, Kant's
doctrine of the categorica] imperative is an "abstruse
formalism" and a "paradigm for a transcendental rea-
soning from above."
Against such an ethics from above Husserl urges
an ethics from below, an ethics founded in the pheno-
menological description and analysis of the acts of
consciousness and their correlative NOEMATA as where
the evaluational and ethical concepts originate. One of
 ETHICS IN HUSSERL
the immediate and most fundamental intuitive insights
of such a phenomenological analysis of consciousness
is the impossibility of an act ofwilling that is not mo-
tivated by a VALUE-feeling. An abject must affect us
emotionally; otherwise, there is no inducement what-
ever, no motive for us to strive for it or to avoid it. A
pure willling free of ali value-feeling is, according to
Husserl, just as nonsensical as a color without exten-
sion. A priori and eidetically, each subject of willing
has tobe a subject ofvalue-feeling.
Values are ultimately experienced and given in
value-feelings. Hume was therefore right: without the
heart and its value-feelings we would not and could
not distinguish between good and bad. Without feel-
ings we have no moral judgments. The fundamental
challenge for Husserl is then how to reconcile the ob-
jective validity of ethics with its ultimate foundation in
value-feelings. To talk of objective validity for Husserl
means to talk of rational insight into what is true and
what is false. The objective validity of ethics then pre-
supposes that rationality and REASON are not limited to
the judging and theorizing intellect. The heart and the
will too must have their analogous but specific forms
ofrationality. It must be possible to categorize the acts
of feeling and willing themselves, and not only their
foundational acts of knowing, under the opposites of
true and false, insightful and blind.
In his three lectures on axiology and ethics from
1908-9, 1911, and 1914 Husserl seeks to develop the
main features of a phenomenological theory ofvaluing
and willing-acting reason by employing the "method
of analogy." Following this method, Husserl wants to
show above ali that in analogy to pure, formal LOGIC,
and also FORMAL ONTOLOGY, there are also a purely
formal axiology and a purely formal praxiology. Just
as there are a priori formal conditions in the form of
formal logica! laws for the rationality and objective
validity ofpredicative and logica! acts, so too are there
a priori formal conditions in the form of formal axi-
ologica! and formal practica! laws for the rationality
and objective validity of evaluative and practica! acts.
These latter laws comprise the field ofresearch of new
formal disciplines that- according to Husserl- ha ve
never been conceptualized in the tradition.
Formal axiology and praxiology lead to the formal-
categorica! imperative "Do the best that is attainable!"
as a purely formal determinati an of volitional correct-
181
ness. This highest formal practica! principle rests on
the law of absorption. "The best is the enemy of the
good." The best attainable is not merely the best com-
paratively speaking, but rather the sole practica! good.
The formal conditions of rational willing can be sum-
marized as follows: willing must aim at its own prac-
tica! possibilities; it must grasp the entire realm of its
practica! possibilities, and from ali the values therein
find, choose, and try to realize the highest value.
Formal axiology and formal praxiology are only the
first and basic stage of a phenomenological theory of
axiologica! and practica! reason. The higher, and for
the practica! end of guiding action, the more essential
and important stage is the exposition of a theory of
material a priori values and purposes. Husserl never
dealt with this material a priori part ofhis axiology and
ethics systematically. He usually distinguishes between
the sensuous, hedonistic values and the spiritual val-
ues. Regarding the latter, he distinguishes three broad
kinds: science, art, and the rational love of self and
neighbor. Occasionally RELIGION is added as a fourth
kind. Corresponding to Husserl's distinction between
subjective and objective spirit, there is a distinction to
be made between subjective spiritual values in the form
of theoretical, axiologica!, practica!, and, for Husserl,
even religious acts of reason, on the o ne hand, and the
correlative objective spiritual values in the form ofthe
spiritual-ideal objective goods of cui ture (i.e., a theory,
a work of art) on the other. As far as a hierarchy of
values is concerned, for Husserl there is a clear order
of rank only between the sensuous and the spiritual
values - the first have only instrumental value for
making possible the second; among the spiritual val-
ues themselves, no such definite and generally valid
rank is established.
Husserl's prewar Gottingen ethics remains mainly
within the purely formal determinati an of "volitional
correctness" and the highest practica! good. For him,
there can be no truly scientific ethics without the clear
distinction between formal and material principles. He
viewed the discovery and elaboration of formal ax-
iology and formal praxiology as his most important
contribution to ethics. He saw himself do ing for ethics
what Aristotle had done for logic.
A truly scientific ethics for Husserl has to be an
ethics from below, that is, the formal and material prin-
ciples of such an ethics have to be grounded in the
182 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phenomenological description by EIDETIC METHOD of
the various acts ofthe heart and ofthe will in which in-
trinsic and extrinsic values and goods, ends and means
are initiated and executed. He subscribes to the Kantian
classification ofthe acts of consciousness into intellec-
tive acts, valuing acts of feei ing, and acts of willing.
Basically there exists a one-sided foundational rela-
tion between acts of these three kinds: acts of willing
are necessarily founded in acts ofvalue-feeling, which
in turn necessarily presuppose an intellective act, be
it a presentation or a judgment. The intellective act
presents a real matter or a state of affairs in its purely
factual-natural determinations and the act of value-
feeling discovers the axiologica! determinations ofthe
pregiven thing or state of affairs, a discovery that in turn
can motivate an act of will. This basic schema of the
foundational relation between the three kinds ofacts is
inserted into the larger framework of the teleological
character of consciousness by Husserl 's discovery of a
form ofwilling in the form of a striving ora tendency at
the core of consciousness and as a universal character
of ali acts.
Value-feelings and consequently acts ofwilling are
dependent on intellective acts in yet another sense.
Value-feelings and acts ofwilling are non-objectivating
acts. Without objectivating intellective acts they are,
according to Husserl, in a certain sense "blind and
dumb." The axiologica! and practica! objects and pred-
icates that are constituted in the acts ofthe heart and of
the will are fully given as such objects and predicates
only in subsequent predicative acts of objectivation and
thematization. In this sense, logical-theoretical reason
enjoys a certain primacy over axiologica! and practi-
ca! reason. In another sense, however, Husserl stresses
how axiologica! and practica! reason encompass theo-
retical reason: theory itself is an axiologica! and prac-
tica! object, and the theoretical acts can be regarded
as mental actions. One has to be careful, though, not
to confuse quite different albeit analogous or related
forms of willing and acting. The teleological striving
that belongs to ali forms of consciousness is nota will-
ing in the same sense as thefiat that precedes an action
or the action-willing itself, which are both different
again from the spontaneity of an act of predication.
The precise differentiation between these and other
forms of willing and their interrelationship requires
great phenomenological ski!!.
The world of our everyday life is a world ofvalue-
objects, objects o fuse, tools, works of art, etc. We can,
of course, abstract from the axiologica! and practica!
predicates, e.g., of a table ora statue, and focus on the
purely natural-material properties ofthese objects. This
is the fOCUS of the NATURAL SCIENCES and NATURALISM.
But we can equally focus in a purely theoretical way
on the axiologica! and practica! objects. This then is
the fOCUS ofthe SO-called HUMAN SCIENCES or CULTURAL
DISCIPLINES. The sensuous properties of an object are
originally given in perception. According to Husserl,
the axiologica! characteristics are originally given in
value-feelings, the practica! characteristics in acts of
willing. For modern objectivist-physicalist natural sci-
ence ali three characteristics are radically subjective.
Knowledge of axiologica! characteristics and value-
objects presupposes emotional value-apperception.
Husserl did not have a uniform conception of this
value-apperception and correspondingly he did not
have a uniform conception of the ontologica! status
ofthe axiologica! characteristics. Rather, two different
conceptions can be distinguished. According to one
conception, the axiologica! characteristics are nonnat-
ural properties ofthe object that are originally given in
a kind of emotional value-perception (Wertnehmung)
besides and in analogy with the natural-sensuous prop-
erties that are originally given in ordinary perception
( Wahrnehmung). According to the other conception,
which is particularly prominent in Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913), the axiologica! characteristics are analo-
gous to the doxic modalities like "probable" or "doubt-
ful," and the acts of the heart and the will are axio-
logica! and practica! position-takings alongside and in
analogy to the doxic position-takings. Both of these
conceptions on their own are equally inadequate for
a full phenomenological account of axiologica! and
practica! reason, nor can they simply be joined to each
other in analogy to the relation between perception and
judgment in theoretical reason.
In employing the "method of analogy," Husserl
takes the structure oftheoretical reason, the way natural
objects are constituted, given, posited, andjudged, and
the way theoretical knowledge claims are justified, as
paradigmatic for his analysis of axiologica! and prac-
tica! reason. But as his many very rich descriptions of
the various acts of the heart and the will and of the
 ETHICS IN HUSSERL
constitution of axiologica! and practica! objects show,
it is not easy to make distinctions between passivity
and activity, receptivity and spontaneity, that exactly
mirror those in the intellect. What is at stake here is
Husserl's fundamental claim of an ultimate unity of
reason in a plurality ofkinds ofreason.
Husserl's prewar Gottingen ethics is grounded in
axiology: in each practica! situation I have to tind,
choose, and try to realize the highest possible objec-
tive value that is attainable forme. Husserl's postwar
Freiburg ethics goes beyond this narrow axiologica!,
i.e., utilitarian and economica!, conception of the eth-
ical life. His mature conception of the ethical life is
grounded in his theory of personal identity. I have a
unified self and a personal identity through the per-
sistence of acquired habits, attitudes, tastes, projects,
and convictions. Besides my natural inclinations, abil-
ities, talents, and gifts in primary passivity, I acquire
habits, attitudes, and convictions as a secondary pas-
sivity through the sedimentation ofmy position-taking
acts. The unity and identity of the self is in continuous
development. New position-takings, guided and influ-
enced but never necessitated by our past sedimented
Iife, confirm and reinforce, modify, or change our past
convictions. Whenever 1 change one ofmy convictions,
I change myself.
As the phenomenological analysis of the constitu-
tion ofthe personal selfshows, I am to a certain degree
myself responsible for the unity, identity, and char-
acter of my personal being. Consciously to embrace
this responsibility and to try to meet its demands is,
according to Husserl in his !ater ethics, the essence
of the ethical life and will. The mature ethical person
sees him- or herself as the subject of a unified life that
he or she wants to give an ethical form. Such persons
place themselves and their whole li ve underthe formal-
categorica! imperative of rational self-determination.
The ethicallife begins with a solemn decision that en-
compasses one's entire future life: from now on my
life shall no longer be merely one of drifting, but a
life determined solely by my own critically tested and
insightful position-takings, a life that is based on a
completely good theoretical, axiologica!, and practica!
conscience, a life with no regrets.
This general and formal determination ofthe ethical
life as a life of rational self-determination in Husserl's
!ater ethics is still consistent with the formal determi-
183
nation of volitional correctness in a practica! situation
of his earlier ethics. There is, however, an important
consideration in Husserl 's !ater ethics that leads away
from these purely formal determinations of the ethi-
callife and ofvolitional correctness. According to this
consideration, the ethical will is the result of an ethical
EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION in which J critically reflect on
the whole ofmy life, and in which I take stock ofmy-
self, of my primary and secondary passivity. in order
to discover my individual ethical vocation.
In his !ater Freiburg ethics, Husserl separates ethics
from axiology in the sense that he no Jonger conceives
of the ethical task in terms of the realization of the
highest possible amount of objective values. Ethical
values are not the objective values of formal and mate-
rial axiology; rather they are absolute personal values.
Every person, according to Husserl, receives, from the
depth of one's personality, one's own absolute values,
one's values of love. These personal values detine my
individual ethical task and project, my ethical ideal, my
ideal selfand my own true "I," which I am called upon
to realize. To go against the absolute ought of such a
value is to be untrue to myself, to Iose myself, and to
betray myseif. Over and against such an absolute value
that is rooted in the self, an objective value counts for
nothing. Absolute vaiues are unconditional values, val-
ues that are incommensurate both among themselves
and with objective values. When I have to choose be-
tween two absolute vaiues, I do not give preference to
the higher value over the lower one, but rather- as
Husserl puts it-I sacrifice one absolute value for the
sake of the other.
Self-realization, self-preservation, and seif-perfec-
tion are the telos of the ethical life in Husserl 's !ater
ethics. But our personal and ethical life is necessarily
a life in common. We live together, not beside each
other but in and through each other. We communicate
with each other through social acts, we work together,
we support, help, and criticize each other. Our indi-
vidual destinies are intertwined in a common life with
its common tasks and projects. Individual and social
ethics are therefore inseparable. The ideal and te/os of
the ethicallife is the ethical community as a universal
community oflove where we freely and lovingly coop-
erate and help each other to realize our own true selves.
The self-realization of each member ofthe community
is dependent on the level of self-realization of ali the
 184 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
other members. We ali fail or succeed together.
The "we" of the truly cooperative common life is,
according to Husserl, an analogue of a person, a per-
sonality of a higher order. It is a "many-headed, and
yet united subjectivity" not apart from and superior to
the individual members, but functioning as a synthetic
unity and communalization ofthe individual ideals and
perspectives. Such a person of a higher order has its
ideal form in what Husserl calls the godly person of
a higher order, the ideal ethical community where the
ideal true selves of each are individually and mutually
recognized and realized, but above ali loved by ali as
adumbrations of such a godly personality of a higher
order.
As JAMES G. HART has shown, Husserl 's !ater ethics
cannot be fully understood apart from his theory of
personal identity, his theory of intersubjectivity, and
above ali his account of the teleological character of
transcendental consciousness, which in turn is closely
linked to his theological thought and his conception of
God. Finally, a certain unresolvcd tension in Husserl's
!ater ethical thought has to be noted. It is the ten-
sion between, on the one hand, a rationalistic ethics
that is grounded in a universalistic Kantian concep-
tion of rationality and that sees rational-scientific self-
determinati an in a humanity of reason as the telos of
thc ethical life and, on the other hand, an ethics of
absolute personal values and of love.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Husserl, Edmund. Vorlesungen uber Ethik und Wertlehre.
Ed. Ullrich Melle. Husserliana 28. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1988.
-. Auf~ătze und Vortrăge (1922-1937). Ed. Thomas Nenon
and Hans Rainer Sepp. Husserliana 27. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
Hart, James G. The Person and the Common Life: Studies in
Husserlian Social Ethics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1992.
Embree, Lester. "Some Noetico-Noematic Analyses of Ac-
tion and Practica! Life." In The Phenomenology of the
Noema. Ed. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree. Dor-
drecht: Kh.1wer Academic Publishers, 1992, 157-21 O.
Melle, Ullrich. "The Development of Husserl's Ethics."
Etudes Phenonuhwlogiques Nos. 13-14 ( 1991 ), 115-35.
- . "Objektivierende und nicht-objektivierende Akte." In
Husseri-Ausgahe und Husseri-Forschung. Ed. Samuel
!Jsseling. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub1ishers, 1990.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- . "Husserls Phănomenologie des Willcns." Tijdschrifi voor
Filosofie 54 ( 1992), 280-305.
ULLRICH MELLE
Husserl Archie/ Leuven
ETHICS IN SARTRE His failure to publish the
ethics promised at the conclusion of L 'etre et le neant
( 1943) has kept .IEAN-PAUL SARTRE from being acknow]-
edged as a phenomenological ethicist. The posthumous
pub1ication ofhis Cahiers pour une morale [ 194 7--48],
though sketchy and incomplete, does much to rem-
edy that situation by providing the positive content for
Sartre's previously published remarks on ethical tap-
ies. After some initial observations regarding Sartre
and phenomenology in general, I shall discuss severa!
cardinal theses of his moral theory from a phcnomen-
ological perspective, concluding with summaries of
each of his so-called three attempts to construct an
ethics.
From the moment of his famous initial encounter
with phenomenology in a con versation with Raymond
Aran ( 1905-1983 ), Sartre resonated with this new
method of do ing "concrete" philosophy. He insisted on
the INTENTIONALITY of consciousness with a thorough-
ness that left even Husserl, in his view, a prisoner of
the "illusion of immanence." The strength of Sartre's
phenomenology - namely, its circumvention of the
realist-idealist epistemology and metaphysics - en-
tails as well its abiding weakness: the relation between
the "given" and the "taken" remains irreducibly am-
biguous. This will have important consequences for
his evolving ethical theory. In sum, socio-economic
conditions (the "given") play a far greater role in his
second ethic than in his earlier ethic of authenticity.
Sartre employs the canonica! phenomenological
terms noesis and NOEMA throughout his career and in-
sists, as he put it in L 'etre et le neant, that "there is only
intuitive knowledge" and that "intuition is the presence
of consciousness to the thing rather than the converse."
So an EIDETIC METHOD culminating in the immediate
grasp of the ei dos or intelligible contour of the abject
forms the heart ofhis phenomenological methodology
at every stage of his career. His descriptions of authen-
tic and inauthentic behavior, for example, are imagina-
tive reconstructions aimed at making essential features
 ETHICS IN SARTRE
of a certain kind of activity evident. In other words,
Sartre 's closely detailed observations frequently are his
"arguments." In this, he consciously imitated Husserl 's
famous disciple, MAX SCHELER, whose work Sartre had
studied while in residence at the Maison Franc;aise
in Berlin ( 1933-34 ): "As Scheler has shown, I can
achieve an intuition ofvalues in terms of concrete ex-
emplifications." As befits an author awarded a Nobel
Prize (which, however, he refused), Sartre's gift for
apt and arresting examples lends his writing a con-
crete evidence that, he hopes, speaks for itself. Even
the "progressive-regressive method" that characterizes
his more dialectica! approach in !ater life requires as
its first phase a phenomenological description of the
mattcr to be explained.
Though he regularly appeals to an existential-
phenomenological schema, Sartre, like MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY,
rejects as idealist the Husserlian reduction to a tran-
scendental EGO. Nonetheless, he employs the EPOCHE
AND REDUCTION or "bracketing of being" in a way that
respects the ·"phenomenon of being" in its brute fac-
ticity, viz., as revelatory ofthe transphenomenal being
of thc phenomenon or being-in-itself. In fact, his mas-
terwork, L 'etre et le neant, subtitled "An Essay on
Phenomenological Ontology," turns on descriptions of
those special phenomena ofbeing such as boredom or
nausea that give us immediate access to transphenom-
enal being. In other words, "EXISTENTIAL" PHENOMEN-
OLOGY, not unlike "Kantian" metaphysics, employs the
adjective to Jimit, ifnot to undermine, the adequacy of
the substantive. Sartre 's use of the epoche was always
problematic.
Ever the moralist, he extends epoche and reduction
to the ethical in the Cahiers: "Any ethics that mutilates
life is suspect. Just as the phenomenologicalepoche ac-
cord ing to Husserl does not remove any nuance ofthe
world, the ethical epoche must not remove any nuance
ofhuman life." Carefully distinguishing the "certain"
from the "probable" in his descriptive analyses, Sartre
intends to bring the phenomena to our attention with
the force of immediate EVIDENCE. He reads the epoche
existentially as an exercise of the freedom at work in
our conscious being-in-the-world. Because human re-
ality is "in situation" (an ambiguous blend of facticity
and transcendence, the given and the taken), because
an inner distance (the temporal ecstasis) that he calls
185
"nothingness" separates consciousness from the world,
and because whatever quality one might ascribe to me
is always mine in the manner of my not-being it, it is
ever possible forme to "bracket" that relationship in a
reflective act that Sartre terms non-accessory or "puri-
fying" reflection: "It is the setting within parentheses,
not ofthe world (for doubt is impossible given sensory
intuition), but ofthe world's signification."
As he explains, somewhat paradoxically, in the
Cahiers, "the epoche has already to be present in the
natur/iche Einstellung [natural attitude] or, to put it an-
other way, incarnated freedom has to be penetrated by
absolute freedom. That is, we have to recognize that
man both is and is not what he is .... If the epoche
can always be carried out, this is because it is always
happening." For example, "desire as consciousness of
the choice to desire includes within itselfin a nonthetic
form its possibility ... of catharsis." Earlier, in L 'etre et
le neant, he says: "The pure, permanent possibility of
nonaccessory reflection [the epoche] is disquieting and
a risk of anxiety to the very extent that choice wants
tobe choice," and, significantly, the basis ofthe reduc-
tive act is ontologica!, namely, that inner distance or
presence-to-selfthat grounds human freedom: "Man is
free because he is nota self but a presence-to-self."
Sartre's early Husserlian reflection, "La transcen-
dence de l'ego" (1936), not only defends what ARON
GURWITSCH calls a "non-egological" conception of con-
sciousness, but attributes to Husserl a characteristically
moral motive for performing the epoche, namely, the
need to face freely the anguish of our freedom that
the natural attitude seeks to escape via flight into a
substantive ego or self. Even at this early stage, the
epoche is emerging as the instrument of liberation
from alienation and the key to authenticity. Its function
is more ethical than epistemic. In subsequcnt works
Sartre sometimes speaks of it as an "awakening," a
"catharsis," or a "conversion." Although he comes to
appreciate and underscore the socio-economic condi-
tions for its exercise, epoche or "purifying reflection,"
as it comes to be called, nonetheless remains an indi-
vidual act and a constant possibility for which each is
responsible. He discusses it at greatest length in the
Cahiers.
At least five concepts serve as essential ingredients
in Sartre's moral philosophy, namely, "freedom," "bad
faith," "authenticity," "gift-appeal," and "fraternity."
 186 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
The first three are nearly synonymous with Sartrean
EXISTENTIALJSM. The last two, developed respectively in
the Cahiers and the Critique de la raison dialectique
( 1960/85), are less familiar but equally integral to a
Sartrean ethic in each phase of its evolution.
As is well known, "freedom" centers the circle of
Sartre's thought. If Sartre is the philosopher of free-
dom, the career of the concept of "freedom" exactly
parallels his philosophical development from individ-
ualistic philosopher of consciousness ("freedom as
the definition of the human") to committed social ac-
tivist ("one cannot be free [concretely] until everyone
is free"). The phenomenological descriptions of the
"consciousness-freedom-responsibility" triad in L 'etre
el le neant form the skeleton for interpersonal (i.e.,
moral) relationships that Sartre will ftesh out in sub-
sequent works. Only in the rather unguarded and in-
choate remarks of his lecture L 'existentialisme est un
humanisme (1946) does he openly speak of freedom
as a "value," indeed, as the foundational value that we
must choose if we are to chose anything whatsoever.
Having approved Scheler's theory that we intuit val-
ues in concrete exemplifications in L 'el!·e et le neant, he
proceeds in this public lecture to speak ofthe necessity
"at every instant to perform actions that are examples."
He insists that "there is not o ne of our acts that, in cre-
ating the man we wish to be, does notat the same time
create an image of man such as we judge he ought to
be." But in addition to giving a content to Sartrean for-
malism, these "value-images" invest individual choice
with collective import: "1 create a certain image ofthe
man that 1 choose; choosing myself, 1 choose man."
It is this Schelerian move more than his better known
but much criticized appeal to Kantian universalizabil-
ity in the lecture that breaks the individualist impasse
of Sartre's vintage existentialist ethic and helps open
its social dimension.
But Sartre's implicit appeal to Scheler in this context
was neither unprecedented nor ad hoc. In his posthu-
mously published Carnets de la drâle de guerre [ 1939-
40], he had written: "Reading Scheler made me under-
stand that there existed values. Basically, until then,
quite absorbed by the metaphysical doctrine of salva-
tion, I'd never really understood the specific problem
ofmorality. The 'ought-to-be' seemed to me tobe rep-
resented by the categorica! imperative; and since 1 re-
jected the latter, it seemed to me that l rejected the
former with it. But when I'd understood that there ex-
isted specific natures, equipped with an existence as of
right, and called values; when I'd understood that these
values, whether proclaimed or not, regulated each of
my acts and judgments, and that by their nature they
'ought-to-be': then the problem became enormously
more complex."
And in his Cahiers he appeals to three of the ax-
ioms of Scheler's non formal ethics concern ing value-
realization as he attempts to formulate a theory that
recognizes personal freedom realizing its ends as a
value a priori: "1 take it that what is wanted by one
freedom must be accepted as such by other freedoms,
simply because it is a freedom that wants it." Some-
what )ater in the same text he uses phenomenological
discourse to amplify what we may caii his "universal
freedom conditiona)," namely, that 1 cannot be free in
any concrete sense unless ali people are free: "Ifl grasp
my freedom in a fulfilled intuition as both the source
of ali my projects and requiring universal freedom, 1
cannot think of destroying the freedom of others."
Perhaps Sartre's major legacy to the vocabulary of
moral psychology is the concept ofbad faith, an expres-
sion he considered weakly analogous to Scheler's "man
ofressentiment." A form ofself-deception, grounded in
the ontologica) dividedness ofhuman reality as factic-
ity/transcendence and as presence-to-self, bad faith is a
kind oftruncated knowledge, an ignorance that knows
better. As such, it lends itself to arresting phenomen-
ological descriptions ofthe kind Sartre paints in L 'etre
et le neant. He reads the phenomenon of resistance in
Sigmund Freud's PSYCHOANALYSIS, for example, as ev-
idence of bad faith. In this case the "censor" itself is
in bad faith since it both "knows" pre-reftectively and
does not know reftectively what "unconscious" mate-
rial it is repressing. Ifthe inner distance that conscious-
ness generates is the ontologica) basis ofbad faith in its
fundamental form, the fact of our "being-for-others,"
our social selves, opens us to another kind ofbad faith,
namely, the widespread desi re tobe what others take us
tobe. His descriptions of the "perfect waiter," the ho-
mosexual, and the woman being seduced are paradigms
of the "lie" to oneself that he terms bad faith. Indeed,
his multivolume study of Flaubert and his age extends
the Weltanschauung ofbad faith to an entire society.
If there is any properly existentialist "virtue," it is
authenticity. Like its antithesis, bad faith, authenticity
 ETHICS IN SARTRE
is grounded in the dividedness ofhuman reality that "is
what it is not'' and "is not what it is" (its facticity and
transcendence respectively). But whereas the person
in bad faith denies this basic truth about itself, which
we might call its "ontologica! freedom" in the sense of
"non-self-coincidence," the authentic individual lives
its condition fully. This means that authenticity sus-
tains the tension of its continuous "could be other"
at every moment of its existence. But this sustained
choice is not a nominalism, as some have suggested.
For example, "it is notat ali a question ofreducing our
friendship to a succession of instants," Sartre assures
us, "but rather of considering its unifying theme as an
intentiona] choice ta do something (to make a friend-
ship) and, from this perspective, to allow each moment
its concrete development." The price of authentic !iv-
ing is the famous existential Angst, which is both an
immediate awareness of our ontologica] freedom and
the experience of our future as possibility. Ifbad faith
is a kind of lie, authenticity entails accepting the truth
about our divided selves. But authenticity is more a
"truth to" than a "truth about" in that it requires our
practica! commitment, not just a national assent. So
the objection that Sartrean authenticity has no content
misses the mark, for it overlooks at least this anguished
"choice of ontologica! freedom" as well as the concrete
"freedom of others" discussed above.
Essential to the elaborati an of a Sartrean ethic are
the correlatives, gift and appeal ("In every appeal there
is a gift"). Adopted from his AESTHETICS (by an act
of creative generosity, the artist invites the spectator
freely to re-create the aesthetic object by means ofthe
artwork), the gift-appeal relationship, especially in the
Cahiers, becomes paradigmatic offree communication
among freedoms: "The appeal is the recognition of a
personal freedom in a situation by a personal freedom
in a situation." In this dyad, aesthetics, ethics, and ex-
istential freedom coalesce. Though there are forms of
gift-giving that enslave (Sartre cites the potlatch made
famous by the anthropologist Marcel Mauss [ 1872-
1950]) and appeals that dominate (an "appeal in bad
faith lacks the structure ofthe gift, that is, the recogni-
tion of the other's freedom"), the gift-appeal relation-
ship that he extends from aesthetics to ethics (friend-
ship) and politics (the pledged group, freedoms recog-
nizing one another) respects and enhances the values
of positive reciprocity and mutuality. "When the gift
187
is given between equals without reciproca! alienation,"
Sartre explains, "its acceptance is as free, disinterested,
and unmotivated as the gift itself. Like the gift, it is
freeing. This is the case in an evolved civilization for
the gift of the work of art to a spectator." But, he in-
sists, "relations among men must be based upon this
[gift-appeal] model ifmen want to exist as freedom for
one another," namely, "by the intermediary ofthe work
(technical as well as aesthetical, politica!, etc.) ... the
work always being considered as a gift." This crucial
mediation of"the work" is overlooked by those, includ-
ing Sartre himself, who contrast his !ater, "materialist"
ethic with this earlier, "idealist" project.
Mutuality suggests commitment to "fratemity," the
last ofthe value-concepts in Sartre 's ethical theory that
we shall consider. In the final interview given before
his death, Sartre admitted to Benny Levy, "1 still don't
see clearly the real relationship between violence and
fratemity." This remained his abiding challenge as he
attempted to develop an ethic of the "we" toward the
end ofhis life. If descriptions of an "ethic of violence"
abound in the Cahiers and in the Critique, where they
are sustained by the "transcendental fact" of material
scarcity as their necessary condition, only in the latter
does Sartre elaborate the ethical ideal of "fraternity"
as the relationship that obtains once scarcity is over-
come, if only temporarily in the spontaneously fusing
group. In a curious mixture of Hobbesian realism and
Rousseauian idealism, he describes the relationship of
"fratemity-terror" that binds together the sworn group,
once its externa! opposition has been overcome. Each
binds him- or herself via an oath to the death to func-
tion as "the same ... here" for "the other ... there,"
like team members in an athletic match.
"What is this relationship between one human being
and another that will be called fraternity?" he asks, and
answers: "It is not the relation of equality. It is a rela-
tionship in which the motivations for an act come from
the affective realm, while the action itselfis in the prac-
tica! domain. Which is to say the relationship between
a man and his neighbor in a society in which they are
brothers is, first of ali, affective/practical. Originally,
people shared awareness of that, you might say, but
now it is a gift that has tobe red1scovered." He posits
"true fraternity," as previously he spoke of "true his-
tory," as the realizati an of full humanity-an ideal for
striving in our battle against scarcity. When asked what
188 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
today prefigures this end result, Sartre answers: "The
fact that there is a morality." Indeed, the moral has as-
sumed the character of mutual concern as well as pos-
itive reciprocity: the gift-appeal relationship has been
Iinked to socio-economic conditions. Not that Sartre
has simply accepted the package of economic deter-
minism, he never did, but his realism counsels him to
respect the "violence" inscribed in interpersonal rela-
tions "mediated" by material scarcity. This remained
the ethical problem for the existentialist who would not
sacrifice one freedom to another, not even for the sake
of the "city of ends."
It is now common to speak ofSartre's three ethics,
the best known and most fully developed being his
existentialist ethics of disalienation or authenticity, de-
pending on whether one views it from a negative or
a positive perspective. A more individualistic ethic
of commitment to freedom, first o ne 's own and then
the other's, this ethic stresses the overcoming ofthose
forms ofbad faith to which human reality seems prone,
either because of its intrinsic dividedness as factic-
ity/transcendence (as he implies in L 'etre et le neant)
or because ofthe socio-economic exploitation and op-
pression engendered by scarcity of material goods (as
the Critique and subsequent writings insist).
In the 1960s Sartre prepared notes for what has been
termed his "dialectica! ethics." A review of these un-
published manuscripts reveals a basic concern with the
ideal of "integral humanity" and its counterconcept,
"subhumanity." The Iatter denotes ourselves as sub-
ject to a rule-driven ethic, where values ha ve hardened
into impersonal norms. In the language ofthe Critique
employed in these pages, the ethical dialectic obtains
between "praxis" and the "practico-inert." The former
denotes purposive human activity in its socio-historical
context, the latter those sedimented past practices that
direct, limit, deflect, and invert our present activities.
The ethics of NATURALISM and STRUCTURALISM re late to
moral praxis in precisely this practica-inert manner.
The ethical project that Sartre recommends is simply
to historicize these timeless, repetitive norms in favor
of "praxis of ali people in association" to perpetually
create and re-create "integral humanity." His emphasis
on work as the model of praxis gives this agonistic
ethic a certain socialist, not to say "MARXIST," flavor.
As in his earlier works, Sartre's method is a mixture
of phenomenological description of moral experience
as such and appeal to the "conditions of the possibil-
ity" of that experience (what, echoing Kant, he calls
the "regressive" or "analytic" method). To this he joins
the "progressive" or historical moment of the ethical
experience of specific groups of individuals. For exam-
ple, he describes the Iived experience ofthose Belgian
mothers who killed their thalidomide-deformed babies.
His point is to illustrate the dilemma of moral conflict
between ethical norms and historical praxis (reminis-
cent ofhis injunction years before to "invent" or create
in the case of moral indeterminacy): human life is an
absolute value but only insofar as it makes integral hu-
manity possible. As always, Sartre wishes to think in
the concrete. His phenomenological account of ethical
experience reveals two essential features of the moral
norm, namely, it is unconditional in its imperative and
it is capable of being met: Kant's famous "ought im-
plies can" receives phenomenological warrant.
But the condition of the possibility of this "can" is
human freedom itself- Sartrean inventive freedom,
not Kantian obediential freedom. This accounts for the
open-ended nature of the ethical situation. It also gen-
erates what Sartre terms the "ethical paradox": moral
norms display the iterability of the practica-inert (to
which they belong) and yet depend on our temporally
unique creative praxis for their functioning as norms.
The basic ambiguity of the "given" and the "taken"
returns. As in his first ethic, one must simply live this
tension creatively. But unlike the ethic of authentic-
ity, which seemed to foster more a style than a content,
Sartre 's dialectica) ethic relies on the givenness of gen-
uine human needs, beginning with the demands of our
biologica! nature and extending to our psycho-social
need for mutuality and positive reciprocity as we com-
bat the violence of material scarcity and oppression in
order to realize "integral humanity."
Sartre 's third ethic (of the "we") is barely adum-
brated in severa! interviews given toward the end of
his life. Composed with Benny Levy after a blinding
stroke forced Sartre to rely on a tape recorder, the re-
sultant livrea deux remains unavailable. The dilemma
of fraternity and violence mentioned above is crucial
to the work. And there are indications that it mounts a
holistic critique of existentialist individualism. But the
paucity of material available, as well as the hermeneu-
tic morass ofits dual authorship, leaves the work more
 ETHICS IN SCHELER
of a biographical oddity than a significant reassessment
of Sartre's lifelong project.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Anderson, Thomas C. The Foundation and Structure of
Sartrean Ethics. Lawrence, KS: Regcnts Press ofKansas,
1979.
- . Sartre s 1\vo Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Hu-
manity. Chicago: Open Court, 1993.
Bel!, Linda A. Sartre:~ Ethics of Authenticity. Tuscaloosa,
AL: University of Alabama Press, 1989.
Catalana, Joseph S. Good Faith and Other Essays: Perspec-
tives on a Sartrean Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1995.
Detmer, David. Freedom as Value: A Critique ofthe Ethical
Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre. La Salle, IL: Open Court,
1988.
Flynn, Thomas R. Sartre and Marxist Existentia/ism: The
Test Case of Collective Responsibility. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1984.
Howells, Christina, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Sartre.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Santoni, Ronald E. Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity
in Sartre:~ Early Philosophy. Philadelphia: Temple Uni-
versity Press, 1995.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "La transcendence de !'ego." Recherches
Philosophiques VI (1936-37), 85-123; The Transcen-
dence of the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert
Kirkpatrick. New York: Noonday Press, 1957.
- . Carnets de la drâle de guerre: Novembre 1939-Mars
1940. Paris: Gallimard, 1983; The War Diaries. Trans.
Quentin Hoare. New York: Pantheon, 1984.
- . L 'etre et le neant. Paris: Gallimard, 1943; Being and
Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Bames. New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1956.
- . L 'existentialisme est un humanisme. Paris: Editions
Nagel, 1946; "Existentialism is a Humanism." Trans.
Philip Mairet. In Existentialismfrom Dostoevsky to Sartre.
Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Cleveland, OH: Meridian Books,
1956, 287-311.
- . Cahiers pour une morale [ 194 7-48]. Paris: Gallimard,
1983; Notebooks for an Ethics. Trans. David Pellauer.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- . Question de methode. Paris: Gallimard, 1957; Searchfor
a Method. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Random
House, 1958.
- . Critique de la raison dialectique, precede de Question
de methode. Vol. 1. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; Critique of
Dialectica! Reason. Trans. A1an Sheridan-Smith. London:
New Left Books, 1976.
- . Critique de la raison dialectique. Vol. 2. Paris: Galli-
mard, 1985; Critique of Dialectica! Reason, vol. 2. Trans.
Quentin Hoare. London: Verso Books, 1991.
--. Conjerence a L 'institute Gramsci, Rome. 1964. Un-
published manuscript conserved at the Bibliotheque Na-
tionale, Paris.
- . L 'idiot de la familie: Gustave Flaubert de 1821 a 185 7.
3 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1971-72; The Family Idiot. Gus-
tave Flaubert, 1821-1857. Trans. Carol Cosman. 5 vols.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981-93.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
189
- . "L'espoir, maintenant .. ."Le Nouvel Observateur 800-
802 (March 1O, 1980, 19; March 17, 1980, 52; March 24,
1980, 55); "The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre." Trans.
Adrienne Foulke. Dissent 27 (1980), 397-422.
Stone, Robert V., and Elizabeth A. Bowman. "Dialectica!
Ethics: A First Look at Sartre's Unpublished 1964 Rome
Lecture Notes." Social Text 13114 (1986), 195-215.
- . "Sartre's 'Morality and History': A First Look at the
Notes for the Unpublished 1965 Cornell Lectures." In
Sartre Alive. Ed. Ronald Aronson and Adrian van den
Hoven. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1911,
53--82.
THOMAS R. FLYNN
Em01y University
ETHICS IN SCHELER UnJike EDMUND HUSSERL,
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, or MARTIN HEIDEGGER, who pubJished
little if anything on ethics during their lifetimes, MAX
SCHELER published a major work on ethics during the
most productive and phenomenologically intensive pe-
riod ofhis career. His interest in ethics is evident even
before 1900, in his pre-phenomenological writings at
Jena, in which he distinguished ethical principles from
those of logic and explored the relation of ethics to
work (Arbeit). But it was only after he met Husserl
in 1901 and subsequently developed his own pheno-
menological perspective during a period ofinteraction
with other phenomenologists in Munich (from 1906)
and Gottingen ( from 1911) that his ethical reftections
assumed their more definitive, mature form. His nine
years as a private scholar and lecturer between his aca-
demic positions at Munich and Koln ( 191 0--19) were
the most productive of his life, and yielded a prolific
outpouring of major phenomenological studies, partic-
ularly in ethics and related areas. While Scheler's !ater
work in PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY and socioJogy of
knowledge also has important implications for his eth-
ical theory, his middle period was phenomenologically
and ethically definitive.
During his middle period Scheler published his
magnum opus, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die
materiale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and nonfor-
mal ethics of value, 1913/ 16), a ground-breaking ven-
ture in applied phenomenology, setting forth in oppo-
sition to KANT's ethical formalism a personalist ethics
based on the teleological intuition and realization of
material (nonformal) values. In the important essay,
190 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
"Ordo Amoris" ( 1916), he a1so elaborated upon a key
under1ying tenet of Formalismus- name1y, that there
exists an order of cognitive emotional INTENTIONAL-
ITY, independent of reason, through which values are
apprehended a priori. During this period he also pub-
lished Zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Sympa-
thiegefiihle und von Liebe und Hass (On phenomen-
ology and theory of sympathy, love, and hate, 1913),
and Uber Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil
(Conceming ressentiment and moral value judgment,
1912), an ingenious reversal ofNietzsche's claim that
Judeo-Christian morality stems from resentment, elic-
iting from Troeltsch the characterization of Scheler as
"the Catholic Nietzsche."
Scheler's ethica1 concems were always closely re-
1ated to his sense ofliving in an age ofworld-historical
crisis and transition - socially, economically, politi-
caliy, and spiritually. Weii before the outbreak of the
World War 1, he was aiready concerned about the
disintegrating spiritual identity of European civiliza-
tion, particularly about the displacement ofthe value-
orientation of the historical Christian ethos by that of
the ascendant age of bourgeois capitalism (MAX WE-
BER, Werner Sombart [ 1863~ 1941 ], and Ernst Troeitsch
( 1865~ 1923 ). The subsequent devastation of Europe by
the war heightened Scheler's concerns about European
unity and identity. These concerns were, for him, never
merely theoretical. He served on diplomatic missions
to Switzerland and The Netherlands, and after the war
he actively promoted the causes of pacifism, interna-
tional repentance, moral conversion, and European re-
unification on the basis of a new form of socialism that
would enlist the best energies of the Western heritage,
particularly those of Augustinian Christianity with its
emphasis on Christian love and sense ofhistorical pur-
pose and order.
These larger concerns had an immediate bearing on
ethics, in Scheler's view since the renewal of Europe
would ha veto begin with individuals and a reordering
of their sense of values. And this, he believed, was a
task that could be accomphshed only through a revi-
talization of ethics. In the first place, this meant that
ethics wouid have to provide principles that could of-
fer individuals some measure of concrete guidance. On
this point Scheler took issue with NICOLAI HARTMANN,
who eschewed questions of normative ethics. Scheler,
by contrast, declared: "After ali, eth1cs is a damned
bloody affair, and if it can give me no directives con-
cerning how I should li ve now in this social and histor-
ical context, then what is it?" In the second place, this
meant that ethics would have to be reestablished on a
secure new foundation. A return to ethical common-
sense theories or utilitarian principles ofthe kind found
in BRITISH MORAL THEORY was no ion ger a viable option.
The challenge to such views by philosophers such as
Nietzsche and by movements such as social Darwinism
had been far too serious to ignore. A new foundation
was required to enable ethics to withstand the assault
of moral skepticism and relativism. For Scheler, that
foundation is to be provided by a phenomenological
theory ofvalues.
While Scheler credits his "methodological con-
sciousness of the unity and sense of the phenomen-
ological attitude" to Husserl, it is clear that he does
not feei bound by Husserrs detailed methodological
concems or by the direction in which Husserl himself
developed them. As early as 1904 Scheler criticized
Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen (1900--190 1) for
its "platonizing" assumption that truth exists as some-
thing in itself, independently of instantiation in objects,
thoughts, or judgments. Like many of his contempo-
raries, he also criticized Husserl 's Ideen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913) for its egological "Cartesianism" and its
insistence on grounding phenomenology, in a manner
reminiscent of Kantian idealism, in the "transcenden-
tal ego." Scheler also rejects the primacy that Husserl
accords to logical-theoretical reason by asserting that
acts of willing and feeling are "founded" in intel-
lective acts and grasped only by means of the intel-
iect's predicative acts of objectivation and thematiza-
tion. By contrast, Scheler insists on the primacy and
autonomy of affective - even subliminal - modes
of value-apprehension, claiming that they ha ve a Pas-
caii an "logic" of their own, independent of reason.
Vaiues, not "objects'' in Husserl 's logica! sense, are the
primordial phenomena, he argues: "A value precedes
1ts object; it is the first 'messenger' of its particular na-
ture" Impressed by the human intellect's capacity for
self-deception, Scheler also attacks what he calls (bor-
rowing Fnincis Bacon 's expression) the "idols of self-
knowledge,'' particularly the Cartesian confidence in
the supposedly infallible "self-evidence" of inner per-
ception, and goes so far as to insist that genuine philo-
 ETHICS IN SCHELER
sophical knowledge has "moral prerequisites" such as
love, humility, and self-control.
Whatever may be said about the relationship be-
tween Husserl and Scheler, or the differences between
their ultimate conceptions of phenomenology, it was
Husserl's conception of "categoria! intuition" that ul-
timately opened the way for Scheler's theory ofvalue,
which is clearly based on the phenomenological no-
tions of "intuition of essences" ( Wesensschau) and the
"material a priori." What Scheler saw in phenomen-
ology was not so much a method as a particular attitude
(Einstellung) or mode of experience by which we atten-
tively "live through" (Erleben) our experiences, intu-
itively apprehending matters (Sachen) as they are given
in an immediate grasp of their essential eidetic con-
tours. "Essences" are taken by Scheler tobe neitheruni-
versals nor particulars, when considered in their pure
"whatness" ( Was) apart from the bracketed question of
"existence," since he did not follow Husserl in distin-
guishing between the EIDETIC METHOD and the transcen-
dental EPOCHE AND REDUCTION. Nor does ScheJer typi-
cally employ the canonica! Husserlian terms "noesis"
and "NOEMA" in his writings, although he clearly recog-
nizes that the bipolar intentiona! structure of conscious-
ness (first highlighted by FRANZ BRENTANO) allows for
two approaches in investigation, which he calls, re-
spectively, "act-phenomenology" and the "phenomen-
ology of facts." The first is, for Scheler, intimately
associated with his personalist anthropology and his
view of the person as the "ontic unity'' (Seinseinheit)
of acts, existing and living "solely in the execution of
intentiona! acts" - a view anticipating Heidegger's
DASEIN-analysis. The second involves a threefold dis-
tinction in varieties of facts: ( 1) natural, (2) scientific,
and (3) phenomenological or "pure" facts. The latter
he distinguishes from the others by virtue of the cir-
cumstances that their essences ( Wesenheiten) are fully
given in such a way that there is a complete coinci-
dence (Deckung) between what is intended and what
is given in them. These facts, or "essences," are also
considered by Scheler to be given "a priori"- that
is, independently of any inductive or ca usa! inferences
from sensory data.
Scheler's ethics is best understood by setting it, as
he did, in relation to Kant's. Scheler accepts Kant's
critique of naturalistic and utilitarian ethical theories.
He agrees with Kant's insistence that ethics must be
191
unconditional and a priori, that morals cannot rest on
anything as unpredictable as the anticipated realization
of contingent goods or ends. But he rejects the Kantian
inference that the "material contents" of moral experi-
ence therefore could have no place in determining the
moral value of an action. On the Kantian view, the only
principle of lawfulness conceivable in morality is that
contributed by a rational subject through the universal
form of the categorica! imperative. But the material
elements given in moral experience could never be
conceived as having their own lawfulness and order
independently of the subject. Hence for Kant, in de-
ciding the morality of an action, such phenomena as
willing and desiring were supposed tobe reckoned in a
purely formal way, without taking into account (indeed
avoiding) their material contents- the actual objects
of such willing and desiring.
While Scheler takes the categorica! imperative as
pointing to an essential facet of morality, he thinks
that this Kantian formalism was incomplete. He feels
that it prevents Kant from offering a clear, coherent
account of our moral experience, or even of the pre-
eminent fact that our primordial comportment toward
the world is affective and involves a pretheoretical
apprehension of values (Wertnehmung). Every mode
of intellectual reasoning, conceiving, or judging al-
ways already presupposes an affective experience of
the value of that about which one reasons, conceives,
or judges. Hence the very project of determining the
will in a purely fohnal manner apar! from the "mate-
rial" value-contents of willing, in the Kantian a priori
manner, is self-defeating. Further, Scheler feels that
Kant's formalist approach blinds him to the fact that
the "moral ought" of the categorica! imperative itself
presupposes precisely what Kant intended his formal-
ism to exclude: material insight into the actual values
implicit in an "ideal ought" (or in what Kant called
the "moral law"). Hence the greatest error of Kantian
ethics, for Scheler, is its neglect of those elements of
experience that are given a priori as the basic phenom-
ena of moral experience- namely, values.
Like Husserl, Scheler holds that Kant is mistaken
in limiting the a priori to the purely formal. His at-
tack on Kant's "formal a priori" and his defense of a
"material a priori" was even more intense and direct
than Husserl 's-a fact that may explain why Scheler,
more than Husserl, drew the fire of Moritz Schlick
192 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
(1882-1936) in his famous article, "Is There a Fac-
tual A Priori?" ( 193G-31 ). For Scheler, the "a priori"
consists in "ali those ideal units of meaning and those
propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate
intuitive content," apart from any question of positing
subjects or posited objects to which such units ofmean-
ing are applicable. Like Husserl, he identifies the a pri-
ori with the content of essential intuition. Kant's dis-
tinction between "a priori" and "a posteriori"- iden-
tified by him with the classical distinctions between
"form" and "matter," "intelligibility" and "sensibility"
- is displaced in Scheler's account by the distinction
between "essence" (identified with "phenomenologi-
cal fact") and "reality" (identified with "resistance").
The a priori is no longer "subjective" but "objective,"
not "formal" but "material," not imposed by reason
but given in intuition, not "independent of ali experi-
ence" but phenomenologically "experienced. " In this
extended sense of "a priori," therefore, one may say
that for Scheler there are certain fundamental a priori
but nonetheless nonformal truths that we may know
by means of essential intuition, and that these truths
yield objective moral judgments concerning the ma-
terial contents of moral experience that are universal,
necessary, and synthetic- judgments such as "spir-
itual values ha ve a higher rank in the scale of values
than sensible values."
One of Scheler's major contentions is that values
( Werte) are distinct from the objects of desire (Ziele)
or goods ( Gilter) that serve as their "bearers." He agrees
with Kant that moral obligation cannot be defined in
tenns of the latter without relativizing it and subordi-
nating it to the empirica! contingencies of particular
whims, ends and purposes (Zwecke). But he insists
that values, unlike their "bearers," are not subject to
such contingencies, since they are neither abstractions
from empirica! goods nor postulates of an empirica!
will (as even Heidegger mistakenly supposed), but are
first given independently even of conscious willing in
the passive intentionalities of subliminal experience.
While Scheler acknowledges that values have no real,
Platonic sort of "existence" in themselves ("Der Wert
ist liberhaupt nicht"), but only a "functional existence"
(as MANFRED FRINGS ca lis it) by virtue of a relation with
an existing "bearer," he nevertheless accords to values
the preeminent sta tus of absolute givenness as a priori
objects of phenomenological insight. He typically ap-
peals to the analogy of color to illustrate the manner
in which values are given. We talk readily about "red"
as a pure color of the spectrum without the need to
conceive of it as covering a surface. Like colors, val-
ues may be found attached to empirica! objects, but as
contents of immediate intuition they do not depend on
instantiation in those objects. We are acquainted, for
example, with cases in which the value of a thing is
presented to us clearly apartfiwn its "bearer," as in the
case of a person (ora work of art, ora room) that may
strike us as pleasant or repugnant without our being
able to say just why this is the case. Values, as such,
are pure eidetic "qualities" given absolutely and inde-
pendently both oftheir "bearers" and of any willing or
positing activity (Setzung) of the subject.
Scheler maintains that values can be shown to ex-
hibit themselves in an objective a priori order of re-
lationships possessing ali thc characteristics neces-
sary for a rigorously grounded ethics. While he takes
into consideration the formal properties and relations
among values ofthe kind mentioned by Brentano (e.g.,
"the existence of a positive value is itself a positive
value"), his analysis of material (nonformal) values and
their a priori interconnections is of much greater orig-
inality and significance. These latter values he groups
into four modalities, corresponding to the affective in-
tentionalities by which they are apprehended and their
respective emotional states. Ranked from highest to
lowest, these include: (1) religious values, such as the
"sacred" and "profane"; (2) cultural (geistige) values,
such as the "true," "right," and "beautiful"; (3) vital
values, such as the "nob le" and "common"; and (4)
sensory values, such as the "pleasant" and "painful."
(Frings discerns a fifth modality of"pragmatic" values,
such as the "useful" and "useless," between Scheler's
third and fourth rank, though admitting Scheler did not
assign them a separate rank.) Scheler would argue that
there is nothing arbitrary or subjective about this hier-
archy, that it is simply a phenomenological fact, open
to our inspection, and based on such evident criteria
(reminiscent of Bentham's hedonic calculus) as rela-
tive duration, depth of satisfaction, and the like. Fur-
thermore, he believed, like Brentano, that this ranking
reftects an a priori "logic of preference," a pre-rational
inclination favoring va1ues of a "higher" rank, as well
as "positive" (rather than "negative") values within a
given rank.
 ETHICS IN SCHELER
In order to understand Scheler's ethics at this point,
it is important to recognize that it rests on a critica! dis-
tinction between moral and nonmoral values. Moral
values (good and evi!) are defined in terms ofthe non-
moral value that is brought into being, as in teleological
theories generally. Accordingly, a phenomenology of
hierarchically ranked non moral values furnishes a clear
basis, in Scheler's view, for establishing the moral val-
ues of good and evi!, which can be defined in terms of
the relative rank of these other, non moral values that
are brought into being. In other words, moral values
are generated through acts ofwilling and realizing non-
moral values. Moral good appears through the willing
of "higher" as opposed to "lower," and "positive" as
opposed to "negative," nonmoral values. When par-
ents make material sacrifices for the education oftheir
children, they place their children 's education before
their own physical comforts, thereby exhibiting a pref-
erence for the "intellectual" value of education over
the "physical" value of their own material comfort.
The moral "good" here derives from the act ofwilling
the higher nonmoral value. Thus Scheler claims that
moral value is never given directly as the content or
abject of the act of willing, but only, so to speak, "on
the back" (aufdem Riicken) ofthis act. Further, on his
view, moral value is actually brought into existence in
a person whenever the existence of a "bearer" of a pos-
itive nonmoral value is willed, regardless of whether
one actually succeeds in bringing about the existence
ofthe intended nonmoral value or its bearer. Thus, his
ethics is teleological, but not consequentialist.
Scheler 'stheory of moral obligation is overtly axio-
logica!. Duty stems from insight into values. An ethics
of insight, for him, is diametrically opposed to an ethics
of duty, such as Kant's, which mistakenly takes moral
laws, imperatives, and duties to be the fundamental
facts of moral consciousness. Scheler criticizes Kant's
deontological ethics as "blind," because it overlooks
the primacy of value-phenomena. It fails to see that
moral imperatives and judgments always already pre-
suppose the comprehension ofvalues. Because ofthis,
an ethics of duty tends to "cut off' (abschneidet) moral
insight, to be essentially negative and restrictive, pre-
supposing an inclination on the part of the subject to
oppose its imperatives. As such, the actions enjoined
by such an ethics tend to lack the generous spontaneity
ofthose based on moral insight. Not only does Scheler
193
therefore insist that obligation must be based on value
and insight, but in the "ought" of obligation (Sollen)
he differentiates between a purely "ideal ought-to-be"
(ideales Seinsollen) and a "moral ought-to-do" (ethis-
ches Tunsollen ). Insight into the former (e.g., "injustice
ought not to be") serves as the basis, he claimed, for
willing and realizing that which is enjoined by the lat-
ter ("Thou shalt not do injustice"). Whether Scheler's
theory adequately accounts for the relations between
axiologica! insight, moral obligation, and inclination,
or such phenomena as moral conflict within the indi-
vidual, is a matter of continued debate.
While Scheler was unabashedly an objectivist and
absolutist in his VALUE THEORY, and even claims objec-
tive a priori validity for the intentiona! feelings (inten-
tionales Fiihlen) by which values are apprehended, he
does not deny a range of relativity in the actual moral
judgments and value-perceptions of various individu-
als and societies. What presents itself as morally oblig-
atory may vary, depending onan individual's level of
insight, moral disposition, virtue, or perceived ability.
Someone suffering from a pathological urge to sacrifice
may not ha ve the same obligation tobe more "selfless"
as a self-centered egotist. A quadriplegic may not be
morally bound to try to rescue a drowning person in
the same way as a fully capable swimmer. Further,
variations may also reflect the historical and cultural
relativity of an ethos, a particular ethical framework,
a particular society's estimations of certain behaviors
or its level of ethical performance, or even differences
in customs. Recognition ofthese types ofrelativity in-
forms the way in which Scheler develops his theory of
virtue, conscience, and the "caii ofthe hour" (kairos),
as well as his theory about "exemplary acts" and types
of"model persons" (the saint, genius, hero, etc.), which
he set forth as vehicles for moral growth. Yet Scheler
steadfastly maintained that recognition of these types
of relativity does not affect the objectivity of values
themselves.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Alpheus, Karl. Kant und Scheler 2nd ed. Ed. Barbara
Wolandt. Bonn: Bouvier, 1981 .
Barber, Michael D. Guardian o{ Dialogue: Max Se hefer:~
Phenomenology. Sociolog;· ofKnowledge. and Philosophy
ofLove. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1993.
Bershady, Harold J., ed. Max Scheler on Feeling, Knowing,
 194 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and Valuing: Selected Writings. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992.
Blosser, Philip. "Moral and Nonmoral Values: A Problem
in Scheler's Ethics." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 48 ( 1987), 139--43.
- . Scheler :~ Critique of Kant:~ Ethics. Athens, OH: Ohio
University Press, 1995.
Deeken, Alfons. Process and Permanence in Ethics: Max
Scheler :~ Moral Philosophy. New York: Paulist Press,
1974.
Frings, Manfred. "The Ordo Amoris in Max Scheler: Its
Relationship to His Value Ethics and to the Concept of
Resentment." Trans. F. Joseph Smith. In Facets of Eros.
Ed. F. Joseph Smith and Erling Eng. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1972.
- . Person und Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wert-
seins. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
-, ed. Special issue of Listening 21 (1986) devoted to
Scheler's "Ordo Amoris."
Perrin, Ronald F. "A Commentary on Max Scheler's Critique
ofthe Kantian Ethic." Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy
12 (1974), 347-59.
-. Max Scheler 's Concept of the Person: An Ethics of Hu-
manism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
Schneck, Frederick Stephen. Person and Polis: Max
Scheler 's Personalism as Politica/ Theory. Albany, NY:
State University Of New York Press, 1987.
Schneider, Marius. Max Scheler 's Phenomenological Philos-
ophy of Values. Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America Press, 1951.
Schutz, Alfred. "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics."
Review of Metaphysics Il ( 1957), 304-14; ( 1958), 486-
501.
Shimomisse, Eiichi. Die Phănomenologie und das Problem
der Grundlegung der Ethik: An Hand des Versuches van
Max Scheler. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
Smith, Quentin. "Max Scheler and the Classification offeel-
ings." Journal ofPhenomenological Psychology 9 ( 1978),
114-38.
Spader, Peter H. "Max Scheler's Practica! Ethics and the
Model Person." American Catholic Philosophical Quar-
terly 69 ( 1995), 63--81.
-. "The Non-Formal Ethics of Value of Max Scheler and
the Shift in His Thought." Philosophy Today 18 (1974),
217-33.
-. "The Primacy ofthe Heart: Scheler's Challenge to Pheno-
menology.'.' Philosophy Today 29 (1985), 223-29.
Uchiyama, Minoru. Das Wertwidrige in der Ethik Max Schel-
ers. Ed. Gerhard Funke. Bonn: Bouvier, 1966.
Wojtyla, Karol (Pope John Paul II). Ocena mozliwo.~ei zbu-
dowania etyki chrzescijwiskiej przy zalozeniach systemn
Maksa Schelera. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Ka-
tolickiego Universytetu Lubelskiego, 1959.
PHILIP BLOSSER
Lenoire-Rhine College
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 K/uwer Academic Publishers.
ETHNIC STUDIES Programs of this sort first
emerged at the University of California late in the
1950s and have been spreading elsewhere in the United
States since then. Although the study of African-
American history and culture in its own right would
seem to have begun with the writings of George Wash-
ington Williams (1849-1891 ), and to have become in-
stitutionalized with the establishment of the Associa-
tion for the Study ofNegro Life and History in 1915 un-
der the leadership ofCarter G. Woodson (1875-1950),
an explicitly multicultural approach to the ethnic study
ofpeoples ofthe United States did not emerge until the
Civil Rights movement ( 1954-65) evoked a re vi val of
interes! in group heritages and their implications for
scholarship, society, and self-identity.
Multidisciplinary programs of teaching and re-
search are concerned with the problems of both race
and ethnicity and tend to focus on ethnoracial mi-
norities, with some variation according to which spe-
cific groups are locally represented. Consideration of
majoritarian Euro-American ("White") groups in the
UNITED STATES and ethnoracial issues in other coun-
tries and empires, often characterized as matters of
"nationality," or "national minorities," have not been
excluded, although, with the exception of the numer-
ous sociologica! studies of Poles, Italians, and Jews in
America, they have often had to take a secondary place
in programs emphasizing African Americans, Asian
Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Indians (or "Na-
tive Americans").
In structure, Ethnic Studies resembles curricular
programs in Environmental Studies, Science Studies,
Technology Studies, and Women's Studies. They in-
clude participation by faculty from COMMUNICOLOGY,
ECONOMICS, ETHNOLOGY, HISTORY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, PHI-
LOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, and other HUMAN SCI-
ENCES and CULTURAL DISCIPLINES. Most if not ali such
disciplines have explicit or implicit phenomenologi-
cal tendencies in them. Although they remain largely
undeveloped, there are enormous opportunities for the
perspectives of a cultural-scientific or philosophical
phenomenologyto play apartin such multidisciplinary
programs.
Humans are always simultaneously inside and out-
side many of what can be called, generically, cul-
tural groups. Such cultural groups might be based on
class, ethnicity, gender, generation, nation, region, etc.
 ETHNIC STUDIES
Groups that are specifically ethnic (from ethnos, the
Greek term for a people; nation, from the Latin nătiă, is
a related but not precisely equivalent term) are based on
claimed heritages ofsuch socially visible determinants
as diet, dress, 1anguage, and re1igion, as well as genet-
ically acquired somatie properties. Elementary forms
ofheritage ofthese sorts are allcged to occur in various
combinations with various and selected emphases such
that insiders and outsiders might believe that the physi-
cal aspects are ultimately immutable (though intermar-
riage, interbreeding, and the occasional mutation can
alter, subordinate, or dilute them), while the acquired
ones are not necessarily subject to Lamarckian inher-
itance. Hence for Ethnic Studies, learning the culture
of a people is a way of possessing it and teaching that
cu !ture is a way of transmitting it across generations.
Upon close consideration, it is nearly impossible to find
a society that does not include a multiplicity of ethnic
groups; however, the relations among them can easily
include domination and antagonisms (e.g., bigotry and
racism) as well as accommodation and tolerance.
The United States of America is and continues to
be a country of immigrants with a number of eth-
nic groups. Ethnic relations, combinations of ethnic
groups, vicissitudes of ethnic consciousness, and re-
ftections on ethnicity are characteristic themes ofschol-
arly interest and societal action in the United States:
there are hundreds of ethnic groups in this o ne country.
Two major paradigms of academic and politica!
thought regarding race and ethnicity in the United
States can be recognized. The older paradigm, still
playing a large role, particularly among politica! con-
servatives and older liberals, is focused upon assimi-
lation as both the inevitable and desirable outcome of
ethnic group contact. Much of the theoretical and em-
pirica! work of sociologists in America defined the pace
and direction of the assimilative processes and rated
groups with respect to their adaptations to it. Integra-
tion into the population mainstream was said to occur
for any ethnoracially distinctive people in a generation
or two. Such a perspective required deemphasizing the
actual condition, e.g., of the Mexican Americans in
Texas and the American Southwest since the Mexican-
American war ( 1846--48); or of the persistence over
time of such cultural enclaves as "Chinatowns"; or of
the continuai interest of elements ofthe Irish-American
population in the Anglo-Irish struggle across the At-
195
!antic. Moreover, few assimilationists questioned the
ethnoracial composition of the so-called mainstream
of America. It might ha ve been asked whether this has
been and stil! remains a socio-culturally hegemonic oli-
garchy of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants that act as
politica!, economic, and cultural gatekeepers for, and
behind, an illusion of an integrated but nevertheless
"White," "Anglo," and middle-class America.
This older paradigm of assimilation was also ac-
cepted as part of the historical dialectic of MARXISM
among the adherents of the progressive politics of the
past century. Marxism 's emphasis on the primacy ofthe
relations of production rather than ethnic differences
- a phenomenon that Friedrich Engels had doubts
about with respect to the socio-economic formations in
America- seemed to require the dissolution of eth-
noraeial sodalities in the acidic solvent of inexorable
class struggle. The recent emphasis on FEMINISM has
also drawn attention away from concentration on the
issues affecting race and ethnic groups and diluted fur-
ther the essentialism found in Marxist theories of class.
Ethnic, class, and gender issues overlap and compound
in cultural groupings and in the formation of individual
identity- a phenomenon that ought to be foca! in the
human sciences.
The newer paradigm that tends tobe emphasized in
Ethnic Studies programs re1ates history, culture, and
consciousness to the extensive history of exclusion (in
ali its forms, e.g., slavery, prejudice, discrimination,
oppression, hegemonism, subordination, etc.) experi-
enced by the so-called "minority" groups. Some mem-
bers of these groups were held as s1aves and then op-
pressed in peonage (African Americans); others were
consigned to low wage agricultura! labor (Mexican
Americans); others were excluded from legal immi-
gration and denied the right to naturalization, although
their children born in America were citizens by birth
(Asian peoples); and still others were declared perma-
nent "dependents" and assigned to reservations (Native
Americans).
With the breakup ofthe Austro-Hungarian and Ot-
toman Empires at the end of World War I, a different
resolution of the ethnic issue emerged. Presented as
President Woodrow Wilson 's doctrine of national self-
determination, and accepted in principle by the League
of Nations, the doctrine was immediately but imper-
fectly applied to the successor states ofthe two defunct
 196 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
empires. It did not apply to the newly emerging UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, nor to the co]onies of
Africa, Asia, and Oceania that the victorious powers
in the war wished to retain. In Western Europe ethnic
tensions arose in severa! countries but did not result
in secessionist or state-building movements. Follow-
ing the dissolution ofthe Spanish, Portuguese, French,
Italian, Dutch, and British overseas empires in the three
decades after the end ofWorld War II, the doctrine was
reasserted in a host of new states admitted to the United
Nations. The postcolonial states in Africa, Asia, and
Oceania were in fact multi-ethnic but claimed unitary
or ethnonational status. Precisely because the num-
ber of would-be nations greatly outnumbers that of
established territorial states in the world, nationalist
movements in behalf of cultural, ethnic and politica!
self-determination and in quest of economic autonomy
continue to arise.
Concomitant with the disintegration of the So-
viet Union and the dissolution and ethno-civil strife
in the Balkan states, ethnic and national tensions
within a number of states intensified. In Europe these
took such forms as riots against refugees and guest
workers in reunified Germany; xenophobic demagogy
launched against France's African ex-colonials; per-
sistent Flemish-Walloon conflicts in Belgium; Greco-
Roman disputes over Cyprus; Spain 's difficulty with its
Basque population; Holland's troubles with its South
Moluccans; and Britain 's long dispute in Northern Ire-
land. In Africa, most postcolonial state societies em-
brace a number of ethnic groups, some ofwhose mem-
bers reside in border areas that stretch beyond the polit-
ica! boundaries. In some ofthese states (e.g., Rwanda
and Burundi), competition and conflict ari se among the
severa! peoplehoods. South Africa has begun to dis-
mantie its apartheid and separate homeland systems,
but intertribal and other ethnic conflicts are emerging.
In Asia, Japan has never resolved its less than egali-
tarian treatment of the Burakumin, Ainu, Okinawan,
and Korean peoples; China must deal with its fifty-five
officially recognized national minorities, its Tibetan
question, and the Taiwan dispute; India must deal with
its Muslims, Sikhs, Parsees, and many more. In North
America, Canada is threatened by its Anglophone-
Francophone division and the reasserted claims of its
Indian, Eskimo, and "Meti" populations. Everywhere
the organization of nationalities into separate states
or autonomous regions suggests itself but seems an
unlikely and inefficacious solution to the multifarious
problems it seeks to address.
A newer paradigm began to emerge conceptually
in the United States when Horace Kallen ( 1882-197 4)
advanced an anti-assimilationist thesis in Cu/ture and
Democracy ( 1924 ): the true test of a democracy would
be its preservation of the cultural identities of its
various peoples. He did not advocate national self-
determination, which would re late ethnicity to territory
and independent politica! authority, but rather plural-
ism, a vision of American society not as a melting pot
but rather as what, in a more recent image, can be called
a "salad bowl," i.e., a civil society wherein it is rec-
ognized that ethnic diversity is essential to a national
culture and in which such differences are appreciated.
That the United States is an irreducibly multicul-
tural, pluralistic, or multi-ethnic society became in-
creasingly clear in the 1950s during the era ofthe Civil
Rights movement. At the same time, there emerged
among some scholars and students at the University of
California a recognition that conventional textbooks
in anthropology, history, literature, politics, sociology,
etc., had failed to present or represent the actual range
of peoples within the society. Multidisciplinary Eth-
nic Studies programs, as they carne to be called, then
began to arise at first as compensatory efforts. These
programs aim not only to expand curricular coverage
but also to legitimate the histories, cultures, and unique
character ofhitherto neglected ethnoracial groups. Pro-
grams in Women 's Studies, Gay and Lesbian Studies,
etc. - each in effect claiming a heritage, a cui ture, or
a lifestyle worthy of legitimating recognition, schol-
arly attention, and social acceptance- subsequently
followed this format.
Whether Ethnic Studies programs must come under
the domination of a single discipline, e.g., sociology,
such that the participation of other disciplines is rel-
egated to a supportive, ancillary, or "token" role, re-
sembling that of subordinated minorities in the wider
society, is an unresolved issue. Should such a develop-
ment occur, an Ethnic Studies program would reflect in
its structures the questioned ideal of assimilation and
integration, which the establishment of Ethnic Stud-
ies was designed to question and which the expression
"multi-discipline" can be used to oppose.
In the phenomenological perspective, the socially
 ETHNIC STUDIES
visible determinations of ethnic groups to which an in-
dividual considers herself or himselfto belong (or not
belong) have cultural characteristics, i.e., they are be-
lieved in, valued, and willed. They are also selectively
noticed. This ali occurs in deeply habitual ways that in
fact are learned but take on the character ofmores and
seem "natural" to those insi de and outside such groups.
These cultural characteristics and the positional strata
of habitual conscious life in which they are consti-
tuted can be reftected upon, analyzed, and described
with respect to the investigator's own self and group
as well as with respect to those of others. Reftective
descriptions, sophisticated or not, are presupposed not
only by attempts at explanation, but also in the realms
of action on the commonsense, cultural scientific, and
philosophicallevels.
The reftective-descriptive approach is recognizable
as a method ofresearch in the so-called qualitative and
interpreti ve tendencies within such cultural disciplines
as sociology. It is crucial for Ethnic Studies. It has
a ro le to play in the self- and other-understandings of
each memberofan ethnic group; in those ofeach ofthe
uni-disciplines that can investigate such groups; and in
the multi-discipline that can be formed from them.
There are precedents in phenomenological philos-
ophy for reftections on ethnicity, particularly in the
writings of SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, HANNAH ARENDT, JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE, and ALFRED SCHlJTZ; a phenomenoiogist
can add relevant implications for this perspective in
the work of other figures. The writings of MAX SCHELER
and ARON GURWITSCH are a rich source yet to be mined
for their relevance to Ethnic Studies. At the present
time actual participation in and reftection upon Ethnic
Studies programs by phenomenological philosophers
can hardly be said to have begun. Nevertheless, given
recent domestic as well as international events, much
can be expected.
The phenomenological philosopher can approach
race and ethnicity directly, much as the cultural scien-
tist does, but without accepting the specifying assump-
tions of a specialized discipline, and might well attain
insights of a general significance by this route. Another
and probably more effective strategy is oblique and
consists in accessing the lives and worlds of various
self- and mutually-recognized peoples through reftec-
tion upon the cultural sciences in which these matters
are positively investigated and, even more promisingly,
197
upon the multidisciplinary efforts of Ethnic Studies
programs and how the subject matter of race and eth-
nicity presents itself in them. This would be analogous
to approaching nature through philosophical reftection
upon historical, logica!, psychological, sociologica!,
and other specialized scientific research on the actual
practices of natural science. Experience has already
proven the benefits of a philosopher 's consulting with
scientific specialists in Ethnic Studies.
For phenomenological VALUE THEORY there is the
issue in multi-ethnic societies of value systems inter-
mediate in breadth between an entire cultural world
and a specific cultural situation. Then again, there are
overlaps between such value systems in such a society.
For what can be called ethnic value systems (and also
for the systems of ends and means intimately related
to them) there arise various questions of ethnic diver-
sity and relations, including, above ali, that ofwhether
there are basic values that hold not for one or a few
but for ali groups, and are thus nonrelative, or whether
RELATIVISM ofnot only value and purpose but even be-
lief systems is the case. On the level of willing and
purposes thcre are, moreover, questions of ETHJCS and
POLITJCS, e.g., that ofwhether tolerance ought to extend
so far as to embrace the aggressively intolerant.
Finally, the question of ethnicity actually be-
gins already to emerge in phenomenology's self-
understanding when, despite the striving for nonrel-
ative validity, it remains significant to speak of the
American, German, French, Latin American, Japanese,
and other national traditions in the history ofthis move-
ment. In sum, more than a little can be expected from
future decades of phenomenology in and of Ethnic
Studies.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1958.
- . The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identitv ami Politics in the
Modern Age. Ed. Ron Feldman. New York: Grovc Press,
!ne., 1978.
Gurwitsch, Aron. Die mitmenschlichen Begegmmgen in der
Milieuwelt [ 1931]. Ed. Alexandre Metraux. Berlin: Wal-
ter de gruyter, 1977; Human Encounters in the Social
World. Trans. Frcd Kcrsten. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Prcss, 1979.
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, eds. Beyond
the Melting Pot: The Negroes. Puerto Ricans. Jews, Ital-
ians. and Jrish of'New York Citv. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1970.
- . Ethnicity: The Theorv am! Experience. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1975.
198 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Hill, Herbert and James E. Jones, eds. Race in America:
The Struggle for Equality. Madison, WI: Univcrsity of
Wisconsin Press, 1993.
Gordon, Milton M. Assimilation in American Lţfe: The Role
of Race, Religion. and National Origins. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1964.
Kallen, Horace. Cu/ture and Democracy in the United States:
Studies in the Group Psychology ofthe American Peoples.
New York: Boni & Liveright, 1924.
Lyman, Stanford M. The Black American in Sociologica/
Thought: A Failure of Perspective. New York: G. P. Put-
nam's Sons, 1972.
- . Chinatown and Litt/e Tokyo: Power, Conflict, and Com-
munity among Chinese and Japanese Immigrants in Amer-
ica. Millwood, NY: Associated Faculty Press, 1986.
- . "The Assimilation-Pluralism De bate: Toward a Postmod-
ern Resolution of the American Ethnoracial Dilemrna."
International Journa/ of Politics, Cu/ture, and Society Il
( 1992), 181-21 O.
- , and Lester Embree. "Ethnic Studies as Multi-Discipline
and Phenomenology." In Phenomenology ofthe Cultural
Disciplines. Ed. Mano Daniel and Lester Embree. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994,211-49.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in In-
ternational Politic.~. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993.
Myrdal, Gunnar, with Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose.
An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.
Newman, William M. American Pluralism: A Study of Mi-
nority Groups and Social The01y. New York: Harper &
Row, 1973.
Park, Robert E. Col/ected Papers, I: Race and Cu/ture. Ed.
Everett Cherrington Hughes et al. Glencoe, IL: The Free
Press, 1950.
Pevar, Stephan L. The Rights ofindians Tribes: The Basic
ACLU Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights. Carbondale, IL:
Southem Illinois University Press, 1992.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Reflexions sur la questionjuive. Paris: Paul
Morihien, 1946; Anti-Semite and Jew. Trans. George J.
Becker. New York: Schocken Books, 1948.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Husserl and Indian Thought." In Pheno-
menology and Indian Philosophy. Ed. D. P. Chattopad-
hyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty. New
Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research/Motilal
Banarsidass, 1992, 20-43.
Schutz, Alfred. "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the
Social World." In his Collected Papers II: Studies in So-
cial Theory. Ed. Arvid Brodersen. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964, 226--73.
Takaki, Ronald. A Different Mirror: A History of Multi-
Cultural America. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1993.
Thernstrom, Stephan, ed. Harvard Encyc/opaedia of Ameri-
can Ethnic Groups. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1980.
Walzer, Michael. What it Means to be an American: Essays
on the American Experience. New York: Marsilio, 1992.
West, Cornel. Race Matters. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.
STANFORD M. LYMAN
Florida Atlantic University
LESTER EMBREE
Florida Atlantic University
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ETHNOLOGY The task of ethnology or cultural
anthropology is a comparative as well as a descriptive
one, for it begins with the assumption of a plurality of
cultures and societies, rather than a single one. Ali the
questions it poses are thus double ones: to what extent
are the concepts we use to depict our own social life
also valid for those of different languages and cultures?
These questions implicate the philosophical foun-
dations of our social theorizing as we11. Is there a
repertoire of human characteristics that is ontologi-
ca11y prior to the acquisition of any particular culture
and language? If so, is the identification of this reper-
toire of any use to ethnology, given the fact that it
is focused precisely on the variations and differences
between such cultures, languages, and societies?
The major theories of anthropology thus must nec-
essarily address themselves simultaneously to the uni-
versality of what it means to be human while at the
same time insisting that such universality is tobe found
in the very phenomenon of linguistic and cultural di-
versity and differentiation. In short, anthropology is
confronted with the dilemma that it can only address
and apprehend the difference of other peoples' LIFE-
WORLDs through the resources of its own perceptual
and conceptual apparatus, which itself is historica11y
and cultura11y conditioned. Yet it can be said that for
most of this century, a commitment to some form of
methodological objectivism has been part and parc el of
al1 anthropological theory, both materialist and idealist.
What the HUMAN SCIENCES are now benefiting from
at our present juncture, however, is the fundamental
critique of such naive objectivism, and it is this cri-
tique which has led to the re-emerging importance of
phenomenological and existential modes ofanalysis in
current ethnographic studies.
It is also clear- though this has been pointed out
for many years- that many of the societies and cul-
tures that anthropology pays attention to are not and
cannot be founded on Cartesian antinomies such as
mind and body, nor on other associated Enlightenment
oppositions such as nature and culture, individual and
society, and so forth. It is reasonable to conclude that
those critiques of Cartesianism that arose within the
development of our own analytical repertoire, such as
phenomenology, stand to achieve a greater descriptive
and analytical purchase on such cultures. For example,
in a recent address, Tim Ingold proposes to borrow the
 ETHNOLOGY
phenomenological concept of the Umwelt, "milieu,"
or as he puts it, "the world as constituted within the
specific life activity of an animal." And he finds in
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's formulation of dwelling a sui table
descriptive labei for the "whole manner in which one
lives one's life on the earth."
Because of his focus on the corporeal nature of
being-in-the-world, one of the most important figures
within the phenomenological tradition for anthropol-
ogy has been MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. For instance,
ethnological experience with small-scale, subsistence
societies repeatedly confirms the centrality ofthe BODY
in organizing a range ofrelational, productive, and cos-
mologica! orders. As ALPHONSE DE WAELHENS has put it,
"the body- but not the body as a thing- is itself
at the center of ... sociality." Sociality is an embod-
ied phenomenon insofar as it begins with the child's
earliest experiences of socialization in the microcosm
of the materna! embrace that subsequently models the
opening up ofthe child's expanded social world. Acts
of nurturance, specifically feeding, become the foca!
sites ofhuman interaction, and what strikes the anthro-
pologist is the ubiquity offeeding, ingestion, digestion,
and excretion as images for a total range of social, pro-
ductive, and spatial arrangements within a community.
According to Roy Wagner, the Daribi, a group of
swidden cultivators of the interior highlands of Papua
New Guinea, liken their communallonghouse to such
an ingesting, feeding organism. The front ofthe house
faces east, the direction of the rising sun, and it is in
this end that the men li ve. The back of the longhouse
is the women 's section. The longhouse is rai sed offthe
ground by posts, but only the front is provided with an
entrance ladder. It is through the front door that food
and supplies are brought into the house. The back of
the house, by contrast, is used as a latrine by men, and
refuse and food leavings are also thrown over the side
at this end. Thus "the 'direction' of life, coming and
going, bringing in, preparing, and finally discarding or
excreting food ... " gives the central corridor of the
longhouse an alimentary function on a par with that of
the human body.
The production of speech also partakes of this
gustatory-procreative imagery in some cases. Calame-
Griaule explains how the Dogon of Ma li (north central
Africa) feei that words are produced inside the body
and that each organ with its different characteristics,
199
makes different contributions to the kind and quality
of words as well as tones and intonations. The speech
of others nourishes and feeds one, and other people's
speech also is seen to fertilize others. Calame-Griaule
says ofthe Dogon that they feei that "words are formed
inside the body and nourished on its substance like a
child in its mother's womb; too, it is expelled by an
irresistible impulse similar to the contractions that lead
inexorably to birth." For the Dogon, the name of an
object is its "seed" or reproductive power: "To speak
of an object is also to utter its name ... For the Do-
gon [this] involves 'giving water to the seeds,' in other
words, setting offthis potential reproduction contained
in the 'seeds,' which favours a sort of symbolic birth,
or more, precisely, rebirth, a perpetua! recreation." The
image of farming, o ne of the ma in subsistence activi-
ties ofthe Dogon, is used to give shape to their notions
of what words are - as something like a plant that
must be nourished and that in turn can serve as nour-
ishment for others. Knowledge is then conceived as
getting sustenance from others through their speech.
In many societies, the human body is conceived and
experienced as a nexus of conduits and paths along
which vital energy and substances flow. Social interac-
tion takes place when these flows are directed outward
toward others or conversely when one is made tobe the
recipient of energy or substances from another. Among
the Songhay ofMali, for instance, Michael Jackson re-
ports that "movements of 'blood,' 'heat,' and 'breath'
take place along pathways in the body .... When these
movements of blood, heat, or breath flow unimpeded
in the right direction a person is healthy, but ifthe flow
is reversed or obstructed illness occurs." Moreover,
"the Songhay re gard the circulation of people, goods,
and services along paths in the village as vitally con-
nected to the circulation of blood, heat, and breath in
the individual body." This means that the daily activi-
ties that people like the Songhay engage in themselves
contribute to a more encompassing embodiment ofthe
communal territory. For example, Waterman reports
that the Yurok of the northwest coast of North Amer-
ica considered trails to be "like people," that is, "they
are sentient, and must be treated with urbanity."
This corporealization ofthe landscape and territory
can be further demonstrated by considering the inter-
changeability of personal names and place names in
certain societies. Among the Yurok, "a man who owns
200 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
a house is regularly called ... by the name ofhis house."
And since Yurok house names themselves have geo-
graphically descriptive terms in them, the sum total of
names ofpeople in a community is isomorphic with the
geographical distribution ofhouses in that territory.
The above examples amply demonstrate the inte-
gral place that a phenomenology of the body has in
the ethnological analysis ofmany cultures' lifeworlds.
But from a broader perspective, anthropology has for
the most part opposed phenomenological approaches.
There have been at least two major critiques ofpheno-
menology within anthropology. The first and most im-
portant was Claude Levi-Strauss's STRUCTURALISM. So-
cial phenomena, he asserted, could never be reducible
to lived experience, since their effects take place in the
space between subjects. A New Guinea actor's view of
his or her ro le in a regional exchange cycle says nothing
about the totality of that exchange cycle (which may
link persons in societies that ha ve no face-to-face con-
tact with each other), nor does it give a sense ofits sys-
tematicity or global logic. Furthermore, Levi-Strauss's
appreciation ofthe dramatic accomplishments ofstruc-
turallinguistics in the 20th century convinced him that
sociallaws were a phenomenon ofthe unconscious and
that LANGUAGE represents an "unreflecting totalization"
beyond intention, will, and consciousness.
Buton the other hand, Levi-Strauss's own "science
ofthe concrete," which is how he described the strategy
of classification he applied to non-Western societies,
inevitably returns time and time again to corporeal
schemata as images for the totalization and detotaliza-
tion that are the products of such categorizing percep-
tual acts. And such a realization should make us under-
stand that ifwe are to work to dissolve antinomies such
as mind and body, categorizing and utilizing, thinking
and produc ing, and so forth, then the artificial divisions
between, for example, anthropology, PSYCHOLOGY, and
GEOGRAPHY within human science are likewise rendered
suspect.
These three seemingly distinct human science ana-
lytics are artfully collapsed in one of Levi-Strauss's
most phenomenological analyses, that of the Cuna
shaman 's curing ritual. For the Cuna, difficult child-
birth occurs because Muu has captured the purba
"soul" of the mother-to-be. The shaman 's task is to
recapture the lost purba soul. The treatment consists in
the shaman 's chanting of a song that te lis the story of
his journey to Muu 's domain in the supernatural world
in order to recover the purba soul. But the abode of
Muu is not merely some mythical place where the spir-
its li ve. According to the song, it represents literally the
space of the vaginal and uterine anatomy of the preg-
nant woman, which are reconnoitered by the shaman
and his guardian spirit or nuchu, and which represents
the battleground on which the struggle to regain the
purba is waged.
To reach Muu, the shaman and his spirit helpers,
the nelegan, must follow the road called "Muu's Way,"
which is the birth canal of the affiicted woman. The
trip itself is phrased in terms of a fantastic landscape
-it is, as Levi-Strauss says, "a complicated mythical
anatomy, corresponding less to the real structure ofthe
genital organs than to a kind of emotional geography."
The route of the nelegan and the shaman becomes a
movement between various named places in this cos-
mized female anatomy. This movement, moreover, is
given a specifically sexual character: the nelegan at the
outset "take on the appearance and the motions of the
erect penis" in effecting this entry onto Muu's Way.
According to Levi-Strauss, the shaman is actually at-
tempting to make the affiicted woman feei the entry of
the shaman and his helpers, so that she can trace their
progress to the site ofthe difficulty in her uterus. Thus
from the point ofview ofthe affiicted woman, "not only
does she feei them [i.e., the nelegan ], but they 'light
up' the route they are preparing to follow- for their
sake, no doubt, and to find the way, but also to make
the center of her inexpressible and painful sensations
'clear' for her and accessible to her consciousness." We
could say that into an inchoate sensation of pain and
anxiety is placed a series of spacings, in the form of a
felt succession ofnamed points along the painful inter-
na! route ofher birth canal. Here the Cuna demonstrate
that what is externa! and what is interna! to the body
are not conceived of in different terms, and that what
is interna! to the body is imaged in exactly the same
terms as life movement through a territorial domain.
For the second major critique of phenomenology
in its ethnomethodological form ( derived from ALFRED
SCHUTZ) we are indebted to the sociologist Pierre Bour-
dieu, who nevertheless accomplished a true reconcili-
ation of phenomenology and anthropology. In his Es-
quisse d 'une theorie de la pratique (Outline of a theory
of practice, 1972), he maintains that by positing for
 ETHNOLOGY
itself as a subject matter "ali that is inscribed in the re-
lationship offamiliarity with the familiar environment,
the unquestioning apprehension of the social world,"
phenomenology "excludes the question of the condi-
tions of its own possibility." Primary knowledge and
experience must always be set against an assessment
ofthe theoretical and social conditions that make such
knowledge and experience possible, and that further-
more are systematically misrecognized or denied by the
actors in the interest of maintaining the self-evidence,
naturalness, and inevitability of a certain mode of prac-
tice. The critica! component of Bourdieu's theory is
thus his identification of the role of concealment or
misrecognition of these objective conditions.
In Wacquant's words in An lnvitation to Reflexive
Sociology ( 1992), "a genuine science of human prac-
tice cannot be content with merely superimposing a
phenomenology on a social topology. It must also eluci-
date the perceptual and evaluative schema ta that agents
invest in their everyday life."
This leads to what can be identified as a more re-
cent third critique, which recognizes the points of sim-
ilarity between Bourdieu's stress on interpretation and
the EXISTENTIAL and HERMENEUTICAL reformuJation of
phenomenology by MARTIN HEIDEGGER. JAMES WEINER,
like Bourdieu, starts from the understanding that the
"interpretations of agents are an essential component
ofthe fu li reality ofthe social world." Tobe in theworld
- the nature of DASEIN-means that human knowledge
and perception are fundamentally relational. For Hei-
degger, both being-in and being-with indicate that tobe
human means to have fundamental relationships with
things and with others with which and with whom we
are concemed, which and whom we care about and
against which and whom we measure ourselves. In
focusing on relationality as a core component of the
human world, Heidegger and Bourdieu can be seen to
have much in common. The difference is that Heideg-
ger does not identify the relational with the social but
with a more primordial existential capacity ofbeing.
Weiner hamesses this relational existential to the
task of analyzing the spatial and temporal dimensions
of the discursive practices of the Foi of interior Papua
New Guinea. Heidegger claims that it was the under-
standing of one 's own death that allowed us tobe truly
temporal beings. Faced with one's death, one works
toward an eventual resolution of one's life, one seeks
201
to make a meaning out ofthe sum of one's projects.
While Foi women are at work processing the sta-
ple sago starch, they compose and sing laments to
the memory of their dead male kinsmen. These po-
etic songs commonly describe the places the deceased
used to inhabit and upon which he exercised his pro-
ductive exertions-in the form of gardens, animal and
fish traps, house-building, and so forth. They appeal to
the abandoned, empty status of such places consequent
to the death of the one who vivified them and left his
mark upon them.
The temporal course of a man's life is thus depicted
as a spatial series of named places that comprises a
path or track through the village territory. The general
conclusion we can draw is that people like the Foi,
Yurok, and Dogon make TIME first through the bodily,
spatial situatedness oftheir goals, activities, and inten-
tions in life, and it is part of this very groundedness
to be forward-looking toward the anticipated outcome
of these goals. Aletta Biersack, writing of the Paiela
of Papua New Guinea, refers to a "horizon of agency"
as the "spatial, temporal, and personal limits of the
projects and their products."
The role of discourse in the construction of lived
temporality is critica!. When the Foi memorialize
their dead through rite, litany, eulogy, teknonymy, and
penthonymy, the dead are brought into their present.
The vivification of memories of the dead is just one
instance of the way the dead can often be el o ser to us
than the living; in the "intense recall" ofthe deceased's
prior situatedness we find an instance ofwhat Heideg-
ger called care, which he described as our source of
interes! in our future. As George Steiner puts it, "The
death of an individual is very often a modulation to-
wards resurrection in other men 's needs and remem-
brance. Heidegger's term is 'respectful solicitude' ."In
this lies the understanding of"how a living community
must constitute a 'being-along-side' its dead."
Yet another approach to placing the work ofBour-
dieu with that of the phenomenological tradition is
found in THOMAS J. CSORDAS. In "Embodiment as a
Paradigm for Anthropology" ( 1990) he suggests that
Bourdieu's notion ofthe bodily habitus can supply the
social and cultural background often lacking in pheno-
menological analyses of individual subjectivity. On the
other hand, a phenomenological focus on pre-objective
intentionality and the perceptual constitution of tran-
202 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
scendent cultural objects offers a way to counteract
the "inadequate provision for self-motivated change
within the habitus" in Bourdieu. Csordas applies this
approach in The Sacred Self" A Cultural Phenomen-
ology ofCharismatic Healing ( 1994) and other studies.
Finally, a sense of the direction that ethnology is
heading with re gard to its reformulations of experience,
subjectivity, and cultural lifeworlds is provided by
Michael Jackson in Paths Toward a Clearing ( 1989).
Jackson advocates an anthropological methodology
based on what WILLIAM JAMES termed radical empiri-
cism: an anthropology that would consider "the way
in which ideas and words are wedded to the world in
which we live, how they are grounded in the mundane
events and experiences of everyday life." And yet in
tandem with an appreciation ofthe subjective focus of
this constructionist account of such a world, the an-
thropologist should also place a consideration ofwhat
resists or !ies beyond the limits of subjectivity, as Hei-
degger urged, of how a concealed objective state of
affairs is made to appear as a result of the focused-
ness and INTENTIONALITY of our consciousness in the
world. An ethnology that addressed itself to both the
phenomenological and the existential in this way would
preserve the truth ofboth our interpretational perspec-
tive and the objective conditions under which such an
interpretational stance creates its own possibilities.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construc-
tion ofReality. Hanmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966.
Biersack, Aletta. "Histories in the Making: Paie! a and Histor-
ical Anthropology." History and Anthropology 5 ( 1990),
63--&5.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Equisse d 'une theorie de la pratique. Paris:
Libraire Doz, 1972; Outline ofa TheOiyofPractice. Trans.
Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992.
~ and Lolc Wacquant. An lnvitation ta Reflexive Sociology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Calame-Griaule, G. Words and the Dagon World. Philadel-
phia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986.
Csordas, Thomas J., ed. Embodiment and Experience: The
Existential Ground o( Cu/ture and Self. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1994.
Heidegger, Martin. Poetry. Language. Thought. Ed. and
trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row,
1971.
Ingold, T. "Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and
People Make Themselves at Home in the World." Paper
presented at the 4th decennial of the Association of Social
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Anthropologists, Oxford, July 1993.
Jackson, M. Paths Toward a Clearing. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1989.
Levi-Strauss, Claude. Anthropologie structurale. Paris: Pion,
1958; Structural Anthropology. New York: Basic Books,
1963.
~.La pensee sauvage. Paris: Pion, 1962; The Savage Mind.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
Mimica, J. Intimations of Infinity: The Cultural Meanings o(
the lqwaye Counting System and Number. London: Berg,
1988.
Munn, N. Wa!biri Iconography: Graphic Representation
and Cultural Symbo!ism in a Central Australian Society.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973.
Waelhens, Alphonse de. "The Human Sciences, the Onto-
logica! Horizon, and the Encounter." In Phenomenology
and Sociology. Ed. Thomas Luckmann. Hanmondsworth:
Penguin, 1978.
Wagner, R. Habu: The lnnovation ofMeaning in Daribi Re-
ligion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
Waterrnan, T. T. "Yurok Geography." University of Califor-
nia Pub!ications in American Archaeology and Ethnology
16 (1977), 177-314.
Weiner, James. The Empty Place: Poetry, Space, and Being
among the Foi of Papua New Guinea. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1991.
~. "Anthropology contra Heidegger, PartI: Anthropology's
Nihilism." Critique ofAnthropology 12 ( 1992), 75--90.
~. "Anthropology contra Heidegger, Part Il: The Limit of
Relationship." Critique of Anthropology 13 (1993), 295--
301.
JAMES WEINER
University of Ade!aide
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY See SOCIOLOGY.
EVIDENCE In everyday communication we use
words like "evidence" and "evident" when something
is so clear to us that there is no need for further demon-
stration. The phenomenological term "evidence," how-
ever, has a more precise meaning, and is closely related
to- though certainly different from- the concept of
TRUTH.
In phenomenology evidence is a key term. EDMUND
HUSSERL, who has given the most detailed analysis of
evidence ever offered in philosophy, even formulated
a "principle of evidence" as the first methodological
principle of phenomenology. In it he states that "a be-
ginner in philosophy" can neither make nor accept any
judgment that he or she has not drawn from evidence,
from "'experiences' in which the respective things and
 EVIDENCE
states of affairs are present ... as 'they themselves' ."
What Husserl postulates in this principle of Evidenz
is, first, that philosophy in general cannot do without
evidence, and second, that the traditionallack ofproof
in philosophy can only be compensated for by the ac-
quisition of evident conceptual insight. He no longer
demands constructions and deductions from philoso-
phy, but rather ~ due to his analytical demands for
describing phenomena and uncovering and exhibit-
ing their structural features ~ he requires a rigorous
method of seeing, noein, in the widest sense of the
word. This does not mean that evident insight could
replace chains of arguments. Neither science nor phi-
losophy could ever dispense with the discursive pro-
cedures of demonstrating and arguing in searching for
truth. But ali such technical orderings are themselves
to be grounded on evidence. Accordingly, the evident
insights concerned have to be brought to light in or-
der to make the methodical procedures philosophically
intelligible.
The evidence on which ali knowledge finally rests
is not simply a natural gift of human perception or
even intuition. Rather, evidence can only be obtained
through its own specific procedure, and it requires its
own way of proof. Husserl, it is true, started his anal-
ysis of evidence with his often cited, and often misun-
derstood, version of evidence as experience (Erlebnis)
and even as the "experience oftruth." This experience,
however, does not mean a special kind or class of in-
tentiona! acts, since it does not have its own typical
abject, a feature that belongs structurally to ali inten-
tions, as is the case with experiences like PERCEPTION,
MEMORY, EXPECTATION, and SO forth, which each have
their own type of objectivity. On the contrary, the ob-
jectivity correlated to the so-called experience oftruth
or evidence is nothing other than something that is
evidently perceived, remembered, or judged, whereas
something evident as such would not make any sense.
Accordingly, experiences of evidence do not have a
special intentiona! status, as though there would be
certa in acts of consciousness "directed toward" some-
thing, and this something would be truth.
On the contrary, evidence cannot be conceived of
phenomenologically except in relation to a distinctive
mode of givenness through which an intended abject is
not determined, but only qualified in a certain way. In
other words, evidence can by no means be attributed to
203
the objectivity in question as though it were an adherent
or intrinsic quality of it; rather, it must be brought
to that objectivity. Thus evidence turns out to be an
achievement of consciousness that has nothing to do
with simply "seeing" that such and such is the case.
Rather, it requires a considerable amount of cognitive
activity.
This raises the question of what phenomenolog-
ically characterizes and distinguishes that which is
grasped in evidence or as evident. To begin with ev-
idence as regarding a special mode of givenness of
something objective, one has to realize that in pheno-
menology the intended abject in these modes is gen-
erally comprehended "as" something or in a certain
"sense." This also refers to the modalities of the be-
ing of the abject, e.g., "certainly existing," "probably
existing," "necessarily existing," and so on. Of special
importance is the modality of"truly existing," because
its claim requires justificati an. This is due to the pheno-
menological fact that only by proving the legitimacy
of such a claim do acts of consciousness take on the
character of knowledge.
It is here that one of the most essential aspects
of phenomenological method appears. Husserl makes
a sharp distinction between "empty intentions" (or
merely "signitive intentions") and their "intuitive ful-
fillment" (anschauliche Erfullung). This distinction is
of decisive importance, particularly for the understand-
ing ofthe phenomenological conception of evidence.
To intend something does not yet mean to know
it in a strict epistemological sense. Intentions merely
referring to objects are just acts of consciousness that
legitimate the concept ofthe abject as "given." But its
givenness by no means guarantees knowledge. For ex-
ample, something objective that is merely thought in an
empty or signitive act, e.g., in aur ordinary inauthentic
speech (uneigentliche Rede), is remote from the thing
itself. It is not yet shown. Further activities are needed
~ namely, those acts of intuitive fulfillment by which
something given obtains its material fullness and intu-
itive presence, and in this way becomes "self-given" or
"itself-given" (selbstgegeben). The experience of ev-
idence is in the final analysis nothing other than the
experience of the self-givenness of something. And if
evidence is also the experience oftruth, then truth must
be understood as the objective correlate of the act of
giving something as it itself. Thus the phenomenologi-
204 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
cal concept of self-givenness proves tobe indispensible
for understanding the concept of evidence as well as
the fundamental phenomenological concept oftruth.
The experience of evidence, however, has by no
means the character of a singular intention. That can be
seen from the fact that evidence requires a synthesis of
coincidence of empty intention and fulfillment, which
corresponds, on the objective side, with a synthesis of
identificati an of the abject in order to make it present
as "itself." Consequently, the phenomenological usage
ofthe "matter (Sache) itself' is not meant in compari-
son to another abject, because even an empty intention
already intends the matter itself and not another state
of affairs. However, the "matter itself' is, qua itself,
not yet given, unless fulfilling activities carne into play.
Thus the concept of the "matter itself' is to be under-
stood only in contrast to deficient modes of givenness
of the same state of affairs. Husserl has repeatedly
stressed this fact and emphasized that the "profuse ex-
pression" of self-givenness serves to exclude the vague
generality of the concept of givenness.
It may be doubted whether Husserl's characteriza-
tion of all fulfilling intentions as "intuitions" (Anschau-
ungen) was advisable, especially since he carried this
concept over into the categoria) realm, speaking of
"categoria) intuitions," and, as such, giving it a ro le in
EIDETIC METHOD. However, he does not use the concept
ofintuition in its traditional meaning as the opposite of
the concept of thought, as though both acts were cor-
related to different objectivities. Instead, intuition here
always functions as the fulfillment of signitive inten-
tions, so that the intuition of something cannot be char-
acterized once and for ali, in relation to itself. Rather,
intuition can only be determined phenomenologically
in recourse to the corresponding signitive intentions.
It follows that every type of abject corresponds exclu-
sively to a certain mode of fulfillment that is essential
to it and cannot be arbitrarily modified. This means
that evidence is subject to varying norms ofperfection
depending upon what kind and "style" of evidence it
is. Obviously the kind and style of performing evi-
dence through fulfilling empty or signitive intentions
differs according to type of object. For instance, the
self-givenness of an object in sensuous perception dif-
fers from the self-givenness of something categoria),
such as an object in NATURAL SCIENCE.
Furthermore, it is important to note that even for
a particular type of abject, perfect or "adequate" evi-
dence cannot be achieved in every intuitive fulfillment.
Rather, each kind of evidence also has various grades
and levels of approximation to the object. They mark
stages on the way to achieving perfect evidence. The
fact that the fulfillment of intention is in principle capa-
ble ofbeing increased shows that the phenomenologi-
cal concept of evidence is basically a methodological
concept, rather than the concept of the lucid certainty
of an intuited truth. Accordingly, evident insight can
in principle be erroneous. Not only may empty inten-
tions be frustrated and then result in new evidence
established through conflict, but they may also be erro-
neously fulfilled, thus yielding to merely presumptive
evidence that requires correction. At the same time,
however, the fact that evidence can be deceptive, mis-
leading, and merely assumed to be evidence means
that the correction of deceptive evidence can only be
carried out on the hasis ofbetter evidence, upon which
the former evidence "shatters." This clearly shows the
methodological orientation of Husserl 's concept of ev-
idence. Thus evidence is not a "miraculous" capacity
for gaining absolute truth, as it may have appeared to
beat first sight, or even as some philosophers have un-
derstood it. Rather, it is a critica) court ofappeal before
which ali steps in the search for truth are subjected to
triaJ by verification.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Husserl, Edmund. Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil:
Theorie der phănomenologischen Reduktion. Ed. Rudolf
Boehm. Husserliana 8. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1959.
Sokolowski, Robert. "Husserl 's Concept of Categorica! Intu-
ition." In Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. Ed. J.
N. Mohanty. Philosophical Topics, voi. 12. Denver, CO:
University ofOklahoma, 1981, 127-42.
Stroker, Elisabeth. "Husserls Evidenzprinzip. Sinn und Gren-
zen einer methodischen Norm der Phănomenologie als
Wissenschaft." Zeitschriftfur philosophische Forschung
32 ( 1978), 3-30; "Husserl 's Principle of Evidence: The
Significance of a Methodological Norm for Phenomen-
ology as a Science." Trans. D. E. Christensen. In Contem-
porary German Philosophy. Voi. 1. Ed. D. E. Christensen.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1982, 111-38.
- . Husserl s Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. Lee
Hardy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
ELISABETH STROKER
Universităt zu Koln
 EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY In its
most rudimentary sense, phenomenology is an effort
carefully to describe the fundamental structures of ex-
perience - the ways in which we encounter, come
to apprehend, and come to express the meaning of
the surrounding world of things and other people to-
gether with ourselves and our perceptions, feelings,
thoughts, and actions. Taken in this sense, pheno-
menology forms part of many, even most, projects
undertaken by philosophers whether they would call
themselves phenomenologists or not. EDMUND HUSSERL
gave phenomenology its direction as a distinctive
movement, however, by combining a passion to re-
turn to these concretely experienced "matters them-
selves" with idealism, in what he termed transcenden-
tal or CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. The different di-
rection given by existential phenomenology arises in
the 1930s and 1940s in reaction to Husserl 's idealism.
In part through the inftuence of Husserl 's own !ater
work and the thought of HEGEL, MAX SCHELER, KARL
JASPERS, and MARTIN HEIDEGGER, french thinkers such as
GABRIEL MARCEL, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, and SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR fused phenomenology
with their projects for an existential philosophy.
Husserl had asked the phenomenological investi-
gator to suspend his or her practica!, scientific, and
ontologica] commitments (the EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION),
so as reftectively to grasp (in eidetic insight) the essen-
tial structures of the ftow of experiences in and for the
experiencing subject, e.g., INTENTIONALITY. He believed
that by pursuing this self-reftective task (the strategy of
phenomenological-eidetic reduction ), it would become
apparent that our concrete experiences of self, others,
and world, as well as our reftective judgments and lin-
guistic articulations of them, are constituted through
the activity of an absolute subject (the transcenden-
tal EGO). The goal of phenomenology- and, Husserl
thought, the goal of human REASON itself- would be
to bring this reduction to completion- to exhibit, in
transcendental reftection, the active self-constitution of
ali forms of experience and judgment. EXISTENTIALISM,
on the other hand, from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
on, had emphasized the fragility of reason, the con-
tingency of existence, and the need for human beings
to create themselves and the meaning of their lives,
not through observation and reftection but by free and
resolute action. How is it that phenomenology, as a
205
philosophy of contemplative reason, could be brought
to converge with an existential philosophy of worldly
involvement?
One answer to this question is that the French
thinkers who called themselves "existentialists" be-
lieved that they could use Husserl 's descriptive method
in areas and on the very phenomena of contingency
and involvement that would be central to a philoso-
phy of human existence. Beauvoir, in L 'invitee ( 1943 ),
and Sartre, in La nausee ( 1938), used the novel to
describe various modes of interpersonal relations and
experiences of contingency and freedom. Sartre also
worked out explicitly phenomenological accounts of
IMAGINATION and emotion. He understood his theory
of the emotions- according to which they are ways
in which the world is magically transformed and we
"live" it as "joyful" or "sad" - to be a direct appli-
cation of Husserl 's EIDETIC METHOD for describing the
intentionality of consciousness (Esquisse d 'une theorie
des emotions, 1939).
Moreover, Husserl himselfhad focused, in Die Kri-
sis der europăischen Wissenscha(ten und die transzen-
dentale Phănomenologie ( 1936) and other late works,
on the need to turn phenomenological analysis toward
the primordial, pre-reftective world of everyday expe-
rience (the Lebenswelt or LIFEWORLD) as the founding
source of conscious life. He had emphasized the pas-
sivity of perception, the experience of the living body,
and the constitution ofthe self- even ofthe transcen-
dental ego- through a temporal process, in interplay
with other se]ves (INTERSUBJECTIVITY) and within the
primordiallifeworld. Thus it was natural for Marcel to
consider, at least for a time, that phenomenology was
an appropriate means for him to develop his account of
the mixed and paradoxical experience of being one's
own BODY and, through this experience, ofbeing in the
presence of other existents and of participating in the
"mystery of Being" itself (Etre et avoir, [Being and
having, 1935]). And it was equally natural for Beau-
voir, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, in ways very different
from Marcel and from one another, to appropriate and
extend phenomenological insights as they offered their
descriptions of the bodily, interpersonal, and histori-
cal contingencies of the human condition. However,
these French thinkers saw that despite Husserl 's ef-
forts to create a purely descriptive science, his linking
of phenomenology with transcendental idealism had
206 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
limited its power and, they believed, distorted it. The
influence of idealism, they thought, had led Husserl to
focus phenomenology preeminently on cognitive life,
and in the end, had dictated that the self (as pure tran-
scendental subject) could neither be genuinely open to
the world, nor be at risk before it, thus failing to do
justice to the primary phenomena ofhuman bodily, so-
cial, and historical existence. As a result they aimed to
orient phenomenology away from idealism and instead
toward some form of realism.
Marcel saw the possibilities for a phenomenology
of incarnation and of hope, of the fullness of embod-
ied human being open to Being, as a form ofChristian
philosophy (Le mystere de 1'C!re [The mystery of be-
ing, 1949]). Beauvoir, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, on
the other hand, saw the possibilities for a phenomen-
ology of human finitude and freedom, an avowedly
nontheistic philosophy. They were aware of Hegel's
"phenomenology" in the Phănomenologie des Geistes
- especially his analyses of desire, of the "unhappy
consciousness," and of the dialectic of master and
slave. They saw Marx's early humanist writings as
material for a phenomenology ofhuman economic ex-
istence. And they also had before them the example
of Heidegger's distinctive appropriation of Husserl's
phenomenology in Sein und Zeit ( 1927). Heidegger
appeared to them to be giving a phenomenological
analysis of human existence, in terms of "being-in-
the-world," as part of an inquiry into the meaning of
Being itseJf (HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY). Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty hoped, by following his lead, to
redirect phenomenology in such a way as to exhibit
human reality within a fu li philosophical ontology-
centrally, in Sartre 's L 'etre et le neant ( 1943), as well as
in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenologie de la perception
( 1945) and Le visible et l 'invisible ( 1964 ). Beauvoir, on
the other hand, questioned the possibility of a universal
ontology. In Le deuxieme sexe (The second sex, 1949)
and La vieillesse (Old age, 1970) she emphasized the
ways in which human reality is informed and crossed
by gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, class, and histor-
ical moment, and hence by the dynamics of power,
oppression, and liberation.
Thus "existential phenomenology" can be seen tobe
the name for a tendency ofthought, developed very dif-
ferently by different hands, in which phenomenology
is tobe freed from idealism and focused on human ex-
istence and, within that new ontologica! commitment,
provided with a conceptual framework to give its de-
scriptions fresh revealing power and adequacy.
What ha ve been some ofthe main fruits ofthis exis-
tential turn? Marcel 's analyses of human embodiment
ha ve proved to be of lasting value, and they were an
important influence on both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
However, Marcel soon distanced himself from exis-
tentialism and phenomenology as he saw them devel-
oping, so it was Beauvoir, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty
who shaped existential phenomenology as we know it.
It is best, therefore, to focus on them, friends- and at
times friendly enemies- whose work shows a com-
mon ground, albeit with a richness ofdifference as well.
The common ground !ies in the concern to elucidate
Heidegger's description of DASEIN, human existence,
in terms of finitude and freedom, and to discern the
implications of this across aspects of human thought
and ACTION. They ali see the human condition as one
of a contingent or "situated freedom." The difference
!ies in the way in which each tends to understand this
formative phenomenon.
For Sartre, whose ontology contains an opposition
between self and WORLD in the form of the duality of
consciousness (the for-itself) and being (the in-itself),
freedom is identica! to the spontaneity of conscious-
ness itself. Freedom is categorica!, what human exis-
tence simply is, such that at every moment the entire
meaning of one's life is at stake. For this reason people
typically preferto cover it up in "bad faith." Freedom is
situated, however, in that one confronts externa! con-
ditions within which one must act - conditions set
by one's body, by one's HISTORY and circumstances, by
the social realities presented by other people, and, ulti-
mately, by one's own death. And yet it is always con-
scious freedom that determines the meaning of these
limiting conditions - as Sartre puts it, a cliff is not
"unclimbable" unless 1 aim to climb it, a particular
social condition is not "unbearable" unless 1 project
a better one that 1 might bring about instead. Thus,
while "there is freedom only in a situation ... there is
a situation only through freedom." Being in-itself-
the exterior reality confronting consciousnesss, which
Sartre posits in his opposition to Husserlian idealism-
is meaningless; it is given meaning only for conscious-
ness. The freedom of one's individual consciousness,
as the creation ofmeaning, is in this way, and in a way
 EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
strangely reminiscent of Husserl, absolute.
Not so, thinks Merleau-Ponty. Our chosen ends do
not simply determine the meanings of things. Rather,
to be a "situated freedom" is to find, precisely prior
to any choice of ends, that one is already engaged
with a meaningful world that both solicits and resists.
"Our freedom does not destroy our situation," Merleau-
Ponty says, but "gears itself to it." Prior to my choice,
that cliffwould appear difficult forme to climb because
it exceeds the power of my body to take it in stride, and
certain social situations are lived by me as painful, and
would motivate my changing them, well before I see
any way to do so. Our freedom to create meaning is
conditiona!, not absolute. We are systems ofbodily and
social intentions be(ore we choose, before we are per-
sons. Rather than Sartre 's radical opposition between
the for-itself of individual consciousness and the in-
itself ofbeing, Merleau-Ponty believes- in a manner
similar to that of Marcel- that we experience a gen-
uine reciprocity between them. Being-within being, not
being-against it, human beings perceiving meaning in
the world as well as expressing and constituting mean-
ing.far it- these would be the themes, he thinks, of a
more adequate existential phenomenology of situated
freedom.
This basic ontologica! difference between Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty yields differing emphases through-
out their phenomenologies. Sartre sees consciousness
and bodily processes as distinct; for Merleau-Ponty,
consciousness is "being toward the world through the
body." Sartre sees consciousness as actively creating
its meanings in the face of conditions in the natural and
social world, while Merleau-Ponty sees consciousness
primarily as perceptual, a mixed "passive-activity" re-
sponding to and emerging from those same conditions.
Sartre sees us in a kind of constant combat with other
people- the other's "look" that he finds exemplary
is one that surprises and assaults us, an objectifying
one. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, we see
"with" the other- we are able to be in conflict only
because we are first in communion and communicate
with each other through bodily gesture and LANGUAGE.
Sartre notes the potential in each new moment for us
radically to change, to reinterpret, our personal his-
tories; Merleau-Ponty tends to find that our histories
already contain just the fragmentary meanings upon
which we must draw in order to do so.
207
Beauvoir, for her part, while sharing Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty's focus on the lived experience of sit-
uated freedom, rejects their pretensions to some uni-
versal ontology in which, as she sees it, man s expe-
rience comes to be the universal and woman 's a mere
appendage. In Le deuxieme sexe~ she argues that the
ontology of an absolute "I" is an invention, a repres-
sive ontology of man asserting power over the "other,"
identified as woman. Thus while in the present time
and condition, man may be a "being toward the world
through his body," woman :~ situation is such that she is
not her body- e.g., she is not tobe identified with her
biologica! possibility of procreation, her desirability as
a sexual object for another, etc. This is due, not to a
lack in women, but rather to the concrete conditions of
the present moment in history that are to be resisted.
In this way, Beauvoir moves toward a view of lived
experience that is radically particular and plural. For
her, social change is the aim ofphilosophy- the pri-
mary task is to frame an account of humanity that is
morally responsible, one that can serve in the struggle
for human liberation. She thus emphasizes the social
dimension in every choice. To continue the earlier ex-
ample, o ne might climb that clifffreely, or in servitude,
and by climbing the cliff one might free oneself, or one
might oppress or limit another person. What counts
in such a situation are the consequences for collective
freedom. She believes that we are, as Dostoyevsky
said, "responsible for everything and to every human
being." What is most important, in her view, is an ap-
proach to understanding freedom that might shape the
mutual creation of a collective freedom.
Thus we hear severa! quite different voices within
existential phenomenology- sti li within the intention
to seek out those phenomena that disclose the situated
freedom ofthe human condition and to interpret human
reality in terms of them. Where, one might now ask,
has this orientation led us and what does it promise
for the future? In response, one can only venture one's
own assessment.
Methodologically, one has to say, using Merleau-
Ponty's words, that "the most important lesson which
the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a com-
plete reduction." That is to say, a faithful phenomen-
ology of human being-in-the-world shows that our
lived experience cannot, in principle, become fully
transparent to reflection. And it shows that this very
 208 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
"showing in principle" is a contingent truth of his-
torical reflection: phenomenology shares the situated
character of ali rational inquiry. It is itself an ongo-
ing enterprise of human freedom and finitude that can
at each point, at best, offer partially and incompletely
convergent understandings of human experience, and
attempt to put those understandings to use in thinking
through the issues posed by fresh forms of scientific
thought and social action.
Substantively, one can try to formulate some con-
vergent understandings that come out of the work of
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Beauvoir, and that may be
seen to offer a framework for further philosophical de-
velopment.
{1) First and foremost, it is living (or "lived") ex-
perience that is the primary reference point for ali
philosophical reflection. The world is inexhaustible
and transcends us; we are inevitably out in the mid-
dle of it; it is experienced to exist independently of
us. At the same time, the world is what, in the most
inclusive sense, we experience (or perceive) it tobe.
There is no world "behind" or "beneath" the world of
our primordiallived experience.
(2) The abstractions of thought and the rules of
practice, in science, philosophy, and society, ha ve their
significance through the fact that they express some
meaning of, refer us back to, or order our actions in
respect to certain aspects of this primordially experi-
enced world. Such expressions of meaning- as in a
physical or psychological theory, in an ethical rute, in
a work of art, or, primordially, in language itself- are
never a mirroring, but creative conferrals, motivated
by a living, complex, and ambiguous context, under-
taken for living, complex, and ambiguous purposes,
and subject to assessment in the same terms.
(3) Specifically, the traditional conceptual polari-
ties of self-world, mind-body, conception-perception,
thought-feeling, individual-society, and present-past
(or present-future) should not be taken to represent du-
alisms in which independent realities interact. In living
experience, each term encroaches upon-and requires
-the other.
(4) Thus the self and the environing natural and so-
cial world have the experienced meanings they have
through a reciproca! interplay. It is not possible defini-
tively to assign specific phenomena to one or the other
alone -everything we experience is both "given" and
"interpreted," natural and social, familiar and new.
(5) Individual behavior is always an expression both
of individual effort, desire, and belicf, on the one hand,
and the solicitations ofhabitual bodily and social prac-
tices on the other. Every action is a fresh involvement,
but it is also always motivated by its context. History,
as we li ve it, is never determined, but it is never simply
invented either.
(6) Finally, the mind is thoroughly entangled with
the body, conception with perception, thought with
feeling, the present with the past and future. If we
take our lived experience as fundamental, conscious
mental life cannot be reduced either to objective bod-
ily processes - as with materialist neuroscience -
or to some distinct property or activity presiding over
( or merely accompanying) them- as in various forms
of dualism. Conscious mental life is both irreducibly
intentiona! and irreducibly physical. We have to sec
these competing analyses as perspectiva!, useful for
certain limited purposes, and rendered coherent only
by reference back to the primordial lived experience
upon which they bear.
Positions such as these lie behind the efforts ofmany
contemporary thinkers in the UNITED STATES. One can
only give a few selected examples.
HUBERT DREYFUS has made important contributions
to the philosophy ofmind through his use ofMerleau-
Ponty's and Heidegger 's analyses of embodied percep-
tion and action critically to assess the cogency of cer-
tain models ofthe mind offered by practitioners in AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ( What Computers Stil/ Can 't Do,
1993, and Mind over Machine, 1986). DAVID MICHAEL
LEVIN (The Listening Self, 1989) and ALPHONSO LINGIS
(Libido- The French Existential Theories, 1985) ha ve
drawn upon Merleau-Ponty's thought in fresh reflec-
tions on psychology, psychopathology, and cu! ture. ED-
WARD s. CASEY has created an original account of the
worlds ofimagination and memory, initiated by reflec-
tion on Husserl's, Sartre's, and Merleau-Ponty's work
(lmagining, 1976, and Rememhering, 1987). MARTIN
DILLON shows how Merleau-Ponty can give a compre-
hensive ontologica! vision (Merleau-Ponty :S Ontology,
1988).
HENRY PIETERSMA and others have sought to for-
mulate and extend Merleau-Ponty's theory of knowl-
 EXISTENTIALISM
edge and science (Merleau-Pon~v: Critica! Essays,
1989). THOMAS FLYNN (Sartre and Marxist Existential-
ism, 1984), James Schmidt (Mer/eau-Ponty: Between
Phenomenology and Structuralism, 1985), BERNARD
DAUENHAUER (The Po/itics of Hope, 1985), and SONIA
KRUKS (Situation and Human Existence, 1990) have
interpreted and extended Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's
analyses of situated action in the context of contem-
porary social and politica! thought. LEWIS R. GORDON
(Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, 1994) draws on
Sartre's work in examining racist attitudes and prac-
tices. RICHARD M. ZANER has opened up the philosophical
analysis of clinica! medical ethics by iliuminating the
experiencc of illness with insights from Marcel 's and
Merleau-Ponty's accounts ofembodied life (Ethics and
the Clinica! Encounter, 1988). EUGENE KAELIN has elab-
orated upon Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies
of art (An Existentialist Aesthetic, 1962). Finally, Jerry
Gill has developed a theory of metaphoricallanguage
on the basis ofMerleau-Ponty's philosophy (Merleau-
s
Ponty Metaphorical Philosophy, 1991 ).
Overviews of this form of phenomenology include
HANNAH ARENDT's "What is Existenz Philosophy?"
( 1946); NATHANIEL LAWRENCE and DANIEL O'CONNOR's
anthology, Readings in Existential Phenomenology
( 196 7), and PAUL RICCEUR 's "Phenomenologie existen-
tielie" (in the Encyclopedie Franr;aise, 1957).
It has been an omission in Continental philoso-
phy that until the emergence of feminism, Beauvoir
has not been widely recognized as central to discus-
sions of phenomenology. To correct this, JEFFNER ALLEN
and IRIS MARION YOUNG have edited an anthoJogy that
discusses relations between French existential pheno-
menology and POST-MODERNISM, French feminisms, and
feminist philosophy in the United States (The Thinking
Muse: Feminism and Recent French Thought, 1989).
Judith Butler ( Gender Troub/e, 1989) draws upon the
anti-essentialism of some existential phenomenology
to give an account of gender as performance. Kate
Fulibrook and Edward Fulibrook (Simone de Beauvoir
and Jean-Paul Sartre: The Remaking of a Twentieth-
Centwy Legend, 1994) offer a detai\ed study, based
primarily on recently published materials, that com-
pletely al ters the customary accounts of the relation-
ship between these two phenomenologists. Many other
thinkers are building from existential phenomenology
toward fresh philosophical insights in FEMINISM, PSYCHI-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
209
ATRY, philosophy of nature, ECOLOGY, and philosophy
of RELIGION.
JOHN 1. COMPTON
Vanderhilt University
EXISTENTIALISM The expression "existen-
tialism" is used in a narrow and in a broad sense.
One understands by existentialism in the narrow sense
the philosophy of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and further also
the thoughts of ali thinkers who in their philosophical
works, but also in literature and art, ha ve tried to make
the philosophy of Sartre more concrete and develop it
into new directions. Philosophers who have foliowed
Sartre in essential points include SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR
and FRANCIS JEANSON, but certainly not Albert Camus,
who is an absurdist.
Jean-Paul Sartre has given us a popular descrip-
tion of what he understood by existentialism in
L 'existentialisme est un humanisme ( 1946). There he
says about his own philosophy: atheistic existentialism
states that if God does not exist, there is stil! at least
one being in whom existence precedes essence, a be-
ing who exists before he or she can be defined by any
concept, and this being is the human reality, or, as MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER says, human DASEIN. What is meant here
by saying that existcnce precedes essence? It means
first of ali that the human being exists, appears on the
scene, and only afterwards defines himself or herself.
If the human reality, as the existentialist conceives of
it, is undefinable, it is because at first a human being is
nothing. Only afterwards wili one be something, and
each one will have to make what he or she wili be.
Thus there is no human nature because there is no God
to conceive of it. Not only is a human being what one
conceives of oneself to be, but one is also that which
one wilis oneself to be through one's thrust toward
existence.
One is nothing but what one is able to make of
oneself. This is the first principle of existentialism,
for which the denial of the existence of God is essen-
tial. The human being is also called a subject; this is
the name we give ourselves when charges are brought
against us. By this wc mean that one has a greater dig-
nity than a stone ora table. Thus we mean that one first
exists, throws him- or herselftoward the future, and is
210 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
aware of the fact that he or she can imagine him- or
herselfto be in the future. At the start one is a plan that
is aware of itself, rather than a patch of moss, a piece
of garbage, ora cauliflower. Nothing exists before this
plan, because there is nothing in heaven tobe imitated.
One will be what he or she has planned to be. By the
word "will" we usually mean a conscious deci sion that
is subsequent to what we have already made of our-
selves. 1 may want to belong to a particular politica!
party, write a symphony, or get married. Yet ali ofthis
is only a manifestation of an earlier, more spontaneous
choice that is called "will." Now if existence really
does precede essence, then one is responsible for what
he or she is. Thus the first move of existentialism is to
make every human being aware of what he or she is,
and to make the fui! responsibility of their existence
rest on each one of them. And when we say that each
human being is responsible for him- or herself, we do
not only mean that he or she is responsible for his or her
own individuality, but that each one ofus is responsible
for ali human beings.
When existentialists use the term "subjectivism,"
they do not just mean that each individual chooses and
makes him- or herself, but rather that it is impossible
for humans to transcend human subjectivity. When ex-
istentialists use the term "subject" they mean to say
that each human being chooses his or her own self, and
that in making this choice every human being chooses
ali humans. For in creating the human being we want to
be, there is not a single one of our acts that does notat
the same time create an ideal ofthe human being as we
think he or she ought tobe. To choose to be this or that
is to affirm at the same time the meaning of what we
choose, because we can never choose evi!. We always
choose what is good, and nothing can be good for us if
it is not good for ali.
lf existence precedes essence and if we grant that
we exist and make our image at the same time, the
image is valid for everyone and for our entire age.
Thus our responsibility is much greater than one might
have supposed, because it involves humankind as a
whole. This may help us understand what is meant by
"big" words such as anguish, forlornness, and despair,
often used in existentialist literature.
What is meant by anguish is that one is in anguish,
for the person who gets involved~and who realizes
that he or she is not just the person o ne chooses to be,
but is also a lawmaker who at the same time chooses
ali humankind - cannot help escape the feeling of
responsibility. Obviously there are many people who
do not seem tobe anxious. But the existentialist claims
that they are hiding their anxiety and are fleeing from
their responsibility. Anguish is evident even when it
conceals itself, and everyone who conceals anguish is
simply in bad faith.
In his major work, L 'etre et le neant( 1943 }, in which
he gives an outline ofhis phenomenological ontology,
Sartre explicitly refers, at the very end of his investi-
galion, to the ethical implications of his ontology. At
that point, in 1943, he promised to develop a more
systematic existentialist ETHICS in a !ater work, but this
book only appeared posthumously. Instead he wrote
the popular lecture in which he directly touches on
the moral implications of his ontologica! position. By
1950, according to Beauvoir, Sartre had come to the
conclusion that the project ofworking out a systematic
ethics had become irrelevant, ifnot completely impos-
sible. In her view he gradually came to the insight that
the ethical attitude begins to appear in a bourgeois so-
ciety when technological and social conditions render
positive conduct impossible; ethics is no more than
a collection of some idealist devices to help us live
the life that poverty of resources and lack of technical
means impose upon us. Yet Sartre's !ater development
has shown that there is more to this than just what
Beauvoir claims here. It is beyond the scope of this
entry to deal with the issues connected with Sartre 's
position after he had turned to MARXISM. Let us there-
fore turn instead to what L 'etre et le neant provides as
the ontologica] foundation of his existentialism.
In this book, Sartre intended to deal with the ques-
tion of Being. After a brief analysis, performed in the
introduction, he comes to the conclusion that the ba-
sic ontologica! problem is tantamount to the question
concerning the relation between the in-itself and the
for-itself, i.e., between the natural world and the hu-
man being. He agrees with Heidegger that in order to
find an answer to this question, one must realize the
human reality, which, as being-in-the-world, is a con-
crete whole in which the two poles are never united.
It is within this concrete unity of one's relation to the
world ofnature that concrete forms ofreference to the
world can be singled out and analyzed as the conditions
oftheir possibilities.
 EXISTENTIALISM
Taking o ne 's questioning attitude as a kind ofhuman
conduct, Sartre comes to the conclusion that nonbeing
must be conceived of as a component of what is reaL
This nonbeing is not the consequence of an act ofnega-
tion, such as the negative judgment, nor does it depend
on negation as a category, as in Kant, nor can it be
explained by the in-itself, which is pure positivity. On
the other hand, as incapable of existing by itself, it calls
for a nothingness at its origin that is a structural feature
ofwhat is reaL
Furthermore, there are a great number of realities
experienced by the human reality that are inhabited
by negation in their inner structure. These negatitees,
too, require that nothingness cannot be conceived of
outside Being and that although nothingness is given
in the heart of Being, it cannot have its origin in the
in-itself. Therefore, the question arises: where does
nothingness come from, if it cannot be conceived of
either outside of Being or in terms of Being, and if
as nonbeing it cannot derive from itself the necessary
force to nihilate itself? The answer is that there must
be a being (not the in-itself) whose property it is to
nihilate nothingness. This being is the human being. A
careful analysis of the human questioning attitude as
well as ofthe negatitees mentioned shows clearly that
it is the human being who brings nothingness about.
This thesis, however, provokes another question. What
must human beings then be in their being in order that
through them nothingness can come into being? For
being can only generate being. Thus the human reality
must be able to put itself outside of being. This can-
not be done by just annihilating things, but by putting
concrete things out of circuit and by putting ourselves
out of circuit in re gard to them. The human being can
retire behind a nothingness. This possibility to secrete
nothingness is what Sartre calls freedom.
However, this freedom - taken as the source of
the nothingness in the world - is not a property of
human actions, nor a property connected with a human
essence; freedom is the very being of the human be-
ing insofar as he or she conditions the appearance of
nothingness in the world. Freedom taken as the typi-
cal mode ofthe human being, which precedes essence,
means that human beings can detach themselves from
the world. This implies that human beings first repose
in the depth ofBeing, and then detach themselves from
it by a nihilating withdrawaL But this is possible only
211
iffreedom is necessarily interwoven with temporality.
In other words, the condition on which human beings
can deny ali or part ofBeing is that human beings carry
nothingness within themselves as the nothing that sepa-
rates their present from ali oftheir past and their fu ture
from their present. Freedom is the human reality it-
self putting its own past out of play by secreting its
own nothingness; this original necessity of being its
own nothingness does not belong to human consious-
ness on the occasion of particular negations only, but
is one's innermost mode of being. In freedom, and as
freedom, each human being is his or her own past and
future in the form ofnihilation.
It is in anguish that human beings become conscious
ofthemselves as freedom: anguish is the mode ofbeing
as consciousness of being. Anguish is precisely my
consciousness of being my own future in the mode
of not-being. The self 1 am depends upon the self 1
am not yet, to the exact extent that the self 1 am not
yet does not depend upon the self that 1 am. In other
words, the freedom that reveals itself to us in anguish
must be characterized by the existence of a nothing
that insinuates itself between motive and act. On the
other hand, anguish as the manifestation offreedom in
the face of the self arises by means of reflection; this
means that the human reality is always separated from
the essence of a nothingness, for essence is what has
been. Essence is everything in the human reality that
we can indicate with the expression: it is. The human
act is always beyond that essence, taken as what has
been already. Anguish appears as an apprehension of
the self insofar as the self exists in the perpetua! mode
of detachment from what has been.
It is true that anguish is very seldom encountered in
our world.lt occurs only when consciousness sees itself
cut offfrom its own essence by nothing, and separated
from its fu ture by its very freedom. Yet most ofthe time
each human being is engaged in what is tobe done; thus
the human reality transcends itself in the direction of
the things of the world. Then one remains within the
realm ofnonreflective consciousness. But in each case
there is and remains the possibility of putting this act
in question and bringing the human reality into the
situation described above. Anguish only is by means
of reflection.
The same is true for the relation between ethical
anguish and our everyday morality. There is ethical
212 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
anguish only when I consider myself as the original
relation to values. Then I realize that my freedom is
the unique foundation of values, and that abolutely
nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular
set of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am
completely unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at
being the foundation of VALUES, although I myself am
without any foundation.
But although it is my continuous possibility to over-
turn the whole set of values, ordinarily my attitude to
values is eminently reassuring: I am just engaged in
a world of values without putting them into question.
Usually, my being is immediately in a sitution. In the
world of the immediate 1 find values that ultimately
derive their meaning from an original projection of
myselfthat stands as my choice ofmyselfin the world.
But as soon as 1 reftect on my condition, the possibility
of anguish is there again. Then 1 know that I do not
have any recourse to any value against the simple fact
that it is I who must create and sustain values, whatever
they may be. Nothing can assure me against myself,
cut off from the world and from my essence by the
nothingness that 1 am. When 1 refuse to reftect on the
undeniable fact, or when I ftee into a psychological
determinism, or try to disarm my anguish by assert-
ing that I am my essence in the mode of being of the
in-itself, then I am in bad faith.
Human beings try to escape this bad faith by an
effort to transcend their selves in order to eliminate
their own lack ofbeing. In so doing each human being
tries to become a being-for-itselfthat at the same time
is a being-in-itself. But the totality one tries to achieve
in this way cannot be given by nature, sin ce it combines
the incompatible characteristics ofthe in-itself and the
for-itself; any human effort to bring about that totality
amounts to the useless passion of trying to become
God.
Now if the term "existentialism" is taken in the
narrow and .proper sense it refers to the philosophy
that is characterized by the ontology, the PHILOSOPHIC AL
ANTHROPOLOGY, and the ethics proposed by Sartre in
L 'etre et le neant and to the views ofthose people who
have followed Sartre rather closely in these ideas. In
contemporary thought this view has been overcome
and is replaced by various forms of POST-MODERNISM,
particularly JACQUES DERRIDA 's deconstruction.
lf the term "existentialism" is taken in the broader
sense, it stands for a number of different philosophical
positions, in which some conception of existence, Exis-
tenz, or ek-sistence occupies a central position in every
effort to come to some understanding of the meaning
of Being. Taken in this sense, the term thus covers the
phiJosophies of KARL JASPERS, GABRIEL MARCEL, MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, as well as the
views of many people inftuenced by the ideas of the
authors mentioned.
Those who have tried to define existentialism in
the broad sense in more detail have done so either
by defining it in a negative manner, or by defining
it by means of typical "existentialist" problems and
issues with which certain authors, called "existential-
ists," concern themselves. The first route was taken by
Walter Kaufmann, for whom existentialism is nota phi-
losophy, but a labei for severa! widely different revolts
against traditional philosophy. Then existentialism is
certainly not a school of thought, nor is it reducible
to any set of tenets. The authors who appear invari-
ably on every list of existentialists- namely, Marcel,
Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre- are not in agreement
as far as essentials are concerned. If Nietzsche and
Dostoevsky are included in the fold, one must make
room for an impassioned anti-Christian and a Russian
Orthodox imperialist. Once Rilke, Kafka, and Camus
are added to the list, it will become obvious that an
essential feature of ali these thinkers is their fervid in-
dividualism. Kaufmann concludes that the refusal to
belong to any school ofthought, the repudiation ofthe
adequacy of any body of beliefs, whatever they may
be, and especially of systems, as well as a marked dis-
satisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial,
academic, and remote from life- that is the heart of
existentialism.
On the other hand, JOHN MACQUARRIE defines exis-
tentialism by its very typical style of philosophizing.
He does not disagree with some ofthe claims made by
Kaufmann, but feels that these negative claims do not
go to the heart ofthe matter. Existentialism begins with
the human being, not with nature. It does not define the
human in terms of body and soul or consciousness,
but rather as existence; its subject is the existent in the
whole range of his or her existing. Existentialism can
be defined further by the very typical set of problems
and issues with which it concerns itself: freedom, deci-
sion, responsibility, finitude, guilt, alienation, despair,
 EXPECTAT!ON
death, and so on.
As I see it, there is not much gained by maintaining
the labei "existentialism" in such a broad sense. I think
it is better to reserve the term for the philosophical
position proposed in L 'etre et le neant and the works
ofthose who were deeply inftuenced by its basic ideas.
As for existentialism in the broad sense, I suggest we
avoid the term altogether and try to find adequate labels
for the philosophical positions developed by Jaspers,
Marcel, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Barnes, Hazel. An Existentialist Ethic. New York: Knopf,
1967.
Beauvoir, Simone de. Pour une morale de 1'ambiguite. Paris:
Gallimard, 1947; The Ethics ofAmbiguiW Trans. Bernard
Frechtman, New York: Citadel Press, 1947.
Desan, Wilfrid. The Tragic Finale: An Essay an the Philos-
ophy o{Jean-Paul Sartre. New York: Harper & Brothers,
1960.
Flynn, Thomas. Sartre and Marxist Existentialism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Foulquie, Paul. Existentialism. Trans. Kathleen Raine. Lon-
don: Dobson, 1950.
Jeanson, Francis. Le probleme morale et la pensee de Sartre.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947.
Kaufmann, Walter. From Dostoevski ta Sartre. New York:
New American Library, 1975.
Macquarrie, John. Existentialism. Philadelphia: Westminster,
1972.
Murdoch, Iris. Sartre, Romantic Rationalist. Cambridge:
Bowes & Bowes, 1935.
Natanson, Ma uri ce. A Critique o{Jean-Paul Sartre s Ontol-
ogv. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1951.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. La nausee. Paris: Gallimard, 1938; Nau-
sea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions,
1949.
- . L 'etre et le neant: Essay d 'ontologie phenomeno/ogique.
Paris: Gallimard, 1943; Being and Nothingness. Trans.
Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Phi1osophical Library, 1956.
- . L 'existentialisme est un humanisme. Paris: Nage1, 1946;
Existentialism. Trans. Bernhard Frechtman. New York:
Phi1osophical Library, 1947.
- . Huis clos. Paris: Gallimard, 1947; No Exit. Trans. Stuart
Gi1bert. New York: Knopf, 1948.
--. Situations. 6 vo1s. Paris: Gallimard, 1947-65.
--. Literal)' and Phi/osophical Essays. Trans. Annette
Michelson. New York: Criterion Books, 1959.
Warnock, Mary. The Philosophy o/Sartre. London: Hutchin-
son, 1965.
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS
The Pennsylvania State University
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
213
EXPECTATION The word "expectation" will
be used here as a generic term to refer to a class of ex-
periences that are directed toward the future, namely,
those in which someone is aware of something as some-
thing he or she will actually experience in the fu ture. As
such, expectation is what EDMUND HUSSERL calls "dox-
ically positing" consciousness, that is, consciousness
that contains a belief that the expected content will
be experienced. This distinguishes expectation from
the phantasy of something as future, where there is
no such belief, e.g., in the activity of planning, when
different possibilities for the future are envisioned to
occur if this or that course of action were undertaken.
Two ways in which expectation can be experienced
need to be distinguished, for one of them, which will
be called "awaiting," has been much more important
in phenomenological theory than the other. We may
think about an appointment we ha ve next week, about a
planned summer vacation months away, or even about
something years away, being quite certain that these
will ali be experienced by us. They are thus "expected."
But these projected fu ture experiences may lack a kind
of connection with the present that characterizes an
"awaited" future. An "awaited" future is a particular
future time that is experienced to be connected with
the present in which the expecting takes place in such
a way that one is aware of the present time as the
beginning and the fu ture time as the end of a temporal
span that forms a context within which one is presently
living. This "living within" means that the awaiting, as
a mental process, endures and is projected to be going
to endure un tii what is expected is present (even though
it in fact might not endure that long).
Although the example suggests it, the distinction
here is not one that depends on the temporal distance
of the expected future from the present. While it is
much more common to "await" something that one is
aware of as about to happen, it is possible to await
a distant future as well. This can be the case with
the experience of dread, for example. One can live
in constant awareness of a dreaded event that is far
off in the future, even if this living-in may often be
in the background of mental life. Thus according to
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's analysis ofbeing human, ali people
await death through a form of anxiety. This concept of
anxiety plays a central role in Heidegger's thought,
bringing, among other things, a sense of wholeness
214 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and individuality to a human life.
What is described here as "awaiting" is perhaps best
recognized in the case of an act of awaiting, a men-
tal process that as a whole is an awaiting, where a
person is actively busied with and attentive to what
is expected. An example would be when someone is
late for an appointment and awaits the arrival of his
or her transportation. Although such an experience can
involve looking, listening, hoping, fearing, etc., these
mental processes are aii subordinated to and encom-
passed within a total act of continuai attending to the
future event.
An act of expectation (whether of the form of
awaiting or not) can involve imaging of the fu-
ture and then would be what Husserl in Vorlesung
zur Phănomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
[ 1905] caiis "intuitive expectation" (anschauliche Er-
wartung). Husserl's analysis of intuitive expectation,
as weii as its counterpart, intuitive recoiiection, shows
it to be a "reproductive" consciousness, meaning that
it is an act that contains another act nested within it.
In the case of imaging expectation, which is a RE-
PRESENTATION ( Vergegenwărtigung), there is an imaging
of oneselfbeing in a fu ture present experiencing some-
thing. Thus in the actual present experiencing there is
reproduced and "appears" a second experiencing of the
expected content and this second experiencing has its
own present and horizons of past and fu ture - ali of
which, for the present experiencing, are presented as
"future."
Although the act of expectation is perhaps the most
commonly recognized kind of expectation, it is not
the type that has played the most significant role in
phenomenological theory. That ro le is played by types
of awaiting that are not fuii acts of expectation, but
are non-independent parts of mental processes. Two of
these types are most important: perceptual anticipation
(and its possible counterpart in other kinds of experi-
ences) and protention. (The word "anticipation" wiii be
used exclusively here to designate the first mentioned
type. Husserl often used "Antizipation" in this way.)
(1) Perceptual anticipations are non-independent
parts of sensory perceptions. Husserl 's analysis of per-
ception shows that when perception of an object pro-
ceeds in such a way that different features of it come
sequentiaiiy into direct awareness, there are always an-
ticipations at any given phase of the process that pre-
delineate or project that which is about tobe perceived.
Alternatively, in the case of an unchanging object, there
may be anticipations of the continuation of the status
quo.
These anticipations are parts ofthe act ofperception
and are not separate acts in their own right, although
they may become the basis for separate acts of expec-
tation. The primary focus in perceiving is on what is
present and not on what one is also aware of as corn-
ing. If the latter does become the foca! awareness, it
does so through a separate act of expectation that pro-
ceeds simultaneously with the act ofperception. To use
the example above, when the awaited vehicle is heard,
there are anticipations of a continuing sound that wiii
become increasingly louder. While that hearing and
anticipating continue, there can arise at a certain point
a separate act of expectation in which there is an imag-
ing of the (sti II actuaiiy out of sight) vehicle corn ing
toward one.
Types of experiences other than sensory perceptions
may also include anticipations as non-independent
parts. Recoiiecting clearly does in its striving phases.
Forms ofthinking such as inferring and efforts to un-
derstand also do, as do aii forms of goal-oriented think-
ing. Whether aii types of experiences are so attended
by anticipations is a topic for further phenomenologi-
cal work. Only perceptual anticipation wiii be dealt
with in the foiiowing discussion of anticipation.
Perceptual anticipations are automaticaiiy aroused
and do not depend on any ego activity for their initi-
ation. Because of this, they form part of what Husserl
caiis "passive synthesis." The term "synthesis" refers
to the coming together of what is expected as ex-
pected with what actuaiiy becomes present. For ex-
ample, when someone turns on the water faucet he or
she passively expects to see and hear water coming
out. We expect this whether or not we are paying at-
tention to what we are doing. Ifwater is perceived then
the anticipation is "fulfiiied" and experience proceeds
concordantly. If no water is perceived, then instead of
a "synthesis of fulfiiiment" there is a "synthesis of dis-
appointment" in this case giving rise to the experience
of surprise.
For Husserl, these passive syntheses and the antic-
ipations that are part of them play a decisive role in
experience. They function in a wide variety of ways
to yield the sense ofvalidity ofwhat is experienced as
 EXPECTATION
well as functioning in the constitution of the MEANING
of objects and WORLD. We will return to this topic.
(2) Protention is the second kind ofawaiting that has
played a significant role in phenomenological theory,
chiefly through the influence of Husserl's writings on
TIME consciousness. Although Husserl seems to have
used the term "protention" to refer to what was just dis-
cussed as perceptual anticipation, after a certain change
in his thinking about timeconsciousness, indicated in
the tenth volume of the Husserliana, he carne to use
the term more often to denote a kind of expectation that
is more basic than anticipation and that, he believed,
is necessarily involved in any mental process whatso-
ever. This "protention" is a non-independent part of an
"absolute consciousness" through which we are aware
not ofthe corn ing aspects ofwhat we are experiencing,
but of our experiencings themselves. As expectation
of the about-to-be lived phases of the flow of mental
life, protention functions along with retention (con-
sciousness of the just past phases of mental life) and
impression (awareness of the very present phase) as
the basic awareness of our experiencings, constituting
them as individuated temporal unities, i.e., as temporal
processes that begin, endure, and end.
Awaiting in the form ofprotention may be the "orig-
inal" form of consciousness of the future. What this
means is that the sense "fu ture" that characterizes what
is expected in acts of expectation or in other forms of
future consciousness, such as the acts of envisioning
a future in planning, does not originate in these forms
of consciousness, but derives from a reference to pro-
tentional awaiting. At any rate, this would probably be
Husserl 's view, although he did not explicitly say so.
A comparison of protention with retention will help
explain this originality.
Protention is awareness ofphases ofmentallife that
are just about to be experienced. Along with retention
and an "impressional" consciousness, protention helps
form awareness of the "living present," i.e., of what
is experienced right now (impressionally) along with
what was just experienced (retained) and what is just
about tobe experienced (protended). The living present
is perhaps most easily grasped reflectively in the case
of awareness of something changing. Husserl uses the
example of hearing MUSIC or, to be more accurate, of
consciousness of the temporally flowing and chang-
ing auditory sensations that are involved in hearing
215
a melody. During the awareness of the sensations in-
volved in hearing the third note and while being aware
of them as precisely "now" through an impressional
consciousness, one is sti li aware ofhaving experienced
the sensations relating to hearing the second and first
notes through retention, and expects to hear the sensa-
tions involved in hearing the fourth and fifth through
protention. In this way, the sensory fields of mental
life are experienced as temporal spreads and the expe-
riences of which they form a part are experienced as
processes.
According to Husserl, retention is original con-
sciousness of the past. What this seems to mean is
that it is perception of the passing of a content, of the
transition of the content from the present into the just
past to the just just past, etc. The originality of this is
that it is awareness of this passing itself, and as such
provides a reference that gives meaning to other modes
of awareness of something as past. Thus recollection,
which is an act of consciousness in which a content
is brought back into the present through a kind of re-
production of the past experiencing of it, is able to be
aware ofthe content as a "past" content only in virtue
of an implicit reference to a perceived passing of that
content. Retention is the perception. of this passing.
In other words, something experienced as a remem-
bered past has that sense of past not so much because
it is experienced as once having been experienced as
present, but because it is experienced as once having
been perceived as passing.
The originality of protention is perhaps analogous
to this. Husserl occasionally refers to protention as a
perceptual consciousness. His analyses of protention
are scarce, however, unlike retention, to which he de-
voted many analyses. Although he does not say this,
cal ling protention "perception," if this is to be analo-
gous to retention, perhaps means that protention is the
consciousness of something's corn ing into the present,
so that when one is aware ofsomething as future in any
other form offuture consciousness, that sense offuture
refers not so much to the item being present in some
future, but to it as something that will be experienced
as coming into the present.
The concept of originality here is an epistemic con-
cept that contrasts with Heidegger's concept of "au-
thenticity." For Heidegger, a form of the expectation
of death is an authentic awareness ofthe future. How-
216 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ever, this concept of authenticity is not an epistemic
concept, but rather has normative import. Thus the
views of Husserl and Heidegger are not contradictory.
What objects are in our experience ofthem has been
thought to be a function of expectation. Husserl has
promulgated the theory that the meaning objects have
for us is the product of sensory data being given mean-
ing through nonsensory "noetic" mental functions. He
has supplemented this structural account of meaning-
giving with analyses of the dynamics of experience,
especially the role that expectational awareness ofun-
sensed parts of objects (or events or environments-
"objects" is used here to cover ali of these) has in de-
termin ing what an object is experienced to be. When
an object is experienced, what it is experienced to be,
from the most generic to the most specific character-
istics, is related to what anticipations will arise in the
ongoing experience in which different aspects of the
object will attain sensory givenness. Ifthese anticipa-
tions are fulfilled in certain basic ways, the object will
continue tobe experienced as a real object (as opposed
to an illusion). Other types of fulfillments will sustain
attributions of generic and specific features of objects.
Ifthe anticipations are disappointed, then the aspect of
whatness to which they relate will be "canceled" and
replaced by a new meaning. In this way, attributions as
basic as the sense of the world's reality arise and are
sustained in ongoing experience.
One issue that arises here concerns the nature of
the relation that such anticipations have to the sense-
givings through which characteristics are attributed. Is
meaning given by an operation that is different from
anticipation, so that the anticipatory content derives
from this meaning? Or are meaning-giving and antici-
pating one and the same process? Husserl's account is
ambiguous with respect to this point. In some places he
writes as if anticipations are based on other modes of
consciousness ofthe anticipated content. In particular,
he has identified a mode of consciousness called "co-
presentation" (Mitgegenwărtigung) through which we
are aware of unsensed aspects of objects as present in
their respective contexts. For instance, when one per-
ceives a table from the top or the side, its unseen un-
derside, having whatever characteristics it is attributed
to have in a given perception, is also there for one as
part ofthe table through "co-presentation." Should one
begin to move appropriately, then expectations would
ari se making one aware of the underside as "about to
be seen." Here anticipation derives its content from the
underlying forms of awareness within which sense-
bestowal has already been achieved. In other places,
however, Husserl writes as if meaning-bestowal is an-
ticipation.
This ambiguity relates to two aspects of Husserl 's
analysis ofworld-experience that he may not ha ve suc-
ceeded in bringing together. On the one hand, antici-
pation is discussed in epistemic terms, as a form of
"empty intention." In these contexts talk of anticipa-
tion and its "fulfillment" predominate and do so in a
way much like his discussions of"asserting" as empty
intention and "verifying" as fulfillment through per-
ception or some other kind of intuition. Here Husserl
is concerned to describe the cognitive dimension of ex-
perience and to analyze how our basic sensory knowl-
edge ofthe world is motivated and sustained so that its
status as reality is upheld. Within this cognitive orien-
tation Husserl writes of the world's "being on hand"
( Vorhandenheit) as correlative to a fundamental doxic
consciousness (a belief) that forms the core ofthe "nat-
ural attitude." There is a tendency in these contexts to
assimilate the process of meaning-bestowal with the
process of anticipation in such a way that the mean-
ings bestowed seem to take on the ro le of "rules" for
harmonious experience. For example, the sense "chair"
with which some piece of furniture appears to some-
one would bea rule specifying what the further course
of experiences of the object "ali round" would need
to be like in order that the abject be continued to be
experienced as a chair (as opposed to having that sense
nullified and replaced by another). The sense "chair,"
then, as such a rule, would in a way be the anticipation
of these further experiences.
On the other hand, Husserl sometimes discusses
perceptual anticipation as connected with someone 's
awareness of their movement (or being at rest), or,
more accurately, with their kinaestheses, i.e., their con-
sciousness of effecting movement and of being able
to do so. Anticipations of what one will perceive are
aroused when one is aware of moving one's BODY.
Yet our practica! engagement in the world through our
motility, although not neglected, seems to play a sec-
ondary role as one way in which further experience
can be generated (the other being motion on the part
of the object). The ro le is secondary because Husserl
 EXPECTATION
tends to see bodily movement as the transportation of
a perceiving mind that is somewhat disengaged from
the world and that is primarily responsible for sense-
bestowal. Thus the more anticipation is connected with
motility, the less it plays a ro le in sense-bestowal.
For different reasons, some phenomenologists who
carne after Husserl developed accounts of world-
perception that embedded perceiving within the con-
text of human action or human motility. ACTION, in the
case of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, and motility, in the case of
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, are not seen as means to gain
knowledge of the world but as the basic INTENTIONAL-
ITY that subsumes perceptual awareness. This inten-
tionality displaces Husserl's more mentalistic sense-
bestowal account and includes fu ture consciousness in
action as achieving the projection ofthe ends of action.
(ALFRED SCHUTZ, by contrast, emphasizes a more cog-
itative projecting or planning of actions.) In these ac-
counts expectation, including perceptual anticipation,
more clearly plays a major role in the giving ofmean-
ing to the world, but in ways different from Husserl's
theory.
Sartre's analysis of perceptual experience situates
that experience within projects of action and are rel-
evant for his ETHICS. Ends of action are anticipated
future states the projection of which gives instrumen-
tal meaning to the content of the present experience.
Sartre seems to ha ve wanted to claim that ali perceptual
meaning is constituted in this way. Similar views are
held by some theories of verbal meaning in LANGUAGE.
Some "reader response" theories of READING and text
interpretation place a large ro le on anticipation in the
process of understanding verbal signs. Anticipations
about how a sentence will be completed play a sig-
nificant role in determining the meaning of the sign
presently experienced as well as its grammatical form.
In Sartre 's theory, distinctions among various forms
of fu ture consciousness of the kind that Husserl made
are of less importance than the common characteristic
217
of projecting a temporal end demarcating a span of
subjective time that is also an end or purpose of de-
liberate movement, i.e., action. Thus it is difficult to
te li what specific ro le, if any, anticipation as discussed
here has in experience for him. What is clear, however,
is that the coming of the end is not seen in relation
to eventual fulfillment of belief but in relation to re-
alization of a previously nonexistent state of affairs.
Looking under the table accomplishes setting oneself
in a new vantage point rather than confirming a belief
about the composition of the underside. It is a mat-
ter of transforming how the world presents itself, not
ofknowing it. In contrast with this, Husserl's analysis
seems, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, to be "intellectual-
ist," a designation that signifies that it is derivative and
not basic.
The contrasts discussed above, both within
Husserl 's theory and between it and those of others,
provide a number of sites for further investigation. How
are anticipation and meaning-giving related? Are an-
ticipation and projection of ends of action the same
or different? To what extent is the latter involved
in meaning-giving? How exactly are protention and
anticipation related? Does protention have a role in
meaning-giving? This sample of questions opens up a
mine of possible investigations into the ro le of fu ture
consciousness in experience, an area of research that
has been mostly neglected by Westem philosophers
throughout the centuries due to an overemphasis on
MEMORY in theories of experience and knowledge.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Held, Klaus. Lebendige Gegenwart. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1966.
Sokolowski, Robert. Husserlian Meditations. Evanston, IL:
Northwestem University Press, 1974.
WILLIAM R. MCKENNA
Miami University

FEMINISM Feminism is a theoretical problem-
atics and a socio-political movement; its activist labei
is the women 's movement. Both movement and theory
are plural and diverse. The beginnings of phenomen-
ology coincided with the advancing first wave of the
movement in GERMANY at the end of the 19th century,
and the second wave began about 1960 and continues
today. The origins and impacts ofthe two waves have
varied with the location. In the UNITED STATES, for ex-
ample, the movement for the abolition of slavery led
slowly to the women 's suffrage movement. In Ger-
many, however, unification in 1871 led to equal recog-
nition ofwomen based specifically on women's actual
contribution to the "New Germany," i.e., through con-
tributing new citizens. The first wave sought women 's
suffrage, property rights, and education. The second
wave is about those aims as well as diversity and iden-
tities, individual and society. It began in the United
States among various freedom movements, the Civil
Rights movement, and the an ti-Vietnamese War move-
ment, which provided occasions for women to rec-
ognize their oppression. The severa! anti-colonialism
movements and student protests in Europe created par-
allel situations for women to recognize the need for
betterment in their lives.
It is interesting that EDMUND HUSSERL 's appointment
to the university at Gottingen in 1901 carne about
twenty-five years after the first women, the Russians
Sophia Kovelevsky (1850-1891) and Julia Lermon-
tova (1846-1919), received degrees in mathematics
and chemistry respectively (termed "honorary" since
women could not legally attend the university). It was
also in 1901 that the first German universities admit-
ted women on a par with men and that Helene Stăcker
( 1869-1943) became the first woman to recei ve a doc-
torale in philosophy ata German university (Berlin); in
1909 she founded a major branch of German feminism,
the Mutterschutz movement. The arrivals at Gottingen
of HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS in 1911 and of EDITH STEIN
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
in 1913 to study with Husserl would have been note-
worthy rather than commonplace occurrences. Univer-
sity women were aware of the continuing women's
movement; for example, Edith Stein as a studentjoined
the Prussian Association for Women 's Suffrage. The
American feminist Katharine Anthony notes in 1915
the existence of eleven feminist magazines in Ger-
many; many books were also available, including two
popular works, Hedwig Dohm's Die Anti-Feministen
(The anti-feminists, 1908), which berated Nietzsche
for his misogyny, and Kăthe Schirmacher's Das Rătsel:
Weib (fhe riddle: woman, 1911 ), which borrowed its
aphoristic style from Nietzsche in order to attack his
sexism.
The issue of education for women was a concrete
lived experience at the German universities where
phenomenology had its origins, but it was not the only
topic regarding women's lives that was alive in Ger-
many at that time. The women 's movement cut across
ali politica! camps, from socialist to centrist to con-
servative, although with differing agendas. Almost ali
of these groups extolled women 's traditional ro les of
mother and wife. But they also urged full admission
of women to professional and other paid labor and
demanded state recognition of the value of work in
the home, improved quality of education, and politi-
ca! participation. MAX SCHELER expressed his support
for these feminist aims in "Zum Sinn der Frauenbe-
wegung" (1913). In "Zur Idee des Menschen" (1915)
he criticized the supposed gender-neutrality of"man,"
much as second-wave feminists attacked the generic
use of"he" in English.
When Germans faced the extreme social upheavals
in the post-war era, beginning with the founding ofthe
Weimar Republic in 1918, women were granted the
vote, but were also under censure for their possible fail-
ure as the "more moral" sex to maintain the moral core
of German society. It is small wonder, then, that when
Husserl in §55 of Die Krisis der europdischen Wis-
senschafien und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
( 1936) rai sed the specific issues that a phenomenology
of INTERSUBJECTIVITY and of sociaJity wouJd need to
discuss, he mentioned the "problem ofthe sexes."
In 1920 Edith Stein obtained the landmark legal
ruling that women could not be prevented from habil-
itating due to their sex. From 1922 to 1932 she taught
in a Dominican gir1s' school, after her habilitation was
218
 FEMINISM
rejected by the Gottingen philosophy faculty. Her back-
ground in phenomenology, the continued debate over
women's place in the Weimar Republic, and her con-
version to Catholicism in 1922 flowed into her interest
in the education ofwomen. She gave many talks to or-
ganizations such as the Congress of Catholic German
Graduates, presenting a Catholic feminist position that
parallels some of today's second wave cultural femi-
nists' pride in women 's caring and holistic attitudes.
In essays between 1928 and 1932, published posthu-
mously as Die Frau. lhre Aufgabe nach Natur und
Gnade (Essays on women, 1959), she articulates a the-
ory of sexual difference in nature and psychology, nei-
ther reducible to biology, that grants intrinsic value to
the feminine. Her articulation ofthe "feminine" quali-
ties of an interest in the personal and a tendency toward
wholeness, contrasted with "masculine" interes! in the
abstract and objective, is echoed by !ater gynocentric
feminists. But Stein recognizes the traps ofboth hyper-
femininity and hypermasculinity, any one-sidedness of
gender, and indicates that wholeness ofthe person re-
quires some am o unt of ali attributes ~an anticipation
of feminist androgyny theories. Her ca11 for women to
aid in healing a world facing totalitarianism and ma-
terialism reminds one oflater feminist peace theorists.
Much of her religious discussions, such as her scrip-
tural justification of woman 's subordination, would be
rejected by feminists now, but her reading of Genesis
affirms that women and men were equally assigned
life's tasks, including ruling the earth ~ on the whole
a feminist theological reading.
Other female students of Husserl and contempo-
rary phenomenologists, such as Stein 's friends HEDWIG
CONRAD-MARTIUS and GERDA WALTHER, were feminists
who lived their activism by becoming philosophers.
Conrad-Martius, having won her doctorale at Munich
in 1912, continued her research as an independent
scholar, supported by her husband. Walther's 1921 dis-
sertation questions the liberalist notion of autonomous
individuality, much as !ater feminist politica! theorists
do, and claims that humans are by nature social be-
ings, anticipating 1980s feminist readings ofwomen 's
connectedness, such as Carol Gi11igan's work. HANNAH
ARENDT studied with Heidegger, Husserl, and Jaspers,
completing her doctoral study in 1928 with Jaspers. In
1933 she reviewed the feminist work of Alice Ruele-
Gerstel, Das Frauenproblem der Gegenwart (Contem-
219
porary women 's issues, 1933), insi sting on the need for
class and family analysis in order to combat sexism.
With these women having their formations before the
Nazi period, and SUZANNE BACHELARD, SIMONE DE BEAU-
VOIR, and ELISABETH STROKER having theirs before the
end of the first wave, phenomenology was attractive
and appears to ha ve been somewhat more receptive to
women than other intellectual movements before the
1960s.
This point becomes clearer as we find other early
contributors to phenomenoJogy. KATHARINA HEUFELDER
completed a doctorale in architecture in 1928 at Berlin,
returning to habilitate in philosophy in 1950; a student
of Heidegger, she wrote major works on Scheler, Hei-
degger, and Hartmann during her university career at
Berlin and Marburg. GERMAINE BREE, with a 1931 doc-
torale from the Sorbonne wrote on JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
and ALBERT CAMUS. ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA studied
with ROMAN INGARDEN in Poland, earning a doctorale in
1952 at Fribourg, Switzerland. MARJORIE GRENE studied
with Heidegger and Jaspers and wrote the first English
introduction to Heidegger. And the literature shows us
others: HILDA OAKLEY published in 1931 on Hartmann,
MARY EVELYN CLARK on ScheJer in 1932, MARIA BRUCK
on Husserl and Brentano in 1933, HANNA HAFKESBRLICK
~ a student of MORITZ GEIGER ~ on ScheJer and HE-
LENE WEIS on Heidegger in 1942, YVONNE PIC ARD, who
studied with ARON GURWITSCH in Paris, on Heidegger in
1946, and CATHERINE RAU on Sartre in 1949.
In the United States the second wave ofthe women 's
movement fo11owed diminished feminist activity in
the 1940s and 1950s. Women went from accepting
the roles, personalities, and politica! positions a11owed
them by a society now ca11ed patriarchal (rule by the
"pater" or ma les) to taking the experiences of women
and their own articulation of them seriously. The val-
idation of women 's experience was crucial to recog-
nizing the extent to which women had been social-
ized into accepting a variety of subordinate positions.
Women increasingly demanded tobe heard rather than
being interpreted by others, particularly by those in a
privileged position, whether due to gender, class, race,
or other reason. The ca11 on experience has thus func-
tioned throughout the first decades ofthe second wave
as a constant reminder ofthe ways in which those who
ha ve and assume power, even with good will, can deny
expression to the experience of those who lack si mi-
220 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Iar power or place in society and its organizations and
institutions.
Phenomenology would seem an excellent approach
for reclaimingexperience. Its method begins with the
reflective turn toward the subject's experiences and
asks that these be seen in as unbiased a manner as pos-
sible, weeding out unexamined assumptions of every-
day life. Feminists might criticize the seeming "view
from above" that Husserl's method requires, particu-
larly the transcendental EPOCilE AND REDUCTION from
the everyday "natural" attitude, a criticism that would
parallel the feminist attacks on malist or masculin-
ist theory with its extreme decontextualization. But
this epoche might also be seen as compatible with
feminist goals of breaking from an unreflective en-
grossment in a patriarchal attitude, as well as naive
claims of being race-, gender-, and class-neutral. Al-
though in ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) Husserl
framed the "natural attitude" in terms ofthe basic per-
ceptual situation of ourselves in relation to a world of
objects, in ldeen Il [ 1912-15] he expanded the natural
attitude to include other historically sedimented mean-
ings that color the things and persons around us. Hen ce
the activity oftranscendental epoche seems to identify
meanings that might adversely influence our pursuit
of knowledge. A phenomenologist who is a feminist
could thus take more seriously the potential impact of
her or his sex and gender, and possibly also ofhis or her
age, class, race or ethnic position, sexual orientation,
and abilities/disabilities.
The Krisis text is also helpful here, especially for
those critics who question the possibility of such an
epoche, since the accomplishment of epoche is seen
as an intention moving toward an ideal goal and does
not negate the value of any partial work accomplished
thus far. That Husserl himselfwas not fully aware ofthe
potential bias from socio-cultural and personal factors
does not, in itself, invalidate ali of his findings. The
question of the degree to which his methodology and
results might be labeled masculinist is still an open
question.
Much recent feminist epistemology and philosophy
of science echo themes found in Husserl's investiga-
tion of modern Western NATURAL SCIENCE. His critique
ofthe NATURALISM stemming from the natural sciences
has important elements in common with some feminist
criticisms of these sciences' supposed objectivity and
value-neutrality. Although few feminist philosophies
of sciences hold with Husserl that the "natural world"
of modern Western natural science is actually an inter-
subjectively constituted product, severa! seek alterna-
tive renderings of"science" that parallel his attempt to
tocate a meaning for "science" that is not bound to the
intellectualization of the "objective" natural sciences.
His analyses of the mathematization of the universe
and its natural causality, both limiting intellectualized
products, and the manner in which they flow back into
our lifeworld contribute to comprehending the social
construction of reality postulated by many theorists.
Husserl 's notions of passive and intersubjective con-
stitution investigated in GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY and
GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY would broaden the under-
standing of the hold of such outcomes on our everyday
human lives.
When the second wave of the women 's movement
began to foster theorizing, it was asked how can we
describe and understand the position of women in so-
ciety today? And how can we account for the historical
absence ofwomen? Philosophers trained in social and
politica! philosophy and the history ofphilosophy were
among the first to respond to these questions. In their
initial attempts to comprehend women 's position in
patriarchy, feminist philosophers uncovered accounts
ofwomen's "natural" inferiority, accounts that usually
traced the inferiority to a "womanly essence." The first
attacks on Western accounts of women were thus ar-
guments against the very notion of essence. Leading
this second wave critique of Western cultural expec-
tations for women is SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR's work of
EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, Le deuxieme sexe (The
second sex, 1949). Beauvoir's status as an independent
philosopher, however, had to be reclaimed following
her death; this task was first seriously undertaken by
Margaret Simons.
Essentialism thus became, in the early 1970s, an
ugly word for feminists who were philosophers. Al-
though feminist phenomenologists understood these
first attacks on essentialism to deal with metaphysically
theorized essences and not with any "essence" what-
ever, and thus not phenomenology's EIDETIC METHOD,
the climate in feminist circ les often led them not to labei
their work phenomenological. This difficulty pertained
more directly for transcendental phenomenology, since
 FEMINISM
Husserl's method had already faced strong criticism
from other phenomenologists, such as Sartre. Some
feminists who worked in existential phenomenology
and other descriptive phenomenologies-e.g., ALFRED
SCHUTZ's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL
ATTITUDE- could more readily use their methodology.
In the 1980s the growing influence of French POST-
MODERN writers created a chillier climate for any
talk of essences within feminist theorizing, including
even feminism-informed descriptions of "woman" or
"women." Thinkers such as Luce Irigaray, Monique
Wittig, and Julia Kristeva filled a thirst for theory in
the Anglo-American academy, as their work seemed to
continue earlier anti-essentialist attacks, particularly on
modern philosophers, and to echo the growing social
constructivist bent of feminist social scientists.
Curiously, however, by the 1990s some problem-
atic elements of postmodernism- e.g., its hegemonic
assertion of discursive determinism and the death of
the subject - moved the field of feminist theorizing
toward an uneasy pluralism. Feminist women of color
in North America and across the world had appre-
ciated the earlier attacks on essentialism, since they
ca !led for a multiplicity of women 's experiences to be
heard when determining socio-political changes, but
they insisted that the discourse theories coming from
postmodernism robbed them of their voice. Women 's
articulation ofwomen 's experience had been a rallying
cry of the second wave, then it carne under attack by
some feminists; however, forothers a return to these ex-
periences became a promising alternative in the 1990s
to the theorized woman some postmodernists seemed
to speak of. Feminists could rediscover previously dis-
credited theories and methodologies and reclaim spe-
cific elements that avoid reducing feminist theory to
biography or conversations- a politically and intel-
lectually bankrupt position in the eyes ofmany.
This shift to pluralism in feminist circles in the
1990s opened a space for feminists with phenomen-
ological training to place work in the public domain
that received broad acceptance; others can engage in
the multiple feminisms incorporated under the broad
title phenomenology. As in other disciplines and in phi-
losophy more generally, our "lost" foremothers are be-
ing recovered: LINDA LOPEZ MCALISTER teJis US ofGerda
Walther's application of phenomenology to a range of
mystical, abnormal, and parapsychological phenomena
221
stil! marginalized in Western culture and, along with
MARY CATHERINE BASEHEART and Theresa Wobbe, she
revives the intricacies of Stein 's rich ve in of REALISTIC
PHENOMENOLOGY.
Topically, new feminist works include descriptions
and reevaluations of experiences and concerns specific
to women, culturally or otherwise, such as menstrua-
tion, childbearing, and menopause. One of the earli-
est published phenomenological analyses in American
feminism is found in IRIS MAR ION YOUNG's 1980 account
of women 's experience of pregnancy, a breakthrough
in American philosophy just in its mention of such
a "womanly" thing. She draws on MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY's existential phenomenology of the Iived BODY
and Beauvoir's descriptions of women 's traditional
roles. SANDRA LEE BARTKY's phenomenologyoffeminist
consciousness analyzes the changes to consciousness
and the correlative "social reality" that one experiences
in becoming a feminist.
Feminists have examined phenomenologists in or-
der to see whether their approaches might serve the
current needs of feminists and women, asking if those
phenomenologists were misogynist in person or in phi-
losophy. LJNDA BELL expands core elements of ETHICS
IN SARTRE that caii for authenticity as a way to resolve
problems presented by feminist theory and practice. Ju-
dith Butler criticizes Merleau-Ponty's claim that sexu-
ality is coextensive with existence, finding behind that
stance an unreflective assumption ofthe "normality" of
heterosexuality. Margery Collins and Christine Pierce
investigate Sartre 's supposed anti-essentialism, only to
find that his writings are sexist, because they place the
rule of essences in the hands of the male, who defines
them according to his will. HAZEL BARNES also queries
Sartre's sexism.
LINDA FISHER, the CO-organizer with LESTER EMBREE
of the first conference on feminist phenomenology,
is formulating the potential for using transcendental
phenomenology, even with its malist attributes, in ex-
ploring gender. ANN JOHNSON opens the possibility of a
feminist phenomenological PSYCHOLOGY in her study of
the emergence of gender-typed behaviors in children.
LOUISE LEVESQUE-LOPMAN is formuJating a phenomen-
oJogicaJ soCIOLOGY, drawing primarily from Alfred
Schutz, in order to investigate women 's descriptions
of social reality and gender consciousness. Maryellen
MacGuigan notes the inconsistencies in JOSE ORTEGA
222 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Y GASSET's views concerning an essential inwardness
of women that renders them essentially confused and
thus inferior to men; she raises similar difficulties with
Julia Marias's notion of sexuate condition and FRED-
ERIK J. J. BUYTENDI.IK's account ofwomen's experience,
which is a]so criticized by MARINA PAOLA BANCHETTI for
its methodological inadroitness.
Other feminist writings develop new methods that
draw on the "classical" phenomenologies. LINDA AL-
COFF gives us a concept of subject as positionality, in
which a choice of identity is opened up because iden-
tity stems from the "externa!" situation, hence from
constantly shifting contexts within which the subject
lives. JEFFNER ALLEN offers the notion of "sinuosity"
as a lesbian-inspired consciousness of the lived body.
REGULA GIULIANI-TAGMANN is a]so working on gender
studies from a phenomenological point of view, prin-
cipally inspired by Merleau-Ponty. MARiA LUGONES as-
says the multiple consciousnesses of persons living
within and between different Ianguages and cultures,
and from their position creates and expresses a tech-
nique, called "curdling," that is creative and resistant.
JULIEN MURPHY considers Sartre's analysis of the ob-
jectifying Iook and rejects it as expressing only this
male's idea ofthe look; she looks to Adrienne Rich to
claim an alternative activity ofthe eye, i.e., feminist vi-
sion. MARILYN NISSIM-SABAT has brought the feminist cri-
tique of science and the phenomenological understand-
ing of meaning-formation to bear on the deficiencies
of PSYCHOANALYSIS. MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE investi-
gates the corporeal ground for fundamental concepts,
including those that underlie patriarchal attitudes, e.g.,
the connection ofmale agency and penile erection with
the creation ofbinary oppositional thinking used in pa-
triarchal thought. GAYLYN STUDLAR applies phenomen-
ological insight to a feminist FILM theory.
In one ofthe first talks on feminism at the American
Philosophical Association, Alison Jaggar described
three feminist stances - liberal, classical Marxist,
and radical. When the talk was published in 1976,
the taxonomy has been expanded to include lesbian-
separatist and socialist feminisms. This categorization
still frames the debate about the conceptual core of
feminism, with the addition of postmodernism. Pheno-
menology seemed to ha ve no place in that world offem-
inisms. In 1995, however, it was numbered along with
eight other feminisms in the collection of "essential
readings" in second wave feminist philosophy edited
by Nancy Tuana and Rosemarie Jong. There are also al-
ternative models for categorizing feminisms, e.g., with
an eye on the historical contexts as found in the work
ofTINA CHANTER, Eva Cole, and writers in the 1994 Hy-
patia symposium. One of the major enduring features
of second wave feminism is its critique of patriarchal
binary oppositions, e.g., male and female, cognition
and emotion. Many classifications of feminisms have
focused on either equality (females are like males) or
difference (females are not Iike males), or alternatively
on celebrating females (gynocentric feminism) versus
nating their oppression (victim feminism). Such binary
techniques skirt this critique and overlook the realities
expressed by these variations on strategy, theory, and
description.
A model with a different central category is Kathy
Ferguson's new taxonomy built around attitudes to-
ward subjectivity: praxis feminisms emphasize inter-
subjective life; cosmic feminisms emphasize self as
related to a larger reality (ecologica! feminism, for ex-
ample); and Iinguistic feminisms emphasize the speak-
ing subject. In tracing the wide varieties of feminisms
and shifting to a metatheoretical stance called mobile
subjectivity, Ferguson gives an alternative to a total-
izing stance, a strategy for pursuing theory and Iiving
multiplicity. Similar strategies would include reassess-
ing any categories of thought and theory and open-
ing up the intellectual field within feminism to a self-
understanding of its history. In its many guises, pheno-
menology as the study of consciousness as it relates
within itself and beyond itself to other subjectivities
and intersubjective realities, including nature however
we grasp it, can provide strategies for going forward
with such feminist work. For example, Edith Stein has
a notion of individuation that is far di fferent from that
ofthe abstractive concept of individual in modern po-
litica! theory, which is the concept that is interpreted
by feminist critiques ofthe malist bias ofthe Cartesian
self. And her notion of essence as both fixated and ftex-
ible, i.e., changeable in its individuations because it is
historically and socially situated, might give feminists
an approach to breaking the anti-essentialism debate
and to conceptualizing the commonalities of women
that postmodernism has Ieft behind in the de bate. There
are many such possibilities for bringing feminism and
phenomenology together.
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Alcoff, Linda. "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structura-
lism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory." In Femi-
nist Theory in Practice and Process. Ed. M. Malson et al.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, 295---326.
Allen, Jeffner. "An Introduction to Patriarchal Existentia1-
ism: A Proposal for a Way out of Existential Patriarchy."
In Allen and Young, eds., 71-84.
Allen, Jeffner, and Iris Marion Young, eds. The Thinking
Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy. Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989.
Anthony, Katharine. F eminism in Germany and Scandinavia.
New York: Henry Hoit, 1915.
Banchetti, Marina Paola. "F. J. J. Buytendijk on Woman: A
Phenomenological Critique." In Fisher and Embree, eds.,
forthcoming.
Bames, Hazel E. "Sartre and Sexism." Philosophy and Lit-
erature 14 (1990), 340-47.
Bartky, Sandra Lee. Femininity and Domination: Studies in
the Phenomenology ofOppression. New York: Routledge,
1990.
Baseheart, Mary Catherine, S.C.N., and Linda Lopez McAI-
ister, with Waltraut Stein. "Edith Stein (1891~1942)."
In A History of Women Philosophers Voi. 4: Contempo-
rary Women Philosophers: 1900-Today. Ed. Mary Ellen
Waithe. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994, 157-87.
Beauvoir, Simone de. Le deuxieme sexe. Paris: Gallimard,
1949; The Second Sex. Trans. H. M. Parshley. New York:
Knopf, 1953.
Beii, Linda A. Rethinking Ethics in the Midst of Violence: A
Feminist Approach to Freedom. Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefie1d, 1993.
Butler, Judith. "Sexual Ideo1ogy and Phenomenological De-
scription: Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty's Pheno-
menology of Perception." In Allen and Young, eds., 85---
100.
Chanter, Tina. "Questioning Sex and Gender Phenomeno-
logically." In Fisher and Embree, eds., forthcoming.
Cole, Eva Browning. Philosophy and Feminist Criticism: An
Introduction. New York: Paragon House, 1993.
Collins, Margery, and Christine Pierce. "Holes and Slime:
Sexism in Sartre's Psychoanalysis." In Woman and Phi-
losophy: Toward a Theory ofLiberation. Ed. Carol Gou1d
and Max Wartofsky. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1976, 112~
27.
Ferguson, Kathy E. The Man Question: Visions ofSubjectiv-
ity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Fisher, Linda. "Towards a Phenomenology ofGendered Con-
sciousness." In Fisher and Embree, eds., forthcoming.
- , and Lester Embree, eds. Feminist Phenomenology. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming.
Gould, Carol. "The Woman Question: Philosophy ofLibera-
tion and the Liberation ofPhilosophy." In Women and Phi-
losophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation. Ed. Carol Gould
and Max Wartofsky. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1976, 5---44.
- , Linda Lopez McAlister, Ann Ferguson, and Kathryn Ad-
delson. "Symposium: Feminist Philosophy after Twenty
Years." Hypatia 9 (1994), 183~224.
Jaggar, Alison. "Politica! Philosophies of Women's Libera-
tion." In Philosophy and Women. Ed. Sharon Bishop and
223
Marjorie Weinzweig. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1979,
258-65.
Johnson, Ann. "Understanding Children's Gender Beliefs:
Implications for a Feminist Phenomenological Psychol-
ogy." In Fisher and Embree, eds., forthcoming.
Levesque-Lopman, Louise. Claiming Reality: Phenomen-
ology and Womens Experience. Totowa, NJ: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1988.
Lugones, Maria. "Purity, Impurity, and Separation." Signs 19
(1994), 458--79.
MacGuigan, Maryellen. "Is Woman a Question?" Interna-
tional Philosophical Quarterly 13 ( 1973), 485~505.
McAlister, Linda Lopez. "Edith Stein: Essential Differ-
ences." Philosophy Today 38 (1993-94), 70--77.
- . "Gerda Walther (1897~ 1977)." In A History of Women
Philosophers Voi. 4. Contemporary Women Philosophers:
1900--Today. Ed. Mary Eden Waithe. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1994, 189-206.
Murphy, Julien. 'The Look in Sartre and [Adrienne] Rich."
In Allen and Young, eds., 101~12.
Nissim-Sabat, Marilyn. "The Crisis in Psychoanalysis: Res-
olution through Husserlian Phenomenology and Femi-
nism." Human Studies 14 (1991), 33-66.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. The Roots of Power: Animate
Form and Gendered Bodies. LaSalle, IL: Open Court,
1994.
Simons, Margaret A. "Beauvoir and Sartre: The Question of
Influence." Eros 8 ( 1981 ), 25---42.
Studlar, Gaylyn. "Reconciling Feminism and Phenomen-
ology: Notes on Problems and Possibilities, Texts and
Contexts." Quarterly Review of Film & Video 12 (1990),
69-78.
Tuana, Nancy, and Rosemarie Tong, eds. Feminism and Phi-
losophy: Essential Readings in Theory, Reinterpretation,
and Application. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.
Young, Iris Marion. Throwing Like a Gir/ and Other Essays
in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Wobbe, Theresa. "Aspeckte einer Phaenomenologie des
Sozialen bei Edith Stein." In Against Patriarchal Think-
ing: A Future without Discrimination? Proceedings ofthe
VI Symposium of the International Association of Women
Philosophers, 1992. Ed. Maja Pellikaan-Engel. Amster-
dam: VU University Press, 1992, 71-80.
MARY JEANNE LARRABEE
DePaul University
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762~1814) Most
phenomenologists have considered subjective ideal-
ism with the transcendental EGO as the principle of
ultimate grounding (Letztbegriindung) to be an unten-
able philosophical system. This rejection ofthe philo-
sophical principles of KANT and the neo-Kantians im-
plies a fortiori a complete disinterest in Fichte's phi-
losophy and its principle, the absolute ego. MARTIN
224 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
HEIDEGGER was interested in the philosophy of Be-
ing and existence of the !ater SCHELLING, who aban-
doned Fichte's speculative subjective idealism as well
as the speculative objective idealism of HEGEL. The
only exception is EDMUND HUSSERL and his transcenden-
tal phenomenology. Husserl was interested in compar-
isons of different types of transcendental philosophy.
His goal was to determine the analogies and differences
of the transcendental-logica! and the transcendental-
phenomenological approach. Fichte was of signifi-
cance for the development of the thought of the !ater
neo-Kantians. Husserl's considerations of the princi-
ples of Fichte's system are thus immediately embed-
ded in his critica! discussions of ne o-Kantian doctrines.
There are in addition other reasons for his interest in
Fichte. He studied Fichte's moral philosophy two years
after the publication of the Logische Untersuchungen
(1900-190 1). The interest in Fichte's moral philosophy
between 1903 and 1918 is connected with Husserl 's
general tendency to emphasize the practica! signifi-
cance ofphilosophy as a rigorous science.
Husserl offered his first seminar on Fichte's Bes-
timmung des Menschen (1800) in 1903. He offered it
again in 1915 and 1918. The urge to find guidance in
the search for a general moral renewal in Germany in
the last years of World War I was an additional moti-
vating force behind his three lectures on Fichte's ideal
ofhumanity in 1918. Neo-Kantians like Paul Natorp
( 1854-1924) discussed similar problems. Husserl stud-
ied Natorp's essay Deutscher Weltberuf (The German
task in the world, 1918) and wrote a letter to him re-
ftecting the similarities and the difference between his
own position and Natorp's essay.
Fichte, according to Husserl, is a prophet of moral
enthusiasm who developed an ethical and theological
worldview philosophy, i.e., a philosophy that cannot
claim to be a rigorous or strict science. This judg-
ment presupposes a rejection ofFichte's philosophical
system as a whole. Fichte's theoretical philosophy, as
Husserl states, is a forced and untenable construction.
There are therefore no references to Fichte in his !ater
attempts to prove the moral force of transcendental
phenomenology as a philosophy of self-responsibility
(Selbstverantwortung).
The reasons for Husserl 's harsh rejection ofFichte 's
theoretical philosophy and his system in general cannot
be found in extended discussions of Fichte 's philoso-
phy. Husserl never studied Fichte 's Wissenschaftslehre
(1794) in depth. It is possible that he read Fichte's
introductions to his system of 1797. There are, how-
ever, relevant arguments developed in his critica! re-
marks on Jonas Cohn 's Voraussetzungen und Ziele der
Erkenntnis (Presuppositions and goals of knowledge,
1908). Fichte and his method is essential for Cohn 's
approach. In Husserl's !ater manuscripts we also find
critica! remarks about the kind of deduction of cate-
gories introduced by Fichte. This version of a tran-
scendental deduction is predominant in the tradition
of German idealism. In his 1etter to Cohn, Husserl re-
jects ali deductions beginning with a highest princip1e
in general without mentioning the possible differences
between, e.g., Cartesian deductions and Fichte's de-
ductions moving through the triad of thesis, antithesis
and synthesis. This difference is not of significance
for Husserl. Like science in general, phenomeno1ogy
- i.e., philosophy as a rigorous science - has to
start from below. Last principles can be found only
in the end after the real work has been done. In the
manuscripts he rejects in addition ali attempts to de-
duce a system of categories as unchanging and eter-
na! princip1es a priori of REASON. It is not possible in
phenomenology to discover such a closed system of
the a priori. The a priori of phenomenology is open for
unlimited possibilities. Fichte is not mentioned in the
letter to Cohn and in the !ater manuscripts, but they re-
vea! the reasons behind Husserl's rejection ofFichte's
system and the idea of system guiding the tradition of
German idealism in general. It is, according to Fichte 's
second introduction, the task of philosophy to provide
a deduction ofthe system of categories, and the a priori
in general, beginning with the absolute ego as a first
principle. Kant promised such a deduction, but he never
proved that the system of categories and the forms of
intuition can be deduced with necessity from the tran-
scendental ego. The presupposition of the possibility
of such a deduction is to recognize that the transcen-
dental ego is indeed the absolute ego, or, in short, the
Absolute. The absolute ego is not the highest princi-
ple in Hegel's system, but the task ofhis Wissenschaft
der Logik (1812-16) is nevertheless a deduction of an
expanded system of categories a priori.
According to Husserl, transcendental phenomen-
ology and Fichte's subjective transcendental idealism
and its methods are in opposition. Not very much space
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE
for analogies remains. Attempts to compare Fichte's
and Husserl 's idealism in the secondary litera ture ofthe
second half of our century ha ve had to find viewpoints
beyond Husserl's own evaluation of Fichte's philos-
ophy. Two types of such comparative interpretations
can be distinguished. It is first possible to investigate
certain analogies and to point out the differences in the
analogies. The other possibility is to provide a criti-
cal reinterpretation of Husserl 's phenomenology and
to prove that elements of speculative thinking are a
necessary supplement of phenomenological research
because phenomenological research by itself cannot
reach its goal of ultimate grounding.
Three types of analogies are considered in the lit-
erature. ( 1) The ultimate principle in Fichte 's and
Husserl 's subjective idealism is the absolute subjectiv-
ity of the transcendental ego. (2) In Fichte's position
and in Husserl 's phenomenology we ha ve the split be-
tween the observ ing ego ofthe philosopher and the ob-
served activities, and the genesis (in Fichte's terms) of
the pragmatic history ofthe absolute subject. (3) There
is a priority of self-realization and self-responsibility
in the genesis of the absolute ego. The task of the
philosopher is in the last instance the practical task of
self-realization and self-responsibility.
A closer considerati an of the first analogy reveals
the differences. Fichte's absolute ego is a pure atempo-
ral activity, a Tathandlung constituting, i.e., creating,
time and space and the categorica! framework in atem-
poral acts of positing and opposing. Husserl 's transcen-
dental ego is the concrete EGO with various systems
of habits, corresponding objects, and a corresponding
world. The structures of temporality are the medium
and not the product of the activities of the ego. Tem-
porality is pregiven to the acts of consciousness in
passive constitution. Bound to temporality, subjectiv-
ity is also bound to facticity, i.e., to the content pregiven
in passive synthesis. The transcendental ego together
with its activities, according to Husserl 's transcenden-
tal aesthetics, is itself pre-constituted in passive gen-
esis, which GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY investigates. The
method of the observation of the reflecting philoso-
pher ofthe second analogy is different. Fichte's obser-
vation immediately presupposes a radical abstraction
leading to the highest principles of his conception of
the logic of reftection, identity and opposition or dif-
ference, and their mutual negation. The observations
225
of the observer require an atemporal intellectual in-
tuition. Observations of intellectual intuition ha ve the
character of speculative deductions. What is deduced
comprises ali of the contents given to the empirical
ego, the empirical ego itself included. In contrast, the
phenomenological observer is bound to the facticity of
pregiven structures of phenomenological experience.
The temporality of inner TIME-consciousness as such
determines the possibility of the split between the ob-
server and the observed activities and their genesis.
There are also differences in the third analogy. Even
to a higher degree than Kant's, Fichte's ethics is an
ethics of the absolute "ought" of absolute freedom.
Husserl 's ETHICS is an ethics "from below." The "ought"
ofactions is the ought ofthe realization ofvalues and is
embedded in the general system of an ethics ofvalues.
The givenness of values in turn presupposes entities
that are given in doxic intentionality, i.e., again the
reality of facticity. There is no absolute ought as the
final principle a priori for a deduction ofthe system of
ethics. The development of ethical principles is teleo-
logical and open in its possibilities.
The attempt to overcome the differences behind
the analogies presupposes a critical reinterpretation of
Husserl 's transcendental phenomenology. Such a rein-
terpretation can be justified with the aid ofthe passages
in Husserl's writings in which he himself interprets
transcendental phenomenology as absolute subjective
idealism with an absolute subjectivity as a principle
of absolute and ultimate grounding. It is questionable
whether such claims are indeed implied in the results of
a purely descriptive phenomenology. 1fthe claims can-
not be justified descriptively, then it must be admitted
that the phenomenological method cannot reach uiti-
roate grounding. In order to reach this goal some type of
speculative thinking has tobe introduced. What occurs
in Husserl 's descriptions as pregiven passivity and fac-
ticity must be understood as the re suit of the creative
powers of an absolute subject. He indeed called the
source of the constitution of in ner time-consciousness
in the nu ne stans of the actual now the "absolute sub-
jectivity." It can be assumed in addition that its activity
is also the driving force behind the passive synthesis of
kinaesthesis. Such a step, suggested by LUDWIG LAND-
GREBE and ULRICH CLAESGES, Jeads to difficuJties. ( J)
According to Fichte the philosopher's observation is
an observation in intellectual intuition. Only intellec-
226 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tual intuition is able to comprehend the timeless acts
in which time and the matter given in time <ţre posited.
The EIDETIC METHOD presupposes TIME, the time that is
required in acts of reflection in general and the time
of the free variation of the contents of transcendental
phenomenological experience. lntellectual intuition, if
it exists, is beyond the scope ofphenomenology. (2) ln-
tellectual intuition for itself, according to Hegel, leads
into the mysticism of an Absolute "as the night in which
ali cows are black." Speculative dialectic is required
for the conceptual development of the content of the
Absolute. Fichte does not use the term "dialectic," but
his method with its movements from thesis and an-
tithesis to synthesis in its essence is a movement of
speculative dialectica! thinking.
Recent comparisons of the philosophy of Jonas
Cohn and Husserl have shown that the concepts of
negation and contradiction in Husserl 's formal and
transcendental logic cannot be interpreted in terms of
the dialectica! conception of negation and contradic-
tion. An attempt to reconcile Husserl's and Fichte's
philosophy is therefore possible only as a deconstruc-
tion of transcendental phenomenology. It requires a cri-
tique ofphenomenology itself. And this critique would
have to show that the phenomenological method can-
not reach the goal ofultimate grounding envisioned by
Husserl, and it would have to reveal the hidden dialec-
tica! structures behind transcendental phenomenology
and phenomenology in general. On the other hand, no
critica! phenomenological investigations have deter-
mined the scope and the li mit of the EVIDENCE given
in speculative dialectica! thinking, its methods, and its
radical conception ofultimate grounding.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Hyppolite, Jean. "Die Fichtesche Wissenschaftslehre und
der Entwurf Husserls." In Husserl et la pensee moderne.
Ed. Herman Leo van Breda and Jacques Taminiaux. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
Kern, Iso. Kant und Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964.
Klockenbusch, Reinhold. Husserl und Cohn. Widerspruch,
Reflexion und Te/os in Phănomenologie und Dialektik.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
Mohanty, J. N. "Fichte's 'Science of Knowledge' and
Husserl's Phenomenology." Philosophical Quarterly (In-
dia) 25, (1952), 113~25.
Rockmore, Thomas. "Fichte, Husserl and Philosophical Sci-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ence." International Philosophical Quarter(v !9 ( 1979),
15-27.
Schneider, Peter K. Die wissenschaftshegriindende Funk-
tion der Transzendentalphilosophie. Freiburg: Karl Alber,
1965.
Seebohm, Thomas M. "Fichte's and Husserl's Critique of
Kant's Transcendental Deduction." Husserl Studies 2
(1985), 53~74.
Tietjen, Hartmut. Fichte und Husserl. Letzthegriindung. Suh-
jektivităt und praktische
Vemunft im transzendentalen !de-
alismus. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980.
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
Universităt Mainz
FILM The history ofthe conjunction ofpheno-
menology with film (and more recently television) has
been greatly influenced by the fact that scholarly study
ofthe medium was legitimated and slowly institution-
alized in the universities of the UNITED STATES only
as recently as the mid-1960s and was thus not syn-
chronous with the rise of interes! in phenomenology
as philosophy and research method in Continental Eu-
rope during the previous decades. Marginally accepted
and housed primarily in university literature depart-
ments, film studies emerged as a discipline during
the years in which semiotics (particularly the work of
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) on the nature of
the sign) and STRUCTURALISM (particularly the work of
Claude Levi-Strauss on the structural study of myth)
were popular in Europe and soon had major impacts
on the American academy. Both not only promised the
HUMAN SCIENCES a new method of textual and social
description, but also appeared as rigorous methods of
literary and cinematic analysis. Attempting to convince
logocentric academics that the study of cinema was a
legitimate scholarly enterprise, film scholars embraced
semiotics and structuralism, and by the mid-1970s had
also adopted a linguistically based PSYCHOANALYSIS and
discursively based ideologica! analysis as more dy-
namic approaches to the psychic and social formation
of film spectators and film texts. Initially, then, film
studies followed such French mentors in cinesemiotics
as Christian Metz and focused first on microanalyses
of film "language" and narrative structures and !ater
on linguistically based, psychoanalytical descriptions
of cinematic identificati an and scopic desi re as well as
on genealogies of cinematic discourse.
 FILM
Prior to the widespread institutionalization of film
studies in the United States during the 1960s, there had
been less formal intellectuallinks between phenomen-
ology and the cinema forged in FRANCE immediately
following World War II and initiated by the publicati an
in 1945 ofGilbert Cohen-Seat's Essai sur les principes
d 'une philosophie de cinema. Cohen-Seat called for a
filmologie, a synthetic science of the cinema whose
task was to describe not only the logic and meaning of
film texts, but also the existential and institutional ac-
tivity offilm-making and film-viewing. His impact was
considerable, giving rise to a filmologie movement that
had, unt il its decline in the 1960s, a certa in international
popularity although it remained virtually unknown in
the United States. First eclectic and interdisciplinary
and then dominated by experimental psychologists, fil-
mologie could hardly be called a phenomenology ofthe
cinema, but many works publishcd in the context ofthe
movement were phenomenologically inflected ~par­
ticularly those that attempted to describe the nature and
psychology of cinematic perception qualitatively.
The movement's Revue Internationale de Filmolo-
gie ( 1947--60) published articles describing cinema's
relation to the perceptual productions of conscious-
ness such as dreams, memories, illusions, spatial and
temporal gestalts such as depth and movement, modes
of identification, and the sense of the real. In 1948,
for example, A. Michotte Van Den Berck published
in the Revue "Le caractere de realite des projections
cinematographiques," an essay prescient in posing,
perhaps for the first time, the still central question
of what has been more recently called the "reality
effect" of the cinema. (Later, in 1953, he posed an-
other question central to contemporary film studies in
"La participation emotionnelle du spectateur a l'action
representee a 1'ecran," attempting a description of the
processes ofidentification and affect in the cinema.) In
194 7, within the context of increasing interdisciplinary
interest in filmologie, psychologist and EXISTENTIAL
PHENOME~OLOGIST MAURICE MERLEAU-PO~TY pubJished,
in Les Temps Moderne, "Le cinema et la nouvelle psy-
chologie," his only essay devoted to the medium he
called the "phenomenological art."
Filmologie also provided the initial context for two
other major avenues of phenomenological investiga-
tion ~ the thematization, description, and interpreta-
tion of, first, the effects of this radically new mode of
227
representation in the culture or I.IFEWORLD of its time,
and second, the aesthetic and primary experience of
film art. In the first instance, phenomenological investi-
gation into the medium 's cultural effects oftcn led from
description to cultural critique. Influenced by the EXIS-
TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, GABRIEL
MARCEL, and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, Edgar Morin's
Le Cinema oul 'homme imaginaire (The cinema or the
imaginary man, 1958) saw the cinema 's essential ambi-
guity and the basis for its fascination as emerging from
the tension between, on the o ne hand, the medium 's
expansive perceptual capacity to bring human being to
reflexive consciousness of itself and to reveal to hu-
man PERCEPTION a world hitherto unseen or taken for
granted and, on the other, the medium's objectifica-
tion of human being in alienated, reified, institution-
alized forms and phantasmagoric images. Even more
negative was ROGER MUNIER 's Contre 1'image (Against
the image, 1962), a phenomenological meditation that
regarded the cinema as a pre-logical and alienating
medium that represented the world as autonomously
constituted, overpowering, and essentially inhuman.
In the second instance, phenomenological investi-
gation of the unique qualities of the aesthetic experi-
ence of cinema have led from description to a some-
times mystical and theologically inflected celebration
ofthe medium's transcendent and transcendental qual-
ities. HENRI AGEL and AMEDEE AYFRE describe the aes-
thetic experience of film art as a way immediately to
apprehend human being and intuit spiritual and moral
truths derived not from theory or logic, but from the
spectator's poetic dialogue with the human and natu-
ral world revealed by cinema. During the early years
of filmologie, Agel asked Le cinema a-t-il une âme?
(Does film ha ve a saul? 1952) and eventually went on to
publish, in 1973, his Poetiquedu cinema: Manifeste es-
sentialiste. Responding in the latter to the contempora-
neous semiotic/structuralist movement and influenced
by Gaston Bachelard ( 1994--1962) on the primordial
and immediate nature of the poetic image, Agel cele-
brated a "cinema of contemplation" that functioned by
analogy rather than reason to allow spectators access
to the essential, transcendental qualities of nature and
human existence. Ayfre, a theologian who had studied
with Merleau-Ponty, initially focused on the medium's
theological and ethical dimensions in Dieu au cinema
(Gad at the cinema, 1952) and published posthumously
228 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Conversion aux images? (Conversion to the images?
1964) and Cinema et mystere (Cinema and mystery,
1969). In a culmi nating work, Le cinema et sa veri te
(1969), Ayfre privileged the "authentic" film whose
images, unlike those of propagandistic or pornograph-
ically commercial cinema, were able to resonate in
our being first pre-logically and then reflectively, ulti-
mately reorganizing our perception and behavior and
re-engaging us with our quotidian LIFEWORLD in a new
and ethically enhanced relation of moral responsibility.
A more widely known celebrant ofthe cinema as an in-
strument of perceptual and spiritual revelation is ANDRE
BAZIN, who was highly influential on both si des of the
Atlantic. A co-founder of Cahiers du cinema, Bazin
was a French critic who wrote extensively on cinema
during the post-war period. Although he died in 1958,
a collection ofhis essays was published posthumously
in France as Qu 'est-ce le cinema? (What is cinema?
1958--62) and subsequently translated into English in
abridged form ( 1967-72) during the infancy of aca-
demic film studies in the United States. For Bazin, the
ontology of cinema is based on its necessary ground-
ing in the photographic image, which claims an exis-
tential bond with the world. Through the convergence
of camera, light, and chemically sensitive paper, the
world makes an actual impression - leaves a "trac-
ing" or "fingerprint"- that projects and animates on
the screen a concrete impression of the actual world.
By virtue ofthis existential or indexical relation to the
world and the medium's mechanical capacity to repro-
duce as well as represent reality, Bazin sees the cinema
as a privileged apparatus capable of phenomenological
EPOCHE AND REDUCTION, description, and interpretation
ofworldly phenomena. Mechanical in nature, the cam-
era brackets or puts out ofplay the habituated vision of
human being, Jets the world speak and impress itself
upon the film and our perception, and Jeads us to a fresh
awareness of the contingent and ambiguous nature of
existence.
For Bazin, the true film artist is humble before this
un ion of camera and world; does not interrupt through
excessive editing the evolution or "becoming" of the
world's meaning; and respects spatial complexity and
temporal continuity through the /ong shot (the camera
is placed ata distance to take in the whole scene), the
long take (the shot is of Jengthy duration and camera
movement rather than editing creates relational mean-
ing among scenic elements), deepfocus (the Jens foca]
length allows clear focus in both foreground and back-
ground of the shot), and camera movement- ali of
which allows the world to reveal itself in its "pure" ob-
jective reality. Bazin privileges what might be called
the "perceptual realism" ofthe cinema. That is, he feels
that objective reality and the richness of the world's
meaning emerges in the medium most fully when the
camera stays within the spatio-temporal bounds of hu-
man - not mechanical - perception. Slow or fast
motion, superimpositions, and various optica! "tricks"
impose meaning upon the world much as do extensive
montage or editorial manipulation, reduc ing ambiguity
and the mystery ofthe world's "becoming."
In 1960, in the United States, Theory of Film: The
Redemption of Physical Rea/ity by Siegfried Kracauer
(1889-1966) provided a complement to Bazin's per-
ceptual realism. A leading intellectual and literary fig-
ure in Weimar Germany (which he left in 1933 when
Hitler carne to power), Kracauer had written exten-
sively on the cinema. His masterwork can be secn as
privileging what might be called the "empirica! real-
ism" of the cinema. Like Bazin, for Kracauer the cin-
ematic apparatus has the power to reveal the objective
world in its significance for human being. However, un-
like Bazin, Kracauer celebrates the apparatus as being
able to extend the limits ofhuman vision mechanically.
Through its own mechanical capacities, including slow
and fast motion, the cinema can reveal the very large
and the very small, the unattended and unintended, the
heretofore hidden. Upon this basis, Kracauer develops
a material aesthetics very different from Bazin 's hu-
manist aesthetics. Initially criticized by film scholars
as a "vulgar realism" developed within the context of a
metaphysical philosophy (i.e., the redemption ofphys-
ical reality) complementary to positivism, Kracauer's
dry and Jengthy description of the cinema seemed far
removed from Bazinian phenomenology. Indeed, it is
only recently (in the revisiting of Kracauer by scholars
such as HEIDI SCHLOPMANN) that his realist "theory" has
been reevaluated as a phenomenology of "film after
Auschwitz" in which the mechanical nature of cinema
reveals, even in fiction, the souJless corporeality of a
perception that exists over and above human intention-
ality.
InitiaJly, Bazin 's and Kracauer's realist aesthetics
excited scholarly debate not only about the difference
 FILM
between them, but also between formalists who saw the
cinema's ontology in its expressive and transformative
properties and realists who privileged the medium's
indexicality (whether perceptually or empirically rep-
resented). However, as film studies moved toward a
"linguistic turn," the realist-formalist debate was itself
called into question.
It was the notion of unmediated representation as
well as the almost religious celebration ofthe cinema's
essential and transcendental revelatory power that be-
came increasingly problematic. JEAN MITRY, in his ex-
haustive and untranslated two-volume Esthetique et
p.\ychologie du cinema ( 1963/ 1965)- both a critique
and culmination ofthe descriptive research done under
the rubric offilmologie- presents meticulous pheno-
menological descriptions of cinematic perception as
well as forms of cinematic expression, but also crit-
icizes Ayfre, Agel, and Bazin. For Mitry, cinema is
not mystical, ineffable, or transcendental, nor is it un-
mediated and apodictic; rather, the medium is open in
its possibilities for signification. Yet Mitry is neither a
semiotician nor a structuralist. At the end of this de-
scriptive and philosophical masterwork, he insists there
can be no essentialist description of cinema, for- un-
like the other arts- the medium expresses life with
life itself and overruns in existential praxis the a priori
principles and rules that would govern and contain it.
Despite their Jack of translation into English, the
theologically informed phenomenology of Ayfre and
Agel, and the work of the more widely read Bazin as
well as Mitry's critique of transcendental phenomen-
ology, together provided the context for the negative
reception ofphenomenology by academic cinema stud-
ies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Coincident with
the discipline's "linguistic turn," the notion that the
mechanical and photographic nature ofthe medium al-
Jowed it a pure and unhabituated vision through which
the world might appear in its essential reality was crit-
icized as, on the one hand, positing a transcenden-
tal vision of the world that might well belong to ED-
MUND HUSSERL 's transcendental EGO and, on the other
hand, amounting to a naive realism that, in claiming
the world 's apodicticity by way of the cinema, sup-
pressed the irreducibly mediated nature of cinematic
representation and ignored the Jatter's Jinguistic and
ideologica! character.
lndeed, when referred to at ali, phenomenology
229
was identified with Husserl 's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY. Works of existential phenomenology that ex-
plored cinematic signification and were more relevant
to issues in contemporary cinesemiotics, such as Bel-
gian psychologist JEAN PIER RE MEUNIER's Les structures
de l'experiencefilmique (1969) or Italian film-maker
Pier Paolo Pasolini's Empirismo eretico (1972) were
almost completely ignored. On the other side of the
Atlantic as well, few attempts at a synthetic descrip-
tion of cinema or of the film experience were noticed
and books such as George Linden 's Rejiections on the
Screen and Mark Slade's Language ()(Cinema: Mov-
ing lmages ()( Man (both 1970) made little impact.
One work that did, however, was by Stanley Cavell
- oddly enough, an analytic philosopher. His phe-
nomenologically inftected ontology of film, The World
Viewed ( 1971 ), explored how the cinema and the spec-
tator co-constitute a lifeworld, but his phenomenology
was overshadowed by his aestheticism and undercut
by the defensiveness of film studies at what was per-
ceived to be his philosophical "slumming" in the new
discipline.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s (the period
identified with the move from classical to contempo-
rary film theory), phenomenology was primarily used
against itself in relation to the cinema. In the context of
semiotic and structural analysis ofthe cinema as a sig-
nifying system, phenomenology was considered blind
to the mediating functions of LANGUAGE and culture.
In the context of !ater psychoanalytical and ideologi-
cal analysis of spectatorial engagement with cinema,
phenomenology provided the means for negative de-
scription and interpretation of, on the one hand, film
spectators as vacant, passive, immoblized, and infan-
tilized image-receptacles and, on the other, projected
films as disembodied, transcendental visions that over-
whelmed and subjugated spectators who mistook cin-
ematic vision and agency as their own. Furthermore,
with the emergence of FEMINIST film theory and post-
colonial studies during this period, phenomenology
was seen as just another totalizing humanistic philoso-
phy that suppressed sexual and cultural differences as
it spoke of"essential" human structures of experience.
Central to this critique were Christian Metz and
Jean-Louis Baudry, their work translated into English
in the mid-1970s. Although early chapters of Metz's
Essais sur la signification du cinema ( 1968) were be-
 230 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
holden to Mitry's phenornenological description of cin-
ematic perception and expressive forms, Metz's subse-
quent work investigates the semiotic codes and psychic
processes that determine cinematic signification, and
is overtly hostile to phenomenology. Baudry's widely
discussed essay "Ideologica! Effects ofthe Basic Cin-
ematographic Apparatus" (written in 1970 and pub-
lished in English in 1974) also includes phenomen-
ology only to critique it. Baudry sees the cinematic ap-
paratus as not only deceptively based on illusory rather
than "real" movement, but also informed historically
by an optics ofRenaissance perspective that comprises
a particular ideology of visual mastery. Overtly link-
ing the camera's mobility ofviewpoint, the intentiona!
structure and supposed disembodiment of its vision,
and the bracketing of the world's real existence in
its illusory image to Husserl 's transcendental subject,
Baudry criticizes this subject and the reduction it per-
forms as phantasmatic and in bad faith, for it allows
the spectator visual mastery and pleasure through the
literal assumption of a false consciousness.
Baudry's argument against cinema~ its apparatus
and its productions and their inherent subjection ofthe
spectator to an ideologically informed "transcendental
vi sion"~ stands opposed to Bazin 's earlier argument
for cinema as inherently engaged in the apodictic and
revelatory process of phenomenological epoche. Both
arguments, however, posit the topographical apparatus
ofthe cinema as resembling the process ofphenomen-
ological method. This potential reversibility between
a phenomenology of film and film as phenomenology
caused further discomfort in a discipline wary of such
chiasmic logic.
Du ring this period of focus on ideology, the uncon-
scious, and spectatorial desire in the cinema, a single
voice attempted to redeem phenomenology for film
studies. In J976, J. DUDLEY ANDREW published The Ma-
jor Film Theories, a widely read introduction to the
premises grounding various approaches to the cinema
during film theory's "classical" period and including a
final chapter on phenomenology that focused on the
work of Ayfre and A gel. In 1977, Andrew applied
phenomenology to a particular film in "The Gravity
of Sunrise," and "The Neglected Tradition of Pheno-
menology in Film Theory" followed in 1978, both pub-
lished in journals specific to the discipline. The latter
essay is both a history of phenomenology's troubled
conjunction with the cinema and a caii for a return to
a mode of thought and a method that might describe
the sensuous, affective, AESTHETrc, and ETiliC AL dimen-
sions of signification in the film experience neglectcd
by the search for codes and textual systems. As be-
fore, the few who hceded this caii in the early 1980s
were hardly noticed. In the United States, there were
isolated essays using a phenomenological approach to
explore film aesthetics, film Mus re, TIME and ten se, cam-
era movement, and sound, but most of these appeared
in journals only tangential to film studies.
Nonetheless, during the decade that followed, cer-
tain scholars emergcd who, working in the essay
form, seemed committed to phenomenological in-
quiry: ANNETTE MICHELSON, BRIAN LEWIS, ALEXANDFR
SESONSKE, ALLAN CASEBIER, JOHN BELTON, FRANK TOMA-
SULO, GERTRUD KOCH, HEIDI SCHLUPMANN, and VIVIAN
SOBCHACK. During this period in Europe, severa! books
of some significance appeared, yet Jean Pierre Meu-
nier's Essai sur 1'image et la communication ( 1980),
an extraordinary broadening of his earlier phenomen-
ology of cinematic identification to a phenomenology
of moving image communication, went unnoticed, as
did Hungarian YVETTE BJRo's less rigorous but appeal-
ing Profan mitologia ( 1982; translated into English in
1990 as Profane Mythologies: The Savage Mind olthe
Cinema).
Given his critica! position in the intellectual mi-
lieu of poststructuralism, however, Gilles Deleuze 's
Cinema 1 {1982) and Cinema 2 ( 1985) were not only
translated {1986, 1989), but also captured attention (if
not application) on both sides of the Atlantic. Based
primarily in the work of HENRI BERGSON on tempo-
ral consciousness and using Charles Sanders Peirce 's
semiology in relation to the essentially iconic nature
of the cinema, Deleuze first explored the "movement-
image" (the development of events or narrative) and
then the "time-image" (coexistent but discrete mo-
ments of duration) ~ arguing the primacy of the for-
mer prior to World War II and the latter after, as well as
describing specific performers, directors, and films in
terms of style as existential comportment in space and
time. Thus Deleuze lays the philosophical and critica!
ground for a semiotic phenomenology of cinema, and
demonstrates its relevance and application to the his-
torical development ofthe narrative film. Nonetheless,
viewing phenomenology as bringing to the foreground
 FILM
the difference rather than similarity between cinema
and natural perception, Deleuze denies that his work is
phenomenological.
The translation ofDeleuze's volumes signaled what
was to become a growing critique of certain deficien-
cies in poststmcturalist thought and an increasing, if
tentative, interest in what phenomenology might offer
film studies. For feminists who had first embraced it,
the psychic and ideologica\ determinism and negativ-
ity of Lacanian psychoanalytical theory and Baudry's
critique ofthe cinematic apparatus forestalled the pos-
sibility ofthe film experience as liberatory, expansive,
or constructive and made it impossible for spectato-
rial pleasure tobe deemed anything but perverse. Film
scholars dealing with national cinemas, cultural iden-
tity, and postcoloniality regarded the "death of the
subject" as premature and ideologically problematic.
Jndeed, in the context of POSTMODERNISM and global
culture, from the mid-1980s on, film studies enter-
tained increasingly fluid notions of subjectivity, sex-
uality, ethnicity, and race and growing awareness of
cultural hybridity, spectatorial agency, cinematic p\ea-
sure and affect, and the presence of the BODY both on
screen and off.
Thus the late 1980s and early 1990s have seen
renewed interest in phenomenology and its non-
determinist and synthetic approach to the film expe-
rience. In 1990, the Quarterly Revinv of Film and
Video published a special issue: "Phenomenology in
Film and Television." Essays deal with representa-
tion, vision as embodied activity, film as experience,
cinematic scopophilia, feminism and phenomenology,
temporality, television reruns, and video technology as
ontology; the issue also includes a selective bibliog-
raphy. Two of its contributors subsequently published
major books, both ofwhich, however different their ap-
proach, contested the linguistic turn that had dominated
contemporary film theory for almost twenty years. On
the one hand, Alian Casebier's Film and Phenomen-
ology ( 1991) uses Husserl 's phenomenology and his
account of representation to challenge dominant no-
tions of the image as merely illusory and substitutive.
Vivian Sobchack's The Address ofthe Eye (1992), on
the other hand, explicitly rejects constitutive pheno-
menology and uses Merleau-Ponty's late work on sig-
nification and his notion of embodied consciousness
to develop an existential and semiotic phenomenology
231
of the film experience that contests and complements
dominant psychoanalytical theories of cinematic iden-
tification. The film experience is described as inter-
subjective and dialogical- the film and spectator as
two viewers viewing, the convergence or divergence
of their vi sua! and intentiona\ interest co-creating the
significance ofthe visible. Furthermore, the cinema is
seen as bringing to visibility for the first time the invis-
ible structure and visual activity we each live as "our
own" vision. It is this structure and activity that links
both spectator and film and accounts for the cinema's
primary intelligibility.
The prospects for phenomenology in film studies
seem bright insofar as phenomenological description
takes account of its own status as qualified by history
and culture and is existential rather than constitutive.
lts biggest obstacles to acceptance are, first, overcom-
ing the prejudice attached to transcendental phenomen-
o\ogy and its alleged essentialism and ahistoricism and,
second, the fact that, unlike much analysis in the disci-
pline, applied phenomenology cannot be done with a
template. Although these obstacles may be difficult to
overcome given the history ofboth theory and method
in film studies, phenomenology offers the discipline
both a rich vocabulary with which to articulate the dy-
namic correlations offilms and spectators in the world
that counts as real, and a reflective method that is re-
sponsive to the film experience as it is variously lived
rather than merely thought.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Agel, Henri. Poetique du cinema: Manifeste essentialiste.
Fribourg: Editions du Signe, 1973.
Andrew, .1. Dudley. "The Neglected Tradition of Phenomen-
ology in Film Theory." Wide Angle 2 ( 1978), 44--49.
- . The Major Film Theories: An lntroduction. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1976.
Ayfre, AmCdee. Le cinema et sa verite. Paris: Editions du
Cerf, 1969.
Baudry, Jean-Louis. "Cinema: effets ideologigiques produits
par l'appareil de base." Cinethique 7-8 ( 1970), 1-8; "Ideo-
logica! Effects ofthe Cinematographic Apparatus." Trans.
A lan Williams. Film Quarterly 28 ( 1974-75), 39-47.
Bazin, Andre. Qu ·est-ce le cinema? 4 vols. Paris: Editions
du Cerf, 1958--62; What is Cinema? 2 vols. Trans. Hugh
Gray. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967-72.
Casebier, Alian. Film and Phenomenology: Toward a Realist
The01y of Cinematic Representation. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991.
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1. L ·image-mouvement. Paris: Edi-
tions de Minuit, 1982; Cinema 1: The Movement lmage.
232 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Hammerjam. Min-
neapolis: Minnesota University Prcss, 1986.
- --. Cinema 2. L 'lmage-temps. Paris: Editions de Minuit,
1985; Cinema 2: The 7/me lmage. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson
and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: Univcrsity ofMinnesota
Press, 1989.
Ingarden, Roman. "Der Film" [ 1947]. In his Untersuchungen
zur Ontologie der Kunst. Musikwerk-Architektur-Film.
Tobingen: Niemeyer, 1962, 319-41; "Film." In his On-
tology of the Work of Art. Trans. Raymond Meyer with
John T. Goldthwait. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Prcss, 1989, 317-42.
Kracauer, Siegfried. Themy o{ Film: The Redemption of
Physical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Merlcau-Ponty, Maurice. "Le cinema ct la nouvelle psy-
chologie." Les temps modernes 26 ( 1947), 930-43; 'The
Film and the New Psychology." In his Sen.~e and Non-
Sense. Trans. Hubcrt L. Dreyfus and Patricia A. Dreyfus.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 48-
59.
Meunier, Jean Pierre. Les structures de 1'experiencefilmique:
L 'identificationfilmique. Louvain: Librarie Universitairc,
1969.
- . Essai sur 1'image et communication. Louvain-la-Neuve:
Cabay, 1980.
Mitry, Jean. Esthetique et psychologie du cinema. 2 vols.
Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1963-65.
Morin, Edgar. Le cinema ou 1'homme imaginaire. Paris: Edi-
tions de Minuit, 1958.
Sobchack, Vivian. The Address ofthe Eye: A Phenomenology
of Film Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1992.
Tomasulo, Frank, ed. Special Issue: Phenomenology in Film
and Television. Quarterly Review of Film and Video 12
(1990).
VIVIAN SOBCHACK
University of California, Las Angeles
EUGEN FINK The historical linkage of Fink
to phenomenology is undisputed, yet there is consid-
erable uncertainty about attributing to him any kind
of essential place in phenomenology's development.
Even a briefhistorical account, however, indicates that
his relationship with EDMUND HUSSERL was an unusual
one, so that the terms for explaining his contributions
ha ve to be drawn from the nature of that relationship
itself.
Fink came to phenomenology after an apprentice-
ship in philosophy marked by an early avid reading
of Nietzsche and Kant. Born in Konstanz on Decem-
ber 11, 1905, he attended the same humanities Gymna-
sium that MARTIN HEIDEGGER had attended nearly twenty
years earlier. There he acquired both his love of phi-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
losophy and the inexpensive hand editions of Kant and
Nietzsche (and others) that he would use the rest of
his life. After completing his Abitur in 1925, Fink en-
tered the university, first in Milnster (summer semester
1925), and then in Freiburg (winter semester 1925/26),
where, except for the summer of 1926 in Berlin, he
remained for the rest ofhis studies.
Fink took every course Husserl offered and then
those that Martin Heidegger began giving as Husserl 's
successor in the first chair of philosophy (from the
winter semester 1928/29 on). In November 1929, with
Husserl as Referent (dissertation director) and Hei-
degger as Korreferent, Fink defended the disserta-
tion that Husserl then published in his Jahrbuch un-
der the title Vergegenwărtigung und Bild. Beitrăge
zur Phănomenologie der Unwirklichkeit, !. Teil (Re-
presentation and image. Contribution to the phenomen-
ology of inactuality, 1930). This would be the only
book Fink would publish until after World War II.
Husserl chose him in 1928 to work as an assistant,
but with the accession ofthe Nazis to power fi ve years
!ater and Fink's refusal to abandon Husserl, his habili-
tation, the next stage of a normal academic career, was
blocked.
Fink became Husserl 's sole assistant from 1930
on, when LUDWIG LANDGREBE, Husserl 's assistant sin ce
1923, Ieft to devote himselfto his Habilitationsschrift.
By this time Fink had entered into Husserl's daily
regime of work, and he worked close1y and intense1y
with him on ali Husserl 's projects un tii Husserl 's death
on April 27, 1938. For example, in 1930 Fink wrote
the "Disposition zu 'System der phănomenologischen
Philosophie' von Edmund Husserl," which has re-
cently been pub1ished in the Husserliana Dokumente
series, an outline for a comprehensive systematic work
Husserl wanted to compose in place ofhis Cartesianis-
che Meditationen [1931 ]. In fact Husserl never got very
far on this new work, continually oscillating between
it and the idea of simp1y revising and expanding the
Meditationen themselves. In the end it was Fink who
produced a methodical revision, offering Husserl in the
summer of 1932 a nearly complete integrated rework-
ing ofthe "Meditationen," including the "VI. Medita-
tion, Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre."
In Fink's full-scale idea for the revision there was to
ha ve been as well a "VII. Metaphysik," but the possibil-
ity of actually finishing this revision was undermined
'
 EUGEN FINK
with Hitler's coming to power. Husserl also set Fink
the task ofrevising his 1917-18 Bem au manuscripts on
"time and individuation," as Husserl had characterized
these studies to Heidegger in a letter from March 28,
1918. The editing work on the Bernau texts, however,
led to Husserl's producing new manuscript studies on
temporality (the so-called C series) and the analysis of
TIME kept transmuting. Whatever draft of a full-scale
text Fink finally wrote, however, is lost, and ali that re-
mains of his efforts are his transcriptions of Husserl 's
originals and his own extensive though discontinuous
research notes.
Besides his dissertation, Fink published only two
other things during his years with Husserl. One
was the famous 1933 Kant-Studien article, "Die
phănomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in
der gegenwărtigen Kritik," a recasting of Fink's "VI.
Meditation" that was nearly not published owing to the
politica! "co-ordination" (Gleichschaltung) that Kant-
Studien was beginning to undergo. It is in this publi-
cation that Husserl made his extraordinary statement:
"At the request ofthe distinguished editorship of Kant-
Studien I ha ve carefully gone through this essay, and I
am happy to be able to say that there is no statement
in it that I could not make fully my own, that I could
not explicitly acknowledge as my own conviction."
Fink managed to publish only one more short article
on Husserl, "Was will die Phănomenologie Edmund
Husserls?" (1934), and then nothing further until he
left Germany a year after Husserl 's death.
Fink worked closely with Husserl on Die Krisis der
europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phiinomenologie ( 1936), which was unfinished when
Husserl died. Within six months of Husserl's death
the entire Nachlass was smuggled to Leuven and thus
saved from destruction, and Fink himself emigrated to
Belgium to join Landgrebe, also in exile there.
This was the time when Fink renewed contact with
phenomenology in France. It had begun earlier when
GASTON BERGER carne to Freiburg in August 1934 to
visit Husserl. Berger drew heavily from Fink's few
published writings in preparing his Le cogito dans la
philosophie de Husserl (1941), and it was Fink's giv-
ing Berger a copy of the "VI. Meditation" that en-
abled others to read that singular text, most notably
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY and TRAN DUC THAO. Now in
1939, within but two weeks of Fink's own arrival in
233
Leuven, Merleau-Ponty carne to spend a week (April
1--6) studying Husserl 's unpublished manuscripts, and
found himself having long conversations with Fink.
The extent to which Merleau-Ponty's adaptation of
Husserl's work drew upon core ideas in Fink's under-
standing has yet tobe explicated, but the references are
unmistakable, and there are remarkable consonances
that surely bear upon our interpretation of the subse-
quent history of phenomenology, especially in FRANCE
and the UNITED STATES.
The Leuven respite lasted, however, little more than
a year. Germany invaded Belgium on May 1O, 1940;
Fink and Landgrebe found themselves again under
the Nazi Reich and they had little choice but to re-
turn to Germany. When Fink arrived in Freiburg he
was inducted into the German military and served
around that city as an airplane spotter. Fi ve years !ater,
with the war ended and normal academic life begin-
ning tobe reestablished, he finally gained his habilita-
tion, presenting his "VI. Meditation" as the work that
Husserl himself had advised him to present for that
purpose a dozen years earlier. Beginning as Dozent
in 1946, Fink became Ordinarius fiir Philosophie und
Erziehungswissenschaft at Freiburg in 1948, where
he remained despite offers from Koln ( 1948), Berlin
( 1957), and Vienna ( 1965). To maintain his indepen-
dence, he even declined Heidegger's request that he
succeed in the chair of philosophy that he, Heidegger,
had so controversially occupied after Husserl. Fink re-
tired in 1971 and died on July 25, 1975.
Fink's writings after 1945 seem to bear litt1e mark
of his having worked so closely with Husserl on tran-
scendental phenomenology. None of the apparatus or
technical issues that typify Husserl 's program seem to
come to the forefront in what he published. As their
titles indicate, his books tend to focus either on overar-
ching ontologica! themes or on human realms ofbasic
significance. The philosophers he writes about are pre-
Husserlian, Hegel and Nietzsche most prominently. His
occasional papers on Husserl ha ve been serious and in-
fluential, but seem to stand apart from his university
lectures and the books he drew from them. In short,
Fink's postwar work seems largely to stand outside of
what Husserl would ha ve envisaged as the continuation
of phenomenology, and he does not figure among what
most take to be the phenomenologists of the second
half ofthe 20th century. Clearly the question of Fink 's
234 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ro le in phenomenology poses peculiar problems.
The place to begin, however, is where Fink be-
gan: with his work with Husserl. And the question
to ask is: what exactly did Fink do for Husserl? But
this question requires first asking a~other: what was it
that Husserl himself did not do, or, better, le(t undone?
Now if Husserl's phenomenology is the transcenden-
tal program announced in the ldeen zu einer reiner
Phiinomenologie und phanomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913 ), the Cartesianische Meditationen, and
the Krisis texts, then it is clear that his real phenomen-
ological philosophy, as he was wont to say in the final
years, lay in his manuscripts, not in these "introduc-
tions" to phenomenology he published.
Yet to elicit the "real" philosophical work from the
incredible mass of Husserl 's manuscripts, one needs
a statement of guiding principles. Is there any such
statement, are there any such guidelines? Do we have
the systematic principles for realizing phenomenology
beyond the preliminary declarations that are so familiar
but that Husserl himself criticized and radicalized? It
is with this question that the place of Eugen Fink in
phenomenology can begin to be defined.
What was left undone when Husserl died was less a
matter of elaborating positive phenomenological find-
ings and making scrupulous eidetic analyses of partic-
ular matters than the defining ofphenomenology in full
systematic organization and integration so as to make it
possible to harmonize the different levels and thematic
domains in its vast programmatic complexity. The fi-
nal task of phenomenology was the phenomenology
ofphenomenology, including most particularly a tran-
scendental themy of method whose principles would
make a systematic self-critique andfinal philosophical
sel(-interpretation possible.
In Husserl 's writings this task was repeatedly an-
nounced, yet in the 1930s it was actua!Zv being done,
except that it was not being done by Husserl alone; it
was being done by Husserl together with Fink. And
indeed, in the material that documents their collabora-
tion, this part was being done far more by Fink than by
Husserl!
When o ne looks beyond Husserl 's own writings, in-
cluding the thousands of Forschungsmanuskripte (re-
search manuscripts) he produced, and begins to study
not just the few essays Fink publishcd at the time but
the many hundreds ofpages ofhis own personal notes,
together with the dozens of typed drafts he prepared
for Husserl (all kept in the Eugen Fink-Archiv at the
Pădagogische Hochschule in Freiburg) - and then
when one adds the remarks Husserl kept making in his
wide correspondence-a remarkable picture emerges.
Fink was neither a secretary do ing editorial work on the
master's texts nor a disciple following Husserl in du-
tiful orthodoxy. He was another thinker with Husserl,
an Other within phenomenology, working to fill out
within it what Husserl himself never did or perhaps
never could do. Thus Husserl describes how he and
Fink had talked over ali the projects and ideas he was
working on, "and we think together," Husserl writes,
"we are like two communicating vessels" (letter to Fa-
ther Daniel Feuling, March 30, 1933). Or in one ofthe
rare letters to Fink himself, Husserl says to him that
he, Fink, has been "for years now no longer my 'as-
sistant,' nor my secretary, not my intellectual servant."
"You are," Husserl continues, "my collaborator, and, in
addition, my seminar, my teachership" (July Il, 1934).
The interplay in question is clear in the "Sixth
Meditation," where Husserl 's extensive alterations and
marginal comments to Fink 's text suggest something of
the kind of conversations the two must ha ve had. And
the subtitle, "The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of
Method," designates the heart of their collaborative
dialogue.
Husserl was a master of analysis, but the consoli-
dation ofhis research results was another thing. Com-
prehensive integration was eluding him in these last
years ofhis life, and by 1934 Husserl had in fact pretty
well abandoned the effort to produce a complete sys-
tematic presentation of his thought. He did achieve
one more grand statement of ideas in his Krisis, but
this was, once again, more the explanation of an en-
try into phenomenology than a comprehensive expla-
nation according to the principles required of a gen-
uine transcendental level. Fink's "Sixth Meditation,"
on the other hand, explicitly sketched out what was re-
quired for that advanced systematic level, and Husserl
returned to it again and again for challenge and stim-
ulus. So to understand Fink 's part of the collaboration
means to understand the "Sixth Meditation."
This supplement to Husserl 's Cartesianische Medi-
tationen is not about the phenomena analyzed in those
preceding five (whether constituted structures or the
originative constituting processes themselves); it is
 EUGEN FINK
about what the doing of that analysis itself must be
according to the requirements of the key operation
ofthe phenomenologica\ EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION. Here
the "subjectivity" by and for which phenomenologi-
cal analysis is done is brought forward as an explicit
theme, together with the specific methods by which
self-awareness on the part of constitutive agency is
achieved ---al\ in explicit critiquc of naive conceptions
or presuppositions stil\ holding sway, so as to allow
purely reduction-level cognition to be realized. Thus
the special nature of the evidential "experiencing," the
"ideation," and the "theorizing" that are done when
constitutive processes themselves are thematized must
be examined, together with specifically transcendental
"languagc" and "science," precisely as transsolipsistic,
as intersubjective in their very practice. Here, too, is
taken up the question of how the vcry sense of being
is affected by the transcendental epoche, and therefore
what kind of being is to be attributed to both constitu-
tive processes themselves and the thinking action and
agency that attends to those processes in the act of
phenomenologizing.
While these issues are formulated in the "Sixth Med-
itation," that text nevertheless does not go very far
toward elaborating their resolution. It is meant rather
as an outline, the "idea" of a transcendental theory of
method, not its actual elaboration, and the theory of
method is only one part of the fu\1-sca\e phenomen-
ology ofphenomenology itse\f.
To see more ofthe systematic integration and more
of the detailed methodological critique it required, we
ha veto go to Fink's manuscript work in the background
ofthe "Sixth Meditation," for this is where Fink's con-
tribution to the dialogue of Husserl 's daily regimen is
documented.
From study of Fink's manuscript notes the follow-
ing main points emerge. ( 1) Leve!s olana~vsis ha veto
be rccognized, and only then can findings on differ-
ent themes be interpretively integrated. (2) The nature
of Husserl's "~ystem" has to be recognized, preciscly
in the interplay between guiding general insights and
phenomenological analysis of details. (3) In particu-
lar, the distinction has to be made between analysis
and specu!ation, that is, between matters that can be
positively investigated and those that, being matters of
philosophica\ interpretation rather than the intuitional
evidencing of phenomena, are "constructive" or "spec-
235
ulative." (4) Finally, recognition ofthe limitations in-
trinsic to phenomenology may require transition be-
yond phenomenology in the sense of a program for
establishing positive findings (i.e., taken as a science).
Levels ol analysis. There is scarcely a work of
Husserl 's that does not mention the need to begin by
using certain already furnished intellectual materials to
perform the analyses that comprise phenomenology's
own work, and then to go back through those anal-
yses in order to criticize the naivete and presupposi-
tions in them. In other words, "naive straightforward
phenomenology" must be followed by what is called
"reflective phenomenology on a higher level" in Er-
ste Philosophie Il [1924]. What makes the difference
between the two is the phenomenological reduction,
which in its moment of epoche neutralizes any concep-
tions whose home origin and application is mundane
experience, i.e., experience that is itse\fthe constituted
resul! of constituting processes. This is especially true
of the self-conceptions ol human being and acting that
philosophica\ history has left already in hand. Thus in
describing the move from naive in-the-world thought
to properly phenomenological reflection, Husserl be-
gan in Ideen I by representing constituting subjectivity
in the conceptual drcss ofhuman immanent psycholog-
ical consciousness. as a "remnant" left over when that
which is externa\ to it, the "transcendent" objects ofthe
surrounding "world," was stripped away. Yet human
consciousness is not phenomenologically conceivable
as separated off from the world; the WORLD embraces
human immanence together with "transcendence," the
objects of"external" experience. Hence the ent1y-\eve\
conception of "immanent transcendental constituting
subjectivity" needed to be reinterpreted at a proper re-
duction-lcvel; subjectivity had tobe "unnaturalized" in
Husserl's terms, "un-·humanized" in Fink's.
The principle of phenomenological se\f-critique is
clear enough; the practice, however, was rarely carried
out in fu\1 radicality. Two signal instances in which
Fink's unpublished writings give concise indication
of the critica\ recasting still needed are thc issues of
temporality and monadology.
For temporality Fink argued two principal points.
First, temporality is analyzed obviously as "inner time-
consciousncss." Yet if consciousness as such is a phe-
nomenon in time, i.e., is mundane, then the structure
of time-consciousness cou ld not set the terms for the
236 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
temporal process that was the very action of fundamen-
tal constitution itself. Urzeitigung(primal temporaliza-
tion) has to be interpreted out of time-consciousness
structures against the mundaneity ofthose structures as
themselves constituted in and by Urzeitigung. Second,
however, and more specifically, if the subject-object
correlation is also a structure typical of consciousness
as mundane, then the presentness that makes for the
way an abject is "before" a subject is precisely what
has tobe explained as a constituted effect; the subject-
object correlation as a presencing structure cannot be
assumed as properly characterizing the constitutive ac-
tion of Urzeitigung itself. Here a reduction-governed
critique must enter to control the more radical reinter-
pretation of the findings of the initial phenomenology
of time-consciousness.
As for monadology, the procedure is similar. Talk
of"monads" is descriptive terminology borrowed from
mundane intersubjectivity. Human subjectivity is di-
vided and multiplied into individual human persons
empathetically bound together and acting in commu-
nity. However, while human inter-multi-subjectivity
may well be taken as indicating the trans-individuality
that must characterize the transcendental, mundane hu-
man multiplicity cannot be retained as the transcenden-
tally appropriate structural paradigm- notat the level
of fu li reduction-governed self-critique. What may be
legitimate as the representation of introductory levels
must here be questioned and radically reinterpreted.
The nature of Husserl :S "system. " Considerations
like these make it imperative to consider the pecu-
liar nature ofHusserl's procedure. For Fink, Husserl's
"system" was intrinsically "open" and dynamic. It was
nota totalizing plan but a dynamic interplay between
concrete investigations and "speculative" projections.
Emerging from the investigations in the first place, the
"speculative" components gave sense and direction to
those analyses, while the investigations of detail con-
tinually broke open the design laid out in these "specu-
lative" comprehensions, thereby forcing their repeated
interpreti ve recasting. Thus "findings"- regarding IN-
TENTIONALITY, for example- cannot be simply taken
at face value. They always have to be seen in terms
of (a) the context in which they are being presented,
their specific location in the investigational strategy
that, continuing on, will eventually impose a deepening
or recasting of the overall conception that ("specula-
tively") guides the individual investigations- aga in,
e.g., intentionality--and (b) the /evel at which they are
seen to lie in relation to the critica! reinterpretation re-
quired ofthem in the reduction-governed countering of
the mundaneity-bound conceptuality that is unavoid-
ably always used.
Analysis and speculation. Thus phenomenology
cannot be content merely to pile up investigative find-
ings; it bas to integrate them through a systematic self-
critica! interpreti ve reftection that, always anchored by
them, never becomes free-ftoating or arbitrary. And the
work of analysis is different from the work of 5pecu-
lation. Husserl was a masterat the first; Fink saw the
second painfully lacking as an explicit component in
Husserl 's everyday labors. It was this that he had to
try to supply. This was particularly true regarding the
question of being. Thus, ultimately, in Husserl 's tran-
scendental phenomenology - where the conception
ofbeing that guided ali its labors was that being is con-
stituted by a proto-process that could not itself be the
result of a constitution into being- absolute consti-
tutive process itself had tobe beyond being, in Fink's
designation, "meontic. " Only a "speculative" reftec-
tion, indeed one that paradoxically held together being
and nothing, could bring any intelligibility to that.
Transition beyond phenomenology. Thus for Fink
many of the principal elements of transcendental
phenomenology were already components that, while
they intrinsically grew out ofinvestigations done under
the principle of intuitive phenomenological evidenc-
ing, needed clarificatory work that did not fit Husserl 's
"principle of ali principles." This was particularly true
for certain key structures that Husserl invariably ex-
plicated using the subject-object correlation. For Fink
explicati an in this manner represented a legitimate pre-
liminary level of phenomenological analysis, but be-
cause the subject-object schema was essentially a mun-
dane structure, this correlation could not be retained in
radical, self-critica! explication of either the fundamen-
tal constitutive process - Urzeitigung - or prima!
constitutive results, most notably the world and the
primary horizonal features ofthe world such as SPACE.
The only recourse for work precisely on the pivotal
"speculative" matters that both governed and emerged
within Husserl 's investigations was to move past the
style, technique, and conceptual paradigms character-
istic of Husserl 's groundbreaking studies.
 FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY
Such, at least, was Fink's understanding ofwhat he
was doing as he took his habilitation by presenting his
"VI. Meditation," his statement ofprecisely the critica!
moment intrinsically required by Husserl 's own work.
Part of what Husserl never did or could do was to
make it possible - even necessary - to go beyond
Husserl! In a sense one could say that Fink, the Other
within phenomenology who was faithful to Husserl to
the end, became at the same time the Other without
- and faithful there to the impetus ofphenomenology
Husserl had founded.
In sum, both the work Fink did for Husserl and
Fink's postwar teaching and writing require attending
to the interplay of the two dimensions of analysis and
speculation that he saw to be fundamental to Husserl 's
phenomenology. Marks of this schema begin to show
unmistakably when one looks retrospectively at both
eras of his work. Yet the thematic elaboration of the
ideas that make it intelligible remain fragmentary and
discontinuous, and have long been kept private. Only
now are they coming to be known, so that only now is
it finally possible to realize what Fink contributed to
Husserl's phenomenology, and therefore perhaps what
that phenomenology itself really comprises.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Fink, Eugen. VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Teill: Die Idee
einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre. Ed. Hans Ebel-
ing, Jann Hol!, and Guy van Kcrckhoven. Husserliana
Dokurnente III!. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 1988; Sixth Cartesian Meditation, The Ideas (){a
Transcendental The01y o{Method. Trans. Ronald Bruzina.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995; Teil 2:
Ergănzungshand. Ed. Guy van Kerckhoven. Husserliana
Dokumente ll/2. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988.
---. "Die phanomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls
in der gegenwărtigen Kritik." Kant-Studien 38 ( 1933),
32!-83; rpt. in his Studien zur Phiinomenologie, 79--156;
"The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl
and Contemporary Criticism." In The Phenomenology of
Husserl. Ed. and trans. R. O. Elvcton. Chicago: Quadran-
gle, 1970,73-147.
- . Studien zur Phiinomenologie, 1930-1939. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
- . Niihe und Distanz. Ed. Franz-Anton Schwarz, Freiburg:
Karl Alber, 1976.
- . Nachdenkliches zur ontologischen Friihgeschichte von
Raum-Zeit-Bewegung. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1957.
- . Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor~fi·agen zum Prohlem des
Phiinomen-Begriff.~- The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
237
Alles und Nichts. Ein Umweg zur Philosophie. Thc
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
- . Nietzsches Philosophie. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960.
- . Spiel als Weltsyrnhol. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960.
--. Metaphysik und Tod. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969.
--. Heraklit Uointly with Martin Heidegger]. Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970.
- . Metaphysik der Erziehung irn Wcltverstiindnis von Plato
und Aristotelc>s. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
1970.
- . Erziehungs,vissenschaft und Lehenslehre. Freiburg:
Rombach, 1970.
- . Traktat liber die Gewalt des Mensclwn. Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1974.
- . Existenz und Koexistenz. Ed. Franz-Anton Schwarz.
Wiirzburg: Kiinigshauscn & Neumann, 1987.
- . Welt und Endllichkeit. Ed. Franz-Anton Schwarz.
Wiirzburg: Kiinigshausen & Neumann, 1990.
--. Natur, Freiheit, Welt. Ed. Franz-Anton Schwarz.
Wiirzburg: Kiinigshauscn & Neumann, 1992.
Fink, Suzanne, and Ferdinand Graf. Eugen Fink. Vita
und Bihliographic>. Freiburg: Eugenfink-Archiv an
Pădagogische Hochschule, Freiburg. 1994.
Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. Bihliographie Eugen
Fink. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
Fink's unpublished Husserl-period writings are kept in the
Eugen-Fink-Archiv at the Pădagogische Hochschule in
Freiburg.
RONALD BRUZINA
University of Kentucky
FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY ED-
MUND HUSSERL conceived of science as the general the-
ory of the world and of logic as the theory of science.
In his Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ), he held
that to every theory there corresponds "a possiblefield
of" knowledge ... known in mathematical circles as a
manif"o!d (Mannigf"altigkât)." Insofar as logic concerns
itself with the study of the object domains (''mani-
folds," or, we would say, models) of possible theo-
ries, Husserl refers to it as ':larma! ontology." He cited
the work in MATHEMATICS of Georg Friedrich Bernhard
Riemann ( 1826-1866 ), Hermann Gunther Grassmann
(1809-1877), William Rowan Hamilton (1805-1865),
Sophus Lie (1842-1899), and Georg Cantor (1845-
1918) as contributions to formal ontology and went
on to provide the theory of the part-whole and depen-
dence relations in the Third Investigation as his own
contribution. Formal Ontology is formal LOGIC inso-
far as it is concerned with objects, what we might caii
238 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the semantics of formal logic. But Husserl's concept
of formal ontology historically antedates the (Tarskian)
set-theoretic semantic concepts (e.g., consequence, va-
lidity, etc.) that we take for granted today. Because it
embodies a conception of semantics alternative to that
with which we are familiar, his notion of the relation
of formal ontology to logic does not translate easily
into late 20th century, post-Tarskian terms. The notion
must therefore be considered first within the historical
context of Husserl 's own thought.
Husserl 's conception of formal ontology is inti-
mately involved with his conceptions both of logic
and of what comprises possible objects of theoretical
inquiry. He inherited an Aristotelian metaphysical per-
spective from the school of FRANZ BRENTANO; his con-
ception of logic was informed by an ontology that in-
cluded both universals and particulars of ontologically
dependent and independent types. The elucidation of
his conception of logic as formal ontology therefore
requires a consideration of his ontology of universal
essences and his EIDETIC METIIOD. He distinguishes var-
ious types of universal essences (ei de) in terms of the
relations of generalization and formalization.
Husserl assumes that each thing is an instance of
some eidos or essence, and that essences may not only
ha ve, but be instances (e.g., he holds that every essence
is an instance ofthe universals "object in general" and
"essence"). Besides the relation of instance to essence,
he held that there is a second relation (of generaliza-
tion) defined on essences. In ldeen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913), the essence "red" is a specification (but
not an instance) of the more general essence, "color."
Specification and generalization are inverses: for any
two essences x and y, x is a generalization of y just in
case y is a specification of x.
But the genus "essence" is not a generalization of
the essence "red" or the essence "triangle." These are
instances (not specifications) ofthe genus "essence." A
(rough) guide for understanding this distinction: the in-
stane ing relation is to the generalization relation as the
membership relation is to the subset relation; similar
and easily confused- but different. Husserl provides
a part-whole characterization ofthe difference between
the relations of instance to essence and specification to
generalization (which he treats under the topics "for-
malization" and "generalization," respectively). Ify is
a generalization of x, then y is a part of x (at least
in some "comprehensive" use of the term "part" that
Husserl is willing to accept). But ify is a part ofx ( even
in the comprehensive use ofthe term "part''), then y is
not a formalization of x.
From this it follows that no formalization is a gener-
alization and vice versa. The relation of specification to
generalization enables the definition ofsome important
types of essences. Any essence x is a gen us iff there is
some different essence y such that x is a generalization
of y. Similarly, any essence x is a species iff there is
some different essence y such that y is a generalization
of x. Any essence x is a highest genus iff it is a genus
and nota species, and a lowest specie.\· iffit is a species
and not a genus. Every essence either is a lowest (in-
fima) species or is specifiable to an infima species, and
is either a highest genus, or is generalizable to a highest
genus.
Husserl distinguishes between the extension and the
empirica] extension of an essence. For any essence x,
there exists an extension of instances of x. Any y is
the extension of" an essence x iff y is the class of ali
possible instances of x. Any y is the empirica! extension
of" an essence x iffy is the class of ali actual (i.e., real)
instances of x. I f both the empirica! extension and the
extension of a given essence are non-empty, then the
former is a proper subclass ofthe latter.
But Husserl distinguishes further types of exten-
sions relevant to his conception of formal ontology.
For any essence x, there exists an eidetic extension of
x. The eidetic extension of any essence x is the class
of lowest species that are specifications of x. Husserl
then distinguishes between two types of eidetic ex-
tensions ofuniversals: "material" and "mathematical."
Any eidetic extension is mathematical just in case it
is a subset ofthe eidetic extension ofthe essence "ob-
ject in general" (etwas iiberhaupt); otherwise, it is a
material eidetic extension.
A second set of distinctions regarding ei de are de-
veloped by Husserl in terms of his notions of onto-
logica! dependence and independence. He calls things
that require nothing el se ( other than the essences they
instance) in order to exist ontologically independent
(example: the nose ofSocrates), ami things that require
something el se (besides the essences they instance) in
order to exist ontologica/~v dependent ( example: the
pugness of the nose of Socrates ). He refers to depen-
 FORMAL ANO MATERIAL ONTOLOGY
dent individuals as moments of the things they require
in order to exist.
The distinction between ontologically dependent
and independent individuals enables an analogous dis-
tinction between dependent and independent essences.
There are at least two types of lowest species and
highest genera (those instanced by only independent,
and those instanced by only dependent instances). Any
essence is a concretum iff it is a lowest species whose
extension is a class of independent instances, and is an
abstractum iffit is a lowest species whose extension is
a class of dependent instances. Example: the essence
"veracity" is an abstractum, but the essence ''truthful
person" is a concretum.
Genera also come in two types. Any genus is con-
crete iff it is a generalization of some concretum, and
is abstract iff it is a general ization of some abstractum.
Any essence is a regional eidos iff it is a highest con-
crete genus. The essence "material thing" is an example
of a regional ei dos. In Husserl 's account, only conc-
reta are absolutely independent (selbstăndig) essences
while ali genera are dependent (unselbstiindig). Since
he claims that any generalization is a part of each of its
specifications, he holds that the regional eidos must be
a dependent eidetic part of each member (concretum)
of its eidetic extension. He defines a regional eidos
as "the total highest generic unity belonging to a con-
cretum, i.e., the essentially unitary nexus of the high-
est genera pertaining to the infimae species within the
concretum." The term "unity'' here signals the ("preg-
nant") concept of whole, and the term "within" (in-
nerhalb) reveals that just as the regional eidos is part
of the concreta that occur as members of its eidetic
extension, so also the abstracta instanced by the de-
pendent parts of individual members of the extension
ofthe regional eidos are parts ofthose concreta. Since
a concretum is a unitary ("pregnant") whole, there is
some foundation relation between any two of its parts,
and hence between the regional eidos and abstracta
that it contains as parts. This claim of the "pregnancy"
of regiona 1 ei de is the reason why E. John Lemrnon 's
conception of synthetic a priori necessity (see below)
is more general than Husserl 's.
The foregoing discussion of Husserl 's ontology of
essence now enables a definition of regional ontology
as the a priori theory associated with a given regional
ei dos. Specifically, a material ontologv is the set of ali
239
"synthetic a priori" sentences that express relations of
foundation (i.e., of ontologica! dependence) among the
parts of ali and only those concreta that share a given
regional eidos as a part.
Husserl's axiomatic conception of such ontologies
can be expressed as follows. Assume some (moda!)
Janguage of material ontology in which the sentences
in the set ~ are formulated. ~ is a set of axioms for the
material ontology of the region y iff: both ~ is a (for
Husserl, probably finite) subset ofthe ontology ofthe
region y and for each sentence S ofthe ontology ofthe
region y, S is a consequence of~- The paradigmatic
case is where ~ is consistent, so the on(v consequences
of ~ are a priori truths of the region y. Husserl did
not have the distinction between consequence and the-
oremhood and assumed that the sentence S should be
a theorem as well as a consequence of~- Husserl then
held that for each regional ei dos there is a set of syn-
thetic a priori axioms expressing foundation relations
between instances of the concreta and abstracta of the
region. He leaves unclear which logic (i.e., Janguage
and inference system) ~ is formulated within.
Husserl 's favorite example of a regional essence and
its ontology in Ideen J is the essence "material abject,"
or "any physical nature whatever," and theoretical (as
opposed to experimental) physics, but the second and
third books ofthe ldeen involve extensive discussions
also ofthe regional ontologies ofthe BODY, the psyche,
and culture. Consequences of the axioms of any re-
gional ontology are truc a priori for that region. But o ne
regional ontology is privileged, in the sense that con-
sequences of its axioms are true of every region. That
is the ontology of the regional eidos "object in gen-
eral" (etwas iiberhaupt), which Husserl called '~j(Jrmal
ontology" to distinguish it from the (aforementioned)
material ontologies. But while Husserl thought offor-
mal ontology as an a priori theory ofthe region etwas
!lberhaupt, he knew that formal ontology could not be
considered just one among the many regional ontolo-
gies. Claiming that the "formal region" is "nota region
but the empty form of any region whatever," he felt
that formal ontology prescribes for material ontologies
a formal structure common to them ali.
Formal ontology is both unique and prescriptive
vis-a-vis the material regional ontologies. One of the
(two) ways Husserl distinguishes formal from mate-
rial ontology involves the Kantian distinction between
240 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
synthetic and analytic a priori sentences. He character-
ized formal ontology as consisting of only the latter,
and the material regional ontologies as including the
former type of a priori sentences. The question then is
what he meant by KANT's term "analytic"; the distinc-
tion between formal and material ontology depends
upon preserving the Kantian distinction between the
synthetic and the analytic a priori.
In ldeen 1 Husserl cites the definition of analytic-
ity given in the third ofthe Logische Untersuchungen.
There synthetic and analytic laws are distinguished in
terms ofthe concept of"formalization salva veritate."
An a priori truth is analytic just in case it is formal-
izable salva veritate (i.e., just in case the sentential
schema that results from [uniformly] replacing senten-
tial constants by sentential variables is also true). He
says further only that a sentence is synthetic a priori just
in case it is not analytic, but is nevertheless grounded
in some regional ei dos. What exactly Husserl meant by
this phrase "grounded in" (inhalte griindenden gesei-
zen) is mysterious.
This presupposes a definition of law (viz. a priori
truth) that is unavailable and yields no criterion for
distinguishing necessary (a priori) from contingent (a
posteriori) synthetic sentences, since neither type is
formalizable salva veritate. The "salva veritate" for-
mulation suggests that Husserl was thinking of analytic
a priori truths as substitution instances of valid senten-
tial schemata. A sentential schema is like a sentence,
except that variables occur in place of its component
non-logica] (sentential) constants. Replacing such vari-
ables (uniformly) with sentcnces yields a substitution
instance of the schema. A schema is valid just in case
it has no false substitution instance, and a sentence is
analytic just in case it is a substitution instance of a
valid schema.
However, interpreting Husserl 's notions of analytic-
ity and formal ontology in terms ofthe current concep-
tion ofvalidity requires two provisos. The first proviso
concerns our (set-theoretic) understanding of validity
and Husserl 's (part-theoretic) understanding of analyt-
icity. Husserl was relatively innocent of the model-
theoretic semantics in terms of which we understand
any type of validity today. Today the metalinguistic
claim "p is valid" means "p is true under every in-
terpretation of the language." An lnterpretation I of
the language is an assignment of a model to the lan-
guage. A model is an ordered sequence (which is a
complicated kind of set) ofsets, including as members
a uni verse U of discourse and some relations on (such
as the subset p of) U. A sentence "S is P" (Husserl's
"predication") is true under the interpretation 1 when
I assigns the predicate "P" to a set p and the subject
"S" to a member of p. These set-theoretic conceptions
are alien to Husserl 's understanding ofthe a priori, and
hence to his conception of formal ontology.
Husserl conceived of predication in terms of the
part relation; he understood "S is P" as true when the
predicate "P" denotes a part of the whole denoted by
the subject "S." The late discussion in Elfahrung und
Urteil ( 1939) of predication as expressing dependent
part relations, and the early claim in the third of the
Logische Untersuchungen that the assertion "the exis-
tence of a whole W (A, B, C, ... ) generally includes
(i.e., is conditiona/ upon) that of its parts A, B, C, ... "
is analytic, both suggest that mereology (the theory of
part-whole relation) is to Husserl's notion ofthe a pri-
ori as set theory (the theory of membership relation)
is to validity. Husserl's own understanding of formal
and material ontologythen presupposes a mereological
semantics envisioned by him but as yet worked out by
no one.
The second proviso concerns which concepts ofva-
lidity are relevant to the ana(ytic and synthetic types of
necessity. The lack of an adequate criterion for distin-
guishing synthetic a priori from synthetic a posteriori
sentences suggests that the concept of validity behind
Husserl 's "formalizable salva veritate" criterion of an-
alyticity is the classical conception. Different sets of
valid sentential schemata correspond to different sen-
tential logics. The question is which set we wish to
consider the analytic sentential schemata, and which
logic the sententiallogic of formal ontology. Ifwe in-
sist upon the theorems of classical logic as the logic of
formal ontology, then we are committed to the classical
conception ofvalidity, and the distinction between con-
tingency and necessity among truths that characterize
· some but not ali (material) regions remains otiose. But
there is historical precedent for rejecting the classical
conception of validity.
Where "-." is negation, "v" is disjunction, and ":J"
is implication, the schemata "-.-.p :J p," "(-.p v q) :J
(p :J q)," and "(p :J q) v (q :J p)" are (controversially)
valid in the classical sense. Intuitionists ( e.g., Luitzen
 FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY
E. Brouwer [1881-1967]) have argued that the first,
and modallogicians ( e.g., Hugh MacColl [ 1837-1909]
and C. 1. Lewis [ 1883-1964]) that the second and third
ofthese schemata should not be valid, and the fact that
they are is evidence of a defect in the classical concept
of validity. The Husserlian distinctions between the
synthetic and analytic a priori, and between the lan-
guages of material and formal ontology can be drawn
in terms ofnonclassical notions ofvalidity.
John Lemmon has suggested that the necessity op-
erator ofthe Lewis system S4 may be interpreted as "it
is informally provable in mathematics that," while the
necessity operator of S5 means "it is analytically the
case that." Given Kant's identification ofmathematical
necessity as synthetic, Lemmon suggests a distinction
between synthetic and analytic necessity. While S5 ne-
cessity might be taken as Husserl 's analytic necessity,
Husserl maintains that material regions are wholes in
the pregnant sen.~e. For that reason, his concept of
synthetic necessity is better expressed by the neces-
sity operator of the system S4.3 studied by Michael
Dummett and Lemmon. S4.3 and S5 could be consid-
ered inference systems for the sentential components
of the languages of material and formal ontology (re-
spectively). The unavailability of such non-classical
notions of ( e.g., S4.3- vs. S5-) validity at the time
Husserl wrote accounts for his own difficulty in for-
mulating the distinction between material and formal
ontology.
Husserl's thought was informed more by the
(Boolean) logic of sentences than the (Fregean) logic
of predicates. But the languages of formal and mate-
rial ontology must certainly have at least a first-order
predicate logic. The semantics and inference systems
of moda! predicate logic ( e.g., whether the Barcan For-
mula should or should not be valid) are matters of
dispute. Such semantic issues of moda! predicate logic
are directly relevant to the question rai sed by Husserl 's
conception offonnal and material ontology: what pre-
cisely are the lexicon, formation rules, and differences
between the inference rules ofthe languages of formal
and material ontology? Until this question is answered,
Husserl's distinction between formal and material on-
tology remains more a philosophical puzzle than a di-
vision of philosophicallabor.
Husserl's preferences regarding the syntax and se-
mantics ofthe languages of formal and material ontol-
241
ogy derive ultimately from his Aristotelian ontology
of dependent and independent individuals and univer-
sals. Nominalists ha ve expressed different preferences
regarding the languages in which they do ontology. We
are confronted by arguments deriving from and rely-
ing upon divergent metaphysical perspectives. Husserl
was right that formal ontology is simply logic; the is-
sues of formal ontology are ali (if only) those of the
philosophy of logic.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Becker, Oskar. "Zur Logik der Modalităten." Jahrhuch
fiir Philosophie und Phiinomenologisclze Forschung 11
(1930), 497-548.
--. Untersuchungen iiber den Modalkalktil. Meisenheim am
Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Heim, 1952.
Burkhardt, Hans, and Barry Smith, eds. Handhook o/Meta-
physics and Ontology. 2 vols. Munich: Philosophia. 1991.
Dummett, Michael, and E. John Lemmon. "Moda! Logics
between S4 and S5."' Zeitschrififtir mathematische Logik
und Grundlagen der Mathematik 3 ( 1959), 250-64.
Lemmon, John. "ls There Only One Correct System ofModal
Logic?" Aristotelian Societv Supplemental)' Volume 33
( 1959), 23-40.
Leonard, Hans, and Nelson Goodman. "The Calculus oflndi-
viduals and its Uses." Journal ofSrmbolic Logic 5 ( 1940),
44--55.
Lesniewski, Stanislaw. "O podstswach Matematyki."
Przeglad Filozoficzny 33 (1930), 77-105.
Marcus, Ruth Barkan. Modalities: Philosophical Essays. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Mohanty, J. N., and William R. McKenna, eds. Husserl:~
Phenomenology: A Texthook. Lanham, MD: Centcr for
Advanced Research in Phenomenology/ University Press
of America, 1989.
Nu li, Gilbert T. "Husserl 's Doctrine ofEssence." In Husserl:~
Phenomenofogy: A Texthook, 69--105.
Quine, Willard Van Orman, and Nelson Goodman. "Steps
Toward a Constructive Nominalism." Joumal of'Symbolic
Logic 12 (1947), 105-112.
Simons, Peter. Parts: A Studv in Ontologv. Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1987.
Smith, Barry, ed. Paris ami Moments. Munich: Philosophia.
1982.
--, ed. Foundations of'Gestalt Theorv. Munich: Philosophia,
1988.
Stumpf, Cari. Uber den psychologischen Ursprung der
Raum\'Orstellung. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1873.
Tarski, Alfred. "Foundations of the Geomctry of Solids."
In his Logic, Semantics. Metamathematics. Trans. J. H.
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--. "The Concept ofTruth in Formalized Languagcs." In his
Logic, Scmantics, Metamathcmatics, 152-278.
GJLBERT T. NULL
Unirersitr o( Wisconsin, Green Bar
 242 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
MICHEL FOUCAULT From the publication of
Folie et deraison in 1961 to his death in 1984 Foucault
was a central figure in FRANCE. His writings address not
only the main philosophical movements in 20th cen-
tury Europe, but aJso PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, HISTORY,
MEDICINE, criminoJogy, LITERATURE, and POLITIC AL THE-
ORY. His theorizing intersects with while distancing
itself from phenomenology, STRUCTURALISM, and the
history of concepts, and hence does not fit squarely in
any of these philosophical camps. Like others writing
in French philosophy of science (.IEAN CAVAILLES, Gas-
ton Bachelard [ 1884-1962], Georges Canguilhem), his
writings and interviews reveal an extraordinary empha-
sis upon methodological protocols and, in general, the
problem ofthe nature ofREASO:-.J. Foucault's philosoph-
ical development is fraught with ruptures and disconti-
nuities as new self-interpretations regularly reorientcd
the directions of his inquiry.
Between 1945, when, at the age ofninetcen, he stud-
ied with Jean Hyppolite, and 1969, when he ascended to
his self-named Chair ofHistory ofSystems ofThought
at the College de France, Foucault received degrees
in both philosophy and psychology and taught exten-
sively across Europe. He published his first four main
works in this period- Folie et deraison (Madness
and civilization, 1961 ), Maladie mentale et psycholo-
gie (Mental illness and psychology, 1962), Naissance
de la clinique (Birth ofthe clinic, 1963), and Les mots
et les choses (The order ofthings, 1966 ). Each is a spe-
cific, detailed analysis of the discursive practices sur-
rounding the production of knowledge in PSYCHIATRY,
clinica! psychology, medici ne, and the HUMAN SCIENCES,
respectively. The fifth major work, L 'archeologie du
savoir (Archaeology of knowledge, 1969), appeared
the same year that Foucault took the position at the
Col lege de France. In it he retrospectively reconstructs
and makes explicit the "archaeological" procedure of
the first four books. From 1969 until his death Foucault
became more internationally politically active. His last
four books - Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la
prison (Discipline and punish, 1975) and Histoire de
la sexualite, 1 ( 1978),1/ ( 1984 ), Ili (1984 ) - reflect his
interes! in supplementing archaeological analysis with
genealogical analysis. In addition to these works Fou-
cault has published numerous essays and interviews
that are crucial for understanding his project.
Before Foucault began writing his major "archae-
Lester Embree, E/izabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ologies," he was concerned with providing a historical
analysis of phenomcnology and existential psychol-
ogy. This was the project ofhis first two publications:
the introduction to LUDWIG 81NSWANCiER 's Le re ve et
1'existence (Dream and existence, 1955), and Maladie
mentale et personnalite ( 1954). In the Binswanger in-
troduction he argues that the fact that dreams provide
crucial insights for understanding human existence ul-
timately leads to a new understanding ofboth the sym-
bolic structure ofmeaning and the relationship between
dreams, the imagination, and images. The consequence
is a criticism of both Freudian and phenomenological
theories of MEANING.
Foucault first criticizes the dream interpretation of
PSYCHOANALYSIS for reduc ing thc meaning of the sym-
bolic images to purely semantic meaning. In doing
so, the Freudian account necessarily misses the mean-
ing contained in the linguistically structured relations
among the symbols. The root of this error is the con-
flation of symhols and indices. Indices (for example,
animal tracks) signify only for a person who is inter-
preting them as pointing toward their referent, whereas
symbols (for example, words) signify independently of
. any interpretation, any consciousness, and any objec-
tive referent. Consequently, symbols are expressive of
the subject in ways indices are not. To the extent that
the Freudian account is concerned only with the objec-
tive reference ofthe dream image and assumes that the
analysis exhausts the meaning of the image, it misses
the full expressive content of the dream.
In contrast, Foucault argues that the phenomenology
of EDMUND HUSSERL- since it both recognizes the dis-
tinction between indication and symbol and recognizes
the fu li expressive function ofsymbols- gives a more
adequate account ofthe meaning of dreams. Neverthe-
less, simply being able to account for the constitu-
tion and manifestation of meaning is insufficient for
grounding the psychoanalytical practice of interpret-
ing the existential character of dreams. Specifically,
it must be possible for the psychoanalyst to under-
stand the meaning ofthe expressive act in its own con-
text. According to Foucault, phenomenology, essen-
tially tied to the Cartesian reductions of knowledge to
self-knowledge and thus inescapably solipsistic, can-
not account for the event of understanding. That is to
say, he thinks that phenomenology can provide an ad-
equate account of the manifestation of meaning, "but
 MICHEL FOUCAULT
it has given no one the possibility of understanding
language."
Throughout "Dream and Existence" Foucault de-
murs from providing a more comprehensive critique
of phenomenology, but its outline is clear. He thinks
that Binswanger's existential-psychological prioritiz-
ing of dreams is justified and completed in the twofold
operation offirst prioritizing the IMAGINATION over PER-
CEPTION, and then founding the imagination in dreams.
In Husserl's account ofphenomenology, the imagina-
tion (Phantasie) in the process of the EIDETIC METHOD
makes possible the intuition of the essence of the ob-
ject ofperception. Foucault takes this to mean that the
essence seen in the image is always hypothetical, and
as a result, any knowledge based on the image can
never escape the ambiguity implicit in the imaginative
act. We can only regain the rigorous goals of pheno-
menology ifwe recognize that dreams, rather than be-
ing an effect of the imagination, are the source of the
imagination. Moreover, since dreams have a symbolic
structure of their own, by analyzing dreams we ana-
lyze the fundamental structures of perception. Once
Foucault has paired ontology with an investigation of
the imagination through dream analysis, however, he
has eliminated tout court the possibility ofthe adequate
description of the contents of consciousness. The im-
age, created in reflection and recollection, does not
present us with truth; rather, it isolates us from the ex-
pressive authenticity of the structured associations of
the imagination. For truth we must turn to poetry, art,
and the imaginative play ofthe id.
In this regard, Foucault's first publication on Bin-
swanger provides the seeds of his future arguments
against phenomenology, structuralism, and HERMENEU-
ncs, which together comprise the complexity of his
critica! project. Specifically, Foucault argues that (1)
hermeneutics will miss the fact that "the imaginary
world has its own laws, its specific structures"; (2)
structuralism will miss the fact that the materiality
of linguistic practices are themselves constitutive of
meaning; and (3) phenomenologywill always seek but
never be adequate to what exceeds it, and consequently
will fail in its foundationalist ends. In Les mots et les
choses the critique of phenomenology becomes more
explicit, although first we must see the way Foucault
narrates his early reflections on existential psychology
historically. In Folie et deraison Foucault reconsiders
243
mental illness not as a property of a subject, but as a
historically constructed category. Likewise, he replaces
the imagination, in its function of providing access to
truths other than those accessible to reason, with the
discourses ofthe insane. In a move that resembles Niet-
zsche 's derivation of good/evil out of the ressentiment
of"slave mentality," Foucault argues that the category
of madness arose as a means for justifying the elite
status of REASON and rationality. Madness, through a
series of conceptual shifts, replaced leprosy as the dis-
ease of the outcast, which in turn elevated reason to
the highest sign of health. The representation of the
mad as divinely inspired gave way in the Renaissance
to the physical marginalization of the insane in soci-
ety. Foucault takes the "ship of fools" to be the best
example ofthe Renaissance attitudes towards insanity
- excluded from, but still in periodic contact with,
city life. The most dramatic shift occurred in the "clas-
sical period" of the 17th century. In France not only
the mad, but the poor, sick, and criminal were confined
under the guidance ofthe H6pital General. Here arose
for the first time the social category ofthe "unreason-
able" and the criminalization that accompanied it. The
mad were no longer discussed directly, but only medi-
ately through discussion ofthe tools of confinement. In
the 18th century, under the auspices of humanitarian-
ism, the insane were freed from the prisons and moved
to asylums. The mad then became objects of medical
study- not in order to libera te the mad from madness,
but, or so Foucault argues, to control them in more sub-
tie and decisive ways. As pure objects wholly excluded
from the "norm," the mad were left to silence, which
is to say that reason has finally excluded its other. Fou-
cault claims that the only voice that remains in touch
with the truths of unreason is the voice heard in the
"lightning flashes" of some (presumably mad) artists.
In Folie et deraison we can witness two more pieces
of Foucault's complex thought. First, he has turned
away from the subject as the locus of meaning, ap-
pealing instead to historically constituted categories
of persons. Second, he interlaces concerns about the
way societies "constitute" madness through their insti-
tutional practices and their discursive practices. In this
conjunction, Foucault introduces the structuring con-
nections between the nondiscursive (power) and the
discursive (knowledge) forms that will be a focus of
his work in the 1970s.
 244 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Foucault, in effect, historicizes structuralism
through the use of discontinuous epistemes. The
episteme of a particular period is identified as the struc-
ture underlying the discursive practices that regulate
the determination of knowledge. The concept of an
episteme allows Foucault to investigate the structures
that determine the linguistic practices of a historical
period without granting the structures atemporal, acul-
tura) status. In Les mots et les choses he argues that
there have been three significant periods in Western
cui ture - the Renaissance, the classical age, and the
modern age - each with its own episteme. The his-
torical division is very similar to the one in Folie et
deraison, although rather than being concerned with
the historical constitution ofthe category ofthe insane,
here Foucault is concerned with the historical produc-
tion ofthe HUMAN sciENCES and the knowledge acquired
through them. Also Iike Folie et deraison, Foucault in-
vestigates the Renaissance age merely as a precursor
to the classical age, spending most of his time on the
classical age itself and how it was transformed into the
modern age.
The clue to understanding the episteme of a partic-
ular period !ies in the understanding of the ordering
connections between things in the world, between lan-
guage and the world, and within language itself. In
the Renaissance age ali three domains were structured
along lines of analogous resemblance. In the classical
age, however, mere analogous resemblance was con-
sidered an occasion for equivocation and error. Conse-
quently, there was a transformation to structuring the
ordering relations along li nes of identity and difference
among representations and the objects of representa-
tions. Ideally, the shift to representation would allow
for maximally precise descriptions free from ali ambi-
guity of objects and their relations. With the emphasis
on precision came the ultimate goal of arranging ali
knowledge univocally and methodically into tables.
What was in principle absent from analysis in the clas-
sical schema ofrepresentation was the subject and the
act ofrepresentation itself. In this sense Foucault can
claim that "man" did not yet exist in the classical age.
It is only when the dogmatism of the connection be-
tween language and things is evidenced that the sub-
ject, in its socio-cultural finitude, becomes the center
of attention. According to Foucault, "man" appears on
the conceptual scene for the first time in the paradox-
ical and ultimately antinomous position of being the
subject and the object of knowledge. The episteme of
the modern age is characterized by the attempt to over-
come the epistemic limitations of the finite subject by
making finitude the very condition for the possibil-
ity ofknowledge. KANT, FICHTE, and HEGEL ali theorize
within this "analytic of finitude," setting the stage for
Husserl 's, MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's, and MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY's versions of phenomenology.
The analytic of finitude manifests itself in three
different ways, the first of which is the account of
the subject as an "empirico-transcendental doublet."
The empirica! conditions ofthe subject have been pre-
sented as the condition of the possibility of the sub-
ject's knowledge. This reduction of the transcendental
to the empirica! takes one of two forms. The "posi-
tivists," e.g., Comte, explain knowledge in terms of
the processes of the body that operate in the produc-
tion of knowledge; the "eschatologists," e.g., Marx,
explain knowledge in terms of the historical, cultural,
or economic processes that operate in the production of
knowledge. Foucault's Kantian analogy is that the pos-
itivists perform the transcendental aesthetic, while the
eschatological philosophers perform the transcenden-
tal dialectic. Each, however, uncritically accepts the
givenness of initial knowledge of the body or of so-
ciety, which is used, in turn, to ground the account of
knowledge. Thus they both fali into uncritical circular-
ity. Consequently- and here Foucault has Merleau-
Ponty clearly in mind- philosophers attempt to pre-
serve both the empirica! and the transcendental charac-
ter of"man" through introducing a mediating analysis
of "actual experience." Foucault claims that, nonethe-
less, these attempts ultimately collapse back into ei-
ther positivistic or eschatological attempts to ground
the transcendental on the empirica!.
If philosophers in the modern age are concerned
about preserving the account of"man" as both empiri-
ca! and transcendental, then, Foucault argues, they will
have to deny the transparency ofthe cogito. Instead of
epistemic immediacy and self-certainty, philosophers
must make recourse to description, repetition, and ver-
ification in an infinite task of making present what is
absent to the cogito- of thinking the unthought. The
relation between the cogito and the unthought is the
second manifestation of the analytic of finitude. Fou-
cault argues that Husserl has provided such a contra-
 MICHEL FOUCAULT
dictory mixture of Kant and Hume. On the one hand,
Husserl restricts meaning to that which stands in rela-
tion to the EGO, and yet, on the other hand, Husserl ac-
knowledges the functioning ofthe ego's pre-reflective
relationship to the world in the constitution of meaning.
Consequently, on this view Husserl becomes trapped
between his rigorously Cartesian concerns for apodic-
ticity and his problematically Aristotelian account of
the pre-reflective conditions of knowledge. This crit-
icism of phenomenology's inability to reconcile the
cogito and the unthought continues the line of argu-
ment inaugurated in the Binswanger "Introduction"
and Folie et deraison.
The third manifestation of the analytic of finitude
appears in the relation between "man" and "his" his-
torical origins. In the classical age the origin ofknowl-
edge !ies in the purely transparent initial event of the
representation of an object by a word. Because of the
historicity of the modern subject- divided between
empirica! opacity and transcendental constitution-
such a transparent origin is no Ion ger accessible. "Man"
is always already in the linguistically structured world.
Rather than this resulting in the failure of historical
objectivity, the subject's historicity becomes itself the
condition for the possibility of history. In this third
doublet Foucault implicitly criticizes Heidegger for
complicating the divided origins of meaning in DA-
SEIN. Indeed, Heidegger places the origins at both the
nearest point and the farthest point from "man." It is
nearest in that the origin is always "proximally and for
the most part'' present to Dasein as the condition of
the possibility for its meaning-constitution. This prox-
imity, however, makes it ultimately ungraspable, and
thus it remains interminably farthest from Dasein. The
origin retreats and returns in the hermeneutica! rela-
tion ofDasein to its world. Dasein's attempt to recover
its unity once more in its return to its origins becomes
Heidegger's "infinite task," a task that must end in fail-
ure. The problem of death traces the failure of Dasein
to comprehend itself in its totality and hence the fail-
ure of a Dasein-analytic to provide the ground for an
adequately clarified meaning of Being. Consequently,
the fact that its origins are always absent from itselfin-
sures that Dasein will never become contemporaneous
with itself, thus condemning Dasein to the conceptual
impoverishment of its finitude.
The irremovable presence of the three doublets at-
245
tests to the contradictory project ofthe analytic offini-
tude in the modern age. The empirica! and the transcen-
dental will never converge, the unthought will never
fully appear to the cogito, and the origins of mean-
ing will always retreat from conceptualization. Against
the antinomous influences ofthe modern age Foucault
turns to Nietzsche. The only alternative to the "doubly
dogmatic anthropomorphic sleep" is the end of"man"
as a conceptual foundation - the final Copernican
revolution. This final dislocation of "man" is not to
be mourned, but affirmed as the beginning of a new
episteme, heralded by Foucault as the return of the
possibility of thinking.
In L 'archeologie du savoir Foucault most directly
confronts the methodological protocols of his early
project. Unlike the structuralists who had "platonized"
the structures of discursive regularity, Foucault real-
ized that ifhis analyses ofLANGUAGE and language-like
entities in terms of their formal properties were to be
successfully carried out, epistemes must be analyzed as
unities of discursive formation. The arguments against
phenomenology in Les mots et les choses function to
clarify Foucault's theoretical project. In contrast to the
empirico-transcendental subject, Foucault analyzes the
parole-langue structure oflanguage, refusing to reduce
o ne to the other- reduc ing neither semantics to gram-
mar, nor meaning to utterances. In contrast to the cog-
ito and the unthought, Foucault analyzes the discursive
structures that determine what of the sayable is actu-
ally said. These two projects comprise the practice of
"archaeology." After 1969- more specifically, after
his inaugural lecture at the College de France ("The
Discourse on Language") and his essay "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History"- Foucault explicitly added ge-
nealogy to archaeology.
In contrast to the retreat from and return to origins,
Foucault's genealogies analyze the contingent and ac-
cidental roots of the discursive practices. The com-
plexity of Foucault's positive project Iies in its aim:
not to question the transcendental conditions for the
possibility of discourse, but to grasp the historical de-
terminants of the actuality of discourse. For Foucault,
only such a project can preserve the rigor of structural
analysis while avoiding structuralism 's dogmatic re-
ductions. The archaeologist uncovers the hidden forms
that structure and regulate the discursive practices of a
period, only for the genealogist to level offthe illusion-
 246 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ary depths of the interpretations. The twofold project
of"revealing" and "leveling" ensures that archaeology
will never be treated "as a search for the origin, for
formal a prioris, for founding acts, in short, as a sort
of historical phenomenology (when on the contrary
its aim is to free history from the grip of phenomen-
ology)."
The relation between archaeology and genealogy
accompanies the interna! relationship between knowl-
edge and power- a relationship at stake in ali of his
works. It is also the relation of complexity that best
characterizes Foucault's position. Archaeology with-
out genealogy takes the chance of intimating knowl-
edge without the activity ofpower; genealogy without
archaeology takes the chance ofintimating power with-
out the production of knowledge. Foucault's position
must be distinguished precisely in its emphasis upon
its complexity - a complexity resistant to ali tran-
scendental recoveries of phenomenology. Beyond ali
analysis, the antinomies that his analysis has grasped
strike deep. Beyond neopositivism, his analysis at-
tests to the complication of facts by theories; beyond
phenomenology his analysis attests to the complication
of intentiona! description and intensional meaning by
concepts and extensional relations of power. Beyond
hermeneutics, it refuses the "grammatical" reduction
of the present to the past or the fu ture, attesting to the
complication of explication itself. Neither structures
nor events, neither "semiology" nor "phenomenology,"
can be reduced or superimposed.
In the end, Foucault's writings situate themselves
at the margins ofphenomenality and self-presence, on
the si de of the "Other" over against such regimes of
the "Same" - precisely in articulating the Other in
their midst. His writings formulate, then, a questioning
of such self-presence in the process oftelling a history
of the present. Thus in Foucault's work, phenomen-
ology becomes less dissolved than put into question:
its semantic reductions become mirrored in conceptual
and institutional analysis; its transcendental appeal to
the origin becomes complicated within its own con-
dition of possibility; and finally, its epistemic claims
to purity become obfuscated within its own motiva-
tions and complicated in the constitutive relations that
overdetermine knowledge and power.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bernauer, James, and David Rasmussen. The Final Foucault.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
Bernauer, James. Mi chel Foucault :~ Force of'Fiight: Towards
an Ethics of Thought. Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanitics
Press, 1992.
Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Trans. lan Hand. Minneapolis:
Minnesota University Press, 1988.
Dreyfus, Hubert, and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Be-
yond Structuralism and Hermeneutic.~. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1982.
Foucault, Michel. Maladie mentale et personnalite. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1954.
-. Folie et deraison: Histoire de la folie a /'âge c/assique.
Paris: Pion, 1961; Madness and Civilization: A Histm:v
of lnsanity in the Age of Reason. Trans. Richard Howard.
New York: Pantheon, 1965.
- . Maladie mentale et psychologie. Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1962; Mental li/ness and Psvchology.
Trans. Alan Sheridan. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987.
- . Naissance de la c/inique: Une archeologie du regard
medical. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963;
Birth ofthe Clinic: An Archaeology ofMedical Perception.
Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1973.
- . Raymond Roussel. Paris: Gallimard, 1963; Death and the
Labyrinth: The World ofRaymond Roussel. Trans. Charles
Ruas. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986.
-.Les mots et les choses: Une archeologie des sciences hu-
maines. Paris: Gallimard, 1966; The Order o{ Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans. A lan Sheri-
dan. New York: Random House, 1970.
- . L 'archeologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1969; The Ar-
chaeology o{ Knowledge [and "The Discourse on Lan-
guage"]. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon,
1972.
-.Ceci n 'est pasune pipe: Deux lem·es et quatre desseins de
Reni! Magritte. Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1973; This is
nota Pipe. Trans. James Harkness. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1981.
-. Surveil/er et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gal-
limard, 1975; Discipline and Punish: The Birth o{ the
Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon, 1977.
- . Histoire de la sexualite, !: La volonte de savoir. Paris:
Gallimard; The Histmy of Sexuality, Voi. 1: An /ntroduc-
tion. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 1978.
- . L 'usage des plaisirs: Histoire de la sexualite, Tome 2.
Paris: Gallimard, 1984; The History of Sexuali(v. Val. 2:
The Use of Pleasure. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York:
Pantheon, 1985.
-.Le souci de soi: Histoire de la sexualite, Tome 3. Paris,
Gallimard, 1984; The Historyo{Sexuality. Voi. 3: The Care
of the Se!{. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon,
1986.
Gutting, Gary. Michel Foucault :~ Archaeology o{ Scientific
Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- , ed. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Hoy, David, ed. Foucault: A Critica! Reader. London: Basil
Blackwell, 1986.
 FRANCE
Poster, Mark. Foucault, Marxism, and Histmy. Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1984.
Rajchman, John. Mi chel Foucault: The Freedom of Philoso-
phy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
Sheridan, Alan. Michel Foucault: The Wi/1 ta Truth. London:
Tavistock, 1980.
Smart, Barry. Miche! Foucault. London: Tavistock, 1985.
STEPHEN H. VVATSON
University o{Notre Dame
DAVID VESSEY
University of Notre Dame
FRANCE VVith the exceptions of a discussion
by Leon Noei (1878-1953) and a long critica! study
by Victor De1bos ( 1862-1916), there was practically
no echo of EDMUND HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchun-
gen ( 1900-1901) in the French-speaking world before
VVorld VVar 1. After the war and with the dispersion of
Husserl's early students, the situation changed com-
pletely. JEAN HERING, who had studied at GOttingen,
was named professor on the faculty of Protestant the-
o1ogy at Strasbourg after the publication of his the-
sis, Phenomenologie et philosophie religieuse ( 1925).
But above ali there was EMMANUEL LEYINAS, who had
heard Husserl and MARTIN HEIDEGGER at Freiburg and
made phenomenology known in France through a
great synthetic work, La theorie de l'intuition dans la
phenomenologie de Husserl ( 1930). And it was again
Levi nas, studying at Strasbourg with Ma uri ce Pradines
( 1877-1958), who, with Gabrielle Pfeiffer, produced
in French Husserl 's Meditations cartesiennes ( 1931 ),
the German original of which was not published un tii
1950. This work was deve1oped from an introduction
to transcendental phenomenology presented in lectures
at the Sorbonne in February 1929.
The invitation to the Sorbonne clearly shows the
spread of Husserl's reputation beyond Germany. But
it is chiefty in the 1930s that the first genuine break-
through occurs, and it is associated with MAX SCHELER
and Heidegger as well as Husserl. This is undoubtedly
due to the more and more frequent contacts between
French philosophers and the University of Freiburg:
GASTON BERGER, for example, met Husserl there on
severa! occasions and published his two remarkable
books, Le cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl and
Recherches sur les conditions de la connaissance, in
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomeno/ogy.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
247
1941. The many emigres from Germany, Poland, and
Russia during the 1930s contributed decisively to the
acclimation ofphenomenology in France. First of ali,
there was ALEXANDRE KOYRE, student of Husserl at
Gottingen, who taught at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes during 1933-39 and published important stud-
ies of HEGEL. The Hegelian background, as will be seen,
is characteristic ofthe French reception of phenomen-
ology.
It must also be remembered that Georges Gurvitch
( 1884-1965) had come from Prague and delivered a
series of lectures at the Sorbonne in 1928-30 devoted
to the "current tendencies of German philosophy,"
emphasizing Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and NICO-
LAI HARTMANN. These lectures were published in 1930.
Also to be mentioned is the stay in Paris from 1933 to
1940 of ARON GURWITSCH, a refuge from Lithuania and
Germany who had studied with Husserl and with Kurt
Goldstein ( 1878-1965). He delivered four annual se-
ries of lectures at L'Institut d'Histoire des Sciences of
the Sorbonne, which were often attended by MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, and published articles on psychology,
especially GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY, GoJdstein, and CON-
STITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. His main work was first
published in the French translation of Michel Butor as
Theorie du champ de la conscience (The field of con-
sciousness, 1957), seventeen years after he fled to the
UNITED STATES in 1940.
Gurwitsch taught alongwith Eric VVeil ( 1904-1977)
and a]so PAUL-LOUIS LANDSBERG. Landsberg, a student of
Scheler, carne to France in 1933, and contributed sub-
stantially to making known his teacher's work, which
had already begun tobe translated with L 'essence et les
formes de la sympathie (The essence and forms of sym-
pathy, 1928). Also to be mentioned are the presence in
France of the Polish psychiatrist EUGENE MINKOWSKI,
who owed as much to HENRI BERGSON as to Husserl,
and Bernhard Groethuysen ( 1880-1946 ), student of
WILHELM DILTHEY and close to GEORG SIMMEL, as well
as author of lntroduction a la pensee philosophique
allemande depuis Nietzsche (lntroduction to German
philosophical thought since Nietzsche, 1927), which
contained a chapter on Husserl.
Typical of the climate of exceptional receptivity
to thought that was increasingly eclipsed in Nazi
Germany is the annual Recherches Philosophiques,
published from 1931 to 1936 under the direction of
 248 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Koyre, Henri-Charles Puech, and A. Spaier, with whom
ALEXANDRE KO.IEVE, HENRI CORBIN, .IEAN WAHL, and Lev-
inas regularly collaborated. The first volume opened
significantly with an article by Wahl entitled "Vers le
concret" (Toward the concrete) and concerned with
Scheler, Heidegger, Hartmann, Husserl, and HEDWIG
coNRAD-MARTIUS. He published a book under the same
title in 1932 that was emblematic for an entire philo-
sophical generation, and had published the epoch-
making Le malheur de la conscience dans la philoso-
phie de Hegel (Unhappy consciousness in Hegel 's phi-
losophy, 1929). Wahl 's Hegel, interpreted first of ali
from the standpoint of the youthful theological writ-
ings, is, so to speak, "existentialized," which is impor-
tant for so-called french EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY.
Wahl evoked Hegel in his move "Vers le concret": "The
concrete will never be the philosopher's da turn. He will
pursue it. It is only in the absence of thinking that the
concrete can reveal itselfto us. This is what the young
Hegel sensed, as did many poets. There is a necessary
dialectic precisely because realism exists. The real is
the li mit ofthe dialectic; it is its origin; it is its end, its
explanation, and its destruction."
Recherches Philosophiques also published impor-
tant translations: Heidegger's "Vom Wesen des Grun-
des" (On the essence of grounds), first published in
the Festschrift for Husserl, and Corbin's translation of
Conrad-Martius' "L'existence, la spiritualite, l'âme"
(Existence, spirituality, soul). ERWIN w. STRAUS pub-
lished there his study of"Le temps vecu" (Lived time),
Levinas published his "De l'evasion" (On evasion),
and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE his famous essay on the EGO. Fur-
thermore, beginning with the second volume, a section
was devoted to reporting on phenomenological work,
first entrusted to Kojeve, then to Corbin, Wahl, Koyre,
and Weil.
It was also in the 1930s that Corbin, who visited
Germany on severa! occasions and met with Heidegger
in Freiburg in 1934 and 1936, undertook the transla-
tion into French of what became the first collection of
Heidegger's writings, Qu 'est-ce que la nu?taphysique?
(What is metaphysics? 1938), which included the inau-
gural lecture, "Was ist Metaphysik?" ( 1929), extracts
from Sein und Zei! ( 1927), and the Rome lecture on
"Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung" (Holderlin
and the essence of poetry, 1936).
Bifur and Mesures, where Corbin published a trans-
lation ofthe Aesthetica in nuce by Johann G. Hamann
(1730-1783), also need to be mentioned to complete
this panorama and establish exactly the ro le ofjournals
in the movement of ideas from Germany into France
before World War II, but Recherches Philosophiques
also indicates in an exemplary fashion the conjunction
of existentialism or proto-existentialism (greatly influ-
enced by GABRIEL MARCEL) and Hegelianism (Kojeve
offered his famous lessons on the Phănomenologie
des Geistes at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes
from 1933 to 1939), which, together, characterize the
reception of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomen-
ology. With En decouvrant 1'existence avec Husserl
el Heidegger (Discovering existence with Husserl and
Heidegger, 1930), Levinas is certainly one of those
who, knowing the Husserlian enterprise thoroughly,
confidently recognized from the outset the critica! dis-
tance of the author of Sein und Zeit from that of his
"master." Then there were the sessions of the Societe
Thomiste ~ meeting at Juvisy in 1932 around the
theme of "Phenomenology and Scolasticism" ~ that
Jacques Maritain ( 1882-1973), Etienne Gilson ( 1884-
1978), and Leon Noei participated in. EDITH STEIN her-
self presented Husserl 's philosophical project, indicat-
ing ways in which it might be included in an original
neo-Thomism.
Another French reading of Husserl also began in
the 1930s. It is certainly true to the philosophy of the
formal sciences in Husserl 's Logische Untersuchun-
gen and Formale und transzendentale Logik ( 1929)
and emerged with JEAN CAVAILLES and his student
and friend ALBERT LAUTMAN. Prior to Mer]eau-Ponty,
Cavailles was Agrege-Repetiteur at the Ecole Nor-
male Superieur from 1928 to 1936, where his influ-
ence was exceptional. The first works of Lautman
("Essai sur les notions de structure et d'existence
en mathematics" [ 1935], "Essai sur 1'unite des sci-
ences mathematiques dans leur developpement actuel"
[ 1935]) as well as those of Cavailles belong to the his-
tory of the phiJosophy of LOGIC and MATHEMATICS and
relate to the questions at the beginning and perhaps
the center of the Husserlian meditation. Cavailles's
dense, enigmatic, and seminal work, La logique et la
theorie de la science ( 194 7), was written in prison
prior to his execution by the Nazis. Also prominent in
this line was SUZANNE BACHELARD's c]assic La logique
de Husserl (1957), ANDRE DE MURALT's L 'idee de la
 FRANCE
phenomenologie ( 1958), and the subsequent work of
JEAN DESANTI, "Phenomenologie et praxis" ( 1963 ), "Les
idealites mathematiques" ( 1968), and "La philosophie
silencieuse" ( 1975).
The first phase of the reception of phenomenology
in France can be considered completed, symbolically,
just before World War II, with the publication in 1939
of the issue in honor of Husserl of the Revue Interna-
tionale de Philosophie. It contained contributions by
Berger, Hering, EUGEN FINK, and LUDWIG LANDGREBE, as
well as Husserl's "Die Frage nach der Ursprung der
Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem" (The
question of the origin of geometry as an intentional-
historical problem), a sketch that would play a leading
role in subsequent work, from Merleau-Ponty through
TRAN DUC THAO to JACQUES DERRIDA. Tran Duc Thao
studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure during the
war and wrote a thesis on Husserl under the direction
of Cavai)Jes. father HERMAN LEO VAN BREDA )eft some
Husserl manuscripts with him and Merleau-Ponty in
1942 and he made severa) trips to Louvain in 1944. His
Phenomenologie et materialisme dialectique (1951)
had a great influence on the intellectual climate of
the time. He was !ater the Minister of Education in
Vietnam. Late in the 1930s Sartre published not only
"La transcendence de 1'ego," but also L 'imagination
(1936), Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions ( 1939),
and L 'imaginaire ( 1940). It is no less true, however,
that the creative period of phenomenology in France
began after the war.
The importance of journals, collective works,
and translations must be noted. In 1946 the inde-
fatigable Jean Wahl founded Deucalion - Cahiers
Philosophiques, as well as a "College de Philosophie"
having its own book series, where the collection Le
choix, le monde, l'existence (Choice, world, existence,
1948) appeared, containing Levinas's remarkable "Le
temps et 1'autre." Later, Phenomenologie-Existence
(1953) was edited by Revue de Metaphysique et de
Morale and contained contributions from Birault, Van
Breda, Gurwitsch, Levinas, Ricreur, and Wahl. Mean-
while, the first issue of Deucalion had brought together
a study by ALPHONSE DE WAELHENS devoted to Sartre and
Heidegger, a study by YVONNE PICARD devoted to the
question ofTIME in Husserl and Heidegger, an analysis
of the method of reflection by ROLAND CAILLOIS, an es-
say by Levinas, "Il y a," which continued the analyses
249
of De l'existence a l'existant (From existence to the
existent, 1947), and a chapter by Cavailles, "La theorie
de la science selon Bolzano."
With PAUL RIC<EUR 's "Husserl et le sens de l'histoire"
in Revue de Metaphysique et de Moral ( 1949), the post-
war years also began to see more elaborate and better
documented contributions drawing on the manuscript
sources available in the Husserl Archives at Louvain,
which archives also became fully available in Paris be-
ginning in 1958, but had been partly available there
previously. This type of research was again exempli-
fied by RENE TOULEMONT with L "essence de la societe
selon Husserl ( 1962).
1950 is the year of the translation by Ricreur, suc-
cessor to Jean Hyppolite ( 1907-1968) at Strasbourg,
of Husserl 's Ideen zu ei ner reinen Phiinomenologie
und phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913). New
translations of Husserl, including, in 1957, Suzanne
Bachelard's of Formale und transzendentale Logik,
have followed almost without interruption since then,
a quite remarkable series of events in France where
vast "publication lags" are legendary. Ricreur's trans-
lation appeared in the Gallimard series edited after the
war by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in which Maurice de
Gandillac's translation of Scheler's Der Formalismus
in der Ethik und die materialen Wertethik ( 191311916)
had appeared in 1948. And while the Husserl Archives
at Louvain had been visited since Merleau-Ponty went
in 1938 and Tran Duc Thao in 1944, a Centre Husserl
was established in the Iibrary ofthe Sorbonne in 1958,
moved to the Centre National de la Recherche Sci-
entifique in 1971, and finally to the Ecole Normale
Superieure in 1986.
The history ofthe great figures ofFrench phenomen-
ology, even if it is always also marked with a critica)
distance with respect to Husserl and more recently Hei-
degger, is well known: from Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR to Ricoeur and Levinas, and con-
tinued by JACQUES DERRIDA, GERARD GRANEL, JACQUES
TAMINIAUX, and MICHEL HENRY.
Even before the vogue ofEXISTENTIALISM, Sartre cer-
tainly played a determin ing ro le in the critica! reception
ofphenomenology. From his studies in Berlin in 1934
he gained the substance ofhis essay on the ego, put his
fin ger on a real difficulty in the evolution of Husserl 's
thought from the Logische Untersuchungen to Ideen !,
and anticipated the idea of a subject-less transcenden-
250 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tai field. Likewise, Sartre composed L 'imagination and
L 'imaginaire during 1935-36. L 'etre et le neant( 1943),
characterized as phenomenological "ontology," drew
upon the analytic of DASEIN ("realite humaine") and
facticity in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit ( 1927).
Merleau-Ponty proceeded differently. From his the-
ses of 1942 and 1945, La structure du comportement
and Phenomenologie de la perception, un tii the last and
unfinished works, Le visible et 1'invisible ( 1964) and
La prose du monde ( 1969), he never stopped deepening
Husserl's thought by beginning with its problems: the
other, the thing, body and ftesh, space, and the brute
or savage world of pre-reftective and pre-predicative
experience.
Paul Ricreur's place is equally distinctive within
the general framework of French phenomenology.
Through his translations and penetrating studies, he
has been more than anybody else "at school in pheno-
menology"- to use the tit le of one ofhis collections, A
1'ecole de la phenomenologie (1986). Against fashions
and passing tastes, he has kept the formati ve discipline
of Husserlian distinctions alive. But he is also the one
who was most involved in the hermeneutica! turn that
strongly marked !ater French phenomenology.
Quite different is the critica! appropriation of a
Michel Henry, who, through his continuing meditation
on affectivity and the originary relation to self in touch-
ing, has brought the thematics of the metaphysics of
life forcefully into the framework of a radical critique
of INTENTIONALITY and worJdJy exteriority.
Ethical exteriority, transcendence - these are the
guiding thoughts ofEmmanuel Levinas, whose style of
appropriation of Husserl (and Heidegger) is again very
different, even though it is, as in the case of Michel
Henry and, in a way, Ricreur, focused on that which is
beyond representation and objectivation in Husserl.
The reading of Husserl in the early work of Jacques
Derrida is radically critica! even if it is essentially im-
manent and, following Heidegger, concerned to extract
everything that relates phenomenology to the "meta-
physics of presence" in Husserl 's project and its con-
crete execution.
Overall, what deserves emphasis is the distinctive
vitality of this continuing phenomenological inspira-
tion within French thought - witness, among other
signs, the recent creation ofthree new phenomenologi-
cal journals: Etudes Phenomenologiques, founded by
JACQUES TAMINIAUX in 1985; Epokhe, founded by MARC
RICHIR, PATRICE LORAUX, and ROBERT LEGROS, which has
published annual thematic issues since 1990; and even
more recently, the phenomenological journal Alter,
edited by NATHALIE DEPRAZ.
Such a vitality rests on a continuous tradition of
historical and critica! studies: from Suzanne Bachelard
to JEAN-LUC MARION and DIDIER FRANCK, passing to
RENE SCHERER, ARION KELKEL, DENISE SOUCHE-DAGUES,
and Granel. This tradition has often been attacked or
discounted at times when other tendencies, such as
MARXISM and STRUCTURALISM, have occupied the fore-
ground. But it is undoubtedly also useful to note that
for each of those who attack Husserlian phenomen-
ology for its metaphysical presuppositions, be it, for
example, MICHEL FOUCAULT, Gilles Deleuze, or Claude
Levi-Strauss, there were to be found responses from
those who, coming from Husserl or Heidegger, have
never claimed to develop any sort of orthodoxy, but
rather to explore al! the possibilities of dissidence and
interna] superabundance.
To close, Jet us remark upon severa! domains in
which the more or less diffuse inftuence of phenomen-
ology is particularly strong. There are of course the
areas of FEMINISM, FILM, and LAW, but those of LITER-
ATURE and PSYCHIATRY are especially remarkable. The
tradition ofliterary criticism linked with the University
of Geneva is such that one can speak of the "Geneva
school." There were fundamental phenomenological
motifs in this tradition from the beginning, above ali
that ofthe description oflived experience, which Gas-
ton Bachelard (1901-1957) called "material pheno-
menology," e.g., the poetics of space and the poetics
of dreams. The princip1e representatives of this tradi-
tion are MARCEL RAYMOND, ALBERT BEGUIN, JEAN ROUSSET,
JEAN STAROBINSKI, and most recentJy, HENRI MALDINEY
and JACQUES GARELLI. The works of MIKEL DUFRENNE,
especially Phenomenologie de 1'experience esthetique
( 1953 ), accelerated this line of inquiry.
PhenomenoJogicaJ PSYCHOLOGY and PSYCHIATRY
were welcomed early to France, notably thanks to the
already mentioned work of Minkowski and !ater HENRI
EY. After the war, LUDWIG BINSWANGER, MEDARD BOSS,
and, more recently, HUBERTUS TELLENBACH were trans-
lated. A veri table French tradition of phenomenologi-
cal psychiatry has developed around GEORGES LANTERI-
LAURA, who wrote La psychiatrie phenomenologique.
 GOTTLOB FREGE
Fondements philosophiques (1963); PIERRE FEDIDA and
JACQUES scHOTTE, editors of the collection Psychiatrie
et existence (1989); and above ali, ARTHUR TATOSSIAN,
author of a remarkable Phenomenologie des psychoses
( 1979). Henri Ma1diney has equally contributed sub-
stantially to this movement, as is attested by his recent
collection, Penser l 'homme et la .folie, a la lumiere de
l 'analyse existentielle et de l 'analyse de destin (Think-
ing the human being and madness in light of existential
ana1ysis and the analysis of destiny, 1991 ).
The quite extraordinary permanence of the
sources ofphenomeno1ogical inspiration within French
thought during more than fifty years shows no signs of
fading. Yet the whole deve1opment, still at once free,
diversified, and critica!, of the phenomenological ap-
proach could paradoxically be the victim of its own
success: it is probably a phenomenon ofthis kind that
DOMINIQUE JANICAUD attempted to characterize and de-
nounce in his pamphlet Le tournant theologique de
la phenomenologiefranr;aise (The theological turn of
French phenomenology, 1991 ). If it is true that pheno-
menology, having become the dominant thought, al-
ways risks being pressed into the service of thematics
that are deeply alien to it, be it a question oftheology
or some other thing, it is nevertheless the case, as Jan-
icaud also writes, that the "facets of phenomenality"
already contain such other unexplored possibilities.
JEAN-FRAN<;:OIS COURTINE
Ecole Normale Superieur
(translated by Lester Embree)
GOTTLOB FREGE Frege was born in 1848,
eleven years before EDMUND HUSSERL, and died in 1925,
thirteen years before Husserl. The two men never met,
but deve1oped a c1ose intellectual contact through read-
ing each other 's works and through a series of letters
exchanged between 1891 (when Husserl was in Halle)
and 1906 (when Husserl was in Gottingen). In 1891,
Husserl sent Frege copies ofhis Philosophie der Arith-
metik, his "Der Folgerungscalcul und die Inhaltslogik,"
and his review of Schroder's Vorlesungen iiber die
Algebra der Logik - ali published in that year. In
1906, Husserl sent Frege his "Bericht iiber deutsche
Schriften zu Logik in den Jahren 1895-99." In return,
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
251
Frege sent Husserl copies ofhis Begriffsschrift ( 1879),
"Uber formale Theorien der Arithmetik" (1886), and
"Uber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift" ( 1883). Husserl
also received offprints of "Funktion und Begriff'
( 1891 ), "Anwendungen der Begriffsschrift" (1879),
"Uber die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Be-
griffsschrift" (1882), Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik
( 1884 ), "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892), "Uber
Begriff und Gegenstand" ( 1892), Review of George
Cantor's "Zur Lehre vom Transfiniten" (1892), and
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893 ). Husserl also re-
ceived a copy of Frege's review of his Philosophie
der Arithmetik (1894). Husserl's markings and notes
on these materials show that he intensively worked
through Frege 's writings. He also seems to ha ve closely
studied the correspondence between Frege and Hilbert
of the years 1889-90, copies of which he may have
received from Hilbert. In any case, Frege's rather neg-
ative review of Philosophie der Arithmetik seems to
have coo1ed offthe relationship.
Besides the letters he wrote to Husserl, Frege wrote
nothing else on Husserl save his review ofthe Philoso-
phie der Arithmetik. Husserl devoted a long section in
the same book to a critica! examination ofFrege's the-
ory ofnumber. In the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-
1901 ), Husserl writes that he no longer supports the
critique of Frege's antipsychologistic position that he
had given earier. Later, referring to Frege's critique of
his own position, Husserl wrote in a letter to WILLIAM
RALPH BOYCE GIBSON that Frege's critique had hit the
nail on the head. In a letter to Scholtz, of February 2,
1936, Husserl reminisces: "I have never got to know
G. Frege personally, and do not quite remember what
occasioned this correspondence. He was known in gen-
eral as a sharp crank, but not very productive either as
a mathematician oras a philosopher."
There ha ve been a host of attempts to determine pre-
cisely the exact nature ofFrege's influence on Husserl.
One thing seems to have been uncontroversial: both of
them, at very pertinent points, were under a common
influence- name1y, that of Hermann Lotze (1817-
1881 ), with whom Frege studied in Gottingen, and
whose influence on himself is explicitly recognized
by Husserl. It also seems to be the case that Husserl
did not in any recognizable manner influence Frege's
thinking. It was at one time widely held that Frege's
review of Philosophie der Arithmetik led to Husserl's
252 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
rejection of his own earlier PSYCHOLOGISM. But closer
attention to what Husserl does in that work and other
works prior to 1900 ha ve shown that his position there
was not psychologistic in the sense in which Frege
took it to be; that Husserl did not completely reject the
basic position ofthat book; and that his overcoming of
psychologism and espousal of a theory of ideal MEAN-
ING (which led to the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik
[ 1900]) carne about independently of Frege's critique,
though certainly under the influence of Leibniz and
Lotze. There also seem to ha ve been enormous differ-
ences between Frege's and Husserl's understandings
of, and attitudes toward, PSYCHOLOGISM - in spite of
their common antipathy toward and rejection of that
doctrine. These differences can be traced towards what
they respectively understood by "psychology" and by
"mental." Frege understood the "psychological" tobe
the same as the "mental" and the latter as being private
and incommunicable.
Husserl, although rejecting the empiricistic-
associationistic psychology, entertained the possibility
of an eidetic PSYCHOLOGY that would yield essential
structural laws of mental life, and regarded the men-
tal as being intentiona! and the intentiona! as having
an ideal content. These made it possible for Husserl
to aim at reestablishing a relationship between the
mental and the logica!, which he regarded as consis-
tent"with the antipsychologism of the Prolegomena,
and which eventually led to the development of his
transcendental phenomenology. Furthermore, although
both Frege and Husserl unreservedly rejected psychol-
ogism (Husserl in greater detail and with more thor-
oughness), Husserl- even as late as the Formale und
transzendentale Logik ( 1929)- expresses the concern
that one did not quite comprehend the deepest nature
and source of psychologism, and talks of "transcen-
dental psychologism," connecting it with the problem
of the "mundanization" of the transcendental (which
eventually becomes the theme of EUGEN FINK 's so-called
"Sixth Meditation.")
Aside from these historical questions pertaining to
the development of Husserl 's thought, the philosophi-
cal questions relevant to the relation between Husserl
and Frege should center on their conceptions of"sense"
and "reference," as well as their conceptions of LOGIC,
LANGUAGE, and MATHEMATICS. Brief remarks will be
made on these topics here. The elementary points are
the following: for Frege, sense and reference both be-
long to signs; for Husserl, they belong to intentiona!
acts (which may be, to begin with, acts ofuttering, or of
understanding, linguistic signs). For both, sense is dif-
ferent not merely from the reference, but also from the
mental image (which is private and incommunicable).
As regards reference, according to both Husserl and
Frege, names refer to whatever entity they designate,
and for both, expressions ha ve sense even when there is
nothing to which they refer (in such cases, for Husserl
-but not for Frege-there is intended reference). The
two differ, however, with regard to "concept-words"
(i.e., predicates) and whole sentences. As for the for-
mer, Frege took concepts to be referents and distin-
guished concepts from the senses of "concept-words"
(or predicate expressions); Husserl held a more usual
view that the concepts are senses, while the entities
that fali under those concepts are the refercnts. As re-
gards whole declarati ve sentences, Husserl again held
the more usual view, i.e., that their senses are proposi-
tions (not too different from Fregean thoughts, which
play that role in Frege's theory), and their rcferents are
states of affairs (Sachlagen). Frege's theory about the
reference of a declarative sentence is quite unusual:
for well-argued reasons, he held the view that a sen-
tence refers to its truth value, either the True or the
False. Thus ali true sentences ha ve the same reference,
so also ha ve ali false sentences. While this talk of the
True and the False as being two entities has puzzled
many, others have been willing to go along with Frege
in view ofthe economy it effects in providing a seman-
tic for propositional logic, and have suggested that we
take care not to treat sentences as names. Behind, and
underlying, these easily noticeable points of similiarity
and difference between the two, there is the e0mmon
conviction that senses (propositions, thoughts) must
be objective- even if not real- entities, not private
to any mind, communicable and shareable. Rejection
of psychologism led both sharply to distinguish these
entities (Husserl called them "ideal" entities) from pri-
vate, mental experiences. But after this distinction is
made and the identity ofmeanings is secure, there nev-
ertheless arises an unavoidable question: how can real,
private, mental acts grasp such ideal, objective enti-
ties? In a remarkable posthumously published note,
Frege considers this to be a mystery. Husserl seems to
have avoided the problem by not separating the ideal
 FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
meanings from the real mental acts in as radical a man-
ner as Frege did. In other words, he recognizes them
to be ideal contents of real mental acts, and, in accor-
dance with his thesis of INTENTIONALITY, construes the
mental not as an irreducibly private particular, but as
a real particular that nevertheless exemplifies ~ bet-
ter still, embodies ~ ideal structural moments. The
ideal is distinguished but not separated from the real.
Precisely how this strategy helps us understand the
possibility of grasping meanings cannot be discussed
here. More recently, Michael Dummett has called it
into question. Husserl 's position with re gard to this is-
sue can be identified if we keep in mind that unlike
Frege, Husserl held that meanings qua meanings are
apprehended only in an act of reflection on them and
that the original pre-reflective acts, of which they are
senses, or NOEMATA, are directed toward their respec-
tive refercnts. Taking an act of judging (that S is p) into
consideration, Husserl held that it is about S (which
is the object-about-which) and is an assertion of the
fact that S is p, while the bare thought is apprehended
through reflection upon the primary act. The sense only
serves as the medium of the object-directed act. One
needs also to ask if, on Husserl 's view, the original pre-
reflective act has a transparency allowing it tobe aware
of its own content even prior to a reflective grasping.
With regard to the nature oflogic and mathematics,
Husserl and Frege held quite different views. To put
it briefly, Frege eschewed an intensionalist conception
of logic. After having distinguished between the sense
and the reference of sentences, Frege banished senses
out ofthe direct concern ofthe logician. Objectivity of
senses is required in order to secure objectivity oftruth-
values, but once that is guaranteed (and the danger of
psychological relativism, which identifies "true" with
"taken tobe true," is set asi de), the logician's concern is
only with the two truth-values (the True and the False,
symbolized by "T" and "F" ), which are but references
of sentences. Husserl's "pure logic" is conceived as a
logic of meanings, and is therefore intensional. This
difference also accounts for their different attitudes
toward the modalities. Frege's logic has no place for
moda! concepts, while Husserl's is formulated in terms
of mod al concepts.
What, then, is the place of the concept of "truth"
in Husserl's logic? Frege explicitly states that logic is
concerned with TRUTH. Husserl conceives of logic as
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
253
a stratified structure: it must begin with a pure log-
ica] grammar, then build on that basis a pure logic
of consequence (which deals with the laws determin-
ing the consistency /inconsistency among propositions
without introducing the semantic notions of truth and
falsity), and, finally, culminate in a logic of truth. The
concept of "truth" has no place in the first two strata;
only the third lays down the formal conditions oftruth
and falsity.
Furthermore, Frege rejected a purely formalist the-
ory of logic, and is widely regarded as the founder
of "logicism," as distinguished from both formal-
ism and intuitionism. Husserl imbibed a formalist
understanding of logic from David Hilbert ( 1862-
1943), and sought to combine it with an intuitionistic-
constructivist theory of logica! cognition.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dummett, Michael. Frege and other Philosophers. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991.
Follesdal, Dagfinn. Husserl and Frege. Oslo: Aschelong,
1958.
- . "Husserl's Notion ofNoema." Journal oj'Philosophy 66
(1969), 680-87.
Husserl, Edmund. [Correspondence between Husserl and
Frege.] Brie/wechsel. Band VI. Philosophenhriej'e. Ed.
Karl Schuhmann in collaboration with Elisabeth Schuh-
mann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994,
107-18.
Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1982.
Gabriel, Gottfried, et al., eds. Gottlob Freges Briefwechsel
mit D. Hilhert, E. Husserl, 8. Russell. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1980.
J.N. MOHANTY
Temple University
FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY Beginning with
his hermeneutica! breakthrough in 1919, philosophy
for MARTIN i-IEIDEGGER is phenomenology, understood
as the pre-theoretical original science of origins, where
original experience is first the pre-worldly "original
something" ( Ur-etwas), "life in and for itself," "factic
Iife," and the "situation-1" before it is called DASEIN
or "being-here." By 1921, in the context of reinter-
preting Aristotle's basic terms phenomenologically, it
also becomes clear that such a philosophy is at once
254 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
always ontology, aiming to explicate any being in its
sense-of-being, the "principle" out ofwhich any being
is how it is. As radical and original when it explicates
the being offactic life itself, philosophy isfundamental
ontology (prinzipielle Ontologie in October 1922). It
is from this fundamental ontology of facticity that the
mundane regional ontologies receive the ground and
meaning of their problems. In its categoria! concern
for the fundamental concepts ofthese domains and the
foundational crises of the sciences addressing these
material and formal regions, ontologica) philosophy is
at once LOGIC, a hermeneutica) logic concerned with
the many ways in which being is said and interpreted
in and from life itself. As fundamental research, both
ontology and its logic find their equiprimordial unity
in a phenomenological HERMENEUTICS offacticity.
Such research has the task oftaking the concrete in-
terpretations already operative in factic life itself, from
circumspective concern to inspective regard to the lu-
cid perspicuity of distressed caring, and making them
categorially transparent in their pre-possession (what
is the basic sense ofbeing in which life already places
itself?) and in their pre-conception (in what ways ofad-
dress and articulation does life speak to itself and with
itself?). Accordingly, philosophy is the explicit actual-
ization of the interpreti ve tendency already operative
in the basic movements of the life that "in its being
goes about [geht um = is concerned with] this very
being." This formula for the self-referential movement
of Being itself in Sein und Zeit ( 1927) becomes the
formal indication of the understanding-of-being that
defines the very being of Dasein. The dominating for-
mal indication of the being of life itself, or Dasein,
that is to guide the concept formation of such an onto-
logica! logic, develops from a triple-sensed INTENTION-
ALITY (relating, holding, fulfilling senses) in 1919-22
into being-in-the-world ( 1923), to-be (Zu-sein: 1925),
ek-sistence ( 1926--27), and transcendence ( 1927-29).
In introducing ontology as a hermeneutics of fac-
ticity in his lecture course of summer 1923, Heidegger
praises CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY for having ad-
vanced beyond the exhausted old metaphysics with a
concept of ontology amenable to research, but notes
that it has not advanced beyond a theory of objects in
its FORMAL ANO MATERIAL ONTOLOGIES; remains closed
to the genesis of their meaning and so to an "object-
less" being that precedes the distinction of subject and
object; and does not ask from which field of being it
is to draw the sense of being that deci des and guides
ali ontologica) problematics. This field is for the first
time identified in ontologica! fashion as Da-sein, out
of which and for which philosophy "is." The course
of summer 1925 continues the critique of a double
neglect by phenomenologists ofthe question ofthe be-
ing of intentionality and of Being as such. The main
theme of the course is a phenomenology grounded in
the question ofBeing, regarding it as the basic question
ofphenomenology, serving to radicalizing its motto to
"back to Being itself." More precisely, it is to be an
"ontoeroteric" phenomenology, articulating the erotic
question o(Being as such by an exposition ofthe place
and placing ofthe question in a privileged access to it,
namely, Dasein, understood in middle-voiced fashion
as both questioning being and questioned by Being
and, at first, unquestioning and immersed in pseudo-
questions.
Sein und Zeit for the first time relates fundamental
ontology (now Fundamenta/ontologie) to an existen-
tial analytic of Dasein as end to means. To this end,
a complete ontology of Dasein, which would provide
the basis for a PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, is not in
fact the purpose of the treatise. Only those elements
of Dasein that serve the purpose of a fundamental
ontology, namely, the elaboration of the question of
the sense of Being on the basis of the understanding-
of-being that Dasein itself is, are singled out for ex-
tended analysis. This ontologica) analytic of Dasein
proceeds to establish that the very being of Dasein is
TIME (Zeitlichkeit) and that its understanding-of-being
is accordingly made possible by the Temporality (Tem-
poralităt) of Being itself. Fundamental ontology is, to
begin with, the analytics ofDa sein, but in the end, it be-
comes the more radical analytics ofthe temporality of
Being itself. The science ofBeing, in distinction from
the positive sciences, thus becomes a transcendental
Temporal science, reflecting the ontologica) difference
between beings and Being itself. Just as the positive sci-
ences project their particular beings onto the regional
constitution of their being, so does transcendental on-
tology project Being itself onto the Temporality that
makes it possible, i.e., onto the "horizon of its under-
standability." But overt explication or thematization in
science, for the sake of conceptual comprehension, is
called objectification. Just as the particular sciences ob-
 FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
jectify their entities against the horizon oftheir being,
so ontology as a science must objectify Being itself
against the horizon of time. The tacit pre-ontological
distinction of Being and beings, when it becomes an
explicitly understood difference, is called the ontolog-
ica! difference.
In its initial projection, fundamental ontology's ba-
sic question ofthe sense ofbeing itself divides into four
basic problems of ontologica! phenomenology (sum-
mer 1927), derived from four classical theses ofBeing:
the ontologica! difference, the basic articulation into
what-being and way-to-be, the unity of the variety of
ways-to-be, and the truth of Being. But these may not
be the only problems. In order tobe open to the revolu-
tion brought about by new problems and so to its own
inner transformation, fundamental ontology must re-
vert back to its ontic origins in the factical existence of
Dasein, moreover in its ontic distinction from the fac-
tual extantness of nature. Ontology is always already
ontically founded, rooted in the original experiences
of li mit situations that make the question of Being not
only the most fundamental, but also the most concrete
of questions. Accordingly, fundamental ontology must
be supplemented by the metaphysical ontic ofbeings as
a whole intrinsic to its own founding, by a "metontol-
ogy" ( 1928). Fundamental ontology must turn over into
a metontology, and endlessly returned to and from its
ontic origins. The latter would include a metaphysics
of existence that would treat the "existentiell" ques-
tions of ETHICS. Fundamental ontology and metontol-
ogy together comprise the fu li concept ofmetaphysics.
Fundamental ontology is a critica! and transcendental
science. In the destructive retrieve ofthe history of on-
tology that belongs to fundamental ontology, Heideg-
ger singles out KANT as the only one to have glimpsed
the dimension oftemporality as a way offounding on-
tology. Contrary to the usual epistemological interpre-
tations, Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft is for Heideg-
ger itself a fundamental ontology, finding and defining
a natural disposition for metaphysics in human REASON
itself, which outlines the "blueprint" and prepares the
foundation for the metaphysics (ontology) that belongs
to human nature. Kant himselfthereby sought to lay the
ground for any future metaphysics that would count as
a science, which Heidegger, by shifting the locus from
human reason in its penchant for asking basic questions
to human being in its finite transcendence, now seeks
255
to repeat. In this Kantian context of the critique of
classical metaphysics, both general and special, fun-
damental ontology is a self-reflexive metaphysics of
metaphysics taking us back to its ground in human na-
ture, a metaphysics of Oase in apropos of its innermost
finitude- God does not ha veto do ontology- where
the elements of a temporal understanding-of-being are
found in Kant's transcendental imagination.
The early Heidegger already admits that the inter-
pretation is forced and violent, and the old Heidegger
openly confesses that Kant's text provided a convenient
refuge to advocate a line of questioning entirely foreign
to Kant's question. The quasi-Kantian effort to estab-
lish a transcendental temporal science ofBeing shatters
in the attempt to "schematize" the temporal ec-stases of
Dasein onto the horizons of the Temporality of Being.
The fact that only the ee-static tense of the Gegen-
wart (present) is schematized on the temporal horizon
of Praesenz, and that Heidegger never gets around to
translating the other two Teutonic tenses into the Lati-
nates of praeteritum and .futurum, indicates how far
this language game was carried before it foundered. A
!ater text from 1944-45 will conclude that the Kan-
tian language of horizon and transcendence is drawn
from the experience of objects and their representa-
tion. What lets the horizon be what it is, the openness
that surrounds us and comes to meet us from this side
of a horizon and its region, is thereby missed; even
more missed, as the other side that withdraws from us
and !ies beyond our control, is the very regioning of
this openness. If a concept grasps and seizes the things
that fali in its compass, then even our overt awareness
of the opening regioning that encompasses us must
be more preconceptual and precursory in character. Jts
very withdrawal draws us into a thinking that is more
rigorous than the conceptual, if it is to be true to the
matter of thought.
In the course of winter 1928-29, after a decade
ofvacillation over this strange "pretheoretical original
science" so unlike any other science, Heidegger defini-
tively abandons the project of making phenomenologi-
cal philosophy into a strict science, observing that it is
not a science not out of lack but instead out of excess,
sin ce it springs from the ever superabundant and ebul-
lient "happening of Oase in" itself. Superlatively a sci-
ence from its abiding inner friendship (philein) with its
subject matter, "scientific philosophy," like the formula
256 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
"round ci rele," becomes a misleading and even danger-
ous superfluity. Instead of regarding it in its scientific
results, as a "grounded totality of true propositions,"
philosophy is best seen in its "under way" character as
philosophizing, accordingly as an explicit transcend-
ing and letting transcendence happen, repeatedly pos-
ing the Being-question by enacting the transition from
the pre-conceptual understanding-of- being belonging
to Oase in to a precursory conceiving of Being, and in
this way repeatedly actualizing the ontologica! differ-
ence between Being and beings without objectifying
Being itself. Philosophy in this frenetic transcending
movement nevertheless continues to function as the
foundation that enables sciences and their respective
regional ontologies, and moreover also accounts for
their periodic revolutions.
Passing mention of "fundamental ontology" in the
ensuing years (e.g., 1935-41, 1947, 1949, 1962) is in-
variably in the past tense: while it is crucial to get and
keep Dasein grounded in the lived question of Being
that Oase in already is, the word "ontology," as a science
ofbeings easily confounded with the traditional disci-
plines of metaphysics, has proved to be an obstacle to
this founding endeavor. Metaphysics as ontology must
now be more fundamentally grasped and, in this regress
into its ground, overcome in its onto-theo-logical roots.
The step back into the ground of metaphysics, which
only asks about beings, about their beingness, is a leap
across the abyss-opening differentiation ofbeings and
Being in order to ask the more fundamental question
about the truth of archaic Being (Seyn) itself, whose
first name had been time. This hitherto unknown and
ungrounded ground of metaphysics, beyond every ef-
fort to produce the doctrina! systems ca !led ontologies,
and even beyond every "critique" of ontology within
metaphysics, is now the most worthy of questions. The
question of the temporal sense of Being, the truth of
archaic Being, the "topic" (linguistic locus) of Being
itself, is radically different from the question ofthe be-
ing ofbeings transmitted by the ontologica! tradition.
Heidegger nevertheless searches for clues to his one
question in its three equiprimordial aspects- the time,
truth, and language of Being - by repeatedly exam-
ining the Greek counterparts of these three aspects:
the kinetic physis, the unconcealing aletheia, and the
prepredicatively structured logos ofBeing itself. Aris-
totle, for example, had a glimmer of the old Heideg-
ger's final question concerning the unique language
proper to Being itself when he noted that being is not
a genus, and the early Heidegger had responded to the
challenge phenomenologically by developing more al-
lusive concrete universals of the being of factic life
by way of ever more subtle "formal indications" ofthe
dynamic being ofintentionality operative in human ex-
perience, like ek-sistence and transcendence. This rela-
tionallocus for the language of Being is maintained in
the !ater Heidegger's nuanced indications of the hold
(Ver-hăltnis), puii (Be-zug), needy usage (Brauch), at-
tentive bondage (Zu-gehăren), and appropriation (Er-
eignis) of Being itself that come with human being's
understanding-of-being.
The very radicality of fundamental ontology thus
dictates that it no longer be called fundamental ontol-
ogy, but that it be re-placed by other guiding names
and continued from another start: not philosophy but
thought, not calculative representational thinking but
sense-directed thinking, the thinking o{ Being (double
genitive), a fundamental thinking that is nota specta-
tor's science but a receptive openness that lets its pur-
suit of sense be, that opens onto a ground itself open
and fathomless, an abyss, clearly nota foundation upon
which something can be built, but afundamentum con-
cussum. Such a thinking continues tobe concerned with
"principles" like that ofidentity, difference, and ground
or "reason," but a principle (Satz) is now tobe located
more in the leap and movement (Satz) toward one's
destined ground than in its statement or proposition.
It seeks not so much to conceive its understanding-of-
being as to indicate and cultivate its self-articulating
sense of direction, in order to maintain a proximating
orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin that is the
single dynamic matter ofthought.
In its reductive regress back to the matter of Being
itsel{, in its unendingly circular deepening of the sin-
gular hermeneutica! relationship ofthe understanding-
of-being, in its exposition of limits at which some-
thing begins tobe what it is, fundamental thinking stil!
bears the traces ofthe old phenomenological approach
from which it received its initial start. While discarding
the inappropriate concern with science and research in
favor of a more fundamental discourse, fundamental
thinking retains not only many of the means acquired
from its phenomenological discipline, but especially
the common end ofthe pursuit ofmeaning (Besinnung).
 FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
The movement "through phenomenology to thought"
dominates Heidegger's path from start to finish.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Heidegger, Martin. Phănomenologische Interpretationen
zu Aristoteles. Einfiihrung in die phănomenologische
Forschung. Ed. Walter Brocker and Kăte Brocker-
Oltmanns. Gesamtausgahe 61. Frankfurt am Main: Vit-
torio Klostermann, 1985.
- . "Phănomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles
(Anzeige dcr hermeneutischen Situation)." Ed. Hans-
Ulrich Lessing. Dilthey-Jahrhuch 6 ( 1989), 235-74;
"Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aris-
totle (Indication of thc Henneneutical Situation)." Trans.
Michael Baur. Man and World 25 ( 1992), 355-93.
-.Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizităt. Ed. Kăte Brocker-
Oltmanns. Gesamtausgahe 63. Frankfurt am Main: Vitto-
rio Klostermann, 1988.
- . Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeithegrifls. Ed. Pe-
tra Jaeger. Gesamtausgahe 20. Frankfurt am Main: Vitto-
rio Klostennann, 1979; Histmy of" the Concept of Time.
Prolegomena. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Prcss, 1985.
- . Die Grundprobleme der Phănomenologie. Ed. Friedrich-
Wilhelm von Herrmann. Gesamtausgabe 24. Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975; The Basic Prohlems of
Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1982.
257
-. Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik im Ausgang van
Leibniz. Ed. Klaus Held. Gesamtausgahe 26. Frankfurt
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978; The Metaphysical
Foundations of Logic. Trans. Michael Heim. Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Prcss, 1984.
-. Einleitung in die Philosophie. Ed. Otto Saame. Gesam-
tausgabe 27. Forthcoming.
-. Kant und das Prohlem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio K1ostennann, 1929; Kant and the Prohlem
of Metaphysics. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1990.
-. Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; Discourse on
Thinking. Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund.
New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
-. Der Satz vom Grund. Pfullingcn: Neske, 1957; The Prin-
ciple of Reason. Trans. Reginald Lilly. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1991.
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger:~ "Being and
Time. " Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Krell, David Farre1l. Intimations o{Mortality: Time, Truth,
and Finitude in Heidegger:~ Thinking ofBeing. University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Prcss, 1986.
Richardson, William J. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology
ta Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.
THEODORE KISIEL
Northern Illinois University

HANS-GEORG GADAMER Gadamer is most
noted for developing a philosophical hermeneutics on
the basis of MARTJN HEIDEGGER 's Sein und leit ( 1927).
Born in Marburg in 1900 and schooled in Breslau,
Gadamer took his doctorate in philosophy at Mar-
burg in 1922 under the direction of NJCOLAJ HARTMANN
and Paul Natorp ( 1854-1924). His dissertation (unpub-
lished) was on Plato (Das Wesen der Lust in den pla-
tonischen Dialogen). He spent 1923 in Freiburg, where
he studied with EDMUND HUSSERL and MARTJN HEIDEGGER.
In 1924, he returned to Marburg where he studied phi-
losophy with Heidegger and classical philology with
Paul Friedlander ( 184 7-1923 ). Gadamer successfully
took the state examinations in philology in 1927, and in
1928/29 with Heidegger's sponsorship he completed
his philosophy Habilitationsschrift, Platos dialektis-
che Ethik ( 1931; Plata sDialectica! Ethics, 1990). His
orientation in this work is clearly Heideggerian; its sub-
title translates as "Phenomenological interpretations
relating to the Philebus." He presents his task as the
attempt phenomenologically to solve the problem of
pleasure as it is posed by Plato, particularly in that di-
alogue. The work suggests a deep proximity between
Plato and Aristotle - a proximity with respect to the
questions of pleasure and the good as well as in re-
gard to the notion of science (episteme), for Gadamer
argues that Aristotelian episteme is rooted in Platonic
dialectic, which, in turn, is rooted in dialogue.
Afterteaching foryears in Marburg, Gadamer's aca-
demic career took him to Leipzig ( 1938-47), Frankfurt
( 1947-49), and finally Heidelberg, where he was the
successor of KARL JASPERS in 1949. In conjunction with
HELMUT KUHN he founded the journal Philosophische
Rundschau in 1952. He retired from his chair of phi-
losophy in 1968, though he continued to lecture, both in
Heidelberg and abroad. He began annual semester vis-
its to American universities, especially Boston College,
which he continued for more than twenty years. Until
the publication in 1960 of his main work, Wahrheit
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. C/aude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
und Methode (Truth and Method, 1975), Gadamer had
published relatively little-scattered essays, commen-
taries, and introductions that concemed themselves pri-
marily with the texts of Plato and Aristotle as well as
the work of Herder, WILHELM DJLTHEY, and Heidegger
and the poetry of Goethe and Holderlin. In Wahrheit
und Methode he attempts to establish a philosophical
HERMENEUTJcs, i.e., a general theory of interpretation,
which is at the same time an ontology.
The starting point for Gadamer's hermeneutics
is Heidegger's treatment of understanding (Vers te-
hen) in Sein und leit. There Heidegger describes his
project of fundamental ontology as phenomenologi-
cal and hermeneutica!. Understanding is always in-
terpretation. Assertion, which Heidegger analyzes as
the "apophantic as," is founded upon the more pri-
mordial "existential-hermeneutica! 'as'." Understand-
ing accordingly takes place within the hermeneutica!
circle and can never be presuppositionless. Gadamer
adopts Heidegger's account of understanding and fol-
lows his lead in turn ing to the philological and theolog-
ical hermeneutica! tradition to find clues for a philo-
sophical account ofhuman experience. The experience
of reading and understanding a text becomes a model
for human experience generally; hermeneutica! expe-
rience, Gadamer writes, is universal. The decisive fea-
ture ofthis experience ofthe text is its circularity: any
part (text) can only be understood in terms ofthe whole
(context) and the whole is tobe understood by means
of its parts.
Gadamer also takes over Heidegger's notion of
TRUTH as an event that is both revealing and conceal-
ing. Truth, then, is nota matter of ah istorica! subjective
representation secured by scientific method, but is his-
torically situated and limited. Situations are defined in
part by the tradition(s) and authorities that ha ve shaped
them. Inevitably the participants bring prior under-
standings to the situation, i.e., prejudgments. Gadamer,
accordingly, is sharply critica! of the methodologism
and scientism that he finds in 19th century philology
and much of modern philosophy, and he wishes to re-
habilitate notions such as "prejudice," "authority," and
"tradition"- notions that Enlightenment thought had
discredited.
Three central and closely related concepts
of Gadamer's hermeneutics are the concepts of
play (Spiel), "effective-historical consciousness"
25 8
 HANS-GEORG GADAMER
( wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein ), and the fus ion
of horizons. "Play" is a metaphor of hermeneutica!
experience inasmuch as the game has order and struc-
ture and the participants experience the play of the
game as being taken over by it. "Effective-historical
consciousness" is "consciousness of the hermeneuti-
ca! situation" - a task that can never be satisfied.
In accord with this concept, there is no immediate or
simply neutra! approach to a work of art or a tradi-
tion, for the work of art affects the situation in which
we approach it. This is the power of history over fi-
nite consciousness. Later, in response to criticism for
making "consciousness" a central concept, he insists
that Bewusst-Sein (being conscious) is more Sein (be-
ing) than Bewusstsein (consciousness). On his account
the historical situation provides the horizon or context
for any understanding. Inevitably, historically situated
understanding is an event of the fusion of horizons.
Expressed in terms of the reading of a text, this fus ion
results from the coming together ofthe horizon (expec-
tations) of reader/interpreter and the horizon provided
by the text. We bring something to the text, and the
text makes a claim on us. The logic of READING is the
logic of question and answer and, so too, the logic of
experience. The basis for this fusion !ies not in the
text or the reader, but in the matter under discussion
(die Sache). Gadamer's notion of die Sache is indebted
both to Husserl and to HEGEL. He means to have his
hermeneutica! position cut across the theory/practice
distinction. The implicit model for the inquirer after
the truth of some matter is not the ideal, so-called
"scientific" observer but the active participant in the
world of affairs who has something at stake in the
sought-for truth. Thus the referent is not so much an
object (Gegenstand) as an enterprise in which we are
involved. Gadamer paraphrases Hegel when he writes
that "the true method is the doing ofthe thing itself."
Legal and theological HERMENEUTICS are exemplary
for Gadamer's hermeneutics inasmuch as understand-
ing is always at the same time application. To under-
stand is to see what must be done or to see the implica-
tions of what has been done. He would deny any fun-
damental distinction ofmeaning and significance. Ap-
plication (or significance) is essential to meaning. Ul-
timately, hermeneutica! experience displays the unity
oftheory and practice. Gadamer finds a philosophical
model for the practica! understanding ofhermeneutics
259
in Aristotle's notion of practica! wisdom (phronesis).
Understanding is not only practica!, but linguis-
tic. Gadamer means his philosophical hermeneutics
not only to develop the notion of understanding in
Sein und Zeit but to develop and make accessible the
work of the !ater Heidegger, for whom the themes of
language and poetry become central. The concluding
section of Wahrheit und Methode is devoted to the
theme oflanguage and linguisticality. LANGUAGE is the
medium of hermeneutica! experience and the horizon
of hermeneutica! ontology. Gadamer asks us to think
of languagc not as a barrier to be overcome but an
enabling bridge. He writes that "Being that can be un-
derstood is language." This does not mean that Being
is linguistic, but that understanding is. Gadamer thinks
about the experience of language in relation to aes-
thetic experience. Wahrheit und Methode begins with
a critique of the subjectification of aesthetics in the
work of KANT and concludes by asking us to return, not
to Platonism, but to Plato's understanding of beauty,
especially in the Phaedrus, where beauty is closely
related to truth.
How is Gadamer's work phenomenological? In the
first place, it is phenomenological in the sense of Hei-
degger's HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY to which it
is so heavily indebted. But Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics is positively related to Husserl 's coNSTI-
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY as well. Gadamer expresses his
(and Heidegger's) great debt to Husserl's overcoming
of the priority of epistemology in modern thought, as
well as its scientism, NATURALISM, and objectivism. He
appeals to Husserl's account of PERCEPTION in his dis-
cussion ofhistoricism and ofthe RELATIVISM that might
seem to follow from his notions of situatedness, his-
toricity, and human finitude. Gadamer insists that un-
derstanding is perspectiva!, but at the same time, he ar-
gues that relativism does not follow from this feature of
human experience. Following Husserl, Gadamcr sug-
gests that the fact that we always have a certain per-
spective does not mitigate against the fact that the per-
spective is a view ofthe thing itself. Most importantly,
however, he presents his inquiry as a phenomenologi-
cal account ofthe experience ofunderstanding; it is, he
says in the foreword to the second edition of Wahrheit
und Methode, "phenomenological in its method." By
this he means that the book's task is to describe the
phenomenon of understanding. His concern, he says,
260 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
is "not what we do or what we ought to do, but what
happens to us over and above our wanting and do ing."
Wahrheit und Methode was sharply criticized from
the perspective of philological hermeneutics by fig-
ures like Emilio Betti (Die Hermeneutik als allge-
meine Methodik der Geisteswissenschafien, 1962) and
E. D. Hirsch ( Validity in Interpretation, 1967) for not
providing a sufficient methodological foundation for
validating interpretation. Jiirgen Habermas has found
Gadamer's hermeneutics valuable in his attempt to
fashion a phiJosophy of the HUMAN SCIENCES (Zur
Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 1967), while at the
same time, he criticized Gadamer's hermeneutics for
being uncritical with respect to tradition. His cri-
tique unleashed a large debate concerning Gadamerian
hermeneutics and the critique of ideology (Hermeneu-
tik und Jdeologiekritik, 1971 ). More recently there has
been extensive discussion ofthe relation ofGadamer's
hermeneutics and French POSTMODERNISM and decon-
struction. The centerpiece of this discussion is the ex-
change between Gadamer and JACQUES DERRIDA in Paris
in 1981 (Dialogue and Deconstruction, 1989). Central
to their differences is the way in which they regard
Nietzsche. For Gadamer, Nietzsche and Derrida adopt
a hermeneutics of suspicion, while Gadamer calls for
a hermeneutics of trust. The task of conversation and
understanding for Gadamer is to tind what the parties
ha ve in common- the fus ion of horizons.
After Wahrheit und Methode Gadamer devotes him-
selfprimarily to work on Plata, though he has published
numerous articles concerning poetry, Hegel, Heideg-
ger, and the clarification ofhis hermeneutics, for which
"Text und Interpretation" (in Dialogue and Decon-
struction) is particularly important. He makes clear
that the textual model for hermeneutics does not mean
that everything is a text. Even things written are not
necessarily texts. There are texts and non-texts; among
texts, there are eminent texts and texts that are not em-
inent. For the most part, he is concerned with eminent
texts, i.e., important literary texts. In this case, he calls
for the effacement ofthe reader and the disappearance
of the interpretati an- the reader becomes "ali ear."
The sign of a good interpretati an is the way it returns
one to the original text. Strictly speaking, philosophy
does not provide us with "eminent" texts that ask for
effacement in this way, but rather invite us to a con ver-
sation in which we need to respond.
In his !ater work on Plata and Aristotle (most impor-
tantly, Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plata und Aristote-
les, 1978; The !dea o(the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian
Philosophy, 1986) as well as his numerous essays on
Heidegger ( many collected in Heideggers Wege, 1983 ),
Gadamer reiterates his debt to Heidegger, but at the
same time, he clarifies their disagreements. In par-
ticular, he rejects Heidegger's reading of the history
of philosophy as a history of the forgetting of Being.
Most importantly in this regard, he resists Heidegger's
interpretati an of Plata as a primary agent of this for-
getfulness. Gadamer illuminates Heidegger's project
and its development by showing us its religious char-
acter and its religious motivation. A consistent theme
ofGadamer's treatment of Heidegger is the breakdown
of language (Sprachnot) in the !ater Heidegger. While
truth for Heidegger is often presented metaphorically
as a sudden flash of lightning, the mediated charac-
ter of truth is important for Gadamer. In his autobio-
graphical writing he characterizes his own way as that
between phenomenology and dialectic. "Phenomen-
ology" means Heidegger but also Husserl. "Dialectic"
means Hegel but, even more significantly, Plata, for
Gadamer remains truc to the thesis ofhis Hahilitation-
sschrift that the roots of dialectic are in dialogue and
conversation.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dostal, Robert. "The World Never Lost: The Hermeneutics
ofTrust." Philosophyand Phenomeno/ogical Research 47
(1987), 413-34.
Frank, Manfred. Das individuelle Allgemeine. Textstruk-
turisierung und Textinterpretation nach Schleiermacher.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Gesammelte Werke. 9 vols.
Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987.
Grondin, Jean. Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheits-
begrif{ Hans-Georg Gadamer. Konigstein i. Ts: Forum
Academicum, 1982.
Hahn, Lou E., ed. The Philosophy ofHans-Georg Gadamer.
LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1995.
Michelfelder, Diane P., and Richard E. Palmer, eds. Dialogue
and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989.
Rosen, Stanley. Hermeneutics as Politics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987.
Seebohm, Thomas. Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Vernunfi.
Bonn: Bouvier, 1972.
Wachterhauser, Brice, ed. Hermeneutic~ and Modern Philos-
ophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1986.
 GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
- , ed. Hermeneutics and Truth. Evanston, IL: Northwestem
University Press, 1994.
Warnke, Georgia. Gadamer· Hermeneutics. Tradition, and
Reason. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987.
Weinsheimer, Joel. Gadamer :~ Hermeneutic~: A Reading of
Truth and Method. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1985.
Wright, Kath1een, ed. Festivals of lnterpretation. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1990.
ROBERT J. OOSTAL
81)'11 Mawr Ca/lege
GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY Gen-
erative phenomenology is the most concrete dimen-
sion ofphenomenology and was broached initially by
EDMUND HUSSERL during the last seven years of his
life ( 1930-3 7). Concisely put, the thing or the "mat-
ter itself' of generative phenomenology is generativ-
i(v ( Generativităt). Generativity is the intersubjective,
geo-historical, and normative generation of MEANING
or sense. Generative phenomenology and its matter
can be discussed in three stages: the distinctiveness of
generative phenomenology in relation to other dimen-
sions of phenomenology; the phenomena peculiar to
generative phenomenology; and the place and role of
generative phenomenology.
There are three methodological strategies explored
in Husserlian phenomenology: static, genetic, and gen-
erati ve, the latter being the most encompassing. More-
over, each strategy can have an "ontologica!" and a
"constitutive" dimension, where the former can pro-
vide a "leading clue" (Leitfaden) to the latter.
As an inquiry in FORMAL AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY,
a static methodology relies on EIDETIC METHOD to at-
tain material essences, essential types, regions, formal
essences, and so forth. Whereas an ontologica! analy-
sis inquires into what something is, or the being of its
being, a constitutive analysis investigates the way in
which something is given, how sense emerges. Thus
a static methodology can analyze how sense is consti-
tuted through intention and fulfillment in a way that
holds for ali conscious beings without this constitu-
tive analysis necessarily being a genetic analysis. The
primary contribution of a static analysis is to identify
structures (such as intentionality, noesis, NOEMA, sen-
sation, intention, fulfillment, etc.) that provisionally
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
261
serve as cornerstones for "higher level" analyses.
Whereas a static method is undertaken without
regard to temporal development, GENETIC PHENOMEN-
OLOGY treats the process of self-temporalization. It be-
gins with the "living present" ofretention, the impres-
sional now, and protention, and ranges to fu li concrete
monadic individuation or facticity. It does this through
descriptions of active genesis, the phenomenology of
(passive) association, and the transformation of pre-
judicative life into active judication. In an ontologica]
re gard, the region of psychophysical being functions
as a leading clue to a constitutive analysis. Accord-
ingly, the ontologica! discipline that can guide con-
stitutive analyses is intentiona! psychology. Because
genetic method is confined to egological temporaliza-
tion between the birth and death of the individual, its
contribution is limited to contemporaneous individuals
or synchronic communities where intersubjectivity is
concerned. The distinctiveness of a generative method-
ology that goes beyond static and genetic methods is al-
ready anticipated at the conclusion ofHusserl's Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931]. Like genetic method,
it goes beyond a static analysis by examining tem-
porality. Yet it goes beyond a genetic methodology
by describing phenomena that transcend the strictures
of monadic facticity. Individual sel(-temporalization
yields to socio-historical generativity.
Generative phenomenology is a phenomenology
of generativity. Generativity is intersubjective, geo-
historical, normatively significant transformation.
Generativity is not a mere biologica! becoming or
species repetition because it concerns the generation of
meaning. The expressions "generativity" and "genera-
tive" appear directly on the heels ofthe Cartesianische
Meditationen. In addition to the third volume edited un-
der the ti tie, Zur Phănomenologie der Jntersubjektivităt
[1929-35], the main leading clues for a generatiV'e
phenomenology are found in severa! A manuscrypts
(whose general title is "Mundane Phănomenologie"),
in a majority of B manuscripts (entitled "Die Re-
duktion"), in a broad range of writings from the C
manuscripts ( assembled under the rubric of "Zeitkon-
stitution als formale Konstitution"), and in numerous
manuscripts from the E signature (named, "lntersub-
jektive Konstitution"). Except for o ne manuscript from
circa 1920, these "generative writings" date from the
early to middle 1930s. Husserl's investigations that
262 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
treat historicity and intersubjectivity are imbued with
the themes of"generativity" and the "generative," and
these terms appear unique to Husserl, not being found,
for example, in either WILHELM DILTHEY Of MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER.
For Husserl, ETHNOLOGY or cultural anthropology
serves as the mundane leading clue to constitutive gen-
erative matters. Ethnology has an advantage over, e.g.,
psychology, because it begins with a communal con-
text that is shaped by tradition (ritual, myth, etc.); in-
tegrates linguistic communication into the make-up of
intersubjectivity; bears on a social life that is marked
by spatio-temporal limits; treats individual becoming
within these geo-historical lifeworlds; and addresses
lifeworld communities as they transform themselves
over the generations.
Rather than merely presupposing the generation of
the cultural world, a generative phenomenology will
proceed by inquiring into how its complex network
of sense is generated. In distinction from Dilthey's
HERMENEUTIC approach, which addresses structural dif-
ferences occurring over the generations in terms ofthe
objectifications of life, a generative phenomenology
inquires into the generation ofthese structures as well
as the structure of generation. Sincefuture becoming is
also incorporated into this analysis, phenomenological
description will take on a normative dimension.
Generativity can be further explicated in terms of
primary generative phenomena. These include normal-
ity and abnormality, homeworld and alienworld, and
intergenerational constitution through appropriation,
critiquc, and communication.
Husserl appeals to normality and abnormality be-
cause he wants to provide an account of the con-
stitution of "transcendence" that takes place contex-
tually and over time. His concepts of normality and
abnormality are accordingly not psychological, thera-
peutic, or medicinal, but rather constitutive; they ha ve
to do with modes of sense-givenness. He distinguishes
four modes ofnormality and abnormality: concordance
(Einstimmigkeit) and discordance ( Unstimmigkeit), op-
timality and non-optimality, typicality and atypicality,
and familiarity and unfamiliarity.
Normality and abnormality characterize a lived re-
lation between the individual and environing worlds.
An experience is normal when it coherently unfolds
over time, and though suffering infractions or discor-
dances, remains concordant overall. But an experience
can also be normal if it is optimal, or concretely the
"best" under certain circumstances. The optimal func-
tions as a norm, and thus as a te/os. Even a discordance
(abnormality) that breaks a concordant appearance can
institute a new normal order (and a new teleology),
rendering the previous one now "abnormal" and is-
suing in competing normalities. When the optimal is
repeated, becoming itself concordant and achieving
a certain ideality, the optimal becomes a "type"; in
this way an object or an experience can be said to
be "typical." As typical of experience, a normal cx-
perience becomes one we can count on and is thus
"familiar."Husserl first discusses normality and abnor-
mality in his early lectures on PERCEPTION (found in
manuscript signature F 1 9 [1904-5/1898]), and does
not return to them in a concerted manner until he un-
dertakes a genetic research perspective (for example
in the D manuscripts from 1917-21 entitled "Primor-
diale Konstitution [Urkonstitution]"). Here normality
and abnormality apply to particular organs or senses
(usually tactile and visual ones) and to the lived BODY
(Leib) as a whole. Furthermore, abnormality is almost
cxclusively characterized as a modification ofnormal-
ity. But in Husserl's generative undertaking, normality
and abnormality are treated as co-relative terms and go
beyond the individual lived body. In order to under-
stand how something can count for us as objective, he
turns to an account oftranscendence within communal
contexts and provides a constitutive account of these
very communities, historical traditions, and lifeworlds
precisely in terms of normality and abnormality. Indi-
viduals can only be described as constitutively normal
or abnormal by virtue oftheir practices within horizons
of community and HISTORY, that is, within homeworlds
and alienworlds.
Homeworld and Alienworld. The concept of the
LIFEWORLD as presented in Die Krisis der eu-
ropiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phiinomenologie ( 1936) is only a provisional notion.
Transcendentally understood, the lifeworld is articu-
lated geo-historically in two modalities as earth-ground
(Erdboden) and world-horizon (Welthorizont). Within
a normative register and from a generative perspective,
Husserl calls the normal lifeworld the "homeworld"
(Heimwelt) and the abnormal lifeworld the "alien-
world" (Fremdwelt). Homeworld and alienworld are
 GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
ways in which generativity is taken up and expressed
socially, geo-historically, and normatively.
Husserl 's first mention ofhomeworld occurs nearly
seven years before the appearance of Heidegger's
Sein und Zeit (1927). Yet it was not until after
1930 that homeworld and alienworld are investi-
galed as generative matters. Homeworlds and alien-
worlds are spatio-temporal, normatively significant so-
cial spheres. Homeworlds are connected to this land or
that place, exhibiting this tradition or sharing that fu-
ture. A home can range anywhere from "mother and
child" to a politica! and national complex, where the ge-
ological or geographical and historical aspects take on
greater or lesser ro les. Furthermore, those who are co-
constitutors of a homeworld, past or present- those
who share values, attitudes, patterns of conduct, etc.-
are called "home comrades" (Heimgenossen). One is a
home comrade to the extent that he or she participates
- in any number of ways- in the re-constitution or
historical generation ofthe homeworld.
Alienworlds are those lifeworlds that are not con-
cordant, optimal, typical, or familiar for the practices,
interests, and beliefs of the home comrades. In other
words, as a phenomenologist, Husserl cannot simply
take the perspective of the alien; rather, he must in-
quire into its modes of accessibility or experiencability.
Thus often these other styles, typicalities, etc., do not
"make sense" from the perspective of the home; they
are experienced as non-optimal, atypical, unfamiliar,
in short, as constitutively abnormal. For a phenomen-
ologist, alienness is "accessible" only in the mode of
inaccessibility and incomprehensibility. Such an inac-
cessibility is expressed as the generative density of an
alien historicity and as the uniquely personal "foreign-
ness" ofthe individual.
In the co-constitution of the homeworld, an alien-
world is simultaneously delimited and constituted as
alien. But equiprimordially the experience ofthe alien
is co-constitutive of home, delimiting its sense: from
the very start there is a becoming alien of the home.
This means that home and alien are co-relative and co-
founding. Even though Husserl does aspire toward a
solidarity ofhumanity where "the o ne world" would be
posited beyond cultural differences, the home is never-
theless not an "original" or "foundational" sphere. Be-
cause generative phenomenology does not begin from
the primacy of the EGO, but with normatively signifi-
263
cant lifeworlds that are co-constituted geologically, ge-
ographically, and historically, generative intersubjec-
tivity decisively goes beyond the static, quasi-genetic,
and foundational Cartesian interpretation explpred in
the fifth of the Cartesianische Meditationen. In fact,
generative phenomenology cannot merely be a reflec-
tion on intersubjectivity, but a participation in it.
When Husserl characterizes constitution from a
generative perspective, he does not appeal to the static
animation of hyle by the noetic component of ap-
prehension, nor does he speak of the genetic self-
temporalization of the ego. Generative sense does not
merely originate from an individual. On the one hand,
sense stems .from a historical tradition. As a result of
communal practices that span generations and are ar-
ticulated in a concordant HISTORY, this sense is in some
measure always already "pregiven." On the other hand,
where the individual qua home comrade is concerned,
constitution takes the form of the "appropriation" of
sense: I make it my own by taking it up. Genera-
tive phenomenology must take into account modes of
sense-pregivenness and the reconstitution of sense as
its unique generation- not only for myself, but for
others: for my home comrades and for individuals who
are in relation to the home as constituting alienworlds.
But genera ti ve phenomenology will do this with a di-
rectedness toward the future and the transformation of
the entire generative framework.
A genetic method was unable to examine birth
and death as transcendental occurrences because its
scope was restricted to an individual life. But because
generative phenomenology treats modes of sense-
pregivenness and types of appropriation of that sense
as it develops over the generations, hirth as well as
death must be integrated into a constitutive framework
and become problems for phenomenology.
Appropriation is an explicit relation to others qua
home comrades of a homeworld, and is implicitly the
constitution ofthe alien of an alienworld. Husserl does
not elaborate the mode of encounter of the alienworld
by the home, but does hint at it both with the term
"transgression" ( Uberschreitung) and by his charac-
terization of alienness as being given in the mode
of inaccessibility. From these descriptions one could
formulate "transgression" positively as the encounter
of the alien from the perspective of the home where
the limits of the encounter are left intact. It would
264 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
have to be distinguished from a relation of "occupa-
tion" (Besetzung) where the limits of the home are
merely expanded. Because this appropriation can also
be naive, the constitution of sense and the reconsti-
tution of homeworlds in relation to alienworlds also
demands "critique," or critica! appropriation ~ what
Husserl called "renewal" in his earlicr phenomenology
of culture.
Finally, the generative descriptions of LANGUAGE
IN HUSSERL, and specifically linguistic communication,
begin to challenge thc predominance that Einfiihlung or
empathy had played in his accounts ofthe constitution
of INTERSUB.IECTIVITY. A homewor]d is fundamentally
determined by language, writes Husserl ~in partic-
ular by communication and narrative. Empathy alone,
which requires the bodily presence of the other, could
never constituie a community with those preced ing or
succeeding me. Although Husserl does explore how
communication constitutes a home, he does not ~ like
MAX SCHELER ~ dcvelop the contribution that the life
ofthe EMOTIONs makes to this co-constitution.
Ontology can provide a leading clue for coNSTITU-
TIVE PHENOMENOLOGY (in this case ethnology or cultural
anthropology for generativity). But for Husserl static
(qua constitutive) phenomenology can also serve ini-
tially as a leading clue to genetic phenomenology. This
order of progression reveals a procedural bias held by
Husserl, namely, that the "simple" provides the starting
point for descriptions ofthe "complex." For example,
Husserl began with the abject at rest and then advanced
to the abject in motion; he moved from static structures
of consciousness to the genesis ofthe monad, from self-
tcmporalization to communal historicity. And he did
not wish to advance "higher" until the "lower" levels
had been sufficiently clarified phenomenologically.
Nevertheless, many of Husserl's descriptions took
him beyond the bounds of his avowcd level of analy-
sis. Ultimately they led him to what he called "gener-
ative phenomena," and led the generations succeeding
him to formulate this new methodological enterprise
as generative phenomenology. As is appropriate to a
generative phenomenology, that project was left to fu-
ture generations. From the perspective of generativity
and of generative phenomenology there is a necessary
reinterpretation ofwhat phenomenology means.
Firs!, the so-called "simple" or "independent,"
which was initially identified with the "concrete," is
abstract. Now generative historicity, transcendental in-
tersubjectivity (i.e., non-independent phenomena), are
the most concrete. In relation to generativity, self-
temporalization (regarded previously as absolute), is
labeled "prior to generation" and thus an "abstract
historicity." In relation to genetic phenomena, static
matters are not foundational, but abstractly temporal.
Rather than genetic method presupposing static anal-
ysis, the static method, Husserl maintains, cannot be
undertaken without presupposing genesis. By impli-
cation, this means that static and genetic methods are
only possible through generative observations. Thus
generativity properly understood encompasses static
and genetic dimensions.
Second, the disclosure of generative phenomen-
ology requires that the three methodological strategies
delineated above have to be described either as a pro-
gressive removal of abstraction (leading from static
to generative) oras the movement from the concrete
to the abstract, whereby generative phenomenology
functions as a leading clue to static phenomenology.
Accordingly, the results won from the previous inves-
tigations have to be reinterpreted in light of genera-
tivity. Some will be left intact, others will be enriched
through gencrative insights, still others will have to
be surpassed or rejected as mere(v provisional or even
misleading. Perhaps this unflagging process ofmethod-
ological reevaluation helps explain why Husserl char-
acterizes the phenomenologist as a perpetua! beginner,
and why phenomenology advances only by zigzag.
Third, the generative phenomenologist describes
the structure of generativity and the generation of this
structure expressed as the correlation of homeworld
and alienworld. Because this structure is generativity
in generation, the phenomenologist must describe it
as it is taking place, i.e., while he or she participates
in its movement. Accordingly, phenomenology itself
is modified in and through this generation. Instead of
simply recalling the position of the phenomenologist
as the disinterested observer, Husserl will insist that
both phenomenology and the phenomenologist remain
in this historicity, i.e., within the generative framework
of a homeworld in relation to alienworlds. And he will
assert, further, that the transcendental dimension and
phenomenologizing activities themselves flow into this
generative movement. Such a recognition of the im-
plicit participatory character of phenomenology shifts
 GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
the merely descriptive character of phenomenology
onto a normative axis as well. Now the phenomen-
ologist is engaged in directing the course of gener-
ativity by taking on responsibility for the generation
of humanity. The normative character of generative
descriptions enables Husserl to charge the phenomen-
ologist with such a responsibility and with the ethical
ro le of "functionary."
What is the ro le generative phenomenology can play
in contemporary thought?
Philosophy. Husserl's articulation of the genera-
tive framework provides us with a means of analyzing
how the universal aspirations of philosophy are at the
same time rooted in the uniqueness of a homeworld
from which philosophy itself emerges- a theme that
JACQUES DERRIDA, among others, has taken up. It also al-
lows us to grasp the very structure of generative singu-
larities such as "family home," "home-town," "home-
polis" or "home-nation" in their generation. These sin-
gularities are presupposed by any philosophical enter-
prise- even a generative one- that makes universal
claims.
Social ontology. Phenomenological description
of homeworlds and alienworlds, and of their co-
constitutive relation for the gen erati ve framework, ad-
dresses the structures of concrete human communities,
the meaning of social ties, shared as well as divergent
interests, and the generative meaning of unique per-
sons, both individual and communal. Accordingly, it
provides the descriptions necessary for a phenomen-
ology of solidarity and for a philosophy of "limits"
(see MAX SCHELER, MICHAEL THEUNJSSEN, and BERNHARD
WALDENFELS).
Ethical theory. Generative phenomenology pro-
vides a phenomenological account of the ethical de-
mand by describing the experience ofthis demand as it
is given or pregiven through the encounter with others
qua home comrades and qua aliens. The "other" is not
just any "other" but the gendered other, the familiar
home comrade sharing similar customs, the alien who
bears an inexhaustible strangeness within the home, the
insuperable particularity of the alien from the alien-
world, etc. Phenomenologically, this is described as
experiencable inaccessibility, or what EMMANUEL LEV-
INAS has called "infinity." Such generative descriptions
are lacking in ethical discourse theory (e.g., Jurgen
Habermas, Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard).
265
Normality and abnormality. Generative pheno-
menology can COntribute to a PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL-
OGY, and SOCIOLOGY of normality and abnormal-
ity (Georges Canguilhem, MICHEL FOUCAULT, Emile
Durkheim [ 1858-1917]). It does not presuppose the
normal to be the natural, original, or average, or the
abnormal to be unnatural or deviant. lnstead, normal-
ity and abnormality are cast as concordance, optimality,
typicality, and familiarity, enabling generative pheno-
menology to take into account both normality as a lived
relation developed in socio-historical contexts and ab-
normality as an ability to institute new norms. Gener-
ative phenomenology is in its own way a "genealogy,"
since it accounts for the generation of normative tele-
ologies in experience, and for the way in which norms
qua norms can be overcome through the institution of
competing teleologies.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bemet, Rudolf. "Le monde et le sujet." Philosophie 21
(1989), 57-76.
Carr, David. Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A
Study of Husserl :S Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston,
IL: Northwestem University Press, 1974.
- . Time. Narrative. and History. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1991.
Held, Klaus. "Heimwelt, Fremdwelt, die eine Welt." In Per-
spektiven und Probleme der Husserlschen Phănomen­
ologie. Phănomenologische Forschungen Band 24125.
Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1991, 305--37.
Holenstein, Elmar. "Europa und die Menschheit. Zu Husserls
kulturphilosophischen Meditationen." In Phănomenolo­
gie im Widerstreit. Zum 50. Todestag Edmund Husserls.
Ed. Christoph Jamrne and Otto Poggeler. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, 40--64.
Husserl, Edmund. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus
Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926.
Ed. Margot Fleischer. Husserliana Il. The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1966.
- . Zur Phănomenologie der Intersubjektivităt. Texte aus
dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929--1935. Ed. Iso Kem.
Husserliana 15. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- . "Gmndlegende Untersuchungen zum phănomeno­
logischen Urspmng der Răumlichkeit der Natur" [1934].
In Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl.
Ed. Marvin Farber. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 11940, 307-25; "Foundational Investigations ofthe
Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature."
Trans. Fred Kersten. In Husserl: Shorter Works. Ed. Peter
McCorrnick and Frederick A. Elliston. Notre Dame, IN:
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1981, 222-33.
- . "Notizen zur Raurnkonstitution" [1934]. Ed. Alfred
Schutz. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1
(1941 ), 21-37.
266 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
- . "Die Welt der lebendigen Gegenwart und die Konstitution
der ausserleiblichen Umwelt." Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research 6 ( 1946), 323--43; "The World of
the Living Prescnt and the Constitution of the Surround-
ing World Externa! to the Organism." Trans. Frederick
A. Elliston and Lenore Langsdorf. In Husserl: Shorter
Works. Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981,
238-50.
Sprondel, Walter M., and Richard Grathoff, eds. Alfi·ed
Schtltz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwis-
senschaften. Stuttgart: Enke, 1979.
Steinbock, Anthony J. "The New 'Crisis' Contribution:
A Supplementary Edition of Edmund Husserl's Crisis
Texts." Review of'Metaphysics 47 ( 1994), 557-84.
- . 'The Project of Ethical Renewal and Critique: Edmund
Husserl's Early Phcnomenology of Cu !ture." The South-
em Journal o{Philosoph1· 32 ( 1994), 449--64.
- . "Phenomenological Concepts of Normality and Abnor-
mality." Man and World 28 ( 1995). 241--60.
- . Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology afier
Husserl. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
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- . "Generativity and Generative Phenomenology." Husserl
Studies 12 (1995), 55-79.
Waldenfcls. Bernhard. Der Stache/ des Fremden. Frankfurt
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Welton, Donn. "Husserl and the Japanese." Review of'Meta-
physics 44 ( 1991 ), 575--606.
ANTHONY J. STEINBOCK
Southern Illinois University
GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY One of
the most important and most baffiing developments
in EDMUND HUSSERL's philosophical method was the
expansion between 1917 and 1921 of the tran-
scendental phenomenology of 1deen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913) into a "systematic phenomenology" that
includes both a "static" and a "genetic" component.
The overwhelming importance of this difference is
brought home by the fact that it also frames MARTIN
HEIDEGGER 's working method in Sein und Zeit ( 1927).
The key to understanding genetic phenomenology
is first to clarify its relationship to the project of a tran-
scendental phenomenology as Husserl first framed it in
1deen1-to set that project in relationship to a reframing
of the field of transcendental analysis once the results
of his Cartesian way are seen as provisional and once
Husserl begins to search for "origins" - and then to
understand how his account of eidetic structures is sup-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
plemented by a theory oftransformation. The sequence
of disciplines that forms Husserl's systematic pheno-
menology are also, roughly, stages through which the
development ofhis systematic phenomenology passed.
The first discipline, developed in 1deen 1 and 11
[ 1912-15], attempts to secure a transcendental ground
for FORMAL ANO MATERIAL ONTOLOGIES. That ground is
the structure of INTENTIONALITY. Husserl thinks of re-
gional ontologies as phenomenological studies that use
EIDETIC METHOD to describe the essential structures of a
given, restricted domain of beings or objects in terms
of the manner they are presented in experience. He
sometimes labels his method here "analytic pheno-
menology," but it may be better to call it categoria!
phenomenology in that its goal is to clarify the ba-
sic categories of beings in terms of certain structural
invariants that constitute and certain rules that regu-
late the relationship between kinds ofbeings and types
of experience. Regional ontologies each articulate a
"part" of the "whole." The clarification of the total-
ity itself requires recourse to what is "foundational"
to ali regional fields. That discipline is transcendental
phenomenology proper. But in 1921 Husserl goes on
to restrict its scope as he describes this grounding dis-
cipline as a "universal phenomenology of the general
structures of consciousness." Together with categoria!
phenomenology it forms the core ofwhat he, also dur-
ing this period, labeled "static" phenomenology.
The task of a static phenomenology is to secure the
structure (intentionality) that provides the irreducible
ground to the various regions, which then allows us
to frame each as a sphere of constitution. The method
that secures the ground of ali regions in intentionality
also provides each with its basic form of analysis: since
the as-structure of appearances is understood in terms
of the one to or for whom objects and complexes are
manifest, all intentiona! analysis is "correlational"; in
accounting for the determinacy of the region in ques-
tion, the relevant type of sense structure (NOEMA) is
placed in relationship to the type of act (noesis) or
acts in and through which objects or complexes are
apprehended or used.
The transcendental phenomenology of 1deen 1 was
limited to the immediately intuitable, essential struc-
tures of transcendental subjectivity. Accordingly, the
transcendental domain was not a field but a "system-
atically self-enclosed infinity of essential properties."
 GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY
The treatment of intentionality as a grounding struc-
ture rather than a field of analysis was fostered by
his Cartesian formulation of the reduction in Ideen !,
which created an ontologica! divide between the being
of the world and the being of subjectivity. As a result
the ground of the various regions of the world is se-
cured apart from a regressive analysis that would move
back from their structures to their origins. Instead, we
are limited to an account that gives us an irreducible,
necessary, and universal structure apprehended "ali at
once" in a transcendental reflection, without a clear
understanding of how it is internally connected to the
regional ontologies we are attempting to clarify.
In Ideen J transcendental phenomenology was taken
to be CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. But with the de-
velopment of genetic phenomenology Husserl carne
to treat constitutive analysis as different from his first
"universal phenomenology ofthe general structures of
consciousness" in that through its study of the "hor-
izontal" structure of experience and through its anal-
ysis of underlying modalizations and transformations
that give rise to manifest structures, constitutive anal-
ysis uncovers a depth to the "sphere of being" first
opened by the transcendental EPOCHE AND REDLICTION.
In contrast to a "horizontal" axis along which we might
situate regional fields, a "vertical" axis is opened, trans-
form ing the grounding structure of intentionality into
a transcendentalfie/d to be explored. In adding depth
it enables us to understand how the regions basic to
and explicated by regional ontologies are derived. The
difference between "surface" and "depth" establishes
an interna/ connection between regional and transcen-
dental fields.
Without using regional ontologies as our guiding
thread, we wi\1 not understand the difference between
the horizontal and the vertical axes ofthe field of consti-
tution. Constitutive phenomenology, properly under-
stood, does not give us yet "another" region besides
the ones opened by categoria! analysis but rather de-
scribes structures belonging to the order of sense or
MEANING, which allow them to become determinate
fields. I f the focus in categoria! phenomenology is on
the identity and difference ofthe eidetic structures of a
given field, the concern in constitutive phenomenology
is to trace the "origin" of those structures by looking
at, for example, the series oftransformations by which
everyday speech becomes propositional discourse, as
267
well as the experiences that make them possible. As
will be discussed shortly, this involves a study of the
internat ties between modalities of active synthesis and
then between active and passive synthesis.
The account of origins in constitutive phenomen-
ology forms a bridge to genetic analysis proper. Be-
fore dealing with their relationship we should situate
Husserl's genetic analysis more generally in contrast
to static phenomenology.
Genetic phenomenology reframes the results of
Husserl 's static account by rescinding two "abstrac-
tions" that made his first characterization of intention-
ality possible. ( 1) The "pure EGo," first described as
a "pole" of unity definable only in terms of the acts
and actions that it serves to relate, is recast as an "ab-
stract" structure of the "concrete ego," which has yet
other transcendental features. It possesses general ca-
pabilities or capacities, whose exercise leads to the
acquisition of dispositional tendencies to experience
things one way rather than another, what Husserl calls
"habitualities." Together they introduce a certain his-
toricity to consciousness. (2) The WORLD, which Jdeen
J reduced and drew into the sphere of "immanence"
as a counterpole, as something identica! posited by
consciousness, is reframed as a concrete world that
has undergone a process of "sedimentation" in which
achievements in HISTORY have been deposited into its
structure. In short, the first notion of intentionat con-
sciousness is now elaborated as intentionat lţfe; the
first notion ofworld is recast as lifeworld. As a result,
genetic analysis expands the parameters of the inten-
tiona! structure first opened by static analysis: ( 1) how-
ever fixed Husserl was onan ego logica! starting point,
the concrete ego itself is understood as essentially re-
lational, as subjectivity immersed in intersubjectivity
and situated in a community; and (2) the world is now
elaborated both as equiprimordial with INTERSUBJECTIV-
ITY and as a historically circumscribed lifeworld. The
effect of reframing and expansion was to internally
connect the being of the field of intentionality with its
becoming.
Static analysis deals neither with the "enigma" of
TIME-consciousness nor with SPACE. The recovery of
these moments, which carries us beyond Husserl's
categoria! analysis into his constitutive and then his
genetic phenomenology, takes place in two different
registers. In his constitutive analysis they are studied
 268 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
as "syntheses" underlying the varieties of experiential
acts. And this account is extended in his genetic analy-
sis when Husserl discovers, through a further analysis
of protention, an interna! connection between space
and time. But from the point of view of the method
itself, we can think of constitutive phenomenology as
an explication ofthe "spatiality" ofthe transcendental
field, while genetic analysis unfolds its "temporality."
This second register is brought into play by a devel-
opment in phenomenological method that allowed it to
integrate temporally and historically configured struc-
tures into its first "formal" notion of the horizon. The
depth first discovered through a constitutive account
can be described not only in terms of structural but
also temporal transformations. At the same time this
locates the difference between constitutive and genetic
phenomenology. As he puts it in Zur Phănomenologie
der lntersuhjektivităt II [ 1921-28], "To trace [the order
of] constitution is not to trace the [order of] genesis,
which is, precisely, the genesis of constitution, itself
actuated as genesis in a monad." Genetic phenomen-
ology deepens the account of the world by adding to
a constitutive account an analysis of the ro le of back-
ground and context in the configuration of regions of
experience. It deepens the account of our being in the
world by schematizing the interplay of experience and
discourse constitutive of the transformation of one re-
gion internally or one region into another as temporal.
It treats the dynamic interplay of experience and dis-
course as deployed over time and as itself part of a
process, historical in nature, that accounts for the con-
crete configuration of a region.
In general we can say that genetic analysis treats
the relationship between the regions or the transfor-
mation of a whole region into another historical form
by seeing transformative structures as temporal. What
is distinct about genetic analysis is that it accounts for
various lateral relationships between different vertical
Iines of constitution found in the transcendental field.
These lateral relations define the diachronic interplay
of language, experience, and appearances in terms of
background and context, an interplay that is at work in
the deep structure ofthose regions covered by catego-
ria! phenomenology.
The acts of experience in and through which ob-
jects, fields, and even the self are presented are ali
characterized as syntheses by Husserl. Static analysis
describes them in terms of their form and then ex-
amines the rules regulating different noetic-noematic
correlations. By contrast, genetic analysis understands
syntheses notjust in terms ofform, but also in terms of
productive achievement, not just in terms of their be-
ing but also their becoming. Husserl dealt mainly with
two form of genesis, which he distinguishes as ac-
tive and passive. Active genesis refers to the conscious
or deliberate production of different ideal complexes
of understanding or real cultural complexes from pre-
constituted elements or objects. Complexes of under-
standing can range from something like counting to
advanced scientific theories. Real cultural complexes
run from a shepherd 's song to Beethoven 's N inth Sym-
phony, from a child's sketch to a composition by Paul
Klee.
Husserl 's own focus is upon the transformations of
meaning that allows us to effect a change from "occa-
sional," everyday talk to something like propositional
discourse. He suggests that ali truth statements indi-
cate "earlier" types ofspeech and then experience from
which they arise. Judgments have a "genesis ofmean-
ing." They point back, level by level, to moda! transfor-
mations from which they are derived, to nested or im-
plied meanings in any one ofthose levels, to a context
not directly expressed in their content yet constitutive
of the meaning in play, and finally, to the origination
oftheir semantic elements from experience. This gives
not only a certain "occasionality" but also a definable
"historicality" to "objective" discourse.
AII active synthesis, however, is interwoven with
what is not spontaneously produced. The final level
to which active synthesis points is passive synthesis.
This level might itself be the result of previous acts of
active production that ha ve become sedimented into the
world and, as a result, form a "secondary sensibility."
Or it might be a level of embodied perception through
which things are presented without active construction
or interpretation, a level of"originary sensibility."
Husserl 's account of passive synthesis moves
through his constitutive to his genetic analysis. He
turns, for example, to the presence of similarity and
contrast played out in the relationship between adum-
brations and objects, recurring across a number of dif-
ferent regional fields, and undertakes a clarification of
their "origin." In doing so he studies the differential
interplay of associative, spatial, and temporal synthe-
 GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY
ses that account for the transfer of sense involved in
our recognition of something as familiar and for the
transformation of sense that arises either as a result
ofbecoming acquainted with new fcatures or ofbeing
disappointed in our anticipations. Transformation has
not only a structural but also a temporal dimension.
Protention, to the extent that it directs experience and
cuts a certain "line" of anticipation through the mul-
tiple possibilities thrown up by a given object, even
links us to the motility of the lived BODY and a certain
affectivity that draws our intentions into a nexus ofin-
volvements. Ultimately ali passive syntheses rest upon
the interplay ofretention and protention, which allows
Husserl then to treat the basic laws of genesis as laws
of time-consciousness.
The account ofpassive synthesis belongs to a disci-
pline that Husserl, echoing but greatly expanding KANT,
calls transcendental aesthetics. Husserl takes originary
PERCEPTION as his paradigm case here, which he sets
in contrast to the active production of propositional
claims studied by his transcendental logic. But it also
seems that previous active constructions that have be-
come sedimented and thus part of our sensibility and
sense ofthings fali under its jurisdiction as well. Tran-
scendental aesthetics, then, covers not just perceptual
senses but, with modification, the acquired and habitual
meanings that also shape our concrete lifeworld.
This gives us yet another interesting way of un-
derstanding the difference between constitutive and
genetic analysis. We can say that constitutive pheno-
menology schematizes the structural transformations
making phenomenal fields possible according to tran-
scendental space. They are framed as layers or strata
beneath each field, providing it with its supporting
ground. Genetic phenomenology schematizes those
transformations in terms of transcendental time, and
thus as a process of development in which the earlier
gives rise to the !ater and in which the future draws
and gives direction to the now. Not only is the ideal-
ity of sense and meaning clarified through the notion
of repeatability over time, but their transference anei
transformation rest upon the interlacing of retentions
and protentions across a living present.
At yet a deeper and final level of genetic analysis
Husserl discovers that space and time themselves are
not just "forms" but are generated, on the one hand,
by the interplay of position, motility, and place, and
269
on the other, by the streaming flow of the process of
self-temporalization itself. Husserl's studies ofthe self-
generation of space and time are clearly the most diffi-
cult of ali his genetic studies.
For reasons having to do with his theory ofEVIDENCE
Husserl uses the ego and its acquired world as his start-
ing point. But Husserl's recognition that subjectivity is
necessarily concrete - that the other is not merely
a correlate of my own intentiona! acts, but someone
who affects me - led him to speak of a genesis at
the level of community, ETHICS, culture, and RELIGION.
In his published writings this appears for the first time
in a series of articles he wrote for a Japanese periodi-
ca!, partially published between 1923 and 1924. There
he traces a development through the course of history
toward a certain te/os in which rational interaction be-
comes normative.
Once Husserl found a way of integrating the notion
of development and transformation into his phenomen-
ological method, and once he found a way of moving
from his first starting point to communal existence and
the lifeworld, new horizons open for his phenomen-
ology. For this reason we find Husserl 's very late work
moving in the direction of yet another type of anal-
ysis, called GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY, in which the
parameters of life and death, homeworld and alien-
world, and even earth and world are used to expand
his first notion of genetic analysis. What holds these
accounts together is that temporality is understood as
the final source in terms ofwhich ali development, ali
becoming, including that interplay of conscious life
and world constitutive of our essential historicity, is
explained. Time, seem from within, is the form of in-
tentiona! genesis.
This clarification ofthe difference between catego-
ria!, constitutive, and genetic phenomenology shows us
how deeply Heidegger's working method in Sein und
Zeit, for ali the striking differences in content resulting
from its application, is indebted to Husserl's frame-
work. While it does not actually attempt to carry them
out, Sein und Zeit establishes a place for regional on-
tologies. Because he wants the use of"ontological" to
be reserved for his transcendental account, Heidegger
characterizes such regional disciplines as "ontic." With
that to the side, Division 1 undertakes extensive struc-
tural descriptions of the various moments of DASEIN as
being-in-the-world, as well as accounts ofthe "origins"
270 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ofthe present-at-hand, on the one hand, and assertions,
on the other. It clearly works with the resources of a
constitutive phenomenology with one important quali-
fication: Heidegger avoids treating any one constitutive
level as absolutely basic, stressing in its stead the sense
in which founding relations are relative and in which
each level is yet another dependent "moment" of the
whole structure of Dasein. Division Il then attempts
to reframe the results of this account in terms of tem-
porality, which is precisely what Husserl's notion of
genetic phenomenology calls for. However different
the content oftheir theories, there is a surprising coin-
cidence between the different levels oftheir systematic
phenomenological methods.
Because references to the notion of genetic pheno-
menology are very sketchy in the works Husserl pub-
lished during his lifetime and because seminal texts
that discuss and use the notion of genetic phenomen-
ology only became available in the Husserliana vol-
umes published after 1965, the concept is rarely taken
up directly by !ater figures in the phenomenological
tradition. Philosophers such as Heidegger, MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, and PAUL RICCEUR un-
derstood that a difference between static and genetic
phenomenology was at work in the development of
Husserl's thinking, but they tended to appropriate the
contrast for their own ends rather than discuss it di-
rectly.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Aguirre, Antonio. Genetische Phănomenologie und Reduk-
tion. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
A1meida, Guido Antonio de. Sinn und lnhalt in der genetis-
chen Phănomenologie E. Husserls. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1972.
Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. "Statische
und genetische Konstitution." In their Edmund Husserl.
Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1989, chap. 7; "Static and Genetic Constitution." In their
An Introduc! ion to Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993, chap. 7.
Carr, David. "Genetic Phenomenology." In his Phenomen-
ology and the Prohlem o{ Histmy. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1974, chap. 3.
Husserl, Edmund. "Statische und genetische Methode." In
his Analysen zurpassiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und
Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926. Ed. Margot Fleis-
cher. Husserliana 11. Thc Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966,
336-45.
- . Zur Phănomenologie der lntersuhjektivităt. Texte aus
dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928. Ed. Iso Kern.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserliana 14. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, 34--
48, 217-21.
-. "Flinf Aufsătze iiber Erneuerung." In his Auf~ătze und
Vortrăge (1922-1937). Ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans
Rainer Sepp. Husserliana 27. Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1988, 3-94.
-. Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kri-
tik der logischen Vernunft. Ed. Paul Janssen. Husserliana
17. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, 213-22, 315-22;
Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Cairns.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, 205-15, 314--24.
-. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrăge. Ed.
Stephan Strasser. Husserliana 1. The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1963, 99-121; Cartesian Meditations: An lntroduc-
tion to Phenomenology. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, 65-88.
Welton, Donn. "Static and Genetic Phenomenology." In his
The Origins o{ Meaning. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1983, chap. 5.
-. The Other Husserl. Forthcoming, chap. 1-7.
DONN WELTON
State University o{ New York, Stony Brook
GEOGRAPHY, BEHAVIORAL See BEHAVIORAL
GEOGRAPHY.
GEOGRAPHY, SOCIAL See SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY.
GERMANY Intensive research has been done
on the development of phenomenology in Germany
before World War II and the main figures and central
themes ofthat time are covered by other entries in this
Encyclopedia. This entry will survey the early devel-
opment. The period after the war will be considered in
more detail.
Phenomenology had its roots in AUSTRIAN philos-
ophy and beyond that in BRITISH EMPIRICISM, but its
original growth has been in Germany and it has spread
from there to FRANCE, JAPAN, RUSSIA, the UNITED STATES,
and the rest ofthe world. EDMUND HUSSERL, the founder
of phenomenology, studied with FRANZ BRENTANO and
was deeply inftucnced by Brentano's project of a de-
scriptive psychology. But it was above ali Brentano's
account of intentionality or object-relatedness as the
 GERMANY
prime characteristic of psychic phenomena that in-
fluenced Husserl, whose work before the mid-1890s,
including the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891 ), is
fundamentally Brentanist in conception. Husserl broke
with his teacher and advocated a non-immanentist ac-
count of INTENTIONALITY in his tradition-founding Lo-
gische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ).
From the very beginning Husserl's conceptions of
formal LOGIC and MATHEMATICS were guided by David
Hilbert (1862~1943). Husserl's new approach in the
Logische Untersuchungen might be understood as a
reaction to GOTTLOB FREGE's Platonistic criticism ofhis
PSYCHOLOGISM in the Phi/osophie der Arithmetik, but
his phenomenology of logic has nothing in common
with Frege's radical Platonism. The Logische Unter-
suchungen reject the psychologistic interpretation of
logic that goes back at least to John Stuart Miii and
could sti li be found in Brentano's reduction of ideal en-
tities to psychic entities as well as in the transcendental
psychologism present in the theory constructions ofthe
neo-Kantians. But Husserl retained Brentano 's concept
ofintentionality as the basic tool for his own enterprise.
He maintained that a clear account ofthe difference be-
tween real, mental, and ideal entities can only be given
with the aid of intentiona! analysis. The ma in question
for Husserl was the "how of the givenness" of ideal
objects for consciousness. In contrast, Frege's critique
ofpsychologism rejected any position that recognized
ideal entities but was sti li interested in the question of
their givenness to subjectivity. Husserl called philoso-
phy back to the "matters themselves," to the descriptive
analytic investigation of experience itself: both to ob-
jects of every sort as they present themselves and to
the structures of consciousness of such objects.
The Logische Untersuchungen had an immediate
impact. WILHELM DILTHEY described it as "epochal,"
and as its influence spread, Husserl attracted increas-
ing numbers of students to Gottingen. Another group
emerged in Munich. ALEXANDER PFĂNDER, who used
the term phenomenology even before Husserl in the
title of a book, was the head of this group. Husserl
visited Munich in 1904. While he was primarily con-
cerned with the philosophical foundations oflogic and
mathematics and had focused on the phenomenology
of cognition, those under his early influence begun to
use his approach, especially his EIDETIC METHOD, on a
quite diverse set of problems. The work they initiated
271
during these early years on ACTION, EMOTION, ETHICS,
FEMINISM, LANGUAGE, LAW, LOGIC, PERCEPTION, RELIGION,
VALUE, etc. continued thereafter. This early group in-
cluded THEODOR CONRAD, HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, JO-
HANNES DAUBERT, MORITZ GEIGER, NICOLAI HARTMANN, RO-
MAN INGARDEN, ALEXANDRE KOYRE, HANS LIPPS, ALEXAN-
DER PFĂNDER, ADOLF REINACH, WILHELM SCHAPP, MAX
SCHELER, EDITH STEIN, and, !ater, HERBERT SPIEGELBERG.
At this same time, Husserl's work began to influ-
ence PSYCHIATRY through KARL JASPERS and LUDWIG BIN-
SWANGER.
Most ofthe members ofthe early group ofphenome-
nologists at Gottingen adhered to so-called mundane
or REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY. Their work involved
substantive objections to Husserl 's own work along
with their own creative appropriation of it. Some re-
mained essentially phenomenologists, while others es-
tablished independent philosophical positions strongly
influenced by phenomenology. Although not strictly
from Gottingen, the most influential philosopher be-
longing to this early group was MAX SCHELER, and much
ofhis work continued tobe deeply phenomenological,
especially his discussions of emotion, value, and reli-
gion, as well as ethics. But while Husserl was to speak
of "anthropologism" as a philosophical error, Scheler
became one ofthe advocates ofPHILOSOPHICAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY.
Husserl had referred to phenomenology as "descrip-
tive psychology" in the first edition ofthe Logische Un-
tersuchungen. But he soon carne to characterize this as
a misnomer. The descriptions of the intentiona! acts
in which objects are given are themselves eidetic and
refer toana priori. But for Husserl this was sti li insuf-
ficient for understanding phenomenology as a first phi-
losophy seeking an ultimate grounding. According to
Husserl, this could only be achieved by a transcenden-
tal turn. In Ideen zu ei ner reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) he asserted
that philosophical radicality requires us to view inten-
tiona! processes not as parts of the world, but rather in
their function of constituting the world. Intentionality
is the "origin" ofthe world qua phenomenon and thus
cannot itselfbe merely another part ofthe world. Purely
transcendental consciousness as an abject of study is
the correlate of a specifically transcendental attitude
on the part of the phenomenologist, and this attitude
is adopted through transcendental EPOCHE AND REDUC-
272 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
TION. The transcendental turn for Husserl opened up
the fu li range and significance of CONSTITUTIVE PHENO-
MENOLOGY.
The idea of "ultimate grounding" (Letzt-
begriindung) as the central task of philosophy is
neo-Kantian. The radical rejection of KANT and neo-
Kantianism in the Untersuchungen is considerably
weakened in the !deen. Husserl even claimed that he
was now a bie to recognize a pure transcendental EGO in
the framework of his phenomenology. The treatment
of Kant in his !ater work, though highly critica! with re-
spect to Kant's constructive and hypothetical method,
is, in general, positive. In particular, Husserl recog-
nized the viability of Kant's transcendental question.
The influence of the neo-Kantians and especially of
Paul Natorp (1854--1924) on the development leading
to the Ideen and beyond cannot be denied. Most ofthe
phenomenologists of the Gottingen circle, however,
were not able to follow Husserl's turn to transcenden-
tal constitutive phenomenology. Ingarden in particular
was to write a sustained critique of Husserl 's tran-
scendental turn and a thoroughjustification ofrealistic
phenomenology.ln the 1920s Husserl gathered together
a group of young phenomenologists in Freiburg that
incJuded OSKAR BECKER, EUGEN FINK, FRITZ KAUFMANN,
LUDWIG LANDGREBE, HANS REINER, and above al!, MARTIN
HEIDEGGER. Husserl 's hopes for the fu ture ofphenomen-
ology centered increasingly on Heidegger. He sketched
out a project in which the task of Becker was to de-
velop the phenomenology of logic and mathematics
as well as the NATURAL SCIENCES. Heidegger's domain
was to be the phenomenology of the HUMAN SCIENCES.
When Husserl retired from Freiburg in 1928, Heideg-
ger was his designated successor, but he soon decided
that Heidegger had abandoned transcendental pheno-
menology and turned to anthropologism with the pub-
lication of Sein und Zeit (1927). Most ofthe members
of the Freiburg ci rele eventually, and in different de-
grees, carne under Heidegger's influence. In the 1920s
Husserl was also influential among phenomenologists
beyond the Freiburg group such as FELIX KAUFMANN, AL-
FRED SCHUTZ, and ARON GURWITSCH. In fact, with the aid
of GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY, Gurwitsch deveJoped a subtJe
criticism of certa in implications of Husserl 's transcen-
dental reduction without rejecting it completely. He,
together with Schutz, Spiegelberg, the two Kaufmanns,
and the Americans MARVIN FARBER and DORION CAIRNS
took German phenomenology to the United States be-
ginning in the 1920s.
Husserl 's own attempts to develop his project in
further volumes of the !deen and most of his other
work as well as his lectures and research manuscripts
remained unpublished for many years. The richness of
the work ofthe 1920s only appeared and had influence
on German phenomenology after 1950. By his death in
1938, Husserl had only published severa! variants of
introductions to his phenomenology, among them the
Encyclopaedia Britannica article ( 1929) and the Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931] in its earlier French ver-
sion. Excluding the Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie
des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905], edited by Heideg-
ger in 1928, Husserl's last book published in Germany
was Formale und transzendentale Logik ( 1929), a new
exposition ofhis phenomenology oflogic in the frame-
work of transcendental phenomenology. The first two
parts ofhis last great though unfinished work, Die Kri-
sis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phanomenologie ( 1936), where he developed
the concept of LIFEWORLD, had to be published in YU-
GOSLAVIA. In addition, Erfahrung und Urteil ( 1939),
a collection of manuscripts on the phenomenology of
logic edited by Landgrebe, was printed outside Ger-
many in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and became available in Ger-
many only after 1948.
Heidegger's preference in the 1920s for the pre-
transcendental phenomenology ofthe Logische Unter-
suchungen over transcendental phenomenology was
the harbinger for the future. With the publication of
Sein und Zeit in 1927, he shifted the focus of pheno-
menology to EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY and !ater to
HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY. The question of Be-
ing (Seins.fi·age) was for Heidegger the hidden presup-
position ofHusserl's approach. In his early lectures the
analysis ofthe ontologica! difference took the place of
the phenomenological reduction. In what he took tobe
opposition to Husserl 's transcendentalism, Heidegger
first turned to the interpretive analysis of a worldly
situated and historical engagement. (Drawing on the
work of Jaspers as well as Heidegger, HANNAH ARENDT
appears the first in this existential-phenomenological
tendency.) While Sein und Zeit was still genuinely
phenomenological in inspiration, after the so-called
Kehre or "turning" ofthe early 1930s, when Heidegger
turned his attention from the analysis of DASEIN's pre-
 GERMANY
comprehension of Being to Being itself, his thought
became less and less phenomenological, although the
origins in phenomenology never entirely disappeared.
Toward the end of his life, Husserl himself real-
ized that the project of a pure transcendental pheno-
menology had lost its influence. The philosophies of
Scheler and Heidegger, his "antipodes," and, accord-
ing to a letter to Ingarden, the general irrationalism
of the 20th century dominated the field. His hope was
that future generations would rediscover the signifi-
cance of his work for a true, rational philosophy. In
the wake of the emergence of the interna! crisis of
the phenomenological movement, the politica! and cul-
tural catastrophe ofthe Nazi regime and its racism and,
ultimately, the war caused a brutal disruption ofphilo-
sophical discourse in Germany. Further discussion of
different conceptions of phenomenology was simply
impossible.
In the first decades after the war, the phenomen-
ological movement "in the broader sense," as Spiegel-
berg !ater defined it, was ali ve in Germany in the strong
influence of French existential phenomenology, above
alJ through thc works of.JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, on the one hand, and Heidegger on
the other. Heidegger's involvement in the Third Reich
was remembered in Germany after the war, but many
considered it a personal mistake not connected with
his philosophy. His earlier writings had had a powerful
influence on Husserl 's students ofthe 1920s with very
few exceptions, e.g., HANS REINER, and he was the lead-
ing figure in German philosophy from the 1930s into
the 1960s.
With Sartre, Heidegger, and Jaspers the catchword
of the first decade after the war in Germany was
not "phenomenology" nor even "existential pheno-
menology," but EXISTENTIALISM, and Heidegger himself
was initially understood as the leading figure of this
movement. There was, in addition, a certain interes!
in Scheler's !ater speculations but no intensive Scheler
research. The older phenomenological movement was
of interes! only for the first historical surveys of philos-
ophy in our century, e.g., that ofWolfgang Stegmi.iller.
The question ofwhether or not Husserl was forgotten in
Germany even began to be raised in non-professional
intellectual journals. The question was justified since
in general the rejection of the phenomenological re-
duction by Merleau-Ponty was, for different reasons,
273
shared by the Heideggerians and even the former as-
sistants of Husserl.
Right after the war Landgrebe's interes! was to find
a transition from phenomenology to metaphysics, and
Fink explored the possibilities of ontologica! expe-
rience; discussed the operational presuppositions in
Husserl 's reduction; and was looking for new founda-
tions forphenomenology in speculative thinking. They
kept a critica! distance from Heidegger, but admitted
implicitly that Heidegger 's critique of Husserl was, in
principle, justified. The attempt to do as much jus-
tice as possible to Husserl under these circumstances
produced some myths in Husserl interpretation. Al-
most commonplace for a long time was the thesis that
Husserl himself had abandoned his original program
in his turn in the Krisis essays to the LIFEWORLD. In
1963 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, by no means a follower
of Husserl but still a skilled interpreter, proved that
these myths were untenable. Unfortunately, this mes-
sage failed to reach many phenomenologists 1in Ger-
many and, especially, many outside Germany.
The presupposition for a new start ofthe phenomen-
ological movement in Germany during the mid-1950s
is the edition ofHusserl's collected works, the Husser-
liana, by the Husserl Archives founded by HERMAN LEO
VAN BREDA at Louvain. The availability of the tran-
scriptions of Husserl 's research manuscripts at Koln
and Freiburg was also significant for this new begin-
ning. The first eight volumes of the Husserliana in
the late 1950s and 1960s triggered vigorous discus-
sion ofthe phenomenological method and its ultimate
grounding (Letztbegriindung). The significance of the
phenomenology ofthe consciousness ofinner TIME had
already been discovered in this context and remained a
central topic. The volumes ofthe Husserliana that fol-
lowed introduced further material relevant to the more
application-oriented research after 1970. Other topics,
not known in their significance before, include GENETIC
and GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY and INTERSUB.IECTIV-
ITY. The significance ofHusserl's late phenomenology
for a phenomenology of HISTORY and the HUMAN sci-
ENCES could finally be discovered with the aid of this
material, and new possibilities provided by Husserl's
analyses of passive synthesis were used in the pheno-
menology of logic.
The history of the institutional framework of the
phenomenological movement in postwar Germany is
274 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
a practica! guide to the periods of its development.
The first phase, from 1950 to 1970, was in the begin-
ning sti Il under the guidance of scholars from FRANCE
and THE NETHERLANDS. The center of the new begin-
ning was the Husserl Archives in Louvain. Landgrebe,
fink, STEPHAN STRASSER, and WALTER BIEMEL, i.e., the
first generation of postwar phenomenologists, worked
at the Archives. In 1949, Fink founded the branch ofthe
Archives at Freiburg. The branch at Koln was founded
in 1951. Jts first director was KARL-HEINZ VOLKMANN-
SCHLUCK, who was followed by Landgrebe after 1956.
Van Breda also initiated a series of international collo-
quia in phenomenology. Fink was the only German on
the original committee. The first meeting took place
in France in 1951, the second in Germany in 1956,
the third again in France in 1957, and the fourth in
Germany in 1969.
The foundation of the "Deutsche Gesellschaft fUr
phanomenologische Forschung" (German Society for
Phenomenological Research) was prepared at the
fourth colloquium in Schwabisch Hali. With this, the
second period of the development of phenomenology
in Germany began. Two international meetings in
Munich in 1971 and Berlin in 1974 were organized
by the society and published in the first three vol-
umes in the series of the society, Phanomenologische
Forschungen (Phenomenological Studies), edited by
ERNST WOLFGANG ORTH. The society institutionaiized its
international meetings in 1976 and the proceedings
of its biennial meetings have been published in the
Phanomenologische Forschungen together with the
proceedings of other conferences on phenomenology
in Germany. The development leading to the activities
of the Deutsche Gesellschaft was, in the beginning,
devoted to the rediscovery of Husserl in the wake of
the publication of the Husserliana. But the activities
of the society were by no means restricted to such
research. The entire extent of the phenomenological
movement, both its past and future development, has
been discussed.
The first meeting organized by the society was de-
voted to "Munich phenomenology." It concentrated
primarily on Pfander's work and was published in
1975 in the Phaenomenologica series. Further research
was done by Spiegeiberg and KARL SCHUHMANN. The
Pfander-Studien (Pfander studies) were published in
1982 by Spiegelberg and EBERHART AVE-LALLEMANT.
The Pfander Archives at Munich are under the care
of Ave-Lallemand. The center for Brentano research
is Brentano-Studien, which was founded by Wilhelm
Baumgartner. The Scheler Gesammelte Werke, under
the care of Maria Scheler and MANFRED FRINGS, was
published in Bern and !ater in Bonn beginning in
1954, but very few publications devoted to Scheler's
work have appeared. However, a collection of essays,
Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der Phi/oso-
phie, was published by PAUL GOOD in 1975. The Max
Scheler Gesellschaft was founded in Ko1n in 1993.
The first volume ofthe Heidegger Gesamtausgahe ap-
peared in 1976. The publication ofthese early lectures
has shed new 1ight on the links between phenomen-
ology and Heidegger's first steps toward FUNDAMEN-
TAL ONTOLOGY. The Martin Heidegger Gesellschaft was
founded in Messkirch in 1986 and has organized sev-
era! conferences and publishes its own series.
The first postwar period of phenomeno1ogical re-
search had its roots chiefly in the circles growing out
ofthe Husserl Archives at Louvain, Freiburg, and Koln.
GERD BRAND, who worked at Louvain, published the first
study extensively using the unpublished manuscripts
of Husserl in 1955. 1so KERN, also connected with
the archives, published a monumental historical work
on Husserl's relations to Kant and the neo-Kantians
in 1964. Landgrebe, the director of the archives at
Koln, published his new conception in 1963 and Fink
at Freiburg developed his critique of Husserl 's tran-
scendental phenomenology grounded in his personal
knowledge of Husserl's intentions. He reached his fi-
nal position in which speculative thinking and dialec-
tic provide the foundation for phenomenology in Sein,
Wahrheit, Welt ( 1958). Biemel contributed a signif-
icant essay on the development of Husserl's pheno-
menology.
Landgrebe had many students and assistants in
Koln and founded a very productive school. Two
Festschrifien, one edited by ULRICH CLAESGESand KLAUS
HELD, the other by Biemel, were both published in 1972.
Independent publications belonging to this context are
the early essays ofHERMANN LOBBE, a former assistant of
Landgrebe; the investigations of HANS ULRICH HOCHE on
non-empirica! knowledge in Kant and Husserl, KLAUS
HELD on the transcendental ego and the living present;
and Claesges on the constitution of SPACE. LOTHAR
ELEY's critica! investigations concerning the crisis of
 GERMANY
the a priori, influenced by HEGEL and CRITICAL THEORY,
belong to this early Koln tradition as well.
The schoo] begun by GERHARD FUNKE at Mainz had
a very different origin. Husserl 's development was ac-
companied in part by the sympathetic and in part by
the critica] and even polemica] responses of the neo-
Kantians. The publications ofthe Husserliana renewed
their interest. The critica] remarks of Hans Wagner
and a series of essays written by Funke collected in
a volume published in 1957 were the first responses
of this type. WOLFGANG HERMANN M0LLER, a student of
Funke, wrote the first book interpreting Husserl as a
transcendental idealist. But an independent interest in
Husserl's phenomenology can be found in Mainz be-
fore Funke inaugurated this Kantianizing tradition of
Husserl interpretation there. ALWIN DIEMER wrote the
first monograph on Husserl 's philosophy as a whole in
1956. ALOIS ROTH's dissertation is the first attempt to
reconstruct Husserl 's ETHICS.
Funke's coming to Mainz developed a strictly
transcendental methodological approach to Husserl 's
phenomenology with a strong bias toward Kantian and
neo-Kantian problematics. The main topics of con-
cern to this school were systematic and critica] reflec-
tions on the concept of phenomenology and the history
of phenomenology and its development, especially in
Husserl. Funke's program was corroborated and mod-
ified first by THOMAS M. SEEBOHM in 1962 and ]ater by
Orth in 1967. The general tendency of this school is
captured in the title of Funke's Phănomenologie­
Metaphysik oder Methode? (1966), which questions
the tendency toward providing phenomenology with
a metaphysical foundation, evident in such works as
Langdrebe 's Phănomenologie und Metaphysik ( 1949).
Furtherpublications belongingto this school have been
published since 1970 in the series Conscientia and the
Mainzer philosophische Forschungen.
The structure of the phenomenological movement
and the topics changed after 1970. ELISABETH STROKER
became the director of the Archives at Koln and
WERNFR MARX followed Fink at the Freiburg Archives.
The phenomenological tradition continued at Mainz
with Funke and ]ater Seebohm. But phenomenology
was now well represented in severa! other universi-
ties. Munich became the center of Pfănder research.
RUDOLF BERLINGER and HEINRICH ROM BACH, together with
the psychiatrist DIETER wvss, are phenomenologists
275
working at Wiirzburg; OTTO POGGELER and BERNHARD
WALDFNFELS are at Bochum; He]d and ANTONIO AGUIRRE
are at Wuppertal; and Orth together with KARL-HEINZ
LEMBFCK are at Trier. The problems of the essence of
phenomenology and the justification and possible lim-
its of especially Husserl's phenomenology have been
discussed at length and the main interest has now
turned to the various fields of phenomenological re-
search. The topics of the majority of the conferences
organized by the German Society for Phenomenology
are devoted to what can be called "applied phenomen-
ology." It is therefore difficult to distinguish differ-
ent phenomenological schools in this period. The dis-
tinction between the different fields of application is
clearer.
Phenomeno]ogy of the NATURAL SCIENCFS has a sigc
nificant place in the work of Elisabeth Stroker, and
other activities in this field were mostly results of her
initiatives. Stroker has been in addition the leading
figure in Husserl scholarship during this period and
has made significant contributions to the phenomen-
ology of logic and of history. A collection of her es-
says was published in 1987. Werner Marx published
studies of Heidegger and ]ater of Husserl. Interest in
the phenomenology of logic in the narrower sense has
been marginal and in general critica!. ERNST TUGEND-
HAT turned tO ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY after his influentiaJ
book, published in 1967, on the concept of TRUTH in
Husserl and Heidegger. He has since published sev-
era! critica! essays concerning Husserl's phenomen-
ology from this point of view. Hoche made a similar
turn in 1982. Eley's metacritique of formal logic is
written from a quasi-Hegelian perspective and also in-
cludes a metacritique of Husserl 's phenomenology of
logic. Husserl's phenomenology of mathematics was
analyzed in two monographs, one by ROGER SCHMIT,
published in 1981, and the other by DIETER LOHMAR,
which was published in 1989. Attempts to apply pheno-
menology to the state ofthe art in this discipline in the
second half of the century have been made by See-
bohm. Most ofthis work has, however, been published
in English.
The vast majority of work during this period has
been devoted to the Geisteswissenschaften, i.e., pheno-
menology of LITERATURE, SOCIOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS,
etc. Significant work in this field had already been
done before 1970- for example, Hans Reiner's in-
276 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
vestigations on the foundations of ethics. Fritz Kauf-
mann and Walter Biemel made significant contribu-
tions in phenomenological AESTHETICS. Roman Ingar-
den 's books on the literary work of art ha ve been highly
influential in this area, and phenomenological research
on history was revived as early as 1953 with the in-
vestigations of Wilhelm Schapp. History and lifeworld
have also been considered in the works ofboth Stroker
and PAUL JANSSEN. Seebohm published a critica! pheno-
menological study on hermeneutics as a methodology
of philological-historical research in 1972, and KARL-
HEINZ LEMBECK published work on history as a science
in 1988. The phenomenology of the lifeworld along
with the works of Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, and Gur-
witsch are at the center of the research conducted by
the group surrounding RICHARD GRATHOFF conceming
INTERSUBJECTIVITY and LANGUAGE. BERNHARD WALDEN-
FELS' study of dialogue published in 1971, his mono-
graph on French phenomenology published in 1983,
and the series Ubergiinge ali belong to the activities of
this group.
In recent years, significant research has also been
done on the prehistory and history of phenomen-
ology. Orth, Schuhmann, and lately also NIELS w.
BOKHOVE have published studies on the prehistory ofthe
term "phenomenology:" An investigation conceming
Husserl 's relation to FICHTE was published by HERMANN
TIETJEN in 1980, and the dispute between Husserl and
Jonas Cohn ( 1869-194 7), a neo-Kantian and Fichtean,
is, together with a systematic comparison, the topic of
REINALD KLOCKENBUSCH's most recent work.
The productive phase of German phenomenology
carne to its end with the last works of Heidegger af-
ter the war. The period of intensive interpretation and
further development of this productive phase has lost
its strength. German philosophy now has the character
of experimental investigations including severa! influ-
ences from abroad, first of ali pragmatism and analytic
philosophy. In addition most of the philosophers who
had their education after the war and received positions
at the universities wili retire within the next decade. In
these circumstances it is very difficult to give a re-
liable estimate for the future, but perhaps there wili
be a retum to the first phase of development, like the
"back-to-Kant" movement in the middle of the 19th
century.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Biemel, Walter. "Die entscheidenden Phasen der Ent-
faltung von Husserls Phănomenologie." Zeitschrifi fur
philosophische Forschung 13 (1959), 187-213; "The De-
cisive Phases in the Development of Husserl's Philoso-
phy." In The Phenomenology ofHusserl: Selected Critica/
Readings. Ed. and trans. R. O. Elveton. Chicago: Quad-
rangle Books, 1970, 148--73.
Bokhove, Niels W. Phănomenologie. Ursprung und Entwick-
lungdes Terminus im 18. Jahrhundert. Ph.D. Dissertation,
Utrecht, Rijksuniversiteit, 1991.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Die phănomenologische Bewe-
gung." Philosophische Rundschau 11 (1963), 1-45;
"The Phenomenologica1 Movement." In his Philosophical
Hermeneutics. Ed. and trans. David E. Linge. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976, 130--81.
Holz, Hanz Heinz. "Husserl - in Deutschland vergessen?"
Deutsche Woche Munchen, 2, Nr. 50, 1952, 10.
Orth, Emst Wolfgang. "Der Terminus Phănomenologie bei
Kant und Lambert und seine Verbindbarkeit mit Husserls
Phănomenologiebegriff." Archivfur Begriffsgeschichte 26
(1982), 231-49.
- . "On the Present Stage of Research in Phenomenology in
Germany." Research in Phenomenology 12 (1982), 197-
209.
- . "Phănomenologie." In Handlexikon zur Wissenschafts-
theorie. Ed. Hans Seiffert and Gerhard Radnitzky. Mu-
nich: Ehreuwirt, 1989, 242-55.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Phănomenologie. Eine begriffs-
geschichtliche Reflexion." Husserl Studies 1 ( 1984 ), 31-
68.
Sepp, Hans Rainer, ed. Edmund Husserl und die
phănomenologische Bewegung. Zeugnisse in Text und
Bild. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement. 3rd
rev. and enl. ed, with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Stroker, Elisabeth, and Paul Janssen. Phănomenologische
Philosophie. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1989.
Waldenfels, Bemhard. "Phănomenologie in Deutschland.
Geschichte und Aktualităt." Husserl Studies 5 (1988),
143--67.
ERNST WOLFGANG 0RTH
Universităt Trier
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
Universităt Mainz
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY Eight schools
of Gestalt theory have been identified by BARRY
SMITH, but the Berlin school led by Max Wertheimer
(1880--1943), Kurt Koftka (1886--1941 ), and Wolfgang
Kohler ( 188 7-1967) is what "Gestalt psychology" usu-
aliy signifies and is the school that, through the work
 GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
Of ARON GURWITSCH and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, has
most interested phenomenology.
Gestalt psychology arose through examination of
earlier work. In 1891 Christian von Ehrenfels ( 1859-
1932) in AUSTRIA published "Uber Gestaltqualităten":
when one hears a piece of music, the notes that one
senses are caused by externa! factors, i.e., air waves,
but the me1ody is a "gestalt quality" that is added
by the mind, something shown by how this quality
stays the same when the notes are changed in melodic
transposition. With similar views, Alexius Meinong
(1853-1920) founded a school of psychology at Graz
in which the experimentalist Vittorio Benussi (1878-
1927) posited a factor he called "production" as the
subjective explanation of gestalt qualities. For those at
Graz, the gestalt quality is an ideal object ofhigher or-
der, while for von Ehrenfels (and similarly for EDMUND
HUSSERL in his Philosophie der Arithmetik [ 1891]) it is
sensuous or quas1-sensuous.
The Gestalt psychology of the Berlin school began
when Wertheimer investigated apparent motion or phi
phenomena in 1912: if objects a short distance apart are
illuminated in rapid succession, a single object is seen
to move and one can be said to ha ve seen a gestalt or
configuration. A gestalt. in this new signification, is a
concrete structure ofconstituents that mutually support
and determine one another and not something added
to sense data. Wertheimer and his followers held that
neither a "gestalt quality" nor "sensations" can be given
concretely. When two dots, for example, are seen as a
twosome, both dots function as terminals, one to the left
and the other to the right. In musical transposition, there
is not an identica! melody but two or more particular
auditory configurations ofnotes that are highly similar
with respect to their structures. Many other gestalts
have been described. Probably the most widely known
is how, as Edgar Rubin ( 1886-1951) showed, the figure
in figure/ground configurations is detached from the
ground, contour belongs to it, the ground extends under
the figure, and, while the figure is shaped, coherent, and
particular, the ground is relatively shapeless, indefinite,
and generic. The dot used as a period at the end of a
sentence fits this description of a figure with the page
as the ground, as does a sound against stillness. Rubin's
work was accepted by the Berlin school.
Then again, in what is known as "Stumpf's para-
dox," a device can produce three slightly different fre-
277
quencies of sound waves, .r, y, and .::, such that when
the first two frequencies are produced in succession,
one hears equal sounds, i.e., .r = y, when the second
two are produced, one hears y = .::, but when the first
and third frequencies are produced, one hears :r :f- .:.
Koffka observed, however, that the constituents in the
first two gestalts have a "platform structure" while
the third has a "step structure," and contended that
constituents in different structures are different con-
stituents. Reformulated as .r = y, y' = .::, and .r' :f- .:',
there is no paradox: .r and .r', etc., are two and similar,
not one and the same.
So-called "categoria! terms" such as identity, dif-
ference, similarity, dissimilarity, equality, inequality,
unity, and diversity ha ve been of interest to phenome-
nologists since Husserl 's Philosophie der Arithmetik.
And the names of small numbers such as "three" can
refer either to a gestalt of perceived items, a three-
some, or they can refer to sets of elements determined
in categoria! thinking. The ideal structures constituted
in thinking are distinct from the perceptual structures
constituted in perception, according to Gestalt psychol-
ogy.
In opposition to those in modern thought who distin-
guish sensations, sense data, or sensa as concrete parts
within perceptual objects, the Berlin school follows
Koffka 's 1915 rejection of the constancy hypothesis,
according to which there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between physical stimuli ( e.g., sound waves ); the
neurological events they directly cause; and the sensa
they then cause indirectly. In other words, if the same
sense organ is stimulated in the same way, a sensation
ofthe same sort must occur, which implies atomism not
only in physics, but also in neurology and psychology.
And if an analytic attitude fails to disci o se the predicted
sensations, unnoticed objects and even unconscious
processes are posited, and psychology is then preoccu-
pied with the discrepancies between what is predicted
by the constancy hypothesis and what is actually ob-
served. Beginning in his French essays from the 1930s,
however, Gurwitsch emphasizes that this hypothesis is
neither self-evident nor experimentally demonstrable.
Moreover, his friend Merleau-Ponty suggests in his
first book, La structure du comportement ( 1942), that
atomism is outmoded in 20th century physics and neu-
rology and that even to posit unobserved differences in
data due to differences between sense organs- e.g.,
278 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the object as heard through the ear as sharply distinct
from the object as seen through the eyes- assumes
the constancy hypothesis (he urges instead the notion
of synaesthesia, whereby gray objects look cool even
when not touched). Many today nevertheless continue
to assume this untestable "hypothesis."
While the Graz school posited an often unobserv-
able difference in the percept due to externa! stimula-
tion, on the one hand, and interna! factors, especially
Produktion, on the other hand, the Berlin school held
that unitary effects might arise from multiple causes.
Gurwitsch asserts this as the difference between ex-
planations of the form P = !1 (:re) + h(.ri) and P =
f(.rc . .ri). Interna! factors include attitude and past ex-
perience and also physiological conditions (e.g., blood
alcohol). Assuming the light reflected in the follow-
ing area and also the reader's neurological system re-
main constant, the interna! factor of attitude can be
recognized with respect to the following set of sixteen
asterisks.
* * * *
* * * *
* * * *
* * * *
Through subtle shifts in attitude, one can see a
square within a square, four horizontallines, two pairs
of horizontals, four vertical li nes, two pairs of verti-
cals, groups of three lines with outliers above, below,
to the left, or to the right, two ta li rectangles, two wide
rectangles, a square of four squares, two horizontal
pairs of squares, two vertical pairs of squares, four
larger squares with L-shaped outliers, twenty triangles
of varying size and orientation, eight tent-shaped fig-
ures on diagonals, i.e., at least sixty configurations or
gestalts. In each there is a different structure in which
the constituents play subtly different roles in relation
to one another.
One does not constantly "see" the same sensations
and just "interpret" them differently, for one cannot
reflectively observe sensa and concept in the percept,
the one a sensuous object and the other an ideal object,
nor can o ne distinguish a stratum of sensing and a stra-
tum of thinking within the perceiving. The tendency
nevertheless to accept such an "interpretation theory"
may stem from reflection on speech, where an identi-
ca! ideal concept is indeed expressed in different marks
and sounds. The sixteen asterisks, however configured,
are not a text with author, reader, or referent, which is
not to deny that speech can function as yet another in-
terna! explanatory factor, e.g., how the exercise above
involved the reader's vision being affected by his or
her reading ofthe list of gestalts.
According to Gurwitsch, "Following the dismissal
ofthe constancy hypothesis, the percept has tobe con-
sidered as a homogeneous unit, though internally artic-
ulated and structured. It has to be taken at face value;
as that which it presents itself to be through the given
act of perception and though that act alone; as it ap-
pears to the perceiving subject's consciousness; as it
is meant and intended (the term 'meaning' understood
in a properly broadened and enlarged sense) in that
privileged mode of meaning and intending which is
perceptual presentation. In other words, the percept
as it is conceived after the constancy hypothesis is
abandoned proves to be what we called the perceptum
qua perceptum, the perceptua/ noe ma or the perceptual
phenomenon."
The abandonment of the constancy hypothesis is
considered by Gurwitsch tobe an incipient phenomen-
ological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION that enables avoiding
the vicious circle whereby perception is "explained
with reference to real things and physical processes
which, in turn, have to be accounted for in terms of
perceptual consciousness." Although he intends this
as a transcendental-phenomenological epoche and re-
duction, it can also be construed as a psychological-
phenomenological epoche and reduction, whereby one
remains in the worldly or natural (and even naturalis-
tic) attitude but suspends consideration of causal rela-
tions between psychic phenomena and not directly ob-
servable extrapsychic factors, such as photons. Gestalt
results can thus be used in phenomenological PSYCHOL-
OGY.
The phenomenological interest is not in the phys-
ical and neurological explanations but in the broadly
descriptive results of Gestalt psychology, especially
those concerning PERCEPTION. These include "gestalt
laws" that hold within that which can be reflectively
observed, e.g., if constituents are closer, similar, form
a closed unit, or continue others, then they tend to be
grouped. An analytic attitude is necessary to discern the
connections of proximity, similarity, etc., among the
constituents, and Merleau-Ponty urges that those that
 GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
are antecedent conditions be called "motivcs" rather
than causes to avoid confusion with externa! physical
conditions, such as sound waves. An analytic attitude
does not provide access to constituents independent
of their ro les in gestalts, but rather reconfigures them.
Gestaltist experimentation was practiced on subjects
who remained in the unreftective attitude, but the psy-
chologists engage in reftection on others insofar as they
relate the objects as perceived to the others perceiving
them. Results ofreftective-descriptive analysis are ex-
pressed in statements that purport to be objective or
nonrelative knowledge, which is to say that others of
good will and skilled in the pertinent approach can
verify, correct, and extend them.
The attempt to appropriate Gestaltist descrip-
tions began with Gurwitsch 's dissertation of 1929.
He begins with the analysis of the NOEMA in
Husserl 's Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie
und phiinomenologischen Philosophie I (1913). The
object-as-it-presents-itself is distinguished from the
thing perceived or the object-that-presents-itself. Then
a distinction is roade within the object as it presents it-
self- the noema- between the noematic nucleus and
the noematic characteristics, i.e., belief-characteristics,
so that the latter can be disregarded. The emphasis is
then on the nucleus of realities as perceived. Funda-
mental for Gurwitsch 's revisions of Husserl 's account
of sensuous perception is his rejection, on Gestaltist
grounds, of hyletic data as chaotic sensa, on the one
hand, and sense-bestowing noetic functions on the
other.
Gurwitsch 's first phenomenological use of
reftective-descriptive Gestalt findings concerns what
is traditionally cal\ed attention. Whereas Husserl and
others conceived of attention as a matter of the objects
remaining the same while attention is directed at them
in this way or that like a beam of light, Gurwitsch
recognizes three series of modifications of the object
as thematized. First, a house-theme can be enlarged to
become the-house-and-yard or it can be narrowed to
omit the porch; similar constituents then play subtly
different roles within the configurations. Second, the
theme can become relevant to another theme - e.g.,
the house as destination of the person approaching it,
the house as merely on the margin as one thematizes
a scientific problem while sitting on the porch - or
the house can disappear from the perceptual field. And
279
in the third series, the thematized object is internally
restructured, as when one ignores the color to consider
the shape.
Gurwitsch 's second use, developed further in The
Field of Consciousness ( 1964 ), concerns the overall
structure of what one is at any moment aware of.
There is always a "theme" in the center with "gestalt-
connections" among its constituents, e.g., windows and
doors, and there is always a "thematic field" composed
of items that are "relevant" to the theme and thus also in
gestalt-connections with it, but extra- rather than intra-
thematically, e.g., the perceived porch can move from
a role within the theme to something "outside" and
relevant to it. Various nonrelevant "marginal" items
are also always objects of awareness, but with merely
"and-connections" between them and the thematic and
relevant items. Interestingly, the perceiver's own soov,
stream of conscious life, and WORLD are always objects
of awareness, at least marginally, for Gurwitsch.
Examples of functional objects such as houses raise
the question of whether this account of relevance only
holds in the perspective of NATURALISM or whether it
also pertains to a cultural analysis in which spatial,
temporal, and causal relations also ha ve practica! char-
acteristics and even VALUES for the subject and thus
more than the noematic nucleus is considered. This is
significant because there is "indefinite continuation of
context" that extends from any real theme to the whole
cultural lifeworld, aspects of which are approached in
various ways in the HUMAN SCIENCES and CULTURAL DIS-
CIPLINES. Such cultural characteristics are suspended to
yield the naturalistic objects thematized in the NATURAL
SCIENCES.
Gurwitsch 's third and fourth uses of Gestalt psy-
chology pertain to the structure of the perceptual ob-
ject naturalistically considered. A physical thing can
be seen from a fixed distance and angle, but one can
also move closer, around, within, and in addition touch,
smell, hear, and otherwise sensuously perceive it. For
Husserl, it would be the same noema while appear-
ances grew larger upon the subject's approach, but for
Gurwitsch the appearance is part and parcel ofthe per-
ceptual noema and there is a series of noemata in this
case. Then again, as one walks around the physical
thing, it ceases to present itselffrom the front and goes
on to present itself from a side, the back, the other
side, the front again, and actually from an infinity of
280 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
standpoints along the way, i.e., there is again an infinite
multiplicity of noemata.
Husserl holds that each noema has an interna! refer-
ence to an "X" or object-pole so that the sameperceived
thing or object might present itself in infinitely differ-
ent ways. Gurwitsch contends that no such reference
to an X is discernible (and also, in a way that was fol-
lowed by JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, that there is no need for an
EGO to organize, pay attention to, etc., what are already
self-organizing constituents) and that the entire object
presents itselffrom each point ofview as a structure or
system of noemata, some of which are quite indeter-
minate, e.g., the arrangement of rooms within a house
one has never entered, though the house is presented
as having an inside arrangement of some sort. The
structure of the object as system of noemata he calls
"conformity to sense," asserting that "the total noe-
matic system must be of such a kind as to be capable
ofreceiving the present perceptual noema as a part or
member of itsel(."
Finally, the unity ofthe stream of consciousness in
TIME, with its expected, protended, impressional, retro-
tended, and recollected phases can be observed refiec-
tively to be configured: conscious life is also a gestalt.
The constituents are the actualized as well as the fu ture
and past inactual immanent noetic phases, and ifthere
is gestalt-coherence and indeed "good continuation" to
the structure, then "the mutual confirmation of single
perceptions following upon each other in the course
of the perceptual process is, we submit, the sufficient
condition of the existence of material things." Gestalt
psychology is thus ultimately useful in coNSTITUTIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY for the purposes offirst philosophy.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty attended Gurwitsch's lec-
tures at the Sorbonne, himself !ater taught psychol-
ogy there for some years, and drew extensively on
Gestalt psychology in La structure du comportement,
Phimonu?nologie de la perception (1945), and !ater
works. Earlier, he refiects on form in physiology (and
physics) and, most significantly, in instinctual, replace-
able (amovable), and symbolic structures ofbehavior,
the Berlin school having long recognized gestalts in
speaking, writing, singing, sketching, etc. He further-
more opposes the naturalistic and even physicalistic
tendencies of Gestalt psychology, is quite aware ofthe
transcendental philosophical implications of his own
critique, and seems prepared along the way to recog-
nize the double signification of categoria! terms: "I f o ne
understands perception as the act that makes us know
existences, ali of the problems that we have touched
upon lead back to problems ofperception. It resides in
the duality ofthe notions of structure and signification.
A 'form,' such as the 'figure-ground' structure, is a
whole that has a sense and thus offers a bearing for
intellectual analysis. But, at the same time, it is not an
idea- it constitutes itself, changes, and reorganizes
itselfbefore our eyes like a spectacle."
Merleau-Ponty's second book can be interpreted,
following the repeated1y cited "Objectivite en psy-
chologie" ( 1932) of the French Gestaltist Paul Guil-
laume ( 1887-1962), as chiefiy approaching ali the
same phenomena as the first book, but through self-
observation rather than through the refiection on others
dominant before. The emphasis (and use ofthe some-
what Gestaltist neurologist Kurt Goldstein [ 1878-
1965]) is, if anything, more on the BODY: "In the last
analysis, ifmybody can bea 'Gesta1t' and ifit can ha ve
privileged figures on indifferent grounds before it, this
is insofar as it is polarized by its tasks, that it exists
toward them, that it collects itself in order to reach its
goal, and the 'body image' is finally a way of express-
ing that my body is in the world." The appreciation
of Gestalt psychology by EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
in FRANCE is also evident in the work of SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE.
Interest in the first or Graz school of Gestalt theory
has recentJy reemerged in REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY,
where gestalt qua1ities are subjected to analysis, along-
side other categories, in the framework of FORMAL AND
MATERIAL ONTOLOGY. The volume recently edited by
Barry Smith contains not only essays and translations
but also a 250-page annotated bibliography, includ-
ing one item on 100 gestalt laws and others show-
ing how this set of eight schools, going back to the
1920s, included social psycho1ogy within its scope.
While Gestalt psychology may have declined in recent
decades due to the infiuence ofbehaviorism and other
historical circumstances, it has not died, and there are
those who currently believe it has great affinities and
thus future in reJation to ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE and
COGNITIVE SCIENCE. Much more USe of such Gestaltist
work as that of Albert Michotte (1881- 1965) on per-
ceived causation can be made within phenomenologi-
cal philosophy and psycho1ogy.
 GREAT BRITAIN
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Embrcc, Lcster. "Gestalt Law in Phenomenological Per-
spective," Journal ol Phenomenological Psychology 10
(1979), 112~27.
- . "Merleau-Ponty's Examination of Gestalt Psychology,"
Research in Phenomenology 1O ( 1980), 89~121.
Dillon, Martin C. "Gcstalt Theory and Merleau-Ponty's Con-
cept of lntentionality," Man and World 12 (1979).
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Phănomenologie der Thematik und des
reinen Ich. Studien iiber Beziehungen der Gestalttheo-
rie und Phănomenologie." Psychologische Forschung 12
( 1929), 19~381; "Phenomenology ofThematics and ofthe
Pure Ego: Studies ofthc Rclation between Gestalt Theory
and Phenomenology." Trans. Fred Kersten. In his Studies
in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1966, 175~286.
- . "Quelques aspects ct quclques developpements de la psy-
chologie de la forme." Journal de Psychologie Normale
et Pathologique 33 ( 1936), 413~70; "Some Aspects and
Dcvclopments ofGestalt Psychology." Trans. Richard M.
Zaner. In his Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology,
3~55.
- . "The Phenomenological and Psychological Approach to
Consciousness." Phi!osophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 15 ( 1955), 303~19; rpt. in his Studies in Pheno-
menology and Psychology, 89~106.
"Beitrag zur phănomenologischen Theorie der
Wahrnehmung." Zeitschriftfiirphilosophische Forschung
13 ( 1959), 419-37; "Contributions to the Phenomenologi-
cal Theory of Perception." Trans. Fred Kersten. In his
Studies in Psychology and Phenomenology, 336--49.
- . The Field o( Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 1964; Tlu'orie du champ de la conscience.
Trans. Michel Butor. Paris: Desc!ee de Brower, 1957.
- . "Pcrccptual Cohcrence and the Judgmcnt ofPrcdication."
In his Phenomenology and the Theory ol Science. Ed.
Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University
Press, 1974,241-67.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. La structure du comportement.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942; The Struc-
ture olBehavior. Trans. Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1963.
Rock, Irwin, and Stephen Palmer. "The Legacy of Gestalt
Psychology." Scientific American ( 1990), 84-90.
Smith, Barry. ed. Foundations ol Gestalt The01y. Munich:
Philosophia, 1988.
LESTER EMBREE
Florida Atlantic University
GREAT BRITAIN In the first edition ( 1960) of
his classical work The Phenomenological Movement,
HERBERT SPIEGELBERG headed his account ofphenomen-
ology in Britain as follows: Great Britain: Low Ebb.
He went on to say, "There can be little doubt that at
the present moment, phenomenology, along with exis-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
281
tentialism has less philosophical status in Britain than
in any other country outside Soviet Russia. It has no
spokesman in either Oxford or Cambridge, and but few
sympathizers elsewhere." He further pointed out that
some ofthe more explicit statements about phenomen-
ology revealed an animus rather than sheer indiffer-
ence, and quoted Gilbert Ryle's remark in Philosophy
(1946 ): "I do not expect that even the corporate zeal
ofthe International Phenomenological Institute (sic!),
will succeed in winning for Husserl 's ideas much of a
vogue in the English-speaking world. In short pheno-
menology was from its birth, a bare. Its oversolemnity
of manner more than its equivocal lineage will se-
cure that its lofty claims are ignored." Nevertheless
Ryle then waxed prophetic and said that an offshoot
of phenomenology known as EXISTENTIALISM may be
smuggled overseas in someone 's warming pan; he con-
tinued, MARTIN HEIDEGGER's "graft upon his master's
former stock is not unlikely before long to be adam-
ing Anglo-Saxon philosophy." It has taken about thirty
years for this prophecy to come true.
Ryle did in his early years show a certain amount
of sympathy for phenomenology, although he became
highly critica! of it !ater on. There are indeed a sur-
prising number of parallels between EDMUND HUSSERL 's
phenomenological analysis of mental acts and Ryle's
philosophical psychology, particularly in the fields of
PERCEPTION and IMAGINATION. During the J920s and
1930s, Ryle was one of the few British philosophers
to show an interes! in continental philosophy. Starting
from the theories of Bertrand Russell, GOTTLOB FREGE,
and Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), he went beyond
them to look at the work of FRANZ BRENTANO, among
others. He was particularly interested in Edmund
Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen (1900-190 1), as
he found in it an extensive treatment of some of the
logica! problems he had been concerned with. Aris-
ing from his studies of these writers, Ryle reported in
his autobiographical essay that he offered a course of
lectures at Oxford, which had as its title: "Logica! ob-
jectivism: Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, and Meinong."
However, this course did not attract any students. We
are told that these faur philosophers become known in
Oxford as "Ryle's three Austrian railway-stations and
one Chinese game of chance."
Ryle's opinion of Heidegger is expressed in his re-
view of Sein und Zeit(1927), where he says: "He shows
282 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
himself to be a thinker of real importance by the im-
mense subtlety and searchingness of his examination
of consciousness, by the boldness and originality of
his methods and conclusions, and by the unflagging
energy with which he tries to think about the stock
categories of orthodox philosophy and psychology."
It is interesting to note here that the fundamental dis-
tinction that Ryle draws in the The Concept of Mind
( 1949) between "knowing how" and "knowing that''-
between practica! and theoretical knowledge- bears
a considerable resemblance to Heidegger's distinction
in Sein und Zeit between Zuhandenheit (readiness-
to-hand) and Vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand). There
was much importance attached to this distinction in
Ryle's work before it became known in Britain that
Heidegger had made a similar distinction some twenty
years earlier.
Phenomenology was not much cultivated as a sub-
ject in Britain between the two world wars. There were
Husserl 's somewhat abortive London lectures in the
early 1920s, followed by two Joint Session Symposia
in 1932 and 1959 respectively. The 1932 symposium
reads as if the symposiasts were discussing a piece of
intellectual history, as if phenomenology had carne to
a dead end. They could not, of course, have any fore-
knowledge of the !ater developments of phenomen-
ology, expecially its influence on philosophical thought
in FRANCE and GERMANY after Wor]d War II.
Over the past three decades, however, there has
been a growing interest in Britain in both phenomen-
ology and existentialism, partly as a result of the writ-
ings of .JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY,
which have been read and discussed by specialists
in the field of French studies as well as by philoso-
phers. Phenomimologie de la perception ( 1945) has
even been read and discussed by analytic philosophers.
Merleau-Ponty was invited to Manchester in 1958,
where he gave a seminar on politics and delivered a
lecture criticizing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN's theory oflan-
guage. Indeed, in more than one university department
of philososphy, students have pressed for courses on
Sartre. As a consequence of this increased interest in
the subject, some philosophers began to turn to the writ-
ings of Husserl and Heidegger upon which Merleau-
Ponty's and Sartre's writings were based. The work
of the PoJish phi]osopher ROMAN INGARDEN, a pupi] of
Husserl, also struck a note of sympathy in Britain. He
visited Manchester in the early 1960s lecturing on aes-
thetic theory.
At first Sartre's philosophy, no doubt because ofits
literary qualities, attracted attention. Analytic philoso-
phers like Mary Warnock wrote introductions to his
thought that sold well. Later Merleau-Ponty's works
aroused interest, and then Husserl began to be read.
But even up to about twenty years ago Heidegger was
still regarded as a figure to be poked fun at. His onto-
logica! use of the notion of "nothingness" was taken
as a textbook examplc of the philosophical misuse of
language, to be cured by analysis. How, it was asked,
can a syncategorematic word such as "not'' be used in
categorematic way?
Sin ce about 1980, however, this pic ture has changed
again quite significantly. Contradicting Ryle's forecast
about the imminent death of what we generally caii
"Continental philosophy," this time has witnessed a
major revival of interest in Continental philosophy by
the phenomenological movement. This started with a
number of new universities, namely the Universities
of Essex, Sussex, and Warwick, which concentrated
their graduate work exclusively on German idealism,
phenomenology, CRITICAL THEORY, and contemporary
French philosophy. Now there is a wide range of insti-
tutions having strong "Continental departments," from
those already mentioned to other places like Middle-
sex University, the University of North London, the
University of Wales in Cardiff, and Greenwich in the
south, as well as Manchester Metropolitan University,
Lancaster University, and the Bolton Institute in the
northwest. Many other universities, like the University
ofNottingham, offer a Master of Arts degree in cultural
studies or critica! theory, in which phenomenology is
taught. The University of Essex, through its Centre
for European Philosophy; the University of Warwick,
through its Centre for Philosophy and Literature; and
Manchester Metropolitan University, through its newly
proposed Centre for European Philosophy, are well
placed to build on and develop this revival of pheno-
menology in Britain. Even the other universities, spe-
cializing in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, tend to empJoy more
specialists in phenomenology than ever before. This
trend, due to positive responses on the part of students,
is still on the increase. Philosophers who have been
the odd ones out at their institutions now see their sup-
port increasing. Still, there has been a positive side
 GREAT BRITAIN
to its isolation: during the 1980s Britain saw the de-
velopment of a Iively community of people interested
in phenomenology. Scholars traveled from conference
to conference, in search of discussions with compe-
tent colleagues working in their own field. Interest in
Husserl 's philosophy has always continued in those
aspects that deal with MFANING and with FORMAL ANO
MATERIAL ONTOLOGY. These are important to the ana-
lytic community insofar as they relate to Frege's ideas
ofmeaning and signification. Scholars in SOCIOLOGY, in
particular, seem taken up with Husserl 's notion ofL!FE-
WORLD. Furthermore, there had always been a sustained
interest in Sartre's existentialism, which has been re-
newed by the recent translation of Cahiers pour une
morale [ 194 7]. And sti li, while aga in entering through
the back door, this "second revival" ofphenomenology
during the 1980s did not go back to the existentialist
avant-garde. Having realized the change of generations
in FRANCE, it rathcr built upon POSTMODERNISM. As can
be seen in the programmatic title of a paper given by
DAVID wooo in the late 1980s to a conference on de-
construction at the University of Warwick, it was first
through the significant impact of the work of JACQUES
DERRIDA and MICHEL FOUCAULT on American academia
- on literary theory and sociology respectively- that
British philosophers rediscovered phenomenology on
its own merits. This paper was called "Heidegger after
Derrida" and, thus combining two philosophers highly
inftuenced by Husserl, reftected in its title the upsurge
of research in phenomenology. Although Heidegger
has become the most inftuential author of this tradi-
tion, as could be seen in the interest given to the Hei-
degger debate in Germany and France, the revival of
phenomenology has led to a diversified and sustained
academic interest in Continental philosophy in general,
mirrored by the foundation of societies, like the Sartre
Society of Creat Britain and the Nietzsche Society,
and in the many publications on Nietzsche, Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Blanchot, EMMANUEL LEVINAS,
Derrida, and even Georges Bataille. Nowadays books
on Heidegger are even reviewed in such journals as
the Times Literal)' Supplement and the Times Higher
Education Supplement.
AII the same, the British establishment remains
more than skeptical. Oxford and Cambridge are vir-
tually frec from phenomenology as from Continental
philosophy in general, while some other old univer-
283
sities even discourage their lecturers from teaching
HEGEL, because, after ali, he is not a serious philoso-
pher. This state is reftected by a prominent publishing
house recently turning down an offer for a volume on
Merleau-Ponty contributing to their scries ofintroduc-
tions to the masters of philosophy, on the ground that
it would not sell enough copies.
Contemporary British philosophers of an analytic
turn of mind are thus sti li suspicious of what they see
as the metaphysical worries about life and the uni verse
that some Continental philosophers, they claim, man-
ifest. They participatc in ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSO-
PHY and believe that their own function is rather to deal
with problcms of conceptual nature that ari se through
our misuse of language. They go on to argue that once
these problems are resolved, philosophy will cease to
exist as a subject. In this climate it was necessary for
phenomenologists to find a context for their research.
lndeed, one ofthe reasons for starting the British Soci-
ety for Phenomenology arose from the fact that when
Merleau-Ponty died in 1961, COLIN SMITH and WOLFE
MAYS suggested to a certain British philosophical soci-
ety that it should have a symposium on his work. The
idea was not rejected but politely noted. Some thirty
years have now elapsed, but the symposium has never
materialized.
The manner in which the British Society for Pheno-
menology came into existence explains why its ini-
tial membership consisted of individuals drawn from
a number of different disciplines- PSYCHIATRY, psy-
chology, sociology, university teachers of French, and
the occasional philosopher of an independent mind.
The situation is somewhat different today. There is
a strong contingent of young philosophers trained in
phenomenology, who are now members of the soci-
ety. And for better or worse the society has a much
more profcssional look that it had at its inception.
Since 1969, the society has had at least one confer-
ence a year, and usually a workshop on some spe-
cialized topic. The annual conference is usually at St.
Edmunds Hali, Oxford, at Easter, where it is regarded
as a Trojan horse planted in the center ofthe stronghold
of analytic philosophy. Our first joint conference was
held at Southampton in September 1969, in conjunc-
tion with the Royal Institute of Philosophy and with
many participants from the Continent, under the title
of "Philosophers into Europe." The proceedings were
284 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
!ater published as the volume Linguistic Analysis and
Phenomenology (1972). Furthermore, there have been
a number of small specialized workshops at the Univer-
sities ofReading, Manchester, and Warwick. They ha ve
covered such topics as STRUCTURALISM, reductionism,
IMAGINATION, the phenomenology ofthe soov, and the
works of Merleau-Ponty, Hegel, Husserl, and Heideg-
ger. The activities ofthe society ha ve not been confined
solely to phenomenology. The society has provided a
focus ofphilosophical interest lying outside the narrow
field of academic philosophy.
The Journal of the British Society for Phenomen-
ology, which is published in January, May, and October
of each year, first appeared in January 1970 under the
editorship of Wolfe Mays. While it orginially had no
university or other subsidy and not even secretariat
help, it is now based in the Institute of Advanced Stud-
ies at Manchester Metropolitan University. Some ofthe
past numbers of the journal ha ve been devoted to defi-
nite themes, such as, for example, the phenomenology
ofthe imagination, structuralism, and phenomenology
and LITERATURE. Special issues have been devoted to
the work of Husserl, Sartre, ARON GURWITSCH, ROMAN
INGARDEN, Michael Poianyi, and MAX SCHELER. Whiie
being among other things concerned to publish schol-
arly work relating to phenomenology, the journal has
kept in touch with philosophical developments on the
Continent through its correspondents living there. Our
American friends have also helped us by informing
us about trends in the UNITED STATES. To keep these
links alive there have been articles on philosophy in
GERMANY, FRANCE, SCANDINAVIA, and AUSTRIA. The jour-
nai has since its inception wished to stimulate interest
in the phenomenological approach in HUMAN SCIENCES.
We publish on such topics as the relation of pheno-
menology to SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY, and EDUCATION.
We believe phenomenology has a special role to play
in enriching these fields of inquiry.
Despite the difficulties faced by phenomenologists
in Britain, the future seems to bring hope. The num-
ber of Continental philosophers is on the increase and
consequently the quality oftheir research is rising too.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Beii, David. Husserl. London: Routledge, 1991.
Bowie, Malcolm. Lacan. London: Fontana, 1993.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Critchley, Simon. The Ethics ol Deconstruction, Derrida,
Levinas. Oxford: Basi1 Blackwell, 1992.
Hammond, Michae1, Jane Howorth, and Russell Kcat. Under-
standing Phenomenology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
Llewelyn, John. The Middle Voi ce ofEcological Conscience:
A Chiasmic Reading in the Neighhourhood ol Levi nas.
London: Macmillan, 1991.
Macann, Christopher, ed. Martin Heidegger: Critica/ Assess-
ments. 4 vols. London: Routledge, 1993.
MacQuarrie, John. Existentialism. Harmondsworth: Pen-
guin, 1962.
Manser, Anthony. Sartre: A Philosophical Study. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1966.
Norris, Christopher. Derrida. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1987.
Smith, Barry, and David Woodruff Smith, eds. The Cam-
bridge Companion ta Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
Steiner, George. Heidegger. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1986; rpt. 1993.
Whitford, Margaret. Luce Irigaray: Philosophy olthe Femi-
nine. London: Fontana, 1991.
WOLFEMAYS
Institute ofAdvanced Studies, Manchester
JOANNA HODGE
Manchester Metropolitan University
ULRICH HAASE
Manchester Metropolitan University
ARON GURWITSCH Born January 17, 1901
in Vilnius, Lithuania, as the son of a wealthy timber
merchant who !ater lost his fortune due to World War 1
and the Russian Revolution, Gurwitsch studied mathe-
matics, philosophy, physics, and psychology at Berlin,
where he also became a protege of Cari Stumpf ( 1848-
1936). He was sent by Stumpf to study with EDMUND
HUSSERL at Freiburg in 1922, where he was especially
impressed not only by the dedication of the pheno-
menologist, but also by his lectures on Natur und Geist
(Nature and spirit), a theme that emerged periodically
in his own work during the next fifty years.
Stumpf subsequently sent him to study the prob-
lem of abstraction with the psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein
(1878-1965) at Frankfurt am Main, who was working
brain-injured veterans. During a lecture at Frankfurt by
the Gestaltist Adhemar Gelb ( 1887-1936), Gurwitsch
had the insight that the abandonment in GESTALT PSY-
CHOLOGY of the constancy hypothesis, whereby phys-
ical stimuli had been assumed to be in a one-to-one
correlation with sensations, was an incipient transcen-
 ARON GURWITSCH
dentaJ EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION. Thereafter, Gurwitsch
eJaborated a vers ion of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
that may be called "Gestalt phenomenology."
In his dissertation accepted by MORITZ GEIGER and
published in Psycho/ogische Forschung, the organ of
the Gestalt school, under the title "Phanomenologie
der Thematik und des reinen Ich" (Phenomenology of
thematization and the pure ego, 1929), Gurwitsch pro-
ceeds in the perspective ofthe Husserl's Ideen zu einer
reinen Phanomeno/ogie und phanomenologischen
Philosophie 1 ( 1913), but includes the beginning of
his objections to Husserl 's theory of hyletic data. Phe-
nomenologically, hy/e and m01phe are not concretely
distinguishable in perceptual objects as they present
themselves, and Gurwitsch suspected that Husserl had
mistakenly modeled perception on linguistic compre-
hension.
Furthermore, ifsensuous objects are always already
structured or organized, then there is no need for a pure
EGO to structure or organize them and, in any case, Gur-
witsch returned to the position of WILLIAM JAMES and the
Husserl of the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901)
whereby no pure ego can be observed on the inward
side of conscious life. This position was also taken
by JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, possibly under the indirect influ-
ence ofGurwitsch, who afterwards published "A Non-
Egological Conception of Consciousness" ( 1941 ), the
first essay on Sartre in English.
Gurwitsch goes on in his dissertation positively to
analyze the inherent structure of any field of conscious-
ness whatever into the focus or theme of conscious-
ness; the thematic fie1d of items relevant to the theme;
and the margin of items devoid of relevancy to the
theme. Then he carefully describes severa! ways in
which themes can be restructured within perception
and thus without need for a separate act of attention
bestowing form upon them. This account is refined
in !ater works including the posthumously published
Marginal Consciousness [ 1953], where he shows at
length that the margin always contains the perceptual
WORLD, the stream of consciousness, and the BODY, at
least two of which are always intended to in nonthe-
matic rather than thematic awareness (and ali three
of which are nonthematically intended to when ideal
objects are thematic ).
Husserl was impressed with this dissertation, per-
sonal discussions ensued, and the phenomenologist
285
was willing to habilitate Gurwitsch at Freiburg if he
could not find a position elsewhere. By 1931 he had
completed most of his Habilitationsschrift, Die mit-
menschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt (Human
encounters in the social world, [ 1931 ]). This posthu-
mously edited work is devoted to the problem ofiNTER-
SUBJECTIVITY raised at the end of the dissertation and
draws on ERNST CASSIRER with respect to how humans
are originally encountered as animate and also MARTIN
HEIDEGGER's Sein und Zeit (1927) with respect to the
originally encountered practica! world of equipment.
Gurwitsch had begun to search for an academic po-
sition when the National Socialists carne to power in
1933 and his fellowship from the Prussian Ministry of
Education was canceled because he was a Jew. He had
previously read Mein Kampfand immediately left Ger-
many for France, where he initially knew hardly any-
one but eventually was in contact with everyone. The
Habilitationsschrift was abandoned because it would
take too long to complete, adapt for the new philo-
sophica1 situation, and translate, and because ALFRED
SCHUTZ's Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The
meaningful structure of the social world, 1932), to
which Husserl had drawn Gurwitsch 's attention, had-
although differently- begun the constitutive pheno-
menology ofthe HUMAN SCIENCES very well.
In Paris, Gurwitsch soon met MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, who then attended his lectures at the Sorbonne
and helped to polish the expression on two of his
French publications; the younger man had previously
read Gurwitsch 's dissertation and !ater learned of the
work of Goldstein and Gelb from him. Gurwitsch was
pleased at his influence and reviewed Phhwnu!nologie
de la perception ( 1945) twice.
Gurwitsch 's pub1ications while in FRANCEare chiefly
devoted to PSYCHOLOGY and the PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOL-
OGY- "La place de la psychologie dans 1'ensemble des
sciences" ( 1934) and "Quelques aspects et quelques
developpements de la psychologie de la forme" ( 1936),
the latter based on his first set of lectures at the Sor-
bonne, being the most significant. But a critica! study
on the psychology oflanguage includes the first pheno-
menological appreciation of phonological linguistics,
also known as STRUCTURALISM.
Before he left Paris Gurwitsch was again well
along in preparing a book manuscript, this one based
on another set of his Sorbonne lectures and entitled
286 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
L 'esquisse de la phenomenologie constitutive (Outline
of constitutive phenomenology). Also abandoned due
to politica! events and the exigencies of moving to yet
another new country, this 1939 text has also been edited
posthumously. It relates phenomenology to the modern
tradition and continues the development of "Gestalt
phenomenology." Along the way, and quite interest-
ingly, it distinguishes the NATURAL SCIENCES from the
HUMAN SCIENCES in terms of whether the "functional
characters" characteristic of cultural objects are ab-
stracted from or not.
Gurwitsch always looked back on his time in France
as his most creative, returning practically every sum-
mer in the 1950s and 1960s and continuing to publish
there, but his early postwar attempts to find an aca-
demic position in the happiest stopping place in a life
of forced wandering was unsuccessful.
Gurwitsch arrived in the America in 1940 as a
refugee from the Nazis for the second time. He had
finally met Schi.itz in Paris in 1937. Alfred Schutz, Aran
Gurwitsch: Briefivechsel, 1939-1959 (The correspon-
dence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1985)
documents their intellectual interaction and friendship
as isolated representatives of a philosophy still alien
in America. A division of labor arose between them
whereby Schutz worked in the philosophy ofthe human
or cultural sciences and Gurwitsch in the philosophy of
logic, mathematics, natural sciences, and psychology.
Gurwitsch only wrote again about the human sciences
after Schutz had died. Schutz observed that Gurwitsch
began with sensuous perception while he himself be-
gan with MUSIC. They disagreed about the ego and also
about transcendental phenomenology, Schutz advocat-
ing the CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL
ATTITUDE. Even their theories of relevance are different.
Nevertheless, they believed themselves to be digging
a single tunnel from two si des of the same mountain.
They also played leading ro les in the founding of the
journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
and ofthe ill-fated International Phenomenological So-
ciety just before World War II.
Living in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Gurwitsch
held one-year jobs, received small grants, and taught
physics and mathematics for a decade. Eventually he
secured his first full-time continuing position in phi-
losophy in 1951 at Brandeis University when he was
fifty years old. Meanwhile, Schutz - who had also
emigrated to the United States in 1940 and joined the
Graduate Faculty of Politica! and Social Science at
the New School for Social Research in 1943 - had
plans for forming a center for phenomenology, bring-
ing DORION CAIRNS there after FELIX KAUFMANN died,
and making severa! attempts to bring Gurwitsch, who
finally carne in 1959 as Schutz's successor. At the New
School, Gurwitsch taught graduate students, and those
whose work he directed include LESTER EMBREE, ROBERT
JORDAN, FRED KERSTEN, WILLIAM R. MCKENNA, GIUSEPPINA
MONETA, GILBERT T. NULL, OSBORNE WIGGINS, and RICHARD
M. ZANER.
Gurwitsch was also a leader in the second and
more successful attempt at founding phenomenology
in the UNITED STATES. "The Last Work of Edmund
Husserl" ( 1956--57) is a long, two-part critica! study of
Husserl 's Die Krisis des europăischen Wissenschafien
und die transzendentale Phânomenologie ( 1936) that
accurately presents that work and challenges the then
common view that Husserl had turned to EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGY in the end. During the founding ofthe
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philoso-
phy in 1962, Gurwitsch was in particular responsible
for the duality within that name. Overall, during the
1960s he functioned as the grand old man of Ameri-
can phenomenology. In reaction to the student revolts
of that decade, he urged a return "to the desks them-
selves." Besides his participation in French pheno-
menology Gurwitsch also helped in the restoration
of phenomenology in GERMANY after the war, almost
accepting a caii to Berlin and serving as a Fulbright
professor at Koln in 1958-59, where he drafted his
posthumously published Kants Theorie des Verstehens
(Kant's theory of understanding, 1991 ).
Gurwitsch 's magnum opus, The Field of"Conscious-
ness, was begun soon after he fled to America, but was
first published in French translation in 1957 because
an American publisher for a work in phenomenology
could still not be found, the original finally appearing
in English in 1964. After relating phenomenology to
William James and various dualistic theories of per-
ception - Husserl's included- he offers probably
the best systematization of Gestalt theory; presents
his version of constitutive phenomenology, including
his Gestalt-phenomenological account of sensuous per-
ception; and sketches an ontology involving ideal and
real "orders of existence," each with its own relevancy
 ARON GURWITSCH
principle. The "perceptual world"- which is actually
also cultural and sometimes called the "lifeworld," and
which has the objective time into which ali biogra-
phies and history find their places as its principle-
is the paramount reality of everyday life and includes
familial, politica!, professional, and other "spheres of
Jife" within itse]f. JAMES M. EDIE, JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS,
and HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, who were a]so becoming in-
fluentiaJ, immediately responded favorably, the latter
in The Phenomenological Movement ( 1960) caii ing it
"the most substantial original work produced by a Eu-
ropean phenomenologist in the United States."
While at the New School, Gurwitsch published
Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology ( 1966),
which retrospectively includes eighteen essays from
thirty-sevcn years and handsomely contextualizes The
Field o(Consciousness. He also spent much ofhis last
decade preparing Leibniz: Philosophie des Panlogis-
mus ( 1974 ). (Husserl's daughter once asked him how
important her father had been and Gurwitsch replied
"the greatest since Leibniz.") A different series of es-
says on physics, mathematics and logic, psychology,
and the human sciences became chapters in Pheno-
menology and the Theory of Science (1974). Included
there is his "Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation
of the Judgment of Predication," which is his attempt
to correct Husserl 's Er(ahrung und Urteil ( 1939). Gur-
witsch had planned to write Reality and Logic during
his retirement. He became emeritus in 1972, and died
June 25, 1973. Thcre was a Festschrift in 1972 and
there ha ve been two memorial volumes thus far.
While others would begin theoretically with phys-
ical objects and then consider cultural characteristics,
animation, and attentional form as somehow added to
them, Gurwitsch bcgins with cultural objects thema-
tized in the practica! attitude, some of which are from
the outset animate. He then seeks how the cultural, for-
mal, and natural sciences originale in sociohistorical
or lifeworldly experience. Unlike many phenomenolo-
gists, Gurwitsch follows Husserl in seeking a transcen-
dental grounding of science. In addition, and more than
any other phenomenologist, he emphasizes analysis of
the NOE MA. Then again, however, and contrary to most
self-identified phenomenologists, Gurwitsch expends
little energy in the interpretation of phenomenologi-
287
cal texts, but rather chiefly produces reflective analy-
ses of phenomena. He was among the very el o sest of
Husserl 's followers, and not least for his critica! revi-
sions ofhis master's doctrines in the light ofthe matters
themselves.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Embree, Lester. "Some Noetico-Noematic Analyses of Ac-
tion and Practica! Life." In The Phenomenology o{ the
Noema. Ed. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, 157-21 O.
- , ed. Life-World and Consciousness: Essays for Aran
Gurwitsch. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1972.
- , cd. Essays in Memory of Aran Gurwitsch. Lanham,
MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1983.
Evans, J. Claude, and Robert Stufflebeam, cds. To Work al
the Foundations: Essays in Memory o{ Aran Gurwitsch.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Phănomenologie dcr Thematik und des
reinen Ich." Psychologische Forschungen 12 ( 1929), 19-
381; "Phenomenology ofThematics and ofthe Pure Ego."
Trans. Fred Kersten. In Gurwitsch, Studies, 175-286.
- . Theorie du champ de la conscience. Trans. Michel Butor.
Paris: Desclec de Brouwer, 1957; The Field o(Conscious-
ness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964.
- . Studies in Phenomenology and Psychologv. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Prcss, 1966.
- . Phenomenology and the Theory o{ Science. Ed. Lester
Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1974.
- . Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt. Ed.
Alexandre Metraux. Berlin: Waltcr de Gruyter, 1977; Hu-
man Encounters in the Social World. Trans. Fred Kersten.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979.
- . Marginal Consciousness. Ed. Lester Embree. Athens,
OH: Ohio University Press, 1985.
- . Esquisse de la phi'11omenologie constituti{. Ed. Jose
Huertas-Jourda. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, forth-
coming.
Schutz, Alfred, and Aron Gurwitsch. Alfi·ed Schiitz.
Aron Gurwitsch Brie{wechsel. 1939--1959. Ed. Richard
Grathoff. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1985; Philosophers in
Exile: The Correspondence ofAlji·ed Schutz and Aran Gur-
witsch. 1939--1959. Trans. J. Claude Evans. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1989.
Gurwitsch 's Nachlass is held at the Simon Silverman Pheno-
menology Center at Duquesne University, with copies at
the Archival Repository of the Center for Advanced Re-
search in Phenomenology, !ne. at The University ofMem-
phis, and the Sozialwissenschafts Archive at the Univer-
si tăt Konstanz.
LESTER EMBREE
Fl01·ida Atlantic University

NICOLAI HARTMANN Hartmann (1882-
1950) was educated in Riga, Latvia, his birthplace,
and St. Petersburg (sometimes Leningrad), where he
graduated from Gymnasium in 1901. He then studied
medici ne at Tartu in Estonia and classical philology in
St. Petersburg before taking his doctorate in philosophy
at Marburg in Germany. There his academic career be-
gan with intensive work on ancient philosophy, includ-
ing his doctoral dissertation ( 1907) under Hermann Co-
hen ( 1842-1 9 18) and Paul Natorp ( 1854--1 924) as well
as Platos Logik des Seins (Plato's logic ofbeing, 1909),
his Habilitationsschrift. But starting in 1912 his chief
concerns shifted to epistemology, and there ensued a
struggle against the logica! idealism of the Marburg
school and against the general neo-Kantian approach.
He acknowledged the work of EDMUND HUSSERL and
MAX SCHELER tobe the contemporary inftuence that was
decisive for this shift in his thinking. There seems little
doubt that the inftuence went chiefty through study of
Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901) and
Scheler's Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die ma-
teriale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and nonformal
ethics of value, 19 13/19 16). He served during World
War I in the German army on the eastern front from
1914 to 1919, beginning work on his monumental Ethik
( 1925) in the trenches during the winter of 1916-1 7.
Hartmann 's decisive rejection ofneo-Kantian idealism
became public in the first work to be publishcd from
this period, Grundzuge einer Metaphysik der Erken-
ntnis (Fundamental characteristics of a metaphysics of
knowledge, 192 1), appearingjust after he succceded to
the chair that Natorp had held at Marburg. This work
declared his affinities with the results being achieved by
phenomenologists, to whom he referred as his nearest
philosophical neighbors. In the Marburg years, MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER and Hartmann were close friends who
often visited each other's family and discussed philos-
ophy. After Hartmann transferred to the University of
Koln in 1925, his relationship with Scheler, whom he
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
considered to ha ve become the leader in the phenomen-
ological movement, was close until the latter's death in
1928. There also seems to ha ve been some contact with
members of ALEXANDER PFĂNDER 's Munich group, in-
cluding MORITZ GEIGER. Hartmann transferred to a chair
at Berlin in 1931 and to Gottingen in 1945. No con-
tacts are reported with other acknowledged members
ofthe phenomenological movement between Scheler's
death and his own on October 9, 1950. Still, there are
very good reasons to count his works among the finest
examples of REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY.
Many of the affinities with and divergences from
Husserl 's phenomenology are made quite clear even
in Hartmann's Grundzuge. With Husserl he relies on
EIDETIC METHOD and affirms that there are universal
essences ("essentialities," Wesenheiten) and that they
are transcendent, i.e., their way of being- which he
terms "ideality" and contrasts with the way of being
("reality") of whatever exists individually and tempo-
rally- is not that ofthought. Hartmann 's last writings
affirm this position and its centrality to any adequate
ontology and epistemology with no less emphasis than
the 1921 book did. He is equally emphatic in assert-
ing that there are species of intuition through which
such essentialities are given so that- since universals
are transcendent rather than immanent- acquaintance
with any ofthem is acquired.
However, in line with other realistic phenomenol-
ogists and many interpretations - more likely mis-
interpretations- of Heidegger, he insisted that ways
of being given belong only to objects ( Gegenstande),
whereas entities- whether real or ideal- as such are
not essentially objects, but are "transobjective." The
limits to what can be made an object and to what can
be known are "gnoseological" (cognitive) limits; they
do not coincide with those ofwhat there is. As such, a
being ofwhatever kind is indifferent to whether it is or
is not cognizable. Beings as such are affected by these
limits neither in their quiddity nor in their being.
Hartmann believed that the phenomenology of
Husserl and Heidegger misconceived these limits when
it proposed as a basic thesis that every being must ha ve
some way of"showing itself." The correlation of noe-
sis and NOEMA that Husserl had asserted as an a priori
principle becomes false when it is elevated to the sta tus
of an ontologica! principle rather than one having its
legitimate place in gnoseology or epistemology. Hart-
2 88
 NICOLAI HARTMANN
mann's necessitarian conception of real being made
it impossible to conceive that a real entity, especially
a material one, could have inherent ways in which it
might be given even when it is not actually given. The
real entity that is known must remain indifferent to,
"untouched by," being known. Even in the case of an
evidently true judgment where the entity as judged
about (the abject, which is essentially relative to the
judging) is itself given, this objectcannot coincide with
(be identica! with) the entity in its transobjective status.
Thus Hartmann is led back from the innovative view
of Husserl and Heidegger toward a variation on the
traditional representional theory ofknowledge with an
accompanying conception of truth as correspondence.
The possibility remains open that this divergence
arose through a terminological misunderstanding fairly
common in the literature on Husserl. It is clear that
Hartmann employs "object" with a meaning closely
akin to the way in which it is used in a long tradi-
tion, extending back at least to KANT. In this sense ali
objects are cognizable or knowable since they are es-
sentially related to a knowing subject: they arise only
in the synthesis of intuition and concept. This use of
the term then carries over into post-Kantian idealism
and into various schools of anti-intellectualist thought:
vitaJistic (WILHELM DILTHEY, HENRI BERGSON); existen-
tial (Kierkegaard, KARL JASPERs); and voluntaristic
(Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, WILLIAM JAMES). Hartmann
tends to treat the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong
(1853-1920) separately from Husserl 's phenomen-
ology and may have overlooked the affinity between
the two. Husserl uses the word in such a way that x is
an object ifthere is anything at ali that can be truly said
ofx. This use would imply that the statement, "Entities
in their transobjective status are not objects," is non-
sensical. The unity of ali objects rather than that of
al! entities would then be the all-inclusive (absolute)
unity.
Hartmann, however, maintains that contact with the
entity about which knowledge is gathered gives rise to
a new immanent formation (Gebilde), one belonging
to the realm of mental entities, the "idea" of tradi-
tional epistemology, which he also termed the "im-
age." The basic error of idealism is to identify this
mental structure with the entity itself. Such immanent
mental structures intend or represent entities through
a phenomenon, the entity as intended. To think that
289
this phenomenon might ever be the represented entity
itself is an error, he thinks, no less serious than that
of idealism. It appears to be the error of those whom
he calls "the phenomenologists."Rejecting the "correl-
ativistic prejudice" leads Hartmann to his view that
"being-in-itself' is not a strictly ontologica! concept.
This appears to be the conclusion that led to his de-
cisive break with neo-Kantianism, and he found it to
be greatly facilitated by the account of categorialform
in Husserl 's phenomenology. A person p 's knowing an
entity x is a relationship in which being-an-object-for-
p belongs to the abject of cognition, x as cognized, not
to x in its transobjective status, which is presupposed
by the knowledge relationship. "Being-in-itself' is the
categoria! form ofthe phenomena through which x as it
is "announces itself" in the knowledge-relation. Epis-
temology (gnoseology, phenomenology), not ontology,
needs the form "being-in-itself' to differentiate objects
of knowledge from mere objects of belief. Being as
such, however, is not given primarily through doxic or
cognitive acts, but pre-objectively (pre-categorially).
That there are real entities that may correspond to phe-
nomena is indicated but not convincingly established
by what can be known about them. Cognition can ex-
plicate what has been given in a noncognitive way, but
the interpretation will never be immune to skepticism.
Here Hartmann adopts a position closely akin to
FICHTE's way of differentiating between what can be
known and what can be shown only by the .feeling
(necessarily obscure self-perception) inherent in voli-
tions or deeds. This sort of feeling shows the ground
for faith, as Fichte termed it, in the reality of the nat-
ural and moral world order that is presupposed by ali
volition. Voluntary strivings are the most prominent
in the class of "emotionally transcendent acts," which
include ali intercourse with persons and dealings with
things, striving, desires, suffering, action, willing, and
moods. Ali of these, not just the strivings emphasized
by Fichte, involve the feeling of affecting or being
affected by reality.
"Reality" is Hartmann 's term for the way in which
actual, i.e., temporal, individual thi11gs exist. It is the
o11ly perfect, full way of bei11g. Idealities (esse11tiali-
ties), 011 the other hand, are no11temporal but 11011-self-
sufficie11t; they exist o11ly by being contained in real
e11tities. Ideal bei11gs are, however, 110 less "tra11sobjec-
tive" tha11 real e11tities are. Thus despite the contrast be-
290 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tween the way realities and essentialities are, Hartmann
held ~in accord with Aristotle and with the idealism
that he himself otherwise emphatically opposed ~ that
real individuals have ideal essences as really inherent
constituents. He seems to have been unaware that this
position is contradictory to that of Husserl. Quite like
Kant and very much in line with the mathematization of
nature, the conception in Galilean science that material
nature is mathematical in structure, Hartmann recog-
nized only two kinds of ideal entities: mathematical
structures on the one hand and values (Kant's princi-
ples of practica! reason) on the other. This is one ofthe
clearest indications that Hartmann conceived what he
called "phenomenology" exclusively from within what
Husserl termed the natural attitude as an objective sci-
ence of the subjective and of subjcctively relative phe-
nomenona.
Although it is apparently acknowledged that there
is a difference in degree ofbeing between essentialities
and realities, there are no degrees of being within the
sphere of reali(v. The concept of reality must encom-
pass material and immaterial traits. The actual world
has a single unitary mode of reality: it is an error to
think that spirit or soul has a preeminent mode of be-
ing, and it would be equally mistaken to attribute such
preeminence to the material realm. Spirit has the pre-
eminence ofthe highest stratum ofbeings but not that
of a higher mode ofbeing. The single, unitary realm of
real entities is stratified in the graduation ofits forms of
being, but its constituents are equally existent. The ex-
istence and reality ofthe spiritual stratum is not some-
how paler or weaker than the mode of being of the
lower strata. The basic modallaw for the actual world
is that the reality-character, as such, of actual entities
neither diminishes nor increases as the highest stratum
is approached. That the mental or spiritual traits of a
person belong to a higher stratum than the person 's or-
ganic traits means that the former traits presuppose, are
founded upon and dependent upon, the latter and that
these limit the range ofthe mental traits the person can
acquire. Higher traits are always "weaker" and lower
ones "stronger," but only in that the higher are condi-
tioned by, dependent on, lower ones while the reverse
is not the case. This "law of strength" is the most basic
law for ali categories of real things.
From the point of view of fundamental ontology,
existence is common to the material, the vital, the psy-
chic, and the spiritual. To deny this commonality of
existence is to deny existence in a shared reality, indi-
viduality, and temporality. Though ali real cntities are
equally real and equally individual, Hartmann differ-
entiates the existence of any real entity from its reality.
Only what is individual and singular and characterizes
each real entity as individual is said to exist. Even the
traits an individual has in common with other individu-
als are real, but only the individual as such, as distinct
from ali other individuals, is said to exist. Existence of
any real entity is higher in determinateness and way of
being than is any of the "essences" it has in common
with othcr entities. Existence depends on reality since
an entity's existence is subject absolutely to whatever
laws apply to ali entities ofthe same kinds.
Nevertheless, every real entity is perf'ectly real, in-
dividual, and existent. Things are no less perfectly ex-
istent than persons are. Things and persons exist differ-
ently, but they do indeed exist together in one existing
world, and existence itsell is perf'ectly alike in each
case. Thus Hartmann appears to use "to exist" and re-
lated terms in a way quite different from the usage of
existential thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and
Heidegger. Moreover, he seems quite willing to ignore
whatever prohibition Heidegger's conception of "on-
tologica! difference" entails against saying of a world
either that it is or that it exists.
The minds or spirits of vital, living individuals do
indeed have essential traits, but a living spirit "is" not
the set of such traits. lts individuality can neither be
canceled nor "auf'gehoben," however much it may be
considered in abstraction. Thus Hartmann rejects ide-
alistic attempts to conceive the egos of vital persons
as forms that have "in themselves" an ideal way of
being, and he clearly attributes such a conception to
Husserl. Although each vital person is "subject to" its
essential traits, bound by whatever essential laws they
entail, sti li, each is unique and individual in the stric test
sense of that word. The individuality of every person
is incomparably richer than that of other material and
organic entities and occurrences.
Insofar as human persons ha ve a historical and cul-
tural being, they take part in an objective spirit as
well as being vital spirits. Historical-cultural being is
a higher being-stratum than that of organic reality and
involves personal beings of a higher order than organic
personal being. Such a spirit Hartmann characterizes
 N!COLAI HARTMANN
rather inadequately as that which is common to ali its
members. Thus objective spirit is formed through the
reality of its members (in contrast to their existence).
Every objective spirit is, however, an individual in
its own right, having its own existence distinct from
but dependent upon and conditioned by their reality.
Hartmann agrees with holistic conceptions of commu-
nity and society. Nevertheless, he emphatically rejects
HEGEL 's conception according to which higher order,
collective persons are universal entities who gener-
ate their human members, whose reality is therefore
thought to depend on that of the objective spirit. An
objective spirit is not exhausted by what is common to
ali its vital members. lts way of being is nevertheless
not ideality but reality. Each has its time and is quite as
singular and unique as each member is. The individ-
uality of a structure is independent of the structure's
order ofmagnitude. Moreover, a one-sided dependence
of vital spirits on objective, collective ones would be
contrary to the categoriallaw of strength.
From the two ways of being, Hartmann differenti-
ates modes of being (Seinsmodi): possibility and ac-
tuality, necessity and contingency, and impossibility
and non-actuality ( Unwirklichkeit). The "incompara-
ble richness" ofhuman existence vis-a-vis nonpersonal
organisms and things has to do with the distinctive
mode of being of vital persons and the freedom that
this mode of being allows. Acknowledging that the
will of persons is free is compatible with many forms
of determinism, in the sense of wiLLIAM JAMES, i.e., the
acknowledgment that freedom does not require really
possible alternatives to choose from. It does, however,
require denial of determinism in Sir William Hamil-
ton 's ( 1788-1856) sense ofthe word (naturalistic deter-
minism). It requires that there be occurrences that Hart-
mann dubs "incompletely real." Reality is the sphere
ofbeing to which belong entities whose real possibil-
ity coincides with their real necessity: their possibility
to be excludes the possibility not to be. There can be
no possibilities that have not been and none that will
not be actualized. Hartmann 's necessitarian doctrine is
more consistent than that of John Stuart Miii. Whereas
Miii thought that his ontology might tolerate unactu-
alized "possibilities of sensation," Hartmann will ha ve
none of them. There are, however, entities whose real
being is not just natural, whose real being is not sub-
ject merely to natural necessity. The necessity of ali
291
real being does not imply uniform determinism for
the world, but rather allows for a layering of differ-
ent forms of determination: the ought-to-be, artworks,
and self-actualization ( Venvirklichung). This layering
or stratification is what allows the distinctive sorts of
autonomy prevailing in each stratum of real beings.
The voluntary activities ofpersons generate the spir-
itual, a novel stratum of real being compared to real
entities that are merely psychophysical. Volitions are
free in a negative as well as in a positive sense. Only
through them- so far as we know- do values have
an effect on the actual course of events. VALUEs are laws
or principles to which any entity conforms insofar as it
"ought tobe." As principles ofwhat ought tobe, values
are not indifferent to real being. However, real being
and laws that describe merely what may, does, or must
become real are indifferent to values and to what ought
to be. Values exert a teleological causation involving
an emotional awareness on the part of a potential agent
that there are conditions or requirements tobe fulfilled
if some value is tobe realized or "satisfied." Involved
in this awareness is awareness of a tension or disparity
between what is understood to be real and what ought
to be real. More to the point, it involves an awareness
of a disparity between what ought to become real and
what will become or is likely to become real unless
something happens tofavor what ought to occur.
Through such awareness, values indicate to a po-
tential agent that something ought tobe done (a duty),
though this is not true of ali the values agents sense.
Values thereby make positive freedom possible, taking
part in the generation of vital spiritual existence and of
"imperfectly real" entities whose generation involves
efficacy on the part of ideal values rather than being de-
termined exclusively by natural causes. A living being
who is tobe an agent must therefore ha ve such traits as
consciousness, resolute activity, energy, foresight, and
purposive efficacy. Hartmann refers to this tension as
"the ought-to-be of spontaneity or activity" (aktuales
Seinsollen). Through it, values may be said to caii for
there to be vital beings in the world who are also spir-
itual - beings who are there through their ACTIONs.
Through their act ion in the cause of values they ha ve
positive freedom.
On the other hand, the plurality of ideal values and
their demands or requirements always allows negative
freedom, i.e., choice and commitment in fa vor of some
292 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and against others- the positive and meritorious du-
ties in Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
( 1785). The traits required of potential agents there-
fore include the resolve to risk guilt. That there ought
to be spontaneous action in the world requires, on the
one hand, the real being of persons in communities of
objective spirit and on the other hand, calls upon each
spiritual being through its existence - whether vital
or objective- to take part resolutely in the creation of
the world.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ballauf, Theodor. "Bibliography." In Nicolai Hartmann. Der
Denker und sein Werk. Ed. Heinz Heinsoeth and Robert
Heiss. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952, 286-
308.
Beck, Lewis White. "Nicolai Hartmann 's Criticism ofKant's
Theory of Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research 2 (1942), 4 72-500.
Garnett, Alexander Campbell. "Phenomenological Ethics
and Self-realization." Ethics 53 (1943), 159-72
Hartmann, Nicolai. Grundziige einer Metaphysik der Erken-
ntnis. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1921.
- . Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1935.
- . Ethik [ 1925]. 4th ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1962;
Ethics. Trans. Stanton Coit. London: George Allen & Un-
win and New York: Humanities Press, 1932.
- . Das Problem geistigen Se ins. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1933.
- . Neue Wege der Ontologie. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer,
1949; New Ways in Ontology. Trans. Reinhold C. Kuhn.
Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953.
-. "Hartmann, Nicolai." In Philosophen Lexikon. Ed.
Werner Ziegenfuss. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1949, 454-
71.
Jordan, Robert Weish. "Unnatural Kinds: Beyond Dignity
and Price." Man and World 20 ( 1987), 283-303.
Landmann, Michael. "Professor Nicolai Hartmann and
Phenomenology." Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 3 ( 1944), 393--423.
Meyer, Gerbcrt. "Verzeichnis der Werke von und iiber Nico-
lai Hartmann." In Modalanalyse und Determinationsprob-
lem. Zur Kritik Nicolai Hartmanns an der aristotelischen
"Physis. " Ed. Gerbert Meyer. Meisenheim am Glan: A.
Hain, 1962, 93-108.
Mohanty, J. N. Nicolai Hartmann and Alfi·ed North White-
head: A Study in Recent Platonism. Calcutta: Progressive
Publishers, 1957.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A
Historical Introduction. 3rd rev. and enl. ed., with the
collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1984, 306-35.
Totok, Wilhelm, et al. "Nicolai Hartmann (20.2.1982-
9.10.1950)." In Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie
VI. Bibliographie, 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1990, 245-55.
Werkmeister, William Henry. Nicolai Hartmann :~ New On-
tology·. Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University Press,
1990.
ROBERT WELSH JORDAN
Colorado State University
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770--1831)
Broadly speaking, phenomenology can be character-
ized first of ali as EDMUND HUSSERL 's descriptive and
interpretive approach to MEANING, which is the inten-
tiona! content of conscious life. It provides an ongo-
ing clarification of meaning in order to abide by the
"matters themselves." The phenomenology of MARTIN
HEIDEGGER discloses the meaning of Being as it onto-
logically and "proto-existentially" impends on human
Jife. And MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY examines the BODY
as a human being's pre-objective yet intentionally lived
experience ofwhat is already there, enabling a human
being to carry out tasks and projects as stable public be-
haviors in the world, thereby making personal identity
unique and non-consignable.
In contrast, Hegel's phenomenological program, as
presented in his 1807 Phănomenologiedes Geistes, has
never given anyone the slightest impression that it is
concerned with meaning or sense. Yet with the excep-
tion of Husserl, many 20th century phenomenologists
ha ve explicitly approached Hegel 's Phănomenologie
in either of two ways: (a) by claiming that certa in as-
pects ofhis program are continuous with or have con-
tributed to their considerations of topics such as the
practica] engagement with the WORLD, INTERSUBJECTIV-
ITY, the unconscious ofPSYCHOANALYSIS, and bad faith;
or (b) by emphasizing that there are critica! differences
between Hegel's project and their own.
Phenomenologists in FRANCE are representative of
the first position. In general terms, they are critica! of
Hegel's gaal of"absolute knowledge," the identity of
thought and Being, which they re gard as spirit's totaliz-
ing comprehension of some first-order truth about what
there is. They thus reproach Hegel for what appears to
be the organizing principle for his Phănomenologie,
viz., his so-called metaphysical monism, because, as
phenomenologists, their primary philosophical inter-
es!, allegedly unlike Hegel 's, is not the coherence of an
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
intellectual system establishing a supersensible entity
(Divine Mind) that both explains and coincides with
the sensible or historical world. Rather, their concern
is to render explicit the meaning or meanings ofthe pre-
theoretical or pre-reflective experience of phenomena
that are for the most part tacit and unthematized.
Nonetheless, phenomenologists representative of
the first position ha ve gone to Hegel 's Phanomenologie
for various themes or conclusions. Notice that what-
ever is selected from the Phănomenologie is presup-
posed to have an intelligibility independent of the
alleged monistic context of spirit's self-knowledge.
However, the consequence of separating themes in the
Phănomenologie from the text's "movement" is a vio-
lation of Hegel 's express objections to such a separa-
tion.
So Maurice Merleau-Ponty finds themes in Hegel's
Phănomenologie attuned to an EXISTENTIALISM that
is open to the movement of HISTORY, fitting for the
contingencies of human ACTION, yet ill suited for
the movement of thought's totalizing comprehension.
The interplay of life, desire, struggle, recognition,
death, and unhappiness - these ali originating from
the Phănomenologie - becomes the foca! point for
Merleau-Ponty to reveal that human subjectivity is not
initially a consciousness in ample possession of clar-
ity and distinctness of thought, but a life to be lived
through in the face ofthe world and other human sub-
jects and in ways in which difficult conditions are con-
fronted or evaded.
This agrees with his concern for an account ofmean-
ing that is primarily explicated through PERCEPTION and
the lived body. Yet Hegel's account ofperception of-
fers no help in such an explication. It does not offer a
phenomenological description ofwhat it means for hu-
man beings to follow what is experientially significant
in perception. Instead, Hegel describes the pitfalls of
a philosophical theory claiming that individual objects
can be identified through perception alone as instanti-
ating universal properties.
For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, perceptual
meanings are rooted in a spatio-temporal network of
experience and hence dependent on a given experien-
tial context, i.e., they are bound to SPACE, TIME, his-
tory, and culture. They delineate the manner in which
the object is presented in perception as already mean-
ingful and as tied in varying degrees to a network of
293
other objects and experiences as well as to the inter-
ests and desires ofthe perceiver. The same can be said
of the lived BODY since, for Merleau-Ponty, not only
is the lived body an expressive and cultural object,
but also his account of such a body is already his ac-
count of perception. Both are meaningful structures
of behavior in an experiential context, and in terms
of its aisthetic (from aisthesis or sensory perception)
and practica! (pre-theoretical) engagements with the
world the lived body is indistinguishable from the life
of perceptual consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, this
phenomenological characterization of perception and
the lived body has primacy over any scientific char-
acterization that theoretically severs them from these
structures and context.
Thus although Hegel's account of perception it-
self does not aid Merleau-Ponty's, separating the
Phănomenologie from a metaphysics of(divine) spirit
or from the "logica!" or "scientific" categories of
Hegel 's system, together with cuii ing certain themes
from the Phănomenologie, does enable him to recast
Hegel's phenomenological program as an exploration
ofhuman beings' practica! engagements with the world
and their forming ofmeanings in contact with experi-
ence, subsequently modifying that experience by the
meanings discovered therein. Understood in this fash-
ion, "phenomenology," Merleau-Ponty claims, "can be
practiced and identified as a manner or style of think-
ing, [existing] as a movement before arriving at com-
plete awareness ofitselfas philosophy.lt has been long
on the way, and its adherents have discovered it in ev-
ery quarter, certainly in Hegel and Kierkegaard, but
equally in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud."
Clearly, PAUL RIC<:EUR would agree with Merleau-
Ponty's remark. Like him, Rico::ur separates Hegel's
project from the metaphysics oftotalizing comprehen-
sion that allegedly is "absolute knowledge." He then
interprets it as a phenomenological program emphasiz-
ing the practica! engagements ofhuman beings with the
world. But unlike Merleau-Ponty, Rico::ur underscores
the reflective activity that Hegel claims human beings
bring to those engagements. In this sense, for Rico::ur,
it becomes impossible to construe a human being's
practica! engagements and his or her pre-reflective ex-
perience as being of one swath. Furthermore, and aga in
following Hegel, the development of reflective activity
comes for Rico::ur by understanding human subjectivity
294 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
not as "consciousness," but rather as "spirit." "Spirit"
is Hegel 's technical term for intersubjectively framed
objective existence. It constitutes and depends on a
human being's reflective attending to his or her own
engagements in the world and with others (as well as his
or her judgments about such matters) in a manner that
is inseparable from his or her own reflective attending
to him- or herself as one human being among others
who likewise are reflectively attending to their engage-
ments and to themselves as intersubjective beings. Ac-
cord ing to Rica:ur, only spirit can accommodate the
development of reflection, and it thus establishes re-
flection 's proper boundaries. Rica:ur's attention to the
development of reflcction in and through spirit allows
him to focus on such Hegelian themes as the ethical
order, culture, evil, and forgiveness. And these in turn
point to other matters with which Rica:ur has been
concerned - namely, the symbolism of evil, RELI-
GION, and faith. However, these interests, along with
Rica:ur's developments ofHERMENEUTICS and Freudian
PSYCHOANALYSIS, focus upon pre-reflective or uncon-
scious reality and speak, for him, to his concems about
the limits of reflective consciousness in grasping and
making wholly transparent subjectivity's practica) en-
counters in the world. In ali these areas, reflective
consciousness runs up against the "problem of double
meaning" in which expressions mean one thing while
simultaneously meaning something else. Confronting
this problem, human reflection can never make mean-
ing transparent. It constantly succumbs to meaning's
multiplicity, and as a consequence, consciousness is
found in the juncture where multiplicity of meaning
and the equivocalness of existence meet and opacity
reigns. In the context of psychoanalysis, for example,
this is especially true for a reflective human being in
whom the unconscious can and does speak.
In this manner, Rica:ur seeks to rethink the tradi-
tional conception of reflective consciousness. At the
same time, however, he wants to maintain that human
beings do have an obligation to engage the world and
to pursue their goals with greater reflection. In short,
he seeks an answer both to the significance of the un-
conscious for a human being whose project is tobe re-
flective about his or her engagements in the world and
the significance of reflection for a human being who,
for the most part, acts pre-reflectively and is bound to
the reality of instincts that the unconscious represents.
Although Hegel does not have the enormous im-
pact that MARX does in JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's major )ater
work, Critique de la raison dialectique (1960/85), he
does play a significant ro le in L 'etre et le neant ( 1943).
Sartre's approach to Hegel there is quite different from
Merleau-Ponty's or Rica:ur's because ofhis earnest use
of Hegel 's Logik. Emphasis on this work had not been
a part of the French Hegelian tradition of Alexandre
Kojeve ( 1902-1968) that influenced Merleau-Ponty
among others. Sartre 's turn to Hegel 's Logik in L'etre
et le neant is due to what he takes to be phenomen-
ology's inability to deal with the problem of Being,
i.e., how to account for the relation between the being
ofthe subject and the being ofthe abject experienced.
It could be said that in his EXISTENTIALISM Sartre uses
Hegelian notions to give an ontologica) reading to the
Husserlian concept of INTENTIONALITY. He explicates
this notion in terms of Hegel 's categories of"being-in-
itself," "being-for-itself," and "negation." These come
to stand for the being of the subject (being-for-itself
and negation) and the being of the object (being-in-
itself). But in Sartre's hands, they serve only as cover-
ing schemes lacking Hegel's immanent reconstructive
development ofthought to mediate them.
Thus they remain fixed opposites with pertinence
only in the domain ofhuman experience, and not in the
domain ofwhat can be thought. As a consequence, both
notions possess no connection in thought and only one,
being-for-itself, is an experience by virtue ofnegation.
It is negation bome by the human subject that allows
being-in-itself to be disclosed, but disclosed as requi-
site support of being-for-itself or the human subject.
For Sartre, this is a "dialectic" not of thought, but of
existence, in which antinomies or antitheses ofthought
are transformed into dissatisfying realities that perme-
ate human existence and can never be overcome. And
ali the necessary attempts by a human subject to tran-
scend them lead to what he calls "bad faith." Existential
ambiguity is now set in ontologica) stone.
Although Sartre does make use of the
Phiinomenologie in both his analysis of "bad faith,"
which bears a strong family resemblance to Hegel's
analysis of "dissemblance" in the Phiinomenologie,
and his analysis of the "existence of others," which
relies heavily on the "Lordship and Bondage" section
ofthe Phiinomenologie, he cannot reach Hegel's con-
clusions. For Hegel, the life of "spirit" involves an
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
interminable quest through destabilizing cognitive and
ethical conflicts and setbacks for a kind of cognitively
and ethically stabilizing like-mindedness with others as
a self-conscious achievement. For Sartre, this reveals
Hegel's philosophical optimism, failing to recognize
that destabilizing cognitive, ethical, and affective set-
backs of human existence are ontologically fixed. In
this manner, Sartre's existential formulation ofthe on-
tologica) dimensions of Hegel 's "logica)" notions in-
forms his use ofHegel's Phănomenologie.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER is the most significant represen-
tative of the second position that 20th century phe-
nomenologists have taken on Hegel, viz., emphasiz-
ing critica) philosophical differences between Hegel's
phenomenological program and their own. AII other
representatives of this position can be seen as disci-
ples of Heidegger, the most renowned being JACQUES
DERRIDA. Unlike representatives of the first position,
Heidegger is a Hegel scholar in his own right with a
groundbreaking and plangent interpretation and a no-
table body of work on Hegel. More importantly, what
distinguishes Heidegger from representatives of the
first position is that he does not cuii various themes
from Hegel to fit into his own philosophical scheme.
Rather, he concentrates on Hegel 's general project and
investigates how it addresses the perennial question
in the history of Western metaphysics, i.e., the ques-
tion of the meaning of Being. In so doing, Heidegger
challenges the philosophical claims Hegel believes the
Phănomenologie is entitled to issue.
The inquiry ofphenomenological ontology into the
being of subjectivity is originally established by Hei-
degger. But unlike Sartre, Heidegger does not make
use of Hegel 's "logica)" notions as covering schemes
to deal with the being of subjectivity. He rather points to
the historical roots of subjectivity as explicated within
the Western metaphysical tradition. Heidegger's FUN-
DAMENTAL ONTOLOGY illuminates the historical dimen-
sion of the inquiry into and the presuppositions of
the being of subjectivity. What Heidegger claims to
discover phenomenologically in the history of meta-
physics is that the being of subjectivity is the being
of ali that is and that such a view culminates in the
thought of Hegel. Moreover, Hegel comes to this view,
Heidegger contends, by his own recognition, exempli-
fied in his Phănomenologie, that the "Absolute" moves
within the am bit of the history of philosophy and si-
295
multaneously constitutes this movement as identica]
with philosophy itself. So Heidegger believes that, like
himself, Hegel makes phenomenology a historically
oriented investigation into the being of subjectivity.
But, unlike himself, he sees Hegel supporting the view
that Being itself is absolute subjectivity, which repre-
sents the course of philosophy and its culmination in
absolute certainty.
Thus Heidegger goes to great lengths to point out the
contrasts between what he takes tobe Hegel's histori-
cally oriented phenomenological ontology ofthe being
of subjectivity and his own. First, despite his historical
focus, Hegel, Heidegger argues, is still under the sway
of Western metaphysics because he does not examine
Being in the light ofits ontologica] difference from be-
ings. In short, the object ofthought for Hegel is Being,
but only as appropriated by the subject in and as abso-
lute knowledge. For Heidegger, the object of thought
is also Being, but only as the enabling condition of
the difference between Being and subjectivity oras the
"clearing" (Lichtung) in which this difference emerges
and abides for a while.
Second, according to Heidegger, Hegel 's work con-
ceives of subjectivity as being unconditioned in the
act of thinking and representing such that it becomes
wholly manifest to itself as the being of ali that is.
Heidegger claims then that Hegel 's conception of the
subject is the metaphysical imprimatur of the modern
age. In this more global rather than textual context,
any object whatsoever must come to stand in relation
to subjectivity in order for that object to be at ali. In
this sense, subjectivity becomes the measure for ali that
is and objects are thus understood to be purely at the
disposal of consciousness.
In contrast, Heidegger's phenomenology conceives
of subjectivity in terms of either the "facticity of DA-
SEIN" or the thoughtful remembrance of the arrival of
what has been. The former refers to the being of a hu-
man individual as one who practically and affectively
attends to his or her life as it impends at any given
time such that the meaning of Being is disclosed and
understood as an issue for this individual; the latter
understands the human individual as one whose very
being is mindfully to remember the meaning of Being
as that which has been "unthought" in the history of
philosophy and is thus yet to come. In both instances,
contra Hegel, the meaning of Being is not compre-
296 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
hended or represented in thought.
Finally, Heidegger believes that Hegel's historically
oriented phenomenology is organized in the form of a
prospective movement that continually directs and in-
corporates the earlier and less developed in thought
into the !ater and more developed. He is at odds with
the Hegelian view that particular philosophical posi-
tions and epochs ofphilosophy arise from one another
out of the necessity of a dialectica! process. Heideg-
ger's historically oriented phenomenology moves ret-
rospectively to that which has been "unthought" in past
philosophical positions in order to reveal not only its
original significance, but also the need for rekindling
a kind ofthoughtfulness in philosophy appreciative of
the lasting character of the "unthought" for a coming
time.
Of ali 20th century phenomenologists, none has
given less consideration to the thought of Hegel than
EDMUND HUSSERL. Philosophical comments by Husserl
on Hegel 's work are virtually nil. Practically every
Husserl scholar accepts without question Husserl 's lack
of consideration of Hegel 's thought because they per-
ceive Husserl as dismissing or ignoring what he takes
tobe a body of outmoded, ifnot dubious, metaphysical
views having no relevance for the tasks ofphenomen-
ology. Furthermore, since Hegel's Phiinomenologie is
usually regarded as considerably attuned with "EXIS-
TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY," that work, it is beJieved,
would be incommensurate with what is usually un-
derstood as either the robust Cartesian or the strong
Kantian orientation of Husserl's coNSTITUTIVE PHENO-
MENOLOGY.
Nevertheless, there are a few critica! remarks on
Hegel in the first volume of Husserl's Erste Philoso-
phie [ 1923/24]. And what is noteworthy about these ob-
servations is that Husserl cites Adolf Trendelenburg's
Logische Untersuchungen (2 vols., 1840). Although
Trendelenburg ( 1802-1872) wrote another critica) text
about Hegel, Die logische Frage in Hegels System
(The logica! question in Hegel's system, 1843), there
is no evidence that Husserl was familiar with it. Nev-
ertheless, these texts inaugurated what may be called
the logica! critique of Hegel's Logik, which is quite
distinct from the 19th century existential (scHELLING
and Kierkegaard), psychological (Fries), and socio-
political (Feuerbach and Marx) critiques ofthis work.
Trendelenburg initiates this critique of Hegel 's
Logik based less on its allegedly spurious metaphys-
ical character than on its inauthenticity or deficiency
as a logic. Despite the fact that Trendelenburg's crite-
rion of adequacy was a revamped Aristotelian logic,
it was not difficult for that criterion to change due
to the development (through FREGE) of formalization
and axiomatization in logic, which, over the next fi ve
decades, for the first time gave the discipline of logic
a scientifically stable foundation for evaluating alter-
native "logics" both past and present. Consequently,
since Hegel 's logic would be resistant to formalization,
the division between the formalistic adequacy of sym-
bolic logic and the formalistic inadequacy of Hegel's
logic could be drawn with significant precision. Given
Husserl's own interests in LOGIC and MATHEMATICS dur-
ing this time, it is most likely that the logica) critique
of Hegel, which Trendelenburg launched and which
has been as current and longstanding as the existential
and socio-political ones, had influenced and settled his
views on Hegel.
Moreover, in Erste Philosophie, Husserl claims that
with Hegel "the character of speculative activity leads
to the end of consciousness," and he cites the follow-
ing remark by Trendelenburg to support this claim:
"In its highest synthesis of consciousness and uncon-
sciousness, speculation also requires the annihilation
of consciousness itself." Since Husserl 's concern was
with the phenomenological elucidation ofthe concepts
and formalism of logic through a conception of con-
sciousness as transcendental, he clearly would have
been unsympathetic to a phenomenological program
such as Hegel 's, in which "absolute knowing" would
yield the elimination of consciousness. So once again,
Husserl 's reliance on Trendelenburg provides him with
his perspective on Hegel.
Yet the reference to Trendelenburg may offer an
opening to a more fruitful philosophical encounter be-
tween Hegel and Husserl than has previously existed.
Trendelenburg's
. work
.
downplays the alleged meta-
physical dimensîbn of Hegel in favor of examining
the "logica!" element. It subsequently facilitates, as we
have noted, the use of formalism as the criterion of
adequacy for the discipline of logic. Both Hegel and
Husserl are themselves critica! of formalism, despite
its technical sophistication, because of its inability to
account for the development of formalization and ax-
iomatization within either "thought's autonomous de-
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
velopment" (Hegel) or formalism 's genetic elucidation
in (modalizing) experience (Husserl).
Although Hegel's critique is quite terse and a
polemic against (a historical\y earlier brand of) formal-
ism's criterial capacity, it is not as extensively worked
out as Husserl 's. Yet both critiques presuppose the
work of phenomenology as either, for Hegel, "the de-
duction of the concept of [the] science [of logic]" or,
for Husserl, the clarification ofthe sense oflogic. The
task of the former is to give access to an analysis in
which the determinacy or sense of a logica! "object"
is neither independently given nor categorially fixed in
thought, but rather is subject to an intrinsically reflex-
ive revision in relation to other logica! "objects," even
contrary ones. The task of the latter is to analyze the
manner in which the sense or determinacy of a logica!
"object" is given in the intentiona! experience of con-
scious life. Thus for both Hegel and Husserl, there is a
strong connection between phenomenology and logic,
because both argue for some conception of subjectiv-
ity to undo the criterial capacity of formalism for the
discipline oflogic.
Once this connection is understood, other areas
for study open up. For example, Hegel's "phenomen-
ological deduction" and Husserl's "phenomenological
clarification" would indeed yield different conclusions
about the conception of subjectivity, yet both would
be critica! of and resistant to PSYCHOLOGISM. Hegel's
understanding of psychologism is not as well devel-
oped as Husserl's, but Hegel's Logik, in its own right,
does sustain a dyslogistic account of psychologism.
Moreover, the possibility of examining the "determi-
nacy of thought" ( Gedanke) in the light of "meaning"
(Bedeutung) and vice versa would be quite feasible.
Despite their different characterizations of pheno-
menology, then, both would claim that phenomen-
ology, using Hegel 's language, is a science system-
atically explicating the experience of consciousness.
Yet the "experience of consciousness" needs tobe pre-
cisely delineated because, for Husserl, it refers to (a) the
human subject's ability to pursue meaning and TRUTH
in everyday Jife through PERCEPTION, IMAGINATION, LAN-
GUAGE, MEMORY, EXPECTATION, and INTERSUBJECTIVITY,
ali ofwhich disclose that pursuit as the following of an
already stabilized course of meaningful conduct; (b)
the work of logic and mathematics engaged in active
cognitive pursuit of meaning and truth pertinent to,
297
yet outside of, everyday life; and (c) the work ofphi-
losophy engaged in either the pursuit of the enabling
conditions of both (a) and (b) or the establishment of
(a) or (b) as enabling conditions themselves. For Hegel,
on the other hand, the "experience of consciousness"
refers only to (c). Although Husserl's phenomenology
appears to examine a wider range of what counts as
the "experience of consciousness" than Hegel 's, it is
only (c) that can genuinely serve as the topic for a
philosophically fruitful exchange between them.
Furthermore, once the "experience of conscious-
ness" is understood as the work ofphilosophy, it com-
pels an examination of what distinguishes the pheno-
menological analysis from that which it appraises, viz.,
the experience ofconsciousness as the work ofphilos-
ophy. What distinguishes it is the fact that the work
of philosophy is laden with the "natural assumption"
(natiirliche Vorstellung) for Hegel and with the "natu-
ral attitude" (natiirliche Einstellung) for Husserl. These
two notions are equivalent, however, only ifthey apply
to the experience of consciousness as the work of phi-
losophy, because the "natural assumption" for Hegel is
peculiar only to philosophy, while the "natural attitude"
does extend to (a) and (b) above.
Once applied to the work of philosophy, pheno-
menological analysis takes on a historical orientation
for both Hegel and Husserl, and this gives to pheno-
menology a critica!, reconstructive, and transcenden-
tal stance. It is critica! because in illuminating either
the natural attitude or natural assumption in the vari-
ous historical workings ofphilosophy, phenomenology
can account for the unacknowledged presuppositions
affecting those workings. It is reconstructive because in
establishing differences between those various work-
ings beyond the boundaries where they have been tra-
ditionally drawn, phenomenology can disclose new
frameworks, new standards, and new criteria. And it is
transcendental because in establishing how the work-
ings of philosophy ought to proceed after historically
disclosing their unrecognized presuppositions, pheno-
menology can claim to identify universal presupposi-
tions and to register a kind of theoretical knowledge
transcendental in character. In each stance, the rele-
vance of spirit and intersubjectivity for the reftective
work of consciousness as well as the correlation of
rationality and actuality come to the fore in both phe-
nomenologies.
298 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
What is poignant yet paradoxical is that Husserl,
whose understanding of Hegel led him to say so little
about him, may be the 20th century phenomenologist
whose work in its own right offers the site in which
Hegel 's thought resonates the strongest.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Adorno, Theodor. Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Stu-
dien iiher Husserl und die phănomenologischen Anti-
nomie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970; Against
Epistemology- A Metacritique. Trans. Willis Domingo.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.
Aschenberg, Reinhold. "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in Hegels
Phănomenologie des Geistes." In Die ontologische Op-
tion. Ed. Klaus Hartmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976,
211-304.
Carr, David. Time. Narrative. ami History. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1986.
Dove, Kenley. "Die Epoche der Phănomenologie des
Geistes." In Hegei-Studien. Beihefi XI. Bonn: Bouvier,
1973, 605-21.
Fink, Eugen. "Dic intentionale Analyse und das Problem
des spekulativen Denkens." In his Năhe und Distanz.
Phănomenologische Vortrăge und Auf~ătze. Ed. Franz-
Anton Schwartz. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1976, 139-57.
- . "Phănomenologie und Dialektik." In his Năhe und Dis-
tanz, 228-49.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Hegel und Heidegger." In his Hegel.~
Dialektik: Fiin{hermeneutische Studien. Tiibingen: J. C.
B. Mohr & Co., 1971, 70-89; "Hegel and Heidegger." In
his Hegel:~ Dialectic: Fi ve Hermeneutica/ Studies. Trans.
P. Christopher Smith. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1976, 100-16.
Gillespie, Michael. Hegel, Heidegge1; and the Ground o{
HistOIJ'. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Haar, Michel. "Structures hegeliennes dans la pensee hei-
deggerienne de l'Histoire." Revue de Metaphysique et de
Morale 85 (1980), 48-59.
Hartmann, Klaus. Sartre :5 Ontology. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1966.
Heidegger, Martin. "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung." In his
Holzwege. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann
1950, 102-97; Hegel :5 Concept ofExperience. Trans. Ken~
ley R. Dove. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
- . ldentităt und Difj'erenz. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957; Iden-
tity and Dif{erence. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York:
Harper & Row, 1969.
-."Hegel und die Griechen." In Gegenwart der Griechen
im neueren Denken. Festschrififiir Hans-Georg Gadamer
zum 60. Gehurtstag. Ttibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960,43-
57.
- . Hegels "Phănomenologie des Geistes. " Ed. Ingtraud
Giirland. Gesamtausgahe 32. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1980; Hegel:~ "Phenomeno/ogy o{ Spirit."
Trans. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1988.
Hyppolitc, Jcan. "Existence et dialectiquc dans la philosophie
de Merleau- Ponty." Les Temps Modernes 17 ( 1961 ), 184--
85.
Les~er E_mbree, El~zabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algzs Mzckunas, Jztendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kirkland, Frank M. "Husserl and Hegel: A Historical and
Religious Encounter." Journal o{ the British Societv for
Phenomenology 16 (1985), 70-87.
Kojeve, Alexandre. lntroduction a la Lecture de Hegel. Paris:
Gallimard, 1947; lntroduction to the Reading o{ Hegel.
Trans. James H. Nichols. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1969.
Kolb, David. The Critique o{Pure Modernity: Hegel, Hei-
degger, and Afier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986.
Lauer, Quentin. "Phenomenology: Hegel and Husserl." In
Beyond Epistemology. Ed. Frederick Weiss. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, 174--96.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Philosophie et non-philosophie
depuis Hegel." Ed. C1aude Lefort. Textures 8-11 ( 1974--
75), 1-36, 1-19; "Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since
Hegel." Trans. Hugh Silverman. Te/os 29 ( 1976), 43-105.
- . "L'existentialisme chez Hegel." Les temps moderne 1
( 1946), 1311-19; "Hegel's Existentialism." In Sense and
Non-Sen.~e. Trans. Hubert Dreyfus and Patricia Dreyfus.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 63-
70.
Ricreur, Paul. De /'inte1pretation. Essai sur Freud. Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1965; Freud and Philosophy: An Essay
onlnterpretation. Trans. Denis Savage. New Haven. CT:
Yale University Press, 1970.
Schmidt, Dennis. The Uhiqui~v o{the Finite: Hegel. Heideg-
gel; and the Entitlements of'Philosophy. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1988.
Schrader, George. "Hegel 's Contribution to Phenomen-
ology." The Monist 48 ( 1964), 18-33.
Waehlens, Alphonse de. "Refiexions sur une problcmatique
husserlienne de l'inconscient: Husserl et Hegel." In Ed-
mund Husserl 1859-1959. [Ed. Herman Leo Van Brcda
and Jacques Taminaux.] The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1959, 221-38.
Westphal, Merold. "Hegel and Husserl: Transcendental
Phenomenology and the Revolution Yet Awaited." In Crit-
ica/ and Dialectica/ Phenomenology. Ed. Donn Welton
and Hugh Silverman. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1987, 102-35.
FRANK M. KIRKLAND
Hunter Ca/lege
MARTIN HEIDEGGER Heidegger was born
in Messkirch, Germany, on September 26, 1889. His
dissertation, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologis-
mus (The theory of judgment in psychologism, 1913 ),
was prepared under Artur Schneider ( 1875-1945). In
1915 he completed his habilitation at Freiburg under
the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) with
Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Dun Scofl1s
(Duns Scotus's doctrine of categories and meanings).
(For the influence on him of EDMUND HUSSERL, see the
·
 MARTIN HEIDEGGER
entry entitled HUSSERL and HEIDEGGER.) Heidegger was
Privatdozent at Freiburg 1915-23, Professor Extraor-
dinarius at Marburg 1923-28, and Professor Ordinar-
ius and Chair ofPhilosophy at Freiburg 1928-46, also
serving as the first Rector ofthe University ofFreiburg
under National Socialism during 1933-34. Heidegger
died in Freiburg on May 26, 1976.
For the early Heidegger, phenomenology is so much
identified with genuine philosophy that he believes not
only that any contemporary or future philosophy must
be phenomenological if it is to fulfill its mission, but
also that ali of the important figures in the history
of philosophy, from the Greeks up to the present, to
the extent that they were genuine philosophers, had
been practicing nothing other than phenomenology in
its broadest sense. From his earliest Marburg 1ectures
up through the major published work from his early
period, Sein und Zeit ( 1927), Heidegger stresses the
necessity of being guided by the "Sache," the issue
or matter at stake in philosophy, and not by empty
concepts or words. Moreover, he asserts that authentic
philosophy consists first and foremost in putting into
words what we implicitly know and experience, and not
in following the model of mathematics by attempting
to construct philosophical systems through the deduc-
tion of consequences from initial abstract and general
assumptions. He takes this to have been the point of
Husserl 's famous maxim "to the matters themselves!"
and sees Husserl's renewed emphasis upon "seeing"
as opposed to constructing or deducing as his deci-
sive contribution in the restoration ofphilosophy to its
original calling.
Accordingly, in §7 of the introduction to Sein und
Zeit ( 192 7), Heidegger declares that the method to be
employed in his investigation into the meaning ofBe-
ing in general, an investigation that he takes to be
the fundamental question for any philosophy, will be
phenomenological. In his explanation ofwhat the term
"phenomenology" as the name for the proper method
ofphilosophy means, he refers both to Husserl's maxim
as well as to the original meaning of the term 's Greek
roots, namely phainomenon and logos. Phainomenon
is said to be that which shows itself in itself, what is
manifest, so that an orientation upon the phenomena is
directed to "the entirety ofwhat is exposed to the light
of day or can be brought to light, which the Greeks
occasionally simply identified with to onta (beings)."
299
Important to note here is that beings, the phenomena,
are not limited merely to that which is already or readily
apparent, but also include anything that can be brought
to light as well.
The qualification "in itself' should be understood
first in contrast to the way that something can show
itself as what it is not in itself, as otherwise than the way
it really is. Thus to refer to an entity as a phenomenon
is precisely not to reduce it to a "mere appearance" or
an illusion, nor is it even an appearance that refers to
something else in the way that a symptom can be taken
as an appearance of the disease that does not become
manifest "in itself," but only in its symptoms. Thus
phenomenology is also nota study of appearances that
refer back to some other "things in themselves." Rather,
to refer to the object ofinvestigation as a phenomenon
points to its essential relatedness to the way that it
becomes apparent, and to the philosopher's obligation
to avoid positing hypothetical entities and to restrict
him- or herself to a description of what is or can be
made clearly apparent. It is important to note that what
can be made clearly and explicitly apparent must not
necessarily be so at the outset. It may rather reveal itself
at first and for the most part in an implicit, nonthematic
way; but it must nonetheless manifest itself somehow,
and in the course ofthe philosophical analysis must do
so directly and as it is, ifit is to become the phenomenon
for phenomenology.
This understanding is amplified in Heidegger's in-
terpretation of the second of the Greek roots of the
term phenomenology. The fundamental trait of logos
that Heidegger derives from his encounter with Greek
philosophy, especially with Plato and Aristotle, is his
interpretati an of logos in terms of its function, its abil-
ity to make something apparent. Rather than defining
speech primarily in terms of its physical si de, its sounds
or marks, or in terms of its grammatical structure, the
Greek philosophers had recognized that its most basic
characteristic is that it allows something to be seen,
makes something accessible to the person to whom the
logos is communicated. Furthermore, it has the struc-
ture of allowing something to be seen as something,
which is reflected for instance in the subjectpredicate
structure of declarati ve statements. Thus the logos has
the ability tobe true or false, to allow the object tobe
disclosed as it is, or- in a false statement- tobe seen
as it is not. But even the false statement can only reveal
300 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
an object as it is not if it has the fundamental character
ofmaking it apparent in some way or another.
Thus in subsection c of§7 Heidegger concludes that
phenomenology is apophainesthai ta phainomena, an
allowing tobe seen ofthat which shows itself as it is in
itself, and declares that this expresses the same thing as
Husserl's famous maxim "To the matters themselves!"
quoted above. He thereby endorses Husserl 's own view
that phenomenology is nothing other than a renewal of
the ancient project ofphilosophy as a rigorous science
begun by Plato and Aristotle, formulated now as the
demand to begin again and accept only those general
claims that can be grounded in the EVIDENCE of seeing
for oneself, i.e., EIDETIC METHOD. However, at the same
time Heidegger qualifies his endorsement by noting
that this descrjption remains merely formal, that it de-
fines a method of philosophical procedure but leaves
open the question of the proper object of phenomen-
ological philosophy.
For Heidegger, what is most properly the object of
phenomenology is that which for us is most in need of
becoming a phenomenon, i.e., of becoming explicitly
and directly apparent to us as it is in itself. This means
both that it must be capable ofbecoming apparent to us
in this way and that it must also at first and for the most
part fail to be so, that it is something that is usually
hidden or apparent to us only in a distorted way. In the
introduction Heidegger asserts, and in the subsequent
chapters of Sein und Zeit he tries to show, that the
proper object of phenomenology is then nothing other
than the Being of beings (Sein des Seienden), which
has been addressed throughout the history of philoso-
phy in an oblique and distorted way ever since it was
first made the object of explicit inquiry by the Greeks.
Hence phenomenology for Heidegger in Sein und Zeit
is most properJy FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, which must
address first of ali the question ofthe meaning ofBeing
in general, and then its modifications and derivations.
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.
To the equation of phenomenology and ontology,
Heidegger adds a third element, namely, HERMENEU-
TICS. In Sein und Zeit, at least in the published first
part, Heidegger addresses the question ofthe meaning
ofBeing through an analysis ofthe structure ofhuman
being, which Heidegger terms DASEIN. Since the mean-
ing of Being is to be examined through an explication
of the basic structure of the way Dasein understands
Being and the structures of Dasein's own existence,
Heidegger concludes that the concept of hermeneutic~
is also appropriate for phenomenology as he conceives
and practices it, since this explication proceeds as an
interpretation, indeed a self-interpretation, of Dasein
and its own activities: "Philosophy is universal pheno-
menological ontology, beginning with the hermeneutic
of Dasein, which as an analysis of existence has tied
the guiding thread ofphilosophical inquiry back to the
place where it arises and to which it returns."
In his endorsement of phenomenology as a formal
method for philosophy, Heidegger clearly sees him-
self following Husserl at this stage of his thinking. In
determining the extent to which his description of the
specific issue of phenomenology as ontology and of
hermeneutics as its point of departure represents a re-
vision or even a rejection of Husserl 's position, three
issues must be addressed, albeit here only briefly, be-
ginning with the question ( 1) whether the emphasis
upon Being as the central issue represents a rejec-
tion of Husserl's "transcendental turn" to coNSTITU-
TIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. The answer to this question is
closely related to and hinges upon the answer to an-
other, namely, (2) whether Oase in is just another name
for transcendental subjectivity. And, finally, there re-
mains the question (3) whether the turn back to pheno-
menology through an analysis of Dasein is not just
a reversion back to a kind of anthropologism, which
would undermine the a priori necessity of phenomen-
ology as a form of pure eidetic philosophy.
Regarding the first question, the controversy would
turn on the extent to which Being is either constituted
by or essentially related to human being. Certainly, at
least at this stage, Being can be a phenomenon only
if it is in some way accessible to us, i.e., only through
Dasein 's understanding ofBeing. So Heidegger clearly
cannot be rejecting Husserl 's tenet concerning the es-
sential relatedness of ali objects to subjectivity in some
form or other. And clearly at this stage, Heidegger
is not reducing Being to human being, since he ex-
hibits in Sein und Zeit a number of forms of being
(e.g., the readiness-to-hand ofuseful objects, the mere
presence-at-hand of objects in the attitude of modern
NATURAL SCIENCE) that are not identica! with human
being. So whether Heidegger would accept Husserl 's
mature view that transcendental EPOCHE AND REDUCTION
involves the reduction to structures revealed through
 MARTIN HEIDEGGER
the analysis of pure transcendental subjectivity as such
turns on the question ofthe differences between Dasein
and subjectivity.
This is the second question posed above. Whereas
transcendental subjectivity can easily be taken as a
kind of self-enclosed sphere with objects within it, Hei-
degger takes the Husserlian doctrine ofthe INTENTION-
ALITY of consciousness and emphasizes the openness,
the other-directedness of human existence that finds
itself not moving within an enclosed sphere, but al-
ways engaged with objects within the world wherein
one lives. Furthermore, the very notion of subjectivity
is closely connected with a theory of consciousness
as a self-enclosed, at least potentially completely self-
transparent sphere, one that has a theoretical awareness
of objects as its basic operation and then adds practi-
ca!, aesthetic, and moral values to them. Heidegger by
contrast stresses the way that objects emerge for us in
everyday life as permeated through and through by a
practica! relevance that does not emerge first and fore-
most in explicit propositions about them, but instead
is a part of the very way we encounter them from the
outset. Thus Dasein is not conceived of as a sphere of
self-certain theoretical awareness, but as a process of
practica! engagement with things that are interpreted
in terms of their relevance to Dasein's purposes. Just
as the structures of transcendental subjectivity prede-
lineate the framework for the possible objectivity of
objects, so too the basic structures ofDasein set up the
framework within which things can emerge for us in
the way they do. Yet the emphasis in the analysis ofDa-
sein is not upon reftection and theoretical awareness,
but upon the process of one's engaging in the activity
of everyday existence. Moreover, whereas Husserl's
stress upon the constructive ro le of subjectivity led to
charges of a revival of subjective idealism, Heideg-
ger's stress upon things appearing for us "as they are
in themselves" is meant to undercut such charges from
the outset.
The move from transcendental subjectivity to Da-
sein means that the transcendental phenomenological
reduction back to the sphere of pure consciousness is
no longer a core requirement of phenomenology for
Heidegger. But that does not mean that the notion of
reduction has become entirely superftuous, since the
analyses presented in Sein und Zeit clearly presuppose
whatever is necessary for eidetic method. This point is
301
also relevant for the answer to the third question posed
above. Ifthe analysis ofDasein consisted strictly in a
factual description of certa in characteristics of human
beings, the way they happen to organize their lives,
and the way that objects typically look to them de-
pending on how they perform this organization, then
Heidegger's analyses could not avoid the charge of
anthropologism that might be directed at them from a
Husserlian perspective (which is why many, including
Heidegger, took Husserl 's remarks in the 1931 public
lectures on "Phanomenologie und Anthropologie" as
criticisms of Heidegger's work).
However, what one finds is that Heidegger's analy-
ses are consistently aimed at revealing the structures of
human experience and the being ofvarious kinds of ob-
jects, and at showing how these two are essentially re-
lated. Specific examples are offered, but the method of
generalization is in each case not inductive, but eidetic.
Heidegger's analyses presuppose the method of eide-
tic variation since they are aimed at uncovering what
Husserl might have called essential interconnections
(Wesenszusammenhănge) and what Heidegger calls a
structure, essential constitution or composition ( Ver-
fassung), or condition. Thus since Heidegger's anal-
yses are aimed at uncovering such necessary features
of Dasein and its ramifications for the constitution of
Being in its many forms and as such, the analyses do
not fali under the charge of anthropologism as Husserl
would use the term, but they escape this charge only
by building on central insights and methods developed
within Husserlian phenomenology.
In addition to the rejection of the notion of tran-
scendental subjectivity as the ultimate ground for phi-
losophizing, Heidegger develops another position at a
very early stage that separates him from the Husserlian
practice of phenomenology. For Heidegger, system-
atic philosophy becomes the disclosure of fundamen-
tal structures of what there is and their modifications
and possible concretions through the phenomenologi-
cal method· of intuitive disclosure. However, at the
same time, when Heidegger points to the distortions
that prevent Being from emerging as a genuine phe-
nomenon for us, he draws from them the conclusion
that phenomenology must necessarily also involve his-
torical reftection. Failing to engage the history of phi-
losophy in an active way makes us captive to the dis-
tortions and concealments that have arisen over time.
302 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
The active confrontation with the history of philoso-
phy is thus the condition for the possibility of gaining
the proper access to the phenomenon at issue in phi-
losophy in two ways, one by helping us to come to see
the distortions and concealing factors as such, and in
addition by taking us back to the experiences that led to
this history in the first place, so that we contemporaries
might be in a better position to recapture these experi-
ences and perhaps gaina glimpse ofwhat inspired our
predecessors, especially the Greeks.
Thus phenomenology will also and inevitably in-
volve an element of destruction, an element of con-
fronting HISTORY, sifting through the sedimentations,
trying to get a glimpse once more of the phenomena
that inspired that history in the first place. Destruction
then involves two elements, first the negative task of
removing distortions, locating and eliminating false as-
sumptions that hide the phenomenon from view, and
then second the positive task ofleading one back to the
original experience of the phenomenon that is the ob-
ject ofphenomenology. From Heidegger's perspective,
it was, among other things, Husserl 's failure to take into
account this necessary element of phenomenology-his
failure to consider the historical determinacy of any
position, including that of the phenomenologist him-
or herself- that led him to repeat what Husserl had
recognized as Descartes's problem, namely, the un-
questioned adoption of too many assumptions from
the tradition that preceded him.
Scholars disagree over the extent to which Heideg-
ger abandoned phenomenology during his middle and
!ater periods in favor of a different approach to what
had traditionally been taken tobe the primary issues of
philosophy. As he begins to avoid the term "philoso-
phy," because it comes tobe seen as too closely identi-
fied with a specific metaphysical project, and moves to
the tit le of"thinking" for his own efforts, so too the term
"phenomenology" also recedes as a tit le for the proce-
dure ofthis thinking. Hence many have come to ques-
tion the degree to which Heidegger's work remains
phenomenological. To the extent that phenomenology
had been identified with the analysis of Dasein as the
fundamental task of philosophy in Sein und Zeit, the
shift away from analysis ofDasein toward the thinking
of the history of Being in the middle and !ater periods
can be seen as a shift away from phenomenology as
well.
Moreover, Heidegger begins to emphasize the role
of LANGUAGE after the Kehre. This is the turn ing away
from an analysis ofBeing by way of an analysis of Da-
sein in fa vor of an attempt to trace historical epochs of
Dasein and everything else back to the history of Be-
ing and the ways in which it has shown and concealed
itself throughout history. It may seem to signal a new
approach in which one is no longer oriented toward
seeing essences, but rather is responding to the address
of language itself. Furthermore, the insight into the in-
escapable element of concealment inherent in Being
itself calls into question the project of bringing com-
pletely to light something that will always essentially
ha ve a tendency to conceal itself, so that the attainabil-
ity of the original goal of phenomenology may also
seem to have been fundamentally misplaced.
There can be no doubt that as Heidegger's own
thinking continues to develop, the nature ofphenomen-
ology for him must at the very least be revised. Yet it is
important to note that even in Sein und Zeit, it was not
clear from the introduction whether the analysis of Da-
sein was tobe the sole task ofphenomenology or rather
an essential, but nonetheless provisional, mode of ac-
cess to the question ofthe meaning ofBeing as such. In
any case, certain essential features of the phenomen-
ological project in general remain central to Heideg-
ger's approach ali the way up to his final works. Four
deserve special mention.
( 1) Whether described as hearing or seeing, or as
in some places as being touched by Being, the expe-
rience first of the thinker and then of the audience of
Heidegger's writings remains an essential component
of his work. Most vividly perhaps in the essays on lan-
guage, Heidegger repeatedly stresses the importance of
having an experience with language, ofhearing a call.
His work sti li attempts to avoid artificial constructions,
abstract speculation, factual induction, or methodical
deduction from first principles in fa vor of allowing that
which is to show itself to us as it is, even if this takes
place only in the form ofthe withdrawal ofthat which
is. For here too it is not merely a matter oftalking about
this withdrawal or providing a metaphysical deduction
of it, but of experiencing it, of coming to see and hear
it in such a way as to transform our thinking, feeling,
and acting.
(2) Although the terminology of eidetic intuition
has long since been abandoned, nonetheless the way
 MARTIN HEIDEGGER
the works proceed is most often through the experi-
ence of a particular instance, a particular work of art or
a poem, a particular example of technology or social
policy, or a specific modern scientific development to
point out something broader, something more perva-
sive that is at work in a particular epoch and in ali ofthe
things that emerge within it. Moreover, these in turn
point to features of what Heidegger ca lis "the truth of
Being" (die Wahrheit des Se ins) or aletheia, "the clear-
ing" (die Lichtung), "the 'there is given"' (das "Es
gibt "), or "the event of appropriation" (das Ereignis).
In each of them certain enduring features about the
way they emerge will be identified, features that show
up in each of the epochs of the history of Being and
are reftected in everything there is. So although the
talk of an eidos disappears and there is an attempt to
address more radically what is meant by the Wesen or
way that something asserts its essence, the search for
certa in basic and enduring traits of what is persists.
(3) Heidegger's intensified concern with LANGUAGE
AFTER HUSSERL does not mitigate the issue-oriented
character of his thinking. Language itself becomes
an issue, and Heidegger now emphasizes how our re-
sponse to language affects the way things show them-
selves to us, but for him words never become mere
words. Language is a showing, a making apparent of
what language names and allows to emerge in a certain
light. Thus the emphasis upon language is never "mere
poetry," but rather an attentive hearing and seeing of
how things come to be present or absent for us.
(4) The nature ofTRUTH as revealing and concealing
does not mean that one should be content with allow-
ing forgottenness, distortion, and withdrawal to reign.
Rather, the very showing of forgottenness, distortion,
and withdrawal as such is meant to show something
about Being itself under the various names that Hei-
degger assigns it in his middle and !ater periods, and is
meant to make something apparent in a way that might
prepare for a change in how things present themselves
as a whole to us. Thus although the expectation of fu li
and final disclosure is abandoned, at least the move-
ment from an undetected distortion and withdrawal to
one that presents itself as such and thus paves the way
for a new awareness of Being as such remains part of
the impetus for thinking, an impetus not far from that
ofthe original phenomenological project.
It is therefore appropriate for one of Heideg-
303
ger's final published essays, "Mein Weg in die
Phănomenologie" ( 1963), to close with the li nes," ...
phenomenology in its most proper form is not a di-
rection. It is a possibility for thought that transforms
itself over time and thus remains, the possibility of
corresponding to that which claims us as what is to
be thought. If phenomenology is experienccd and re-
tained in this way, then it can disappear as a title in
favor of the issue for thinking, whose revelation re-
mains a mystery." Although the name might disappear,
phenomenology as a possibility to be striven after and
enacted remains up until the end in Heidegger's view
the way to respond to the issues for what bas tradition-
ally been called philosophy and Heidegger in his !ater
phases calls the thinking ofBeing.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ballard, Edward, and Charles Scott, eds. Martin Heidegger:
In Europe and America. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1973.
Biemel, Walter. "Husserls Encyclopaedia-Britannica Artikel
und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu." Tijdschrifi voor
Filosofie 12 ( 1950), 246-80; "Husserl 's Encyclopaedia
Britannica Article and Heidegger's Remarks Thereon."
Trans. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston. In
Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Ed. Frederick A. EI-
Iiston and Peter McCormick. Notre Dame, IN: University
ofNotre Dame Press, 1977, 286-305.
-. Martin Heidegger in Selhstzeugnissen und Bilddoku-
menten. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1973.
Heidegger, Martin. Die Grundprohleme der Phănomenolo­
gie. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herman. Gesamtaus-
gahe 24. Stuttgart: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975; Les
prohlemes fondamentaux de la phenomenologie. Trans.
Jean-Fran\=ois Courtine. Paris: Gallimard, 1985; Basic
Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- . Sein und Zeit. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herman.
Gesamtausgahe 2. Stuttgart: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977;
L 'etre et le temps. Trans. Fran\=ois Vezin, from the work of
Rudolf Boehm and Alphonse de Waelhens ( 1st part) and
Jean Lauxerois and Claude Roels (2nd part). Paris: Galli-
mard, 1994; Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- . Prolegomena zur Geschichte des ZeitbegrifJ~. Ed. Pe-
tra Jaeger. Gesamtausgahe 23. Stuttgart: Vittorio Kloster-
mann, 1979; The History of the Concept o{ Time. Trans.
Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1985.
- . [Letter.] In William Richardson. Heidegger: Through
Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1967, viii-xxix.
- . Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; On the
Way to Language. Trans. Peter Hertz. New York: Harper
& Row, 1971.
304 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
-. Zur Sache des Denkens. Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1969;
On Time and Being. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York:
Harper & Row, 1972.
-. Platons Sophistes. Ed. Ingeborg Schiiss1er. Gesamtaus-
gabe 19. Stuttgart: Vittorio K1osterrnann, 1992.
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger s "Being and
Time. "Berkeley: University ofCaliforia Press, 1993.
- , ed. Reading Heidegger from the Start. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1994.
Kockelmans, Joseph, ed. A Companion to Martin Heideg-
ger s "Being and Time. " Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced research in Phenomenology/University Press of
America, 1986.
Marx, Wemer. Heidegger und die Tradition. Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1961; Heidegger and the Tradition. Trans.
Theodore Kisiel and Murray Green. Evanston, IL: North-
westem University Press, 1971.
Poggeler, Otto. Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullin-
gen: Neske, 1963; Martin Heidegger s Path of Thinking.
Trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Bamer. Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987.
- , ed. Heidegger. Koln: Kiepenhauer & Wisch, 1969.
Sallis, John, ed. Reading Heidegger: Commemorations.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Schiirrnann, Reiner. Le principe d'anarchie: Heidegger et la
question de 1'agir. Paris: Seuil, 1982; Heidegger on Being
and Acting: from Principles to Anarchy. Trans. Christine-
Marie Gros. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1987.
Taminiaux, Jacques. "From the Idea of Phenomenology to
the Other." In his Heidegger and the Project of Funda-
mental Ontology. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1991, 1-54.
Sass, Hans-Martin. Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and
Glossary. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documenta-
tion Center, 1982.
Volpi, Franco, et al., eds. Heidegger et /'idee de la
phenomenologie. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 1988.
von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. Der Begriff der
Phiinomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl. Frankfurt
am Main: Vittorio Klosterrnann, 1981.
- . Subjekt und Dasein. Interpretationen zu "Sein und Zeit. "
Frankfurt am Main: Klosterrnann, 1974.
THOMAS NENON
University of Memphis
HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY The
phenomenology that emerged in EDMUND HUSSERL's
Logische Untersuchungen (1900-190 1), and that
was given programmatic statement in his Jdeen zu
einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomenologische
Philosophie J ( 1913), was not only a philosophy in its
own right, but had the power to evoke severa! suc-
cessors, including hermeneutica! phenomenology. In
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
1900-1901, Husserl showed that our mental acts of
perceiving, thinking, and imagining already possess
MEANING prior to their being expressed in propositional
form, and that they impress their mark, their meaning,
upon the propositions. These "intentiona!" acts, for in-
stance, grasp a phenomenon according to some univer-
sal species; grasp it as a thing or an attribute, ora com-
posite; define it as possible or actual. Husserl pointed
out that in these intentiona! acts, consciousness is detin-
ing an interpretative meaning (Aujfassungssinn) ofits
data. Although we see an anticipation of hermeneu-
tica! phenomenology in this doctrine, neither the Un-
tersuchungen nor !ater works of Husserl can be said
to exemplify hermeneutica! phenomenology in a strict
sense.
AII phenomenology thematizes human awareness,
differentiating the many forms our awareness may take
(PERCEPTION, MEMORY, etc.), investigating whether and
how a form of awareness may be cognitive, exploring
the connection ofawareness to object, etc. But Husserl
claimed that the phenomenologist could gain access
to consciousness and its many intentiona! formations
by way of a primordial intuition (Anschauung) that
presented consciousness as well as its intentiona! ob-
ject as it was in itself- as he said: die Sac hen selbst.
Thus his phenomenology was intuitionistic. Moreover,
his phenomenology sought to go behind language to a
pre-linguistic mentallife; neither for mental life itself
nor for the phenomenological study of it was the syn-
tax or the semantics of language essential. So it was
mentalistic. Consciousness and its formations possess
their essential features quite in advance of the linguis-
tic utterances that express them. Husserl 's was also
a foundational kind of philosophy, with an acknowl-
edged affinity to Cartesianism.
Phenomenology became hermeneutica! when it ar-
gued that every form of human awareness is interpre-
ti ve, when it was not content to regard interpretation
as just one specific form of awareness directed to one
particular range of objects- for instance, texts. If al!
the intentions of our perception and IMAGINATION are al-
ready marked through and through by LANGUAGE, and,
moreover, if the phenomenologist him- or herself can
no longer claim an intuitive access to mental life, but
is always interpreting it, then we are in HERMENEUTICS.
This mutation of phenomenology was inaugurated by
one book, MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's Sein und Zeit (1927),
 HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
though further developments were still to come.
Characteristically, Heidegger's methodological ex-
position in §7 is already a bit of hermeneutics, an in-
terpretation ofthe Greek language. "Phenomenology"
means: logos of the phainomenon. The phainomenon
is that which makes itself manifest and logos is the
power in a word or in a discourse that makes something
manifest. Phenomenology accordingly is a practice of
making something manifest that is in one way already
manifest, and yet that is in another way stiH concealed,
in need of further manifestation through a logos. And
this phainomenon is Being; ordinary beings or entities
are manifest enough to us, but the being of beings -
what it is to be - is partially manifest and partially
hidden. Heidegger conceived of phenomenology as a
method, a method for ontologica! study (study of the
being of beings) and the first reason why phenomen-
ology is hermeneutica! is that it focuses on something
that is and remains both concealed and unconcealed.
In such a case, its practice is interpretation.
Sein und Zeit uses the capitalized Latin-based word
Interpretation for phenomenological researches into
Being and such related structures as TIME, TRUTH, and so
on. Being is not merely an intellectual notion, category,
or form, as the tradition tended to treat it; rather, it
is an actual phenomenon disclosed to us in our life,
manifested to us through actual experiences such as
authenticity, death, and care - a phenomenon that
beckons to us and yet retreats from us as well.
A second reason why phenomenology may become
hermeneutica! is that the human being comes to take on
a central ro le. This particular being, ourselves (Heideg-
ger calls us DASEIN), already possesses an understand-
ing of Being (Seinsverstiindnis), though it is a shad-
owy and vague one in which Being remains largely
hidden from view. Philosophy is to interpret to DASEIN
the "meaning" of Being as such, but, just the same,
the meaning of Being is already grasped by Dasein to
some limited degree. Philosophy's interpretations de-
pend on the pre-ontological understanding of Being
that everyone possesses. Heidegger's phenomenology
can never be without presuppositions ( voraussetzungs-
los) as Husserl 's aspired to be. It cannot analyze Ee-
ing and the "phenomena" that accompany it - time,
truth, humanity itself- starting from scratch with an
EPOCHE AND REDUCT!ON or a first principle of reason.
Philosophy must not only address itselfto our quotid-
305
ian understanding, it will even gain some insights from
it.
Phenomenology may become hermeneutica! for a
further reason. Not only is it addressed to Dasein, but
Sein und Zeit is a study of Dasein. It consists of a
"hermeneutic of Dasein" because it cannot proceed
by any intuition of consciousness or of its intentiona!
states, and this is owing to the character of our be-
ing. Intuition is an immediate presence, but Dasein can
never be purely present in any relation, not even to
itself. Dasein must be interpreted, just as the phain-
omenon of Being must be, because by its very way
of being, it resists being made present. Heidegger's
foca! topic, the being of Dasein, is interwoven with
nonbeing. Dasein's self-distancing- he also calls it
ekstasis- and transcendence is climactically realized
as being-toward-death; we exist precisely as we are
losing existence.
There is a further hermeneutica! aspect of Heideg-
ger's work. Lying at the center of his study of Da-
sein is the phenomenon of Auslegung, treated in §32,
the interpretation that is practiced in everyone's daily
life. Auslegung proves to be the basis of the possi-
bility of the pre-ontological Seinsverstiindnis that ev-
eryone possesses, and likewise of the philosopher's
ontologica! Interpretation that builds further upon it.
In the ontologica! structure of Dasein this Auslegung
is the point at which the import of hermeneutics for
the phenomenological theory of knowledge and con-
sciousness is most apparent: interpretation is estab-
lished in place of the Cartesian and Husserlian themes
of consciousness and perception, themes that are absent
from Sein und Zeit because they have been supplanted
atjust this point. All Auslegung has a "fore"-structure,
i.e., always implements presuppositions, and it has an
"as"-structure, i.e., invariably finds meaning in what
it experiences. Again, just as Heidegger makes TIME a
central component in human being (which is expressed
in the title of the book), so he establishes the histor-
ical character of Dasein 's temporality, which brings
the implication that a given generation can only live
by a self-interpretation that makes reference back to
earlier generations (§74). In accord with that histori-
cality is the nature of philosophical analysis itself-
it can never proceed separately from the retrieval and
interpretation of past philosophical writing (§6). In-
terpretations of Aristotle, KANT, and others will never
306 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
be merely supplementary, but central: they will be ger-
mane to ali Heidegger 's philosophizing. The words and
statements ofhis phenomenology will not abandon past
philosophy, but conserve, deconstruct, and interpret it,
preserving the "force of the most elemental words in
which Dasein has expressed itself."
Yet Sein und Zeit does not carry out a hermeneu-
tica! shift completely and consistently. Its account of
discourse (Rede) and language (Sprache) remains fun-
damentally in accord with Husserl's doctrine of the
intentiona! act that subsequently becomes expressed in
a linguistic form. Heidegger does not, therefore, show
a linguistic constitution for everyone's understanding,
interpretation, and articulation of meaning. For that
reason, there is no evidence of a social and historical
matrix for Dasein 's disclosedness and awareness- it
is as ifthe individual achieved disclosure ali alone, and
as if Dasein 's disclosure was always of the same type
in every epoch and every civilization.
In the years and decades after Sein und Zeit, Heideg-
ger tended less and less to use programmatic titles such
as "phenomenoJogy," "FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY," and
"hermeneutics," and for that reason commentators are
sometimes loath to bring the !ater works under such
headings. This is connected with the question of the
"tuming," the Kehre, that was inaugurated in his !ater
work. It is a controversy in the interpretation of Hei-
degger whether a major rupture was brought about, or
whether the continuity ofthought is stronger. One fea-
ture that cannot be denied is that the interpretation of
poetic works as well as interpretations ofpre-Socratic,
classical, and modern philosophers looms very large,
so that the !ater work is "hermeneutica!" through and
through in the original Greek sense of the word (see
Sein und Zeit, §7c), which signified the very practice
of making interpretations. And in the course of many
of these interpretations- whether of Holderlin, Trakl,
or Stefan George; of Heraclitus, Kant, or Nietzsche-
Heidegger delivered himself ofmany thoughts bearing
on "hermeneutics" in the modern sense of the word:
theoretical thoughts regarding the con duct of interpre-
tation.
He sharply criticized antiquarian scholarship that
failed to appreciate how the poet's concern, or the
philosopher's idea, has bearing also upon ourselves
in our own time. His gift of reading was to make the
"matters themselves" that were treated in the poem or
the treatise-das Gedichtete and das Gedachte-Iiv-
ing and actual for the current generation. Yet precisely
where Heidegger's readings were "hermeneutica!" in
just this way, they were also "phenomenological," for
such interpretations could bring the audience to see
for themselves the "matters themselves" that had moti-
vated the writing. Heidegger also sought often, partic-
ularly in the study of philosophers' texts, to bring to the
fore that which was "unthought"- das Ungedachte
-in the work in question; thus these studies are indeed
phenomenological in the sense ofthe term that he had
defined in Sein und Zeit.
These !ater works do reveal the linguistic character
of ali Dasein 's disclosures, and the epochal, historical
character of each form of understanding, so, although
they rarely use the term "hermeneutics," they complete
the mutation that was begun in Sein und Zeit.
Heidegger attained great influence in GERMANY, first
through the explicit phenomenological work of the
1920s, then through the work of the 1940s and 1950s
that was implicitly phenomenological. The particular
heritage of hermeneutica! phenomenology was taken
up and given a distinctive profile by his student, HANS-
GEORG GAD AMER. Gadamer was a classical scholar who,
during the 1920s, sought to interpret Plato 's work by
way of modem phenomenology- his viewpoint was
thus that ofphenomenology, even as the practice itself
was hermeneutics. His study ofthe Philebus, published
in 1931-Platons dialektische Ethik-was described
in the subtitle as a phenomenological interpretation.
Gadamer shows us that dialogue, or dialectic, both as
we see it in the work of Plato and in the nature of
the matter itself (die Sache), has an ethical root in the
openness of one speaker to another. Hermeneutics is
thereby given an ethical twist, and phenomenology an
intersubjective twist, which will remain characteristic
of ali his work up to and beyond his magnum opus,
Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and method, 1960). This
is described in its subtitle as "Outlines of a Philosoph-
ical Hermeneutics," i.e., a comprehensive theory of
understanding and interpretation. The prototype of in-
terpretation is, as before, in the Greek ethical principle
of moral wisdom, phronesis. No interpreter can pro-
ceed alone. Each is always under the guidance of the
horizon fumished by the language of his or her own
community, and the history ofthat community's tradi-
tions.
 HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Philosophical henneneutics is no handbook for
practice, but the investigation of the grounds of the
possibility for practice: the linguistic character of a
text, the history of its prior interpretations and effects,
the linguistic character ofthe interpreter's own projec-
tions and reflections, and so on. Gadamer's theory is
phenomenological in both a narrow sense and a broader
sense: it is explicitly indebted to Husserl 's INTENTIONAL-
ITY and Heidegger 's teachings on LANGUAGE and TRUTH;
more broadly, it maintains that interpretation is fulfilled
by letting the Sache, the subject matter treated in the
interpreted text, carne to appearance. Through many
lectures and writings, Gadamer introduced a German
public and a world public to central issues in pheno-
menology, hermeneutics, and their sources in the West-
ern tradition.
Along with Gadamer, it is the French philosopher
PAUL RICCEUR who has contributed most to making
hermeneutics known in the world at large. Though
he began as a Husserl translator and interpreter, his
work from the 1960s onward tended to move away
from phenomenology toward a philosophy of lan-
guage, promoting the encounter between hermeneutics
and other traditions in the philosophy oflanguage such
as French structuralism and Anglo-American "ORDI-
NARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS." This work of mediation is
well represented in Le conflit des interpretations ( 1969)
and Temps et n?cit (1983). There are other currents
in modern hermeneutics that have a tenuous connec-
tion at best with phenomenology, such as Hans Robert
Jauss's Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneu-
tics (1977), and such works fali outside this survey.
Hermeneutica! phenomenology made considerable
headway in the English-speaking world from the 1970s
onward both in terms ofscholarship and in terms of new
philosophical perspectives. As the works of Husserl,
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricceur, and others became avail-
able in translation, there appeared many books and ar-
ticles in English devoted to their work. At the same
time, English-language philosophers continued to de-
velop this form of thought by exercising it in severa!
domains of philosophy.
CALVIN O. SCHRAG, beginning with his 1969 Experi-
ence and Being, has developed a philosophy of lan-
guage out ofthe tradition of hermeneutica! phenomen-
ology. In the philosophy of NATURAL SCIENCE, there ha ve
been studies both phenomenological and hermeneuti-
307
cal in character, such as the work of .JOSEPH .1. KOCK-
ELMANS. He has published many studies showing the
import of Husserl and Heidegger for physics, and his
teaching and lectures on problems such as scientific
realism and truth in science have become influen-
tial. In cooperation with THEODORE KISIEL, he edited
Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences in 1970.
PATRICK HEELAN draws upon both phenomenology and
hermeneutics in order to deal with scientific hypothe-
ses and experimentation; in Space-Perception and
the Philosophy of Science (1983), he links the sci-
ences to perception and its cultural conditions. GRAEME
NICHOLSON has also treated the philosophy of percep-
tion hermeneutically and phenomenologically in See-
ing and Reading (1984), and his 1992 Illustrations of
Being develops the consequences for ontology of the
principle of aur pre-ontological understanding of Be-
ing.
The discipline of phenomenological analysis and
the suppleness of hermeneutica! reflection may con-
tinue to nourish each other in the decades to come.
AESTHETICS, ETHICS, LAW, and RELIGION are certainly do-
mains of philosophical thought - in addition to the
philosophy of science, perception, language, and on-
tology- where this tradition may yet ha ve great con-
tributions to make.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Derrida, Jacques. La voix et le plu?nomene. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967; Speech and Phenomena.
Trans. David Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
Heidegger, Martin. Erlauterungen zu Ho/derlins Dichtung.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1951.
- . Vortri.ige und Aufsi.itze. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954.
- . Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; On the
Way ta Language. Trans. Joan Stambaugh and Peter Hertz.
New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger.~ Being and
Time. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Kockelmans, Joseph. Heidegger and Science. Lanham,
MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1985.
- . Ideas for a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of the Natural
Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
Palmer, Richard. Hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1969.
Poggler, Otto. Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen:
Neske, 1963; Martin Heidegger:~ Path ofThinking. Trans.
Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber. Atlantic High-
lands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987.
308 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Ricreur, Paul. La metaphore vive. Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1975; The Rufe o{ Metaphor. Trans. Michael Czerny.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
GRAEME NICHOLSON
University o{ Toronto
HERMENEUTICS Hermeneutics is used in
four different senses. According to the oldest sense
it is the methodology of the interpretation of texts.
According to the second sense it is the general theory
ofunderstanding. According to the third sense it is the
fundamental-ontologica! interpretation (Aus!egung) of
Being. The fourth sense restricts hermeneutics to the
hermeneutics of symbols, a dimension reaching into
the latent and unconscious.
Hermeneutics in the first sense was already known
in antiquity under the name "the art of grammar." This
art included grammar in the narrower sense but also
other guidelines for the professional interpretation of
texts. Mastery ofthis art leads to the universal wisdom
ofphilology. Philology includes rhetoric, the art ofthe
application ofthis wisdom, and vice versa. The church
fathers called the art of grammar "hermeneutics" and
used its guidelines for the interpretation of the Scrip-
tures, but added guidelines for the understanding of
their "higher meaning."
The development of modern methodical hermeneu-
tics starts with a new principle introduced in Protestant
hermeneutics. This principle, !ater called by Schleier-
macher (1768-1834) the first canon of hermeneutics,
demands that a text has to be understood in the context
of its contemporary readers and not in the context of
the interpreter, because the meaning of the text, origi-
nally clear for contemporary readers, can be darkened
and corrupted by tradition. Classical philologists in the
19th century, such as August Boeckh ( 1785-1867), de-
veloped refined hermeneutica! systems. It is their main
merit to have removed the ambiguities in Schleierma-
cher's formulations of the second canon of hermeneu-
tics. This canon demands that the understanding ofthe
whole ofthe text presupposes the understanding ofthe
parts and vice versa, which is called the "hermeneuti-
ca) circ le." This principle is older than the principle of
the first canon and can be traced back to antiquity. The
basic thesis of the methodologists of the 19th century
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. C/aude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
was that the MEANING of the parts is alrcady partially
determined by the "whole" ofthe language ofthe time
and the "whole" of the context of the text. To inter-
pret parts of the texts referring to wholes of this kind
in the "lower hermeneutics" is precisely what the first
canon requires. In the interpretation of style in higher
hermeneutics the whole is the whole of an ensemble
oftexts ofthe author(s) tobe studied by comparative
methods. The whole ofthe text occurs only on the level
of "generic hermeneutics," which interprets the liter-
ary genre and with it the purpose or intention of the
author(s).
Methodical hermeneutics has a hierarchy of lev-
els. The work of the lower levels is presupposed
on the higher levels and assumptions on the higher
levels clashing with the results of the lower levels
must be rejected. Violations of this methodical prin-
ciple lead to vicious circularities. The methodologists
never claimed they understand by method a Cartesian
method leading to the discovery of"the" true interpre-
tation. Rather, the method eliminates errors; it falsi-
fies. Hermeneutica! methodology is furthermore crit-
ica! in the Kantian sense. It determines the limits of
the method. The limits occur on the level of generic
interpretation and critique.
The method also demands that the work of inter-
pretation and the work of critique must be separated.
Especially on the generic level the interpretation must
be done prior to and without presupposing the results
of higher critique, i.e., the answers to the questions of
whether the text has attained its purpose and is true
in this sense. These rules cannot be applied in case
of the work of the genius, the eminent text. The stan-
dard for critique can only be found by means of the
interpretation of the eminent text. Thus the circle of
interpretation and critique, meaning and truth, cannot
be methodologically dissolved in such cases.
Recent literature on "traditional" hermeneutics is
written from the viewpoint of the third or fourth
sense of hermeneutics, i.e., without being interested
in method or else having an interest in other methods.
No real account for the rules and claims ofthe method-
ologists is given. A phenomenological account of the
method presupposes a correct presentation.
Hermeneutics as a general theory of understand-
ing can be treated as a branch of phenomenology. The
first task of an epistemology of the human sciences
 HERMENEUTICS
is the classification of the human sciences. WILHELM
DILTIIEY distinguished .\ystematic HUMAN SCIENCES, e.g.,
ECONOMICS, POLITIC AL SCIENCE, LAW, and SOCIOLOGY, and
the historical-philologica lhuman sciences. The under-
standing of HISTORY and its function in the human sci-
ences is crucial. History has to apply the results of
the systematic human sciences, but it also provides
new material for their further development. History is
thus not restricted to the interpretation ofwritten doc-
uments, but investigates ali traces ofhuman activities,
i.e., tools, buildings, works of fine art, and other archae-
ological remains. The modern conception ofhistory is
essentially governed by a modified vers ion of the first
canon. Foreign cultures and the past must be treated as
self-centered and must be each understood in its own
context.
The second task of the epistemology of the human
sciences is a general theory of understanding. This
theory wili be a phenomenological theory if the fol-
lowing requirements are fulfilied. ( 1) The search for
causal laws, indispensable for the natural sciences, is
not of basic significance for the human sciences. (2)
The method is descriptive and interested in types and
structures of lived experience. (3) Lived experience is
not an experience of an in ner private realm but implies
as an essential factor the givenness of other persons
and cultural objects. Dilthey's general theory of un-
derstanding fulfilis these requirements. Dilthey never
calied his general theory ofunderstanding "hermeneu-
tics." Hermeneutics for him is methodical hermeneu-
tics. The general theory of understanding was calied
hermeneutics only in the literature ofthe second decade
of our century. Dilthey considered EDMUND HUSSERL 's
Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901) as a part ofhis
own research program and !ater calied his own descrip-
tions phenomenological. Husserl, after his criticism of
historical relativism in "Philosophie als strenge Wis-
senschaft" ( 1911 ), changed his evaluation of Dilthey.
His own contributions to the epistemology of the hu-
man sciences and a general theory of understanding
in the ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie Il [ 1912-15] and
Phiinomeno/ogische P.l~\·chologie [ 1925] are exp1ica-
tions ofbasic concepts of Di1they in terms of Husserl 's
own phenomeno1ogica1 system. He even said that
Dilthey's idea of a universal human science, if reflect-
ing its own presuppositions, immediately leads to tran-
309
scendental phenomenology. MARTIN HEIDEGGER intro-
duced the third sense ofhermeneutics as the hermeneu-
tics of Being. Hermeneutics in this sense presupposes
the ontologica! difference between Being (Sein) and
beings (das Seiende). The only link between the sec-
ond and the third sense is the role of linguistical-
ity in Heidegger's FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY. The Jink
still exists after Heidegger abandoned hermeneutics
and HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY together with the
hermeneutica! circle as concepts that are stili too for-
mal for his enterprise. HANS-GEORG GADAMER 's critique
ofmethodical hermeneutics and hermeneutics as a gen-
eral theory of understanding finds its ultimate ground-
ing in the principle of 1inguisticality. Already Heideg-
ger's move toward the ontologica] difference implies
a rejection of phenomenology. A hermeneutics of Be-
ing in the medium of 1inguisticality has to cover ali
understanding, including NATURAL SCIENCES. Methodi-
ca] hermeneutics as such is not interesting from such
a viewpoint. Seen from the higher viewpoint of lin-
guisticality, methodical hermeneutics and methodical
approaches in the human sciences are deficient modes
ofunderstanding.It is necessary to criticize their inau-
thenticity.
Hermeneutics in the fourth sense was developed by
PAUL RICCEUR in his investigations of interpretation in
PSYCHOANALYSIS and the hermeneutics ofsymbols. Both
be1ong to the hermeneutics ofthe latent. A hermeneu-
tics ofthe latent deals with a latent that is also latent for
phenomenology. There are reasons for the rejection of
this thesis, but the discussion ofthis problem belongs to
the phenomenology of the unconscious and to psycho-
analysis, and not to a phenomenology ofhermeneutics.
Investigations belonging to phenomenological rsv-
CHOLOGY do not presuppose the transcendenta1-pheno-
menological reduction. It is also not necessary to show
that the structures under investigation are a priori and
relate to the EIDETIC METHOD in the phenomenological
sense. The same holds for a general theory of under-
standing that is phenomenological.
Dilthey distinguished clementa!)' understanding
and higher understanding. Elementary understanding
happens in ali social interactions. What is understood
is not the other person, but this interaction and its goals.
The understanding is not restricted to the understand-
ing oflinguistic expressions. The understanding ofthe
actions of the body of the other and the use of tools
310 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
one-sidedly found linguistic expressions. Higher un-
derstanding presupposes that the understanding per-
sons interrupt their involvement in interaction and take
time to understand a whole context of life expressions
and their meaning and significance. The goal ofhigher
understanding is the understanding of the life-nexus
or connectedness of life (Zusammenhang des Lebens).
The structure ofnME, known immediately in the expe-
rience of ourselves, is the basic presupposed structure.
The understanding of one's own life history, and its
meaning and significance for the understanding person,
is the basic model. The underlying temporal structure
is, in Husserl's terminology, "appresented" in the un-
derstanding of other persons and their situations and
life histories as a variant (Modifikation) of ourselves.
Higher understanding can also be directed toward the
sequence oflife expressions in the work ofart.lt is not
the author ofthe work of art who is understood, but the
work ofart as an expression oflife.
Finally, higher understanding can be interested in
the intersubjective structures of elementary under-
standing in its different dimensions - family, econ-
omy, law, and politica! power. The phenomenological
analysis of the different dimensions is an analysis of
the basic concepts guiding the systematic human sci-
ences. The understanding of fixed life expressions on
the linguistic level of texts and on the pre-linguistic
level of tools, buildings, paintings, and sculpture, to
the extent to which they represent past connectedness
oflife, is the realm ofthe methodical understanding of
the historical human sciences. Dilthey recognizes the
work of the methodologists, but adds two viewpoints.
First, lower hermeneutics has the preparatorytask ofre-
constructing the linguistic and the historical context of
fixed life expressions in the past and in foreign cultures.
It is the work demanded by the first canon. The work
of higher understanding is the real task of hermeneu-
tics. It presupposes method but in addition a divinatory
element leading to the hermeneutic correspondence be-
tween interpreter and text. Empathy is already required
for a successful elementary understanding. The ability
of emphathy is a divine gift, a talent. Some ha ve this
talent in a very high degree. Successful work in higher
hermeneutics requires not only methodical skills but
an outstanding talent for empathy. Second, the study of
effective connectedness, !ater called effective history
(Wirkungsgeschichte), is tobe added, i.e., the history
of the interpretation and application of fixed life ex-
pressions in the tradition- e.g., Shakespeare 's plays,
Newton 's physics, Kant's Critique, the New Testament,
the Forum Romanum, the White House.
The material-ontologica! region of cultural objects
and the general structures of the life environment
(Lebensumwelt) or LIFEWORLD (Lebenswelt) is, accord-
ing to Husserl, the region of the human sciences. He
gives general hints about the system ofthe human sci-
ences and the task of phenomenological research in
this field. The references to Dilthey indicate that he
considered Dilthey's work as a major achievement. He
also shares Dilthey's view that phenomenological psy-
chology is the basic discipline ofthe human sciences.
Husserl 's ma in contribution to the general theory of
understanding is his analysis of INTERSUBJECTIVITY and
the givenness of the other. Though he developed this
theory in his published work only in the framework of
transcendental phenomerwlogy, it can be considered on
the level of a mundane phenomenology without fac ing
the problem of solipsism. The givenness of the other
originally occurs in the animal realm and the givenness
of objects in the proper sense, including cultural ob-
jects, is founded in the givenness of other persons. The
structures of this givenness are the condition for the
passive associative appresentation of the other as an-
other living BODY. That the other is appresented means
that the experience ofthe other cannot be given in orig-
inal EVIDENCE forme. It occurs as a transcendence in the
immanence, as an absence that will never be present as
such. I am bound to my own body and cannot have the
experience of the other person in his or her own body.
Understanding starts with elementary understanding.
The other person is given as a variant (Modifikation)
ofmyselfin his or her interactions with me. The devel-
opment of forms of higher understanding is sketched
out by Husserl in the fifth ofhis Cartesianische Medita-
tionen [ 1931] and the manuscripts on intersubjectivity.
The presupposition of ali predicative linguistic un-
derstanding is the givenness of the other and the
elementary understanding of the other on the pre-
predicative level. Seen from the viewpoint of FORMAL
AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY, the animal region for itseJf
is given only after performing an abstractive reduction
in the lifeworld. Seen from the viewpoint of GENETIC
PHENOMENOLOGY, the givenness ofthe other on the ani-
mallevel is one-sidedly founding for the givenness of
 HERMENEUTICS
the cultural objects in the lifeworld. Husserl's general
theory of understanding is thus opposed to the turn to
pure linguisticality. He recognizes what in other theo-
ries is called the "material" conditions of understand-
ing. It is an explication of Dilthey's thesis that objec-
tifications of life always imply nature in the sense in
which nature is given in cultural contexts. Husserl's
theory is furthermore in accordance with independent
investigations of other phenomenologists such as ARON
GURWITSCH, ALFRED SCHUTZ, and aJso MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY. Schutz's work is the main phenomenological
contribution to a general theory of the systematic hu-
man sciences.
Phenomenological investigations concerning me-
thodical hermeneutics have to presuppose the general
phenomenological theory of understanding and inter-
subjectivity, but in addition they ha veto deal with spe-
cific questions. The differences in the structures of oral
and written discourse have to be analyzed. Such an
analysis leads to the difference between life expres-
sions bound to the temporal phase in which they occur
and fixed life expressions that can be given as the same
again in different phases oftime. Method presupposes
fixed life expressions, fixed discourse. What Husserl
said about writing as a presupposition for the origin of
geometry is useful in this respect. Some observations of
.IACQUES DERRIDA and others can be taken into account
as well after bracketing their speculative background.
The second problem is the difference of a literary
tradition with and without methodical hermeneutics.
Gadamer's theses about effective history, the priority
of the lived tradition, and the impossibility of inter-
preters to reflect on themselves outside the context of
the historicity of lived tradition can be derived from
the phenomenology of the time of lived experience.
His theses about linguisticality, however, are not ac-
ceptable from a phenomenological point of view. A
phenomenological account ofunderstanding is also in-
terested in method. It has to analyze the "unclear ide-
alizations" underlying the method. Every methodical
discipline, every science, presupposes specific ideal-
izations and abstractive reductions. The idealization of
methodical hermeneutics is given with the decision to
consider a past, represented in a fixed life expression,
as a past present. The abstractive reduction brackets
the fact that the fu ture ofthis pastisa past for the inter-
preter's present. Bracketing the future horizon of the
311
past present means that ali assumptions about meaning
and significance in the future horizon must be rejected
ifthey are incompatible with contents in the context of
the past present.
The abstractive reduction also brackets application,
because application happens in the present of the in-
terpreter. Interpretations and applications ofthe text in
its fu ture horizon can be studied methodically if their
past present is considered under the reduction. The re-
suit is a methodical study of the efficient history of
a text. The abstractive reduction and idealization do
not imply that interpreters reflect on themselves out-
side the lived tradition. The scientist performing his or
her specific abstractive reductions does not and cannot
leave the lifeworld either. Already Dilthey insists that
the research of the human sciences has significance
only if applied to the present self-understanding of the
tradition.
The next task is a phenomenological account ofthe
genesis of methodical hermeneutics. It is essential to
recognize that positive application of a tradition is al-
ways accompanied in complex literary traditions by
rejections and repressions of parts of the tradition as
false. To apply the Christian tradition means to reject
the Jewish and Hellenistic traditions. Dilthey's invcs-
tigations have shown that the first canon is the result
of reflecting on a specific situation in which a long
tradition of the interpretation of a group of texts sti il
recognized as true is rejected as false. A phenomen-
ological analysis of the genesis of pre-methodical and
methodical hermeneutics has to analyze the structures
of the interplay of application and rejection and the
different rules for a scholarly treatment of texts in the
literary tradition connected with them. Different types
of hermeneutica! consciousness, i.e., attitudes of con-
sciousness toward tradition, and their genesis must be
distinguished. The part-whole relation of the second
canon will be of significance in this respect. A pheno-
menological theory ofparts and wholes can be used to
analyze the different part-whole relations occurring in
pre-methodical and methodical hermeneutica! proce-
dures.
Other problems occur in the interpretation of fixed
life expressions not connected with written discourse of
the time. The possibilities and limits ofthe understand-
ing of such traces need clarification. The application
of methods grounded in certain results of the natural
312 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
sciences also requires phenomenological clarification.
The basic question concerns how nature is a necessary
and indispensable part of the cultural world and the
lifeworld.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Boeckh, August. Enzyklopădie und Methodenlehre der
philologischen Wissenschaften [1877/86]. Ed. Ernst Bra-
tuschek. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1966 (reprint); abridged trans.
as On Interpretation and Criticism. Trans. Jean Paul
Prichard. Norman, Oklahoma: University Press, 1968.
Dithey, Wilhelm. Der Aufhau der geschichtlichen Welt in den
Geisteswissenschafien. Gesammelte Schrijien 1, 1914.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. 2nd. ed.
Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965; Truth and Method. Trans.
Garrct Bardcn and John Cumrning. New York: Seabury
Press, 1975.
Husserl, Edmund. Phănomenologische P.1ychologie. Ed.
Walter Bicmel. Husserliana 9. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962; 2nd rev. ed. 1968; Phenomenological Psy-
chology: Lectures, Summer Semeste1; 1925. Trans. John
Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- . Zur Phănomenologie der Jntersuhjektivităt. 3 vo1s. Ed.
Iso Kern. Husserliana 13-15 Dordrecht: K1uwer, 1973.
Mohanty, Jitcndra Nath, ed. Phenomenology and the Human
Sciences. The Hague: Martnius Nijhoff, 1985.
Orth, Ernst Wolfgang, ed. Dilthey und die Philosophie der
Gegenwart. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1985.
Ricceur, Paul. Le conflit des inte1pretations: Essais
d 'hernu!neutique. Paris: Editions du Seu il, 1969; The Con-
flict o( lnte1pretations. Trans. Don Ihde. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1974.
Seebohm, Thomas M. Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Ver-
nunft. Bonn: Bouvier, 1972.
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
UniversitătMainz
HISTORY In order to understand the complex
relationship between phenomenology and history, the
best place to begin is doubtless EDMUND HUSSERL 's essay
"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ). Husserl
stands ready to unveil the "phenomenological grasp of
essence" (die phanomenologische Wesense1jassung) as
the culmination ofthe EIDETIC METHOD that will enable
philosophy to be at last what is has always wanted
but has so far failed to be: strict or rigorous science.
But readers are told very little there about that method;
they will have to wait for the ldeen zu einer reinen
Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philoso-
phie l ( 1913 ). Instead, the essay is polemic, deal ing
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
primarily with what Husserl considers the two greatest
threats in his day to the ideal of philosophy as rigor-
ous science and its realization. The first is "naturalistic
philosophy," which "falsifies" the ideal, i.e., pursues
the idea of rigor in the wrong way; and the second is
"historicism and Weltanschauungsphilosophie,"which
"weakens" and ultimately calls into question the pur-
suit ofthe ideal altogether.
In the latter case, some philosophers look at the his-
tory of thought and only see a series of failed attempts
to ascertain eterna! truth. With this assessment Husserl
wholeheartedly agrees. But then they move from that
to the conclusion that philosophy can never be more
than the expression of the Weltanschauung of its eul-
ture and its historical period. (Though he does not say
so directly, Husserl implicates WILHELM DILTHEY in this
move.) For Husserl this is an invalid inference and an
instance ofthe self-refuting relativism he had attacked
in the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-190 1). Philos-
ophy should stop mulling over its own past and get
on with its task. The history of philosophy is fine as
a branch of history, but should not be substituted for
philosophy itself. This is part of the meaning of the
injunction "to the matters themselves." It is reinforced
in the ldeen where Husserl tells us, even before intro-
ducing phenomenological bracketing, that we should
in effect "bracket" the entire history of philosophy.
Philosophy may in fact be in history, but its aim is to
transcend history toward the timeless essences that are
tobe grasped by phenomenology.
Of course, this does not prevent phenomenology
from attempting to grasp the essence of history itself,
and Husserl makes some early efforts in that direction.
"Geschichte" refers, like its English equivalent, both to
the course ofhuman events, principally in the past, and
to the discipline whose aim is to know those events.
In severa! ways Husserl is like Dilthey and the neo-
Kantians ofhis time: he abjures Hegelian-style specu-
lation about the grand sweep ofhistory, aims instead at
the clarification of historical knowledge, and consid-
ers history a HUMAN SCIENCE that cannot be reduced to
Of integrated with the NATURAL SCIENCES. History is an
empirica! discipline and thus deals with facts. But the
facts it is concerned with are not those of the natural
world. In ldeen ll [ 1912-15] Husserl works out the no-
tion ofthe spiritual or cultural world (geistige Welt) as
a distinct region of reality with its own a priori ontol-
 HISTORY
ogy and its way ofbeing constituted in consciousness.
Husserl 's approach throughout is to trace the basic con-
cepts ofscience back to the prescientific WORLD and the
attitudes we take toward it. The "natural attitude" of
ldeen 1 is subdivided in ldeen Il into the "naturalistic"
and the "personalistic" attitudes, and it is in the Jatter
that the human sciences have their source. The basic
entities here are not things, but persons and communi-
ties of persons, and the basic occurrences are experi-
ences, thoughts, and actions that stand under relations
of motivation rather than causality.
When these structures of personal and social exis-
tence are related to TIME, they reveal features we think
of as historical. Persons are not "in" time in the same
way that things and natural events are in time. They do
not simply persist through time, and the events of one
moment in one's life do not simply produce those of
the next causally. Rather, the past has meaning for the
person, and forms an intentiona! background or hori-
zon for present and future. Persons "survey" time and
think ofthemselves and the communities to which they
belong in terms of their past and fu ture.
By the time of the Cartesianische Meditationen
[ 1931] Husserl was sufficiently attentive to both the
social and historical aspects of conscious experience
that he attributes them to transcendental and not merely
to empirica! or "personal" consciousness. Constitution
is cumulative and requires GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY;
the EGO is not merely an empty subjective pole but is
the substrate ofhabitualities. The ego constitutes itself
for itself, he says, "in the unity of a history." While
this statement suggests something like a personal or
individual history, Husserl goes on in the Fifth Med-
itation to a discussion of "personalities of a higher
order," i.e., social groups or communities conceived as
collective subjects that likewise constitute themselves
through their history (a theme already touched on in
the "Gemeingeist" manuscripts of a decade earlier).
This growing appreciation for the historical char-
acter of even transcendental subjectivity achieves its
fullest expression in Husserl 's last work, Die Krisis
der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phanomenologie (1936). In part this may re-
flect the renewed influence of Dilthey. Though the lat-
ter had died in 1912, his collected works were being
published posthumously. In 1927 volume 7 appeared,
containing Dilthey's late manuscript on Der Au/bau
313
der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften
(The make-up ofthe historical world in the human sci-
ences, [ 191 0]). Husserl was acquainted with this vol-
ume at Jeast through the work of his assistant LUDWIG
LANDGREBE and of GEORG MISCH, who both pubJished
significant studies of Dilthey in relation to phenomen-
ology in those years. There is some irony in the fact that
Dilthey should have played a positive role here, since
he was the intended target of Husserl's early polemic
against historicism.
In any case, Husserl's concern with history emerges
in his last work out of his reflection on the sta tus and
significance of science. It is a mistake to think that the
scientific consciousness can simply transcend its con-
crete social situation and go directly to the TRUTH. The
pursuit oftheoretical truth is itself historical. Even if it
is the nature of consciousness to engage in this pursuit,
the individual always inherits it as an ongoing activ-
ity of the society in which he or she takes it up. The
incipient scientist also builds on the results already ob-
tained by others. Thus although a cognitive endeavor
such as science - even a "pure" or ideal discipline
like geometry - is pursued by individuals, it owes
its undertaking in each case, as well as its capacity to
advance, to the social context in which it exists. Each
inquirer depends on the sedimented acquisitions ofhis
or her predecessors.While the cognitive life ofthe indi-
vidual owes its birth to the social context, and depends
on the same context for its success, there is a negative
side to this dependence. The concepts and methods
taken over from the tradition can equally function as
prejudices that skew the individual 's perspective on the
subject matter. It can happen in any field that theoret-
ical progress requires not building on, but criticizing
and rejecting what is handed down. But even this takes
place against the background ofthe discipline's tacitly
accepted goals, problems, methods, and basic concepts.
Thus even conceived as a critica! enterprise opposed
to accepting anything on authority, science belongs to
a historical tradition.
In the Krisis Husserl recognizes that this analysis is
no less true of philosophy itself than it is of the other
disciplines. In the modern era philosophy has taken
over from the sciences its mathematical-physical con-
ception ofthe world and then failed to understand sub-
jectivity because it has tried to explain it causally as an
element within that world. Even KANT, who recognizes
314 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the constitutive role of subjectivity, sti li conceives of
the latter purely in relation to a scientifically construed
world. Thus there is a need to return to the LIFEWORLD
in which subjectivity has its home prior to science,
and in which the activity of science, and every other
cognitive activity, including philosophy itself, has its
point of departure. While the sciences do not need to
understand themselves philosophically in order to suc-
ceed, it is philosophy's task to understand them, and
this means tracing them back to their prescientific ori-
gins. But philosophy must likewise understand itself,
and must accordingly circle back on its own origins in
the lifeworld.
lfthe world-as-portrayed-by-science turns out tobe
a historically developed and thus in some sense contin-
gent phenomenon, the prescientific lifeworld, by con-
trast, seems universal and necessary. Yet Husserl rec-
ognizes that the lifeworld is itself historical in a less
obvious but more important way. Like the common-
sense world evoked by other philosophers with sim-
ilar concerns, the lifeworld turns out to contain the
sediments of past scientific accomplishments. The pre-
given, naively intuited world of any individual, inno-
cent of explicit theoretical interpretation, is therefore
a historically sedimented cultural world that may dif-
fer radically from the similarly naive world of another
culture or historical period.
Thus Husserlmoves from his early, rather hasty dis-
missal ofthe importance ofhistory, at least for philos-
ophy, to an almost obsessive preoccupation with it, to a
conception of consciousness as deeply and pervasively
historical at every level - prescientific and scientific,
individual and social. And he is led in this direction by
phenomenology itself, in his usual relentless pursuit
of die Sachen selbst. Yet this result is bound to raise
serious questions about the original idea of phenomen-
ology as rigorous science- that is, as the inquiry that
rises above historical contingency to attain universal
eidetic structures. Though Husserl in the Krisis is far
from giving up on the ideal - indeed, he presents
phenomenology with even more missionary zeal than
ever before- it is clear that he is struggling mightily
with some of the more disturbing implications of his
own conception of history.
Most of Husserl 's successors in the phenomenologi-
cal movement take over and develop further the con-
ception of historicity found in his late work. MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY especially, as well as PAUL RICCEUR, are
strongly inftuenced by the Krisis in their approach to
phenomenology. In their work and in that of JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE - especially after L'etre et le neant ( 1943)
- and SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, the inftuencc of HEGEL
and MARX leads to a heavily historicized conception of
consciousness and human existence. For these thinkers
the acknowledgment ofhistoricity is not fatal to pheno-
menology, but it does contribuie, together with other
considerations, to a substantial curtailment of its pre-
tensions. The capacity to grasp timeless esscnces, and
thus to attain the status of a rigorous scicnce, is no
longer touted as phenomenology's chief virtue, as it
was by the early Husserl, but phenomenology itself.
somewhat more modestly conceived, survives.
The case is somewhat different for MARTIN IIEI-
DEGGER, whose ideas on historicity developed con-
currently with those of Husserl. In a late chapter of
Sein und Zei! (1927) Heidegger takes up the topic of
Geschichtlichkeit (historicity) and reveals that he too
has been inftuenced by Dilthey. Up to this point his
discussion of authentic human existence has empha-
sized DASEIN's relation to the future and to the prospect
of death. Now he turns his attention to birth and ori-
gins. His previous discussion of social existence or
being-with-others as a dimension of Oase in had tied it
primarily to inauthenticity (das Man ), suggesting that
authenticity means isolation. Now he suggests that we
derive possibilities of authentic existence by choosing
heros and taking over existing traditions from the past.
For many readers of Sein und Zeit, especially those
inftuenced by the Sartrean EXISTENTIALISM it helped to
inspire, one is struck by a sharp contrast when one
arrives at this chapter: the authentic self, which had
seemcd a figure oficonoclastic rebellion from the mass,
now emerges as a stern and proud traditionalist paying
homage by obedience to the authority ofthe past.
But this conception of the historical character of
Dasein is really only a reflection of a much deeper
and more thoroughgoing notion of historicity that en-
compasses the nature of understanding and ultimately
that of truth itself. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger is not
content to raise questions about the historical character
of knowledge, reason, and understanding. He is con-
vinced that human existence is radically finite, under-
standing is a projection of Oase in 's facticity, and truth
is something like a historical occurrence ( Geschehen ).
 HUMAN SCIENCES
Such a conception is bound to conflict with the mani-
festly "transcendental" project of Sein und Zeit to artic-
ulate the general, i.e., the presumably timeless and tran-
shistorical, structures of human existence. This leads
Heidegger, not long after the publication ofthat work,
to what most interpreters see as an abandonment of
phenomenology, at least in any form that could appear
continuous with Husserl or even with the phenomen-
ological tradition in FRANCE. And it may be largely the
influence ofthis !ater Heidegger in France that leads to
the decline of phenomenology in that country during
the POSTMODERN phase. It remains to be seen whether
phenomenology will be done in by a conception ofhis-
tory that originally arose from phenomenology itself.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Carr, David. Phenomenology and the Prohlem of History: A
Studv o{ Husserl:~ Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- . Time, Narrative, and Historv. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1986.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Gesammelte Schnjien. 5th ed. Voi. 7. Ed.
Bernard Groethuysen. Stuttgart: Teubncr, 1968.
Gadamcr, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tiibingen:
Mohr, 1962; 7htth and Method. Trans. Garrct Barden and
John Cumming. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
Hohl, Hubcrt. Lehenswelt und Geschichte. Freiburg: Karl
Alber, 1962.
Janssen, Paul. Geschichte und Lehenswelt. The Hague: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1970.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der
Gcisteswissenschaften." Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie und
phănomenologische Forschung 9 ( 1928), 237-367.
Misch, Georg. Lehensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
Bonn: Cohen, J930; 2nd. ed. Leipzig: Teubner, J93 J
Olafson, Frederick. The Dialectic o{Action. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, J 978.
Soffer, Gail. Husserl and the Prohlem o{ Relativism. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
DAVID CARR
Emory Universi(v
HUMAN SCIENCES Also called the "eul-
tura! sciences," the human sciences (die Geisteswis-
senschaften, les sciences humaines) are special or pos-
itive theoretical sciences that are concerned in various
ways with aspects of human cultural life and cultural
worlds. These disciplines are related to practica! appli-
cations as well as to the everyday prescientific life from
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
315
which they, like ali sciences and also philosophy, origi-
nale. This genus ofsciences currently includes COMMU-
NICOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHNOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY,
POLITIC AL SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, and SOCIOLOGY as sin-
gle disciplines, but human or cultural sciences are also
increasingly included in multidisciplines such as EHI-
NIC STUDIES and those re}ated to ECOLOGY, FEMINISM,
RELIGION, and TECHNOLOGY. The rise of sciences of this
kind, which ha ve their prehistories in the medieval and
ancient worlds and were accelerated through the ex-
panding contact with non-European societies in recent
centuries, is as much a distinctive feature ofthe modern
Western wor}d as the rise ofthe NATURAL SCIENCES.
Beyond such chiefly theoretical disciplines there
are what can be called normative, evaluative, or axi-
otic disciplines, which are concerned with ARCHITFC-
TURE, DANCE, FILM, LITERATURE, MUSIC, THEATER, etc.,
and there are also practica/ disciplines, such as ED-
UCATION, LAW, MEDICINE, NURSING, PIIYSICAL EDUCATION,
and PSYCHIATRY. A broader category, CULTURAL DISCI-
PLINES, has been called for and theoretical, axiotic,
and practica! species might then be recognized within
it, although many cultural "sciences" already include
practica! components, e.g., the way psychotherapy is
often considered part of psychology. Practica! action
always has cognitive foundations within it and when
these foundations are scientific, scientific technologies
and technigues can be spoken of. There are also eval-
uational foundations in, e.g., social work, that make
nontheoretical disciplines normative.
The mentioned non-philosophical disciplines have
not only been reflected upon from standpoints in
phenomenological philosophy, but also increasingly
have phenomenological tendencies within them. Non-
philosophical contributors to disciplines affected by or
convergent with philosophical phenomenology include
the psychiatrists LUDWIG BINSWANGER and KARL JASPERS
and the SOCioJogists GEORG SIMML'L and MAX WERER. Dis-
tinguishing philosophy as such from human science is
among the problems of the philosophy of the human
sciences.
A human scientific discipline can be said to be
phenomenological, first, if it is devoted to basing
knowledge on the best possible EVIDENCE ofthe matters
themselves in the relevant region. This evidence can
occur with respect to the ancient Hellenic world, for
example, not only through the study of texts, but also
316 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
through considering depictions and artifactual and non-
artifactual remains, the last mentioned including, e.g.,
the remains of wild animals, such as fish bones, that
were available as food in the ecosystem of an ancient
society.
Second, it is characteristic of phenomenology in
general for matters, persons and communities included,
tobe taken as they present themselves to and are dealt
with in the cultural life reflected upon, in which case
the belief systems, value systems, and systems of ends
and means correlative to the habitual believing, valu-
ing, and willing discernible in that culturallife can be
reflectively observed and analyzed from the theoretical
standpoint of a cultural science. The approach is then
reflective, and such an approach is not alien to human
sciences and philosophy prior to and independent of
the rise of phenomenology.
Third, an approach that is phenomenological distin-
guishes description of what phenomena are from the
explanation ofthem in terms ofpsychological motives,
historical influences, etc., and emphasizes both empir-
ica! descriptions and the a priori descriptions attain-
able through EIDFTIC METIIOD (most cultural scientific
description and explanation is, however, in terms of
empirica! types).
Phenomenological phi losophy and phenomenologi-
cal human science are not distinguished, however, in
these three respects, which they share. Some phenome-
nologists distinguish philosophical and cultural scien-
tific phenomenology in terms ofthe transcendental vs.
the mundane attitude, others in terms ofthe ontologica!
vs. the ontic, and yet others in terms of o ne worldly dis-
cipline, phenomenological psychology or PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ANTHROPOLOGY, on which the other disciplines are
founded.
There is an early history ofthe philosophy ofthe hu-
man sciences that goes back to Hume's Treatise ( 1739)
and Mill's Logic (1843), where the title "moral sci-
ences" is used, if not to Vico, Hegel, Aristotle, Plato,
and especially to the Sophists. The history, however, of
this part ofphilosophy ofscience was foca! for the neo-
Kantians, most recently ERNST CASSIRER, as well as for
various phenomenologists, and began in relation to WIL-
HELM DILTHl'Y's Ein/eitung in die Geisteswissenschaften
(lntroduction to the Human Sciences, 1883).
The expression Geisteswissenscha{t, currently ren-
dered in English as "human science," has been traced
back to the Geschichte des Hellenismus (History of
Hellenism, 1843) of Johann Droysen ( 1808~1884 ), but
Dilthey made it prominent. The human sciences for
Dilthey include the more humane disciplines that study
the arts, the more socially oriented sciences, such as po-
litica! theory, and the more normative disciplines such
as AESTHETICS and ETHICS, and his broad title for these
disciplines played a certain role in the administrative
structure ofthe Imperial German university.
Dilthey is best known for defending the indepen-
dence ofthe human sciences from the natural sciences,
but he also recognized that the world of spirit or eul-
ture is never separable from nature and that both kinds
of science have a common base in our prescientific
understanding of life. The difference for him is that
the human sciences never Iose sight of the need to un-
derstand the original wholeness, connectedness, and
purposefulness of life, while the natural sciences be-
gin with separated partial elements whose connections
must be explained by hypothetical generalizations.
Against the neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband
(1848~1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863~1936) ~
who were concerned to distinguish psychology from
transcendental philosophy, considered it a natural sci-
ence, and excluded it from the Kulturwissenscha{ten
~ Dilthey included psychology in the Geisteswis-
senschaften. His position became widely accepted
in Germany; furthermore, these two titles are inter-
changeable in Cassirer's final writings and also in
those of ALFRED SCHUTZ. The !ater Dilthey relied in-
creasingJy on the interpretation of expressions and ob-
jectivations of experience and Lebensphilosophie und
Phanomenologie ( 1930), by Dilthey's follower GFORG
MISCH, was widely read. Dilthey considered EDMUND
HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-190 1) sup-
port for his project and Husserl came to acknowl-
edge considerable influence on him by Dilthey. In
"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ), Husserl
objected to considering philosophy a worldview be-
cause that led to historicism, RELATIVISM, and skep-
ticism. But after correspondence with Dilthey, study
of others such as Windelband and Rickert, and his
own investigations of the constitution of the cultural
world in the ldeen zu einer reinen Phanomeno/ogie
und phanomenologischen Phi/osophie Il [ 1912~ 15)
and elsewhere, he accepted Dilthey's problematics and
advocated the phenomenological philosophy ofthe hu-
 HUMAN SCIENCES
man sciences, which is also evident in Die Krisis der
europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Philosophie ( 1936).
Husserl distinguished sciences in the "personal-
istic attitude" from those in the naturalistic attitude
of the natural sciences and recognized both a natu-
ral scientific psychology and a human scientific psy-
chology, in the latter respect also adopting the strat-
egy ofproceeding from a human scientific psychology
to how the social and historical world is constituted.
In Phănomenologische Psychologie [ 1925] he praised
Dilthey's psychology as a true phenomenological psy-
chology and advocated a way to transcendental pheno-
menology from Dilthey's universal human science as
an alternative to his own Cartesian way that began, by
contrast, in complete emptiness of content. This alter-
native path begins from the LIFEWORLD and ultimately
invo[ves GENERATIVE PIIENOMENOLOGY.
Besides the view of the lifeworld as cultural,
Husserl 's own contributions are especially related to IN-
TERSUB.IECTIVITY and TIME-consciousness. Dilthey's dis-
tinction between elementary understanding and higher
understanding can be used to refine Husserl's analyses.
The former is immediate and does not usually require
methodical interpretation, while the latter, founded
upon it, requires empathic activities of reliving the
social, historical, and personal contexts of life expres-
sions as structured wholes. Husserl 's phenomenology
ofthe cultural world chiefly pertains to systematic hu-
man sciences such as economics, sociology, jurispru-
dence, and politica! science. Dilthey's concern with the
historical and philological human sciences and their
methods, i.e., HERMENEUTICS, is, however, missing in
Husserl, but can be supplied.
Husserl 's students LUDWIG LANDGREBE and FRITZ
KAUFMANN wrote dissertations that were explicitly con-
cerned with Dilthey in relation to phenomenology, and
EDITII STEIN and GERDA WALTHER earlier published es-
says in Husserl 's Jahrbuch on topics pertinent to the
human sciences. MAX scHELER offered relevant insights
on empathy, group solidarity, VALUE THEORY, and the
sociology of knowledge.
Philosophical reflections especially on the WORLD
as historical and on history as a science of it are to
be found in MARTIN HEIDEGGER's work, beginning with
Sein und Zeit ( 1927). Heidegger is also chiefly respon-
sible for beginning the post-Diltheyan discussions of
317
interpreti ve methods within HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY and for the enduring phenomenological con-
cerns with HISTORY, LANGUAGE, and TECHNOLOGY, which
ha ve been carried further by IIANS-GEORG GADAMER, DON
IHDE, .IOSEPII .1. KOCKELMANS, and PAUL RICCEUR.
In Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The
meaningful structure of the social world, 1932) and
Collected Papers ( 1962-96), Alfred Schutz began phi-
losophizing about the social world and the specifi-
cally social sciences, particularly Weberian-style so-
ciology and Austrian-school economics. doing so in
the perspective of a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
TIIE NATURAL ATTITUDE; this effort has been contin-
ued by MAURICE NATANSON and others. Subsequent
contributors to transcendenta[ CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY of the cultural or human sciences include ARON
GURWITSCII and THOMAS M. SEEBOHM. In FRANCE, the
classica[ expression in EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY is
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's "Les sciences de ['homme
et la phenomenologie" ( 1961 ). His student, GEORGES
GUSDORF, wrote lntroduction aux sciences humaines
( 1960). Ricceur's hermeneutica[ phenomenology carne
!ater. Non-phenomenologists in France, such as MICHEL
FOUCAULT, and in GERMANY, such as Jiirgen Habermas,
ha ve also been interested in the philosophy of the hu-
man sciences. lnterest in the philosophy of the hu-
man sciences as such in the UNITED STATES is chiefly
phenomenological, but there is also interest in them
in STRUCTURALISM, CRITIC AL THEORY, and even ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY.
Systematically speaking, the philosophy of the hu-
man or cultural sciences has a vast and complex subject
matter. Natural matters- including those with psy-
ches, genetic endowments, and ecosystems-are rela-
tively easy to distinguish, classify, and re late, while the
types of human persons, communities, and traditions
approached in the cultural sciences are more numerous
and have more aspects amenable to thematization, as
the disciplines and multidisciplines listed at the outset
of this entry already indicate. And unlike the natural
sciences, the human sciences are prone to a reflexiv-
ity whereby there can be a sociology of psychology,
an economics of sociology, a history of historiogra-
phy, etc., and also an overlapping of provinces, which
hardly simplifies their tasks.
Nevertheless, the human sciences can, upon reflec-
tion, be seen to approach the cultural world in one or an-
318 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
other ofthree species ofperspectives. This is analogous
to the sorting of naturalistic sciences into the physical
and the biologica!. The most popular approach begins
with a reflective-experiential thematization of individ-
ual or personal human life, and then proceeds through
social psychology to approach the social and then the
historical world. Since there are actually severa! disci-
plines ~ e.g., child psychology, geriatrie psychology,
and psychology of learning ~ within the psychologi-
cal perspective, it seems best to speak in the plural of
psychological human sciences.
Alfred Schutz bcgins with the constitution ofmean-
ingful behavior within an abstractly nonsocial individ-
ual life and then divides the world of others or social
world in a broad signification into directly encountered
"consociates," indirectly encountered but also simul-
taneously alive "contemporaries," and then the "pre-
decessors" and the "successors," who are of course
deceased or yet to be born, respcctively. Consociates
and contcmporaries make up the social world in a nar-
rower signification. There is interes! in the constitution
of groups in these regions, but Schutz's emphasis is on
the individuals and their social actions, interactions,
and relationships.
As Dilthey showed in Die Aufbau der geschicht-
lichen Welt in den Geisteswissenscha(ten [The con-
struction ofthe historical world in the human sciences,
191 0], it is also possible, however, to begin in the phi-
losophy of the cultural sciences not with individual or
personal life, but rather with collective or communal
life. This can be done in two ways. In social sciences
such as linguistics and politica] science, the function-
ing of communal life in relation to language or to the
politica! system is considered synchronically, i.e., with
great emphasis on how these systems are structured at
a given time, usually the present. To be sure, histor-
ical considerations are not absolutely excluded when
such aspects of the cultural world at one time are in-
vestigated, but they are subordinated. Because social
scientific results often ha ve practica! applications in the
current situation, the articulation of social science into
particular sciences and academic departments and the
numbers of scientists in them are considerably greater
than in the psychological and historical sciences. For
this reason and others, such as the current traditional
academic classifications ofpsychology as a natural sci-
ence and of history as part of the humanities, the phi-
losophy of the human sciences is often narrowed into
a philosophy ofthe social sciences.
Yet there are also what are best called historical
sciences, species of which include politica! history,
economic history, history oftechnology, history ofart,
military history, etc., whether or not these particulars
are recognized as distinct disciplines with separate de-
partments in universities. Archaeology, for example,
is properly understood as a historical human science,
but, at least in most American universities, it is inter-
estingly combined with ethnology under the heading of
"cultural anthropology" and placed among the social
sciences. The historical sciences nonetheless ha ve it in
common to thematizc the cultural world not only as it
is lived communally, but also in a diachronic way, i.e.,
to emphasize continuities and changes over time.
The human sciences have in general been much in-
fluenced by NATURALISM during the past two centuries.
This is manifest in the positivistic attempt to imi tate the
natural sciences by treating cultural objects as natural
objects, if not physical things, and resorting to math-
ematics whenever possible. Opponents of positivistic
tendencies within the human sciences and the philoso-
phy ofthem often reject mathematical methods, which
seems unfortunate, in order to emphasize sheerly qual-
itative and interpreti ve methods. It is also important to
recognize that cultural situations and worlds are formed
of objects with cultural characteristics, i.e., the values
and uses whereby objects are good and bad and ends
and means.
Some phenomenologists emphasize the considera-
tion of cultural characteristics not only as what distin-
guishes the region of the cultural sciences, but also as
what justifies the contention that the latter ha ve prior-
ity over the former, which, phenomenologically, would
seem to require an abstraction for the derivation of
their naturalistic regions. When acceptance of the val-
ues and uses of cultural objects is not abstracted from
for the sake of natural science, there can bea tendency
of researchers to identify with ( or oppose) the cultural
worlds they research.
Besides the questions of the generic, specific, and
particular subject matters and scienccs thematized in
the phenomenological philosophy ofthe human or cul-
tural sciences ~ and the questions of the relations
between such sciences and the natural and formal sci-
ences, on the one hand, and also between them and
 HUMAN SCIENCES
thc everyday life from which they arise and in which
their results are employed for practica! purposes, on
the other hand- there are long stand ing methodolog-
ica/ prob/ems that have interested phenomenological
philosophers.
In the background of such problems are the prob-
lems in early 20th century neo-Kantianism concerning
the social vs. the historical sciences in terms of distinc-
tions between generalizing and nomothetic vs. partic-
ularizing and idiographic disciplines, which have also
been of concern to LOGICAL POSITIVISM, but ha ve not yet
held much interest for phenomenologists.
Stemming chiefly from the historical sciences, there
is first of ali the methodology of interpretation and cri-
tique oftcxts and traces, which is called HERMENEUTICS
and which drew much renewed attention by figures in
Gcrmany from Heinrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)
to Wilhelm Dilthey. This classical modern hermeneu-
tics has been adapted creatively into what became
hermeneutica! phenomenology by Heidegger and oth-
ers; atternpts have also been madc by THOMAS M.
SEEBOHM to disclose the transcendental phenornen-
ological grounds of hermeneutica! method and by
RUDOLF MAKKREEL to clarify its transcendental reflec-
tive grounds. It is not clear, however, that the rneth-
ods for the interpretation of nonlinguistic data, which
Dilthey called "rnonurnents," ha ve been appreciated as
well as the herrneneutics of texts. Such nonlinguistic
data are fundamental for archaeology and LESTER EM-
BREE has attempted to clarify how they are accessed
pre-predicatively.
In the social sciences, STRUCTURALISM is a prominent
method that addresses the structures of cultural objects
in language and in nonlinguistic representations such as
pictures. These stern largely from Ferdinand de Saus-
sure ( 18 5 7-1913) and are extended by Roland Barthes
(1915-1980), MICHEL FOUCAULT, Jacques Lacan ( 190 ]-
), and Claude Levi-Strauss. Although many concepts
and rnost terminology are different and also some of
the concerns, e.g., those with unconscious processes, it
is not clear that semiotic and structuralist methods are
substantially incornpatible with those of phenomen-
ology, but most of the work of showing overlaps and
complementarities has yet to be done.
The other mcthodological concern stemming from
reflection on chiefly social science occurs in Schutz
when he attempts to develop Weber 's method of ideal
319
types phenomenologically. Schutz holds that the cul-
tural sciences differ from the natural in that the latter
rely on primary constructs about natural objects that
are not pre-interpreted, while the former are conversant
with secondary constructs, which are constructs about
the constructs in ordinary languagc and everyday life.
In other words, he is emphatic that the subjective mean-
ing or insider interpretations of individuals and groups
are what the constructs of outsiders, theoreticians and
philosophers included, are about.
Whether or not comrnonsense interpretation some-
how includes the pre-prcdicative constitution of val-
ues and uses for Schutz is not always clear. But where
the idealizing construction of the models used in the
cultural sciences for selves, others, actions, interac-
tions, relationships, motives, human products, and so-
cial groups are concerned, his contributions are enor-
mous and also do not seern incompatible with the re-
sults of methodological reflections on hermeneutica!
and also structuralist and semiotic efforts. The over-
laps and complementarities have begun to be studied,
e.g., by RICHARD LANIGAN.
Whilc individual personal life is treated in the his-
torical and social sciences as at best derivative from
comrnunallife in the socio-cultural world, psycholog-
ical human science begins with personal life and, as
mentioned, works out from there to the rest of the
world. Its methods include interpretation and other ap-
proaches taken toward personal documents and other
representations, but it can most effectively rcly on self-
observation and reflection on others. In the latter ap-
proach, it does proceed on the basis of somatie indi-
cations such as gait, gesture, posture, intonation, and
visage, and thus has a prominent place for the pheno-
meno1ogy ofthe BODY.
Because of the need to know a good deal not only
about the current states but also the histories of the
actual practices of observation and theorizing in the
wide variety ofhuman sciences- as well as, e.g., de-
partmental structures within the academy- there is a
tendency among ali philosophers, and thus not merely
phenomenologists, to emphasize either particular cul-
tural sciences, e.g., sociology, or species of cultural
science, e.g., the social sciences, and not the human
or cultural sciences in general. But social science is a
species of human or cultural science just as physical
science is a species rather than the genus of natural sci-
320 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ence. Phenomenological reflection on this entire family
of sciences is as difficult as it is desirable.
Once the multiplicity of cultural worlds as opposed
to the allegedly one natural world are understood to
be the common theme, the perspectives, thematized
aspects, and methodologies of particular cultural sci-
ences and their species can be approached, as can the
basic question of the difference between and relations
of the human and natural sciences. Further questions
concern how the knowledge gained in the theoretical
human sciences is used in cultural disciplines of the
axiotic and practica! sorts. Included in these further
questions is the already mentioned question ofthe dif-
ferences between and relations of philosophy and the
cultural sciences.
Emerging issues for the human sciences and the
phenomenological philosophy of them include ecol-
ogy, ethnicity, and gender. If there are major differ-
ences between masculine and feminine worldviews in
ali societies, earlier observation and theory is distorted
and needs to be corrected for gendered variations in
experience, believing, valuing, and willing, since over
half of humanity is female. Ethnic identities, groups,
and conflicts may ha ve been suppressed and ignored in
many nation states and empires in the past, but this is
increasingly difficult to do, and like gender, ethnicity
is a fundamental structure of human culturallife. And
while the environment might be thought, naturalisti-
cally, to be nature in relation to organisms, it is diffi-
cult, upon reflection, not to consider plants, animals,
and ecosystems as parts ofhuman cultural worlds, i.e.,
as cultural matters shaped by and including values and
uses for humans.
Finally, there is an interesting issue for the philos-
ophy of the natural sciences insofar as they are now
deeply interested in science as a human activity and
thus how its traditions and communities are amenable
to historical and sociologica! and other particular forms
ofhuman scientific investigation. How does the natural
scientific world ofphysics relate to the cultural worlds
out of which it arises? What is the impact of physics
back upon the cultural world, not only with respect to
the natural scientific technologies that it makes possi-
ble, but also with respect to the everyday values and
uses of cultural objects? How different is natural sci-
ence from religion in these respects?
Can the same questions not be asked about the ori-
gins and impacts of the cultural sciences, e.g., how
everyday thinking in some communities has come to
be affected by MARXIST politica[ theory or PSYCHOANAL-
YSJS? And, most philosophically, can RELATIVISM and
thus skepticism be avoided once one begins to re-
flect on how objects and theories present themselves to
and are dealt with by socio-historical groups and indi-
viduals, scientists and philosophers included? In other
words, are non-trivial and non-relative truths, values,
and purposes attainable or not?
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschajien.
Versuch einer Grundlegung fur das Studium der
Gesellschafl und der Geschichte [1883]. Gesammelte
Schriften 1. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 4th ed., 1959; lntro-
duction to the Human Sciences. Ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel
and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989; Introduction d l 'etude des sciences humaines.
Trans. L. Sauzin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1942.
Gusdorf, Georges. Introduction aux sciences humaines.
Paris: Publications de la Faculte des Lettres de 1'Universite
de Strasbourg, 1960.
Makkreel, Rudolf. Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Stud-
ies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Les sciences de l 'homme et
la phenomimologie. Paris: Cours de Sorbonne, 1961;
"Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man." Trans. John
Wild. In his The Primacy of Perception. Ed. James M.
Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1964,
43-96.
Misch, Georg. Lebensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
Bonn: Cohen, 1930; 2nd ed. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931.
Mohanty, J. N. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Natanson, Maurice, ed. Phenomenology and the Social Sci-
ences. 2 vols. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University
Press, 1973.
Orth, Emst Wolfgang, ed. Dilthey und die Philosophie der
Gegenwart. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1985.
Polkinghome, Donald. Methodology for the Human Sci-
ences. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1987.
Ricceur, Paul. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Ed.
and trans. John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
Sche1er, Max. On Feeling, Knowing. and Valuing: Selected
Writings. Ed. Harold J. Bershady. Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 1992.
Schrag, Cal vin O. Radical Reflection and the Origin of the
Human Sciences. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University
Press, 1980.
Seebohm, Thomas M. Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Ver-
nunft. Bonn: Bouvier, 1972.
Strasser, Stephan. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963.
 HUNGARY
Thines, Gcorges. Phenomenology and the Science of Be-
haviour: An Historical and Epistemologica/ Approach.
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977.
LESTER EMBREE
F/orida Atlantic University
HUNGARY The emergence ofHungarian phi-
losophy at the beginning ofthe 19th century was inftu-
enced by two factors. On the one hand, as citizens of
the Habsburg Empire, Hungarian philosophers sought
to define a national identity by opposing speculative
philosophy of German origin and promoting the writ-
ing ofphilosophy in Hungarian. This tendency, similar
to other national awakenings throughout Austrian- and
German-ruled East Central Europe, was paralleled by
another tendency that aimed to absorb the results of
German philosophy, especially those of Kant and his
followers. Before the revolution in 1848 and the war
ofliberation against the Habsburgs in 1849, there were
attempts to create what was called "national philoso-
phy," along with a Hungarian vocabulary ofphilosoph-
ical terminology. The stai led development of Hungar-
ian philosophy after 1849 cannot be reduced to the
defeat of the Magyars in their 1849 war of liberation.
The Hungarian philosophers had also proved unable
to develop an adaptable. practicable philosophical vo-
cabulary, or to cultivate a lasting national tradition in
philosophy.
The an ti speculative tendency ofHungarian philoso-
phy through the first half ofthe 19th century is likewise
expressed by the far greater interest and sympathy of
Hungarian scholars for politica) and legal rather than
philosophical ideas. In this context, one could mention
Janos Erdelyi (18 14-1868), who saw this tendency
as a national characteristic of the Hungarian people.
The other key inftuence in Hungarian philosophy can
be clearly measured in the first systematic philoso-
pher writing in Hungarian, Kăroly Bohm ( 1854-1911 ),
whose work shows the inftuence, first of KANT and Kan-
tianism, then, in the third volume of his Az ember es
vi/aga (Man and his world, 4 vols, 1883-1942), of a
revised yet naive kind of Fichtean subjectivism.
The inftuence of phenomenology in Hungary was
preceded by a renaissance of philosophical culture at
the end of the 19th century. This renaissance took the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
321
form of an authentic Neo-Kantianism, connected with
the name ofBernăt Alexander ( 1850-1927). Alexander
was a genuine thinker, yet his pedagogica! talents and
broad knowledge of the history of phi1osophy proved
even more important for Hungarian philosophy. As
a professor at Budapest, he taught whole generations
of young philosophers, many of whom made impor-
tant contributions to international philosophical life
(Valeria Dienes, GYORGY LUKACS, Geza Revesz, VILMOS
SZILASI, Arnold Hauser, Menyhert Palăgyi).
Some of Alexander's students became connected to
phenomenology. These were also familiar with the an-
alytic tradition in Austrian philosophy (Bolzano, I'RANZ
BRENTANO, and the representatives of Brentanism).
From the viewpoint of phenomenology, these students
of Alexander and other thinkers in this period can be
divided into two groups. The first includes philoso-
phers who explicitly considered themselves phenome-
nologists (.!ENO F.NYVV ARI, vilmos szilasi); the second
includes significant thinkers strongly inftuenced by
phenomenology in some sense (Bela Zalai, Baron
Ă.kos von Pauler, Kăroly Mannheim, ANTAL scHOTz,
Săndor Sîk). Another figure, though not a phenomen-
ologist, was Menyhert Palăgyi ( 1859-1929), who be-
came known through his attacks on EDMUND HUSSERL 's
position in the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ).
In Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in
der modernen Logik (The conflict of psychologizers
and formalizers in modern logic, 1903), Palăgyi up-
holds Husserl 's rejection oflogical PSYCHOLOGISM, but
criticizes his approach as too closely resembling a Kan-
tian logica] formalism. Palăgyi's views on the inte-
grated character of sensation likewise inftuenced the
history ofphenomenology-see especially his Natur-
philosophische Vorlesungen (Lectures in nature phi-
losophy, 1924) and his Wahrnehmungslehre (Theory
ofperception, 1924), which was welcomed and devel-
oped by MAX SCHELER.
JENO ENYVV ARI studied at Budapest and Gottingen,
and was connected first to the Bolzanian tradition,
then to phenomenology. His understanding of pheno-
menology was based on Husserl's Logische Unter-
suchungen; for him, the main task of phenomen-
ology was a precise description and analysis of
the structure of human consciousness, reducing im-
mediate consciousness data to their essential con-
tenis. In A phansikus (phaenomenologiai) adottsagok
322 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
/enyegismeretehez (On the knowledge of phansical
[phenomenological] data, 1912) he distinguishes bc-
tween two kinds ofiNTENTIONALITY. The first is pheno-
menological intentionality, which concerns immedi-
ate experience (Erlebnisse). Enyvvary calls the other
kind "entailing" (inhaesiv) intentionality, meaning by
this a second-order intentiona] operation in which the
first kind of intentionality is contained, and thus re-
calls Husserl 's concept of(imgierende Intentionalităt.
That is, his entailing intentionality intends the first
(phenomenological) intentionality. In his other works
he also treated problems of abstraction (Ada/ek az
ideatio phaenomeno/ogiajahoz, [On the Phenomen-
ology ofldeation, 191 1]) and the knowledge of general
laws through investigation of immediate experiences
(Egy phaenomeno/ogiai adottsagosztalyr6! [A class of
phenomenological data, 1911 ]). Enyvvary also wrote
a philosophical dictionary (Philosophiai sz6tar, 1923 ),
with the explicit aim ofapplying the method ofpheno-
menology to the definition of philosophical terms.
VILMOS (WILHELM) SZILASI studied in Budapest, and
was invited to Freiburg by Husserl in 1919. His first
work (A tudati rendszerezes elmeleterâl, [On the the-
ory of the systematization of consciousness, 1919])
shows the influence of BELA ZALAI, and through him
of a Meinongian Gegenstandstheorie. In 1946, he suc-
ceeded MARTIN HEIDEGGER in the chair of phiJosophy
at the University of Freiburg. Although most of his
works are in philosophy of NATURAL SCIENCE, he is
among the important figures in the history of pheno-
menology. This is due to his pedagogica! activity, his
early writings, and above ali to his book Einfiihrung
in die Phănomenologie Edmund Husserls (Introduc-
tion to Edmund Husserl 's phenomenology, 1959). This
book is outstanding in severa] ways. First, Szilasi was
among the few who resisted popular interpretations of
Husserlian phenomenology, such as the reduction of
Husserlian views to nea-Kantian philosophy. Second,
he resisted over-emphasizing differences among the
developmental phases of Husserlian phenomenology,
pointing out the integral and systematic character of
Husserl 's work from the Logische Untersuchungen to
Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschafien und die
transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936). In Szilasi's
view, Husserl's phenomenology is no "Bewusstsein-
sphi/osophie" (a kind of subjectivist philosophy of con-
sciousness) as opposed to, say, Heidegger's FUNDAMEN-
TAL ONTOLOGY, but rather a broad attempt to establish a
universal typology of forms of knowledge and being,
overcoming thereby the dichotomy between objectiv-
ity and subjectivity.
Ofthe second group ofthe Hungarian philosophers
influenced by phenomenology, BELA ZALAI was, besides
the young Lukacs, the most important. Zalai was born
to a Calvinist family in Debrecen, Hungary, and died
in a concentration camp in Omsk during World War 1.
As a young man, he belonged to the Sunday Circle
of philosophers in Budapest, among whose members
we find ARNOLD HAUSER, Karo]y Mannheim and GY()RGY
LUKĂcs. Zalai was a disciple of Alexander in Budapest,
then spent years in Paris and Leipzig, where he stud-
ied HENRI BERGSON, Wundt, and especially Meinong,
through whom he interpreted Husserl 's Logische Un-
tersuchungen and phenomenology in general.
Zalai 's ma in philosophical concern, which he called
the problem of systematization, shows the influence of
Meinong's theory. Yet he saw both Meinong's Gegen-
standstheorie and Husserl 's phenomenology as intro-
ductions to what he called a theory of systems. In his
view, Husserl overcame psychologism in his Logische
Untersuchungen; phenomenology was, however, sur-
passed by Meinong's theory of objects. To complete
this process, he proposed his theory of systematiza-
tion. Zalai held that there is no single act or datum
of knowledge. What is perceived or experienced as a
single moment is only the result of what he termed
"transformation": through transformation, it becomes
possible to see a segment of reality as a separate or
isolated entity, although any such entity is only a part
of a given system of knowledge and experience. Such
systems are bound together in overarching systems,
which are based on an ultimate context of systems.
The task of philosophy, in Zalai 's view, is the in-
vestigation of this ultimate context; he often calls
this activity "metaphysics," rather than philosophy.
He explained this notion in many of his writings ("A
kozvetlen tapasztalas osszefi.igges-rendszere" [The
system of immediate perception, 1906]; "A filoz6fiai
rendszerezes problemaja," [The problem of philo-
sophical systematization, 1911 ]; "A realitasfogalom
tipusair61" [The types ofthe concept ofreality, 1911];
ali published in: A rendszerek altalanos elmelete [A
general theory of systems, 1984 ]), but especially in his
main work Allgemeine Theorie der s_vsteme (General
 HUNGARY
theory of systems, 1914; published in German, 1982).
Husserl's inftuence on Zalai's work can be seen in
many respects, among which Zalai 's understanding of
intentionality deserves special attention. As he writes,
in most lived experiences the intentiona! character (in
its original, Brentanian sense) is only a framework of
an inherent structure that is not in itself intentiona!.
He calls this structure "logica!" and identifies it with
the content or matter of an experience. In lived experi-
ence, the intentiona] character and the intentiona! con-
tent forma unity. Only by abstracting from this original
unity-which one couldcall, with the word ofthe ]ater
Husserl, "hyletic"- is it possible to identify the char-
acter of intentionality as directedness to an object. On
the other hand, the hyletic content has its own pattern
of behavior, which Zalai terms, as before, a process
of systematization. The term "systematization," then,
ftuctuates in Zalai 's works between designating, on the
one hand, the original process of reality and, on the
other, the process of philosophical activity, by which
reality of any kind is conceptually systematized.
In his earJy period, GYORGY (GEORG) LUKĂCS, was
also deeply inftuenced by phenomenology. His Heidel-
berger Asthetik (published posthumously first in Hun-
garian in 1972, then in the original German in 1974)
was written between 1912 and 1918 in Heidelberg, but
remained incomplete, mainly because of World War
1. The main theme of this work is the special char-
acter of works of art, a subject matter that was !ater
developed and specified by ROMAN JNGARDEN as well.
Lukacs's approach to AESTHETICS has the remarkable
characteristics that he, untypically in his time, starts
his analyses with the question of the ontologica] and
epistemological possibility of particular works of art.
As he writes at the very beginning ofhis investigations:
"There are works of art- the question is how they are
possible." In developing his insights, he distinguishes
between what he calls "logica] phenomenology" on
the one hand, and "aesthetical phenomenology," on
the other. "Logica! phenomenology" for Lukacs co-
incides more or Jess with Husserl 's concept of logic
as a theoretical science in Logische Untersuchungen;
"phenomenological aesthetics," on the other hand, is
characteristically different from the former inasmuch
as it is based, in a special sense, on psychology. As he
writes, aesthetic phenomenology is a theory of forms
of aesthetic experience.
323
By his theory of aesthetics, Lukacs hopes to over-
come any description of aesthetic experience that is
grounded on the correlation between aesthetic expres-
sion and reception and concentrates exclusively on the
very field of aesthetic forms. The three ma in forms in
aesthetic experience are that of the artist (the o ne who
produces particular works of art) on the one hand, that
of the recipient (the one who sees, hears, etc., a given
work of art) on the other hand, and, finally, that of the
work of art itself. Each of these forms can be investi-
gated by applying a kind ofphenomenologicalmethod.
Phenomenologicalmethod, however, is understood by
Lukacs as a kind of formal analysis of particular expe-
riences- which, as he expressly states, cannot lead us
to a complete grasp ofthe very meaning of a particular
work ofart. Phenomenology is only an introduction to
such a grasp of meaning, which can be completed by
carrying out a kind of nonrational act of knowledge
or "jump" (he refers in this context to Kierkegaard's
famous definition of the act of faith). Lukacs presents
an interesting, although not completely original, typol-
ogy of the person of the artist, according to which we
can distinguish between the dilettante (the one who
cannot organize his or her aesthetic experiences into
a meaningful whole), the virtuoso (the one who per-
fectly knows the formal requirements of works of art,
but lacks appropriate aesthetic experience ), and finally,
the genius (who not only has aesthetical experiences,
but also knows how to unite them into an aesthetically
organic whole).
Further on in his work, Lukacs investigates the his-
torical aspects of the work of art, and concludes that
the eterna! meaning that we seem to recognize in ex-
periencing great works of art cannot be properly un-
derstood except on the basis of a formal analysis of
the historical-cultural process of their production. At
this point, even his understanding ofthe term "pheno-
menology" undergoes remarkable changes; while the
Husserlian inftuence in his understanding of the term
was obvious earlier, in the !ater chapters ofhis work he
stresses more and more that the meaning of the term
stands closer to a Hegelian kind of phenomenology.
Although he believes that Husserlian and Hegelian
phenomenology share common features, he seems to
think at the same time that the main objective of
Husserlian phenomenology was "to secure pure ob-
jectivity, and to bracket any subjectivity." This shows,
324 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
however, that his understanding of phenomenology
was from the very beginning weak methodologically
and that, at the time of his Heidelberger Ăsthetik, he
was not familiar with the ma in works ofHusserl 's tran-
scendental period. His understanding ofthe problem of
the work of art, on the other hand, was a unique attempt
in his time to create an encompassing phenomenologi-
cal aesthetics.
Lukacs left Hungary in 1919, and gradually be-
came associated with MARXISM. His attitude concerning
phenomenology in his !ater years was dominated by his
then new philosophical and politica! orientation. This
explains why he criticizes Husserl and phenomenology
so sharply in severa! passages of A polgari .filozofia
valsaga (The crisis of bourgeois philosophy), which
was published in 1949 after his return to Hungary.
The influence of phenomenology in Hungary was
fairly strong between the two world wars, yet neither
Husserl nor any other phenomenologist had any com-
mitted followers other than Szilasi. In his early writ-
ings, however, Karoly (Karl) Mannheim (1893-1947)
clearly shows the influence of Husserl. In his 1918
work ("Az ismeretelmelet szerkezeti elemzese" [Struc-
tural analysis of epistemology]) he explicitly refers to
Husserl, using the term EPOCHE in the Husserlian sense;
his view ofthe correlation between subject and object
as the central question of philosophy again betrays
Husserlian influence.
ANTAL SCHUTZ, ĂKOS VON PAULER, and SĂNDOR SlK
were familiar with phenomenology and applied some
of its results. Schiitz, the leading figure of neo-
Scholasticism in Hungary, spent some time in the in-
stitute of Oswald Kiilpe ( 1862-1915) in Wiirzburg. He
understood Husserl's phenomenology as a new devel-
opment on Bolzano's philosophy of the facts of con-
sciousness. He applied, too, a wider understanding of
the phenomenological method, inasmuch as he saw it
as a necessary methodological precondition for philos-
ophy. For him, the phenomenological method enables
us to reach an unbiased view ofthe objects of everyday
experience (A bOlcselet elemei [Elements of philoso-
phy, 1940]).
ĂKOS voN PAULER, the most important philosopher
in Hungary during the first half of the 20th century,
was strongly influenced by FRANZ BRENTANO, besides
having personal contact with him during the early
1900s. In his Az etikai megismen?s termeszete (The na-
ture of moral knowledge, 1907) he reflects the central
notions of Brentano's Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis
(The origin of ethical knowledge, 1895). Pauler, too,
saw Husserl as the heir ofBolzanian philosophy. In his
systematic work (Bevezetes afiloz6fiaba [Introduction
to philosophy, 1920; German edition: Grundlagen der
Philosophie, 1925]) he identifies the resul! ofthe vari-
ous phenomenological reductions with his own concept
of"logical essences" (logismata) and praises Husserl
for his notion of the epoche. As he writes, "Husserl 's
most original insight was the necessity of a pheno-
menological attitude, as opposed to the natural atti-
tude." Pauler compared Husserl 's notion of intuitively
grasped essences to the Platonic ideas, and argued that
even Plotinus, in attempting to view the things of the
natural world as they are in themselves, was applying
a phenomenological method. It seems, however, that
Pauler did not appropriately understand the Husserlian
difference between eidetic and transcendental epoches
and reductions.
SĂNDOR sfK also considered the method of unpreju-
diced description of the world of everyday experience
the main merit ofphenomenology. In his three-volume
Esztetika (Aesthetics, 1942), he shows himself to be
a follower of Husserl in that he emphasizes the im-
portance of EIDETIC METHOD. In particular, however, he
seems to be deeply influenced by MORITZ GEIGER. By
applying the phenomenological method in the context
of his neo-Scholastic conceptions (he himself was a
Catholic priest) his work becomes close to the attempts
ofREALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY. His main concern, how-
ever, remains the hermeneutica! relation between sub-
ject and object in aesthetic experience.
During the early 1960s some disciples of Lukacs
started to investigate phenomenology within the his-
tory of philosophy. In fact, this historical approach
to the problems of phenomenology became dominant
from the early 1960s until the late 1980s. Among the
products of this period, one must mention GYORGY
MIHĂLY VAJDA 's two works on Husserlian phenomen-
ology (Zar6jelbe tett tudomany [Science in parenthe-
ses, 1968], and Mitosz es raci6 hataran [Between
myth and reason, 1969]), LĂSZL6 ĂRON's monograph
on Husserl ( 1982); and articles by JĂNOS KRIST6F NYfRI
and ISTVĂN M. FEHER.
During the late 1960s, Hungarian phenomenology
developed a special orientation toward phenomen-
 HUNGARY
ology of LITERATURE. following ROMAN INGARDEN and
EMIL sTAIGER, Vajda considered and applied phenomen-
ological elements in his critica! works on the history of
literature ("Fenomeno16giai szemlelet az irodalomtu-
domanyban es az irodalomban" [A phenomenological
approach to literary theories and to literature, 1968]).
The collapse ofthe Soviet system in Hungary again
brought the end of one cultural period and the begin-
ning of another. This applies to philosophy as well,
although it is not possible to make any sharp de-
marcation. The tendencies that have become visible
since 1989 were latently present earlier, the scholars
and philosophers who started work in phenomenology
since 1989 having worked philosophically under the
previous regime as well.
Yet in all this a general change of interest can be
clearly recognized. Whereas unti1 the early 1980s, Ger-
man philosophical traditions (Austrian traditions, Ger-
man idealism, HEGEL, and MARXISM) determined philo-
sophical orientation in Hungary, from the early 1980s
philosophy from FRANCE has become more and more
dominant. In reading present-day Hungarian philo-
sophical publications, one easily notes how many arti-
cles concern French philosophers such as JACQUES DER-
RIDA, MicheJ foucauJt, and JEAN-FRAN<;:OIS LYOTARD, but
aJso EMMANUEL LEVINAS and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY.
Readers are eager to learn more about relatively minor
philosophical traditions; thus JAN PATOCKA or Emil M.
Cioran are read more extensively. Phenomenological
investigations are concentrated especially on the work
of Husserl, Levinas, Heidegger, HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
and PAUL RIC<EUR. There is, however, a tendency to re-
turn to the origins of Husserlian thought, and to the
Austrian traditions in Hungarian philosophy. The in-
fluence of German philosophy seems to be weaken-
ing; at the same time, a strong interest in present-day
English-speaking philosophy has grown in works by
Janos Krist6fNyiri, Lajos T6th, and BALĂzs M. MEZEI.
Perhaps the most influential young Hungarian
philosopher of strong phenomenological interests is
LĂSZLO TENGELYI. Although he published his first book
on Kant ( 1988), his second work is a historical-
systematic analysis of the concept and interpretation
of guilt in post-Cartesian history of philosophy (A
bun mint sorsesemeny [Guilt as experience of destiny,
1993]). Tengelyi's efforts are focused first on applying
the phenomenological method throughout the history
325
of a philosophical problem and second on ground-
ing philosophy in ethical principles. Ethical princi-
ples are established by a kind of phenomenological
method, in which HERMENEUTICS and phenomenology
prove complementary points of view. Tengelyi is also
one ofthe leading figures in a group ofyoung philoso-
phers who investigate the questions ofphenomenology,
hermeneutics, phenomenology ofreligion, and pheno-
menological ETHICS. In this ci rele, REALISTIC PHENOMEN-
OLOGY is also represented.
It is also noteworthy how phenomenology, both in
historical and systematic phenomenological studies, is
emphatically present in the growing variety of philo-
sophical periodicals and publications in Hungary. The
most significant periodica! is Magyar Filoz6fiai Szemle
edited by the Association of Hungarian Philosophers.
Gond, edited by Mihaly Vajda, but also Bela Bacs6's
Athaeneum and Gabor Ferge's Existentia must be men-
tioned. In Ferge's periodica!, some materials are pub-
lished in German and English. In these periodicals, as
in others, one finds vi vid discussion of the problems
of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and philosophical
methodology in general (e.g., Balazs M. Mezei: "Guilt,
Destiny and Job's Cartesianism," Budapest Review of
Books, 1993). The rising interest in phenomenology in
Hungary points to similar tendencies that can be seen
in the CZECHOSLOVAKIA and in RUSSIA and the former
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. Phenomenology
appears in these countries, not as one movement among
others in the history of philosophy, but as a unique
opportunity to rediscover, after years of politica! and
ideologica! oppression, an authentic and creative way
of doing philosophy.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Aron, Laszl6. "Masaryk und die Rezeption des Posi-
tivismus in der Brentano-Schule." In r G. Masaryk
und die Brentano-Schule. Ed. J. Zumr and Th. Binder.
Graz: Forschungstelle und Dokumentationszentrum fiir
osterreichische Philosophie, 1992.
Feher, Istvan M. "Philosophen und Philosophieprofessoren
- Philosophie und Philosophiewissenschaft." Mesotes 2
( 1992).
Hofling, Hans, ed. Beitrăge zur Philosophie und Wis-
senschafi. Wilhelm Szilasi zum 70. Gehurtstag. Munich:
Francke Verlag, 1960.
Mezei, Balazs M. "Brentano and Jan Patocka." Brentano-
Studien 8 ( 1994).
326 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
- . "Jan Patocka, and the three Movements." Existentia (Bu-
dapest) ( 1992-1994 ).
- , ed. World and Lile-Wor!d: Aspects of"the Philosophy ol
Edmund Husserl. Frankfurt am Ma in: Peter Lang, 1995.
- . "Husserl and Brentano on the History of Philosophy."
Brentano Studien 9 ( 1996).
- , and Barry Smith. Brentano and the Faur Phases of Phi-
losophy. La Salle, IN: Open Court, forthcoming.
Nyiri, Janos KristOf (Nyiri, J. C. ). Europa peremen (On the
margin of Europe). Budapest: Europa, 1986; German ver-
sion: Am Rande Europas. Wien: Bohlan, 1988.
- . Tradition and lndividuality. Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1992.
Prohaszka, Lajos, ed. Gedenkschrift .fi.ir Akos von Pau!er.
1936.
Smith, Barry. "Zalai Bela filozofiaja" (The philosophy of
Zalai Bela). Magyar Filo::6fiai Szemle 3 ( 1987).
- , ed. Philosophy and Politica! Change in Eastern Europe.
La Salle, IL: Hegler Institute, 1993.
Steindler, Larry. Ungarische Philosophie im Spiegel ihrer
Geschichtsschreihung. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988.
Tengelyi, Lăszlo. "Das Zweideutige an Husserls Kopernika-
nischer Drehung." Mesotes 13 (1993).
Toth, Lajos. "Meinong tărgyelme!ete" (The Meinongian the-
ory of objects) [1990]. In World and Lile-World. Aspects
of"the Philosophy of"Edmund Husserl.
BALÂZS M. MEZEI
ELTE University Budapest
EDMUND HUSSERL The founder of the
"phenomenological movement" was born in Prossnitz,
Moravia- then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and now Prostejow, Czech Republic - on April 8,
1859. The Husserl family had been dornici led for many
generations in this area - the name itself seems de-
rived from the Czech huiscka, which means "gosling."
Although Husserl's house of birth was located in the
Jewish area of the town, his family was part of the as-
similation that occurred after the revolution of March
1848, when Jews gained full rights as citizens and be-
came more integrated into communal and commercial
life. Husserl 's father opened a textile business in the
center oftown in 1860 and Edmund attended the public
primary school in Prossnitz.
From these rather humble origins, Husserl went
on to the German Gymnasium in Olmiitz (Oiomouc,
Czech Republic). He began his university studies at
Leipzig, where from 1876 to 1878 he studied primarily
astronomy with some interest in mathematics, physics,
and philosophy. It was during this period that he be-
came acquainted with Tomas Masaryk (1850--1937),
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohunty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richurd M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic PublisMrs.
who later became the first president ofCzechoslovakia.
With hindsight, it can be said that Masaryk played a
substantial ro le in Husserl 's development, as he in-
spired Husserl to study Descartes and Leibniz as well as
BRITISH EMPIRICISM. Furthermore, Masaryk introduced
his compatriot to the work of FRANZ BRENTANO, which
would be ofpivotal importance in Husserl 's intellectual
life.
Beginning with the summer semester of 1878,
Husserl continued his studies in Berlin, where he fo-
cused upon mathematics under the tutelage of Karl
Weierstrass ( 1815-1897). He completed his mathemat-
ical training in Vienna from 1881 to 1882, where his
dissertation, Beitrăge zur Theorie der Variationsrech-
nung (Contributions to the theory of variation calcu-
lus), was accepted on October 8, 1892, and he was
promoted to Ph.D. on January 23, 1883.
Following a brief return to Berlin to work with
Weierstrass, Husserl engaged in philosophical stud-
ies with Franz Brentano in Vienna from 1884 to 1886.
Following Brentano 's recommendation, he studied fur-
ther in Halle an der Salle with Cari Stumpf ( 1849-
1936), a former student ofBrentano, and submitted his
Habilitationsschrift in Halle in 1887. The tit le of this
work - "Uber den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische
Analysen" (On the concept of number. Psychologi-
cal analyses) is indicative of Husserl 's sh ift towards
a philosophical analysis of the methods and unproven
presuppositions of MATHEMATICS. Husserl then began
his academic career as Privatdozent at Halle, where he
remained until 1901.
Husserl's first major publication from the period in
Halle was the Philosophie der Arithmetik of 1891 (the
first four chapters of which contain, with only minor
changes, the text ofhis Habilitationsschrift). One sees
in this work both the marks of his early training and
the themes that would characterize his )ater philosophy.
Certainly the influences of Weierstrass and Brentano
are apparent. Husserl would admit )ater that the desire
of Weierstrass for a radical grounding of mathemati-
cal analysis by the mathematician through a rigorous
development of the real number system set the tone
for his own scientific work. Such a desire for abso-
lute and solid foundations is evident in ali of Husserl 's
work, and certainly the model provided by the debate
about foundations in mathematics is never far from
Husserl 's mind. However, while Weierstrass saw the
 EDMUND HUSSERL
laying of such foundations as a task of mathematics
itself, Husserl takes such "foundation work" to be a
properly philosophical task.
Indeed, Husserl's early focus on the question of
foundation in mathematics can be understood in two
ways: first as an interest in establishing for mathemat-
ics a solid foundation; second as an interest in the way
in which such a well-founded mathematics can then
function as a foundation for other sciences. This ap-
proach corresponds exactly to what Husserl eventually
would seek for philosophy itself-that is, a desire that
philosophy be well founded, and consequently that it be
the solid foundation for ali the sciences. In this broader
conception of all-encompassing philosophical investi-
galion, Brentano's influence can be seen. Thus Husserl
inherited not only a set of problems, but also the ethic
of intellectuallife as a constant labor to achieve greater
clarity not only about the objects of one's reflection,
but also about the subjective motives and conditions
of such reflection. Looking back on this early period,
Husserl would say that "through philosophical work,
I resolved to renounce ali great goals and to be happy
when I could achieve here and there the smallest firm
ground within the swamps ofunclarity lacking ali foun-
dation."
Though Husserl did indeed labor intensely at Halie
under less than ideal conditions, it was not un tii the turn
ofthe century that another major publication emerged:
the two volumes of the Logische Untersuchungen in
1900-1901 (English translation 1970; also translated
into Russian [ 1909], French, Spanish, Italian, Por-
tugese, Japanese, and Chinese). As implied above, ali
ofHusserl's philosophical endeavors were determined
by the problem ofthe connection between subjectivity
and objectivity, and in his two early works ofthe Halie
period this problem is discussed in the context of objec-
tivity within the spheres ofmathematics and LOGIC and
its relationship to the subjective accomplishments of
counting, judging, and forming conclusions. The Un-
tersuchungen can be seen as mapping out a twofold ap-
proach to the problem. First, there is a sharp refutation
( especially in the first volume, Prolegomena zur reinen
Logik [Prolegomena to pure logic]) of PSYCHOLOGISM,
that is, the confusing of logica! laws with either psy-
chological laws or psychological acts - a confusion
evident in rnuch of the reflection on logic during this
period. Second, there is a careful analysis ofiNTENTION-
327
ALITY as the definitive feature of consciousness. Here
again, the shadow of Brentano is seen. The volurnes
ofthe Logische Untersuchungen slowly gained recog-
nition for Husserl weli beyond Halie and Gottingen,
where he was appointed Professor Extraordinarius of
philosophy in 1901.
The nurnber of substantial writings published by
Husserl during his lifetirne is relatively smali when
cornpared to the large quantity of rnanuscripts found
by HERMAN LEO VAN BREDA on his first visit to Freiburg
shortly after Husserl's death. Part of the reason for
this is that Husserl literally "thought" through his
pen, and his enorrnous self-discipline and ethic of at-
ternpting to describe the "phenornena" in their min-
utest details cornbined to produce a huge number of
manuscripts, largely written in Gabelsberger stenog-
raphy. The period in Gottingen is no exception to this
aspect ofHusserl 's philosophicallife, with the only ma-
jor publication appearing in 1913: ldeen zu ei ner reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie, Erstes Buch (first English translation 1931, sec-
ond 1982; also translated into French, Spanish, Italian,
Portuguese, and Japanese ). Despite this paucity ofpub-
lication, Husserl 's thought exerted influence during this
period through his teaching and other avenues. For ex-
arnple, in 1902 JOHANNES DAUBERT, a student ofTheodor
Lipps (1851-1914 ), visited Husserl in Gottingen and
!ater introduced the Untersuchungen to other students
ofLipps in Munich such as ALEXANDER PFĂNDER, MORITZ
GEIGER, and ADOLF REINACH. In the subsequent years,
contact with these "Munich phenomenologists" also
influenced Husserl 's own developrnent. From 1905 on-
ward, severa! students carne frorn Munich to study
with Husserl, and together with others formed the
"Gottingen Philosophical Society," whose rnembers in-
cluded THEODOR CONRAD, HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, DI-
ETRICH VON HILDEBRAND, ALEXANDRE KOYRE, and EDITH
STEIN. Many ofthe figures frorn this Gottingen period
contributed to the formation of what has come to be
called REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY.
Perhaps due to the lack ofpublication in this period,
the first book of the Ideen carne as a surprise to some
early adherents of Husserl. It was viewed by some as
a movement away frorn an ontologicaliy neutra! po-
sition to a more "idealistic" view of the intentiona!
life of consciousness. For Husserl, though, the thirteen
years since the Logische Untersuchungen had brought
328 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
a clearer conception of the methodological hasis of
his philosophical struggle to clarify the connection be-
tween subjectivity and objectivity. An important part
ofthis new publication developed the notion ofEPOCHE
AND REDUCTION. Central to this methodological inno-
vation (already mentioned in lectures in 1906-D7) is
the "bracketing out" or "placing in parentheses" of
the uncritical belief in the existence of the world in
order to lay open the structures of transcendental con-
sciousness. Only through such a "pure" description
of the ultimate constituting nature of consciousness
could the naive NATURALISM that Husserl saw present
in both ordinary life and the scientific inquiry of his
day be overcome and a proper point of departure be
established for the solution ofphilosophical problems.
Hence the move from the Logische Untersuchungen to
Jdeen 1 could be described as a shift from a descriptive
to a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. No doubt, it was
expressions such as the hypothesis of an "annihilation
of the world" in the latter work that led many readers
to see in this shift an idealistic motif. Important to the
account of consciousness given in Ideen 1 is the in-
troduction ofthe term NOEMA to denote the intentiona!
abject.
The establishment by Husserl during his Gottingen
years of the Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phăno­
menologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research) gave the growing
phenomenological movement an effective instrument
through which it could speak. Until the cessation of
publication in 1930, the Jahrbuch presented a great
number of important phenomenological investigations.
For example, the inaugural article was Husserl's own
Ideen !, and other significant texts included MAX
SCHELER's Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die ma-
teriale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and nonformal
ethics of value ), which was published in two parts in
1913 and 1916, and MARTIN HEIDEGGER's Sein und Zeit
of1927.
In 1916 Husserl was appointed the successor to
Heinrich Rickert ( 1863-1936) as holder of"Lehrstuhl
1" within the philosophical faculty of the university at
Freiburg im Breisgau. In the same year, his youngest
son, Wolfgang, was killed at the Battle ofVerdun while
serving as a volunteer in the German army. Husserl held
his own nationalistic leanings (though less extreme
than those belonging to some of his colleagues and
students), and some traces of these sentiments might
even be seen in his lectures on FICHTE in 1917. Nev-
ertheless, the terrible tragedy of World War I can be
viewed as marking a shift in Husserl 's thought (for ex-
ample, there is development in Husserl's ETHICS). As
pivotal as the war and its aftermath and the subse-
quent rise of National Socialism is for understanding
the development of Husserl 's thought, it is crucial to
note that for him these events were signs of some-
thing fundamentally amiss in European civilization, of
a sickness whose roots went far deeper than the imme-
diate circumstances of these terrible events. Writing
in 1923 of the "politica!, national, religious, artistic,
and philosophical chaos" in Germany, Husserl was not
only describing Weimar Germany, nor was he simply
expressing his belief that the war, in a certain sense,
had continued past 1918, "to be waged with psycho-
logical torture, moral deprivation, andeconomic need."
Rather, the tragedy of the times is taken as an indica-
tion that Europe had lost sight ofits own rational te/os,
ofthe project that Husserl takes in his !ater thought to
be the very definition ofthe idea of"Europe": a belief
in the possibility of a fully rational existence and in the
ability ofhuman beings to justify and have insight into
what they do and why they do it.
Given this view that his age had succumbed to nar-
row and inadequate forms ofrationality that ultimately
showed their bankruptcy, it remains to Husserl 's credit
that he did not yield to the superficial pessimism or
irrationalism that repeats itself in every age, nor did he
simply pronounce solutions. Rather, in what amounts to
a form of optimism in reason itself, he conducted ongo-
ing phenomenological investigations across a myriad
of areas in order to uncover the primordial roots of the
contemporary malaise, and remedy it through a proper
grounding of reason itself. Husserl 's !ater thought can
be seen, then, as an extension of his basic aim to exe-
cute a phenomenology of REASON in ali its expressions.
What became more evident to Husserl is that descrip-
tion ofthe intentiona! structures of consciousness (the
task of static phenomenology) must be accompanied
by an account of how such structures develop - in
short, a phenomenological description of the genesis
of meaningful intentiona! acts. Hence there emerges
in Husserl 's ]ater work a GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY that
is able not only to encompass the description of the
constitutive origin of the world in transcendental sub-
 EDMUND HUSSERL
jectivity, but also to give an account of the subject's
relation to other subjects and an historicallifeworld.
Throughout the 1920s Husserl struggled to sum-
marize the results of his phenomenological investiga-
tions into a systematic work. The closest this project
carne to fruition was in the Cartesianische Meditatio-
nen, published in French in 1931. Nevertheless, the
themes covered in the manuscripts and in university
and other lectures (such as those in London in 1922,
Amsterdam in 1928, and Paris in 1929) yield a clear
view of Husserl's broad interests and give the sense
of a systematic work. In the University lecture courses
of 1923-24 one finds the extension of transcenden-
tal phenomenology as foundational science, as Erste
Philosophie, and in other lectures the relationship be-
tween transcendental phenomenology and PSYCHOLOGY
is explored. The study of intentiona\ PHILOSOPHICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY and wor\d-apperception, INTERSUBJEC-
TIVE constitution, and prob1ems of TIME and individu-
ation are the concerns of many manuscripts. In 1929
Husserl published the Formale und transzendentale
Logik where he once again draws upon the themes of
the Logische Untersuchungen, although now on the
basis ofhis fully developed phenomenology.
Especially important for Husserl 's postwar work
were his private assistants: EDITH STEIN, LUDWIG LAND-
GREBE, and EUGEN FINK. They had the tasks ofmanaging
the ever-increasing number of manuscripts, transcrib-
ing Husserl 's stenography, and preparing texts for pub-
lication. Out ofthis form of collaboration, only one text
carne to publication during Husserl's Phănomenologie
des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (On the phenomenology
ofinternal time-consciousness) in 1928. This work was
prepared by Edith Stein and edited by MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, a1though, given the extensive work by Stein, it is,
with certain reservations that this work can be consid-
ered an authentic text of Husserl. The same can be said
of a text edited and revised by Landgrebe that appeared
in 1939 entitled Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and
judgment).
The relationship between HUSSERL and HEIDEGGER
was also of great significance. Husserl placed great
hope in Heidegger as the person to assume the leader-
ship of the phenomenological movement. In 1927-28
there was collaboration with Heidegger on an article
defining phenomenology for the Encyclopaedia Bri-
tannica. As Husserl entered officially into the status
329
of professor emeritus at Freiburg in March 1928, it
was Heidegger whom Husserl promoted as his succes-
sor. However, as became apparent to Husserl through
subsequent careful reading of Heidegger's Sein und
Zeit (1927), Heidegger's thought had gone in other di-
rections. In 1931, Husserl 's lecture "Phanomenologie
und Anthropologie" delivered in Frankfurt, Halle, and
Berlin, was clearly critica! of Heidegger for what
Husserl took to be a betrayal of the principles of
transcendental phenomenology. In addition to Heideg-
ger, two other assistants of the Philosophical Sem-
inar who worked with Husserl were osKAR BECKER
and ARNOLD METZGER. It should be added that even
an incomplete list of students from this period in-
dicates the depth and widespread nature of the in-
terests in Husserl 's phenomenology. Among those
who worked with him were: FRITZ KAUFMANN, AL-
FRED SCHUTZ, ARON GURWITSCH, HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
KARL U)WITH, HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, EMMANUEL LEVINAS,
PAUL-LOUIS LANDSBERG, RudoJf Camap (1891-1970),
and Herbert Marcuse ( 1898-1979), along with the
Americans DORION CAIRNS and MARVIN FARBER and the
Japanese SHUZO KUKI and HAJIME TANABE.
The last years ofHusserl's life brought severe hard-
ship due to the seizure of power by the National So-
cialists in January 1933. His status as emeritus was
suspended by the National Socialists on April 6, 1933
(though he was reinstated on Ju1y 20, as the first set of
race laws in Germany did allow for "non-Aryans" ap-
pointed to academic positions before August 1, 1914,
to maintain their positions). Following the enactment
of the Niimberg race laws of 1935, Husserl was fully
excluded from academic 1ife and also had to vacate
his home of over twenty years. Nevertheless, even in
these dire circumstances Husserl 's philosophical inves-
tigations continued. He dialogued with many visitors
such as GASTON BERGER and JAN PATOCKA. Jnvited Jec-
tures in Vienna and Prague in 1935 are the basis for
the publication in 1936 of Parts 1 and II of Die Kri-
sis der europăischen Wissenschqften und die transzen-
dentale Phănomenologie in the Belgrade periodica!
Philosophia. This poignant text struck some followers
as embarking in new directions. An emphasis on HIS-
TORY, and a thematic focus on the concrete LIFEWORLD,
yield the sense of a turn toward both a HERMENEUTICAL
and an EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. AJthough there
are various approaches employed by Husserl in his
330 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
work, its ultimate aim remains to the end an attempt at
the foundational renovation ofphilosophy as a rigorous
science. It was Husserl's conviction that only through
a radical uncovering and verification of subjectivity by
phenomenology would the danger of a one-sided ob-
jectivism and the opposing threats of skepticism and
RELATIVISM be overcome.
Reftecting back from the standpoint of the Krisis
text, it is evident that Husserl's !ater thought does not
make a radical break with the earlier. Already in the es-
say "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" published
in the journal Logos in 1911 it is no longer a question
of addressing a crisis in the foundation of a particu-
lar field such as mathematics (as one could interpret
the Philosophie der Arithmetik), nor taking to task the
inadequacy of reftection upon the forms of thought in
general (LOGIC). Rather, the entire range of both the
NATURAL and HUMAN SCIENCES is seen to suffer from
prejudices of NATURALISM, positivism, psychologism,
and historicism. These crises ari se due to the lack of a
clear comprehension within particular sciences oftheir
own task, origin, and foundation- in short, a lack of
self-comprehension. However, at the same time that
Husserl recognizes with growing clarity the crises in
the various sciences and the need for a philosophical
foundation for the sciences, he also perceives more
clearly the impotence of the existing philosophy. Phi-
losophy is itself not in a position to provide what is
needed "because it is not yet a science at ali." Husserl
thus sees the first task of philosophy as being essen-
tially one of establishing itself as a rigorous science.
It is also already apparent in "Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft" that Husserl views these difficulties in
the sciences and in philosophy to have far-reaching
cultural ramifications. According to Husserl, culture in
the West is based on science, and an insecure science
results in an insecure culture. Hence the caii for phi-
losophy as a rigorous science is a caii to shore up the
foundations of a eul ture. The themes of a crisis in eul-
ture and the relationship of philosophy to the pressing
needs of modern life take on even deeper significance
in the five essays on "Erneuerung" or "renewal" writ-
ten in 1922-23 for the Japanese journal Kaizo. Husserl
calls for a renewal or rehabilitation of the European
spirit based on renewed philosophy, and indeed, seeks
a rehabilitation of the world based on a renewed Eu-
rope. The fundamental crisis is described as a loss of
faith in REASON and renewal is the reestablishment or
rekindling of faith in reason.
The faith that was lost has sustained Europe since
its "foundation" or origin, that is, since the Greeks.
This faith not only proclaims the possibility of rational
existence, but also that such an existence comprises a
goal for authentic humanity, that in order for human
life to be truly human, it must be rational. The belief
that authentic human life is a rationallife is a beliefthat
this life must be imbued with a sense of critique, and
a desire to see for oneself, to accept nothing simply on
the basis ofthe tradition, tobe willing to examine one-
self and one's actions. Rationality in its proper sense
also implies an attitude that is not dominated by im-
mediate, pressing concerns. It is not interested solely
in functioning, but in truly comprehending and know-
ing why the world and its inhabitants function as they
do. The rationality of this critical-theoretical attitude
should not be confused with the impoverished sense of
rationality put forth by positivists and their equation of
rationality with empirica! facts. lndeed, facts viewed
merely as empirica! represent a certain "irrationality"
for Husserl. Only a fu li sense of rationality concerned
with universal, omnitemporal ideas is capable of re-
newing Europe and bringing it to a realization of the
meaning of its own existence.
The types of crises described by Husserl with such
conviction in the Krisis parallel the form of the crises
in mathematics and logic outlined in his earliest work.
Functioning without insight into what one is doing,
working with forms ofthought that are accepted with-
out question, lacking awareness of where these forms
of thought come from - these are some of the dom-
inant features of the eri sis of science, philosophy, and
culture. In a text written in 1936 and !ater published
by Fink under the title "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung
der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem,"
Husserl gives an account of LANGUAGE that shows
clearly that such crises do not prevent mere function-
ing. But a functioning wherein the meaning oflanguage
is lost, and wherein one can speak and write words
without really knowing what one is saying or writing,
is similar to the loss of meaning that occurs in a sci-
ence that continues to function well as a "technique,"
but does not understand itself, its origin, or its goal.
The struggle for a culture to have insight into
itself and ali its activities parallels the struggle of
 EDMUND HUSSERL
the individual philosopher to be truly "answerable"
for his or her own thought and action. Hence the
fullest description of authentic human life for Husserl
is self-responsibility, and the ultimate characteriza-
tion of Husserl's philosophy is one of absolute self-
responsibility. Tobe fully human is to know what you
are doing and why you are doing it, and hence to be
truly responsible for who you are. The struggle for
such responsibility and the attempt to be accountable
for who one is and what one does is no easy task. Yet
for Husserl it is this struggle alone that provides the
meaning ofboth personal and communal existence.
Husserl 's ethos as well as his accomplishments go
far toward explaining the growth and spread of the
phenomenological movement across the planet. As he
approached his death in Freiburg on April27, 1938, he
feltjustified in claiming that his life had been true to the
philosophical struggle for self-responsibility. Shortly
thereafter, HERMANN LEO VAN BREDA managed to res-
cue over 40,000 pages of manuscripts from Freiburg
and bring them to safety within the Institute of Phi-
losophy of the Catholic University in Leuven, Bel-
gium. Van Breda also managed to remove Husserl 's
large philosophicallibrary containing 2,817 books and
1, 152 offprints, as well as correspondence and further
documentation concerning Husserl's life and career.
Already in the autumn of 1938 one can speak of the
founding ofthe Husserl Archives, as Van Breda man-
aged to hire Husserl 's last assistants Landgrebe and
Fink. Before Husserl's death, Fink had begun to orga-
nize Husserl 's manuscripts, and this work on Husserl 's
Nachlass continued in Leuven along with the transcrib-
ing ofthe manuscripts from Gabelsberger stenography.
These transcriptions could then be studied by visiting
scholars, as was already the case for MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY during his first visit to Leuven in 1939. The
work of actually editing these manuscripts for publi-
cation could only begin in earnest after World War II
and since that time over thirty volumes ha ve appeared
in the Husserliana series - the collected works of
Edmund Husserl. The Archives continues the work to-
day of transcribing, editing, and publishing Husserl's
works, as well as conducting research into the nature
of Husserl's thought and its relationship to key devel-
opments in philosophy.
331
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Allen, Jeffner. "Husserl: Bibliography of English Transla-
tions." The Monist 59 (1975), 133-37.
Bell, David. Husserl. London: Routledge, 1990.
Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Edmund
Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1989; An Introduction ta Husserlian Phenomen-
ology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
Elliston, Frederick A., and Peter McCormick, eds. Husserl:
Expositions and Appraisals. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame
University Press, 1977.
Escoubas, Eliane, and Mare Richir, ed. Husserl. Grenoble:
Editions Jerome Milion, 1989.
Gabel, Gernat U. Husserl. Ein Verzeichnes der Hochschul-
schriften aus westeuropăischen und nordamerikanischen
Lăndern 1912-1990. Hiirth: Edition Gemini, 1995.
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser
Vortrăge. Ed. Stephan Strasser. Husserliana 1. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950; 2nd rev. ed. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; Cartesian Medita-
tions. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1960; Meditations Cartesiennes. Trans. G. Peiffer and E.
Levi nas. Paris: Col in, 1931, 3rd ed. Paris: Vrin, 1992.
- . Die Idee der Phănomenologie. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Husserliana 2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950; 2nd.
rev ed. 1973; The ldea of'Phenomenology. Trans. William
P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973; L 'idee de la phenomenologie. Trans. A.
Lowit. Paris: Presses Universiatires de France, 1970.
- . Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomen­
ologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine
Einfiihrung in die reine Phănomenologie. Ed. Karl Schuh-
mann. Husserliana 311. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1976; Jdeas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and ta a
Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General lntro-
duction ta a Pure Phenomenology. Trans. Fred Kersten.
Edmund Husserl: Collected Works 2. The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1982; Jdees directices pur une phenomelogie
et une philosophie phenomenologique. Trans. P. Ricceur.
Paris: Gallimard, 1950.
- . Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomen­
ologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phănomenolo­
gische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Ed. Marly
Biemel. Husserliana 4. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1952; rpt. 1991; Jdeas Pertaining ta a Pure Pheno-
menology and ta a Phenomenological Philosophy. Sec-
ond Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitu-
tion. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. Ed-
mund Husserl: Collected Works 3. Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1989; Recherches phenomenologiques pour la constitu-
tion. Trans. E. Escoubas. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1982.
- . Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomen­
ologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phănomenolo­
gie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Ed. Marly
Biemel. Husserliana 5. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1952; rpt. 1971; Jdeas Pertaining ta a Pure Pheno-
menology and ta a Phenomenological Philosophy. Third
Book. Phenomenology and the Foundation ofthe Sciences.
Trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl. Edmund Husserl:
Collected Works 1. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980; La
332 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phenonu?nologie et lesfondements des sciences. Trans. D.
Tiffeneau and A. L. Kelkel. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1993.
- . Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und die tran-
szendentale Phănomenologie. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husser-
liana 6. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954; 2nd rev. ed.
1976. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcenden-
tal Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1970; La crise des sciences
europeennes et la phenomenologique. Trans. G. Granel.
Patis: Gallimard, 1976.
- . Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Ed. RudolfBoehm. Husser-
liana 7--8. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956-1959;
Philosophie premiere. 2 vols. Trans. A. L. Kelkel. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1970/72.
- . Phănomenologische Psychologie. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Husserliana 9. Thc Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962; 2nd
rev. ed. 1968; Phenomenological Psychology. Trans. John
Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- . Zur Phănomenologie des inneren Zeithewusstseins
(1893-1917). Ed. Rudolf Boehm. Husserliana 10. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; 2nd rev. ed. 1969; On
the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interna!
Time (1893-1917). Trans. John Barnett Brough. Edmund
Husserl: Collected Works 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991; Le~·ons pour une phenonu?nologie de
la conscience intime du temps. Trans. H. Dussort. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.
- . Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vor/esungs- und
Forschungsmanuskripten (1918-1926). Ed. Margot Fleis-
cher. Husserliana 1I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966;
Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis. Trans. Anthony
Steinbock. In preparation.
- . Philosophie der Arithmetik. Ed. Lothar Eley. Husserliana
12. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. The following
piece from this volume has appeared in English as "On the
Concept of Number." Trans. Dallas Willard. In Husserl:
Shorter Works. Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. El-
liston. Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press,
1981, 92-119; Philosophy of Arithmetic. Trans. Dallas
Willard. In preparation; Philosophie de l'arithmetique.
Trans. J. English. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1972.
- . Zur Phănomenologie der Intersuhjektivităt. Texte aus
dem Nachlass. Erster Teil (1905-1920). Zweiter Teil
(192!-1928). Dritter Teil (1929-1935). Ed. Iso Kern.
Husserliana !3-15. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- . Ding und Raum. Ed. Ulrich Claesges. Husserliana 16.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973; Chose et espace:
Le~·ons de 1907. Trans. J.-F. Lasvigne. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1989.
- . Formale und transzendentale Logik. Ed. Paul Janssen.
Husserliana 17. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; For-
mal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Caims.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969; Logiqueformelle et
logique transcendentale. Essai d 'une critique de la raison
logique. Trans. S. Bachelard. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1965.
- . Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band. Prolegom-
ena zur reinen Logik. Ed. Elmar Holenstein. Husser-
liana 18. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. Logis-
che Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Untersuchungen zur
Phănomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Ed. Ursula
Panzer. Husserliana 19/I-2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1984; Logica! 1nvestigations. Trans. John Findlay. Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970; Recherches logiques.
3 vols. Trans. H. Elic, R. Scherer, and L. Kelkel. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1959--63.
- . Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie. Ed. Ingeborg
Strohmeyer. Husserliana 21. The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1983.
- . A!-!fsătze und Rezensionen (!890--1910). Ed. Bernhard
Rang. Husserliana 22. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1979; Early Writings in the Philosophy ofLogic and Math-
ematics. Trans. Dallas Willard. Edmund Husserl: Col-
lected Works 5. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1994.
- . Phantasie. Bildbewusstsein. Erinnerung. 1898-I 925. Ed.
Eduard Marbach. Husserliana 23. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1980; Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, Memorv.
Trans. John Barnett Brough. In preparation.
- . Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnis-theorie. Vorlesun-
gen 1906107. Ed. Ullrich Melle. Husserliana 24. Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.
- . Atţ{~ătze und Vortrăge (1911-1921). Ed. Thomas Nenon
and Hans Rainer Sepp. Husserliana 25. Dordrecht: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1987. The following pieces from this vol-
ume have appeared in English: "Philosophy as a Rigor-
ous Science." Trans. Quentin Lauer. In Edmund Husserl.
Phenomenology and the Crisis ofPhilosophy. Ed. Quentin
Lauer. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965,71-147. This
also appeared in French: La philosophie comme science
rigoureuse. Trans. M. Buhot de Launay. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1989. "Pure Phenomenology,
Its Method and Its Field of Investigation" (Husserl 's Inau-
gural Lecture in Freiburg). Trans. Robert Welsh Jordan. In
Husserl: Shorter Works. Ed. Peter McCormick and Fred-
erick A. Elliston. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1981,9-17.
- . Vorlesungen iiber Bedeutungslehre. Sommer-semester
1908. Ed. Ursula Panzer. Husserliana 26. Dordrecht: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1987.
- . Auj5ătze und Vortrăge (1922-1937). Ed. Thomas Nenon
and Hans Rainer Sepp. Husserliana 27. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. The following pieces
from this volume have appeared in English: "Renewal: Its
Problem and Method." Trans. Jeffner Allen. In Husserl:
Shorter Works. Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A.
Elliston. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981, 326-31. "Phenomenology and Anthropol-
ogy." Trans. Richard Schmitt. In Husserl: Shorter Works.
Ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston. Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1981,315-23.
- . Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-19!4). Ed.
Ullrich Melle. Husserliana 28. Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1988.
- . Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschafien und die
transzendentale Phănomenologie. Ergănzungsband. Texte
aus dem Nachlass (!934-1937). Ed. Reinhold N. Smid.
Husserliana 29. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1993.
- . Logik und allgemeine Wissenschafistheorie. Vorlesung
1917/18. Ed. Ursula Panzer. Husserliana 30. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995.
 HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER
- . "Entwurf einer 'Vorrede' zu den Logische Untersuchun-
gen." Ed. Eugen Fink. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 1 (1939),
106-33, 319-39; Introduction to the Logica/ lnvestiga-
tions. Trans. Philip Bossert and Curtis Peters. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.
- . Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie
der Logik [ 1939]. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1972; Experience and Judgment: Investigations in
a Genealogy o/Logic. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl
Ameriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1973; Experience et jugement: Recherches en vue d 'une
genealogie de la logique. Trans. D. Souche. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1970.
- . Briefwechsel. Ed. Karl Schuhmann in collaboration with
Elisabeth Schuhmann. Husserliana Dokumente 3/ 1-10.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
!Jsseling, Samuel, ed. Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-
Forschung. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1990.
Kockelmans, Joseph. Edmund Husserl:~ Phenomenologi-
cal Psychology: A Historico-Critical Study. Pittsburgh:
Dusquesne University Press, 1967.
Lapointe, Fran(:ois. Edmund Husserl and his Critics. An In-
ternational Bibliography. (1894-1979). Bowling Green,
KY: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1980.
Ricceur, Paul. A 1'ecole de la phenomenologie. Paris: Vrin,
1993; Husserl: An Analysis ofhis Phenomenology. Trans.
Edward Ballard and Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: North-
westem University Press, 1967.
Sallis, John, ed. Husserl and Contemporary Thought. At-
lantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983.
Schmitz, Manfred. "Bibliographie der bis zum 8. April 1989
veroffentlichten Schriften Edmund Husserls." Husserl
Studies 6 ( 1989), 205-26.
Schuhmann, Karl. Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg
Edmund Husserls. Husserliana Dokumente 1. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
Sepp, Hans-Reiner, ed. Edmund Husserl und die phănomen­
ologische Bewegung. Zeugnisse im Text und Bild.
Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988.
Smith, Barry, and David Woodruff Smith, eds. The Cam-
bridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
Sokolowski, Robert. The Formation of Husserl s Concept of
Constitution. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- , ed. Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradi-
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Sommer, Manfred. Husserl und der friihe Positivismus.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985.
R. PHILIP BUCKLEY
McGil/ University
HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER Despite a wealth
of literature on this many-sided subject, a definitive
appraisal of this relationship - personal as well as
Lester Emhree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
333
philosophical and professional- at the very heart of
the phenomenological movement remains to be writ-
ten. HERBERT SPIEGELBERG's reJiabJe initial account ad-
mittedJy falls short because of lack of factual infor-
mation on the development of the relationship. With
the recent emergence of a wealth of documents from
the archives, a thoroughgoing account of this close
philosophical collaboration gone awry, during a period
when neither EDMUND HUSSERL nor MARTIN HEIDEGGER
was publishing, can now be reconstructed in its vari-
ous phases: old teacher and young student ( 1916-19);
director ofthe Freiburg philosophical seminar and his
teaching assistant ( 1919-23 ); the Marburg prelude to
the philosophical succession with Husserl's impending
retirement (1923-28); and the philosophical estrange-
ment and denunciation (1927-31).
(1) The young student Heidegger was an enthusi-
ast of phenomenology years before Husserl assumed
the Freiburg chair in philosophy in 1916. Husserl 's in-
fluence is second only to Aristotle during this period.
Heidegger's dissertation on PSYCHOLOGISM in 1913, as
well as the more historically oriented Habilitations-
schrift on a doctrine of categories and signification in
1915, assume a distinctly phenomenological orienta-
tion (e.g., in intuitively "reading off' categoria! differ-
entiations directly from reality itself) in the context of
the Aristotelian Scholasticism and neo-Kantianism that
comprised Heidegger's primary schooling at Freiburg.
Husserl was instrumental in having the Habilitations-
schrift published in 1916 and, by the end of 1917,
actually 1ooks forward to the occasions of "sym-
philosophein" with "my most va1uab1e philosophica1
co-worker, in whom 1 have great hopes." Before 1918
ends, he nominates Heidegger as the "phenomenologist
ofreligion" in his school, taking over where his former
assistant, ADOLF REINACH, killed in the war, left off.
In retrospect, Husserl regrets having come too late
in Heidegger's philosophica1 upbringing, after he had
a1ready deve1oped his own unique style. But Heideg-
ger himself characterizes the years 1917-20 as ones of
"constantly 1eaming in my association with Husserl."
Indeed, Heidegger's unpublished notes at this time for a
treatise on the phenomenology ofre1igious conscious-
ness or Iife still bear a distinctly Husserlian accent
even while the sense ofphenomenologybecomes rad-
icalized with the help of the atheoretical paradigm
of reJigious experience. EIDETIC METHOD and CONSTI-
334 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGICAL anafyses utilizing termino)-
ogy drawn from Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
undphănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) abound
in Heidegger's examination of the founding relations
of motivation operative in the essential historicity of
religious experience as reflected in the devotionallit-
erature. A growing sense of the hermeneutica! ratio-
nality of ali experience is still coupled with Husserl's
centering of eidetic-transcendental phenomenology in
a pure EGO of empty potentiality, which the young
Heidegger sets over against a historical ego fulfill-
ing itself in its situations, while calling on a genetic
phenomenology to develop the founding connections
oforigin ofthe various "UFEWORLDs" (theoretical, aes-
thetic, ethical, religious) as motivated and constituted
within the absolute historicity of pure consciousness.
The initially medieval notion of INTENTIONALITY, al-
ready in place as a relation ofnoesis and NOEMA in the
1915 work, is reduced from the theoretically oriented
consciousness-over-against-an-ob ject to the more pri-
ma! dynamis of a sheer directedness-toward, under-
stood as the wellspring and "giving" element of life,
its elan vital. When Heidegger in his first course after
the war calls this the prima) "It" instead ofthe prima! I,
this "It" could still be construed by students common
to them as what Husserl in his courses was already
calling the "anonymously functioning intentionality"
of inner time-consciousness.
(2) Airman Heidegger returns from the war philo-
sophically transformed into a radical phenomenologist
and, as Husserl 's teaching assistant, espouses their
common cause in his first lecture course of 1919 by
rebutting the 1912 objections of Paul Natorp ( 1854--
1929) - objections still unanswered by Husserl -
against phenomenology's ambition to find access to
and describe immediate experience, regarded by the
tradition as inaccessible and inexpressible. The in-
stantaneous and astounding teaching success of his
new spokesperson is regarded by Husserl as his own
success and the success of the cause of phenomen-
ology. Terms like "lifeworld" (Lebenswelt), "destruc-
tion" or "unbuilding" (Abbau -!ater, in the hands of
JACQUES DERRIDA, deconstruction), and "sense ofbeing"
(Seinssinn) first occurring in their respective courses
and manuscripts at this time suggest the fruits that are
being borne in common from their continuing philo-
sophical conversations. Husserl's courses during this
period are marked by a growing appreciation of the
history of philosophy for his thought, the beginnings
of a GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY based on his ear)ier stud-
ies of inner time-consciousness, and a confrontation
with WILHELM DILTHEY's more hermeneutica) approach
to phenomenology, as in the oft-repeated course enti-
tled "Natur und Geist" ( 1916-28) that continues the
constitutive analyses of the then not yet published
Ideen II [ 1912-15]. Indeed, Dilthey scholars like Ed-
uard Spranger (1878-1963) and GEORG MISCH already
re gard Husserl 's phenomenology as HERMENEUTICS, and
students at Freiburg common to Husserl and Heideg-
ger, like FRITZ KAUFMANN and GUNTHER STERN, serve
only to reinforce this impression of the inner compat-
ibility of a HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMENOLOGY and of a
common problematic between Husserl and Heidegger
at this phase in their development.
Husserl 's implicit trust in his teaching assistant is
demonstrated by the way they share the seminar duties
of each semester, where new students are required to
attend Heidegger's "phenomenological exercises for
beginners" before they can participate in the exer-
cises "for advanced students" always given by Husserl.
Husserl's strong respect for Heidegger's originality,
manifested from the start in a highly idiosyncratic style
of expression, is evident in letters of recommendation
that regularly excuse Heidegger's lack of publication
by pointing to the difficult labor of a ripening genius
in search of his unique language. This respect will
eventually backfire upon Husserl 's first encounter with
the galleys of Sein und Zeit ( 1927), with a novel lan-
guage and impenetrable style in which he could no
longer find his own way of thinking. But during the
early Freiburg period of close collaboration in teach-
ing and in discussion, where he has occasion to read
dense manuscripts penned by Heidegger like the 1921
review of KARL JASPERS' Psychologie der Weltanschau-
ungen and the 1922 introduction to a book on Aris-
totle, Husserl comes to regard his brilliant young as-
sistant as his one true follower, to whom the future of
the phenomenological movement was to be entrusted
upon his retirement. The oft-cited anecdota! statement
attributed to Husserl during this period thus rings true:
"Phenomenology, that's Heidegger and I - and no o ne
el se. "(3) In his seminar exercises, Heidegger makes no
secret of his preference for Logische Untersuchungen
(1900-190 1) over /deen 1 among Husserl 's then pub-
 HUSSERL ANO HEIDEGGER
lished works. Heidegger's seminar on Jdeen J held in
the winter semester 1922/23 thus marks a turn ing point
toward a more public critique ofHusserl's constitutive
phenomenology injuxtaposition to his own hermeneu-
tica! phenomenology, in a burst of independence that
accompanies the shower of new concepts that would
become Sein und Zeit. He writes KARL L<)WJTH: "In the
final hour of the seminar, 1 publicly burned and de-
stroyed the Jdeen to such an extent that 1 dare say that
the essential foundations for the whole [ofmy work] are
now cleanly laid out. Looking back from this vantage
to the Logische Untersuchungen, I am now convinced
that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one
second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicrous." In
a subsequent letter, he notes that his course on ontology
in the summer of 1923 "strikes the main blows against
phenomenology. I now stand completely on my own
feet ... There is no chance of getting an appointment.
And after 1 have published, my prospects will be fin-
ished. The old man [der Alte, referring to Husserl] will
then realize that 1 am wringing his neck - and then
succession is out. But I can't help myself." And in July
1923 he writes to Karl Jaspers about Husserl receiving
a "call" to a chair in Berlin: "He 1ives from the mission
of 'founder of phenomeno1ogy.' No one knows what
that is ... no one understands a 'mathematics of the
ethica1' (the latest!)."
And indeed Heidegger's final Freiburg course un-
der Husserl entitled "Ontology: Hermeneutics of Fac-
ticity" de1ivers a blow against a sense of FORMAL ANO
MATERIAL ONTOLOGY understood as merely a theory of
objects, which thereby allows a more crucial sense
of Being as object-free, yet sustaining the genesis of
objects, to be overlooked. For a phenomenon is not
merely a what, an object, but more basically a how of
access and apprehension. But how it gives itself, the
possibility latent in the designation of a phenomenon
as intentionality, is betrayed by taking the ideal of sci-
ence tobe mathematical, with ali its concomitant tradi-
tional assumptions. What is needed in this situation is
a critica! destruction of the tradition in order to return
to Aristotle, where we shall see that something more
original has lapsed into degeneration and concealment,
and that even this self-concealment must be made a
phenomenon by and for phenomenology. This is the
explicative route taken by a hermeneutics of facticity.
The first course at Marburg in the winter of 1923/24,
335
"Introduction to Phenomenological Research," contin-
ues this historical critique by a running comparison
of Husserl with Descartes, who infected Husserl with
a "concern for known knowledge" that leads to an
ideal of scientificity, certainty, and EYIDENCE that de-
cides in advance what the theme of the science of
phenomeno1ogy is to be. Thus the rousing battle cry
of"back to the matters themselves!" comes to disguise
a dogmatism ofthe narrowest kind. Why is it that con-
sciousness becomes the central theme of phenomen-
ology? Why should its field of research be conscious-
ness, its acts, and its objects? Why is lived experience
designated as being-conscious? Phenomenology thus
becomes the mathesis of lived experiences, which as
acts are intentiona! and as objects are apprehensible
in inner perception, and as such define the region of
consciousness. Concern for absolute scientificity -
for the security, universal binding force, and valid-
ity that it brings, where being is reduced to being the
possible region of a science - in fact draws pheno-
menology away from what is primarily decisive for it
since its initial breakthrough, its capacity to speak of
the freely given matters themselves. Heidegger in fact
began the course with an initial exposure ofthese mat-
ters through his very first etymological analysis ofthe
Greek roots of "phenomeno-logy," revealing that the
self-showing ofphenomena must always contend with
the ineluctable countermovement of self-concealment.
He also notes that the very phenomenon of concern
(Sorge), understood purely in its measure of restless-
ness and questioning, already serves to take phenom-
ena like consciousness, person, ego, subject, etc., back
to their original soi! in factical DASEIN, back to the Greek
concern for the Dasein of the world and the being of
life.
The course of summer 1925, "History of the Con-
cept ofTime," with its "destruction" ofthe sixth Logis-
che Untersuchungen and renewed "public burning" of
Jdeen 1, provides the most sustained and detailed cri-
tique of Husserl that we shall ever get from Heidegger.
In the context of developing his own "phenomenology
grounded in the question of Being" against the back-
ground of its history and three breakthrough discover-
ies (intentionality, categoria! intuition, and therefrom
a new sense ofthe a priori) made by Husserl, Heideg-
ger indicts his mentor and ali previous phenomenolo-
gists for a double ontologica! negligence, not only of
336 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the question of the being of intentionality but of the
question of the sense of Being itself. But in Husserl 's
analyses ofintentionality and categoria! intuition in the
Sixth Investigation, Heidegger sees the beginnings of
the broadening ofthe sense oftruth and givenness in the
direction of the pre-judicative, which Heidegger now
wishes to radicalize back to its full Greek beginnings.
Husserl's placing ofthe primacy on PERCEPTION and
its overt bodily presence is reduced back to the more
immediate presence of handy tools, which in turn is
founded upon the more tacit non-objective presence of
concernedness and its environing world. It is in this
way that Husserl 's EIDETIC METHOD is displaced by a
more fundamental understanding of Being, as a pri-
mary familiarity from which we understand everything
else. In fact, in this context, Heidegger borrows a term
first coined in Ideen II (written in 1912-15), "appre-
sentation," to describe the empowering relations of co-
presence between world and things. In noting Husserl 's
transmittal to him of the unpublished manuscript of
ldeen II, as well as the progress that Husserl had made
beyond it toward a phenomenological PSYCHOLOGY, no-
tably in his repeated Freiburg courses on "Nature and
Spirit," Heidegger adds a personal remark to his stu-
dents of 1925 concerning his ongoing relationship with
his old mentor: "But Jet me say that Husserl is aware
of my objections from my lecture courses in Freiburg
as well as here in Marburg and from personal conver-
sations, and is essentially making allowances for them,
so that my critique today no longer applies in its full
trenchancy. Here it is not really a matter of criticism
for the sake of criticizing but criticism for the sake of
laying open the issues and promoting understanding.
It almost goes without saying that even today I still
regard myself as a learner in relation to Husserl."
(4) The detailed dedication to Husserl found in
the footnote in Sein und Zeit ( 1927) expresses grat-
itude to Husserl "for incisive personal guidance and
free access to unpublished investigations" during their
Freiburg years, which served to familiarize Heidegger
with the most diverse areas of phenomenological re-
search, thereby allowing him to take a few steps himself
toward disclosing the "matters themselves." The brief
dedication page itself, along with the nearly complete
rough manuscript of Sein und Zeit, was ceremoniously
presented to Husserl "in grateful respect and friend-
ship" on his birthday in April 1926.
In the same month, Husserl got his first real look at
this long awaited book, now scheduled for publication
in his Jahrbuch, in the form of the first galleys. The
shock of alienation is immediate. Heidegger writes to
Jaspers in May 1926: "From the fact that Husserl finds
the whole thing strange and can 'no Ion ger find a place'
for it in the usual phenomenology, 1 gather that 1 am de
facto already further away than I myself believe and
see." Despite the shock, Husserl continues to promote
the cause of Heidegger, whose reputation in academic
circles grows exponentially with the publication ofhis
eagerly anticipated book.
In October of 1927, Husserl, approaching manda-
tory retirement, invites Heidegger, his anticipated suc-
cessor, to collaborate with him on a joint statement
defining "Phenomenology" for the Encyclopaedia Bri-
tannica. Spending ten days at Husserl's home, Hei-
degger writes a portion of the second of (ultimately)
four drafts and begins the critique of Husserl's first
draft and second partial draft. Draft and counterdraft,
revisions and counterrevisions, annotations, and asso-
ciated correspondence together tell a detailed tale of
confrontation of two phenomenologies attempting to
meet halfway and find a rapprochement, and quickly
ending in failure.
In the first draft, Husserl introduces his transcenden-
tal phenomenology by way of psychological pheno-
menology. In his counterdraft, Heidegger pauses on
this way in order first to situate phenomenology's re-
turn to consciousness within the history ofthe thought
ofBeing, beginning with Parmenides' dictum relating
Being ineluctably to its thought and ending in KANT's
transcendental consciousness. (Elements ofthis talk of
Being are carried over by Husserl into his third, but
not the final, draft.) Heidegger thus seems to concede
phenomenology's need to return to consciousness, but
at once notes that the "field of problems" that is thus
opened up is not simply that "of pure subjectivity,"
as Husserl quickly emends, but that "of the being of
entities in the articulated multiplicity of its kinds and
levels." Pull and counterpull thus continue throughout
the draft.
In his remarks and in a subsequent letter, Heideg-
ger tries to convince Husserl that the central problem
of Sein und Zeit is likewise transcendental constitu-
tion, that this possibility is to be found precisely in
the being that ek-sists and so is not something present-
 HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER
at-hand, but rather as a being-in-the-world that under-
stands Being - an issue that they had been debating
since Husserl first saw the galleys the year before. But
Husserl could never accept that a world belongs to
the essence of the pure ego, and Heidegger kept ask-
ing what this absolute ego could be in its being in
distinction from the pure psychic ego. Thus Husserl
concludes, in a letter to ROMAN INGARDEN, that Heideg-
ger "has not grasped the entire sense of the method of
phenomenological reduction," and so the basic course
ofhis thought. A month earlier, he had written:
"Heidegger has become my close friend and I be-
long among his admirers. Ali the more reason why I
have to regret that his work (and his lecture courses as
well) appear tobe essentially different from my works
and courses, and that, at least up to now, none of our
common students has built viable bridges between us.
There is a great deal in the ba lance for future philoso-
phy on how and whether he works his way through to
an apprehension ofmy universal intuitions .... Now he
is a power, absolutely honest and not ambitious, poised
strictly on the issues. Every great one-sidedness, that
oftruly independent thinkers, blazes the trai! anew. Let
us hope so."
The end ofthe year brings the first committee meet-
ing to nominate Husserl's successor at Freiburg, with
Husserl participating in an advisory capacity. Heideg-
ger is notified of the proceedings along with a request
to devote an entire day at the Husserl home "for a scien-
tific discussion ofyour book." The meeting takes place
on Sunday, January 8, 1928. Shortly thereafter, Husserl
notifies Heidegger that the committee had unanimously
decided to submit his name as the sole candidate (unica
loco) for the chair. The committee proposal to the
provincial ministry of education observes, in support
of Heidegger: "The work that appeared just last year,
Sein und Zeit (First Part), placed him in the forefront of
contemporary philosophers. He thus effectively joins
in the movements stemming from WILHELM DILTHEY and
phenomenology that seek to provide a new orientation
for ali of philosophy. The astounding originality with
which Heidegger attempts to develop and at once to en-
rich the basic ideas ofthese movements in their radical
consequences has for years, even before the appearance
of his work, manifestly had its effects solely through
Heidegger's impressive lecture courses and seminars
at Marburg. This researcher is undoubtedly also one
337
of the most significant philosophical teachers of our
time."
In retrospect, Husserl admits to doubts in his own
capacity to penetra te this new direction of thought so
alien to his own way ofthinking, and thus accepts Hei-
degger's assurances that he is sti li pursuing a transcen-
dental phenomenology, as the forthcoming Second Part
of Sein und Zeit (which shifts the formal focus from
"ek-sistence" to "transcendence") would show. Feeling
isolated by the recurrent tendency ofhis many students
to go their own ways with his ideas, leaving him "a
beckoning leader without followers," obsessed by the
idea of assuring a fu ture for the transcendental pheno-
menology that he had founded, he sees the successful
teacher Heidegger as the only candidate who could
continue his "school," and so decides unconditionally
in his favor. Despite his misgivings, the old Husserl
looks forward to Heidegger's return to Freiburg as an
opportunity to bring him back under his "instructive in-
fluence," thereby to "overcome his raw brilliance" and
win him over through his own more sober and mature
insights into "the radical new spirit of transcendental
phenomenology." This hope would be sorely disap-
pointed.
In April 1926, in view of the imminent appearance
of Sein und Zeit in his Jahrbuch, Husserl had asked
Heidegger to edit his 1905 lectures on inner time-
consciousness from manuscripts transcribed by EDITH
STEIN. The only slightly reworked edition appears in
mid-1928 asJahrbuch IX, now under Heidegger's gen-
eral editorship. Husserl complains of not even seeing
the galleys, although Heidegger had sent him an ad-
vance copy of his unusually terse foreword ("Quite
appropriate!"- "Durchaus angemessen!"- replies
Husserl) at the same time that his appointment is con-
firmed by the provincial ministry. Heidegger's return
to Freiburg in late 1928 proves to be far less reconcil-
ing than Husserl had hoped. By the end of the year, it
becomes clear to Husserl that any intense philosophi-
cal interchange is for Heidegger "an unnecessary, un-
wanted, uneasy matter." The barest interchanges con-
tinue only on more formal public occasions.
On April 8, 1929, at the university gathering of
former students on the festive occasion of Husserl's
seventieth birthday, Heidegger formally presents the
Festschrift (a special edition of the Jahrbuch) to
Husserl along with a short speech addressing Husserl 's
338 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
leadership and their corresponding followership over
the years, not without some allusion to their personal
relationship: "And so the works we present to you
are also only a testimony that we wanted to follow
your leadership, not a proof that we have succeeded
in being followers." Heidegger also rhetorically reiter-
ates some of the points that he had been making over
the years concern ing phenomenology's "to the matters
themselves!" as an open possibility for ever new di-
rections, as a breakthrough in attitude rather than as a
particular doctrine, worldview, or school: "Or has your
research not first of ali created a whole new space for
philosophical inquiry, with new demands, transformed
assessments, a fresh regard for the hidden powers of
the great tradition ofWestern philosophy? Yes, exactly
that!"
With the publication of his Formale und transzen-
dentale Logik in mid-1929, Husserl finally takes the
time (two months) for a meticulous reading of not
only Sein und Zeit but also Kant und das Problem der
Metaphysik ( 1929) and, of course, Heidegger's contri-
bution to his Festschrift, "Vom Wesen des Grundes"
( 1929), "in order to come to a dispassionate and con-
clusive position toward the Heideggerian philosophy."
The marginalia in his copies of these texts (ali auto-
graphed copies from Heidegger!) graphically record
his thoroughgoing rejection of them both in method
and in content. To Heidegger's dedications of"friend-
ship" and "heartfelt greetings," Husserl now counters,
"amicus Plato magis amica veritas." The vei led attacks
discrediting his works, which associates had warned
him about for years, Husserl now finds in abundance
in Heidegger's writings, as in the polemic against the
primacy ofperception and the "worldless ego."
Husserl rebuts Heidegger's "unjust objections"
against Descartes as ifthey were attacks upon himself,
and regards the forthcoming German edition of Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931] as his reply to Sein und
Zeit. He recognizes his Intentionalitiit in Heidegger's
Verstehen and its a priori, as well as the drive toward
a formal ontology that, however, would no longer bea
mathesis inasmuch as Being is not objective ("l don't
see this at ali," notes Husserl, for whom "being" is
being-constituted); repeatedly asks "What does 'con-
stitute' mean"? in view of the polyvalence to which
Heidegger subjects the term; and cannot comprehend
Heidegger 's phronetic sense of "repetition" in view of
his own more univocal Platonic sense.
Husserl's "Nachwort zu meinen Jdeen" ( 1930)
brings the first public denunciation of the new "phi-
losophy of Existenz," without, however, openly nam-
ing Heidegger. The same circumlocution occurs in
Husserl 's lectures to the Kant Societies in Frankfurt,
Berlin, and Halle in 1931, "Phănomenologie und An-
thropologie," which inveighs against the overriding in-
terest in a PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY among "the
younger German philosophers." On January 6, 1931,
Husserl writes his confidential letter to ALEXANDER
PFĂNDER, baring his soul over the entire course of his
relationship with Heidegger, "my dearest friend for al-
most a decade," from initial promise to final disavowal.
"Incomprehensibility precludes friendship- this re-
versa) in scientific estimation and personal relationship
was one ofthe most difficult ordeals ofmy life."
Extant correspondence suggests that personal and
politica! recriminations were exchanged between the
Husserl and Heidegger households un tii Husserl 's
death in 1938, when Heidegger's conspicuous ab-
sence from the funeral led to further recriminations
in the ensuing years. Philosophically and pedagog-
ically, Heidegger held two seminars of "phenomen-
ological exercises" in the first semester of his return
to Freiburg, only to drop such titles in his works and
teaching until his !ater, more autobiographical essays,
although Husserl and his phenomenology are men-
tioned on occasion in the thirty-year interim. In fact,
the earliest of these philosophical-biographical tracts,
the quasi-factual "Dialogue on/from Language" with
the Japanese, is introduced by a note ( 1959) seeking
"to counter widely circulated allegations" that Hei-
degger was responsible for the deletion of the ded-
ication to Husserl from the edition of Sein und Zeit
that appeared in 1942. This dialogue on the "language
of being" tacitly underscores the signal importance of
the First lnvestigation on "Expression and Meaning"
for the )ater Heidegger's permutation of intentional-
ity into a "hermeneutic relation" of mutual c1aim and
"usage" between Being and human being. Other such
tracts in which the old Heidegger retrospectively revis-
its his early personal-philosophical relationship with
Husserl are the letter that prefaces WILLIAM RICHARD-
soN's Through Phenomenology to Thought ( 1963);
the article dedicated to the publisher of the "pheno-
menological movement," Hermann Niemeyer, entitled
 HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER
"Mein Weg in die Phănomenologie" (1963 ), and the
Spiegel interview ( 1966, published 1976). In fact, Hei-
degger's modification of Richardson's original title,
"From/Through Phenomenology to Thought," where
phenomenology is the process of "allowing the most
proper matter of thought to show itself," is itself an
acknowledgment of a lasting debt to Husserl 's "princi-
ple of phenomenology" for Heidegger's own lifelong
endeavor to variously indicate the place of emergence
of the archaic Being (Seyn) that holds, draws, pulls,
solicits, or is otherwise ineluctably related to human
being. The "unrelenting speli" and "magic" ofthe Lo-
gische Untersuchungen, especially the sixth, invoked
in "Mein Weg in die Phănomenologie," is coup1ed with
the invocation, contrary to Husserl's shunning of the
historical, of the authority of great thinkers like Aris-
totle in leading Heidegger to a deeper sense of the
"self-manifestation of phenomena."
In an essay entitled "Das Ende der Philosophie und
die Aufgabe des Denkens" ( 1964), Husserl is criticized
along with HEGEL for ending philosophy by making sub-
jectivity its "matter." Heidegger sees a deeper pheno-
menological matter that remains unthought in philos-
ophy's matter that it is the task of thought to indicate,
namely, the clearing of an opening that allows any-
thing whatsoever to appear. The old Heidegger's last
of four seminars with French scholars in Zăhringen in
1973 is devoted almost exclusively to the question of
how Husserl touches or "brushes" the question of the
sense and truth of Being with his notion of categoria!
intuition in the Sixth Investigation, thus for Heidegger
the "focus of Husserl 's thought," and yet eventually
neglects this question in the remainder ofhis thought.
The doctrine of categoria! intuition broadens the no-
tion of givenness far beyond sense-givenness, to the
categoria! realm that enables things to appear, which
is thus appresent in presenting things. Being is accord-
ingly the presenting process that necessari1y presents
things, not itself a thing but the clearing in which and
by which things appear. Being is not a concept that
takes into possession, but an horismos that firmly but
gently environs what the re-gard is meant to guard.
This clearing, the locus out of which the question of
time and the truth of being is to be developed, is the
matter "itself' of phenomenology, tautological think-
339
ing at its ontologica! best, where phcnomenology aga in
recognizes its roots in Parmenides "himself."
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Beaufret, Jean. Dialogue avec Heidegger III: Appmche de
Heidegger. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974.
Courtine, Jean-Franc;:ois. Heidegger el la piu'nomenologie.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992.
Heidegger, Martin and Elisabeth Blochmann. Briejivechsel
1918-1969. Ed. Joachim W. Storck. Marburg: Deutsche
Schillergesellschaft, 1989.
- , and Karl Jaspers. Briefivechse/ 1920--1963. Ed. Wal-
ter Biemel and Hans Saner. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1990.
Husserl, Edmund. Phiinomenologische Psvchologie. Ed.
Walter Biemel. Husserliana 9. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962; Phenomenological Psychology. Trans.
John Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- . Notes sur Heidegger. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1993.
- . "Husserls Randbemerkungen zu Heideggers Seinund Zeit
und Kant und das Prohlem der Metaphysik." Ed. Roland
Breeur. Husserl Studies 11 (1994 ), 3--63.
- . Briefivechse/. 10 vols. Ed. Karl Schuhmann in collabora-
tion with Elisabeth Schuhmann. Husserliana-Dokumente
3/J-10. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
- , and Martin Heidegger. "Fenomeno/ogia ": Storia di un
dissidio (1927). 2nd ed. Ed. Renato Cristin. Milan: Edi-
zioni Unicopli, 1990.
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of' Heidegger:~ Being and
Time. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1993.
Levi nas, Emmanuel. En decouvrant /'existence avec Husserl
et Heidegger. Paris: J. Vrin, 1939; 3rd enl. ed., 1967.
Marion, Jean-Luc. Reduction et donation: Recherche sur
Husserl, Heidegger et phimomeno/ogie. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1989.
Miseh, Georg. Lehensphilosophie und Phănomeno/ogie.
Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richwng mit
Husserl und Heidegger. Bonn: Cohen, 1930; 2nd ed.
Leipzig: Teubner, 1931.
Ott, Hugo. Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biogra-
phie. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1988; Martin
Heidegger: A Politica/ Lif'e. Trans. Alian Blunden. New
York: Basic Books, 1993.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Zu Heidegger's Spiegei-Gesprach i.iber
Husserl." Zeitschriji fiir phi/osophische Forschung 32
(1978), 561--612.
Stapleton, Timothy J. Husserl and Heidegger: The Ques-
tion of' a Phenomenological Beginning. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1984.
Tugendhat, Ernst. Der Wahrheitshegriff'bei Husserlund Hei-
degger. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 196 7.
Waehelens, Alphonse de. Phenombwlogie et verite. Essai
sur /'evolution de /'idee de veri te chez Husserl et Heideg-
ger. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953.
THEODORE KISIEL
Northern lllinois University

IMAGINATION The emphasis placed in pheno-
menology on eidetic insight and PERCEPTION might
seem to render the role of imagination superftuous
or secondary. While both perceiving and essential in-
sight (Wesensschau) bear on stable, if not altogether
fixed, regularities- namely, physical objects and ma-
terial and formal essences respectively- imaginati an
would seem to be concerned with fugiti ve phenomena
that elude the invariancy so highly prized in pheno-
menological description. Yet from the very beginning,
EDMUND HUSSERL considered imagination a topic wor-
thy of serious pursuit in two respects: as something to
be described in its own right, and as having special
methodological merit.
( 1) Imagination describedfor its own sake. At first,
Husserl followed FRANZ BRENTANO in maintaining that
there are no essential differences in the act-character of
imaginati an and perception, both being modes of"rep-
rcscnting" ( Vorstellen ); the critica] differences consist
only in the different kinds of content at stake in the two
acts. But by the time of Husserl's lectures on "Phan-
tasie und Bildbewusstsein"- which were part of the
same 1904/05 course that included the lectures on in ner
time-consciousness- he had rejected this approach as
inadequate, since it made the difference between phan-
tasms and perceptions either a mere matter of degree or
a question of direct vs. indirect representation: sensa-
tions are direct and unmediated representations, while
phantasms are mediated by connections and concepts
of various kinds. He insists instead that there are dif-
ferences of kind, not just of degree, between what we
imagine and what we perceive, which are not just two
ways of "objectifying" in which the appearance of an
abject occurs.
The crucial differences are differences in act-
character, i.e., in modes of consciousness: in the pre-
sentation ( Gegenwărtigen, Prasentation) of something
present vs. the non-presentation or RE-PRESENTATION
(Nicht-Gegenwiirtigen, Vergegenwiirtigen) of some-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kocke/mans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
thing not-present. Perceptual consciousness gives its
content the "credit" of being "actually there," as "it-
self," given "in person," while imagining conscious-
ness "discredits" it as "non-actual," "merely" re-
presented. In the case of an "image" qua "picture"
(Bild), a more complex structurc emerges: Husserl dis-
tinguishes the picture (i.e., thc photograph, painting,
etc.) as a perceived physical thing; the pictorial abject
(e.g., the image of a child) as sheer appearance; and the
subject of the picture (e.g., the independently existing
child who has been painted or photographed).
These distinctions are sti li observed in Husserl 's
analysis ofDurer's engraving "The Knight, Death, and
the Devii" in ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie
und phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913). But
analysis highlights the different modes of conscious-
ness at stake in experiencing it. "Normal perception"
grasps the engraving as a physical thing, while "per-
ceptive consciousness" focuses on the figures, "knight
on horseback," "devii," etc. "Aesthetic observation,"
on the other hand, seeks to apprehend the "depicted
realities," e.g., a flesh-and-blood knight. Husserl em-
phasizes that the perceptive consciousness of the en-
graved figures is a "neutrality modification" ofthe ini-
tial perception of the material work of art: although
the latter is posited as a really existing thing, the pic-
taria! abject itself is given ncither as existing nor as
not-existing. This claim allows him to make the much
more general assertion that "imagining in general" is
a "neutrality modification ofthe 'positing' (setzenden)
act ofre-presentation ( Vergegenwiirtigung), and thus of
remembering in the widest sense of the term." Ali re-
presentations can therefore be divided into memories
on the one hand and their neutralized re-presentations
on the other - i.e., into positing and non-positing
re-presentations, of which imaginings form a signifi-
cant subset along with supposings, doubtings, etc. And
thanks to this common genealogy, imaginings may
combine with perceivings and rememberings in mani-
fold ways (sa that there can be imaginings of memories
or perceptions as well as imaginings in memories) and
with themselves (so that we can have "phantasies in
phantasies").
This line of thought would seem to privi lege MEM-
ORY -and thus perception, from which most memories
stem-over imaginati an as the mere (albeit sometimes
complex) "modification" ofthe former. Yet Husserl in-
340
 IMAGINATION
sists that while imagination is typically a modification
of a positing re-presentation (i.e., an act of remember-
ing) ora positing presentation (i.e., an act of perceiv-
ing), it is not necessarily linked to a particular previous
positing and need not modify any particular previous
act as such, but can be an entirely spontaneous act.
Such an act nonetheless preserves features basic to ev-
ery act of remembering or perceiving (e.g., horizon,
the field structure of space, the successive nature of
time, the fulfillment or cancellation ofintentions, etc.).
Moreover, although the perceptual anticipations that
are non- independent parts of ali acts of percei ving need
not give rise to explicit acts of imaginati ve EXPECTATION,
these predelineations can indeed motivate an intuitive
filling-out, a kind of imaginati ve explication function-
ing as a quasi-determination ofwhat is given in passive
synthesis as a determinable indeterminacy. Here too,
there is neither a temporally nested re-production of
any particular past course of experiencing nor a neu-
trality modification of something in particular already
posited, but a kind of quasi-experiencing according to
the general style proper to the type of objectivity in
question. To such imaginative explication there must
also be added the possibility of an imaginative trans-
formation ( Umfingieren) that varies some aspect ofthe
given ( or constructs an entire phantasy-world) while
respecting its general style, yielding an as-if experi-
encing and its correlative quasi-reality.
In !ater writings such as Erfahrung und Urteil
(1939), Husserl refers to such imagination as "quasi-
positing," i.e., it posits its objects as if they were exis-
tent, causally efficacious, etc. This brings imagination
significantly closer to what is traditionally regarded
as "fiction" and hence to the Coleridgean criterion
of "willing suspension of disbelief." And it calls into
question the necessity of any strict neutrality modifica-
tion, since the "as-if' is not ontically neutra): it takes
the imagined object ( or state of affairs) to be possibly
-but only purely possibly- the case. It also suggests
thatfeigning, that is, pretending tobe the case, whether
in action or in mentation, is an important variant form
of imagining.
(2) lmagination as methodologically valuable. It
was thanks precisely to the recognition of a kind of
imagination that is not necessarily tethered to memory,
yet preserves fundamental structural features of experi-
ence per se in its free play that Husserl was able to em-
341
ploy it as a keystone in the arch of phenomenological
method. For only by the "free variation" of examples
through their imaginati ve exfoliation can genuine con-
sistencies and regularities appear that might otherwise
never be grasped. In ldeen !, Husserl 's example of the
free use of imagination in EIDETIC METHOD is the geome-
ter, who is not restricted to actual skctches or models,
but elucidates essential clarifications by generating, in
phantasy, variation upon variation of the geometrica)
figure in question. Similarly, the phenomenologist can-
not derive ali pertinent essential knowledge from the
primordial givenness of perception, but must supple-
ment what experience has actually delivered with what
imagination can project. It is notable that this necessary
supplement need not be restricted to the productions of
the investigator's own imagination but can include-
indeed, should include- contributions from the imag-
inative work of others in the fields ofHISTORY and LITER-
ATURE (especially poetry); Husserl even names fiction
a "vital element" and source for the truth phenomen-
ology seeks. (As MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY and others
have pointed out, the investigator's own imagination
is historically and culturally situated and thus limited,
making recourse to others' stories even more crucial.)
Husserl further refines and extends the methodolog-
ical use ofimagination in phenomenology in Erfahrung
und Urteil. A given case (whether actually experienced
or imagined) is taken as a "model" or example that is
then varied in imagination; the imaginati ve activity can
be active, i.e., willed as such, or spontaneous, i.e., just
occurring on its own without explicit volition, and can
be continued indefinitely. Eventually, sufficient "over-
lapping" (Deckung) occurs among the variants to allow
a "unity of coincidence" to ari se, and an invariant- an
ei dos or essence, that which is the same throughout-
emerges and can be grasped in its own right. Another
crucial aspect ofthis procedure is what might be termed
the test of "imagining away": if a given feature can-
not be eliminated in imagination, then it belongs to the
phenomenon under investigation. What is essential to
a phenomenon is what it cannot do without, and imagi-
nation is indispensable in establishing this sine qua non
status. The via negativa of this approach rejoins and
complements the via positiva of allowing the invariant
to arise from the series ofvariations. But what matters
most is that imagination, whether employed actively
or passively, gives us access to a realm ofpossibilities
342 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
considerably broader than any set of instances drawn
from our own perceptual experience (and thus posited
as actually happening oras having happened).
Imagining is an essentially intuitional act rather than
a conceptual one. Yet despite staking out the enor-
mous territory of re-presentations and doing much
of the most extensive, painstaking mapping of it,
Husserl rarely singled out the intuitional element ofre-
presentations as such, including the instance of imag-
ination. It was left to his close student and disciple,
EUGEN FINK, to take this step in a prize essay and
dissertation entitled "Vergegenwartigung und Bild,"
first published in the Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und
phiinomenologische Forschung in 1930. Fink consid-
ered ali re-presentations to involve an origi'lary access
to temporal horizons not given in (oras) the present, an
insight that had already led Husserl to his investigations
of inner time-consciousness in his 1904/05 lectures.
But Fink emphasizes that the temporal horizons and
spatial parameters of what we imagine constituie an
entire WORLD, a "phantasy-world" (a "quasi-world," as
Husserl says in Erfahrung und Urteil). Fink describes
this world as inherently "possible"- even when ele-
ments ha ve been incorporated into it from actual worlds
and even though its "open leeway (Spielraum) ofpossi-
bilities" are structured in accordance with the "a priori
laws of intuitiveness in general." The ontic status of
such a world is that of"unreality," ofthe "as it were."
Yet although objects in the phantasy-world are at once
possible and unreal, they are coherent and consistent
enough for predicative judgments to be made about
them, and taken together, forma totality that transcends
consciousness.
This phantasy-world is not to be confused with an-
other image-world, also intuitional in character: the
"picture-world" (Bildwelt) that opens to us when a cer-
tain appearance serves as its "bearer," e.g., the sur-
face of a painted canvas. This surface is typically hid-
den from direct apprehension; we see through it into
the picture-world with which it coincides. Thus Fink
calls the image a "window" onto the picture-world,
and such a window, the unique point of access to the
picture-world, is "nothing other than the pure picture-
phenomenon itself."
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's L 'imaginaire ( 1940) a]so ends
with an analysis of a work of art regarded as what he
calls an "externa! image." For Sartre, such an image
serves as an effective "analogon" for a purely imagined
object; by grasping it in its very materiality, we are con-
veyed to the latter, which is the only object that counts
in imagination. In this way, Sartre merges into one con-
tinuous experience what Fink would keep rigorously
separate: re-presentational acts of pure "phantasy" and
presentational acts of picture-consciousness based on
a "bearer." However, Sartre's study- based on his
earlier study of alternative conceptions of imagination,
L 'imagination ( 1936) - is valuable for its broader
typology of the "image family." The pure image-
usually regarded as a "mental image" - is the first
member of this family and possesses four traits: it is
a consciousness not of an image, but of an object in
image form; it does not possess an endless wealth of
detail as does a perceptum, but "suffers from a sort of
essential poverty''; its object is posited as a "nothing-
ness" that itself takes four forms (nonexistent, absent,
existing elsewhere, or "neutralized," i.e., not posited
as existing); and it is spontaneous.
Sartre also discerns other kinds ofimages, largely on
the basis ofthe difference in the materiality by which
they are presented. Some of these possess a strictly
physical medium of presentation (photographs, illus-
trations, portraits, caricatures, impersonations ), others
a mixture of material and psychic media (faces in
flames, arabesques seen in tapestry, hypnagogic im-
ages). What matters most, however, is not the medium
ofimagining, much less its objects, but the precise "at-
titude of consciousness" or intentiona! stance we take
up: e.g., seeing the painting of a person as a portrait,
or regarding a schematic drawing as representing a
dancing figure. Part of this attitude is also the knowl-
edge we bring to the act of imagination; thus I can
never be surprised by what 1 imagine, since I find in
the image only the very comprehension 1 ha ve brought
to it, though affectivity or feeling is also integral to
image-consciousness. For Sartre, then, the imaginer's
intentiona] act transcends the images themselves, aim-
ing toward the real objects they signify. Yet what we
get is nevertheless the "essential ambiguity" of an un-
real object in a derealized "anti-world," and in the very
act of intending it, 1 "make myself unreal" as well.
A less despairing view is found in EDWARD s. CASEY's
lmagining: A Phenomenological Study ( 1976), which
provides a twofold analysis of imagination, "inten-
tiona!" and "eidetic." On an intentiona! analysis, the
 IMAGINATION
object phase consists in the "image" (i.e., how the
imagined object is given) and the "imaginative pre-
sentation," which is made up of the specific content
imagined (i.e., just what we imagine); the "imagina!
margin" (the edge of the content); and its "world-
frame" of imagina! space and time (the world-frame
standing somewhere between Fink's commitment to
a full-fledged imagined world and Sartre's dismissive
idea of an anti-world.) The act phase comprises three
main types of imagining: "imaging" (that is, sensu-
ous displays of discrete objects and associated traits),
"imagining-that" (wherein the specific content is a state
of affairs, itself either sensuous or non-sensuous), and
"imagining-how" (i.e., how to do something, wherein
the imaginer is involved as agent, either in person or by
proxy). Combinations are frequent: we imagine how to
swim the crawl stroke by imagining that a certain state
of affairs obtains- e.g., that the pool water is warm
- and in so doing we generate a number of images
that illustrate or support what we are imagining. Other
act-forms are possible but not explored in this book:
e.g., imagining-as or imagining-with-respect-to.
An eidetic analysis ofimagining reveals a set ofsix
paired traits. Spontaneity and controlledness exhibit an
exclusivist "option-necessity": each act of imagining
arises either spontaneously - unbidden, on its own
accord- oras solicited by the imaginer, who controls
its course more or less completely. By the same token,
every aspect and phase of imagining is self-contained
- i.e., coheres without having to rely on modes of
continuation or supplementation- and se(f-evident: it
is as it presents itse(f, without needing any additional
experience or history to complete it. Where the first two
pairs obtain for both object- and act-phases of imag-
ining, the third pair holds only for the object phase.
lndetenninacy signals the way that each imaginative
presentation trails off into an a ura of indefiniteness, an
intrinsic vagueness that belongs to it and is nota failing
or sign of incompletion. Pure possibility indicates that
the status ofwhat we imagine is neither necessary nor
actual, but possible- and not just possible but purely
possible, that is to say, only possible, without any im-
plication of impending or even potential development.
It is to be noted that indeterminacy and pure possi-
bility, along with self-containment and self-evidence,
are "trait-necessary" insofar as they characterize every
feature of imagining without exception.
343
Following a comparative assessment of perception
and imagination, Casey's study concludes with an ex-
amination of imaginati ve autonomy in terms of "inde-
pendence" (of causality, context, use) and "freedom of
mind." The role of such "thin autonomy'' in various
activities and fields- especially psychology, philoso-
phy, and art- is then investigated.
Both Casey and Sartre end their studies ofimagina-
tion by referring to the importance ofimagining in art, a
theme that has been actively discussed ever since Kant
- followed by Schelling, Coleridge, and other Ro-
mantics- suspected that imagination is indispensable
to the creation and enjoyment of art. ROMAN INGARDEN
takes up this theme in detail in Das literarische Kunst-
werk (The literary work of art, 1931 ), describing how
imagination fills in gaps and fteshes out details beyond
the indefinite descriptions or schematic adumbrations
offered in the bare words of the text, thus creating
sensuously intuitive scenes in "imaginative modes of
appearing" that exceed what the words explicitly indi-
cate.
In Phimomenologie de l 'experience esthetique
( 1953 ), MIKEL DUFRENNE builds on Ingarden 's model
ofliterature as dependent on the active participati an of
the reader, extending it to a general theory in AESTHET-
Ics. Yet the very activity singled out by Ingarden and
attributed to imagination- i.e., the fiii ing in of inde-
terminacies and opacities- is excluded by Dufrenne
as unnecessary, for in art "appearance says ali" and
does not require imagination to specify it further into
representational concreteness. What is required, how-
ever, is "feeling," which derives from a "sympathetic
reftection" in which objects (the proper concern of
imagination) are replaced by "quasi-subjects," while
appearances become aspects of an expressed and ex-
pressive world. Thus imagination is at once surpassed
and suppressed in the experience of art.
In subsequent writings, Dufrenne introduces the
idea of "great images" that mediate between humans
and nature and the notion of an "imaginary in depth"
that anchors us in, and attunes us to, the natural world.
A similar turn is taken by Gaston Bachelard ( 1884-
1962), who distinguishes between a "formal imag-
ination" that concerns itself with the elegances and
niceties of sheer form (whether in art or science) and a
properly "material imagination" that has to do with the
way the four ancient elements - air, fire, earth, and
344 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
water- sustain poetic imaginaries of many kinds. A
material imagination aims notat building up and shap-
ing represented objects, but at following the intricate
and subtle pathways into the material world as it is
co-imagined by poets and readers alike. Thus poetic
images, far from taking us into the ethereal and ir-
real, "resonate" with the materiality of the very world
around us and bring to light its oneiric depth.
Others have explored the importance of imagina-
tion in art, notably WOLFGANG ISER in Der Akte des
Lesens (The act of reading, 1976)- which takes up
the "image-character ofrepresentation" in READING in a
discussion heavily indebted to Husserl, Ingarden, and
Dufrenne- and BRUCF WILSIIIRF, who in Ro le P/aying
and ldentity ( 1982) investigates the ro le of imagina-
tion in acting and theoretical experience more gener-
ally, emphasizing its bodily and physiognomic instan-
tiations. Wilshire, like Dufrenne, is sensitive to the
restrictions of imagination in art - it "carries limits
and obstructions" - but he underlines the way that
imagination also brings a vision ofthe unlimited.
The boundless resources of imagination are such
that its creative and constitutive character cannot be
limited to the domain of art. To trace out its import and
impact in other areas is an unfinished task, but one that
stil! beckons with much promise. How is imagination
part ofsociallife? OfRELIGioN? Ofpolitical action? Of
erotic encounter? Of ordinary thought and LANGUAGE?
Of perception and memory? With these questions we
not only retilrn to a point of origin in Husserl 's first
investigations into the interplay between imagination
and other acts of re-presentation and presentation, but
also look forward to future descriptive work in direc-
tions yet uncharted.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bachelard, Gaston. L 'eau et les reves. Paris: Jose Corti, 1942;
Water and Dreams. Trans. Edith R. Farrell. Dallas, TX:
Pegasus, 1983.
Cairns, Dorion. "Perceiving, Remembering, Image-
Awareness, Feigning Awareness." In Phenomenology:
Continua/ion and Criticism. Essays in Memory of Do-
rion Cairns. Ed. Fred Kersten and Richard M. Zaner. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, 251--{)2.
Casey, Edward S. Imagining: A Phenomenological Study.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- . "Imagination and Phenomenological Method." In
Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Ed. Frederick A. El-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Ca", J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
liston and Peter McCormick. Notre Dame. IN: University
ofNotre Dame Prcss, 1977, 70-82.
-."Sartre on Imagination." In The Philosophy of'Jean-Paul
Sartre. Ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp. La Salle, IL: Open Court,
1981, 139--{)6.
Dufrenne, Mikel. Le poetique. 2nd ed. Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1973.
- . "L'imaginaire." In his Esthetique et philosophie. Voi 2.
Paris: Klincksieck, 1976, 99-132.
Fink, Eugen. "Vergegenwărtigung und Bild." In his Studien
zur Phănomenologie (1930--1939). The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1966, 1-78.
Husserl, Edmund. Phantasie, Bildbewusstein, Erin-
nerung. Zur Phănomenologie der anschaulichen Verge-
genwărtigen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925). Ed.
Eduard Marbach. Husserliana 23. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1980.
-. Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie
der Logik. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Prague: Akademia,
1939; Experience and Judgment. Trans. James S.
Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1973.
Ingarden, Roman. Das Literarische Kunstwerk. 3rd ed.
Tilbingen: Max Niemeyer, 1965; The Literal)' Work of
Art. Trans. George G. Grabowicz. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Prfess, 1973.
Levin, David M. "Induction and Husserl's Theory ofEidetic
Variation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
29 (I968), 1-15.
Rica:ur, Paul. "Ryle and Sartre on Imagination." In The Phi-
losophy o{Jean-Paul Sartre. Ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp. La
Salle, IN: Open Court, 198I, 167-78.
Sarai va, Maria L 'imagination se ion Husserl. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. L 'imaginaire. Paris: Gallimard, 1940; The
Psychology of Imagination. Trans. Bernard Frechtman.
New York: Citadel, 1961.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. "Fiktion und Realităt." In his In den
Netzen der Lebenswelt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1985, 226-34.
Wilshire, Bruce. Role Playing and Identity: The Limits o{
Theatre as Metaphor. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1982.
Zaner, Richard M. "Examples and Possibles: A Criticism of
Husserl's Theory of Free-Phantasy Variation." Research
in Phenomenology 3 ( 1973), 29-43.
EDWARD S. CASEY
State University of New York, Stony Brook
ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
Study Project on Phenomenology of the Body
SUSUMU KANATA
Hiroshima University
INDIA When "phenomenology and Indian
philosophy" is being spoken about, the "and" does not
imply any relationship or inftuence obtaining between
 INDIA
the two. Any such relationship is obviously out of the
question for classical Indian philosophy. Nevertheless,
we can look for phenomenological elements in Indian
thought. Only when we come to speak about recent and
contemporary Indian philosophy does it make sense to
ask if the phenomenological movement has had any
impact.
One should bear in mind, to begin with, that Indian
philosophy is not a homogeneous body of doctrines,
theorems, theories, and argumentations, but contains
within it an enormous diversity of opposed, conflicting
philosophies rang ing from Carvaka materialism at one
extreme to the Advaita Vedanta monistic idealism at
the other. Saying something in general about Indian
philosophy is as risky as saying something in general
about Western philosophy. But one of the mistakes
committed by many Western thinkers - most rele-
vantly in the present context, by both EDMUND HUSSERL
and MARTIN HEIDEGGER- is to ha ve heJd the view that
"philosophy"- not the word, but the concept, the dis-
cipline- is Western in origin and consequently that to
speak of "Indian philosophy" is to contradict oneself
and to speak of "Western philosophy" is to indulge in
a tautology. This point of view, which goes back in a
way to HEGEL, is based on ignorance ofthe conceptual,
discursive, and theoretical contcnt of Indian thought
and is mistaken.
For present purposes it will be taken for granted that
the key concepts ofphenomenology are consciousness
or subjectivity, EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION, and constitu-
tion. This will guide an exploration of the complex
world of Indian thought for phenomenological ele-
ments.
Phenomenology, especially in the transcendental
form of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY, centers around
a specific understanding of the nature of conscious-
ness. According to this understanding, consciousness
is intentiona], not in the pre-phcnomenological sense
of relatedness to an abject in the world, but in the
sense of being necessarily correlated to a MEANING or
a NOEMA. AJong with this understanding of INTENTION-
ALITY, phenomenology, in its transcendental form, un-
derstands the abject, with its specific object-sense, as
being constituted by intentionality through an overlap-
ping ofthe meanings that the various acts con fer. Hen ce
we ha ve the doctrine of constitution of the WORLD in
consciousness - in the sense that only through con-
345
sciousness does the world come to be presented, and
also in the sense that ali meanings that the world con-
sists in, including thc meaning "world," have their ori-
gins in appropriate structures of consciousness. It is
also an important component of this complex theory
that consciousness is intrinsically temporal and that
by virtue of its intrinsic TIME, it constitutes itself as a
flux, constitutes its unity as an enduring ego, as well as
unities of immanent acts as temporal entities: ali these
constitutive accomplishments, including the temporal
dimensions of past, present, and fu ture, ha ve their ori-
gin in the "living present" that becomes, for Husserl,
the absolute consciousness.
At first sight, this thesis of a world-constituting,
transcendental, and absolute subjectivity seems very
close, in spirit, to a recurrent theme in Indian - es-
pecially, Vedantic -- thought. For Vedanta, especially
in the non-dualistic formulation that Samkara gave it,
the foundational reality, the principle of ali principles,
that which underlies and makes possible ali cognition,
is consciousness (cit)- in metaphysical jargon called
Atman and Brahman. But when we look closer at this
Vedanta thesis, we begin to realize the enormous dif-
ference that obtains between it and Husserl 's position.
Most importantly, consciousness, in Vedanta, is self-
showing (svayamprakasa) and, like light, it shows ali
objects, but it is not intrinsically intentiona!. Its inten-
tionality, being-of-this-or-that-object, is only a "super-
imposed" property. Philosophical wisdom would then
consist in precisely seeing this point- intellectually
as well as intuitively- that pure consciousness, freed
from the empirica! constraints of body and world, is
one, not many, universal, not individual, not differen-
tiated into mental states and with no intentiona! direct-
edness toward the world. Such a consciousness can
be the foundation of experience, but cannot constitute
it. The possibility of empirica! experience requires, be-
sides consciousness, a principle oflimitation -avidyă
or ignorance- that projects the world of names and
forms on the one consciousness.
However, if phenomenology is also a description
of experience, then what the Vedantists do may well
claim to be so. While in their logica] and discursive
work they advance arguments in fa vor of such a rad-
ical thesis, they also attempt to describe the different
modalities of experience in order to demonstrate that
cultivating or realizing such an undifferentiated, uni-
346 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
versa! consciousness, freed from aii intentionality, is
within the range of human possibilities. A common
strategy was to distinguish between four stages of con-
sciousness: waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and the
"fourth" (the "transcendent," turiya), ofwhich the first
three, in graded withdrawal from intentionality, are
available to aii, while the Iast is available only to the
wise in the so-called "mystical" experience. Naturally,
philosophers had to justify the claim that dreamless
sleep was a state of consciousness by drawing upon
the premise that the judgment, on waking, that one
slept well but knew nothing, was a memory-judgment.
A similar descriptive psychology of the various
modalities of consciousness, in much greater detail,
is to be found in the Buddhist Iiterature, beginning
with the well-known five elements (skandhas): rupa,
vedanii, samjiiii, vijiliina, and samskiira (form, feeling,
perception, mind, and impulses)- a Iist in which, it
should be noted, mental consciousness is distinguished
from sensory consciousness, perceptual consciousness,
feelings, and volitions. Each ofthese is further divided
into subordinate types, so that early BUDDHISM offers
a rich description of mental states not rivaled by any
other tradition.
But we still do not have a transcendental constitu-
tive phenomenology. In some of its forms, Buddhism
was phenomenalistic with regard to material objects,
which were construed as "aggregates" ofsensory data.
Likewise, the self as an "I" was shown to emerge out
of the way these five types of states intertwine and
interact with each other- the substantial EGO having
been denied. Could we say that the "I" is constituted
by interna! features of the flux of states of conscious-
ness? In any case, the technique - psychophysical
and voluntaristic - that the Hindu and the Buddhist
traditions developed, nurtured, and theoretically de-
fended, the technique of Yoga and meditation, may be
said tobe meant to do what Husserl's epoche and re-
ductions were to do- i.e., to "purify" consciousness
of presuppositions and presumptions, from Iiving in
the naive world-belief (in the case of Buddhism, be-
Iief in substantial things and egos), and thereby tobe
able to achieve, to intuitively experience, transcenden-
tal subjectivity. (Of classical phenomenologists, only
MAX SCHELER and, following him, HELMUTH PLESSNER
recognized this function of Yoga.) But the consequent
deepening and purifying of consciousness is still far
from theoretically-scientifically exhibiting the consti-
tution ofthe world in consciousness.
One reason why, in spite of a metaphysics of tran-
scendental consciousness and a rich descriptive psy-
chology of the inner Iife, Indian thought does not
eo ipso yield a transcendental constitutive phenomen-
ology is that the Indian theories did not quite come to
subscribe to the sort of theory of meaning or sense-
as distinguished from reference- that seems to ha ve
Ied Husserl to a theory of constitution (primarily of
sen~e). lf constitution is, in the first place, constitution
of sense (meaning, noema) and only secondarily -
inasmuch as a thing can be shown to be a noematic
structure- constitution of things, we ha veto Iook for
such a doctrine only in Buddhism. The Hindu theories
of meaning were referential.
From the perspective of Western phenomenology,
Buddhism offers greater affinity, and this for two rea-
sons. In its theory of meaning, Buddhism, in aii its
forms, tended to deny direct reference, and tended to
regard the thing to which Ianguage claims to refer to
be rather a conceptual construct (vikalpa). In a more
developed form, the theory of meaning became "dif-
ferential": the word "man," for example, means what
it does inasmuch as it serves to exclude nonhumans
but does not positively denote aii men. The system of
meanings becomes a system of differences, much like
certain suggestions of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-
1913) or JACQUES DERRIDA. AJong with this theory of
meaning and consequent disavowal ofreference, Bud-
dhism- as contrasted with the Hin du philosophies-
understood consciousness to be a stream of events (of
consciousing) rather than as states of a substance, and
also as having a form or content (iikiira) of its own,
as opposed to the generally accepted Hindu view that
consciousness is formless or contentless (nirakara),
what appears to be a content being really an object
out there. Given these two conceptual resources, Bud-
dhism could arrive at the view that both the ego and the
object are but constructs- shall we say constituted-
in the ongoing stream of consciousness.
The only Hindu system that recognized the inherent
intentionality of consciousness is Nyăya, but it used
this to bolster its realistic ontology: every seeming
content of consciousness, even the content of a non-
veridical perception, has its place in the world.
Whereas classical Advaita Vedănta, as developed
 INDIA
by Samkara, devalued the soov as an object (a-cit) in
the world ~ not to be confused with consciousness
(cit)~ there were tendencies within Indian thought
and sometimes explicit doctrines, to counteract this
tendency and to ascribe to the body a positive role in
spiritual life. Body, in these !ater modes of thinking,
was regarded not as a hindrance to freedom, but as
capable of being cultivated as a means to freedom.
Yoga is an important part ofthis mode ofthinking.
It is in contemporary Indian thinking that the idea
of bodily subjectivity ~ quite independently of any
influence from Western thought ~ is rescued from its
anonymity in classical Indian thought and brought to
the forefront, first in the metaphysical system ofSri Au-
robindo, but most interestingly in K. c. BHATTACHARYA's
philosophy. The latter's The Subjectas Freedom (1931)
is possibly the major contribution of Indian thought to
genuine phenomenology thus far. Bhattacharya gives
an account of various levels of subjectivity, beginning
with the bodily. Contrary to Western thinking, Bhat-
tacharya brings out how at each level consciousness
claims to be free from its object. This freedom, the
first idea of which comes from the body's standing
apart from the world, is realized progressively through
psychic or mental subjectivity, but finally in the spiri-
tual subjectivity. I must add that there are also impor-
tant phenomenological insights in the works of Kalidas
Bhattacharya, K. C. Bhattacharya's son.
In more recent times, .1. N. MOHANTY's researches
on Husserl began with Edmund Husserl Theory of s lied Publishers Ltd., 1989.
Meaning (1964) and has continued in Husserl and
Frege ( 1982) and The Possibility of Transcendental
Philosophy ( 1985). His main concern has been with
Husserl 's philosophy of LOGIC, theory ofmeaning, con-
cept of intentionality, and the nature of transcendental
philosophy. In a numberof essays, he has also explored
the presence in Indian thought of a phenomenological
strand. o. SINHA has instituted a phenomenological in-
terpretation of Advaita Vedănta. MARGARET CHATTERJEE
has attempted original phenomenological descriptions
of musical and religious experiences. D.P. CHATTOPAD-
HYAYA 's fallibilistic epistemology and )ater turn to an
open-ended transcendental philosophy have been un-
der the influence of Husserl 's thinking, although he has
never been a strict Husserlian. KRISHNA ROY has written
a comparative study of Hermeneutics: East and West
( 1993 ). ANINDITA BALSLEV has interpreted Samkara's
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyc/opedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
347
theory of vivarta as a theory of constitution (as con-
trasted with "creation" and "real transformation"). J.
L. MEHTA has drawn attention to the re1evance of Hei-
deggerian HERMENEUTICS for interpreting the Hindu sa-
cred scriptures. In a remarkable essay, KARL scHuH-
MANN has given us a picture of Husserl's changing
understanding of Indian thought, from his early Halle
years through the )ater Freiburg years. In 1988, a con-
ference on "Phenomenology and Indian Phi1osophy"
was held in New Delhi (under the sponsorship of the
Indian Council ofPhilosophical Research and the Cen-
ter for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc.) in
which some leading European, American, and Indian
scholars participated. This conference brought to the
attention of a larger audience the relevance (and lim-
its) of phenomenology for Indian philosophy, leading
to intense debate on the issues.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ba1slev, Anindita. "Analysis ofl-consciousness in the Tran-
scendental Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy." In
Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy, 133-40.
Bhattacharya, K. C. The Subject as Freedom. Bombay: Amal-
ner, 1931.
- . Studies in Philosophy. 2 vols. Calcutta: Progressive Pub-
lishers, 1957.
Chattopadhyaya, O. P., Lester Embree, and J. N. Mohanty,
eds. Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1992.
Chatterjee, Margaret. The Concept o{Spirituality. Delhi: Al-
Mehta, J. L. Philosophy and Religion. Essays in Interpre-
tation. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Re-
search, 1990.
Mohanty, J. N. Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- . Essays on Indian Philosophy: Traditional and Modern.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Roy, Krishna. Hermeneutic.~: East and West. Calcutta: AII ied
Publishers, 1993.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Husserl and Indian Thought." In Pheno-
menology and Indian Thought, 20-43.
Sinha, O. The Idealist Standpoint. Santiniketan: Center for
Advanced Study in Philosophy, 1965.
J.N. MOHANTY
Temple University
D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
Jadavpur Universi(v
348 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ROMAN INGARDEN lngarden was born in
Cracow on February 5, 1893. In 1911 he began his
studies of philosophy in Lvov, where he attended lec-
tures by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), a dis-
ciple of FRANZ BRENTANO. In 1912 he continued his
stuides at Gottingen under EDMUND HUSSERL (philoso-
phy), David Hi1bert ( 1862-1943) (mathematics), and
George E. Milller (1850--1934) (psychology). He fol-
lowed Husserl to Freiburg im Breisgau, where in 1918
he received his Ph.D. with lntuition und lntellect bei
Henri Bergson as his dissertation. That same year he
returned to Poland, where he began teaching mathe-
matics in high schools. He was at first isolated because
of the domination of logically oriented philosophy in
Poland, the so-called "Lvov-Warsaw school." In 1924
he completed his habilitation under Twardowski with
Essenziale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des We-
sens (Essential questions. Contribution to the problem
ofuniversals) and became Privatdozent at the Univer-
sity ofLvov, where he became Professor Extraordinar-
ius in 1933. He accepted the chair ofphilosophy at the
Jagiellonian University at Cracow in 1945. Although
he represented REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY, he was ac-
cused of "idealism" in the 1950s and suspended from
teaching philosophy. He used this time to prepare a
critica! translation ofKant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft
into Polish. Ingarden regained his chair in 1956 and
retired in 1963. His philosophical activity did not stop:
he published new works and educated a new genera-
tion ofthinkers. Ingarden died in Cracow on June 29,
1970.
As with many other early phenomenologists, Ingar-
den was strongly influenced by Husserl 's program of
phenomenological philosophy as a strict, eidetic sci-
ence. His doctoral dissertation as well as his Habil-
itationsschrift belong to epistemo1ogy, but his deep-
est concern was with AESTHETICS. This research, pub-
lished in 1931 as Das literarische Kunstwerk (The lit-
erary work of art), took him away from the transcen-
dental and idealistic turn that appeared in Husserl's
thought with the publication ofhis Jdeen zu ei ner reinen
Phiinomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913).
His work on aesthetics is the best-known part ofln-
garden's philosophy. His investigations are of an onto-
logica] nature and the knowledge he gained decisively
shaped his philosophical system. Taking the connec-
tion between the mode ofbeing and the formal structure
of objects as his point of departure, Jngarden submits
the work of art to a phenomenological-essential anal-
ysis. Through ontologica] analyses he distinguishes
three different and reciprocally connected ontic strata
in works of art: ( 1) the materia/fundament ofthe work
of art (e.g., a painted canvas); (2) the work of art,
a purely intentiona] and schematic product founded
upon the material object; and (3) the aesthetic abject,
a concretization of the work of art accomplished by a
perceiver in the aesthetic attitude.
A work of art exists for Ingarden neither as real
nor ideal, but rather as purely intentiona] and hetero-
nomic. It owes its existence both to the creative acts of
consciousness and to the physical (ontic) fundament,
which is independent of these acts. This existence is
describable neither in psychological nor in physical
terms. As an intentiona! object every work of art pos-
sesses its own identity and is intersubjectively identi-
fiable.
The differentiation between the work of art and the
aesthetic object is, for Ingarden, essential. A work of
art becomes an aesthetic object through the concretiza-
tion brought about in the aesthetic attitude. Through
transforming the work of art into a schematic prod-
uct, this concretization brings the perceiver into con-
tact with aesthetic qualities and values. A work of art
readily becomes an intersubjective object, whereas an
aesthetic object remains "monosubjective," accessible
only to the perceiver who accomplishes the aesthetic
concretization of the work. To o ne and the same work
of art may belong many different aesthetic objects
through which it itself appears.
Because of the dissimilarities in the process of aes-
thetic experience evoked by different types of art, In-
garden did not create a typology of aesthetic expe-
riences and objects. He treated differences in expe-
riencing pictures, musical works, or literature as not
essential but rather matters of degree within continua.
From the aesthetic attitude, which is only proper for
the perception of works of art, Ingarden distinguishes
the attitude of an "aesthetic consumer" (a work of art as
a source ofpleasure), which he considers tobe rather a
matter of a practica! nature. He also includes a certain
distance toward works ofart as a condition ofaesthetic
experience (i.e., freeing oneself from involvement in
everyday life). This distance does not mean a contem-
 ROMAN INGARDEN
plati ve attitude. Ingarden always emphasizes the active
ro le ofthe perceiver in the process of contact with art.
For instance, the process of intercourse with the liter-
ary work of art begins with the acts of grasping the
phonic/visual signs and other creations in LANGUAGE.
This is the basis for seizing the MEANING, for seeing the
given objects and actions in IMAGINATION, and for the
acts of understanding.
According to Ingarden, the process of aesthetic ex-
perience has short moments of passive contemplation
besides the active phases. Although he considers emo-
tions and feelings to be a relevant component of aes-
thetic experience, he does not deny the presence of
cognitive factors in it.
The most essential function of art, for lngarden, is to
enable the perceiver to ha ve direct intercourse with aes-
thetic VALUES. This function is realized through affect-
ing the "emotionallife." Excessively intense EMOTIONS
of the perceiver can, however, be a hindering factor
in the efficient course of aesthetic experience. Among
the preconditions ofthis experience, Ingarden includes
concentration ofattention on works ofart, self-control,
and peace of mind. Only some of the emotions con-
nected with experiencing art are of an aesthetic nature.
Aesthetic value is a polyphonic harmony of aes-
thetic qualities founded upon the aesthetic objects. The
values are neither the features ofthe object, nor some-
thing created by the subject who experiences them.
Aesthetic values are not the only ones that are con-
nected with works of art. According to Ingarden, there
also exist values- he named them "artistics"- con-
nected with special "skills" or "efficiencies" of the
work of art, which enable an efficient creation of the
aesthetic attitude and its result- the aesthetic object.
The artistic values are thereforc of an instrumental na-
ture. Both the aesthetic and the artistic values belong
to the intentiona! object (including the aesthetic object
and the work ofart). This does not mean, however, that
they are the purely intentiona! beings themselves.
The ontologica! analyses of works of art affected
lngarden 's entire ontology. lts best elaboration is con-
tained in Spor o istnienie swiata (The controversy over
the existence ofthe world, 1947-48). A being, i.e., an
object, can be considered in three differentrespects: (1)
the material one, (2) the formal one, and (3) the exis-
tential one (modes ofbeing). Ingarden understands on-
tology as based on eidetic insight and intuitive analyses
349
of the contents of ideas, i.e., upon the EIDETIC METHOD,
which enables o ne to discover the necessary and purely
possible relations between the pure ideal qualities. On-
tology is for him the most general theory of objects.
He distinguishes it from metaphysics, which fulfills the
ro le of an applied theory of objects and which, being
based on ontology, considers the nature and essence
of factual beings. The eidetic character distinguishes
metaphysics from the so-called real sciences.
Ontology aims at obtaining a general spectrum of
eidetic possibilities and necessities with reference to
any objects whatever. In the frame of an existential
ontology, which has nothing to do with MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER's FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, lngarden distinguishes
and clearly defines four mutually exclusive pairs of
moments of being: something can be (1) existentially
autonomous or heteronomous, (2) existentially original
or derivative, (3) existentially separate or not separate,
and (4) existentially self-dependent or contingent. Con-
siderations connected with the analysis of the second
pair has led Ingarden to an original interpretation ofthe
relation of causality. His analysis of time has brought
some additional pairs of existential moments, such as
actuality and non-actuality; persistence and fragility;
and fissuration and non-fissuration. These differenti-
ations enables him to distinguish and describe four
basic modes of being (consisting of noncontradictory
combinations of existential moments ). These are: ( 1)
absolute being (autonomous, original, separate, self-
dependent); (2) temporal (real) being; (3) ideal (ex-
tratemporal) being; and (4) purely intentiona! (quasi-
temporal) being. We cannot experience any existing
abject without its mode ofbeing.
In epistemology Ingarden distinguishes: ( 1) the pure
theory of knowledge, which is actually a part of ontol-
ogy, because he describes it as an a priori analysis of
the general idea "knowledge"; (2) criteriology, which
researches such epistemic values as objectivity and
adequacy; and (3) the critique of knowledge, which
evaluates factually obtained results of scientific and
philosophical cognition.
Ingarden perceived Husserl 's phenomenology as
a mixture of epistemological, ontologica!, and meta-
physical problems. He reproached him for not realizing
that he took these as well as many other assumptions
for granted. According to lngarden, it ali led Husserl to
an unnecessarily extreme idealistic position connected
350 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
with a strongly epistemological point of view on phi-
losophy. Ingarden himself defined phenomenology as
a science dealing with the contents of ideas of pure
experience, and treated it as a part of ontology.
The philosophy of lngarden is a development of
phenomenology as a cognitive discipline. He tried to
avoid what he considered the vicious circle of Husserl 's
transcendental reduction (the transcendentality of our
consciousness is at the same time the result and the
assumption of the transcendental reduction) through
eidetic analyses derived from the view that our ways of
direct experience of objects within the world depend on
the ontic structure of these objects. Every reconstruc-
tion of our knowledge must begin from an analysis of
the nature ofthe objects ofthis knowledge.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Burski, Jacek. Die Strukturen der ăsthetischen Kommunika-
tion im Denken von. Ingarden. Miinster: Diss. Universitat
Miinster, 1992.
Hartman, Jan. Spos6b istnienia rzeczy materia/ne} w "Sporze
o istnienie swiata .. R. Ingardena. Lublin: UMCS, 1993.
Ingarden, Roman. "Uber die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii
in der Erkenntnistheorie." Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und
phănomenologische Forschung 4 ( 1921 ), 545--68.
-. "Intuition und Intellect bei H. Bergson." Jahrbuch fiir
Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 5 ( 1921 ).
-. "Essentia1e Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Prob1em des We-
sens." Jahrbuchfiir Philosophie und phănomenologische
Forschung 7 (1925).
- . Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus
dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik, und Literaturwis-
senschaft. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931; The Literary Work
of Art: An Investigation an the Borderlines of Ontology,
Logic, and the Theory of Literature. Trans. George G.
Grabowicz. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1973.
- . O poznawaniu dziela literackiego (On comprehending
the world of 1iterature). Lvov: Ossolineum, 1937; The
Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Trans. Ruth Ann
Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
em University Press, 1973.
- . Spor o istnienie swiata (The controversy over the exis-
tence ofthe world), 2 vols. Cracow: PAU, 1947-48; Ger-
man ed. in 3 vols. Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1964-65;
Polish ed. in 4 vols. Warsaw: PWN, 1981-s7.
-.Studia z estetyki (Studies in aesthetics). 2 vols. Warsaw:
PWN, 1957-58.
Kotowa, Barbara. Zaloieniafilozoficzne programu badafz lit-
erackich R. Ingardena. Warsaw: PWN, 1980.
Sama, Jan. Fenomenologia R. Ingardena na tle filozofii E.
Husserla. Kielce: WSP, 1981.
Schopper, Wemer. Das Seiende und der Gegenstand. Zur
Ontologie Roman Ingardens. Munich: Berchmanskolle,
1974.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Song, Byung-Ok. Das Kausalproblem bei R. Ingarden.
Tiibingen: Diss. Universitat, 1980.
Str6zewski, Wladyslaw and Adam W~ţgrzecki, eds. W kr~gu
filozofii Romana Ingardena. Warsaw: PWN, 1995.
Szczepanska, Anita. Estetyka R. Ingardena. Warsaw: PWN,
1989.
ANDRZEJ PRZYLEBSKI
A. Mickiewicz-University
INTENTIONALITY For EDMUND HUSSERL, "in-
tentionality" is the name of a problem more than a name
for a specific philosophical theory or doctrine. Once
the transcendental phenomenological EPOCHE bas been
exercised, and the thematic scope of the transcenden-
tal phenomenological reduction determined, the prob-
lem largely concems the objectivation and reflective
clarification ofthe sui generic characterization of con-
sciousness (or: mentallife, or perhaps better, just life ),
which, no matter what specific differences may be dis-
cemed conceming it, nonetheless can be said to "intend
to" something (reviving in English the obsolete sense
of the verb ta intend according to which, for exam-
ple, "to intend one 's eyes to something" signifies to
look at something; we thus avoid, among other things,
the strictly purposive connotation of the verb "to in-
tend," e.g., to do something). Accordingly, mental pro-
cesses ( or: life-processes), such as perceivings, judg-
ings, wishings, willings, desirings, valuings, thinkings,
and the like, are called "intentiona) or intentive pro-
cesses" (sometimes: "intentiona! lived experiences")
or simply "intendings." In the older terminology of
Husserl, but still occasionally found in !ater writings,
intendings are also called "noeses," and what is in-
tended to as intended ta (or: what is intended as such)
is called the "noematic sense ofthe noesis," or simply
the "noema." The NOEMA is what is intended to, just
and precisely (or: "purely") as it is intended to in the
noesis or intending to it.
Yet another verb commonly used for "to intend"
is the verb "to mean" (meinen). A mental process,
any mental process, means something as something
in being aware of it. The "something meant" is often
called by Husserl a "sense," and sometimes an "ob-
jective sense." The word "sense," and allied words,
emphasize the fact that the world and things in it and
affairs exemplified by those things are not causally re-
 INTENTIONALJTY
lated to the awareness of them (although this is by no
means to exclude the causally related as an object of
consciousness). The word "sense" then serves as ater-
minological safeguard against confusing, for instance,
perceiving as "transcendental" and as related in this
perceiving to something perceived just and precisely
as perceived, on the one hand, with the same process of
perceiving considered as an event in the world standing
in (e.g., causal) relation to another event in the world,
the perceived, on the other hand. An easy example of
an "objective sense" is a verbal signification. The sig-
nification ofthe word "dog" is not the letters, "d," "o,"
"g"; nor does it consist of the marks "d," "o," "g." It
is equally well expressed by the word "perro" or the
word "Hund." The signification is rather something
"ideal," not real as are the marks or sounds making
up the word. The signification is an "objective sense"
presented as it itself in an act of meaning, specifically
verbal meaning. But verbal meaning is, after ali, only
one kind of MEANING.
There are, in addition, perceptual meanings with
perceptual "objective senses," the perceived just and
precisely as meant and, e.g., seen, or tasted, or sniffed,
or heard. For example, 1 see a tree in the back yard. In
seeing the tree, I distinguish, on the one hand, the see-
ing as really going on over a period oftime and, on the
other hand, the tree presented as "it itself' in the mean-
ing and seeing of it. The seeing is a perceptual meaning
of the tree as tree. Other cases of perceptual meaning
would be olfactory meanings, tactual meanings, au-
ditory meanings. I might even go on to examine yet
other meanings: rememberings (mnemonic meanings)
of trees seen, judicative meanings (judgings of judg-
ments about trees), valuings of trees, and so forth. In
any case, in our example, the seeing confronts me with
a tree in definite although, as Husserl says, one-sided
ways: from this rather than that side, straight before
me, or occupying a lateral position near me, perchance
far from me. Moreover, the tree is presented in and
through the seeing of it with certa in prospects, such as
casting shadows at certain times during the day, or as
giving shade, or even as motivating the remembrance
of the same tree I had seen before. Throughout ali the
seeings the tree is presented and meant as the "same,
real tree" just asI see it and believe in it as existing.
The real thing, the tree, can only present itself ow-
ing to meanings belonging to a series of seeings, one
351
perhaps following upon others. The seen tree is meant
as "one and the same" over against the stream of the
flowing multiplicity of seeings in and through which
it is presented. The tree appears in my seeing of it
as a meant and believed in identity, as identically the
same. Were the tree not meant as identically the same,
it would disappear with the multiplicity of seeings of it.
Accordingly, it may be said that the "objective sense"
of seeing and meaning the tree is "atemporal," hence
"ideal" in much the way in which a verbal signification
is "ideal." There is something meant as meant, identi-
ca! as meant, which, for this very reason, should not be
confused with the succeeding and successive multiplic-
ity of seeings of the tree. Meantness as meant, the tree
purely and precisely as meant, is "irreal," Husserl says,
and its "irreality" consists of its atemporality; "TIME,"
then, is a necessary but not a suffi.cient condition for
intentionality.
Thus the multiplicity of seeings and their "noematic
correlate," their sense, are mutually correlative, but
also equally, as well as mutually, irreducible one to the
other. The "real" and the "ideal" are then not opposite;
they are not tobe confused; they are irreducible correla-
tives that mutually "imply" one another, are intimately
and intentively bound up with one another. There is
a "transcendental idealism" only by virtue of a "tran-
scendental realism," and conversely. (Husserl never
denied a "transcendental realism," although he never
seems to ha ve worked it out as he did a "transcendental
idealism.") In still other words, there is something in
and for itself only insofar as it is for me; and there is,
conversely, something for me only insofar as it is in
and for itself, just and precisely as intended to.
Husserl attributed to FRANZ BRENTANO the discovery
of intentionality, although he immediately transformed
"intentionality" to signify a state of affairs radically
distinct from what it signified for Brentano. Thus even
though a term in common, "intentionality" conceals
profound differences between them. In the first place,
there is no transcendental-phenomenological epoche in
Brentano in consequence ofwhich intentionality arises
as a problem. In the second place, Brentano speaks, as
Husserl never did, always and only ofthe "intentiona!
relation" or "reference" that a single mental process
has to its intentiona! or mental object- an object "not
to be understood as real," Brentano says; single pro-
cesses, or acts of consciousness, are distinguished from
352 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
each other in that each has a different intentiona! ob-
ject. Thus as LUDWIG LANDGREBE pointed out, the idea
that two or more acts, descriptively different from one
another, can have the same objective sense is alien
to Brentano. Another difference between Husserl and
Brentano is that for Husserl, the object intended to,
the object meant, does not refer to a hypothetically
assumed non-phenomenal real world that determines
the order ofphenomena. Thus for Husserl whatever is
intended to does not have what Brentano calls "inten-
tiona! inexistence"; what is intended to is, for Husserl,
not numerically distinct from "the" object: the tree seen
and meant in the seeing of it is indeed the "real" tree,
"the" object, tree; it is this tree, just and precisely as
seen. That the tree is intended to in my seeing of it does
not mean the "the tree" is not what I see when I see the
tree, ifthe tree exists. AII that terms such as "objective
sense," "intentiona! object," and the like signify is that
there is intentionality of a particular or specific kind-
a tree-seeing rather than a house-seeing.
Finally, Brentano does not distinguish, as does
Husserl, between everyday, public things and "sense
data"; for Husserl we have to distinguish between the
public tree and the private "sensations" we experi-
ence when we see a public tree. (Husserl's attempt
to clarify the distinction is probably as unsatisfactory
as Brentano's failure to make it; Husserl eventually in-
troduces the concept of"hyletic data," a non-intentive
facet of intentionality, to do so. On the other hand,
the attempt to clarify the distinction eventually Ieads
to various formulations ofthe central idea ofthe LIFE-
WORLD.) "Intentiona! object," "objective sense," and
Iike terms do not, then, signify a second object in some
sense or other as "in the mind" and distinct from yet
other objects; it is in no sense a "content" ofthe mind,
although Husserl 's Ianguage, especially in his earlier
writings, can be misleading (e.g., as when he speaks of
"primary contents").
lntention(l/ (l!lalysis involves two Iines of inquiry:
a "noetic line" and a "noematic line." They are "lines"
only because the making thematic and description of
the o ne is always at Ieast implicitly the making thematic
and description ofthe other.
The noetic line of inquiry. In his writings, Husserl
distinguishes at least three basic modes of intend-
ing: ( 1) simple believings, disbelievings, and doubt-
ings ("doxic intendings"); (2) intendings that are af-
fective, emotional, valuing modes ofintendings ("non-
doxic intendings"); and (3) intendings that are will-
ings and strivings ("conative intendings"). Addition-
ally, Husserl describes a "neutrality modification" that
cuts across the three modes: neither disbelieving, be-
Iieving, or doubting, or emotional apathy, or conative
obtuseness. We also have to mention that intentional-
ity, any intending, includes "horizonal intendings"-
in any particular intending, the object intended to can
also be the object of other actual and possible intend-
ings of specific kinds. For example, I see the tree; the
tree is seen as the object of other possible seeings (from
close by, from another side, under these and those as-
pects). In seeing the tree, moreover, the tree is also
meant as the object of possible tactual perceivings as
well as something about which a judgment might be
made oras something that may be willed the habitat of
the village smithy. 1 mean the tree notjust as the abject
or sense of other possible intendings, but also as some-
thing intendable to by others: it is "co-presented with
the horizon" of being intended to by others than my-
self intending to the same tree, eventually to the same
world. The noetic line of analysis consists Iargely of
describing and making explicit co-intended actual and
possible intendings.
Intendings are said by Husserl to be either "evi-
dent" or "non-evident." (The term EVIDENCE [Evidenz]
has a signification quite distinct from that expressed
by the termin Anglo-American philosophy.) "Evident
intendings" are also said by Husserl to be "experienc-
ings" in either a broad or a narrow sense. In the broad
sense, "experiencing" is synonymous with "evidence
in general," and in the narrow sense "experiencing" is
synonymous with "evidence" ofsomething real as op-
posed to something ideal (where by "real" we signify
something having its own Iocus in SPACE and TIME).
As a rule, Husserl uses the term "empirica!" to des-
ignate experiencing in the narrow sense ("empirica!"
is then not the opposite of "pure" or "transcendental"
as in KANT). "Evident intendings" are those in which
what is intended to shows itself as it itself; it is that
intending in which something is a "phenomenon" in
the broadest proper sense. According to Husserl, there
are evident intendings not only to real things, but also
to ideal things (e.g., "universals," "eidetic singulari-
ties," and the Iike) intended to and presented as they
themselves. Quite universally, Husserl says, things are
 JNTENTIONALITY
intended to as being of generic and specific kinds, and
another task of intentiona) analysis is to describe and
make explicit these intendings with respect to the de-
terminations that they must ha ve in order tobe possible
examples of generic and specific kinds.
Intendings are further characterized by being "lived
or engaged in" by an EGO; such intendings are called
"actiona) intendings," or just "acts." Not ali intendings
are acts, many are not lived in at ali by the ego (hence
are "non-actional''), and indeed in principle some can-
not be lived in by an ego ( e.g., retentions and pro-
tentions that comprise the stream of intendings, which
in later terminology are said to proceed in "primary
passivity"). In actiona) intendings, the ego is said to
be "busied" with the "what" that is intended to in in-
tendings- the intendings are strictly the ego's own
intendings to what is intended to. The ego, however,
is not a really inherent part of any actiona) intending;
what may be said tobe inherent is the "quality" ofbe-
ing Iived in by the ego, and it is this "quality" ofbeing
lived in by the ego that is the phenomenological datum.
The ego is not a content of the stream of intendings,
nor a content of any intending.
A basic feature of intentionality is synthesis, which
for Husserl is that mode of combination, connection,
or confirmation exclusively peculiar to intendings. It
is that which gives unity to intendings so that each in-
tending is in itself a synthetic whole and each whole
is combined with others (e.g., where a seeing is com-
bined with a remembering of the seeing). Synthesis
is operative throughout a multiplicity of modes of ap-
pearances, for instance, visual, tactual, and auditory.
Nonnally, Husserl says, 1 look "through" the appear-
ances and perceive the underlying shape or color of
the world. The point is that the continuous sequence
of appearances is connected synthetically, the appear-
ances characterized as "adumbrations" ofthe things or
affairs in question. A fundamental form of synthesis
is the "synthesis of identification" by virtue of which
one and the same intentiona) object is meant and in-
tended to (e.g., seen) just and precisely as one and the
same. For example, ali the while the seeing ofthe tree
is proceeding, there is a continuous identifying and
distinguishing of earlier phases of seeings throughout
the )ater course of consciousness, or there is a contin-
uous identifying and distinguishing of physical things
as selfsame and numerically distinct from other things
353
(tree, garden, vulture in the tree) throughout the course
of seeing or remembering. A phase of one 's mentallife
or consciousness is continuously intended to as iden-
tica) throughout a multiplicity of changing temporal
appearances as it recedes into the past. Or a physical
thing, such as a tree, may be perceived or remembered
as identica) and perhaps as unchanging throughout a
multiplicity of changing spatial appearances (near, far,
left or right). Another kind ofsynthesis is that of"asso-
ciation," to which identifying and distinguishing syn-
thesis is basic.
As in the case ofidentifying and numerically differ-
entiating synthesis, where something is both intended
to and meant as the same and as numerically distinct
from something else, "associative synthesis" can be
actiona) or passive. For example, two or more affairs
are meant and intended to each as selfsame and, si-
multaneously, as not identica) with each other, as nu-
merically distinct. They are then not meant and in-
tended to merely as not identica) with each other, but,
e.g., as more or less similar and more or Iess differ-
ent from each other, perhaps absolutely Iike or even
unlike. Involved here is what Husserl calls a "transfer
of sense." For example, suppose that simultaneously
a round shape is itself presented as here and a round
shape is itself presented as there. "Founded" on this
presentation is an "associative transfer of sense," so
that the transferred sense "round" and the presented
sense "round" establish or "found" a synthesis of per-
fect likeness in shape. The transfer of sense is always
mutual, and each ofthe two things is perceived as alike
in shape: an associative synthesis. Other kinds of syn-
thesis that Husserl studies in various connections and
with respect to a wide variety of philosophical prob-
lems are the synthesis of fulfillment (or verification),
the synthesis of continuity and discontinuity, the syn-
thesis of annulment, and the synthesis of clarification.
For Husserl, synthesis is not limited, as in Kant, to
thinkings and judgings, but characterizes ali cases of
intentionality.
The noematic line of inquiry. In any "act" of in-
tentionality the ego is busy with something as having
determinations of one or another kind; the act has its
"objective sense." Something can be something, no
matter what. But the something in question may very
well have a highly determinate objective sense, may
appear as it itselfin a very clearly defined manner. The
354 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
clearly defined manner is ca !led the "what of the in-
tentiona! abject." By the term "what" Husserl is not
referring to the species of something; instead, he is
speaking of the determinations something is meant as
having - its being round, obnoxious, sweet-tasting,
large or small, and so on. The term "objective sense"
is often ambiguous in Husserl 's writings. Frequently
it signifies the "what" of an intentiona! abject, the de-
terminations the abject is meant and intended to as
having, rather than the act of intending. Here we can
observe a relativity characteristic of intentionality -
to take an example from Husserl, Napoleon as victor
at Jena and Napoleon as vanquished at Waterloo. In
these differing cases of intentionality, Napoleon is in-
tended to as identica!, as the same intentiona! abject,
but with differing objective senses- "victor at Jena,"
"vanquished at Waterloo."
The intentiona! abject can be meant and intended to
as having the same objective sense in acts that differnot
only in kind, but also in terms of modes of givenness,
of how the intentiona! abject is given or presented.
In one case, there may be a perceptual mode of pre-
sentation or givenness, and in another there may be
a memorial mode of presentation - taking the term
"presentation" ( or: "givenness") broadly enough to in-
clude non-presentation, "empty givenness." In addi-
tion, there may be further differences tobe investigated
in modes of presentation themselves (clear, obscure).
Finally, there is, besides the "what" and "how" of
the noema, its "thus-and-so." An act of simply believ-
ing in something is said to "pasit" its intentiona! abject
as having an objective sense presented in this or that
manner. The intentiona! abject posited with the objec-
tive sense may be made thematic in further reflection,
and likewise the posited (or: positional) characteris-
tic (sometimes: the "thesis," "doxic thesis," or "thetic
characteristic"; in Logische Untersuchungen [1900-
1901 ], "qua1ity" or "belief-character") may be made
thematic, or objectivated. The positional characteris-
tic of an abject may be, for instance, the existence
(or nonexistence) of the abject; that is, the abject, we
may also say, is believed in as existing or nonexisting.
When objectivated, being or nonbeing are made the-
matic. Husserl also distinguishes a "non-doxic" pasit-
ing, e.g., when I like something, it is posited as good
(or if I dislike something, as bad). When objectivated,
goodness or badness are made thematic. But in neither
case should posited characteristics be confused with
the objective sense; they are not part of the objective
sense ofthe intentiona! abject. Being and goodness are
not "predicates."
It should be added that doubting and disbelieving are
said to be modifications of simple believing or pasit-
ing. If a simple believing in something as existing.
for instance, undergoes modification into a disbeliev-
ing, there is a correlative alteration in the positional
characteristic from existence to nonexistence. We say
"simple" believing in this case because there are more
complex cases ofbelieving, such as confirmatory acts
in which something is verified as indeed existent ( or
nonexistent). Or there are cases in which a simple be-
lieving proves to be not just prima facie confirmati an,
but fully justified believing. Although the positional
characteristic is not part of the objective sense of the
abject as intended to, stil! together with the other com-
ponents it makes up the "thesis" ofthe act ofintending.
However, if 1 am busied with seeing something, striv-
ing to make that something explicit in its "what" and
"how," this is not ipso facto to make the positional
characteristic thematic; this occurs only if there is a
busiedness with this "being busied with the seen be-
lieved in as existing in the seeing of it."
When the positiona1 characteristic is objectivated,
there is a new act and a new positional characteristic
with the previous positional characteristic as the objec-
tive sense. The distinction is an important one because
it signifies that for every positional characteristic, there
is always a possible (doxic) objectivation. Thus ( doxic)
positionality covers the whole realm of intentionality,
"rational," "affective," and "practica!." But because
objectivating the "what" and "how" is not ipso facto
objectivating the positional characteristic, the pheno-
menologica1 concreti an ofhow/what/thus-and-so is not
objectivatable, thematizable, as a concretion.
This distinction has a significant consequence. Be-
cause what and how something is meant and intended
to can be objectivated or made thematic in part or
who1e without at the same time making its thus-and-
so thematic, the what and how of something comprise
only a necessary, but never a sufficient condition for
the existence ofthe meant and intended-to. Conversely,
because it is only in a separate and further act that the
thus-and-so is objectivated, it follows that existence is
only a necessary, but never a sufficient condition for
 INTERSUBJECTIVITY
what and how something is meant and intended to.
Accordingly, we distinguish ( 1) the noematic core
comprising modes of givenness of the perceived,
judged, liked, etc., along with the objective sense(s)
of the intentiona! object, correlative to the noetic core
comprising the various intendings and meanings (per-
ceivings, judgings, thinkings, likings, conations), in
some of which the ego lives and is busied in one or
another way with the intentiona! object, as well as
those intentive processes in which the ego has lived
or in principle cannot live; and (2) the noematic mo-
ments comprising positional characteristics (existence,
goodness, beauty, etc.), correlative to noetic moments
comprising positings (such as believings, assumings,
presumings, doubtings, etc.).
Note that in Logische Untersuchungen "content"
consists of the noematic core, and "belief-quality"
(or just "quality") consists of the noematic core
plus the noematic moments; "material" consists of
the noematic core and the modes of givenness. The
1anguage of noesis and noema is drawn chiefiy
from ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913).
Intentionality turns out to be not only synthetic in
various ways, but also high1y stratified in structure, and
part of the problem of intentiona1ity consists in clari-
fying that structure and the "founding-founded" rela-
tions among the stratifi.cations, especially as they have
a bearing on a diverse set ofproblems in LOGIC, MATHE-
MATICS, ONTOLOGY, PERCEPTION, and VALUE THEORY. fre-
quent]y those philosophica1 problems defi.ne the scope
ofthe intentiona! ana1ysis tobe carried out. Many times
in returning to a given set of philosophical problems,
Husserl found it necessary to redefi.ne and correct pre-
vious analyses of specific cases of intentionality, some-
times seeking new ways of describing this sui generic
feature of life. Husserl 's infiuence in this respect has
been continuous and wide-ranging, from the question-
ing by MARTIN HEIDEGGER of the sui generic status of
intentionality, to the adaptation of intentionality to the
EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY of, e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE,
to the development and broadening of Husserl's own
intentiona! analyses of the BODY and embodied life in
the wor]d by MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, to the search for
the in ner principles of organization of intentionality by
ARON GURWITSCH. Others in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY have
found it necessary to modify Husserl's accounts of
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Ca", J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
355
intentionality in order to deal with other sets of philo-
sophical prob]ems (John Searle, RODERICK CHISHOLM).
And while some phenomenologists have sought the
limits of intentiona! analysis (ALFRED scHUTZ), others
have extended it to areas indicated by Husserl, but not
extensively analyzed by him (the fi.eld of AESTllFTICS
by ROMAN INGARDEN, experience of the ho]y by GERDA
WALTHER, and ETHICS by MAX SCHELER).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bemet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Edmund
Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1989; An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomen-
ology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Husserl 's Theory of the Intentionality of
Consciousness." In his Phenomenolog~· and the Theorv of'
Science. Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1974, 210--40.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. Edmund Husserl.~ Phenomenolog~•.
West Lafayette, IN: University of Purdue Press, 1994.
Mohanty, J. N. The Concept oflntentiona/i(v. St. Louis: War-
ren H. Green, 1972.
Olafson, Frederick A. "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality
in Contemporary Perspective." In Husserl: Expositions
and Appraisals. Ed. Frederick A. Elliston and Peter Mc-
Cormick. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1977, 160-67.
Smith, David, and Ronald Mclntyre. Husserl and Intention-
ality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. "Der Begriff der Intentionalităt in der
Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl." Philosophische
Hefie (Prague) 5 (1936), 74-91; "Intention and lntention-
ality? in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl." Trans.
Linda L. McAiister and Margarete Schăttle. In his The
Context ()j'the Phenomenological Movement. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, 3-26.
FRED KERSTEN
University of Wisconsin, Green Bay
INTERSUBJECTIVITY In EDMUND HUSSERL 's
phenomenology "intersubjectivity" is not a title for a
systematic, self-contained theme. Rather, in various
thematic spheres intersubjective problems arise that
are nevertheless connected with one another and have
solutions that mutually condition one another. Even
the primary method of Husserl's phenomenology, the
EPOCHE AND REDUCTION to pure consciousness, has its
intersubjective aspect. Furthermore, the distinction be-
tween one's own and another's consciousness, or be-
356 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tween o ne 's own conscious "world" and that of another
is an intersubjective problem. As regards the analysis
ofthe constitution of different kinds of objects in con-
sciousness, there are on the one hand, intersubjective
problems in a special sense: the experience of the body
of another, the experience ofthe psychic experiences of
another, and social communication. On the other hand,
ali problems of constitution ha ve an intersubjective as-
pect: the constitution of objective TIME, of objective
SPACE, of o ne 's own BODY, of o ne 's own person. and
the natural and sociocultural WORLD. Intersubjectivity
also plays a fundamental ro le in questions that arise in
the theory of science, as in the distinction between the
NATURAL and li UMAN SCIENCES, or that between the natu-
ra]istic and the personalistic attitudes. Finally, intersub-
jectivity occupies a central position in Husserl 's ETHICS
and monadological ontology. Intersubjectivity there-
fore encompasses the whole of phenomenology, and
a complete phenomenology of intersubjectivity would
bea complete phenomenology in general.
Even in his early years Husserl saw himself con-
fronted with problems of intersubjectivity and occu-
pied himselfmore and more with such problems in the
course of his development. Already in the first of the
Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ), he spoke of
the communicative function of linguistic expressions.
He considered this function as the "announcement" of
psychic experiences through "signs" (Anzeichen ), oras
a perceptual understanding ofthese "signs" on the basis
of associations. However, in the further course of the
Untersuchungen he did not take these communicative
functions of expressions in LANGUAGE into considera-
tion. The problem of intersubjectivity was not really
important for Husserl un tii the years 1905 to 1907,
when he methodologically defined his phenomenology
as a specific research area through the epoche and re-
duction to pure consciousness. At that time he found
himself in a dilemma: on the o ne hand, he ciung philo-
sophically to the idea of a multiplicity of conscious
subjects, and, on the other hand, he saw himselflimited,
by the form of the reduction he was operating with at
that time, to a single pure consciousness (o ne pure flow
of consciousness). He solved this dilemma in the lec-
tures on "Grundprobleme der Phănomenologie" (Basic
problems of phenomenology, 191 O) by extending the
phenomenological epoche and reduction to intersub-
jectivity, i.e., by also apprehending as pure phenomena
of consciousness the experiences of others who are re-
presented to one through empathy, do ing this by means
of the second step of a "double reduction."
In this time between 1905 and 191 O, he also began to
analyze the structure of empathy. He did this above ali
in discussions with Theodor Lipps (1851-1914). He
borrowed the word "empathy" (Einfiihlung) as well
as the rejection ofthe analogy-inference theory for the
experience of other persons from Lipps. But he rejected
Lipps's own theory of empathy (instinctive projection
of o ne 's own experiences into an externa! body) and he
also selected another way of fonnulating the problem:
in his theory of empathy Lipps had started out from
the so-called "expressive movements" (for example of
joy, anger, anxiety). Husserl instead asked first how
we apprehend o uter bodies as sens ing (endowed with
sensations ).
Also, in the discussion of empathy in the texts
that were published after Husserl 's death as ldeen zu
ei ner reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologische
Philosophie Il [ 1912-15], he started from the co-
perception of fields of sensation (the "aesthesiologi-
cal level") localized in the body of another. He had
concerned himself with the problem of empathy in
grea! detail probably in August or September 1915.
At that time Husserl gained a new way of approach-
ing the problem of empathy: he came to the insights
that no fields of sensation can be empathically expe-
rienced immediately in a body that is externally per-
ceived, and that this happens only insofar as the outer
body becomes experienced as a living body fhr the
other through the RE-PRESENTATION of that alien point
of view. Thus, in these texts from 1915, he discussed
above ali the problem of how the presentation of a
conscious subject in space comes about, and he saw
the re-presentation of the other subject as made pos-
sible by the outer re-presentation of oneself (phantasy
of oneself in an externa] place in space ). However, he
!ater rejected this attempt as "too constructive."
Also very important for Husserl 's theory of empathy
were the lectures "Einfiihrung in die Phănomenologie"
(lntroduction to phenomenology, 1926/27). Here he
solved the problem ofthe similarity between one's own
body and the body ofanother (the similarity is the basis
of empathy) by the immediately constituted correspon-
dence between perceived externa! spatial fonns, on the
one hand, and kinaesthetically perceived movements
 INTERSUBJECTIVITY
of one's own body, on the other. With this, phantasy
presentation of o ne 's own body in an o uter spatial form
was no Ion ger the condition for empathy. In the fifth of
the Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931] Husserl gave
a summary overview of his theory of intersubjectiv-
ity. But he left many earlier insights out of it (above ali
those from the lectures of 1926/27). Also, he came back
aga in and aga in to the problems of intersubjectivity in
texts after 1930.
After this short historical survey some themes from
Husserl 's phenomenology of intersubjectivity will be
discussed in a systematic way.
In the fifth of the Cartesianische Meditationen and
in other texts devoted to the problem of our experi-
ence of the other (consciousness of another subject),
Husserl starts with a special kind of "reduction" or
thematic epoche: he confines himselfto an EGo's own
consciousness and, within this limited transcendental
sphere, analyzes the motivations and the context of ex-
periences in which the other comes tobe indicated. But
this limited sphere, called "sphere of ownness" or "pri-
mordinal sphere," has two different meanings or scopes
that are very often intermingled (e.g., in the Fifth Med-
itation ). In the first sense, it is a sphere of solipsistic
experiences that are the motivational base forthe empa-
thy of other consciousnesses and thcir intentiona! cor-
relates (their objects). This basic sphere is a sphere of
originally given or immediately perceived objects and
also comprehends spatial things, such as the physical
bodies of others, and a psychophysical reality, namely
the lived body or own-body. These immediately expe-
rienced objects ha ve no intersubjective meaning on this
level, and the question is how, in this sphere of directly
(immediately) perceived objects, "empathy" or "un-
derstanding" ofnot directly perceived and not directly
perceivable objects (i.e., others' consciousnesses and
their intentiona! objects) is motivated and confirmed in
the further course of experience. In the second sense,
the sphere of ownness or primordinal sphere also in-
cludes the ego 's own acts of empathy or comprehension
because these acts are also originally or directly given.
In this sense, the sphere of ownncss or primordinal
sphere is defined by the originally or directly given,
but it makes no sense to say that it functions as the mo-
tivational base for empathy, because empathies as my
own acts are included in this sphere. But not included
in this sphere are the intentiona! correlates, ( objects) of
357
these acts of empathy, i.e., other subjects (conscious-
nesses) and their intentiona! correlates because other
consciousnesses are never directly or originally per-
ceived, but only indicated (appresented) by means of
directly perceived things. Thus, here the accent is on
the best "originality" conceivable (rather than on the
reduction to a "solo" sphere prior to empathy). This
second sense of "sphere of ownness" or "primordi-
nal sphere" defines what Husserl calls a monad or a
monadic EGO. Although it is a very important and fruit-
ful concept, it designates an abstract, i.e., a not sepa-
rately existing reality because, according to Husserl's
own theory, an intentiona! act, e.g., empathy, is not
separable from its intentiona! correlate, e.g., another
person 's consciousness and his or her intentiona! cor-
relates.
Empathy (experience ofthe other). The primary mo-
tivational foundation of empathy is the perceptual sim-
ilarity between my own body and an externally per-
ceived body inside the primordinal sphere (in the first
sense). This similarity is less a similarity between two
externa! spatial forms than an immediately fel! corre-
spondence between the kinesthetically perceived inten-
tiona! movements of the own-body, on the one hand,
and the outwardly perceived movements and positions
of an externa! body, on the other hand. This similarity
motivates an apperceptive transfer in which the exter-
na! body is apprehended in analogy with the own-body
as a sensing and perceiving body. This apperceptive
transfer is not a discursive act of thinking or a logica!
inference, but occurs in o ne glance just as, without rec-
ollection and comparison, we transfer to the objects of
our ordinary perception the sense that similar objects
ha ve acquired for us in former experiences.
But therc are two important differences between
this ordinary apperceptive transfer and the appercep-
tive transfer of sense from my own body to a similar
externa! body. First, in this latter transference, the orig-
inal object, i.e., my own body, from which the sense is
transferred, is always perceptually present. So the own
and the similar externa! body appear perceptually as a
pair and the transfer ofsense is perfonned in the special
fonn of an "association by pai ring" (Paarungsasso::.i-
ation). Second, in this transference of sense the other
sensing and perceiving body is not apprehended sim-
ply as a duplicate of my actual bodily self, but as a
different "point of view," i.e., as the point of view 1
358 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
would have ifl were not here where 1 actually am, but
there, in the situation ofthe other body. In other words,
this associative transfer of sense is not immediate but
mediated by my re-presentation ( Vergegenwiirtigung)
of an actual "point of view" 1 actually do not ha ve.
A further question is how the transferred sense, i.e.,
the appresentation of the psychic si de of the externa!
body, can possibly be confinned in experience and why
it is not simply annulled by the fact that it can never be
immediately perceived by me. Basically, this confirma-
tion is made possible by the fact that the immediately
perceived externa! body and its appresented psychic
side stand, in my empathic experience, in a tempo-
rally continuous nexus of reciproca! motivations: the
now perceived externa! body motivates (indicates, ex-
presses) by its perceivable form and behavior a psychic
side, and this not perceivable psychic side motivates
(requires as its expression) a further continuation in my
expectation ofthe perceivable behavior ofthe externa!
body. If such further behavior is in fact perceived by
me, it confinns my former motivating appresentation
ofthe psychic side and may again motivate (indicate)
some other contents on the appresented psychic side
that in their turn motivate (require) in my expectation
some further mode ofperceptible behavior, and so on.
There are also other styles of confirmation of empathy.
Further problems in this line concern the awareness
of an intersubjective objectivity (the same intentiona!
objects in mine and the other's consciousness) and,
finally, of a common world.
Authentic and inauthentic empathy (eigentliche und
uneigentliche Ein(iihlung). Husserl distinguishes be-
tween these two modes of empathy mainly for the
purpose of distinguishing between the naturalistic and
personalistic exploration of the human being. In our
inauthentic understanding ofthe other, only that which
pertains to his or her externally perceivable body is pre-
sented in intuition, while his or her consciousness (the
psychic) is but emptily (not intuitively) appresented
by associative induction or empty indication. In other
words, in this empty understanding I consider the other
only from the outside intuitively and do not re-present
intuitively his or her situation from his or her own point
of view ("from the inside"). This inauthentic experi-
ence ofthe other indicates a special attitude toward him
or her and is the foundation for the consideration ofhu-
man and other conscious beings from the standpoint of
the natural sciences. From this standpoint the psychic
may be erroneously interpreted as a mere annex ofthe
physiological.
In our authentic experience of the other, which
Husserl also designates as "absolutely empathizing
cognizance" (absolute ein(iihlende Kenntnisnahme), I
li ve as if I were within the other by intuitively trans-
posing myself (hineinversetzen, hineinversenken, ein-
leben) into the motivations ofthe other's situation (in-
tuitive appresentation). This authentic understanding
expresses the personalistic attitude toward the other
and is the foundation for the human sciences.
Social acts. Acts of empathy (Ein(iihlung, Kompre-
hension, Fremdverstehen) are not yet called social acts
by Husserl. Accordingto him, social acts are acts ofad-
dressing others (sich an Andere wenden ). These are acts
of communication, but not necessarily on a linguistic-
conceptuallevel. Gestures- e.g., pointing- are also
communicative. Basic for social acts is the intentiona!
evoking of the partner's awareness that I intend to
communicate something to him or to her. This com-
munication may be merely an informative one (when I
intend merely the other's taking notice of something),
but it may also express my wish or my will that the
other does something more, e.g., when I address others
by requests or orders. In this context, Husserl speaks
of a social or personal self-consciousness: I am aware
of my own intentiona! acts as understandable and un-
derstood by others.
The intersubjective transcendentalfield. By means
ofthe reduction to intersubjectivity (the "double reduc-
tion," mentioned above), the consciousnesses of other
subjects belong methodologically to the thematic field
of transcendental phenomenology. They are intention-
ally included in this field by my own empathic and
social acts. But the other subjects transcend my own
sphere of consciousness sin ce they are re-presented in
these acts as conscious beings, i.e., as being.for them-
selves ((iir sich selbst), and since this "being for them-
selves" is never originally (primordially) experienced
by myself. At the same time, they are re-presented as
co-subjects or co-constituting subjects, in their inten-
tiona! acts constituting together with myselfa common
world, and as intentionally including myself by their
empathic and social acts.
 ITALY
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Andrew, W. K. "The Givcnncss of Self and Others in
Husserl 's Transcendental Phenomenology." Journal of
Phenomenological Psychology 13 (1982), 85-100.
Ellsiton, Frederick A. "Husserl 's Phenomenology of Empa-
thy." In Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Ed. Freder-
ick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick. Notre Dame, IN:
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1977,213-31.
Hart, James G. The Person and the Common Life. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
Heid, K1aus. "Das Problem der Intersubjektivităt und die
Idee einer phănomenologischen Transzendentaiphiloso-
phie." In Perspektiven transzendental-phănomenologi­
scher Forschung. Ed. Ulrich Ciaesges and Kiaus Held.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, 3--60.
Husserl, Edmund. Zur Phănomenologie der Jntersuhjek-
tivităt. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil: 1905-
1920; Zweiter Teil: 1921-1928; Dritter Teil: 1929--1935.
Husserliana i3-15. Ed. Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, i973.
Hutcheson, Peter. "Husserl's Problem of Intersubjectivity."
Journal o{ the British Society for Phenomenology ii
(i980), 144--62.
- . "Husserl's Fifth Meditation." Man and World i5 ( 1982),
265-84.
Ibarne, Julia. Husserls Theorie der Jntersuhjektivităt.
Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1994.
Rompp, Georg. Husserls Phănomenologie der Jntersuhjek-
tivităt. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, i991.
Schutz, Alfred. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersub-
jectivity in Husserl." In his Collected Papers JJJ: Studies
in Phenomenological Philosophy. Ed. Ilse Schutz, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966,51-91.
Strasser, Stephan. "Grundgedanken der Sozialontologie Ed-
mund Husserls." Zeitschrif'tf~ir philosophische Forschung
29 (1975), 3-33.
Theunissen, Michael. Der Andere. Berlin: Walter de Gruytcr,
i965, second edition, 1977.
Toulemont, Rene. L 'essence de la soeiere selon Husserl.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962.
Iso KERN
Universităt Bern
(Trans. William McKenna)
ITALY Phenomenology was originally in-
troduced by ANTONIO BANFI, whose early writings on
Husserl, whom he had met personally in Freiburg, date
back to 1923. In his main work, Principi di una teoria
delia ragione ( 1926 ), Ban fi refers to both Logische Un-
tersuchungen ( 190{}-190 1) and ldeen zu ei ner reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913) and explains Husserl's phenomenology
as an investigation of experience that has broken free
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
359
of ali dogmatic premises. Such an approach is opposed
to both idealism and positivistic empU'icism. Despite
the opposition of neo-Scholasticism and the residues
of positivism and pragmatism, the neo-idealism of
Benedetto Croce (1866--1952) and Giovanni Gentile
( 1875-1944) was dominant in Italy at that time.
Through phenomenology and its descriptive method
Banfi tried to work out a new critica! rationalism that
could avoid the metaphysics of the subject and the
naivete of realism. Husserl's EIDETIC METHOD was un-
derstood by the Italian philosopher as a way to seize
the rational structure of experience without prejudice.
The eidos does not exist beyond empirica! reality, but
!ies on the si de ofthe world of experience as an infinite
possibility of the rational order within the complex re-
lations revealed by experience itself. It is worth point-
ing out that Banfi soon realized that Husserl's eidetic
analysis necessarily came to recognize the historical
nature of phenomena. The complex relations of expe-
rience can be clarified only when referred to a concrete
subject, i.e., through reference to operations carried out
by humans in modes that are determined by their own
historical frameworks. In the late 1930s Ban fi 's con-
crete humanism largely anticipated the central issue of
Husserl's Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften
und die transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936).
Banfi 's support of phenomenology was first echoed
by a series of Husserlian studies, among them soFIA
VANNI ROVIGHI's essays of 1933, followed by a mono-
graph, Husserl ( 1939). Her interpretation, of Chris-
tian inspiration, represents an interesting contribution
to the lively controversy between neo-Scholasticism
and neo-idealism, the latter being represented by Gen-
tile's actualism. Vanni Rovighi tries to demonstrate
how Husserl's INTENTIONALITY justified a recovery of
medieval Christian Aristotelianism, principally repre-
sented by Aquinas, in opposition to idealistic subjec-
tivism. A further intersting contribution was offered
by NORBERTO BOBBIO in 1934-35, who tried tO apply
the phenomenological method to law.
By the end ofthe 1930s, however, interest in pheno-
menology declined in Jtaly, while the EXISTENTIAUSM
ofMARTIN HEIDEGGER gained considerab[e ground. LUIGI
PAREYSON, NICOLA ABBAGNANO, and ENZO PACI were the
main representatives of existentialism in ltaly, even
if they ali carne from different perspectives. The fi-
nal struggle with and defeat of the idealism of Croce
360 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and Gentile began with the risc ofthis line ofthought.
Pareyson was the most faithful to Heidegger's the-
ses; he emphasized their hermeneutica! character and
turned his attention to irrational and religious issues
of Kierkegaardian inspiration. Deal ing with the typi-
cal themes of anguish and the limits of existence and
reason, Abbagnano opted for a "positive" solution, re-
ferring to the social sciences and the pragmatic em-
piricism of John Dewey. Paei, o ne of Ban fi 's students,
emphasizcd the temporal and finite in human experi-
ence. The possibility of a rational meaning of life is
to be related to death and should include an open and
always relative conception oftruth.
Banfi originally looked at the spread of existential-
ism in Italy with sympathy. Yet he never failed to assert
the phenomenological inspiration of his own critica!
rationalism, even ifthat meant engaging in open con-
troversy with his own students. He founded the journal
Studi Filosofiei in Milan, the city in which he was
teaching, in 1940. Among its contributors were names
fated to become well known in the world ofltalian eul-
ture. Shortly before dying, Banfi dedicated his last and
posthumously appearing essay, "Husserl ela eri si delia
civilta europea" (1958), to the Husserliana edition of
the Krisis. He saw in that work the confirmation of
the tie between rationalism and historicism, between
historical humanism and critica! rationalism, that he
had discerned twenty-five years before as the ultimate
result of phenomenological research.
Enzo Paei, Ban fi 's heir and successor at Mi lan, in-
troduced phenomenology again in the early 1960s. Ex-
istentialism had exhausted its innovating spur, whereas
neo-positivism, Marxism, and social science were ex-
tending thcir influence considerably. The main basis
for a "return to Husserl" suggested by Paei !ies in the
appearanee of Husserl 's posthumous works under HER-
MAN LEO VAN BREDA's leadership, Cartesianische Med-
itationen [ 1931 ], !deen Il and III (1952), and Krisis
( 1954 ), as well as Etfahrung und Urteil ( 1939), edited
by LUDWIG LANDGREBE, and Welt, fch und Zeit (World,
l, and time, 1955) by GERD BRAND, etc. These works
caii attention to remarkable issues, sueh as GENETIC
PHENOMENOLOGY, passive synthesis, INTERSUBJECTIVITY,
the intermcdiary function ofthe BODY between the sur-
rounding world and consciousness, and sense-making
operations as pre-categorial processes occurring on the
Jeve] of thc LIFEWORLD.
According to Paei, such investigations belie ali
charges of idealism and intellectualism ever brought
against Husserl. Thc phenomenological framework
seen from this point ofview should show how, far from
being immune to misunderstanding and irrationalistic
deftection, Heidegger's EXISTENTIAL PfiENOMENOLOGY
represents only an cpisode within phenomenology.
That is why Heideggcr's negative limits may be tran-
scended only by returning to Husserl. Abbagnano had
already written about positive existentialism, but he
had also shown an inclination for empirieism that Paei
did not share. Abbagnano elaboratcd a phenomenology
ofrelations, supported by externa! philosophical refer-
ences, among them the reference to the philosophy of
process and eterna! objects of Alfred North Whitehead.
Under the lead of Paei and his students, who kept
the tradition of the Milan sehool ali ve and strength-
ened it through contacts with and inftuences on other
parts of [ta]y (FILIASI CARCANO in Rome and GIUSEPPI
SEMERARI in Bari), the return to Husserl prevailed in the
1960s and the first half ofthe 1970s, when phenomen-
ology was widespread in Italy. The journal Aut Aut,
founded by Paei, was its principle means of diffusion.
This interest in phenomenology was marked by the
systematie translation of Husserl 's work, un tii then un-
known in Italian except for ldeen!. A wide production
ofbooks and essays gave rise to a lively debate. Mean-
while, works by JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, PAUL RIC<EUR, LUDWIG LANDGREBE, EUGEN FINK,
KAREL KOSfK, LUDWIG BINSWANGER, and others were
being translated. Regarding publications by ltalians,
we should first mention Paci's anthology Omaggio a
Husserl ( 1960), which inaugurated the return to pheno-
menology, and then GUIDO PEDROLI's Lafenomeno!ogia
di Husserl ( 1958), ENZO MELANDRI's Logica ed expe-
rienza in Husserl (1960), ENZO PA CI 's Tempo e veri ta
ne/la fenomenologia di Husserl ( 1961 ), Giuseppe Se-
merari 's Scienza nu o va e ragione ( 1961 ), c ARLO SINI 's
lntroduzione allafenomeno!ogia come scienza ( 1965),
as well as his anthology La fenomenologia ( 1965),
which colleeted the fundamental writings witnessing
the return to Husserl.
A systematic return to phenomenology was also
recorded in FRANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HUN-
GARY, and the UNITED STATES, and played a key ro]e
in the International Congress of Phenomenology held
in Mexico City in 1960. The phenomenological ap-
 ITALY
proach did not limit its influence to the philosoph-
ical sphere in Italy but affected rsYCIIIATRY (thanks
to DANILO CARGNFLLO, LORFNZO CALVI, and FERDINANDO
BARISON) and AFSTHETICS as welJ. The latter was well
represented by the works ofLUCIANO ANCESCHI and DINO
FORMAGGIO, both students ofBanfi. Anceschi, who was
professor of aesthetics at Bologna, founded the review
Il Ve1Ti and thereby began a center ofphenomenologi-
cal studies mainly devoted to LITERATURE, which pro-
duced works and activities of great interest and origi-
nality. Similarly, LUIGI ROGNONI was active in the field
of aesthetics in MUSIC.
In the early 1970s, the blooming Italian phenomen-
ology had to cope with the ris ing ti de of MARXISM in-
spired by Antonio Gramsci. Italian neo-Marxism not
only participated in cultural motivations that actually
influenced the whole of European cu !ture, but was also
deeply rooted in the contemporary politica! situation.
This situation reflected the constant electoral growth
of the Communist Party along with the birth of the
student protest, which followed the American, French,
and German models, and eventually witnessed the deep
eri sis of the democratic system threatened by the ter-
rorism of the Red Brigades. The secular culture was
deeply affected by Marxism and generally tried to meet
the requirements of economic justice and social recov-
ery, while restraining all violent excesses.
It was within this framework that the last orig-
inal initiative in phenomenology was produced by
Paei in his Tempo e verita ne/la fenomenologia de
Husserl ( 1961) and Diario fenomenologico ( 1961 ).
Paei suggested an approach between phenomenology
and Marxism. He was followed by Semerari and his
students, but he also met strong resistance in the or-
thodox wing of Marxism as well as among those who
opposed Marxism. Paei was experimenting with a line
ofthought in part similar and parallel to that of Sartre, a
good friend whose work he deeply appreciated. But un-
like Sartre, who finally considered phenomenology no
more than an introduction to Marxism, Paei recognized
in Husserl an attempt to criticize and correct MARx's
position. The main work reflecting the approach of
phenomenology and Marxism is Paci's Funzione delle
scienze e significato de!l'uomo (Function of the sci-
ences and signification of the human, 1963 ). In this
work he begins from Husserl's Krisis, criticizes the
HUMAN SCIENCES, and tries to draw conclusions from
361
Marxism in general and the Italian Marxist tradition
in particular (Antonio Labriola and Antonio Gramsci).
The relation turns upon the assertion of the subject's
integral humanity that may be found in both Husserl
and Marx. By criticizing the classical economic cate-
gories and recovering human labor as a pre-categorial
operation and source of MEANING and VALUE. Marx an-
ticipates Husserl 's transcendental FPOCHf' AND RFDUC-
TION. Yet Marx retains some residual materialism and
NATURALISM that Husserl corrects through the reduction
to the LIFEWORLD, which is not tobe understood ata real
world level, but as an opening to a possible sense, a life
within infinite truth, beyond any fetishism and idola-
try, that is a call to ali humanity. Nevertheless, unlike
Husserl, Marx did not limit the meaning of praxis to
the theoretical practice of science and philosophy, but
extended it more directly to human historical practice
as a whole.
In the 1980s, after a long period of eri sis, Marxism
followed the same decline as Communism- a sort of
premonition of its future collapse. Its influence grew
weak, while the ideas of French STRUCTURALISM began
spreading in ltaly. But it was the re turn toN ietzsche and
Heidegger that produced an autonomous hermeneuti-
ca! line of thought. Remarkably influential was the
inspiration of PAUL RICCEUR and HANS-GFORG GADAMFR,
and particularly the awareness that the thought of Hei-
degger could not be reduced to the existentialist image
that had prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s.
Hermeneutica] philosophy in ltaly developed
through two different experiences. The first one was
led by GIANNI VATTIMO, whose Pensiero debole ( 1983 ).
which also became popular abroad, ignored phenomen-
ology and identified in Heidegger the premise for a final
overcoming of philosophical discourse, choosing adi-
rection that shows some affinities to that of Richard
Rorty. In this way Vattimo developed the hermeneu-
tica! heritage of his master Pareyson, whom he had
succeeded at Turin.
The second development was introduced by CARLO
SINI, Paei 's sucessor in Mi lan. In Semiotica e
filosofia ( 1978; cf. La fenomenologia e la filosofia
del/'esperienza [ 1987]), he acknowledged its pheno-
menological inspiration and linked it with thc prospec-
tivism of Nietzsche (brilliantly analyzed by Yattimo
himself), as well as the unended semiosis ofthe pheno-
menology of Charles Sanders Peirce, the importance
362 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ofwhich had already been understood by Paei.
Ten years, HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY pre-
vailed in Italy, marking the theoretical decline of
Husserl 's phenomenology. Stil!, historical surveys of
his thought continued to be produced, thanks to the
contributions of GIOYANNI PIANA's Esistenza e storia
negli in edili di Husserl ( 1965) and l problemi delia
fenomenologia (1966); ANGELA ALES BELLO's Husserl
e la scienze (1980); and others, e.g., ELIO FRANZINI's
La fenomenologia ( 1990) and Paolo Spinicci 's l pen-
sieri de li 'esperienza: Interpretazione di "Esperienze
et giudizio" ( 1985).
In recent years the problem of the relationship
between Husserl and Heidegger, within their mutual
phenomenological inspiration, has once more proved
tobe decisive in the understanding ofthe development
of philosophy in our century. A considerable contri-
bution has been offered by JACQUES DERRIDA 's work
and the posthumously published courses ofthe young
Heidegger. ALFREDO MARIN! and PIER ALDO ROVATTI ha ve
worked in this direction profitably. Dealing with is-
sues of pre-categorial operations in Husserl and the
end of philosophy in Heidegger in Etica delia scrit-
tura (1992), Sini has carried out a reconstruction of
phenomenology in terms of "phenomenography": it is
writing and no longer the phenomenological voi ce that
may possibly be the founding seat of the practice of
philosophy.
CARLO SINI
Universita degli Studi di Milano
FULVIA VIMERCATI
Universita degli Studi di Milano

WILLIAM JAMES At the height of his ca-
reer William James (1842-1910) unwittingly made a
decision that in effect deprived severa! generations of
philosophers in the UNITED STATES of easy access to one
ofthe greatest philosophical works ofthe 20th century,
EDMUND HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-
1901 ). In response to an inquiry from a prestigious
American publishing house about the merits of an al-
ready completed translation of Husserl's work, James
advised against its publication on the grounds that no
one in America would be interested in another German
work on logic. The cavalier and chauvinistic tone of
this remark is untypical and unworthy of James, who
would no doubt have been chagrined to discover that
in the second edition of his work Husserl generously
refers to James's "genius for observation in the field
of descriptive psychology," and expresses his indebt-
edness to James for his help in achieving "my release
from the psychologistic position."
Contemporary scholars generally agree that Husserl
was right to have detected affinities between James's
work and his own. lndeed, it is now firmly estab-
lished that James independently developed many of
the themes that would subsequently come to be asso-
ciated with the phenomenological tradition, e.g., IN-
TENTIONALITY, TIME, and the primacy of PERCEPTION.
In the opening pages of the Principles of Psychology
( 1890), James outlined a program for a natural scien-
tific psychology that would maintain a thoroughgoing
dualism, while also investigating the causal links be-
tween physiological and mental states. BRUCE WILSHIRE
has shown that this program gradually broke down in
the course of the work, as James carne to realize that
it is impossible to specify the nature of a mental state
exclusively in terms of its extrinsic ca usa! conditions.
Although in the Principles he never fully sorted out the
ditferent strands of his emergent methodology, he did
begin to distinguish between descriptive and explana-
tory modes of investigation, eventually referring to the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 3 63
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
latter as "physiological preliminaries." In James's !ater
Essays in Radical Empiricism ( 1912), the inconsisten-
cies of psychophysical dualism were fully abandoned
in favor of a return to "pure experience." According
to James, the fie1d of pure experience does not present
itself as merely subjective or psychological, but rather
as a realm of givenness that precedes the distinction be-
tween subjective and objective and makes this distinc-
tion possible. Like Husserl, James concludes that the
traditional modern interpretations of the immanence
of conscious life and the transcendence of things must
be redefined in terms of their differing modes of ap-
pearance within a prior and comprehensive zone of ali
manifestation. James also developes the implications
of this fundamental thesis. He repudiated the modern
interpretation of"mind" as an inner space set offfrom
the rest ofnature, and he rejects Kant's distinction be-
tween phenomena and things-in-themselves. He also
rejects the view that the task of philosophy is to guar-
antee that our concepts and theories somehow mirror
the world.
The key to James's phenomenological turn is his
gradual emancipation from the premises of BRITISH
EMPIRICISM. The empiricists had generally described
the mind as an interior space containing representa-
tions of reality. According to John Locke ( 1632-1704 ),
for example, the "cabinet" of the mind is empty and
dark at birth, and the organs of sensation are windows
through which enter "visible resemb1ances or ideas of
things without." The mind assembles into configura-
tions those elementary impressions that habitually oc-
cur together. If a subsequent impression or complex of
impressions is similar to an earlier impressional con-
ten!, association triggers the revival ofthe earlier con-
ten!, and the mind then fuses earlier and !ater contents
into a blurred general image. Thus association by con-
tiguity explains the recognition of unified things, and
association by resemblance explains how we gradu-
ally acquire a repertory of ideas. James makes severa!
criticisms ofthis theory.
First, he rejects the notion that our most primi-
tive sensations are isolated atomic impressions. Al-
though sensation does present simple qualities, it al-
ways presents these as parts of "sensible totals" that
are presentations of objects situated within "fringes"
or horizons: "The 'simple impression' of Hume, the
'simple idea' of Locke are both abstractions never re-
364 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
alized in experience. Experience from the very outset
first presents us with concreted objects, vaguely con-
tinuous with the rest of the world." Second, he rejects
the notion that cognition consists in the mere presence
within the mind of sense impressions and associatively
processed ideas. He points out that the empiricist ac-
count of mental processes fa ils to distinguish between
mental acts and their contents or objects: "Mill and the
rest believe that a thought must he what it means, and
mean what it is." Finally, he suggests that it is incoher-
ent to appeal to unconscious processes of association
by contiguity and resemblance without ever offering an
account of how the mind registers these relationships
in the first place. For example, unless !here occurs a
consciousness of resemblance somewhere in the cir-
cuit, it is simply nonsense to speak of resemblances
between impressions. In short, empiricism trades on
a tacit acknowledgment of conscious intentiona! acts,
while its overt theory reduces those acts to the mere
having and processing of intramental impressions.
If MF.ANINGs cannot be reduced to blurred general
images, then neither can logica! laws be reduced to
inductive generalizations about our thought processes.
James criticizes John Stuart Mill ( 1806-1873) and Her-
bert Spencer ( 182G-1903) for failing to account for the
fact that the logica! network of our meanings forms an
ideal system whose relations have a necessity and uni-
versality that cannot be accounted for by habit and asso-
ciation. Speaking ofthe genesis of conceptual systems,
he asks his readers to reflect on the following question:
if a hundred different beings were created, each en-
dowed with powers ofmemory and comparison, and if
each were presented with a "magic lantern show" that
imprinted on its mind the same group of sensations, but
in different combinations, and if a long enough time
were tobe allotted for arrangement and classification,
what results would occur? James contends that each of
these beings would eventually develop identica! classi-
ficatory systems, because their powers of comparison
would yield insight into the "relation between the in-
ward natures of the sensations," rather than merely
registering patterns dictated by the order oftheir suc-
cession. In short, judgments of comparison ha veto do
with relations between ideal meanings rather than with
associative experiences on the perceptuallevel.
James balances this defense of ideal meanings with
a strong commitment to the primacy ofperception. Per-
ception puts into play discriminatory insight into the
inward natures ofsensible totals that detach themselves
from a rich relational context provided by the object's
fringes. This discrimination is already the beginning of
conception that focuses on sameness ofinward natures,
and thus makes possible the identification ofperceived
particulars and their description in fixed categories. In
short, perceptual and categoria] intuitions work in tan-
dem as two different but intertwined ways ofpresenting
the same objects. As JAMFS M. EDIL points out, this is
the same position that Husserl develops in the Logis-
che Untersuchungen, where he describes the recipro-
ca] founding-founded relationship between ideal and
perceptual dimensions. Unlike GOTTLOB FREGF., whose
critique of PSYCHOLOGISM relegates ideal senses to a
subsistent "third realm," James and Husserl focus upon
their functional status. A meaning or sense is simply
what we know when we know some particular. We
grasp the "what" both as a surplus whose sense exceeds
the particularity of this instance, and as the condition
for the manifestation ofthe particular thing.
James often observes that in conception clarity is
gained, but richness is lost. Conception enables us to
reach beyond the immediate field of experience, and
thus to give meaning to the flow of life and to have
some control over the future. Conceptual discrimina-
tion also permits the kind of detachment requisite for
the precision and clarity of scientific theories. James
firmly asserts that without such abstractive thinking
we would be incapable of dealing efficaciously with
things. However, he also insists that conceptual anal-
ysis functions for ends set by our practica! interests:
"classification and conception are purely teleological
weapons ofthe mind." We are always interested partic-
ipants before we are theoretical spectators. Things first
appear not as objects of theoretical investigation, but
as paths or obstacles in a vast instrumental complex.
Overemphasis on conceptual abstractions generates the
illusion ofthe absolute spectator, an attitude that James
called "vicious inte11ectualism" in A Pluralistic Uni-
verse (1909). He concludes that a philosophical ac-
count of truth must always consider full facts rather
than objects taken in abstraction. In The Varieties of
Religious Experience ( 1902), he asserts that a fact in
its full concreteness is a "conscious field plus its object
as felt or thought of plus an attitude towards the object
plus a sense ofselfto which the attitude belongs." The
 WILLIAM JAMES
originality of pragmatism, James contends, !ies in the
prefercnce that it gives to the concrete sources of ab-
stractive thought. We encounter the deeper and richer
features of reality only in our perceptual experience.
We ought therefore to count only those conceptual sys-
tems as truc that help us to makc sense ofthe perccptual
world, and that lead us back harmoniously along "the
trunk line of meaning" to the realm of perceptual ac-
quaintance. Pragmatism, he asserts in The Meaning of
Truth ( 1909), "begins with concreteness, and returns
and ends with it."
This emphasis on the roots of our conceptual net-
works in the perceived world accounts for a difference
in tone between James's pragmatism and contempo-
rary versions of pragmatism that claim to revitalize
his position, but in fact owe more to Dewey's natural-
ism and to Nietzsche 's perspectivalism. After realizing
the incoherencc of causal accounts of cognition, James
never again tried to account for rationality in terms of
natural drives or adaptive powers. Moreover, he never
construed perceptual and conceptual perspectives as
illusory projections of a will to power. His pragmatism
was always subordinated to his theory ofintentionality
and to a strong sense that, as he puts it in The Will to
Believe ( 1897), "the inmost nature of reality is con-
genial to the powers we possess." He recognizes that
our acts of directedness toward objects are interpretive
and selective achievernents, rather than merely pas-
sive registrations of already constituted entities. But
he sees no reason to conclude that all of our knowl-
edge is relativized by reason ofits interested character.
ALFRED SCHUTZ, o ne ofthe first scholars to give a pheno-
rnenological reading of James's analysis ofthe stream
of thought, further developed James 's account of how
our interestsdetermine our sense ofreality. James calls
attention to the various worlds or "sub-universes" to
which we seem at different times to belong. There is,
first of all, the paramount reality of the world of per-
ception. Then there are the worlds of scientific theory,
of ideal relations, of mythology and religion, of the
"idols ofthe tribe," of dreams, ofphantasy, and ofmad-
ness. Each of these worlds has its particular cognitive
style, its specific mode of conscious engagement and
sociality ( or lack thereof). The world of perception is
paramount because it is common to us ali, and because
it is more fully and more consistently the locus of prac-
tica! interest and social interaction. Schutz points out,
365
however, that the perceptual world itself is sedimented
with socially constructed layers ofmeaning. As James
himself observes, our pcrceptions are always shaped
by a history and prehistory of interpretations. James
concludes that there is no way to prove to a skeptic 's
satisfaction the "postulates of rationality" that guide
the elaboration of our conceptual networks. AII we can
do is point to the harmonious interplay between percep-
luai consciousness and categoria! thought. Everything
therefore suggests that James was never really preoc-
cupied by the quest for certainty or by the dream of
finding privileged representations. His pragmatism is
not so much the product of epistcmological concerns
as it is a corollary of his cmphasis on the selective and
interested character of our classificatory systems.
In the Principles, James develops a complex theory
of personal identity and frec agency. He distinguishes
between the "me" (the empirica! self) and the 'T' (the
agent of cognition and of human actions). However,
he observes that even the most attentive reflection fails
to discover a perduring sort of entity that is ordinar-
ily denoted by the term "EGo." This is because the
present moment of consciousness cannot take itself as
an object. Consciousness is a ternporally cumulative
stream whose self-appropriation is always retrospec-
tive. James concludes that there is no need to postulate
a substantial principle of unity from which each suc-
ceeding "judging thought" may be said to emanate or
to proceed. The fringe-structure of the present mo-
ment of consciousness (its retention of the just past
and its anticipation ofthe immediate future within the
span of the present) provides an adequate explana-
tion of the continuity of human agency. Although the
present thought never has itself for an object, part of
its concrete object is always the immediately preced ing
thought, which has not yet faded from within the hori-
zon ofthe present. Thanks to the "peculiar warmth and
intimacy" that characterize this immediately preced-
ing thought, the present thought recognizes the earlier
thought as its own. The next thought performs a similar
act of appropriation, and thus the unity of conscious-
ness is preserved by a series of successive appropria-
tions.
Although the present thought is always the agent of
appropriation, its appropriation is ascribed to the self as
lived in the bodily mode. 1 recognize my every earlier
thought as belonging to the unity ofmy emergent self-
366 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
hood whose foca! point is the lived soov: "The body
is the storm centre, the origin of coordinates ... Ev-
erything circles around it, and is felt from its point of
view. The word 'I' then is primarily a noun ofposition,
just like 'this' and 'here'" (Essays in Radical Empiri-
cism [ 1912]). ARON GURWITSCH argues convincingly that
this description ofthe interplay between the stream of
consciousness and the lived body makes for a remark-
ably comprehensive and nuanced phenomenology of
personal identity and human action. He concludes that
well before HUSSERL and HEIDEGGER, "James may be
said to have discovered temporality as the fundamen-
tal structure of conscious life."
James recognizes that the body is both the func-
tional center ofthe field of consciousness and the locus
ofstimuli and reflexes. Indeed, he sometimes describes
bodily movements in a mechanistic fashion as reflexes
unrelated to the performances of consciousness. For
example, he characterizes emotion as an automatic
bodily reaction to physical stimuli. The only conscious
activity involved in EMOTION is the experience of corpo-
real disturbances. However, his discussion of freedom
and determinism gives priority to his more phenomen-
ological view ofthe body as the functional center ofthe
field of consciousness. The key to our freedom is the
power of consciousness to shift its attention. The focus
of the present conscious act is not necessarily deter-
mined by its predecessors. Freedom appears wherever
consciousness displays its mastery over the flow of ex-
perience by reason of its power to shift the focus of its
attention. James adds, however, that our potential for
freedom must be constantly cultivated ifit is not to suc-
cumb to deterministic influences of reflexes and habit.
His writings in ETHICS continually appeal to the need
to believe in freedom and in the value ofthe strenuous
and creative life. The first ethical act is the decision to
believe in freedom itself.
It is unfortunate that James 's study of RELIGION has
been largely neglected by scholars within the pheno-
menological tradition. James applies his critique of
psychologism to those interpretations that question the
value of religious phenomena by calling attention to
their psychological conditions and origins. He is well
aware of the "exalted emotional sensibility" of many
religious geniuses, but he insists that it is a category
error to explain away religious experience by identi-
fying it with fear of death, the spirit of resentment, or
perverted sexuality. In a wry commentary on attempts
to construe religious beliefs as products of repressed
sexual drives, because of the barely concealed erotic
imagery of some mystical writers, he observes that one
might as well interpret religious faith as an aberration
of the respiratory function, since religious texts often
invoke the soul 's breathless panting. An honest account
ofreligious experience must adopta pluralistic method
that takes into account its total sense. James points out
that religious experience does not seem tobe related to
any particular bodily drive or emotion; rather, it makes
use of the full range of emotions, desires, and motives
to express intentions of a unique order. On the other
hand, he also sets a limit to speculation based on a
phenomenology of religious experience. Descriptions
of mystical and other religious experiences do not jus-
tify theological or metaphysical conclusions.
This emphasis on the limits of REASON is typical of
James. The spirit of his pragmatism is perhaps best
expressed in the essay "The Sentiment of Rationality"
( 1897), in which he contends that human rationality is
guided by two great passions ofthe mind: the passion
for ever more lucid and elegant conceptual systems,
and the rival passion for the richness and complexity
of perceptual experience. He suggests that the harmo-
nious coordination ofthese intellectual passions yields
our best chance for truth. When both of these pas-
sions are satisfied, we have the sense that there are no
further questions tobe asked. Although this is no guar-
antee of the rightness of our convictions, there comes
a point in any inquiry when it is imprudent or even
pathological to continue to consider alternative possi-
bilities. A sense of the mean between extremes is as
necessary in intellectual inquiry as it is in practica!
affairs. As a philosopher, James was also committed
to the view that the moments in which we experience
the feei ing ofrationality are provisional resting places.
Philosophy's role is ever to seek alternatives, and to
criticize comfortable conclusions. There can be no to-
talizing syntheses. At a time when the latest swing
ofthe pendulum has taken philosophy from excessive
confidence in reason 's powers to an equally excessive
reduction of ali truths to pleasing or powerful illusions,
this balanced appraisal of human rationality offers an
attractive alternative.
 JAPAN
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cobb-Stevens, Richard. "A Fresh Look at James' Radical
Empiricism." In Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges.
Ed. Ronald Bruzina. Albany, NY: State University ofNew
York Press, 1982, 109--21.
Edie, James M. "The Genesis of a Phenomenological Theory
of the Experience of Personal Identity: William James on
Consciousness and the Self." Man and World 6 ( 1973),
113-19.
- William James and Phenomenology. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1987.
Embree, Lester. "The Phenomenology ofSpeech in the Early
William James." Journal o{the British Societyfor Pheno-
menology 1O ( 1979), 1O1-9.
- . "The Metaphysics of Psychology in James 's Princi-
ples." In William James :~ Philosophical Psychology. Ed.
Michael H. DeArmey and Stephen Skousgaard. Lan-
ham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1986,41-56.
Gavin, William J. "William James on Language." Interna-
tional Philosophical QuarterZv 16 ( 1976), 81-86.
Gurwitsch, Aron. The Field ol Consciousness. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Prcss, 1964.
- . "On the Object ofThought." Philosophy and Phenomen-
ological Research 7 ( 1947); rpt. in his Studies in Pheno-
menology and Psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestem
University Press, 1966, 301-31.
James, William. The Works ol William James. Ed. F.
Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and Jgnacio K. Skrupskelis. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Linschoten, Johannes. On the Way Towards a Phenomen-
ological Psychology. Trans. Amcdeo Giorgi. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1968.
McDermott, John J. "Editor's Introduction." In The Writings
ol William James: A Comprehensive Edition. Ed. John J.
McDermott. New York: Modern Library, 1968, xiii-xliv.
Roscnthal, Sandra B., and Patrick L. Bourgeois. Pragmatism
and Phenomenology: A Philosophic Encounter. Amster-
dam: Gruner, 1980.
Schutz, Alfred. "William James' Concept of the Stream
ofThought Phenomenologically Interpreted." Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 1 ( 1941 ), 442-52; rpt.
in his Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological
Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, 1-14.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A
Historica! Introduction. 3rd rev. and enl. ed., with the
collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982, 62--63, 100--104.
Stevens, Richard. James and Husserl: The Foundations ol
Meaning. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
Wild, John. The Radical Empiricism ol William James. New
York: Doubleday, 1969.
Wilshire, Bruce. William James and Phenomenology: A
Study ol the "Principles of Psychology." Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1968.
RICHARD COBB-STEVENS
Boston College
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
367
JAPAN Phenomenology was introduced into
Japan by KITARO NISHIDA through his articles before
Wor]d War l, and it is well known that EDMUND HUSSERL
himself contributed two articles to the Japanese jour-
nal Kaizo in 1923 and 1924. During the 1920s HA.IIME
TANABE, SATOMI TAKAHASHI, TETSURO WATSU.ll, and others
visited Freiburg and heard lectures by Husserl, OSKAR
BECKER, EUGEN FINK, and MARTIN HEIDEGGER. They re-
turned to Japan to introduce phenomenology in more
detail and also tried more or less to criticize and solve
various problems from their own points of view. The
originality and high level oftheir accomplishments are
still quite remarkable today.
Kitaro Nishida is the greatest figure in modern
Japanese philosophy, not only because of his found-
ing of the Kyoto school, but also through his broad
influence on the philosophica1 activities ofthis country
in general. Scarcely any Japanese philosopher of any
originality has been uninfluenced by his thought. This
fascination seems to come from his deep insight into
reality as the ultimate unity that dominates through the
multiplicity of world phenomena. This unity is not a
mere object of cognition, but rather something that de-
mands the whole personality of each observer. Perhaps
he attained his insight through his many years of Zen
practice in his earlier years. Some ofhis poems (waka)
reveal the purity and deep innocence ofhis personality
to us. He expressed the unity of uni verse and person-
ality initially by the phrase "pure experience" (iunsui
keiken) and then, in his !ater thought, with special refer-
ence to Plat o 's chăra by the term "seated field" (bas ha).
This is the unity of (anonymous) consciousness and
true Being. AII oppositions and even ali contradictions
are reconciled in this unity because ali differences al-
ways assume a unity. Nishida was so concerned to
ascertain this unity in phenomena that their differences
were for him of only secondary significance, at least
compared with their unity. Coincidentia oppositorum
in various dimensions of experience was for him both
an ideal and a reality. Concerning such an ultimate
unity, Sein and Sollen are one and the same. This all-
embracing character of his thought gave it a kind of
incomprehensible fascination. If phenomenology is a
way of searching for truth through various phenomena
as "they occur, Nishida's thought is quite phenomen-
ological. "Truth must be nothing other than reality as
such" (Zen no kenf..:yii [Study of the good, 1911 ]; cf.
368 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei [Intuition and re-
flection in self-consciousness, 1917]; there are English
translations of both books, and a German translation
ofthe former).
Hajime Tanabe, a younger colleague of Nishida
at Kyoto, carne to criticize him for slighting the dif-
ferences among mundane phenomena and rejected as
mysticism his concept of the immediate unity of con-
tradictory opposites. Tanabe proposed a new dialectic
called the "logic of species," which means that ev-
ery contradictory opposition must be mediated by a
third term just as a genus and an individual are to
be mediated by a species (Shu no ronri no benshăhă
[Dialectic of species logic], 194 7). The controversy
between Nishida and Tanabe during the 1930s over
the dialectica! method is a major event in the history
of Japanese philosophy. Tanabe visited Freiburg in the
middle of the 1920s and heard the lectures of Husserl
himself. Thus he became one of the earliest to intro-
duce phenomenology into Japan. About phenomen-
ology he wrote: "The fact that the transcendental con-
sciousness of phenomenology !ies, unlike that of KANT,
within the primordial sphere of the experienced must
be accepted because of its concreteness over against
the abstractness of the Kantian formalism. On the
other hand, this fact becomes a disadvantage insofar
as it makes phenomenology incapable of accomplish-
ing what Kantian transcendental philosophy has done."
Generally speaking, transcendental consciousness is
required to ground the transcendent being of objects.
"But because Husserlian transcendental consciousness
makes ali the object-intentionalities immanent in itself,
it may be difficult to tind a criterion in the structure
of transcendental consciousness itself for discriminat-
ing between a genuinely transcendent object and one
that is only seemingly transcendent" ( Tetsugaku tsiiron
[Elements of philosophy ], 1933). Tanabe had already
begun the work of a dialectician, mediating practically
between "spirit" and "transcendent material" under the
influence ofNishida.
SATOMI TAKAHASHI of Tohoku University in Sendai
studied phenomenology in Freiburg during 1926-27,
about the same time as Tanabe, and became the founder
ofthe phenomenological tradition at his university. His
monograph Husserl no genshăgaku (Husserl 's pheno-
menology, 1931 ), is one ofthe earliest comprehensive
introductions of phenomenology in Japan. Moreover,
his article "Genshogakutei kangen no kanosei" (The
possibility of the phenomenological reduction, 1930;
cf. Zen tai no tachiba [The standpoint oftotality, 1932])
may be called one of the most profound arguments
ever dedicated to this theme. Concerning the relation
between the phenomenological EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION
and the neutrality modification, he asserts, even con-
trary to Husserl 's opinion, that the latter is always in-
volved in the former as a part of it. In other words,
the phenomenological reduction is the act ofreflection
upon what is neutralized in its thesis ofBeing. The iter-
ability of the neutrality modification, which is denied
by Husserl, is admitted. Every being that is neutral-
ized is founded by Being in the condition (Zustand) of
prima] experience, which culminates in eterna! love.
On the other hand, Takahashi denies the absolute im-
manence of the stream of consciousness posited by
Husserl in Ideen zu ei ner reinen Phanomenologie und
phanomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) as the mere
result ofthe latter's metaphysical assumption ofCarte-
sian dualism.
Takahashi was consistently interested in the phe-
nomenon ofTIMEand, through confrontation with HENRI
BERGSON, HEIDEGGER, WILLIAM JAMES, and Augustine,
etc., he reached his own position (Jikanron [On time,
1953]). In his opinion there are three possible views
according to whether the pivot of time is regarded
as being (1) in the past, (2) in the present, or (3)
in the future. Bergson holds the first, Heidegger and
Hermann Cohen ( 1842-1918) hold the third, and St.
Augustine and FRANZ BRENTANO hoJd, if anything, the
second. Takahashi does not mention Husserl, whose
position, however, seems to stretch over the second
and third views. Takahashi himself claimed to take no
exclusive position. He accepted not only the time that
starts from the future and past, but also the one that
either flows from the present over into past and future
or arrives at the present from both opposite directions
simultaneously. Among such times centering upon the
present he discriminates ( 1) the intellectual (reflective)
"thin" present and (2) the emotional "thick" present.
The latter embraces both future and past tightly in it-
self, the most eminent example ofwhich is the present
residing in love.
TETSURO WATSUJI was an incomparably brilliant fig-
ure, not thoroughly focused on a single theme as was
the case ofNishida. He produced many excellent works
 JAPAN
in diverse domains ofthe HUMAN SCIENCES: ancient and
modern history of Japan, history of major world reli-
gions, history of oriental and occidental thought, PHILO-
SOPIIICAL ANTIIROPOLOGY, FTHICS, ETIINOLOGY, compar-
ative study of cultures, and history of arts and AES-
THFTICS. In all these regions he produced research at
the highest level. His approach was the HERMENEUTI-
CAL PHENOMENOLOGY inspired by Martin Heidegger's
Sein und Zeit ( 1927), which he read during his stay
in Europe ( 1927-28). Throughout his diverse stud-
ies, he consistently investigated the "Human Being,"
which has in itself a double-sidedness: the individual
and the social. It is not a closed substance or cog-
ito, but a dialectica! relationship between two sides or
moments that reach beyond inwardness into the tran-
scendence of other human beings. Watsuji points out
that the Japanese word for "man" (nin-gen) means et-
ymologically "between man and man." Human Being
is therefore a priori a relational Being or a Being-in-
between.
On the relation between HFRMENEUTICS and pheno-
menology, Watsuj i asserts that Heidegger defines "phe-
nomenon" as that which manifests itself in itself. But
what Heidegger seeks is Being by way of beings. So
from his standpoint beings must be called "phenom-
ena" ofBeing. But beings are essentially different from
Being itself (the ontologica! difference). They are not
the "itself' of Being, but rather the "others" of Being.
Thus Being often hides itself behind its phenomena.
Through such a hiddenness the insufficiency of Hei-
degger's definition of"phenomenon"becomes clear. In
fact, Being manifests itself not "in itself," but "in oth-
ers." What manifests itself does so only in that which is
other than itself. And to let something manifest itselfin
what is other (as other) is called "interpretation," where
this other is its "expression." Heidegger's original in-
tention may be made clearer, says Watsuji, through
such a hermeneutica! transformation of his concept of
phenomcnon, while, on the other hand, the necessity
of a phenomenological reduction that guides our eyes
from beings to Being is stil! to be affirmed. Watsuji
wants to substitute for such Being the "Human Se-
ing" as the inter- and intra-subjective relationships he
conceives of ( cf. Fado [Clima te], 1935; there are En-
glish and German translations) and Ningen no gaku
toshiteno rinrigaku [Ethics as science ofhuman being,
1934])
369
GOICHI MIYAKE, who studied in Freiburg during
1930--31 and !ater taught at Sendai and Kyoto, ex-
pressed an elementa1 doubt about the validity of the
Husserlian epoche. Referring to some portions of For-
male und transzendentale Logik ( 1929), where the
naivete ofTRUTH and EVIDENCF becomes progressively
apparent, Miyake says: "Here this gradual realization
which Husserl called painful but inevitable stands in-
volved in the depths of transcendental subjectivity,
leaving a profound anxiety. Husserl thought it pos-
sible to overcome this gradual realization, but if we
consider it frankly, are we sure ofthis?" (Heideggerno
tetsugaku [Heidegger's philosophy, 1950]).
Miyake reports that during his stay in Freiburg he
asked OSKAR RECKER and evcn Husserl about this point
and also pondered it himselfin many ways, but he could
not gain clarity. Miyake found the phenomena ofhori-
zon and TIME becoming the foundation of Husserlian
phenomenology. In these, the Jiving Being ofthe philo-
sophical truth could be found, combining the static and
the dynamic, the finite and the infinite. But an "anx-
ious" relativity and naivete emerges here in the to-be-
concluded but never-ending process that becomes the
fundamental phenomenon of philosophical reasoning.
This is an extreme situation for the phenomenology
of REASON. But insofar as phenomenology stands upon
reason, it will be impossible to Jessen this crisis by re-
course to a more fundamental ground. Miyake asks in
the face ofthis impasse: "Should not philosophy stand
upon a more original 'truth' than scientific truth?"
The fertile accumulation ofphenomenological stud-
ies in the 1930s by the thinkers mentioned and by oth-
ers was not continued smoothly and without interrup-
tion by their successors. The disruption in the tradition
caused by World War Il was grave. From the end of
the war unti1 the beginning of the 1960s, Husserl 's
phenomenology was known chiefly as the forerunner
or background of Heidegger's and .Il· AN-PAUL SARTRE's
ontologica! thought, and was rarely the proper theme of
study. But together with the rise ofthe name ofMAURICE
MERLFAU-PONTY and the introduction of Husserl 's !ater
thought, interest in this common ancestor of EXISTEN-
TIAL PHFNOMENOLOGY was awakened, and the renais-
sance ofHusserl's phenomenology in Japan during the
1970s followed. Since then severa! phenomenologi-
cal thinkers of originality ha ve emerged, among whom
three may be mentioned.
370 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
As already noted in the case of Nishida, Japanese
phenomenological thinkers of originality converge to
a great extent in attempting to overcome the subject-
object scheme of modern European thought as well
as the mind-body dichotomy of Cartesianism. WATARU
HIROMATSU recognizes the extension of the BODY (or
body schema) into the tools that are being used by me
in TECHNOLOGY or into another body when one feei the
pain of another ego. (He calls the latter the Siamese-
twin structure.) Such experiences are not one's illu-
sion, though some philosophers want to say so, but
genuine experiences that make up our daily life. Fur-
thermore, Hiromatsu denies the simple substantiality
of any subject (EGO) and any object (thing). For him
"phenomenon" is not only "that which manifests it-
self," but also "that which manifests something else
than itself," e.g., the fine piece ofwood manifests "pen-
cil." The former is real and individual, but the latter is
ideal and universal. Both comprise the essential double
(ideal-real) structure of the object: this pencil. Corre-
spondingly, the subject ofthe ego who recognizes this
object-pencil is more than a simple 1. On the one hand,
it confronts the object individually here and now, but
on the other hand, it is concerned with the ideality
of the object beyond the here and now, i.e., as one
of many congruent subjects: we. Thus the subject-I,
too, has the double structure: I as "we" (or we as "1").
This structure is called by Hiromatsu the "communal
subjectivity" and considered the sine qua non of any
role-taking and role-playing in our social life (Sekai
no kyodoshukanteki sonzaik6z6 [The communal sub-
jective structure ofthe being ofthe world, 1972]).
HIROSHIICHIKAWA is concerned with the interrelation
between body and the world, where the former does
not mean a physical entity in the world, but some-
thing beyond the traditional dichotomy between mind
and body. He calls it, in archaic Japanese, "mi." (mi
is said to be very like the "implexe" of Paul Valery
[ 1871-1945].) Mi is either body as mind or mind as
body. Mi consists of three dimensions of unity: ( 1)
tropistic unity, (2) intentiona! unity, and (3) mediated
(intentiona!) unity. These are not only hierarchically
related to each other, but also interwoven like a mov-
able semi-lattice. Tropistic unity is accompanied by
no consciousness or solcly by consciousness ofresults
and not of process ( e.g., the control of muscles during
walking). It founds other unities from inside. Inten-
tional unity is accompanied by consciousness or is
easily brought to consciousness (e.g., EMOTION, PERCEP-
TION, or IMAGINATION). It involves particular tropistic
unities as substructures within itself and is determined
by them while controlling them. Here the 'T' (ego)
emerges as an intentiona! subject that is never com-
pletely objectified, because the 'T' is deeply rooted in
the tropistic dimension.
Mediated unity is the intentiona! unity of Mi me-
diated by tools and signs. In daily life 1 not only in-
tend objects in the world directly, but also work upon
objects through tools and upon other human beings
through signs, where tools and signs are no mere ob-
jects outside of mi, but are already incorporated into
it as its lived elements of unity. The extended or ex-
panded unity of mi not only articulates itself, but also
intentionally articulates the world in which it is living.
The self-determination of mi is at the same time the cor-
responding determination ofthe world, e.g., "mood" is
a tropistic determination of the world. Therefore, the
environmental crisis of the world today means at the
same time the crisis of unity of mi that results from an
overload of machi nes and signs. Since as Mi involves
an unconscious structure in itself, Ichikawa considers
the phenomenological epoche and reduction of Husserl
insufficient for the task of its disclosure. To clarify the
"passive synthesis" involved in mi, one must consider
its genetic process, while taking account of results of
various scientific studies. At the same time one must
endeavor to free oneself as far as possible from his-
torical and cultural restrictions laid tacitly upon one's
consciousness (e.g., Husserl's "pure consciousness" is
sti li quite European). Such a reduction must be neces-
sarily incomplete and demands infinite repetition (Mi
no k6z6 [The structure of mi, 1984]).
As shown in the cases of Nishida, Watsuji, and
Hiromatsu, many Japanese thinkers have shared the
common aim of trying to bridge the so-called abyss
between the I and others, as well as that between mind
and body or between subject and object. But except
for Nishida, who knew very well the contradictory
character of the coexistence of multiple individuals
in INTERSUBJECTIVITY, the other thinkers seem to have
comparatively weak ideas of individuality; for them,
an individual means only an example or special deter-
mination of something universal, e.g., nothingness or
the human genus, and does not mean anything more.
 KARL JASPERS
This tendency is not unrelated to the particular devel-
opment of the long historical and cultural tradition of
Japan.
One remarkable case of the recent theory of hu-
man coexistence that thematizes this tradition can be
taken up here, namely, that ofBJN KJMURA, a phenomen-
ologist in PSYCHJATRY. As a specialist in the treatment
of schizophrenia, Kimura pays attention to the phe-
nomenon of self-awareness. Phenomenology means
for him, as for Heidegger, "to Jet be seen what man-
ifests itself, just as it does so from itself, hither from
itself." But what manifests itselfhere is not Being, but
the self of the human being. Through such a pheno-
menology, insofar as a doctor becomes aware ofwhat
manifests itself from within the patient, the latter is
helped to see what manifests itself from itself, namely
the self wanted of him or her. Tbus Kimura makes
much of the special multiplicity of the first and sec-
ond person pronouns in Japanese. In contrast to Euro-
pean languages, Japanese has more than ten kinds of
these first person-second person pairs in daily usage:
ware-nanji, watashi- ( or watakushi-) an ta ( or anata),
boku-kimi. ore- (or washi-) omae (or kisama), shăsei­
kinden (or kijo ), uchi-otaku, etc. These pairs are used
strictly according to the situation in which a dialogue or
communication occurs. The ma in standard of discrim-
ination is the social pecking order between the speaker
or writer and conversation partner.
In Kimura 's opinion this phenomenon manifests the
comparatively strong dependence of the Japanese self
not only on status and social order, but upon something
"between" oneself and others. This self is very flexible
and is able to adjust to the variety of the situation, be-
cause unlike the European self, the Japanese self has
no rigid identity in itself, but has a very sofi identity
always related to the mediate sphere in which I and
others are not yet clearly discriminated. This sphere of
the "in-between" must not be confused with the "I and
Thou" of dialogical philosophy, such as that of Mar-
tin Buber ( 1878-1965), because while the latter comes
forth only on the premise of existing individua1s (l and
he, she, it), the former genetically precedes ali individ-
ual selves and then brings them about. The individual
self must strive, while growing, to determine its own
identity, starting from this mediate sphere; failing that,
it will be threatened by the primitive others who re-
main undiscriminated within itse1f. Kimura says: "In
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
371
the case of schizophrenia the others ha ve already gotten
into the basis or home of the self' (Jikaku no seishin-
byări [Psychopatho1ogy of self-awareness, 1970]; cf.
Hito to hito tono aida [Between man and man, 1972
- there is a German translation- and Seishinbunret-
subyă no Genshăgaku [Phenomenology of schizophre-
nia, 1975]).
In Japan, Genshogaku-nenpă (Annua1 Review of
the Phenomeno1ogica1 Association of Japan) is the spe-
cia1ized journa1 for phenomenology. Phenomenologi-
cal societies include:
Nihon Genshă Gakkai (Phenomenological Association
of Japan; founded 1980, 300 members) c/o Profes-
sor Susumu Kanata, Faculty of Synthetic Science, Hi-
roshima University, (738) 1-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-
hiroshima, Japan.
Genshă-gaku Kashakugaku Kenk.va-kai (Society for
the Study of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics;
founded 1978, 160 members) c/o Professor Yoshihiro
Nitta, Department of Philosophy, Sophia University,
( 102) 7-1 Kioichuom, Chiyoda-ku, Japan.
Kaishakugaku Symposium (Society for Hermeneutica!
Study; founded 1988, 60 members) c/o Sumio Takeda
and Kohei Mizoguchi, Department ofHuman Sciences
& Faculty of Literature, Osaka University, ( 560) 105
Machikaneyama-cho, Toyonaka, Japan.
HIROSHI KO.IIMA
Niigata Universitv
KARL JASPERS Best known for his philosophy
of existence, Jaspers ( 1883-1969) began his career in
PSYCHJATRY. One cannot fully understand Jaspers' psy-
chiatry or philosophy without appreciating his earliest
goals in MEDJCJNE. These emerged during his years in
training as a research assistant. In the best medical tra-
dition, he sought to describe as concretely and as faith-
fully as possib1e the clinica! picture, i.e., the signs and
symptoms, ofhis patients' illnesses. He was convinced
that such explications of psychopatho1ogy could pro-
vide the basis for advancing psychiatry as a scientific
discipline. What made him unique among his peers was
his recognition that his efforts to furnish better clinica!
descriptions would require him to confront epistemo-
logical and methodological questions. How can one
 372 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
faithfully describe another person 's experience? What
is the mode of access and evidence for these descrip-
tions? How can such accounts remain scientific? Ifthey
are scientific, how do they compare with other scien-
tific approaches? This search for a method led Jaspers
in directions unusual for a physician. He threw him-
self into the Methodenstreit of the early 20th century,
debates concern ing the methods appropriate to the NAT-
URAL and HUMAN SCIENCES. He acquainted himseifwith
the views and often the persons ofMAX WEBER, WILHELM
DILTHEY, Wilhelm Windelband ( 1848-1915), Heinrich
Rickert ( 1863-1936), EDMUND HUSSERL, and others.
This concern with methodology is exemplified in
early essays (1911-12), but it achieved brilliant ex-
pression in Allgemeine Psychopathologie (Genral psy-
chopathology, 1913). Although its author was barely
thirty years old, this work-extensively revised in subse-
quent editions-still stands as one ofthe landmark texts
in psychiatry. It merits careful study even today by
philosophers and scientists interested in methodology
in psychiatry, medicine, and the human sciences. The
influence ofWeber, Dilthey, and GFORG SIMMEL appears
in Jaspers' insightful use of the distinction between
understanding and explanation. Weber also influenced
Jaspers' argument regarding ideal types as a fruitful
form of conceptualization in the human sciences.
In early essays and in a section of the Allgemeine
Psychopathologie, Jaspers adopts and extends Edmund
Husserl 's phenomenology from the Logische Unter-
suchungen (1900-190 1). In the 1950s, he described
his appropriation of Husserlian phenomenology in the
following terms: "My own investigations as well as
my reflection about what was being said and done in
psychiatry (in 1911) had led me on tracks which were
new at that time. Philosophers gave me the impetus ...
As method I adopted Husserl 's phenomenology, which,
in its beginnings, he called descriptive psychology; I
retained it although I rejected its further development
into insight into essences ( Wesensschau ). It proved to
be possible and fruitful to describe the inner experi-
ences of patients as phenomena of consciousness. Not
only hallucinations, but also delusions, modes of ego-
consciousness, and emotions could, on the hasis ofthe
patients' own descriptions, be described so clearly that
they became recognizable with certainty in other cases.
- Phenomenology became a method for research."
Phenomenology plays a limited ro le in Jaspers' psy-
chopathology. It is restricted to serving as the method
for developing the basic concepts of psychopathol-
ogy, such as delusion, hallucination, loose associa-
tions, thought-insertion, etc. Although he is strongly
influenced by Husserl, he departs from Husserl 's meth-
ods in particular ways. First, Jaspers takes psychiatric
phenomenology to be an empirica! method (ein em-
pirisches Verfahren ). This signifies that in his hands
it is not a philosophical method. It is rather a method
of empirica! science that attempts to describe the sub-
jective experiences ofthe psychiatric patient. Because
Jaspers' phenomenology is an empirica] method, it dis-
regards Husserl 's EIDETIC METHOD of free variation in
IMAGINATION that finally leads to an intuition of essential
features ( Wesensschau ).
Second, Husserl's phenomenology emphasizes ex-
amples of mental life given through self-reflection,
while Jaspers' psychopathology examines particular
cases of mental pathology present in patients. Because
the psychiatrist seeks to comprehend the experiences
of other people, he or she must employ a form of em-
pathy (Einfi'ihlung) or understanding ( Verstehen). The
psychiatrist must foresake, then, the emphasis on self-
reflection of the Husserlian philosopher. The psychi-
atrist should strive instead to "intuitively re-present"
(anschaulich vergegenwiirtigen) the pathological ex-
periences ofhis or her patient.
Jaspers remarks severa! times that it is the patient
and the patient alone who has direct access to his or
her own subjective experiences. How, then, is the psy-
chiatrist able to gain cognitive access to these experi-
ences? Through an empathic "re-presentation" ( Verge-
genwiirtigung) of them. In "RE-PRESENTATION" the ob-
ject ofwhich one is aware is not itself directly given; it
is not itself directly present to one's mind. But the ob-
ject is experienced as if it were itself directly given, as
if it were directly present. In re-presentation I examine
the object of my awareness as if it were directly given
to me although in actual fact it is not.
But if the object is not in fact directly given to me
in re-presentation, how can Jaspers require that such
re-presentation be "intuitive" (anschaulich )? Although
Husserl developed his own technical sense ofthe term,
Anschauung in German sometimes carries the conno-
tation of"experiencing an object in graphic detail." An
intuitive experience thus differs from a non-intuitive
experience for Jaspers in that the latter re-presents its
 KARL JASPERS
object vaguely and indistinctly while in the former
the object is re-presented distinctly and graphically.
When the psychiatrist "intuitively re-presents" to him-
or herself the experiences of patients, these patholog-
ical experiences are not and cannot themselves be di-
rectly given to the psychiatrist. But the psychiatrist
must graphically re-present them to him- or herself in
great detail as if they were directly given. Intuitive re-
presentation is the closest one person can come to the
"direct presentation" of another person 's experiences.
How can the psychiatrist begin to attain this dis-
tinct, detailed, and graphic re-presentation of a patient's
experiences? Jaspers claims that the best help for at-
taining these re-presentations comes from the patient's
own self-depictions (Selbstschilderungen). These self-
depictions can be provoked and tested in conversa-
tion with the patient. Moreover, the clearest and most
complete self-depictions by patients are written ones.
Jaspers is convinccd that the person who has the experi-
ence is the o ne who can most easily find the appropriatc
depiction of it. The psychiatrist who merely observes
the patient would struggle in vain to formulate what
the patient can say about his or her own experience.
Because it is patients, and not psychiatrists, who
alone can directly observe pathological experiences
through self-reflection, psychiatrists must rely on
patients' communications. Psychiatrists should, of
course, continually test the credibility of patients as
well as their powers of judgment. And Jaspers is cog-
nizant of the mistakes the psychiatrist can make in
accepting a patient's statements as all too reliable. But
Jaspers also warns ofthe reverse mistake ofremaining
radically skeptical of patients' reports.
Jaspers follows Husserl 's method in the Logis-
che Untersuchungen in a further step: Jaspers main-
tains that the phenomenological method must remain
"presuppositionless" (vorurteilslosig). The Jaspersian
phenomenologist is not permitted to ascribe to the pa-
tient anything he or she is not actually experiencing.
Jaspers writes, "Only that which actually exists in (the
patient's) mental life should be re-presented; every-
thing that is not actually given in (the patient's) mental
life does not exist." Under the influence of Husserl,
Jaspers wants to do full justice to what the patient is
actually experiencing; he does not want to overlook any
real features, however complex, of the patient's expe-
riences. Yet at the same time, Jaspers does not want to
373
impute to the patient anything that he or she does not
actually experience; he wishes to describe exclusively
what is present in the patient's own lived experience.
This is precisely what Husserl 's "descriptive pheno-
menology" had sought to do: to describe the features
of mental processes .fully but exclusively as they are
lived through by the experiencing subject. This means
that it would be erroneous to postulate the efficacy of
causes, motives, or other origins ofthe patient's expe-
riences unless those causes or motives are themselves
actual mental processes of the patient. This is why,
for Jaspers as for Husserl, concepts and theories taken
over from prior sources pose dangers.
Concepts and theories carry connotations and im-
plications that may not apply to the real experiences of
a particular patient or of any patient at ali. As Jaspers
writes,
"We must set asi de ali received theories, psycholog-
ical constructions, or materialist mythologies of brain
processes. We must apply ourselves purely to what we
can understand, apprehend, distinguish, and describe
in its actual existence." He is here guarding against an
"explanatory" psychopathology that would postulate
underlying mechanisms that are not themselves expe-
rienced by the patient but are nevertheless supposed
to produce what the patient does experience. A "de-
scriptive" psychopathology is distinguished from such
an explanatory psychopathology because the former
restricts itself to explicating the patient's experiences
precisely and exclusively as the patient actually lives
through them. For this reason, the phenomenological
psychiatrist must employ a sort of EPOCHE AND REDUC-
TION to bracket or set asi de ali interpretations (Deutun-
gen) and prejudgments (Beurteilungen) and purely de-
scribe what is actually occurring in the patient's mental
life.
Jaspers acknowledges that achieving this prejudg-
ment-less attitude is not simple or easy. He warns, "As
experience teaches us, this is a very difficult task. This
peculiarly phenomenological presuppositionlessness is
not an original possession. It is rather a laborious acqui-
sition after long critica! work and often futile efforts in
constructions and mythologies. Just like we as children
first draw things not as we see them but rather as we
think them, so we as psychologists and psychopathol-
ogists go through a stage in which we somehow think
mental processes to the stage of a presuppositionless,
374 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
immediate apprehending of mental processes just as
they are. Always renewed efforts are required, and we
must repeatedly overcome prejudgments in order to
earn this prize ( Gut): this phenomenological attitude."
Jaspers' phenomenology is thus "presupposition-
less" in the sense that it does not impute features to
mental processes just because some theory or set of
concepts implies those features. It rather ascribes fea-
tures to mental processes only if those features can be
intuitively re-presented on the basis ofthe evidence of
the patient's speech or behavior.
Later in the Allgemeine Psychopathologie Jaspers
introduces additional methods to deal with aspects of
the patient's life that phenomenology systematically
"brackets" or sets asi de. He then describes ( 1) a "psy-
chology of understanding" (verstehende Psychologie)
that will furnish scientific access to the various motives
or meaningful sources ofthe patient's experiences; (2)
an "explanatory psychology" ( erklărende Psychologie)
that will investigate causal mechanisms that shape ex-
perience; (3) a "somatopsychology" for studying bod-
ily events in the patient that can be seen or detected by
an outside observer; and (4) methods for intepreting the
objective expressions or products ofthe patient's men-
tallife. But prior to the employment ofthese methods,
Jaspers deems it essential to appreciate the patient's
actual experiences cautiously and fully and not to leap
precipitously beyond what the patient is actually living
through.
Why does Jaspers in his phenomenology empha-
size this descriptive procedure free from preestablished
concepts,judgments, and theories? Ifthere are tobe any
useful concepts in psychopathology, they must be built
on a sound basis in EVIDENCE. Any psychopathological
concepts that do not pay strict attention to the details,
subtleties, and nuances of patients' experiences will
fail to do full justice to its subject matter. Moreover,
psychopathological concepts that imply more than is
actually present in the patient's own lived experience
cannot serve as a reliable foundation for theory for-
mation. Jaspers thinks, accordingly, that the evidential
basis for any conceptual constructs in psychopathol-
ogy must be phenomenological; i.e., the evidential base
must be a graphic and detailed re-presentation of the
manifold features ofpatients' pathological experiences
precisely as the patient lives through them.
Intuitive re-presentation, while remaining a form
of understanding and empathy, is the closest the psy-
chopathologist can come to direct observation of his
or her subject matter. As Jaspers writes, "For the re-
presentation ( Vergegenwărtigung) of ali of these phe-
nomenologically ultima te qualities 1 ha ve already used
severa) expressions like seeing, intuiting, empathizing,
understanding, and the like. With ali of these expres-
sions 1 mean for the same ultimate experience to be
understood. It is this experience which alone fulfills
our concepts. It is this experience which in the psycho-
logical domain plays the same ro le as sense perception
does in the natural scientific domain."
Jaspers requires that psychopathology develop this
phenomenology ofits basic concepts because he is wor-
ried that psychiatrists, when they interview patients,
will rest content with only a vague, indefinite, and
indeterminate awareness of the patients' experiences.
Jaspers worries, in other words, that psychiatrists will
content themselves with merely an awareness of the
pregiven meanings of concepts and theories that the pa-
tients' reports bring to mind. What Jaspers demands, by
contrast, is a detailed, definite, and graphic awareness
of the experiences that patients actually undergo, and
this detailed and graphic psychiatric awareness must
be firmly based on what the patient says and how the
patient acts. Jaspers expresses ali of this quite clearly
himself: "In histology it is required that, when examin-
ing the cerebral cortex, we should account for each fiber
and each ce li. Phenomenology places upon us entirely
analogous demands: we should accountfor each men-
tal phenomenon, each experience which comes to light
in the exploration of patients and their self-depictions.
We should in no case remain satisfied with a global im-
pression ( Gesamteindruck) and a few details selected
ad hoc, but we should know each single particularity
and how to apprehend and judge it."
In conclusion, we shall simply list those features
shared by Husserl 's and Jaspers' phenomenologies and
then those features with regard to which they differ.
First, the shared features: ( 1) The phenomenologist de-
scribes mental processes fully and exclusively as they
are lived through by the person whose mental life is
under investigation. (2) The definition of phenomen-
ological concepts is based exclusively on the intuition
of the phenomena that the concepts designate. This
is what makes phenomenology "descriptive." (Nega-
tively stated: phenomenological concepts never refer
 KARL JASPERS
to mental processes that cannot be intuited; i.e., pheno-
menological concepts never refer to mental processes
whose existence and features can only be inferred.) (3)
Phenomenology "brackets" or sets aside ali explana-
tory theories of mental life insofar as these theories
refer to explanatory factors that are not themselves ex-
perienced by the person whose mental life is under
study. This is what renders phenomenology "presup-
positionless."
The differences between Husserl 's and Jaspers' phe-
nomenologies consist in the following: ( 1) The con-
cepts developed by the Husserlian phenomenologist
are essential concepts while the concepts defined by the
Jaspersian phenomenologist are empirica! concepts.
Husserl's phenomenology is an eidetic philosophy;
Jaspers' phenomenology is an empirica! science. (2)
The Husserlian phenomenologist takes his or her own
mental life as one example (among many other possi-
ble examples) of mental life in general. The Husser-
lian phenomenologist thus emphasizes self-reflection.
The Jaspersian phenomenologist studies psychiatric
patients as individual examples of psychopathological
mentallife in general. The Jaspersian phenomenologist
therefore employs empathy and understanding (Versle-
hen). (3) Husserl 's methodological notion of"originary
intuition" is the notion of a direct, self-reflective, and
detailed presentation by the phenomenologist of the
mental processes under study. Jaspers' notion of "in-
tuition" is the notion of a less direct, empathetic, and
detailed re-presentation by the phenomenologist ofthe
mental processes under study.
In addition to adopting components of Husserl's
method in Logische Untersuchungen, Jaspers also em-
ployed the phenomenological notion of intentionality
in analyzing patients' pathological experiences. In A ll-
gemeine Psychopathologie Jaspers writes, "In percep-
tions as well as representations ( Vorstellungen) we dis-
tinguish three elements: the sens01y material (e.g., red,
blue, the pitch of a sound, etc.), spatial and temporal or-
der, and the intentionat act (the intending directedness
to something, the objectification). The sensory material
is animated (heseelt) through the act and first attains
through it the objectivity of its meaning." In his ensu-
ing descriptions of patients' experiences Jaspers shows
how each of these three elements of intentionality can
assume abnormal forms.
Jaspers could make productive use of Husserlian
375
phenomenology as long as he regarded it as an em-
pirica! (scientific) descriptive psychology. When he
found Husserl portraying it as a philosophy, how-
ever, Jaspers dissented. He reacted strongly against
Husserl 's "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft"
( 1911 ). In this essay he saw an emphatic requirement
that philosophy seek to imitate the sciences by provid-
ing equally compelling and verifiable knowledge. Tak-
ing a position that was almost the reverse of Husserl 's,
Jaspers contended that any attempt to make philosophy
"scientific" violated its true nature as this had come to
fruition in the great philosophies of the past. He thus
regarded himself as having to shoulder the burden of
defending genuine philosophizing against those who,
like Husserl and the neo-Kantians, thought they were
salvaging the respectability ofphilosophy by making it
comparable to science when they were in fact thereby
distorting and betraying it. In spite of his lack of for-
mal training in the field, Jaspers decided to become a
philosopher.
Jaspers educated himself by studying Descartes,
Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Ni-
etzsche, among others. He found a natural bridge from
psychiatry to philosophy in the "psychology ofthe un-
derstanding" ( verstehende Psychologie) that he had de-
veloped in his Allgemeine P.1ychopathologie, primar-
ily on the hasis of Dilthey's descriptive psychology.
lndeed, it seems that Dilthey's influence was strong
when Jaspers wrote Psychologie der Weltanschauun-
gen ( 1919). This volume contains some ofthe concepts
and patterns ofthought that shaped Jaspers' subsequent
philosophy of existence. MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's lengthy
review ofthis book remains important.
As Jaspers developed his philosophy, he moved far-
ther and farther away from his early roots in Husserlian
phenomenology. It may justifiably be said, however,
that Jaspers' Philosophie ( 1932) sti li owes much to the
skills he had acquired in carrying out phenomenologi-
cal descriptions in his psychiatric writings. And even
in Jaspers' !ater works, such as Von der Wahrheit (On
truth, 194 7), his interest in delineating different meth-
ods of thought remained central. Finally, despite his
antipathy to Husserlian phenomenology as a model for
philosophical thinking, Jaspers managed to find useful
roles for some Husserlian concepts, such as intention-
ality, in his Die grossen Philosophen, voi. 1 (The great
philosophers, 1957).
376 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Jaspers' writings on phenomenological psychother-
apy influenced psychiatrists between the wars in GER-
MANY, Switzerland, FRANCE, and other European coun-
tries. Indeed, these writings served as the first to
demonstrate the fruitfulness of adapting Husserlian
phenomenology to methodological and substantive is-
sues in PSYCHIATRY. The relatively recent appearance
of an English translation of Jaspers' General Psy-
chopathology ( 1963) has meant that this work has in-
fluenced only the last two generations of English and
American psychiatrists. Already, however, the book's
impact is widespread, especially in England. In the
UNITED STATES, the teaching and publications of Paul
R. McHugh and Phillip R. Slavney in particular have
helped to disseminate, update, and apply the Jaspersian
approach. It is important to remember, however, that
Jaspers utilized only Husserl 's Logische Untersuchun-
gen. It would fali to succeeding psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, and philosophers to establish connections be-
tween psychopathology and Husserl 's )ater thought.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dilthey, Wilhelm. "ldeen iibcr cine beschreibende und zer-
gliedernde Psychologie." In his Gesammelte Schrifien.
Band V Die Geistige Weft. Einleitung in die Philosophie
des Lehens. Erste Hălfie. Ahhandlungen zur Grundlegung
der Geisteswissenschajien. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner Ver-
lagsgcsellschaft, 1974; Descriptive Psychology and His-
torical Understanding. Trans. Richard M. Zaner and Ken-
neth L. Heiges. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
Husserl, Edmund. "Philosophie als strenge Wisscnschaft"
(191 1]. In his Auf~ătze und Vortrăge (1911-1921). Ed.
Thomas Nenon and Hans-Rainer Sepp. Husserliana 25.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Jaspers, Karl. Allgemeine Psvchopatlwfogie. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 191 3; General Psychopathology. Trans.
J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1963.
- . Psychologie der Weftanschauungen. Berlin: Spring-
Vcrlag, 1919.
- . Von der Wahrheit. Munich: R. Piper, 1947; "On Truth."
In his Basic Philosophica{ Writings: Selections. Ed. and
trans. Edith Ehrlich, Leonard Ehrlich, and George B. Pep-
per. Athens, OH: Ohio University Prcss, 1986,228-353.
- . Die grossen Philosophen. Voi. 1. Munich: R. Piper, 1957;
The Great Phifosophers. Voi 1. Ed. Hannah Arcndt. New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962.
- . Gesammelte Schrifien zur Psychopathologie. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1963.
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophv o/ Karl .Jaspers.
Enl. ed. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1981.
Rickman, Hans Petcr. "The Philosophic Basis ofPsychiatry:
Jaspers and Dilthey." Philosophy and Social Science 17
( 1987), 173-96.
Wiggins, Osborne P., Michael A. Schwartz, and Man-
fred Spitzer. "Phenomenological!Descriptivc Psychiatry:
The Methods of Edmund Husserl and Karl Jaspers." In
Psychopathology, Language. and Phifosophy. Ed. Man-
fred Spitzer, Christoph Mundt, Michael Schwartz, and
Friedrich Uehlein. New York and Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag, 1992,3-15.
0SBORNE P. WIGGINS
University ofLouisville
MICHAEL ALAN SCHWARTZ
Case Western University

IMMANUEL KANT Two points of view on
Kant ha ve served as catalysts for the critica) reconstruc-
tion of his philosophy in phenomenology. Both oper-
ate with Kant's transcendentalism, which is knowledge
concerned not with objects, but with our a priori mode
of knowledge of objects. One serves as the catalyst for
EDMUND HUSSERL's critica! considerations of Kant, the
other as the catalyst for MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's. In the first,
the focus is on the grounding of NATURAL SCIENCE; in the
second, the focus is on the grounding of metaphysics,
not in the knowledge of the sensible world, but in the
realm of free rational agency.
Husserl contends that without phenomenological re-
construction, Kant's transcendentalism remains strin-
gently bound to the conditions ofscientific knowledge.
He then broadens transcendentalism phenomenologi-
cally to include prescientific experience and the sub-
ject's own intentiona) awareness, whose reasonable-
ness is sustained in and by perception. Heidegger main-
tains that without reconstruction, Kant's grounding of
metaphysics is tethered too strongly to subjectivis-
tic formulations and hence mistakenly identifies that
which enables what we caii experience. He seeks to
transform transcendentalism by referring to the Lich-
tung (clearing) that enables anything-object, the sub-
ject, and his or her representationallvolitional activities
- to be disclosed as conditions at ali. The "clearing"
is a non-representational horizon enabling both expe-
rience and its conditions to appear "for a time."
Ali this reflects Husserl 's and Heidegger's concern
with the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787). To
some extent, their phenomenological reconstructions
converge. But ultimately, they produce influential Kant
interpretations that diverge from each other. The rest
ofthe "phenomenological movement" takes its cues on
Kant from their approaches. Their interpretations also
Jet them oppose the varieties of neo-Kantianism. For
Husserl, neo-Kantianism rehabilitates transcendental-
ism in the face ofpsychologism, which reduces Kant's
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas·lourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
transcendentalism to the "facts of consciousness" and
not to the subject's a priori conditions of experience.
In other words, psychologism reduces the a priori el-
ements of experience to the psychical mechanism of
the human species and subjects it to scientific observa-
tion. On the other hand, neo-Kantianism concentrates
on the a priori presuppositions of mathematical natural
science, but denies that they are intrinsic to conscious-
ness. Rather, they are logically pertinent to the con-
struction of objects in thought. So both psychologism
and neo-Kantianism disavow that there are subjective
sources that bear the a priori presuppositions of expe-
rience.
It is Husserl 's doctrine of INTENTIONALITY that en-
ables access to those "subjective sources" by steering
between the Scylla ofpsychologism and the Charybdis
of neo-Kantianism. According to this doctrine, con-
sciousness is not representational, but essentially di-
rected toward objects, objects that thus stand in a tran-
scendent rather than immanent relation to it. Further-
more, acts of consciousness are directed toward objects
via correlative ideal MEANINGS. Those acts are temporal,
but their meaning-correlates have the capacity ofbeing
identified and reidentified over time. Ultimately these
ideal meanings are accomplishments whose "origin"
or "genesis" !ies in intentionallife.
Husserl avoids the rocks of psychologism because
he maintains that intentionality cannot be registered
naturalistically as an item among other items in the
causal order of nature. The method of EPOCHE AND RE-
DUCTION shows consciousness tobe a "region" indepen-
dent of the "region" of "nature." In contrast, natural-
istically driven psychologism reduces consciousness
either to nature or some part thereof and holds that
consciousness is subject to causal laws. Husserl also
bypasses Neo-Kantian constructivism. Intentiona! ob-
jects are not logically constructed by consciousness in
thought, but instead are rendered present to conscious-
ness by virtue of intentionality. Intentionality enables
meanings or intentiona) objects to be given as intel-
ligible and essential structures within the conscious
experience. For example, a perceptual act would be es-
sentially identified by its passive character; the object
perceived would be essentially given as something out
there in the world and indistinct from its sense. In con-
trast, a propositional act would be essentially charac-
terized by its expressible quality; the object expressed
377
'
378 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
(the meaning) and the object that the proposition is
about would be rendered distinct in such an act.
Intentionality as noetic-noematic correlation and as
constitution signals Husserl 's fidelity to Kant's tran-
scendentalism and "Copernican turn." ARON GURWITSCH
claims that Kant fa ils to recognize intentionality. How-
ever, others contend that Kant either operated with or
anticipated a doctrine of directedness toward objects.
Husserl himself believed Kant could anticipate inten-
tionality as both correlation and constitution, but was
unable to give it express philosophical treatment. In
Erste Philosophie [ 1923/24], he understands Kant's
"Copernican turn" to consist in the determination of
the sense of objectivity on the basis of the "correla-
tion between subjectivity and objective content," but
believes Kant did not go deep enough in his analysis
ofthis correlation.
Regarding prescientific nature, Husserl challenges
Kant's failure to formulate more sharply an account of
consciousness "naively" heeding what is already tacitly
organized, experientially significant, and contextually
"sedimented" in the LIFEWORl.D and for PERCFPTION. He
maintains that prescientific nature operates only "la-
tently" in Kant and thus it requires reconstruction. In
Die Krisis der europdischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phdnomenologie ( 1936), he takes his
point of departure from Kant's 1781 "Transcenden-
tal Deduction." To show a theory of constitution and
of prescientific nature in Kant, Husserl combines two
readings of the "Deduction," each with two distinct
proofs. One reading contends that the "Deduction"
contains both "an objective deduction and a subjec-
tive one"; the other states that the deduction includes a
proof"from above" and a proof"from below." The for-
mer regards the "objective deduction" as establishing
the objective validity ofthe categories and the "subjec-
tive deduction" as establishing the manner in which the
categories achieve that validity in relation to our cog-
nitive capacities. The latter reading offers two demon-
strations of how the relation between the categories
and sensible intuitions can be established - either
from apperception through imagination to sensibility
or from sensibility through imagination to appercep-
tion. On this reading, the imagination both coordinates
the employment of the categories and facilitates the
direction ofthat employment.
No Kant scholar before or since combines both of
these readings. By combining them, however, Husserl
is able to reconstruct a hierarchical sequence of con-
stitution in Kant. The "objective and subjective deduc-
tions" enable Husserl to reconstruct the two functions
of the understanding as two levels of intentiona! ac-
complishment. The "deduction from above and from
below" allows him to re late these levels hierarchically,
so that the scientific view, resulting from the under-
standing's functioning at the objective level, is shown
to arise from the understanding operating passively,
constituting the already organized and always devel-
oping sense ofthe lifeworld.
Husserl recognizes that the "lifeworldly" structures
cannot be expressly part of Kant's own theoretical en-
terprise for two reasons. First, his own notion of tran-
scendental subjectivity is registered in his discussion of
constitution, and not in the metaphysically paralogistic
orientation of pure reason. It is not entangled in some
kind of double-world account, nor is it involved in jus-
tifying the objective validity of the a priori conditions
of empirica! knowledge. Rather, it entails the spectrum
of intentionality through which ali levels of meanings
- from higher-order idealizations of intellectual ac-
tivity to lower-order vague typicalities of lifeworld1y
experience- are thematized. Unlike Kant's, Husserl 's
notion of transcendental subjectivity is notat odds with
empirica! subjectivity; rather, it is at one with it insofar
as empirica! subjectivity is its unreflective yet inten-
tiona! life.
The second reason has to do with Kant's concept
of "formal intuition," i.e., an intuitive representation
in which mathematical concepts can be constructed.
Since a priori concepts of the understanding are not
mathematical and hence not the result of idealization,
they cannot be constructed or exhibited in a formal
intuition. But they can be schematized. In that case, a
formal intuition as a schema is an intuitive setting for
making possible the temporal determination of sensi-
ble objects or empirica! intuitions in accordance with a
priori concepts. It is a representation oftime that serves
as an a priori condition for intuitively construing phe-
nomena as categorially objective, public phenomena
in the spatiotemporal world and not as ad hoc psycho-
logical arrangements of mental states in an individ-
ual mind. But this non-mathematical yet objective and
public world, of which Kant sought the conditions of
knowledge, would not be equivalent to Husserl 's "life-
 IMMANUEL KANT
world," since it would not be either the pre-objective
aisthetic world of perceptual experience or the indeter-
minate yet ubiquitous horizon within which ali other
worlds, scientific and prescientific, objective and pre-
objective, are disclosed. GERHARD FUNKE, ARON GUR-
WITSCH, ISO KERN, PAUL RICCEUR, and THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
ha ve explored these and other aspects of Husserl 's re-
lation to Kant.
Despite his criticism of Kant's sharp distinction
between sensibility (receptivity) and understanding
(spontaneity), Husserl views his own doctrine ofinten-
tionality as generally compatible with Kant's "Coperni-
can turn." In Husserl 's order of constitution, receptivity
and spontaneity "dovetail" in a concrete colligation of
intentionality, whcrein each stands with its correlate
and refers beyond the temporal horizon of its corre-
late's mode of givenness to the temporal background
of the modes of givenness of other correlates. The re-
suit, Husserl believes, enables him to account for the
sense-history of theoretical knowledge or judgments.
Unlike Husserl's, Heidegger's interpretation of
Kant, especially in Kant und das Problem der Meta-
physik ( 1929), falls squarely on the "Schematism,"
whose argument presupposes the Kantian distinction
between sensibility and understanding. This focus
scrves the purpose of reconstructing Kant not as an
incipient theorist of intentionality as constitution, but
as an incipient theorist of"ecstatic temporality."
In Sein und Zeit ( 1927), Heidegger argues that TIME
does not consist of a stream of"nows" and is not itself
an entity that is objectively there in the present. Rather,
it is a horizon of the understanding of Being in which
past, present, and future are the temporalizations of
DASEIN. Heidegger's phenomenological ontology con-
strues the meaning of Being in terms of Oase in 's un-
derstanding ofBeing. Temporality in general is futural
and can only be understood in terms of the situation
in which Dasein confronts (a) the range of choices re-
gard ing the way it wants to carry out or to be its being
and (b) the fact that Oase in has to carry out or be its
being as its being is given to it.
In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Heideg-
ger again approaches time from the stance of Dasein,
and in so doing, interprets the Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunft as Kant's unwitting or incipient identification of
time and the unity of apperception. As a consequence,
human subjectivity is shown to be fundamentally tem-
379
poral. Sin ce the "Schematism" offers the "sensible con-
ditions under which alone pure concepts of the under-
standing can be employed," it signals the place where
Kant explains the results ofthe transcendental synthe-
sis of the imagination, whereby time is related to the
objects of experience. Heidegger thus contends that a
schema, or what Kant calls a "transcendental determi-
nation of time," is the horizon of constant presence in
which an object is revealed as present.
Although this places the objective character of ob-
jects in direct and essential connection with the finitude
ofthe subject, the "Schematism" still does not charac-
terize temporality in what Heidegger believes is its
more primordial sense. Heidegger maintains that tran-
scendental imagination is, for Kant, the concealed root
of both sensibility and the understanding. lf Kant had
followed this insight and explicitly identified transcen-
dental imagination with temporality, then temporality
would be the condition on which the appearance of ob-
jects continually comes to pass as having been in the
offing. Furthermore, as temporal, the finite subject is
one whose being affected by the appearance of objects
is always already in the offing.
Heidegger concedes that his reconstruction concen-
trates on the 1781 or "A" edition of the Kritik and that
such a reconstruction of the 1787 or "B" edition is
nigh impossible. Since the 1787 version of the "De-
duction" seems to deny any paramount distinction be-
tween the imagination and the understanding, referring
to the imagination as an "action of the understanding
on the sensibility" oras belonging to "o ne and the same
spontaneity" of the understanding, the primacy of the
imagination, Heidegger believes, is surrendered there
in fa vor of the understanding. Hen ce the source of ali
synthetic activity is no longer the imagination, but the
understanding. This represents, according to Heideg-
ger, Kant's "shrinking back" or "recoiling" from the
"power of the imagination" in discursive thought, a
power that rcnders discursive thought radically tempo-
ral and finite and that serves as the essential ground for
Kant's "metaphysics of experience."
But just as Heidegger reformulates the 1781 Kritik
as an incipient precursor to Sein und Zeit, it is also pos-
sible to do likewise for the claims about the imagination
according to the "two-steps-in-one proof structure" of
the 1787 vers ion. Instead of claiming that the unity of
apperception logically implies the unity of time, we
380 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
can argue from thc determination or objectification of
the unity oftime to the unity ofapperception. Since the
determination of time is a result of the transcendental
synthesis of the imagination, it must conform to the
categories. If it did not, it could not be objectified as
a unity. Since the categories are the necessary condi-
tions ofthe unity ofapperception (according to the first
step ), the transcendental synthesis of the imagination
necessarily conforms to the categories. However, since
time is a formal a priori condition of ali appearances
whatsoever, the items of the sensible manifold can be
objectified together anly ta the extent that they are con-
nected to one another in a single time. Thus they can be
conceptualized together in a single consciousness anly
when they are given as connected in a single time (ac-
cording to the second step ). The unity of time thereby
becomes a necessary condition of the possibility of
human experience. But it is a condition established
outside of apperception, although exacted upon apper-
ception, and hence serves to "restrict" it. This would
be the kind of conclusion Heidegger would seek.
Heidegger !ater proceeds with his interpretation of
Kant in the context ofhis renowned Kehre. Although
he continues to read Kant in terms of the ground-
ing of metaphysics, there is a shift whereby his mea-
sure is no longer the meaning of Being as a proto-
existentially impending issue for Dasein, but rather
the meaning of Being as the "clearing." Die Frage
nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre van den transzenden-
talen Grundsătzen ( 1962) and "Kants These liber das
Sein" ( 1963) are representative, though these are writ-
ten drafts oflectures originally given in the 1930s. Hei-
degger's "Briefe liber den Humanismus" (1947) offi.-
cially signals the appearance ofthe Kehre; however, the
shift actually takes place in his writings ofthe 1930s,
albeit without the !ater more "poetic" cast. The same
is not true for his posthumous Die Grundprobleme
der Phănamenalagie [ 1927] and Phănamenologische
!nte1pretation van Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft
[ 1927 /28], which are pre-Kehre works.
Prior to the Kehre, Heidegger's FUNDAMENTAL ON-
TOLOGY attempts to disclose the meaning of Being
through an analysis of the structures or "existential ia"
of Dasein. Subsequent to it, he asks how the meaning
of Being is revealed by virtue of the way in which it
is thought in the ancient, medieval, and modern meta-
physics of the "West." When Heidegger's Kant inter-
pretation is placed in this post-Kehre context, !here is
less interest in reconstructing the first Kritik in terms
of Dasein's temporality. As part of modern thought,
this work is under the sway of"Western" metaphysics,
because the "clearing" remains "unthought" in it and
it understands Being as something subject to represen-
tational thought.
In Die Frage nach dem Ding, the supreme principle
ofKant's metaphysics of experience- "the conditions
of the possibility of experience in general are likewise
conditions of the possibility of the ohjects of experi-
ence" -- is for Heidegger Being as constant presence
and as representational because what counts for things
being objects of experience is their being known or rep-
resented. To be represented requires being present to
and for the subject engaged in representing or knowing.
Thus according to Heidegger, Kant conceives objectiv-
ity as the Being of ali things that can be experienced,
known, or represented by the subject. He regards Kant
as exclusively concerned with the ro le of pure concepts
in the mathematical character of natural bodies present
in space, and not with time as the condition of their
application to ali appearances whatsoever.
In "Kants These liber das Sein," Heidegger argues
that Kant's thesis about Being, which normally appears
episodically throughout his work, is actually a guiding
idea ofthe first Kritik. Heidegger interprets Kant's first
claim - "'Being' is obviously not a real predicate,
i.e., it is not a concept of something which could be
added to the concept of a thing"- as distinguishing
"reality" from "existence," "actuality," and "being."
If "Being" were a real predicate, then it would serve
as a determination belonging to the substantive or real
content of a thing and could be attributed to that content
in ajudgment. But since the real or substantive content
of a thing can be thought in a concept without the thing
existing before us, the thing's reality is not the thing's
being or existence.
Heidegger interprets Kant's second claim- "['Be-
ing'] is purely the positing of a thing, or of certain
determinations in and of themselves" - as asserting
that, as a predicate nonetheless, Being does not predi-
cate substantivally what a thing is; it rather predicates
modally that a thing is. The meaning of Being for
Kant, according to Heidegger, is not real predication.
It is positing modally. Positing, Heidegger says, is for
Kant the establishment of something as existing by
 JMMANUEL KANT
virtue of a subject engaged in representation. In setting
up something as possibly, actually, or necessarily ex-
isting, Being as positing essentially stands for Kant in
relation to the representational capacities of the sub-
ject. (Again Heidegger draws the conclusion that Kant
endorses the thesis of Being as representational, but
he does so without explicitly considering how Kant
could or did explain the role oftime in Being's pasit-
ing, especially in terms of the very strong connection
Kant initiates between the schema of modality and the
"Postulates of Empirica! Thought.")
Temporality is thus criterial for Heidegger in in-
terpreting the kind and degree of success or failure
the first Kritik has in addressing the meaning of Se-
ing and the grounding of metaphysics. In Kant und
das Problem der Metaphysik, he finds in Kant the ele-
ments for a successful inquiry. In !ater works, he thinks
Kant's pathway is closed. What makes the difference
for Heidegger between Kant's success and failure is his
openness to temporality. This openness is signalled by
the possibility of giving greater emphasis to the self-
affection of human reason through the integral unity
of the modalities of time than to the self-reflection of
human reason through conceptual or representational
thought. IfKant's analysis ofhuman experience is read
as giving greater weight to the conceptual dimension
ofthat experience, then he is approaching it, Heidegger
believes, in a way that allows the meaning ofBeing to
be "forgotten" in the history of Western metaphysics.
Heidegger points human reason to a level of experi-
ence whereby the impact of sensibility, affection, and
intuition on it, through time's integral unity, enables
the meaning of Being to be an issue "taken to heart"
by it in a distinctly non-representational manner.
On this point, Heideggerian phenomenology is of a
piece with Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl sees in
Kant an incipient phenomenologist whose analysis of
human experience could have moved in the direction
of thematizing the non-representational or lifeworldly
dimension. Kant is measured against this phenomen-
ological ability in both Heidegger's and Husserl's in-
terpretations, and this is reflected in the work of phe-
nomenologists as diverse as MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
with his emphasis on the a priori of BODILY intention-
ality and MAX SCHELER with his critique of Kantian
formalism in ethics.
Ultimately, however, there is a major difference be-
381
tween Husserl and Heidegger with respect to the non-
representational domain. Husserl 's phenomenology
leads to the reflective incorporation of that domain.
He believes that this evinces his deep affinity with
Kant's "Copernican turn" and transcendentalism. Hei-
degger 's phenomenology, on the other hand, abi des by
what it discloses, viz., the affective incorporation of
Dasein into that domain, what Heidegger carne to call
the fourfold (Geviert).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Allison, Henry E. "The Critique o/Pure Reason as Transcen-
dental Phenomcnology." In Dialogues in Phenomenology.
Eds. Don Ihde and Richard Zaner. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1975, 136--55.
~. "Gurwitsch's Interpretation of Kant." Kant-Studien 83
( 1992), 208-2 I.
Carr, David. "Kant, Husserl and the Non-Empirica! Ego."
Journal of Philosoph.v 74 (1977), 682-90.
Cassirer, Emst. "Kant und das Problem der Meta-
physik. Bermerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-
Interpretation." Kant-Studien 36 ( 1931 ), 1~36; "Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics: Remarks on Martin Heideg-
ger's Interpretation of Kant." In Kant: Disputed Ques-
tiollS. Ed. and trans. Moltke Gram. Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1967, 131-57.
Dufrenne, Michel. "Heidegger et Kant." Revue de Meta-
physique et de Morale 54 ( 1949), 1-20.
Fink, Eugen. "Die phănomenologischc Philosophie Edmund
Husscrls in der Gegenwărtigen Kritik" [ 1933). In his Stu-
dien ::ur Phănomenologie. 1930--1939. The Hague: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1966, 79-156: "Husserl's Phenomenology
and Contemporary Criticism." In The Phenomenology of
Husserl. Ed. and trans. R. O. Elveton. Chicago: Quadran-
gle Books, 1970, 73-14 7.
~. "Die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie bei Kant und
in der Phănomenologie." In his Năhe und Distanz.
Phiinomenologische Vortrăge und Auf~ătze. Ed. Franz-
Anton Schwarz. Freiburg: Karl Alber, I 976, 7--44.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Kant und die philosophische Her-
menutik." Kant-Studien 66 ( 1975), 395--403; "Kant and
the Hermenutical Turn." In his Heidegger:~ Ways. Ed. and
trans. John Stanley. Albany, NY: State University Press of
New York, 1994, 49--59.
- . "A new epoch in the history of the world begins here
and now." Trans. John Donovan. In The Philosophy of
Immanuel Kant. Ed. R. Kennington. Washington, DC: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1985, 1-14.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions
of Consciousness." In his Studies in Phenomenology and
Psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1966, 148-74.
-. Kant.~ Theorie des Verstandes. Ed. Thomas Seebohm.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
Henrich, Dieter. "Uber die Einheit der Subjektivităt."
Philosophische Rundschau 3 ( 1955), 28--69.
382 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Kern, Iso. Husserl und Kant. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964.
Kirkland, Frank M. "Husserl and Kant: The Problem ofPre-
Scientific Nature and Transcendental Aesthetic." In Kant
and Phenomenolo6'Y· Ed. Thomas Seebohm and Joseph
Kockclmans. Lan ham, MD: The Center for Advanced Re-
search in Phenomenology/University Press of America,
1988,31-59.
Klein, Ted. "Being as Ontologica] Predicate: Heidegger's
Interpretation of 'Kant's Thesis of Being' ." Southwestern
Journal of"Philosophy 4 ( 1973), 7-33.
Mohanty, J. N. The Possihility o/Transcendental Philosophy.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Prauss, Gerold. Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers "Sein
und Zeit. "Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1977.
- . "1ntentionalităt bei Kant." In Akten des VI. interna-
tionalen Kant-Kongresses. Vols. 1-3. Bonn: Bouvier,
1987, 853-59.
Ricreur, Paul. "Kant et Husserl." Kant-Studien 46 ( 1954), 44-
67; "Kant and Husserl." In his Husserl: An Anal1·sis ofHis
Phenomenology. Trans. Edward Ballard and Lester Em-
bree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967,
175-201.
Seebohm, Thomas. Die Bedingungen der Măglichkeit der
Transzendentalphilosophie. Bonn: Bouvier, 1962.
- . and Joseph Kockelmans, eds. Kant and Phenomenology.
Lanham, MD: The Center for Advanced Research in
Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1984.
Sherover, Charles. Heidegge1; Kant and Time. Lanham,
MD: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1988.
FRANK M. KJRKLAND
Hunter Ca/lege
FELIX KAUFMANN Kaufmann was horn
in Vienna in 1895 and received a doctorate in law
from the University of Vienna in 1920. His disserta-
tion under Hans Kelsen ( 1881-1973) was published
in 1922 as Logik und Rechtswissenschaft (Logic and
jurisprudence). This work led to his appointment as
Privatdozent in philosophy of law with the juridica!
faculty of the University of Vienna. While a student,
Kaufmann introduced his fellow law student, ALFRED
SCHUTZ, to the philosophy OfEDMUND HUSSERL. Through
the years, Kaufmann and Schutz read and discussed a
number of Husserl 's seminal phenomenological texts,
including Vorlesungen zur Phi.inomenologie des in-
neren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905], Formale und transzen-
dentale Logik ( 1929), and Cartesianische Meditatio-
nen [ 1931]. Kaufmann received a doctorate in philoso-
phy from the University ofVienna in 1922, publishing
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
this dissertation in 1924 as Die Kriterien des Rechts
(Criteria ofright). While serving as Privatdozent, Kauf-
mann earned his living by working as a manager for
the Anglo-Persian Oii Company. Meanwhile, he par-
ticipated in a number of intellectual circles, including
the circle surrounding Hans Kelsen; a private semi-
nar of Richard von Mises ( 1883-1953); and the group
that was !ater to become known as the Vienna Circle
(where he referred to himself as "his majesty's loyal
opposition," to indicate his nonpositivist stance).
When Germany invaded Austria in 1938, Kaufmann
accepted an invitation to join the New School for So-
cial Research in New York, where he fled with his wife
and son. He was a member ofthe Graduate Faculty of
the New School and also served as a founding mem-
ber ofthe International Phenomenological Association
and on the editorial board of Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research until his death. From the UNITED
STATES, Kaufmann labored to help others escape from
the Nazis, and also was actively involved in the preser-
vation of Husserl 's manuscripts and the relief effort for
EUGEN FINK and LUDWIG LANDGREBE.
Kaufmann 's research ranged widely, including pub-
lications in philosophy of LAW, the foundations of
LOGIC and MATHEMATICS, ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY, and
the methodology of the HUMAN and the NATURAL SCI-
ENCES. In his main interests (law, mathematics, and
scientific methodology) Kaufmann introduces and de-
velops methodological insights, based upon key con-
ceptual and experiential analyses in Husserl 's writings,
to recast traditional and contemporary controversies
and problems. In each case he argues that a phenomen-
ological foundation leads to a more fruitful account of
the problems at hand, and to resolution for a number
of traditional controversies. A champion of Husserl 's
phenomenology in the Vienna Circle, Kaufmann's de-
bates with RudolfCarnap (1891-1973), Cari Gustav
Hempel, and others led to decades-long exchanges of
articles on the nature of MEANING and TRUTH, the foun-
dations ofmathematics and the social sciences, and the
status oflaws, principles, and data in scientific inquiry
in general. Kaufmann, who characterized himself as a
"methodologist," always sought to clarify and to so-
lidify the logica! and experiential foundations of any
inquiry. Husserl regarded him as one ofthe most com-
petent logicians in the phenomenological movement
and as one of his most loyal friends, and Kaufmann 's
 FELIX KAUFMANN
acclaim by a diverse array ofrespected contemporaries
is noteworthy. Albert Einstein ( 1879-1955) regarded
him as one ofthe great living philosophers.
Kaufmann develops Hans Kelsen's pure theory of
law (according to which the normative nature of laws
and legal terms cannot be derived from facts alone,
since norms belong to a different "sphere") from its
Kantian basis to a view based on a phenomenological
analysis ofthe concept ofnorms. This analysis denies
the existence of a separate "normative sphere" requir-
ing a peculiarly normative method. He also applies
a phenomenological approach to key legal concepts,
such as that of responsibility in criminal law.
Kaufmann's Das Unendliche in der Mathematik
und seine Ausschaltung (The infinite in mathematics
and its exclusion, 1930) was regarded by Husserl as
a major contribution to the phenomenology of math-
ematics, and engendered a great deal of interes! and
discussion among the members of the Vienna Circle.
In this and related works, Kaufmann develops a con-
structivist approach to the foundations ofmathematics
based upon a phenomenological account of the basic
facts of cognition. This account includes discussion of
the JNTENTIONALITY of mental life, the objectivity of
logica! and mathematical concepts, the nature of es-
sential features of the objects of consciousness, and
the difference between empirica] and non-empirica]
universal statements - the distinction between indi-
vidual and specific universality drawn by Husserl in
the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). From this
basis various problems in the foundations ofmathemat-
ics are analyzed, including the set-theoretic interpreta-
tion of mathematics, the extended functional calculus,
the Dedekind cut, Cantor's diagonal procedure, trans-
finite numbers, and a number of logica! antinomies in
mathematics and set theory. In each case Kaufmann
uses his phenomenological approach to reject various
interpretations of mathematical and logica! notations,
procedures, and problems.
Many of these problems are seen to stern from two
methodological errors: interpreting symbols as repre-
senting sets of objects, when in fact they represent
formation laws and not objects, and misunderstanding
the nature of(and cquivocating between) empirica! and
non-empirica! universal statements. The set-theoretic
account of mathematics is rejected, and the concept
of "set" is argued to be completely unnecessary for
383
the definition ofthe natural number series. Kaufmann
also rejects transfinite numbers and non-denumerable
infinite sets, which he claims to be impure (because
ambiguous and circular) pseudo-concepts. The natural
numbers are defined as formal eidetic singularities (in
Husserl's sense), and Peano's axioms are modified to
clarify the definition of natural numbers. AII of math-
ematics flows from the definitions ofthe natural num-
bers and keeping this clearly in focus enables one to
avoid many of the logica! antinomies of mathematics.
While taking a constructivist position, Kaufmann also
criticizes the tendencies toward PSYCHOLOGISM ofsome
other constructivist mathematicians, such as Luitzen
Egbertus Jan Brouwer ( 1881-1966).
Kaufmann holds that methodology (which he de-
fines as the logica! analysis of scientific procedure)
deserves the status of a separate field, independent of
logic, whose goal is to explicate and clarify the rules,
laws, postulates, and procedures of the social or hu-
man sciences and natural sciences. Central to this role
is methodology's goal of clarifying the procedures for
verifying and falsifying scientific claims. For Kauf-
mann, methodology presupposes objective MEANINGS
that are already constituted (logica! analysis is the
analysis of meanings, according to Kaufmann); thus
methodology presupposes phenomenological analyses
oflived meanings. Many ofhis methodological analy-
ses begin with explicit phenomenological analyses of
basic scientific and prescientific terms and concepts.
Kaufmann discusses a number of methodological is-
sues stemming from the social sciences, as well as
some ranging over ali the sciences, both natural and
social.
For Kaufmann the key to the methodology of the
sciences !ies in viewing science as an ongoing and
highly structured human enterprise that is based upon
lived meanings stemming in part from ordinary, pre-
scientific experience. Indeed, Kaufmann holds that the
prescientific and scientific realms share some basic em-
pirica! procedures, and are thus (at that level) not en-
tirely distinguishable. A science is defined not in terms
of its objects of study, but in terms of its rules of pro-
cedure. Although Kaufmann 's view of the structure of
science went through development and modification,
it is possible to find in his work a rather consistent
set of the primary elements of scientific procedure:
the ideals of science (such as truth, precision, and the
384 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ideal of a rational, and therefore knowable, cosmos
- these ideals serve as regulati ve ideas of science in
Kant's sense); the basic rules of scientific procedure
(unrelated to goals, these provide the criteria for the
truth and falsity of propositions); preference rules of
scientific procedure (related to scientific goals, hav-
ing the status of conventional norms for the gathering,
verification, falsification, and employing of empirica!
evidence); heuristic postulates (having the status of
conventions, not refutable by empirica! evidence, e.g.,
the principles of ceteris paribus and marginal utility
in economics, free will in sociology, uniformity ofna-
ture in physics ); the scientific situation (the state of a
given field of inquiry at a particular time ); the impor-
tance of grounds (with protocol propositions playing
key ro les as grounds); and the layers or strata ofhuman
experience (including the distinction between presci-
entific and scientific strata of experience ). Kaufmann's
methodology of the sciences studies and clarifies the
ways in which these elements interact in the pursuit of
scientific knowledge.
The basic rules of science guide research in every
science, but they are not a priori laws. Rather, they
serve as regulative ideas (so as not to violate the prin-
ciple of permanent control). Methodology ofthe Social
Sciences (1944) identifies seven basic rules of science.
These rules are: scientific decision (the basic decision
in scientific research is that of adding or deleting propo-
sitions from the corpus of propositions belonging to
a particular science); the methodological principle of
sufficient reason (scientific decisions must be grounded
in EVIDENCE and procedural rules); grounds (proposi-
tions recording sense observations must play a central
role in evidence); scientific situation (a proposition be-
ing considered for addition to the scientific corpus must
be judged in light ofthe totality of relevant knowledge
available at the time of a scientific decision); the prin-
ciple of permanent control (no empirica! proposition is
immune from rejection based on further evidence ); the
procedural correlate ofthe principle of contradiction (a
scientific decision may not admit any proposition to the
scientific corpus that generates a contradiction in that
corpus ); and the procedural correlate ofthe principle of
the excluded middle (no undecidable proposition may
be admitted into the corpus).
Kaufmann traces many methodological problems
(and the controversies surrounding them) to basic epis-
temological problems. Phenomenology plays a key
role in sorting out and solving these problems. The
issues of truth and knowledge are central to method-
ology. The concepts of "truth" and "verification" in
science are defined in terms of coherence- a coher-
ence that can never be finally or ultimately established,
and that is defined in terms of the rules of scientific
procedure. Truth, knowledge, and probability must not
be defined in terms of absolute or perfect knowledge.
In spite of this, Kaufmann rejects RELATIVISM in its
various guises (nominalism, sociologism, historicism,
etc.). For him many ofthe methodological controver-
sies in the natural and the social sciences (for instance,
the pervasive one between rationalism and empiricism)
stern from a lack of clarity with respect to the status
of the rules and postulates of science. These rules and
postulates have the status ofnorms, and are not subject
to the sort offalsification characterized by Karl Popper
( 1902-1994 ). The reason for this is to be found in the
scientific situation, in which rules, postulates, obser-
vations, mechanisms, and hypotheses are interrelated
in an extremely complex fashion. An unexpected ex-
perimental result could stern from a faulty assumption
about control parameters, an imperfection in a mecha-
nism or sample, or a false hypothesis. No experiment
or observation taken by itself is sufficient to establish
its own interpretation (the data cannot speak for them-
selves ). Kaufmann holds that scientific laws should not
be interpreted as laws ofnature but as laws relating ob-
servation to expectation, based on contemporary scien-
tific understanding and instrumentation. Thus even ba-
sic laws of physics such as the conservation of energy
and the uniformity of nature are in essence heuristic
postulates, rules guiding physicists in what to expect,
and how to observe, in their experimental and theoret-
ical grappling with nature. Such postulates are subject
to the principle of permanent control.
Even logica! laws are often misunderstood in
methodological controversies. For instance, Kaufmann
argues that despite many claims to the contrary, the
law ofthe excluded middle does not apply to synthetic
propositions- its procedural correlate does (and this
correlate is a property ofthe system of procedural rules
of science, rules that determine how to proceed with
a science, given the observational input and the con-
temporary scientific situation). Likewise, the concept
of "ground" in science is related to the rules of sci-
 FRIEDRICH LEOPOLD KAUFMANN
entific procedure and thus differs from the concept of
"ground" in deductive logic.
It is characteristic of Kaufmann 's work that his
thought developed and changed. While his focus upon
methodological and phenomenological issues and the
clarity and precision of his thought and writing re-
mained steadfast, he continually refined his view. He
published various lists of basic and procedural rules
ofscience. His conception ofscience gradually shifted
its emphasis from the side of logic ~ and the notion
of science as a set of propositions and rules for ad-
mitting or rejecting propositions from the set ~ to
science as a set of procedures and heuristic procedural
rules. His reading of the work of John Dewey ( 1859-
1952), with whom he corresponded extensively in the
!940s, contributed to a shift from stress upon deductive
and a priori rules to a growing concern with inductive
and probabilistic elements of scientific procedure. Al-
though Kaufmann 's work has been heretofore largely
ignored, his methodological pluralism enabled him to
assimilate ideas from many sources, and the insight,
precision, and intellectual honesty ofhis work won the
respect of thinkers as diverse as Edmund Husserl, Al-
fred Schutz, Albert Einstein, RudolfCarnap, and John
Dewey.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Helling, Ingeborg K. "Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, and
the Economists ofthe Mises Ci rele: Personal and Method-
ological Continuities." In Alfi·ed Schutz. Neue Beitrăge
zur Rezeption seines Werkes. Ed. Elisabeth List and Ilja
Srubar. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988, 43--68.
--."A. Schutz and F. Kaufmann: Sociology Between Science
and Interpretation." Human Studies 7 (1984), 141--6!.
- . "Wirken in der Emigration. Felix Kaufmann." In Exil.
Wissenscha{t. Identităt. Die Emigrat ion deutscher Sozial-
wissenschafiler 1933-1945. Ed. Ilja Srubar. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1988, 181-205.
Kaufmann, Felix. Methodenlehre der Soziahvissenschaft.
Vienna: Verlag Julius Springer, 1936; Methodologia de
las ciencias sociales. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Economica, 1946.
--. Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschal-
tung. Leipzig and Vienna: Dentike, 1930; The Infinite in
Mathematics: Logico-Mathematica/ W!·itings. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1978.
--. "Remarks on Methodology ofthe Social Sciences." So-
ciologica/ Review 28 ( 1936), 64-84.
- . "The Significance of Methodology for the Social Sci-
ences." Social Research 5 ( 1938), 442--63; 6 ( 1939), 537-
55.
385
- . "Truth and Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 1 ( 1940--1941 ), 59--69.
- . "Strata ofExperience," Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research 1 ( 1940-41 ), 313-24.
-. "The Logica! Rules of Scientific Procedure." Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 2 ( 1941-42), 457-7!.
-. "Verification, Meaning and Truth." Philosophy ami
Phenomenological Research 4 ( 1943-44), 267--s3.
- . Methodology of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1944 [not a translation of Methoden-
lehre, but a different book, influenced by the work of John
Dewey].
-. "The Nature of Scientific Method." Social Research 12
( 1945), 464-80.
-. "Scientific Procedure and Probability." Philosophy ami
Phenomenologica/ Research 6 ( 1945-46), 47--66.
-. "Basic lssues in Logica! Positivism." In Phi/osophic
Thought in France and the United States. Ed. Marvin
Farber. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1950, 565-88.
Reeder, Harry P. The Work of Felix Kaufinann. Lan-
ham, MD: Center for Advanced rcsearch in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 199!. [Including the
index and classification of Kaufmann's Nachlass and a
bibliography ofKaufmann's published works].
Srubar, Ilja. "On the Origin of 'Phenomenological' Sociol-
ogy." Human Studies 7 ( 1984 ), 163-89.
Kaufmann 's papers reside in the Archival Repository of the
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology at Wil-
frid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario. A microfilm
of the papers is located at the Sozialwissenschaftliches
Archiv, University of Konstanz, Germany.
HARRY P. REEDER
University of Texas at Arlington
FRITZ LEOPOLD KAUFMANN (1891-1958) Kauf-
mann is generally not well known to contemporary
students of phenomenology and was not always un-
derstood by his contemporaries, but is actually one
of the most innovative phenomenologists of the first
generation. Kaufmann carne to phenomenology from
the perspective of WILHELM DILTHEY's philosophy, with
an eye to developing a "middle ground" or unity in-
corporating both philosophical positions. In doing so,
he anticipatcd even MARTIN HEIDEGGER in viewing con-
sciousness as an essentially worldly phenomenon and
the work of art as a world-revelatory phenomenon.
Born in Leipzig, Kaufmann began his university
career enrolled in the faculty of law at Geneva ( 191 O)
and Berlin ( 191 ~Il). His interests quickly gravitated
from law to philosophy. Only his unpublished and un-
submitted 1918 Leipzig Habilitationsschrift, entitled
386 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Der Konflikt, conta ins material reflecting his legal stud-
ies. In Berlin, Kaufmann was quickly immersed in a
philosophical tradition shared with EDMUND HUSSERL.
He studied with Husserl 's former teacher Cari Stumpf
(1848-1936) and with Benno Erdmann (1851-1921),
among others. Both Erdmann and Stumpfstressed, al-
though quite differently to be sure, the relevance of
psychology to philosophical investigation. From 1911
to 1913, Kaufmann studied in Leipzig under Wil-
helm Wundt (1832-1920), Johannes Volkelt (1848-
1930) and Eduard Spranger ( 1882-1963). He was
deeply indebted to Volkelt for introducing him to a
metaphysically oriented aesthetics and especially to
Spranger who, in his 1912 course, "Die Philosphie
der Gegenwart," introduced Kaufmann to the philos-
ophy of Dilthey within the perspective of Husserl 's
Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). The Dilthey-
Husserl connection is a key to understanding Kauf-
mann 's phenomenological orientation.
Kaufmann studied with Husserl in Gottingen from
April 1913 until the outbreak of the war in 1914.
He came to study phenomenology, of course, but
a phenomenology whose character and philosophi-
cal relevance he interpreted in a unique way. Even
before he arrived in Gottingen, he did not inter-
pret phenomenology realistically, nor did he view
Husserl's ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913) as a retreat
back into idealism. In both respects Kaufmann was
unique in the Gottingen circle of Husserl's students.
His interest in phenomenology was threefold. In the
first place, he viewed Husserl 's "strengen Sachlichkeit"
as an antidote to nea-Kantian system building. In the
second place, he further interpreted Husserl 's rigorous
method and insistence upon the constitutive function
of consciousness and the correlation of subject and ab-
ject as the way to escape the traps of realism, idealism,
and intuitionism. In the third place, and what most dis-
tinguishes Kaufmann the phenomenologist, is the fact
that he saw Husserl 's 1913 constitutive analysis of con-
sciousness as a rigorous clarification and extension of
Dilthey's interpretati an of historicallife.
Already by 1913 Kaufmann was engaged in
the phenomenological investigation of a historically
viewed, embodied consciousness that can only be de-
scribed within the context ofthe world in which it finds
itself. In a 1914 lecture on Kant's ethics, for example,
he rejected both KANT's formalism and MAX SCHELER's
intuitionism regarding values. He claimed that ethical
values must be regarded as "meaning-elements of the
everyday world which can only be understood within
the context of that world." Moreover, as meaning-
elements of a historically viewed consciousness, values
are accessible to phenomenological analysis.
In Freiburg after the war Kaufmann continued his
investigation of consciousness as a historical phe-
nomenon. While there, he met Heidegger for the first
time. Although it would bea mistake to say that Kauf-
mann 's philosophical direction was altered by his en-
counter with the young Heidegger, it did intensify and
focus his interest in historical consciousness in terms
ofthe new structural analyses ofoASEIN and "being-in-
the-world." Heidegger's influence is clear in the first
chapter ofKaufmann 's Freiburg dissertation, Das Bild-
werk als ăsthetisches Phănomen (The image as aes-
thetic phenomenon, 1924). lts three chapters progres-
sively deepen one 's insight into the consciousness of an
artistic image in analyses that are existentially (Heideg-
ger), phenomenologically (Husserl), and finally histor-
ically (Dilthey) based. The dissertation sets out the ba-
sic ideas and subject matter that occupied Kaufmann
throughout his life. His book on Thomas Mann ( 1957),
the last major work that he completed during his life-
time, can be viewed as a mature expression of basic
analyses and concepts already present in the 1924 the-
sis, applied this time to a particular artist and his work
rather than to artistic consciousness in general.
Kaufmann's philosophical vision is rooted in his
passionate commitment to discovering the fundamen-
tal nature of reality. Above ali, he was in search of
the TRUTH, and both the content and the form of his
thinking are integral to this search as he conceived of
it. Without understanding this, one cannot understand
his writings or his life. His rejection of idealism and
realism, his interest in the concept of representation,
and his preoccupation with art and the artistic vision
are ali motivated by that search. His interest in a mid-
dle ground between realism and idealism, Dilthey and
Husserl, individual and universal must be understood
in terms ofthe same motivation.
Starting, as always, with historically determined
consciousness, Kaufmann 's thesis examines the con-
stitutive process whereby the experience ofthe artistic
representation causes a transformation of conscious-
 KOREA
ness and its intended object. In this transformational
process the object of consciousness attains univer-
sal significance and consciousness itself becomes en-
dowed with universal meaning. Artistic consciousness
is a privileged access to the true nature of reality, ac-
cord ing to Kaufmann, which explains its pivotal role
in his writings as a whole. Without access to the true
nature of reality, i.e., without art and, we might add,
philosophy or religion, life is reduced to purely indi-
vidual meaning, which for Kaufmann would be a life
that is not fully human, one completely engulfed in the
present moment and its immediate demands. For Kauf-
mann, a life reduced to the merely personal is not worth
living, and its valuelessness is revealed with each of
life's tragedies.
More than half of Kaufmann 's published works re-
ma in untranslated. His Nachlass, housed at the Husserl
Archives in Leuven, contains both published and un-
published material written for the most part in German
longhand and shorthand (Gabelsberger stenography),
as well as in English. It includes notes for the lectures
Kaufmann delivered in Freiburg from 1926 to 1935,
offprints of his many articles in German and English,
originals of his Leipzig and Freiburg Habilitations-
schriften, his doctoral thesis, notes for lectures deliv-
ered at Northwestern University ( 1938-46) and at the
University ofBuffalo (1946--54) during his refugee pe-
riod in the United States, and much ofhis philosophical
correspondence. The current grouping of many of the
documents on aesthetics in the Nachlass, incorporating
material from very early and late periods, reflects Kauf-
mann 's plans for a wide-ranging book, to be entitled
Phenomenology of Art, which was never completed.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Kaufmann, Fi-itz. "Die Philosophie des Grafen. Paul Yorck
und von Wartenburg." Jahrhuch fiir Phănomenologische
Forschung 9 ( 1928), 1-236.
--. "Die Bedeutung der kiinstlischeren Stimmung." Jahr-
huch
.fiir Phănomenologische Forschung 1O Ergăn:::ungshand
(1929), 191-223.
--. Geschichtsphi/osophie der Gegenwart. Berlin: Junker &
Diinhaupt, 1931.
--. "Art and Phenomenology." In Phi/osophical Essays in
Memm:1· o{ Edmund Husserl. Ed. Marvin Farber. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940.
~. "Ethik und Metaphysik." Zeitschriji fi'ir philosophische
F orschung 1O ( 1956 ).
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
387
~. Das Reich des Schănen. Bausteine ::ureiner Philosophie
der Kunst. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960 [conta ins a
bibliography].
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement. 3rd
rev. and enl. ed., with the collaboration of Karl Schuh-
mann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1982, 248-9.
CHRISTINE SKARDA
University o( California, Berkelev
FRED KERSTEN
University ol Wisconsin, Green Bay
KOREA The earliest acquaintance of Korean
scholars with phenomenology dates back to the late
1920s and early 1930s, when a handful of Koreans at-
tending what was then known as the Keijo Imperial
University in Seoul took part in seminars on EDMUND
HUSSERL, MAX SCHELER, and MARTJN IIEIDF.GGER. Perhaps
it was indicati ve of the general trend of reception of
philosophy from GERMANY at institutions in .JAPAN like
this before World War II that the main interest had al-
ready shifted from the somewhat "dated" Husserlian
philosophy to Heidegger's thought. Still retaining the
labei of phenomenology, Heidegger introduced an en-
tirely new and, especially to the Orientals, surprisingly
intuitive and appealing way oflooking at human being
and the world. Some of the clearest documents from
this period are an article on Heidegger 's notion of care,
"Haideiga-ni okeru Sorge ni tsuite" ( 1932), and one on
"Haideiga-ni okeru chihei-no monddi" ( 1935), which
were published in the journal Ris o by CHONG HONG PARK.
On the other hand, KI-RAK HA, who wrote "Haidege-e
issese kongkansengkwa sikanseng muncey'' (On spa-
tiality and temporality in Heidegger, 1940), criticized
Heidegger for orienting his analysis of DASEIN one-
sidely to the issue ofTIME, neglecting the other essential
aspect ofhumankind's being, namely, SPACE.
A serious and systematic study of phenomenology
in Korea shows not only that it reflected the worldwide
Husserl "renaissance," but that it was also sensitive to
what occurred in the works of major followers, reform-
ers, and critics of Husserl developed after World War
Il. Seoul National University quickly emerged as the
Republic of Korea's central academic institution af-
ter 1945. Its Department of Philosophy was occupied
by respectable senior faculty, one of whom, HYONG-
KON KOH, conducted seminars on Heidegger while the
388 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
aforementioned Park lectured on Kierkegaard, Niet-
zsche, and JASPERS. But phenomenology did not gain a
firm foothold on Korean soi! for at least another decade.
Moreover, the ravages of the Korean War ( 1950-53)
had c1aimed heavy tolls on the human and physical re-
sources ofthis newly emerging nation, rendering it ali
the more necessary to seek graduate education over-
seas.
Thus, from the viewpoint of the history of the re-
ception of modern Western philosophy in Korea and
of phenomenology in particular, there was a nearly
absolute hiatus between what was taught in a severely
regimented cultural environment before 1945 and what
was tobe a new learning experience for a growing num-
ber ofphilosophy students after 1945. KANT and HEGEL,
the epistemology ofneo-Kantianism as well as BRITISH
EMPIRICISM, pragmatism, and a variety of other schools
of thought continued, but phenomenology was reju-
venated by a new generation of scholars who studied
in Europe. During 1959--{) 1, .JEON sooK HAHN studied
in Heidelberg and brought more recent knowledge of
Husserlian phenomenology back to Korea. KAH KYUNG
CHO, who had previously studied in Heidelberg, vis-
ited the Husserl Archives in Koln in 1963 and main-
tained a close relationship to LUDWIG LANDGREBE. He
was also the first returnee from Europe to teach pheno-
menology at Seoul National University. Though he
lectured mostly on Heidegger and his Siljon Chelhak
(Philosophy of existence, 1961, 1Oth ed. 1993) treated
Husserl only marginally, he began Husserl seminars in
the early 1960s, using Die Krisis der europăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
(1936) and Erlahrung und Urteil ( 1939), as well as
Landgrebe's Husserl interpretations.
While three younger colleagues- YER-SU KIM, IN-
SUK CHA, and HYONG-HIO KIM- may also be considered
pioneers among Korean phenomenologists trained in
post-war Europe, a steady stream of aspiring students
went to Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus by 1994,
no less than thirty-five Koreans returned home with
Ph.D. degrees, mostly from German universities, after
having written on phenomenology or in closely re-
lated areas. Especially in the early stages ofthe expan-
sion and reorganization of Korean universities, study
abroad was a crucial career decision. But unlike young
academics dispatched and supported by their home
institutions, the "freelancing" students never had the
guarantee of an appointment upon returning home,
and this lack of coordination contributed to an over-
supply of "foreign" Ph.D's. in philosophy. There are
dozens of well qualified, but unemployed philosophy
degree holders, not a few of them having been trained
in phenomenology. Some moved away from pheno-
menology or sought employment in entirely unrelated
areas. Meanwhile, incentives were given to those in
academic positions without the Ph.D. (the degree not
having been previously mandatory) to obtain it. There
were at least twenty-three phenomenology-related dis-
sertations accepted during this "grace period" at var-
ious Korean universities, raising the current total of
phenomenology-related degree holders, both home ed-
ucated and foreign trained, to about sixty.
Given so many specializing in phenomenology, it
was inevitable that phenomenologists formed a perma-
nent section of the Korean Philosophical Association
in 1976, and as the volume ofactivity increased further,
the Korean Society for Phenomenology was officially
born in 1978. lts presidents ha ve been MYONG-RO YOON,
JEON SOOK HAIIN, IN-SUK CIIA, and YOUNG-HO LEE. The
official outlet of the Society, fl.vunsang-hak Yim-gu
(Research in Phenomenology), was not intended as a
journal in the strict sense. It is a series ofvolumes pub-
lished at varying intervals from papers presented at the
meetings of the society. Such meetings are held four
to six times a year, totaling eighty-four by the end of
1994. Volume titles indicate the common theme under
which the papers are collected and are, in English trans-
lation, What is Phenomenology? (1983 ), Phenomen-
ology and Individual Sciences ( 1985), Development of"
Phenomenological Issues ( 1984 ), Husserl and Modern
Philosophy ( 1990), Phenomenology of" Lif"eworld and
Hermeneutic.\· ( 1992), World, Man, and the Intentional-
ity of Consciousness (1992), and Phenomenology and
Practica! Philosophy ( 1993 ).
A significant am o unt ofpubl ication, however, stems
from individual initiatives. According to a recent sur-
vey of Korean phenomenology by Jeon Sook Hahn
there are 35 books, roughly 250 articles, and over 36
major titles of translated books that have appeared,
for the most part, during the past quarter of a century.
These statistics do not include the some 60 disserta-
tions referred to above, parts of which ha ve been pub-
lished separately in shorter articles. In Die Heidegger-
Rezeption in Korea ( 1991 ), GWANG-IL sw lists 288
 KOREA
Korean-language titles of books and articles on Hei-
degger alone. No doubt there are more lists of spe-
cialized titles, such as those on JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, but
such titles can only be suggested here: YER-su KIM, Die
bedeutungstheoretische Problematik in den Philoso-
phie Husserls und Wittgensteins (1966); IN-SUK CHA,
Eine Untersuchung uber der Gegenstandsbegriff in
der Phănomenologie E. Husserls ( 1968); MYONG-RO
YOON, On the Objectivism of the German-Austrain
School ( 1971 ); KYU-YOUI\G KIM, lntentionality and Vi-
sua! Direction in Husserl 's Time Constitution (1974);
JEON sooK HAHN, The Cartesian and Non-Cartesian
Way for Husserl (1975); KWANG-HIE SOH, Time and
Time-Consciousness in A ugustine and Husserl ( 1977);
OH-HYUN SHIN, Sartre :5 Concept of the Self ( 1977);
KEEL-WOO LEE, Subjektivităt und lntersubjektivităt: Un-
tersuchungen zur Theorie des geistigen Seins bei E.
Husserl und N. Hartmann ( 1984 ); CHONG-HYON PAEK,
Phănomenologische Untersuchung zum Gegenstands-
begrţff in Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunfi" (1985);
JEONG-OK CHO, "Liebe" bei Max Scheler unter beson-
derer Beriicksichtigung des Begriffs "Eros" ( 1990);
KWAN-SUNG CHO, Das Verstăndnis van Phiinomenologie
bei Roman fngarden ( 1990); HAK-SOON KANG, Die
Bedeutung von Heideggers Nietzsche-Deutung im
Zuge der Verwindung der Metaphysik ( 1990); NAM-IN
LEE, Edmund Husserls Phănomenologie der Instinkte
( 1991 ); ZAE-SHICK CHOI, Der phănomenologische Feld-
begriffbei Aran Gurwitsch (1994).
One may wonder what the central contribution of
Korean phenomenology thus far might be. More than
any other thought significantly accepted, transmitted,
and assimilated across national and cultural bound-
aries, phenomenology is conscious· ofthe problematics
of how and why such knowledge of the "other" is
possible. The factual encounter with and the possible
assimilation of an "alien world" (Fremdwelt) as dif-
ferent from my own "familiar world" (Heimwelt) is
predicated on the structure of the "horizon" and the
phenomenological sense of the WORLD as the "total
horizon" of human experience. The alien part of the
world, however, is never so totally severed from mine
or so abysmally strange as to defeat ali my efforts to
understand it. According to Husserl, it is always by
way ofprojecting and extrapolating from my own per-
spective that 1 can have access to an alien perspective
and assimilate it.
389
Time and again, students from Asia traveling to Eu-
rope would ha veto face the curious question from their
Western teachers and peers as to how they overcame the
barriers of language and the entirely different cultural
tradition. Without false modesty, Asian students nor-
mally responded by saying that they had "brought with
them" the basic ability to understand the seemingly dif-
ferent West and only failed previously to explain what
they have been doing ali along, which was to bring
what they already knew about their own tradition to
bear upon the new and unfamiliar one.
If Korean scholars have truly understood some of
the most basic problems of phenomenology "origi-
nally," it must be because they were able in princi-
ple to recognize them as their own problems. This
could be made manifest in the way they "interpret"
those problems "differently," and yet in a manner es-
sentially faithful to the phenomena. Until recently, this
"affinity recognition" has been ignored in the interest
ofintellectually more gratifying higher-level construc-
tions. But we have to descend into the lower layers
of conscious life and explicate the structures and re-
lations between what is "founding" and what is "be-
ing founded." Moods or basic states of mind ( Grund-
stimmungen) such as anxiety, sorrow, shame, boredom,
wonder, and doubt are always there in reallife regulat-
ing the lifestyles of Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Con-
fucianism, and Taoism, and yet, seldom analyzed in
their constituting function for the higher order of ideas
and values. They must become topics of sharpened
analysis. In this connection, NAM-IN LEE's recent work
has disclosed, through a great feat of empathetic read-
ing, a congenial ground in Husserl 's theory of instincts
that shows his phenomenology to be a "universal vol-
untarism." More intercultural phenomenology may be
built on this basis.
There ha ve also been attempts to apply the insights,
methodological and otherwise, gained of phenomen-
ology to inherently Korean thought. In Yul-Gok-kwa
Merleau-Ponty bikyo Yengoo (A comparative study of
Yul-Gok and Merleau-Ponty, 1972), HYONG-HIO KIM has
compared, for example, Yul-Gok, a noted Confucian
scholar of 16th century Korea, with MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY. He also connects Husserl 's notion of LIFEWORLD
to the way the concept of TRUTH is formed in tradi-
tional Korean thought. But similar short essays by Kim
on ancient stories and myths can be regarded more as
390 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
preliminary pointers than precedent-setting exemplars
in intercultural phenomenology. His most recent work,
Derrida-wa Nojang-uy Tokbup (Derrida and the art of
reading Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, 1987), is a much
more spirited attempt at an East-West synthesis that
merits international critica] review. Another philoso-
pher, .IYONG-BOK RIE, was a participant in the Third
Oriental Phenomenology Congress, sponsored by the
World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Re-
search and Learning ( 1992), and presented a paper en-
titled "Eine Hermeneutik des Symbols im Buch der
Wandlungen."
Most Korean phenomenologists, though trained in
Europe and multilingual, adjust to the academic envi-
ronment at home soon after returning, and are obliged
to publish for the most part in their native tongue.
Exceptions are those with long-term or permanent
overseas appointments, thus having much freer ac-
cess to conferences and publications in Westem lan-
guages. For example, a POLITIC AL SCIENTIST residing in
the United States, IIWA YOL JUNG, has made himself
known through erudite and elegant essays on pheno-
menological, existential, and hermeneutica! subjects.
Perhaps his "Heidegger's Way with Sinitic Thinking"
( 1987) should be mentioned as a typically intercultural
and international contribution by an overseas Korean
scholar. YINHUI PARK, though now returned to Korea
permanently, was also a frequent participant in pheno-
menological conversations in the U"'ITED STATES during
his decades-long teaching career in Boston.
However, a more durable bond has been estab-
lished between the international community of phe-
nomenologists and Korean scholars through the activ-
ities of KAH KYUNG cHo. His "Gedanken abseits der
dichotomischen Welterklarung" ( 1967) was the first
attempt by an Asian to review critically Heidegger's
relationship with Lao Tzu and his conversation with a
Japanese visitor entitled "Aus einem Geschach von der
Sprache." Cho's lecture, "Anschauung und Abstrak-
tion im Lichte der modernen Wissenschaftentheorie"
( 1969) was also the first major phenomenological pre-
sentation by a Korean scholar at an international con-
ference. More recently, at the Xlllth Conference ofthe
General Society of German Philosophy, Cho pointed
out the significance of physis for Heidegger's thought
of Being in a widely noted paper, "Die okologische
Suggestibilitat der Spatphilosophie Heideggers" (Eco-
logica! suggestibility in Heidegger's !ater philosophy,
1986).
Landgrebe noted in his introduction to Cho 's Be-
wusstsein and Natursein ( 1987) that whereas most
Japanese tried to appropriate Husserlian phenomen-
ology by setting it against the background of Zen Bud-
dhism, Cho made his knowledge ofTaoist philosophy
relevant to interpreting phenomenology. Phenomen-
ology was seen as an extreme form ofthe modern "phi-
losophy of consciousness." Gratifying though the great
degree of self-transparency was that consciousness
has achieved from its subject-centered coNSTITUTIVE-
PHENOMENOLOGIC AL perspective, Husserl himself even-
tually had to face the consequences of having blurred
the boundary of ordo essendi and ordo cognoscendi.
His talk of the primacy of the lifewordly a priori, and
a bodily a priori, ofthe "norm-giving" authority ofthe
"factual"- as well as his admission ofthe unsurpass-
ability of "world logic" by ali real as well as possible
logics-all this points to the limits ofthe philosophy of
consciousness and suggests the need for a different kind
of openness toward what !ies beyond consciousness.
Heidegger's !ater philosophy may be construed as an
attempt at opening such a consciousness-transcending
vîsta in an approximation to Lao Tzu's posture of"let-
ting be."
The future ofphenomenology in Korea depends on
the possibility of creatively participating in ongoing
international dialogues. Fresh cues coming from reve-
lations about Husserl 's universal voluntarism and mon-
adology suggest, if anything, that the opportunity rad-
ically to rethink the problem of intersubjective and so-
cial understanding beckons- a very real opportunity
if multi cultural and ETHNIC diversity are to function in
today's globallife with more than a semblance ofhar-
mony born offear. Lack ofvenues, especially for those
who were trained early to express themselves also in
English or German, but having no means to keep it up
once they returned home, has been a sorely felt handi-
cap for Korean scholars. The recently inaugurated se-
ries of publication, Orbis Phănomeno/ogicus, holds
out a promise of bridging such a gap. Volumes under
preparation include Korean Contributions to Pheno-
menology.
 ALEXANDRE KOYRE
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cho, Kah Kyung, ed. Philo~ophy and Science in Phenomen-
ological Perspective. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.
~. Bewusstsein und Natursein. Phănomenologischer West-
Ost-Diwan. Freiburg: Karl A1ber, 1987.
Hahn, Jeon Sook. Hyensanghakuy ihhae [Understanding of
phenomeno1ogy]. Seou1: Minumsa, 1984.
~. Hyensanghak: Gu Ppoorlilul Chajase [Phenomeno1ogy:
In search of its roots]. Seou1: Minumsa, 1995.
Jung, Hwa Yol. "Heidegger's Way with Sinitic Thinking."
In Heidegger and Asian Thought. Ed. Graham Parkes.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987,217--44.
Kim, Hyong-Hio. Gabriel Marcel-uy goochey chelhakkwa
yejenquy hyengisanghak [The philosophy ofthe concrete
and the metaphysics of being-on-the-way]. Seoul: In-
gansarang, 1990.
~. Derrida-wa Nocang-uy Tokbup [Derrida and the art
of reading Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu]. Seol: Hankwuk
Jungsinmwunhwa Yenkuwen, 1987.
Kim, Young-Han. Heidegger-eyse Rica:ur-kkaji: Hyentay
chelhakjek haysekhaklnva sinhakjek haysekhay [From
Heidegger to Ricreur: Philosophical herrneneutics and
theological hermeneutics of modem times]. Seoul:
Bakyengsa, 1987.
Lee, Ki-Sang. Heidegger-uy siljonkwa ene [Existence and
language in Heidegger]. Seoul: Mwunyey chwulphansa,
1991.
Lee, Nam-ln. Edmund Husserls Phănomenologie der In-
stinkte. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
Park, Yinhui. Hyensanghakkwa bwunsekchelhak [Pheno-
menology and analytic philosophy]. Seou1: Iljokak, 1977.
Seo, Gwang-11. Die Heidegger-Rezeption in Korea. Ph.D.
diss., Diisse1dorf, 1991.
Shin, Oh-Hyun. Jayuwa bikuyk: Sartre-uy ingansiljonlon
[Freedom and tragedy: Sartre's theory of human being].
Seou1: Moonhakga Jisengsa, 1979.
Suh, Woo-Suk. Umak hyensanghak [Music and phenomen-
o1ogy]. Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1989.
KAH-KYUNG CHO
State University of New York, Buffalo
NAM-IN LEE
Seoul National University
ALEXANDRE KOYRE Koyre was bom in
Odessa on August 29, 1892, and died in Paris on April
28, 1964. He went to Paris in 1908, probably to study
mathematics (and philosophy). During winter 1909-
1O he moved to Gottingen, at that time the "Mecca of
mathematics," where especially Ernst Zermelo ( 1871-
1953) was working on set-theoretic paraduxes such
as Russell 's antinomy, and ADOLF REINACH, appointed
Privatdozent only in 1909, was working on classical
paradoxes in philosophy (the liar, Zeno's paradoxes).
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
391
Already at the end of his first Gottingen semester, in
February 191 O, Koyre was a leading figure in the circle
of young students of phenomeno1ogy there. He man-
aged to procure for Reinach a set of the proofs of an
article on the psychology of judgment that Karl Marbe
(1869-1953) was about to publish; probab1y on this
basis Reinach criticized Marbe's views in an article on
negative judgment that appeared in 1911.
In summer 191 O, Koyre attended not only the lec-
tures of David Hi1bert (1862-1943) on fundamental
problems of mathematics, but also Reinach 's lecture
course on Plato, in which the pre-Socratics (especially
Zen o, who is criticized along with Russell 's Principles
of Mathematics of 1903 ), Socrates, and three early di-
alogues by Plato were treated. Although Koyre stated,
in his own lntroduction a la !ee ture de Platon ( 1945),
that he had "leamed to understand Plato only by ex-
plaining him," it is noteworthy that in the first part of
this work he treats Meno, Protagoras, and Theaetetus,
which are precise1y the dialogues Reinach had dea1t
within1910.
In winter 1910--11 Koyre turned to experimen-
tal psychology and entered a lasting friendship with
David Katz (1884-1953), an assistant in psychology at
Gottingen whose psycho1ogical work was influenced
by Reinach. He a)so tumed to EDMUND HUSSERL. He
attended Husserl's lectures on logic as theory of cogni-
tion, those ofReinach on KANT's critique ofreason, and
the meetings of the Gottingen Philosophical Society,
where ali the students of phenomenology participated.
Together with Reinach, MAX SCHELER, and two other
students, he even participated in an "inner circle" of
this society where he presented his own ideas on math-
ematical and logica! paradoxes. He also discussed them
with Hilbert's assistant Richard Courant ( 1888-1972),
a cousin of EDITH STEIN.
In 1911 Koyre lectured to the society on HENRI BERG-
soN. He must have leamed about Bergsonian thought
in Paris. Husserl first heard of Bergson through this
lecture. In the same year Koyre prepared three unpub-
lished manuscripts, "Insolubilia," "Die Antinomien
der Mengenlehre," and "Paradoxa als Perpetuum mo-
bile." His very first publication, "Sur les nombres de
M. Russell" in Revue de Metaphysique et Morale,
carne from this fund of ideas. Russell 's definition of
number in The Principles of Mathematics was said
to contain paradoxes and thus could not serve as
 392 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
a foundation for mathematics (Russell published a
"Reponse a M. Koyre"). From the same source Koyre
also derived "Bemerkungen zu den Zenonischen Para-
doxen," which was published in Husserl 's Jahrhuch
fiir Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung in
1922. There he insists, against Reinach 's way of sol v-
ing Zeno's problem by means of an analysis ofthe con-
cept ofmotion, that the paradox in question is common
to motion, infinity, and continuity and thus requires a
broader framework for its solution. Notwithstanding
this critica! approach, the article is dedicated "to the
memory of AdolfReinach": Koyre's erstwhile teacher
who had been killed in action in 1917. Finally, the
two !ater articles, "The Liar" and "Manifold and Cate-
gory," published in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research after World War II, are ultimately drawn from
the same fund of ideas.
In March 1912, Koyre submitted his manuscripts
to Husserl, who studied them carefully and in part
annotated and took excerpts from them. Neverthe-
less, he considered them insufficient as a basis for
Koyre's projected doctoral dissertation. Finding his
way thus blocked, Koyre followed Reinach's advice
and returned to France in late 1912 or early 1913. Like
his lifelong friend and fellow Gottingen student HED-
WIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, he had meanwhile developed a
strong interes! in religion. At the same time, Reinach 's
vast erudition had aroused in him a strong interes! in
the history of philosophy. Accordingly, he took the
doctorat es lettres at the Sorbonne in June 1923 with
two works, L 'idee de Dieu et les preuves de son exis-
tence chez Descartes ( 1922) and L 'idee de Dieu dans
la philosophie de Saint Anselme ( 1923). In his orals he
defended Scheler's phenomenology of religion against
the scholar of German literature Henri Lichtenberger
(1864-1941).
After Reinach's death, Husserl became the lead-
ing figure of the phenomenological movement for
Koyre too. He paid him extended visits, first in July
1921 and again in September and October 1922. An-
other visit in October 1928 was meant to help pre-
pare Husserl 's Paris lectures, for which Husserl had
been invited by Lichtenberger at Koyre's instigation.
In these lectures, given in February 1929, Husserl re-
ferred publicly to "the fine and profound investigations
of Messrs. Gilson and Koyre" that had made clear the
presence of Scholastic thought in Descartes 's philoso-
phy. Husserl had worked out a summary ofthese lec-
tures for the French audience and the translation, while
anonymous, is without doubt the work of Koyre. In
Paris Husserl was also present at Koyre 's defense of
his thesis, La philosophie de .Jacoh Boehme ( 1929).
Part of it also appeared, in Conrad-Martius's trans-
lation, as "Die Gotteslehre Jakob Boehmes" in the
Husserl Festschrift ( 1929). Koyre was a bie to travel
to Freiburg for the presentation because of a grant
from Husserl. A month !ater Husserl sent the expanded
manuscript ofhis Paris lectures to Koyre, who revised
the french translation of it by EMMANUEL LFVINAS and
Gabrielle Pfeiffer and supervised the publication of
Husserl 's las! book, Meditations Cartesiennes (1931 );
in fact, Husserl considered him as the "true translator"
of this work. In July 1932, while Koyre was staying
with Husserl for what was to be his last visit to Ger-
many, Husserl was elected a Corresponding Member
of the French Academie des Sciences morales et poli-
tiques. Here again Koyre had played a decisive role
by writing the four-page report to Leon Brunschvicg
(1869-1944) on the basis ofwhich Husserl was elected.
In Paris, Koyre co-founded the journal Recherches
Philosophiques ( 193 I-36), which introduced pheno-
menology into FRANCE by publishing translations of
work by, among others, Conrad-Martius, HELMUTII
PLESSNER, OSKAR BECKER, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, and KARL
LOWITH. The journal also published the first studies
of JEAN WAHL, GABRIEL MARCEL, and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE.
When an eventually short-lived scientific committee
for the edition of Scheler's posthumous work (he had
died in 1928) was formed in 1932, Koyre was called
to serve on its board. He was also among the first
members ofthe International Phenomenological Soci-
ety founded by MARVIN FARBER in 1940. Nevertheless,
he told HERBERT SPIEGELBERG in 1956 that he did not
know whether he was a phenomenologist or not. At the
same time, however, he spoke ofHusserl 's influence on
him as decisive. Actually, this statement results from
a certain distortion of historical perspective, for the
Platonic realism, historical approach, and high regard
for medieval objectivism that Koyre on that occasion
erroneously attributed to Husserl are ali hallmarks of
Reinach 's approach.
It was also in line with Reinach that at the 1932
meeting of the Societe Thomiste in Juvisy on pheno-
menology Koyre declared himself in agreement with
 ALEXANDRE KOYRE
Edith Stein, who asserted: "Husserl never managed
to convince any of his old students of the necessity
to arrive at a transcendental idealism." Such expres-
sions werc more of general convictions inherited from
Reinach, rather than thcmes Koyre would ha ve worked
on, for his interest in the connection between the his-
tory of philosophy and that of RELIGION soon had also
led him to the bistory of NATURAL SCILNCE. It is in these
historical fields and above ali on their interconnection
that his work had become concentrated and that he at-
tained prominence. During 1922--40 he taught mainly
at the Ecole Pratique des Hautcs Etudes in Paris. In
1941 he became Professor at the French Ecole Libre
co-foundcd by him at the New School for Social Re-
search in New York. He returned to the Ecole Pratique
in 1945 and continued teaching there, except for vis-
its to the UNITED STATES (Columbia University, Univer-
sity of Chicago, Johns Hopkins University, and above
ali the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study), which
continued until 1962.
Koyn!'s work spans an amazing variety ofthemes.
As regards the history of phi1osophy, he published,
besides his aforementioned books on Plato, Anselm,
and Descartes, annotated French translations of texts
by Anselm, Fides quaerens intellectum (1927), and
Spinoza, Trai te de la reforme de l'entendement ( 1936).
In 1944 his Entretiens sur Descartes appeared. He
had written La philosophie et le probleme national
en Russie au debut du X!Xe siecle in 1929. A col-
lection of related articles appeared in 1950 under the
tit le Etudes d 'histoire de la pensee philosophique en
Russie. Another collection, Etudes d 'histoire de la
pensee philosophique ( 1961 ), brings together articles
on Condorcet, Hegel, Louis de Bonald, and Heidegger.
As concerns the history of religious thought, in
1955 Koyre published, in addition to his early book
on Boehme, a collection of articles, Mystiques, spir-
ituels, alchimistes du XV!e siecle allemand dealing
with Valentin Weigel, Caspar Schwenckfeld, Sebas-
tian Franck, and Paracelsus. But he is above ali the
author of severa! major classics in history of sci-
ence, such as his Etudes galileennes (Galilean stud-
ies, 1940), on the laws of falling bodies and iner-
393
tia; From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe
( 1957), which traces the history of cosmology from
Nicholas of Cusa to Leibniz; and the more special-
ized work, La revolution astronomique, Copernic, Ke-
plet: Borelli ( 1961 ). In 1965, 1. B. Cohen published
Koyre's Newtonian Studies on Newton's "Rules of
Phi1osophizing," his optics, and the law of attrac-
tion posthumously. A year !ater Rene Taton collected
most of Koyre 's articles on Leonardo da Vinei, Gio-
vanni Battista Benedetti, Galileo, Bonaventura Cav-
alieri, Pierre Gassendi, Nicolo Tartaglia, and Blaise
Pascal under the title Etudes d 'histoire de la pensee
scientifique. Already in 1934 Koyre had published an
annotated French trans1ation ofBook I ofCopernicus's
main work as N. Copernic, Des revolutions des orbes
celestes. Togetherwith 1. B. Cohen he also prepared the
two-volume critica] cdition of Newton's main work,
Philosophiae natura lis principia mathematica ( 1972).
Materials of a more biographical nature are contained
in De la mystique a la science: Cours, conferences
et documents 1922-1962, edited by Pietro Redondi in
1986.
Koyre's influence made itself fe1t above ali among
historians of science in the United States, France, and
Italy. More particularly, it should be mentioned that
Thomas Kuhn developed his theory of paradigms out
of Koyre's work, where the very expression "scien-
tific revolution" was coined. A two-volume Festschrift,
Metanges Alexandre Koyre publies a l'occasion de son
70e anniversaire ( 1964), testifies to his unique signif-
icance in this field. An issue of the Revue d 'Histoire
des Sciences et leurs Applications ( 1965) is devoted
to his memory; also worthy of mention is Gerard Jor-
land, La science dans la philosophie. Les recherches
epistemologiques d 'Aiexandre Koyre (1981 ). Under
the title Science: The Renaissance of a History, Pietro
Redondi published the proceedings of a conference on
Koyre's thought in an issue of History and Technol-
ogy. Koyre's Nachlass is kept at the Centre Alexandre
Koyre, Museum National d'Histoire Naturelle, Paris.
KARL SCHUHMANN
Universiteit Urrechr

LANGUAGE ANALYSIS, ORDINARY See ORDI-
NARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS.
LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL The pheno-
meno]ogica] prob]em ofLANGUAGE IN HUSSERL has been
transformed in major ways by MARTIN HEIDEGGER, MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY, EMMANUEL LEVINAS, HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, and PAUL RICCEUR. To begin with, this prob-
]em never ceased to haunt Heidegger, even iffrom the
outset, as with EDMUND HUSSERL before him, he only
perceived it through the logic of signification. Heideg-
ger's meditation took severa! ways, passing from the
logica! approach to an existential approach, the o ne and
the other sustained by his ontologica! preoccupation,
prior to culminating in a quasi-mystical vision. In the
first step, the region of sense and signification is first
and autonomous in relation to language. The second
step corrects the apparent indifference with respect to
speaking and the speaking subject, for it places the
human, this "animal who has speech," in the center.
Language is no longer described as a simple instru-
ment in the hands of a subject capable of handling it
in its guise as a neutra] activity by which a thinking,
sensing, and acting being expresses him- or herselfand
communicates more or less well with others. Taking its
origin in the being-in-the-world of DA SEIN, the existing
human being, language in Sein und Zeit ( 1927) appears
initially as an ensemble of signs of the same order as
the equipment that we use and that forms our every-
day practica! environment. But it roots itself in a world
from now on invested with a preliminary "structure
of significance" in which the possibility of significa-
tions properly so called resides, which in turn found
the "possibility of speech and language."
At the foundation of speech is discourse, a fun-
damental mode of existing, original in the same way
as Verstehen (understanding) and Befindlichkeit (onto-
logica] disposition); in contrast with the metaphysical
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
tradition, neither the understanding nor reason, much
less sensibility or affectivity, has preeminence over
language. If speaking appears tobe a way of express-
ing oneself, of saying how o ne comprehends the world,
others, and oneself, ofreacting in the face ofthings and
beings, then the world is always already pre-articulated
and valorized in its significance before any interpreta-
tion and appropriation by speech, which is only its
explicit enunciation.
The distinction of the essential components of lan-
guage into sign, expression, and signification that
Husserl sti li retained is based on the metaphysical top-
i ca (topics) ofthe sensible and the intelligible that Hei-
degger rejects: the essence oflanguage does not reside
in the semiotic or semantic function any more than
in the expressive function. Significations are neither
copies nor images of things or of lived experiences,
nor the products of acts of a sense-bestowing subject,
and speech consists even less in placing a signification
on a previously neutra! and significationless datum.
Far from being a property inherent in the being or the
work of a subject who carries it within, creating it by
a sovereign act or drawing it from reality, MEANING
arises from the appropriating explication of being-in-
the-world; it is expressly instituted by the discourse
that actualizes it in an articulated ensemble of sig-
nifications. Signification maintains a certain primacy
over the word: everything happens as if the significa-
tions, already there, sought to molt into words, as if
- virtually ready to be said - they become words
through a spontaneous mutation and not an arbitrary
act of giving meaning. Discourse is no less Aussage
and Mitteilung, enunciation and sharing with others,
establishing a view ofthe world in common. In exercis-
ing its communicative function, speech does not really
transmit messages, opinions, or sentiments to others;
the exchange of words is nothing like an exchange of
commodities. Moreover, instead of founding commu-
nication, speech presupposes that existence is already
in an everyday common world that expressly realizes
Miteinandersein, being-in-the-world-with-others.
To speak is not simply to pronounce words, emit
sounds, and give them meaning by an intellectual act.
The order of priority is reversed. Speech is founded in
discourse and discourse is not derived from linguistic
expression, even though genuine speaking is based on
the acts of hearing and understanding. This original
394
 LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL
thesis confirms the ordinary experience of communi-
cation: to speak and hear are its essential moments
and the mode par excellence of Mitsein. The speak-
ing of language is determined neither beginning from
its transmissions nor beginning from its signification,
any more than hearing consists in catching a voice and
sounds affecting our hearing. Language never plays
its ro le better than when it effaces itselfbefore what is
said: 1 never comprehend better what is said to me by an
other than when 1 am "ali ears" and when, so to speak,
the sounds ofthe other's voice, including the words he
or she pronounces, fade away. Thus as early as Sein
und Zeit and confirmed ]ater, a veritable "reversal" of
our experience oflanguage announces itself, which, in
restoring ali authority to the saying itself, deprives the
word of its privilege. This is why Heidegger, like a
mystic of old, praises the virtues of silence as the foun-
dation of the authentic being able to speak. Far from
being the manifestation of a deficiency or impotence of
speaking, silence ends the ordinary chatter of everyday
life that is a deficient mode of speaking. People often
abandon themselves to a facile common talk that is
satisfied with repeating the sayings of the anonymous
"they." To speak is tobe listening to a discourse already
uttered or engendered by this "colloquy" (Gesprach)
that we are; it is to receive and respond to the always
already spoken words in the language that we speak.
How could people in their everyday speaking not be
held in the grips of ordinary language and the "they
say" of common sense that is a depository of ali that is
said and can be said about the world?
More vigorously than ever, the !ater Heidegger
fights against the entire phonocentric and logical-
grammatical representation of language that has dom-
inated from antiquity up until Husserl in order to sum-
mon us to the place where language itself speaks and
where humans learn with humility that they are not the
masters of language, but that it is rather they who are
under the command oflanguage. The thinker, who does
not disdain being near poets nor the teachings of the
language that they speak, invites us to go through the
region in which the enigmatic relationships between
words and things are clarified and where we learn that
speaking is not just using words in a banal fashion to
name things and beings; naming cannot be reduced to
providing an already known object with a name, to af-
fecting things with a labei that fits them like a glove. It
395
is time to renounce this "thingly" imagery that makes
ofthe word itself a thing, without, for ali that, clarify-
ing the relation that coordinates one with the other, the
word and the thing named. Naming is not the arbitrary
act of denomination that some believe it to be. Con-
trary to a tenacious image inherited from metaphysics,
words are not barrels and buckets from which we draw
the content of a pregiven meaning.
To speak is to receive into oneselfthe saying ofthe
words of our language. To name is "to caii the thing
to the word," to summon it in its very absence into
our presence, to invite it to do something in a world of
things with the result that in ali strictness, according
to the poet Stefan George ( 1868-1933), whom Hei-
degger cites in Unterwegs zur Sprache (On the way
to language, 1959), "there is no thing where the ap-
propriated word naming it is lacking," for "the being
of every thing lives within the word." Words are like
gestures that engender a world by making things come
to the world and the world come to the things. This
is the "poietic" power of speaking attested to by the
poet, who, better than anyone, knows that we do not
cease to speak afier our language, which always walks
in front of us in each of our steps. Language is like the
"house of being" that humankind inhabits, the unique
dimension in which we can establish residence, and
where the paths of thinking always already pre-traced
in our bosom are discovered. Provided we listen to our
language, we become aware that we are always already
caught up in its saying (Sage), in the inextricable in-
terweavings of the relations that it spins and to which
we belong due to our own speaking.
With the omnipresence and omnipotence of lan-
guage that is expressed in the unusual tautological for-
mula "Die Sprache spricht" (language speaks), humans
do not speak except by providing a reply to it and by
entering into correspondence with its saying. lf speech
relieves humans of ali initiative, what they say, each
of their words, is carried by the speaking of their lan-
guage. Language is like the "Gelaut der Stille" (the
sounding of stillness) that nevertheless does require
the speaking ofmortals in order tobe understood, pro-
vided that they are disposed to the quiet hearing ofthis
eloquent silence. In his will to penetrate the mystery
oflanguage, Heidegger discovers another name that is
more appropriate because it gathers together in a sin-
gle word logos and Being, the Saying and the Said, and
396 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
that which induces us to speak. He calls it "die Sage"
(Saying), from an ancient word that has the same origin
as deixis, the source ofsigns that are not made from the
gestures ofhumans, but rather from the "gesture ofthe
world." This is a remarkable hypostasis of language
that seems to take away every power of the speaking
subject in order to give this power to the Saying and the
Said oflanguage. For the thinker, ali originallanguage
is "the coming of Being into the Said" that it assumes
as its destiny, and it is foundational for the history of
the community ofhumans.
At this point we are far from the initial phenomen-
ological approach to language, carried away into the
mysterious land in which !ies the being of language as
Sage (legend) and out ofwhich ali that "there is" in the
world originates.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY addresses the probJem of
language by beginning from a criticism of Husserl's
account and by taking a path opposite to what the latter
had privileged. Centering his reflection on speech, he
placed the accent on the act of expressing, which does
not presuppose the anteriority of any language; thus
speaking appears from the outset as rooted in corpore-
ity. It is one's own BODY that is the primordial signifier
and ali meaning proceeds from it. Speaking itself as
expression is a bodily gesture and even one ofthe fun-
damental functions of the body. It is the voice that
incarnates meaning while externalizing it for others
in the sign. There is something of a hodily language
(langage corporel) and the bodily subject then liter-
ally defines itself by its "indefinite power to signify,"
to grasp and communicate a meaning. The "pheno-
menology of language" presents itself first of ali as a
"phenomenology of speech."
Language for Merleau-Ponty is never the simple
clothing of a thought that possesses itself in fu li clar-
ity. He so objects to such an extent to the "phantom
of a pure language" - the idea of a language made
up of entirely transparent signs designating the mat-
ters themselves, or already established pure signifi-
cations without remainder or equivocation- that he
refuses the myth of a universal univocallanguage that
presupposes the precise, arbitrary, and magica! corre-
spondence between language and what it signifies, as
if signs could correspond adequately to significations,
words to things. This model of a language that in its
purity guarantees the coincidence between thought and
reality is actually born from language spoken (langage
parte), from language after the fact, which disappears
before the meaning ofwhich it is the carrier. Once the
word is spoken, the thickness of the words, their au-
tonomy, dissolves and they appear like neutra! tools in
the service of significations.
Instead of indicating it, the signifier rathcr harbors
the meaning that, like that of gestures, is not in the
elements of which it is made; rather, it is their com-
mon intention. The meaning is readable precisely as the
linguistic gesture that is the incarnation of it. Merleau-
Ponty thus detaches himself from the early Husserl
in order to converge with the !ater Husserl through
the image of language as "Verleiblichung" ( embodi-
ment). The difference between speaking speech and
spoken speech (parole par/an te and parole par/ee) is
already accentuated in the Phenomenologie de la per-
ception ( 1945). Language appears there as operating
and as enactment ofmeaning. The rooting ofthe ideal-
ity ofmeaning in the perceived is revealed at the same
time. One can grasp it only in its place of cmergence
in speech that is the dimension of embodiment where
signification shows through. Yet expression overlooks
itself as expressive operation in order to appear to itself
as the translation of an ideal text. The task that imposes
itselfin this is thus to reveal the speaking speech under
the speech spoken.
As the signifying power of the body, language at-
tests that linguistic signification prolongs and accom-
plishes the gestural signification that is deployed in
bodily forms of behavior. Only if the verbal sign is
arbitrary and non-natural is it impossible to derive the
linguistic signification from a signification immanent
in the bodily and phonetic gesture. And yet signifi-
cations do not precede signs, but arise in contact with
them. Conform ing to the lessons in linguistics ofFerdi-
nand de Saussure (1875-1913), Merleau-Ponty holds
that speech does not produce meaning independent of
language. There is a primordial stratum in language,
and meaning does not proceed from the representation
ofthe thing in the word, but rises up in the very texture
ofspeech.
The idea of a perfect expression, through and
through transparent, is nonsense, ali language is in-
direct, and meaning always comes to us circuitously,
obliquely, incomplete. Speech is beyond the possibil-
ities inscribed in the language, while the language
 LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL
presents itself to the subject as a system of dispari-
ties between signs and significations. An irreducible
precariousness strikes the language that, at the same
time, says more than the words taken separately say.
This is why to grasp speech in the nascent state is to
catch it against the background ofsilence that precedes
it. Meaning then appears at once as transcendent ofand
immanent in the signs. It does not preexist the signs,
it conquers itself in their active deployment without
their ever losing their opacity to the benefit of a pure
thought. This is an experience that confirms the Saus-
surian discovery that signs are only signifiers beginning
from their differences, that meaning is not reducible to
a positive entity, but is situated between signs. Sign
and signified do not preexist the act of expression, and
in no case are there pure signs and pure significations.
Instead of clothing and conveying preestablished sig-
nifications, words are animated with an autonomous
vitality. There is neither a one-to-one correspondence
of signs with significations or with things, nor a to-
tal sayability of the real. In a language, there are only
under-standings; the idea of total communication is ab-
surd. A thing is never entirely said or thought, for there
always subsists something unwritten and unthought
about it.
The essential silence that underlies speech is not
an obstacle to but a condition for signification. Much
more than a meaning, language is something like a be-
ing. The expression is not on the level of material signs,
which by themselves are insignificant, nor on the level
of subjectivity, nor that of the object. This explains
the unusual affirmation: "It is not we who speak, it is
truth that speaks itself on the basis of speech." Rather
than being a negation of language, the silence of the
perceived world is primordial speech, the mute logos,
and expression is only the infinite conversion of silence
into speech and speech into silence. Coming closer to
Heidegger than to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty ascends to-
ward an ontology of language, toward the enigmatic
image of the language of Being that makes us under-
stand the "very voice ofthe things." This also confirms
his formula according to which "it is being that speaks
in us, and not we who speak ofbeing."
The cthical requirement that guides EMMANUEL LEV-
INAS ca11s for a reinterpretation of the essence of lan-
guage, which he accomplishes through an explication
using Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. He ini-
397
tia11y inscribes the problem into the immediate relation
with the Other, for to comprehend the Other is always
at the same time to ca11 the Other, to address oneself
to him or to her, to 5peak with the Other. This is the
language that he ca11s ethics because, differing from
the objectivating language of things and the world, it
opens the eminent access to the Other. Speaking is an
ethical event prior to being a logica) event. Ca11 to and
vindication ofthe Other, language puts in question the
EGO and the egocentric orientation of its life that liber-
ales it. It is only in responding to the Other, in sharing
the world with the Other, that language is born as an in-
tersubjective system of objective determinations. Due
to speech, the world becomes the common world, the
world shared and the object of communication with
others. Objectivating language is posterior and sub-
ordinate to the ethical language that is primordia11y
encounter with the Other and the foundation ofthe ob-
jective system for the designation of things. Thus the
essence of language according to Levi nas resides nei-
ther in signs nor in significations, but in the "originary
coming ofthe face-to-face with others."
The Other who origina11y is signifying alone is the
source ofa11 signification and the condition ofthe pos-
sibility ofthe very function ofthe sign. But the signifi-
cation that emanates thereby bas nothing abstract about
it; it is the indication of his or her own indigence, of
his or her distress, and hence of my responsibility for
the Other. Two types oflanguage fo11ow from this, that
which is reference to things and that which is rela-
tionship to the Other, but speaking about things sti11
always assumes speaking with others: "In designating
a thing," Levinas notes, "I designate it to an Other."
Nevertheless, there is a "language before language," a
"speech before speech," that reveals itself in the face
ofthe Other and that is the ca11 ofthe Other and salute
to the one addressed.
In Autrement qu 'etre (Otherwise than being, 1974),
Levi nas further deepens his meditation by showing that
language cannot be reduced to its function of denom-
ination. Rather, it surges through the Saying and the
Said. Instead of being simply sign or expression of a
meaning, it designates and consecrates "this here as
that there" and by this means it enters into the order of
"hearsay," of an already said. Language is this Saying
that ali together carries, is absorbed by, and inscribes
itself into the Said. Contrary to Husserl, Levi nas does
398 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
not think that the word is a simple intention, nor even
the expression of a meaning; it is literally JACQUES DER-
RIDA's "will to speak" (vouloir dire) par excellence,
which at once proclaims and consecrates what it iden-
tifies in the already said. It is in the already said that
words exercise their function of sign while the signifi-
cation ofthe Saying goes beyond the Said, beyond the
essence assembled in the Said. Duplicating the Being
that it designates and names, language is not indifferent
to this Being; it does not just Jet it be seen. Tobe sure,
the Said appears anterior to the communication and to
the representation of Being, as if, prior to the language
of humans, there was a language of Being that makes
itself heard by the voice of silence that poetry puts
into human words. But Levinas rejects the mysticism
of language, somewhat similar to his view, that Hei-
degger propagates, and pleads instead for a language
in which Saying is first and foremost testimony to and
responsibility for the Other.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER thematizes the prob]em of
language beginning from the double rootedness of his
thinking in Husserl 's phenomenology and Heidegger's
ontology and in the double tradition to which he at-
taches himself: philological and philosophical issues
from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, Husserl, and Heideg-
ger. Concerned about hermeneutica! theory, method,
and practice, his reflections bear upon every sector of
cu! ture, from art to literature and philosophy, in which
comprehension and interpretation of a MEANING that is
only given through and within the play of dialogue are
involved. Far from being reduced to the pure grasp of a
neutra! signification subsisting, so to speak, "in itself,"
as the translation of meaning from one language to
another could suggest, the act of comprehension is lit-
erally the "coming ofmeaning to language." Instead of
hiding within the pure interiority of a thinking subject
who uses language as a means of expression, meaning
inhabits the language that harbors it. The celebrated
Gadamerian formula according to which nothing can
be understood and interpreted outside the element of
language comes from this.
True to the principle ofHERMENFUTICS, Gadamer be-
gins from a critique of the concept of language as de-
veloped in a long tradition in the Occident through two
opposed approaches, the one privileging the thesis of
the unity between language and thought and the other
opposing them in a radical heterogeneity. Modern sci-
ence and philosophy ended by reducing language to a
pure symbolic form (ERNST CASSIRER) and to only see-
ing in it one mode ofrepresentation among others ora
simple means of expression, a pure instrument in the
service of a sovereign thought. Instead of considering
language as "language ofman" but following Wilhelm
von Humboldt ( 1767-1835), Gadamer judges that ev-
ery act of speaking is anchored in a language that,
rather than being an objective and indifferent system
of signs, is an "image of the world" ( Weltbild): trac-
ing the contours and the articulation of a world that
humans inhabit, language determines ali of their re-
lations to the world and of the things of the world.
Consequently, if humankind is 1anguage, language is
definitively the "1anguage of things" and the truth of
our world. Under Heidegger's influence, Gadamer thus
admits that Being is language and humans are held in
its play. It is through it and in it that reality is manifest,
it is in the dialogue that the thing changes into a spoken
thing and offers itselfto thinking.
An inextricable relation sea1s humans and language,
language and world: there is only a world for us to the
degree that it addresses itself to us and is expressed in
language. The world is not prior to its structuration in
the uni verse of meaning and language even though it
is "in enunciation that it comes to language" and be-
comes manifest for us and that it is in dialogue that
ali language has its effective reality, that the "putting
to work of the understanding" between humans is in-
stituted. If the world "in itselr' is the ground and the
te/os of our discourse, it is built up in the "commu-
nity of life" that is always already a "community of
language," both of them engendered in one and the
same historica1 genesis. Each of the languages traces
its perspectives and the "profiles" of a unique and com-
mon world; each grasps, beginning from its view ofthe
world pre-articulated in its language, the view of the
world constituted in any language other than its own.
Being at once a 1imit and an obstacle to the experi-
ence ofthe world and its support that cannot be gotten
around, language is properly the "mark of finitude,"
which reflects itself ali together in the dependence of
our speech in regard to a language, in our belonging
to a historical "community of language" and its tradi-
tions, in the belonging of ali meaning to the dimension
of language.
For PAUL RICCEUR, just as for Merleau-Ponty, lan-
 LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL
guage is an essentially philosophical stake that he ap-
proaches through the double chal/enge that opposes to
the phenomenoJogist ORDINAR V LANGUAGE ANALYSIS, on
the one hand, and ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHYand pragmatism
on the other. The detour through the science of lan-
guage is an essential move for phenomenology today
because structural linguistics has the merit of having
posited language as a system of signs defined solely by
their differences, and as an autonomous system whose
closure it postulates. This is the major challenge that
terminates the primacy and autonomy of the speaking
subject in the operation of conferring meaning. Since
the sign is no Jonger defined substantially, but in terms
of relations to other signs at the hcart of the system,
language appears as a selF5u{ficient and closed system.
Ricceur does not accept ali the presuppositions of lin-
guistic STRUCTURALISM, criticizing its misappreciating
ofthe primary intention oflanguage that intends to say
something about something. With Husserl he admits
that languagc at once expresses an ideal meaning and
a reference to the real. But it crosses two thresholds in
o ne and the same movement of transcendence: that of
the ideality of meaning and also that of reference, for
it has a grasp on reality and expresses at the same time
the hold of reality over thinking. To recognize the lim-
its of structural analysis incites the phenomenologist
to return both to the foundations of language, in order
to rethink its unitary nature, and to consider the theory
of signification afresh once more in order to put it to
the test of semiology.
Now according to Ricceur, language is based on the
fundamental distinction between system and discourse
and on the idea that language is a totality articulable in
a series of levels, each one of which is characterized
by a certain type of unity: phonemes, semantemes,
morphemes, and then utterances or sentences. While
admitting, with Husserl, the privilege ofthe signifying
function of language, Ricceur insists upon the com-
plexity of tensions through which it is exercised in
the word, the phrase, discourse, and finally the text.
Every word indicates, identifies an object, and exer-
cises an ostensive function, but a sign only becomes a
word in the position of a potential utterance, when o ne
speaks in an instance of discourse. And at the same
time the word is more than the utterance, since it sur-
vives the ephemeral moment of spcaking and returns
to the system of language at the heart of which it has
399
a use-value accumulated in the course of history. The
word is more and less than the phrase; it is like an "ex-
changer" between the system of language and the act
of speaking. In the successive occurrences- the ex-
pressions spoken on this or that occasion- a sentence
has a content of meaning that transcends the act of
enunciation in such a way that every discourse is both
realized as an event and comprehended as an identica!
signification. The latter has an objective side that is
what the utterance signifies and a subjective side that
is what the speaker means in a given situation. This
ali refers, on the one hand, to Husserl's significational
intention that constitutes language and whose decisive
moment is the ideality of meaning and its reference to
the reality of things and, on the other hand, to acts of
discourse of a speaker engaged in a relation of inter-
action. Beyond this, as we have learned from GOTTLOB
FREGE and Husserl, the objective dimension of signifi-
cation includes at once a sense and a reference, the first
immanent in language and the second belonging to the
order ofthe relations between language and world.
Not only does every expression imply a common
world without which no common language would be
possible, but the institution of this world is from the
outset inscribed in the intentiona! essence of language
with respect to which it always intends in the sig-
nification something other than itself. To reduce the
signification to the use of a word, as would LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, would abolish the signifying intention.
If structural semiotics leads to renouncing the primacy
of the speaking subject and to reconquering semantic
unity for the sake of the primacy of structure over the
process of significance- without, for ali that, juxta-
posing the openness oflanguage to the lived world and
the closedness ofthe uni verse of signs- then the con-
frontation with linguistic analysis and its difficulties
in explicating the discourse of action leads Ricceur to
caii attention yet again to the intentionallived experi-
ence and to the genesis ofmeaning. The two steps, the
semantics and the pragmatics, of action are called to
join themselves in what engages the whole of analytic
and descriptive discourse bearing upon the necessary
elements ofthe language phenomenon.
Ifthe theory ofsignification retains, for Ricceur, the
value of a decisive contribution to the philosophy of
language, he does not disdain the contributions that
he finds as much in Heidegger's ontology and in the
400 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
hermeneutics ofGadamer as in linguistic analysis. The
model oflanguage urged by Saussure, who emphasizes
the opposition of"langue" and "parole," reduces ali the
substantial aspects of language to differences and di-
acritical values in order to Iead to a system of signs
closed upon itself. Through this, the center of the gen-
esis of meaning is displaced from a "phenomenology
of speech" centered on the speaking subject toward a
theory that makes a detour through the synthesis ofthe
act of speaking with the structure of language. As the
place where this synthesis occurs, discourse not only
makes reference to the world through its utterances in
a self-referential representation, but also reestablishes
the speaker and the interlocutor in their respective ro les
and language itself in the ro le of universal "medium"
in and through which the subject asserts itself and a
world appears.
Ricceur gradually deepens his reflection on the en-
Iivening power at work in the very heart of ordinary
language. He illustrates it through the semantics ofthe
metaphoric utterance, which, under the influence of an
actual context, reveals a new signification. Even though
it can be incorporated into the lexicon ofthe language,
the metaphor does not ha ve an existence at first except
as a deviation. As a dead metaphor, it enriches the pol-
ysemy of the current means of expression and it only
lives on in its utilization and semantic impertinence.
From the metaphor as poetic word one passcs on to
ever more vast textual unities in a metaphoric discourse
that has a double reference, literal at first and then
metaphoric, that attests to the vitality of a language.
Converging with Heidegger, Ricceur asserts that the
philosophy of language is philosophy itself inasmuch
as it thinks the rclationship of being and being-said.
Elevated to a manifestation of Being, language conse-
crates the "simultaneous birth ofthe being-said ofthe
world" and the "speaking being" ofhumankind; by the
"closure oflanguage" it institutes itselfin a closed uni-
verse of meaning at the same time that it itself posits
its own opening to Being.
Another major transition leads Ricceur from the
phenomenology of language to the hermeneutics of
the text. If it is true from the linguistic point of view
that the text is no less problematic than the discourse
beginning from which he defines it, this does not hap-
pen without difficulty. Writing and reading a text is
not a particular case of oral dialogue. Rather, the text
is posited and conceived as an original possibility of
discourse, the meaning of which no longer resides in
the lived experience of the saying, but in the said;
separate from the intention ofthe author, it takes onan
autonomous life, finding itselffreed from ostensive ref-
erences to the dialogi cal situation and moving through
this as a power free to refer to a new world, to unnoticed
aspects of our being-in-the-world. Since the text is no
Ion ger addressed to a determinate interlocutor but to an
anonymous public, what it loses in situational efficacy
it gains by multiplying and diversifying the referential
possibilities. This is the triple autonomy that the text
enjoys: with regard to the author, with regard to its ini-
tial aim, and with regard to the world and the context
in which it was conceived.
Yet Ricceur sti li refuses the "ideology ofthe absolute
text" that not only suspends the relatio.1 to the world but
Iiterally abolishes it and distances itself from the event
ofthe interpretation of it. No longer seeing the hidden
intentions of the author, but rather the deployment of
the world that adumbrates itself in the very structure
of the text, interpretation thus acquires an objectivity
that is usually denied. Rather than a "work on the text,"
interpretation is, according to Ricceur, "the act of the
text itself." If READING is in a sense the appropriation
of the text, it engagcs in a disappropriation of the
self of the reader- albeit without the listening to the
text having to change into an unreserved obedience-
on the condition that it agrees to play the dialectica!
game ofbelonging and distantiation that hermeneutics
teaches.
The confrontation with analytic philosophy, which
has its center of gravity in the sphere oflanguage usage,
quite naturally imposes itself on a theory of discourse
that itself takes its point of departure from the utter-
ance. Careful to establish fruitful exchanges between
the phenomenological approach and pragmatic and an-
alytic philosophy, Ricceur in turn enters into the privi-
leged field of exploration that is the theory of ACT ION,
which must investigate the manncr in which acting
is "said" and is described by revealing the aspects that
permit treating it on the "model ofthe text." For what is
accomplished by action is detached from the immediate
situation of enacting in the same way as what is said is
detached from the dialogical situation. The encounter
between two concurrent approaches - one of which
insists on the meaning of lived experiences and their
 LANGUAGE IN HUSSERL
"sayability," while the other puts the stress on propo-
sitional utterances and already given expressions -
is, Ricceur is convinced, profitable to both, which can
mutually correct and enrich themselves thereafter. The
phenomenology oflanguage has thus progressively led
Ricceur to a hermeneutics of symbols understood as
signs in a double sense, then to a hermeneutics of
the text, and finally yields a hermeneutics of action.
Ricceur thus unceasingly moves through this vast field
of investigation on the horizon of which stands the
"great philosophy of language" that our epoch needs
- and that it attempts to actualize, with whatever de-
gree of success, along li nes that sometimes converge
and sometimes diverge.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Apel, Karl Otto. Transformation der Philosophie, /. Sprach-
analytik, Semiotik. Hermeneutik. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1973.
Ammann, Hermann. Die menschliche Rede. Vols. 1 and 2. T.
Lahr i. B., 1925-27.
Biemel, Walter. "Diehtung und Sprache bei Heidegger." Man
and World 2 ( 1969), 487-514.
Biihler, Karl. Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfimktion der
Sprache. Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1965.
Derrida, Jacques. La voix et le phhwnu?ne. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967; Speech and Phenomena.
Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Grundziige
einer Philosophischen Hermeneutik. Tiibingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1960; Truth and Method. Trans. Garret Bardin and
John Cumming. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
- . "Mensch und Sprache." In his Kleine Schriften. /.
Philosophie. Hermenutik. Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972,
93-100.
- . Kleine Schriften. III. Idee und Sprache. Plato-Husserl-
Heidegger. Stuttgart: J. C. B. Mohr, 1976.
Greisch, Jean. La parole heureuse: Martin Heidegger entre
les choses and les mots. Lausanne: Beauchesne, 1987.
Gusdorf, Gcorges. La parole. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1953.
Heidegger, Martin. Vortrăge und Auf.~ătze. Pfullingen:
Neske, 1954.
- . Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; On
the Way to Language. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York:
Harper & Row, 1971.
Jaeger, Hans. Heidegger und die Sprache. Bern: A. Francke,
1971.
Kelkel, Arion L. La legende de /'etre. Langage et poesie chez
Heidegger. Paris: J. V rin, 1980.
Kockelmans, Joseph J., ed. On Heidegger and Language.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
Kusch, Martin. Language as Calcu!us vs. Language as Uni-
versal Medium. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishcrs,
1989.
Lester E_mbree, El~zabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algts M~ekunas,lltendr~ Nalh Mohanty, Thomns M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academtc Publishers.
401
Levi nas, Emmanuel. Totalite et infini: Essai surl'exteriorite.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961; Totalitl' am/Infinit\':
An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso. Lingis. Pitts-
burgh: Duqucsne University Prcss, 1969.
- . Autrement qu 'etre ou au-dela de 1'essence. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; Otherwise than Being or Total!\'
Other than Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. The Hagu~:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
- . Noms propres. Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1976.
Lohmann, Johannes. "Martin Heideggers ontologische Dif-
ferenz und die Sprachc." Lexis 1 ( 1948), 49-106.
Maldiney, Henri. Aitres de la /angue et demeures de la
pensee. Lausanne: L' Age d'homme, 1975.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Sur la phenomenologie du lan-
gage." In his Signes. Paris: Gallimard, 1961, 105-22; "On
the Phenomenology of Languagc." In his Signs. Trans.
Richard C. McCleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1964, 84-97.
-.La prose du monde. Paris: Gallimard, 1969; The Prose of
the World. Trans. John O'Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1973.
- . Le visible et 1'invisib/e. Ed. Claude Lefort. Paris: Galli-
mard, 1964; The Visible and the Invisih/e. Trans. Alphonso
Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1968.
Ricreur, Paul. Le conflit des interpretations. Essais
d 'hermeneutique /. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970; The
Conflict of Interpretations. Trans. Don Ihde. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- . La metaphore vive. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975; The
Rufe o{Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinwy Studies ofthe Cre-
ation of Meaning in Language. Trans. R. Czerny and J.
Costello. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- . Du texte a l'action: Essais d 'hermeneutique II. Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1986; From Text to Action: Essavs in
Hermeneutics. II. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B.
Thompson. Evanston, IL: Northwcstern University Press,
1991.
- . Hermeneutics ami the Human Sciences: Essavs on Lan-
guage, Action and lnte1pretation. Ed. and t~ans. John
B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs.
Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluss an
Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
- . Antwortregister. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994.
ARION L. KELKEL
Universite de Paris VIII
(Transl. Lester Embree)
LANGUAGE IN HUSSERL A complex pheno-
menological philosophy of LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL
has evolved, but the thought of EDMUND HUSSERL is
central to this evolution, his inherently remarkable
thought preparing for the mutations that his successors
402 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
bring about by reinterpreting his basic theses. Initially
Husserl treated the problem of language as a logician
more than as a philosopher. With John Stuart Miii and
GOTTLOB FREGE he recognized the need for a reflection
on language prior to one on thought. In order not to
be a private phenomenon without objective validity,
thought needs to be uttered, and in order to be utter-
able and communicable, it must color itself somehow
in the fonn of an expression. AII thought worthy ofthe
name is given in and through language. Acts of pure
thinking are never experienced, only acts ofuttering.
Phenomenology forbids recourse to linguistic, his-
torical, psychological, or any other objective theory
and requires describing ~ without presupposition or
prejudice ~ how we live language in speaking and
hearing others speak naively and spontaneously. lnas-
much as speaking is to express oneself about some-
thing, eventually addressing oneself to somebody,
Husserl 's reftections in the Logische Untersuchungen
( 1900-190 1), especially the First and Fourth Investiga-
tions, pursue a Bedeutungslehre, a theory of expression
and signification. By means of a series of reductions
and progressive differentiations, he elucidates these
two terms that, as a rule, apply only to the linguistic
sphere and broadens them to cover ali acts of con-
sciousness ofthe sort he calls signifying or intentiona!
acts. He starts with a double reduction: since expres-
sion always supposes an intention of signifying that
"animates" the sensuous phenomenon with which it is
mysteriously united and to which it gives life, there is a
reduction ofthe sensuous aspect, on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, there is a provisional suspension of
the communicative function of language.
Every verbal expression belongs to the category of
sign, and language is defined by its semiotic function,
the power of humans to create and institute signs, to
comprehend and interpret them. There are two types of
signs: those that are called indications, which provoke
gestures, attitudes, practica! behaviors, reactions, etc.,
and those called expressions, which call for the pro-
duction of other signs, awaken thoughts, images, sen-
timents, etc. The indication is not "in itself' a sign; it
does not express anything because it does not transmit
anything that corresponds to an intention. The expres-
sion, however, is always a significant sign and the signi-
fication ofthe expression is always what a discourse or
somebody means. lndications do not express anything
~ or at least they do not as such perform the function
of signification, which happens in the act of speaking.
Contrary to MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, Husserl does not
think that speaking is a sort of gesture or that the verbal
expression is a sort ofindication, even ifthe expression
indirectly indicate.1· the speaker's lived experience and
a content of signification.
Every sign is a sign of something, it is defined by its
referential function; as an artificial and arbitrary sign,
the word and what it signifies are interrelated within
the same unity o/intentiona! consciousness, which re-
sults from an empirica! and contingent association. But
the sign truly fulfills its function as sign only when it
effaces itself, so to speak, before that which it signifies
so well that, paradoxically, the indispensable physical
face of the sign does not comprise its essence. Taken
in themselves, signs ~ the printed word or the sound
heard ~ are simply perceived objects, shapes traced
on paper or sounds vaguely heard. As soon as the per-
ceived sign takes on its function as significant sign,
however, our intention goes through it to bear exclu-
sively upon the object intended to in the act bestowing
the signification. With an "unreadable" or difficult-to-
decipher handwriting, when 1 begin to comprehend, 1
no longer see the black marks traced on the paper, or
even the letters; through them 1 intend what they sig-
nify. The sign never plays its role better than when it
ceases to be a pure sign in order to refer beyond it-
self to a sense, an object, a state of affairs. Likewise,
the corporeal expressions that externalize sensations,
sentiments, and emotions (a face that is called "expres-
sive") are not expressions in the strict sense ofthe term
because they lack the intent to signify; they signify
something only on the condition that one interpret~
them and to the extent that a specific act imposes a
signification upon them. This is why mimicry, plays
ofphysiognomy, and gestures, which are not animated
by an emphatic intent to signify, are excluded from
language.
That every speech is, either actually or potentially, a
speech addressed to others, that every locution is inter-
locution and elocution, does not imply that words that
accompany gestures and even are phonetic gestures
behave like simple gestures. Speaking and hearing are
correlative and communication is an eminent function
of human language. In order for an other to compre-
hend it, speech needs the mediation ofthe physical face
 LANGUAGE IN HUSSERL
of Janguage: when I hear the other, I only perceive the
sounds that he or she emits directly, the objective cor-
poreal aspect of speech, while the subjective aspect, the
intentiona) acts by which the speaker gives meaning to
the signs that he or she produces, are not present, just
as mine are not for the other. This is the irreducible
limit of otherness.
Yet when I grasp the other's expression as speech
addressed to me, 1 must perceive the o ne who speaks as
a person who does not emit incomprehensible sounds
or cries, but speaks to me and intends to communi-
cate a message to me, and in return, must treat me as
a person with whom he or she is able to enter into
interpersonal relations. According to Merleau-Ponty,
relations of reciproci~v are thus established in which
the one who speaks and the one who hears join to-
gether in sharing the meaning of speech exchanged to
such an extent that one cannot say whether it belongs
to the one who speaks or to the one who Iistens.
Nevertheless, the suspension ofthe communicative
dimension is justified by the fact that the word ceases
to be a word, the expression of a signification, at the
very moment when interest is directed at the sensuous
aspect, at the purely phonic or acoustic phenomenon.
To pay too much attention to accent, to intonation, to
the rhetorical elements of speech, is tantamount to tak-
ing the risk that the MEANING that it conveys will escape
me or will be hidden under pragmatic, illocutionary, or
gestural elements. Monologue shows that to communi-
cate with others is not the sole function oflanguage, for
in thinking, which is a way of speaking to oneself, I do
not communicate anything to myself and 1 do not need
to have recourse to signs even though it can happen,
in a pathological state ofauditory-verbal hallucination,
that l speak to myself as an other.
The word that one recognizes as such, the same
word that is not confounded with the multiplicity of
sensuous occurrences, is thus not reducible to the pure
physical phenomenon. lf a linguistic sign is not identi-
fiable and recognizable in its form despite and through
the diversity of elements of it that can vary, it can-
not fulfill its function. To do so, it must remain the
same and be repeatable as such, despite its deforma-
tions by various speakers. The identity ofthe sign and
the word is something ideal and owes nothing to their
empirica) and real existence. Nevertheless, the ideal
identity holds above ali for the signification that sub-
403
sists through and despite the diversity of the real acts
conferring signification. This is not in contradiction
with the jluctuation in the meaning of words, since if
the signifying acts can vary, the ideal unities of sig-
nification in between which the acts oscillate remain
invariant and identica) to themselves. On this condition
the interlocutor comprehends a speech in the same way
as the locutor.
The unity and identity of the signification is con-
firmed even in the case of expressions whose significa-
tions change according to the context ofthe utterance,
not in a fortuitous but in an essential way, as happens
in expressions called subjective and essentially occa-
sional, such as expressions whose signification varies
according to the person to whom o ne addresses oneself
or according to the situation and interlocutive context:
personal pronouns, demonstratives, adjectives, and ad-
verbs of place and time, ali of which imply a deictic
function. They ha ve nothing Jess than an identica) core
of meaning that is a general referential function con-
sisting in naming the immediate context of discourse.
This category of expressions raises a crucial problem
for the theory of Janguage because there are many of
them in ordinary Ianguage. They do not depend solely
on the interlocutive context; even the signification of
objective expressions can vary as a function of circum-
stances, as is shown by impersonal utterances such as
"it is raining," "it is cold," to which the qualification
"today" or "here and now" is added tacitly. What varies
and changes in function ofthe situation is not the sig-
nification, which remains identica) in its generality;
rather, it is the signifying intention. The signification
of most ordinary words is determined by context and
appears to fluctuate according to circumstances, but
the fluctuation is ascribable to the subjective acts of
signifying, not to the signification in itself. Without
the ideal identity of significations, ordinary Janguage
itself could not function, nor could any communication
between humans through Janguage take place without
naive confidence in the univocity ofthe words founded
uponit.
The ideality and objectivity of the signification is
such that Husserl even speaks of "significations in
themselves," as Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) had
spoken of "truths in themselves," the difference being
that ideality for Husserl has neither a normative sense
nor the sense of an ideal Janguage a la Leibniz, i.e., a
404 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
language with significations that are perfectly univo-
cal and determinate once and for ali. For Husserl this is
an absurd hypothesis, for the ideality oflanguage only
permits comprehending how, despite the fluctuation
of signifying acts, significations remain communica-
ble and objective and not purely subjective and subject
to the circumstantial hazards of the speech act. The
ideality ofthe signification is no more in contradiction
with the contingency of the subjective act of speaking
than with the change in the meaning of words during
the course of the history of a language. The significa-
tion of the words of a language does not exhaustively
reduce to the psychological, sociologica!, historical,
or pragmatic circumstances oftheir use. When one in-
quires into the meaning of a word, what o ne most often
has in view is not the word pronounced hic et nunc,
nor is it the fortuitous act of signifying. One intends
the signification ofthe word as such.
Ideal objectivity is not the privilege of the signi-
fications of scientific utterances. It is essential to ali
the formations of meaning and works of culture that
Husserl also qualifies as "ideale Sinngebilde." These,
in order to be what they are, must bc comprehensible
by anyone, expressible in discourse, and translatable
from one language to another. The ideal objectivity
of significations is the condition for their communi-
cability. Every language is built up entirely beginning
from such ideal objectivities. Each word only comes
but ance into the language; it is the element ofthe iden-
tica] meaning intended in innumerable expressions in
which it can take part. In fact, the word enjoys a triple
ideality.
( 1) On the level of expressian as such, on the level
of its phonological and graphic structure, and inside
a historical language, each word is unique and not
confused with any of its utterances. The speaker or
reader recognizes it each time as the same word, even
though its semantic content varies from one locutor to
another, from one employment to another, from one
context to another.
(2) On the semantic level of"the unity ofsignifica-
tion," the word intends an identica! content ofmeaning
across expressions belonging to different languages or
across its different usages. The ideal identity ofthe sig-
nification is again what assures its translatahility and
its reiterability in multiple occurrences in which the
word takes part, ali the while being independent ofthe
subjectivity of the subject and of the particular speech
act.
(3) On the third level, which no longer actually
concerns language as such, the ideality is that of the
abject or intended state of affairs. This is empirically
conditioned as much by the perceptual acts of appre-
hension as by the two strata of ideality and by the
objective reality itself. It follows that the signification
of a word is never absolutely translatable nor commu-
nicable withaut remainder; various intuitive acts may
be able to fulfill the intention of signification in var-
ious situations, but these fulfillments coincide neither
necessarily nor perfectly due to the fact that the ideal-
ity of the meaning of language is of the same kind as
what Husserl calls "bound" in opposition to the "frec"
idealities (logical-mathematical formations): they al-
ways make reference to an empirica! subjectivity and
are linked to some particular spatiotemporal territory.
Every expression not only has its signification, but
also relates through it to the objects that it names-
this actual psychic Erlehnis, that real state of affairs,
or this or that situation that it renders in somc man-
ner manifest. In an optative utterance there is "partial
coincidence" between the desire as abject, as signified
by the utterance, and the desire expressed as subjective
lived experience. In this case, the signification is the
desire thought about, signified by words, not the de-
sirefelt. This is the distance that separates the gestural
language of animals, to which some claim to reduce hu-
man speaking, from discursive language, the essential
moment ofwhich is the uttered signification.
A widespread notion claims to reduce language to
its sole metaphoric function and to assimilate significa-
tion to the images that the word eventually evokes, as
if comprehending an expression came down to finding
the images that relate to it, and failing to do so would
render the expression empty of meaning and incom-
prehensible -~as if the signification of a word were
nothing other than the image ofthe matter designated.
This hypothesis is denied by a large part of abstract
vocabulary, even the most common of our everyday
languages (science, government, freedom, differential
calculus). Husserl refutes it as part ofthe nominalistic
tradition that reduces the signification to the word it-
self, for to comprehend a word without thinking ofthe
matter it represents is to have before the mind not the
simple linguistic sign, but the singular act that confers
 LANGUAGE IN HUSSERL
its signification and its reference to the object upon it.
To deprive a word of its function of signifying is to
remove its character as a name and to reduce it to a
mereflatus vocis.
The expression always intends an object, a state of
affairs, and by means of its signification it names it,
but it does not, in the proper sense ofthe word, express
it. The relation between words and things has some-
thing mysterious about it and one can legitimately ask
whether or not there is correspondence between the ex-
pressive acts and the intuitive or perceptual acts through
which the designated object can be grasped. Everything
happens as ifthe word comes tobe placed on the object
perceived, as if it comes to makc up part of it. Yet for
Husserl, it is not the words and the things that enter
into relation, but the expressive acts and the acts of in-
tuitive fulfillment in which things present themselves.
And ifthe act ofsignifying harbors a reference to the
object, provided the intention to signify animates the
linguistic signifier, discourse occurs, even ifthe inten-
tion is neither fulfilled nor confirmed by an intuition.
That is how one can speak without knowing or see-
ing. Thus signifying does not imply, either necessarily
or in essence, the perception of the object, and lan-
guage fulfills its significational function regardless of
the real object that it refers to. Utterances bearing upon
a perceived object are perfectly independent ofthe per-
ception that 1 ha ve of it and can be comprehended by an
interlocutor who does not have the object designated
before his or her eyes. An expression is speech only if
it can be comprehended in the absence of the object,
outside of its real presence. But to pass from the per-
ceived "white color" to the utterance "this is white"
adds nothing to the sense-content ofthe perceived, nor
does it deform it. Every sense perceived, remembered,
or imagined is susceptible of being expressed- this
is the universalizable sayability of the sense- but to
be the object of discourse, the sense must be registered
in the order of linguistic signification.
To use an expression "meaningfully" and to relate
to the object that it represents is one and the same
act, whether the intended object is real or fictional.
In return, to posit that only the expression that relates
to a real object is endowed with signification is to
posit wrongly that an expression to which no real ob-
ject corresponds is devoid of signification. To identify
signification and real object would come down to ban-
405
ishing most of the expressions of ordinary language
(metaphors such as "mountain of gold") as devoid of
signification. That there is a genuine difference be-
tween signification and intended abject is attested to by
the very existence ofthe plurality ofhuman languages
with phonetically dissimilar expressions but equivalent
significations. Beyond this and contrary to an old and
purely taxonomie notion, a language is not uniquely
composed of common nouns designating objects and
conveying significations that are independent, quasi-
self-sufficient, while others (e.g., prepositions) that are
dependent are not meaningful except as "composed
with" autonomous significations.
Finally, the last major thesis of Husserl 's the-
ory of language: no matter how intimate the con-
nection between language, grammar, and LOGIC. we
must guard against confusing them. The often evoked
logical-grammatical parallelism between concepts,
judgments, reasonings, and their forms of grammatical
expression does not exist either in fact or in principle.
It would be naive to seek a logica! distinction behind
every explicit grammatical distinction even though the
alliance is close between acts of thinking and acts of
speech. For there to be discourse, it is nevertheless
necessary that the elements making it up are arranged
in conformity with certain rules in order to form a
unity of signification. Every language is based upon
such a logical-grammatical system. It is not so much
that there is a strict correspondence between the gram-
matical structure of discourse and the logica! structure
of thought as it is unnecessary to presuppose the ex-
istence of an ideal, thoroughly logica!, language that
must serve as a model for ali empiricallanguages. No
language is more logica! than another, no one obeys
better than another the logical/aws that determine the
correctness of thought.
But in every language there is something like an a
priori architecture, an "ideal armature" that ali natu-
ral languages more or less imperfectly incarnate, for
the grammatical rules they obey do not result from the
pure and simple application of logica! laws, but rather
from their long and confused histories. They were born
in great part from the hazards of circumstance, from
the manifold cultural and historical inftuences that they
undergo. Every language includes a predetermined sys-
tem of categories of signification by virtue of which a
word is a noun, a verb, an adjective, an adverb, etc.,
406 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and also includes the laws that regulate the possibil-
ity or impossibility of combining such significations
and such words; it thus establishes the conditions for a
coherent discourse, the purpose of which is the intel-
ligible expression and communication of a meaning.
The pure logica! grammar that Husserl conceives of
and relates to the tradition of grammaire gimerale et
raisonnee has as its goal to specify the conditions for a
discourse to be a genuine discourse- to define "rules
of coherence," independent of the intended objective
reality, to determine which combinations of words be-
longing to different categories do not occasion any
genuine signification, even if the combined elements,
taken one by one, are perfectly supplied with meaning.
Breaking with his initial thesis, Husserl insists in
his last writings on the signifying act as such and its
incarnation in acts of effective speech. He writes of
"spiritual corporeality," holding that like the objectiv-
ity of the meaning, language is founded in a historical
intersubjectivity and that the linguistic expression is
always doubly enrooted, i.e., in the subjective acts of
the speaker and in the significations already instituted
and sedimented in the language the speaker speaks and
actualizes through his or her speech. The speaking sub-
ject is no longer the passive witness ofthe emergence
of significations in the act of discourse nor the disin-
terested spectator assisting at the genesis of sense in
the objective structures instituted without and indepen-
dent ofthe speaker. Meaning engenders itselfin living
speech by the institution of new unities of meaning;
it is aii at once the presence of an already constituted
sense and the genesis of a sense constituting itself. But
like every formation of sense, language is rooted in
the LIFEWORLD and is founded in predicative and pre-
predicative experience of this lived world that is as
much subjective as intersubjective. Thus Husserl re-
covers the speaking subject and his or her Lebenswelt
that from now on is a world constituted by and within
language.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bachelard, Suzanne. La /ogique de Husserl: Etude sur
"Logique forme/le et /ogique transcendentale . .. Paris:
Presscs Universitaires de France, 1957; A Study of
Husserl:~ Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Lester
Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1968.
Cairns, Dorion. "The Ideality of Verbal Expressions." In
Phenomeno/ogy: Continuation and Criticism. Essavs in
Memory of Dorian Cairns. Ed. Fred Kersten and Ri~hard
M. Zaner. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, 239~50.
Cunningham, Suzannc. Language and the Phenomeno/ogi-
ca/ Reductions of Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1976.
Derrida, Jacques. La voix et le phi!11omene. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967; Speech and Phenomena.
Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwcstern Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
-."La forme et le vouloir-dire. Note sur la phenomenologic
du Jangagc." In his Marges de la phi/osophie. Paris: Edi-
tions du Minuit, 1976; "Form and Meaning: A Note on thc
Phenomenology of Languagc." In his Margins o[Phi/os-
ophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Univcrsity of Chicago
Press, 1982.
Edie, James M. "Husserl's Conception ofthe Ideality ofLan-
guage." Humanitas Il (1975), 201-17. .
- . Speaking and Meaning. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1976.
Eley, Lothar. "Logik und Sprache (Husserl)." Kant-Studien
63 (1972), 247--60.
Frege, Gottlob. "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung." Zeitschrififilr
Phi/osophie und phi/osophische Kritik 100 ( 1892), 25-50.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Outlines of a Theory of 'Essentially Oc-
casional Expressions.'" In his Marginal Consciousness.
Ed. Lester Embree. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,
1985.
Hiilsmann, Heinz. Zur Theorie der Sprache hei Edmund
Husserl. Munich: Pustet, 1964.
Husserl, Edmund. Vor/esungen iiher Bedeutungs/ehre. Som-
mersemester 1908. Ed. Ursula Panzer. Husser/iana 26.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
-. "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als
intentional-historisches Problem." Ed. Eugen Fink. Re-
vue Internationale de Phi/osophie 1 ( 1939), 203-25; rpt.
in his Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenscha.fien und
die tranzendenta/e Phănomeno/ogie. Eine Ein/eitung in
die phănomeno/ogische Philosophie. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Husserliana 6. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954, 365--
86; "The Origin of Geometry." In The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An lntro-
duction ta Phenomeno/ogica/ Phi/osophy. Trans. David
Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestcrn University Press, 1970,
353-78.
Hutcheson, Peter. "Husserl and Private Language," Phi/oso-
phy and Phenomeno/ogica/ Research 42 ( 1981 ), 118-28.
Katz, Jarold J. Language and Other Abstract Ohjects. To-
towa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981.
Mohanty, J. N. Edmund Husserl:~ The01y of Meaning. The
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- , ed. Readings an Edmund Husserl\· "Logica/ lnvestiga-
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Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. Bedeutung, Sinn, Gegenstand. Studien
zur Sprachphi/osophie Edmund Husser/s und Richard
Hănigswa/ds. Bonn: Bouvier, 1967.
Pos, Henrik J. "Phenomenologie et linguistique." Revue In-
ternationale de Phi/osophie 2 ( 1939), 354--63.
Reeder, Harry P. Language and Experience. Descriptions
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ology/University Press of America, 1984.
Rica:ur, Paul. "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language." In
Phenomenology and Exdentialism. Ed. N. Lee and M.
Mandelbaum. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University
Press, 1967,207-17.
Welton, Donn. "lntentionality and Language in Husserl's
Phenomeno1ogy." Review of Metaphysics 27 ( 1973-74),
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- . The Origins of Meaning. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1983.
ARION L. KELKEL
Universite de Paris VIII
(Transl. Lester Embree)
LAW Most of the relationship of phenomen-
ology and law has been tangential rather than substan-
tive because principal figures in the phenomenological
movement ha ve either been content merely to refer to
law in passing or because, when giving it more de-
tailed attention, they have done so in other contexts
and for different purposes. EDMUND HUSSERL is an ex-
ample of the former, and for the latter one can think
of MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's varied comments about
law in the framework of politics and language, and
ALFRED scHuTz's remarks about law in terms of sub-
jective and objective meanings of group categories.
Only occasionally have anything like full-fledged phe-
nomenologies of law appeared.
The relationship between phenomenology and law
has also been tangential in the reverse direction, i.e.,
in the ways that diverse legal philosophers outside
the movement have found some inspiration in it for
their understanding of law. For instance, certain Latin
American legal philosophers have appropriated MAX
SCHELER's and NICOLAI HARTMANN'S phenomenoJogies
of objective values. This group includes the Spanish-
Mexican jurist LUIS RECASENS SICHES, who has tried to
square the objectivity of legal values with the his-
toricity of the ideals they embody, and the Argen-
tinean philosopher, CARLOS coss1o, who has tried to
blend phenomenological and existentialist thinking
with Hans Kelsen's (1881-1973) nea-Kantian "pure
theory" oflaw to developa view oflaw as "egological
object." Cossio 's ma in interes! is judicial decis ion mak-
ing, but his analyses are not much different from what
one finds in the work of philosophers and jurists well
outside phenomenology such as Roscoe Pound ( 1870-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
407
1964), Benjamin Cardozo ( 1870-1938), Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes Jr. ( 1841-1935), and Lon Fuller (1902-
1978).
Philosophers outside the phenomenological move-
ment ha ve also found inspiration in it in terms of the
"nature of things" (Natur der Sache) view of law.
Rooted in the 19th century, though mainly developed
in France and Germany after World War II, this the-
ory sought to avoid both legal positivism and natural
law theories. lts practitioners held that judges should
be guided by the "nature of the thing" to which legal
norms are applied and that a proper appreciation ofthe
former should shape the latter. The Natur der Sache
approach to law is mosi closely associated with Gus-
tav Radbruch ( 1878-1949) in Germany and Franc;ois
Geny ( 1861-1959) in France, whose work embodies
the "nature of things" view without the explicit labei.
Their work actually had very little to do with pheno-
menology, but, following them, WERNER MAIHOFER did
make much more use of phenomenology and also de-
veloped a much more expansive use of this approach
to law.
Rejecting existential thinkers who isolate the indi-
vidual and insist on an extreme individualism, Mai-
hofer argues for a contrasting solidary view ofthe self.
With this change in view, the Natur der Sache view
of law becomes a tool for constructing a fu ture world
worthy of being lived. Correlatively, for him, despite
the original intentions ofthe Natur der Sache view, the
latter leads to natural law theory conceived not as ide-
ology, but as a utopia- a picture of a fu ture existence
worth striving for. Unhappily, though, the Natur der
Sache view has not always avoided discrediting ide-
ologies. As Wolfgang Friedmann has pointed out, this
view was used by the West German Supreme Court
in 1953 to argue that, under the Bonn Constitution of
1949, it was in the "nature of things" that the husband
represent the family to the "outer world" and that the
wife 's proper sphere is the "inner order" of the hom~.
(Maihofer himselfsharply criticized this decision.)
There are diverse other ways in which legal philoso-
phers outside the phenomenological movement have
been influenced by it. Much of this work has been
published in France, Germany, ltaly, and Latin and
South America; for a bibliography, see Paul Amse-
lek Methode phenomenologique et theorie du droit
(Phenomenological method and legal theory, 1964)
408 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and Simone Goyard-Fabre. But as Amselek has com-
plained, much of this work is valueless because the
word "phenomenology" is used only as a convenience
tabel rather than as a way to give us any insight into
what an adequate phenomenology of law might be.
For that one has to consult the works of Amselek and
Goyard-Fabre themselves, as well as those of a hand fut
of other philosophers.
In the beginning of the phenomenological move-
ment, GERHART HUSSFRL, son ofthe founder and a lawyer
in his own right, contributed severa! works on philos-
ophy and law. But the most important early work in
the fie)d came from ADOLF REINACH, a Jeader in REALIS-
TIC PHENOMENOLOGY. In "Die apriorischen Grundlagen
des biirgerlichen Rechtes" ( 1913), he explores the sig-
nificance of the promise for understanding civil law
- say, in interpreting contracts. He considers that a
promise already has a pre-legal essence because it is
an example of social acts in which it is already situ-
ated. He goes on to develop an ontology ofthose social
acts through which legal norms are created, though his
ma in interest is in the legal objects of those acts- for
example, property, claims, duties, etc.
For Reinach, these legal objects are not timeless en-
tities such as Platonic forms. Rather, they are tempo-
ral objects subject to creative and destructive acts. He
wants to inquire into the essential laws- the essences
-of, say, property, that guide such acts. Or again, it
is part of the essence of a claim that it can be satisfied
in a limited number of ways- by being waived, ful-
filled, or disavowed. Thus something essential about
the nature of claims controls the positive law in terms
of the ways that claims can be terminated. Of course,
positive law might interfere in relationships that make
up the essence of some legal object such as property
or claims. It might decide that, say, claims under wills
would not be honored if the heir murdered the testa-
tor to get the inheritance. But such possibilities only
show, for Reinach, how the positive law depends on
an essential law and that the latter would prevail in the
absence of the former. There is an a priori ontologica)
law expressed in the legal object such as a claim that
the positive law finds rather than invents.
A priori legal structures thus underlie social acts.
Social acts are rather like processes, as Stanley L. Paul-
son has nicely argued, and legal nonns in any given
legal system are the analogous products that embody
the a priori legal structures. For instance, there is an a
priori essence of correlativity such that social acts that
generate legal norms will ha ve their discussion of cor-
relativity ofrights and duties governed by that a priori
essence.
One example that Reinach considers is the concept
of obligation as it obtains in the law of contract. Here
there is a correlativity controlled by a priori ontologica)
laws that makes possible the obligation and the claim
embodied in the social act of contracting. Positive law
does not create the correlativity, but rather discovers it.
One illuminating aspect ofReinach 's descriptions of
the social acts through which legal norms are created
is the issue ofhow the social acts involved differ from
commands. Acts, he tells us, are either spontaneous
or nonspontaneous. The former he further divides into
the internat and the social, and within both categories
there is a further distinction between those necessarily
referring to another person and those not so. Issuing
commands does necessarily involve such a reference,
and commanding is a social act that also requires com-
munication. Such acts ha ve purposes that are objects of
the acts, but not purposes achieved through their mere
performance. Legally issuing norms, on the other hand,
achieves its goat simply through their enactment. What
had been unregulated is now regulated. For instance,
Section One of the German Civil Code provides that
"the legal capacity of an individual begins at birth."
No one here is being commanded at any future time,
and the legal norm does not depend on a command for
its being and validity.
A second major essay in the phenomen-
ology of law consists of PAUL AMSELEK 's Methode
phenonu?nologique et theorie du droit ( 1964 ). The book
seeks to avoid alt the unhelpful "phenomenological"
excurses into law mentioned above by limiting itselfto
a pure description of the ei dos of law and situating it
onan existential plane-the relationships people have
with it. The author sees a close analogy here both with
Kelsen's "pure theory" of law- i.e., law purified of
any politica) ideology- and with Husserl's struggle
to distinguish phenomenology from psychology.
For Amselek, the eidos of law has three kinds of
elements. First, there are generic norms that are nei-
ther mental representations nor pure concepts. Rather,
they serve as existential models for human conduct by
permitting law to serve certain social aims. Law as a
 LAW
nonn is seen as a tool or model for measuring what is
expected in social behavior.
The second kind of element in the essence of law
consists of specific norms that are ethical in character,
and that take on the function of commands. By "ethi-
cal" Amselek does not mean to defend one normative
ethical theory rather than another or, still less, to at-
tempt a fusion of law and morality as in natural law
theories. Rather, the meaning is that human beings ha ve
a self-directive capacity unshared by other life forms
and inanimate objects, and ethical norms in law guide
our autonomous actions. Such norms are oftwo kinds,
those that are imperative and those that are permissive.
Although Amselek admits that it is odd to talk of per-
missive commands, he insists that both permissive and
imperative norms are commands because both instruct
us to do or to abstain from doing something.
Insofar as the command theory goes, Amselek
agrees with Kelsen, but he also disagrees with the lat-
ter's view that law consists of orders to officials to
impose punishment for breaches of law. Legal norms
do not present themselves to us as coercive, but they
do manifest themselves as compulsory. Law is compul-
sory because. Reinach notwithstanding, ali legal norms
are commands of public officials to direct human be-
havior. This is in fact the third kind of eidetic element
that law possesses.
SIMONE GOYARD-FABRE's Essai de critique phenomen-
o/ogique du droit (Essay in phenomenological critque
of law, 1970) offers us another substantive essay in
the phenomenology of law. She agrees with Amselek
that human behavior is thoroughly regulated by law,
and that law is neither a mere surface phenomenon in
society nor an ensemble ofideas. Rather, law envelops
us; it is a modality of human life. And she also shares
his desire to get inside law rather than discuss it from
the outside, to trace the origin of the phenomenon of
law to its roots. For this to occur, we must first bracket
previous theories of law to prepare the ground for a
pure description of the legal world. Then we must ef-
fect a critica! reduction to uncover the principles and
foundations of law. This second task is a reflective
scrutiny of the legal world and its ultimate source in
consciousness.
For Goyard-Fabre, phenomenological description
of law reveals it as a normative order that has an ap-
titude for organizing and regulating society. Law re-
409
places mere aggregations of people with their associ-
ation as citizens. With this legal expression of public
order, people are no longer independent entities ex-
isting partes extra partes, but members of an organic
whole with powers, rights, and obligations. Legal nor-
mativity presents itself to us both as organizational
structure and prescriptive injunction. It is not identica!
to moral normativity, but rather has a factual existence
in and through the ways that legal texts and judgments
are applied to facts to create a normative order. The
phenomenon tobe studied is therefore sociallife itself.
The phenomenon of law provides the abject of the
science of law, and this topic in turn leads Goyard-
Fabre to a discussion of Kelsen 's theory. She is in-
spired by the latter, but ultimately refuses to endorse
it because of obscurities in his concept of the "basic
norm" ( Grundnorm) for establishing legal validity. She
prefers instead the radicality of Husserl's phenomen-
ology, which better permits us to grasp the foundations
oflaw through an eidetic analysis ofthe essence ofthe
juridica!. She wants to pursue a genealogy of law in the
same sense that Husserl sought a genealogy of logic in
his Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ).
One valuable aspect of Goyard-Fabre's objective
descriptions of "le phenomene juridique" consists of
her rejection ofthe command theory oflaw endorsed in
different forms by John Austin, Kelsen, and Amselek.
She rejects the command theory for reasons much the
same as those used by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of
Law (1961 ). For instance, she argues that pennissive
norms are not, as against Amselek, commands because
we do not live them that way, and it is misleading to
describe them as such. Law does not manifest itself
to us as an imperative so much as it does as advice.
It expresses what deserves to be in order to regulate
appropriate behavior.
For Goyard-Fabre, as for Husserl, descriptions of
the phenomena lead back to an examination of our
consciousness of the phenomena, and it is this turn to-
ward the reflective attitude that allows us to attain the
foundation of law and understand the final reason for
its dynamic and structure. In other words, from pure
description we proceed to a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
Ol.OGY ofthe legal by seeking the transcendental func-
tion of consciousness that makes law possible. This
turns out to be the interna! teleology of consciousness
that drives us toward order. The normative structure
410 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
of consciousness is such that there is a basic need for
order, which, although never complete, unavoidably
imposes itself upon life. Positive law is its concrete
expression: it makes explicit reason 's transcendental
lawgiving power just as, correlatively, we find in law,
the fundamental legal dimensions of consciousness.
The original need for order is the source for law as
well as the first pure expression of the juridica!.
Two other major phenomenological incursions into
law go in opposite directions. The first is WILLIAM A.
LUIJPEN's Phenomenology of Natural Law ( 196 7). This
book attempts to defend natural law against legal pos-
itivism and bases its case on an EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY construed broadly enough to include the
works of not only MARTIN HEIDEGGER, but also Soren
Kierkegaard. Luijpen argues that we have an implicit
knowledge of justice revealed by the natural light of
reason. This traditional concept of lumen naturale is
described, however, in Heideggerian terms as "uncon-
cealment," "disclosure," etc. What is disclosed is that
we ha ve a pre-thematic awareness of justice grounded
in our perception of human beings as being-for-the-
other. Furthermore, this being-for-the-other is a pos-
ture of love that is described as an acknowledgment
of the other's rights as subject. The essence of inter-
subjectivity contains at least the demand that we have
to-be-for-the-other.
For Luijpen, founding a legal order is the first step
toward effectively humanizing many forms of coexis-
tence or - to use the Hobbesian metaphor of which
he is fond- taming the "wolf' of barbarism within
us ali. The positive law is created to proiect our ability
to affirm the other as subject, and this law in turn is
grounded and justified by its minimum content of jus-
tice, i.e., its ability to keep us from destroying the other.
Justice and law both originale from love, understood
as the way one subject can be oriented to another.
But such an approach leaves obvious problems not
adequately dea It with here. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's Critique
de la raison dialectique ( 1960), for example, gets crit-
icized because it does not ascribe any meaningfulness
to love in constructing a genuine intersubjectivity. But
what about legitimate conflicts ofinterest and different
perceptions of the demands of justice, which make up
much of the daily life of the law and politica! debate,
and for which appeals to being-for-the-other seem par-
ticularly unhelpful?
It is also the case that, as Luijpen points out, the le-
gal order itself can degenerate and yield the possibility
of human destruction. This is the subject of the last,
and most interesting, part ofthe book. Here the author
discusses war and peace, just war theories, and a de-
fense of the view that nuclear wars can never be just.
This part ofthe text can be understood and appreciated
independently of what preceded it because it neither
relies on nor embodies any phenomenology.
The last major phenomenological incursion into law
is ]argeJy unknown. It is HERBERT SPIEGELBERG's Gesetz
und Sittengesetz (Law and moral law, 1935). Only its
preface has been translated into English (by E. F. Car-
ritt at Oxford in 1939). This work was written in 1931
and 1932 and submitted as the author 's Habilitations-
schrift to become a Privatdozent in the University of
Munich. However, the Nazi takeover of 1933 prevented
the examination from taking place and Spiegelberg
went to Zurich, where the book was eventually pub-
lished. Within the context of a REALISTIC PHENOMEN-
OLOGY, Spiegelberg delineates no fewer than sixteen
different meanings of norms organized in fi ve broad
categories: those that refer to the MEANINGs of concrete
objects, states of affairs, logica! functions, and episte-
mological concepts, and finally those that explain these
others in everyday language. He defends this phenom-
enal diversity against Kelsen 's theory, which reduces
ali meanings of legal norms to commands. In arguing
that the command theory is unhelpful for understand-
ing various senses of legal norms, Spiegelberg gives
us an early example ofwhat would be discussed much
]ater in The Phenomenological Movement ( 1982), i.e.,
opposing the phenomenologist's restorative brush to
the tradition 's reductivist razor. In this context he also
praised Reinach 's work on law as the only work that
transcends the unilluminating tradition of legal theory.
To conclude, there are in the English-speaking
world today at least three philosophers doing work in
the phenomenology of law. NEIL DUXBURY completed
his doctoral dissertation on Reinach at the London
School ofEconomics in 1985 and is interested in prob-
lems of law and power as discussed in critica] legal
studies. In "Towards a Phenomenology of Legal Think-
ing" (1992), MICHAEL SALTER tries to investigate the es-
sential structures of legal thought. He bases his study
on a HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY. Such thinking,
he tells us, provides us the legal forms through which
 LAW
we understand our experience ofvarious legal phenom-
ena and institutions: courts, legislatures, positive law,
etc. We are then in a position to judge the adequacy of
those institutions in the light ofthose experiences.
Salter 's phenomenology of legal thinking is part of
a broader plan to produce a phenomenology of legal
experience in general. He considers, and intends to
show, that his results will diametrically oppose those
of analytical positivism in Austin and Hart, Kelsen's
pure theory oflaw, and various thinkers associated with
legal realism in America and Scandinavia.
Lastly, WILLIAM s. HAMRICK has contributed a num-
ber of papers as well as An Existential Phenomen-
ology of Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty ( 1987). That
work tries to develop the main outlines of an EXIS-
TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY of Jaw within the context of
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY'S phenomenoJogy of the SO-
cial world. He seeks to answer two main questions.
First, if Merleau-Ponty had written a phenomenology
oflaw, what would it have looked like? And second, if
his phenomenological descriptions of the social world
are correct - as the author argues that they mostly
are- what are the philosophical consequences for an
adequate understanding oflaw? The answer to this sec-
ond question involves comparing and contrasting what
Merleau-Ponty himself says about law with the views
of severa! thinkers mentioned above, as well as others
in mainstream legal philosophy.
In the course of describing the origin of law and
its essential structures, law and society, and law and
morality, Hamrick shows, among other things, how
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language can ex-
plain Hart's view of law as a combination of primary
and secondary rules while also transcending Hart's
positivism. This accomplishment disproves Roscoe
Pound's assertion (in his Jurisprudence) that pheno-
menology is unimportant in the philosophy of law
because its work had already been done by the rule
skeptics of American legal realism.
Looking to the future, there are severa! important
tasks fac ing phenomenologists oflaw. On the one hand,
they need to consolidate the gains they have made in
order to determine whether the phenomenon of law
can best be described within the context of existen-
tial phenomenologies and/or from the perspective of
philosophers such as Husserl and Reinach. Freed from
the allegiances ofprevious generations to one camp or
411
the other, it may be possible now to combine the best
insights ofboth in a more adequate synthesis.
Second, these revised descriptions should take into
account discussions in the philosophy of law over the
last two decades or so about a number of important
issues. These include the relationship ofrules and prin-
ciples- e.g., in Ronald Dworkin 's criticisms of legal
positivism. There is also a good deal of contemporary
skepticism about the possibility of the objectivity of
justice and the existence of law at ali as opposed to
different types of power struggles - as one finds in
a variety of critica! legal theorists and postmodernists.
And third, there are POSTMODERNISM's attacks on the
universality ofreason underlying the project ofmoder-
nity in fa vor of a reason more limited to ("embedded"
in), and not valid outside, particular historical contexts.
In the legal world as well, such criticisms are crucial
sin ce from them stern conceptions of rights and respon-
sibilities and the treatment of prisoners.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Amselek, Paul. Methode phenomenologique et theorie du
droit. Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence,
1964.
- . "The Phcnomenological Description of Law." Trans.
Raoul Mortley. In Phenomenology and the Social Sci-
ences. Ed. Maurice Natanson. Voi. 2. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1973, 367-449.
Cossio, Carlos. "Phenomenology of the Decision." Trans.
Gordon Ireland. In Latin-American Legal Philosophy. Voi.
3. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948, 343-
400.
Friedmann, Wolfgang. "Phenomenology and Legal Science."
In Phenomenology and the Social Sciences. Ed. Maurice
Natanson, Voi. 2. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1973, 343--65.
Goyard-Fabre, Simone. Essai de critique phenomenologique
du droit. Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1972.
Hamrick, William S. An Existential Phenomenology o{Law:
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1987.
Luijpen, William A. Phenomenology of"Natura/ Law. Pitts-
burgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1967.
Maihofer, Wcrner. Le droit naturel comme depassement du
droit positi{. Paris: Archives de philosophie du droit 8,
1963.
-."Ideologic und Naturrecht." In Ideologie und Recht. Ed.
Wcrner Maihofer. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostcr-
mann, 1969.
Paulson, Stanley L. "Remarks on the Concept of Norm."
Journal of" the British Society for Phenomenology 21
(1990), 3-13
Reinach, Adolf. "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des
bUrgerlichen Rechtes." Jahrhuch fi"ir Philosophie und
412 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phănomenologische Forschung 1 (1913), 685 847; rpt.
in his Gesammelte Schrifien. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921;
also rpt. under the title Zur Phănomeno/ogie des Rechts.
Munich: Kosel- Verlag, 1953; 'The Apriori Foundations
of Civil Law." Trans. John F. Crosby. Aletheia 3 (1983),
1-142.
Salter, Michael. "Towards a Phenomenology oflegal Think-
ing." Journal o{the British Societyfor Phenomenology 23
(1992), 167-82.
Spiegclberg, Herbert. Gesei:: und Sittengeset::. Strukturan-
a~vtische und historische Vorstudien ::ur einer gesetzes-
.fi"eien Ethik. Zurich: Max Niehans, 1935.
- . Sol/en und Diilfen: Philosophische Grundlagen derethis-
chen Recl1te und Pffichten [written 1934--37 as a follow-up
to Gesetz und Sittengesetz]. Ed. Karl Schuhmann. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
- . The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical !ntro-
duction. 3rd rev. and cnl. ed., with the collaboration of
Karl Schuhmann. Thc Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
WILLIAM S. HAMRICK
Southern l/linois University
EMMANUEL LEVINAS Levinas was born in
Kaunas (Lithuania) on January 12, 1906 ( or, according
to the Julian calendar that was used then, on Dccember
30, 1905). His parents were practicing Jews and mem-
bers of an important Jewish community in which study
ofthe Talmud was practiced ata high level. As a child,
Emmanuel learned to read the Bible in Hebrew, while
Russian was the language in which he was educated.
This enabled him to read the great novelists and po-
ets Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc., writers
who, together with Shakespeare, remained important
to his thinking. In 1916, during World War I, the family
moved to Kharkov in the Ukraine, where Emmanuel
attended high school and experienced the upheaval of
the Revolutions of February and October 1917.
In 1920, the family returned to Lithuania. In 1923,
Emmanuel travelled to Strasbourg, where he matricu-
lated at the university, after having studied Latin for one
year. In his autobiographic "Signature" (1963/1966)
as well as in the interview Ethique et infini ( 1982),
he mentions Charles Blondei ( 1876-1939), Henri
Carteron, Maurice Halbwachs ( 1877-1945), and Mau-
rice Pradines ( 1874--1958) as the four professors who,
for him, embodied ali the virtues ofthe French univer-
sity. These years also mark the beginning ofhis lifelong
friendship with Maurice Blanchot.
Having obtained his License in philosophy, on the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
advice ofGabrielle Pfeiffer, with whom he !ater trans-
lated Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931 ], Levi nas be-
gan his study of EDMUND IIUSSERl's Logische Unter-
suchungen ( 1900--1901 ). Phenomenology, and espe-
cially the analysis of INTENTIONALITY and its horizons,
revealed entirely new ways ofthinking, different from
intuition, induction, deduction, or dialectics. He de-
cided to write a dissertation on Husserl's theory of
intuition and spent the academic year of 1928-29
in Freiburg im Breisgau, where he gave a presenta-
tion in one of Husserl 's last seminars. It was MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER, however, who, through his Sein und
Zeit ( 1927) and his teaching, impressed Levi nas as the
greatest innovator and a great thinker on the level of
Plato and KANT. In 1929, Levinas attended the famous
encounter between ERNST CASSIRER and Heidegger in
Davos, where he explained parts of Sein und Zeit to
some French scholars. After returning to Strasbourg, he
defended his dissertation, La theorie de l'intuition dans
la phenomenologie de Husserl ( 1930), which received
a prize from L 'Institut. This book had been preceded by
a long review article on Husserl 's Ideen zu ei ner reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913) in the Revue Philosophique de la France
et de l'Etranger ( 1929). Through these and !ater publi-
cations on Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas introduced
phenomenology to JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and other key fig-
ures ofpostwar philosophy in FRANCE.
Levinas became a French citizen in 1930; he mar-
ried, performed his military service in Paris, and began
to work at the school of the Alliance Israelite Uni-
verselle in Paris. This institution was a center that
strived to emancipate Jews from countries around the
Mediterranean, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,
Turkey, Syria, etc., through education. At the Sor-
bonne, Levinas attended the courses of Leon Brun-
schvicg ( 1869-1944) and ~ though irregularly ~ the
famous lessons of Alexandre Kojeve ( 1902-1968) on
HEGEL 's Phănomenologie des Geistes. at the Ecole des
Hautes Etudes. There he also met Sartre, Jean Hyppo-
lite ( 1907-1968), and other future celebrities. He also
participated in the monthly soirees of GABRIEL MARCEL.
In his early Parisian years, Levinas began writing a
book on Heidegger, but abandoned this project when
Heidegger became involved with the Nazis. A frag-
ment ofthe book, "Martin Heidegger et !'ontologie,"
possibly the first essay on Heidegger in French, was
 EMMANUEL LEVINAS
pub1ished in 1932. His next essay on Heidegger did
not follow until 1948 and was the Spanish transla-
tion of a paper that Levi nas had given in 1940 to the
students of Jean Wahl ( 1888-1974) at the Sorbonne.
The French text appeared in 1949 in a collection of
Levinas's articles on phenomenology, En decouvrant
l"existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Discovering ex-
istence with Husserl and Heidegger, 1949; augmented
edition, 1967).
Levinas's first thematic essay, "De l'evasion," was
published in 1935. In retrospect, the central question of
his ]ater work can be recognized in it: is it possible to
transcend, in thinking, the horizon ofBeing? Although
the question was not expressed in a polemic way, this
essay was a first attempt by Levinas to wrestle free
from Heidegger's ontology (as Levinas consistently
ca lis Heidegger's "thought of Bcing").
In 1939, Levinas was called to serve in the war,
where he functioned as an interpreter of Russian and
German, and in 1940 he became a prisoner ofwar. As a
French officer, he was not sent to a concentration camp
but rather to a military prisoners' camp where he did
forced labor in the forest. During his captivity he also
read and discussed Hegel, Proust, Diderot, Rousseau,
and others. Most members of his family in Lithuania
were murdered by the Nazis. According to his own
words, the forebodings, the reality, and the memory
of the holocaust have always accompanied Levinas's
thinking.
His first personal book, most of which had been
written during his captivity, appcared in 194 7, shortly
after the war had ended. lts title, De l'existence a
l'existant (From existence to the existent), clearly pro-
claims the need for a thought bcyond onto1ogy; it re-
verses the orientation of Heidegger's thought, which
aims to transcend the "metaphysics" ofbeings (Seien-
des, l'etant, l'existant) to Being (Sein, etre, existence).
Levinas points to another transcendence: the Good
commands an exodus beyond the limits of Being. This
book had bcen preceded in 1946 by the publication of
a fragment of it under the title Ii y a. The expression "il
y a" translates from the German es gibt (there is), but
it receives an interpretation that is very different from
Heidegger's: rather than the generosity of a radical
giving, il y a is the name of a dark and chaotic in-
determinacy that precedes ali creativity and goodness.
However, it was not until the 1951 article "L'ontologie
413
est-elle fondamentale?" that Levinas presented an ex-
plicit critique of Heidegger's enterprise.
In the context of postwar EXISTENTIALISM, where
Marcel, Sartre, Camus, and others determined the
philosophical scene, Levinas's first thematic publica-
tions went almost unnoticed, duc perhaps to their orig-
inality and extreme difficulty. But another publication
of 1947 drew more attention. On the invitation of Jean
Wahl, professor ofphilosophy at the Sorbonne and di-
rector ofthe parauniversitarian Ca/lege Philosophique,
Levi nas gave a series offour lectures on "Time and the
Other" (Le temps et l'autre) during the academic year
of 1946--4 7. The text of these lectures was published
in the same year as part of a collective book entitled
Le choix, le monde, l'existence (Choice, world, exis-
tence ). Despite its sti li partially experimental character,
it already expressed the core of ali of Levinas's ]ater
work: the Other is the center, and TIME, as the ultimate
horizon, determines the relations between the Other
and the self.
Until 1961, Levinas was known as a specialist in
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, but his
modest number of publications in the fie1d of phi-
losophy was no reftection of the fact that one of the
most important thinkers of the century was preparing
an impressive oeuvre. His contributions to philoso-
phy seemed far outweighed by his numerous essays
on questions related to Jewish spirituality. Given his
involvement in the education of foreigners at the Al-
liance's school, of which he had become the director
in 194 7, and the fact that he did not hold an academic
position ata French university, his inftuence in philoso-
phy was limited, as compared to his growing impact in
the field of Jewish studies. After the war, he studied the
Talmud under some ofthe best scholars and, in 1957,
began giving a series ofTalmudic lessons of a personal
nature at the annual colloquium of Jewish intellectuals
who use the French Janguage. His philosophical fame
was, however, established when he published Totalite
et infini: Essai sur l'exteriorite ( 1961 ). This book was
the ma in thesis that he presented for his doctorat d 'Etat,
while the collection ofhis already published philosoph-
ical works was accepted as the complementary thesis.
Soon his international fame led to many invitations
and prompted an overwhelming number of papers on
his philosophy. In 1961, Levi nas became professor of
philosophy at the University of Poitiers and in 1967
414 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
he was appointed to the University of Paris-Nanterre.
From there he moved to the Sorbonne (Paris IV) in
1973, where he became an honorary professor in 1976.
He died in Paris on December 25, 1995.
Totalite et infini proposes a revolution, not only in
phenomenology, but with regard to the entire history
of European philosophy, from Parmenides to Heideg-
ger. It even contains a critique ofthe whole ofWestern
civilization, marked by the spirit ofGreek philosophy.
Western thought and practice are ruled by a desire for
totalization; an attempt is made to reduce the uni verse
to an originary and ultimate unity by way of panoramic
overviews and dialectica] syntheses. This monism must
be criticized in the name of a thought that starts from
the phenomena as they present themselves. Such a cri-
tique meets old traditions ofthought that reach back to
Biblica] and Talmudic sources, but it is also perceptible
in Plato and Descartes. Against such a Western "total-
itarianism" Levinas maintains that the human and the
divine Other cannot be reduced to a totality of which
they would only be elements. A truthful thought re-
spects the nonsynthesizable "separation" that charac-
terizes the relations between the Other and me, or-to
borrow the terminology ofPlato 's Sophist- it respects
the irreducible non-identity of the Same (tauton) and
the Other (to heteron). The Same is clearly connected
to the traditional subject, the EGO or consciousness of
modern philosophy, a subject for whom the totality
of beings is spread out as a panoramic uni verse, but
the Other is associated with the Infinite. Whereas the
category of totality summarizes the way in which the
ego inhabits the world- its worldly economy- the
infinite names the Other's ungraspable or incompre-
hensible character. "The Other" is in the first place
the other human being 1 encounter; in a !ater develop-
ment it also stands for God. Levinas refers to the third
of Descartes's Meditationes de philosophia prima for
a formal analysis of the relation that simultaneously
links and separates the Infinite and the ego, whose
consciousness originarily contains "the idea of the In-
finite" and thus thinks more than it can fathom. His
own, more concrete approach is given through a pheno-
menology (or "transphenomenology") of the modes in
which the human Other is revealed to me. The Other's
face or speech (or any other typically human aspect that
manifests the Other) is revealed as a refutation of any
totalitarian or absolutistic fonn of economy. Thus the
Other presents him- or herselfneither as a phenomenon
in the normal sense of phenomenology, for which ali
phenomena belong to wider horizons, nor as a being
within the totality of beings. "The face" transcends ali
phenomenality and beingness and is, in this sense, "in-
visible," other than being, "ab-solved" and "absolute."
The ego's contact with the Other's face or speech is in-
comprehensible but not unreal. It cannot be expressed
in an ontologica] framework; the description must also
use an ETHICAL terminology. To encounter another is to
discover that I am under a basic obligation: the human
Other's infinity reveals itself as a command; the fact
of the Other 's "epiphany" reveals that I am his or her
servant.
The intentiona! ( or rather quasi-intentional) analy-
sis of the relation between the other and me reveals
an asymmetrical relationship that precedes every pos-
sibility of choice or decision. Thc tension between this
asymmetry and the economy ofthe ego 's enjoyment of
the WORLD is unfolded in analyses of ali the topics of
20th century philosophy such as ACTION, freedom, LAN-
GUAGE, BODY, PERCEPTION, VALUE, WOrk, HISTORY, )ove,
death, etc., and many consequences for a radical trans-
formation ofphenomenology are made explicit. In con-
stant discussion with Heidegger, Levinas struggles to
developa non-ontologicallanguage in order to express
the beyond ofBeing, but, in doing so, he uses that very
same language to overcome it. This struggle continues
to lead in a direction that can already be perceived in
those parts ofthe book that were written last.
After 1961, Levi nas produced a considerable num-
ber of texts in which his second magnum opus was
prepared. This was published in 1974 under the ti-
tie Autrement qu 'etre ou au-dela de 1'essence (Other-
wise than Being or beyond essence). Clearer than De
l 'existence a 1'existant and Totalite et infini, this ti-
tie, a double translation of Plato 's characterization of
the Good as "beyond the ousia," declares its inten-
tion to overcome ontology. Surprisingly new descrip-
tions of Being, interest, sensibility, language, ethics,
etc., are given. The asymmetrical relation between the
Other and me is further analyzed as contact, being
touched, proximity, vulnerability, responsibility, sub-
stitution, being a hostage, obsession, and persecution.
Time is analyzed as radical diachrony. The unchosen
character of responsibility is unfolded as a passivity
more passive than the passivity that is opposed to ac-
 EMMANUEL LEVINAS
tivity. "Me voiei" (see me here; here I am) is shown to
precede any self-consciousness, and God is referred to
as having passed into an immemorial past, a passing
that has left a trace from which the human Other rises
up as primary command.
The difficulty with any attempt to think beyond Be-
ing !ies in the philosophical unavoidability of a the-
matizing language. In thematizing the asymmetry of
substitution, Levinas's text betrays the non-objective,
nonthematic and non-ontologica! nature ofthat asym-
metry. The resulting incongruency is made explicit in
the distinction between the Saying (le Dire) and the
Said (le Dit). Philosophy produces instances of the
Said, but every Said is preceded and transcended by a
Saying, to which the Said must be brought back. This
reduction refers all philosophical texts to the proxim-
ity of "the-one-for-the-other." If philosophy is !ove of
wisdom, it is also, and primarily, the wisdom of !o ve.
The fact that Levinas not only published agreat deal
on topics related to Judaism, but writes on God and RE-
LIGION in his philosophical work too has induced some
interpreters to think that Levinas offers a masked the-
ology instead of a phenomenologically rooted philoso-
phy. Difjicile liberti? (Difficult freedom, 1963), Quatre
lectures talmudiques (Four talmudic lectures, 1968),
Du sacre au saint (From the sacred to the saint, 1977),
and L'au-dela du verset (Beyond the verse, 1982) show
his attachment to the Talmudic tradition; De Dieu qui
vient a l 'idee (Of God who came to the idea, 1982)
is an example of his philosophical concern about the
question of God. Levi nas, however, and without ever
denying his roots, always insists on the phi1osophi-
cal character of his work designated as such. In his
philosophical studies he operates in a manner simi-
lar to Descartes, Hegel, or Heidegger; even when he
quotes from the Bible, his argumentation does not ap-
peal to extraphilosophical authorities. All people able
to read his texts are invited to validate the truth of his
arguments on the hasis of their own experiences and
thought. However, as a language that strives for uni-
versality, philosophy does not exclude the explicit and
implicit thoughts of particular traditions and spiritual-
ities.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bemasconi, Robert, and David Wood, eds. The Provocation
415
of Levinas: Rethinking the Other. New York: Routledge,
1988.
Bemasconi, Robert, and Simon Critchley, eds. Re-reading
Levinas. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1991.
Burggraeve, Roger. Emmanuel Levinas: Une bihliographie
primaire et secondaire (1929-1985) avec complement
1985-1989. Leuven: Peeters, 1990.
Chalier, Catherine, and Miguel Abensour, eds. Emmanuel
Levinas. Paris: L'Heme, 1991.
Cohen, Richard, ed. Face to Face with Levinas. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1986.
Greisch, Jean, and Jacques Rolland, eds. Emmanuel Levi nas:
L 'ethique comme philosophie premiere. Paris: Du Cerf,
1993.
Levinas, Emmanuel. La theorie de l'intuition dans la
phenomenologie de Husserl. Paris: Vrin, 1963; The The-
ory of!ntuition in Husserl:~ Phenomenology. Trans. Andre
Orianne. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1973.
- . De l'existence a l'existant. Paris: Fontaine,1947; rpt.
1978; Existence and Existents. Trans. Alphonso Lingis.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
- . Le temps et l'autre [ 194 7]. Montpellier: Fata Morgana,
1979; Time and the Other. Trans. Richard Cohen. Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.
- . En decouvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
Paris: Vrin, 1949; 2nd ed. 1967.
- . Totalite et infini: Essai sur l'exteriorite. The Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1961; Totality and Jnfinity: An Essay on Ex-
teriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969.
- . Difficile Liberte: Essais sur le Judăisme. Paris: Albin
Michel 1963; 2nd ed. 1976; Dijficult Freedom: Essays
on Judaism. Trans. Sean Hand. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991.
- . Humanisme de l'autre homme. Montpellier: Fata Mor-
gana, 1972.
- . Autrement qu 'etre ou au-dela de l'essence. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Thc Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981.
- . De Dieu qui vient a !'idee. Paris: Vrin, 1982.
- . Hors sujet. Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1987; Outside the
subject. Trans. Michael Smith. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1994.
- . Entre nous: Essais sur le penser-a-l'autre. Paris: Grasset,
1991.
- . Col/ected Philosophical Papers. Trans. Alphonso Lingis.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Llewelyn, John. Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of
Ethics. New York: Routledge, 1995.
Peperzak, Adriaan. To the Other: An !ntroduction to the Phi-
losophy ofEmmanuel Levinas. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue
University Press, 1993.
- , ed. Ethics as First Philosophy. New York: Routledge,
1995.
Wyschogrod, Edith. Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem ofEth-
ical Metaphysics. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
ADRIAAN PEPERZAK
Loyola University o{ Chicago
416 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
LIFEWORLD See WORLD.
LITERATURE Literature reflects the entire
spectrum of human experience, presenting abundant
themes for phenomenological investigation. Immedi-
ate, lived experience of literary works can be studied
as a particular variety of aesthetic experience. Pheno-
menology can clarify the essential features of literary
works as one class of aesthetic objects; it can inves-
tigate the character of subjective acts through which
literary works are created, read, interpreted, and en-
joyed; it can consider the import of a given work as an
expression ofhuman experience, a particular record of
human concerns; it can attend to the same work as rep-
resenting a particular historical world in which human
beings have found themselves situated.
The immediate experience of litera ture, moreover,
raises issues of more general nature. As linguistic com-
positions, literary works invite reflection upon the gen-
eral nature ofLANGUAGE in its various functions and its
overall significance within subjective experience. As
expressions of human subjective life, works of liter-
ature direct us to the widest questions of subjective
and intersubjective experience. As representations of
specific historical and cultural worlds, literary works
solicit attention to the import ofthe experienced woRLD
as the all-encompassing horizon of existence. As tex-
tual accomplishments crcated and read within preestab-
lished cultural settings, works of literature spur reflec-
tion upon the force of historical traditions, the chal-
lenges of interpreti ve understanding, and the continuai
exchange ofreceived and novel conceptions ofhuman
existence.
Given this range of possibilities, there is no single
phenomenological philosophy of literature; rather,just
as the history ofthe phenomenological movement fea-
tures a variety of developments beyond the work of
EDMUND HUSSERL, phenomenological studies of litera-
ture reflect these developments. Husserl himself, aside
from occasional references to litera ture, never pursued
a detailed theory ofliterature. Nevertheless, his pheno-
menology provides conceptual and methodological re-
sources that others ha ve utilized, in a variety of ways,
for the study of literature.
Of ali these thinkers, ROMAN INGARDEN'S work
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. C/aude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
is most representative of a distinctively Husserlian
phenomenological philosophy of literature. Although
his work, compared to Husserl 's !ater work, re-
flects a sensibility more attuned with REALISTIC PHENO-
MENOLOGY, his analysis of the literary work recalls
Husserl 's demand for rigorous criticism of subjective
experience as a field of intended MEANING. Ingarden ap-
proaches the work strictly as it is intended in experience
and articulates a general ontology ofthe work's partic-
ular manner of being. In this regard, his project uses
EIDETIC METHOD on the work as a "purely intentionat
object." Through adoption of a phenomenological ap-
proach, he resists the metaphysical presuppositions of
idealism and realism. The literary work, phenomeno-
logically clarified, is neither a purely ideal object nor
a purely real object. The experienced work is intrinsi-
cally tied in its meaning to the phonetically "material"
textures of language; therefore, its being falls short of
the pure ideality of a mathematical object, a meaning
that completely transcends the empirica! reality of the
language that expresses it. On the other hand, because
the work is experienced as a formation of meanings,
representing ideal, imaginative, or fictive entities, it is
irreducible to the phonetic material of its signification.
Existing purely as intended, the work remains bound
to the empirica! reality ofits expressive language, even
as it partially transcends the physical being of a book
or the phonetic sounds recorded in it. Hamlet remains
forever in Denmark, though my copy of Hamlet is lost
and my recitation ofhis soliloquies forgotten.
As a purely intentiona! object that cuts across the
distinction between real and ideal objects, the work
exists "heteronomously," governed both by the inte-
rior subjectivity of the reader and the intersubjective
linguistic scheme of the text. As heteronomous, the
work resists categorization either by positivistic or psy-
chologistic approaches. As a purely intentionat object,
the work exists exclusively through inward, subjec-
tive experience of its meaning, a fact that positivism
is ill equipped to reconcile. However, as a formation
of meanings governed by a scheme of significations
independent of any individual subjectivity, the work
resists psychologistic reduction to the psychic experi-
ence of an author or a reader. The work, as a theme of
experience governed by a textual scheme, transcends
the psychic experience of the subject, even as it is
made present only through the experience of a read-
 LITERATURE
ing or writing subject. Neither ideal nor real, reducible
neither to individual psychic experience nor to the em-
pirica! existence of a series of linguistic utterances,
the literary work is an essentially intersubjective phe-
nomenon. Tied as it is to a sequence ofpublicly acces-
sible linguistic significations, the work as experienced
is a correlation of the individual streams of experience
of author and reader.
Ingarden's aim is to clarify the interplay ofthe var-
ious correlations between real, linguistic significations
and ideal, represented meanings; between the given
scheme of the work and the subjective experience of
that scheme; and between the author's and reader's
streams of subjective experience. To trace these cor-
relations as they contribute to the overall import of
the work, he describes the work as a structure of var-
ious strata of meaningful contents. As heterogeneous
elements of the work, these strata articulate the lev-
els of meaning unified through the sequential read-
ing ofwords, sentences, chapters, and so on. Ingarden
distinguishes four basic strata: ( 1) the stratum of ver-
bal sounds, phonetic formations, and so forth, which
serves as the empirically real basis of significations;
(2) the centrally important stratum of semantic units
of MEANING: the meanings of sentences and groups of
sentences, which serve as basic "building blocks" of
representational meaning; (3) the stratum of"schema-
tized aspects" of represented objects, in which, aspect
by aspect, detail by detail, through the correlation of
"semantic units" ofmeaning, particular represented ob-
jects are schematically brought to appearance; and (4)
the stratum of fully realized represented objects and
states of affairs, encompassing the "finished" import
of the work, brought to maturity as representing an
entire fictional "world." At this final level of accom-
plished meanings, the "serious" work, at least, conveys
its philosophical or metaphysical import. Here, how-
ever, before this notion of strata, a note of caution is
needed. Over the course of reading, the work is experi-
enced not as a piecemeal collection ofthese strata, but
as an orchestrated, "polyphonic" unity of meanings.
Analytically discrete, each stratum is essential to the
experienced meaning of the work, but the work itself
is experienced polyphonically, as a unified formation
of meanings.
This brings us to the manner in which the work is in-
tended by the reading subject. When reading a work of
417
fiction, the reader adopts an attitude of"quasi-belief" in
the states of affairs represented in the text. The declara-
tive sentences in a literary work are not regarded as ex-
pressing genuine judgments about the actual world, but
"quasi-judgments" about a fictional world. The reader
bestows upon the represented objects, characters, and
events a character of reality short of genuine reality;
the reader maintains an attitude of "make-believe" as
he or she attends to the sequence of significations that
express the meaning ofthe work. Reading amounts to
a reorchestration in IMAGINATION of the strata of mean-
ings originally assembled in the work by its author.
Therefore, Ingarden distinguishes the work from any
one ofits individual readings, or "concretizations." The
work itself is a merely schematic formation of mean-
ings riddled with "places of indeterminacy." Just as
perception of the actual world is at best incomplete,
dependent upon limited perspectiva! views of the per-
ceived object, literary description is never complete,
however copious a descriptive style is employed by an
author. An objectivity portrayed in the work- a thing,
a person, a city, and so forth- is portrayed schemat-
ically, through a finite series of represented aspects.
The reader thereby supplements the author's original
scheme of meanings, imaginatively completing those
aspects ofthe work that remain vague, ambiguous, un-
fulfilled, or only partially fulfilled.
This notion of concretization replies to the problem
of the plurality of interpretations. Each concretization
of the work is unique, but given the inherent inter-
subjectivity of the work as a linguistic scheme, any
particular concretization can be weighed for its rel-
ative accuracy. The work attains, to some degree, an
independent, public, and objective existence. lts degree
of determinacy depends upon its linguistic grace and
the coherence it achieves as an orchestration of mean-
ings. Although the reader follows a scheme laid out by
the author, it is a mere scheme; sites of indeterminacy
inevitably disturb the agreement between concretiza-
tions, and the agreement achieved between author and
reader is no exception. Relatively determinate as a rep-
resentational and expressive scheme, the work tran-
scends each concretization, including that which the
author realizes in the moment of creation. The finished
work subsists as an intersubjective scheme of poten-
tial experiences, a perpetually nascent formation of
meanings. The work is fulfilled in numberless related
418 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
concretizations, mediated through the intersubjective
adjudication of language.
While Ingarden's analyses focus upon immediate
experience of the work, other thinkers have turned
to literature as an occasion for raising questions of
somewhat wider scope. Philosophers associated with
HERMENEUTICAL and EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY ex-
tend their analyses beyond the range of traditional aes-
thetic problems. These thinkers give primary emphasis
to reflection upon the basic conditions of human ex-
istence. Therefore, philosophy of literature is attuned
to the existential significance of litera ture as a cultural
enterprise of se! f-definition and self-determination.
MARTIN HEJDEGGER's work is chiefly concerned with
issues of FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY; phenomenoJogical
reflection is geared toward the origins of humanity's
inherent understanding of Being. According to Hei-
degger, human existence is essentially endowed with
a grasp of the meaning of Being, however vague that
grasp remains; therefore, human existence is essen-
tially interpretive: understanding ofBeing already im-
plies interpretation of Being. Heidegger examines the
conditions under which Being is interpreted and the
ways in which this interpretation is borne out in human
affairs. None the least of these affairs is the creation
of works of art, includ ing literary works of art. Hei-
degger's work has therefore exercised considerable in-
fluence in 20th century literary theory. We may briefly
distinguish two aspects of Heidegger's thought that
bear relevance to the philosophy of litera ture.
The first ofthese is a general theory of interpretation
articulated in Sein und Zeit ( 1927), a theory seminal to
the overall development of HERMENEUTICS. Hermeneu-
tics seeks to clarify the nature of interpretive under-
standing in general and the interpretation of linguistic
texts in particular. In this context, the works of HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, PAUL RICCEUR, Hans Robert Jauss, and
Mari o J. Val des are worthy of mention. Each of these
thinkers has adopted Heidegger's basic orientation, in
order to present more detailed theories of textual inter-
pretation. They share a sensitivity to the idea that in-
terpretation involves confrontation between two fields
of meaning: that which is provided by the text, and
most importantly, that which is brought to the text by
the reader. Interpretation is essentially anticipatory, in-
scribed within a structure of preestablished meanings
that Heideggercalled the "hermeneutica! circle." Since
our understanding of a text is conditioned by the man-
ner in which we anticipate its meaning, as novel, as
story, as poem, the practice of interpretation must re-
tain awareness of its own structure of anticipations.
Such awareness is not intended to cleanse interpreta-
tion of its prejudices; according to this theory, unprej-
udiced interpretation is impossible in principle. Bereft
of any preconception of what is to be interpreted, we
would find ourselves unable even to begin the project
ofinterpretation. Rather, in Gadamer's work reading is
conceived as a dialogue between text and reader, and
both text and reader contribute to a "fusion of hori-
zons" ofmeaning. Awareness ofwhat is brought to the
text by the reader is intended to heighten the sense of
confrontation between text and reader, to render that fu-
sion aware of itself for the sake of increasing the yield
of unforeseen meanings. Hermeneutica! clarification
of interpreti ve practices seeks chiefly to demystify the
practice ofreading, on the one hand, and liberate it from
misconceived ideals of objectivity, on the other. Truly
"objective" reading is that which rccognizes itself as
subjectively conditioned.
Beyond the general theory of hermeneutica! under-
standing, another aspect of Heidegger's work is rel-
evant to our theme. Heidegger turned frequently to
works of art and litera ture as expressions ofhumanity's
interpretation ofBeing. His attention to creative works
was militated by his view that Being, as the being of
beings, resists disclosure through manners ofpresenta-
tion suited for the categorization of individual beings.
Being as such, as a sense ofthe manner in which indi-
vidual beings exist, tends to conceal itself in any ordi-
nary concern for beings. The sense of Being, therefore,
must be wrested out of particular entities through a cer-
tain form of phenomenological reflection - through
attention to the manner in which beings themselves in-
dicate a particular meaning of Being. Creative works
of art and litera ture provide decisive subject matter for
this sort of reflection, for the act of creation in a given
medium is implicitly interpretive ofBeing. In any cre-
ative work, a particular interpretation of the self, the
world, and the situation ofthe self in the world is borne
out.
Works of art and litera ture created in particular his-
torical epochs serve to disclose humanity's grasp of
Being as it is interpretively understood within a par-
ticular epoch. The artistic or literary work serves as
 LITERATURE
a localized "site" of expression in which is secured a
particular presentation of a meaning of Being that oth-
erwise resists disclosure. The creative challenge ofthe
visual or literary artist is to fashion a work, in a par-
ticular medium, that brings the meaning of Being into
the open, into the world; the interpretive challenge of
the audience or reader is to approach the work thought-
fully, to "preserve" it, such that the sense ofBeing that
it discloses is further nurtured and is understood as a
disclosure of Being. Literature, for Heidegger, serves
as a critically important manifestation of humanity's
understanding of itself as existing in the world, with
Others, in a current of historical tradition, subject to
the question of its own existence.
For JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, the philosophical significance
ofliterature lies in its status as a distinctive mode ofhu-
man ACTION. According to Sartre's EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY, human beings are cast into the world in an
ontologica] situati an of radical and unconditioned free-
dom. As a being for itself, the human being exists as an
utterly indeterminate consciousness of self and world;
the human being experiences itself authentically as a
nothingness, a lack ofbeing and a desire for being. Hu-
man existence, in response to its freedom, is burdened
with a total responsibility to choose itself, to project
the manner in which it will pursue its being. The de-
cision to write, to express one's situation through the
creati an of literary works, represents a specific variety
of this "fundamental project." The creati an of literary
works, therefore, is simultaneously an exercise in the
creation ofthe self, the definition ofthe world, and the
determinati an of values. Since literature originates in
response to the basic condition of freedom, the prob-
lem offreedom also provides the sale authentic theme
for literary expression. Sartre's own production as a
writer provides ample testimony to this view.
As a philosopher ofliterature, Sartre ca Ils for a liter-
ature of"engagement" committed to the enhancement
of humanity's self-realization of freedom. Writing is
at once a personal act ion and a politica! action .. Qne
writes for the sake of oneself, but also for the sake of
others. Writing represents a choice to confront one's
freedom effectively or deficiently, in authentic recog-
nition offreedom or in the self-deceptive refuge ofbad
faith; therefore, what is decisive in a literature of en-
gagement is the extent to which the issue offreedom is
presented as a problem. If the act of writing is to suc-
419
ceed as an authentic appropriation of freedom, then it
must result in works that engage the reader's attention
to his or her own situation as a radical responsibility
to choose. It must also caii attention to the alienation
of human freedom that results from humanity's situ-
atedness in politica! and social orders of enslavement.
Sartre believed that a literature of"extreme situations"
was best suited for pursuit of these goals. Works of
fiction should depict situations in which characters are
cast radically upon the issues of their own freedom,
their total responsibility for their being, and the con-
tinuing exigency oftheir existential choices.
Sartre's own considerable output in novels, short
stories, and THEATER reflects this sensibility, and the
same orientation can be found in the works of SI-
MONE DE BEAUVOIR. Reflection upon writing as an ex-
istential project is also the dominant motif of Sartre's
literary criticism, most fully expressed in his biogra-
phies of authors such as Charles Baudelaire, Gustave
Flaubert, and Jean Genet. MAUR! CE MERLEAU-PONTY has
also touched upon issues of literature, usually in the
context of a wider investigation into the phenomen-
ology of linguistic expression.
ALFRED SCIIUTZ and MAURICE NATANSON offer inves-
tigations of literature that reflect some of the basic
concerns of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. The Jiter-
ary work is examined as representing the lived experi-
ence of fictional human beings in fictional worlds. As
a microcosm of subjective life, the literary work of-
fers insight into the manner in which the experienced
world is constituted as a domain of typical and taken-
for-granted meanings. For Schutz and Natanson, how-
ever, the issue of meaning-constitution is understood
as a fundamental question of INTERSUBJECTIVITY. The
WORLD experienced in daily life is first and foremost a
social world; its constitution as a field of shared, typ-
ified meanings must be referred back to a fundament
of social action and interaction. On the basis of our re-
lations with one another, our share in a common stock
of knowledge, our shared language, and our mutual
recognition of one another as subjects for the world,
the mundane world attains its particular meaning for
us as the real domain of experience. The meaning-
constitution of the mundane world is a matter of on-
going, ifunreflected-upon, intersubjective negotiation.
The value of litera ture, as a theme for phenomenologi-
cal inquiry, is its capacity to reflect, in a unified field of
420 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
symbolic meanings, the originary status of subjective
and intersubjective experience. Through the reading of
the fictional work, we bear witness to the manner in
which fictional characters come to terms with them-
selves, one another, and the sense of the world that
they share. The fictional world, as a microcosm whose
meaning is constituted through and for the interaction
of fictional subjects, reflects our own constitution of
the macrocosm, the world as experienced in daily life.
Finally, the influence of phenomenological concep-
tions of literature is discemible in a variety of schools
of literary criticism. Phenomenological concerns are
recognizable within American New Criticism (Rene
Wellek studied with Ingarden), within reader response
theory (the work OfWOLFGANG ISER on READING is partic-
ularly relevant), and within the Geneva school of criti-
cism (the works of George Poulet and Jean Starobinski
are especially comparable with phenomenological ap-
proaches). Furthermore, although any detailed exam-
ination !ies beyond the scope of this survey, we must
certainly note the historical importance of the rela-
tions between phenomenological theories of literature
and the !ater theoretical movements of STRUCTURALISM,
POSTMODERNISM, and CRITIC AL THEORY. PhenomenoJogi-
caJ criticism has, perhaps, enjoyed its heyday; never-
theless, its importance within the development of20th
century literary criticism should not be overlooked.
Phenomenological philosophies ofliterature ha ve pur-
sued a variety ofissues: clarification ofthe structure of
literary works, reflection upon the practices of reading
and writing, and criticism of the conditions of liter-
ary creation and interpretation; these questions remain
central to the practice of literary criticism. In this re-
gard, the continuing relevance of phenomenological
philosophy ofliterature is assured.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Ti.ibingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1960; Truth and Method. Trans. Garrett
Bardin and John Cumming. New York: Crossroad, 1975.
Heidegger, Martin. " ... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ... "
In his Vortrăge und Auf~ătze. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954,
187-204; " ... Poetically Man Dwells ... " In his Poetry,
Language, Thought. Ed. and trans. Albert Hofstader. New
York: Harper & Row, 1971,211-29.
- . Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. Pfull ingen: Neske, 1954;
"The Origin ofthe Work of Art." In his Poetry, Language,
Thought, 15-E7.
- . "Wozu Dichter?" In his Holzwege. Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klosterrnann, 1950, 269--320; "What are Poets
For?'' In his Poetry, Language, Thought, 89--142.
Ingarden, Roman. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Un-
tersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik,
und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931;
rpt. Ti.ibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1960, 1965; The Literary
Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of On-
tology, Logic, and Theory ofLitera ture. Trans. George G.
Grabowicz. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Univ Press, 1973.
- . Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks. Ti.ibingen:
Max Niemeyer, 1968 [rev. and enl. version of the Pol-
ish original, O poznawaniu dziela literackiego. Lvov: Os-
solineum, 193 7]; The Cognition of the Literary Work of
Art, Trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem Univ Press, 1973.
Jauss, Hans Robert. Ăsthetische Erfahrung und literarische
Hermeneutik /. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1977; Aesthetic
Experience and Literary Hermeneutics. Trans. Michael
Shaw. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.
- . Toward an Aesthetic of Reception [essays originally pub-
lished separately in German]. Trans. Timothy Bahti. Miu-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.
Magliola, Robert R. Phenomenology and Literature: An In-
troduction. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Univ Press, 1977.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Sens et non-sens. Paris: Nagel,
1948; Sense and Non-Sense. Trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus
and Patricia A. Dreyfus. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Uni-
versity Press, 1964.
- . Signes. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; Signs. Trans. Richard C.
McCleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1964.
Natanson, Maurice. The Journeying Self: A Study in Phi-
losophy and Social Role. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1970.
- . Literature. Phi/osophy, and the Social Sciences: Essays in
Existentialism and Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962.
Ricreur, Paul. Le confiit des interpetations. Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 1969; The Conflict oflnterpretations. Trans. Don
Ihde. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1974.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Qu 'est-ce que la literature? In Situations
II. Paris: Gallimard, 1947, 55-330; What is Literature?
Trans. Bemard Frechtman. New York: Harper & Row,
1965.
- . Situations. 10 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1947-76; Literary
and Philosophical Essays [selections from Situations 1
and ///]. Trans. Annette Michelson. London: Rider, 1955;
Situations [Situations IV]. Trans. Benita Eisler. New York:
George Braziller, 1965.
Schutz, Alfred. "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality."
In his Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. Ed.
Arvid Brodersen. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964,
135--58.
- . The Sociologica! Aspect of Literature: Construction and
Complementary Essays. Ed. Lester Embree, Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming.
Valdes, Mario J. Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the
Study of Literature. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1987.
MICHAEL MCDUFFIE
Muskingum College
 LOGIC
LOGIC The phenomenology oflogic and MATH-
EMATICS is the main topic in EDMUND HUSSERL's earJy
work, which culminates in the Logische Untersuchun-
gen ( 1900--1901 ). lts final version can be found in
Formale und transzendentale Logik ( 1929), Etfahrung
und Urteil ( 1939), sections in the !deen zu ei ner reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913 ), the Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931 ],
and lectures such as the Analysen zur passiven Synthe-
sis [ 1925/26].
Husserl 's conception oflogic was influenced by lo-
gicians and mathematicians of his time, first of ali the
formalism of David Hilbert ( 1862-1943), but he never
discussed the results of Kurt Godel ( 1906-1978). The
Formale und transzendentale Logik distinguishes be-
tween logic as apophantic logic and logic as formal
ontology. Apophantic logic analyzes logica! form in
ordinary and formalized language. FORMAL ONTOLOGY
investigates logica! forms as forms of objects in gen-
eral and includes pure mathematics, the theory of pure
manifolds (structured sets).
Three logica! disciplines can be distinguished. ( 1)
First, there is the general theory of categorica] form, in-
cluding the pure logica! grammar separating meaning-
ful and meaningless expressions in apophantic logic.
(2) The logic of consequence, i.e., of deductive infer-
ence, has as its principle the law of non-contradiction.
The laws ofthe logic ofconsequence are also the laws
governing the deductions of formal-ontologica! axiom
systems of pure sets (rei ne Mannigfaltigkeiten). (3) The
logic of TRUTH, i.e., semantics, is a general theory of
modalization. The two-valued semantics of truth and
falsity in classica1 logic presupposes the limiting case
of perfect predicative and pre-predicative evidence of
states of affairs. Many-valued logics and the semantics
of"rossiBLE WORLDs" might today be viable candidates
for Husserl 's project of a universal mathesis for the
logic oftruth.
The phenomenology of logic is for Husserl not
merely one area ofphenomenological research among
others. The EVIDENCE oflogical and mathematical truths
is stronger than the fallible evidences of the empirica!
sciences. AII attempts to explain their specific apodic-
ticity with the aid of a weaker evidence are spurious.
PSYCHOLOGISM is such an attempt. A phenomenology
of logic can be justified only if phenomenology itself
starts with a first and apodictic cvidence. In the first edi-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
421
tion ofthe Logische Untersuchungen, phenomenology
was sti li characterized as descriptive psychology. Such
a phenomenology can prove that logica] objects are not
mental entities, but it is as such still understood as a
descriptive empirica] discipline. Looking back on the
outcome ofthe Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl re-
alized that the descriptions there are actually descrip-
tions of a priori structures. He discovered in further
reflections that even in this case phenomenology is a
sublime psychologism and a proper target of GOTTLOB
FREGE's and his own criticism ofpsychologism.
The method of the Logische Untersuchungen im-
plies a sublime psychologism because the a priori sub-
jective structures ofthe givenness oflogical objects are
still understood as the material a priori structures of a
being in the world, and a material a priori in general
presupposes the stronger evidence ofthe formal a priori
of logic. He also admits !ater that his refutation of rela-
tivism in the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik ( 1900) was
only a refutation ofpsychologistic NATURALISM and not
a refutation of RELATIVISM in general, and thus did not
include historism. Neither the Fregean nor the the Kan-
tian solution is acceptab1e in phenomenology because
they rely on hypothetical substructions (transcenden-
tal arguments) that postulate either Platonic entities or
an absolute subject. A phenomenology of logic can
only be justified with the aid of the transcendental-
phenomeno1ogical reduction.
Neither the significance of the phenomenology of
logic for the development of the phenomenological
method nor Husserl 's conception of logic was recog-
nized in the REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY of the ear]y
phenomenologica1 movement. ALEXANDER PFĂNDER 's
Logik ( 1921) is simply a manual of traditional logic;
here logic is an independent discipline and is, together
with phenomenology, a presupposition of epistemol-
ogy, while phenomenological investigations are useful
only for investigating the relation of logica! forms to
acts of thought and to intentiona! objects. They ha ve
no significance for the clarification of logica! form
as such. OSKAR BECKER was interested in fonnalized
moda! logic, but not in a further development of the
phenomenology of logic. MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's concep-
tion of logic includes formalized logic. His evaluation
of the development of formal ontology is opposed to
Husserl 's. Formal mathematics is, for him, the most
deficient mode of thinking. A renewed interest in the
422 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phenomenology oflogic occurs only in the phenomen-
ological movement in the UNITED STATES.
The transcendental-phenomenological reduction is
the final justification for the phenomenology of logic,
but phenomenology of logic can be developed without
giving a final justification at the outset. It is, however,
immediately connected with the justification through
the EIDETIC METHOD. The following steps can be distin-
guished.
( 1) Intentiona! objects, in the terminology of the
Cartesianische Mediationen, are either immanent,
mental objects or they are transcendent objects. Imma-
nent objects can be identified as phases in the identity
of the temporal unity of lived experience. Real tran-
scendent objects do not belong to the mental unity of
consciousness. They can be given as the same in differ-
ent phases of conscious life. The identity of real tran-
scendent objects is inseparable from the matter (hyle)
of perception. Ideal objects, e.g., a right triangle, are
ideal because they are given as the same in different
matter, e.g., black lines on white paper, or white lines
on a green blackboard. They are nevertheless also tran-
scendent because they are given as the same in different
phases of conscious life.
(2) Setting aside some cultural objects, concepts,
i.e., universal concepts (Allgemeinheiten in the termi-
nology of Elfahrung und Urteil), are recognized as
ideal objects in the tradition. Phenomenological anal-
ysis can distinguish different types ofuniversals. Uni-
versals are either empirica! or pure. The pure universals
are the ei de. The following distinctions belong to both
types of universals: concrete universals refer to many
things of the same kind than can subsist for them-
selves or to pieces of such things. Abstract universals
refer to abstract moments that can only subsist together
with other abstract moments in concrete objects, e.g.,
colors and shapes. Abstract moments are first given
as themselves as singularities, e.g., a specific shade
of red. They are nevertheless universals because they
can be given as the same in different concrete things,
e.g., the same shade of red in a car and in a bicycle.
The givenness of abstract moments requires a specific
abstraction or universalization. Abstraction in general
presupposes acts of variation. To have a concept of
a specific shade of red implies the consciousness of
its possible givenness in varying contexts. The type
of abstraction leading to abstract moments must be
distinguished from generalizing abstraction leading to
universals of higher order. Universals of higher order
are either universals of higher order for lower univer-
sals of concrete things or for abstract moments, like
"red in general" for different shades ofred and "color"
for different colors. Generalizing abstraction requires
the variation ofthe contents oflower order universals.
What is in common and what is different in concepts
can only be given in such variations. Considerations on
this level are sufficient for the development of a tradi-
tional apophantic logic. But it is not possible to decide
with their aid whether logica! concepts are pure, i.e.,
a priori, or empirica!, or whether they are material or
formal.
(3) Acts of abstraction require variation and vari-
ations are acts of IMAGINATION. A universal will be
empirica! if the domain of variation is determined by
pregiven experience. The givenness of a pure univer-
sal or eidos a priori requires, first of ali, the eidetic
reduction. This reduction suspends acceptance of the
real existence of an object and considers only the pure
whatness. The other requirement is eidetic intuition.
Eidetic intuition recognizes what is common and what
is different in free variations, i.e., variations not bound
to actual experience. "Free variation" is not arbitrary
variation. It requires certain rules and viewpoints.
(4) ldeen 1 distinguishes formal eide, belonging to
apophantic logic and formal ontology, and material
eide. It furthermore distinguishes exact material eide
and morphological material eide. Many philosophers
will admit that logica! forms are in some sense a priori.
Some recognize the a priori character of exact material
eide, e.g., of the eide of geometry. Many will deny
that material morphological concepts can be a priori
concepts. It may seem impossible to determine rules
for "free variation."
A solution can only be found in the further devel-
opment of the phenomenology of logic. The rules for
free variation in formal apophantics are the rules offor-
malizing abstraction. Formalizing abstraction involves
keeping unchanged some abstract component of sig-
nification or MEANING corresponding to a syncategore-
matic expression and varying other categorematic parts
of the meaning. The "and so on" of variation can be
indicated by variables for categorematic meaning that
can satisfy the syncategorematic expression. Thus in
compoundjudgments one can distinguish the sentence
 LOGIC
connectives, e.g., "and" or "or," as syncategorematic
parts and the judgments connected by them as cate-
gorematic parts, presented in formalizing abstraction
as variables. Within one judgment we can distinguish
the predicates as categorematic parts and the predicate
connectives, including the copula, as syncategorematic
parts of the expression. The syntcategorematic parts
represent the categorica! form; the types of categore-
matic parts belonging to such a categorica! form are
called categorica! matter.
The Logische Untersuchungen introduce such
considerations in the Sixth Investigation. Husserl
points out that this analysis presupposes the formal-
ontologica! investigations of whole and part in the
Third Investigation. The introduction to the second
edition of the Logische Untersuchungen (1913) em-
phasizes that this investigation is essential for the de-
velopment of phenomenological method in general.
According to ldeen 1 the rule guiding the variations
leading to exact material ei de is the idea of an "and so
on" in a well-ordered series leading to an ideal limit:
a straight line is the shortest connection between two
points. But such an idea receives its precise formu-
lation again in formal ontology and this idea can be
applied only to abstract material moments ofthe genus
extension, i.e., first of ali, SPACE and TIME. The rules for
the variation leading to morphological material eide
already surface in the Third Investigation. The basic
rule is that abstraction has to isolate abstract moments
connected by foundation relations ~ e.g., visual ex-
tension and visual quality ~ to keep one unchanged
and to vary the other. This leads to the discovery of
the laws offoundation between abstract moments. The
first concrete eide that can be reached are the universal
structures ofthe different regions of material ontology.
Empirically general concepts are the result of varying
the content of particular concepts. Morphological eide
are given immediately in the highest degree ofuniver-
sality.
The descriptions in the Logische Untersuchungen
comprise a movement in a zigzag pattern focusing first
on o ne aspect of the state of affairs, then the other, and
then returning to the first again. The purpose of the
zigzag is to clarify the methodical presuppositions of
the first description with the aid ofthe second. Husserl
begins with simple material descriptions of phenomena
ofvisual perception. Reftections on the basic structures
423
ofthe phenomena that include formalizing abstraction
discover that they entail structures not bound to the
material. They remain the same in varying material
structures and, therefore, belong to formal ontology.
As such they can be applied to the realm of meaning
and provide the rules for the variations necessary for
the discovery of apophantic categories. Formal onto-
logica! structures can also be used as guidelines for the
eidetic intuition of material eide, first of ali the ma-
terial eide governing the most universal structures of
material ontology. The generalizing abstraction leading
to universal empirica! concepts varies particulars that
are pregiven in experience. Eidetic intuition, following
the rules for varying that are pregiven by the formal-
ontologica! theory ofwhole and parts, reaches the first
concrete wholes on the level ofhighest universality.
The approach ofthe first four investigations is, in the
terminology of ldeen !, directed at the NOEMA. They do
not explain the nature ofthe priority offormal ontology
for logica! theory and they do not explain why there
ought to be a strict correspondence between the formal
a priori of formal ontology and the formal a priori
of apophantic logic. The static noetic analyses of the
last two investigations do not solve these problems
completely. After Formale und Transzendentale Logik,
Husserl 's phenomenology of logic also includes the
GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY of the noesis in Er(ahrung
und Urteil and in Analysen zur passiven Synthesis,
which contain lectures on the basic problems of logic
and transcendental logic. These texts also provide some
further information about the logic oftruth.
The first prefigurations of logica! categorica! forms
can be found in the forms of the structure of passive
associative synthesis in pure perception. There are, on
the one hand, the associative structures of coexisting
content in the hyletic field: contrast and fusion of qual-
ities, units of contents in the foreground of a perhaps
changing background, and configurations of such units
in a common background. On the other hand, there are
the materially determined temporal structures of pas-
si ve synthesis: disappointed and fulfilled contents of
protention, the disjunctive split in modalized proten-
tions after disappointment, and the open possibility of
protentions without associatively determined content.
The givenness of categorically articulated objects
requires active syntactic synthesis. Active synthesis on
the pre-predicative level is a synthesis in intentiona!
424 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
acts of imagination. It implies active attention. The
attention is divided, i.e., it is directed to a concrete
content on a background and, in addition, it is directed
toward the interna] properties of the content and its
relations to other units of content in the hyletic field.
It has the character of a pre-predicative judgmental
activity. The divided attention is unified in the tempo-
ral horizon of presently given and explicitly expected
contents. The structures given in such syntactical syn-
theses are the structures of fulfilled and disappointed
explicit expectations, modalized and disjunctively di-
vided expectations, and empty expectations of open
possibilities. Split attention is also given in the recog-
nition of objects as similar or equal with other objects
given in other temporal phases of experience. The dif-
ferent aspects ofthe structures ofpassive synthesis are
given in the articulation of active synthesis as different
and taken together in the unity of o ne intentiona! object.
The intentiona! object is the categorically articulated
object of PERCEPTION. Categorica! form as such cannot
be grasped on the level ofpre-predicative experience.
Predicative synthesis presupposes LANGUAGE and IN-
TERSUB.JECTIVITY. lntersubjectivity and pre-predicative
interaction are pregiven in passive synthesis in the as-
sociative appresentation of the other as another living
BODY. Intersubjectivity and language are necessarily
implied in the givenness of objects in the proper sense,
i.e., possible objects ofinteraction and communication.
The communicative function of language is, however,
not relevant for analysis of logica! form and its gene-
sis. Predication requires signs with a sign matter dis-
tinguished from the matter ofthe objects signified. The
immediate intentiona! object ofpredication is the state
ofaffairs meant. The state ofaffairs given in perception
is bodily there, present in o ne of its aspects. It is absent
in the meant state of affairs. The forms of categorica!
articulation in a meant state of affairs are counterparts
of the forms of categorica! articulations in the given
state of affairs. The reference of linguistic expressions
to states of affairs is possible because the system of
categorica[ forms of meaning and those of being cor-
respond to each other and are represented, though in
often ambiguous ways, in the gram mar of natural lan-
guage. The categorica! articulation of the meant state
of affairs has its own ideal li mit in adequate evidence,
which can be attained in clear and distinct judgmen-
tal articulation. Adequate predicative evidence does
not imply the adequate evidence of categorica! artic-
ulation of objects given in immediate pre-predicative
experience. Pre-predicative experience is modalized.
Predica ti ve meaning referring to objects ofthis experi-
ence is, therefore, modalized as well. Truth and falsity
are left as two possible mutually exclusive moda! val-
ues only in case of adequate predicative and adequate
pre-predicative evidence.
Predicative categorica! articulation refers to the
state of affairs meant and not to categorica! forms as
such.lt is the first presupposition for a possible formal-
izing abstraction and categorica[ intuition in which cat-
egorica[ form as such is thematic. The second presup-
position, following the hints of "Die Frage nach dem
Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches
Problem" ( 1939), is that oral discourse is given as writ-
ten discourse. Formalizing abstraction in traditional
apophantics begins with the analysis of the grammat-
ical structure of a natural language, but it is not re-
stricted to it. Equivocations in grammatical structures
of language can be discovered by comparing the cate-
gorica] articulation of the pregiven language with the
categorica! articulation of the state of affairs meant
and the categorica! articulation ofthe state of affairs as
such. Formalizing abstraction must also from the out-
set include formal-ontologica] considerations. Already
the first steps in the logica! regimentation of gram mar
lead to the discovery ofthe formal eidetic impossibility
ofunified meaning in certain categorica! articulations.
They are impossible because they are contradictory.
The distinction between contradictory and non-
contradictory judgmental structures leads to the devel-
opment of the logic of consequence and finally to the
formal-ontologica! deductive systems of pure MATH-
EMATICS. They require the elimination of ambiguities
with the aid ofthe construction offormalized languages
in which the categorica! intuition oflogical categorica!
form can be represented adequately. The development
of categorica! intuition and formalizing abstraction pre-
supposes from the beginning the correlation oflogic as
formal apophantics and logic as formal ontology. What
is missing in Husserl 's ace o unt is a phenomenological
analysis of the logic of truth in his phenomenology of
REASON and his idea of a mathesis of possible truth.
This is a task for further phenomenological research.
Husserl 's approach in the phenomenology of logic
is opposed to the Kantian approach. KANT separated
 LOGICAL POSITIVISM
the categorica! forms of the understanding and intu-
ition. Thc schematism, presupposing a transcenden-
- . Eifahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie
tal deduction, links both. The schematism of imagina-
tion has priority, according to the phenomenology of
logic. What follows is the activity of syntactical pre-
predicative and predicative synthesis as the condition
ofthe givenness ofthe ideal objects in formalizing ab-
straction and categorica! intuition. The objects of for-
mal eidetic intuition are not FREGE's Platonic entities.
They are the necessary correlates of a consciousness
under the telos of reason.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bachelard, Suzanne. La logique de Husserl: E"tude sur
"Logique .fhrmelle et logique transcendellfale. " Paris:
Presses Univertaires de France, 1957; A Study of Husserl:~
Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Lester Embree.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968.
Cavailles, Jean. Sur la logique et la theorie de la sci-
ence. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 194 7; "On
Logic and the Theory of Science." In Phenomenology
and the Natural Sciences. Ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans and
Theodorc Kisiel. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1970.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Context in Logic." In his The Field o{Con-
sciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964,
325-35.
--. "Reflections on Mathematics and Logic." In his Pheno-
menology and the Theory o{Science. Ed. Lester Embree.
Evanston, IL: Northwcstem University Press, 1974, 60--
76.
Husserl, Edmund. Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band.
Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Ed. Elmar Holenstein.
Husserliana 18. The Haguc: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975; Logi-
sche Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Untersuchungen zur
Phănomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Ed. Ursula
Panzer. Husserliana 1911-2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1984; Logicallnvestigations. Trans. John N. Findlay. Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
--. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (191 !]." In his
Auf~ătze und Vortrăge (1911-1921). Ed. Thomas Nenon
and Hans Reiner Sepp. Husserliana 25. Dordrccht: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1987, 3--62; "Philosophy as a Rigorous Sci-
ence." In his Phenomenologyand the Crisis o{Philosophy.
Trans. Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965,
71-147.
- . Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und phănomen­
ologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Ein-
fiihrung in die reine Phănomenologie. Ed. Karl Schuh-
mann. Husserliana 3/1. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1976; Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General1ntro-
duction to a Pure Phenomenology. Trans. Fred Kersten.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
--. Formale und transzendentale Logik. Ed. Paul Janssen.
Husserliana 17. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; For-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
425
mal a11d Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Caims. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969; rpt. 1978.
der Logik [1939]. Ed. Ludwig Landgrcbe. Hamburg: Felix
Mei ner, 1972; E:r:perience and Judgment: Investigations in
a Genealogy o{Logic. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl
Amcriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Prcss,
1973.
- . "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als inten-
tionalhistorisches Problem." Ed. Eugen Fink. Revue 111/er-
nationa/e de Philosophie 1 ( 1939), 203-25; rpt. in his Die
Krisis der europăischen Tf'issenschajienund die transzen-
dentale Phanomenologie. Ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana
6. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1954, 365-86; "[The Ori-
gin ofGeometry]." In his The Crisis o/European Sciences
and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 353-
78.
Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1982.
- , cd. Readings on Edmund Husserl:~ "Logica/ Investiga-
tions." The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
--. Orth, Ernst Wolfgang, ed. Logik, Anschaulichkeit
und Transparenz. Phănomenologische Forschungen 23
( 1990).
Pfander, Alexander. Logik. Halle an der Salle: Niemeyer,
1921.
Seebohm, Thomas M., J. N. Mohanty, and Dagfinn F0llesdal.
Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Tragesser, Robert S. Phenomenology and Logic. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1977.
Willard, Dallas. Logic and the Ohjectivitv of" Knowledge.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984.
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
Universităt Mainz
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM See LOGICAL POSITIVISM.
LOGICAL POSITIVISM Also known as "logi-
cal empiricism," logica! positivism refers not so much
to the work of a single philosopher as to a unified
set of doctrines articulated, shared, and developed by
an international association of philosophers and sci-
entists in the 1920s and 1930s. The inception of logi-
ca! positivism as a philosophical movement, however,
is closely tied to the person and work of the Ger-
man philosopher Moritz Schlick ( 1882-1936). Schlick
came to the University of Vienna in 1922, at the be-
hest ofthe Ernst Mach Society there, as professor ofthe
426 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
philosophy ofthe inductive sciences. In many ways his
presence was but a continuation of a well-entrenched
Viennese empiricist tradition. Having written his dis-
sertation in physics under Max Planck ( 1858~1947),
he maintained that our knowledge of the world is to
be drawn exclusively from the empirica! sciences, and
that the primary task of philosophy is to provide a
comprehensive theory of scientific knowledge. In re-
action to the speculative excesses of German idealism,
Schlick insisted that philosophy has no special access
to a reality over and above the reality addressed by the
NATURAL SCIENCES. PhiJosophy is to clarify the mean-
ing and logic of scientific statements, not to produce a
stock of its own.
A forceful personality with a talent for provoca-
tive presentation, Schlick gathered around himself
the group of scientists, mathematicians, and philoso-
phers that !ater became known as the "Vienna Cir-
ele." This circle included among others, Herbert Feigl
( 1902~ 1988), Otto Neurath ( 1882~1945), Rudolf Car-
nap (1891~1970), and Kurt Godel (1906-1978). In
1929 it published its manifesta - "The Vienna Cir-
ele, Its Scientific Conception of the World" - and
held its first annual international congress in Prague,
jointly sponsored by the Society for Empirica! Philos-
ophy in Berlin led by Hans Reichenbach (1891~1953)
and Cari Hempel. In 1930 it took over the journal enti-
tled Annalen der Philosophie, renaming it Erkenntnis.
Edited by Carnap and Reichenbach and published con-
tinuously until 1940, this periodica! became the chief
literary outlet of the logica] positivist movement. In
the course ofthe 1930s this movement achieved inter-
national scope, gaining adherents in POLAND, SCANDI-
NAVIA, THE NETHERLANDS, GREAT BRITAIN, and the UNITED
STATES. Meetings ofthe Vienna Ci rele were attended by
the American philosopher W. V Quine and the British
philosopher A. J. Ayer, who !ater popularized the doc-
trines of logica! empiricism in the English-speaking
world with the publication of Language, Truth, and
Logic in 1936. Although LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN and Karl
Popper were not members of the Vienna Circ le, they
were in regular contact with it. Wittgenstein's Tracta-
tus Logico-Philosophicus ( 1921) had a profound influ-
ence on the logica! positivist theory ofmeaning (a the-
ory that Wittgenstein himself disowned), and Popper's
Logik der Forschung (The logic of scientific discov-
ery) was originally published in 1935 as part of a series
of monographs sponsored by the Vienna Ci rele.
By the end of the 1930s, logica! positivism, as a
movement, had lost much ofits social cohesion. Many
members of the Vienna Ci rele and the Berlin Society
had fled to diverse institutions in America in the face
ofthe growing Nazi menace; Schlick had been shot to
death by an irate student. By the 1950s it had lost much
of its philosophical credibility as well, having been
subjected to searching and detailed criticism, often by
its own adherents.
The ma in doctrines of logica! positivism can be or-
ganized around its central tenet: the principle ofverifi-
ability. Simply put, this principle states that only those
statements that can be verified on the hasis of sense ex-
perience are meaningful. It is important to emphasize
that this principle functioned for the positivists not as
a criterion of TRUTH, but as a criterion of MEANING: it
was not designed to expose ali statements that cannot
be verified on the hasis of sense experience as false;
rather, it was intended to show that they are mean-
ingless - and hence can be neither true nor false.
According to a phrase that became a slogan for the
movement, "The meaning of a statement is the method
of its verification." If a statement cannot be verified
by an appeal to sense experience, then it simply has
no meaning. Or so the logica! positivists declared. For
this reason they did not claim to have solved the tra-
ditional roster of metaphysical problems, such as the
immortality ofthe soul or the freedom ofthe will. They
simply dismissed them as pseudoproblems. Claims of
RELIGION and even judgments in ETHICS and AESTHET-
ICS were also excluded from the domain ofmeaningful
discourse. Only the claims ofthe sciences, both formal
and empirica!, remained.
In this move the logica! empiricists made a con-
scious appeal to the philosophy of the BRITISH EMPIRI-
CIST David Hume. Hume divided the objects of ali our
knowledge into "relations of ideas" and "matters of
fact." The former are expressed in the propositions
belonging to the formal sciences of LOGIC and MATH-
EMATICS, which are true only because they are, ulti-
mately, tautological; the latter are the proper objects
of claims whose truth is decidable on the hasis of
sense experience. AII other knowledge claims, Hume
insisted, should be discarded. In a famous passage at the
end ofhis Enqui1y Concern ing Human Understanding
( 1748), he suggests that we run through the libraries
 LOGICAL POSITIVISM
of the world and, taking into our hand any volume
of religion or school metaphysics, ask ourselves the
following questions: Does this volume contain any ab-
stract reasoning concerning quantity or number? Does
it contain any reasoning based on experience concern-
ing matters of fact? If the answer to both of these
questions is "no," then we must consign the book to
the flames, "for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion."
The doctrina! development of logica! empiricism
can be traced in successive attempts to offer a plausi-
ble philosophical explication of the principle of veri-
fiability. On the one hand, the logica! positivists owed
the world an account ofthe logic of"verification," and
on the other, an account of the status of the "veri fier."
Substantial difficulties, however, were encountered on
both fronts. In the attempt to state the necessary and
sufficient conditions for verification, the basic problem
was to exclude metaphysics without excluding a good
deal of science, and to retain science without retain-
ing a good deal of metaphysics. The "strong version"
of the principle of verifiability, promoted by Schlick,
erred in the former respect. According to this vers ion, a
statement can be verified ifand only ifit can be directly
and conclusively established through sense experience.
Clearly this version would exclude ali statements of
general law in science as meaningless, for a general
claim can never be completely verified through a finite
series of sense experiences. We might claim, for in-
stance, that free-falling bodies accelerate at the rate of
9.8 meters per second squared. And we might con duct a
few experiments to see ifthis is true. Or we might con-
duct many experiments to see if it is true. But as Hume
pointed out, no matter how many experiments we con-
duct, it is always possible that future experience will
provide the exception. Since science is largely made
up of just such law-like statements, the strong version
ofthe verifiability principle is too strong. It excludes a
good deal of science.
However, the "weak version," espoused by Neu-
rath and the !ater Carnap, turned out to be too weak,
erring in the opposite direction. According to it, a state-
ment is verifiable if and only if it can in principle be
directly verified on the basis of sense experience or
confirmed through indirect methods of empirica! test-
ing. General statements oflaw, then, could be admitted
into the circ le of meaningful discourse as empirically
427
testable hypotheses. Although they cannot be directly
and conclusively verified through sense experience,
they can, when joined with suitable hypotheses, find
confirmation through experimental procedures. When
their observable implications, under given hypotheses,
match the yield of sense experience, their probability
is rai sed. This version, however, is too weak, allowing
metaphysical statements to creep in as antecedents of
conditiona! claims with testable consequents.
Consider the following claim: "If the Absolute is
tired today, then l weigh 185 pounds." If 1 affirm the
antecedent of this conditiona!, I can derive an empiri-
cally testable statement, the one concern ing my weight.
My weight can be verified on the scale, hence the
claim "The Absolute is tired today" is, on this ver-
sion, meaningful, for when joined to the hypotheses
represented by the conditiona! statement, it yields an
empirically testable consequence. lf we seek to fore-
stall this problem by disallowing any non-empirica!
conditiona! claims in the premises, we are sti li not out
of the woods. For any metaphysical statement can be
conjoined to any empirically testable statement, thus
forming a conjunction that is itself empirically testable
by virtue of the logica! operation of simplification, as
the American logician Alonzo Church pointed out. So
the statement, "The Absolute is tired today and I weigh
185 pounds" turns out to be meaningful on the weak
version of the principle of verifiability.
Similar problems were encountered in attempts to
give an account of the "verifiers." Thus far vague ap-
peals to "sense experience" have been made. But what
is it, exactly, in sense experience that verifies a state-
ment? In an attempt to maximize the degree of certainty
at the foundation of scientific knowledge, some held
that the verifying statements must be restricted to in-
trospective reports on current sense data (e.g., "This
patch ofblue here, now"). But it would seem that such
reports on particular episodes of private experience
are too slender a basis to support the entire edifice of
scientific knowledge concerning the objective world.
They may ha ve the epistemic virtue ofbeing certain, of
representing, as Schlick put it, "unshakable points of
contact between knowledge and reality," but they are
not objective in the sense ofbeing intersubjectively ac-
cessible. On the other hand, to employ the language of
physical objects in issuing verifying statements would
represent a gain in objectivity, but only at the expense
 428 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
of rendering them irreducibly hypothetical in charac-
ter. For any claim about physical objects exceeds what
is actually given in sense experience. Ifl claim, on the
basis of present perception, that there is a chair be-
fore me, I do so with reference to an ostensible chair
sense datum given in that perception. That statement
may turn out to be false, on subsequent experience,
were the chair sense datum not followed by a typi-
cally coherent series of chair sense data. To pasit a
physical abject, or to state a fact about one, is to utter
a statement that has an infinite number of particular
experiential implications, but only a finite number of
them can be realized in my experience. This, how-
ever, entails a view of verification that was far less
exciting than what the principle ofverification initially
promised. For the original idea was to test scientific
hypotheses against conclusively established empirica!
fact, not against another hypothesis.
Problems in specifying a plausible version of the
principle of verifiability were indeed substantial, but
philosophical unhappiness with it came to a head when
it was applied to itself. Is the principle of verifiability
meaningful by its own standard? Consider the state-
ment, "A statement is meaningful if and only if it can
be verified on the hasis of sense experience." Can such
a statement itself be verified on the basis of sense ex-
perience? It is difficult to see how it could. ls it, then, a
formal truth, a tautology, acceptable for the same rea-
sons that the statement "A is not non-A" is acceptable?
It would appear not- for it seems to say something
new, interesting, and informative about what it is for
a statement to be meaningful. lf, on the other hand,
it is merely a stipulative definition, then it is hard to
see why it is especially binding- others are free to
stipula te other definitions ofmeaningful statements for
other theoretical purposes. ls it, perchance, a disguised
recommendation- something like the following: ac-
cept only those statements as meaningful that can be
verified the basis of experience? Then it must be con-
strued as a wish that the logica! empiricists had for
the world. But again it is difficult to know why those
antecedently convinced otherwise should welcome it.
Despite these and other difficulties, EDMUND HUSSERL
found himself in complete agreement with the posi-
tivists on one major point: their rejection of philosophy
as speculative system building. Both Husserl and the
positivists demanded that philosophical work be tied to
what is actually experienced. In fact, in ldeen zu einer
reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen
Philosophie 1 ( 1913), he claimed that if "positivism"
means the unprejudiced grounding of ali sciences on
the "positive," that is, on what can be grasped in di-
rect experience, then "we are the genuine positivists."
But Husserl quickly parted ways with the positivists,
principally on two issues: the range of experience
available to philosophy and the kind of experience
required by philosophy. In "Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft" ( 1911) he characterizes positivism in
general as a species of "NATURALISM"- the tendency
to reduce ali spheres of being to nature as conceived
by the natural sciences. Husserl held that there are in
fact three ontologically distinct spheres of being -
nature, consciousness, and ideas- and that the natu-
ralization of consciousness and ideas would invariably
lead to RELATIVISM and make it impossible for philoso-
phy to fu! fiii its proper task. The positivistic restriction
of experience to what is actual in sense perception
means that science and philosophy can only articulate
what happens to be the case, not what must be the
case. But, he maintained, above the actuallies the do-
main of the necessary and the possible- the realm of
pure ideas. From insight into this realm the philoso-
pher can derive necessary synthetic principles of strict
universal validity. From the pure idea of TRUTH, for
instance, the philosopher can derive a body of prin-
ciples regarding the conditions that must be met by
any true proposiiion. Husserl was convinced that the
procedure for deriving a body of such principles is not
analytic, as if ali necessary truths were mere tautolo-
gies, nor speculative, leading to philosophical systems
based on ultimately arbitrary definitions, but rather ex-
periential, for he thought, unlike the positivists, that
it was possible to experience - to intuit - neces-
sary states of affairs and therefore rigorously confirm
necessary truth claims. Such forms of intuition- the
"intuition of essence" generated by the EIDETIC METHOD
- would serve as the source of well-grounded philo-
sophical statements regarding the necessary principles
ofthought, VALUE, and ACTION.
To deny that experience reaches to the realm ofthe
necessary is to deny philosophy the possibility of ar-
ticulating the conditions of its own validity as a body
of truth claims, thus leading, upon reflection, to skep-
ticism. Moreover, to restrict the range of experience to
 LOGICAL POSITIVISM
the actual is to convert ali questions of absolute norma-
tivity to questions of mere fact, thus making it impos-
sible for reason to pronounce in a universally binding
way on the unavoidable human questions of ultimate
truth, value, meaning, purpose, and the like. In this way
-as Husserl put it in Die Krisis dereuropăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendenta!e Phănomenologie
( 1936)- positivism "decapitates philosophy." Under
the constraints of positivism, neithcr science nor phi-
losophy could play a normative role in the formation
of human cui ture; moreover, the great Enlightenment
ideal of human life guided by REASON alone, to which
Husserl wholeheartedly subscribed, could not even be
approached.
Like the naturalization of ideas, the naturalization
of consciousness also leads to an epistemological im-
passe. The basic question of epistemology, according
to Husserl, is whether and how consciousness makes
contact with reality. It is not possible to give a non-
question-begging answer to this qucstion on the hasis
of empirica! scientific research, as the positivists advo-
cated. Ali of the sciences, Husserl maintains, operate
within the "natural attitude": they accept and take as
their point of departure the givenness of the world in
experience. Conflicts in scientific claims regarding the
specific disposition of the world are to be adjudicated
primarily by appcals to experience. But philosophy
proposes to question experience itself; it wants to ask
whether and how consciousness is in touch with the
world in the first place. Any attempt to answer this
question on the hasis of empirica! scientific investiga-
tion necessarily begs the question, for empirica! sci-
entific investigation assumes the very connection with
the world that philosophy wants to make problematic.
Therefore, if the specific level of the philosophical
problem of knowledge is to be recognized and hon-
ored, philosophy must make use ofnovel methods and
a novel form of experience.
To investigate the relationship between conscious-
ness and reality, the philosopher cannot simply take
leave of the standpoint of consciousness and look at
reality in order to see if it really is the way it ap-
pears to be within consciousness, for any access to
reality is necessarily mediated by consciousness. The
only viable approach to this philosophical problem,
Husserl insists, is to reflect upon one's own conscious-
ness, then to investigate and faithfully to describe the
429
way in which consciousness relates itself to reality (a
theory of INTENTIONALITY) and the way in which con-
scious experience serves as a source ofjustification for
beliefs about reality (a theory of rationality). Setting
aside the natural belief in the existence of the world
in what Husserl called the "transcendental EPOCHE AND
REDUCTION," the philosopher must attend solely to the
experience of the world within the domain of pure
consciousness and its unique mode of being. Unlike
the worldly items that appear within it, expericnce is
itself an unending flux of acts and appearances tied
together by specific relations within immanent TIME.
The philosopher- now a practicing phenomenologist
-must investigate how such acts and appearances are
temporally structured so as to present - or represent
-objects, as well as how they are related to each other
so as to provide a hasis for justified belief concern ing
those objects. By instituting the "transcendental reduc-
tion" the philosopher creates for him- or herself the
kind of experience that is required if the central ques-
tions of epistemology are to be solved through care fui
and detailed research. And such fundamental research
will in turn serve as a hasis for the phenomenological
clarification ofthe knowledge claims advanced by the
empirica! sciences within the natural attitude.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth. and Logic. London: Gollancz,
1936.
- , ed. Logica! Positivism. New York: The Free Press, 1959.
Carnap, Rudolf. Der Logische Aufhau der Welt. Berlin:
Weltkreis, 1928; The Logica/ Structure o( the World.
Trans. Rolf A. George. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 196 7.
Feigl, Herbert, and May Brodbeck, eds. Readings in the Phi-
losophy ofScience. New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts,
1953.
Grlinbaum, Adolf. Philosophical Prohlems o( Time and
Space. New York: Knopf, 1963.
Hempel, Cari. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York:
The Free Press, 1965.
Kraft, Victor. Die Wiener Kreis. Vienna: Springer-Verlag,
1950; The Vienna Circle. New York: Philosophical Li-
brary, 1953.
Morick, Harold, ed. Challenges to Empiricism. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1972.
Popper, Karl. Logik der Forschung. Vienna: Springer, 1935;
The Logic of Scientific DiscoveiJ'. Trans. Karl Popper.
London: Hutchinson, 1959.
Quine, Willard van Orman. Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The
Quine-Carnap Correspondence. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990.
430 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Reichenbach, Hans. The Rise ofScienti{ic Philosophy. Berke- van Fraassen, Bas. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford
ley: University of California Press, 1951. University Press, 1980.
Schlick; Moritz. Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Berlin: Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Ti·actatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Springer-Verlag, 1918; General Theory al Knowledge. Trans. C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, 1922.
Trans. Albert E. Blumenberg. Vienna: Springer-Verlag,
1974.
Sellars, Wilfrid. Science, Perception and Reality. London:
LEE HARDY
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.
Suppe, Frederick, ed. The Structure of Scientific Theories. Ca/vin Colleqe
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977.

IMI
GABRIEL MARCEL The son of a former
Ministre Plenipotentiaire to Sweden and Directeur des
Beaux Arts at the Bibliotheque Nationale and other na-
tional museums, Marcel ( 1889-1973)attended the Sor-
bonne and had as his teachers Andre Lalande ( 1867-
1964 ), HENRI BERGSON, and Victor De\bos ( 1864--1916).
He took the agn?gation in philosophy, along with JEAN
WAHL, who was in his class. Marcel held teaching po-
sitions in various lycees until 1940, when he decided
to make his living entirely from his work as music
and drama critic for severa\ literary reviews and as
a consultant to severa! publishers. In addition to his
many philosophical works, Marcel wrote music and
over a dozen plays. He was awarded membership in
the Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, and
delivered, in 1949-50, the Gifford Lectures, and in
1961, the William James Lectures at Harvard Univer-
sity.With his Journal nu!taphysique (1927), Gabriel
Marcel began to publish the personal reflections in
diary form that he had begun in 1914, and Etre et
avoir (1935) continues this. In a note dated October
13, 1933, Marcel remarks that a "phenomenology of
having" would serve well his purpose of a renewed
reflection on the question of Being. That Novem-
ber he presented his famous lecture "Outlines of a
phenomenology of having" to the Lyons Philosophi-
cal Society. Despite the use of "phenomenology" in
the title of this address, and severa! other places in
which Marcel apparently identifies his work as being
within the phenomenological tradition, one must note
HERBERT SPIEGELBERG's judgment that there is no ev-
idence that Husserl had any significant influence on
his understanding of phenomenology. Marcel admit-
ted that he read ldeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913) prior
to World War I and attended Husserl's 1ectures at the
Sorbonne, but indicated that he was not impressed.
By Marcel 's own admission, his primary interest
was in a renewed analysis of Being. His phenomen-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 431
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ological studies (of having, fidelity, hope, promising,
etc.) would involve certain "concrete approaches" to
ontology. To Marcel a "phenomenological analysis"
means an analysis of the content of thought as such,
an analysis that prescinds from factual, psychological
states. His phenomenology is a search for the "mean-
ing" intrinsic to a certa in type of experience as opposed
to a reduction of experience to empirica! conditions. In
the estimation of his pupi! PAUL RICCEUR, Marcel used
EIDETIC METHOD carefully to explore examples primar-
ily of personal experience to determine their essen-
tial meanings: "hoping in" as distinct from "hoping
for," having-as-possession as distinct from having-as-
implication, etc.
The ontology served by Marcel 's phenomenologi-
cal studies had much in common with that of MARTIN
HEIDEGGER (although Marcel did not encounter Heideg-
ger's works until his own thought had already taken
shape) insofar as both launched a critique of "episte-
mological" thinking and foundations in the "cogito." In
his article (which has the force of a true, original mani-
festo) of 1925, "Existence et objectivite," he speaks of
exploring the "limits of objectivity," and ofthe attempt
to reach a ground that transcends the classical subject-
object relationship. Without having studied Heidegger,
and unbeknownst to himself, Marcel's early writings
parallel Heidegger's contemporaneous critique of the
founder of phenomenology.
The publication of the Journal metaphysique
marked Marcel's conscious break with his earli-
est philosophical influences, idealism in its German
(scHELLING) and British (Bradley) varieties. His de-
cision to publish his thoughts in their original, diary
form signaled the rea1ization by Marcel ofthe finitude
of human thinking, of the circumscription of thought
by time and place that he would come to characterize
throughout his works as "situatedness." In the Jour-
nal metaphysique and in "Existence et objectivite," he
explores what he referred to as the "irreducible" and
"uncharacterizable" dimensions of experience, dimen-
sions against which it is impossible to set ourselves
in the position of onlookers, and thus dimensions it
would be impossible to doubt. "Existence" itself is pro-
claimed the basic irreducible, although what he means
by existence is tied directly to what he calls "sensu-
ous presence." Sensuous experience of existence is a
matter of "feeling" rather than of thought and does
 432 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
not, Marcel insists, possess the subject-object struc-
ture of cognitive, intellectual experience. Feei ing of-
fers an "assurance" that is not that of"certitude." Feei-
ing is something primordial and to try to translate it
into other, logical, categories and to impose foreign
criteria of validation is to betray the primordial sense
of feei ing, which bel ies the subject-object distinction.
Feeling, sensation, is "immediate participation" of a
subject in its world, a relation in which the subject is
not in a confrontational relationship to an object.
It is in the Journal metaphysique that Marcel first
raises the centrality of embodiment. Not only is the
BODY one's enrootedness and emplacement in exis-
tence, but embodiment shows the irreducibil ity of ex-
istence to objectivity. While ali instances of "having"
implicate one's body, Marcel contends that one does
not have one's body, since the EGO who supposedly
"has" the body would be bodiless, with ali of the ab-
surdities of Carstesian dualism ensuing. The sense of
"my body," which characterizes participant experience
of embodiment, belies dualism and finds expression
in "1 am my body." Marcel 's groundbreaking work on
embodiment stands as one of his most important in-
ftuences on subsequent EXISTENTIAL PHFNOMENOLOGY,
especially that of MAURICE MFRLEAU-PONTY.
With the publication in 1933 of his essay "Posi-
tions et approches concretes du mystere ontologique,"
Marcel's discourse turned distinctively to the question
of Being. His former preoccupation with existence as
sensuous irreduciblity to objectivity and as primordial
participation is subsumed into a more comprehensive,
and social, framework. "Being" retains the irreducibil-
ity of existence so that he says that his inquiry into Be-
ing presupposes an affirmation with respect to which
one is, in a sense, passive, and of which one is the
"stage" rather than the subject. The subject cannot
objectify the ontologica] participation constitutive of
itself. At this time Marcel clearly sees the difficulty
besetting his claims about irreducibility. What is the
relation ofthought to immediate participation? Marcel
had claimed in hisJournal metaphysiquethat existence
cannot be characterized. Yet clearly he does not mean
to say that what is not objectifiable in the strict sense
is thereby unknowable. In "Positions et approches ... ,"
Marcel introduces his distinction between problem and
metaproblem (mystery).
A problem finds its intelligibility in itself, in front of
one, exemplifying the modern notion of the unbiased
and distanced investigator. According to the episte-
mology of modernity, the investigator can and must,
in order to gain "objectivity," separate his or her per-
sonality, politica] views, emotions, etc., from his or her
"scientific" identity. In the properly ontologica! realm,
for Marcel, this is a distortive methodology. In the
ontologica] realm a "problem," such as embodiment,
involves the investiga tor. Only a being who has partici-
pant experience of embodiment can, for Marcel, reveal
what it is like tobe such a being (to grasp the cssence
of embodiment). A truly "neutra]" investigator of em-
bodiment, one totally frec of prejudice, would be an
unembodied being.
Such an unembodied investigator would be com-
pelled to study embodied beings from without and
could only note certain common externa! character-
istics of their behavior. But for Marcel, echoed more
recently by Thomas Nagel, such an investigation would
completely miss the participant sense of embodiment
characterized by the enunciation "1 am my body." A
metaproblem (mystery), then, is intelligible, but re-
veals its intelligiblity in participant experience. One
cannot extract oneself from such experience without
losing intelligibility. Being, of course, is the most fun-
damental ofmetaproblems for Marcel. One cannot step
out of Being and assume some sort of externa! per-
spective upon it (hence one is the "stage" in this regard
rather than the "spectator"). Marcel is convinced that
one cannot credibly hold to the "fiction" of a transcen-
dental EGO, for this would commit o ne precisely to such
a vicious abstraction.
At the same time Marcel realizes that he is ap-
parently driven toward a contradiction, for would not
any thinking (including his own) necessarily objectify
what he has claimed is unobjectifiable? In response, he
offers, parallel to the problem-metaproblem distinc-
tion, that ofprimary and secondary reftection. Primary
reftection is objectifying and analytic, and character-
izes science and scientifically minded philosophy. Sec-
ondary reftection is "recuperative," repairing the dam-
age done to participation by primary reftection, and
drawing out positively the "essences" of participant ex-
perience. Yet to recognize the insufficiency of primary
reftection is, in some way, alreac~v to know existence
or Being. Thus Marcel is led to posit an "intuition"
within the immediacy of participation to ground both
 GABRIEL MARCEL
his critique of primary reflection and his articulation
of the essences of participatory experience. Secondary
reflection is a recovery only by being grounded in a
"blinded intuition" of participant experience. This in-
tuition is not self-conscious, and can know itself only
in its various fonns of expression. It is in this vein that
o ne must understand Marcel 's claim at the beginning
of his Gifford Lectures, Le mystere de t•etre, that his
reflections comprises a true Socratic "anamnesis," or
recollection.
In his !ater writings Marcel no longer found the
word "intuition" acceptable and moved in the direc-
tion of an "indirect ontology," in which Being is not
confronted, but always "vei led." In effect, this concern
with an indirect approach led Marcel in the direction of
hermeneutica! theory. This is clear in the chapter "My
Life" in Le mystere de ll!tre, in which Marcel reiterates
his critique of objectivity in light of his understand-
ing of situatedness. He refers to artistic judgments as
paradigmatic. Artistic judgments are always subtended
by unconsciously accepted general assumptions. The
"historically conditioned attitude" in such matters is
"inescapable," for judgments free ofthe local, the tem-
poral, the personal are impossible.
Marcel applies this appreciation to self-understan-
ding. One cannot adopt a reflective position toward
oneself free of situatedness. In reflection, a certain
distance or withdrawal occurs, but one in which one
never becomes the "pure epistemological subject." Onc
always carries along one's life. Self-understanding is
possible only in the form of a "story," a "narration."
One shapes "episodes" into a meaningful framework,
which, however, is a "construction" that cannot "repro-
duce" life as it is lived. Instead of a correspondence,
narration makes "allusion" to a participant experience
searching for a means of expression. The "allusion" is
to life as participantly lived, and even though Marcel
now emphasizes the fragility of intelligible construc-
tions, it is evident that he must retain his previous
contention that there is, of necessity, some degree of
consciousness on the level of participant experience.
This makes possible expressions of a certain "ade-
quacy" regarding intelligible expressions of lived ex-
perience. One must, then, take into consideration the
move toward an "indirect" ontology in assessing Mar-
cel 's notion of essence and his phenomenological stud-
ies. Ricocur has noted Marcel 's genuine eidetic abili-
433
ties, but it is clear that Marcel 's critique of reflection
moves him in the direction of HANS-GEORG GADAMER 's
"fusion of horizons," toward a communicative devel-
opment of universality. Philosophy is essentially dia-
logica!.
Being is not understood by Marcel solely to
be the ground of our existence. From the Journal
metaphysique on, he spoke of Being as a "fullness"
and of an "exigency" for Being on our part. This Au-
gustinian dimension runs consistently throughout his
writings and forms the context for a number of his
phenomenological studies (hope, despair), particularly
those regarding intersubjective life (being-with, avail-
ability, fidelity). Here can be found his sharpest criti-
cism offorms of transcendental idealism. In dialogical
life, in the encounter with the Thou, there is experi-
enced an "anti-Copernican" revolution, a decentering
of self in fa vor of the "hold" of the Thou over us. Re-
spect for the Other is a condition of dialogue. Here
COMMUNICATION and ETHICS arc inextricab]y linked.
Dialogue requires recognition of the Other as a
value, as a "presence," a singular existent, with a name
and a face, irreducible to concept, abject, impersonal
identity. In intersubjective relationships, Being reveals
itself to have a "depth" dimension. Not only does
Marcel, in his phenomeno]ogy of INTERSUBJECTIVITY,
join with EMMANUEL LEVINAS in recognizing the ethical
claim of the Other, "Thou shalt not kill," but Marcel's
phenomenology of love insists that "Thou shalt not
die." Of course, the intelligibility ofthe life of dialogue
and intersubjective relations is essentially dramatic (he
continually insists that his dramas are an integral part
of his thought) and not systematic, involving freedom
of response, fidelity or betrayal, hopefulness or despair.
In such matters, Marcel insists in his !ater writings as
in his first that commitment and witnessing are asked
of us and that the cogito as "guardian of the threshold
of validity" is out of place.
Marcel 's critique ofprimary thinking and of"objec-
tivity" is not merely epistemological. He is convinced
that the root of much contemporary malai se, socially
and politically, is the insinuation of instrumental reason
into human relationships, the unrestricted proliferation
ofTECHNOLOGY, the prevalence of propaganda, of mass
conformity. Indeed, his last writings show him as con-
vinced as ever that we are living in a "broken world,"
in which philosophy must return to its Socratic ro le of
434 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
"awakener" to new possibilities ofhuman ftourishing.
Both Herbert Spiegelberg and Paul Ricreur discern
an authentic phenomenological mood or tone in Mar-
cel's writings. For Spiegelberg, Marcel's phenomen-
ological studies exhibit the very best marks of pheno-
menological analysis. For Ricreur, it is a similar en-
thusiasm for "research" and "concern for subtle dis-
tinctions." At the same time, both critics agree that
Marcel clearly rejects the quest to make philosophy a
rigorous science, the move to foundations in the cogito,
and the transcendental EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION. Ricreur,
who considers himself in many ways to be continu-
ing Marcel's work, has questioned the adequacy ofthe
latter's theory ofreftection, "the status ofits own state-
ments." Marcel always insisted upon the integrity of
philosophy and contended that its work was an intel-
lectual one, yet his own development ofwhat he meant
by secondary reftection was tentative. Ricreur thinks
that in reacting to tendencies in modern thought to-
ward a restrictive understanding ofreason, Marcel has
separated primary and secondary reftection in an un-
helpful, non-dialectica! fashion, exposing his thought
to a self-referential weakness. Ricreur's own preoccu-
pation with ITiethodology can be viewed as an attempt
to address this difficulty.
Toward the end ofhis career, Marcel became aware
that STRUCTURALISM had entered the philosophical scene
with a view "quite alien" to his. Given the upheaval in
philosophy spurred by structuralism, and now seeing
20th century philosophy from this si de ofthat upheaval,
it can be said that, after ali, Marcel 's EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY and the phenomenological movement itself
have much more in common (subjectivity, conscious-
ness, intentionality, the relation between meaning and
experience) than not.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cooney, William, ed. Contributions of Gabriel Marcel to
Philosophy. Lewiston: Edwin Mellon, 1989.
Gallagher, Kenneth. The Philosophy o{Gabriel Marcel. New
York: Fordham University Press, 1962.
Gillman, Neil. Gabriel Marcel on Religious Knowledge. Lan-
ham, MD: University Press of America, 1986.
Godfrey, Joseph. A Philosophy of Human Hope. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Hanley, Katherine Rose. Dramatic Approaches to Creative
Fideli(v: A Study in the Theater and Philosophy ofGabriel
Marcel. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.
Marcel, Gabriel. Journal metaphysique. Paris: Gallimard,
1927; Metaphysical Journal. Trans. Bernard Wall.
Chicago: Regnery, 1950 [conta ins the 1925 article "Ex-
istence and Objectivity," originally printed in Revue de
Metaphysique et de Morale].
~. Etre et avoir. Paris: Aubier, 1935; Being and Having.
Trans. Katharine Farrer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
~.Du refus a 1'invocation. Paris: Gallimard, 1940; Creative
Fidelity. Trans. Robert Rosthal. New York: Nooday, 1964.
~. Homo Viator: Prolegomenes d une metaphysique de
1'esperance. Paris: Aubier, 1944; Homo Via tor: lntroduc-
tion to a Metaphysic o{ Hope. Trans. Emma Craufurd.
New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
~. Position et approches concretes du mystere ontologique.
Paris: Vrin, 1949; The PhilosophyofExistentialism. Trans.
Manya Harari. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949
[the French ti tie is the same as the original essay of 1933
that it contains, translated into English as "On the Onto-
logica! Mystery"].
~.Les hommes contre l'humain. Paris: La Colombe, 1951;
Man Against Mass Society. Trans. G. S. Fraser. Chicago:
Regnery, 1962.
~. Le mystere de 1'etre. Voi. !: Reflex ion et mystere; Voi. JJ:
Foi et reali te. Paris: Aubier, 1951; The Mystel)' o{ Being.
Voi. 1: Reflection and Mystery. Trans. G. S. Fraser; Voi. 2:
Faith and Reality. Trans. Rene Hague. Chicago: Regnery
1951.
~. Presence et immortalite: Journal mi:taphysique (1939-
1943). Paris: Flammarion, 1959; Presence and lmmortal-
ity. Trans. Michael Machado. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 1967.
Micelli, Vincent. Ascent to Being: Gabriel Marcel :v Philos-
ophy ofCommunion. New York: Desclee, 1965.
Moran, Denis. Gabriel Marcel: Existentialist Philosopho;
Dramatist, Educator. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1992.
Parain-Vaii, Jeannc. Un veilleur et un eveilleur. Lausanne:
L'Age d'Homrne, 1989.
Peccorini, Francesco. Selflwod as Thinking Thought in the
Work of Gabriel Marcel: A New Jnterpretation. Lewiston:
Edwin Mellon, 1987.
Prini, Pietro. Gabriel Marcel e la metodologia de/1' inverifi-
cabile. Rome: Studium, 1950.
O'Malley, John. The Fellowship of Being. The Hague: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1966.
Ricreur, Paul. Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers. Paris: Temps
Present, 194 7.
Schillp, Paul, and Lewis Hahn, eds. The Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1984.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A
Historical lntroduction. 3rd rev. and enl. ed., with the
collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982.
Troisfontaines, Roger. De 1'existence a 1'etre. 2 vols. Lou-
vain: Nauwelaerts, 1968.
Zaner, Richard. The Problem o{ Embodiment. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
The following are dedicated to research and scholar-
ship in Marcel 's philosophy:
 MARXISM
Presence de Gabriel Marcel
85 Boulevard Port Royale
Paris, France
(American Liason: R. K. Hanley
Department of Philosophy
Lemoyne College
Syracuse, NY 13214-1399
Gabriel Marcel Society
efo Patrick Bourgeois
Department of Philosophy
Loyola University
New Orleans, LA 70118
THOMAS BUSCH
Villanova University
MARXISM The relationship between pheno-
menology and Marxism has a long history, espe-
cially in Europe. The best summary of the more re-
cent encounter is to be found in the four volumes of
papers stemming from meetings organized by ANTE
PAZANIN, Jan M. Broekman, and BERNHARD WALDEN-
FELS, held in Dubrovnik from 1975 to 1978. Apart
from this encounter, there are numerous philosoph-
ical trends that combine and employ both Marxism
and phenomenology. The CRITICAL THEORY of Max
Horkheimer ( 1895-1975), Theodor Adorno (1903-
1969), and Ji.irgen Habermas is influenced by both
trends. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, and
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY in FRANCE were influenced
by Alexandre Kojeve, Georg Lukacs ( 1885-1971 ), ED-
MUND HUSSERL, HEGEL, and Karl Marx as well as MARTIN
HEIDEGGER. In ITALY, ENZO PAC! and the praxis theory
of Antonio Gramsci are combined in a unified trend.
Under the inftuence of ROMAN INGARDEN, Sartre, and
partially Heidegger, philosophers in POLAND have re-
vitalized Marxian humanism. In CZECHOSLOVAKIA the
Prague Linguistic Circle, through JAN PATOC'KA, had
direct contact with Husserl; KAREL KosiK became a
phenomenologically inspired Marxist. In HUNGARY the
Budapest schooi, stemming from the work of Lukacs
and actively carried on by Mihaiy Vajda, shows inti-
mate ties between the two trends. In YUGOSLAVIA the
Lester Embree, E/izabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
435
Praxis Group, including Gajo Petrovich and Mihailo
Markovich, developed Marxism under the influence of
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. In GER-
MANY, SUCh figures as LUDWIG LANDGREBE, KARL-HEINZ
VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, and EUGEN FINK have engaged in
analyses to show the connections between Marxism
and phenomenoiogy. Only thinkers who have made
substantive connections between phenomenology and
Marxism and whose work had a founding inftuence for
these connections will be discussed here.
The theme ofthe LIFEWORLD brings together a vari-
ety of concerns in both Marxism and phenomenology.
For Husserl the lifeworld is a world of temporal open-
ness, for Sartre it is the locus of the possible vectors
of choice and action, for Merleau-Ponty it is the phe-
nomenal field, and for Marx it is the domain of so-
cioeconomic struggles and critica! predictions of rev-
olution. In turn, both trends offer a human-centered
universe, from which the human can be alienated in
diverse ways. For phenomenology, both the objectiva-
tion and psychologization ofhuman awareness empties
the world of MEANING, while for Marxism the objecti-
vation of human activity as pure labor power leads to
alienation. Both converge in their critique of scientistic
reification of the human as an alienating overlay upon
the lifeworld.
The lifeworld is equally a basis for overcoming
dualisms, in particular the one between idealism and
metaphysical materialism. Prior to dualism, there is a
constant connection to the world: in the case of Marx-
ism, it is tabor, in the case of phenomenology, it is
INTENTIONALITY. Variations are also notable. Marx re-
ferred to labor by the working class as the concrete
overcoming of dualism, while Lenin alloted that func-
tion to the revolutionary elites. Although at one level
Sartre separates the in-itself from the for-itself, this
duality is abolished at the level of projects and pre-
reftective awareness. Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the
impossibility of dualism by anchoring ali human ac-
tivities in the perceptual-corporeal field as mutual in-
teraction of phenomena and activity, arguing that it is
as impossible to extricate either from the other as it is
impossible to extricate human activity from the human
corporeal interaction forming the sociopolitical body.
For Husserl, various layers of awareness, from ki-
naesthetic to passive syntheses, make dualisms redun-
dant. For Landgrebe, even the question ofmetaphysical
436 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
materialism is undercut at the level ofthe kinaesthetic
constitution ofspatiality and temporality, and hence the
active production of historical SPACE and TIME. At this
level Landgrebe is in agreement with a basic Marxian
conception that history is not based on theoretical time,
buton the time of activities directed and organized pur-
posively, and purposes are intentiona!.
Although Husserl rejected the theory of dialectics
in a most emphatic way as a mass confusion of chaotic
concepts, various Marxists, such as Lukacs, were able
to combine phenomenological conceptions of essence
and form, articulating them in historical settings, such
as the "essence of class consciousness" or the "essence
of capitalistic society," and regarding them as a more
scientific mode of articulating dialectical-historical re-
lationships than other methods. Essence and form are
not abstractions behind singular objects, but comprise
a concrete totality of interconnections within which
singular objects find their function and meaning. Con-
sciousness is interpreted by Lukacs in terms of social
class, with the claim that the proletariat has a con-
sciousness from whose vantage point the entire society
becomes comprehensible as a constitution ofboth the-
oretical and practica! understanding. Lukacs !ater lent
support to the sterile notion of dialectics, promoted
by the poJitics of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RE-
PUBLICS, but he returned after the Hungarian revolution
of 1956 to the phenomenological articulation ofsociety
as "social ontology" allowing for partial subject-object
conjunctions at the level ofmeaning. This narrows the
Husserlian conception of intersubjective objectivity.
Husserl articulated a triadic morphology of( 1) the con-
stitution of the sense of the other as similar to myself;
(2) a mutual founded-founding between the individ-
ual and the we-consciousness as a polycentric aware-
ness; and (3) an intersubjectively signified objectivity
present in dialogue and praxis.
A closer connection to phenomenology, and specif-
ically to the credibility of the primacy and/or the in-
clusion of consciousness in theoretical works, became
preeminent in Marxism after World War II. The crisis
of scientific reason, including the claims to science by
dialectica! theorists, became manifest.
Apart from Husserlian analyses in Die Krisis der
europiiischen Wissenschafien und die transzenden-
tale Phănomenologie ( 1936), critica! theory offers a
more complex investigation ofthe crisis by conjoining
phenomenology and Marxism at the level of"praxis."
The latter is evoked to demonstrate the crisis of the
modern sciences, specifically in their NATURALISM, and
to offer a critique of "instrumental rationality." This
critique is designed to provide clues for deciphering
hidden ideologies and to make emancipatory praxis
possible. Critica! theory extends the notion ofpraxis in
the lifeworld beyond the common Marxian economic
limitations; it includes a variety of purposive-rational
activities.
In France, Sartre was at the forefront and led the de-
bate. Although his first major work, L 'etre et le neant
( 1943 ), may seem more compatible with Hegel than
with Marx, his critique of static Being (and by impli-
cation "materialism") allowed Sartre to reread Marx-
ian theory against the Soviet dogmatic conception of
materialism and its "mirror theory of consciousness."
Sartre recoups knowledge for Marx in terms of a praxis
in which practica! knowledge is designed not to mir-
ror but to transform the world. Any passive theory of
mirroring reality is best suited to accommodate the
interests of a ruling or an elite class, leading to an
"eterna!" bondage ofthe working class. Thus Marxism
must be interpreted as a theory of purposive activity,
comprising the reality of the human and the active
transformation of the world as a genuine understand-
ing of this world. Praxis both unmasks and modifies
reality, and thus avoids objectifying reification. This
implies that the proletariat is best suited to understand
the world of concrete praxis. The task ofthe proletariat
is to unmask the reification ofthe objectified world and
to rebel against its continuous maintenance in fa vor of
a radically new project. As soon as a worker recog-
nizes his or her consciousness as class consciousness,
as serial consciousness, he or she becomes part of a
new awareness of mastery over the "objective" world
and ofbeing in a position to project boundless possibil-
ities for transforming the given reality. Sartre here sti li
includes the notion of"transcendence" ofthe given ob-
jective conditions, although he interprets this move in
practica! terms. No type of materialism can accomplish
such a move.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty relates Marxism and
phenomenology not only on the hither si de of projects
and politica! aggregations, but also prior to the com-
mon views of praxis that emphasize labor as means
for the transformation ofthe environment. Subtending,
 MARXISM
pervading, and enveloping all objects and activities is
the phenomenal-perceptual field. Every human action
is inextricably intertwined in this field and signifies
the solicitations, suggestions, shifts, and above all the
depth and ambiguity ofphenomcna. lndeed, the signi-
fications are the phenomena that cradle every datum,
and significations come in clusters, opening other dus-
ters. No signification can be traced in its pure essence
without residua of ambiguities. Merleau-Ponty locates
the ambiguities ofthe historical development ofMarx-
ism and its various practices in Humanisme et terreur
( 194 7) and Les aventures de la dialectique ( 1957). The
first ambiguity, stemming from Lukacs's work, is con-
cerned with the subject-object dichotomy and whether
it could be surpassed in the relationship between the
institution of the elite party and the proletariat. The
party clarifies the proletariat to itself, while the latter
-as the truth ofhistory-mediates the party's actions
by the interests ofthe proletariat. Second, the ambigu-
ity of the first relationship is resolved in favor of the
party, which claims privileged knowledge ofhistorical
purpose and thus must lead the proletariat. The party
is the universal subject, while the proletariat is its ob-
ject. This is Leninism and Stalinism and results in a
violence of humans against humans. Third, the solu-
tion to this violence requires the lending of priority to
spontaneous revolutions by the proletariat, since it is
the historically destined group capable of abolishing
subject-object dichotomies. But this too is ambiguous,
since the proletariat acts not of its own accord, but due
to inevitable historical forces. Meanwhile, the latter
turned out to be historically false, since the proletar-
ian revolutions either did not take place in their purity,
or they led to dictatorships of groups as subjects over
other groups as objects.
The conclusion drawn by Mcrleau-Ponty suggests
that human situatedness in the phenomenal field pre-
cludes trusting in any unconditional universality of
"reasonable human beings" forming all-encompassing
human relationships. In consequence, relationships are
not only situated in the field of signification, but are
shi fting and lead to continuous ambiguities. Due to this
conception, it is no longer feasible to claim a basic the-
sis, such as economy, that would explain everything.
Rather, one must begin at the intersection of current
relationships within which humans live; this includes
customs and culture and above ali LANGUAGE. The lat-
437
ter is central in interpreting and transforming not only
nature, but also the human being.
The Marxist Lucien Goldmann shows the connec-
tion between phenomenology and Marxism in terms of
a subject-subject, society and object nexus. Apart from
Marxian dialectics, he uses Lukacs's and Heidegger's
theories to break out of the sterile neo-Kantian dual-
ism. Goldmann favors Lukacs's theory ofthe primacy
ofsociety over Heidegger's "authentic individualism"
that resulted in the latter's acceptance ofthe Nazi mys-
tification of society as das Volk.
Enzo Paei, who represents phenomenological
Marxism in ltaly, points out the inadequacies of the
French phenomenologists, particularly Sartre, with re-
spect to the practice of phenomenological method re-
quired to lead to the concrete subject and its intentiona!
life. The method helps articulate the constitutive role
of subjectivity and thus comprises means to overcome
the traditional dichotomies of inner and outer. This
point helps Paei claim that the proletariat can be cog-
nizant of the intentiona! structure of the reified world
and thus can take on the class struggle in intentiona!
praxis. This aspect is analyzed by Paei from the vantage
point of Husserl 's Krisis. He regards the eri sis in terms
of increasing reification and thus alienation through
the reduction of human relations to object relations.
These are expressed in the capitalistic divinization of
scientistic objectivity, manifested in the process ofpro-
duction. The sole way ofthwarting this crisis consists
of Husserl's phenomenological method and- prop-
erly understood- the works of Marx. Both attempt
to recoup the place of the human in the lifeworld and
to overcome the fetishism of reification. This requires
that humans take responsibility for their world and for
the realization of human - and not object - possi-
bilities. The latter are latencies of the lifeworld as a
sedimentation of intentionalities. The latencies can be
rearticulated and shown to possess human intentiona!
ground. Here the subject and the lifeworld are the tran-
scendental grounds ofpraxis and social relationships.
Ludwig Landgrebe relates phenomenology and
Marxism at the level ofthe activity ofthe BODY, which
abolishes subject-object dichotomies and is a ground of
teleological conccptions. Moreover, the presumption
of metaphysical materialism is inadequate without the
prior grasp of concrete activities and kinaesthetic prac-
tices that correlate with the environment as purposive.
438 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Kinaesthetic practices are involved in every activity
that implicitly functions in the context of expectations
and their fulfillment. In this sense, the conception of
materiality is already framed in its practica! meaning:
it makes sense insofar as it is correlated to the purpo-
sive bodily engagements. This is the dissolution ofany
metaphysical dogmatism. Bodily activity also subtends
sense awareness, thus phenomenologically confirming
Marx 's claim that even the senses are nota pure means
of knowledge, but are primarily engaged in practica!
activity.
For Landgrebe, such activities comprise the pri-
macy of the "I can" as the condition of subsequent
abstractive and formalizing capacities. For him this is
the basic Husserlian transcendental condition for the
cognition of the world. The latter is prior to the scien-
tifically constituted world of homogeneous space and
time. It is centered on the active bodily orientations
toward tasks, deploying objects as up-down, left-right,
front-back, from here to there, from now to then. This
orientation is given from a position that is passively
present prior to the "I think." It is the here-now region
as an absolute fact prior to the distinction between
essence and its factual exemplar. Thus it is the ground-
ing transcendental condition of the human lifeworld.
In addition, this absoluteness combines both necessity
and contingency.
At this point HISTORY appears as the sedimented ac-
tivities both of individual and intersubjective orienta-
tions in and to the lifeworld. An individual is mutually
oriented in and by the sedimented activities ofthe life-
world's history. The phenomenological background is
used by Landgrebe to articulate the dilemmas in which
Marxian metaphysicians have reduced Marx's thought
to the metaphysics of "material nature." On the one
hand, material nature is regarded "scientifically" as an
explanatory category, and on the other hand, nature is
regarded as a function of a lifeworld and its sedimented
historical practices. For Landgrebe, Marx's thought is
grounded in the latter conception in such a way that
the "material base" is not metaphysical, but a "science
of practices" wherein nature is a basis for purposive
tasks and human orientations, inclusive of politica! de-
cisions concerning property and production, tasks in-
volving social classes, and the changing relationships
between these two factors. Such relationships are not
static; they change with different tasks and their correl-
ative bodily activities. Marxism is phenomenological
at this level, and ali the metaphysical impositions by
Marxists attempting tobe "scientific" fa il to appreciate
Marx 's position.
While seldom mentioned in connection to Marx-
ism, the work of Eugen Fink mediates between the
two trends. At various levels, he shows the presence
of rulership and labor and their shifting temporal re-
lationships to be among the fundamental phenomena.
Temporality is a reflective cognizance that allows both
the belonging of the human to nature and fulfillment
of natural needs as well as the freedom to be open to
the world. This cognizance is what comprises the basis
of work and rulership, what compels human beings to
be concerned with their fu ture and to secure it through
work or rulership. The latter are coextensive with EDU-
CATION and with social relationships. They comprisc a
techne that both relates the human to, and allows work
with, nature. Work, rulership, and education are social
phenomena. Society is, in principle, coextensive with
the fundamental phenomena.
At issue for Fink is the abstractive tendencies in
philosophical thinking, tendencies that attempt to use
one basic phenomenon as all-explanatory. Work, rulcr-
ship, temporality, and education arc interconnected
with other basic phenomena. Losing sight of these
interconnections leads to utopian ideologies and one-
sided power. This power shows up specifically in mod-
ern philosophies, where ali thought is regarded instru-
mentally and the environment is posited as material
for productive labor. The latter requires freedom, with-
out which the human being could not grasp work, and
freedom cannot be without work. In this sense, one
can produce one's future because one is cognizant of
one's needs, but also because work is an opening of
freedom, and not a mere reaction to an environment.
Modern thought stretches the notion of freedom to the
li mit and as a result conceives ofwork as all-powerful,
capable of any remaking of the environment. While
Marxism does not reach the ontologica! grounds of
modern philosophical thinking, it is one ofthe leading
manifestations of this modern thought: through work,
humans are in a position to restructure the environment
and to obtain total freedom from it. Nonetheless, Marx-
ian thought must be connected to other phenomena if
it is to avoid abstractive ideologica! utopias.
Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck is best known for
 MATHEMATICS
his ontologica! investigations of various philosophies
and various periods. What is relevant for the connec-
tion between phenomenology and Marxism in his work
is the opening of the ontology of modern age that
subtends Marxism. MODERN PHILOSOPHY is metaphysics
gone wild in a variety of forms, from Platonism and
ideal human constructs to power drives, ali imposed
arbitrarily on "indifferent nature." Even mathematical
theories embody in their essence rules for the transfor-
mation of nature in accordance with the requirements
of reflective will and are, therefore, a kind of TECH-
NOLOGY. This will posit, for the modern age, the iden-
tity between freedom and equality. Modern history is
the tension between these two concepts, such that at
times they converge and at times they diverge. The
project ofMarxism is to show how these two concepts
have diverged in capitalism; one has politica! freedom,
but economic inequality. It will require communism to
make these concepts identica! once again.
Although there are controversies between pheno-
menology and Marxism, and between phenomenolo-
gists and Marxists objecting to each other's and their
own camp's interpretations of these two trends, there
appear to be major convergences and sufficient mutual
respect to warrant continued dialogue.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Fetscher, lrving. Der Marxismus. Seine Geschichte im
Dokumenfen. Band I: Philosophie-Ideo/ogie. Band II:
Oekonomie--So:::iologie. Munich: A. Piper, 1962.
--. Vrm Marx :::ur Sol'ietideo/ogie. Frankfurt am Main: Moritz
Diesterweg, 1956; 21 st ed. 1981.
Fink, Eugen. Gnmdphănomene des menschlichen Daseins.
Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1979.
- . Traktaf iiher die Gewalf des Menschen. Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1974.
Goldmann, Lucien. Lukacs et Heidegger. Paris: Gouthier,
1973; Lukacs and Heidegger. Trans. William Boelhower.
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.
Habermas, Jiirgen. Legitimationsprohleme im Spătkapital­
ismus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973; The Legiti-
mation Crisis. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1975.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. Phănomeno/ogie und Geschichte.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliches Buchgesellschaft, 1968.
Lukacs, Georg. Geschichte und Klassenhewusstsein.
Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1968; Hisforv and Class-
Consciousness. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1971.
Mcrleau-Ponty, Maurice. Humanisme ef terreur: Essai sur le
prohleme communiste. Paris: Gallimard, 1947; Humanism
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. C/aude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
439
and Te1-ror. Trans. John O'Ncill. Boston: Beacon Prcss,
1969.
-.Les aventures de la dia/ectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1955;
Adventures olthe Dialectic. Trans. Joseph Bien. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
McCarthy, Thomas. The Critica/ Theol)" olJiirgen Haher-
mas. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978.
Paei, Enzo. Fun:::ione de/le scien:::e e significato del/"uomo.
Mi lan: Il Saggiatore, 1963; The Function al the Sciences
and the Meaning olMan. Trans. Paul Picconc and James
E. Hansen. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1972.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Critique de la raison dialectique. Paris:
Gallimard, 1960; Critique al Dialectica/ Reason. Trans.
Alan Sheridan. New York: Routledge, 1984.
Volkmann-Schluck, Karl-Hcinz. Einf!ihrung in das philo-
sophische Denken. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster-
mann, 1965.
-. Politische Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1974.
Waldenfels, Bernard, Jan M. Broekman, and Ante Pazanin,
eds. Phănomenologie und Marxismus. Band I: Kon:::epfe
und Methoden. Band II: Praktische Philosophie. Band Il!:
Sozialphilosophie. Band IV: Erkennfnis und Wissenschaft-
stheorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977-79; vols. 1
and 2 translated as Phenomenology and Mm:'(ism. Trans.
J. Claude Evans. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.
ALGIS MICKUNAS
Ohio University
MATHEMATICS The idea of a distinctively
phenomenological philosophy of mathematics has its
origin in the work ofEDMUND HUSSERL. Husserl received
his Ph.D. in mathematics, and his philosophical views
grew out of his early efforts to address some basic is-
sues in the foundations ofmathematics. His first book,
Philosophie der Arithmetik ( 1891 ), expresses severa!
ideas about a phenomenological approach to mathe-
matics that would, in one form or another, continue
to play a role in his !ater philosophy. Husserl came
to regard that work as deficient in a number of re-
spects, however, and his conception of a phenomen-
ological philosophy of mathematics varied somewhat
as his views matured. After launching an attack on PSY-
CHOLOGISM in Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901)
and taking a turn into CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY,
he continued to give serious thought to general issues
about LOGIC and mathematics in ldeen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913), Formale und transzendentale Logik
( 1929), Die Krisis der europăische Wissenscha(ten
440 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
und die transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936), Er-
fahrung und Urteil ( 1939), and numerous unpublished
works.
A number of themes concerning mathematics
emerge from Husserl 's mature, transcendental pheno-
menology. A central theme is to show how the subjec-
tivity ofthe cognitive acts and processes by which we
come to have knowledge can be reconciled with the
objectivity of "ideal" mathematical objects and truths.
Husserl approaches this problem through his theory of
INTENTIONALITY, according to which consciousness is
directed at ( or "referred" to) mathematical objects by
way of the contents (or "MEANINGs") of its acts. Thus
the phenomenology of mathematics would require an
analysis ofthe acts, contents, and objects ofmathemat-
ical cognition, which would provide, at the same time,
an analysis ofthe meaning and reference ofmathemat-
ical expressions.
Let us first consider what Husserl says about the ob-
jects of mathematical cognition. He argues that math-
ematical objects must be understood as "ideal," not as
"real." Mental acts and processes have temporal du-
ration and are "real," but mathematical objects cannot
be characterized this way. Mathematical objects, like
other objects, are identities through different cognitive
acts, but they must be understood as abstract, and as
not located in space and time. They are omnitempo-
ral and acausal. In Etfahrung und Urteil he says that
they are "free idealities," meaning that they are ide-
alities that are not bound to particular times, cultures,
places, or persons. To assume that they are not "free,"
Husserl argues, would make it impossible to account
for the science of mathematics as it is actually given
and practiced.
These comments on mathematical objects suggest
that Husserl was some kind of a Platonist or mathe-
matical realist. There has been some disagreement in
the literature about exactly how to interpret his real-
ism. The matter is complicated by the fact that Husserl
seeks a transcendental, "constitutive" phenomenology
of our awareness ofmathematical objects and facts, and
this suggests to some that he is some kind of an ideal-
ist. Many commentators ha ve emphasized one ofthese
tendencies in Husserl's thought to the exclusion ofthe
other, but interpretations ofthis kind do not seem tobe
in the spirit of his effort to show how the perspectives
can be reconciled. It can be argued that he is an ideal-
ist about the nature of our awareness of mathematical
objects, but not about the objects themselves.
The objects transcend our cognitive acts and pro-
cesses and are seen as such in a more detailed pheno-
menological description. We see, for example, that acts
directed to mathematical objects are no different from
other kinds of acts in having "horizons," where these
horizons are determined by the meanings (or contents)
of the acts. The horizon of possible ways of fiii ing in
our knowledge of a number, set, or function given un-
der a certain description shows that our knowledge of
such objects is not complete. To this extent, the num-
ber, set, or function transcends our grasp of it and is
mind-independent. We also cannot will such an object
to be anything we want. Only certain possibilities are
compatible with the meaning under which the object is
thought. These and other considerations lead Husserl
to criticize naive forms of metaphysical realism and
idealism about mathematics.
Husserl's mingling of idealism and realism has
some historical precedent in the work of Bernhard
Bolzano (1781-1848), and also in KANT's claim that
one can be a transcendental idealist and an empirica!
realist. The difference between Husserl and Kant is
that Husserl wants to be a realist about mathematical
objects as well. The problem with Kant's view of math-
ematics is that the discipline has changed significantly
since the 18th century.
Husserl also began to develop an analysis of the
cognitive acts and processes by which we come to
ha ve knowledge of mathematical objects. In Philoso-
phie der Arithmetik he argued against GOTTLOB FREGE
and others that the concept (in the intensional sense)
ofnumber could not be defined and that we must seek
to understand it by investigating the cognitive acts and
processes in which our awareness of number had its
origins. He found that acts of collecting, authentic
counting, and comparing, along with certain acts of
abstraction, reflection, and formalization were, in ef-
fect, conditions for the possibility of the awareness of
number. In !ater works, he developed and refined his
analysis of the knowledge of ideal objects. In ldeen !,
for example, he argued that the transition from SPACE
to the mathematical idea of a Euclidean manifold was
a function of a formal universalization that must be
distinguished from generalization.
In the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl argues that
 MATHEMATICS
knowledge of founded "categoria!" objects, of which
mathematical objects and facts forma species, requires
that our intentions to such objects be fulfilled. Knowl-
edge is a function ofthe fulfillment of our empty inten-
tions, whether in ordinary perception or in the founded
intentions of mathematics. He defines the notion of
intuition in terms of the fulfillment of intentions and
holds that intuition is the basic source of EVIDENCE. It
follows that there must bea kind of categoria! intuition
and, for mathematical objects in particular, a kind of
mathematical intuition that is built up from straightfor-
ward perceptual acts in various founded acts, such as
acts of abstraction and reflection. Husserl had already
noted in the Logische Untersuchungen that different
types and degrees of evidence could be provided by
intuition. Evidence could be of an a priori nature or
not, it could be apodictic or not, more or less adequate,
and more or less clear and distinct.
From these general claims we can derive a number
ofbasic features of a phenomenological view ofmath-
ematical intuition, evidence, and TRUTH. First, Husserl
holds that mathematical knowledge is a priori, and that
mathematical truths are apodictic (i.e., necessary), al-
though there can be certain adjustments or corrections
in our understanding of which truths are apodictic.
Mathematical knowledge can be more or less clear and
distinct, and also more or less adequate. By the time of
Formale und transzendentale Logik, Husserl came to
regard perfect adequacy as an ideal limit. In order to
ha ve adequate evidence concern ing a mathematical ab-
ject, every possible act required to make knowledge of
the abject complete would ha veto be carried out. Sin ce
we are onlyfinite beings we would have to say, with
respect to our knowledge of objects, that mathematical
truth is always "truth within its horizons." This is still
compatible with Husserl's distinctive form of realism,
since it means that there is something about an abject
that transcends our knowledge, that there is more that
we could come to know.
Since Husserl 's analysis of knowledge starts with
the notion of intentionality, we arrive at a view that
is quite different from a causal theory of knowledge.
This is especially important in the philosophy ofmath-
ematics, for adherence to a causal theory ofknowledge
seems to rule out the possibility of explaining mathe-
matical knowledge. It could be argued, moreover, that
any causal theory would presuppose such an intention-
441
alist view. Another notable feature of Husserl's posi-
tion is that in taking mathematics to ha ve its origins in
our everyday experience in the LIFEWORLD we have an
advantage over alternative views on which it is diffi-
cult to explain how parts of mathematics could have
applications.
Many additional features of the phenomenological
view of mathematics derive from the centrality of the
notion of intentionality. Consciousness, as we said, is
directed at (or "referred" to) mathematical objects by
way of the intentiona! contents ( or "meanings") of its
acts. It frequently happens that the same object is given
to us under different "meanings," but we do not always
know when this is the case. This fact induces a rather
strict criterion ofintensional identity and difference on
the contents of our acts. Husserl says we must always
start with objects precisely as they are intended. This
leads him, in generaL tobe very cautious about elimina-
tive reductionist schemes in philosophy. Reductionism
is the effort to collapse the differences between the
meanings under which we think objects by introduc ing
translation schemes and the like. Ifthis is coupled with
eliminativist motivations, we can encounter problems.
The philosophy ofmathematics in particular is rife with
eliminativist programs, since mathematics has been the
last bastion of abstract or ideal objects.
Predictably, Husserl argues that such programs do
not do justice to our mathematical intentions and to
the way in which mathematical objects are intended in
our acts. Husserl objected to psychologism for these
reasons. Psychologism was just a fonn of empiricistic
reductionism. Other forms included anthropologism,
nominalism, and some forms of fictionalism. In gen-
eral, Husserl was opposed for these reasons to various
forms of empiricism, NATURALISM, positivism, and con-
ventionalism about mathematics. These views simply
do not do justice to what we know in the science of
mathematics. They fail to respect mathematics itself
as it is actually given and practiced, and they could
actually hinder progress in the science of mathematics.
We also see in this attitude a resistance to a one-sided
extensionalism about logic and mathematics.
Empiricist reductionism is also typically accompa-
nied by some form of RELATIVISM, and so a phenomen-
ology of mathematics should avoid such relativism,
but without going to the opposite extreme of abso-
lutism about mathematics. Mathematical truth, for us,
442 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
is truth within its horizons, and our knowledge is sub-
ject to degrees of adequacy and clarification. In !ater
writings, like the Krisis, Husserl extended these ideas
to a critique of historicism about mathematics (in par-
ticular, geometry) and science, but argued that an ah is-
torica! rationalism about mathematics was equally mis-
taken. What is needed instead is a descriptive meaning-
clarification that is not reductionistic, and that could be
applied to the primitive terms and axioms ofmathemat-
ical theories. The EIDETIC MFTHOD of free variation in
IMAGINATION would serve the purpose of such informal
rigor. Husserl also continued to emphasize the role of
the GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY ofbasic Concepts oflogic
and mathematics, for the point ofsuch analysis is to caii
us back to the basic meanings ofthese concepts and to
see how meanings come to be sedimented in founding
and founded acts in a way that reflects our own a priori
cognitive role in the development ofmathematics.
In his criticism of Frege in the Philosophie der
Arithmetik, Husserl points out that even Frege's at-
tempt to provide an explicit, extensional definition
of number in the Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884)
amounts to a kind of reductionism about the meaning
of the concept of number. Since the effort to provide
such a definition is central to logicism, it is clear that
the phenomenology of mathematics must be different
from logicism.
Formalism in the style of David Hilbert ( 1862-
1943) might also be associated with a reductionist out-
look, but there are also other problems with it. For-
malism, taken seriously, involves just the kind of for-
getfulness of meaning, or forgetfulness of origins, that
Husserl decries. This does not mean that formalization
has no value. On the contrary, Husserl thinks it has
great value as long as it does not preclude the notion
of meaning and de generate into "mindless" or "mean-
ingless" technical work. Indeed, the "crisis" ofthe sci-
ences described in works like the Krisis is supposed to
involve just such a degeneration. Husserl 's idea is that
where there is REASON there is thinking of objects under
certain concepts or meanings. It is these meanings that
govern our thinking of objects, and hence our investi-
gations. The horizons of our acts are determined in a
rule-like way by the meanings, and they fix our expec-
tations and our understanding of how to work toward
the ideal of completing our knowledge through posing
and solving open problems. Hence to eschew meaning,
or meaning as we actually have it in mathematics, is
to Iose our aims and in some sense to subvert reason
itself.
In the process of developing these central ideas,
Husserl put forth and sometimes withdrew many other
interesting ideas on geometry, arithmetic, logic, the
theory of parts and wholes, FORMAL ONTOLOGY, mani-
fold theory, formalization, axiomatization, and related
subjects.
A number of philosophers and phenomenologists
who followed Husserl ha ve investigated these ideas or
compared them with developments in logicism, for-
malism, intuitionism, predicativism, mechanism, and
the rise of Cantorian set theory. Early investigators
inciuded OSKAR BECKER, FELIX KAUFMANN, and ARON
GURWITSCH. Severa! mathematicians and logicians were
also influenced in some measure by phenomenology.
HERMANN WEYL invokes Husserl's work in his devel-
opment of predicative analysis, his flirtations with in-
tuitionism, and his views on mathematical cognition.
Arend Heyting (1898-1980), following Becker, iden-
tifies the constructions of intuitionistic mathematics
with fulfilled mathematical intentions. KURT GODEL ar-
gues for a phenomenological foundation ofmathemat-
ics. The recent work of PER MARTIN-LOF on intuitionistic
meaning theory has also been influenced by phenomen-
ology.
At present, there is a renewed interes! among
philosophers in the phenomenology of mathematics.
It is likely that this will continue. GOdel, for example,
has argued that phenomenology holds the promise of
providing the most workable philosophy ofmathemat-
ics in light of developments following the discovery of
the set-theoretic paradoxes and the demise of Hilbert's
programat the hands ofthe incompleteness theorems.
There is also much that can be done in light of other de-
velopments in the philosophy and foundations ofmath-
ematics sin ce Husserl 's time. There is not only room
for more work on the relation ofthe phenomenology of
mathematics to logicism, formalism, mechanism, intu-
itionism, predicativism, and the rise of Cantorian set
theory, but also on its relation to new forms of Platon-
ism, empiricism, nominalism, fictionalism, structural-
ism, and the use of moda! concepts in mathematics. We
could also expect to deepen our understanding of math-
ematics through further analysis of phenomenological
ideas in connection with the work of seminal figures
 MMN~G
like Jules Henri Poincare ( 1854-1912), Ernst Zermelo
(1871-1953), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Willard
van Orman Quine, Imre Lakatos ( 1922-1973) on the
"quasi-empirical" character of mathematics, and oth-
ers.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Becker, Oskar. Mathematische Existenz. Untersuchungen zur
Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phiinomene. Halle:
Max Niemeyer, 1927.
Godel, Kurt. "The Modern Development ofthe Foundations
of Mathematics in the Light of Philosophy." In his Kurt
Gădel: Collected Works. Ed. Solomon Feferman, et al.
Voi. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 374-87.
Lohmar, Dieter. Phiinomenologie der Mathematik. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer, 1989.
Miller, J. Philip. Numbers in Presence and Absence. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Rosado-Haddock, Guillermo. "Husserl's Epistemology of
Mathematics and the Foundation of Platonism in Math-
ematics." Husserl Studies 4 ( 1987), 81-102.
Rota, Gian-Carlo. "Husserl and the Reform of Logic" and
"Husserl." In Discrete Thoughts. Ed. Mark Kac, Gian-
Carlo Rota. and Jacob Schwartz. Boston: Birkhăuser,
1986, 167-73, 175-81.
Schmit, Rogcr. Husserl~ Philosophie der Mathematik. Pla-
tonistische und konstrucktivistische Momente in Husserls
Mathematikhegriff'. Bonn: Grundmann, 1981.
Seebohm, Thomas, Dagfinn Foltcsda1, and J. N. Mohanty,
eds. Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Tieszen, Richard. Mathematical Intuition: Phenomenology
and Mathematical Knowledge, Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1989.
- . "Husserl and the Philosophy of Mathematics." In The
Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Ed. Barry Smith and
David Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995, 438--{)2.
Tragesser, Robert. Husserl and Realism in Logic and Math-
ematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Willard, Daltas. Logic and the Ohjectivity of' Knowledge.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984.
RICHARD TIESZEN
San Jose State University
MEANING One of phenomenology's
main preoccupations is with the meanings and
meaning-structures characterizing experience. ( Some-
times meaning [Sinn] is rendered as "sense.") A the-
ory of meaning is of central importance for pheno-
menology. For this, we go back to the first of ED-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
4~
MUND HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--
1901). Like his contemporary, mathematician and !o-
gician GOTTLOB FREGE, Husserl rejected PSYCHOLOGISM
in the theory of meaning, sharply distinguished be-
tween the mental act of intending a meaning and the
meaning that is intended, and also distinguished be-
tween the meaning that is intended and the abject that
is referred to through that meaning. The mental act is
a real, psychological occurrence belonging to the in-
ner life of an EGO, and the abject that is being referred
to may be a real spatiotemporally individuated entity
or an irreal entity (an essence ora number, for exam-
ple) or even nonexistent. In contrast, the meaning is
an ideal entity, not spatiotemporally individuated, not
a real part ofanyone's mentallife, but capable ofbeing
communicated and shared and of being again. Men-
tal life thereby comes to be conceived as a many-one
correlation between real acts and ideal meanings.
Husserl's own theory went through at least five
phases. At the beginning, in the Philosophie der Arith-
metik ( 1891 ), he thought it possible to clarify meanings
by showing how they originale in mental life. Later
rejecting this attempt as a sort ofpsychologism, he ad-
vanced the thesis in the first edition ofthe Logische Un-
tersuchungen that the meaning of a meaning-intending
act (Jinguistic or otherwise) is a species whose in-
stances are ali those acts that intend that meaning. Later
he held that as so stated, the theory fails to distinguish
between the ideality of meanings and the ideality of
universal objects, and thus he replaced it by the theory
that the ideal meanings are correlates of acts.
Meanings are now called noemata, which are said to
be constituted by meaning-conferring acts "animating"
the hyletic data of one's experience. The problem with
this account centered around the concept of "hyletic
datum" is that no such pure, uninterpreted data could
be identified, and experience, however far one may
proceed to decompose it or trace it back to simple ele-
ments, is always found to be meaningful in the broad
sense. With this remnant of empiricism overcome by
ARON GURWITSCH and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, the uni-
versality of noesis and NOE MA, experience and mean-
ing, becomes the defining feature of both descriptive
and CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY.
The fourth phase of Husserl 's thinking about mean-
ings is to be found in the Jdeen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
444 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phie 1 ( 1913 ), where a distinction is ma de between
sensuous, perceptual meanings (now called Sinne) and
their transformations into conceptual and logica! form
(now called Bedeutung), the latter being expressible in
LANGUAGE.
Finally, constitutive and especially GENETIC PHENO-
MENOLOGY proposed tracing every meaning back to its
Urstiftung or "original establishment" in history. HIS-
TORY is then studied as history ofmeanings, and mean-
ings are said to be historical in their origin. Ali this
should nevertheless be understood in the context ofthe
central thesis of the ideality of meanings. It is only
ideal meanings that are truly historical.
Unlike in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, the bearer of mean-
ing for phenomenology is not a sign, nor a word or
sentence regarded as a linguistic entity, but rather an
intentiona! experience or, technically, an act. Linguistic
meaning is grounded in contentual meanings that them-
selves are ideal contents of actual and possible acts.
Perceptual meanings are meanings of perceptual acts.
In each case, ideality implies repeatability. A meaning
is not an evanescent particular. Early on, Husserl saw
that the thesis of the ideality of meanings cannot ac-
commodate the meanings ofthe so-called "occasional
expressions" or indexicals that are essentially tied to
variable spatiotemporal and subjective contexts. Hold-
ing fast, however, to that basic concept, he went on to
distinguish between the function of indic ating mean-
ing and the indicated meaning, and suggested that the
former is an invariant meaning-function of indexicals,
while the latter changes from occasion to occasion.
But Husserl was soon dissatisfied with this account
ofindexicals and ata certain point oftime was tempted
to regard indexicals as somewhat like proper names in
that the name coincides with the object: on this changed
theory, an indexical names its object by pointing (via an
act of intending) to that object. In the course oftime he
began to think that occasional elements were contained
in ali experiences of real things. This change of view
was connected with his discovery that ali intentiona!
experience is horizonal, so that even the so-called ob-
jective meanings, which were earlier contrasted with
subjective and occasional meanings, threatened to be
subsumed under indexical ones.
The thesis that ali experience is horizonal also en-
tails that an atomism of meanings must be rejected.
But does the rejection of atomism of word meanings
entail an unmitigated holism for which the context of
meanings cannot be limited, so that against the limit-
lessness of context the distinction between valid and
invalid meanings, between meaningfulness and mean-
inglessness, would disappear. Here phenomenology
must abide by the principle that a horizon is a horizon
insofar as it lets a thematic figure stand out. Identities
(ofmeaning) get constituted within a horizon (of a con-
text, of a tradition, of a history), and we need not set up
a speculative construct of a limitless contexture within
which identities are merely vanishing ripples.
An intentiona! act, like an expression (an utterance,
for example), not only has a meaning, but is about
something, that is to say, it has an objective correlate.
Even in the absence of a really existent object or even
of an ideal entity, an expression may have meaning.
With the question of real existence or nonexistence of
its object thus placed within brackets, an intentiona]
act may have its meaning and its intended object. The
two do not coalesce inasmuch as the same object may
be intended in a different manner, and so through a
different sense. Since there is no direct access to an
object sa ve through a sense, and since there is no route
from an object to a sense, but rather always from a
sense to the object referred to, the identity ofthe object
becomes a function ofthe various senses through which
it may be referred to. Hence the priority ofmeaning in
phenomenological research.
The goal of knowledge is TRUTH, i.e., apprehen-
sion of the object as it is. If this goal is not to be
a chimera, what it entails is that the te/os of know-
ing as an intentiona! act is achieved when the object
is experienced exactly as it was intended. The cog-
nitive movement, then, is from meaning-intention to
meaning-fulfiliment, to a coincidence of the intended
meaning and the fulfilied meaning. The fulfilling or
verificatory experience itself does not con fer meaning
upon an expression. The ideal meaning is prior to per-
ceptual or experiential confirmation. But the fulfilling
experience has its own meaning-content as weli.
Thus from the phenomenological perspective, there
is no escape from meaning. A phenomenology of PER-
CEPTION therefore has to do with perceptual meanings, a
phenomenology of RELIGION with religious meanings,
a phenomenology of AESTHETIC experience with aes-
thetic meanings, and so on. In each case, the task is to
describe the meanings, to look for their constitution,
 MEANING
and to watch for how the meanings, in each case, make
up a different world.
In other philosophers belonging to the phenomen-
ological movement, the idea of meaning departs con-
siderably from Husserl 's. In this account we shall refer
to the views of MARTIN HEIDEGGER, MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, and JACQUES DERRIDA. In Heideggcr's view, the
origin of meaning is not in the sign, nor is it in con-
sciousness, i.e., in the meaning-intending act, but rather
in DASEIN 's understanding of Being. The sign itself, for
Heidegger, is a case of being ready-to-hand (zuhan-
den), and so the reference of the sign presupposes a
more fundamental reference- i.e., "being useful for"
- characterizing the mode ofbeing of ali that is ready-
to-hand. Every ready-to-hand is a movement in a total
functional context. But the Iatter totality refers back to
a primary "toward-which" or "for the sake of which"
(Worum-willen)- which is constitutive ofthe being
of Dasein. This account denies the Husserlian intuition
of meanings. Understanding is not intuitive, but pro-
jective. "Sinn" means "the toward-which (Woraufhin)
of the primary project, which makes comprehensible
something as that which it is in its possibilities." An
entity has "meaning" when it is understood in the light
of such a project.
Perhaps one can formulate the difference between
Husserl 's and Heideggcr's theories of meaning thus:
for Husserl, theoretical meaning, which is the con-
ten! of intentiona] acts of consciousness, is primary,
whereas for Heidegger practica] meaning deriving
from Oase in 's practica! projects is primary.
In Phenomenologie de la perception ( 1945),
Merleau-Ponty rejects Husserl's grounding of mean-
ings in subjective acts, of the meaning of words in
achievements ofthe thinking subject, and would rather
return to "la langue," and then embed language in the
pre-objective lived world. The word is neither "merely
a psychic, physiological, or even physical phenomenon
set alongside others" nor an "empty container," a
merely externa! accompaniment of thought. Both em-
piricism and intellectualism are mistaken. The word
itself has a meaning. Speech is not a sign of thought,
but by its physiognomy and together with its gestural
and existential significance, it is "the subject's taking
up of a position in the world of his [or her] meanings"
that already are in the lived, cultural, world.
Derrida 's critique of a Husserlian theory of mean-
445
ing does not require having recourse to a phenomen-
ological theory of human beings and their world. It
is rather an attempt to radicalize Husserl 's own tran-
scendental move. The Husserlian ideal meanings, by
their very ideality, are independent of any particular act
of speaking ( or intending) them, just as they are also
independent of any fulfilled reference. The ideal mean-
ings are repeatable, but for their repeatability, they
precisely require the written text that the Husserlian
account rejects as a mere externa) and accidental ac-
companiment. While this dependence of ideality on
writing shows that idealities are not purely transcen-
dental (i.e., they, in their full identity, cannot be con-
tents of the inner acts), their repeatability implies a
never-to-be-completed process of repetition. Besides,
repetition implies difference, so that the alleged pure
identity ofmeaning threatens tobe dissolved into infi-
nite and endless differences. Taking up Husserl's idea
of horizon - that every meaning-intention functions
within a contexture- Derrida sees no way of limiting
this horizon, while an endless opening of the context
would obliterate the distinction between the meaning-
ful and the meaningless. The thesis of "ideal unity
of meaning" thereby gets "deconstructed" - not de-
nied or refuted. The validity ofthis "critique" depends
upon the correctness of Husserlian ideas of "ideality,"
"constitution," and "repeatability" : on these matters,
it would seem that the Derridian reading of Husserlian
texts is on the one hand clase and on the other hand
flawed by a rhetoric that goes beyond phenomenology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cairns, Dorion. 'The ldeality of Verbal Expression" [ 1941].
In Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. Ed. Fred
Kersten and Richard M. Zaner. The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1973, 239-50.
Derrida, Jacques. La voix et le plu?nonu!ne. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967; Speech and Phenomena.
Trans. David Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwcstern Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
Edie, James. Speaking and Meaning. Bloomington, N: Indi-
ana University Prcss, 1976.
Follesdal, Dagfinn. "Husserl's Notion ofNoema." Journal of"
Philosophy 66 ( 1969), 650-87.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Essentially occasional expressions." In
his Marginal Consciousness. Ed. Lcster Embree Athens,
Oh: Ohio University Press, 1985, 65-79.
Heffernan, George. Bedeutung und Evidenz hei Edmund
Husserl. Bonn: Bouvier, 1983.
446 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Mohanty, J. N. Edmund Husserl:~ Theory of Meaning. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
-.Husserl and Frege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1982.
Smith, David, and Ronald Mclntyre. Husserl and Jntention-
ali(l'. Boston: Reidel, 1982.
Welton, Donn. The Origins olMeaning. Thc Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1983.
J. N. MOHANTY
Temple University
MEDICINE Despite its historical diversity,
the phenomenon of medici ne reveals two fundamen-
tal themes. ( 1) People become ill or injured; as this
is experienced as unsettling, a "dis-ease," they seek
help. (2) However "help" may be construed, others
profess that ability. In whatever tradition or approach,
what Edmund Pellegrino calls the "architectonic" of
medici ne is the relationship between healer and person
to be healed: the clinica! event. The complex, domi-
nant allopathic model of medici ne is only one among
severa] approaches, including osteopathy, homeopathy,
chiropractic, etc., that, for various reasons, have notat-
tained its prestige or influence. Within allopathy there
are diverse traditions- dogmatism, empiricism, and
methodism - that have been influential at different
times.
The marriage of medicine to biomedical NATURAL
SCIENCE avidly promoted since the 19th century, and
politically supported in the 20th, resulted in much so-
phisticated TECHNOLOGY (transplantation, contraceptive
pills, gene splicing, etc.) and diagnostic wonders (ultra-
sonography, computed tomography, cardiac catheteri-
zation, etc.). Especially in the biomedical sciences, the-
ory and practice are merged: to know is to have power
over things known. "Nature" (and human "nature") be-
came conceived in terms of the ability to control and
alter what is known. As Hans Jonas argues, "practica]
use is no accident but is integral to it ... 'science' is
technological by its nature."
Medical technologies provide powerful means for
transfonning human nature, effecting Jasting changes
in sexuality, genetic predispositions, etc. Technologi-
cal and biomedical prowess pose serious moral and po-
litica] dilemmas. Psychopharmacology makes it plau-
sible to control individuals and populations, render-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ing present-day humanity, especially more vulnerable
members, a crucial moral problem. Mortality may be
controlled and makes the extension of life and death
heady moral and policy issues.
Medicine's central theme is clear: the clinica]
event governs. The physician must determine "what's
wrong," "what's likely to happen," and what can
and, with the patient or legal surrogate, should be
"done about it." Diagnostic, pharmacological, and
other knowledge is strictly therapeutic, for the sake
of afflicted people, specifically, the 130DY - circum-
stances and conditions permitting, its aim is to cure,
improve, or at least comfort.
This was recognized throughout medical history.
Many Hippocratics thought that diseases stemmed
mainly from opulent living. Changes in the soul (mood,
habit, temperament) were thought to be connected to
changes in the body, and whatever was taken in had
effects. When intake is improper or creates an imbal-
ance, a healer must exercise clinicaljudgment, assess-
ing the relationship among the powers (physies) of the
body along with those of illness and the healing "art."
Clinica] judgment yields insights into the forces oflife
and death; the healer's word counts. The clinica] event
is a unique complex of knowledge, experience, and
practice employed by healers, as the Hippocratic oath
affirmed, solely on behalf of afflicted people.
Medicine is a craft, an artful exercise of informed
reasoning, a diagnostic and prognostic science, and an
interventional enterprise. In each respect, it abounds
in interpretations of personal and bodily signs. The
meaning ofthese differs historically and within differ-
ent traditions, depending on which ofwhat Susanne K.
Lan ger ( 1895-1985) ca lis "generative ideas" ha ve gov-
erned the interpretation of signs, therapies, knowledge,
practice, the meaning of illness or health, etc. Interpre-
tations are as diverse as the data to which physicians
attend, and lead to interventions governed by therapeu-
tic goals.
One core generative idea is "symptom." lts orig-
inal dogmatic interpretation is that they are externa]
signs ("visibles") of interna] disorders ("invisibles")
stemming from the imbalance or improper location
of "humors." For contemporary physicians, however,
interpreting and treating diseases involves a form of
analogical reasoning that moves from externa] bod-
ily signs ( effects) to interna] pathological events in
 MEDICINE
search of causal connections (the original meaning of
diagnosis) suggesting statistically significant patterns
("logica! classification of disease") forming distribu-
tion curves along which a particular condition will,
with more or less probability, be found. Recently, im-
portant changes have raised questions about the allo-
pathic model, espccially as medicine has shifted from
its primary focus on scientific discovery (of diseases
and their causal mechanisms) to intervention. This shift
is toward a more prominent concern for the individual
sick person, making clinica) judgment and discourse
thematically central.
This shift also demonstrates the place of interpre-
tation and HERMENEUTICS. Some urge that sound prac-
tice requires new kinds of knowledge: not only biol-
ogy, but COMMUNICOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, and
other HUMAN SCJENCES. The shift also revived generative
ideas from a rival medical tradition. Known as empiri-
cism in Hippocratic times, one of its main forms !ater
evolved into medical skepticism or, due to its concern
with method and the priority oftherapy, methodism.
Skeptics opposed dogmatics on every topic, includ-
ing "humors." Their interpretation of"symptoms," for
instance, emphasized the patient's personal and histor-
ical characteristics: place and style of living, dietary
regimen, moods, habits, and the like. Medical reason-
ing focused on the person in search of historical con-
nections for the patient's illness so as to devise plans
of action to alter the course of illness and lifestyle.
"Symptoms" became "commemorative signs" indicat-
ing those connections: semeiesis supplanted diagnosis.
Rather than analogically derived causal connections
between "visibles" and "invisibles," the personal, his-
torical circumstances determine illncss and health: epi-
logismos replaced analogismos.
Similarly, contemporary physicians increasingly
emphasize "communication skills" in relating to pa-
tients, to understand and treat them- beginning with
the patient's own experience and understanding of iii-
ness and narrative about it, then diagnosing the patho-
physiology. The major diseases of our times (heart dis-
case, stroke, diabetes, malignancies like lung cancer
and AIDS) occur, Eric Cassell notes, "primarily from
the way we live"- echoing the skeptic's emphasis.
The "art'' is essentially therapeia and episteme is based
on it, for it is only in the course of treating illnesses
that they are known and understood. History-taking
447
and clinica) conversations are as necessary as physical
diagnoses, and aim at devising interventional strategies
jointly with patients, families, or surrogates-the true
authorities for decisions.
In allopathic medicine, understanding disease re-
quires that particular symptoms and their mechanisms
be generalized into statistica) diagnostic patterns. Typ-
ically expressed in regular ways in cells, organs, or
enzyme systems, biologica) reactions may also be al-
tered by genetic makeup or changes in the immune sys-
tem. Clinica! intervention suggests that such abstrac-
tion risks undermining the aim of the clinica) event.
Personal habits, diet, the environs, and the like are
equally significant for understanding and treatment.
Sensitive clinica) care requircs affirming the patient's
experience in the patient's own terms - and in light
ofthese, negotiating acceptable therapies or preventive
measures. Increasingly recognized as crucial to clinica!
judgment are, Arthur Kleinman insists, the narratives
in which patients express and order their experience of
illness. It is thus important to develop listening skills
in order to learn how patients express and interpret
their experiences in their own narrative language. Of-
ten, neither patients nor families te li their stories well,
at times making it difficult to determine whethcr they
are informed, uncoerced, and capable of making deci-
sions. Helping patients tell their stories is thus a vital
clinica) responsibility.
Nevertheless, physicians are rarely trained tobe sen-
sitive and reftective interpreters of different systems of
meaning. They are also rarely taught that biologica)
processes are known only through socially constructed
categories. Not only is interpreting patient discourse
a "semiotic activity," but so are diagnosis, therapeu-
tic determinations, and prognosis. Clinica) judgment
thus denotes initiating and interpreting patient narra-
tives and translating them into medical discourse, to
determine what is wrong and what can be donc about
it, and then, with the patient, family, or legal surrogate,
deciding what can and should be done.
Beyond interpreting bodily signs, the physician
must attend to each patient's embodiment: experiences
and interprctations of the body and self woven into,
expressed by, and displayed through the rich tapestry
of personal narrative. Within their personal and cul-
tural context, symptoms are, like textual symbols, mu-
tually determinative and enlightening: context elab-
448 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
orates meaning, symbol crystallizes context. Clinica!
judgment is, Kleinman remarks, "more like literary
criticism or anthropological analysis of a ritual ... than
like the interpretation of a laboratory test or a micro-
scopic slide of a tumor," and, therefore, the physician 's
methodology is best understood as a form of EXISTEN-
TIAL or HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY.
Other aspects ofthe clinica! event need attention and
caii for insights from phenomenologically informed
sociology, psychology, communicology, and other dis-
ciplines. As noted, diagnostic, pharmacological, prog-
nostic, and other knowledge is strictly designed and
ordainedfor the sake ol afflicted people- its aim is
to cure, improve, or at least comfort. The clinica! event
governs, but even in its most rudimentary form the re-
lationship between healer and person needing help is
quite complex. A phenomenology of medicine should
at least attend to the following aspects of the clinica!
event.
( 1) At least two persons are engaged in a kind of
con versation at a particular time in each of their re-
spective biographies, the dialogue going on within spe-
cific circumstances (e.g., intensive care) occurring in
one among many settings (hospital, oftice, or clinic),
involving other providers (nurses, consultants, social
workers) and various ofthe patient's intimates (family,
friends, acquaintances). Each setting has its own writ-
ten and unwritten guidelines, protocols, regulations,
and laws, ali of which are set within the broader so-
ciety with its prevailing values concerning sickness,
wellness, and the like.
In addition to what ALFRED SCHUTZ terms their re-
spective biographical situations - including values,
beliefs, habits, personal histories - physicians be-
long to a specific profession_ (medicine) and specialty
(surgery or pediatrics)- at times, even subspecialty
(neurosurgery or neonatology)- each of which has
its own codes and standards of practice. Medical work,
moreover, is conducted within some institutional ar-
rangement (partnership, clinic, or hospital) with its
committees, policies, etc. The particular region and
state have their regulations and laws as does the fed-
eral government; the medical profession and specialty
organization ha ve their standards of practice and codes
-ali of which are components of the current cui ture
with its folkways, mores, laws, institutions, and his-
tory. Personal, professional, institutional, and prevail-
ing social value-contexts configure and influence each
clinica! encounter. Understanding the specific issucs
at stake in any clinica! encounter requires identifying
and explicating these elements and how they shape
what is attended to and interpreted by the situational
participants.
(2) On the side ofthe patient is an equal though less
formal cultural ordering. Their biographical situations
reveal distinctive values, attitudes, histories, linguistic
usages, and habits, some of which are shared by the
person 's intimates. Patients typically belong to social,
business, politica!, or religious groups that have their
own traditions, values, and usages- which in various
ways indicate much about the patient. Like physicians,
patients are part of the same ( or some) cui ture with
its prevailing social values, mores, and folkways. Un-
derstanding the patient's experience of illness, injury,
or handicap requires identifying and explicating these
elements, principally by careful attention to linguistic
usages (images, metaphors, etc.), paralinguistic char-
acteristics (pauses, emphases, etc.), and situational de-
terminants (place, time, setting, etc.)- accomplished
through cautious mindfulness to the participants' nar-
ratives.
(3) Structurally, the relationship is essentially asym-
metrical, with most power on the si de ofthe physician.
Physicians, not patients, have the knowledge, skills,
access to resources, social legitimation, and legal au-
thorization to deal with illness. Not only does illness
compromise the patient, so does the relationship itself.
The patient is multiply disadvantaged. This structural
imbalance suggests that the relationship !ies within the
moral order. The unavoidable trust by the patient in-
vokes, on the healer's si de, a peculiar blend of virtues
of justice (dike) and self-restraint (sophrosyne): the
physician ought never take advantage of the exposed
and vulnerable patient, family, or household. In this
respect, the myth of Aesculapius at the heart of the
Hippocratic tradition stands in dramatic contrast to the
vi sion of social life embodied in another great mytho-
logical tradition expressed in the ring of Gyges tale in
Plato's Repuhlic- in which "taking advantage" ofthe
vulnerable is precisely the point of asymmetrical social
relations.
(4) Current social conditions (fragmentation, spe-
cialization, vertical and horizontal mobility) are such
that asi de from a person 's ci rele of intimates and more
 MEDICINE
or less stable neighborhood, people for the most part
interact as strangers. They do not know to what extent
they share values, be\iefs, or attitudes about health and
illness and do not usual\y know what claims they may
make on each other. A need for help and the offer to
help brings them together, but their relationship can
be difficult. When that need is signaled by serious iii-
ness, involving aggressive and intimate interventions,
the situation is ripe for conflict. Yet the sick person
has little choice but to trust in numerous ways: people
(often anonymous, from anaesthesio\ogists to manu-
facturers), things (equipment, substances), and proce-
dures (tests, operations). There are substantive reasons
for ensuring ongoing, sensitive conversations with pa-
tients, but among strangers these can be awkward. Di-
alogue deeply informed by the structural asymmetry
of their relationship is essential - the sole means by
which the physician can at ali earn that trust, even
temporarily.
(5) Talking with patients, the physician is engaged
in complex interpreti ve efforts to find out what's going
on, what's going to happen, and what can and should
be done. This means that the physician is responsi-
ble for taking nothing for granted about the patient, the
content ofpatient discourse, and its paralinguistic char-
acteristics, physiognomic gestures, and the setting that
mutually determine the sense ofwhat is said and done.
The physician must also determine the pathophysiol-
ogy and the form it takes within this person's embody-
ing organism, personal life, and cultural milieu. That
they are strangers ineluctably influences their conver-
sation, especially when recommended surgeries, med-
ications, diets, and other treatments are aggressive, in-
vasive, and intimate. The physician must attend to the
patient's pertinent history, ability to understand and
comply, and willingness to accept recommendations.
(6) Reflection on the experience of illness reveals
that space, place, time, relations between se\fand body,
etc., undergo alterations that disclose emotive, voli-
tional, and cognitive components that are specifically
focused. Attention is directed-to the sick person ("How
do you feei?"), oriented-toward the patient's particu-
lar circumstances ("What's wrong with you?"), and
aimed-at his or her possible futures ("When will you
get bettcr?"). This displays an almost visceral alertness
- a bodily tug tobe mindful ofthis person within the
context of compelling vulnerability. As thus focused,
449
these constituents propel the self beyond itself. They
are in this sense an elemental ec-stasis; to be self is
to be-beyond, always already with the other. "Subjec-
tivity" is from the outset of life "co-subjectivity." Self
(person) is an accomplishment, a prize won through
complex developmental experiences that at times un-
dergo profound changes within the experience of iii-
ness.
(7) Certa in phenomena are therefore especially crit-
ica! to understanding medical practice and the illness
experience: body, self, and JNTERSUBJECTJVITY in partic-
ular (self: that ee-static moment so deeply embedded,
embodied, inscribed inwardly; embodiment: that "inti-
mate un ion" that frustrated Descartes and many others
after him). So "intimately" is selfbound to its embody-
ing body that there is the constant temptation to say, "1
am my body": hit "my" body and you hit "me." Here is
the source of"be\onging," from it springs other senses.
Yet however intimate and profound is the relation be-
tween self and self's body, it is equal\y truc that the
body can be experienced as strange and alien.
1 am my body; but in another sense 1 am not simply
my body. This otherness is so profound that we feei
forced to qualify the "am" : it is not identity, equality,
or inclusion. It is "mine," but this means that self is
distanced from its body, for otherwise there would be
no sense to "belonging," to experiencing it (and other
things) as "mine." So close is the union that one's ex-
perience ofthe own-body can be surprising (its happy
obedience that the self notices for the first time ), even
shattering (its hateful refusal to obey my wishes). So
intimate is it that self has moments in which it feels
"at home" with it. Yet so other is it that there are times
when self treats the own-body as a mere thing that is
other (obsessively stuffing it with food or otherwise
mistreating it; or as when it is encountered as "having
a life ofits own" to which self must willy-nilly attend).
(8) Embodiment is essentially expressive. It is that
whereby feelings, desires, strivings, etc., are enacted
(in culturally and historically different manners). Em-
bodiment is valorized, for what happens to embodying
organism happens to embodied self. As the embody-
ing organism is that whereby the individual "ru\es and
governs," the embodied self is at the same time sub-
ject to its conditions. What happens to it matters to the
self whose body it is: the embodying organism !ies at
the root of the moral sense of inviolability of self, of
450 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
personhood- of"privacy," "integrity," "respect," and
"confidentiality."
This VALUE character of the embodying organism
helps.elucidate why many bioethical issues- preg-
nancy, prenatal diagnosis, abortion, psychosurgery,
withdrawal of life-supports, euthanasia, etc.- are so
highly charged and deeply personal. On the other hand,
the profound moral feelings evoked by certain medical
practices (surgery, chemotherapy, dialysis) and much
experimentation (the human genome project) are un-
derstandable. They are ways of intervening into that
most intimate of spheres: the embodied person. Self is
embodied, enacts itself through that specific animate
organism that is "its own." Bodily schemata, attitudes,
movements, actions, and perceptual abilities are ali
value-laden modalities by which self enacts and ex-
presses its character, personality, habits, goals: that by
which selfis alive.
(9) As ali ve, the embodied self is intimately bound
to death; when horn we are old enough to die. At the
same time, there is something else about human birth.
Unless nurtured by others, a baby most surely will die.
Unlike other animals and most primates, humans do
not come ready equipped at birth with the repertoire
of instincts necessary to make it on their own. Social-
ity is fundamental to human life. The typical opposi-
tion, "nature versus nurture," is a half-truth. Whatever
our biologica! endowment, "being" is "becoming" (as
GABRIEL MARCEL said, to be human is "etre-en-route"),
and becoming is necessarily a being enabled-to-be by
a myriad ofnurturing actions. Others are inscribed and
dwell within us, enabling us to be who we are.
( 1O) Kierkegaard was right: these relationships are
reflexive. lndeed, selfis a reflexive expression divested
ofthe pronominative it modifies ("my-," "your-seJr').
Self is thus related to an other: it is that in the relation
that the relation relates itselfto its own self. So under-
stood, however, it is still not completely grasped, for
"that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its
own self' is, as Kierkegaard saw, set into play either by
itself or by another. As the first possibility is incoherent
- such a caus a sui cannot exist, cannot bring itselfinto
nor maintain itself in being- the relation that relates
itself within that relation to itself must ha ve been set
into play by another. He postulates a "Power" that, "as
it were," lets this peculiar inwardly-outward reflexive
relatedness "go out of Its hand" and lets it be on its
own: the phenomena of parenting and birth. Mother
lets baby go from her womb (better: baby finds itself
biochemically ready to exit and there it is, worlded).
Baby is enabled-to-be whatever it may be within the
womb, where there are already the beginnings of mu-
tual relationships.
Each human being is a reflexivity: self is self-
reflexive, however minimally this may beat any partic-
ular stage. Its being/becoming is "staged," temporally
phased in its being/becoming-what-it-is. In different
terms: within the relation, mother is reflexively related
to and as herself in and by her being related to baby;
baby is reflexively related to and as itself in and by
being related to its mother; and both are related to and
as each other in and by being self-and-other-related
within the relationship. There are thus two self-related
reflexivities related, within their relation, to one an-
other, bound to and as each other inwardly- mutually
situated and oriented to one another.
The ec-stasis is a "being oneself by and as being
with others." The ee-static being is one whose inward-
ness and awareness of self is enabled by the other. Tobe
human is thus to be a reflexive inwardness turned (by
the mutual relationship with the other) reflexively out-
ward from the outset. The immediate nurturing other
(parent/baby) is already within the self(baby/parent) as
that whereby the baby is at ali able to be and become.
Subjectivity is intersubjectivity (esse is co-esse). By
enabling the baby to be-en-route, mother is enabled to
be-herself (i.e., she is mother by and as mothering or
nurturing her baby) - and conversely. To be self is
at root tobe enabled-to-be-self-aware, to whatever ex-
tent and in whatever way it may be. Even a miminally
self-aware infant cannot continue to be without the
enabling, nurturing mutuality relationships of mother
(and others) with baby; the infant's being as self-aware
arises through those relationships with mother (and
others) and correspondingly, mother becomes mother
through her mutually relating relationships with baby.
(Il) Sick or well, people not only experience and in-
terpret their own bodies (pain, discomforts, or hunger)
and themselves (well, sick, or poorly), but also react
emotionally to what is happening to them ( fear, hope, or
uncertainty). Patients want to know, at times fervently,
about their illnesses; they want to know "what's go-
ing on" and "what can and should be done about it";
they want to know that the people taking care of them
 MEDICINE
also care for them. Whether their doctors inform them
(well, poorly, or notat all) about their ailments, people
interpret their own illnesses in typical ways: as "bron-
chitis," a "cold," "ulcers," but also as "unfortunate," a
"damned nuisance," or "devastating." Within the clin-
ica! event, the same complex, mutually related reflex-
ivities are evident between healer and patient. Each
relates to, experiences, and values the other (doctor:
"This patient needs help"; patient: "This doctor is very
careful"). Each experiences and values him- or herself
within the relationship to the other (doctor: "I think
1 can help you"; patient: "She really cares for me").
Each relates reflexively to, experiences, and values the
relationship itself (doctor: "Helping you is rewarding";
patient: "I felt as if I were a part of a team").
(12) By another principle of clinica! hermeneutics,
the doctor is engaged in "second-order" interpreta-
tions (Schutz), precisely because the doctor is always
faced with the patient's experiences and interpretations
(of self, body, world, as well as of physician, nurse,
or drugs). In different terms, like language, illness is
complex: the way it is manifested, what it means to
the patient, what the doctor says and how this is un-
derstood by the patient (and vice versa), what family
or friends say, and still other factors to be taken into
account. Medical interpretations are multidimensional:
the doctor interprets the pathophysiology, the way the
disease is uniquely manifested in a particular patient,
how it is experienced and what its significance is for the
sick person, how the patient reacts to the physician 's
talk, etc.
(13) Medicine, finally, is an essentially fallible en-
terprise; mistakes are always possible. What distin-
guishes medicine from most other professions is the
constant possibility of doing terrible harm to a vulner-
able person. This suggests a third principle of clinica!
hermeneutics: the physician's work with patients must
always include the possibility of diagnostic, therapeu-
tic, prognostic, and other types of interpreti ve error and
make concrete plans in the event that mistakes occur.
The relationship with patients thus also includes the
oftentimes difficult effort to communicate to patients
the risks and uncertainties associated with every treat-
ment- after all, they must li ve with the aftermath of
every decision.
As Samuel Gorovitz and Alasdair Maclntyre put it,
human beings are "particulars" like hurricanes and salt
451
marshes, which interact continuously with a variety of
uncontrollable environmental factors. The systematic
focus on particulars, then, involves other values than
those belonging to truth seeking and problem solv-
ing, and these are just as interna! to medicine as truth.
Particulars are wholes that flourish or languish in the
world; they involve a sense ofvalue: what that particu-
lar's own "good" is. We cannot even study particulars
without some reference to that good, nor without ref-
erence to its own perspectives and striving. Unless one
understands what it is for a tree, dolphin, or gorilla to
flourish, one fails to understand them as the particulars
they are. A type of regard or respect for their integrity
is a precondition for understanding. Therefore, a sci-
ence of particulars cannot be concemed simply with
finding law-like generalizations, and the best possible
judgment may always turn out to be erroneous because
of the necessary fallibility of our knowledge of partic-
ulars.
As regards different types of particulars- hurri-
canes, dolphins, or people - the kinds of predictive
power and corresponding law-like generalizations by
which we know whatever it is we do know about them
will necessarily differ. We always face regions of ig-
norance regarding any type of individual- variations
in environmental context, specific factors about their
history, specific configurations of physical and other
operative mechanisms. Some of these factors, more-
over, vary in unpredictable ways (environmental con-
texts ofpeople even within the same ethnic group, for
instance ). Thus the types of generalizations available
for each type of particular are in principle generaliza-
tions prefaced by "characteristically and for the most
part," or in Husserl 's well-known phrase, "un tii further
notice."
To be sure, patients are encouraged to believe that
physicians will not make mistakes, even though the
desired results may not be achieved and even though
it is undeniable that some physicians make mistakes.
Because of the necessary fallibility of medical science
and practice, it is in the nature of medical practice that
mistakes are possible. Thus the patient-physician rela-
tionship must be understood as including that prospect;
errors occur, sometimes culpably, sometimes because
of the current state of development of medicine, and
sometimes because of the necessary fallibility of the
art itself.
452 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Whether one focuses on allopathic medicine or the
altematives mentioned or refiects on the traditional di-
versity of medical history, the two core clues for a
phenomenology of medicine are the afflicted and vul-
nerable person who seeks help and those who profess
the ability to help. Whichever tradition or approach
is followed, the relationship between healer and per-
son needing help is critica!: the clinica! event is the
common thematic thread. On that basis, an array of
other issues inherent to the relationship must be probed.
Because medicine in any form falls within the moral
order, a range of ethical questions must also be ad-
dressed: values governing "helping"; diversity of moral
values (patient, family, professional, institutional, cul-
tural) and how inevitable confiicts may be resolved;
whether or not different moral traditions can compre-
hend the range of ethical, social, and politica! issues
raised by the "new genetics"; whether or not "health"
and "illness" are moral values; and still others.
Medicine is a rich mine for detailed phenomenologi-
cal work: the place of "free phantasy variation" in di-
agnostic and linguistic interpretations; the forms of
EVIDENCE and TRUTH in medical work; the precise ways
in which "doctoring" involves special forms ofEPOCHE
AND REDUCTJON; and the phenomena of embodiment,
self, person, intersubjectivity, and the forms of social-
ity- and how these are constituted within the clinica!
event.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Baron, Richard J. "An Introduction to Medical Phenomen-
ology: I Can't Hear You While I'm Listening." Annals of
Interna! Medici ne 103 ( 1985), 606-11.
Cassell, Eric J. The Healer :5 Art: A New Approach to the
Doctor-Patient Relationship [1975]. 2nd ed. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1985.
Edelstein, Ludwig. Ancient Medicine. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1967.
Gorovitz, Samuel, and Alasdair Maclntyre. "Toward a The-
ory of Medical Fallibility." Journal ofMedicine and Phi-
losophy 1 (1976), 51-71.
Jonas, Hans. "The Practica! Uses ofTheory." Social Research
26 (1959), 127-50.
Katz, Jay. The Silent World ofDoctorand Patient. New York:
The Free Press, 1984.
Kleinman, Arthur. The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Heal-
ing, and the Human Condition. New York: Basic Books,
1988.
Leder, Drew. The Absent Body. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas·Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
A/gis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 K/uwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Nether/ands.
Pellegrino, Edmund D. "The Anatomy of Clinica! Judg-
ments: Some Notes on Right Reason and Right Action." In
Clinica! Judgment: A Critica! Appraisal. Ed. H. Tristram
Engelhardt, Jr., Stuart F. Spicker, and Bernard Towers.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979, 169-94.
- . "The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clin-
ica! Medicine." In The Clinica! Encounter: The Moral
Fabric ofthe Physician-Patient Relationship. Ed. Earl A.
Shelp. Boston: D. Reidel, 1983, 153-72.
Rawlinson, Mary C. "Medicine's Discourse and the Practice
ofMedicine." In The Humanity ofthe Il!: Phenomenologi-
cal Perspectives. Ed. Victor Kestenbaum. Knoxville, TN:
University ofTennessee Press, 1982, 69-85.
Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. Structures of the
Life-World. 2 vols. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1973--89.
Schwartz, Michael Alan, and Osborne P. Wiggins. "Science,
Humanism, and the Nature of Medical Practice: A Pheno-
menological View." Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
28 (1985), 331-61.
Toombs, S. Kay. The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenologi-
cal Account ofthe Different Perspectives of Physician and
Patient. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
van den Berg, Jan H. Medical Power and Medical Ethics.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1980.
Zaner, Richard M. The Context of Self: A Phenomenological
Inquiry U5ing Medicine as a Clue. Athens, OH: Ohio
University Press, 1981.
- . Ethics and the Clinica! Encounter. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1988.
-. Troubled Voices: Stories ofEthics and Illness. Cleveland:
Pilgrim Press, 1993.
RICHARD M. ZANER
Vanderbilt University
MEMORY Memory has been on the agenda of
phenomenology since the beginning. As early as 1893
EDMUND HUSSERL concemed himself with the question
ofhow the unity of a changing event is retained after the
event itselfhas ceased to occur. How is it that we keep
in mind something such as a melody that has ended as
something actually heard? Indeed, how do we even re-
taina melody as a selfsame event as it is unfolding and
then vanishing? To address these epistemic and experi-
ential issues, in Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des
inneren Zeitbewusstseins [1905] he distinguished be-
tween "fresh memory" and "full recollection." In fresh
memory, I hold together a continuously fading event;
in full recollection, I repeat it. But in what does such
fading and repeating consist?
In pursuing stricter descriptions of these two kinds
of memory - each a basic phase of the "conscious-
 MEMORY
ness of interna! time"- Husserl developed subtle dis-
tinctions between what he called (inspired by WILLIAM
JAMES) "primary" and "secondary" memory or (increas-
ingly after 1908) "retention" and "recollection." In re-
tention, I hold onto an event that is "just past'' by a
"unique kind of intentionality." What is unique is that
I intuit- indeed, I can even be said to perceive- a
transpiring event before it has expired by virtue of the
fact that I grasp it in a continuum of fading phases. The
retaining is not a specific grasp of something determi-
nate or object-like; it is itself embedded in the flow of
TIME as a "comet's tai!" ofthe event 1 experience. Even
though every retention stems from an originary source-
point of time perceived as "now," the retention itself
gives rise to a series of modifications of itself: reten-
tions ofretentions ofretentions ... In this way a given
retention bears "the heritage of the past in the form
of a series of adumbrations." As "adumbration" (Ab-
schattung) suggests, it is a matter of shadowings-forth
of the original temporal event, to which corresponds
the "running-off' (Ablaufen) of retentions that stream
from this event as a persisting unity. Where the suc-
cession of newly arising "nows" represents "ever new
life," the sinking-down (Absinken) ofretentional series
passes into obscurity in a "march of death." At every
stage the temporal event assumes a modified "way of
appearing" that is at once continuous and yet ever dif-
ferent, thereby effecting a "continuous transition of
perception into primary memory."
Husserl 's passion for making EIDETIC distinctions
is nowhere in better evidence than in his claim that
secondary memory or recollection must be distin-
guished sharply from primary memory or retention.
His paradigm case remains musical, but now it is a
matter ofremembering an entire concert, notjust a sin-
gle melody. In recollecting a concert, I am stationed
in time after the event-to-be-remembered has ceased
to happen. I must repeat or "reproduce" it, and I do so
by re-presenting it in my mind. Presentational aware-
ness ( Gegenwărtigung)- a mode of perception- has
given way to RE-PRESENTATION ( Vergegenwărtigung), a
positing "presentation" that is distinguished from the
non-positing presentations of pure IMAGINATION. The
running-off of retention has ceded place to the running-
through of recollection. What I run through is the en-
tire previous experience, both its row ofnows and the
"temporal fringes" that flank each now. 1 recollect the
453
concert-event itself as "an immanent or transcendent
enduring objectivity," and I am aware of a new series
of retentions- those that now accompany my current
recollection. In short, remembering the fully expired
past is a complex phenomenon in which there is adi-
versity of "modes of accomplishment" ranging from
f!ash memories to full-scale reproductions. The variety
ofthese modes is considerably greater than is possible
in primary memory. While there is only one way for
the just past to be run off in retention - i.e., to sink
continually downward- there are many ways for the
elapsed past to be run through in recollection.
Similarly, there are various ways in which to antici-
pate or expect the fu ture- ways that contrast with its
spontaneous protention, the analogue of retention and
the forward frînge of every present moment. But EX-
PECTATION, in contrast with recollection, is essentially
empty and unfulfilled.
The acute differences between retention and recol-
lection (including the fact that retention is intuitive and
recollection is not) must not diminish the fact that both
are modes ofmemory. As such, they cannot be utterly
divergent and, in fact, they draw close to each other on
severa! counts. For one thing, every recollection has
its own retentions. More importantly, a particular re-
tention is, in its very partialness, revised and repeated
in an eventual recollection that includes it and other
related retentions. When I recollect a given event, I
bring it back as ifit were present; recollecting is qua~i­
perceiving; it is running through the original event "as
it were." The present of the reproduced event is not
given, nor is it itself even presented as such, but it is
nevertheless re-presented. For there is an identity be-
tween what is the retained and what is the recollected
object: I recollect the same event that is retentionally
modified in the first experiencing of it.
Husserl 's celebrated Vorlesungen of 1905- edited
extensively by EDITH STEIN and (to a much lesser ex-
tent) by MARTIN HEIDEGGER- were continually supple-
mented, especially through 1917. The emphasis of the
lectures and their supplements was placed on precise
description, and it can be argued that they represent
the purest and most complete examples ofphenomen-
ological analysis ever produced by Husserl himself.
He never lost interest in memory- it sti li comes un-
der close scrutiny in the C manuscripts of 1930---35
-but his attention was drawn increasingly to special
 454 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
problems rai sed by remembering rather than to the phe-
nomenon as such. In the late text Erfahrung und Urteil
( 1939), for example, the question of the "unity of the
remembered" is taken up at length.
A sti li more revealing instance of Husserl 's !ater,
more focused concern with memory is found in the
fragment entitled "Die Apoditizkităt der Wiedererin-
nerung" [ 1922/23]. This remarkable text opens with a
skeptical question: Ifl do not have apodictic certainty
regarding my past experiences, am I not confined to
the momentary truth of my "ego cogito"- i.e., what
is true at this very moment about my current cogitation?
How can I be certain that my past life of experience
and thought is my experience and thought? How can I
lay claim to it if I am not absolutely certain that it is
mine? Again employing a musical example, this time
the memory of a song I ha ve heard, Husserl argues that
1 recollect this past experience with varying degrees
of "adequacy"- as more or less certain up to a limit
of complete adequation in "perfect memory": "some
recollections may unveil more ofthe object, and some
unveilless."
But more than differing degrees of adequation or
fulfillment is at stake in recollection. When I recollect
my previous experience of a song, I also reftect (on
myself) in the recollection: I find my (former) self in
its very intentiona! content. To do this I must first of ali
reduce the spatiotemporal "world-reality" ofthe song
and its sin ger. Then, by a further "apodictic reduction,"
1 gain access to the past flowing that belongs to the past
remembering, indeed to my entire "past transcendental
life." In particular, I experience apodictic evidence of
my past perception of the song; it is as if my present
self or ego and my past self were "swimming together
in a stream," albeit in contrary directions, my present
self going downstream, my past selfupstream. In thus
rejoining my previous self, my intention of the past
is continually fulfilled. Hence recollection, despite the
fact that it deals with an already elapsed experience,
possesses apodictic contents. We see this most saliently
in the case of recollecting an experience that has just
ended: about this experience I have an "ineliminable
certainty." Even in the case ofrecollecting temporally
remote experiences, we can say that "the mode of cer-
tainty runs inalterably through the entire continuum of
intentionality." In the end, nothing is altogether or in
principle uncertain, even ifwe must recognize degrees
of certainty and the fallibility of memory with re gard
to particular details. Every recollection has its "frame
of uncertainty," but this is compatible with the fact
that it "will also always and necessarily ha ve a certain,
universal, and ineliminable content."
Beyond establishing the evidential certainty ofrec-
ollection in the face of a dire Cartesian skepticism, the
fragment of 1922/23 also attributes to recollection an
indispensable epistemic ro le in mentallife: namely, the
enduring truth of that to which we return in recollec-
tion "again and again." This truth can be simply em-
pirica!, as in the ascertainment of certain facts whose
repeatability in recollection supports their objectivity,
or it can be eidetic: i.e., at the level of law or essence.
In his introduction to his 1962 French translation of
Husserl's "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Ge-
ometrie als intentional-historisches Problem" ( 1939),
JACQUES DERRIDA has emphasized the paradox ofmak-
ing essential structures dependent on their own reit-
erability in memory. At the very least, Husserl points
to the continuai reinforcement that occurs in the ordi-
nary course of remembering. The same thing that is
given in an "original now" of perception is prolonged
in the "just now" of retention, and it appears once
more in the "as it were now" of recollection (itself
often repeated again and again). The same synthetic
logic of retentive-cum-reproductive reinforcement ob-
tains in the case of essences, which are thereby "rec-
ognizable again and again as absolutely the same, i.e.,
[as] 'again'-experienceable." Certainty and sameness
show themselves to be two si des of the very power of
remembering to bring the past back in a consistently
reliable format: to re-present it as ever equal to itself.
One important phenomenon of memory to which
Husserl did not systematically attend is forgetting. It
was left to Heidegger to address forgetting as some-
thing to be taken seriously in its own right- as Sig-
mund Freud had already indicated. In Sein und Zeit
( 1927, the year before he edited and presented Stein 's
edition ofHusserl's time lectures) Heidegger proposes
that there is a primary forgetting that, far from being
merely a deficient remembering, enables the latter it-
self to exist: "Just as expecting is possible only on
the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on
that offorgetting, and nof vice versa." On Heidegger's
account, far from forgetting being a reason for search-
ing for ever greater memorial certainty - much less
 MEMORY
apodicticity- "having forgotten" ( Vergessenheit) is a
positive form of disclosure for DASEIN, indeed an "ee-
statica! mode of one's having been- a mode with a
character of its own." Just as one becomes "authentic"
(eigentlich) only on the basis ofbeing inauthentically
embroiled in the everyday WORLD, so one remembers
only from forgetting as the horizon of memory itself.
It follows that forgetting is not simple oblivion; it is
not a passive process; it is an active forgetting- as
Nietzsche might call it- of one's own thrown being-
in-the-world.
Indeed, forgetting, like authentic temporality, has
its own "ec-stasis," albeit one that has as its effect a
closing-off: "the ecstasis (rap ture) of forgetting has the
character ofbacking away in theface of one 's ownmost
'been,' and of doing so in a manner which is closed
off from itself- in such a manner, indeed, that this
backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of
which one is backing away, and thereby closes itself
off too." Paired with disclosure is a double closure-
or, more exactly, a double foreclosure: of the forgot-
ten event itself and of oneself as sealed off from this
event in non-remembering. "Only on the basis of [Da-
sein's] forgetting," remarks Heidegger, "can anything
be retained by the concernful making-present which
awaits ... To such retaining there corresponds a non-
retaining which presents us with a kind of 'forgetting'
in a derivative sense." Such secondary non-retaining
corresponds to the ordinary sense of forgetting the past
- the very sense that spurred Husserl to write "Die
Apodiktizităt der Wiedererinnerung." Heidegger pro-
poses that an ontologically prior sense of forgetting
sets the stage for remembering in its many guises. Such
forgetting abets the work of "repetition," the authen-
tic form ofDasein's having-been as the handing down
of the possibilities of existence. In repetition I do not
attempt to bring back the past as I do in recollection;
instead, 1 resolutely anticipate what can be repeated in
the future as a "reciprocative rejoinder" (Erwiderung)
to possibilities ofthe very Dasein that has already been
there.
In !ater writings as well, forgetting figures promi-
nently in Heidegger's subtle and highly suggestive ap-
proach to memory. It figures, above ali, as the way in
which Being has become "veiled" from adequate on-
tologica! remembrance. This lethic veiledness is not a
belated product of ontologically obtuse thought but has
455
been present from the earliest moments ofGreek med-
itation on Being: "What is most thought-provoking,
what long sin ce and forever gives us food for thought,
remains in its very origin withdrawn into ob1ivion
(Vergessenheit)." The task of memory is not merely
to recapture or restore what has been forgotten but
to keep in mind what must be thought about, and to
do so by fostering and preserving what remains to
be thought. In this light, "keeping is the fundamen-
tal nature and essence of memory." Such memory is
a thinking-back (Andenken: commemorative thinking,
a re-thinking that responds) to Being as the thought-
worthy. But it thinks back only from within the horizon
of oblivion itself: "only from within the unknown an-
nounced by this horizon does Being appear come to
meet us."
It follows that any reduction of memory to repre-
sentational thinking will be inadequate to the task of
such an ontologically adequate remembering. Mem-
ory therefore means "something else than merely the
psychologically demonstrable ability to retain a men-
tal representation ( Vorstellung), an idea, of something
which is past." As the stepchild ofMnemosyne, mem-
ory is more a matter of"heart" (Gemut) than of"mind"
(Geist). It is a mindfu1ness that is ''the gathering and
convergence of thought upon what everywhere de-
mands tobe thought about first of ali." In "Das Ding"
( 1951) Heidegger asserts that the encounter with a bare
"thing" caUs for more than representational recollec-
tion: the thing becomes a mere "object" when "we
place it before us, whether in immediate perception or
by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation"
(erinnernden Vergegenwărtigung: Husserl's word is
here explicitly invoked).
Others in the phenomenological tradition ha ve taken
up the question of memory in productive ways. In Der
Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
(Formalism in ethics and nonformal ethics of value,
1913/1916), MAX SCHELER briefty but pointedly treated
"immediate" and "mediate" remembrance as types of
memory that are not reducible to retention and rec-
ollection, since the first bears on the content and the
second on the act of remembering. Forgetting, strictly
speaking, belongs only to mediate, act-bound remem-
brance, as does the allied phenomenon of "trying to
remember X." WILLIAM EARLE has argued forcefully for
a "direct realism" of memory in his Autobiographical
456 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Consciousness (1972). In order to remember some-
thing (i.e., to "recollect" it in Husserl 's sense ), no rep-
resentations, much less images, are required- given
that the past, albeit elapsed, presents itself to us in
person and as such. Heidegger's critique of represen-
tationalist views of memory is here strengthened by
a positive thesis concerning the past's unmediated ac-
cessibility (unmediated even by the act-character of
remembering itselt).
If Husserl's treatment of recollection has been
widely disputed, his account of retention has rarely
been challenged. Nor has its considerable promise of
possible extensions been fully explored. One such ex-
tension, for instance, is found in MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY's account ofthe "customary body," whose repet-
itive skillful actions imply a specifically habitual BODY
memory. As outlined in his Phenomenologie de la per-
ception (1945), such a body memory, in its contin-
ual availability and instantaneous enactability, is the
corporeal complement of primary memory as envis-
aged by Husserl. The organist or typist- in Merleau-
Ponty's leading examples- draws upon a fund ofim-
mediately accessible bodily actions that require no in-
tervention ofrepresentations (indeed, the interpretation
of such representations would risk aborting the actions
themselves). Habitual body memory exemplifies the
"corporeal intentionality" upon which Merleau-Ponty
insists as an expansion upon FRANZ BRENTANo's original
yet unduly mentalistic notion of act-intentionality-
which cannot contain, much less explain, the varieties
and vicissitudes ofbodily experience.
To posit body memory is to open up a Pandora's
box of further possibilities. Some of these have been
explored in EDWARD s. CASEY's Remembering: A Pheno-
menological Study ( 1987). Investigating severa! non-
habitual forms of body memory, this book also exam-
ines place memory (not only memory of place as such
but the crucial, though hitherto undiscussed, role of
place in virtually ali remembering) and commemora-
tion (in which the past is less recollected than reenacted
in a participatory manner). Considered as well are three
"mnemonic modes" that make up the proximate envi-
ronment ofthe remembering self: recognition, remind-
ing, and reminiscing, each of which is intermediate
between mind and world in distinctive ways. The in-
herently social character of commemorating and rem-
iniscing is emphasized, as are the special indexical di-
mension ofreminding and the close (but not exclusive)
alliance with perception in the case of recognizing. A
critique ofmentalism is conjoined with an effort to cir-
cumscribe the paradigma tic position to which recollec-
tion has been assigned in Western thought from Plato
onward (though reaching an apogee in early modern
philosophy). Emphasized here is the "thick autonomy''
of memory- its enmeshment in the toils of perduring
process, its continuing existence in density, depth, and
slow sedimentation. Despite its intrinsic thickness, re-
membering is also seen to possess its own freedom, at
once active and passive, based equally in the self and
in the other, and situated in the present and in the past
(and even, by its adumbrative power, in the future).
We are what we remember ourselves to be. Yet at the
same time, our remembering in-gathers the diversities
and marginalities and forgottennesses of our conscious
life, taking everything experienceable in as remem-
bered- and giving it back out aga in as re-membered
in the ongoing place-world.
The matter of memory is stil! far from settled. Ever
more precise descriptions of remembering - and of
forgetting-are needed ifphenomenology is to realize
its mission offinding the essential structures of a basic
phenomenon such as this. Moreover, questions of just
how a phenomenological approach to memory might
contribute to contemporary concerns in coGNITIVE sci-
ENCE and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE are unreso]ved but
important to address. In contrast with most ofthe cur-
rently employed paradigms in the areas just mentioned,
phenomenology offers a nuanced treatment ofmemory
in its experiential, qualitatively specific aspects. This
treatment, despite its incompleteness at the present mo-
ment, not only complements other more quantitative
approaches, but is called for in any adequate account-
ing ofthe many remaining mysteries ofmemory.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Casey, Edward S. Remembering: A Phenomenological Study,
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques. "Introduction" In Edmund Husserl.
L 'Origine de la Geometrie. Trans. Jacques Derrida. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1962; Edmund Husserl:~
Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. Trans. John P.
Leavey. Stony Brook, NY: Nicolas Hays, 1978.
Earle, William. The Autobiographical Consciousness: A
Philosophical Inquiry into Existence. Chicago: Quadran-
gle, 1972.
 MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
Heidegger, Martin. Was heisst Denken? Tubingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1954; What isCa/led Thinking? Trans. J. Glenn
Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
~. "Aus einem Feldweggesprăch liber das Denken." In his
Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, 19-52; "Conver-
sation on a Country Path." In his Discourse on Thinking.
Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York:
Harper & Row, 1966, 58-90.
~. "Das Ding." In his Vortrăge und Auf~ătze. Pfullin-
gen: Neske, 1954, 163-85; "The Thing." In his Poetry,
Thought, Language. Ed and trans. Albert Hofstadter. New
York: Haper & Row, 1971, 165-82.
Husserl, Edmund. Zur Phănomenologie des inneren Zeitbe-
wusstseins (1893-1917). Ed. Rudo1fBoehm. Husserliana
1O. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; On the Pheno-
menology of the Consciousness of Interna! Time (1893-
1917). Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991.
~. Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie
der Logik. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Prague: Academia,
1939; Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Ge-
nealogy ()/'Logic. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl
Ameriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1973.
~. "Die Apodiktizităt der Wiedererinnerung." In Analysen
zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungs-
manuskripten 1918-1926. Ed. Margot Fleischer. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, 365--83; "The Apodic-
ticity ofRecollection." Trans. and intro. Deborah Chaffin.
Husserl Studies 2 (1985), 3-32.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomimologie de la Perception.
Paris: Gallimard, 1945; Phenomenology of Perception.
Trans. Co1in Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1962; rpt., with trans. revisions by Forrest Williams, At-
lantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976.
Scheler, Max. Die Formalismus in der Ethik und die materi-
ale Wertethik. Bern: Francke, 1966; Formalism in Ethics
and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Trans. Manfred. S.
Frings and Roger L. Funk. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1973.
EDWARD S. CASEY
State University of New York, Stony Brook
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY Although a
contemporary and friend of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and SI-
MONE DE BEAUVOIR, Maurice Merleau-Ponty spent his
life as an academic. He was bom in Rochefort-sur-
Mer, Charente-Maritime, on March 18, 1908, studied
at the Ecole Normale Superieure, and taught philoso-
phy and psychology at the Sorbonne and finally at the
famous College de France. He died in Paris on May
3, 1961, only 53 years old. Merleau-Ponty's interest in
philosophy was supplemented with scientific interests,
particularly in PSYCHOLOGY and the HUMAN SCIENCES.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
457
His first book, La structure du comportement ( 1942),
dealt with the question whether the scientific study of
animal and human behavior should be mechanistic.
No doubt there were humanistic concems behind this
question. How can we in our scientific study do justice
to the distinctive nature of animals and, in particular,
human beings? How are we to counter those tendencies
of NATURALISM in science that reduce the human being
to nothing more than a material or natural object?
La structure shows the influence of GESTALT PSY-
CHOLOGY, a school ofpsychology that emphasized the
need to recognize structures or forms, particularly
in perception. Applying this way of thinking more
broadly, Merleau-Ponty argued that a particular case
of animal or human behavior is not a response to a
physically or chemically determined stimulus-object,
but a response to a structured environment in which
both the object and that particular response ha ve a spe-
cific, holistic sense or meaning for the animal. A type
ofbehavior, in short, is tobe seen in correlation with a
meaningful environment, which for its part is specific
to that behavior.
Merleau-Ponty took this development in the sci-
ences to converge with the insights ofphenomenology.
For as he saw it, the question as to what mode of exis-
tence a form has could not be avoided. From the earlier
discussions in La structure, it had become clear that a
form is nota (first-order) object, but rather the milieu
through which such objects appear to a sentient being.
From the standpoint ofbiology or Gestalt psychology,
to be sure, it appears as an object of sorts, but this is
clearly due to the objectification intrinsic to the scien-
tific attitude. The question remains: what is a form, ifit
is not an object but rather a condition for the possibility
of experience? To answer this question, according to
Merleau-Ponty, we should adopta reflective stance and
try to appreciate structures from the standpoint of the
being whose behavior is so structured. This realization
led him to phenomenology, the movement of thought
of which he became a classical representative and to
which he remained loyal to the end of his life.
The founder of that movement, EDMUND HUSSERL,
had held that phenomenology is a retum to the "mat-
ters themselves," i.e., a reflection on the experience
in which objects present themselves to us. He inter-
preted this retum in the spirit ofthe Kantian tradition,
namely as a retum to the subject as a condition for the
458 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
possibility of the WORLD. In the absence of this tran-
scendental subject, Husserl thought, there would be no
world at ali. Because this subject constitutes whatever
is or can be thought, it cannot be a part of the world.
He therefore called it pure consciousness. Husserl's
CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY, it is clear, is reminis-
cent of KANT, who agreed with Hume that what we are
given by sense is an unintelligible manifold, and then
proceeded to argue that what is needed to overcome
Hume's problem are acts that interpret the manifold
and thus create for us a world of objects. The Kantian
principles of interpretation are the so-called forms of
sensibility and the categories ofthe understanding.
Merleau-Ponty, however, interpreted the idea of
phenomenology in his own way, as MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER had already done in Sein und Zeit ( 1927). The
work that established his reputation was entitled La
phimomenologie de la percep ti an ( 1945). In it he ar-
gued that the most primordial form of experience is
that of embodied PERCEPTION, rather than pure con-
sciousness. Embodied percipience, he went on to say,
does not precede the world but is a part of it. For when
I perceive things and other people in my environment,
Ido so by virtue ofthe cognitive capacities within my
own BODY. Experience does not begin with a sensi-
ble manifold that stil! has to be interpreted, i.e., given
a MEANING, by an essentially disembodied conscious-
ness. This manifold is already meaningful.
For example, the moment we perceive anything at
ali, we take it as something belonging to a milieu or
a field, as something we can look at from a different
perspective oras something with which we can do this
or that. As the Gestalt psychologists had put it, it stands
out as a figure against a background. And this back-
ground is in a sense known to the percipient, because
it is that in which he or she can move about. In fact,
the percipient is from the outset in that field: the back-
ground is that which can be explored by proceeding
from his or her present point of view. The field, we
might say, is the scope of the body's capacities with
which the percipient from the very beginning of ex-
perience knows he or she is endowed, and which are
ready to be exercised. And the exercise of a particular
capacity on a given occasion - e.g., an act of vis ual
focusing on a particular object- does not wait for a
deliberate decision, but is rather a response elicited by
what comes to us out ofthat field. In slightly different
terms, an appearance is taken to be the appearance of a
specific object because of its place in the body's field.
In fact, the appearance is not at ali given prior to that
interpretation, as if the latter were a conceptualization
of it, or an act of inference based on the appearance.
The perceptual act goes straight to the object itself, so
that we cannot say, as has often been said, that we begin
our experience with appearances.
This notion offield is clearly similar to the notion of
structure that he used in La structure, except that it is
viewed phenomenologically. In both cases, it amounts
to a framework that embraces both perceptions and
their objects but that is not itself either a perceptual
awareness or an object. Its role is cognitive in that it
guides the perceptions to their objects and in doing so
it overcomes the so-called subject-object dichotomy.
Thus we see that Merleau-Ponty understands the
body as itself "cognitive." lts perceptions and capaci-
ties open up the world and enable us to move around
in it with confidence. But such a view of the body-
which had also been advocated by GABRIEL MARCEL,
whose work was familiar to Merleau-Ponty-made it
necessary for him to argue at great length against the
view according to which it is simply an object ofphys-
iology and anatomy. He tried to justify his position by
citing a wealth of detail from contemporary psychology
and physiology, particularly in their medical applica-
tion to patients. The body, to be sure, can be made into
an object and we can have knowledge ofthat objectifi-
cation, but at the primordial level of our experience it
is not an object but a subject, a body-subject. Even to
caii the body an instrument is inadequate, because that
would suppose that we can somehow discern the user
apart from the instrument used. Such a formulation
would suggest, for example, that a user would be able
to examine the instrument before actually using it. In
Merleau-Ponty's view, however, my body is essential
to my very being. Whatever objective knowledge there
may be, including that of the body, it can be acquired
only by using the body's perceptual capacities, i.e., by
proceeding from the world it opens up.
Within the pages of the Phenomenologie one finds
agreat many analyses ofthe various modalities of our
experience of the body, executed in astounding detail
and with critica! discussion of existing literature. Not
only visual perception but also the SPACE and motility
ofthe body are discussed. An entire chapter is devoted
 MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
to the body as sexuality, including an important dis-
cussion of PSYCHOANALYSIS. Another topic is that of
LANGUAGE - the body as expressing itself in linguis-
tic and other gestures, a topic to which Merleau-Ponty
frequently returned in his !ater work. Other analyses
are directed more at the way the world appears to us
by virtue of our bodily access to it, for example, the
characteristics that distinguish its oriented space from
that of pure geometry. Our experience of other people
in INTERSUBJECTIVITY is also discussed, for the world
appears to us as a world shared by different persons.
In fact, as Merleau-Ponty, following MAX SCHELER, ar-
gues, the most primordiallevel of embodied existence
is general and pre-personal, rather than articulated as
mine over against yours. Private individuals, and the
always present possibility of disagreements and con-
fticts between them, exist only on the basis of an un-
derlying co-existence. Needless to say, we do not find
in Merleau-Ponty a sympathetic treatment ofthe tradi-
tional problem of other minds.
As noted, embodied perception is in his view the
most primordial form of experience. So he also resists
the tendency of"intellectualism" to go further and ex-
plain this "cognitive" character of the body by refer-
ence to supposedly more original intellectual functions.
Phenomenology can only describe the body's knowl-
edge for what it is, namely access to the world. It can-
not offer explanations that would make us understand
it from a more ultimate point ofview, for example, that
of a universal, all-surveying, disembodied conscious-
ness, as he believed Kant and Husserl had held. He
remarked in criticism of the latter that the possibil-
ity of phenomenological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION ends
here, at the lifeworld. We can give a critique of NATURAL
SCIENCE by explaining the origins of scientific abstrac-
tions, objectifications, and conceptualizations out of
the lifeworld of embodied perception, but the body's
cognitive achievements are "hidden" from us in the
sense that they cannot be derived from earlier beliefs.
They give us a world that is real and true, but do this
in a way that we ourselves cannot understand. We are
in the world as a matter offact, not by virtue ofbeliefs
we hold.
The doctrine ofthe body-subject must be counted as
Merleau-Ponty's most original contribution to pheno-
menology. Although it draws on Husserl's then un-
published Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie
459
und phdnomenologischen Philosophie II [1912-15),
it amounts to a very important reinterpretation of that
phi1osopher. The latter's methodological concept of
reduction, while not completely rejected, has on1y a
limited validity. Even if phenomenology is synony-
mous with philosophy, such a philosophy's claim to
be able to eliminate all presuppositions, to be a rigor-
ous science, is dropped. For ifthe body-subject is rock
bottom, it is certainly not a point of view having no
presuppositions.
Although the Phimomimologie was to remain the
author's principal work, he applied the doctrine ofthe
body-subject to topics other than perception in the re-
stricted sense. For example, he contributed to a pheno-
menological AESTHETICS by writing severa! important
articles as well as a small book, L 'cei! et l 'esprit ( 1961 ),
on the art ofpainting. Paul Cezanne, he argued, did not
want to imi tate nature, as realistic art had done, but he
wanted to give expression to nature as it shows itself
to the body-subject.
The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty is some-
times distinguished from Husserl 's constitutive pheno-
menology by calling it EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY.
The reason for this designation is in part the empha-
sis on embodiment as an ultimate fact. And embodied
perception expresses the actually existent in its full
concreteness, in a richness of detail never captured by
words or concepts. Merleau-Ponty also stressed, some-
what as had been done in EXISTENTIALISM, that each of
us is in the world (au monde) as an individual existence.
Now phenomenology cannot but use general concepts,
thus giving the impression of describing what Husserl
called essences, e.g., the essence ofbeing human. But
according to Merleau-Ponty, we should not overlook
the fact that beneath or behind an essence, such as we
capture with a general concept, there exists the finite,
flesh-and-blood individual person, whose own being is
particular and unique, not that of an object of knowl-
edge.
From the emphasis so far given to the doctrine ofthe
body-subject one should not conci ude that his descrip-
tion of it comprises his entire philosophy. Merleau-
Ponty clearly recognizes that human experience is not
coextensive with our bodily commerce with the world.
The Phenomenologie therefore contains agreat deal of
other material. He discusses such traditional philosoph-
ical themes as knowledge, HISTORY, TIME, and freedom.
 460 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
With respect to this last topic, he particularly criticizes
Sartre's doctrine. He even provides an outline of an on-
tology. There is also a wealth of critica! discussions of
historical figures in philosophy. And last but not least,
he explores the question ofthe nature ofphilosophical
refiection.
After the publication of his main work, Merleau-
Ponty published a great many articles on a variety of
topics, for the most part collected in two volumes, Sens
et non-sens (1948) and Signes (1960). He also pub-
lished two books on POLITIC AL PHILOSOPHY, Humanisme
et terreur ( 194 7) and Les aventures de la dialectique
( 1955). Both are discussions of Marxist thought, for
which he, like Sartre, had great sympathy, based es-
pecially on the then recently discovered manuscripts
of 1844. The terror and repression of the Communist
regime in Moscow, however, presented great problems
to his humanist mind. It was an issue that his attach-
ment to MARXISM made it difficult for him to resolve,
but he did eventually break with Communism, a deci-
sion that led to a public break between himself and his
friend of many years, Sartre.
During the sixteen years following the publication
ofhis Phenomimologie, he worked on a book that was
to be a follow-up to it, but it remained incomplete.
The manuscript on which he was actively working at
the time of his death was posthumously published un-
der the ti tie Le visible et l 'invisible ( 1964). Because
the text is not only incomplete but extremely difficult,
interpretations of it must be tentative. This text is pri-
marily concerned with what he intended to be a new
ontology. Severa! interpreters hold that it implies a far-
reaching critique, perhaps even an outright repudiation,
of the earlier work. But is can also be argued that Le
visible et l 'invisible is intended as a formulation of the
most basic ontologica! assumptions of his phenomen-
ological analyses, a task he had already begun in the
Phenomenologie.
In the earlier book Merleau-Ponty argued, as dis-
cussed, that the body-subject is "cognitive" in the sense
that it opens up a world that the percipient sponta-
neously and without hesitation or doubt considers real.
By virtue of its existence in a field, embodied percep-
ti an reaches out beyond the appearances toward the
object as it really is. But he did not think that this cog-
nitive achievement ofsense perception could be further
explained, for instance, by trying to penetra te to a pure,
transcendental consciousness, as Kant and Husserl had
suggested. Merleau-Ponty rejected this as intellectual-
ism or idealism, but neither was he inclined to accept
the doctrine of being of classical realism. He wanted
an ontology that would confirm his phenomenology of
perceptual knowledge.
As he had also stipulated in the Phenomenologie,
ontology must itselfbe phenomenological, i.e., an elu-
cidation ofthe sense ofreality already pre-reftectively
envisaged by the percipient. In Le visible et l 'invisible
he propounds the thesis that being is fiesh. To under-
stand this we have to recall that embodied percipience
owes cognitive success to its field-character. A per-
ceptual act reaches a reality "beyond appearances" by
virtue ofthe fact that the latter occupies a place in the
same field in which the percipient moves, a field that
is ultimately temporal rather than spatial. In Le visible
et l 'invisible, Merleau-Ponty goes further and suggests
that being a perceiver and being an abject of percep-
tion are reversible roles within that field. He saw such
a reversibility illustrated by the fact that a hand touch-
ing something in its milieu can itselfbe touched by the
percipient's other hand. And he took this tobe a bodily
analogue of reftection, the body refiecting on itself and
revealing it tobe both subject and object. One and the
same thing appears as both perceiving and perceived.
The two ro les are different, but being as flesh is neutra!
with respect to both, though it exists only as the unity in
the subject-object differentiation found in experience.
The unity ofbeing here designated as flesh would seem
to be very similar to what surfaced in earlier works as
the unity of a field.
Traditional epistemology often saw the body as an
obstacle to knowledge, taking it to be one of the pri-
mary sources ofthe subjectivity and relativity that ha ve
to be overcome to obtain knowledge of the things
in themselves. Wanting to rehabilitate the sensible,
Merleau-Ponty clearly wanted to detine being, not as
correlative with some higher-level power of thought,
but in a way consonant with the body's role in percep-
tion. And he tried to do this by his ontology ofthe ftesh.
For this implies a positive evaluation ofthose features
of the body that had traditionally been held to be ob-
stacles. Although a perception always envisages things
from a place in a field- which is in the last analysis a
place intime- it does nevertheless perceive the mat-
ters themselves in their very being, because their being
 MODERN PHILOSOPHY
consists precise1y in being so accessible, i.e., their field-
character. As he put it in Le visible et l'invisible, what
had been construed as an obstacle between a percipient
and the abject, "the thickness of the flesh," is exactly
what the latter 's visibility consists of. In short, this new
ontology has tumed the obstacle into a gateway to the
being ofthings.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Barbaras, Renaud. De 1'etre du phenomime. Grenoble: Edi-
tions Jerome Milion, 1991.
Dillon, Martin C. Merleau-Ponty s Ontology. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1988.
- , ed. Merleau-Ponty Vivant. Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1991.
Geraets, Theodore F. Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcen-
dentale. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
Hoeller, Keith, ed. [Merleau-Ponty and Psychology.] Review
o/Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 18 (1982-83).
Madison, Gary Brent. The Phenomenology of Merleau-
Ponty. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1973.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. La structure du comportement.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942; The Struc-
ture ofBehavior. Trans. Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1963; Die Struktur des Verhaltens. Trans. Bemhard
Waldenfels. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976.
- . Phenomenologie de la perception. Paris: Ga11i-
mard, 1945; The Phenomenology of Perception. Trans.
Co1in Smith. New York: Humanities Press, 1962;
Phănomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Trans. Rudolf
Boehm. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966.
- . Humanisme et terreur. Essai sur le probleme communis te.
Paris: Gallimard, 194 7; Humanism and Terror: An Essay
on the Communist Problem. Trans. John O'Neill. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969; Humanismus und Terror. Trans. Eva
Moldenhauer. Frankfurt am Main: Hain, 1976.
- . Sens et non-sens. Paris: Nagel, 1948; Sense and Non-
Sense. Trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Drey-
fus. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
- . E!oge de la philosophie. Paris: Gallimard, 1953; In
Praise of Philosophy. Trans. James E. Edie and John
Wild. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963;
"Lob der Philosophie." In his Vorlesungen. Ed. and trans.
Alexandre Metraux. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973.
-.Les aventures de la dialectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1955;
Adventures ofthe Dialectic. Trans. Joseph Bien. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973; Die Abenteuer
der Dialektik. Trans. Alfred Schmidt and Herbert Schmidt.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968.
- . Signes. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; Signs. Trans. Richard C.
McCleary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1964; trans in part in his Das Auge und der Geist. Ed. and
trans. Hans W. Arndt. Hamburg: Meiner, 1984.
-."La conscience et 1'acquisition du langage (1949--1950)."
[Maurice Merleau-Ponty a la Sorbonne]. Bulletin de Psy-
chologie. 18 (1964); Consciousness and the Acquisition
of Language. Trans. Hugh J. Silverman. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
461
- . L 'cei! et 1'esprit. Paris: Gallimard, 1964; "Eye and Mind."
Trans. Carleton Dallery. In his The Primacy ofPerception.
Ed. James M. Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1964, 159-90; "Das Auge und der Geist." In
Das Auge und der Geist. Ed. and trans. Hans W. Arndt.
Hamburg: Meiner, 1984.
-. Le visible et 1'invisible. Ed. Claude Lefort. Paris: Galli-
mard, 1964; The Visible and the Invisihle. Trans. Alphonso
Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1968; Das Sichtbare und das Unsichthare. Trans. Reg-
ula Giuliani and Bernhard Waldenfels. Munich: Wilhelm
Fink, 1985.
-. Resumes de cours. College de France 1952-1960.
Paris: Gallimard, 1968; Themes fi"om the Lectures at
the College de France 1952-1960. Trans. John O'Neill.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970; "Vor-
lesungszusamenfassungen." In his Vorlesungen. Ed. and
trans. Alexandre Metraux. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973.
-. L 'un ion de 1'âme et du corps chez Malebranche Biran et
Bergson. Ed. Jean Deprun. Paris: Vrin, 1968; 2nd rev. and
enl. ed. 1978.
-.La prose du monde. Paris: Gallimard, 1969; The Prose of
the World. Trans. John O'Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
em University Press, 1973; Die Prosa der Welt. Trans.
Regula Giuliani. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1984.
-. Merleau-Ponty a la Sorhonne. Resume de cours 1949--
1952. Dijon: Cynara, 1988; Keime der Vernunft. Vorlesun-
gen an der Sorbonne 1949--1952. Ed. Bemhard Walden-
fels. Trans. Antje Kapust. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994.
-. La nature. Notes. Cours du College de France. Ed. Do-
minique Scglard. Paris: Seuil, 1995.
Metraux, Alexandre, and Bemhard Waldenfels, eds. Leih-
hafiige Vernunfi. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1986.
Pietersma, Henry, ed. Mer/eau-Ponzv_· Critica! Essays. Lan-
ham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1989.
-. "Knowledge and Being." Man and World 23 (1990),
205-23.
Sallis, John, cd. Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Lan-
guage. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981.
HENRY PIETERSMA
University of Toronto
MODERN PHILOSOPHY One way to un-
derstand the phenomenological method of EDMUND
HUSSERL is to see it in the context of the history of
philosophy, to consider it, for example, in relation to
classical modem philosophy, particularly Descartes,
Leibniz, Hume, and KANT.
Husserl 's phenomenology has deep ties to the Carte-
si an tradition. One ofhis !ater works was, in fact, a radi-
cal reworkingofDescartes's view and was titled Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931]. Husserl agreed with
Descartes on a number of key points. Both believed
462 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
that philosophy can and should be built on a founda-
tion of certainty. Related to this, they were committed
to the accessibility of a class of self-evident ("clear and
distinct") truths. Foremost among these is the cogito
("I am thinking"). And for both philosophers the no-
tion of"thinking" was tobe understood in a very broad
sense. As Descartes put it, I am a "thing that doubts,
understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling,
and also imagines and has sensory perceptions." This
cogito was to be the foundation for ali knowledge,
including the sciences. In turn, this meant that knowl-
edge was to ha ve its grounding in subjectivity- I am
thinking.
But Husserl also disagreed with Descartes on sev-
era! crucial issues. Unlike Descartes, he was not willing
simply to add to the bare cogito the notion of a mental
substance that was do ing the thinking. On Husserl 's
view, if one really looked for absolutely certain foun-
dations for knowledge, one had tobe extremely careful
not to smuggle into the cogito any naive assumptions
arising from a substance metaphysics. On the same
grounds Husserl was unwilling to assume at the out-
set the validity of causal laws. Descartes had used
these laws in his proofs for the existence of God, and
thereby the externa! world. But for Husserl such laws,
along with substance metaphysics, remained assump-
tions that were far from self-evident truths. In addi-
tion, Husserl rejected the use ofDescartes's deductive
method, claiming that LOGIC, like MATHEMATICS, was a
special science in need ofphilosophical grounding and
could not be circularly employed in that task.
Rather than simply assuming the validity of the
method of logic and mathematics, Husserl argued that
a genuine "first philosophy" must proceed by an un-
mediated intuition of self-evident truths. His pheno-
menological method therefore involved the careful de-
scription ofthe intuited data that presented themselves
clearly and distinctly to reflection. His appeal to in-
tuition is not meant to invoke some unusual state of
consciousness. He sees intuition on the model of PER-
CEPTION - the direct awareness of something present
to consciousness. The elements that present themselves
in intuition will provide the truths on which pheno-
menology will build. Descartes 's notions of substance,
causality, etc., may surface again at a !ater stage of
investigation, but then they should be understood as
MEANINGs that can be given on the hasis of EVIDENCE
that is weaker than the self-evidence required at the
start of philosophical inquiry.
Husserl thus trimmed the Cartesian cogito to those
elements that he took to be self-evident. But then he
added one element that, he argued, appeared to be as
self-evident as the original cogito. It was nothing that
Descartes had denied, it was simply an element on
which Descartes had failed to capitalize: namely, if I
am certain that I am thinking, Husserl argued, I am
equally certain that I am thinking about something.
This "something" is the experienced object. The ob-
vious problem, of course, is that the things I think
about do not always exist. I can imagine a unicorn or
believe in Santa Claus, and my mere thinking about
them does not bestow existence on them. So the cogito
does not, by itself, give one warranted certainty about
the existential status of the things one thinks about.
Nonetheless, ifthere is tobe any access to reality, it is
here in the objects-thought-about that this reality will
appear.
This emphasis on the fact that thinking is directed
toward some sort of object, real or fictional, Husserl
calls the INTENTIONALITY of consciousness, following
FRANZ BRENTANO, with whom he had studied. Brentano
had argued that one can distinguish between physical
and psychological phenomena on the grounds that only
the latter has an intentiona! structure. That is to say,
only psychological states ha ve "reference to a content
... directedness toward an abject." Physical objects, on
the other hand, do not have this characteristic. Unlike
Brentano, however, Husserl does not use intentional-
ity as a means of making the traditional metaphysical
distinction between the mental and the physical. He
explores intentionality only as an essential structure of
conscious experience. Ali metaphysical claims must
ha ve their grounding in this experience.
One other profound difference between Descartes
and Husserllies in their understanding of science. For
Descartes, the NATURAL sciENCEs dealt with a transcen-
dent reality whose existence required proof. Transcen-
dent reality lay on the far side of an epistemological
chasm. The existence of a subject could be known
clearly and distinctly; the existence of the physical
world, by contrast, was knowable only through fallible
sensory experience that provided only mental represen-
tations ofphysical reality. One needed a philosophical
"bridge" to guarantee the veracity of our ideas of the
 MODERN PHILOSOPHY
physical world. Descartes built that bridge by appeal-
ing to the existence of a nondeceiving God.
Husserl, on the other hand, refused at the outset to
accept any epistemological gulf between conscious-
ness and its experienced objects. The notion of tran-
scendent reality, he argued, needed fresh understand-
ing. The obj ects that appear in experience carry varying
degrees of evidence regarding their existential status.
On the basis ofthe evidence that they carry with them,
consciousness assigns to them their most likely exis-
tential status. One crucial piece of evidence for tran-
scendence is that the object appears only partially. lts
temporal and spatial aspects never appear in their en-
tirety. Such objects are assigned the meaning "transcen-
dent." Transcendence is no longer seen tobe on the far
si de of an epistemological divide; rather, it is among
the meanings assigned to some experienced objects.
Husserl is not claiming, of course, that consciousness
gives existence to physical reality. His concern is with
the meaningthat one gives to some aspects of one's ex-
perience. "Transcendent" is one such meaning. Again,
the issue is not metaphysics, it is experience.
This fresh way of looking at transcendence carries
with it a new understanding of science. The latter,
Husserl argues, is not simply a description ofthe laws
governing objective reality, as it appeared to be for
Descartes. Husserl sees science as an intersubjectively
constructed system of meanings, an interpretation of
aspects ofthe experienced world.
The difference between the two views can be seen
quite clearly in their respective attitudes toward the
"mathematization of nature." Descartes, like Galileo,
attributed the secondary properties of objects (e.g.,
their color, taste, smell, etc.) to the mental or subjec-
tive side of experience. As such, these properties did
not belong to physical nature. Primary qualities (e.g.,
shape, quantity, etc.), on the other hand, were taken
to be genuine properties of physical objects. These
properties lend themselves to mathematical (often ge-
ometrica!) treatment. So Descartes, following Galileo,
believed that theories ofphysical objects, based exclu-
sively on their primary qualities, could be constructed
on a mathematical basis. That is, he was committed to
the mathematization of nature.
For Husserl, the assumption that one could for-
mulate a mathematical science of nature without ex-
amining the relationship between mathematics and
463
subjectivity was an example of the error he termed
"objectivism." Objectivist theories simply assumed
knowledge ofthe physical world (in this case, knowl-
edge of its mathematical properties) without any ref-
erence to the role played by conscious experience
in ali knowledge claims. Husserl, in Die Krisis der
europăischen Wissenscha:fien und die transzendentale
Phănomenologie (1936), argues at length that by fol-
lowing in the footsteps ofthinkers such as Galileo and
Descartes, modern philosophy has lost sight of the real
origin ofmathematical and geometrica! insights. He ar-
gues that even mathematical properties must be under-
stood within the framework of conscious experience.
Beginning with ordinary, imprecise experiences, tran-
scendental subjectivity gradually and through a process
of idealization constitutes the "li mit forms" of mathe-
matical properties. The views ofGalileo and Descartes,
bypassing the constitutive function of consciousness,
suffer from "objectivism."
Acknowledging that ali he has is his cogito- i.e.,
acts of consciousness- and the objects of conscious-
ness, which may or may not actually exist (and also
the EGO, which can be omitted here), Husserl intro-
duces his phenomeno)ogicaJ EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION.
This reduction is in the spirit of Descartes 's methodic
doubt. The motivation for it is the beliefthat one cannot
merely make assumptions about the existential status
of experienced objects; one needs clear evidence to
support such claims. To highlight the dubitability of
our judgments about the existential status of objects,
Descartes had appealed to the possibility of doubt; with
his reduction, Husserl appeals to neutrality. The pheno-
menological reduction is a maneuver intended to put
aside any unexamined assumptions about the existen-
tial status of objects that appear in experience.
One might wonder what has happened to the "com-
monsense" view of the world in ali this. On Husserl 's
view, most of our commonsense beliefs, like most sci-
entific and philosophical beliefs, are infected with the
fallacy of objectivism. In contrast, he argues that we
are never in a position to know anything about mind-
independent objects alone. Whatever we know about
them is always known in the context of our experience
of them. A naive acceptance of commonsense beliefs
about our knowledge of the physical world has been,
he claims, the source of agreat many of philosophy's
missteps.
464 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Husserl 's insistence on the ineliminable connection
between subject and object in experience led him to
describe the subject, the ego, as a "monad." His debt to
Leibniz is explicit here, but he is also quick to point out
that his notion of the monad is not metaphysical. He
identifies it, not with substance, but with what he calls
the "concrete ego." The concrete ego includes ali its in-
tentionat acts and objects. This Husserlian monad is the
full field of actual and potential conscious experience.
Given this characterization, one can see the analogy
with the Leibnizian monad- both are self-contained,
neither has need of a "window" to something outside it-
self. The Leibnizian monad mirrors the whole uni verse;
the Husserlian version encompasses a whole universe
in virtue of its inclusion of ali actual and possible ex-
periences. As Husserl put it, the phenomenology of
the monadic ego coincides with phenomenology as a
whole.
One question that faces any account of subjectivity
as a monad without windows is that it appears to end in
solipsism. But Husserl, with his claim that the monadic
ego includes ali actual and possible experience, argues
that the notion of any being (ego or otherwise) lying
outside that scope is nonsense. The issue, then, is to
uncover within the field of experience evidence for
the real existence of other egos. This Husserl attempts
to do with his account of empathy, particularly in the
fifth of his Cartesianische Meditationen; in fact, in
research manuscripts ofthe early 1920s, he announces
that monads do indeed have windows, and that these
"windows" are precisely the experiences of empathy
through which we are open to others.
Husserl 's first debt to Descartes is his insistence
on grounding philosophy in the absolute certainty of
the cogito, but his supplement to Descartes, his adding
of the intended object to the act of thinking, brings
him not only to Leibniz but also to a vers ion of KANT:
subject and object become inextricably linked. Husserl
preserves the most general aspect of the Kantian tra-
dition in that he insists on giving serious considera-
tion to the contributions of both subject and object in
experience. For him, as for Kant, any effort to under-
stand objects requires that one take into consideration
the subjective state in which they are experienced. On
Husserl 's view, understanding what the subjective state
is will shed light on the possible existential status of
its object. So, for example, if I ha ve evidence that the
subjective state I am in is imagining, then I have evi-
dence that the object I am experiencing is probably not
actual. Reciprocally, if I have evidence that the object
of my awareness does not exist, then I ha ve evidence
that I am probably imagining rather than perceiving.
Husserl is not naive about the degree of certainty that
one can have about the existential status ofthe objects
of one's experience. Like every other philosopher who
takes our fallibility seriously, he believes that we can
achieve varying degrees of probability about whether
the experienced object is actual or fictional. What he
offers are explicit indications about how to look for
relevant evidence.
Husserl was just enough of a Kantian to insist that
perceptual experience (an important basis for natu-
ral science) is not purely receptive. As he puts it in
Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929), "nothing
exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual
and potential performance of my own consciousness."
One always has only experienced objects, and that
means for him that one always has only interpreted
objects, meaningful objects. Phenomenology becomes
the philosophical investigation of meanings.
But in highlighting his debt to Kant it is important to
point out that Husserl was not simply a Kantian. In one
important departure from Kant, Husserl was committed
to pre-predicative, as well as predicative, experience.
In addition, while Kant inferred transcendental subjec-
tivity from the objects he believed were structured by
it, Husserl claimed that the transcendental ego could
be observed in its structuring role through reflection.
Most importantly, he denied Kant's distinction between
phenomena and noumena. While phenomena include
fictional objects ofvarious sorts, for Husserl they also
include aspects of reality. Those aspects are always
partial, but they are nonetheless aspects of reality.
The issue for Husserl was not between realism and
metaphysical idealism. His phenomenology was in-
tended as a third alternative that simply bypassed that
traditional quarrel. Both naive realism and metaphysi-
cal idealism were, he thought, misconceived. Each, in
a sense, emphasized o ne aspect of experience to the ex-
clusion ofthe other. Thus realism claimed access to an
objective, uninterpreted world, while idealism reduced
the world to the subjective, to utter mind-dependency.
For Husserl, the truth lay somewhere between these
two extremes. He indeed accepted the existence of a
 MODERN PHILOSOPHY
world that was not the product of the mind, but he
argued that access to that world would always be con-
ditioned by the consciousness that experienced it. Any
science that we construct, as well as any metaphysics,
must always understand itself as an interpretation of
reality by conscious subjects ~ neither a simple mir-
roring nor a pure construction ofthat reality.
Husserl 's claims about the importance of recogniz-
ing the ro le ofsubjectivity and interpretation in experi-
ence might suggest that he was advocating a view about
the theory-ladenness of observation. But that is not the
case. N orwood Russell Hanson ( 1924--196 7) argues in
Patterns of Discovery (1958) that one's observations
are shaped by what one knows, by one 's background in-
formation. Husserl 's claims are more fundamental than
that, focusing as they do on structures that are univer-
sally shared by ali subj ects, rather than on the particular
background knowledge of individual observers. So, for
example, in the case ofphysical objects, he argues that
ali perceivers will experience them partially, they will
experience temporal and spatial "perspectives" (i.e.,
partial aspects of the objects), but never the entire ob-
jects themselves. Husserl highlights these sorts of uni-
versal structures goveming experience, to indicate one
essential portion ofthe subjective conditions that shape
our experience.
The early phase in Husserl 's philosophy carne tobe
known as his "static" phenomenology because it paid
so little attention to developmental aspects of knowl-
edge. One might expect that a more developmental
framework for his theory of knowledge would bring
Husserl closer to Hanson 's view. And in one small
way it does. In !ater years, especially in Formale und
transzendentale Logik and his Cartesianische Medita-
tionen, Husserl spells out a GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY,
one that pays attention to the development (the "sed-
imentation") of meanings in experience. But even in
its genetic phase, with its emphasis on development in
knowledge structures, Husserl 's phenomenology does
not concern itself primarily with the ro le of individual
differences in background knowledge. Rather, he fo-
cuses on the laws that govern what types of experiences
must precede other types, and on the laws that govern
the development ofhabitual or dispositional states. The
emphasis continues to be on essential structures gov-
erning any consciousness; the difference between the
static and genetic accounts is that the latter takes se-
465
riously the temporal relations among those types of
structures. From the early phase through the !ater one,
this much of Kant remains: the focus is on a priori
structures of experience, not on empirica! differences
among subjects.
How does one put together a Cartesian quest for cer-
tainty and a Kantian insistence on the pervasive ro le of
subjectivity in experience? This is where Husserl re-
vises a bit ofDavid Hume. Husserl was as committed as
Hume to the necessity of grounding one 's philosophical
claims in experience. But he was strenuously opposed
to Hume's skepticism. His remedy was to argue that if
one looks closely at experience, one will discover that
it is not filled with random bits of data ("impressions"
or "ideas") that somehow gravitate toward one another
by associative mechanisms. Rather, on closer investi-
galion one discovers that experience is filled with es-
sentially distinct types ofthings. And these types, their
characteristics, and the relations among them, are law-
governed and predictable. Even Hume's claim about
the distinction between "impressions" and "ideas" is
based on a recognition oftwo different types of expe-
rience. On Husserl's view there are many more than
two types, but Hume's acknowledgment of the two is
enough to give Husserl his opening.
Husserl 's view can be elaborated in the following
way: if I can distinguish between impressions and
ideas, I do so on the basis of certain qualities of the
two (vividness, etc.). Once that distinction is made,
I can go on to distinguish among the kinds of psy-
chological states in which those objects appear. If the
abject appears vivid, etc., I take myselfto be perceiv-
ing, ifit is faded, etc., I take myselfto be remembering
or imagining. In other words, there are law-governed
relationships between the types of objects I experi-
ence and the types of psychological states in which I
experience them. Framed in Humean language, when
I take myself to be experiencing an impression, that
counts as some evidence that I am perceiving. When
I take myself to be experiencing an idea, that counts
as some evidence that I am remembering or imagin-
ing. So the correlations between the characteristics of
the data and the type of experience one takes oneself
to be having are not random; they are law-governed
and predictable. This is the sort of Humean assump-
tion that Husserl makes explicit and capitalizes on. As
he did with Descartes, so Husserl does with Hume ~
466 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
he ferrets out an unexploited assumption and puts it to
use.
The recognition of these types and their law-
governed relationships is what Husserl calls the "in-
tuition of essences" or EIDETIC METHOD. Recall that by
"intuition" he merely means the seeing of something,
even partially, as it is. And it is this capacity to see,
to intuit, law-governed types in experience that, on
Husserl 's view, disarms skepticism. It is true that 1
never have certainty about the existential status ofthe
object. 1 can, after ali, take an object to be physical
when it is a hallucination. Any philosophyneeds to rec-
ognize this possibility. Nonetheless, 1 can have some
degree of certainty about the types of experiences that
I have, about the types of objects that appear in them,
and about the laws that govern the two.
Notice an important distinction here. The certainty
that Husserl claims for us is not certainty that 1 am, for
example, now perceiving. Rather, it is certainty about
what would have to be the case if 1 were perceiving.
When 1 take myself to be perceiving a chair, 1 do so
because I believe (perhaps mistakenly) that a particular
set of conditions has been met. For example, 1 believe
that if 1 were to walk around the object it would con-
tinue to appear as a three-dimensional object, that if 1
were to see it at a !ater time it would still appear as a
chair, etc. That is, my experience (notjust objects pure
and simple) forms a structured set of law-governed
types. To that extent, one is capable of some degree
ofknowledge about experience. One may misread the
data, but o ne sti li has some knowledge ofwhat the rules
are that govern the proper assignment of meaning to
both acts and objects in experience.
This is where the Cartesian quest for certainty and
the Kantian commitment to the pervasiveness of sub-
jective interpretation come together. By carefully ex-
amining experience, one can discover with some de-
gree of certainty the laws that govern the subjective
assignments ofmeaning. But Husserl also believes that
one can assume with some degree of certainty that ev-
ery possible consciousness is governed by the same
set of laws. His claims about the essential structures
of conscious experience are not, then, empirica! claims
about human psychology. They cover every conceiv-
able type of thinking being, from gods and animals to
humans. So for Husserl, an insistence on the role of
subjective interpretation does not entail simple subjec-
tivism or even species-relativism. Absolutely univer-
sal, a priori laws are supposed to be at work.
One further point can be made regarding Husserl 's
emendations on Hume. For Hume, our perceptual ex-
perience is limited to awareness of purely subjective
impressions. In this he presses the Cartesian subjective
starting point to its limits: we are not, on his view, in
a position to know that our mental contents are caused
by or are semblances of a mind-independent world.
Conscious experience, for him, seems to be denied any
basis for knowledge of an externa! physical world.
Husserl, by contrast, characterizes consciousness as
intentionality. It is not a "container" of ideas or im-
pressions; it is directedness toward things. Objects and
events in the physical world are among the objects to-
ward which it is directed. As he did with Descartes,
so here too Husserl rejects the gulfthat is supposed to
separate consciousness and its surrounding world.
Husserl 's phenomenology, then, has a Cartesian
starting point in what he takes to be the absolute cer-
tainty ofthe cogito. He pares down the cogito to elim-
inate any appeal to substance, causality, or deduction,
and expands the act, cogito, to include an intentiona!
object. The intentiona! (act-object) structure of experi-
ence is taken tobe law-governed in the types ofmean-
ings that are assigned to acts and to their correlated
objects. And ali ofthis is taken to entail the view that
objects alone are never available to philosophical theo-
rizing; they can only be treated as experienced objects,
objects that ha ve been gi ven meaning of some sort. The
existential status of these experienced objects cannot
be assumed at the outset; one applies the "phenomen-
ological reduction" and then looks for evidence in the
characteristics of the phenomena that will point, with
some degree of probability, to their existential status,
to their possible transcendence. Husserl acknowledges
the possibility of subjective error but argues that con-
scious subjects are the source not only ofpossible error,
but also of ali meaning.
Later phenomenologists - including MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIMONE DE BEAUYOIR,
and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE - leveled further objections
against modern philosophy. Among the most inftuen-
tial objections was the claim that philosophy ought
not have its starting point in a purely subjective, and
exclusively cognitive, state. These !ater phenomenolo-
gists also argued that modern philosophy had underes-
 MUSIC
timated the importance ofthe BODY, and ofthe relation
between LANGUAGE and thought. The human person,
they argued, had been understood narrowly, as a spec-
tator of its world rather than as a free and active player.
This in turn minimized the significance ofboth choice
and ACT ION. Some ofthese criticisms, of course, applied
to Husserl's phenomenology as well as to his forebears
in modern philosophy.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cristin, Renato. "Husserl und Leibniz." Studia Leihnitiana
22(1990), 163-74.
Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres de Descartes. Ed. Adam and
Tannery. 12 vols. Paris: Cerf, 1897-1910; Philosophical
Writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984-85.
Fulton, James Street. "The Cartesianism ofPhenomenology."
Philosophical Review 49 ( 1940), 285-308.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions
ofConsciousness." In his Studies in Phenomenology and
Psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1966, 148--74.
- . "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Conscious-
ness in Historical Perspective." In his Phenomenology and
the Themy of Science. Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1974, 210-40.
Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature [ 1739--40]. Ed. L.
A. Selby Bigge [1888]. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Husserl, Edmund. "Kant und die Idee der Transzendental-
philosophie" [1924]. In his Erste Philosophie. Ed. Rudolf
Boehm. Husserliana 7. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1956, 230-87; "Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Phi-
losophy." Trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl. South-
western Journal of Philosophy 5 (1974 ), 9-56.
Kern, Iso. Husserl und Kant. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Husserls Abschied von Cartesian-
ismus." Philosophische Rundschau 9 (1962), 133-77;
"Husserl 's Departure from Cartesianism." In his The
Phenomenology ofEdmund Husserl: Six Essays. Ed. Donn
Welton. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981, 66--
121.
Murphy, Richard. Hume and Husserl: Towards Radical Sub-
jectivism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.
Ricreur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology.
Trans. Edward Ballard and Lester Embree. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1967.
SUZANNE CUNNINGHAM
Loyola University of Chicago
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
467
MUSIC One ofthe many links between pheno-
menology and music is already implied in EDMUND
HUSSERL 's dedication of his Logische Untersuchungen
( 1900-1901) to Cari Stumpf ( 1848-1936), whose con-
cept of Verschmelzung (fusion)- developed to de-
scribe the way a musical consonance (e.g., the interval
of a fifth) is already perceived as a consonance without
our having to perform an active synthesis of separate
sounds- is appropriated and extended by Husserl, no-
tably in Analysen zur passiven Synthesis [ 1918-26]. Of
more importance for a phenomenology of music, how-
ever, are the many examp1es of tone and melody in
Husserl 's discussions ofTIME and MEMORY in Vorlesun-
gen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
[1905].
When we perceive a melody, the tone we are hearing
now has a double temporal "halo," horizon, or "frînge"
that Husserl describes with the terms "retention" and
"protention" : the just-past tone is "retained" in con-
sciousness (not as a literally still sounding echo, but
as the still present sense of something havingjust hap-
pened), while the immediate further unfolding of the
melody is "protended" more or less indeterminately.
As the melody progresses toward completion in musi-
cal time, its opening tones recede further into the past,
yet are still retained, precisely as earlier moments of
the same melody and as contributing to its unfolding
sense. In this way, the melody's sounds and silences
are not successive events in flat chronological time,
but have a characteristic temporal density, with each
tone simultaneously directed toward the emerging next
tone and bearing, as it were, a comet's tai! ofprevious
phases. Thus the whole melody, rather than individ-
ual sounds, is constituted as a single coherent temporal
process. Even a single enduring tone is a reticulation of
retentions and protentions knitting each "now" -phase
into the continuous sounding ofthe tone as a whole.
Similarly, during any "now" instant in a larger mu-
sical work, past stretches ofthe piece are retained while
future developments are protended: what is sounding
at any moment is sustained by a temporal depth em-
bracing all that has come before, even as further pos-
sibilities are ongoingly indicated and fulfilled, disap-
pointed, or modified as the piece proceeds. Thus a
unitary consciousness of a complex musical whole is
built up step by step, growing richer in content until
468 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the piece finally comes to completion. Then it is this
temporally extended unity itself that recedes into the
past, eventually moving out ofthe immediate,just-past
horizon of retention into a more distant past reached
only by recollection, which in turn can re-play, for
example, the melody heard yesterday - generating
"the same" melody, step by step, anew. Moreover, as
Husserl points out in Formale und transzendentale
Logik ( 1929), a work such as Beethoven's Kreutzer
Sonata is itself an ideal unity irreducible to its per-
formance on this or that occasion. Hence Husserl 's
account deals not only with the constitution of tempo-
ral unity- be it that of a tone, a melody, or an entire
piece- but also with the identity and repeatability of
musical works.
No systematic account is yet available of occasional
early work in phenomenology of music. This would
include, for example, "Versuch einer Phănomenologie
der Musik" (1922-23) and "Zur Phănomenologie der
Musik" ( 1925), by musicologist and joumalist Hans
Mersmann (1891-1971), and "Zur Phănomenologie
der Musik" ( 1926), by composer, theorist, and critic
Herbert Eimert (1897-1972). In what sense and to
what extent these and similar works from this pe-
riod are phenomenological nevertheless remains to
be determined. In some cases, the term simply con-
notes a general rejection of PSYCHOLOGISM in AESTHET-
Ics, coupled in some authors with an investigation
of fundamental elements pertaining to the appearance
of the musical work of art - an emphasis that re-
calls the object-oriented focus ofREALISTIC PHENOMEN-
OLOGY. That not ali early phenomenology of music
follows this trend can, however, be seen in "Beitrăge
zu einer Phănomenologie der Musik" ( 1931 ), by Gus-
tav Giildenstein ( 1888-1972), who had studied with
Husserl in Freiburg in the early 1920s and whose The-
orie der Tonart (Theory of tonality, 1928) Husserl (to
whom the work is dedicated) praised for its "genuinely
phenomenological spirit."
Mersmann and Eimert were not only among the first
in the field ofmusic to turn to phenomenology, but were
also advocates of new music; a similar conjunction is
found in lntroduction a la musique de douze sons (In-
troduction to twelve-tone music, 1949), by Rene Lei-
bowitz ( 1913-1972 ), who explicitly refers to Husserl 's
notion of phenomenological reduction in suggesting
that the twelve-tone system of composition as it was
developed by Arnold Schonberg (1874--1951), places
the tona! system in brackets.
Similar points are made about the atonal music
of Anton Webern (1883-1945) by LUIGI ROGNONI in
Fenomenologia delia musica radicale (1966; enl. ed.
1974). Though Rognoni also cites such works as
"Fenomenologia delia relazione e musica contempo-
ranea" (1960) and "Annotazioni per una fenomenolo-
gia delia musica" (1964) by ENZO PACI, he rei ies
chiefty on Husserl 's Die Krisis der europiiischen Wis-
senschaflen und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie
( 1936) in elucidating the emergence of atona! and elec-
tronic music in the 20th century. On the other hand,
in Les fondements de la musique dans la conscience
humaine (The foundations of music in human con-
sciousness, 1961 ), the well-known conductor Ernst
Ansermet (1883-1969) appeals to a Sartrean pheno-
menology of consciousness and existence in defending
the supremacy of tona! music over any type of poly-
tonality, atonality, musique concrete, etc. It is never-
theless significant that whichever side phenomenology
has been invoked in service of, musicians themselves
have turned to phenomenology in grappling with is-
sues raised as the taken-for-granted structures of mu-
sical sense were being put in question by alternative
musical styles based upon radically different presup-
positions.
ROMAN INGARDEN's phenomenology of music (de-
veloped in the late 1920s and first published in Polish
in 1933), however, takes standard "classical music" as
its guiding example. He is concerned primarily with
the problem ofthe musical work's ideal, "supratempo-
ral" identity, which governs yet transcends any given
performance ofthe work. The work is also irreducible
to its written score, since it is a complex formation
of sounding tones and their qualities - and not a se-
quence of printed signs- that is the intentiona! object
ofthe musical experience per se. Yet the score assures
the work's identity over historical time by embody-
ing it in a system of relatively determinate symbols
- a set of instructions delimiting a "schema" that any
competent performer can ftesh out in presenting a spe-
cific, spatiotemporally individuated performance "of'
this enduring work. A similar concern for the work of
music as an ideal object is found in ALFRED scHuTz's
"Fragments on the Phenomenology ofMusic" [1944],
which also addresses the constitution of the unity of
 MUSIC
a musical theme in inner time-consciousness; the ro le
of continuance, intermittence, and repetition; and the
question ofthe "frame ofreference" the Iistener brings
to the musical experience. In contrast, Schutz's essay
on "Making Music Together: A Study in Social Re-
Iationship" ( 1951) focuses on the "mutual tuning-in
relationship" that allows participants not only in music
making, but in any form of social communication to
experience themselves as a "We" insofar as they expe-
rience the unfolding of a complex temporal formation
together.
Despite the earlier studies mentioned, phenomen-
ology ofmusic did not begin to emerge as a distinct sub-
field within phenomenology un tii the 1960s and 1970s,
Iargely due to the pioneering and dedicated efforts of
phenomenologist and musicologist F. JOSEPH SMITH. His
numerous works span more than three decades and
carry into effect his commitment to shi ft and restructure
the visual-spatial bias he detects in phenomenology as
a whole. According to Smith, emphasis on the visual
dimension of experience has worked to the detriment
of a phenomenology of sound and music, and he ac-
cordingly calls for phenomenology to be enriched by
an "akoumenology" that can do justice to sound -
including non-Westem and 20th century music - in
its own terms. Smith's explicit and pivotal movement
away from visual metaphor and toward the Iived expe-
rience ofsound-as-such is a fundamental development
in phenomenology of music, and is confirmed in de-
tailed parallel studies independently undertaken by DON
IHDE in Listening and Voi ce ( 1976). Though some of
Smith 's essays rest upon a Husserlian treatment of time
and ofpassive synthesis, he also appeals to MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER's work, and is critica! ofany solely mentalistic
approach or any sort of"subjective idealism." Instead,
he calls for recognition of the intersubjective, bodily,
and ontologica! dimensions of music, and suggests-
without working it out in detail- that music not only
expresses a genuinely social consciousness, but can
itself foster social participation.
Interest in applying a phenomenological approach
to issues in music continued to grow during the 1970s
and 1980s, as can be seen for instance, in a number
of dissertations; many authors tend to favor Husserl's
descriptive phenomenology, but others have tumed
to the works of Heidegger and MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, as well as SCHUTZ, MIKEL DUFRENNE, INGAR-
469
DEN, PAUL RICCEUR, and HANS-GEORG GADAMER. One key
book from this period- Music as Heard (1983), by
THOMAS CLIFTON- rests Iargely but not exclusively on
Husserl 's phenomenology. Clifton identifies four in-
variant constituents ofmusical experience: time, space,
play, and feeling. His discussion ofmusical TIME, which
rests on Husserl's descriptions, discloses such struc-
tures as beginning, ending, continuity, contrast, inter-
ruption, and various simultaneous time "strata"; his
treatment of musical SPACE Iocates such features as
musical line, surface, and depth, including, e.g., ex-
periences of sounds penetrating, overlapping, or in-
tersecting. Play in music is examined in terms of rit-
ual, heuristic behavior, agonie e1ements, etc., and feei-
ing is approached in terms of a fundamental relation-
ship of mutual "possession" between music-as-heard
and the bodily-kinaesthetic, receptive-participative self
who experientially appropriates and Iives through its
movement. Indeed, for Clifton, tonality itself is a "cor-
poreal acquisition," a habit ofthe Iived BODY.
LAWRENCE FERRARA 's Philosophy and the Anafysis
of Music (1991) provides a methodological synthesis
of phenomenological and hermeneutica! approaches
with conventional techniques in music analysis in or-
der to produce an integrative account of musical expe-
rience. Unlike Ingarden- for whom music is a single-
Iayered art, in contrast to the multilayered structure of
works of LITERATURE - Ferrara demarcates at Ieast
six strata of musical significance: historical context;
formal structure or syntax; sound-in-time; represen-
tation; virtual feeling, understood as in the work of
Susanne K. Langer (1895-1985); and onto-historical
world. His "eclectic" methodology enables music an-
alysts not only to engage each ofthese strata individu-
ally within any given work, but also to respond to their
polyphonic interplay and to provide concrete sugges-
tions for performers. In this approach - which has
been successfully applied in a number of dissertations,
as well as in Ferrara's own publications-Husserlian
phenomenological techniques are used for the descrip-
tion of sound-in-time; conventional formalist methods
( e.g., harmonic analysis, analysis of thematic and in-
tervallic relations, etc.) are used to analyze musical
syntax; and approaches informed by the hermeneu-
tics of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricceur provide a
means for the "interpretation" of musical reference.
But through what Ferrara calls "bridging," the inter-
470 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
pretations offeeling and onto-historical world are care-
fully grounded in the syntax and sound-in-time levels,
making such interpretations intersubjectively corrob-
orable, since they are tied to specific features that can
be objectively located through formal analysis of the
score or experientially confirmed in phenomenological
evidence. Throughout, however, he wams against both
a solipsistic "subjectivism" resulting from any focus
on individual consciousness taken as isolated from the
world (and from the intersubjective community) and
an untenable "objectivism" seeking some sort of abso-
lute certainty without re gard for human situatedness in
language and tradition. Classical phenomenology, he
argues, may be an appropriate approach to the sheer
sound-in-time dimension of music, and is especially
helpful where the usual formalist methods fali short,
e.g., in some atonal and electronic music. But it should
be supplemented by hermeneutica! procedures in order
to do justice to music 's referential meanings and onto-
logica! import, and may in some cases be juxtaposed
to psychological and semiological methods as well;
such multifarious methodological configurations may
be the wave ofthe future for studies in phenomenology
ofmusic.
For example, Peter Faltin's Phanomenologie der
musikalischen Form. Eine experimentalpsychologis-
che Untersuchung zur Wahrnehmung des musikalis-
chen Materials und der musikalischen Syntax
(Phenomenology of musical form: An experimental-
psychological investigation into the perception ofmu-
sical material and musical syntax, 1979) is conceived
in a phenomenological spirit in that it is oriented to-
ward the "matters themselves" - the sounding phe-
nomenon, "music" (rather than, say, its printed score)
- yet relies on psychological research methods to
measure listeners' perceptions of musical structures
and qualities. YIZHAK SADA! has developed a pheno-
menology of musical style and a unique approach to
music analysis, coupling his phenomenological roots
and concerns with investigations into the temporal and
poietic aspects of music represented by the work of
Michel Imperty; the semiological accounts ofmusic as
in the work of Jean-Jacques Nattiez and Jean Molino;
and musical perception as seen in the work of Irene
Deliege. He is also committed to corroborating theory
through experimental activities, and the resulting brand
of "experimental aesthetics" is enriched with a back
and forth movement to fundamental questions of the
epistemological status of music-as-experienced. And
GIOVANNI PlANA is committed to a "structural pheno-
menology" of music, i.e., an investigation of deep un-
derlying a priori structures of musical sound. Through
the work ofthese authors as well as John Gilbert, David
B. Greene, FRIEDRICH JAECKER, ZIJA KOCUKALIC, JUDITH
LOCHHEAD, and many others, there has been an on-
going effort to bring phenomenological methodology
into the mainstream ofmusicology and music analysis.
The phenomenological contribution is to be respon-
sive to the experienced sound phenomena themselves,
thereby bringing out features usually not adequately
dealt with in the visual-spatial paradigms and terminol-
ogy of conventional music theory. On the other hand,
a notable strength in formal methods ofmusic analysis
and factualistic accounts of music history is that they
provide a high degree of empirica! adequacy because
claims about musical structure and historical fact can
be shown tobe true or false by their correspondence to a
musical score or historical document. Thus such tech-
niques as the "bridging" used in Ferrara's "eclectic"
method arise from a dialogue between the resources of
phenomenology and hermeneutics on the one hand and
the needs and criteria of a preexisting discipline on the
other.
Another emerging trend in phenomenology of mu-
sic gives increased emphasis to improvised music,
which is addressed, for example, by DAVID suDNOW,
ROBERT CREASE, and ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE (who also ex-
pJores bodily-kinaesthetic dimensions of music mak-
ing). The theme ofimprovisation has been carried even
further by BRUCE BENSON, who exposes the historical
and philosophical roots of the notions that a musical
"work" is a completed unity, with its own autonomous
(i.e., context-independent) identity, created by an indi-
vidual genius; that the ideal ofperformance ought tobe
complete fidelity in reproducing this work unchanged;
and that "classical" music (i.e., the "classics" ofWest-
ern tonality that still dominate the repertoire) is the
finest form of music, providing the standard in terms
ofwhich ali other music (popular music, contemporary
"serious" music, "early" music, jazz, blues, spirituals,
world music, etc.) is judged (and often marginalized).
In contrast to the paradigm based on creating, preserv-
ing, and revering classic "works," he suggests returning
to an older paradigm of context-dependent "pieces" of
 MUSIC
music, and recommends thinking of ali music mak-
ing in improvisational terms. Performers, for instance,
necessarily improvise in some regards in bringing the
score to life in sound and making it speak to us, and
they do so in the context both of a historically shift-
ing performance tradition and of a historically situated
community of listeners.
For example, "restorations" of medieval, Renais-
sance, and baroque music inevitably reveal the values
of the present "restorers" even as they attempt to let
past music speak for itself, since the very appeal to
"authenticity" in performance is not only a historical
phenomenon, but one alien to the original context in
which these pieces were performed. Moreover, like
performers, composers do not make music in a vac-
uum, but improvise within- and shift- the limits of
a tradition. Thus making music, like ACTION in general,
not only relies upon the possibilities available within a
certa in type of order, but can transgress and transform
this order itself. Benson ultimately characterizes mu-
sical activity as a communal, contextual conversation,
which implies- as in EMMANUEL LEVINAS- genuine
respect for the Other, so that no one voice, be it that
of composer, performer, or listener, is allowed to dom-
inate or drown out the other voices. Here Benson's
work converges not only with Smith's interest in mu-
sic's community-building potential and Schutz's use
of music as a model for social relationships, but with
similar concerns in the work of GABRIEL MARCEL.
Recurring themes in phenomenology of music in-
clude an abiding commitment to addressing the experi-
enced musical sound itselfrather than substituting, say,
the analysis ofvisual scores for the direct experience of
musical phenomena (or "akoumena"); a persistent fo-
cus on music as a temporal formation, including ques-
tions of unity or cohesion, identity or ideality, and his-
torical situatedness and interpretation; some emphasis
on bodily, kinaesthetic, and intersubjective/communal
dimensions of music making; and an emerging con-
cern for music in the context of its world. The latter
point has been addressed from the perspective of the
HUMAN SCIENCES in, for example, The Sociology ofMu-
sic ( 1984), by FABIO DASILVA, as well as by Ferrara and
Benson from a hermeneutica! standpoint. But it can
also be approached within phenomenology itself (as is
already indicated by, e.g., the analyses of music and
Jifeworld by BERNHARD WALDENFELS).
471
Here we may allude to methodological issues that
are not unique to a phenomenology of music, but
can arise in any of the CULTURAL DISCIPLINES when-
ever it is a question of the phenomenological inves-
tigation of complex historical-cultural formations. It
is sometimes held that it is nccessary to "go beyond"
Husserlian phenomenology, repairing its deficiencies
by turning, for example, to EXISTENTIAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY or to HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY. (Claims
of this sort were especially prevalent when key early
works by Husserl - notably Ideen zu einer reinen
Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philoso-
phie II [ 1912-15] - were not yet readily available,
and persist where Husserl 's contributions to a GEN-
ERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY concerned with intersubjec-
tive, historical-cultural phenomena have not been suf-
ficiently recognized.) Some of the issues that are at
stake in this context can be sketched out with refer-
ence to the notion of"freedom from presuppositions."
It is surely true - as Ferrara points out - that
holding the presumptions and procedures of conven-
tional music analysis in abeyance can open the way for
alternative approaches, such as a phenomenological
concern with sound-in-time. Moreover, as Smith re-
minds us, we must be ready to set asi de prejudices and
expectations derived from, say, the music of Mozart's
time when we listen to music based on utterly dif-
ferent principles (e.g., work by John Cage). But as
both Ferrara and Benson emphasize, it is precisely the
presuppositions proper to a given tradition that pro-
vide the structures of pre-understanding allowing us
genuinely to hear the music of this tradition. And as
Clifton indicates, the pre-understandings in question
are not merely intellectual. Rather, an informed lis-
tener is one who has developed the appropriate sensi-
bility for the music of a given tradition by acquiring
certain sedimented modes of comportment in the lived
body. Both music and its listeners are thus inevitably
situated; consequently, the argument runs, any attempt
at a completely "presuppositionless" investigation is
not only wrong-headed, but impossible.
Yet we need not interpret the phenomenological no-
tion of"freedom from presuppositions" as though it is
equivalent to the goal of"having no presuppositions at
ali." Rather- as Husserl tells us in the introduction to
the second volume of Logische Untersuchungen- the
"principle of freedom from presuppositions" only at-
472 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tempts to exclude any assumptions or statements "not
permitting of a comprehensive phenomenological re-
alization." If we accept Husserl's initial phenomen-
ological impulse as valid (e.g., ifwe are willing to take
phenomena as correlative to consciousness or world-
experiencing life, rather than seeing them primarily as
manifestations ofBeing and clues toward a FUNDAMEN-
TAL ONTOLOGY), we may note that presuppositions or
pre-understandings are intertwined with the phenom-
ena themselves as part ofthe "how" oftheir givenness.
Tobe "free from" such presuppositions does not mean
making them go away, but freeing ourselves from au-
tomatically and naively taking them for granted, i.e.,
from tacitly and unquestioningly assuming their valid-
ity and force without even noticing that we are do ing so.
Instead, we begin to appreciate them for what they are,
and they may be explicitly thematized, reactivated, ap-
propriated or placed in question, and so on. Thus we do
not attempt to strip away presuppositions in search of
some pure "origin," but undertake a "phenomenologi-
cal realization" that makes these very presuppositions
themselves experientially available.
This has profound implications not only for the fur-
ther development of a phenomenology of music, but
a!so for such fie!ds as ETHNOLOGY and ETHNIC STUDIES.
We may understand a piece of music as gathering and
guarding a WORLD - as sustaining and holding open
the historical-cultural world it presupposes so that this
world can endure. But music must be heard tobe music.
And for music to be heard in such a way that its world
endures, we, the listeners (and performers), must be
free to appropriate its presuppositions experientially,
at least to some extent. This does not mean seizing
them from some supposedly desituated perspective,
but suspending the hegemony of our own assumptions
enough to let other possibilities move us as well. This
may not result in a perfect "fusion" of horizons (to
borrow Gadamer's term), but can foster at least a tem-
porary and partial coincidence ofhorizons such that the
lived experience ofthe music of an un familiar tradition
can open us to the world ofthis tradition and allow us
to respect it as irreducible to, yet co-possible with, our
own. Phenomenology ofmusic begins by retuming us
to the experienced music itself as that which provides
the evidence for descriptive, eclectic, and hermeneuti-
ca! investigations of it. But with this, phenomenology
of music also has the potential to contribute to an em-
bodied ETHICS capable ofresponding to the challenges
of diversity in an increasingly pluralistic world.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Behnke, Elizabeth A. "At the Service of the Sonata: Music
Lessons with Merleau-Ponty." In Merleau-Ponty: Critica/
Essays. Ed. Henry Pietersma. Lanham, MD: Center for
Advanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press
of America, 1990,23-29.
Benson, Bruce Ellis. Improvising Music: An Essay in Musical
Hermeneutics. Forthcoming.
Clifton, Thomas. Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Pheno-
menology. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.
Ferrara, Lawrence. Philosophy and the Analysis of Music:
Bridges to Musical Sound. Form, and Reference. West-
port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Fischer, Matthias. "Die Stimme der Musik und die Schrift der
Apparate." In Gehărgange. Zur Aesthetik der musikalis-
chen Auffuhrung und ihrer technischen Reproduktion. Ed.
Matthias Fischer et al. Munich: Peter Kirchheim, 1986,
9-44.
Greene, David B. Mahler. Consciousness, and Temporality.
New York: Gordon & Breach, 1984.
Husserl, Edmund. Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbe-
wusstseins (1893-1917). Ed. Rudo1fBoehm. Husser!iana
1O. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; On the Pheno-
menology ofthe Consciousness of Interna/ Time (1893-
1917). Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991.
Ihde, Don. Lis ten ing and Voice: A Phenomenology ofSound.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1976.
lngarden, Roman. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst.
Musikwerk, Bild, Architektur. Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer,
1962; Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work,
The Picture, The Architectura/ Work, The Film. Trans.
Raymond Meyer with John T. Goldthwait. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1989; The Work of Music and the
Problem ofits Identity. Trans. [from the Polish ed. of"Das
Musikwerk"] Adam Czerniawski. Ed. Jean G. Harrell.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Lippman, Edward. "The Phenomenology of Music." In his
A History of Western Musical Aesthetics. Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 1992, 43 7--69.
Piana, Giovanni. Filosofia delia musica. Milan: Guerini,
1991.
Sadai, Yizhak. Harmony in its Systematic and Phenomen-
ological Aspects. Trans. J. Davis and M. Shlesinger.
Jerusalem: Yanetz, 1980.
Schutz, Alfred. "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Mu-
sic" (1944]. In his Collected Papers IV. Ed. Fred Kersten
et al. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, 243-
75.
- . "Making Music Together: A Study in Social Relation-
ship." In his Co!lected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory.
Ed. Arvid Brodersen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964,
159-78.
Smith, F. Joseph. The Experiencing of Musical Smmd: Pre-
lude to a Phenomenology ofMusic. New York: Gordon &
Breach, 1979.
 MUSIC 473

~, ed. In Search of Musical Method. New York: Gordon & LAWRENCE FERRARA
Breach, 1976. New York University
~, ed. Understanding the Musical Experience. New York: ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
Gordon & Breach, 1989. Study Project on Phenomenology ofthe Body
Sudnow, David. Talk sBody: A Meditation Between Two Key-
boards. New York: Knopf, 1979.

NATURAL SCIENCE IN CONSTITUTIVE PERSPEC-
TI VE Philosophy of science, as usually under-
stood, approaches scientific theories from the method-
ological standpoint, i.e., it theorizes about scientific
procedures in order to make scientific knowledge un-
derstandable. In such an approach the problem of sci-
entific validity becomes the chief philosophical is-
sue. Phenomenology proceeds in a way different from,
but in clase connection with, this methodological ap-
proach. Instead of taking natural science for granted
- i.e., science as a system ofpregiven scientific state-
ments and arguments that only require logica! and
methodological analysis - it inquires into the con-
ditions that make such statements and arguments pos-
sible.
These conditions can be understood in various
ways: they can be the real conditions of worldly ob-
jects themselves or they can be the conditions of the
scientists as members of a scientific community with ali
the personal, social, and sociocultural relationships that
make their research possible. But phenomenology con-
fronts a different set of conditions. Through philosoph-
ical reflection on science in the proper sense, pheno-
menology rei ies on the EIDETIC METHOD to inquire into
the universal structures of human subjectivity, which,
in the final analysis, count as the ultimate conditions of
the possibility of objectivity in general and of scientific
objectivity in particular. These subjective conditions to
which phenomenology claims to gain access are, to be
sure, not the defacto capacities and cognitive activities
of particular scientists, for these could not be the con-
ditions in which such matters as scientific validity and
TRUTH are grounded. Rather, something like transcen-
dental subjectivity will prove necessary for objective
knowledge to be possible.
It was EDMUND HUSSERL who first took up the task
of grounding science in this way and who stressed
throughout his life that phenomenology was to provide
such a grounding. The method he developed for this
purpose was initially a type of descriptive analysis that
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,4 74
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
only !ater became part of what is called constitutive
analysis. Both names, however, are only informative
with respect to the domain of phenomenological analy-
sis. The way in which everything we deal with is given
and becomes accessible only through intentiona! acts
ofconsciousness shows that the domain ofphenomen-
ology is focused on the relations between intentiona!
acts and intended objects. Thus Husserl 's turn to the
abject was simultaneously supplemented by a turn to
the subject. He relies on a new type of reflection that
discloses relations between the subject and the abject,
referred to as INTENTIONALITY, as a matter of mutual
relations. It is basically these relations that count as the
"given" in his phenomenology. Phenomenology must
investigate what is given in the world of everyday life
as well as in the scientific universe correlative to such
intentiona! activities, which stand behind ali scientific
research.
Husserl 's insight into the parallelism between the
structures of subjective acts and the structures of the
objects to which these acts refer forms the basis for the
first conception ofthe phenomenological grounding of
natural science: science is tobe regarded as constituted
in specific intentiona! activities ofthe subject in such a
way that these activities always take place on the foun-
dation of simple originary acts. For example, the truth
of an empirica! proposition as asserted in processes
of thinking is founded upon perceptual processes of
observing the objects that such claims are about. It
then becomes a principal task for phenomenological
analysis to show how the epistemological roots of fun-
damental scientific concepts - for instance, space,
time, mass, force, energy - can be traced back to
the corresponding concepts formed and used in the
nonscientific world of everyday life and how, on the
other hand, the scientific concepts originale and are
built up from these original concepts. The different
kinds of abstraction and the specific types of general-
ization, idealization, and formalization - which are
intentiona! activities and constituie scientific concepts
step by step at different levels of consciousness until
their precise meanings in science are achieved- need
to be analyzed, distinguished, and classified.
Husserl himself actually presented no detailed anal-
yses of these processes, leaving them instead to his
successors, but he struggled throughout his research to
tind the true starting point for such inquiries. Numerous
 NATURAL SCIENCE IN CONSTITUTIVE PERSPECTIVE
descriptions of things and states of affairs of everyday
life and- especially in his last work, Die Krisis der
europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phănomenologie ( 1936) - his turn to the LIFEWORLD
were principally motivated by the concern to scrutinize
the relations between this world of everyday life and
natural science. It is obvious that the so-called world
of science does not represent a second world beside
or above the reality of everyday life, for it is precisely
the latter world that is, on the one hand, experienced
straightforwardly and is, on the other hand, objectified
by science.
This led Husserl to the fundamental question ofhow
the objectification of the world by natural science can
be comprehended and how science in general can be
understood as an achievement ofthe subject. This fun-
damental issue of his phenomenology refers basically
to the problem of the structure of subjectivity. How is
it that the same subject who lives its life here and now
within the world as a finite being is, at the same time,
capable of constituting, examining, and corroborating
statements in science, thus participating in truth and
bringing forth accomplishments of scientific validity
that outlast its life in the everyday world?
This problem of subjectivity led Husserl to a radi-
calization of his analysis of constitutive acts. In terms
of method it is characterized by a series of "reduc-
tions," the most significant ofwhich is the transcenden-
tal EPOCHE AND REDUCTION providing the crucial move
from the earlier descriptive phenomenology of acts
of consciousness to the [ater CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY of subjectivity. The transcendental EPOCHE ANO
REDUCTION involves an abstention from all judgments
ofbeing and does so in such a way that the WORLD, and
all that belongs to it, becomes a theme for phenomen-
ology as a world as it is "meant as being." That is, in
Husserl 's terminology, the world is thereby reduced to
the "transcendental phenomenon" of the world. This
phenomenon is "transcendental" in the sense that the
subject, while performing this peculiar reduction, es-
tablishes itself as a transcendental subject: reflecting
on its own intentiona! activities, it detects doxic po-
sitional or thetic components in all acts that "posit"
being and do so only as being in a certain sense. By
these components the intentiona! acts are now recog-
nized as sense-bestowing (sinnstifiende) acts, and are
set out and investigated as such in strict correlation
475
with the modalities of being of the intended objects.
Through the latter being "given" in the natural attitude,
transcendental phenomenology thereby arrives at the
insight that the being of all that is given is "posited"
in the course of its experience. Ali natural givenness
in everyday life as well as in natural science is thus to
be recognized as a transcendental sense-product of a
subjectivity in which being is posited.
The phenomenological concept of constitution thus
acquires its precise meaning through the transcenden-
tal reduction, which is then, so to speak, the gateway
to a field of discoveries to be made by "constitutive
analysis." The constitution of an object in this field
no longer simply means that the phenomenon is to be
described in its essential features, nor does it mean
merely the mental procedures of identifying syntheses
as they are in principle needed for the unification of in-
dividual modes of appearance of any object in order to
make it conceivable as one and the same. Rather, con-
stitution in the strict sense of transcendental pheno-
menology means that the former merely descriptive
analyses, being referred to singular intentiona! acts,
must be replaced by investigations ofthe intentionality
that, from the teleological standpoint of its function,
make the synthetic unity possible.
This holds especially for al! constituted unities of
theory and object in science, which are extremely com-
plex in themselves and based on unities in the lifeworld.
Constitutive analysis must trace these back to the life-
world by reactivating their sense levels, on which for-
mer sense-bestowing achievements are "sedimented."
Constitutive phenomenology must furthermore exam-
ine these transcendental achievements in all their com-
plexity and implications through penetration into the
"intentiona! horizons" of every performance.
What is especially significant are the intentiona! re-
lations between actuality and potentiality with respect
to sense-bestowing acts. These show that ali acts are
temporal and that the constitution of an object can in
principle only take place as a process in TIME. This
holds for the constitution of any object whatsoever and
is, in a final analysis, due to how consciousness is basi-
cally structured temporally. Thus since the temporality
of constitution essentially consists in the fact that what
has been already achieved is included in the present
constitution, all constitution is genetic constitution.
GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY opens up a wide field of
 476 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
constitutive analysis for Husserl, especially where the
constitutive problems of natural science are concerned.
This is a science for which nature must first be given,
for nature is that which is approached through the meth-
ods of science. According to constitutive phenomen-
ology, this implies that one has to regard the constitut-
ing subject not only as a transcendental subject, but at
the same time as a human subject who is the origin not
only of natural science but ofthe constitution ofnature
as we11.
The inherent problems ofthis twofold determinati an
of the subject and of its identity need not be pursued
here. But it should be mentioned that the human sub-
ject is the foundation of natural science - and this
not only because, and not only insofar as, it is active
in science, but already by virtue of its ro le in consti-
tuting the sense of existence of the object of science,
i.e., nature. Furthermore, nature thus conceived is to
be constituted as the hasis for a science of nature that
claims objective knowledge in a special sense. Its ob-
jectivity refers to a certain property ofpropositions and
arguments about its objects that we ca11 "objective" if
they can in principle be made by and demonstrated to
everybody. Objectivity can only be constituted by a
plurality of subjects. A solipsistic subject would not
be able to understand the term "objectivity"; it could
not even conceive it. Objectivity essentia11y refers to
INTERSUBJECTIVITY.
Further study shows how Husserl tried in very subtle
and detailed investigations to elucidate how intersub-
jectivity itself is constituted. In conducting these in-
vestigations he again carne across the human, i.e., the
somatie existence of the subject as one of the neces-
sary conditions for intersubjectivity. The human BODY
is thus not irrelevant to foundations of natural science.
In turn, the possible commonality in which the differ-
ence and distinctiveness ofthe single subjects must be
overcome is the commonality oftheir sense-bestowing
achievements that make the objectivity of natural sci-
ence possible.
Notwithstanding that Husserl had not solved a11 the
problems ofthe constitutive analysis of intersubjectiv-
ity, he could thus claim to have discovered the tran-
scendental origin of natural science. One of the ur-
gent requirements placed on philosophy of science in
general is then to revive and preserve in our present
consciousness the knowledge of the constitutive con-
ditions of natural science. This is so not only because
science is the theoretical structure developed in the
highest and most advanced form ofhuman activity, but
also because the progress of science is accompanied by
an ever increasing estrangement ofhumanity from sci-
entifica11y investigated and configured nature. Husserl
had this estrangement in mind when he ca11ed atten-
tion to the "covering over" ofthe sense ofthe originary
lifeworld and thus the forgetting ofthis foundation and
spoke ofthe crisis ofthe modern sciences. Ifthis crisis
is to be overcome, it must first be exposed, i.e., the
concealments and the shiftings of sense through for-
mer sense-bestowals have to be made visible and the
genesis of sense reactivated by methods of constitutive
analysis.
Thus Husserl 's constitutive phenomenology of na-
ture is to serve a double purpose: (1) to show the fruit-
fulness ofthe phenomenological method for establish-
ing a philosophical grounding of natural science, and
(2) to help us better understand what natural science is
and what is means for our practica! life that the world
is increasingly shaped by natural science.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Gurwitsch, Aron. Phenomenology and the Theory ofScience.
Ed. Lester Embree, Evanston, IL: Northwestem Univer-
sity Press, 1974.
Hardy, Lee, and Lester Embree, eds. The Phenomenology of
Natural Science. Dordrecht: K1uwer Academic Pub1ish-
ers, 1991.
Hee1an, Patrick A. "Husserl's Philosophy of Science." In
Husserl:~ Phenomenology: A Textbook. Ed. J. N. Mohanty
and William R. McKenna. Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of
America, 1989.
Kocke1mans, Joseph, and Theodore Kisie1, eds. Phenomen-
ology and Natural Science. Evanston, IL: Northwestem
University Press, 1970.
Stroker, Elisabeth, ed. Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der
Philosophie Edmund Husserls. Frankfurt am Main: Vitto-
rio Klostermann, 1979.
-. The Husserlian Foundations of Science. Ed. Lee Hardy.
Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Pheno-
menology/University Press of America, 1987.
-."Husserl and the Philosophy of Science." Journal ofthe
British Society for Phenomenology 19 (1988), 221-34.
- . Husserl s Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. Lee
Hardy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
-. "Lebenswelt durch Wissenschaft." Proto-Soziologie 5
(1993), 28-47.
ELISABETH STROKER
Universitiit zu Kăln
 NATURAL SCIENCE IN HERMENEUTICAL PERSPECTIVE
NATURAL SCIENCE IN HERMENEUTICAL PER-
SPECTIVE The basic insights of HERMENEUTI-
CAL PHENOMENOLOGY can be appJied to the domain of
the natural sciences. Authors who work in this field
often take their point of departure from MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER and particularly from his conception ofthe nature
of science and of the relation of the sciences to phi-
losophy. Heidegger formulated his view in Sein und
Zeit (1927), in some essays in Holzwege ( 1950), and
in Vortrăge und Aufsătze, as well as in Die Frage nach
dem Ding (1962).
Some authors working in this field have made an
effort to explain Heidegger's own position in regard
to the natural sciences in detail or to subject it to
a critica! analysis (CARLOS ASTRADA, HAROLD ALDER-
MAN, RAINER BAST, PIETRO CHIODI, KARLFRID GRUNDER,
THEODORE KISIEL, JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS, HANS SEIGFRIED,
VINCENZO VITELLO, MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN). Others, in ad-
dition, have made an effort to develop these semi-
nal ideas in new directions (PATRICK HEELAN, THEODORE
KISIEL, JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS). Although JOHN COMP-
TON's work in the philosophy ofscience was deeply in-
ftuenced by MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and that of JOSEPH
ROUSE has found inspiration in MICHEL FOUCAULT, one
can nonetheless in an indirect manner find the inftu-
ence ofHeidegger's conception ofthe sciences also in
their ideas.
Hermeneutica! phenomenology is not preoccupied
with logica!, methodological, or epistemological is-
sues, but rather focuses on the ontologica! problems
with which the natural sciences confront us. The fol-
lowing are some examples of such questions: what is
the ontologica! status of the concept of "nature" as
this is studied in physics, chemistry, and biology? In
what sense and within what limits can one meaning-
fully speak about the TRUTH of scientific theories and
scientific claims? To what do the empirica! sciences
of nature really owe their high degree of rigor and
certainty? What is the ontologica! status oftheoretical
entities? What is one to think about scientific realism,
constructive empiricism, conventionalism, etc.? How
does the LANGUAGE used in the natural sciences relate
to the language we speak outside the domain ofthe sci-
ences? How is one to measure the enormous impact of
the sciences on our entire world through modem TECH-
NOLOGY? How do the sciences affect the way we think
outside the domain of the sciences? How do the sci-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
477
ences affect our conceptions ofRELIGION, morality, AES-
THETICS, and our politica! practice? What is the impact
of the natural sciences on our "system" of EDUCATION?
How do the sciences actually change our social and
politicallife? There are many other such questions, yet
the basic questions are always: what is natural science?
How do scientific activities relate to nonscientific ac-
tivities? Precisely what happens when one adopts the
theoretical attitude? What is the exact relationship be-
tween a scientific object and the corresponding thing
that we encounter in the everyday WORLD? What is the
nature of our scientific thematization and objectivation
and what is the ontologica! status ofthe objects consti-
tuted in the scientific thematization and objectivation?
It is one ofthe basic theses of hermeneutica! pheno-
menology that understanding, to the degree that it is
articulated and unfolded, is interpretation. This thesis
implies that our scientific understanding ofnature, too,
is no more than an interpretation of what is. Thus our
large-scale research programs and theories are ali very
sophisticated interpretations of natural phenomena that
rest on a limited number of assumptions, the validity
of which cannot be justified on the basis of empirica!
grounds alone. This state of affairs implies, in turn,
that no research program or theory can ever compre-
hensively express the ontologica! structure ofthe real,
natural world. Every scientific theory, even though it is
and remains a theory ofwhat is real, is in truth no more
than a possible interpretation of a large set of phenom-
ena on the basis of certain principles, some of which
are accepted only on pragmatic and historically condi-
tioned grounds. To explain what is characteristic for a
hermeneutico-phenomenological approach to the natu-
ral sciences, it is necessary first to show that the natural
sciences are indeed in need of careful ontologica! re-
fiections that concern themselves with the meaning of
scientific theories and claims. From the discussions
between dogmatists, skeptics, transcendentalists, op-
erationalists, logica! empiricists, positivists, etc., it is
clear that the foundations of the natural sciences can
be, and have been, interpreted in different ways. Thus
it is necessary to determine critically the precise mean-
ing of scientific theories and claims, and to explain
how such claims relate to other possible claims about
natural phenomena.
In this task hermeneutica! phenomenologists care-
fully examine how the theoretical approach to the
478 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
world develops from a more original practica! preoc-
cupation with things. Here they are particularly con-
cemed with the meaning and function ofthe objectify-
ing thematization in which the mathematical projection
ofthe natural world is brought about. In our prescien-
tific life we deal concemfully with things. When we
adopt the scientific attitude we give up this concemful
preoccupation in order to look at things in a purely the-
oretical manner. Yet adopting the theoretical attitude
does not consist in abandoning our concern, but rather
in taking a second look at things.
Because ofthe change in our attitude toward them,
the things that originally were things of concern now
begin to assume a different character. They Iose their
location in their original world and henceforth appear
only in a place that is unrelated to us and is also without
limitations. The thing's actuallocation does not matter
any longer; its location has become a world-point, as it
were, which is in no way distinguished from any other
such point (demundanization). In addition, space and
spatial determinations of things we encounter in our
everyday life also become objectified and stripped of
their typicallimitations. At the same time, a similar ob-
jectification takes place in the temporal determinations
and aspects ofthings and events as well as in the con-
ception of time characteristic of everyday life. For in
the sciences we no longer consider these things in the
perspective oftheir possible use in concrete situations.
The advantage of this way of proceeding is that from
now on we are a bie to describe and determine with pre-
cision the structural moments ofwhat is merely there,
present-at-hand.
Another important characteristic ofthe modem nat-
ural sciences consists in the fact that these sciences
make the things appear only in that kind of objectivity
which is constituted by the different scientific objec-
tivations. It appears that the things can be made into
objects of theoretical research in more than one way.
Each form of objectivation implies a particular attitude
ofthe scientists toward the things in the world, so that
the things that are encountered in this way are always
seen from a particular point ofview. By making the as-
pect that has been revealed from a given point ofview
the object of a critica! and methodical inquiry, the sci-
entists, in their theoretical attitude, lay the foundation
of a particular empirica! science.
Accordingly, by their very attitude toward the things
in the world, the scientists definea certa in area ofthings
as their domain of inquiry. The discovery and delim-
itation of a well-defined domain of inquiry is the first
step of every form of scientific inquiry. The entities
that belong to this domain are then made into a theme
of investigation and constituted as objects with only
a limited number of characteristics. In Newton's me-
chanics this is brought about by definitions and "laws
ofnature." Once the objects ofthe domain are thus pro-
jected mathematically, the rest is then also determined:
the approach to this domain is given its particular me-
thodical direction, the structure of the conceptual and
discursive explanation has received its orientation, and
a specific technical language is established. The pur-
pose ofthematization is to free the things ofthe world,
or a particular group of them, in such a way that they
can be the object of a purely theoretical discovery and
can therefore be examined objectively.
Now if it is indeed true that ali forms of human
knowledge are forms of interpretation, then it is also
legitimate to claim that scientific PERCEPTION, too, is
already an interpreti ve act. One can show, for instance
- as does Heelan - that visual space tends to have
a Euclidean geometrica! structure only when the envi-
ronment is filled with objects that always ha ve the same
pattern and always show the same aspects, and when
these shapes and patterns continually exhibit standard
Euclidean shapes. On the other hand, our perception
tends to have a hyperbolic structure when vision is
not aided by these clues. From this it follows that ali
scientific perceptions are hermeneutica!. The scientific
observers leam to "read" perceptual and instrumental
stimuli as one learns to read a text. Thus the hermeneu-
tica! aspect ofthe natural sciences is located at the heart
ofthese sciences where one would ha ve least expected
it, namely within the acts of scientific observation.
Other hermeneutica! dimensions of the natural sci-
ences on which hermeneutica! philosophers have fo-
cused are scientific discovery and scientific rationality.
As far as the first issue is concemed, hermeneuticists in
this case take up issues raised earlier by Norwood Rus-
se! Hanson, Stephen Toulmin, and Michael Polanyi. In
the view of these authors, one was concerned in the
tradition of logica! empiricism mainly with scientif1c
explanation, and a very sophisticated logic of science
was developed there. It is usually assumed in that tra-
dition that there is no parallel logic of discovery. With
 NATURAL SCIENCE IN HERMENEUTICAL PERSPECTIVE
respect to questions conceming discovery one usuaUy
appealed to intuition, the gestalt switch, the concept
of genius, etc. Problems of scientific discovery were
claimed to lie outside the domain of philosophy of
science proper, and were thus usually relegated to psy-
chology and the social sciences.
Later, when a revisionist movement in philosophy
of science developed that focused explicitly on science
as an ongoing process in finite historical contexts, the
history of science began to play a much more impor-
tant role in philosophical reflections on the sciences;
in some cases sociology of knowledge and cognitive
science also played important parts. Yet the work done
in this movement was mainly philosophical in nature.
Hermeneuticists are positive about this development
in the philosophy of science. Yet they are also con-
vinced that many of the authors working in this area
are somehow stuck in an unacceptable philosophical
framework ofmeaning. This is the reason why the ba-
sic issues need to be rethought from the perspective of
hermeneutic phenomenology and why one must pay
special attention to the meaning and function of the
hermeneutica! circle in reflections on scientific discov-
ery.
As far as the debate about REASON in the sciences is
concemed, some hermeneuticists feei that the domain
ofthe rational in logica! empiricism was usuaUy more
or less identified with the domain of the logica!. This
led, in turn, to the view that scientific discovery cannot
be rationally accounted for; thus there simply cannot be
a logic of discovery. There can only bea psychology or
sociology of discovery. Hermeneuticists disagree with
this view and propose that one pay more attention to
the situation and the historical context in which every
discovery comes about, instead of one-sidedly focus-
ing on the actual behavior ofthe relevant scientists. To
substantiate their criticism ofthe logica! empiricist po-
sition and to justify their own hermeneutica! approach
to the natural sciences, these hermeneutica! phenome-
nologists reflect criticaUy on a number of issues that
psychologists and sociologists often tend to overlook.
First, scientific problems arise oftheir own accord;
they are not solicited; they demand the attention of
the scientists. The scientists respond to this appeal;
this is the reason why a psychology of discovery is
not very helpful. Second, problems are always very
complex because they manifest themselves as some-
479
thing that runs against a background of meaning with
which they conflict. In addition, the problem always
stands in a much broader background of meaning that
is taken to be unproblematic and that is assumed to
contain in principle aU the insights needed to sol ve the
problem. Furthermore, scientific discovery takes place
within the domain of language in which ali known in-
sights have already been formulated in a manner that
severs them from their historical situation so that they
can be applied time and again in new and different
contexts. Third, scientific problems have a vectorial
character that is closely related to their contextual na-
ture: they are obtrusive, solicit inquiry, and push, as it
were, in a certain direction, as far as possible solutions
are concerned. FinaUy, these problems appear to show
themselves from a chiaroscuro situation; they are not
seen or experienced by aU, but must be brought into the
open, clearly formulated, and placed into their proper
contexts.
These issues explain why we need a hermeneutic
of the natural sciences. For the rationality of scien-
tific discovery can perhaps be described best by caU-
ing scientific discovery a narrative explanation. The
process of scientific discovery always takes place in
a social and historical situation; it is articulated and
structured from the perspective of a shared tradition,
and it is studied by researchers trained in the skiUs,
habits, attitudes, and conditions of the discipline at a
certain stage of its development. Scientific discovery
can therefore correctly be called a rational - be it
also a faUible- response to a changing problem situ-
ation that is interpreted and resolved according to the
resources provided by a concrete conceptual context
or world. The kind of rationality operative here can
be called ontologica!, because it is concemed with a
set of relationships between the context of meaning
from which the discoverers proceed and the scientific
problem and meaning with which they are concretely
concemed; it is in this domain that the hermeneutic
circle is of great importance. This rationality can be
caUed hermeneutica!, insofar as discovery is always an
interpretive response, a response from the perspective
of a carefully defined horizon of meaning. FinaUy, this
rationality is historical to the degree that the discov-
erer rei ies on a particular tradition for its resources and
insofar as every discovery is irreversible in time.
The question ofwhether the position ofhermeneu-
 480 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tical phenomenology can be called realistic is debated
among phenomenologists. Heelan caUs his position re-
alistic but qualifies the term by calling it hermeneu-
tica! or horizonal realism. For in his view it belongs
to the essence of science to specify ever new hori-
zons of reality that become accessible to perception
by "readable technologies," a special product of sci-
entific theory. Kockelmans, on the other hand, argues
that hermeneutica! phenomenology cannot be called a
form of realism, because every form of realism is at
root stiU a form of dogmatism, whereas hermeneuti-
ca! phenomenology is a transcendental, critica! form
ofphilosophy. Yet at the same time, he also maintains
that every good scientific theory is a theory of what
is, just as every good scientific claim is a claim about
what is. To avoid contradiction in this latter view, it is
necessary to broaden the classical coherence theory of
truth and to detine truth basically as revealment.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Heelan, Patrick. Space-Perception and the Philosophy ofSci-
ence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- . "Natural Science as a Hermeneutic oflnstrumentation."
Philosophy ofScience 50 (1983), 61-75.
- . "Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Phi1osophy of
Science." In Gadamer and Hermeneutics. Ed. Hugh J.
Silverman. New York: Routledge, 1991, 213-28.
Heidegger, Martin. Holzwege [ 1950]. Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klosterman, 1963.
- . Vortriige und Aufsiitze. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954.
- . Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Kre11. New York:
Harper & Row, 1977.
- . The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.
Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- . Die Frage nach dem Ding. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1962; What is A Thing? Trans. W. B. Barton
Jr. and Vera Deutsch. Chicago: Regnery, 1967.
Kisiel, Theodore J. "Zu einer Hermeneutik naturwis-
senschaftlicher Entdeckung." Zeitschrift fiir allgemeine
Wissenschaftstheorie 2 ( 1971 ), 195-221.
- . "The Rationality of Scientific Discovery." In Rationality
To-Day. Ed. Theodore F. Geraets. Ottawa: Ottawa Univer-
sity Press, 1979, 401-11.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. The World in Science and Philosophy.
Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1969.
- . Heidegger and Science. Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of
America, 1985.
- . Ideasfor a Hermeneutic Phenomenology o(the Natural
Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS
The Pennsylvania State University
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
NATURALISM Sometimes also called scien-
tism, positivism, or objectivism, naturalism has been
and remains the main opponent of phenomenology.
In most naturalism, nature is ali that there is; gen-
uine philosophical and scientific knowledge is solely
based on the sensuous perception of physical objects;
and thus values and purposes, as well as minds and
gods, are beyond nature, do not exist at ali, or can-
not be known. They are merely words. Other forms of
naturalism recognize humanly imperceptible realities,
such as x-rays and the unconscious. ANALYTIC PHILoso-
PHY, ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS, LOGICAL POSITIVISM,
MARXISM, and PSYCHOANALYSIS are naturaJistic. In ad-
dition, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY, PSY-
CHOLOGY, and others of what are sometimes called the
"behavioral sciences" are often pursued in a behavior-
istic fashion that is associated with naturalism. Behav-
iorism classically denies that the inside or first person
perspectives on subjects can yield scientific results. Fi-
nally, naturalists tend to deny insight into ideal objects,
such as logica! forms, and thus tend to be nominalists
as well.
There ha ve been naturalistic movements in AESTHET-
ICS and LITERATURE that emphasize nature in contrast to
the traditionally emphasized human or religious sub-
jects. The naturalism in philosophy and science that
phenomenology opposes is not incompatible with such
cultural movements. But the chief source of inspiration
for "intellectual naturalism," as it might be called in
order include psychological and social scientific dis-
ciplines, is not the aesthetic experience of nature, but
rather modem NATURAL SCIENCE. Such science, which is
basically mathematical physics, began to supersede an-
cient and medieval Westem natural philosophy around
the time of Galileo; it has produced century after cen-
tury ofstunning accomplishments, and is well reftected
in the epistemology and metaphysics of modern phi-
losophy. That KANT as well as Descartes were also
physicists of the first rank seems not unrelated to this
emphasis.
Naturalism has been considerably strengthened in
two respects since the second half of the 19th cen-
tury. First, this was when the centuries-old dreams of
scientific TECHNOLOGY began to be fulfilled with the ap-
plication ofphysical scientific knowledge in founding
and developing the chemical and electrica! industries, a
process that has intensified and generalized into every
 NATURALISM
industry since then. Second, this was also when Darwin
made his revolution in biology, which was followed by
a biologica! form of naturalism before World War 1
that affected HENRI BERGSON and WILLIAM JAMES among
others. Continuing developments in biologica! science
and biotechnology promise to support considerable bi-
ologica! naturalism into the 21 st century, some of it
currently reflected in COGNITIVE SCIENCE and ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Few phenomenological philosophers (and none of
the leading figures) either disparage the achievements
of modem natural science per se or are unconcemed
about the problematic impacts of scientific technol-
ogy, which became unignorable with the industrialized
slaughter of World War 1. But they have grave hes-
itations about the generalization of natural scientific
attitudes into philosophy such that metaphysics is in
effect considered coterminous with physics and episte-
mology is considered conterminous with the method-
ology ofphysics. They do not oppose science but sci-
entism. The peripheralization if not outright ignoring
of normative disciplines such as AESTHETICS, ETHICS,
and POLITICS in the name of how human nature "actu-
ally works" is also cause for concern, for what besides
particular economic interests can then guide the vast
powers ofscientific technologywhen traditional values
are set aside and no altematives ha ve been developed?
For naturalism to be understood phenomenologi-
cally, NATURAL SCIENCE and its relations to everyday
life, the cultural or HUMAN SCIENCES, the formal sci-
ences, technology, and philosophy itselfneed tobe re-
flected upon. This reveals that the nature investigated
in natural science is the result of special efforts, so
that natural science is nothing natural. Fundamentally,
a specific attitude must be cultivated in order to thema-
tize contents of cultural worlds as naturalistic objects.
In this attitude, the practica! and evaluational character-
istics that belong to objects as originally encountered
in everyday life are habitually regarded. Then the sun
and moon, for example, have their ordinary human
uses as means to recognize the time of day, month,
or year abstracted from and become strictly abstract
astronomical objects. That such objects can be more
easily related to mathematical models and that such
models then make more precise clocks and calendars
possible is part of the attraction of the naturalistic ap-
proach, which advances not merely theoretical science
481
but also scientific technology. And when an approach
is astonishingly effective in one specialized area, it is
often tried in ali disciplines, philosophy included.
It would be an error merely to consider the naturalis-
tic attitude of natural science as theoretical in contrast
to the practica! attitudes of nonscientific life. This is
an error because it is possible to take up a theoreti-
cal attitude toward contents of the everyday lifeworld
that does not abstract from their everyday values and
purposes and that thus remain basic concrete objects.
One can then theorize about communities, traditions,
persons, and wor!ds in ECONOMICS, ETHNOLOGY, COM-
MUNICOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, POLITICAL SCIENCE,
SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, and other human Or cultural
sciences. A scientific attitude specifically pertaining
to sciences of this kind can consider teleological ex-
planations. In contrast, explanations of phenomena in
terms of ends and values for persons and communities
are suppressed in the naturalistic attempt to explain
events in terms only of efficient causes, which become
prominent when the WORLD is regarded as structured
not in terms of culture, communities, and traditions,
but solely in terms ofnaturalistic events in space, time,
and causality.
One consequence ofthe remarkably rapid advance
of not only the theoretical natural sciences but also the
natural scientific technologies derived from them is the
contemporary tendency in the common mind to iden-
tify "science" with "natural science" to the disregard
of the human sciences, e.g., history and sociology. A
more balanced view would recognize the scientific in
general and then divide it along one dimension into
the natural or even the naturalistic and the human or
cultural sciences and along another dimension into the-
oretical and applied science, so that there are then four
bideterminate forms ofthe scientific, and this is stiU not
to consider the formal sciences of LOGIC and MATHEMAT-
ICS. It is in disciplines such as ARCHITECTURE, MEDICINE,
NURSING, and PSYCHIATRY that cultural scientific knowJ-
edge as well as natural scientific knowledge can be
used for practica! purposes. An adequate account of
"application" is still needed, but it can begin with the
insight that rarely are results and methods from but
one theoretical discipline employed in a science-based
practica! discipline.
It is also a common mistake among the less sophis-
ticated opponents of naturalism to include the promi-
482 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
nence of mathematical methods in modern natural sci-
ence among the defining characteristics of what they
oppose. Such thinkers would tend to advocate qualita-
tive instead of quantitative approaches. This is an error
first of all because qualitative accounts have always
been produced in the phase of natural science called
"natural history." Second, it needs tobe recognized that
not all mathematical methods are quantitative in the
strict sense that requires units, counting, and measure-
ment. The recognition of nonquantitative mathematics
helps it be seen that mathematics is fundamentally con-
tinuous with logic in what might generically be called
"formal analysis." Such formal analysis has also been
consciously practiced since ancient times in logic (and
applied in rhetoric) and is thus nothing peculiar to sci-
ence that is either modern or natural or, for that matter,
to naturalistic technology, philosophy, and culture.
If the error of considering formal analysis, which
can also be called "applied formal science," as a detin-
ing trait of naturalism is avoided, then a place for math-
ematics in the cultural sciences can be recognized as of
methodological use apart from any naturalistic abstrac-
tion to which the originaUy useful and valuable cultural
objects of socioculturallife might be subjected. This is
not to deny that mathematical approaches in sciences of
aU types involve formalization and idealization as ab-
stractive techniques that transcend the various unique
qualitative features of naturalistic as well as cultural
objects. Then again, there is also no denying that for-
mal methods, which are chiefly statistica!, have made
possible the constantly more powerful science-based
techniques for manipulating cultural life, e.g., in the
advertising industry and also in the opinion polling that
increasingly guides politica! campaigning and gover-
nance.
The physicalistic emphasis within naturalism in-
volves a further disregarding of the psychic com-
ponents that were the preoccupation of premodern
thought and are always the preoccupation ofprescien-
tific life, where people are chiefly interested in people.
Thus the question of whether the heavenly bodies are
gods is excluded by physicalistic astronomy. Beyond
this, humans as weU as other animals also have their
psyches physicalistically disregarded and then only
atoms, molecules, chemistry, and physiology are reaUy
real. A naturalistic epistemology tends to emphasize
physicalistic forms through a preoccupation with the
sensuous perception of material objects and an empha-
sis on the logica! reconstruction of natural scientific
methods for establishing knowledge of such objects.
This excludes methods for understanding personalities,
traditions, and communities through RE-PRESENTATION
and interpretation, all of which involve psychic lives,
values, volition, teleological explanation, and culture.
Chief among the techniques included in the cultural ori-
entation ofthe human sciences are those that pertain to
HERMENEUTICS, which is concerned with the interpreta-
tion and critique not only of texts but also of traces,
i.e., data that are nonlinguistic, such as archaeological
remains and facial expressions. Hermeneutics is much
appreciated by phenomenologists of ali tendencies.
When psychic, social, historical, and cultural ob-
jects are not as such excluded from consideration, the
issues central for disciplines and multi-disciplines such
as ETHNIC STUDIES, ECOLOGY, and FEMINISM can be ap-
proached, aUowing difficult problems of RELATIVISM
and reductionism to emerge and be generalized. Are
objective or nonrelative knowledge and purposes at
aU possible when even scientists and practitioners and.
what they claim to know and do might vary accord-
ing to the professional (and, sometimes, extraprofes-
sional) communities and traditions in which their ac-
counts and purposes are constituted? Would recourse
to EIDETIC METHOD in order to establish what holds for
any cultural situation or world whatever be sufficient
in such a case? One of the attractions of naturalism as
a broad outlook in philosophy as well as science is that
if one habituaUy abstracts from cultural characteristics
in order to gain access to naturalistic objects, then one
readily believes in a nature that is the one nonrelative
reality in contrast to the many relative cultural worlds.
But the price ofthis objectivity is suspiciously cheap.
What is essential for natural science and naturalism
as the general outlook if not ideology derived from it is
that the cultural characteristics with which ali objects
are originally encountered are abstracted from in order
to have the naturalistic objects. The naturalistic atti-
tude is fostered in the professional training of natural
scientists and natural-science-based technologists and
practitioners and is thus automatically adopted in or-
der to do physics or, in different variants, botany, and
behavioristic psychological and social science, engi-
neering, as weU as some areas of medicine and even
types ofpsychiatry. As intimated, however, naturalism
 NATURALISM
is ultimately a new and problematic type of culture.
Natural scientific knowledge and thus control ofnature
has even become an object of a new and religion-like
faith for many, while for others the very project and
its consequences are deeply disturbing. It is ironic that
an alternate to traditional religion would engender new
religious attitudes.
While an increasing tendency to oppose natural-
ism can be discerned in the history ofphenomenology,
phenomenology cannot be said to ha ve been utterly in-
nocent of naturalism. EDMUND HUSSERL was originally
interested in astronomy, received his doctorate in math-
ematics, chiefly published works in the philosophy of
logic and mathematics, and developed his philosophy
at Gottingen, a major center not only for 20th century
mathematics and physics, but also for natural scien-
tific technology. Naturalism was opposed by him as
part ofhis objection to PSYCHOLOGISM in Logische Un-
tersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ), where he vigorously held
that ideal objects can be grasped in categoria! intuition.
Places for a theory of VALUE, a theory of ACTION, and
a philosophy of the human or cultural sciences can be
found in subsequent publications of his lifetime, be-
ginning with "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft"
( 1911) and in his characterization ofthe natural attitude
in §27 of Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913). Neverthe-
less, after the emphasis on the grounding of logic and
mathematics, Husserl 's emphasis in the works of his
lifetime is on natural scientific psychology and physics.
Only with the posthumous publications in 1952 of
Jdeen II [1912-15], with its central distinction within
the natural attitude between the naturalistic attitude of
natural science and the more fundamental personalis-
tic attitude of the cultural sciences; the publication in
1954 ofthe full text of Die Krisis der europăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
( 1936), with its emphasis on the world as lifeworld; and
the publication in 1962 of Phănomenologische Psy-
chologie [ 1925], with its project of a human or cultural
scientific psychology, did it become conspicuous that
any naturalism in Husserl was a matter of emphasis
rather than essence.
The philosophy of the cultural sciences of AL-
FRED SCHUTZ, beginning with Der sinnhafte Aujbau
der sozialen Welt (The meaning-structure of the so-
cial world, 1932), is at least as naturalistic in empha-
483
sis as the works Husserl published, but, again, careful
study discloses not only the teleological explanation
involving "in-order-to motives" but also the inclusion
of values and purposes under his operative concept
of MEANING. SimilarJy, ARON GURWITSCH's The Fiefd of
Consciousness ( 1964) and other works, and the GESTALT
PSYCHOLOGY centrally appropriated by him, will be
comprehended naturalistically if one does not watch for
the occasional passages devoted to how the "percep-
tual world" and the life-spheres within it are originally
cultural, something systematically advocated in !ater
essays and in the posthumously published Die mitmen-
schlischen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt [Human en-
counters in the social world, 1931] and Esquisse de
la phenomlmologie constitutive [Sketch of constitutive
phenomenology, 1937]. Such naturalistic emphases in
the second generation of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
relate in part to the times and audiences in GERMANY
and the UNITED STATES before and after World War II.
More recent work, such as that of RICHARD M. ZANER
in the philosophy of medicine, THOMAS M. SEEBOHM in
the philosophy of hermeneutics, and LESTER EMBREE in
the philosophy of archaeology reflect more culturally
oriented work in this tendency.
The analyses of equipment, practica! concems, lan-
guage, and interpretation in MARTIN HEIDEGGER's Sein
und Zei! ( 1927) can hardly be considered naturalistic.
Carefully considered, the opposition to naturalism dis-
cernible in the EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY in FRANCE
of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and SI-
MONE DE BEAUVOIR does not include opposition to natu-
ral science, but only rejection of its naturalistic attitude
for metaphysical and epistemological purposes. Fol-
lowing the work of GABRIEL MARCEL as well as MAX
SCHELER, the phenomenology of the BODY in France
opposed the naturalism that would reduce the corps
propre from the culturally encountered soma of a psy-
che to the naturalistic object of anatomy and physi-
ology. Merleau-Ponty was especially concemed with
naturalism in biology and psychology. Later concems
in French phenomenology with history, politics, and
feminism show an appreciation of the lived world as
cultural and of human existence as more than the in-
tellects of natural scientists. "The world is more than
nature" might be an apt slogan. After all, human life or
existence always already includes valuing and willing
and its situations and worlds always already include
 484 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the cultural characteristics that are constituted in those
strata oflife; naturalism can only pretend that they are
not there.
With the work of HANS-GEORG GADAMER and others,
including PAUL RICCEUR and JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS, and
in complex connections with other approaches, includ-
ing STRUCTURALISM and CRITICAL THEORY, HERMENEU-
TICAL PHENOMENOLOGY has additionally COntributed !O
the philosophy ofthe human sciences and the appreci-
ation of cultural life and cultural worlds as such. But
that phenomenological alternatives to naturalism are
positively interested in natural science is clear in the
work of PATRICK HEELAN as well as Kockelmans for
hermeneutica! phenomenology, JOHN COMPTON for ex-
istential phenomenology, ELISABETH STROKER for con-
stitutive phenomenoJogy, and HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS
for REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY. DON IHDE Jeads the cur-
ren! hermeneutica! phenomenology oftechnology.
Systematically speaking, the alternatives to natu-
ralism among phenomenologists are oftwo sorts. The
worldly or mundane alternative consists essentially in
an appreciation of cultural worlds and ali that this
entails in the way of theories of understanding and
interpretation, emphasis on values, purposes, teleolo-
gies, personalities, communities, traditions, etc. This
position is epitomized in the widespread phenomen-
ological contention that the human sciences are prior
to the natural sciences. At least tacitly, the assump-
tion in mundane or worldly phenomenology is that ali
genuine philosophical problems can be solved from
intramundane standpoints. In this perspective, the dif-
ference between philosophy and science may be only
that between the one "generality" and the numerous
specialities. Schutz's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
THE NATURAL ATTITUDE seeks phiJosophically to found
historical and social science upon psychology in the
same way that many philosophers of natural science
would found biology upon chemistry and physics, but
it is sometimes mistaken for sociology, while he in-
creasingly Jooked to a PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
The other non-naturalistic phenomenological philo-
sophical alternative is transcendental. The modem
project of grounding ali specialized theoretical, nor-
mative, and practica! disciplines in conscious life goes
back to Descartes and can be seen in MODERN PHILOS-
OPHY, BRITISH EMPIRICISM, KANT, FICHTE, and others. It
would be an error to see an exclusive historical con-
nection ofthis modern project in first philosophy with
naturalism and the rise ofnaturalistic science and tech-
nology as essential, for Husserl and others in transcen-
dental phenomenologycomfortably include the human
sciences (and cultural scientific methods) along with
the formal sciences of logic and mathematics and the
physical and biologica! natural sciences among the pos-
itive disciplines in need of transcendental grounding.
The primary difference between the mundane and
transcendental alternatives to naturalism concerns the
status of conscious life. Secondary issues include
whether the life in question is exclusively human or
includes nonhuman species and whether it is funda-
mentally personal or communal. But can conscious
life have the always already established belief in its
own being-in-the-world suspended, so that the prob-
lems of grounding the whole of the world in a part of
it are dissolved, or must conscious life be considered
only as part ofthe world, so that the modern transcen-
dental task of grounding the world, nature included,
must be abandoned? In other respects, there are many
convergences between the mundane and transcenden-
tal versions of phenomenology on various issues, ali
of which are, in various ways, opposed to naturalism
but not natural science.
In decades to come, as natural sciences and natu-
ral scientific technologies will continue their astonish-
ing progress, phenomenologists will constantly need
to examine how these disciplines originate from and
then ha ve social and environmental impacts back upon
basic cultural life. Work in value theory, ethics, and
philosophical politics, along with the philosophies of
human and formal as well as natural science and tech-
nology, will be indispensable. Naturalism will not go
away.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
De Boer, Theodore. The Development of Husserl s Thought.
Trans. Theodore Plantinga. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1978.
Cobb-Stevens, Richard. Husserl and Analytic Philosophy.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1984.
Conrad-Martius, Hedwig. Die Erkenntnistheoretischen
Grundlagen des Postivismus. Bensarben, 1920.
Husserl, Edmund. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,"
Logos 1 (1911-12); rpt. in his Aufsătze und Vortrăge
(1911-1921). Ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp.
Husserliana 25. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1987; "Philosophy as Rigorous Science." In his Pheno-
 THE NETHERLANDS ANO FLANDERS
menology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Trans. Quentin
Lauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965, 71-147.
Levinas, Emmanuel. La tfzeorie de l'intuition dans la
phenomenologie de Husserl. Paris: Vrin, 1963; The The-
ory oflntuition in Husserl:~ Phenomenology. Trans. Andre
Orianne. Evanston, IL: Northwcstem University Press,
1973.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. La structure du comportement,
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942. The Struc-
ture of Behavior. Trans. Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1963.
Sinha, Debabrata. "Phenomenology and Positivism." Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1962-{)3),
562-77.
LESTER EMBREE
F!01·ida Atlantic University
THE NETHERLANDS AND FLANDERS Two
dominant movements can be distinguished within the
philosophical climate in The Netherlands and Flanders
at the beginning ofthe 20th century with respect to the
reception ofphenomenology. Neo-Thomism was dom-
inant within the Catholic circle and neo-Kantianism
was dominant outside this circle. This climate deter-
mined the reception of phenomenology until the end
ofWorld War II.
From a neo.:rhomistic point of view, which had its
firm base in the Higher Institute ofPhilosophy at Leu-
ven, the central question was whether Husserl 's pheno-
menology is reconcilable with a realistic metaphysics.
In 191 O in the first French article on Husserl, Mgr.
Leon Noei (1878-1953) considered the Logische Un-
tersuchungen (1900---190 1) as an effective refutation
ofpsychologism. He notes with satisfaction that in the
Prolegomena Husserl defends the traditional Scholas-
tic logic against the customary contempt of that time.
Some decades !ater, in his capacity as president of the
Higher Institute, Msgr. Noei would be one ofthe peo-
p1e who made the foundation ofthe Husserl Archives
possible.
During the first decades ofthe 20th century ali com-
mentators agreed that Husserl had turned toward an
idealistic philosophy. The debate now focused on the
question whether Husserl's phenomenology had been
an idealistic philosophy from the outset or whether
phenomenology, taken as a purely descriptive method,
could be separated from the idealistic doctrine. Some
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
485
participants in this discussion were Joseph Marechal
(1878-1944 ), who claimed that such a separation was
not possible, and Rene Kremer (1887-1934), who de-
fended the other option.
Outside the Catholic ci rele Husserl 's phenomen-
ology was mainly received in a neo-Kantian perspec-
tive. The University of Groningen, where Gerard Hey-
mans (1837-1930) taught at the time, held a compe-
tition in 1922 on A Comparative Study Concerning
Plata s Doctrine of Ideas and Husserl s Doctrine ofan
Intuition of Essences. Henri Schmidt Degener ( 1891-
1969) wrote his doctoral dissertation for this occasion.
His study relies heavi1y on Paul Natorp's (1854-1924)
interpretation of both Husserl and Plato. He claims
that after the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl's
thought developed more and more in a Kantian di-
rection. He concludes that in Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913 ), Husserl 's essences can no longer be
distinguished from ideas in the Kantian sense.
HENDRIKJ. ros was one ofthe first in The Netherlands
and Flanders to apply the phenomenological method
to a specific scientific discipline, namely linguistics. In
the 1920s he studied under Heinrich Rickert ( 1863-
1936) in Heidelberg and under Husserl in Freiburg.
In his doctoral thesis, Kritische Studien iiber philol-
ogische Methode ( 1923 ), he stresses the necessity of
a phenomenological, i.e., a descriptive analysis of the
ways in which, in this case, linguistic phenomena are
given. He opposes this newly discovered method to
the constructive method, which he attributes to Paul
Natorp, among others. In a contribution to the volume
of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie dedicated
to Husserl in 1939, Pos pointed out the importance of
Husserl 's discovery of the LIFEWORLD as the founda-
tion for ali scientific knowledge, including that about
LANGUAGE. Pos also organized Husserl's visit to The
Netherlands in 1928, where he gave his so-called "Am-
sterdamer Vortrage" (Amsterdam lectures), published
in 1962 in Husserliana, volume IX.
The development ofphenomenology in The Nether-
lands and Flanders gained momentum after World War
Il. This impetus was called EXISTENTIAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY. Important sources of inspiration wcre MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, GABRIEL MARCEL, and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, but
above ali the influence ofMAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY can
hardly be overestimated. Existential phenomenology
486 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
not only became the dominant movement within the
philosophical climate of The Netherlands and Flan-
ders, but also determined the way in which Husserl's
phenomenology was interpreted.
The work of ALPHONSE DE WAELHENS can illustrate
this. In some articles dating from the 1930s he re-
jected Husserl's phenomenology: it cannot even serve
as a philosophical method because as such it inevitably
leads to idealism. According to de Waelhens the same
holds true, mutatis mutandis, for Heidegger. After
World War II, however, he strikes a different note.
He then stresses the importance of the discovery of
the Jifeworld, i.e., the existential reservoir of ali sense
that is to be constituted. Because of this discovery it
is possible, according to de Waelhens, for phenomen-
ology to overcome the traditional opposition between
realism and idealism. He repeatedly defended the pos-
sibility of interpreting Husserl 's phenomenology along
these lines, for instance during the second and third
International Colloquia on Phenomenology. The pre-
refiective experience of an anonymous subject is also
the central theme of La philosophie et les experiences
naturelles ( 1961 ). De Waelhens played an important
ro le as a mediator between phenomenology in FRANCE
and GERMANY. Besides severa] extensive studies on
Heidegger, he translated, partly in collaboration with
WALTER BIEMEL and RUDOLF BOEHM, a number of Hei-
degger's works into French. Finally, the monograph on
his greatest source of inspiration- Une philosophie
de l'ambiguite: L 'existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-
Ponty ( 1951)- should be mentioned here.
Numerous philosophers threw themselves into ex-
istential phenomenology during the first decades after
World War II. Within the scope ofthis survey only a few
names can be mentioned. NICO WIM LUIJPEN acquired
international fame with his Existentiele fenomenologie
( 1959; Existential Phenomenology, 1960), which was
translated into severa! Janguages and reprinted severa]
times. In this work he calls the notion of existence or
INTENTIONALITY the fa it primiti[ of existential pheno-
menology. He defines this notion as the unity ofrecip-
rocal implication ofhuman being and world. With this,
it is possible to escape the dichotomy between realism
and idealism. Luijpen points out that the openness of
the subject is not restricted to the world. It includes the
possibility of a relation to the transcendent absolute,
God. He elaborates on this point in Phenomenology
and Metaphysics (1965; Fenomenologie en metafYs-
ica, 1966).
Closely related to the position of Luijpen is that
of REMIGIUS KWANT. Together with Luijpen he de-
fended existential phenomenology against the objec-
tion, mainly from neo-Thomistic opponents, that it ex-
cludes the possibility of a metaphysics. Kwant's main
source ofinspiration was Merleau-Ponty. He wrote sev-
era! studies on his philosophy, for instance on his !ater
work in From Phenomenology to Metaphysics ( 1966).
In other works he also relies on the oeuvre ofthe French
phenomenologist, for instance in Mens en expressie, in
het licht van de wijsbegeerte van Merleau-Ponty ( 1968;
Phenomenology of Expression, 1969).
REINOUT BAKKER also paid a great deal of attention
to Merleau-Ponty's thought. He translated some ofhis
work into Dutch. He was also the first and only one in
The Netherlands and Flanders to write a general history
of phenomenology, De geschicdenis van het fenome-
nologische denken (The history of phenomenological
thought, 1964 ), in which he deals with MAX SCHELER as
well as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS was the first in The Nether-
Jands and Flanders to write a general introduction
to Husserl 's thought, Edmund Husserl. Een inleiding
tot zijn fenomenologie ( 1963; A First Introduction to
Husserl 's Phenomenology, 1967). He concludes this
book with an attempt to settle the issue concerning the
realistic or idealistic character of Husserl's doctrine.
He argues in favour of the unity in the development
of Husserl 's thought by stressing the different attitudes
from which Husserl thinks. Because the transcendental
attitude is most fundamental for Husserl, his pheno-
menology can be considered an idealistic doctrine. But
this does not affect the lasting value ofhis analysis from
a phenomenological or existential point ofview, if only
the phenomenological reduction is seen as a reduction
from the cultural world to the lifeworld. Kockelmans
has also written a study of Husserl 's phenomenological
psychology entitled Defenomenologische psychologie
volgens Husserl. Een historisch-critische studie ( 1964;
Edmund Husserl 's Phenomenological Psychology: A
Historico-Critical Study, 1967) and an introduction to
Heidegger's thought, Martin Heidegger. Een inleiding
in zijn denken ( 1962; Martin Heidegger: A First Intro-
duction to his Philosophy, 1965). In addition to these
historical studies Kockelmans has also written severa!
 THE NETHERLANDS ANO FLANDERS
books in the phiiosophy of NATURAL SC!ENCE- for in-
stance, Phaenomenologie en natuurwetenschap ( 1962;
Phenomenology and Physical Science, 1966).
In the 1950s and 1960s phenomenologywas applied
to the sciences on a large scale, particularly the HUMAN
SCIENCES. It has often been said that the most original
contributions to phenomenology in The Netherlands
and Flanders lie in this field. The so-called Dutch,
or more specifically, the Utrecht school in particular
gained an international reputation. The members of
this school applied the phenomenological method to
PSYCHOLOGY and PSYCHIATRY.
The central figure around whom this school was
formed was FREDERIK J. J. BUYTENDIJK. His interest in
phenomenology was first aroused in the 1920s, when
he regu!ariy met MAX SCHELER and HELMUTH PLESSNER.
On the occasion ofBuytendijk 's sixty-fifth birthday his
companions offered him a collection of essays, Per-
soon en Wereld. Bijdragen tot de Phaenomenologis-
che Psychologie (Person and world: Contributions to
phenomenological psychology, 1953). The main theme
ofthis phenomenological psychology is human situat-
edness. Human beings can on1y be understood from
their lifeworld. On the one hand, this is a world in
which one finds onese1f, and on the other, it is a world
that one actively constitutes. Much attention is paid
to the human BODY and HISTORY. The point of depar-
ture and the touchstone ofthis psychology is everyday
lived experience. It finds its theoretical justification in
the philosophical notion of intentionality, because this
notion refers to the indissoluble bond between human
beings and the world.
The leading members ofthis Utrecht school are the
psychiatrists HENRICUS RUMKE and JAN HENDR!K VAN DEN
BERG; the theorist of EDUCAT!ON MARTINUS LANGEVELD;
and the psychoiogists DAVID VAN LENNEP and JOHANNES
LINSCHOTEN. Two other collections of essays with which
this school presented itself are Situation: Contribu-
tions to Phenomenologica! Psychology and Psycho-
Pathology ( 1954) and Rencontre, Encounter. Begeg-
nung ( 1957).
The concept of phenomenological psychology
this group advocated was not undisputed. STEPHAN
STRASSER, Buytendijk's colleague at the University
of Nijmegen, was never a member of this school.
Without explicitly referring to this group, he wams
in his Fenomenologie en empirische menskunde. Bij-
487
drage tot een nieuw ideaal van wetenschappelijk-
heid ( 1962; Phenomenology and the Human Sciences,
1963) against the dangers of what he calls phenomen-
ological impressionism. In the Dutch edition of this
book he predicts that a fu ture historian of phi1osophy
will conclude that an incomplete knowledge ofpheno-
menology has led especially in The Netherlands to a
conception of phenomenology that can be expressed
in two words: I see! In this connection the Husser-
lian phrase Bilderbuchphănomenologie (picture book
phenomenology) is often used.
Johannes Linschoten, once considered to be Buy-
tendijk's most talented pupi!, eventually tumed away
from phenomenological psychology. This did not
mean, however, that he renounced phenomenology
altogether. In his article "Die Unumgiinglichkeit der
Phanomenologie" ( 1962) he argues that so-called
phenomenological psychology, which concentrates on
describing the pre-reflective sphere of experience, co-
incides with phenomenology in general. This pheno-
menology, being a philosophical discipline, is relevant
to psychology, but Linschoten now reserves the term
"psychology" for the scientific endeavorthat strives for
objective knowledge by means of formalizing, quan-
tifying, and experimental analyses. With this vision
Linschoten anticipated the actual developments. In the
mid 1960s phenomenological psychology rapidly lost
ground to experimental psychology.
Existential phenomeno1ogy as a whole lost its dom-
inant position in the philosophical climate of The
Netherlands and Flanders during the 1960s.lt was con-
fronted with the rise of various new movements such
as CRITICAL THEORY and STRUCTURALISM. Some authors
who commented on these confrontations from a the-
matic point of view are, besides the above-mentioned
Kwant and Bakker, JAN BROEKMAN and KEES STRUYKER
BOUDIER.
In 1966 and 1967, the confrontation with ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY led to a fierce controversy, in which nu-
merous authors participated. One of them was coR-
NELIUS VAN PEURSEN. In Fenomenologie en analytische
filosofie (1968; Phenomenology and AnaZvtic Philos-
ophy, 1972) he defends phenomenology by pointing
out the convergence between developments in ana-
lytic and phenomenological philosophy. In both move-
ments an awareness has broken through that the logica!
realm cannot be separated from the realm of contin-
488 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
gency, i.e., in the case of analytical philosophy, OR-
DINARY LANGUAGE, and in the case of phenomenology,
the lifeworld. More recently, Herman Philipse's (195 1)
doctoral dissertation on De fundering van de logica in
Husserls 'Logische Untersuchungen '(The foundations
oflogic in Husserl 's Logica! Investigations, 1983) was
motivated by the question whether this work is still
valuable from a analytic philosophical point ofview.
Another participant in this discussion was THEO DE
BOER. His defense of Husserl's phenomenology rests
partly on stressing Husserl's own phenomenological
orientation, which he distinguishes from the domi-
nant existentially oriented interpretation of Husserl's
phenomenology. This point is elaborated in De on-
twikkelingsgang in het denken van Husserl (1966;
The Development of Husserl s Thought, 1978). In this
study De Boer argues that many Husserl interpreta-
tions approach his philosophy too much from existing
philosophical movements. Consequently they misun-
derstand its unique character. These approaches often
result in making absolute what is only a stage in the de-
velopment of Husserl 's thought. He argues for the unity
of Husserl's oeuvre as being a unity of development.
The same major problems are dealt with by Husserl in
an ever more radical manner, ultimately leading to a
transcendental idealistic solution.
The impact of Heidegger's philosophy on philo-
sophical Iife in The Netherlands and F1anders is doc-
umented by many interpretive monographs and es-
says. After de Waehlens, it was especially SAMUEL
ussELING who wrote authoritative studies of Heideg-
ger, beginning with his doctoral dissertation on Hei-
degger. Denken en danken, geven en zijn (Heidegger:
Thinking and thanking, giving and being, 1962). Later
he investigated the relations between phenomenology,
HERMENEUTICS, and rhetoric in Retoriek en Filosofie.
Wat gebeurt er wanneer er gesproken wordt? (1975;
Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical
Survey, 1976). Theo De Boer published an important
study in 1978 on Heidegger's critique ofHusserl in Sein
und Zeit. PAUL RICCEUR became known to the Dutch pub-
lic through the edition ofthree antho1ogies in Dutch by
ADRIAAN PEPERZAK in 1968, 1970, and 197 J.
The first Dutch translation ofEMMANUEL LEVINAS ap-
peared in 1966. It was a rather deficient translation of
Totalite et infini and did not attract much attention. A
very good new translation with notes by Theo De Boer
was published in 1987. In 1969 Adriaan Peperzak pub-
lished Het menselijk gelaat (The human face), a collec-
tion of central texts by Levinas translated into Dutch.
In his own work, Peperzak has defended a version of
phenomenology in which elements of Hegel, Heideg-
ger, and Levinas are combined with elements of the
metaphysical tradition. This can be seen in Verlangen
(Desire, 1971) and in Weeftels (Textures, 1974). U en Ik
(You and I, 1976) tries to overcome the differences be-
tween Levinas's descriptions of intersubjectivity and
Hegel 's analysis of the master-slave relation. In Sys-
tematiek en geschiedenis (1981; System and History
in Philosophy, 1986), he defends a phenomeno1ogical
perspective on the unity of thematic philosophy and
the history ofphi1osophy.
Finally, there is the way in which phenomenology
is dealt with from a deconstructive point of view. The
guide here is of COUfSe JACQUES DERRIDA. RUDOLF BERNET
has paid considerable attention to Derrida's Husserl
reading. A number of articles bear witness to this. In
"Is the Present ever Present? Phenomeno1ogy and the
Metaphysics ofPresence" ( 1982), for example, Bemet
offers a deconstructive reading of Husserl 's analysis of
time-consciousness. He argues that Husserl carne to a
result that could undermine his program, which can be
characterized as a metaphysics of presence. However,
Husserl recoiled from these results and did not want
to accept the consequences of his own analysis. Some
of Bernet's essays on Husserl and the ways in which
his phenomenology have been interpreted are collected
in La vie du sujet: Recherches sur 1'interpretation de
Husserl dans la phenomenologie (1994).
A survey ofphenomenology in The Netherlands and
Flanders, or for that matter ofphenomenology in gen-
eral, is not complete without mentioning the Husserl
Archives in Leuven, Be1gium. One name is closely
Jinked to the Archives, that of HERMAN LEO VAN BRE DA.
He rescued Husserl 's Nachlass. This resulted in the
foundation ofthe Archives in 1939. Van Breda initi-
ated the publication of Husserl 's collected works in the
series Husserliana, and the series of studies in pheno-
menology called Phaenomenologica. Up to now thirty
volumes have been published in the Husserliana series.
The complete series will contain some forty volumes.
Furthermore, Van Breda was the initiator of severa! in-
ternational colloquia on phenomenology in the 1950s
and 1960s. Since the death of Van Breda, Samuel IJs-
 THE NETHERLANDS AND FLANDERS
seling bas been director ofthe Husserl Archives.
In the course of time the Archives have known
numerous collaborators who edited volumes in the
Husserliana series. Restricting ourselves to those who
worked or still work in The Netherlands and Flan-
ders on a more permanent basis, the following names
can be mentioned. Stephan Strasser, already referred
to above, was the editor ofthe first volume, Cartesian-
ische Meditationen und Pariser Vortriige, published in
1950. Walter and MARLY BIEMEL edited six volumes.
Rudolf Boehm edited three volumes; since 1974 he
has been co-responsible for the series. KARL SCHUH-
MANN edited the new edition of Jdeen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie I in 1976. Furthermore, he edited the first volume
in the series Husserliana-Dokumente, entitled Husserl-
Chronik (1977), a very detailed survey of Husserl's
philosophical life. Together with his wife, Elisabeth
Schuhmann, he has edited the third title in this se-
ries, Husserl's ten volume Briefwechsel (1994). He is
one of the founders of the journal Husserl Studies. At
present he teaches at the University ofUtrecht. ULLRICH
MELLE edited two volumes in the Husserliana series. At
present he teaches at the Katho1ieke Universiteit Leu-
ven, as does the above-mentioned RudolfBernet, who
is responsible for the fourth series in English, Edmund
Husserl: Collected Works.
Some of the authors mentioned ha ve made sugges-
tions concerning the future of phenomenology. One
of them is Stephan Strasser. Having been occupied
with phenomenology for some fifty years, an occupa-
tion that led among many other studies to Das Gemut
(1956; PhenomenologyofFeeling, 1977), he asks him-
self in Welt im Widerspruch (posthumously published
in 1991) what the significance ofphenomenologyis to-
day. According to Strasser, phenomenology, Husserl 's
phenomenology included, is a philosophy of experi-
ence rather than a reftective philosophy. The possibil-
ity of reflection presupposes an original contact with
the world, and experience brings about this contact.
Strasser's answer to the question ofthe most fundamen-
tal experience differs from that of Husserl. According
to Strasser, perception cannot be the fundamental mode
of experience, not even inner perception, because its
results are inevitably ambivalent. In the search for a
fundamental experience he finds support in Levinas.
The most fundamental experience has to be an ethical
489
experience that shatters the noetic-noematic scheme,
an experience that consists of an unselfish turn toward
the other. This foundation is in a way reconcilable
with Husserl's own intentions because, according to
Strasser, these pertain to ETHICS.
In an article published in 1985 and included in his
Van Brentano tot Levi nas. Studies over defenomenolo-
gie (From Brentano to Levinas: Studies on phenomen-
ology, 1989), Theo de Boer evaluates the phenomen-
ological method, especially EIDETIC METHOD. He con-
cludes, in accordance with Heidegger, that essences
should not be taken as objects, but instead as the frames
or conditions of possibility of ali experience. These
frames themselves, however, can be experienced, and
thus the element of Husserl 's intuitionism is preserved.
De Boer agrees with Rica:ur that phenomenology is
not only the abject of criticism by HERMENEUTICS, or
for that matter, by a deconstmctive reading. It also is
the foundation for the possibility of criticism insofar as
phenomenology, on the level of perception, discloses
the dimension of sense along which hermeneutics as
well as a deconstmctive reading li ve.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Coenen, Herman. "Phănomenologie und Sozialwissenschaft
in den Niederlanden. Eine Skizze der aktuellen Lage."
In Sozialităt und lntersubjektivităt. Ed. Richard Grathoff
and Bemhard Waldenfels. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1983,
338-49.
!Jsseling, Samuel. "Das Husserl-Archiv in Leuven und
die Husserl-Ausgabe." In Buchstabe und Geist. Zur
Uberlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte. Ed.
Walter Jaeschke et al. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987, 137-
46.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. Phenomenological Psychology: The
Dutch School. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Kortooms, Toine, and Kees Struyker Boudier. "Een bijdrage
tot de geschiedenis van de Husserl-receptie in Belgie en
Nederland." Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijs-
begeerte 81 (1989), 1-20, 79-101.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. Phenomenology in Psychology and
Psychiatry. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1972.
Struyker Boudier, Kees. "Phănomenologie in den Nieder-
landen und Belgien." In Dialektik und Genesis in der
Phănomenologie. Ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth. Freiburg: Karl
Alber, 1980, 146--200.
- . Wijsgerig leven in Nederland. Belgie, en Luxemburg
1880--1980. 8 vols. Nijmegen: Ambo, 1985--92.
Van Breda, Herman Leo. "Le sauvetage de 1'heritage Husser-
lien et la foundation des Archives d 'Husserl." In Husserl et
490 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
la pensee moderne/Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit.
Ed. Hennan Leo Van Breda and Jacques Taminiaux. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, 1-41.
TOINE KORTOOMS
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen
KITARO NISHIDA The founder of the so-
called "Kyoto school" of philosophy, Kitaro Nishida
(1870-1945) was called to a professorship at the Im-
perial University in Kyoto in 1911. Through his teach-
ing and his writings he played such a preeminent ro le
in Japan's academic philosophy that many talented
philosophers gathered around him. Nishida is almost
the only philosopher in Japan since the Meiji Restora-
tion ( 1868) to build up an independent and original
philosophical system. He introduced phenomenology
into JAPAN, and his Students- HAJIME TANABE, SHUZO
KUKI, GOICHI MIYAKE, TOKURY0 YAMAUCHI, and others-
were so attracted to phenomenology that they went on
to study with EDMUND HUSSERL, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, and
EUGEN FINK in Freiburg im Breisgau.
With his strong desire for knowledge, Nishida, in the
Far East, steeped himself in the European and Ameri-
can philosophy ofhis time. He was the first in Japan to
recognize the important meaning of the philosophers
of that time, such as HENRI BERGSON, Husserl, Alexius
Meinong ( 1853-1920), FRANZ BRENTANO, and WILLIAM
JAMES. His sympathy with James's philosophy is al-
ready to be found in his diaries before the appearance
of his first work. And he retained a strong affinity to
Bergson ali his life. This is not to deny that Husserl, too,
had a deep and strong affinity to James (e.g., the con-
cept ofthe "fringe") and Bergson (e.g., ROMAN INGAR-
DEN showed that the "dun?e" ofBergson is very similar
to Husserl 's concept of the stream of consciousness ).
Nishida was born near Kanazawa. He experienced
the rise of the Japanese empire and died in 1945 as
it fell. He was eleven years younger than Husserl,
whose first important work, Logische Untersuchun-
gen, appeared at the turn ofthe century (1900-1901).
Nishida 's first major work appeared in the year 1911,
entitled Zen no kenyku (A study of good). This work
already evinces his characteristic thought. He was
the first in Japan to present Husserl's phenomen-
ology in its connection with neo-Kantianism and with
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
the Brentano school. His papers, e.g., "Ninshikiron
niokerujun-ronri-ha no shutyo nitui te" (On the position
ofthe purely logica! school in epistemology, 1911) and
"Gendai niokeru risoshugi no tetsugaku" (The idealis-
tic philosophy of the present, 1917) are representative
works of that time.
Another simi1arity between Husserl and Nishida is
their JifeJong interest in LOGIC and MATHEMATICS. It is
well known that Husserl began his studies and his aca-
demic career as a mathematician and that his disser-
tation, Beitriige zur Theorie der Variationsrechnung
(1882), and his Habilitationsschrift, Ober den Begriff
der Zahl (1887), published in Philosophie der Arith-
metik ( 1891 ), dealt specifically with the foundations
ofmathematics. On the other hand, Nishida had some
hesitation about choosing his professional field. He
chose philosophy because the problem of life was of
the greatest interest to him. But he retained his interest
in the foundations of mathematics throughout his life,
as the countless letters to Shimomura, his pupi! and a
philosopher of mathematics, show.
There is also a similarity in their modes ofthinking.
Tokuryu Yamauchi, his eminent student and pheno-
menologist, who studied with Husserl in Freiburg and
was the successor to Nishida's chair at Kyoto Univer-
sity, called Nishida "a man who thinks as he writes."
Likewise it bas been said: "Husserl ne pensait qu 'en
ecrivant." Both philosophers dedicated their lives to
the analysis ofthe "matters themselves." It is no exag-
geration to say that they died thinking and writing.
Nishida related himself to Husserl 's phenomen-
ology in a somewhat different manner than did the
philosophers ofthe Kyoto school, such as HAJIME TAN-
ABE, TOKURY0 YAMAUCHI, GOICHI MIYAKE, KEIJI NISHITANI,
and others. As Nishida was the founder of this school
and a contemporary ofHusserl, Bergson, and James, he
considered phenomenology to be valuable and a pos-
sibility of philosophical thinking, but he maintained
a critica! distance from it. In addition, it should be
mentioned that Nishida practiced Zen meditation in
temples. He built up his system of philosophy on the
experience of Zen meditation, which is expressed in
his concept of pure experience. This concept was de-
rived from the experience of sanmai, e.g., samiidi, in
Zen BUDDHISM. Thus Keiji Nishitani bas said rightly:
"Nishida's philosophy owes its originality to the East
Asian spiritual tradition, that is, to Buddhism."
 KITARO NISHIDA
Nishida's attitude toward Husserl 's phenomenology
is expressed critically with respect to the essence of
consciousness. Nishida poses the question ofhow con-
sciousness is determined to be consciousness, i.e., the
question ofthe essence of consciousness. Nishida was
dissatisfied with Husserl's phenomenology on the fol-
lowing points: (!) its subjectivism, that is, the circum-
stance that consciousness is regarded only as an indi-
vidual existing entity and experience as always belong-
ing to an individual person; (2) the difference between
the subject and the object is presupposed as already
self-evident; and (3) comprehension, feeling, and will
are considered tobe only different levels of conscious-
ness.
In actuality, the question is put in such a way
that while phenomenology defines the essence of con-
sciousness as consciousness of something, that is, as
directedness toward something, it does not go on to
inquire into the essence of INTENTIONALITY. It seems
to Nishida that insofar as the essence or basis of con-
sciousness is not discussed, phenomenology is not ad-
equately established. That Nishida maintained this ob-
jection until his death is clear in his letters to his dis-
ciples, RISAKU MUTA! and GOICHI MIYAKE. Nishida posed
the question as to the essence of consciousness radi-
cally and found a way out of solipsism.
A Study of Good has four topics: ( 1) pure experi-
ence, (2) real being, (3) the good, and (4) religion. The
concept of "pure experience" also appears in William
James, but with Nishida this concept is independent
of the historical connection. This work is very near to
phenomenological research in the sense of its descrip-
tive way ofthinking.
The concept of pure experience is a concept of im-
mediate consciousness and thus a psychological con-
cept insofar as it is about a kind of consciousness.
Yet it is never a subjectivistic concept. Investigation
into true being begins with doubting everything that
one can doubt. This doubting approach corresponds to
the phenomenological method of EPOCHE. By means
of doubting as his method, Nishida gains "immedi-
ate consciousness, which one cannot doubt." This is
a fact of intuitive experience, namely, knowledge of
the phenomenon of consciousness. But the conscious
phenomenon is an essence prior to the difference be-
tween subject and object, thus before the realm ofthe
subject-object relation. "The appearance-phenomenon
491
of what is present and the becoming-consciousness
of what is present are simply the same." This recalls
Husserl 's theory of the difference and indifference of
thing-appearance and the appearing act.
The so-called externa! thing, i.e., the thing-
phenomenon, is not transcendent and independent
of our consciousness. The immediate primordial fact
is the consciousness-phenomenon, never the thing-
phenomenon. Our BODY is a part of our consciousness-
phenomenon. Consciousness is not in the body,
but vice versa, the body is in the consciousness-
phenomenon. The consciousness-phenomenon is ali
there is. The thing-phenomenon is only that as-
pect of the consciousness-phenomenon that is com-
mon to everyone and unchanged. The consciousness-
phenomenon does not consist of the soul separated
from the thing.
"Experience" means to know the fact, after be-
coming aware of it and putting prejudices aside.
"Pure" means the state of experience per se, without
adding thought or judgment. Thus experience is pre-
predicative experience. Pure experience is prior to the
relation of consciousness to its object. According to
Nishida it is something prior to directedness-toward-
something. It is the original experience per se on which
intentionality is grounded.
Nishida reftects on the nature of pure experience.
This reftection is similar to phenomenological reftec-
tion. Although pure experience is implicitly complex,
it is always a simple fact in the moment of percep-
tion. When past-consciousness gains a new mean-
ing in present-consciousness, the experience of the
past-consciousness is not the same as past conscious-
ness itself, even when it is only a repetition of past-
consciousness. That which is analyzed by present con-
sciousness is stiU not the same as present conscious-
ness. This problematics is the same as Husserl 's in his
late philosophy of time-constitution.
Nishida grounds the purity and immediacy of pure
experience on the fact of the unity of concrete con-
sciousness. "Consciousness actually forms a system,"
he says. This concept of the system of consciousness
is similar to Husserl 's concept of the horizon, which is
expressed as the wholeness of the phenomenological
consciousness, the world. Consciousness per se is for
Nishida a chaotic unity from which various manifold
states of consciousness differentiate themselves.
492 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Even in the case of externa! perception, attention
is not directed by the externa! thing, but by an un-
conscious unifying power of consciousness. Attention,
turned toward the externa! thing, is actually directed by
the unity of consciousness. By means of the concept
of the "unity of consciousness" (the unifying power of
consciousness), Nishida designates consciousness as a
system that develops itself out of itself. Thus think-
ing overcomes PSYCHOLOGISM. There is neither inward
nor outward experience. Consciousness is, as a unified
system, true being. For Nishida consciousness is an
ontologica! concept.
Pure experience shows itself as present-conscious-
ness. In the present it is the unity of consciousness,
which, as an attentive gaze, is itself the foca! point
of consciousness. MEANING (sense) or judgment results
from the present-consciousness's distancing itselffrom
the unity of itself. Thereby the present-consciousness
becomes a past-consciousness, i.e., a represented con-
sciousness. Thence a difference between subject and
abject comes to expression. Consciousness estranged
(alienated) from itself is united in the greater con-
sciousness by means of now-consciousness. Pure ex-
perience shows itself as present-consciousness. In the
present it is unifying. Therefore meaning (sense) or
judgment is based on the interruption of the unity of
consciousness. Yet the interruption is produced by the
opposition between present-consciousness and past-
consciousness. It is phenomenologically understand-
able that Nishida regards consciousness as a system,
but not that he explains two modes of consciousness,
present and past regarding consciousness, through
consciousness-unity and its interruption.
Thinking is first of ali an act that brings a relation-
ship to unification. In judgment, the fact of original
pure experience is analyzed and developed into sub-
ject and predicate. Judgment is in the deepest sense
the self-division of primordial ( originary) being. Be-
hind every judgment !ies the experience of that which
it unifies. According to Nishida, in the background of
purely logica! judgment there is intuitive pure expe-
rience. "The horse is galloping" is based on the pure
experience in which the galloping horse appears as
such. "Only when we have surrendered ourselves to
the object ofthought and have lost our self in it, do we
see thinking accomplished."
That thinking develops itself out ofitself is a central
thesis. Therefore Nishida's basic view ofTRuTH is that
"truth will emerge by means of our always losing our
subjective self and becoming something objective."
His description ofthe self-differentiation oftrue being
is carried out phenomenologically: the whole (as hori-
zon) appears at first implicitly. Its content differentiates
itself and presents itself. When this self-differentiation
oftrue being is accomplished, the whole oftrue being
is actualized and perfected. In short, the One develops
itself out of itself.
The distinctiveness ofNishida's thought consists of
the following points: ( 1) The basic experience, namely
pure experience, is grasped metaphysically as true be-
ing. (2) The development of true being is regarded as
a dialectica! movement. (3) The ground (basis) of the
world and my ground are the same, i.e., the self. Phe-
nomenologists may assert, in objection to Nishida's
thought, that he was metaphysically oriented from the
beginning. Many objections may be raised against the
presupposed dialectica! method and his assertion about
the self in us and in the world.
But if one chooses to evaluate Nishida's way of
posing the question positively, one must remember
that Husserl viewed the intentionality of conscious-
ness as unarguable. In intentiona! analyses the basic
idea, "consciousness of something," is presupposed as
self-understood. Nishida found Husserl's subjectivism
inadequate. But if we could interpret the question of
the essence of consciousness as the essence of inten-
tionality, we could conclude that the question as to the
essence of consciousness is concerned with the scope
ofthe relation between subject and abject. This scope
is precisely that upon which the intentionality of con-
sciousness is based. With Nishida the question as to
the essence of consciousness - as a question about
the scope of the relation- is: what is placed between
the subject and the abject? He inquires into and seeks
the bases of the relation of the two as such, which is
precisely as a relation that is neither subject nor object.
The relation as such is grasped as pure experience,
which is the immediate consciousness of the unity of
subject and object.
When HEINRICH ROMBACH distinguishes the basic in-
tention of Heidegger's phenomenology from that of
Husserl, Nishida's question as to the essence of inten-
tionality may be seen to have something in common
with Heidegger's criticism of Husserl, for intention-
 KITARO NISHIDA
ality itself is a founded mode of being-in-tbe-world.
Wbat Nisbida and Heidegger bave in common is tbe
question of tbe mode of being of directedness to tbe
object, tbus oftbe relation between subject and object.
Tbe question of tbe mode of being of intentionality
was carried out, in Nisbida, as tbe self-differentiation
of pure experience, and in Heidegger as FUNDAMENTAL
ONTOLOGY. Rombacb's interpretation oftbe fundamen-
tal concept of Husserl 's pbenomenology is quite close
to Nisbida's pure experience wben be writes: "Tbey
(subject and object) always bave to appear togetber,
for tbe subject is notbing otber tban tbe structured lo-
cus of tbe capacity-for-presence of a particular kind of
object and tbe object is notbing otber tban a manner of
possible being-grasped by a subject."
From tbe perspective ofbis late pbilosopby,A Study
of Good is merely tbe beginning of Nisbida 's pbilos-
opby. Tbereafter, based on tbe tbeory of pure experi-
ence, be confronted tbe nea-Kantian pbilosopbers and
carne to tbe point wbere pbilosopbical reflection could
be carried out no further. Tbis spbere of irreflectiv-
ity involved tbe same problematics tbat Husserl found
in bis very last years in connection witb tbe "living
present." In Husserl too pbenomenological reflection is
founded onan unreflective dimension. Nisbida tbougbt
tbat tbis unreflective dimension is tbe absolute will
(Jikaku niokeru chokkan ta hansei [Intuition and re-
flection in self-consciousness, 1917]). Tbis will must
be transformed by action-intuition seeing (Hataraku
mono kara mitru mana e [From tbat wbicb acts to tbat
wbicb sees, 1927]).
BODY and action-intuition are tbe tbemes in
Nishida 's late pbilosopby. We could find some pbeno-
menological elements in tbese tbemes, but tbe bigb-
est point of bis late pbilosopby !ies in tbe tbougbt of
"place" as absolute notbingness. In bis final stage of
pbilosophical tbinking be elucidates tbe "place" (topos)
and tbe "notbingness" oftbe world. In tbis connection,
be analyzes tbe structure of tbe judgment. Wbat does
not become tbe subject but becomes tbe predicate is
tbe foundation of tbe consciousness as tbe wherein of
consciousness, its essence. "Not to become tbe sub-
ject" means "not to be objectified." Consciousness is
tbe place wberein objectification occurs. Tberefore, if
consciousness as sucb becomes conscious, tben tbis
is tbe objectified consciousness. Consciousness as act-
ing is always bidden in tbe darkness of tbe "place" of
493
"notbingness." Consciousness is tbe "place" of"notb-
ingness" in wbicb being is.
But consciousness is not really tbe "place" of ab-
solute "notbingness." Tbere is a most comprebensive
notbingness, tbe ultimate wherein in wbicb conscious-
ness is tbe place oftbe notbingness tbat Nisbida names
"absolute notbingness." Tberefore, tbere is a tbreefold
stratification: (1) tbe "place" of being, (2) tbe "place"
of relative notbingness, and (3) tbe "place" of absolute
notbingness tbat is endless openness. Tbese places mir-
rar eacb otber. Tbis tbougbt about tbe tbreefold place
again recalls tbe concept ofborizon. Husserl too defines
tbe concept of borizon as tbe possibility of tbe scope
and finds it in tbree dimensions: ( 1) tbe outer borizon,
(2) tbe inner borizon, and (3) tbe universal borizon,
tbe borizon of borizons as tbe WORLD. Tbe borizon in
Husserl bas tbe cbaracter of endless openness, but it
bas notbing to do witb notbingness.
Tbere are also similarities between Nisbida and
Heidegger. For Heidegger tbe buman being is in tbe
world: being-in-tbe-world. Tbe buman being or DA-
SEIN is out of itself, in tbe openness of tbe world.
In tbis sense Nisbida's late pbilosopby is very simi-
lar to Heidegger's, even if be expressed critica! argu-
ments against Heidegger. For example, be objected tbat
in Heidegger's pbilosopby tbe place wberein we will
die will be found, but tbere is no place in wbicb we
will be bom. Nishida also asks wbere tbe project (En-
twurf) comes from and in wbicb place tbe resoluteness
(Entschlossenheit) occurs. He says tbat it is out of tbe
self-consciousness ofnotbingness tbat we can explain
tbese.
Nisbida does not besitate to say: it is in my self
tbat I know my self. Tbere is a definitive difference
between "I know tbis tree" and "I know my self." "I
know my self' is not adequately expressed, because
it can be said about tbe objectified knowledge of my
self. Tberefore Nisbida adds "in my self': "1 know
my self in my self." Wbere tbis knowing act bappens,
namely in my self, is very important. Tbe self is out of
my self, existence. Tbis wherein is tberefore necessary,
because I must distinguisb object-knowledge from self-
knowledge. Tbis expression "in my self' means tbe
realm between tbe subject and tbe object, wberein I am.
Tbe place of my self is illuminated by tbe openness of
tbe place in wbicb my self is. Tbis place in wbicb my
knowledge ofmy selfwill bappen is tbe world and tbis
494 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
world is vertical, structured into absolute nothingness.
This nothingness is the endless openness ofthe world.
This world, the place of the absolute nothingness, is
structured in vertical and horizontal ways such that
the place of our selves, the world, has the manifold
structured dimensions in depth and width of endless
openness.
Nishida's method is ultimately not phenomenologi-
cal but dialectica!. Therefore, what Goichi Miyake,
Nishida's eminent disciple, said as a phenomenologist
against Nishida's absolute reflection is very impor-
tant. It is precisely by virtue of absolute reflection
that Nishida could insist that pure experience is the
essence of consciousness. His inquiry into the realm
ofthe subject-object or the absolute place ofnothing-
ness is the result ofhis absolute reflection. But he had
to base it on the phenomenological theory of reflec-
tion. Reflection on our experience confirms that there
is no reflection that- illuminating itself as a source of
light- at the same time performs the act of reflection.
In other words, with reflection there is always some-
thing dark left over that is not illuminated by reflection.
Therefore, no philosophical reflection, insofar as it is
based on experience-reflection, can escape naivete. Ac-
cording to Miyake, Nishida's absolute reflection is to
be condemned as impossible. Miyake's objection leads
to the final situation ofhuman being-in-the-world.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dilworth, David. "The Concrete World of Action in Nishida's
Later Thought." Analecta Husserliana. 8. Dordrecht: D.
Reidel, 1978, 249-70.
Kosaka, Masaaki. Nishida Kitaro and Watsuji Teturo. Tokyo:
Shicho-sha, 1964.
- . Nishida Kitaro sensei no shogai to shiso (My teacher
Nishida Kitaro- his life and thought). Tokyo: Sobum-
sha, 1966.
Miyake, Goichi. Heidegger no tetsugaku (Phenomenology
of Heidegger). Tokyo: Kobundo, 1950.
Nishida, Kitaro. Nishida Kitaro Zenshu (Complete works
with lettcrs from Nishida and diary). 19 vols. 4th ed.
Tokyo, 1987-89.
Voi. 1. Zen no kenkyu (A study of good).
Voi. 2. Jikaku niokeru chokkan to hansei (Intuition and re-
flection in self-consciousness).
Voi. 3. Ishiki no rnondai (The problem of consciousness)
Voi. 4. Hatarakurnono kara rnirurnono e (From that which
acts to that which sees ).
Voi. 5. lppansya no jikakuteki taikei (Self-conscious system
of the universal).
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Voi. 6. Mu no jikakuteki Gentei (Self-conscious definition of
the nothingness).
-. Die Intellegible Welt. Drei philosophisch Abhandlungen.
Trans. Robert Schinsinger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1943 [Ger-
man translation of Eichiteki sekai (from voi. 5 ofthe com-
lete works), Goethe no haikei (from voi. 12 of the com-
plete works, Zettai rnujun no jiko-doitsu (from voi. 9 of
the complete works).]
Nishitani, Keiji. Nishitani Keiji Chosaku shu (Collected
works of Nishitani Keiji). Voi. 9. Nishida-Tetsugaku
to Tanabe- Tetsugaku (Nishida-philosophy and Tanabe-
philosophy). Tokyo: Sobum-sha, 1989.
Rombach, Heinrich. Gegenwart der Philosophie. Freiburg:
Karl Alber, 1962.
Shimomura, Torataro, ed. Nishida Kitari5 - Dojidai no
kiroku (Nishida Kitaro - documents of the contempo-
rary). Tokyo: Iwanami, 1971.
Ueda, Shizuteru. Nishida Kitaro wo yornu (A lecture to
Nishida Kitaro). Tokyo: lwanami, 1991.
TADASHI 0GAWA
Kyoto University
NOEMA EDMUND HUSSERL introduced the
technical term noema in Ideen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913) to denote the intentiona! abject of con-
scious experience. In that work Husserl describes the
INTENTIONALITY of experience as a noesis-noema corre-
lation. These terms refer to the two moments (insepara-
ble parts) of the intentiona! experience. "N oesis" refers
to a really inherent content of the "subject's" experi-
ence, viz., the meaning-intention that is directed toward
an abject in a determinate manner and with certain po-
sitional or thetic characteristics. "Noema" refers to the
intentiona! content of the experience, its "objective"
correlate, i.e., the intentiona! abject or the object as in-
tended. These terms were meant to be used in the course
of phenomenological descriptions. However, Husserl
also gives us an account ofwhat they themselves mean
and how they are to be used in phenomenological de-
scriptions. Unfortunately, his account, at least in ldeen
1, is somewhat tentative and appears ambiguous.
Husserl uses (1) the language of objects, suggest-
ing the noema is the intended abject itself but simply
as intended (e.g., the perceived as such, as perceived);
(2) the language of contents (irreal, ideal, or inten-
tiona! contents); and (3) the language of sense (i.e.,
language that connects the notion of noema to that of
sense as a determinate mode ofpresentation). Because
he used a new term and used it in an apparently am-
 NOE MA
biguous way, exactly what he meant by the term and
what he meant to denote with its use has become a sub-
ject of much controversy, especially among American
philosophers concemed with the interrelation between
so-called Continental and so-called ANALYTIC PHILOSO-
PHY's theories oflanguage.
Husserl understood himself to be advancing a new
theory of intentionality that avoided central difficul-
ties in the theories of intentionality known to him,
especially FRANZ BRENTANo's. Husserl first explicitly
developed his theories of meaning and of intentional-
ity in the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). This
work, even while disagreeing with Brentano, extends
the latter's notion of what is best called "descriptive
psychology." Husserl distinguishes the really inherent
contents of an individual experience from its inten-
tiona! contents. The really inherent contents (e.g., the
temporally successive phases of an experience and the
sensation-contents) are the concrete parts that make up
the real bcing of an experience as a psychic occurrence;
they are peculiar to an individual experience and con-
stitute it as an intentiona! experience. The intentiona!
contents belong to the experience by virtue of its being
directed toward a particular objectivity; they present
that objectivity in a determinate manner and can be
common to many individual experiences. They are not
really contained in the act; they are "ideal" or "irreal''
contents.
More particularly, Husserl in the Untersuchungen
distinguishes the object that is intended from the ob-
ject as it is intended in a particular experience, and
he incorporates the latter into his notion of intentiona!
contents. He then claims that the intentiona! content or
the MEANING ideally contained within an experience is
related to the experience itself as a species is related
to its instantiation. Insofar as the intentiona! content
is distinct from the real contents and insofar as the
intentiona! content explains how different acts can be
directed to the same object in the same determinate
manner and with the same thetic character, the inten-
tiona! content must be separate from the real content
of the act. However, insofar as the intentiona! content
directs this particular act to its object, it must be really
present in the act. This doubled character of intentiona!
content is possible on the view that the intentiona! con-
tent or the meaning ofthe act is a species (an essence)
instantiated in particular acts.
495
Husserl soon carne to recognize that phenomen-
ology could not properly be conceived merely as a
descriptive psychology, for as such it was unable ade-
quately to address problems surrounding the nature of
cognition. Consequently, he moved beyond descriptive
psychology to an explicitly transcendental CONSTITU-
TIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. His understanding ofthe distinc-
tion between really inherent and intentiona! contents is
transformed in his transcendental phenomenology, and
comes to be expressed in the language of noesis and
noema. The decisive moment in this transformation is
Husserl's development ofthe theory ofthe phenomen-
ological or transcendental EPOCHE and transcendental
attitude. The epoche or reduction is a methodological
technique by which the philosopher suspends partic-
ipation in the general thesis of the natural attitude,
the thesis or positing whereby the objects of our ex-
perience - including the experiences themselves as
refiected upon in the science of psychology- are real,
worldly existents. The result ofthe performance ofthis
suspension is that our attention is drawn away from
objects simpliciter, as straightforwardly experienced,
to the objects of experience simply insofar as they are
objects experienced in a certain manner and with cer-
tain determinations. The performance ofthe reduction,
in other words, invites the philosopher to concentrate
attention on the intentiona! correlation between expe-
rience and its object precisely as experienced, i.e., the
noesis-noema correlation. It is in Ideen 1 that Husserl
first explicitly recast his theory of intentionality in the
light ofthe reduction, and in so doing he fashioned the
technical vocabulary ofnoesis and noema.
The terms are first introduced as a way of explicating
the distinction between the real and intentiona! con-
tents of experience. Husserl characterizes the noema
(using ontologica! terms such as "the perceived [ob-
ject] as perceived," "the remembered [object] as re-
membered," "the judged [state of affairs] as judged,"
or, more generally, "the intended [object] just as in-
tended." He analyzes the noema into three components,
but his language now begins to vacillate between onto-
logica! and logica! terms. He speaks ofthe "full noema"
within which he distinguishes the "characteristics" of
the noema, i.e., its thetic character as well as its manner
of givenness, from the "noematic core." The noematic
core is also characterized as the "noematic sense," and
is further analyzed into an object and its attributes or
496 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
"predicates." The object, which Husserl calls the "de-
terminable" or "pure X," is the identica! object intended
in the experience and the logica! subject ofthe "predi-
cates."
Writing this article, for example, I am perceptually
aware of the computer monitor. I see it as presenting
the words I write, as sand-colored, as having a set of
controls along its bottom, as resting on the shelf of a
computer table to the left ofthe laser printer and above
the dot-matrix printer and keyboard. I am aware of
its base, of the unseen si des and rear of the monitor,
and all the while I take for granted its existence as a
real, physical entity in the world. To understand this
perception in Husserl's terms, we might say that the
determinable X of the perceptual noema is the spatial
individual of a particular type; its noematic sense or
core are those elements (including the determinable
X) that present the object as such-and-such. Hence,
the noematic sense ofthis experience is the "computer
monitor as sand-colored, on the computer table, to the
left of the laser printer, and so on." In the full noe ma
is added to this noematic sense the object's manner of
givenness (perceived) and the thetic characteristic that
posits the perceived object as (presumptively) existent.
Moreover, if outside my study I recall the look of the
monitor and describe it to someone, both the noematic
sense of the memorial experience on the hasis of which
I offer my description and the noematic sense of the
describing experience- which is at the same time the
expressive sense of the description- are the same as
the noematic sense of the perception. Furthermore, I
continue to posit the real existence ofthe monitor, al-
though the manner of its givenness has changed from
perceptual to memorial and presented in words. Were
the monitor destroyed in a fire, I could still remember
it, and this experience would have the same noematic
sense as the previous perception, memory, and descrip-
tion; the monitor's manner of givenness would remain
memorial, but I would no longcr posit its real exis-
tence. I would instead posit it- and thereby, vary for
the first time the thetic characteristic ofthe full noema
-as once, but no longer, existing.
In these descriptions there already appears an in-
dication of the ambiguities surrounding the ways in
which Husserl speaks ofthe noema. He sometimes de-
scribes it as the intended object just as intended, which
certainly leaves open the inference that the noema is
ontologically identica! with the intended objectivity
itself. But insofar as the object that is intended is dis-
tinguished from the object as intended, he also leaves
open the inference that the noema is an intentiona! ob-
ject ontologically distinct from the intended objectivity
itself. At other times, Husserl speaks ofthe intentiona!
contents of an act, and since he has given the notion
of"intentional contents" at least three different mean-
ings in the Logische Untersuchungen, there is room
for controversy about how to understand the doctrine
of intentiona! contents in Ideen 1. At still other times,
he identifies the noema (or at least a part of it) with the
notion of (expressive) sense. And, finally, since it is
possible that an experience can be directed to an object
that does not actually exist or to that object in a manner
other than it actually exists, the formulations in terrns
of"content" and "sense" again leave open the inference
that the noema as intentiona! object is an intensional
entity (i.e., the meaning of a linguistic expression) that
is ontologically distinct from the intended objectiv-
ity, but bears a referential (i.e., semantic) relation to it.
The notion ofthe noema cannot properly be understood
unless some account is given of the relation between
the notions of"intentional content," "sense," "intended
object as intended," and "intended object itself."
Since interpreters of Husserl must clarify what he
means by the term "noema," and given the ambiguities
in Husserl 's own usage, it is no surprise that contro-
versy has ensued. His interpreters, adhering at least at
the outset to the principle of charity, must reconcile
these different formulations and these different per-
spectives when giving a comprehensive interpretation
ofhis theory ofthe noema. And any such account must
explicate the relation between the noema and the in-
tended objectivity itself, for even ifthe intentiona! ob-
ject is ontologically identica! to the intended objectiv-
ity, there remains some manner of difference between
the intended objectivity itself and that objectivity con-
sidered just in the manner in which it is intended.
AROJ\ GURWITSCH was among the first of Husserl's
followers to focus attention specifically upon the
noema as a theme. His criticism of Husserl 's theory
of hyletic contents in perception led him to develop a
detailed account of the perceptual noema. Gurwitsch
views the perceived object, i.e., the object that is in-
tended, as a whole of parts, i.e., the infinite, system-
atically organized totality of the object's (noematic)
 NOE MA
appearances (the object as intended). The object is the
ideally realizable, but not actually realized or realiz-
able, totality of noemata presenting it. There are clear
difficulties in Gurwitsch 's account. Sin ce the noema for
both Husserl and Gurwitsch is, at least in part, a sense,
and since for Gurwitsch the perceived object is a total-
ity of noemata, his view transforms the intended object
into a whole composed of a multiplicity of senses. Even
if Gurwitsch could avoid this charge by distinguishing
the full noema from its core, i.e., the noematic sense
itself, his interpretation, understanding the noema as
the appearance of the object, yields a phenomenalism
wherein the perceived object itself is a whole whose
parts are perceptual appearances. Gurwitsch's account
fails properly to distinguish the whole (or concrete)
presentation of the object with its multiple noemata
from the identica! perceived object itself.
JOHANNES DAUBERT, a leader in the development
of REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY at Munich, was another
early interpreter of Husserl who investigated the doc-
trine of the noema. Unlike Gurwitsch, however, who
sought to develop the notion of the noema as an as-
pect of the experienced object, Daubert criticizes the
Husserlian notion of the noema. He interprets the re-
duction and the disclosure ofthe noema as a separation
of consciousness and sense from the object, as a retreat
from the autonomous reality of the experienced world
in favor of a dependent world of consciousness and
its ideal world of senses, and as a reduction of the real
world to an ideal world. Daubert understands Husserl 's
claim that acts intending nonexistent objects have a
noematic correlate tobe a falsification ofthe very cog-
nition on which Husserl claims to reflect. According
to Daubert, normal cognition is always engaged with
real objects and is nothing apart from them. This direct
engagement with objects is an immediate awareness
(Innesein) to which intentiona! consciousness with its
noema is secondary. In immediate awareness itself,
and here Daubert departs from Husserl and Gurwitsch,
there is no noema. Intentiona! consciousness arises
when an interpretive moment, a taking-the-object-as,
supplements our immediate awareness. But, and here
Daubert agrees with Gurwitsch, the noema-sense is de-
pendent upon the object of immediate awareness and
can never be separated from an object; it is impossible
for Daubert that there exist a noema without an object
from which it is derived.
497
Another interpretation of the noema departs from
what most concemed Daubert, viz., Husserl's sepa-
ration of sense from the object. This interpretation
arose as an alternative to Gurwitsch 's and its spirit was
shaped by DAGFINN F0LLESDAL 's claim that Husserl 's
phenomenology was very much influenced by the
thought of GOTTLOB FREGE. This "Fregean" interpre-
tation of Husserl 's doctrine of the noema, developed
at [ength by DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH and RONALD MCIN-
TYRE, centers around two claims: ( 1) the noema is the
intentiona! content but not the intended object of the
act, and (2) the noema is an abstract, intensional entity
that is to be understood as a linguistically expressible
meaning and characterized basically as Frege charac-
terized meaning. This interpretation transforms Gur-
witsch's "object theory" of intentionality, wherein the
noema is the intended objectivity itself (as intended),
into a "mediator theory" of intentionality, wherein the
noema is the intentiona! (but not intended) object that
mediates semantically the experience's directedness to
the intended object itself.
The Fregean interpretation, unsurprisingly, did not
go unchallenged, and the challenges to it, especially
those of RICHARD HOLMES, LENORE LANGSDORF, and
ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, were directed at the central the-
sis of the Fregean interpretation that the intentiona!
object is an abstract, intensional entity ontologically
distinct from the intended object and semantically me-
diating the act's directedness to the intended object.
Holmes and Langsdorf stress the point that the iden-
tica!, determinable X, which Husserl calls the object,
is the most fundamental moment contained within the
noematic core; hen ce there is no mediating relation be-
tween the noema and the object. Sokolowski, on the
other hand, stresses the point that the manner in which
Husserl discloses the apophantic domain, i.e., the do-
main of sense, in, for example, Formale und transzen-
dentale Logik ( 1929), is prior to and different from
the phenomeno[ogica[ EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION; hence
the notions of noema and sense are not identica!. In-
sofar as ali these challenges insist on some sort of
identity between the noema and the intended objectiv-
ity itself, they are also defenses of the Gurwitschian
interpretation. However, beyond asserting the identity
of noema and intended objectivity, these challenges to
the Fregean reading did not detail a new understand-
ing of the relation between the object as intended and
498 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the intended objectivity itself to replace Gurwitsch's
whole-part analysis, although much of Sokolowski's
other work suggests one.
Other authors, while disagreeing with important fea-
tures of the Fregean reading, have tried to mediate
the dispute in various ways. J. N. MOHANTY for ex-
ample, argues that the differences between the Gur-
witschean and Fregean readings are not as marked as
they first appear and that the two readings can ulti-
mately be reconciled. If we understand the perceptual
noema as a pre-conceptual but conceptualizable en-
tity, we render Gurwitsch's view reconcilable with the
Fregean interpretation, which understands the noema
as an abstract (conceptual) entity. This account, how-
ever, seems to ignore Gurwitsch's insistence that the
perceptual noema is the perceived object as perceived.
DONN WELTON and MARY JEANNE LARRABEE argue instead
that the two interpretations are each correct within a
limited range of application- more specifically, that
Gurwitsch's reading is appropriate for perceptual noe-
mata while the Fregean account is appropriate for non-
perceptual, e.g., judgmental, noemata.
JOHN DRUMMOND, on the other hand, insists on the ir-
reconcilability ofthe two readings. He stresses the fact
that Husserl 's development of the theory of the reduc-
tion brings about a new understanding ofthe notion of
phenomenological contents, one that is not limited, as
in the Untersuchungen, to the real contents of experi-
ence to which are opposed intentiona! contents. Rather,
the phenomenological contents, to which phenomen-
ological reflection is directed, are now understood to
include both real and intentiona! contents. Thus the
intended objectivity itself as intended, is now under-
stood as a moment of the transcendental correlation
between experience and its experienced world. Drum-
mond also argues for a revised interpretation of the
relation between the noema and the intended object it-
self; his interpretation, while maintaining Gurwitsch 's
position that the noema is the intended objectivity itself
as intended, differs from Gurwitsch in arguing that the
'
relation between the noema (the intended abject as in-
tended) and the intended object simpliciter is analyzed
as an identity-in-manifold, rather than a whole-part,
relation.
This survey of the history·of a "metaphenomeno-
logical" controversy cannot, of course, do full justice
to the range of detail and the subtlety of argument in-
volved in the positions mentioned. The controversy,
however, is important, since a proper understanding
ofthe noema and its relation to the phenomenological
reduction and phenomenological reflection points in
three directions. First, in the Cartesianische Medita-
tionen [1931] Husserl speaks ofthe object and, hence,
transcendentally considered, of the noema, as a "tran-
scendental clue" to the structures of intentiona! con-
sciousness. The care fu! analyses of the noematic cor-
relate of an experience, therefore, by presenting to us
the structures and levels involved in the object's sig-
nificance for us, points toward correlative structures
and levels in the noesis intending that object in a de-
terminate manner, with a determinate significance, and
determinate thetic characteristics. We are thereby led
into the proper domain ofphenomenological reflection,
viz., intentionality, the noesis-noema correlation. Sec-
ond, by virtue ofthe fact that the noesis-noema struc-
ture is universal, i.e., that every intentiona! experience
has its noematic correlate, there are noematic analy-
ses for every type of experience: PERCEPTION, MEMORY,
EXPECTATION, IMAGINATION, VALUING, etc. The analyses
of the noemata of these various kinds of experiences
reveal not only the necessary structures of each kind
of experience, but also the interconnections among the
various kinds, for example, between perception and
memory, or memory and expectation, between percep-
tion and judgment, between imagining and idealizing,
between idealization and scientific theorizing. Noe-
matic analyses thereby lead as well to an understanding
ofthe unity ofhuman experience and ofits single cor-
relate, the WORLD. Third, a proper understanding ofthe
doctrine of the noema and of intentionality clarifies
Husserl 's relations to philosophers such as Descartes,
Hume, KANT, and others in MODERN PHILOSOPHY, against
the background of whose philosophies Husserl devel-
oped his own philosophy. Moreover, ifthe doctrines of
the reduction and of intentionality, including that ofthe
noema, involving as they do a correlational conception
of consciousness and an overcoming of the sharp dis-
tinction between intending subject and intended object,
signify that Husserl 's theory of cognition has broken
from modern philosophy's epistemological paradigms,
then an understanding of these notions also clarifies
Husserl 's position in the controversies between mod-
ern thought and POSTMODERNISM.
 NURSING
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dreyfus, Hubert L. "The Perceptual Noema: Gurwitsch's
Crucial Contribution." In Life-World and Consciousness:
Essays for Aran Gurwitsch. Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston,
IL: Northwestem University Press, 1972, 135-70.
Drumrnond, John J. Husserlian Intentionality and Non-
Foundational Realism: Noema and Object. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
~, and Lester Embree, eds. The Phenomenology of the
Noema. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
Follesdal, Dagfinn. "Husserl's Notion ofNoema." TheJour-
nal of Philosophy 66 ( 1969), 680-87.
~. "Noema and Meaning in Husserl." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement, 1990), 263-
71.
Gurwitsch, Aron. "Phănomenologie der Thematik und des
reinen Ich. Studien liber die Beziehungen von Gestalt-
theorie und Phănomenologie." Psychologische Forschung
12 ( 1929), 279-381; "Phenomenology of Thematics
and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between
Gestalt Psychology and Phenomenology." In his Studies
in Phenomenology and Psychology. Trans., Fred Kersten.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1966, 175-
286.
~. The Field ofConsciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 1964.
~. "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Conscious-
ness in Historical Perspective." In his Phenomenology and
the Theory ofScience. Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston, IL:
Northwestem University Press, 1974, 210-40.
Holmes, Richard. "An Explication ofHusserl's Theory ofthe
Noema." Research in Phenomenology 5 (1975), 143-53.
Husserl, Edmund. Formale und transzendentale Logik. Ver-
such ei ner Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Ed. Paul Janssen.
Husserliana 17. The Hague:: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; For-
mal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Caims. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
Langsdorf, Lenore. "The Noema as Intentiona! Entity: A Cri-
tique ofFollesdal." The Review ofMetaphysics 37 (1984),
757-84.
Larrabee, Mary Jeanne. "The Noema in Husserl's Pheno-
menology." Husserl Studies 3 (1986), 209-30.
McKenna, William R. Husserl s "Introductions to Pheno-
menology." The Hague: Mantinus Nijhoff, 1980.
Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1982.
~. "lntentionality and Noema." In his The Possibility of
Transcendental Philosophy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1985, 13-24.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Husserl's Concept of the Noema: A
Daubertian Critique." Topai 8 ( 1989), 53-61.
Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald Mclntyre. "Intention-
ality via Intensions." Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971),
541-61.
~. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning,
and Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982.
Sokolowski, Robert. "Intentiona! Analysis and the Noema."
Dialectica 38 (1984), 113-29.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 K luwer Academic Publishers.
499
Welton, Donn. The Origins of Meaning: A Critica! Study of
the Thresholds ofHusserlian Phenomenology. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.
JOHN J. DRUMMOND
Mount Saint Mary s College
NURSING Interest in phenomenology among
nursing scholars developed rapidly during the late
1980s and early 1990s. Illustrating this, the Cumu-
lative Index to Nursing Literature lists 143 items con-
cerning phenomenology and nursing that appeared be-
tween 1991 and 1993. The degree to which phenomen-
ology is involved in these articles and the quality of
phenomenological research varies greatly. Most ofthe
articles listed are attempts to describe the experiences
of clients that are of significance to nurses. The sec-
ond most frequent theme concerns the experiences of
nurses in giving certain kinds of care. Some articles are
about theoretical issues in the study of nursing. Most
of these studies describe certain aspects of nursing in
which phenomenology is used as the method or as a
method in a qualitative or HUMAN sciENCE study. Few,
however, address the fundamental phenomenological
issue ofwhat constitutes nursing.
Although most phenomenological studies of nurs-
ing do not directly describe the essence of nursing,
these studies usually grow out of an interest in artic-
ulating the meaning of nursing from nursing practice
itself. This focus on nursing practice represents a rejec-
tion of the attempt to establish the place of nursing in
academia by defining nursing as a science or an applied
science that occurred when nursing moved into aca-
demic settings. Focusing on nursing practice itself led
some scholars, beginning with MADELEINE LEININGER,
who used ethnography to define nursing as caring. This
definition gained increasing acceptance in nursing dur-
ing the 1980s and early 1990s. Some nursing schools
included caring in their curricula and some, especially
Florida Atlantic University, based their entire program
on caring. The dissatisfaction with defining nursing as
a science or applied science was amplified by FEMI-
NISM. As nursing scholars attempted to articulate the
meaning of nursing from nursing practice, they fol-
lowed qualitative and human science approaches and
especially phenomenological methodology.
500 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Most nursing scholars who follow EDMUND
HUSSERL's dictum "back to the matters themselves,"
have articulated aspects of nursing practice. Some
nurses merely saw in phenomenology a way of artic-
ulating nursing as practiced. Others were attracted, as
well to phenomenology itself, as is evident in descrip-
tive and eidetic studies of FRAN REEDER and MARILYN
D. RAY. At present, only PATRICIA BENNER, SALLY GADOW,
NANCY DIEKELMANN, ANNE BISHOP, JOHN SCUDDER, JEAN
WATSON, JOSEPHINE PATERSON, and LORETTA ZDERAD have
attempted to articulate the meaning of nursing itself.
Benner has described the essence of nursing in terms
of competencies and the movement from novice to ex-
pert in nursing. Watson has developed a philosophical
science ofnursing as a moral ideal based on phenomen-
ology and transpersonal pyschology. Gadow has inter-
preted the nurse as an existential advocate. Diekelmann
has described nursing education as dialogical, pheno-
menological interpretation ofnursing practice. Bishop
and Scudder have articulated nursing as a caring prac-
tice.
Benner is a nurse who became interested in pheno-
menology under the influence of HUBERT DREYFUS be-
cause she saw in phenomenology a way ofarticulating
the meaning of nursing as practiced. Benner's study
of competency and expertness in nursing has proba-
bly drawn more attention to phenomenology than any
other work. Initially, she received a grant that made it
possible to assemble a team, send out questionnaires,
and do extensive observation and interviewing. From
this study, she selected exemplars of nursing excel-
lence that disclosed the meaning of competent nursing
practice and through HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
explored the meaning of nursing itself. She describes
thirty-one competencies, grouped in seven domains.
Rather than defining these competencies categorically,
she discloses their meaning through exemplars that
were interpreted phenomenologically. She further de-
scribes the movement from novice to expert, drawing
on the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus.
Novices follow rules, those moving from novice to ex-
pert apply principles in situations, and experts respond
immediately to situations, drawing on experience and
understanding. Her work has much influenced nursing
practice and nursing education by describing compe-
tencies and excellence in nursing in a way that makes
sense to those engaged in practice.
Sally Gadow, a nurse who holds a Ph.D. in philos-
ophy, develops her conception of the nurse as an ex-
istential advocate from the perspective of EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGY. Rather than beginning with nursing
practice as Benner does, Gadow attempts to develop a
philosophy for contemporary nursing that is distinctly
different from traditional nursing. She claims that exis-
tential advocacy is, in fact, the essence ofnursing. She
describes existential advocacy as three ways of being
with patients. The first is the nurse helping clients to
exercise their right of self-determination through deci-
sions that fully express their values. Self-determination
is such a basic human right that Gadow believes that
it ought to be respected even if it goes counter to fos-
tering good health. The second is that nurses should
relate to patients with their whole selves, rather than
merely as professionals. The third is that nurses should
assist patients in unifying their experience of the or-
ganic with that ofthe lived BODY, thereby not reducing
the patient to the moral status of an object.
Anne Bishop and John Scudder, a nurse-philosopher
team, have attempted to articulate the meaning ofnurs-
ing by bringing together phenomenological philosophy
and nursing practice. They have drawn on Benner's
study, on their own studies, and on phenomenological
interpretations ofthe meaning ofhuman being that are
especially relevant for nursing practice. They contend
that Benner has articulated well the essential aspect of
nursing in which the nurse has the legitimate authority
to act as a competent professional. In addition, they
have articulated the in-between stance of nursing in
which nurses act in-between the physician, patient, and
administrators to give everyday care to patients. They
contend that the in-between position is a privileged,
though difficult, one from which to make moral deci-
sions that involves bringing together MEDICINE, agency
resources, and patients' desires. They conducted a
phenomenological study of fulfillment in nursing that
indicated that practicing nurses overwhelmingly find
fulfillment through moral acts and personal relation-
ships. This finding challenges the implication in much
of nursing litera ture that nursing primarily consists of
following the dictates of the nursing profession or ef-
fectively using TECHNOLOGY.
Nursing, rather then being essentially a professional
or technological enterprise, is, according to Bishop
and Scudder, a practice in the sense of HANS-GEORG
 NURSING
GAD AMER 's interpretation of practice. Nursing is a prac-
tice in that it seeks to foster the good through his-
torically developed ways of caring for patients. Thus
nursing is the practice of caring. Their interpretation of
caring is informed by Nell Noddings and Carol Gilli-
gan, but they point out that an interpretation of care
suitable to nursing must extend beyond personal care
in a network ofrelationships to include the historically
developed ways of caring that are central to the practice
ofnursing. When nursing is interpreted as the practice
of care, then nursing ETHICS is primarily concemed with
fostering good care and only occasionally with making
judgments about exceptional cases such as when to ter-
minate the technological means that may be the only
thing keeping a patient organically (though not exis-
tentially) "alive." Bishop and Scudder have expanded
their interpretation of nursing by developing an ethic
of practice that begins with the moral sense of practice
and focuses on the fulfillment ofthat sense.
Much confusion in nursing comes from the fail-
ure to distinguish between nursing as a practice and
the study of nursing - the term "nursing" refers to
both the practice and the discipline. The discipline of
nursing should articulate the practice ofnursing rather
than reducing nursing practice to an applied science.
The study of nursing is a practica! human science, as
interpreted by STEPHAN STRASSER, in that it not only
articulates the practice but seeks to improve it.
Phenomenological methodology is well-suited to
articulating nursing practice, but some nursing schol-
ars have questioned its capacity for fostering needed
reform in nursing. Some critics ofthe work ofBishop
and Scudder have challenged their belief that signifi-
cant reform of nursing can come from discovering and
realizing the possibilities in nursing practice. These
critics contend that such reform will not foster the type
of autonomy needed by nurses individually and profes-
sionally because their place in the health care system
has been limited to that of a helping role by those
who dominate health care. For example, JEAN WATSON,
a leader in nursing theory and an advocate of pheno-
menological study ofnursing, has questioned its ability
to foster needed reform. DAVID ALLEN and JANICE THOMP-
SON, along with many other feminists, have drawn on
CRITICAL THEORY to support reform ofhealth care.
Although phenomenology has been criticized as in-
adequate to foster reform, it has, in part, spawned one
501
of the major reform movements in nursing education.
This movement, called the "new curriculum," is based
on the belief that nursing is basically care and that the
goal of education is to foster understanding of nurs-
ing by interpretation of its meaning in clinica! situ-
ations. NANCY DIEKELMANN, a leading advocate of the
new curriculum, contends that curriculum develops out
of dialogue between students, practitioner, and faculty
interpreting the meaning ofnursing care. She rejects at-
tempts to teach nursing theoretically, claiming instead
that practice is theory-generating when interpreted di-
alogically. The new curriculum has been strongly sup-
ported by the National League for Nursing, the ac-
crediting agency for programs in nursing education.
Perhaps the involvement of phenomenology in the re-
form ofthe curriculum can show how phenomenology
can contribute to reform.
At present, however, one major problem facing the
phenomenological interpretation of nursing still con-
cems the place of phenomenological interpretation of
nursing in the reform of health care. A second prob-
lem is the relationship of the studies of the meaning
of nursing itself, such as those of Benner, Gadow, and
Scudder and Bishop, to the many phenomenological
studies ofthe various aspects ofnursing currently tak-
ing place. The third is whether phenomenology will
play a major ro le in articulating the meaning of nurs-
ing or will it be regarded merely as a methodological
option in the qualitative interpretati an of nursing. The
fourth concems the role phenomenology will play in
developing a philosophy of nursing.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Allen, David. "The social policy statement: A reappraisal."
Advances in Nursing Science 10 (1987), 39-48.
Benner, Patricia. From Novice to Expert: Excellence and
Power in Clinica! Nursing Practice. Menlo Park, CA:
Addison-Wesley, 1984.
- , and Judith Wrubel. The Primacy al Caring: Stress and
Coping in Health and lllness. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-
Wes1ey, 1989.
Bishop, Anne H., and John R. Scudder Jr. The Practica!,
Moral, and Personal Sense ofNursing: A Phenomenologi-
cal Philosophy of Practice. Albany, NY: State University
of New York, 1990.
- . Nursing: The Practice of Caring. New York: National
League for Nursing, 1991.
- . Nursing Ethics: Therapeutic Caring Presence. Boston:
Jones & Bartlett, 1995.
Diekelmann, Nancy. "Curriculum revolution: A theoretical
502 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and philosophical mandate for change." In Curriculum
Revolution: Mandate for Change. Ed. National League of
Nursing. New York: National League for Nursing, 1988,
137-57.
Gadow, Sally. "Existential advocacy: Philosophical founda-
tion in nursing." In Nursing: Images and Ideals. Opening
Dialogue with the Humanities. Ed. Stuart Spicker and
Sally Gadow. New York: Springer, 1980, 79-1 O1.
Leininger, Madeleine. Caring: An Essential Human Need.
Thorofare, NJ: Charles B. Slack, 1981.
Paterson, Josephine and Loretta Zderad. Humanistic Nurs-
ing. New York: Wiley, 1976.
Ray, Marilyn. "Phenomenological method for nursing re-
search." In The Nursing Profession: Turning Points. Ed.
Norma Chaska. St. Louis, MO: C. V. Mosby, 1990.
Reeder, Fran. "The importance of knowing what to care
about: a phenomenological inquiry using laughing at one-
self as a clue." In Anthology on Caring. Ed. Peggy Chin.
New York: National League ofNursing, 1992.
Thompson, Janice. "Critica! scholarship: The critique of
domination in nursing." Advances in Nursing Science 10
( 1987), 27-38.
Watson, Jean. Nursing: The Philosophy and Science of Car-
ing. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979.
JOHN R. SCUDDER JR.
Lynchburg College
ANNE H. BISHOP
Lynchburg College

OBJECTIVISM See NATURALISM.
ONTOLOGY, FORMAL & MATERIAL See FORMAL
& MATERIAL ONTOLOGY.
ONTOLOGY, FUNDAMENTAL See FUNDAMENTAL
ONTOLOGY.
ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS "Lin-
guistic analysis" has been used to designate a number of
different philosophical schools. In its broadest sense it
has included LOGICAL PosmvisM; logica! behaviorism;
logica! atomism; formal analysis and ideal language
philosophy; and ordinary language philosophy. In its
narrower sense it frequently designates only the last
two of these, and it is with the latter that we shali be
primarily concemed.
At the turn of the 20th century, philosophers were
looking for new paradigms and new methods for phi-
losophy. The phenomenal success of the natural sci-
ences provided a seductive model. Scientific theories
were clearly stated, carefuliy argued, and appeared to
be progressing toward consensus. Some philosophers
looked on these characteristics as providing a standard
for philosophy as well. They urged an emphasis on
clarity, attention to logic and argument- ali issuing
in a focus on the structure and use of language. But
the particular ways in which philosophers attended to
language differed in teliing respects.
The logica! positivists, the logica! behaviorists, and
the philosophers involved in constructing artificiallan-
guages ali shared one basic assumption: that ordinary,
everyday language was either the source ofphilosophi-
cal problems or was at least incapable ofresolving such
problems. For the logica! positivists, it contained some
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. ?.aner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
meaningless statements that purported tobe metaphysi-
cal; for the logica! behaviorists, it contained misleading
mental terms that needed to be reduced to behavioral
equivalents; and for the artificiallanguage enthusiasts,
interested in constructing a logically perfect language
for philosophic use, the syntax and much of the se-
mantics of ordinary language were misleading. Logica!
atomists, on the other hand, saw in portions of it (e.g.,
atomic and molecular propositions) a reflection ofthe
structure of reality (atomic and molecular facts). For
the first group, ordinary language was unsystematic
and deceptive; for the second group, careful analysis
showed that some of it mirrored the structure of facts.
In contrast to both groups, ordinary language phi-
losophy was committed to the view that everyday lan-
guage is philosophicaliy useful and important as it
stands, but does not offer anything like an unambigu-
ous reflection of reality. Ordinary language philosophy
abandoned the quest for absolute logica! precision and
for certainty about the nature of reality. To see how
some of the details of the view were advanced, con-
sider two of its leading proponents- Wittgenstein and
Austin. (Some other philosophers whose work !ies at
least partialiy within ordinary language philosophy in-
clude Gilbert Ryle, Stuart Hampshire, P. F. Strawson,
and John Searle.)
LUDWIG W!TTGENSTEIN, an Austrian by birth, was ed-
ucated at Cambridge University in England by G. E.
Moore, Bertrand Russeli, and others involved in the
founding of ciassicaJ ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. In 1922
he published Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a work
squarely within the tradition of logica! atomism. But
by the early 1930s his views had begun to change dra-
maticaliy. In 1933, he dictated a set of class notes that
were circu1ated in a blue cover, and carne to be known
as The Blue Book. Two years !ater he dictated a second
set of notes; these circulated with a brown cover, and
were known as The Brown Book. Together, these pro-
vided the raw material for his enormously influential
book, Philosophical Investigations, which was pub-
lished posthumously. In these three works the "!ater"
Wittgenstein argued strenuously against his own ear-
lier logica! atomism and argued for the philosophical
importance oflooking carefully at language as it func-
tions in everyday life.
Early in The Blue Book Wittgenstein claims that phi-
losophy's efforts to mimic science, by explaining and
503
 504 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
generalizing, lead into "complete darkness." Philoso-
phy's primary business is to describe, not to explain
or to reduce anything to anything else. This in itself
marks a decisive departure from the spirit of the lin-
guistic philosophy practiced earlier in the century. It
is also a point of convergence with phenomenology.
Clarity will continue to bea standard for ordinary lan-
guage analysis, but complete precision, and progress
toward explaining reality, are now said to ha ve impor-
tant limits.
One motivation for this softening of the standards
borrowed from the sciences lay in Wittgenstein's atti-
tude toward concepts. For the tradition of Leibniz and
Kant, concepts were thought to have sharply defined
boundaries. Wittgenstein challenges this notion, writ-
ing in The Blue Book, "We are unable clearly to circum-
scribe the concepts we use; not because we don 't know
their real definition, but because there is no real 'def-
inition' to them." His view that concepts have fuzzy
edges, and that the meaning they have can vary from
one context to another, dominates virtually ali of his
!ater work.
In Philosophical Investigations he uses the concept
"game" to illustrate his point - there are bal! games,
board games, solitary games, games with scores and
games without scores, games with winners and losers
and games without winners and losers, etc. That is to
say, the concept "game" covers a number of different
cases that ha ve overlapping similarities but do not ha ve
any one essential and defining characteristic. They are
connected only by a set of"family resemblances." It is
important to notice that "game" is only one illustration
of his more general claim. The concept of LANGUAGE
itself, according to Wittgenstein, is best understood as
a series of overlapping games that can be played, for
which there are a series of conventional rules but no
one essential definition.
In The Brown Book Wittgenstein constructs a long
series of possible "language games," many of which
exclude elements that are part of our own ordinary lan-
guage but that he takes nonetheless to be reasonably
usable languages. Some ofthese he creates completely
out of commands, part ofhis effort to show that naming
is not the only, nor even the most important, function
of language. His point seems to be that the elements
actually involved in ordinary language are largely con-
tingent.
Furthermore, he argues that the psychological states
thought to accompany aur use of language are also
quite contingent. An interna! state of meaning or un-
derstanding or knowing is not obviously necessary, on
his view, in explaining the competent use oflanguage in
ali cases. In the case of learning and using a language,
for example, Wittgenstein considers what is involved
infollowing a rule. He argues that if, in order to ex-
plain how one follows a rule for language-use, one's
final appeal is to the mental states of individuals -
for example, their intentions- ali manner of diverse
interpretations ofthe rule can be made plausible. Ulti-
mately, one needs to rely on social practice to decide
how particular rules are meant tobe followed. And o ne
has then to look to behavior rather than to individual
mental states in order to decide when the rule is being
followed.
While he makes repeated attempts to move discus-
sions of understanding, interpretation, meaning, etc.,
away from notions ofinternal mental states and toward
behavior- relating them, for example, to being able to
go on, being able to compare one (externa!) thing with
another, etc. - i t is probably an oversimplification to
depict his view simply as behaviorism. He does not
deny the possibility of interna! mental states, but he is
at pains to show that we can explain what needs to be
explained about language-use without having recourse
to them.
Wittgenstein maintains that the same ftexibility that
attends our use of the concept "game" also prevails
for concepts like "understanding," "interpreting," "in-
tending," etc. There is not some one interna! abject
that these terms name, an abject that might be "pointed
to" introspectively. The terms are used in connection
with a wide variety of situations and behaviors, and
any insight into what the terms mean will require that
these variable factors be taken into account. Mental
concepts, like most ofthe others, have fuzzy, ftexible,
overlapping boundaries.
In addition, Wittgenstein suggests that some mental
states have a character analogous to what phenome-
nologists would cal! a "temporal horizon." States like
believing or loving or hop ing cannot, he says, last only
for an instant. They require a certain duration and nor-
mally get their meaning as part of a larger context.
That, he claims, is an additional reason why they do
not lend themselves to simple introspection. "Do not
 ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS
try to analyse your own inner experience ... what is
at issue is the fixing of concepts," he writes in his
Philosophical Investigations.
One ofthe reasons that Wittgenstein argues for flex-
ibility in our understanding of concepts is that he sees
the MEANING of words as something that we give to
them. Meanings do not descend from some source in-
dependent of us. And we give words their meanings
in the context ofvariable "language games" and broad
"forms of life" that develop and fade. Thus there is no
reason to assume that the meanings we give to words
will be fixed within rigid boundaries. Essential defini-
tions will be rare, occurring mostly in areas like logic
and mathematics. But even here one needs to take ac-
count ofWittgenstein's view ofthe a priori: "But ifit is
a priori, that means that it is a form of account which
is very convincing to us." Even the a priori loses every
trace of immutability.
Against logica! atomism he argues that one cannot
understand language by approaching it atomistically;
words must be taken in the context of a rich and vari-
able set of relations- relations to other words, to the
conventions ofthe particular language game, to the sit-
uations in which they are used, to the forms oflife from
which they emerge. On his view, ordinary language be-
comes philosophically problematic only when one tries
to abstract it from these normal relations.
J. L. Austin also argues for the philosophical im-
portance of ordinary language. Like Wittgenstein, he
opposes both logica! atomism and the philosophical
importance of constructing artificial languages. What
then is the philosophical task in relation to language? In
his Philosophical Papers (1961) he writes that words
are "our tools, and ... we should use clean tools ...
[and] realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and
... relook at the world without blinkers." Ordinary
language, on his view, will not simply tell one, unam-
biguously, about reality, but if one uses it with care
and attention, it is likely to provide some valuable dis-
tinctions and connections that have been found useful
through generations ofuse. Here there is a convergence
with HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY.
Austin agrees with Wittgenstein that the meaning
of terms is a function of the context of their use. In
this connection he emphasizes the importance of con-
sidering the meaning of statements or utterances and
not simply sentences or isolated words. He expands on
505
the notion of the use of an utterance to ca li attention to
what he termed the "illocutionary forces" oflanguage-
use. Among these he gives special consideration to
the "constative" and "performative" uses of language.
The former includes ali ofthe ways in which we assert
things. The latter, the performative use, includes ali the
things that we do simply by our use of words- like
promising, bequeathing, commanding, etc. - and as
he eventually shows, even stating and asserting ha ve a
performative aspect. Austin 's point is that to link the
meaning of language to its use requires that one take
full account of the many dimensions of its use. The
different contexts in which individual words can be
used is important in understanding their meanings -
he gives a fine example ofthis in his discussion ofthe
term "real." But taking account of the ways in which
whole utterances can be used, the total "speech act,"
is equally important if one is fully to understand the
meaning of a piece of language.
Austin's discussion of language is particularly in-
structive in eliminating a common misconception
about ordinary language philosophy. It has sometimes
been suggested that the latter concerns itself solely with
discussing pieces oflanguage, and ignores ali the more
significant problems of traditional philosophy. Austin 's
book Sense and Sensibilia (1962) makes it quite clear
that this is untrue. In it he uses a detailed analysis of
various terms of ordinary language- "real," "look,"
"illusion," etc.- to argue that phenomenalism, ofthe
sort offered by A. J. Ayer and others, is based on a
mistaken use of terms of ordinary language. His goal
is to dislodge a misguided theory of perception; his
tools include an analysis of ordinary language. Simi-
larly, he uses the view he shares with Wittgenstein-
namely, that not ali nouns must name something- to
argue against the existence of universals - including
the universal "meaning."
Again, like Wittgenstein, he acknowledges that or-
dinary language is sometimes not adequate to our
needs. Austin himself coined the term "performative"
because he found no other term that captured the spe-
cific aspect of speech that he wanted to highlight. In
deciding a particular case, however, one needs to pay
close attention to the facts of both experience and lin-
guistic conventions. In Philosophical Papers he writes:
"We are using a sharpened awareness of words to
sharpen our perception of, though not as the final ar-
506 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
biter of, the phenomena. For this reason 1 think it might
be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy ...
'linguistic phenomenology' ."
This well-known statement by Austin suggests that
ordinary language philosophy shares some common
ground with phenomenology. And indeed it does. Both
the ordinary language philosophers and the phenome-
nologists argue for the importance of context, of re-
lations; both groups oppose atomistic approaches to
philosophical issues. And for both groups (including
the !ater work of EDMUND HUSSERL and Wittgenstein)
this means looking at problems in the context of a lived
world, a cu! ture. Both schools are unwilling to take the
model of science or of logic as the only valid frame-
work for doing philosophy. Furthermore, both groups
place heavy emphasis on description. On the one hand,
this means an effort to avoid imposing theoretical pre-
suppositions on their investigations; on the other hand,
it also means somewhat less emphasis on argumentand
proof, and more emphasis on laying out the data clearly
for others to see for themselves. Philosophy is seen by
both Husserl and the ordinary language philosophers
as a method rather than as a body of doctrine.
Some phenomenologists, notably the early MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, shared with ordinary language philosophers
a valuing of the commonplace. Both find everyday
things (whether hammers or speech) tobe philosoph-
ically relevant and revelatory. Furthermore, Wittgen-
stein, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and the !ater Heidegger
ali argue for the inseparability ofthought and language
(a view apparently not shared by Husserl). Merleau-
Ponty also shares with ordinary language philosophy
an emphasis on the social dimension of language; one
begins, he says, to understand a foreign language by
"taking part in a communallife." He analogizes one's
use of language to one's "use" of one's own soov:
neither requires an interna! mental act to represent it.
Language is simply part of the "equipment" that one
can reach toward and use.
There are, however, important differences between
phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy.
These become more apparent when one considers the
philosophers individually. Where Husserl, for exam-
ple, looks for an absolutely certain starting point for his
philosophy, the ordinary language philosophers aban-
don such a quest. (But then, so too do some of the
!ater phenomenologists.) Where Husserl is concerned
to uncover essences, universals, and commonalities,
both Wittgenstein and Austin are committed to un-
covering particularities, differences, and distinctions.
Where Husserl takes concepts to have clean bound-
aries, Wittgenstein and Austin see them as far less tidy.
On Husserl's view, one task ofphenomenologyis to
uncover the defining characteristics of diverse mental
states by intuiting and then describing them. Wittgen-
stein, by contrast, argues that reflection on our mental
states is not what reveals their meaning. Rather, we
learn their meaning by seeing how the words we use to
describe them play roles in different language games
and involve differing types of contexts and behaviors.
For Husserl, the act ofmeaning-giving on the part ofthe
individual EGO is of central importance; for Wittgen-
stein and Austin, meaning is largely a function of so-
cial contexts and conventions. And for them, meanings
are not entities of any sort, while for Husserl they are
"ideal" (i.e., timeless) entities. When Husserl does talk
about language, and he rarely does that in the context
ofhis phenomenology, he is primarily concerned with
its logica! structure rather than with the web of dis-
tinctions embodied in its everyday uses. He speaks,
in fact, of the desirability of having an unambiguous
language in which to articulate precisely the insights
revealed by his phenomenological analyses- a view
profoundly at odds with ordinary language philosophy.
While Husserl is heavily committed to the importance
of the a priori, Wittgenstein counts it as no more than
psychologically compelling. And although Austin, like
Husserl, opposes skepticism, unlike Husserl he does
not opt for the cogito as a certain starting point ofphi-
losophy. Rather, he tries to undercut the very sort of
argument that allows skepticism to gain a foothold in
the first place- the argument from illusion.
In the case of Heidegger, too, there are significant
divergences from ordinary language philosophy. For
him, a careful investigation of language will help to
uncover the true meaning of Being, while for Wittgen-
stein it will help to uncover the mistaken notion that
language has some privileged relation to reality, a re-
lation that is revelatory of the nature of that reality.
While both Wittgenstein and Heidegger refer to the
importance of the relation between understanding po-
etry and understanding language, Wittgenstein is not
concerned, as Heidegger is, with the originality of the
use oflanguage in poetry, nor with its capacity to reveal
 JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET
Being. Rather, he focuses on the idea that the under-
standing ofpoetry carries with it a slightly different and
important sense of "understanding" than it does in the
context ofunderstanding, say, scientific prose. For Hei-
degger (and at least the early Husserl), one discovers
the meaning of terms. With Heidegger this frequently
involves tracing the etymology of the term. Wittgen-
stein and Austin, by contrast, take the meanings of
words to be human constructs. For them, etymology
is entirely legitimate, but it is not taken as revealing
the "true" meaning ofwords; it might simply highlight
some meanings that ha ve been forgotten or altered over
time. Finally, for Heidegger language is not so much
an object to be analyzed as it is one of our vehicles
for being-in-the-world. It is, as he says enigmatically,
the "house ofBeing." Ordinary language philosophers
would be likely to reply that such a phrase uses ordi-
nary words in a most extraordinary way.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Austin, J. L. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon, 1961.
~. Sense and Sensibilia. London: Oxford University Press,
1962.
~. How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1975.
Durfee, Harold, ed. Analytic Philosophy and Phenomen-
ology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
Dwyer, Philip. Sense and Subjectivity. A Study o{Wittgenstein
and Merleau-Ponty. Leiden: Brill, 1990.
Gier, Nicholas. Wittgenstein and Phenomenology. A Compar-
ative Study of the Later Wittgenstein. Husserl, Heidegger;
and Merleau-Ponty. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1981.
Heidegger, Martin. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen:
Neske, 1959; On the Way to Language. Trans. Peter Hertz.
New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
~. Poetry, Language, and Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter.
New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
Husserl, Edmund. E1fahrung und Urteil [1939]. Ed. Ludwig
Landgrebe. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1954; Experienceand
Judgment. Trans. James. S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1975.
Mays, Wolfe, and S. C. Brown, eds. Linguistic Analysis
and Phenomenology. Lewisburg, PA, n.d. [proceedings
of 1969 symposia ].
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Signes. Paris: Gallimard, 1960;
Signs. Trans. Richard C. McCleary. Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1964.
Reeder, Harry. Language and Experience: Descriptions
of Living Language in Husserl and Wittgenstein. Lan-
ham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1984.
Rorty, Richard, ed. The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
507
Philosophica/ Method. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 196 7.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. "'Linguistic Phenomenology': John
Austin and Alexander Pfander." In his The Context of
the Phenomenological Movement. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981, 83-92.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. New
York: Harper & Row, 1958.
~. Philosophical lnvestigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe.
New York: Macmillan, 1958.
SUZANNE CUNNINGHAM
Loyola University of Chicago
JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET Ortega (1883-
1955), was bom and died in Madrid. After completing
his studies at the University of Madrid in 1904, he did
postdoctoral work in Germany ( 1905-8, 1911 ), pri-
marily at Marburg and especially with Herman Cohen
( 1842-1918). In 1912, he became familiar with pheno-
menology as practiced by EDMUND HUSSERL in his Lo-
gische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ). After that, his
works were to contain numerous references to ques-
tions and authors of phenomenological import. His
broadly conceived and far-reaching pedagogica! effort
~implemented by means ofhis teaching at the Univer-
sity of Madrid (1911-36) and elsewhere, his writings
and lectures (leamed and semi-popular), his journal,
Revista de Occidente (first period: 1923-36), and the
publishing house by the same name that he founded
- permitted him to give shape to and foster a phe-
nomenologically oriented movement throughout SPAIN
ANO LATIN AMERICA.
Ortega's early and generous reception of pheno-
menology was not uncritical. By the time of his first
book, Meditaciones de! Quijote ( 1914), he had arrived
at the conviction that idealism, as the philosophical
doctrine and attitude proper to the modern era, had al-
ready exhausted its historical potentialities. Hence he
saw his philosophical task as essentially involving the
critique and overcoming of idealism, both classical and
phenomenological, and therefore of modemity.
Since the time of Descartes, conscious experience
had primordially meant self-consciousness or reflec-
tion. This axiom was rooted in the search for the
indubitable, which could be recognized by its non-
dependent sta tus. In the eyes of Descartes and his foi-
508 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
lowers, this required denying the world an absolute
character, for one gains access to the WORLD not directly
but by means of consciousness, which is thus taken as
the non-dependent sphere (;_,Que es filosofia? [What is
philosophy?, 1929]). This notion, which corresponds
precisely to Husserl's understanding of Cartesianism,
had to be corrected by the founder of phenomenology
as the expression of a faulty description. Consciousness
was indeed self-consciousness, but only through and in
conjunction with the primordial phenomenon ofbeing
"conscious of' something or other. Yet this duality is
not tantamount to the availability of two realities that
would subsist si de by side, even if one (consciousness)
refers to the other (world); it is instead, as Ortega put
it in his lnvestigaciones psicol6gicas ( 1915-16), the
event consisting in one referring to the other, which is
what Husserl called INTENTIONALITY.
Now, just as Husserl subjected Descartes's under-
standing of the nature of the absolute dimension of
experience to a critique that, descriptively speaking,
showed it tobe incomplete, so too did Ortega endeavor
to establish that Husserl 's thesis to the effect that the
fundamental fact is the dual unity of consciousness and
world was likewise essentially inadequate. As he put
it in La idea de principio en Leibniz ( 194 7), Husserl 's
phenomenological philosophy, or the idealistic inter-
pretation of it, is nota pure description but involves an
hypothesis, namely, that an act of consciousness is real,
but its object is only intentiona!, and thus irreal. Such
a position is not in keeping with the goal pursued by
philosophers, who are basically after some primordial,
exemplary, ultimately firm reality to which they may
refer ali others, i.e., something that can serve as their
foundation.
That notwithstanding, Husserl's effort was not seen
by Ortega as being either groundless or arbitrary. On
the contrary, he understood Husserl tobe trying to iden-
tify something that the philosopher would not posit,
but just the opposite- namely, that which would be
im-posed on him, something therefore that would be
self-posited, something "positive" or "given." This he
believed to have found in "pure consciousness," i.e.,
in the contemplative regard in which one is confined
to the self-aware presentation ofthings as they appear,
whatever their sort. But then the world would be re-
duced to sense, phenomenon, or pure intelligibility, as
the correlate and outcome ofthe freely executed act of
consciousness that Husserl in Jdeen zu einer reinen
Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913) called the phenomenological EPOCHE AND
REDUCTION. Equivalently, Husserl took consciousness
as being relative only to itself, and what appears thereto
(i.e., the world) as being relative to the acts of con-
sciousness ("Apuntes sobre el pensamiento," 1941 ).
But that is altogether impossible. Ortega's critique of
the notion of epoche or reduction hinges on the dis-
tinction between a primary and a reflective act of con-
sciousness and the adequate descriptive account ofthe
difference between them. According to him, a primary
or straightforward act of consciousness is naive or un-
reflective, and therefore it is a performance in which
people believe in what they think about and effectively
will what they will, etc. In other words, it is the un-
mediated access to the world, for to such an act nothing
is just an object; rather, everything is a rea1ity. Now,
if this is correct, one is already in possession of what
Husserl was looking for, i.e., the self-positing or ab-
solute dimension of experience, which cannot be the
outcome of an ad hoc intellectual process in which one
would be involved subsequently, as is the case with
one's arriving at the world qua phenomenon as the
result of carrying out the phenomenological reduction.
Naturally, Ortega did not mean thereby that one is
unable to perform an act of consciousness by means
of which one would deal with a preceding act in one
of severa! possible ways (e.g., analysis or description).
Quite the contrary: one can even go, in fact, so far as
to cancel it with respect to the truth claims it makes
by considering it, say, as an error or an illusion. But
one cannot un do, de-realize, or suspend the reality of a
prior act, if for no other reason than the reality of such
an act, as concluded, is no longer able to be altered.
In Ortega 's opinion, here in !ies the fundamental rea-
son why idealism must be overcome. The ultimate fail-
ure of description, which is part and parcel of that doc-
trine, even in its exacting phenomenological version,
amounts to this: that it approaches the given as if it were
a "primary and naive act of consciousness," which is
precisely what it is not. Rather, it is reality itself, the
living situation in which the real is rendered available
non-mediately. Accordingly, it is Ortega's position in
his "Prologo para alemanes" (1934) that ali idealists
presuppose the real by making their departure on its
basis and then, by placing themselves in another real-
 JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET
ity, proceed to characterize the primary act as a mere
act of consciousness. Moreover, the idealistic turn of
phenomenology is logically contradictory, for were it
practicable, then the result would be that reflection
would do away with the most essential feature of the
primary act, to wit: its character ofreality, thus showing
itself to be incompatible with the basic aim of pheno-
menology-namely, to effect the essential-descriptive
analysis of what is given, just as it is given, not to en-
gage in the explanation of it ("Sobre el concepto de
sensaci6n," 1913 ). Therefore, Husserl 's search for the
absolute would ha ve come to grief precisely with the
performance ofthe epoche, which, ifOrtega's analysis
is correct, would be both unnecessary and impossible.
In light of this, Ortega grasped the need to identify
something that would truly be given non-mediately by
means of an essential and adequate description of ex-
perience.
Recently an intriguing suggestion has been made
by Javier San Martin- namely, that Ortega 's critique
ofthe idealist interpretation ofphenomenology and his
elaboration of a systematic, descriptive account of hu-
man life qua radical reality are consistent with many of
the posthumouslypublished analyses that Husserl con-
ducted after Jdeen 1. Be that as it may, as submitted
to Husserl through EUGEN FINK, Ortega's "liminal ob-
jection" to phenomenological idealism may then be
summarized as follows: first, the suspension of the
most intrinsic dimension of an act of consciousness,
namely, its performative value, vollziehender Charak-
ter, or positing power, is tantamount to its nullification;
second, one is called upon to suspend the performa-
tive value of an act of consciousness by means of the
"phenomenological reduction," which, though reflec-
tive, is as much an act of consciousness as the primary
act and is thus in no special position to suspend it; and
third, the reduction, though an act of consciousness, is
nonetheless allowed to keep its vollziehender Charak-
ter and to posit primary consciousness as absolute be-
ing, which is accordingly understood as Erlebnis, or the
self-aware givenness of something other precisely as
it appears ("Ensayo de Estetica a manera de pr6logo,"
1914 ).
In short, reflective consciousness is assigned a priv-
ileged status in both classical and phenomenological
idealism, and such a status is none other than that of
a weltsetzend or world-positing power. But this is pre-
509
cisely the problem, for it is contradictory to assign
it such a status and yet make it amount to its self-
removal, for, on the one hand, it is presented as the
straightforward access to reality and, on the other, it is
taken tobe the objectivation ofthe latter and its reduc-
tion to the disclosure ofthe phenomenal. Accordingly,
Ortega contended that "consciousness" is "precisely
that which cannot be suspended or revoked," since it
is no act of pure contemplation, but rather consists in
our being placed without mediation at the real. How-
ever, if this is so, "consciousness" is "reality, not con-
sciousness." In consequence, he was called upon, on
the grounds of his refined descriptive analysis of the
phenomenon "consciousness of," to abandon idealism
and to substitute something else for consciousness as
the first datum concern ing the uni verse. Individual hu-
man life was to play this role for Ortega.
This formulation, however, does not do complete
justice to Ortega 's motivation in his effort to overcome
idealism. In his "Pr6logo," he argues that philosophy
had reached maturity with German idealism (FICHTE,
SCHELLING, and HEGEL), in which the movement of re-
flection achieved the fullness of its intellectual form.
According to Ortega, this meant that, for the first time,
philosophers had arrived at an understanding of their
discipline as the product of a systematic way ofthink-
ing that, inasmuch as it deals with its own problematic
possibility and is content with nothing but the plen-
itude of the real, cannot be mistaken for a science.
This notwithstanding, the excesses of Romantic ide-
alism, arising from the conflict between philosophy's
commitment to truth and its systematic manner ofpro-
ceeding, had to be brought under control. At the turn
of the century, the neo-Kantians, among others, were
faced with this task. Yet this school was found wanting
by Ortega and other members ofhis generation, such as
NICOLAI HARTMANN and Heinz Heimsoeth (1886-1975),
his fellow students at Marburg, for it did not thor-
oughly subject its theses to an unprejudiced confronta-
tion with the real, taking instead something derivative
("culture") as the originary. They had, however, the
"good fortune" of finding the "wondrous instrument"
called phenomenology, which permitted the required
confrontation (truthfulness), yet failed as the means
to systematic thought, for, by its very nature, pheno-
menology is incapable of arriving at a systematic form
or structure. Accordingly, ifphilosophy was to remain
 510 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
practicable at the level of its maturity, it had to be-
come an essential-descriptive analysis of a self-giving
reality that, as given, would prove itself to be system-
atically structured and come to be adequately grasped
as such. It was precisely Ortega's contention that only
individual human life measured up to such a require-
ment, and it was his lifelong philosophical endeavor to
demonstrate it.
Ortega's first mature expression of the idea of life
is his formula "1 am 1 and my circum-stance," which
is found in Meditaciones de! Quijote. This amounts to
a descriptive radicalization ofHusserl's concept "con-
sciousness of," and so it was taken tobe by Ortega, who
brought it now to signify, first of ali, the coexistence of
myself and my world. But this meant that the unity of
reciprocity of which life basically consists cannot be
seen any longer as synonymous with the notion of ego
cogito cogitatum qua cogitatum, as Husserl was !ater
to enunciate it in Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931],
for human life so understood is not ideality, i.e., inten-
tionality, but reality itself. Life is an irreducible event
amounting to my ongoing struggle with my circum-
stance. lf one wishes to go on employing terms like
Erleben and Erlebnis to present life at the level ofpri-
mordiality, then one should strip them oftheir intellec-
tualistic and idealist connotations and lea ve them only
with their basic signification - namely, that which
points to life as the happening in which something be-
falls me absolutely and cries out for my making sense
of it, so that 1 may be able to li ve and go on living. Ac-
cordingly, 1 am no res cogitans or thinking being; 1 do
not exist because 1 think, but the other way round: cog-
ito quia vivo. I think because 1 experience my being,
without mediation or choice, as my struggle to exist in
the world. In fact, 1 am a being who is condemned to
translate this necessity into freedom. Freedom is born
in and conditioned by such an encounter. 1 am thus
a res dramatica, the drama enacted by myself in the
world with things ofthe world.
1 am aware of this encounter, but not by means
of an explicit presentation. My glance is not directed
upon my engagement with things in the same way as it
is objectively conscious of and straightforwardly con-
cerned with them. The self-presence of my life is the
paradox of its transparency, for my life is the neces-
sary and ongoing giving of itself to the things of the
world ("Guillermo Dilthey," 1933-34 ). This, however,
should not be misunderstood as ifit were a contempla-
tive affair. To begin with and always, living is, to some
degree or other, "finding ... [myself] shipwrecked in
the world" ("Centenario," 1930) and thus in need of
guidance that cannot be dispensed with except at the
perii of my life. (One could compare this notion with
Heidegger's Geworfenheit.) In other words, thinking,
in the formal acceptation of the word, cannot be my
fundamental way of being connected with things, for
when 1 set out to think 1 do so as a response to my pre-
intellectual and dialectica! relationship with them, to
wit: the problematic situation that 1 already find myself
living in, and that 1 have to overcome in order to be
able to continue living with a modicum of sense.
This brief categoria! analysis oflife is pregnant with
consequences (cf. Un as lecciones de meta.fisica, 1932-
33 ). First of ali, it implies an interpretation of the his-
tory of philosophical reftection, and second, it cries out
for a characterization of our POSTMODERN predicament.
Already in 1916, while lecturing at the University of
Buenos Aires, Ortega had succeeded in providing both.
According to him, it is possible to take the movement
of philosophical thought as a search for the absolute,
which, in succession, is identified with the independent
reality of the world (as conveyed by the metaphor of
the wax tablet) among the thinkers of antiquity and
the Middle Ages, and with the independent reality of
thinking (as given expression by the metaphor of the
container and its contents) among the thinkers of the
modern era. The articulation of these two stages was
provided by the critique of realism found at the heart
of idealism; the articulation of the second phase and
our postmodern situation is the critique of idealism that
Ortega thought he had adequately carried out ("Las dos
grandes metaforas," 1924). But again the outcome is
to be a new metaphor, and he proposed that of Cas-
tor and Pollux, the Dioscuri, Gemini, or Twins who
can exist only as Dii consentes or mutually consenting
deities. This metaphor is useful to present the abso-
luteness of human life as a dual unity of reciprocity,
and corresponds to the sense of Ortega's formula, "1
am 1 and my circum-stance," provided that the "and"
can be descriptively shown to be irreducible and not
just a matter of appearance, inasmuch as it means the
"dynamic dialogue between 'myself and my circum-
stance.'"
To appreciate the full significance of Ortega's for-
 JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET
mula, one must underscore the fact that it contains at
least two differeni senses of self or EGO. One of them
is fundamental or grounding, and the other derivative
or grounded. The former may be characterized as the
awareness constitutive of life, that is to say, as the per-
formative or entitative availability of life to itself (or
as life's being-for-itself, which is expressed by the first
"I" of such a formula). The latter may be characterized
as an awareness occurring in life, that is to say, as the
consciousness in which I objectivate some matter of
concern or other in the world (oras life's engagement
with things, which is expressed by the second "I" of
the formula). The failure to recognize this distinction
and its irreducibility is the error of idealism.
Self-reflection, as the mark ofhuman life, is thus no
longer tobe mode led after objectivating consciousness.
If it were, it would cancel itself in contradiction. The
one-thinking-itself (der Sich-selbst-denkende) would
then posit itself, as any positing activity (conscious-
ness) would, but that would be tantamount to pre-
supposing itself, i.e., to taking itself as its own ter-
minus, or as being already endowed with a (posited)
nature. Now, ifanything, life is that which, ofnecessity,
is always in the offing as that which is to be fashioned
by itself. Hence life turns out to be the most elusive of
"phenomena," for it is in no sense readily available, ei-
ther as one ofits products (the posited) oras any ofthe
identifiable acts of (positing) consciousness. But nei-
ther is it reducible or merely retraceable to the temporal
bed of such events or to the mental flow "springing"
therefrom (Bewusstseinsstrom), as Husserl seems ulti-
mately to ha ve believed (i_,Que es conocimiento? [What
is consciousness? 1929-31]; cf. Husserl 's Vorlesun-
gen zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
[ 1905]). Moreover, if any act of consciousness per-
formed by me - i.e., by the second "I" of Ortega's
formula - is reflective in character (in a derivative
sense), then the act that is being reflected upon (in-
cluding its reference to its NOEMA) must already be
self-reflective (or reflective in a primordial sense as a
being-for-itself), or the terrors of infinite regress and
the lack of final intelligibility would ensue. Life, there-
fore, is the "non-objective, straightforward entitative
self-presencing ofbeing," the "sphere ofreflection in-
itself," or the domain of originary reflexivity wherein
I (as the second "I" of Ortega's formula) actually find
myself"immersed ... as it were, in a medium oflight."
511
In view of this, one must say that Ortega's meta-
physical position clearly entails a radical reformula-
tion of the commerce of life and REASON. In a sense,
he has "generalized" the concept of reason, for hu-
man life is seen by him, even in the most humble of
its engagements, as an adventure consisting in making
sense of self and world. However, in opposition to the
physical-mathematical and technical forms of reason,
which are only some ofits specialized styles ofperfor-
mance, "living reason" fundamentally proceeds on the
basis ofthe why (what have I done or become?) and the
whatfor (what amI aiming to do and transform myself
into?). Hence the basic form ofreason is narrative and
its character is historical, whether one is considering
individual or collective life ("Historia como sistema,"
1935). We have occasion to appreciate this in terms of
the logic of the unfolding of philosophical reflection,
for, in order to think adequately, philosophers must
first "understand the nature of the historical situation"
in which they find themselves. Self-justification, in the
sense just indicated, is the.first principle ofphilosophy.
Consistent with this, phenomenology, like other philo-
sophical positions before it, was adjudged "naive" by
Ortega to the extent that it left the nondoctrinal reasons
motivating and requiring its emergence- i.e., the eri-
sis of idealism and modernity - outside the scope of
its examination.
Ortega 's commitment to the clarification and justi-
fication ofthings in life, as the locus of experience and
understanding, thus precluded him from falling prey
to subjectivism or irrationalism (cf. El tema de nuestro
tiempo, [The theme of our time, 1923 ]). Consistent
with such a position, first philosophy or metaphysics
was taken by him to be the endeavor to carry out the
systematic categoria! analysis of life, which is possi-
ble only if life itself exhibits a systematic character.
To be sure, that could not have been done by Ortega
without the methods and tools belonging to pheno-
menology, and yet, as we have seen, his goal showed
itself to be incompatible with Husserl 's account of the
phenomenon "consciousness of," to the extent that his
description of it is essentially inadequate. Ortega's step
beyond Husserl amounted to seeing, first and foremost,
that our individuallives are, pre-theoretically and with-
out mediation, at reality itself. Taking that step, how-
ever, did not imply for Ortega that metaphysics would
be transformed into the "thinking of Being," as hap-
 512 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
pened with Heidegger, or into an onto1ogy, whether in
the form ofMARTIN HEIDEGGER's fundamentalproject in
Sein und Zeit (1927), or in that ofNicolai Hartmann's
regional onto1ogies, or in that of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's EX-
ISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY in L 'etre et le neant (1943).
And it could not have meant any such thing because
Being, in any ofits forms, is "only endowed with sense
as a question posed by a subject ... who is essentially
a movement toward it" ("Filosofia pura," 1929). This
movement is the endeavor to fathom itself that human
life basically amounts to, and the manifo1d significa-
tions attributed to Being in the history ofthought are, in
light of this, reducible to a "subsistent relationship" to
human beings qua living reason (even, by way of para-
dox, in the case of the idea of Being as the In-Itself).
But ifthis is so, then Being is "only an hypothesis"-
perhaps the most radical o ne- that human life has pro-
duced for its se1f-interpretation (El hombre y la gen te,
1949-50), yet an hypothesis nonethe1ess. Accordingly,
those "disciplines," and the manners of thinking from
which they arise, presuppose life as the radical reality
and thus cannot come to constitute an ultimate "sci-
ence," which, in keeping with Ortega's position, may
not be any other than metaphysics, if construed as the
categoria! analytic ofhuman life.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ferrater Mora, Jose. Ortega y Gasset: An Outline ofhis Phi-
losophy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957.
Marias, Julian. Ortega. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Madrid: Alianza Edi-
torial, 1983; voi. 1 trans. as Jose Ortega y Gasset: Circum-
stance and Vocation. Trans. Frances M. L6pez-Morillas.
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. Obras Completas. 12 vols. Madrid:
Alianza Editorial/Revista de Occidente, 1983. For present
purposes, the most important works are:
-."Sobre el concepto de sensaci6n" (I) [1913]; "On the
Concept ofSensation." Trans. Philip W. Silver. In Pheno-
menology and Art. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975, 95-
115.
-. Meditaciones de{ Quijote (l) [1914]. Meditations on
Quixote. Trans. E. Rugg et al. New York: W. W. Norton,
1961.
-. "Ensayo de estetica a manera de pr6logo" (VI) [1914].
"An Essay in Esthetics by way of a Preface." In Pheno-
menology and Art, 127-50.
-. Jnvestigaciones psico/6/ogicas (XII) [1915-16]. Psycho-
logical Jnvestigations. Trans. Jorge Garcia-G6mez. New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987.
-.El tema de nuestro tiempo (III) [1923]; The Modern
Theme. Trans. J. Cleugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.
-."Las dos grandes metaforas" (Il) [1924].
-. ";,Que esfilosofia? (VII) [1929]; What is Philosophy?
Trans. M. Adams. New York: W. W. Norton, 1960.
-."Filosofia pura: Anejo a mi folleto 'Kant'" (IV) [1929].
- . "En el centenario de una universidad" (IV) [ 1930].
-. "Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro" (IV) [ 1932]; "In
search of a Goethe from within." Trans. Willard R. Trask.
In Dehumanization in Art and Other Writings on Art and
Cu/ture. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956, 121--60.
- . Unas lecciones de metajisica (XII) [1932--33]; Some
Lessons in Metaphysics. Trans. M. Adams. New York:
W. W. Norton, 1969.
-. "Guillermo Dilthey y la idea de la vida" (VI) [1933-34];
"A Chapter from the History ofldeas- Wilhelm Dilthey
and the !dea of Life." In Concord and Libertv. Trans. H.
Weyl. New York: W. W. Norton, 1946, 129--82. ,
-. "Pr6logo para alemanes" (VIII) [ 1934]; "Preface for Ger-
mans." In Phenomenology and Art, 17-76.
- . "Historia como si stema" (VI) [1935]; History as a System
and Other Essays toward a Philosophy ofHistory. Trans.
H. Weyl. New York: W. W. Norton, 1941.
-.La raz6n hist6rica (XII) [1940/1944]; Historical Reason.
Trans. Philip W. Silver. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.
- . "Apuntes sobre el pensamiento, su teurgia y su demiur-
gia" (V) [1941]; "Notes on Thinking -Ils Creation ofthe
World and Its Creation of God." In Concord and Libertv,
49--82. .
-.La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evoluci6n de la teoria
deductiva (VIII) [1947}; The !dea of Principle in Leibniz
and the Evolution ofDeductive Theory. Trans. M. Adams.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1971.
-.El hombre y la gente (VII) [1949--50]; Man and People.
Trans. Willard R. Trask. New York: W. W. Norton, 1957.
-. ,;Que es conocimiento? [1929, 1930-31]. Madrid:
Alianza Editorial/Revista de Occidente, 1984.
Rodriguez Huescar, Antonio. La innovaci6n metajisica de
Ortega: Critica y superaci6n de/ idealism o. Madrid: Min-
isterio de Educaci6n y Ciencia, 1982; Jose Ortega y Gas-
set s Metaphysical !nnovation: A Critique and Overcom-
ing of Idealism. Trans. Jorge Garcia-G6mez. Albany, NY:
State University ofNew York Press, 1994.
-.Perspectiva y verdad. 2nd. ed. Madrid: Alianza Editorial,
1985.
San Martin, Javier. Ensayos sobre Ortega. Madrid: Univer-
sidad Nacionala Distancia, 1994.
Schutz, Alfred. "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sci-
ences." In his Collected Papers 1: The Problem of Social
Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962, 140-49.
Silver, Philip W. Ortega as Phenomenologist: The Genesis of
Meditations on Quixote. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1978.
JORGE GARCÎA-GOMEZ
Southampton Ca/lege

PERCEPTION AFTER HUSSERL There are
fi ve paradigms around which a taxonomy of contempo-
rary phenomenological accounts of perception might
be organized. Rene Descartes is neither a phenomen-
ologist nor a contemporary, but his understanding of
perception set the context and problem structure for
debates concerning it in MODERN PHILOSOPHY, includ-
ing the contemporary challenges to modern thought,
and his paradigm survives in contemporary schools of
scientific or empirically oriented thinking. Descartes
maintained a causal theory ofperception in which there
are two kinds of causality operative. A real object or
thing, extended in space and time, and transcendent to
human consciousness, exerts a causal influence upon
our organs of sense in such a manner as to generate a
likeness or copy of itself in the imagination, the faculty
of our minds that retains images. The imagination can
also have a causal influence on the immanent image:
it can separate aspects of the image (e.g., its figure or
shape, its color, its weight, odor, etc.) from each other
and recombine them in different ways. This accounts
for the "false and fantastic images" we ha ve in dream-
ing, hallucinating, etc.
The Cartesian model generates the epistemological
problem of determining whether the immanent image
is a true copy of the transcendent thing. Since ali we
know of the transcendent thing is what is revealed in
the immanent image and there is no way to compare the
two, the result is skepticism: we can never be certain
that the information derived from perception provides
veridical knowledge about the world. Ultimately, we
ha veto trust in God that the faculties we are endowed
with are reliable for practica! purposes. The real world
is known only to God, and finite human minds can only
approximate that measure.
IMMANUEL KANT introduced the paradigm that has
been most influential on the deve!opment of pheno-
menology, the transcendental model. Like Descartes,
Kant established the measure of ultimate truth about
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
the world in terms of the God he held to have cre-
ated it. God is the ens realissimum, the most real thing,
but is unknown to finite humans. God and the world,
or "thing-in-itself," are noumenal; they are absolutely
transcendent to human cognition, beyond the realm of
human experience. We must presuppose that God and
the thing-in-itself exist, however, in order to give ac-
counts of our own existence and the existence of the
phenomenal world, i.e., the world as we experience it.
Kant follows Descartes in conceiving perception as
the result of two kinds of causality. (1) Our sensations
- sounds, colors, odors, tastes, textures, etc.- are the
raw data produced in us somehow by the action ofthe
thing-in-itself upon our sense organs. These raw data
are fleeting and incoherent. (2) They are organized or
synthesized into abiding objects standing in stable rela-
tions to one another by mental faculties known as "pure
forms of intuition" and "categories of the understand-
ing." Space and time, as pure forms of intuition, are
immanent structures that account for the fact that we
perceive objects as extended in three dimensions and
events as succeeding one another in a one-dimensional
linear sequence.
Our science consists in knowledge, not ofthe world
in itself, but of the phenomenal world, the world as
mediated by the categories governing our manner of
understanding. One of the key categories is causality.
The laws of science reflect our manner of synthesizing
or unifying experience according to causal relations.
Thus (a) the matter of perception is attributed to an
origin in the transcendent or noumenal domain, but
(b) the form of perceptual experience is explained by
the transcendental or organizing activity of our mental
faculties. The phenomenal world is an immanent do-
main, that is, a human domain constituted by us, and
what we know of it cannot be asserted tobe true ofthe
thing-in-itself.
The account of perception in EDMUND HUSSERL rad-
icalizes Kant's transcendental approach through a
methodology known as the transcendental EPOCHE AND
REDUCTION. Kant had argued that since our cognition
is limited to the phenomenal domain structured by the
pure forms and categories ofhuman understanding, we
can neither claim to ha ve knowledge of the thing-in-
itselfnor apply the structures making up human experi-
ence to the noumenal domain, the transcendent world.
Husserl notes that natural scientists do not observe this
513
514 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
restriction, but typically contend that the laws of sci-
ence govem the "real world," the world transcendent
to or independent ofhuman cognition. He regards this
attitude as both naive and natural. The transcendental
epoche suspends the thesis ofthe natural attitude, this
thesis being the taken-for-granted beliefthat we expe-
rience the world as it is in itself. This belief can be
"bracketed" or "placed in abeyance." Working within
the purified sphere, one regards the objects of expe-
rience as objects of experience, i.e., as phenomena,
and not as real things existing apart from us. In other
words, we "intend" objects or constitute objects as real,
but the phenomenologist takes the intentiona! object as
just that, an object constituted by consciousness.
Husserl argues that this INTENTIONALITY of con-
sciousness is its defining characteristic. He maintains
that "ali consciousness is consciousness of an object,"
claiming thereby that the activity whereby conscious-
ness directs itselftoward its objects consists of a formal
synthesis over time of the features that define the ob-
ject as it is experienced. In the perceptual domain, he
observes that although we see objects one si de ata time
(e.g., we can see at most only three facets of a cubical
object in any one perspectiva! viewing), we synthesize
the various views or "adumbrations" into a six-faceted
intentiona! object. We intend the object or constitute
the object as six-sided, as a cube, even though strictly
speaking we are only ever witness to three, because
we link or synthesize the adumbrations into a unity or
totality. So long as we refrain from makingjudgments
about the transcendent world and restrict ourselves to
the domain of phenomena, we can be assured that our
assertions about the latter are certain because there is
a coincidence of what we experience evidentially and
what we assert or judge to be the case. If I say that
there exists a cube in the transcendent domain, I may
be mistaken, but I cannot be wrong in saying that I
intend this object now present to my consciousness as
a six-sided figure, ali of whose facets are constituted
as square.
Perception is privileged among the other possible
"noetic modes" of consciousness (e.g., MEMORY, IMAG-
INATION, EXPECTATION) in that it provides the starting
point for phenomenological analysis. We take the per-
ceptually given,just as it is given, without making any
theoretical claims about what caused it to be given
(because any such claim could never be warranted by
experiential EVIDENCE), and then go on to describe the
constitutive acts and receptivities performed by con-
sciousness in the active and passive syntheses whereby
it intends the object as an object of a certain kind.
So conceived, perception is an intentiona! act of con-
sciousness that structures sensory contents (the ma-
terial of sensation or what Husserl sometimes calls
"hyletic data") with MEANING originating within con-
sciousness.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER was one of Husserl's students,
perhaps his most famous, who developed phenomen-
ology along existentiallines. Instead oftaking science
as the foca! point of his philosophical inquiry, Hei-
degger concerned himself with the full spectrum of
human existence. Whereas Husserl tended to regard
consciousness as disengaged, reflective, spectatorial
thought, Heidegger took up the standpoint of DASEIN,
literally "being-there," referring to human existence in
ali its rich complexity, including such everyday modal-
ities of engagement as care and mood in addition to re-
flective distantiation. Heidegger has also been regarded
as a transcendental thinker in the Kantian tradition,
that is, as someone attuned to the human proclivity
to project our own existential structures (or "Existen-
tialien," to use his term) upon the world in which we
dwell, but in Heidegger 's case, it is not clear that ali the
meaning ofhuman experience derives from projection.
In his best-known book, Sein und Zeit (1927), Hei-
degger writes as though we perceive the world at
the most fundamental level as an equipment complex
(Zeugganzheit) or totality of things structured around
their use. Instead of seeing objects as removed from
the context of human concerns, Heidegger argues that
our primordial or most basic contact with things takes
place ata level in which we take them for granted, even
overlook them, because we concentrate on what we are
doing with them, what we are using them for. For ex-
ample, it is only when a tool breaks that we begin to
pay attention to the item for its own sake. Within this
schema, perception might be regarded along Husser-
lian lines as transcendental projection on the part of
Dasein, but with the constitutive framework oriented
around goal-directedness and utility rather than cogni-
tion for its own sake.
In the same book, however, Heidegger follows a line
ofthought that might be seen as a departure from tran-
scendental thought insofar as it involves a suspension
 PERCEPTION AFTER HUSSERL
ofthe projection ofhuman categories. Heidegger refers
to this using the Greek term aletheia, which designates
at the same time both "truth" and "unforgetfulness."
The idea here is that the knowing of a thing involved
in using it is an overlooking or forgetfulness of the
thing because it subsumes the thing under the struc-
tures of our concerns, and that the thing itself might
reveal itself in a different way if we just Jet it be. To
Jet be (sein lassen) in this manner is not to ignore or
neglect something, but to still one's own concems and
attend to the thing or attune oneself to it on its own
terms as one might give oneself over to the sound of
music in a manner of listening that is neither merely
active nor merely passive but both.
In !ater works, Heidegger uses the German term
"Ereignis" ~ "event" or "appropriation" ~ to refer to
the way in which in perception, things claim or appro-
priate us just as we are intent upon grasping or appro-
priating them. Things steadfastly remain themselves
as they traverse the opening provided by aletheia and
come into the place (Stelle) or context of finite hu-
man concerns. Since at the primordiallevel, Dasein is
unmindful of itself when engaged in perception, one
might picture Heidegger's paradigm of perception as
the emergence of a thing within the finite framework
(Gestell) established by the manner in which Dasein is
tacitly attuned to Being at a given moment. ("Being"
here refers to the broadest horizon functioning as the
latent context of Oase in 's attunement to the world at
large.)
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, heaviJy infiuenced by both
Husserl and Heidegger, conceived perception much as
did Husserl, with two important modifications.
( 1) Sartre does not refrain from making an onto-
logica! or existential claim about the domain of tran-
scendence, to which he referred as "being-in-itself'
(''l'etre-en-soi"), but does refrain from making episte-
mological or knowledge claims about it. "It is," Sartre
said, and "it is in-itself," but that is all that can be said
about it. Being-in-itself is one of two "transphenom-
enal phenomena"; it is the phenomenon that accounts
for the being of every phenomenon, but that always
appears as mediated or constituted by consciousness,
and hence cannot be known as it is in itself. "Being-
for-itself' ("! 'etre-pour-soi") is Sartre's term for con-
sciousness, the other transphenomenal phenomenon; it
is the one that defines or delimits all phenomena. Con-
515
sciousness, the nothingness referred to in the title of
Sartre's major work, L 'etre et le neant (1943), projects
its negativity into the world as the defining edge or
limit of the perceptual gestalt that gives the figure its
perceptual meaning against the relatively undefined
background ofthe world.
(2) Whereas Husserl regarded consciousness as
grounded in the structures of a transcendental EGO,
Sartre adopts a non-egological view of consciousness
and conceives consciousness as absolutely ungrounded
and radically free. The for-itself, or consciousness, is
"condemned to be free"; that is, it is not bound by any
innate structure in its activity of projecting meaning
into the phenomenal world. Consciousness, however,
always finds itselfin a particular situation or historical
context, and is inclined to fiee the burden of freedom
and responsibility by fali ing into the habitual structures
operative in its situation.
Sartre designates this fiight from freedom as "bad
faith," a form of self-deception in which the for-itself
seeks to ground its projections by adopting prevalent
forms of projecting meaning, thereby gaining the ap-
proval of popular sentiment, but at the expense of its
own authenticity. The doctrine of bad faith, then, ac-
counts for the regularity and predictability of socially
regulated forms ofperception such as racism and sex-
ism. One may see persons of a different race or eul-
ture as inferior, not because they are, but because one
seeks to evade responsibility for seeing them in a cre-
ative manner (i.e., in accordance with one's freedom
to project one's own meaning upon the world and its
denizens ), and falls back upon the norms prevalent in
one's situation.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, Sartre's friend and coedi-
tor with him ofthe avant-garde magazine, Les Temps
Modernes, until a falling out over politica! issues, de-
parted sharply from Sartre on epistemological and on-
tologica! issues centering around questions concerning
perception. He is best known for his seminal work
on the philosophical implications of human embodi-
ment and his innovative ontology based on the notion
ofthe "fiesh ofthe world." Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty
was heavily influenced by the phenomenological think-
ing of Husserl and Heidegger, but he took this line of
thought in new directions using GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY.
Perception played a central ro le in Merleau-Ponty's
thinking throughout his career. Shortly after the publi-
 516 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
cation of his major work, Phenomimologie de la per-
ception ( 1945), he wrote that "the perceived world is
the always presupposed foundation of all rationality,
all value and ali existence." Since the fallibility ofper-
ception has been a dominant theme in Westem philos-
ophy sin ce the time of the ancient Greeks, this thesis
amounts to a significant revision of the tradition. It
is based upon the thought that perception provides a
paradigm for veridicality. Whereas the tradition had
sought for nonperceptual criteria to use in determining
the reliability of perception, Merleau-Ponty reverses
this in declaring that it is from perception that we de-
rive our most basic model of valid knowledge.
This claim immediately runs up against the various
arguments from illusion that have traditionally pro-
vided the basis for distrusting perception: sometimes
we know that we are deceived by perceptual experi-
ence, e.g., we see a person on a walk through the woods
only to discover that it was an oddly shaped tree, not a
person at ali. But Merleau-Ponty points out that the dis-
covery of perceptual error is itself a perceptual event;
perception thus provides the basic paradigm for the
discovery and rectification of error. Just as the waking
world dispels the dream, making it difficult or even
impossible to recall, so in the unfolding of perceptual
experience, the resolution of uncertainty in the veridi-
cal perception displaces the errancy of the perceptual
quest for trustworthy understanding.
Merleau-Ponty conceives perception as a complex
interaction taking place between the human BODY and
the woRLD. Sin ce the traditional dis trust of perception
was correlated with a derogation ofthe body and eleva-
tion ofthe mind, his attention to the body as the core of
human understanding and spirituality also amounts to a
philosophical revolution. Bodily motility- including
retina! focusing, manual probing, and selectivity ofthe
senses working together in synaesthesia- reveals that
the body is both active and questing as well as passive
and receptive in its interrogation ofthe world: how the
world reveals itselfto us is a function ofthe manner in
which we attune ourselves to it.
Merleau-Ponty conceives the relationship of the
lived body and the perceptual world as one of re-
versibility: the truth of empiricism is that our percep-
tual powers adjust themselves to the world and take
the measure of reality from worldly things. But there
is a truth to transcendental claims too: what we take
from the world is also a function of our expectations,
which vary according to our conceptual framework,
cultural setting, attitude, even the range of sensitivity
of our sense organs. The result is an understanding of
perception as reciproca! accommodation ofworld and
body that reveals the real world, but reveals it only to
the extent that the body is capable of perceiving it.
The tree we see is real and our vision is trustwor-
thy, but we might see more if our eyes were capable
of seeing beyond the current limits of vision, which
stop before ultraviolet and infrared. Furthermore, the
perceptual world has the capacity to draw us out of
conceptual and cultural predispositions: it has taught
us, against expectation, that tobacco is not an enhance-
ment to life, that bloodletting does not restore health,
and that different races are equally human.
Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis led him to de-
velop an ontology in which the classical oppositions of
mind vs. body, selfvs. other, spirituality vs. corporeal-
ity, thought vs. matter, etc., give way to the model of
the flesh of the world folding back upon itself. When
I touch a tree or a person, when I feei a breeze or dip
my hand into running water, the event that takes place
is that of one manifestation ofworldly corporeality in-
teracting with another: I could not touch the tree if I
were not touched by the tree, nor could I see the tree
were I not visible myself and capable of being seen
from the perspective defined by the standpoint of the
tree. The tree and I retain our individual identities -
one of us will li ve after the other dies - but we are
both emergences ofthe flesh ofthe world, and our in-
terdependence did not begin with our births nor will it
end with our deaths.
JACQUES DERRIDA might well be regarded as the cen-
tral figure in the contemporary movement known as
POSTMODERNISM. The philosophy of deconstruction has
grown up around his writings. His thought is relevant
here because it poses a strong counterthesis to the var-
ious phenomenological accounts of perception. In a
phrase, Derrida's contention is that "there never was
any 'perception' ... " This is not as radical a thesis as
this phrase, taken out of context, might indicate. In fact,
Derrida argues against a relatively narrow view ofper-
ception taken from his interpretation of Husserl. In this
view, perception consists in a coincidence oftwo forms
of presence: the presence of a perceptual abject to con-
sciousness, and the presence of consciousness to itself.
 PERCEPTION IN HUSSERL
As noted above, Husserl grounded one of his claims
to apodicticity on the coincidence of a judgment (e.g.,
I see the chair) with the state of affairs judged (e.g.,
the chair actually seen): if there is no difference be-
tween these two, then it is impossible for the judgment
to be false. Derrida maintains that there is, indeed, a
difference here, that to see the chair as a chair and as
identica! to itself over time requires the functioning of
an ideality, the idea of "chair," which itself depends
on the functioning of a signifier (or a "trace") capa-
ble of providing the linkage between the temporally
dispersed representations ofthe object in question.
Derrida's paradigm might be regarded as a variation
ofKant's, described above. AII our representations are
mediated by formal idealities, hence there is never any
direct presentation of the thing itself. He differs from
Kant, however, in his understanding of the nature of
this mediation. Kant described the mediation as in-
volving pure forms of intuition and pure categories of
the understanding, both of which he regarded as uni-
versal and necessary. Derrida conceives the mediation
as involving the play of signifiers, taken as traces that
displace the trace left or inscribed on the sensory ap-
paratus prior to any conscious awareness or perceptual
experience of the abject. These mediators are neither
universal nor necessary, but subject to such vicissitudes
as the historical evolution of systems of signifiers.
In Derrida 's view, what we take as a percep-
tual presentation is actually a RE-PRESENTATION (Verge-
genwartigung). The perception of a chair, for example,
does not involve a coincidence of seeing and judging,
but rather the tacit subsumption ofthis perceptual ab-
ject under the ideality "chair" (i.e., the seeing of the
chair as a chair) and thus differs from itself insofar as
the abiding ideality differs from the momentary per-
cept. There is also an intrinsic moment of deferring
in the perception insofar as the object adumbrated is
seen as an aspect of a totality (i.e., the chair as it is it-
self, which comprises the totality of adumbrations) that
can never be apprehended, but functions as the ideal
synthesis that regulates our sense of a finally adequate
vision. This play of differing and deferring, designated
by Derrida in the neologism "differance," is necessar-
ily at work in the process we caii perception; hence,
if what is meant by "perception" is the coincidence
asserted by Husserl, then "there never was any 'per-
ception.'"
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
517
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Derrida, Jacques. La voix et le phenomene. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967; Speech and Phenomena.
Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
-.De la grammatologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967; Of
Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Ed.
Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. New York: Dover,
1955.
Dillon, M. C. Merleau-Ponty:~ Ontology. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1988.
-. Semiological Reductionism: A Critique of the Decon-
structionist Movement in Postmodern Thought. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Heidegger, Martin. Kant und das Prohlem der Metaphysik.
Bonn: Cohen, 1929; Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics.
Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1990.
Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: Hartnoch,
1787; Critique al Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp
Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.
Merleau-Ponty, Ma uri ce. Le visihle et 1'invisihle. Ed. CI aude
Lefort. Paris: Gallimard, 1964; The Visihle and the lnvisi-
ble. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestem
University Press, 1968.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. L 'etre et le neant: Essai d 'ontologie
phenomenologique. Paris: Gallimard, 1943; Being and
Nothingness: An Essay an Phenomenological Ontology.
Trans. Hazel Bames. New York: Philosophical Library,
1956.
M. C. DILLON
University of Binghamton
PERCEPTION IN HUSSERL All experiences
in which something is "itself present" to someone are
included under the broad concept of perception by
EDMUND HUSSERL. This distinguishes perceiving from
other types of experiences such as the IMAGINATION,
MEMORY, Of EXPECTATION of a physica! thing where we
do not have the sense of encountering the original in
person but rather of envisioning or reproducing such
an encounter.
Husserl 's definition extends the concept of percep-
tion beyond sensory perception. Ideas- for instance,
propositions- are "perceived" when we actively and
insightfully produce them. Retention, the conscious-
ness of the just past, although not perception in the
full sense, is "perceptive" because it gives us the orig-
inal, although not as now present. It is rather original
 518 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
consciousness ofthe past. There is thus a tendency for
Husserl to call "perception" ali forms of consciousness
of an original resulting in a concept of perception that
coincides with his concept of"EVIDENCE."
Within this broad generic concept, there are differ-
ent specific forms of"perception" relating to different
kinds of objects or dimensions of reality. Sensory per-
ception is one species and is original consciousness
of spatiotemporal objects. This species of perception
is emphasized by Husserl, and that emphasis will be
followed in the remainder ofthis entry.
In Husserl's early work, e.g., Logische Unter-
suchungen ( 1900--1901 ), the topic of sensory percep-
tion is discussed mostly in logica! and epistemological
contexts, particu1arly in connection with the develop-
ment of a theory ofthe verification ofthought. Here the
ma in concern is to produce a detailed analysis of per-
ception that identifies the characteristics that contribute
to its privileged epistemic ro le in verification and to de-
velop a theory of conciousness that relates perception
to other forms of awareness in a way that emphasizes
what these other forms derive oftheir nature from their
relationship to perception. Logica! and epistemologi-
cal issues remained a context for Husserl 's writings on
perception throughout his career. One notable devel-
opment beyond the early work was the working out
of a genetic phenomenology of the relationship of per-
ception and thought, which one finds in works such as
Analysen zur passiven Synthesis [ 1918-26], Formale
und transzendentale Logik ( 1929), and Erfahrung und
Urteil ( 1939). This effort involved such things as trac-
ing logica! syntax, such as the disjunctive form, back
to the experience ofperceptual conflict.
Partly because of problems encountered in the
pursuit of that concern, and also for other motives,
Husserl 's discussion ofperception broadened into what
could be called an "ontologica!" direction wherein
perception's ro1e in the existence and composition of
the world of human experience is analyzed. Of the
work Husserl published, this direction is most evi-
dent in Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913) and Carte-
sianische Meditationen [ 1931]. The account below will
attempt to relate to both the epistemological and onto-
logica! aspects of the theory.
According to Husserl, the "objects" of perceptual
experiences are originally "constituted" in those expe-
riences. This is the central idea ofHusserl's coNSTITU-
TIVE PHENOMENOLOGY of perception. This idea is best
understood within the context of his effort to develop
a theory of REASON that would safeguard reason from
cultural developments that he thought threatened it.
Among other things, he saw PSYCHOLOGISM in logica!
theory and NATURALISM in the philosophies of the NAT-
URAL and HUMAN SCIENCES as harmfu] deve]opments.
Husserl 's theory addressed the naturalistic theories
of perception that were involved in these develop-
ments. He sought to give an account of perception that
was not based on any assumptions about the world,
an account where both the objective reference of per-
ceptions and their role in producing knowledge could
be understood without postulating any mundane re-
lationship between the objects of perception and the
perceiving mind. In his theory, the capacity ofpercep-
tual consciousness to be consciousness of something
objective, i.e., its INTENTIONALITY, is an intrinsic fea-
ture of perception, something that can be accounted
for without assuming the existence of a world of ob-
jects causally interacting with consciousness.
Proceeding by actively abstaining from such as-
sumptions (by using the method of phenomenological
EPOCHE AND REDUCTION), the theory deve]oped as a form
of idealism ("transcendental idealism"). However, the
theory also had a component of realism. Husserl sought
to address problems about the objective reference of
consciousness that stemmed from Cartesian dualism
- problems that had led to important forms of natu-
ralism - with a theory that tried to show how expe-
riences of perceiving can and do have as their objects
the very mundane objects that we normally experience
our WORLD to consist of, and to explain how these ob-
jects have the features that they have for us in ordinary
experience. Thus the existence ofthe world of normal
experience is not at all denied by the theory. Rather, an
account of how we can perceive it is one of its main
goals.
The idea of the intrinsic intentionality of percep-
tion is captured in Husserl's concept of"constitution."
According to him, the world is "constituted" in con-
sciousness. This can be taken to mean that the "being
on hand" ( Vorhandenheit) of the world, i.e., its pres-
ence to us, or else its being there for us as available
to become present, is achieved through suitably struc-
tured processes of consciousness. In Husser1's theory,
 PERCEPTION IN HUSSERL
constituting the world in the mode of presence is the
specific function of sensory perception.
Husserl's idea of constitution is that whatever is on
hand to us is present or there as available tobe present
only through processes of consciousness whose own
composition corresponds to the particularity ofwhat is
on hand. Perceiving something, then, is not in any re-
spect like an empty, featureless opening onto the world
that allows the world to impress its nature onto our
mind. The encounter with any object involves a highly
specific "way ofbeing conscious" without which there
could not be an experience of that object. Moreover,
such "ways ofbeing conscious" make possible the very
basic sense of "encounter" and produce the sense of
the world being ready-made and already there in such
a way that we have the sense of discovering it through
our perceptions.
Perceptual experience operates, then, on two levels.
On one level, it seems to function to inform us about a
spatiotemporal world that is given to it as already there
and ready-made. Such an understanding ofperception
is part of our "natural attitude" toward the world and
our relation to it. But on a deeper level this very un-
derstanding and the experiences ofthe world on which
it is based are the result of a productive functioning of
subjectivity that "constitutes" the world of experience.
Husserl 's "world-constitutive" theory of perception
proceeds from the idea that whatever feature of the
world is considered, the account of the perception of
that feature must never rely on the assumption that it
is simply there, but must find the relevant processes of
consciousness that achieve awareness of that feature.
Phenomenological investigations of perception, then,
result in identifying sets of correlations between fea-
tures of the world as experienced and components of
consciousness that achieve those features.
Husserl identifies three major components of per-
ceptual experience that function together to make it
intrinsically intentiona!. A perception of something
comes about when ( 1) sensory contents of conscious-
ness motivate and sustain (2) an interpretive content
in a certain way such as to give rise to (3) awareness
of an "object as experienced." Each of these contents
requires further discussion.
The sensory contents of perception, called "sen-
sory data" or "hyletic data," are parts of the temporal
flow of mental life and are constituted in inner TIME-
519
consciousness. They are qualitatively distinctive and
diverse phenomena, sometimes of complex organiza-
tion, the flow ofwhich in our mentallives does not by
itself amount to an experience of anything, i.e., does
not present us with something identica! and identifiable
across time. They are, however, the bearers of inten-
tionality in that they can motivate and sustain "noeses,"
i.e., interpretive or "sense-giving" components within
the same perceptual experiences, and then take on an
objectifying ro le. For example, a flow of qualitatively
particular auditory sensations within someone's men-
tal life can become part of the experiencing of the
sound of a telephone ringing in the next room if it can
support the relevant spatial and generic apprehensions.
Unlike many other theories of perception, in Husserl 's
theory sensory data do not become parts of what is
experienced, but rather remain as components of the
experiencing of it.
One's entire waking (and dreaming) life is filled
with fields of sensory data. There is a distinct and sep-
arate field for each of the senses and the fields are or-
ganized according to various associative connections.
There are hyletic data correlated with both the struc-
tural and qualitative aspects of what is perceived, and
it is in virtue of this correlation that hyletic data con-
tribute to the intrinsic intentionality ofperception. For
instance, there is a field ofvisual hyletic data that cor-
relates with the visible sector of the world. Among
other things, this hyletic field contains correlates to the
spatiality ofthe world through the "quasi-space" ofthe
visual hyletic field.
When we perceive something, we are aware of some
of its features in an intuitive way - we actually see,
feei, hear them. This "fullness" ofthe visible colors,felt
surface qualities, etc., correlates with the hyletic data.
It is in part due to this fullness that objects, environ-
ments, etc., are experienced as "themselves present."
Hyletic data thus perform a very important function
within rational consciousness. As the intrinsic factors
in experience that help "achieve" the "embodied pres-
ence" of objects, they help rationally to motivate a
perceptual belief in the reality of objects and of the
world in general and to give perception the special
epistemic value that it has in relation to other modes of
consciousness of objects.
The bestowing of sense correlates with "what" the
perceived is experienced tobe in a particular act of per-
 520 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ception. This "what" includes ali the features (generic,
individual, and relational) that the object is experi-
enced to ha ve in that perception. Hyletic data can often
sustain different sense-bestowings in that they can un-
derdetermine the sense-bestowings that they support,
making perceptual error possible about what, how, or
even that an object is. By the same token, the disclo-
sure of perceptual error can and most often does take
place within perception, when new experience better
supports a different sense-bestowal.
Error and correction of error are made possible by
an anticipatory dimension ofperception. In bestowing
sense, consciousness projects in more or less specific
ways what would be experienced of its object in the
immediate fu ture, in continuing cxperience ofthe same
object, and anticipates a future that will be consistent
with and thus sustain the operative sense-bestowal. On
occasion, expectations are disappointed as experience
proceeds, and this motivates a retroactive reinterpreta-
tion and corrected apprehension.
Husserl envisions that in an extreme case, sensory
data could ensue in such a way that no sense-bestowal
could be sustained, because ali anticipation would be
disappointed and experience would become chaotic,
possibly even to the extent that our normal perceptual
belief in the actuality and being on hand of the world
(the "natural attitude") would cease to exist and thus
we would no longer ha ve a world. In this way, Husserl
determines the correlate of the actuality of the world
to be the coherence of perceptual experience insofar
as it motivates and sustains the natural attitude. While
this determination continues a thought of the modern
rationalist tradition, Husserl 's analyses supporting his
view surpass those of ali predecessors, chiefiy due to
the superiority of his analysis of time-consciousness.
Sensory data and noeses are "really intrinsic" (reel[)
components of experiences, components that have their
individual identity determined by the temporality ofthe
experience of which they are a part, in particular by
their locus in subjective time. There are other parts of
experiences, however, that are not really intrinsic parts.
One example ofthis outside ofthe realm ofperception
is the experienced verbal MEANING of an act of think-
ing or of speaking. Meanings are parts of experiences
in the sense that they are dependent on them for their
existence. However, their individual identity is not tied
to the temporality ofthe experiences ofwhich they are
a part; rather, they are capable of being repeated as
numerically the same in any number of experiences.
And unlike worldly objects that have "real" existence,
they have "ideal" existence. This means that their in-
dividual identity is not determined by spatiotemporal
factors. The same (numerically identica!) meaning can
be apprehended in numerically different acts ofthought
of different persons in different places at the same time.
Husserl claimed that perceptual experiences con-
tain an ideal component called a "NOEMA" and that
consciousness is structured as a noetic-noematic corre-
lation. The really intrinsic components of a perception
are correlated with features its object is experienced to
have in the perception, but these features might not be
features ofthe object as it actually is (as future experi-
ence will determine it tobe). Or it may be that (as fu ture
experience would show) the perceived object does not
really exist at al!. Despite such eventualities, there be-
longs to every perception the "object as experienced."
Husserl terms the object as experienced the "noematic
sense" (Sinn) of a perception and claims that it belongs
to the perception as an inseparable, ideal (not reell)
part.
The "object as perceived" is not a part of nature,
Husserl claims, and has no natural properties. This de-
terrnination is of great significance for Husserl 's theory
of perception, for it is one of the chief ways that he
sought to combat naturalism in epistemology. It does
this by making knowledge- whether in the form of
the productofperceptual exploration (which involves a
continua! synthesis ofperceptual senses) or in the form
of the verification of thought by perception (a synthe-
sis of linguistic and perceptual senses)- the result of
ideal syntheses, i.e., syntheses of ideal entities. Such
syntheses are subject to ontologica! or logica! norms,
and not naturallaws.
Husserl finds that the noematic sense is an "abstract
form" within the "full" noema. The fu li noema contains
characteristics of the "object as experienced" that are
not "parts" or "features" of the "object" per se, such
as the reality status with which the object appears and
the clarity or obscurity ofpresentation. It also includes
features that relate to the kind of experience to which
the noematic sense belongs. Thus the "same" noematic
sense can be part oftwo different experiences, such as
an act ofthought and an act ofperception. This makes
it possible for perception to verify thought: the identity
 PERCEPTION IN HUSSERL
of sense allows the two types of experience to come
together by being about "the same" in a strict sense,
and the difference in the way that the object is given
in each type of experience provides the basis for their
different epistemic values.
Given that an object has more features than it is ex-
perienced to ha ve and that this fact is part of our aware-
ness of the object, the perceptual noema has within it
the "idea" of a fully determined object, a component
of the perceptual sense that Husserl calls the "deter-
minable X." The idea of the fully determined object
functions teleologically: it attracts afuture directed in-
terest in perceptual exploration of an object and thus
provides a basic epistemic orientation to life. In con-
nection with this, the idea of a fully determined object
motivates "co-presentational" act-components within
the noesis, which together make up what Husserl calls
the "inner horizon" of a perceptual experience. These
components are not "borne" by sensory data and have
ali the non-intuitionally fu li aspects of the perceptual
sense as correlates. Such aspects relate to the non-
visible parts of material things, for example. The co-
presentations set out sense-components consistent with
the idea of the object as that which is posited on the
basis of the intuitional moments.
These co-presentations provide the basis for the
anticipations discussed above that arise during the
course of perceptual exploration of an object. In this
exploration, syntheses are experienced wherein co-
presentations give rise to anticipations that are fulfilled
or disappointed as intuitional moments enter into iden-
tity syntheses with moments that are not intuitional.
Husserl thought that provided they progressed harmo-
niously along certain lines, such syntheses maintained
and increased in rational power a positing of "actually
existing" objects and an "actually existing" world. It
is through this idea of synthesis that Husserl's ace ount
of perceptual intentionality begins to realize the goal
of solving problems about the objective reference of
perception that were created by Cartesian dualism.
This brief account has of necessity left out severa!
aspects of Husserl 's theory ofperception. Among these
is the topic of kinaesthesia (consciousness of move-
ment), to which Husserl devoted many analyses in his
phenomenology ofthe BODY. This is an aspect ofper-
ception opened up by Husserl 's thought that MAURJCE
MERLEAU-PONTY has developed extensively.
521
Numerous lines of inquiry concerning perception
have been opened up by Husserl and provide oppor-
tunities for creative phenomenological work. One of
these concerns Husserl's claim that perception has an
ideal component, the noema (and noematic sense). In-
vestigations are particularly needed to learn more about
the nature ofthis ideality in order to answer questions
about any possible subjection to some kind of non-
naturalistic historical change, which have serious im-
plications for a Husserlian phenomenological theory
of knowledge and truth. In addition, Husserl 's claims
about the privileged ro le of perception in relation to
other kinds of experience deserve more investigation
in light ofthe criticisms of JACQUES DERRJDA and others,
who have seen more relative originality and epistemic
value in signitive and other non-intuitional forms of
consciousness than Husserl seems to allow. Finally,
Husserl's use of hyletic sensory data in his theory has
for a long time aroused controversy. There is first of
ali a real need for a work of scholarship that gives a
comprehensive picture of Husserl's theory of sensory
data and then some original investigations aimed at
settling some ofthe concerns that ha ve been raised, for
exampJe, in the work of ARON GURWITSCH.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Drummond, John J. Husserlian lntentionality and Non-
Foundational Realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1990.
- . and Lester Embree, eds. The Phenomenology of the
Noema. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
Kersten, Fred. Phenomenological Method: Theory and Prac-
tice. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.
Gurwitsch, Aran. The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1964.
McKenna, William R. Husserl:~ "Introductions to Pheno-
menology. "' The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
- . "The Problem of Sense Data in Husserl 's Theory of Per-
ception." In Essays in Memory of Aran Gurwitsch. Ed.
Lester Embree. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced Re-
search in Phenomenology/University Press of America,
1984, 223-40.
- . "Husserl 's Theory of Perception." In Husserl:~ Pheno-
menology: A Textbook. Ed. J. N. Mohanty and William
R. McKenna. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced Re-
search in Phenomenology/University Press of America,
1989, 181-212.
Melle, Ullrich. Das Wahrnehmungsprohlem und seine
Verwandlung in phănomenologischer Einstellung. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.
522 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Welton, Donn. "Structure and Genesis in Husserl's Pheno-
menology." In Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Ed.
Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick. Notre Dame,
IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1977, 54--69.
WILLIAM R. MCKENNA
Miami University
PHENOMENOLOGY See CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY. CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL
ATTITUDE, EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, GENERATIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY, GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY, HERMENEU-
TICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, and REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY.
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY The
term "anthropology" appears in the 16th century, at
about the same time as "psychology" and in the con-
text of German Scholastic philosophy. Magnus Hundt's
Anthropologium de hominis dignitate, natura et pro-
prietatibus, de elementis, partibus corporis humani,
physiognomia etc. appears in Leipzig in 1501. Otto
Casmann, a pupi! of Rudolph Goclenius (the latter
had brought out a work entitled Psychologia in 1590),
wrote a Psychologia anthropologia sive animae hu-
manae doctrina (1594); its second part appears as An-
thropologiae Pars II, h.e. de fabrica humani corporis
methodice descripta ( 1596). The definition of anthro-
pology as "doctrina humanae naturae" encompasses
here the bodily characteristics of humans as well as
their spiritual-psychic and moral dignity (including
their fallibility). Odo Marquard's claim that the school
philosophy ofthat time had thereby freed itselffrom the
theologically oriented metaphysical tradition is exag-
gerated and seems infiuenced by !ater developments. It
underestimates the "theomorphic" approach to human
beings even in 20th century anthropology. Marquard
sees the point of departure for the concept of anthro-
pology in the question of how the human being is to
be understood, ifnot (any longer) through metaphysics
and not (yet) through mathematical-experimental sci-
ence. But this is anachronistic and unhistorical.
IMMANUEL KANT divides his Anthropologie in prag-
matischer Hinsicht ( 1798) into the physiological and
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
the pragmatic, and the latter is clearly motivated
by the moral-metaphysical considerations of "self-
responsibility" and the "divine voice of conscience"
according to his Metaphysik des Sitten (Metaphysics
of morals, 1797). This shows the thoroughly religious
basis of the humanism that comes to the fore as "hu-
manity" in Kant's practica) imperative and serves as the
basis for the pragmatic anthropology that asks "what
can or should human beings as free agents make of
themselves?" True, Kant wanted to make anthropology
into a "proper academic discipline"; he even wanted to
make it the source of all the practica! subjects of morals,
manners, and education. But this source hardly seems
tobe a science. Even for Kant it is more like a collection
ofinteresting observations leading to worldly wisdom,
which he !ater calls "anthropology from a pragmatic
standpoint." This is clearly a "philosophical anthropol-
ogy," but it is neither a critically organized metaphysics
nor a rigorous special science like physics.
It does ha ve a metaphysical perspective for ordering
and interpreting the manifold phenomena ofhuman re-
ality it observes, right down to physical geography. The
metaphysical orientat!on of Kant's pragmatic anthro-
pology is expressed in the notion that human beings
can have a representation of the "I," and that the hu-
man being is thereby elevated above all other beings on
earth. Through the unity of consciousness the human
being is a person, a being completely different in rank
and dignity from things. For philosophy, the question
of man - as anthropology - comes to encompass
all other questions. Accordingly, anthropology cannot
be compared structurally with other "ologies": for one
thing, the human being cannot be divided up into areas,
and for another, the human being actively brings forth
such things as sciences and, in particular, anthropology
itself.
By the turn of the 19th century it is already clear
that the theme of anthropology is not only the nature of
man, but also the problem of experience, which is -
more broadly than in Kant- that of man 's total con-
crete encounter with and understanding of the world.
Occasioned by the attempt to acquire, ground, and sci-
entifically order experiences about the human being,
experience as human reality becomes problematic and
with it the whole system of the sciences. Indices for
this post-Kantian development are the appearance of
the "sense for history" and the establishment of the
 PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
so-called HUMAN SCIENCES ( Geisteswissenschaften) and
the social sciences. They ali ha ve a peculiar double as-
pect: on the one hand, they provide in formation about
the reality ofman (as one reality among others), and on
the other hand, they treat man as a quite peculiar reality
that functions as the locus of any possible understand-
ing ofreality. WILHELM DILTHEY's work is an important
landmark here. The world becomes the human world,
i.e., culture. The difficult emergence ofthe concept of
culture in the 19th century thus becomes the decisive
presupposition for the conception ofphilosophical an-
thropology as it is propagated in the 1920s.
In the 19th century Rudolph Hermann Lotze ( 1817-
1881) put his entire work- in the special sciences as
well as in philosophy and metaphysics- in the frame-
work of an anthropology. For Lotze, who explicitly
links up with Kant, anthropology is not the name of a
discipline ora method; rather, it indicates the guiding
standpoint under which ali knowledge ofthe world is
to be evaluated. Since it is the concrete human being,
as a conscious natural and cultural being, to whom
appearances appear, ali world-apprehension must be
dealt with in terms of human beings' concrete ways
of living and thinking, their views of the world. This
is why the term "philosophical anthropology" is used
for the most part negatively, i.e., as distinguished from
physiological anthropology or from other, even more
specialized forms and this is why even in the 18th cen-
tury a positive meaning of the term is hard to locate.
The new philosophical anthropology that unfolds
against this background in the 1920s, and tends to
become a new sort of philosophia prima, could also
be called "cultural anthropology," though this term is
usually used as equivalent to ETHNOLOGY and thus more
narrowly. Basic to the new philosophical anthropology
is the idea that the concept of the world is mediated
by culture, as formulated in 1884 by Wilhelm Windel-
band ( 1848-1915), who considers eul ture the "ultimate
synthesis" of our experiential knowledge ofthe world.
In the same vein ERNST CASSIRER declares in 1923 that
"the critique ofreason thus becomes the critique of eul-
ture." The concept ofthe world can be transposed into
the concept of eul ture because the world is always the
human world. Culture and man imply each other. This
is to say that world and humankind are inseparable
correlates. The resulting concept of "cultural anthro-
pology" (before the term even exists) proves tobe less
523
an overcoming of metaphysics- as some of its advo-
cates claim -than a new form of it. Kant's "culture of
reason" sti li influences the new concept of eul ture, and
for Kant, "metaphysics" was the culmination of ali the
culture ofhuman reason.
Thus anthropology develops, as Jiirgen Habermas
says, in connection with a theory of nature and a the-
ory of society and history. But this occurs with a fun-
damental focus on the incomparable reality of man
himself, since "nature" and "culture" are both the re-
ality of humankind itself and the basic dimensions of
their experience. Thus the philosophical anthropology
that was developed in the 1920s by phenomenologists
and neo-Kantians oscillated between metaphysics and
description. The first worked out and published philo-
sophical anthropology of this sort was MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER 's interpretation of human DASEIN as FUNDAMENTAL
ONTOLOGY in Sein und Zeit ( 1927). In this sense Heideg-
ger belongs with authors like MAX SCHELER, HELMUTH
PLESSNER, Cassirer, and ARNOLD GEHLEN.
Heidegger is vehemently opposed to characterizing
his work as anthropology because the term is either
used too empirically or else is completely vague. If it
is one of the peculiarities of human beings that they
produce widely differing pictures of themse1ves and
their world, then one should not limit oneself to one
picture. This is why Plessner speaks ofthe human be-
ing as homo absconditus. Besides, Heidegger thought,
"no age has been so ignorant about man as ours. For no
other age has man been so questionable." But in this
regard Heidegger could refer to Scheler's early essay
"Zur Idee des Menschen" ( 1915) and his short book
Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (The position
of humankind in the cosmos, 1928). Cassirer too, on
the occasion of his 1929 encounter with Heidegger,
declared that it is epochs of crisis that lead to the prob-
lem of philosophical anthropology: reflection on the
world is essentially self-reflection, posing the question
ofthe nature ofhumanity. This crisis theme is also ex-
pressed in Plessner's notion of eccentric (ex-centric)
positionality and in his positively interpreted notion
of destabilizing (Entsicherung). Gehlen points to the
human being's "structure oflack" and "need for inter-
pretation." The paradoxical character ofthis anthropo-
logical point of departure is typical: because humans
are in principle beings of crisis, ex-centric, unstable,
unfixed, and in need of interpretation, times of acute
524 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
crisis and disorientation can bring forth anthropolo-
gies; thus Heidegger can introduce fundamental ontol-
ogy as (philosophical) hermeneutics ofDasein because
human existence is always already the hermeneutics of
Dasein.
Heidegger's concepts of disclosedness (Er-
schlossenheit) and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) can
also be compared structurally as a philosophical an-
thropological insight with Scheler 's concept of"world-
openness." The "worldhood" of Dasein in Heidegger
can be seen as humankind 's original relatedness to eul-
ture. Like the "world-horizon," culture is the frame-
work in which ali entities appear, including that spe-
cial entity, the human being itself. Heidegger's use of
the terms "being" and "appropriation" (Ereignis) ex-
presses the non-reducibility of the cultural anthropo-
logical model metaphysically.
Max Scheler's anthropology can be traced back to
his 1915 essay "Zur Idee des Menschen," where the
connection to Husserl's concept of intentionality and
to Westem metaphysics is made. Scheler's 1928 book,
by contrast, emphasizes an idea that was neglected
by Heidegger, which is the human being's place in na-
ture. Following a hierarchy, Scheler first locates human
beings in the realm of organic nature, in order to ac-
knowledge their special position at the fifth level, that
of world-openness (which is theoretically linked with
Husserl's idea of reduction). The "drive to become"
( Werdedrang) and the "becoming God" (werdender
Gott) are the terms that thematize the happening ofbe-
ing or appropriation (Ereignis) (as in Heidegger) and
defy rational derivation and empirica! analysis.
The hierarchical scheme that sometimes appears
contrived in Scheler is more convincing in Plessner.
Human beings are positional- i.e., they are living be-
ings distinct from the surrounding, inorganic world of
things- but they also stand in relation to this position-
ality, and this "eccentric positionality" condemns them
to cu !ture. This means that humans must lead their lives
between utopian placelessness and concretely profiled
expression. Condemned to personal self-assertion, the
human being is forced to project roles, and to assume
a kind of "Doppelgănger" sta tus that leads by way of
other people to the concept of God. In the attempt to
go deeper than the usual historical characterization of
humankind, Plessner must presuppose a natural his-
tory that admittedly has no teleological order, so that
the production of humanity reveals the unpredictable
nature of its occurrences.
Emst Cassirer interprets the human being, who may
not be presupposed as a metaphysical substance, as
animal symbolicum. What the tradition calls the soul-
body relation is for him the prime example of a "sym-
bolic relation." Humans construct themselves in their
"symbolic forms" and establish a reality- eul ture-
as a symbolic universe. For Cassirer there is nothing
before or after the symbolic formation; hence it is an
irreducible phenomenon.
Arnold Gehlen seeks to establish an "empirica! phi-
losophy" and seems to distance himself as far as pos-
sible from metaphysical and "purely philosophical"
concerns. Yet he attributes to philosophical anthropol-
ogy a foundational role in philosophy. The crisis struc-
ture ofhumanity is understood biologically, in that the
character of human needs is described concretely in
comparison with animals. But it is to be noted that
Gehlen repeatedly emphasizes the incomparable value
of human biology, which leads him deep into the do-
main of research into mentalities. Interna! and exter-
na! "sensory overload" can be stabilized by "institu-
tionalization." "World-openness" and "projects of self-
understanding"- which must be understood as prac-
tica! and lived phenomena- are the essential traits of
the human being. In Urmensch und Spătkultur Gehlen
characterizes these basic anthropological behaviors in
their cultural-genetic and open development. He works
out the "categories" that ari se out ofhumanity's histori-
callife situations and that find their place in the context
of a theory of action. One of Gehlen's metaphysical
presuppositions is human consciousness, which can
be descriptively analyzed and treated functionally, but
is irreducible. In his early writings Gehlen 's point of
departure is "phenomenological," without much refer-
ence to EDMUND HUSSERL; by this he means the descrip-
tion of situations that sticks to what can be intuitively
experienced and is free of speculation.
What the important 20th century philosophical an-
thropologies have in common is the tendency toward
the so-called concretization of subjectivity, coupled
with an extraordinarily rich elaboration of this con-
cept, extending into the realm of anonymous structures.
Husserl's phenomenology is an extremely important
influence on 20th century philosophical anthropology,
even though Husserl, in a 1931 Berlin lecture, crit-
 PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
icized his students for their "anthropologizing." But
precisely the genuinely and purely phenomenological
theories, SUCh as the theory of INTENTIONALITY, EPOCHE
ANO REDUCTJON, and JNTERSUBJECTIVITY, ied Husserl in
the direction of anthropology before he even knew it.
Intentionality presupposes an empirica!, organic, hu-
man subject, a living being interacting with others.
That is, the transcendental subject is also necessarily
a concrete human being. The reduction that arises out
of the epoche is an act of freedom. As constituted, the
world is an intersubjectively accessible cultural world,
and subjectivity as intersubjectivity exists in the pro-
cesses of constitution. In 1932 Husserl even speaks of
transcendental phenomenology as "universal human
science as anthropology."
It is thus no wonder that phenomenologically ori-
ented authors such as MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, COR-
NELIUS VAN PEURSEN, ENZO PACI, KAREL KUYPERS, HEIN-
RICH ROMBACH, JEAN-DOMINIQUE ROBERT, and many oth-
ers have developed and discussed philosophical an-
thropology as phenomenological.
The problem of this anthropology, especially when
it claims to be first philosophy, will always be that it
must describe its basic structures in very general and
highly modifiable ways and must always deal with new
situations and questions whose investigation will take
place in fields other than philosophical anthropology.
In addition, phenomenological anthropology is faced
with the ambiguous difficulty that it must deal, on the
one hand, with appearances, and, on the other, with
appearing itself and must hope to come to terms with
the one by appealing to the other.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cassirer, Emst. An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Phi-
losophy ofHuman Cu/ture. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1944.
Gehlen, Amold. "Wirklicher und unwirklicher Geist. Eine
philosophische Untersuchung in der Methode absoluter
Phănomenologie" [ 1931]. In Gesamtausgahe. Voi. 1. Ed.
Lothar Samson. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
1978, 113-381.
- . Gesamtausgahe. Voi. 2. Ed. Lothar Samson. Frankfurt
am Main: Klostermann, 1980.
Habermas, Jiirgen. "Anthropologie." In Fischer-Lexikon
Philosophie. Ed. Alwin Diemer and Ivo Frenzel. Frankfurt
am Main: Fischer, 1958, 18-35.
Husserl, Edmund. "Phănomenologie und Anthropologie.
Vorlesung in den Kant-Gesellschaften von Frankfurt,
Berlin und Halle" [1931]. InAufsătze und Vortrăge (1922-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
525
1937). Ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp. Husser-
liana 27. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989,
164--81; "Philosophy and Anthropology." Trans. Richard
G. Schmitt. In Husserl: Shorter Works. Ed. Peter Mc-
Cormick and Frederick A. Elliston. Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 315-23.
Kant, Immanuel. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hin-
sicht (1798). In Akademie-Ausgabe. Voi. 7. Berlin: Max
Niemeyer, 1917, 117-333.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Anthropologie." In Wissenschaftsthe-
oretisches Lexikon. Ed. Edmund Braun and Hans Rader-
macher. Graz: Styria, 1978,41-46.
Landmann, Michael. De Homine. Der Mensch im Spiegel
seines Gedankens. Freiburg: Alber, 1962.
Marquard, Odo. "Anthropologie, philosophische." In His-
torisches Wărterhuch der Philosophie. Ed. Joachim Ritter.
Voi. 6. Basel: Schwabe, 1971, 362-74.
Miihlmann, Wilhelm E. Geschichte der Anthropologie
[ 1948]. 7th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Athenăum, 1968.
Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. "Anthropologie und Intersubjektivităt.
Zur Frage von Transzendentalităt oder Phanomenalităt
der Kommunikation." Phănomenologische Forschungen
4 (1977), 103-29.
-. "Rudolf Hermann Lotze. Das Ganze unseres Welt-
und Selbstverstăndnisses." In Grundprobleme der grossen
Philosophen. Ed. Joseph Speck. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1986, 9-51.
-. "Der Begriff der Kulturphilosophie bei Ernst Cassirer."
In Kultur. Bestimmungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Ed. Hei-
mut Brackert and Fritz Wefelmeyer. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1990, 156-91.
Plessner, Helmuth. "Die Stufen des Organischen und der
Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie"
[ 1928]. In Gesammelte Schriften. Voi. 4. Ed. Giinter Dux.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981.
-."Homo absconditus" [1969]. In Gesammelte Schrijien.
Voi. 8. Ed. Giinter Dux. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1983, 353--66.
Scheler, Max. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos [ 1928].
9th ed. Bem: Francke, 1978.
ERNST WOLFGANG 0RTH
Universităt Trier
(Trans. by J.N. Mohanty)
PHILOSOPHY, ANALYTICAL See ANALYTICAL PHI-
LOSOPHY.
PHILOSOPHY, MODERN See MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
526 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION The
phenomenon of human communication has occupied
a critica! if not always central position in phenomen-
ological philosophy. The description and analysis of
the phenomenon was begun by EDMUND HUSSERL him-
self. As in many other instances, he charted much of
the problematic - its peculiar paths and aporias -
for those who would follow. Following him, the phe-
nomenon has been addressed in one way or another
by a number of philosophers in the phenomenological
tradition. In addition to Husserl 's work, that of MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, and EMMANUEL
LEVINAS will be considered here.
For ali its originality, phenomenology bears legacies
ofthe philosophies it engages, whether it does so wit-
tingly or not. The broad outlines ofthe phenomenologi-
cal problematic of communication are already drawn
in the opening lines of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias.
He observes that ali people are gathered together in a
shared experience of the world, that the world itself
is held in common, as is the experience ofthat world,
which is directly symbolized (homoios) in mental ac-
tivity. But the bits of sound and the broken scratchings
that come directly and then indirectly to symbolize
(symbolon) this mental activity, words spoken or writ-
ten, are different among various peoples. Ofimmediate
concern here- and of perennial preoccupation- is
the nature of these "symbolizations"; first, of the re-
lation of "mental act" to "physical act" in speaking,
writing, and the like; and second ofthe correlative co-
incidence of "mental acts" presumably established by
the relation.
The character of the relation and so of the cor-
relative coincidence that symbolization is to achieve
is further complicated for phenomenology proper by
Descartes's radical sundering of res cogitans and res
extensa - by extension, of actio cogitans and ac-
tia extensa. The distinction between "mental act" and
"physical act," drawn gradually in Greek, Roman, and
medieval thought, is completed in the Meditationes de
Prima Philosophia ( 1641 ). The implication here that
"mental acts" and "physical acts" takes shape in fun-
damentally incommiscible substances seems to create
irresolvable difficulties in determining the character
of the relation of "mental act" to "physical act" and
so also of determining the character of the correlative
coincidence of"mental acts."
Husserl gathers these legacies together when he
takes up the issue of communication early in his Lo-
gische Untersuchungen (1900--190 1). Taking speech
as his exemplar- for which he is much criticized by
JACQUES DERRIDA in La voix et le phenomene ( 1967) and
elsewhere- he describes the communicative act from
the standpoint of a speaker's intent to express certain
thoughts to another. For him, this intention manifests
itself in indication and intimation, whereby, through
the manipulation of physical bits of sound, the speaker
at once indicates to the listener a desire to express
something about something and in this indication in-
timates the content of the expression itself. This in-
tent to communicate is fulfilled in the communicative
moment proper, by the hearer's recognition that the
speaker intends to communicate through these bits of
sound; by the hearer's comprehension that such bits of
sound are accompanied by certain sense-giving acts on
the part ofthe speaker; and by the hearer's subsequent
participation with the speaker in a peculiar sort of"cor-
relation ofthoughts" achieved by reproducing more or
less corresponding sense-giving acts.
The possibility of such a fulfillment here, however,
presents a dilemma. The requisite recognition, com-
prehension, and participation that fulfills the speaker's
intent to communicate presupposes, on the part of lis-
tener and speaker alike, a correlation of "mental acts"
regarding the relation of"mental act" to "physical act,"
the very relation that has yet to accomplish this corre-
lation. In order to achieve what must concurrently be
accomplished, Husserl finds it necessary to appeal to
the intuitive fulfillment ofthe speaker's intent to com-
municate. In this, the listener's intuition somehow sur-
mounts the otherwise insurmountable rift between the
"mental act" and "physical act" and so, in turn, between
"mental acts" themselves. (In a 1925 lecture course,
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs [Prole-
gomena to the history of the concept of time, 1979],
Heidegger suggests that the mediation that intuition
performs here is immediate, amounting to something
of a spontaneous recognition.)
In the fifth of the Cartesianische Meditationen
[ 1931 ], apparently dissatisfied with the earlier appeal
to intuition as a viable means of crossing the Cartesian
chasm, Husserl steels himselfto the necessity of estab-
lishing a communication prior to communication itself.
Attempting to resolve the dilemma, he tums from the
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION
analysis of overtly communicative acts - speaking,
writing, and the like, i.e., acts in which communica-
tive intent is preeminent- to an analysis of acts that
are covertly communicative- acts exemplified in the
"concordant bodily behavior" encountered in the pres-
ence of another, i.e., acts that need involve no commu-
nicative intent, no express movement toward another.
Husserl begins his analysis by reducing the other
along with the rest of the world 's contents to their ap-
pearance in the immanent "sphere of ownness" that
circumscribes phenomenological consciousness ("my
own" consciousness, as Husserl has it). By means of
this reduction, the other is divested of ali transcen-
dence save an immanent transcendence in reflection
in which the other appears over against me, a body
amid other bodies, a possible abject of my attention.
Portraying what is essentialiy a prereflective process
in a reflective manner, the analysis proceeds as fol-
lows: by way of a "mundanizing apperception," in this
"sphere of ownness," 1 can carne to discem the re-
lation of "mental act" to "physical act" in coming to
appreciate the relation ofmy EGO and BODY or "animate
organism." Locating this related ego-body amid other
worldly bodies, 1 find myself confronted with the body
of another. And as against the behavior of other objects
in my world, in the "concordant bodily behavior" of
that other, 1 discover a clue that provokes me to postu-
late a relation between a "physical act" and a "mental
act" on the part ofthis other that mirrors the relation I
find in myself. By way of an "apperceptive transfer,"
an "analogizing apperception," I postulate a relation
between the other's body and an alter ego that reflects
the one I ha ve discerned in myself. Having determined
these relations, it occurs to me to consider how my
behavior might look if I were there, what relation of
"mental act" to "physical act" might be obtaining were
I that other.
But I am not that other. I am nowhere "there," but
"here." ţ:onsequently, such a consideration cannot, in
principle, insure the requisite correlation of"acts," the
correlative coincidence essential to the resolution of
the dilemma. In order to complete this covert commu-
nication, this communication prior to communication,
Husserl finds it necessary to appeal to a notion of em-
pathy - the functional equivalent of the appeal to
intuition in his analysis of overt communication. Like
intuition, however, empathy too requires the accom-
527
plishment ofthat which has yet tobe achieved, that is,
a correlative coincidence of"mental acts" with respect
to the relation of "mental act" and "physical act." The
dilemma remains unresolved.
With the turn to the LIFEWORLD made explicit in !ater
manuscripts- such as the texts that make up Die Kri-
sis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phiinomenologie ( 1936)- an ali but palpable
tension is produced as the transcendental confronts the
existential. Amid this tension, the dilemma of the re-
lation of "mental act" and "physical act" and that of
the correlative coincidence of "mental acts" becomes
even more pressing. The problem, however, is simply
pushed into the transcendental realm. There it remains,
unresolved as the analysis ofthe Fifth Meditation, for
ali intents and purposes, is repeated.
In Phimomenologie de la perception (1945), MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY moves out from the tension
present in Husserl's !ater work- a tension frustrat-
ing but fertile. He uses this tension to his own ends,
pushing the implications of the confrontation produc-
ing it until finally the radical priority ofthe existential
is forced into evidence. Merleau-Ponty points out that
Descartes himself was made to concede in his letter
to Elisabeth (June 28, 1643) that the quotidian admix-
ture of "mental act" and "physical act" stands prior
to any reflective analysis that would divide them into
mutualiy exclusive realms. For Merleau-Ponty, this an-
tecedent union is present in each and every mundane
act of expression.
As Husserl understood it in Ideen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913 ), expression is first and foremost concep-
tual expression. As such, expression neither requires
nor demands corporeality. In this immaterial state ex-
pression is essentially non-productive. Despite enig-
matic hints to the contrary, it is limited here to "mirror-
ing" or "depicting" the MEANING or signification (Be-
deutung) of sense (Sinn) already accomplished in a pre-
expressive fundament. Expression is said to exhaust it-
self in the expressing as such. But in Merleau-Ponty's
hands conceptuality presses itself into corporeality and
only there does it find itself as such. Corporeality at
once completes and accomplishes conceptuality. The
reflective iliusion that distorts and disfigures this re-
lation is shattered. In deed and in word, "mental act"
participates with "physical act" whether doing or say-
 528 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ing is called for, called forth, or recalled.
Expression, the upsurge of this participation, ex-
presses itself as a bodily dialectic of movement and
spatiotemporality. This dialectic is not that of a merely
"mobile" body at once oblivious to coordinates deter-
mining its position in the abstract axes of space and
time, indifferent to its own motion or magnitude. It is
that of a motile body oriented with respect to a space
and a time borne by both matter and matters, by ob-
jects and by others: the space and time of doing and
of saying. In the movement of doing and saying, the
dialectic proceeds from the done and the said - the
material residue of do ing and saying (or, by implica-
tion, of not doing and not saying) - toward what is
to be done and said, toward what, in the end, will be
done and said. Thus doing and saying determine the
significance ofwhat is and ofwhat can be (both in the
sense of what is able to be and of what is permitted
to be ), a significance gathered in and gathered from
doing and saying itself. This ongoing determination of
significance is the intelligibility- the manifest sense
(sens)- of do ing and saying. Such intelligibility is the
communicativeness of expression: the covert commu-
nicativeness of doing, the overt communicativeness of
saying.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER had already explored the charac-
ter of this intelligibility- the logos or Rede of do ing
and saying- in Sein und Zeit ( 1927), though in a man-
ner that made its embodied "nature" less evident than it
would become with Merleau-Ponty. He too takes lea ve
of Descartes, ofboth his premises and his project. This
does not, however, am ount- at least in Sein und Zeit
- to a turn away from Husserl 's work. Rather, with
respect to the intelligibility of doing and saying, Hei-
degger clearly exploits many ofHusserl's fundamental
investigations. In this, much ofhis originality !ies in the
audacity and the creativity with which he "existential-
izes" structures already delineated by Husserl (where
such "existentializing" amounts, at least in part, to a
profound and protracted eradication of the Cartesian
element in what he takes over from Husserl).
Husserl 's formulation of the genetic and constitu-
tive structure of the intelligibility of do ing and saying
- its intricate intentionality- must be gathered in de-
tai! from a number ofworks, but can broadly be said to
consist of a tripartite complex of signification, expres-
sion, and indication. Signification is the signification
of sense, the attribution of MEANING to the perceptual
complex of sense data and its fulfillment- to the ex-
tent that such fulfillment occurs. In its simplest form,
it consists of an intentiona! act directed in a particular
manner toward an intentiona! object, the latter subsist-
ing, in part, in a synthesis of matter and form. Ex-
pression, as mentioned, is conceptual expression, the
coming to consciousness of signification, presumably
arising from and moved by the energies of attention.
Indication is the non-essential corporeal accoutrement
to this expression, somehow indicating the occurrence
of the expression, and, by means of this indication,
somehow intimating its content.
At once with and against Husserl, Heidegger in
his 1925 lecture course Prolegomena zur Geschichte
des Zeitbegriffs is adamant that ali signification is ex-
pressed signification, and that ali expressed significa-
tion is disclosive (whether or not such disclosiveness
is indicati ve and as such intimative or something more
profound from whence the indication itself derives).
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger reformulates this assertion
in terms of his own "existential" reworking of these
Husserlian structures. Husserl 's perceptual complex of
sense data becomes a totality of significance that stands
as the horizon of an "involved perception," the ongo-
ing circumspection ofmundane preoccupations (where
totality of significance names a complex intermeshing
of what can be and what may be amid what is). Cir-
cumscribed by an emergent and emerging familiarity,
this totality of significance is determined by compre-
hension ( Verstehen)- whatever its present degree-
and "colored" by disposition (Stimmung)- whatever
its current valuative dimensions.
The particularity of this totality is, for Heidegger,
always in the midst of being rearticulated in the ar-
ticulation, the synthesis and diaresis, of significance
that comprises doing and saying. Guided by whatever
project is at hand, comprehension and disposition are
specified in this articulation as the matter and manner
ofthat doing and saying (a reformulation of Husserl's
signification of sense). Termed interpretation by Hei-
degger, this specification (a reformulation of Husserl 's
expression of signification) amounts to taking hold of
something as something for the sake of something, an
appropriation ofwhat is in terms of its significance, in
terms ofwhat can be and what may be.
The structure of this "something taken hold of' is
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION
clarified in, among other places, "Die Frage nach der
Technik" (1954). Drawing there upon the "doctrine of
the four causes" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Heidegger
delineates this "something taken hold of' in terms of
what is gathered together in it, as the complex "debt"
it owes for what it is. It is indebted to the material from
which it stems, that is, what that material is, how it
stands at present and has arrived at that standing. It
is indebted to the possibilities this material contains,
what it can be and may be with respect to what it now
is. It is indebted to the doer or the sayer as the one who
gathers material and possibility together according to
comprehension and disposition. And it is indebted to
the project of the doing or the saying, to the telos that
guides and sets bounds to the gathering itself.
In the gathering- the articulation of significance,
to return to Sein und Zeit - that comprises doing
("being-in," as Heidegger would have it), what is ap-
propriated is what can be and what may be, insofar
as it actually (and presently) can be and may be. Put
in different terms: in doing, the potentiality of what
is, insofar as it is a potentiality of what is, is appro-
priated and, in this appropriation, actualized- using
here the medieval rendering of the doctrines set forth
in the ninth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In saying
(for Heidegger, "being-with"), what is appropriated is
what can be and what may be as such, as an asserted
possibility of what is (this wou1d explain his other-
wise enigmatic statement in "Brief uber den Human-
ismus" [ 1947] that "language is the house of Being").
Again, to put this in different terms: in saying, poten-
tia1ity is brought into actuality as potentiality per se, as
possibility (BRENTANo's study, Van der mannigfachen
Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles [Ofthe man-
ifold meaning of being in Aristotle, 1862], is helpful
in coming to terms with the necessity of actualizing
the potential as such). It is evident here that doing and
saying require one another, that they are necessarily
coextensive: doing is the do ing of saying (the actual-
ization ofthe potentialization ofwhat is) and saying is
the saying of doing (the potentiality ofthe actuality of
what is).
The movement of appropriation in doing and say-
ing is a movement of EXPECTATION: a question in the
guise of an assertion, a question awaiting response
(this movement is explored with great facility by HANS-
GEORG GADAMER in Wahrheit und Methode [Truth and
529
method, 1960]). This expectation is "worked out" in
the encounter with what is, with objects in do ing and
with others in saying; it is met in that encounter, and,
in this meeting, to one degree or another, it is satis-
fied and it is disappointed. It is by means of the latter
- in grasping the response that disappoints - that
comprehension and disposition are cultivated.
The perpetually shifting synthesis and diaresis of
significance resulting from this cultivation marks the
movement of appropriation and is the intelligibility of
that movement (and so ofboth the do ing and the saying
that this movement consists in). This intelligibility !ies
nowhere behind or beneath the movement, but is the
movement itself. Taking hold of their respective ob-
jects, doing and saying disp1ay this intelligibility in the
ongoing articu1ation ofsignificance (this would bea re-
formu1ation of Husserl 's notion of indication). In this
continuing determination of (potential) significance,
the specification of comprehension and disposition in
doing and saying is disclosed, as is the (actual) sig-
nificance of objects and of words in the satisfaction
and disappointment of that determinati an (a reformu-
lation of Husserl 's notion of intimation). This display
and disclosure is both the covert communicativeness
of doing (and of saying insofar as saying is a doing)
and the overt communicativeness of saying (and of
doing insofar as doing is a saying, that is, is directed
toward another with the intent to communicate). Here,
in the recuperation of Husserl 's work, the dilemma of
the relation of "mental act" and "physical act" is re-
so1ved as is the dilemma ofthe correlative coincidence
of "mental acts."
But expression, the communicativeness of doing
and of saying, is not yet communication (GEORGES GUS-
DORF has made much ofthis distinction in his too often
overlooked La parole [Speech, 1953 ]). As a byproduct
of expression in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger can con-
ceive of commmunication only in a patronizing sort
of relation: as a "leaping in for" and dominating the
other, in its "negative" instance; or, in its "positive" in-
stance, as a "leaping ahead of' and liberating the other.
Here Heidegger remains within the bounds established
in Husserl 's concern to resolve the dilemma of the
corre1ative coincidence of "mental acts" by means of
the communicativeness of do ing and saying. But what
was a means to an end for Husserl, and a problematic
to which he returns time and again, comes to an end
530 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
for Heidegger, who appears never to ha ve reconsidered
this initial formulation.
In Autrement qu 'etre ou au-dela de l 'essence (Oth-
erwise than being or beyond essence, 1974 ), EMMANUEL
LEVINAS rejects the reduction of communication as such
to the communicativeness of doing and saying. This
critique, perhaps already begun in the closing remarks
of Theorie de l 'intuition dans la phenomenologie de
Husserl (1930) and developed at length in Totalite et
infini (1961), reaches its pinnacle here. For Levinas,
the communicative relationship is not in its essence
one of appropriation: it is neither the singular appro-
priation ofthe other in body or thought (a tyranny that
he discusses at length in "Liberte et commandement"
[1953] and that Heidegger also considers when for-
mulating the fundamental distinction between "being-
in" and "being-with" in Sein und Zeit), nor is it a co-
appropriation mediated by some "third term," a term
that provides the common element for communion (for
Husserl, a co-appropriation mediated by the indications
of speaking or by "inferences" from concordant bodily
behavior; for Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, mediated in-
authentically by the vague "certainties" shared in "idle
chatter" or authentically by the "truth" disclosed in
"resolute saying"). This co-appropriation, made pos-
sible by the communicativeness of doing and saying
and by the response that this communicativeness elic-
its (itself a doing or a saying), cannot, of course, be
discarded in considerations of communication as such.
It is rather that this reciproca! expressiveness, however
important, obscures a more fundamental relationship.
Prior to this reciproca! expressiveness- a relation
that for the most part, seeks the assurances of a certain
sameness (a coincidence of thought, of ego with alter
ego, of self with other as another self) and the relative
security this sameness provides - !ies the "face-ta-
face" encounter, the fundamental communicative re-
lationship, a relationship of risk, a reciprocity of al-
terities. Levinas describes this "face-to-face" relation-
ship as one of"proximity." The notion of"proximity"
describes, perhaps paradoxically, the distance without
distance that comprises this relationship. On the one
hand, it is at once the irreducible distance opened up
by the absolute alterity of the other; here, the insight
of Descartes is recovered, yet the inviolability of this
otherness is no longer an ontologica! inviolability, but
one that pertains to ETHICS. And on the other hand, it
is a reciproca! caii for openness and a demand for re-
spect that sounds across this uncrossable distance, a
reciprocity of responsiveness to and of responsibility
for the other that stands prior to and eludes, in this
otherness, ali appropriation. It is a giving of oneself to
the other, a receiving of oneself from the other.
Whatever else communication is, it is a dialogue
- a dialogue of self with other, of self with self as
other; and it is a perpetua! beginning - a beginning
without origin or end. Whatever else phenomenology
may teach us about communication, it will bring us
implicitly or explicitly to symbolon, the term that fig-
ures so prominently in the opening lines of Aristotle's
Peri Hermeneias, a term whose radical sense is "being
thrown together."
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Jaspers, Karl. Philosophie. 2nd ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1948; Philosophy. Voi. 2. Trans. E. B. Ashton. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self, and Society. Ed. Charles
W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.
- . The Philosophy of the Act. Ed. Char1es W. Morris.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.
- . The Individual and the Social Self. Ed. David L. Miller.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Schrag, Ca1vin O. Experience and Being. Evanston, IL:
Northwestem University Press, 1969.
- . Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986.
Schutz, Alfred. Der sinnhajie Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Vi-
enna: Springer-Verlag, 1932; The Phenomenology of the
Social World. Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1967.
- . Collected Papers !: The Problem of Social Reality. Ed.
Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
- , and Thomas Luckrnann. Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt.
Voi. 1. Neuweid: Luchterhand, 1975; The Structures of
the Life-World. Voi. 1. Trans. Richard M. Zaner and H.
Tristram Enge1hardt Jr. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Uni-
versity Press, 1973.
- . Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt. Voi. 2. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1983; The Structures of the Life- World.
Voi. 2. Trans. Richard M. Zaner and David J. Parent.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1989.
Shpet, Gustav. Knigoizdatel' stvo gernes. Moscow: Jarle-
nie i smys1, 1914; Appearance and Sense. Trans. Thomas
Nemeth. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Waldenfels, Bemhard. Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs.
Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluss an
Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
DAVID JAMES MILLER
Michigan Technological University
 PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY More than
sixty years ago EDMUND HUSSERL spoke publicly for the
first time in a systematic fashion about phenomeno1ogi-
cal PSYCHOLOGY, which he had discovered around 1900
in his search for a new foundation for phi1osophy. In
a lecture course of 1925 entitled Phiinomenologische
Psychologie he envisioned this new psycho1ogy as a
discipline destined to p1ay an important role in the a1-
ready established empirica! psychology as well as in
philosophy. Husserl characterized PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGY as an a priori, eidetic, intuitive, purely
descriptive, and intentiona! science of psychic phe-
nomena, in which science remains entirely within the
natural, mundane, or worldly attitude.
From this characterization it is clear that phenomen-
ological psychology, as the a priori and eidetic study
of psychic phenomena, is to be distinguished from
traditional empirica! psychology insofar as pheno-
menological psychology is concerned only with the
"essences" or ei de of the psychic phenomena and not
with the psychic facts purely as such. Thus it re-
lies on the EIDETIC METHOD. Furthermore, contrary to
empirica! psychology, phenomenological psychology
tries to explain these "essences" as unities ofmeaning
within the realm uncovered by a typical psychological-
phenomenologica1 EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION. Phenomen-
ologica( psychology is distinguished from transcen-
dental phenomenology because only in philosophy is a
transcendental reduction performed and is ali meaning
explained as constituted by transcendental subjectivity.
Under the influence of Husserl 's ideas about pheno-
menological psychology, an extensive phenomenologi-
cal psychological movement has developed in many
countries, especially GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, the
UNITED STATES, and SOUTH AFRICA. There are, however,
very few psychologists who have used Husserl's in-
sights and ideas without major modifications in con-
tent, method, or both. The major difficulties experi-
enced by psychologists who have studied Husserl's
ideas in this regard are not rooted in his view of empir-
ica! and phenomenological psychology as such, but
are traceable to his transcendental phenomenology.
Most phenomenological psychologists cannot under-
stand, or cannot accept, Husserl 's position on tran-
scendental reduction and on transcendental subjectiv-
ity. This was the reason why many phenomenological
psychologists turned to the existential interpretation of
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
531
Husserl 's phenomenology that was initiated by MARTIN
HEIDEGGER 's Sein und Zeit ( 1927). To understand the
basic move made from the Husserlian philosophy of
phenomenological psychology to the existential one it
is necessary to say a few words about the manner in
which Husserl justified his conception and why this
justification was found to be unacceptable to EXISTEN-
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY.
In his discussion of the reduction, taken as the
"bracketing of ali being," Husserl stated that an at-
tempt to practice the transcendental reduction and the
systematic self-examination that is made possible by it,
as well as the actual uncovering ofthe ego 's whole con-
scious life, reveal that all that is and exists for the pure
EGO, including consciousness itself, is constituted in
and by it, and that every kind ofbeing has its own way
of constitution. After such a reduction it thus becomes
clear that every imaginable entity, whether immanent
or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcen-
dental subjectivity, which constitutes ali meaning and
being.
In Husserl 's view it is nonsense to conceive of the
uni verse of apodictically true being as something that
!ies outside the uni verse of consciousness and is related
to it merely externally. Both belong together essentially
and, as such, they are concretely one, in the absolute
concretion of transcendental subjectivity. If transcen-
dental subjectivity is the uni verse of al! possible MEAN-
ING (Sinn), then an outside of consciousness must be
nonsense ( Unsinn ). Thus if carried out with system-
atic concreteness, phenomenology is necessarily tran-
scendental idealism. Yet this is neither a psychological
idealism that would derive a meaningful world from
meaningless, sensuous data (Berkeley), nor a Kantian
idealism that somehow believes in the possibility ofthe
world ofthings-in-themselves in addition to the world
of phenomena. Rather, it is a transcendental idealism
as a consistently executed self-explication in the form
of a systematic egological science. This is not a form
ofsolipsism because, in the final analysis, it is possible
in such a phenomenology to explain how the problems
of intersubjectivity and the entire intersubjective world
can be solved in a truly radical manner.
Heidegger was convinced that Husserl 's phenomen-
ology does not respect the limits imposed both on hu-
man reason and on the meaning of Being. In his view,
both are inherently temporal, historical, and finite. No
532 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
forms ofhuman understanding are ever more thanjus-
tifiable interpretations. There is no absolute knowledge
and no presuppositionless philosophy. Furthermore, in
Heidegger's view, it makes no sense to reduce a hu-
man being to a transcendentally pure consciousness
and Being to being-object. No one experiences him- or
herself as a pure consciousness; rather, we experience
ourselves as beings that stand open to the world, and
thus are beings-in-the-world, who ek-sist. As a being-
in-the-world, whose essence is ek-sistence, transcen-
dence, and freedom, each human being experiences
Being always in the concrete form of a WORLD. This
world to some degree reveals Being; yet in other re-
spects it also necessarily conceals it.
It is evident that anyone who wants to develop a
phenomenological psychology ofthe kind Husserl had
in mind, yet at the same time wants to follow Hei-
degger in his reinterpretation of Husserl's idealistic
phenomenology, and thus can admit only a hermeneu-
tica! phenomenology, or anyone who at least somehow
follows Heidegger in his criticism of Husserl's tran-
scendental phenomenology, must try to find another
way to explain the radical distinction between philos-
ophy and phenomenological psychology. As we have
seen, Husserl explained this difference by making a dis-
tinction between the psychological-phenomenological
reduction employed in phenomenological psychology
and the transcendental reduction employed in transcen-
dental phenomenology. Now for Heidegger, a transcen-
dental reduction is impossible and is to be eliminated.
In other words, an ontology concerned with the mean-
ing ofBeing has to take the place ofHusserl's system-
atic egology.
In working out the details ofthe move from a tran-
scendental to a HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, not
ali authors who have been interested in the status
of phenomenological psychology have followed the
same route. Some (Heidegger, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY, etc.) take their point of departure
in Husserl 's lecture course on phenomenological psy-
chology, whereas others (sTEPHAN STRASSER, etc.) prefer
to begin in Husserl 's la test works, notably Die Krisis
der europă ischen Wissenschafien und die transzenden-
tale Phanomenologie ( 1936).
To understand the second position, it is necessary
to say a few words about Husserl 's view of the re-
lationship between phenomenological psychology and
transcendental phenomenology as he gradually carne
to conceive of this during the last decade of his life.
Husserl seems to have realized that a systematically ex-
ecuted phenomenological reduction as used in pheno-
menological psychology must necessarily evolve into
the transcendental reduction. But this would mean
that phenomenological psychology ultimately would
be taken up into transcendental phenomenology. This
conception was strongly promoted by EUGEN FINK, who
at that time was o ne of Husserl 's assistants. Strasser
follows this interpretation and thus accepts the view
that what is called phenomenological psychology is
not a special discipline distinguished from both em-
pirica! psychology and phenomenological philosophy;
rather, the term refers to a certain conception of em-
pirica) psychology that can be justified philosophi-
cally by phenomenological philosophy. In other words,
for Strasser, the term "phenomenological psychology"
refers to a determinate current or school within the
realm of empirica! psychology as a whole. This school
leans on phenomenological philosophy as far as its
philosophical foundations are concerned. It thus is to
be distinguished from the kind ofpsychology promoted
by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), Carl Stumpf (1848-
1936), John Watson (1878-1958), Max Wertheimer
(1880-1943), etc., who assumed quite different kinds
of philosophies.
Sartre, on the other hand, explicitly maintains that
phenomenological psychology is to be conceived as
a special discipline and not as a particular trend in
contemporary psychology. He explains the difference
between empirica! psychology and phenomenological
psychology by stating that the meaning of phenomen-
ological psychology is to furnish empirica! psychol-
ogy with the necessary foundations for its empirica!
investigations by explaining the human meaning ofthe
phenomena with which empirica! psychology deals in
its observations, experiments, tests, explanations, cor-
relations, etc. In reference to the relationship between
phenomenological psychology and philosophy, Sartre
was convinced that phenomenological psychology is
regressive in that phenomenological psychology nec-
essarily has to take into consideration the facticity of
humankind's ek-sistence, which necessitates a regular
recourse to the domain of the empirica!. Philosophy,
on the other hand, is progressive in that the study of
the very essence of the human cannot be verified by a
 PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
recourse to empirica! facts.
From Heidegger's point of view, one can add to
this that any philosophical study of humans is ulti-
mately oriented toward the question ofthe meaning of
Being, whereas phenomenological psychology is ori-
ented toward an understanding of the concrete human
phenomena themselves. Yet distinguishing the two sci-
ences does not at ali entail that they are also to be
separated. On the contrary, ali phenomenological psy-
chology is and must be necessarily oriented toward
a philosophical investigation of humankind in which
it finds its foundation. It is understandable that those
who follow Heideggerpreferto call phenomenological
psychology, thus interpreted, "existential psychology,"
because the philosophical study of the human being,
in which phenomenological psychology finds its ulti-
mate foundation, is an analytic of DASEIN's ek-sistence
in Heidegger's sense.
Psychologists who accept the need for a pheno-
menological psychology- regardless ofwhether they
identify this science with a certain philosophical con-
ception of humankind (Strasser) or whether they con-
ceive of it as a "scientia media" between the philo-
sophical and empirica! studies of human beings -
defend the view that empirica! psychology tries to ex-
plain, at least in principle, exactly demarcated aspects
of the lives of human beings, taken individually or
socially, by reducing them to objective structures and
rules that are universally valid and intersubjectively
acceptable as such. This necessarily implies formal-
ization, functionalization, and some form of quantifi-
cation. As forms ofreduction, these procedures lead to
reductive models, which objectively describe certain
aspects ofthe life and behavior ofhuman beings.
lf o ne accepts this point ofview, then as a necessary
consequence one must also defend the thesis that an
empirica! science of human beings as such, of human
beings as persons, is impossible. Empirica! psychol-
ogy, because ofthe reductions necessarily imposed by
the empirica! methods tobe used, has to restrict itselfto
quantifiable aspects of humankind's existential orien-
tation toward the world; the term "quantifiable" is here
to be taken in a very broad sense in view of the fact
that one will usually employ only statistica! methods.
It has been observed by severa! authors that an em-
pirica! psychology that would make use of the objec-
tifying procedures and methods mentioned would by
533
necessity be reduced to physiology and biology. Ev-
ery phenomenologist who defends the point of view
briefty outlined above is aware that an objectifying
thematization, which necessarily includes formaliza-
tion, functionalization, and quantification, will lead to
reductive models that are relatively poor in comparison
with the concrete ek-sistential orientations toward the
world and the immediately lived experiences as such.
But here one must realize first that no possible kind of
theoretical knowledge is able to describe and to explain
the concrete as concrete. Furth«rmore, in presenting
ek-sistential orientations of humans toward the world
with the help ofreductive models, we must indeed set
asi de certa in aspects of a human being's life that, seen
concretely, may be ofthe greatest importance.
Yet one must also realize that in this way one gains
the possibility of defining certain aspects of human
"behavior" unambiguously and of describing it in con-
nection with other quantified phenomena. Finally, it
is certainly not true that an empirica! investigation
must completely set aside human phenomena such as
meaning, INTENTIONALITY, purpose, teleology, gestures,
and linguistic behavior as expressions ofEMOTIONs and
meaning, as can be shown easily with the help of con-
temporary literature in which it is apparent that under
certain conditions these aspects of our orientation to-
ward the world can be quantified in an indirect manner.
Psychology as an empirica! HUMAN SCIENCE relying to
some extent on quantitative methods is feasible.
Under the inftuence of certain publications by Hei-
degger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, many phenomen-
ological psychologists have come to the conclusion
that the methods ofphenomenological psychology can-
not be the methods recommended by Husserl. One is
convinced that in view of the fact that the knowledge
achieved by the application of descriptive methods is
and remains some form of interpretation, the methods
to be used are those described by the French authors
mentioned as ek-sistential analyses or by Heidegger
as hermeneutica! interpretations, precisely because of
the inh~rently temporal and historical nature ofhuman
behavior.
It is important to note that the necessity of a pheno-
menological psychology as a new science between em-
pirica! psychology and the philosophical study of the
mode ofbeing ofhuman beings was not defended here
on the ground that there is a gap to be filled between
 534 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
empirica! psychology and the psychotherapeutic prac-
tice in which the results of empirica! investigations are
applied to practica! situations and problems of concrete
human beings. It may very well be the case that such
a gap indeed exists; yet it is not the task ofphenomen-
ological psychology to fill it. It seems that this would
be the task of an art and not one of a scientific theoret-
ical discipline that is to provide empirica! psychology
with basic concepts, principles, and specifications for
the use of methods.
Yet underlying the issues touched upon here there is
another very important one. The empirica! psycholo-
gists who effectively make use ofthe insights brought
to light by phenomenological psychology interpret the
psychic phenomena and the various forms ofbehavior
from the perspective ofthe theoretical framework made
available by phenomenological psychology. When the
results of empirica! research are brought to bear by psy-
chotherapists on the difficulties and problems clients
bring up in psychotherapeutic sessions, the clients
themselves interpret the phenomena and forms of be-
havior they present to the psychotherapists within a
framework of meaning that in most cases is different
from that of the therapists. It stands to reason that the
therapists will be able to help these clients to the de-
gree that they are abie to "penetrate" the framework of
meaning from which the clients understand their own
situations. For only ifthe therapists can do so will they
be able fully to understand their clients' positions and
needs, and help them effectively.
Now where one projects phenomena upon a frame-
work of meaning or world in empirica! psychology, we
also encounter here the need for the opposite procedure,
namely to enquire back from the known phenomena to
the world from which they ideally can be understood.
The work of the psychotherapist is here similar to the
work ofthe person who interprets the meaning of a text
by projecting it upon a horizon or world from which
it can be understood. It is in this kind of research that
the methods of HERMENEUTICS, first developed in clas-
sical philology, are to be employed. In other words, in
addition to empirica! and descriptive psychology there
is still a need for an interpreti ve psychology. To avoid
needless confusion, it is perhaps recommendable not to
speak about three different sciences, but instead to say
that psychology contains empirica!, descriptive, and
interpreti ve components.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Driie, Hennann. Edmund Husserls System derphănomenolo­
gischen Psychologie. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963.
Husserl,
Edmund. Phănomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen
Sommersemester 1925. Ed. Wa1ter Biemel. Husser/iana
9. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962; Phenomenologi-
cal Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925. Trans.
John Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
~.Husserl: Shorter Works. Ed. Peter McCormick and Fred-
erick A. Elliston. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1981.
~. Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phănomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die
phănomenologische Philosophie. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Husserliana 6. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954; The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Pheno-
menology: An 1ntroduction to Phenomenological Philos-
ophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Uni-
versity Press, 1970.
Kockelmans, Joseph J. Edmund Husserl:~ Phenomenologi-
cal Psychology: An Historico-Critical Study. Pittsburgh:
Dusquesne University Press, 1967.
Kockelmans, Joseph J., ed. Phenomenological Psychology.
The Dutch School. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenologie de la perception.
Paris: Gallimard, 1945; Phenomenology of Perception.
Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1962.
~. Les sciences de 1'homme et la phenomenologie. Paris:
Gallimard, 1953; "Phenomenology and the Sciences of
Man." Trans. John Wild. In his The Primacv o{Percep-
tion and Other Essays. Ed. James Edie. Evanston, IL:
Northwestem University Press, 1964, 43-95.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. L 'imagination. Paris: Alcan, 1936; 1magi-
nation. Trans. Forrest Williams. Ann Arbor, MI: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1962.
~. Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions. Paris: Hennann,
1939; Sketchfor a The01y ofthe Emotions. Trans. Philip
Mairet. London: Meuthen, 1962.
~. L 'imaginaire: Psychologie phenomenologique de
1'imagination. Paris: Gallimard, 1940; Psychology of the
lmagination. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1948.
Strasser, Stephen. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963.
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS
The Pennsylvania State University
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL See POLITICAL PHILOS-
OPHY.
 PHYSICAL EDUCATION
PHYSICAL EDUCATION One of the key
themes of the phenomenological movement is the no-
tion ofthe lived BODY. Yet the phenomenological recog-
nition of the body-subject, and the disclosure of the
centrality of lived bodily experience, is itself an ongo-
ing historical process taking place within a larger cul-
tural context marked not only by new ways of paying
attention to bodily life, but also by new bodily prac-
tices and new ways of theorizing about practices. For
example, by the time ofthe inception ofthe phenomen-
ological movement, both DANCE and physical education
were already feeling the influence of a non-dualistic ap-
proach to movement, gesture, and expression inspired
in part by the work ofFran<;ois Delsarte ( 1811-1871) in
Paris; one effect ofthe new approach was the very shift
in terminology in North America from physical "train-
ing" to physical "education." Military-style drill meant
to discipline the physical body gradually gave way to
addressing the whole experiencing person through cre-
ative play and rhythmic movement. Meanwhile, the
first three decades ofthe 20th century in Europe saw a
move away from traditional gymnastic exercises and an
emergence ofvarious forms of"harmonic" and "rhyth-
mic" gymnastics (some ofwhich influenced European
pioneers in soMATICS, who in turn gave courses on their
own new work in body and movement awareness for
physical education - or "physical re-education" -
teachers). Eventually, an appreciation for the situated,
personal subject moving in lived TIME and SPACE -
as presented, for example, in the phenomenologically
shaped PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY of FREDERIK J. J.
BUYTENDIJK - was incorporated into some European
physical education theory. (This is reflected not only
in citations in the literature, but also, for instance, in
the fact that some physical education teachers trained
in THE NETHERLANDS have been required to take course-
work in phenomenological PSYCHOLOGY.)
But while an implicitly phenomenologica\ orienta-
tion seems to lie at the core of physical education, the
actualized version is both underexplored and underde-
veloped. Over the past two decades, explicitly pheno-
menological work has been gaining ground in North
American physical education; however, the gains have
largely been theorists doing research on phenomen-
ology rather than practitioners do ing phenomenology.
There has also been research done using phenomen-
ological methods developed for the HUMAN SCIENCES,
535
but do ing phenomenology in an applied way is not yet
prevalent. The phenomenological character ofphysical
education seems to manifest itself in three loose cat-
egories: work that acknowledges phenomenology as
relevant and useful; work that involves using pheno-
menological methods; and work that is based in doing
phenomenology in an applied and/or heuristic fashion.
Theorists in the philosophy of physical education
and sport have been making the case for the rele-
vance of phenomenology as a theoretical framework
for philosophical inquiry and analysis in physical edu-
cation. R. Scott Kretchmar's 1974 dissertation offering
"A Phenomenological Analysis of the Other in Sport"
is a case in point. We might a\so point to the fact
that CALVIN O. SCHRAG's "The Lived Body as Pheno-
menological Datum" ( 1962) is included in William J.
Morgan and Klaus V. Meier's anthology concerning
Philosophic Inquily in Sport ( 1988), as are excerpts
from JEAN-PAUL SARTRE and GABRIEL MARCEL and es-
says by ALPHONSO LINGIS and IRIS MARION YOUNG. The
volume also contains an excerpt from EUGEN FINK's
Oase des Glucks. Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des
Spiels (Oasis of happiness: Thoughts concerning an
ontology of play, 1957) in a translation that also ap-
peared in the journal Philosophy Today in 1960 (and
again in 1974), while Meier's own essay on "Embod-
iment, Sport, and Meaning" contrasts Cartesian dual-
ism with MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's investigations of
"incarnate consciousness" and unequivocally recom-
mends a phenomenologica\ approach to philosophy of
sport. The Schrag, Fink, and Meier pieces mentioned
are also included in Ellen W. Gerber's edited collection
devoted to Sport and the Body ( 1972; 2nd ed. 1979),
as is SEYMOUR KLEINMAN's 1964 essay on "The Sig-
nificance of Human Movement: A Phenomenological
Approach." Kleinman has also published or presented
many other papers dedicated to justifying the kindred
association between phenomenology and physical ed-
ucation. For instance, "Phenomenology- The Body
- Physical Education" ( 1964) deals with the relcvance
ofMerleau-Ponty's notion ofbody-subject to physical
education, while "Physical Education and Lived Move-
ment" ( 1971) takes ERWIN w. STRAUS 's "Le mouvement
vecu" ( 1935-36) as its point of departure. Kleinman
has since shifted from a more theoretical perspective
aimed toward introducing phenomenological concepts
to physical educators to the actual "do ing" of pheno-
536 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
menological work within a somatics context, a turn
reflected in the degree program he heads at The Ohio
State University and in the yearly conferences he or-
ganizes as we11 as in some of his more recent essays.
For example, in "Intelligent Kinesthetic Expression"
( 1990), he recommends a "kinaesthetic" and "somatie"
phenomenology of artistic and athletic movement, and
in "Researching Lived Experience in Movement and
Dan ce" ( 1991-92 ), he warns against di vorcing "pheno-
menology" as the production of texts (an aspect em-
phasized in MAX VAN MANEN's 1990 work on phenomen-
ological methodology, Researching Lived Experience)
from direct somatie encounter and from the living prac-
tice of moving.
By far the bulk ofphenomenological work in phys-
ical education is in the area of using phenomenology
and phenomenological methods in the conduct of in-
quiry- in the design, implementation, analysis, and
reporting of research. Expository work on the "how
to" aspects ofphenomenology is evident, for instance,
in the 1969 master's thesis by Peter Spencer-Kraus on
"The Application of 'Linguistic Phenomeno1ogy' to
the Philosophy of Physical Education and Sport"; in
Sharon K. Sto11's 1982 essay on "The Use of Pheno-
menology to Investigate and Describe Sport in the
Historical Genre"; and in Kathleen Pearson's presen-
tation of "Methods of Philosophic Inquiry in Physical
Activity" (1990). Phenomeno1ogical work that is ac-
tua11y descriptive and experientia11y oriented is also
becoming more prevalent, particularly in master's the-
ses and doctoral dissertations. Notable examples in-
clude Nancy Wessinger's master's and doctoral work
on the child's experience of games in physical edu-
cation; Brian Pronger's work on gay men and ath-
letics; Rick Osbourne's thesis on "Competition and
the Ultimate Athletic Experience: A Phenomenologi-
cal Approach" ( 1979); Janice L. Progen's disserta-
tion comprising "An Exploration of the Flow Expe-
rience among Selected Co11ege Athletes" ( 1981 ); and
Katherine A. Welter's thesis concerning "Complete
Moments in Sport: A Phenomenological Approach"
( 1978). Stephen Smith 's doctoral work on seeing a risk,
and MAUREEN CONNOLLY's doctoral work on difficulty,
have since inspired more applied phenomenological
work in the area ofteacher preparation in physical ed-
ucation.
There is also a relatively strong, albeit
sma11, descriptive-narrative phenomenological tradi-
tion within physical education, especia11y in Canada.
Ph(momenology and Pedagogy and Lifeworld Editions,
two publication series sponsored by the University of
Alberta (Edmonton, Alberta), were powerful vehicles
for this descriptive-narrative phenomenological work,
and some ofthe more compe11ing descriptions are from
physical education: HEATHER DEVINE's "The Pheno-
menology of Training" ( 1984 ), COLIN LORBACK 's "Wa-
ter Experience" (1981 ), and DAVID P. JOHNs's "Pheno-
menology and the Gymnastic Movement" ( 1981, rpt.
1985). Related essays have appeared in the United
States in, for instance, Dorothy J. A11en and Brian
Fahey's edited co11ection on Being Human in Sport
( 1977), e.g., Kenneth Ravizza's "Potential ofthe Sport
Experience" and Ginny Studer's "Moment-to-moment
Experiences of Self." More widely published work
in the descriptive-narrative tradition that resonates
strongly with physical education includes the work of
JAN HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG and MARTINUS LANGEVELD
(both members of the so-ca11ed Utrecht school). JAN
BROEKHOFF, a Netherlands scholar based at the Univer-
sity of Oregon, is another who advocates a narrative
approach that is deeply invested in the body; he sup-
ports the necessity of body-based phenomenological
work in physical education.
Fina11y, there is an emerging trend toward do-
ing phenomenology in physical education in an ap-
plied/heuristic fashion. For example, the field of adap-
tive physical education (physical education for special
populations) provides many opportunities for this kind
of work. Zeroing in on eidetic features of a particu-
lar type of movement experience can make it clearer
how to modify an activity so that persons with vari-
ous capacities can a11 participate, as can asking special
needs "insiders" directly about their own experience
and making recommendations based on their frame of
reference (rather than tacitly assuming that of able-
bodied experience). Moreover, working with insiders'
descriptions and stories - and developing a richly
detailed yet non-dual language for articulating bodily
experiences- wi11 not only reveal the body as a basis
of meaning for self and self with others, but can also
foster empathy, contact, and understanding the Other
-even the differently-abled Other- "from the inside
out." Conno11y's work in phenomenology and special
populations is supported by the seminal work ofs. KAY
 POLAND
TOOMBS (The Meaning oflllness: A Phenomenological
Account of the Different Perspectives of Physician and
Patient, 1992) and her remarkable account ofthe lived
experience of multiple sclerosis, which amply demon-
strates how descriptive phenomenological work can
bring clarity and empathy to the preparation of prac-
titioners, be they teachers or physicians. Thus here-
as in NURSING- the phenomenological movement has
begun to make a contribution to practice in the field, as
well as to theory building and research within the field
and philosophical reftection about the field.
Physical education has been practicing phenomen-
ology "in the wild." The narrative tradition in phys-
ical education is neither strong nor encouraged; de-
spite this, it has retained its voice and sustained itself.
Ironically, many in physical education use pseudo-
phenomenological concepts in a largely unreftective,
unacknowledged manner in their teaching and leam-
ing. The connections must be made explicit so that
the full force of ali that phenomenology has to offer
can be experienced as fully as possible. By using the
resources of a phenomenological orientation - such
as experientially grounded language, narrative descrip-
tion, insider experience, and a sensitivity to common
patterns across contexts ( eidetic features) - the body
could return to its place of authority in physical educa-
tion and the lifeworld.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Connolly, Maureen. "Practicum Experiences and Joumal
Writing in Adapted Physical Education: Implications for
Teacher Education." Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly
11 (1994), 306--28.
- . "Phenomenology, Physical Education, and Special Pop-
ulations." Human Studies 18 ( 1995), 25--40.
Devine, Heather. "The Workout: The Phenomenology of
Training." Phenomenology and Pedagogy 2 (1984), 163-
77.
Johns, David. "Body Awareness and the Gymnastic Move-
ment." Phenomenology and Pedagogy 3 (1985), 116--25.
Pronger, Brian. "Gay Jocks: A Phenomenology ofGay Men
in Athletics." In Sports and the Gender Issue: Critica!
Perspectives. Ed. Michael A. Messner and Don Sabo.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1988, 141-52; rpt. inRe-
thinking Masculinity: Philosophical Explorations in Light
of"Feminism. Ed. Larry May and Robert A. Strikwerda.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992, 41-55.
Sandau, Jerry. "Heidegger and Schwarzenegger, Being and
Training." Philosophy Today 32 (1988), 156--64.
Smith, Stephen. "Seeing a Risk." Phenomenology and Ped-
agogy 5 (1987), 63-75.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
537
- . "Where is the Child in Physical Education Research?"
Quest 43 (1991), 37-54.
Stoll, Sharon K. "The Use ofPhenomenology to Investigate
and Describe Sport in the Historical Geme: An Alternative
Approach to Sport History." Quest 34 (1982), 12-22.
Wessinger, Nancy Peoples. "I Hit a Home Run! The Lived
Meaning of Scoring in Games in Physical Education."
Quest 46 (1994), 425-39.
MAUREEN CONNOLLY
Brock University
POLAND Polish phenomenology has been
shaped by both externa! circumstances, especially po-
litica! realities, and by Polish intellectual culture, tra-
dition, and language. Phenomenology as a distinct
movement was first introduced to Poland in 1913 by
WLADYSLAW TATARKIEWICZ, who \ater became one ofthe
most prominent Polish historians of philosophy and
aesthetics. ROMAN INGARDEN published his first article
on phenomenology in 1919.
In 1928, LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN pub\ished Husser-
[owska nauka o akcie, tresci i przedmiocie przedstaw-
ienia (Husserl's science ofthe act, content, and subject
of representation). Next to Ingarden, Blaustein was
the only significant phenomenologist in Poland be-
fore World War II. He published frequently until 1938.
He was silenced and !ater died during World War II
in a Nazi concentration camp. Blaustein, like Ingar-
den, was connected with Lvov, the birth place of the
Lvov-Warsaw school in philosophy and logic. Neither
of them, however, commited himself to that school.
At that time, they both promoted EDMUND HUSSERL's
version of phenomenology. Ingarden eventually de-
veloped his own version. One should notice, however,
that the founder ofthe Lvov-Warsaw school, Kazimierz
Twardowski ( 1866--1938), was, like Husserl, a student
of FRANZ BRENTANO. Twardowski's theory of objects
of thought caused a polemica! reaction in Husserl.
Roman Ingarden was a student of both Twardowski
and Husserl. His option for phenomenology resulted
in an outsider's position in Lvov where he lived before
World War Il.
The years 1939-56 were very unfavorable for Polish
intellectual life in general, phenomenology included.
First it was the war, and then the changes in the po-
litica! system followed by years of rigid Communist
538 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
regime that saw in phenomenology a threat to Marxist
ideology. In the early 1950s, MARXISM became the only
philosophy taught in state universities.
The Communist Party introduced a more friendly
policy toward intellectuals in 1956 and there was rel-
ative prosperity for Ingarden and a growing interest in
phenomenology thereafter. Severa! articles on pheno-
menology were published in Polish philosophicaljour-
nals each year. But the philosophical mainstream in
Poland was dominated by disputes between Marxists
and non-Marxists (mainly Roman Catholics). Pheno-
menology never enjoyed a central position. Together
with its old adversary, the Lvow-Warsaw school and
its descendents, it was rather a "neutra!" zone since the
1960s. A phenomenologist ora philosopher of science
could also be a Marxist ora Catholic. The ideologica!
approach was a hidden one. What appeared on the sur-
face was an objective, "ideologically neutra!," rational
investigation. Nevertheless, the frequently taken ap-
proach was manifested in the question: what is wrong
in this philosophy? rather than: is the statement under
scrutiny true?
Roman lngarden had a group of students and
colleagues who continued and developed his tra-
dition of phiJosophizing (ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA,
MARIA GOLASZEWSKA, WLADYSLAW STROZEWSKI, ADAM
WEGRZECKI, and ANDRZEJ POLTAWSKI). Ingarden's views
and judgments were crucial to the way most of the
youn-ger Po1ish philosophers (not only his students)
approached phenomenology. The main interests ofthat
group of phenomenologists was in AESTHETICS, VALUE
THEORY, and PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
Another scholar whose philosophy and charismatic
personality attracted students to phenomenology was
KAROL WOJTYLA (Pope John Paul II). Wojtyla was intro-
duced to phenomenology by his philosophy professor,
Roman Ingarden. Next to him, TADEUSZ STYCZEN and
JOZEF TISCHNER are the most prominent Roman Catholic
clergy phenomenologists in Poland. Both can be de-
scribed as Thomist (or neo-Thomist) personalists, or
Thomist phenomenologists. Their main field of inter-
est is ethics, philosophical anthropology, and social
and politica! philosophy. The phenomenology of Sty-
czeri and Tischner has been formed in the tradition of
Jacques Maritain ( 1872-1973 ), the French existential-
isi, and Scheler, under the heavy infl.uence of Karol
Wojtyla. Many young scholars continue this tradition.
In 1967, Karol Martei published the first book
on Husserl in Poland after World War II: U pod-
staw fenomenologii Husserla (At the base of Husserl 's
phenomenology). This book was for many years an
important text for philosophy students interested in
phenomenology.
After 1970, when the so-called "normalization" of
the politica! relations between Poland and West Ger-
many took place, Polish authorities no Ion ger objected
to research on such prominent German thinkers as
Friedrich Nietzsche, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, KARL JASPERS,
and others. Until then, each ofthose philosophers had
been virtually banned from intellectual life in Poland,
at least on its official, public level. Nietzsche was seen
through the Ienses of Gyorgy Lukacs, i.e., as being
above aii the forerunner of Nazism. Heidegger's un-
doubted links with the Nazi Party had made the ap-
propriateness of not only any affirmative, but even of
any neutra!, "purely philosophical," study of his phi-
losophy questionable. Jaspers was labeled as an anti-
communist. However, after West German chancellor
Willy Brandt visited Poland and paid tribute to those
killed by the Nazis on Polish soi!, the era of "building
bridges between West and East" was declared. Polish
philosophers, especially those of the younger gener-
ation, eagerly tried to catch up with the West and to
explore long forbidden terrains. Hence from the early
1970s one can witness in Poland a growing number of
publications on German phenomenologists.
The idealism-realism controversy between Ingar-
den and Husserl doubtlessly contributed to agreat pop-
ularity of Edmund Husserl in Poland. The interest in
his philosophy was to a certain degree a result of in-
teres! in Ingarden. Husserl's works are the works most
frequently discussed by Polish philosophers interested
in phenomenology.
Polish phenomenologists from the generation ofln-
garden's students are more or less "lngardenists." This
resulted from the authority oflngarden and from signif-
icant inaccessibility of foreign books in Poland. With
the exception of Ingarden, ali great phenomenologists
of the "classical" period of this movement were non-
Polish. Even lngarden wrote some of his works origi-
nally in German. In some cases, it was years until these
were translated into Polish.
For the above reasons and also because ofthe high
position of HISTORY as a discipline in Poland, many
 POLAND
of the post-World War II works on phenomenology
( especially those written before the 1980s) belong to
the field ofthe history ofphilosophy.
Since many original works were inaccessible, the
way in which the views of a foreign philosopher were
presented to Polish readers affected their opinion of
that philosopher. Therefore, some scholars who are
not really phenomenologists are very important for
phenomenology in Poland. This is especially true in
the case of Leszek Kolakowski. Because of the im-
portance of Kolakowski 's own original works, and be-
cause ofhis inftuence on the present young generation
of Polish philosophers, which is greater than that of
Ingarden, Kolakowski's opinions about Husserl, HENRI
BERGSON, etc., have great weight. Many young Polish
philosophers-to-be became interested in Husserl be-
cause Kolakowski wrote about him. Kolakowski treats
phenomenology first and foremost as part of the his-
tory of European philosophy, i.e., as being a search
for answers to "timeless" questions already asked in
pre-Socratic Greece. The human condition, our quest
for knowledge, our fascination with transcendence are
subjects of his interest.
KRZYSZTOF MICHALSKI aJso had a significant impact
on the reception of phenomenology in Poland. In the
1970s, he published extensively on phenomenology,
especialJy on Heidegger and HANS-GEORG GADAMER.
His comprehensive and challenging work on Heideg-
ger was titled Heidegger i filozofia wsp6lczesna (Hei-
degger and contemporary philosophy, 1978). In it he
translated the specifically Heideggerian terms into Pol-
ish (many of them for the first time) and strongly in-
ftuenced the perception of Heidegger in Poland. His
translation of Heidegger 's neologisms, being basically
an imposition of a certain interpretation, is by now
well-rooted in Polish philosophical jargon.
Free from the obstacles it faced in Poland, pheno-
menology was developed by some Polish philosophers
abroad. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka is the most success-
ful among them. The other great Polish name in pheno-
menology in the UNITED STATES is ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI.
However, being already a third-generation American,
Sokolowski does not regard himselfas part ofthe Pol-
ish philosophical community. Tymieniecka received
her initial philosophical education in Poland, being
a student of Ingarden whose phenomenology - as
well as Karol Wojtyla ' s - she energetically promotes
539
worldwide. Tymieniecka has elaborated her own ap-
proach to phenomenology. With a major interest in
aesthetics, she focuses her philosophy on the problems
of human creativity and life.
Many of the leading phenomenologists in France
as welJ as Germany (JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, GABRIEL MAR-
CEL, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, MARTIN HEIDEGGER) were
known in Poland as existentialists rather than phe-
nomenologists, since the term EXISTENTIAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY was not commonly used in Poland un tii recently.
Next to his philosophy offreedom, Sartre 's atheism
was a foca! point for the philosophers in Poland, which
has been a battlefield in the war between the Roman
Catholic Church and the Communist Party. In 1961,
one ofthe most brilliant Polish philosophers, and at that
time one ofthe Jeading Party ideologists, Adam Schaff,
published Marksizm a egzystencjalizm (Marxism vs.
existentialism). Schaff's role in stimulating interest in
phenomenology was similar to Kolakowski's. In this
book, which really opened the debate on EXISTENTIAL-
ISM in Poland, Schaffpresented Sartre as an existential-
ist and the problem of"existentialism and humanism"
vs. "Marxism and humanism" as the kind of problem
Marxist philosophers could and should be occupied
with. Humanism here had three aspects: the Heideg-
gerian concept presented in his "Brief iiber den Hu-
manismus" ( 194 7), the Renaissance concept, and the
popular understanding of humanism as basically syn-
onymous with "atheism." Many philosophers jumped
on the bandwagon at that time. At the same time, the
Roman Catholic philosophers, notably Wojtyla, pro-
moted Maritain's existential humanism.
Ultimately, the problem of"religious faith vs. philo-
sophical faith" became a major subject ofinvestigation.
Philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Leon
Shestov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Martin Buber, Jaspers, and
Heidegger were discussed from that position.
An anthology of texts by leading French, German,
and Russian existential phenomenologists titled Filo-
zofia egzystencjalna (Existential philosophy) was pub-
lished by Leszek Kolakowski and Krzysztof Pomian
in 1965. They wrote a very insightful introduction
to this anthology. Both the introduction and the texts
published in Filozofia egzystencjalna served students
for years as a basic source of knowledge about ex-
istentialism. With time, however, the initial fascina-
tion with existentialism faded. Today, there is some
540 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
interest in particular philosophers (Sartre, Jaspers, Bu-
ber, Shestov, Berdyaev) or in particular problems (the
Other, communication, freedom, reason vs. faith, etc.)
rather than in existentialism as a movement. In 1972,
in a special issue of Studia Filozoficzne devoted to
Roman Ingarden, Stefan Sarnowski published a text,
"Fenomenologia i egzystencjalizm" (Phenomenology
and existentialism), that can be regarded as a summary
ofthe debate on existentialism in Poland.
Discussions of Sartre and existentialism did not en-
tirely dominate the phenomenological movement in
Poland. Roman Catholic phenomenologists like ADAM
WţGRZECKI were interested first of ali in Max Scheler.
Karol Wojtyla's occupation with Scheler's philosophy
contributed to this interest immensely. Wojtyla was one
of the most important Polish phenomenologists, even
before he became pope. His election to the Holy See
only magnified interest in his philosophy among Pol-
ish scholars. Numerous works are devoted to his philo-
sophical views, and even more are written in the spirit
ofhis philosophy. Wojtyla's phenomenology, focusing
on the ethical and metaphysical sta tus of a person as
well as his theory of action is strongly influenced by
Thomas Aquinas. This combination of Thomism and
phenomenological anthropology and ethics is visible
in many works ofPolish philosophers in the 1980s and
1990s.
After Husserl and Scheler, Heidegger became the
most important foreign phenomeno1ogist for Poland.
In the same decade, serious scholarship on Jaspers
was initiated by Roman Rudzir\.ski, whose untimely
death in 1985 left his work unifinished. In the 1980s,
Jaspers's philosophy became a major point of inter-
est for KRYSTYNA GORNIAK-KOCIKOWSKA and CZESLAWA
PIECUCH. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, NICOLAI HARTMANN,
PAUL RICCEUR, and HANS-GEORG GADAMER are a[so fre-
quent[y discussed in Polish philosophical literature.
From the late 1970s on, they were joined by HAN-
NAH ARENDT, DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND, EDITH STEIN, EM-
MANUEL LEVINAS, JACQUES DERRIDA, and OCCasionally by
ALFRED SCHUTZ. JACEK SOJKA published a book on the
social onto1ogy of Schutz entitled Pomi?dzyfilozofig a
socjologig: Spoleczna ontologia Alfreda Schiitza (Be-
tween philosophy and sociology: The social ontology
of Alfred Schutz, 1991 ).
Persona1ism was another field of interest for
Catholic phenomenologists. GABRIEL MARCEL ( 1889-
1973), Emmanuel Mounier ( 1905-1950), and Jacques
Maritain were introduced to the Polish audience as per-
sonalists or "re1igious existentialists." Karol Wojtyla's
interest in Maritain contributed very strong1y to the
popularity ofhis philosophy in Po1and. Some Marxists
(e.g., Klara J<;drzejczak, Ryszard Poplawski) specia1-
ized in critica!, anticlerical presentations of personal-
ism. Others attempted an "objective," "nonreligious"
analysis of that movement. Even Protestant thinkers
like Andrzej W6jtowicz participated in the dispute on
the meaning of a Person.
One of the best known concepts of the Poznan
schoo1 of methodo1ogy (Jerzy Kmita, Leszek Nowak,
Wlodzimierz Lawniczak, etc.) ~ the method of ab-
straction and gradual concretization, which has been
presented (wrong1y, as shown by A. Kocikowski)
as "Marx's scientific method" ~ has visible traces
of Husserl 's "princip1e of all principles" and of ln-
garden 's concept of "concretization" as presented in
Das literarische Kunstwerk (The literary work of art,
1931 ). Although the Poznan school of methodo1ogy
originated from the phi1osophy of one of the most
prominent members ofthe Lvov-Warsaw schoo1, Kaz-
imierz Ajdukiewicz, it has enough space left for its
members and supporters to be creatively interested in
phenomenology. Works by younger scholars ~ e.g.,
EWA KOBYLINSKA'S investigation on INTENTIONALITY and
hermeneutica! pansemiotism, S6jka's on Schutz, and
PAWEL ozoowsKI's texts on Ricceur ~ can serve as ex-
amples. Barbara Kotowa wrote on Ingarden's aesthet-
ics. However, Poznan never really was a very signifi-
cant center ofphenomenology in Po1and.
On the other hand, the achievements of the mem-
bers ofthe Poznan school ha ve an influence on the way
phenomenology is dealt with in Poland today. Scholars
ofthe younger generation use texts written by members
of Poznan school. For examp1e, writing on aesthetics,
LUKASZ A. PLESNAR supports his views by quoting Jerzy
Kmita and Wlodzimierz Lawniczak's work in aesthet-
ics and theory of culture, although neither Kmita nor
Lawniczak are phenomenologists. Phenomenology in
Poland is not iso1ated. Scholars from different philo-
sophical orientations influence and creatively stimulate
one another.
Thanks to Ingarden, the interest in phenomenologi-
cal aesthetics was very high among Polish philoso-
phers. Anna-Tere sa Tymieniecka, Maria Golaszewska,
 POLAND
Alicja Kuczynska, and Wladyslaw Str6zewski are
the most significant. Aesthetics was an area where
"friendly coexistence" of opposite philosophical po-
sitions occasionally turned into a battlefield. For in-
stance, Ingarden was criticized for proposing "false
solutions" for some problems important for the soci-
ology of literature and for not showing enough inter-
est in the social context ofthe reception ofthe literary
work. Numerous authors, such as JANINA MAKOTA, JERZY
SWIECIMSKI, and G. SZULCZEWSKI, used phenomenology
for solving specific problems in aesthetics, especially
in the visual arts. In the United States, WOJCIECH CHOJNA,
who was educated in Poland, and !ater studied under
J. N. MOHANTY and Joseph Margolis, uses his Ingarden-
oriented phenomenologyto investigate problems in so-
cial philosophy and aesthetics.
R. w. KLUSZYNSKI deals with the place ofphenomen-
ology in the theory of FILM as do WACLAW M. OSADNIK
and LUKASZ PLESNAR. Osadnik and Plesnar claim that
intentiona! objects are the hasis for the creation ofthe
representational stratum of a film work. Having their
work rooted in the linguistic theories, they propose to
speak ofthe quasi-intentional character of such objects
in the same sense as one speaks ofthe quasi-linguistic
nature of film communication, because it stresses their
theoretical character.
Philosophy of language is a major field of interest
for HANNA BUCZYNSKA-GAREWICZ. Her other interest is
the problem of freedom. She is inftuenced mainly by
Husserl and Scheler.
Part ofthe works by ANDREZEJ POLTAWSKI, Krystyna
Zamiara, A. Zalewski, K. Sroda pertain to phenomen-
ological PSYCHOLOGY. P6ltawski was a disciple of In-
garden, but is also strongly inftuenced by Karol Wojtyla
and HENRI EY. His other point of reference is the phi-
losophy of G. E. Moare (1873-1958). His interest in
the problems of consciousness and PERCEPTION make
philosophy of knowledge and phenomenological psy-
chology his main fields of activity. P6ltawski's book
Swiat, spostrzeienie, Swiadomosc: Fenomenologiczna
koncepcja swiadomosd a realizm (World, perception,
consciousness: The phenomenological concept of con-
sciousness and realism, 1972) belongs now to the canon
of classic texts in the field. Another area of his in-
vestigation is philosophical anthropology. Converg-
ingly, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY, especially in the work of
Kurt Lewin ( 1890-1947) and Wolfgang Kohler ( 1887-
541
1967), who inftuenced Jan Dembowski's Psychologia
malp (The psychology of apes, 1951 ), has been appre-
ciated in Poland. An important book written from the
position ofGestalt theory, Trud istnienia (The hardship
of existence, 1986) by Kazimierz Dl_lbrowski, author
of a theory ofpositive disintegration, serves as support
for Brunon Holyst's views on Husserl 's ethical an-
tirelativism. Phenomenologically inftuenced works by
Jacek S6jka, Jacek Tittenbrun, Zdzislaw Krasnodl_lbski,
M. Czyzewski, and others, have been published in so-
CIOLOGY. Stanislaw Czerniak published a book on Max
Scheler's sociology of knowledge entitled Socjologia
wiedzy Maxa Schelera (Max Scheler's sociology of
knowledge, 1981, with a summary in German).
A new generation of more "world-oriented" schol-
ars, scholars who are ready to join the international
community, is emerging now in Poland. However, the
present "atomization" of phenomenology in general,
i.e., its split into numerous quite separate divisions,
does not make the situation easy. At present, it is dif-
ficult to say which of the phenomenological orienta-
tions, if any, will gain the greatest popularity among
the young Polish philosophers and will be creatively
developed. It is also too soon to see how will they use
the freedom from ideologica! and politica! pressure.
However, the new politica! situation after the fali of
Communism, and the new generation ofphilosophers,
seem to be promising for the future of Polish pheno-
menology. In general, the direction provided by Karol
Wojtyla is continued by his disciples and by the young
generation of scholars trained by them. This is today
the strongest current in Polish phenomenology. Thanks
to much greater freedom than was the case in older gen-
erations, Polish philosophers participate intensively in
the international exchange of ideas. A significant num-
ber of them live and publish outside of Poland. For
many (e.g., K. G6rniak-Kocikowska, J. S6jka, and W.
Zelaniec) phenomenology is one but not the only field
of interest. In other cases, a philosopher is interested
in certain problems (such as time, freedom, creativ-
ity, etc.) and investigates this problem from different
perspectives with phenomenology being one of them.
There are new initiatives and new fields of interest,
some of which are presented below.
Bogdan Baran wrote the first book in Poland pre-
senting phenomenology in the UNITED STATES. It is both
a short history ofthat movement there and the introduc-
542 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tion of some of its most important achievements. Baran
names JAMES M. EDIE, LESTER EMBREE, DON IHDE, HUGH SIL-
VERMAN, ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, and
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka as representative for con-
temporary American phenomenology. From his point
of view, Americans started to be interested in pheno-
menology when phenomenology in Germany was dy-
ing, which in his opinion happened in the 1940s. Baran
is very cautiously optimistic about the fate of pheno-
menology in its last fortress, America.
MARIA BIELAWKA writes on the discovery of inner
time-constituting consciousness in an essay in Studia
Filozoficzne, 1990. In that paper, she shows a pos-
sible way of explaining the epistemological paradox
of our consciousness, which is timeless but has the
ability of constituting TIME. She accepts the thesis that
Husserl 's opening up of the domain of in ner conscious-
ness was possible because of a momentary, apodicti-
cally certain, transcendental or critica! self-reflection.
Bielawka sides with Husserl in the conclusion that it
is a necessity of reason to accept the existence of a di-
vine being (the absolutely creative consciousness). Her
strong statement about the meaning of "constitution"
by Husserl as co-creation of reality through the agency
ofthe structure of our mind somewhat summarizes the
years of discussions Polish phenomenologists ha ve had
on the nature ofhuman being and ofhuman actions. By
saying that the human being is the co-creator of reality,
and by tracing this view back to Husserl, she places the
achievements ofPolish Roman Catholic phenomenol-
ogists in the legitimate Husserlian tradition.
Extensive work in the field of Husserl studies has
been done by STANISLAW JUDYCKI, whose book /nter-
subiektywnosc i czas (lntersubjectivity and time, 1990,
with a summary in German), focuses on Husserl's late
writings. Judycki is also interested in the investigation
ofphenomenology per se. His articles on the nature and
subject matter of phenomenology provide valuable in-
formation and insight. Judycki frequently refers to the
works of German and American phenomenologists.
The "Aletheia" Foundation publishes a periodica!
entitled Aletheia and a series ofbooks, mostly transla-
tions of contemporary classic philosophical positions.
An issue on Heidegger dzisiaj (Heidegger today) was
published in 1990. It contains short writings by Hei-
degger, including "Mein Weg in die Phănomenologie"
(1963), and texts about Heidegger. The volume is de-
voted to his philosophy and to the controversy about
Heidegger and Nazism (with a bibliography on that
subject). As it was in the past forty years, Cracow,
Lublin, and also Warsaw remain the cities in which
most of the research in phenomenology is concen-
trated.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
A comprehensive bibliography ofbooks, articles, essays, etc.,
published in Poland in the Polish language in the field of
phenomenology between 1913 and 1987 (not including
texts by or on Roman Ingarden) has been put together by
JANUSZ SIDOREK and published in Analecta Husser!iana
27 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 685-
714. Listed below are items published after 1987.
Baran, Bogdan. Saga Heideggera (Heidegger's saga). Cra-
cow: Inter Esse, 1990.
Chojna, Wojciech. "The Phenomenological Redescription of
Violence." In Justice, Law, and Violence. Ed. James B.
Brady and Newton Garver. Philadelphia: Temple Univer-
sityPress, 1991,112-17.
D6bowski, J6zef. "Dlaczego epistemologia bezzalo:i:eniowa
jest konieczna i jak jest mo:i:liwa?" (Why is presuppo-
sitionless epistemology necessary and how is it possi-
ble?). In Profite racjonalno.~ci. Ed. A. Zachariasz. Lublin:
UMCS Publications, 1988, 72-112.
G6miak-Kocikowska, Krystyna. "The Concept of Freedom
in Jaspers and Heidegger." In Heidegger & Jaspers. Ed. A.
M. Olson. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993,
139-53.
Judycki, Stanislaw. "Fenomen i analiza" (Phenomenon and
analysis). Studia metafilozoficzne 1 (1993), 213-34.
Kowalczyk, Stanislaw. Wprowadzenie do .filozofii J. Mar-
itaina (Introduction to the philosophy of J. Maritain).
Lublin: RW KUL, 1992.
Majewska, Zofia. "Intencjonalny spos6b istnienia wartosci
a prob1em miejsc niedookreslenia" (Intentiona! mode of
the existence of values and the problem of the places
of indefinability). In Studia z ontologii i epistemologii
wartosCi. Ed. J. Lipiec. Krak6w: Alma Art, 1990.
Michalski, Krzysztof. Logika i czas. Proba analizy Husser-
lowskiej teorii sensu (Logic and time: On Husserl's the-
ory of sense ). Warsaw: Panstwowy Institut Wydawniczy,
1988.
Piecuch, Czescawa. Transcendentna i immanentna trdc
poj(!cia "Chijfer" u Karla Jaspera (The transcendent
and immanent content of the notion of "Chiffer" in Karl
Jaspers). Cracow: ZNAE, 1990.
Plesnar, Lukasz A. Semiotyka.filmu (Semiotics of film). Cra-
cow: Jagellonian University Press, 1990.
S6jka, Jacek. "Filozofia i nauki spoleczne. Czy mo:i:liwajest
fenomenologiczna socjologia?" (Philosophy and social
sciences. Is phenomenological sociology possible?). In
Kategoria potocznosci. Zr6dlafilozoficzne i zastosowania
teoretyczne. Ed. A. Jawlowska. Warsaw: Instytut Kultury,
1991.
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Salamun-Hybacek, Elisabeth, and Kurt Salamun, eds.
Jahrbuch der 6sterreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft
3/4 (1990/91).
Studia Filozoficzne (Philosophical studies ). 2/3 ( 1990) (Con-
tains papers presented at the conference marking the fifti-
eth anniversary of Husserl's death. The conference was
organized by the Polish Philosophical Society in Cracow
in 1988).
Zelazna, Jolanta. Egzystencjalia i struktury heideg-
gerowskiego Dasein [Existentials and structures of Hei-
degger 's Dasein]. Torun, 1993.
Zelaniec, Wojciech. "Fathers, Kings, and Promises: Husserl
and Reinach on the A Priori." Husserl Studies 9 (1992),
147-77.
The following philosophical joumals deserve attention:
Analecta (Warsaw), Analecta Cracoviensia (Cracow),
Arka (Cracow), Etyka (Warsaw), Filozofia (Lublin),
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny (Cracow), Logos 1 Ethos
(Cracow), Principia (Cracow), Przeglad Humanisty-
czny (Warsaw), Przeglad Filozoficzny (Warsaw), Studia
Philosophiae Christianae (Warsaw).
One can also find publications on phenomenology in Catholic
joumals such as Znak, Roczniki Filozoficzne KUL, Zeszyty
Naukowe KUL (KUL stands for Catholic University of
Lublin), Studia Teologica Varsaviensia, and W Drodze,
as well as in the atheistic joumals such as Czlowiek i
Swiatopoglad, Studia Filozoficzne, Euhemer, and Argu-
menty, some ofwhich do not exist anymore. Interestingly,
many authors published in both types of joumals. Occa-
sionally, there were articles on the relation between pheno-
menology and Christianity or phenomenology and Marx-
ism. Teksty, a rather interdisciplinary jouma!, frequently
publishes phenomenology as well.
KRYSTYNA GORNIAK-KOCIKOWSKA
Southern Connecticut State University
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Every philosoph-
ical movement that deals thematically with the distin-
guishing features of human existence has important
implications for politica) thought. And the history of
Western politica) philosophy shows that major concep-
tual developments tend to occur when politica! life is
particularly strife-ridden. Given the central concems
of the phenomenological movement and the histori-
cal era in which it emerged, it is not surprising that it
has generated a considerable body of politica! thought.
Some of this thought builds upon fundamental claims
defended by phenomenologists. And some of it grows
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
543
out of criticisms directed against part orali ofthe over-
all phenomenological orientation.
EDMUND HUSSERL 's late "Vienna" )ecture, "Die Krisis
des europăischen Menschentums und die Philosophie"
( 1935), draws together themes from throughout his cor-
pus. Among them are severa! whose politica! signifi-
cance becomes evident in the politica) thought ofthose
whose philosophical work he inftuenced. In this essay,
he argues that human beings are not merely corporeal
entities subject to the laws of physical causality. They
are also essentially free agents who fashion a culture
and a history that are always open to innovation and
that in turn provide them with resources to produce
new achievements. He argues that because scientific
or philosophical NATURALISMS of whatever sort treat
human life as nothing other than one of many types
of being, ali of which are wholly a product of and
subject to causal mechanisms, they are both not only
theoretically mistaken, but also practically dangerous.
They mislead people into misconstruing the sources
of ACTION and the possibilities for fruitful, harmonious
communal life.
At least as important for politica! thought is the
analysis of human existence that MARTIN HEIDEGGER
presents in Sein und Zeit ( 1927). This seminal work
stresses, among other things, both the distinctiveness
of human existence and its historicality and finitude.
We are born into a material and cultural WORLD not of
our own making, we inevitably modify it in ways not
fully under our control, and we hand over the outcome
of our transactions with one another and the surround-
ing world to the next generation. Much ofHeidegger's
subsequent work was devoted to developing, and sig-
nificantly transforming, his treatment of these topics.
His own politica) activity during the reign of Nazism
clearly deserves severe censure. To what extent his con-
duct has its basis in his philosophical analyses remains
a matter of deep controversy. Nonetheless, those anal-
yses have continued to influence the politica) thought
of the many scholars who ha ve always been opposed
to totalitarianisms of ali sorts.
Both Husserl and Heidegger recognized their debt
to KANT. But they drew different lessons from him.
Husserl's work shows an unwavering dedication to the
modernist Enlightenment ideal of a self-critica) com-
prehensive science toward which we are able to make
unending progress. Heidegger's work, with its atten-
544 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tion to the limitations that pervade ali thought and
action, opens the way for sustained reflection on the
disunities and discontinuities in ali parts ofhuman ex-
perience. This emphasis has found echo in the multiple
versions of POSTMODERNISM. Nietzsche, who had no dis-
cernible influence on Husserl, is prominent particularly
in Heidegger's !ater thought.
The politica! and social context in which both
Husserl and Heidegger lived was riddled with con-
flict. The turmoil and widespread misery that industri-
alization and the workings ofbourgeois capitalism had
brought with them provoked strong criticism of the
prevailing politica! order. Both fascism and Marxist
communism gained great strength not only in intellec-
tual circles but also in daily life. MARXISM, though, held
the much greater intellectual attraction.
A major intellectual outcome of the rise of inter-
es! in Marx 's work was the return to prominence of
Hegelianism, particularly those parts of it that deal
with history and politics. Thus Marx and HEGEL, along
with Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger, estab-
lished the conceptual context in which, after World War
II, a distinctive corpus of politica! thought developed
that bears the unmistakable mark ofphenomenology's
influence.
Two of the most eminent German philosophers to
have developed the politica! implications ofthis intel-
lectual heritage have been HANS-GEORG GADAMER and
Jilrgen Habermas. HANNAH ARENDT, who produced her
most important work in the United States, was also a
native German reared in this tradition, largely under
the tutelage of Heidegger and KARL JASPERS.
Gadamer, whose principal work is Warheit und
Methode (Truth and method, 1960), is in the forefront
ofthose who followed the lead of Sein und Zeit and de-
veloped a HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY. Hermeneu-
tica] phenomenology seeks to discern meanings, uni-
ties, and continuities underlying the multiple phenom-
ena that comprise our experience of living with one
another in a common world. Included in this search is
the practica! aim ofbringing our own thoughts, aspira-
tions, and objectives into effective dialogue with those
of our predecessors as well as of our contemporaries.
In practicing this hermeneutica! phenomenology,
Gadamer explicitly invokes the Platonic dialogues and
Aristotle 's practica! philosophy to complement the tra-
dition of German philosophy since Kant. In particular,
Gadamer has emphasized the linguisticality of human
life. We always think and act on the basis of LANGUAGE.
Rather than our having language as an acquisition, lan-
guage is constitutive ofus and the context in which we
li ve. And, like us, language is thoroughly historical.
Among the main implications Gadamer's work has
for politica! philosophy are ( 1) that no theory, politica!
or otherwise, can ever attain definitive validity, and (2)
that ali norms for conduct, politica! or otherwise, bear
the marks oftheir historical articulation, interpretation,
and application. This is so because oftheir dependence
upon traditions in which they arise and the linguisti-
cality of ali traditions.
Thus for Gadamer, the Enlightenment project of
seeking to achieve sufficient independence from our
material and cultural circumstances so that we could
exercise impartial, autonomous critica! judgment on
either theoretical claims or practica! activity is mis-
guided. What we can come to know of the true or
the good we know in and through the resources of
the tradition to which we belong. Our tradition does
not isolate us from others. Rather, it provides us with
the wherewithal to understand. In principle, no part of
human HISTORY is wholly inaccessible to us. But no
interpretation of o urs of any part of it can be definitive.
By contrast, Jilrgen Habermas's work- culminat-
ing in his theory of communicative action, which gets
its fullest expression in Theorie des kommunikativen
Handelns (Theory of communicative action, 1981)-
represents an attempt to refurbish the Enlightenment
project to make it responsive to the conceptual and
practica! contexts oftoday's politicallife. Like Husserl
and Heidegger, Habermas rejects naturalism. But with
Marx he emphasizes the material and social conditions
that shape ali aspects of human life. Hegel has taught
him the intersubjective or dialogi cal character of rea-
son. And from Kant he has learned that for each sort of
activity there are permanent norms that determine the
validity of any performance thereof.
Habermas has his roots in the Frankfurt school
of CRITIC AL THEORY. Other distinguished members of
this school are Theodor Adorno ( 1903-1969), Karl-
Otto Apel, Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), and Her-
bert Marcu se ( 1898-1979). Pragmatism and speech
act theory have also figured significantly in his work.
Habermas emphasizes that we live in a linguistically
articulated and hence public world of shared experi-
 POLJTICAL PHILOSOPHY
ence. This world comprises three domains to which
linguistic performances refer, namely, the domains of
objective, social, and subjective reality. Politics is part
of social reality.
For Habermas, the central task for contemporary
politica! thought is to determine the valid basis for the
norms that are to guide politica! practice. He rejects the
efforts of systems theorists and others to make politica!
practice subject to norms derived from the exercise of
instrumental reason. Instead he proposes a theory of
communicative action whose norms are those required
for undistorted communication. Only such communi-
cation, he holds, can do justice to the complexity of
the lifeworld. The LIFEWORLD, a notion he has adapted
from Husserl 's !ater thought, embraces all three do-
mains of reality. Norms for appropriate conduct can
only be formulated and tested in discourse in which,
in principle, everyone is equally entitled to participate.
To promote and engage in such discourse is to en-
gage in fully rational communicative action. Thus the
task of politica! practice is to establish and maintain
institutions that support and foster communicative ac-
tion. Constitutional democracy, with the discourse and
practices that are inherent in it, is the proper politica!
structure for so doing.
Among the principal contributions that Hannah
Arendt has made to politica! philosophy are the dis-
tinctions she makes between politics and other sorts
of activity and the account she gives of the kinds of
achievements that politics promotes. The politica! do-
main is primarily a domain of persuasive discourse in
which we share our opinions and judgments about how
we should best act to set our distinctive stamp on the
resources of the common world into which we have
been born. The objective of politica! effort is to be-
queath to our successors a heritage that both bears the
mark of what we have accomplished and nonetheless
leaves room for them to make their own contributions.
For her characterization of the distinctive features of
politics, spelled out in detail in The Human Condition
( 1958), Arendt drew heavily on her understanding of
the Greek polis and Aristotle's reflections on it. She
also made extensive, though not always explicitly ac-
knowledged, use of the analysis of human existence
that Heidegger presented in Sein und Zeit.
Besides the German strand, there has also been a
French strand, represented most notably by JEAN-PAUL
545
SARTRE and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. At the root oftheir
politica! thought, in addition to the works of Husserl
and Heidegger and their predecessors in German phi-
losophy, are the lectures of Alexandre Kojeve ( 1902-
1968) on Hegel, delivered between 1933 and 1939 and
given book form as La lecture de Hegel (The reading
of Hegel, 194 7).
The politica! dimension of Sartre's work springs
from his lifelong attention to the matter of freedom.
In his most famous work, L'etre et le neant (1943),
Sartre raises the issue of what we should do with the
freedom that is unavoidably ours. His efforts to respond
to this issue extend over the rest ofhis work. Already in
the review Les Temps Modernes, which he edited with
Raymond Aron ( 1905-1983 ), SIMONE DE BEAUYOIR, and
Merleau-Ponty and which first appeared in 1945, Sartre
argues that we should commit ourselves to addressing
the urgent politica! and social questions of our times.
To do this effectively, we must recognize the dialectica!
structure ofhuman existence. That is, in the course of
our lives we both shape our milieu and are in turn
shaped by it.
Bourgeois thought, Sartre claimed, could not do jus-
tice to the dialectica! character of life. But Marxism
provided important guidance for doing so. Commu-
nism, as a movement, brought Marxism to bear on
contemporary social and politica! issues. But it itself
tended to disregard the freedom constitutive of each
person. Sartre therefore argued that a fully developed
politica! philosophy would have to show how indi-
vidua1s, groups ofpeople, institutions, and material re-
sources ali dialectically interact, and then foster ways to
ensure that individual freedom would always be given
its due recognition and opportunity to be exercised.
His Critique de la raison dialectique ( 1960) gives a
detailed account of the dialectica! view of politics at
which he arrived.
The sources of Merleau-Ponty's politica! philoso-
phy were much the same as those of Sartre's. But the
investigations that culminated in Phenomenologie de
la perception ( 1945) led him to what he found to bea
more subtle dialectic that was structured by ali dimen-
sions of human ]ife. PERCEPTION, MEMORY, and IMAGI-
NATION, speech, action, work, and thought ali display a
dialectica! structure that shapes each of them and ties
them to one another. This dialectic also ties us to one
another, to institutions, and to our material surround-
546 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ings. Because of this pervasive dialectic, ali aspects
of our lives display an ambivalence or ambiguity that
never gives way to a Cartesian clarity or certainty.
Reflecting on the politics ofhis time in Humanisme
et terreur (1947), Merleau-Ponty maintained a hope
that Soviet Communism would come to show itself as
a progressive force in history, one whose violence gave
promise of reducing subsequent violence. But Soviet
activity connected with the North Korean invasion of
South Korea convinced him in 1950 that this hope no
longer had any defensible basis.
Adding to his ongoing reflection on contemporary
politica! events an analysis of language inspired by
Saussurian linguistics, Merleau-Ponty came to the con-
clusion that none of the versions of Marxism that
served as the theoretical hasis for any actually exist-
ing regime was defensible. Instead, in Les aventures
de la dialectique ( 1955), he concluded that parliamen-
tary democracy was the best presently available form
of regime. Because it provides for an expression of
opposition to established practices and policies, parlia-
mentary democracy in effect gives formal recognition
to the inevitable ambiguity ofpoliticallife.
CLAUDE LEFORT, who worked cioseJy with him,
has continued to develop politica! themes central to
Merleau-Ponty's thought. Among these developments
are Lefort's studies ofthe French Revolution and of de
Tocqueville's reflections on democracy, which are to
be found in his Essais sur le politique ( 1986).
Though PAUL RICCEUR has not written extensively on
politics, what he has written is of considerable interest.
His reflections on politics are applications ofhis studies
dealing with TIME, history, ACTION, and the self. The
sources on which he draws are Jargely those that inform
Merleau-Ponty's work. But as Soi-meme comme un
autre (Self as another, 1990) shows, he has also taken
into account pertinent parts of recent Anglo-American
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY.
FRANCE is also home to a postmodern current
of politica! thought, many of whose principal fig-
ures develop at least parts of their positions in ex-
plicit opposition to phenomenology. Among them are
Gilles DeJeuze, JACQUES DERRIDA, MICHEL FOUCAULT, EM-
MANUEL LEVINAS, and Jean-Francois Lyotard. The post-
modernists agree that the Enlightenment claims for a
reason that is able to establish universal, ahistorically
valid truths and norms are indefensible. So too are any
phenomenologically based claims that consciousness
or the self is capable of attaining wholly undistorted
insights either into itself or into its surrounding world.
Nietzsche or Freud or both, by reason oftheir diagnoses
of the numerous ways in which we delude ourselves,
provide resources that many postmodernists deploy in
articulating their critiques of politica! doctrines and
practices.
Contemporary French FEMINISM tends to agree with
the general postmodern critique of any thought deriv-
ing from Enlightenment principles or from phenomen-
ological analyses of consciousness. Prominent here are
Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva.
Both the German and the French strands of po-
litica! philosophy informed by phenomenology have
had a significant impact upon recent politica! thought
in North America. Numerous books and articles on
topics in politica! thought that reflect phenomenologi-
cal influence appear each year. This influence is also
evident in the presentations made at many meetings
of professional academic societies. Among the many
American scholars who have brought phenomenolog-
ically informed politica! thought to prominence in the
UNITED STATES and in the process have critically en-
riched it, severa! are particularly deserving of men-
tion. FRED DALLMAYR has made clear, subtle analyses
of major parts of both the German and the French
strands. His work on Heidegger is especially notewor-
thy. Comparable clarity, insight, and scope is charac-
teristic of Richard Bernstein's studies ofboth ofthese
strands. Seyla Benhabib, Thomas McCarthy, and Tom
Rockmore ha ve produced impressive critica! studies of
principal parts ofthe German strand. Benhabib, Nancy
Fraser, and IRIS MARION YOUNG have ali made notable
contributions to feminist thought by drawing on both
German and French sources.
No less noteworthy work has been done by Amer-
ican scholars on the French strand. Ronald Aronson,
WILLIAM MCBRIDE, and THOMAS FLYNN have done im-
portant work on Sartre's politica! philosophy. Flynn
has also contributed substantially to Foucault schol-
arship, as have James Bernauer and David Hoy. SONIA
KRUKS 's and HWA YOL JUNG 's critiques ofMerleau-Ponty
and other French phenomenological thinkers also merit
mention. JOHN CAPUTO and William Connolly ha ve help-
fully drawn attention to the politica! implications of
severa] French postmodemists. The phenomenologi-
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
cally informed environmental philosophy that ALBERT
BORGMAM has developed likewise has weighty impli-
cations for politics.
Mention also should be made of the affinities be-
tween contemporary communitarian politica! thought
and the phenomenological tradition. They both stand
in opposition to the individualism that is ingredient in
many versions of politica! liberalism. Instead, commu-
nitarians emphasize the ties that not only bind us to
communities but are indeed constitutive of us. Each
of these communities has its own distinctive history,
a prominent part of which is some accepted view of
a shared or common good that its members should
seek to realize. Hence- liberalism notwithstanding
- each person's own individual good is inextricably
bound up with those of his or her fellow citizens. It
follows then that justice is not first and foremost a pro-
cedural matter and that it is indissociable from the com-
mon good rather than enjoying a priority overthe good.
Two of the most prominent communitarians, Charles
Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre, clearly recognize their
affinities with important parts ofthe phenomenological
tradition.
Running through the wide-ranging debates that
comprise the politica! thought nurtured by or generated
in opposition to phenomenology is much the same set
of issues that has been perennial in Westem politica!
philosophy. Among these issues are four that are par-
ticularly prominent now at the end of the 20th century.
One of these is the nature of the politica! agent. To
what extent, if any, can individuals exercise genuine
agency? If they can, then how do they come topos-
sess the appropriate qualifications for exercising it? A
second, closely related, issue concems how a person
acquires legitimate authority over others. What limits
are there to legitimate politica! authority and how are
these limits tobe enforced? Third, how does one deter-
mine the proper relationships between the individual
person and his or her fellows and their politica! institu-
tions? For example, to what extent is family life tobe
subject to politica! regulation? The fourth of these is-
sues is perhaps the one that most distinguishes our era
from previous ones. It is the issue of how the human
community is to respond to the scarcity of resources.
This ever more obvious scarcity of a number of vital
resources, e.g., water, arable land, usable energy, and
health care, raises questions concerning just distribu-
547
tions whose complexity is without precedent. Dealing
well with the scarcity of these and other resources is
no longer something that an individual state, however
powerful, can do. The scarcity can only be effectively
dealt with intemationally. Today, a politica! philoso-
phy that does not respond to ali ofthese issues in some
detail is seriously impoverished. Each ofthese matters
is weighty and they ali impinge upon one another. How
one deals with any ofthem has ramifications for ali of
them.
By its rej ection of ali versions of naturalism, pheno-
menological thought implies that the future is open to
human initiative that can be either good or bad. What
at least some of us do at least some of the time intro-
duces something genuinely new into the world. One
domain in which the new can occur is that ofpolitics.
Phenomenological reflection therefore sets two endur-
ing tasks for the politica! philosopher. First, it calls for
him or her to describe as fully as possible the scope and
nature of our capacity to bring about something new in
the public order of our relations with o ne another. And
second, it calls for an analysis of what distinguishes
the beneficent new from the trivial or the maleficent
new.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. London: Rout-
ledge, 1992.
Borgmann, Albert. Techno/ogy and the Character ofContem-
porary Life: A Philosophical Study. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1987.
Dallmayr, Fred. Critica! Encounters: Between Philosophy
and Politics. Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame
Press, 1989.
Dauenhauer, Bemard P. The Politics of Hope. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.
Flynn, Thomas R. Sartre and Marxist Existentialism: The
Test Case of Collective Responsibility. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1984.
Fraser, Nancy. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
In gram, David. Habermas and the Dialectics ofReason. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.
Kruks, Sonia. Situation and Human Existence: Freedom,
Subjectivity, and Society. London: Routledge, Chapman
& Hali, 1990.
Lefort, Claude. Essais sur le politique. Paris: Seuil, 1986;
Democracy and Politica! Theory. Trans. David Macey.
Minneapolis, MN: University ofMinnesota Press, 1989.
548 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
McBride, William. Sartre s Politica! Theory. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana Uni versi ty Press, 1991.
Michelfelder, Diane, and Richard E. Palmer, eds. Dialogue
and Deconstruction. Albany, NY: State University ofNew
York Press, 1989.
Waldenfels, Bernhard, Jan P. Broekrnan, and Ante Pazanin,
eds. Phiinomenologie und Marxismus. 4 vols. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977~79; Vols. 1 and 2 trans. as
Phenomenology and Marxism. Trans. J. Claude Evans.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.
Warnke, Georgia. Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987.
Whiteside, Kerry. Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of
Existential Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1988.
Zimmerman, Michael E. Heidegger s Confrontation with
Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1990.
BERNARD P. DAUENHAUER
University of Georgia
POLITICAL SCIENCE This discipline has
come to have a fairly exact meaning in the second half
of the 20th century: the attempt to study politics by
using methodologies that replicate, as far as possible,
those of NATURAL sciENCE. This undertaking generally
grounds itselfin a model ofscientific inquiry as "value-
free" - as a study of "facts" only, conducted by a
neutra] and dispassionate observer. It offers a positivist
account ofpolitics, treating politica! phenomena as sets
of objective, empirica! data from which explanatory
and- ideally- predictive models can be developed,
particularly through the use of aggregating quantitative
techniques. It is behaviorist in orientation, focusing
on the observable behaviors and the recordable and
quantifiable opinions of politica! actors to the exclusion
of more experiential dimensions of politics. It is also
atomistic in its conceptions, regarding individuals as
fundamentally discrete entities and politica! systems
as devices that aggregate their interests and actions. It
fosters NATURALISM.
Politica! science thus conceived developed above
ali in the UNITED STATES. Although contested today, it
still continues to be the dominant paradigm for the
study ofpolitics there, and has also been influential on
the academic study ofpolitics in European universities
and elsewhere. The entire "canonica!" phenomenologi-
cal tradition, from EDMUND HUSSERL to the !ater work
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, contains an incipient critique of
politica! science, putting into question its claims to
objectivity and value-neutrality and its behaviorist ex-
clusion ofiNTENTIONALITY, MEANING, and consciousness
from the study of politics. However, none of the ma in
figures of the tradition ha ve engaged directly with the
discipline.
The point of origin for a phenomenological critique
of politica! science perhaps !ies in Husserl 's critique
of the "natural attitude" in science and his insistence,
in his late work Die Krisis der europăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
(1936), on the priority of the "lifeworld" (Lebenswelt)
as a pre-refiective dimension that must ground any kind
of conscious investigation or activity. The lifeworld is
thus both the ground for the conceptual operations of
politica! science itself and also always exists as the
ground for politica! action of any kind. In neglecting
this, the positivist politica! scientist fails to grasp his
or her own lived relation to what is being studied and
also ignores fundamental dimensions of politica! real-
ity, instead fiattening the ambiguous world of politics
into a domain of exact and manipulable data.
This last point can be further illuminated through
MARTIN HEIDEGGER's account of technology. The
essence ofTECHNOLOGY, Heidegger argues, is a mode of
disclosure ofBeing that "enframes" or brings forth na-
ture as mere "standing reserve" for human uses. Such
an attitude replaces the open and refiective questioning
ofBeing that is the essence ofthe human being with a
calculating rationality that "entraps" nature. Moreover,
such an enframing threatens to extend itself from the
domain ofnature to humans themselves, reducing even
human beings to merely quantifiable resources. Viewed
from such a perspective, politica! science is part of a
dangerous and potentially dehumanizing movement.
Heidegger also puts into question the atomistic con-
ception of human beings on which politica! science
rests by arguing that human existence is always a form
of co-being or Mitsein. The self is not a sharply de-
lineated EGO or a self-referential cogito, but always a
dwelling in the world with others. Thus aggregating
"individual" opinions or actions will not take us very
far in understanding the politica! domain.
In the french EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY of MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY, a critique of atomistic and empiri-
cist notions of the self is yet more directly brought to
 POLITICAL SCIENCE
bear on the HUMAN sciENCES and on the analysis ofpol-
itics and HISTORY. For Merleau-Ponty human existence
is always embodied. Thus the observer is situated in his
or her field of perception, and knowledge is always at
root perspectiva!. A detached vision, such as positivism
claims to have of its objects of study, is never possi-
ble. Merleau-Ponty criticizes both behaviorist psychol-
ogy and the positivism of"orthodox MARXISM," which
claims to have an objective and scientific knowledge
of the "laws" of history. He insists that both miss the
necessarily open, or indeterminate, quality of human
existence. Although we can talk of tendencies in hu-
man history, and of "sedimentations" that predispose
individuals, and even societies, toward particular ends,
the realm ofhuman ACTION remains one of openness-
indeed freedom - that precludes definitive explana-
tions or predictions. Freedom, as Merleau-Ponty puts
it in Phenomenologie de la perception ( 1945), "thrusts
roots into the world," such that human existence must
rather be conceived as a dialectic offreedom and struc-
ture, ofthe contingent and the necessary.
Given such a dialectica! quality to human existence,
it follows also that the distinction between facts and
VALUEs - on which politica! science places such im-
portance - is put into question. Facts can never be
wholly "objective," while values do not belong to the
sphere ofjudgment alone, but are created in a concrete
situation not always wholly of our own choosing or
making. The project of a value-neutral politica! science
is, following Merleau-Ponty, not merely misguided but
hazardous, for it refuses to recognize its own values and
evades responsibility for their consequences. It also in-
volves an unjustifiable hubris conceming the capacity
of human reason to understand the world of politics,
for this is a world where sense can rapidly turn into
nonsense and good intentions into sources of suffering
or violence.
Phenomenology does not only engage with polit-
ica! science as a methodological critique. There are
also some thinkers who develop phenomenologically
informed accounts ofthe politica! world. These bear on
the substantive concems of politica! science while also
addressing issues, notably about the place of freedom
and MEANING in politics, that politica! scientists nor-
mally disregard. This is particularly true ofthe work of
HANNAH ARENDT (in her youth a student of Heidegger),
who wrote extensively on politics after World War II.
549
As a German Jew and a refugee in the United States
for most ofher productive life, Arendt's concerns were
shaped by the politica! evils of Nazism and other totali-
tarian regimes in ways in which the work of Heidegger
certainly was not. But much ofher work can be read as
a critica! appropriation and development for the realm
of politics of his account of DASEIN as a disclosure of
Being.
In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt distin-
guishes between labor, work, and action as the three
central dimensions ofhuman existence. Although labor
(the cycle of repetitive tasks necessary for the basic bi-
ologica! maintenance ofhuman beings) and work (the
fabrication of durable things through which humans
put their mark upon nature) are both necessary to the
human condition, it is in the sphere ofaction-the vita
activa- that human being and freedom most fully ap-
pear. It is in this sphere also that she locates politics, at
least at its best.
The vita activa is the life of action, including speech,
and it requires as its basic condition what Arendt calls
"human plurality." By the latter she means the exis-
tence of a web of human relationships between peo-
ple who are never identica!, yet who experience them-
selves as sufficiently equal tobe a bie to understand one
another other. Were they identica!, were there no dis-
tinctions between them, action as a way of disclosing
the self to others would not be necessary. But it is in
action that human beings uniquely reveal who they are,
that the self discloses and creates itself. For this dis-
closure to take place there must be a possible space of
disclosure- that is, a public space, ora politica/ arena.
Thus politics is not properly about economic matters
or the pursuit of personal self-interest, but is about the
free disclosure of self, through deeds and words, to
one 's equals in a public realm. It was to ancient Greece
that Arendt looked for this paradigm of politics- to
the polis. There, within a literal and moral space de-
fined by the fabric of the laws, free and equal citizens
could engage, in Aristotle's words, in the "sharing of
words and deeds."
This vision takes politics tobe significantly different
from the power-centered and interest-laden object of
study ofthe modem politica! scientist. But although she
looks to ancient Greece for the original model, Arendt
uses this vis ion as a powerful heuristic tool for analysis
and critique of the modern politica! world. Through it
550 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
she brings to light the ways in which the instrumentality
associated with labor has degraded the politica! sphere.
She also persistently searches for the specific forms in
which public spaces for appearance have, from time to
time, reappeared in history and addresses the question
ofhow such spaces might further be fostered now. Thus
starting from what politica! scientists would categorize
as a normative theory- one about what politics ought
ideally to be, not about what it is - she develops an
analysis of modern politica! institutions and processes
that can cast new light on some of the substantive
matters with which politica! science concems itself.
The modern world, Arendt shows, is one in which
the "instrumentalization of action" and the concomi-
tant "degradation ofpolitics" into mere means for other
ends has become pervasive. Production, consumption,
and species survival have invaded what ought to have
been the sphere of action for its own sake. In her es-
say On Revolution ( 1963 ), Arendt examines how what
now passes for politics has come, since the period of
the American and French Revolutions, increasingly to
concern itself with nonpolitical matters: with the "so-
cial question," the utilitarian "pursuit of happiness,"
and the attempt to regulate the economy. She demon-
strates that as these concerns ofthe world oflabor have
invaded politics, the spaces for the public disclosure of
self- the "spaces offreedom" that were created in the
original moments of both the French and the Ameri-
can Revolutions- increasingly ha ve tended to close
up. The institutionalization of the initial democratic
impulse, particularly the growth of unwieldy and un-
responsive forms ofrepresentation, party systems, and
new elites, has now stultified politics, converting it
from a realm offree action into a set ofinstruments for
the efficient administration of power for material ends.
Worse, it has brought about the passivity and anomie
ofthe masses on the basis ofwhich totalitarian regimes
have, in some instances, been able to emerge.
Politica) scientists, claiming to focus only on "what
is," conceive of politics as indeed about the wielding
of power for instrumental ends. But this focus on what
immediately presents itselfto observation functions to
obscure knowledge of other kinds of politica! reality.
For as Arendt goes on to demonstrate in On Revo-
lution, there does also exist another tradition, one in
which politics as the disclosure of being, or the realm
of freedom, remains possible. The "lost treasures" of
the revolutionary tradition, the "islands" and "oases"
of freedom, presently need to be identified and nur-
tured, instead of being occluded by politica! science.
They are to be found in the practices of face-to-face
debate and direct action that have surfaced fleetingly
- yet repeatedly - in modern politics: in the early
American town meeting, the politica! clubs of revo-
lutionary Paris, the workers' soviets in Russia (before
the business ofrevolution became "professionalized"),
resistance to the Nazi occupation in Denmark, or the
civil rights and antiwar movements ofthe 1960s in the
United States. We need to bold onto the memory of
such moments of free action and examine them as a
counterpoint to the technologized emptiness of what
today passes for politics, or as a tradition from which
politics as a space of human disclosure and freedom
might once again be created.
A rather different account ofpolitics in the modern
world, but one that also bears on the substantive con-
cerns of politica) science, can be drawn from the !ater
work of JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, particularly from sections
of his Critique de la raison dialectique ( 1960). Like
Arendt, Sartre is concerned with the loss of meaning
that human action undergoes and the ways that free-
dom comes to be "deviated" in the modern world. He
does not operate with Arendt's distinctions between
labor, work, and action. On the contrary, he takes what
he calls praxis- the intentiona! transformation of na-
ture to meet human needs that Arendt calls work -
as paradigmatic of human action in general. This is
because he argues that ali action, politica! action in-
cluded, has to take place one way or another through
the mediations of the material world, mediations that
always impose certain logics or "exigencies" upon it.
Sartre's earlier work was explicitly phenomenologi-
cal. His major opus, L'etre et le neant (1943), built,
albeit rather unfaithfully, on the work of Husserl in de-
veloping a phenomenology ofhuman existence. In the
Critique, Sartre's aim is to integrate a phenomenologi-
cal dimension into MARXISM. For Marxism (like polit-
ica! science) has attempted to treat the human world
as a realm ofpurely objective facts, amenable to com-
prehension through "analytical" or positivist reason.
Against this view Sartre builds on his earlier work in
arguing that since ali individual praxis is intentiona!
in character, thus involving a project, the entire edi-
fice of the human world- from economic production
 POLITICAL SCIENCE
to the built environment, to culture, art, and politica!
institutions ~ emerges only from syntheses, however
circuitous and complex they may be, of a multiplicity
of such praxes. A "science" that ignores the intention-
ality ofhuman praxis~ that is, its aspect of freedom ~
will be able to arrive at no more than one-sided or "ab-
stract" explanations. Such a non-phenomenologically
informed science loses sight of the concrete praxes
through which even seemingly self-regulating systems
and institutions are in fact maintained. Thus it ends
by condoning evasions of responsibility for the con-
sequences ofpraxis. For example, those French social
scientists who explained the low wage levels ofthe in-
digenous population in colonial Algeria as arising "nat-
urally," as an "inevitable" outcome ofthe interaction of
a modem and a primitive economy, served to obscure
the ongoing project of racism and violence through
which generation after generation of colonialists ac-
tively perpetuated the system of low native wages.
Much of the Critique is concemed with examining
the diverse forms praxis can take because of the fact
that it is always intrinsically social. Sartre develops
a typology of different kinds of social groups, distin-
guished by the manner and extent to which they de-
flect, alienate, or even in part destroy freedom. In what
he calls a "fused group," no loss of freedom initially
occurs because each member experiences his or her
aim as identica! to that of ali the others and because
each realizes that the action of ali is needed to achieve
it. Such groups are small, face-to-face, and sponta-
neous, and generally ari se under conditions of extreme
threat. They are rather similar to Arendt's "islands"
and "oases" offreedom, though Sartre's own example
is of the crowd that spontaneously carne together and
stormed the Bastille during the French Revolution.
In describing the aftermath ofthis event, Sartre bril-
liantly extends the insights of Arendt, showing why
such groups cannot endure without a deviation or a
diminution of freedom. Having achieved their initial
common goal, the members ofthe group face two kinds
of pressures. One kind comes from outside: to maintain
control ofthe Bastille, they must organize themselves.
Some must work the guns, others must keep watch,
arrange for food, etc. Thus a differentiation of func-
tions and the need to coordinate them starts to dilute
their initial unity of purpose. In doing their allotted
task, each stil! freely engages in their shared project,
551
yet each also has to agree only to do certain things ~
to restrict his or her praxis ~for the group to continue
its project.
The second kind ofthreat is interna!: members might
for various reasons want to defect, but the continued
presence of each is a necessary condition for success.
Interna! coercion must therefore be brought against
members to ensure that they remain in the group. In
responding to both externa! and interna! pressures, the
group suffers a dispersa! of its energies, and individu-
als increasingly find their initial project coming back
to haunt them as demands or "exigencies" that they
had not anticipated. In more extreme forms, as groups
become bureaucratized ~as coordination and control
are formalized in fewer and fewer hands and in increas-
ingly rigid institutions, such as parties and structures of
the state~ freedom seems increasingly to turn against
itself, so that what started as "goals" end by becom-
ing "destinies": individuals stil! recognize their own
project, but now as something other than what they
had intended.
Neither the work of Sartre nor that of Arendt
and other phenomenological thinkers implies that one
should seek wholly to replace the subject matter or
methods of politica! science by phenomenology. For
as Sartre shows so well, human action does indeed
give rise to institutions and structures that ~ once es-
tablished ~ take on their own dynamics, develop their
own objective processes. The methods of positivist so-
cial science thus continue to have their place as the
study of such processes. But they need to be integrated
into a wider study ~ what Sartre calls a dialectica!
investigation ~ that also includes the place of human
intentionality and freedom in the coming into being,
perpetuation, and alteration of such processes.
Could there be a phenomenological politica! sci-
ence? The term appears to be an oxymoron. Insofar
as phenomenology concerns itself exclusively with the
world as it appears to intentiona! consciousness and po-
litica! science with the world as a set ofindubitably ex-
isting real entities amenable to empirica! investigation,
they would appear to offer incommensurable and even
contradictory accounts ofhuman reality. However, po-
litica! science and phenomenological inquiry into po-
liticallife are perhaps best seen as two different aspects
of what might be conceived as one broader and more
synthetic investigation of politics. There could not bea
552 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phenomenological "politica! science," but there could
bea study ofpolitics that would integrate the study of
objective processes with a phenomenological exami-
nation of politica! experience and intentionality. Such
a study would reveal the world of politics to be more
ambiguous and less predictable, more a realm of val-
ues and freedom and less a realm offact, than politica!
science today is willing to admit.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bernstein, Richard. The Restructuring of"Social and Politica!
Themy. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
Dallmayr, Fred. Beyond Dogma and Despair: Towards a
Critica! Phenomenology of Politics. Notre Dame, IN:
Notre Dame University Press, 1981.
Jung, Hwa Yol. Rethinking Politica! Themy. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1993.
-. The Crisis ofthe Politica! Understanding: A Phenomen-
ological Perspective in the Conduct of Politica! Inquiry.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979.
- , ed. Existential Phenomenology and Politica! Theory.
Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972.
Kruks, Sonia. Situation and Human Existence: Freedom,
Subjectivity and Society. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Marcel, Gabriel. Les hommes contre l 'humain. Paris: La
Colombe, 1951; Man Against Mass Society. Trans. G. S.
Fraser. South Bend, IN: Gateway, 1978.
McBride, William. Sartre:~ Politica! Theory. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. La Rebeli6n de las Masas. Madrid:
Revista de Occidente, 1930; The Revolt of the Masses.
New York: Norton, 1932.
Paei, Enzo. Funzione de !le scienze e significato dell 'uomo.
Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1963; The Function ofthe Sciences
and the Meaning ofMan. Trans. Paul Piccone and James
E. Hansen. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1971.
Smart, Barry. Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxism. Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.
Spur1ing, La urie. Phenomenology and the Social World: The
Phi/osophy of Merleau-Ponty and Its Relation to the So-
cial Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.
Schmidt, James. Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between Pheno-
menology and Structuralism. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985.
Taylor, Charles. Philosophical Papers. 2 vols. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Thao, Tran-Duc. Phimomenologie et materialisme dialec-
tique. Paris: Minh-Tan, 1951; Phenemenology and Di-
alectica! Materialism. Trans. Daniel J. Herman and D. V.
Morano. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986.
Warren, Scott. The Emergence of Dialectica! Theory: Phi-
losophy and Politica! lnquiry. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984.
SONIA KRUKS
Oberlin College
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
PORTUGAL The German founders of pheno-
menology inspired the Portuguese phenomenological
movement. DELFIM SANTOS, lecturer in Portuguese at
Berlin between 193 7 and 1942, had direct contact with
NICOLAI HARTMANN and MARTIN HEIDEGGER. The influ-
ence of contemporary German philosophy on his doc-
toral dissertation at the University of Coimbra, Con-
hecimento e realidade (Knowledge and reality, 1940),
is striking. He considers phenomeno1ogy not merely
one among many philosophical currents but indeed
as the philosophy of philosophy insofar as transcen-
dental consciousness constitutes the absolute ground
that gives significance at ali spheres ofbeing. Santos's
understanding of phenomenology has a metaphysical
character, a tendency that will prevail in subsequent
Portuguese phenomenology.
JOAQUIM DE CARVALHO, professor at Coimbra, used
the introduction to the Portuguese translation in
1952 of EDMUND HUSSERL 's "Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft" (1911) to present a well-documented
synopsis of Husserl's thought. From the concep-
tion of absolute truth in the Logische Untersuchun-
gen ( 1900-1901) to the theory of noesis and
NOEMA in the Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913), this
thought has a unity in the idea ofphilosophy as a rigor-
ous science. This means that philosophy is, at the same
time, a methodology and an a priori objective meta-
physics or, in other words, the pure science of essences.
On the basis of HERMAN LEO VAN BRE DA 's article, "Les
Archives-Husserl a Louvain" (1947), Carvalho calls
attention to the unpublished work of Husserl, "which
is more important than his publications," and this led to
studies by Portuguese scholars in the Husserl Archives
at Leuven and Koln.
LUIS CABRAL DE MONCADA, law professor at Coim-
bra, worked under the influence of especially Husserl,
MAX SCHELER, and Hartmann in composing Filosofia
do direito e do estado (Philosophy of law and the
state). Scheler's Der Formalismus in der Ethik und
die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and non-
formal ethics ofvalue, 1913/ 1916) is cited abundantly.
Moncada succeeds in overcoming positivism in law
by means of the enlarged notion of experience in
the phenomenological approach, where data are not
restricted to spatiotemporal phenomena but include
among other things the domain ofvalues.
 PORTUGAL
The role of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
(RPF) cannot be overestimated where the diffusion of
phenomenology in Portugal is concerned. This jour-
nal has been edited since 1945 by the Jesuit Philo-
sophical Faculty at Braga. Its second volume ( 1946)
includes two articles on phenomenology, DIAMANTINO
MARTIN's "Fenomenologia e Imortalidade" and SEVE-
RIANO TAVAREs's "Os arquivos de Husserl." In 1955
JULIO FRAGATA published two articles in it, namely, "A
fenomenologia de Husserl" and "A possibilidade da
filosofia como ciencia rigorosa." The following year,
two more articles appeared in RPF: "A fenomenolo-
gia" by CARLO GIACCON and "O arquivo de Husserl em
Louvaina" by Van Breda and RUDOLF BOEHM. Numerous
articles on phenomenology have appeared in it since
then.
During the late 1950s and the 1960s phenomen-
ology in Portugal showed an extraordinary develop-
ment, particularly with re gard to the study of Husserl,
even earning a laudatory reference by HANS-GEORG
GADAMER in the Philosophische Rundschau ( 1963) in
an article on the phenomenological movement. To a
great extent this is due to the group of researchers
who organized the first Portuguese Colloquium of
Phenomenology in November 1964 at Braga (Per-
spectivas da fenomenologia de Husserl, 1965) and
the founding at Coimbra of the Centro de Estudos
Fenomenol6gicos: ALEXANDRE MORUJĂO, GUSTAVO DE
FRAGA, MANUELA SARA IVA, and JULI O FRAGATA. The three
first mentioned belonged to the Philosophical School
at Coimbra and the last mentioned was of the Philo-
sophical Faculty at Braga. These scholars had ali done
research at the Husserl Archives in Koln or Leuven and
had studied with the most illustrious phenomenologists
ofthat period, in particular LUDWIG LANDGREBE and Van
Breda.
ALEXANDRE MUROJĂO is the most outstanding figure
in the Portuguese phenomenological movement. After
graduation in electrica! engineering from the Univer-
sity of Oporto in 1948 and in philosophy from Coim-
bra in 1954, he continued his studies in Koln with
Landgrebe and KARL-HEINZ VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK and in
Leuven with Van Breda. His study of Husserl focuses
fundamentally on the concept of INTENTIONALITY. In A
doutrina da Intencionalidade em Husserl: Das Inves-
tigac;ăes L6gicas ds Meditac;ăes Cartesianas ( 1956),
he exhibits three different concepts of intentionality in
553
Husserl: the psychic (receptive) intentionality, the tran-
scendental (understanding) intentionality, and the con-
stitutive (productive-creating) intentioJllality. Although
these differences do not imply distinct1intentionalities,
they show different degrees ofintentionallife. Murojâo
points to the ontologica! question that is raised by the
problem of intentionality. The intentiona! abject is just
an abject of pure logica! consistency in which any exis-
tential index is neutralized. But by leaving the ontolog-
ica! question unanswered, the very question in inten-
tionality requires deeper investigation. Morujâo 's most
comprehensive work is Mundo e intencionalidade: En-
saio sobre o conceito de mundo na fenomenologia de
Husserl ( 1961 ). It aims at a deepening ofthe ontologi-
ca! question that is implicit in the idea ofintentionality.
The result is that the world as a horizon- as opposed
to the world as "omnitudo realitas"- cannot be inte-
grated into the constitutive function of consciousness.
It is precisely there that the deficiency of Husserlian
phenomenology is found: it does not ontologically jus-
tify the phenomenological thesis that there is an experi-
ence of a being that is not linked to the experience ofthe
world. Murojâo's studies of Husserl's work included
other themes as well, such as JNTERSUBJECTIVJTY and
HISTORY (Subjectividade e Hist6ria, 1969), but always
with a realistic perspective on phenomenology.
The aim of Gustavo de Fraga in Husserl e
Heidegger: Elementos para uma problematica da
fenomenologia (1966) is to show that Husserl's
transcendental phenomenology was not constructed
against metaphysics; on the contrary, the operative con-
cepts in Husserl's thought, as EUGEN FINK called them,
include metaphysical consequences that need tobe de-
veloped. According to Fraga, the concept of intention-
ality, when viewed with respect to TEMPORALITY, is of a
teleological nature. It is in this way that the pure atmo-
sphere of subjectivity appears in Husserl as the only
way to reach the absolute. The apodictic evidence of
the "1 am" is embedded in a historical movement that
culminates in a supratemporal and transhistorical telos.
It is precisely here that phenomenology needs theology
and reveals that inspiration in religion. A new concept
of intersubjectivity results from a teleological and the-
ological reading of Husserl 's transcendental idealism.
The universal and absolute will that lives in ali tran-
scendental subjects is identified with the divine will,
which requires the structurallayer of intersubjectivity
554 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
in order to concretize itself. The early philosophy of
MARTIN HEIDEGGER~ which Jimits itse]fto the anaJytic
ofDASEIN, and is therefore intertwined with anthropolo-
gism and historicism ~ thereby also limits the opening
to the transcendentallife of consciousness, which has
been made possible by the reduction of the factual to
the absoluteness of the phenomenon. The metaphys-
ical dimension of Husserl's CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY is taken up again by Fraga in the second part of
Fenomenologia e dialectica {1972).
Manuela Saraiva presented her Ph.D. thesis,
L 'imagination selon Husserl, at the Catholic Univer-
sity of Louvain in 1963 and it was published in the
Phaenomenologica series in 1970. The works of JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE on the imagination led her to investigate
the relations between Husserl and Sartre and thereupon
to systematize the Husserlian theory of the imaginary.
But Sarai va 's research also attempts to clarify the link
between this Husserlian theory and the aesthetic doc-
trines of ROMAN INGARDEN and MIKEL DUFRENNE. The
essential results of Saraiva's systematization are that
the imagination is an intuition, a RE-PRESENTATION, and
a neutralization: (1) the imagination is intuitive be-
cause it visualizes the object; (2) it is a re-presentation
in its own right that does not copy PERCEPTION and
does not intertwine itself with it; and (3) it is a neu-
tralization in the sense of a passage to an irreality
and in this way it makes free imagination and also
aesthetic consciousness possible. Saraiva's main ob-
jection to Husserl concerns the latter's application
of re-presentation through similarity to aesthetic con-
sciousness. For Husserl, questions of AESTHETICS in-
volve both re-presentation and neutralization, but In-
garden, Sartre, and Dufrenne al! reject the idea of re-
presentation and maintain merely that of neutraliza-
tion. In !ater work Saraiva has been concerned with
the relations between philosophy, LITERATURE, and rsv-
CHOANALYSIS. See in particular the articles "Filosofia
e psicanalise" in RPF ( 1978) and "Sartre e o mito do
her6i" in RPF ( 1982).
Julio Fragata attempts both a global interpretation
of Husserl's pheomonology and, at the same time, an
analysis of partial aspects of it. In A fenomenologia
de Husserl coma fundamenta da filosofia ( 1959), he
presents Husserlian phenomenology as a knowledge
with a radical foundation in which there is a total
absence of presuppositions and in which the things
are data in themselves for an authentic intuitive EVI-
DENCE. However, Fragata's overall positive assessment
of Husserl 's work does not prevent him from objecting
precisely to Husserl 's lack of radicalism in his total ap-
proach to being, namely in its ontologica! dimension.
By not going into this question, Husserl did not avoid
the "enigma of transcendence" and did not provide a
solution to it. In searching for a solution beyond re-
alism and idealism, Husserl was eventually overcome
by idealistic prejudices that led him to betray his own
demand for radicalism. Attention must be drawn to the
last three studies in Problemas da fenomenologia de
Husserl ( 1962), which is mainly a collection of Fra-
gata's articles in the RPF, namely, "Metafisica Husser-
liana e metafisica Tomista," "O Problema de Deus
na fenomenologia de Husserl," and "Fenomenologia
e problema critica."
In "O pensamento Filos6fico de Julio Fragata"
( 1986 in an issue of RPF devoted to Fragata), Alexan-
dre Murojâo concisely expounds the position of Fra-
gata vis-a-vis Husserl. Fragata contests the idealism of
transcendental phenomenology, which he considers a
methodological idealism that ends in an idealization.
From Husserl's phenomenology the demand is obvi-
ous for a natural though intimately reflective attitude
as the fundamental beginning of a knowledge or, in
other words, the demand for a transcendent world.
Although the reception of the work of Martin Hei-
degger was not comparable to that of Husserl, his in-
fluence was important in the Portuguese philosophical
panorama, both directly and through French EXISTEN-
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. De!fim Santos published "Hei-
degger e Holderlin" in 1939 and "Filosofia como on-
tologia fundamental," where he presents the existential
analysis of Heidegger, in 1955. Also Gustavo de Fraga
approaches the themes ofthe Kehre, ontology, and the
links of the philosopher with National Socialism and
Catholicism in a small work entitled Sobre Heidegger
( 1965). But it is especial!y CELESTINO PIRES and JOSE
ENES who have occupied themselves most intensely
with Heidegger's work. The first mentioned published
various articles in the RPF: "Heidegger e o ser como
hist6ria" (1963), "Da fenomenologia a verdade: Um
caminho de Martin Heidegger" ( 1966), "Deus e teolo-
gia em Martin Heidegger" ( 1970). For his part, Enes,
although not treating the work of Heidegger directly,
represents the hermeneutica! dimension of Heidegger 's
 POSSIBLE WORLDS
philosophy in the best way in A Porta do Ser: Ensaio
sobre ajustţficar,;iio noetica do juizo de percepr,;iio ex-
terna em S. Tomas de Aquino (At the gates of being:
Essay on the noetic justification of the judgment of
externa! perception in Aquinas, 1969) and Linguagem
e ser (1983). He considers HERMENEUTICS as the in-
evitable method for ontologica! discourse today. On-
tologica! discourse, worked out philosophically, is a
metalanguage of pre-predicative ontologica! experi-
ence significant for ali discourse that human beings
have when living their existence.
It is most of ali the French existentialism, mainly the
thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, that was the most widely
read in Portugal, especially in extra-academic circles,
LITERATURE in particular. VIRGILIO FERREIRA Stands OUt
here. From his first novels, among which Aparir,;iw
( 1959) and Cantico Final ( 1960) are the most notewor-
thy, the crucial themes of existentialism ari se: the ab-
surdity of existence, li mit moments ofthe alarming and
lucid discovery of death; the inhospitality ofbeing-in-
the-world, where people find themselves alone, though
free, vis-a-vis the absurd; and anxiety. In a brilliant
and extensive essay, "Da fenomenologia a Sartre,"
which he used to introduce his translation of Sartre's
L 'existentialisme est un humanisme (1 946), Ferreira
traces the road from Husserlian phenomenology to the
existential philosophy of Sartre and provides a theoret-
ical and critica! reflection ofthe foundations ofSartre's
position.
CurrentJy, HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY is cen-
tral in Portugal. In Fenomenologica e hermeneutica.
A relar,;iw entre as _filosofias de Husserl e Heideg-
ger (1992), JOĂO PAISANA treats the relation between
Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies precisely
on the basis ofthe structures of interpretation. Paisana
characterizes Husserl 's phenomenology as a reflective-
explicative phenomenology, which, in the Cartesian
tradition, regards being as an object-being. This means
that priority will be given to predicative logic. Heideg-
gerian phenomenology, however, is a hermeneutica!
phenomenology, pre-objective and pre-predictative.
The main concern ofthis phenomenology is the discov-
ery of the hermeneutic structures of Dasein, structures
that establish ali the apodictic activity ofknowledge.
MICHEL RENAUD and MANUEL SUMARES have been es-
pecially interested in French phenomenology, in par-
ticular in the work of PAUL RICCEUR. Among Renaud's
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
555
various studies ofRica.:ur and his hermeneutics, special
emphasis should be given to "Fenomenologia e her-
meneutica. O projecto filosofico de Paul Rica.:ur," pre-
sented at the Second Portuguese Colloquium on Pheno-
menology (RPF, 1985). He views Rica.:ur's philosoph-
ical project as a disagreeing agreement or, in other
words, as an agreement ofthe most radically disagree-
ing intellectual, scientific, and philosophical opposi-
tions. Hermeneutics provides Rica.:ur with the possi-
bility of extending the Husserlian analysis to the most
diverse fields of philosophy and science.
In Para ali!m da necessidade: O sujeito ea cultura
na .filosofia de Paul Ric(Eur ( 1987), Manuel Sumares
shows that there is a practica! dimension to Rica.:ur's
attempt to overcome the alienation of immediate con-
sciousness, a practica! dimension that would be a cre-
ative poiesis allowing new ways of relating to things,
outselves, and others. Rica.:ur places this poiesis in the
intersubjective experience of language, communica-
tion, and history.
To close, it may be said that Portuguese pheno-
menological studies will continue. The thematic is-
sues of Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia on Edmund
Husserl (1988), Martin Heidegger (1 989), GABRIEL
MARCEL ( 1989), Paul Rica.:ur ( 1990), and EMMANUEL
LEVINAS ( 1991) are proof of this.
ANTONIO FIDALGO
Universidad de Seira Interior
POSITIVISM See LOGICAL POSITIVISM.
POSSIBLE WORLDS Phenomenology as a
science of essences is concerned with pure possibili-
ties rather than with what is merely actual. "To each
essence," writes EDMUND HUSSERL in Ideen zu einer
reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen
Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ), "there corresponds a series of
possible individuals as its factual instancing." In this
sense, an essence is a pure possibility and is appre-
hended through an act of phantasy that imagines pos-
sible variations upon a given or imagined particular
case, i.e., by EIDETIC METHOD. If a world consists only of
real, determinate individuals, and since not ali concrete
556 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
essences- i.e., essences that by themselves, without
further supplementation, can be realized in individuals
-are in fact instantiated, there are more possible indi-
viduals than are real and actual, and so more possible
worlds than the actual. Thus Husserlian phenomen-
ology, since its inception, stands in close proximity to
the Leibnizian thesis that the actual world is only one
ofmany possible worlds.
It is, however, only in more recent times that system-
atic attempts have been made to understand Husserl's
thinking from the perspective of what has come to
be calied "possible-worlds semantics." In the classical
Fregean semantics, expressions in intensional contexts
refer to their customary MEANINGS. Thus "p" in "Bob
believes that p" does not refer to its truth-value (as
it does ordinarily, according to GOTTLOB FREGE), but
rather refers to its own sense, i.e., to the thought that
p. By this theory of indirect reference, Frege is able to
find solutions to the problem ofthe apparent failure of
identity for singular terms in act-contexts as weli as to
the problem of the failure of substitutivity, in belief-
contexts, of sentences with the same truth-value. It also
has an explanation ofwhy existential generalization of
terms in act-contexts seems to fail. But the Fregean
theory has to admit such abstract entities as senses and
thoughts into its ontology, and it does not aliow, in
act-context, de re sentences, sentences that are about
concrete, particular objects: ali our beliefs are, on this
theory, about abstract entities such as thoughts.
Possible-worlds semantics finds a way out of this
impasse. A possible-worlds theory of meaning was
first proposed by Rudolf Camap in 1955. According
to this theory, meaning is understood as a set-theoretic
function that is a set of ordered pairs, each pair consist-
ing of a (possible) world and the individual to which
the term would refer in that world. Meanings are thus
functions ofpossible worlds.
In order to interpret the Husserlian theory of mean-
ings in light of possible-worlds semantics, it is neces-
sary to ask if the Husserlian conception of meaning as
an ideal entity, and the overali thesis of INTENTIONAL-
ITY, can be preserved and brought in accordance with
that semantic theory. The first attempt in this direction
was made by JAAKKO HINTIKKA in 1969 and 1975, but
the realiy fuli-fledged work on this topic is stili DAVID
SMITH and RONALD MCINTYRE'S Husserl and fntentiona/-
ity ( 1982).
Hintikka 's theory is based on the assumption that
ascribing a propositional attitude to a person ("S be-
lieves that p") involves dividing ali possible worlds into
two classes: those possible worlds that are compatible
with that attitude and those that are incompatible with
it. "S believes that p" is then equivalent to "in ali the
possible worlds compatible with what S believes, it is
the case that p." Belief- in general, intentionality-
on Hintikka's theory is not, as it is in Frege's, a rela-
tion to an abstract entity such as a thought, but rather
a relation to a set of possible worlds. Hintikka not
only develops such a Carnapian theory, but interprets
Husserl 's intentionality in the language of this theory,
denying the need for abstract entities calied meanings,
and admitting only a theory of reference, i.e., refer-
ence in many possible worlds. A belief is de re when
the meaning-function-"in this case, an individuating
function, corresponding to Carnap 's individual con-
cepts"- assigns the same individual to every relevant
world. Although thus getting rid of Husserlian mean-
ings, Hintikka claims to ha ve recovered the Husserlian
thesis that the identity ofindividuals is "constituted" by
the individuating function ranging over many possible
worlds.
Two objections were raised against such a theory
of intentionality by J. N. MOHANTY in 1981. In the first
place, the theory reduces meanings (or Husserlian NOE-
MATA) to sets of ordered pairs extensionaliy conceived.
Second, the theory makes use of a naive ontology of
possible worlds, and does not ask about their consti-
tution. Both of these objections ha ve been taken into
account in later papers by Hintikka and others. First
of ali, Smith and Mcintyre have proposed retaining
the Fregean sense along with a possible-worlds the-
ory; second, Hintikka (along with CHARLES HARVEY)
has made room for a theory of constitution of possi-
ble worlds. The former proposal refuses to identify (or
even define) the meanings in terms of extensionaliy
conceived sets, but recognizes the value of explicat-
ing the former in terms ofthe latter; it also recognizes
that a theory ofmeaning as belonging to philosophy of
language and theory of intentionality goes beyond the
needs of a semantic theory. Smith and Mcintyre also
recognize that Husserl 's theory of intentionality admits
of a version that does not assume possible entities, i.e.,
an actualist version. The real issue, however, is not
which version to choose, but how the actual (the act)
 POSSIBLE WORLDS
and the possible are interrelated.
In 1981, Hintikka recognized that meaning-
functions as set-theoretic entities are not adequate ex-
plications of Husserlian intentionality. What is needed
is to develop suitable operationalizations ("recipes" or
"algorithms") that would answer the question ofhow it
is that the object of an act (or the reference of a linguis-
tic expression) is determined in each possible world.
But is not the use of"possible world" likely tobe a sort
of naive ontology? Hintikka and Harvey ha ve sought
to take this criticism into account, and make use of
Husserl's account of"modalization" in Erfahrung und
Urteil ( 1939), fruitfully supplementing the account of
"modalization" to be found in contemporary logica)
theory. The former account begins with "motivated"
possibilities, and needs to be able to construct logica)
(or rather "free") possibilities. The latter begins with
"free" (and so unlimited) possibilities, and so needs
to be able to develop a principle by which these un-
limited possibilities may be limited only to those that
are grasped in understanding the meaning of an ex-
pression (for we cannot be said to grasp the unlimited
possibilities). This last point shows that a possible-
worlds semantics cannot be an analysis of the actual
phenomenological content of consciousness, although
the latter would show that possibilities (as contained in
the horizon) are involved in one's actual understand-
ing.
How is a possible world constituted? Starting with
a "home world" and a "principle of production," one
can follow Husserl in using disjunction and negation
to generate possibilities and eventually, by an act of
reflective reification, to constitute pure possibilities.
Thus a possible-worlds semantics stands in need of
a constitutive grounding in intentiona! consciousness.
One also cannot but ask, with THOMAS M. SEEBOHM in
1988, what has happened to the concept of "world"?
The real world is "open": it is not determined whether
a sea battle will be fought tomorrow. But a possible
world, if understood as a maximally consistent set of
statements, is an ideal entity. In Leibnizian thinking,
God's infinite intellect was the original home of al! pos-
sible worlds. Shom of this topos, the possible worlds
could only be "fictional variants" of the real world,
constituted by a finite intellect. The thesis of al! pos-
sible worlds, as also of a possible world in its totality,
is a thesis from God's point of view. Nothing in ex-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas·Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
557
perience warrants this totalization. As Husserl writes
in Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931 ], "a world itself
is an infinite idea, related in infinities ofharmoniously
combinable experiences- an idea that is the correlate
of the idea of a perfect experiential evidence." It is in
view of these problems that Hintikka admits that "we
cannot even hope to operate actually with any possible
world as a completed whole. The best we can hope to
do is to deal with parts or partial specifications ofpossi-
ble worlds." And as he also notes, "possible worlds ...
are never present to one's mind individually, one by
one, but always come to us in bunches."
Ali this hangs together closely with the phenomen-
ological theory ofthe horizon ofthe intentiona) act.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Hintikka, Jaakko. Modelsfor Modalities. Dordrecht: D. Rei-
de!, 1969.
-. The Intentions of Intentionality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
1975.
- . "Phenomenology vs. Possible-Worlds Semantics: Appar-
ent and Real Differences" (Response to Mohanty). Revue
International de Philosophie 35 (1981), 91-112; rpt. in
Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Ed. Hu-
bert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 251-55.
Harvey, Charles, and Jaakko Hintikka. "Modalization and
Modalities." In Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences.
Ed. Thomas Seebohm, Dagfinn Follesdal, and J. N. Mo-
hanty. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, 59-
77.
Husserl, Edmund. Erfahrung und Urteil [ 1939]. Ed. Ludwig
Landgrebe. Hamburg: Claassen & Gaverts, 1948.
Krysztofiak, Wojciech. "Phenomenology, Possible Worlds,
and Negation." Husserl Studies 8 (1991-92), 205---20.
Mohanty, J. N. "Intentionality and 'Possible Worlds': Husserl
and Hintikka." Revue Internationale de Philosophie 35
( 1981 ); rpt. in Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Sci-
ence. Ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 233-45.
-."Husserl on Possibility." Husserl Studies 1 (1984), 13-
29.
Ranta, Aame, "Constructing Possible Worlds." Photocopy.
Stalnaker, R. "Possible Worlds and Situation." Journal of
Philosophical Logic 15 ( 1986), 109-23.
Smith, David W., and Ronald Mclntyre. Husserl and Inten-
tionality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982.
Seebohm, Thomas. "Phenomenology of Logic and the Prob-
lem of Modalizing." Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 19 ( 1988), 235-50.
1. N. MOHANTY
Temple University
558 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
POST-MODERNISM "Post-" paradigms dom-
inate the inteliectual landscape of the contemporary
academy everywhere. They are multiple and sprawl-
ing rhizomaticaliy: post-modern, post-structuralist,
post-metaphysical, post-Western, post-Marxist, post-
colonial, even post-philosophical, and now inevitably
post-phenomenological. Although they are ali imbri-
cated, postmodernism is the paramount "post-ism" of
ali. The prominent Italian postmodern thinker GIANNI
VATTIMO is almost ready to distance himself from it
because it has become, he fears, an inteliectual fad.
Phenomenology, too, is a philosophical movement.
As a movement, it is neither a school of thought nor
a fixed set of dogmas: it is never stagnant but al-
ways dynamic. Its vitality is preserved in its capac-
ity to transform itself. As a perpetua! beginner, the
phenomenologist is one who maintains, according to
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, the constant vigiJance that
would not Jet us forget the source of ali knowledge:
the end of phenomenology is the account of its begin-
ning. From EDMUND HUSSERL to MARTIN HEIDEGGER, JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, ALFRED SCHUTZ, HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, PAUL RIC<EUR, EMMANUEL LEVINAS, and
JACQUES DERRIDA, phenomenology has gone through
REALISTIC, CONSTITUTIVE, EXISTENTIAL, HERMENEU-
TICAL , and perhaps, deconstructive phases covering
a vast array of themes such as AESTHETICS, ECOLOGY,
ETHICS, FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, HISTORY, LANGUAGE,
NATURAL and HUMAN SCIENCES, RELIGION, POLITICS, SO-
CIOLOGY, and TECHNOLOGY.
Phenomenology is not of but in postmodernity.
Phenomenology and postmodernism are directly in-
tersected by JEAN-FRAN<;'OIS LYOTARD'S two works: La
phenonu!nologie ( 1954 ), which went through its tenth
edition in 1986, and La condition postmoderne ( 1979),
which defined postmodernism as a philosophy. The
first work is a critica] account of phenomenology based
primarily on Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-
Ponty. It has been called a "phenomenology ofpheno-
menology," an expression familiar from Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty. The latter work sketches postmodern
knowledge in bold and broad strokes. "Postmodern
knowledge is not simply a tool of authorities; it refines
our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability
to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not
the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy."
Merleau-Ponty was also suspicious, from the start, of
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jiterulra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm. Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
any attempt of phenomenology to provide an apodictic
foundation of knowledge and was ready to recognize
ambiguity as endemic to the order of things and its
multiple dimensions. He found phenomenology, in the
!ater Husserl, functioning not as a "rigorous science"
but as a "pure interrogation."
JACQUES DERRIDA 's deconstructionism is both a post-
modern affair and the latest phase in the movement of
phenomenology as a philosophy. In part it is a criti-
que of Husserl 's privileging of speech over writing, as
phonocentrism. It may be said, nevertheless, that Der-
rida's technique of destabilizing the established regime
of knowledge is not entirely new. Husserl 's critique
in Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und
die transzendentale Phiinomenologie ( 1936) of mod-
ern scientism as based on the Galilean mathematiza-
tion ofnature that takes the LIFEWORLD as the sociocul-
tural infrastructure of science for granted is in itself an
exemplary exercise in deconstruction. In Die Grund-
probleme der Phănomenologie [1927], Heidegger, for
whom questioning is the "piety ofthinking," used the
expression Destruktion, which is as basic as reduc-
tion and construction to phenomenological ontology
and has been translated into French as deconstruction.
He not only deconstructed modern philosophy from
Descartes to Nietzsche as "humanism," but also mod-
ern "technologism" as Gestell (enframing). For many
commentators in the phenomenological tradition, the
lasting legacy of Heidegger's thought resides in his
claim that technology, which includes media technol-
ogy and cybernation, has become one-dimensional,
autonomous, planetary, hyperreal, and above ali ho-
mogenizing, i.e., a "modernization" that is a planetary
homogenization. If a postmodern society is a society
of the mass media and what makes postmodern soci-
ety "transparent" is mass communication or "telemat-
ics," then Heidegger's deconstruction oftechnology as
Gestell is indeed far ahead of the postmodern condi-
tion.
Postmodernity is a constellation of many different
and colorful ideas. The conceptual world it fosters is a
"rhizomatic" assemblage of such notions as connect-
edness (interbeing or intertextuality), multiplicity, het-
erogeneity, alterity, and marginality. By nature the rhi-
zome has the characteristic of lateral, subterranean,
and profuse growth with neither beginning nor ending.
"Interbeing" or "intertwining" cherishes the transver-
 POST-MODERNISM
sai movement of the rhizome. Except for difference,
which is opposed to both separatism and inferiority,
there would be neither relation nor multiplicity. With-
out difference, there would be no need to speak of
interbeing. To put it in a nutshell, difference is the ax-
ia! principium of postmodernity. What identity is to
modernity, difference is to postmodernity. It is the no-
tion of difference that makes ali the difference between
modernity and postmodernity. Lyotard's postmodern
condition demands a discernment of and to differ-
ences. To play on the titles of Vattimo's two works:
at the "end of modernity" !ies the "adventure of differ-
ence," which again is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's
critique ofthe dialectics in HEGEL and MARXISM for the
sake of MAX WEBER 's appreciation of the plurality and
ambiguity ( Vielseitigkeit) of historical facts. No won-
der there is a proliferation of the ideas of difference
in postmodern thought: among the most prominent
are Heidegger's Differenz as Unterschied, Derrida's
differance, Lyotard's differend, Levinas's heteronomy,
Michel de Certeau's heterology, and Mikhail Bakhtin's
heteroglossia.
Let us compare the "modernist" Hegel and the
"postmodernist" Heidegger on the question ofthe dif-
ference bctween identity and difference. In his eager-
ness to prove the teleology of history as the march
of Reason, of world history or the end of historical
progress, Hegel falls short of making the dialectic
open-endcd. After history's final synthesis or, as Mark
C. Taylor puts it, the identity ofidentity and difference
that coincides with the coming ofthe State, his dialec-
tic reaches or fulfills the "end of history." In the end,
the State fulfills and totalizes the end of history. Vat-
timo concludes, therefore, that the Hegelian dialectic
consummates the long metaphysical tradition of iden-
tity in Western philosophy. The modernist Marx only
inverted the Hegelian dialectic by making it stand on
its feet (materiality) rather than on its head (spiritual-
ity). For Marx, the end of history is not the State but,
some say, anarchism.
Contrariwise, Heidegger 's Dif.ferenz as Unterschied
offers a postmodern alternative to the cultural politics
ofidentity. Unterschied doubles difference with the be-
tween ( Unterlschied) that at once connects, preserves,
and promotes difference and the relational (i.e., inter-
being). Difference as dif/ference is capable of conserv-
ing the principle ofcomplementarity (and reversibility)
559
that refutes the Hegelian and Marxian principle of op-
positionality as the driving force ofhistory.
Without differencc, there would be no reciprocity,
no reciprocity between the I (ipseity) and the Other
(alterity). Alterity is the name given to the otherness
of the Other in interhuman relationships. In order to
emphasize the importance of alterity in such relation-
ships, in the ethical, it might very well be spelled "altar-
ity," which is the neologism of Mark C. Taylor. What
differance is to Derrida, altarity (alterity) is to Tay-
lor. The term altar comes from the Latin altere, which
signifies "a high place." Thus the idea of"altarity" el-
evates the world ofthe Other and makes the reading of
it an elevated text. The birth of heterocentricity is the
elevation ofthe Other to "altarity."
After the Copernican discovery of a "Thou" by Lud-
wig Feuerbach in the 19th century, there is no other
philosopher who celebrates heterocentricity more seri-
ously than Levi nas, who introduced Husserl 's pheno-
menology to the French intellectual world. Levinas is
the ethical thinker par excellence because his philos-
ophy is not only a single-minded elaboration of the
ethical, but also a culmination of the ethical based on
heterocentricity.
Only by way of heterocentricity is an ethics possi-
ble in which the Other is not only not an alter ego but
is more primary than the self. In the ethics of "altar-
ity," responsibility precedes freedom, for the former is
other-directed while the latter is self-centered or ego-
centric. The ethical is the conception ofthe selfwhose
center is "elsewhere" and "otherwise": the only ethical
self is a "responsible self." Levinas calls this concep-
tion of the ethical "meontology." From the standpoint
ofhis heteronomy or meontology, the very idea of exis-
tence (ex/istence) has been profoundly misunderstood
among its antagonists as well as its protagonists: as its
etymology shows, what is really central to it is not the
centrality but the eccentricity (ex-centricity) ofthe self
toward the world of other people (Mitwe/t) and other
things ( Umwelt). The human as eccentric is a being
who is exposed to and outreaches the outside world
or what Levinas calls "exteriority." Thus the motto of
existence must be: Do not go inside, go outside! Be
an ethical agent first, not an epistemological subject.
The authenticity of existence is guaranteed not by ego-
centricity, but only by heterocentricity or dialogue of
eccentric agents. It is found not "in here" but "out
 560 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
there," not in"( en)closure" but in "disclosure."
FEMINISM, Luce Irigaray insists, is the issue of our
epoch. It represents asea change. Ecriture feminine ( or
parler-femme) engenders, incorporates, and embodies
what is principally postmodern. In many respects, it is
the standard-bearer or exemplar of postmodernism. It
not only serves as Ariadne's thread to postmodernism,
but is also the joyful and even prophetic voice of Or-
pheus welcoming the dawn of a new world rather than
the owl of Minerva that takes ftight only at dusk. In
sum: the deconstructive endeavor of ecriture feminine
both destroys a "real" world and constructs a "possible"
one. Judith Butler considers feminism, as a philosophy
of sexual difference, the "subversion of identity." Iri-
garay contends that Hegel was "obliged to detine man
and woman as opposed and not as different." There is
indeed the difference between un and une philosophe,
between a male and a female philosopher. Sexual dif-
ference has become paradigmatic to feminists, and fe-
male emancipation - upon which the emancipation
of the whole of humanity may depend- is the cele-
bration of sexual difference itself. As the subversion
of identity, the feminist philosophy of sexual differ-
ence argues against what Fran<;oise Collin considers
"phallic monism" and "homogenizing equality," that
is, a "one-sex model" in which man is the measure of
ali things and woman does not exist or does not ex-
ist as an ontologically distinct category - in which
woman does not exist independently of or differently
from man. Sexual difference is a substrate of alterity,'
but this feminine substrate is not just a "fig leaf' hiding
difference.
The theory of human nature (as universal) has
marginalized the feminine and feminine difference in
that it regards woman not so much as different from
man, but rather as less than man. According to the the-
ory ofhuman nature, what is particular in woman is al-
ways particular and what is particular in man is readily
universalizable. Herein !ies the inftuence ofBeauvoir's
Le deuxieme sexe ( 1949) on the social and cultural con-
structivist view of femininity: gender is made, it is a
factum, that is, one is not horn but becomes a woman.
It is the "morphology" rather than the anatomy of the
body, Irigaray insists, that has marginalized and disem-
powered woman. The universalizing or essentializing
theory ofhuman nature independent of cu !ture and his-
tory is a fiction or chimera.
The feminist philosophy ofthe BODY or what Eliz-
abeth Grosz calls "corporeal feminism" has created
multiple waves and ripples on philosophical think-
ing today. Chantal Chawaf says: "lt's a privilege to-
day to be a woman." Feminism as a philosophy of
the ftesh exemplifies a postmodern concern to unearth
and transverse not only the modernist dualism ofmind
and body, but also a host of other issues. The Carte-
sian cogito is the epistemological principle founded
on the mind as purely disembodied or incorporeal rea-
son (res cogitans, "thinking thing") in separation from
and alienation to the body as a part of nature (res ex-
tensa, "extended thing"). In the cogito, disembodied
logocentrism and mental interiority are sealed offfrom
corporeal exteriority.
The primacy ofbody over mind is the invention of
Nietzsche, who has pervasive inftuence on postmodern
thought: the human is solely body, and soul is only
another name for something about the body, an idea
that is deeply rooted in Vico and Spinoza. According to
ERWIN w. STRAUS, the body is the root of sociogeny. Only
because of our body are we said tobe social: tobe social
is first and foremost to be intercorporeal. Only by way
ofthe body are we made visible. In contrast, the mind is
related only to one body; it is directly related to neither
other minds nor other bodies. The mind becomes a
relatum only because the body populates a world with
other bodies.
The body is the ftesh that is a living subject capa-
ble of authoring the world before merely responding
to it. The return of subjectivity in corporeal feminism
signals the reinsertion of subjectivity in philosophical
discourse. STRUCTURALISM challenged phenomenology
as a philosophy of consciousness, of subjectivity, of
intentionality, and spoke of the "death of man," of
"man" as a living subject. Some phenomenologists
acknowledge the "twilight" zone of subjectivity and
reconceive subjectivity as decentered. It is notewor-
thy that in Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne
( 1985), Jilrgen Habermas- the staunchest defender of
modernity as an unfinished project-also criticizes the
subject-centered rationality ofphenomenology, includ-
ing Merleau-Ponty's subjectivity finding itselfcentered
in its body. Habermas, however, is unaware ofthe fact
that reason defined as communicative action requires
the body as its root. The philosophy of communicative
action defined in terms of mind as the site of reason
 POST-MODERNISM
and body as the site ofunreason is self-defeating. If, as
MICHEL FOUCAULT asserts, power and resistance are in-
separable twins or "compatriots," feminism as a theory
of resistance to and subversion of the status quo is in
need of affirming a subject that is capable of activating
or instituting transformation.
Corporeal feminism celebrates and valorizes the
body as the site ofjouissance (carnal enjoyment). The
French expressionjouissance is what makes the fem-
inine "calendar of the flesh," which is consonant with
the cyclical rhythm ofnature. It is uniquely a feminine
construction. Jouissance may be said tobe the Nirvana
principle of femininity and the principium of corpo-
real feminism. Since it empowers the feminine, it is
also feminine puissance. Incorporating the "fertility of
the body" in our thinking and doing, it denounces the
false dichotomy between the mind (con/ception) and
the body (per/ception) as a "patriarchal bifurcation."
As the conceptual or morphologicallocus of feminine
difference,jouissance is not singular and oppositional
but multiple and complementary.
The most interesting aspect of jouissance is the
homonymous play on the sound ofthe word as "j'oui's
sens," which means "I hear meaning" and which is
intended to subvert the way of privileging masculine
ocularcentrism, of the ocularcentric epistemology of
the Cartesian cogito, which is in pursuit of "clear and
distinct ideas." The subjectivity ofwomen, it has been
emphasized, is reinserted into philosophical discourse
as an argument against scopic phallocracy, i.e., against
the objectifying look ofmen.ln sum,jouissance auscul-
tates the valorizing voi ce of feminine difference with-
out losing subjectivity at the edge of objectivity. It is
an epochal attempt to overcome and defenestrate phal-
locracy.
Touch or caress, like hearing, is the sense of prox-
imity, while vi sion is the sense of distance. Influenced
by Levinas's ethics of proximity, of the face-to-face,
Irigaray claims that the eye or look privileges the mas-
culine and that investment in vision at the expense
of the other senses impoverishes the body's material-
ity and corporeal relations. While "spectatorial" vision
glorifies the masculine, the "participatory" sense of
touch valorizes the feminine. To feminize body poli-
tics (the plural ofthe body politic) is therefore to accent
the senses of proximity (hearing, touching, and tasting)
and to decenter or de-panopticize the haunting specter
561
of vision in our thinking and doing.
The feminine way embodies the communal sense of
intimacy by way oftouch, contact, proximity, face-to-
face consociation, and "soft" knowledge. Based on the
sense of proximity, particularly of touch, the ethics of
care is uniquely a feminine ethics. Joan Tronto holds
that what masculine identity is to justice, feminine dif-
ference is to care. In the tradition ofphenomenological
philosophizing, it is Heidegger who defines DASEIN as
care (Sorge, cura), in his epochal work Sein und Zeit
(1927). Based on the Latin fable ofHyginus, Dasein is
inspirited with care with its body (corpus) as the gift
of earth (tellus, humus).
The feminine ethics of care in the United States
has surged ahead with Carol Gilligan 's discerning cri-
tique of the gender-biased psychology of Lawrence
Kohlberg on the stages of moral development. When
the ethics of care is engendered and monitored by femi-
nine difference, it takes on a radically new countenance
or gives birth to a new, postmodern ethics. It sub-
verts the modernist ethics based on individual rights
and transmutes it into a postmodern ethics based on
responsibility. The ethics of care interrupts and trans-
forms egocentricity into heterocentricity, self-absorbed
"taking" into other-directed "giving" that is the moral
locus of care. It calls for the sacrifice ofthe self for the
Other (i.e., self-transcendence). It is indeed a Coper-
nican revolution in moral thinking. There has been
no philosopher who was more emphatic than Levinas
about the inseparability of ethics, heteronomy, and re-
sponsibility. Ethics is for him primary, and everything
else begins as ethics. Because of this primacy of the
ethical, subjectivity is for Levinas asserted never for it-
self, but only for another (pour l 'autre).ln other words,
subjectivity (or ipseity) comes into (ethical) being as
heteronomic: it is my non-transferable answerability
or responsibility to the Other (l'autrui) that makes the
individual an authentic and unique subject. Only be-
cause subjectivity is described in heteronomic, ethical
terms is responsibility understood as the fundamen-
tal structure of subjectivity: I am who I am because
1 am responsible for others. Although responsibility
without autonomy or freedom is a sham, autonomy
is ancillary but not contrary to responsibility simply
because we can be autonomous without being respon-
sible, but we can never be responsible without first
being autonomous.
562 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that CALVIN
o. SCHRAG has recently developed the idea oftransver-
sality to structure connections in the face of the dif-
ference between modernist identity and postmodernist
difference. Transversality is the new hinge that al-
lows philosophizing to swing across both disciplinary
boundaries and cultural borders.lt is a way ofweaving
different texts, of composing intertexts. By transmuting
universality into transversality, he opens up a new hori-
zon in order to deconstruct what might be called mod-
ern man 's white mythology, which has masgueraded as
Eurocentrism, sexism, and even speciesism. Inspired
by the philosophical insights ofMerleau-Ponty, Sartre,
Foucault, Lyotard, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Ouat-
tari, Schrag favors and argues for "the transversal logos
of communicative rationality" by refuting the "univer-
sal logos of logocentrism." Transversality promotes
dialogical enrichment across differences and embraces
the conception of truth as the way of communicabil-
ity. It intends to circumvent the modern hegemony of
identity on the one hand and the postmodern anarchy
ofmultiplicity on the other. It administers, as it were, a
double-edgedpharmakon to both modernity and post-
modernity. By splitting the difference between them,
i.e., by maximizing the advantages and minimizing the
disadvantages, Schrag indeed advances the cause of
phenomenology as a philosophical movement.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Beauvoir, Simone de. Le deuxil?me sexe. Paris: Gallimard,
1949; The Second Sex. Trans. H. M. Parshley. New York:
Knopf, 1953.
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Chawaf, Chantal. "An Intcrview." Trans. Christine Laennec.
In Shifting Scenes. Eds. Alice A. Jardine and Anne M.
Menke, New York: Routledge, 1991, 17-31.
Collin, Fran9oise. "Philosophical Differences." Trans. Arthur
Goldhammer. In A History of Women in the West Vol. 5:
Toward a Cultural Identity in the Twentieth Century. Ed.
Fran9oise Thebaud. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1994,261-96.
Derrida, Jacques. Psyche. Paris: Galilee, 1987.
Gasche, Rodolphe. "Deconstruction as Criticism." Glyph 6
(1979), 177-215.
Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1994.
Habermas, Jiirgen. Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne,
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985; The Phi/osophical
Discourse o{Modernity. Trans. Frederick Lawrence. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
Irigaray, Luce. Ce sexe qui n 'en est pas un. Paris: Minuit,
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
1977; This Sex Which Is Not One. Trans. Catherine Porter
with Carolyn Burke. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1985.
- . Ethique de la difference sexuel/e. Paris: Minuit, 1984;
An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Trans. Carolyn Burke and
Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Jacques, Francis. Difference et subjectivite. Paris: Montaigne,
1982; Difference and Subjectivity. Trans. Andrew Roth-
well. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991.
Jung, Hwa Yol. "Writing the Body as Social Discourse: Pro-
legomena to Carnal Hermeneutics." In Signs ofChange.
Ed. Stephen Barker. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1995, 259--77, 389-411.
Laqueur, Thomas. Making Sex. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Hors sujet. Saint Clement: Morgana,
1987; Outside the Subject. Trans. Michael B. Smith. Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Lyotard, Jean-Fran9ois. La condition postmoderne. Paris:
Minuit, 1979; The Postmodern Condition. Trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1984.
- . La phenomenologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1954; 1Oth rev. ed., 1986; Phenomenology. Trans.
Brian Beakley. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1991.
Schrag, Calvin O. The Resources ofRationality. Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992.
Taylor, Mark C. Altarity. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987.
Vattimo, Gianni. Le .fine delia modernita. Milano: Garzanti,
1985; The End (){ Modernity. Trans. Jon R. Snyder. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
- . Avventure delia differenza. Milano: Garzanti, 1980; The
Adventure of Difference. Trans. Cyprian Blamires with
Thomas Harrison. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993.
HwA YoLJUNG
Moravian Ca/lege
PSYCHIATRY Modern psychiatry, as rep-
resented by Emil Kraeplin (1856-1926), and pheno-
menology, as developed by EDMUND HUSSERL, began
around the same time, namely, during the last decades
of the 19th century. Moreover, psychiatry and pheno-
menology have always shared a common goal: they
have both sought detailed descriptions ofhuman expe-
rience. This communality of goals has repeatedly led
psychiatrists to turn to phenomenology for aid in expli-
cating mentallife. For many psychiatrists it has seemed
that phenomenology offered a method that could help
them better understand and conceptualize the experi-
ences of their patients. As a re suit, psychiatrists ha ve
 PSYCHIATRY
utilized various phenomenological approaches just as
phenomenologists have explored subjects in psychia-
try.
The history of this relationship has remained am-
biguous, however. Frequently a gap has yawned be-
tween the broad theoretical perspectives adapted from
phenomenology and the needs of clinica! practice. Fur-
thermore, psychiatrists - who are often trained in
the biologica! and natural sciences - may feei dis-
inclined to delve deeply into explorations of the sub-
jective when these explorations appear to them to re-
main too abstract or metaphysical. And, returning the
compliment, phenomenologists have usually exhibited
a profound reluctance to ascribe centrality to biological
and naturalistic perspectives. In the post-World War II
years, impressive progress in empirica! research has
provided physicians with powerful means for diag-
nosis and treatment, for example, with psychopharma-
cology; because psychiatrists are always pragmatists at
heart, these new means have tended to supplant pheno-
menological insights.
More recently, the relationship has grown more
complicated, and these complexities offer hope of a
revitalized cross-fertilization between psychiatry and
phenomenology. On the one hand, empirica! research
in psychiatry continues at an even more rapid pace.
On the other hand, many physicians and patients are
more aware ofthe gaps, inadequacies, and even unto-
ward consequences ofthe one-sidedness ofthese new
developments. This has spurred a turn toward holistic
medici ne, wellness, and environmental medicine that is
more congenial to phenomenological views. Moreover,
there is a growing recognition that phenomenological
and neurobiological perspectives can no Ion ger oppose
one another. Indeed, it is becoming apparent that these
two perspectives require one another; when properly
conceived, each will strengthen the other. We shall
first sketch a briefhistory ofthe relationships between
phenomenology and psychiatry. Subsequently, we shall
delineate possible directions that future inquiry might
take.
The main value of phenomenology for psychiatry
has historically consisted in phenomenology's careful
descriptions of the many facets of human existence.
On the level of clinica! practice, psychiatrists who are
schooled in phenomenology have leamed to explore
the subtleties and nuances of their patients' experi-
563
ences. On the level ofresearch and theory, phenomen-
ological psychiatrists have been able to conceptualize
invariant features of abnormal mental Iife. Moreover,
phenomenology, because of its emphasis on the con-
crete situatedness ofpersons through embodiment, eul-
ture, and HISTORY, has made psychiatrists more aware
ofthe complexity ofhuman existence.
The first influence of phenomenology on psychi-
atry is found in the work of KARL JASPERS. Jaspers
began his career as a psychiatrist, tuming to philos-
ophy only !ater. The first article indebted to pheno-
menology was concemed with morbid jealousy ( 191 0).
His early book, Allgemeine Psychopathologie (Gen-
eral psychopathology, 1913), was decisively shaped
by the ideas of Husserl, WILHELM DILTHEY, and MAX
WEBER, among others. Drawing on Husserl's Logis-
che Untersuchungen (1900-190 1), Jaspers developed
his own phenomenological method. This phenomen-
ology was designed to detine the basic concepts ofpsy-
chopathology, such as "delusion" and "hallucination."
Jaspers' phenomenology resembled Husserl's in be-
ing descriptive, intuitive, and presuppositionless. But
because psychopathology pertains to the patient's ex-
periences, Jaspers viewed understanding (Verstehen)
and empathy (Einfiihlung) as essential components of
the method. He did diverge from Husserl by explicitly
rejecting EIDETIC METHOD. Jaspers saw his own pheno-
menology as empirica!.
Jaspers' phenomenological approach influenced
psychiatrists in what carne tobe known as the "Heidel-
berg school." This school included HANS GRUHLE, KURT
SCHNEIDER, and WILLY MAYER-GROSS. Schneider assisted
Jaspers with rewriting and expanding the Allgemeine
Psychopathologie (fourth edition) during World War II.
The fourth edition incorporated notions from Jaspers'
philosophy of existence.
Mayer-Gross carried the phenomenological orien-
tation to GREAT BRITAIN in 1933. His textbook, Clini-
ca/ Psychiatry (1969, 3rd edition), influenced numer-
ous British psychiatrists. By then, however, Jaspers'
phenomenology was viewed as empirica! in contrast to
Husserl's. Moreover, Husserl's phenomenology carne
to be misperceived as a mere precursor to MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER's analysis of DASEIN as imported into psychi-
atry by LUDWIG BINSWANGER. Jaspers' contributions to
psychopathology are usually regarded as definitive in
Great Britain. Furthermore, present-day British work
564 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
in the field tends to deny Husserl 's inftuence on Jaspers.
Under the leadership of AUBREY LEWIS, the Mauds-
ley Hospital in London disseminated Jaspersian pheno-
menology to the English-speaking world. The Ameri-
can psychiatrist PAUL R. MCHUGH trained there. McHugh
in collaboration with PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY has done much
to advance Jaspersian and other facets of phenomen-
ological psychiatry in the United States.
At the Tavistock Institute in England, R. o. LAING in-
troduced an EXISTENT!AL-PHENOMENOLOG!CAL approach
to schizophrenia. While this approach draws on a num-
ber of existentialists, it is indebted mainly to JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE. Laing also studied interpersonal aspects
of mental disorders. He is perhaps best known for his
criticisms of psychiatry, especially his challenges of
the standard sanity/madness distinction.
In Germany and elsewhere in Continental Europe,
other important schools of phenomenological psychi-
atry ha ve developed. The most significant figure in the
Continental appropriation of phenomenology is prob-
ably the Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger. Bin-
swanger's phenomenology is nourished by his exten-
sive clinica! experience. He searched his entire life for
a proper form of phenomenological conceptualization
and method. First inftuenced by Husserl, Binswanger
subsequently employed central features ofHeidegger's
analytic of Dasein. In his last works, under the inftu-
ence of VILMOS (WILHELM) SZILASI, Binswanger again
turned to Husserl 's ideas.
In Switzerland the most important follower ofBin-
swanger was ROLAND KUHN. Kuhn developed a pheno-
menological conception ofthe Rorschach test. He com-
bined psychopharmacology with psychotherapy and in
fact invented imipramine (Tofranil), which even to-
day is considered a standard drug for the treatment of
depression.
In Germany most ofBinswanger's students worked
in the Department of Psychiatry at Heidelberg. HEINZ
HĂFNER applied Binswanger 's approach to patients with
personality disorders (such individuals are called "psy-
chopaths" in Germany) and KARL P. KISKER to patients
with schizophrenia. HUBERTUS TELLENBACH extended
Binswanger's concepts to the world of the melan-
cholic. Tellenbach constructed a typology of depres-
sives, focusing on pre-morbid characteristics, e.g., an
extreme tendency toward orderliness. He inspired AL-
FRED KRAUS to study existential types and role theory.
WOLFGANG BLANKENBURG developed a phenomenoJogi-
caJ understanding of characteristic features of chronic
schizophrenics and described the loss of taken-for-
grantedness (Selbstverstăndlichkeit).
Earlier in Heidelberg there were physicians in-
terested in the field of psychosomatic medicine. An
anthropological approach was created by the in-
ternist, Viktor von Weizsăcker. Inftuenced by MAX
SCHELER's reftections on biologica! philosophy, von
Weizsăcker's conception of the Gestaltkreis (forma-
tive cycle) posited an interaction between perception
and movement. Also inftuenced by Scheler was VIKTOR
voN GEBSATTEL. Von Gebsattel developed his ideas in
association with Binswanger, EUGENE MINKOWSKI, and
Straus. He adopted what he called an "anthropological-
existential" framework for investigating such topics as
the world of the compulsive, depersonalization, and
addictions and perversions. HERBERT PLOGGE has writ-
ten a number of essays in "medical anthropology" that
are focused on various dimensions ofhealth and illness
and on the experiences of one 's body.
In the last two decades, the phenomenological tra-
dition at the University ofHeidelberg has sought to in-
corporate empirica! investigations and neurobiological
perspectives. WERNER JANZARIK has explicated a com-
prehensive "structural-dynamic" theory. This theory is
geared to providing a holistic approach that will make
both biologica! and psychopathological data relevant
to practicing clinicians. CHRISTOPH MUNDT has investi-
galed severa! concepts ofrNTENTIONALITY, including the
most recent ones, e.g., Daniel Dennett's. In both theo-
retical and empirica! studies he applies these concepts
to schizophrenia. As the present director ofthe Psychi-
atric Clinic at the University of Heidelberg, Mundt is
interested in revitalizing the phenomenological tradi-
tion there, but he insists on do ing so in conjunction with
empirica! investigations of populations of patients. In
this regard Mundt has voiced sharp criticisms of the
"autistic" tendencies in past phenomenologies.
J0RG ZUTT in Frankfurt has developed an "under-
standing anthropology" (verstehende Anthropologie)
aimed at overcoming mind-body dualism. From this
point of view he has contributed severa! insights into
the psychopathoJogy ofthe lived BODY. GERHARD BOSCH,
a student of Zutt's, has studied infantile autism from
the perspective of a "phenomenological anthropology."
He employs Husserl's analyses of intersubjectivity in
 PSYCHIATRY
order to explicate the defect involved in the autistic
child's social encounters.
ERWIN W. STRAUS, along with von Gebsattel, Bin-
swanger, and Zutt, founded the joumal Der Nervenarzt
in 1930. Straus was trained as a psychiatrist and neurol-
ogist, but he also possessed a profound knowledge of
classical authors such as Aristotle, Augustine, Goethe,
and Shakespeare. From the University of Berlin Straus
emigrated to the United States in 1938. He taught psy-
chology at Black Mountain College in North Carolina,
engaged in research at Johns Hopkins University, and
in 1946 moved to the Veterans Administration Hospi-
tal in Lexington, Kentucky. At Lexington in the 1960s,
he helped disseminate phenomenology to Americans
through his conferences on "Phenomenology: Pure and
Applied."
Straus was convinced that abnormal mental condi-
tions could be adequately understood only as deforma-
tions of normal experience. He also insisted that scien-
tific psychology, especially in its behavioristic forms,
furnished only misconceptions of normal mental func-
tioning. These two convictions led him to undertake
anew the study of normal experience, primarily sensory
experience, but to undertake it in a manner different
from that of traditional scientific psychology. Straus
first called his own approach "anthropological" and
!ater "phenomenological." In the area ofpsychopathol-
ogy he devoted specific studies to obsessions, compul-
sions, hallucinations, disorders of time in depressive
states, and the pseudoreversibility of catatonic stupor.
His broader concern, however, was the pathology of
I-world relationships.
Kurt Goldstein ( 1878-1965) was a biologist and
physician who developed a GESTALTIST conception of
the human organism. Goldstein 's inftuence on ARON
GURWITSCH and MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY ied these two
younger phenomenologists to investigations that bear
on psychiatric problems. Goldstein's own descriptions
of the breakdown of organization and the organism's
"catastrophic" responses remain highly relevant today.
In Dutch psychiatry the two most prominent figures
have been H. C. RUMKE and JAN HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG.
Rilmke has warned of the dan ger involved in the loss
of scientific and objective criteria in phenomenologi-
cal psychiatry. Caii ing for a genuinely "scientific psy-
chology," he has studied the experiences ofhappiness,
compulsion, and affective contact. Rilmke's sensitive
565
description of the psychiatrist's "praecox feeling" in
the presence of schizophrenic patients remains highly
relevant. J. H. van den Berg is perhaps best known
for The Changing Nature of Man: Introduction to a
Historical Psychology ( 1975). Also of interest is A
Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological
Psychopathology (1974).
In Switzerland MEDARD soss has carried Heidegge-
rian views directly into psychiatry, especially in the
areas of psychotherapy and psychosomatic medicine.
Boss's writings apparently have the approval of Hei-
degger himself. Heidegger personally participated in
some of Boss's seminars, and Boss has published ex-
tensive records ofthese under Heidegger's own name.
GION CONDRAU has continued to elaborate a Bossian
approach to psychotherapy, also drawing directly on
Heidegger.
EUGENE MINKOWSKI, a native of Poland who settled
in FRANCE, was strongJy inftuenced by HENRI BERGSON.
Minkowski may be regarded as the first psychiatrist to
take seriously the notion that a mentally il! person is
fully human and should be treated as a fellow human
being. Minkowski lived with mentally ill people and
sought to understand them on their own terms. Cen-
tral to his understanding of mentally ill persons is the
notion that for them access to the future is blocked. In
1929, Minkowski helped found the group L 'Evolution
psychiatrique, which published a journal by that name.
After World War II, HENRI EY worked with
Minkowski to revive L'Evolution Psychiatrique. In
1972, HERBERT SPIEGELBERG wrote of Ey, "his is the
most thorough and original utilization of phenomen-
ological philosophy in French psychiatry." Drawing
on concepts from evolution, Ey has developed an
"organo-dynamic" model ofpsychopathology; he thus
seeks to integrate consciousness and brain processes.
Starting first from a phenomenology of normal mental
life, he attempts to understand mental illnesses as "de-
structurations" of consciousness. Of special interest is
Ey's reinterpretation ofthe unconscious.
PAUL RICCEUR 's study of Freud, De l 'interpretation:
Essai sur Freud ( 1965), established strong ties between
PSYCHOANALYSIS and HERMENEUTICS. This work aJso sets
forth a hermeneutica! critique ofHusserlian phenomen-
ology, especially connected with Freud's understand-
ing of the unconscious. Ricceur's writings led some
people to reevaluate the scientific status of psycho-
566 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
analysis. On this topic an interesting counterweight to
Ricreur's book is AdolfGrunbaum's The Foundations
of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique ( 1984 ).
Among Japanese psychiatrists, BIN KIMURA is the
leading representative of phenomenological and ex-
istential approaches. His investigations of the "in-
between" (the mood or atmosphere between two peo-
ple) utilizes a theme in Japanese culture that allows him
to explicate aspects ofthe doctor-patient or therapeutic
relationship.
American psychoanalysts, such as Harry Stack Sul-
livan ( 1892-1949), have introduced much needed so-
cial perspectives on mental illness. They view the self
and its personal identity as constituted through INTER-
SUBJECTIVITY. Their psychology is thus "interpersonal"
rather than "intrapsychic."
Henri F. Ellenberger has written an important his-
torical study, The Discovery ofthe Unconscious: The
History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry ( 1970).
Ellenberger criticizes the narrow (i.e., theory-based)
view of the unconscious and emphasizes that there is
more to this field than Freud. As one of the coedi-
tors of Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and
Psychology ( 1958), Ellenberger helped bring pheno-
menological and existential approaches to psychiatry
and psychology to the attention of Americans.
Ro Ilo May (1909-1994) was another coeditor of
Existence. He also coedited other compilations of es-
says that in the 1950s and 1960s helped familiarize
American readers with phenomenological and existen-
tial psychiatry. In his own early writings, such as Psy-
chology and the Human Dilemma ( 1967), May sought
to clarify for an American audience the links that the
new psychiatry and psychology bore to Kierkegaard,
Husserl, Tillich, Sartre, and other European thinkers.
Irvin D. Yalom's Existential Psychotherapy (1980)
offers an account of mental problems as arising from
confticts rooted in the basic "givens of existence":
namely, death, freedom, isolation, and meaningless-
ness.
ono DORR-ZEGERS has carried the Heidelberg tra-
dition of Blankenburg and others to SPAIN AND LATIN
AMERICA. Dorr-Zegers' work has also been strongly in-
ftuenced by HANS-GEORG GADAMER and Heidegger. In
Spain phenomenology has been represented primarily
by RAMON SARRO, P. LAIN ENTRALGO, and J. J. LOPEZ IBOR.
Lopez Ibor in his book, Angustia vital (Vital anxiety,
1952), draws mainly on ORTEGA v GASSET, Scheler, and
Heidegger. He remains more willing than most phe-
nomenologists, however, to extend the field to include
psychopharmacology and biology.
During the last thirty years a growing number of
French psychiatrists have been systematically devel-
oping phenomenology by incorporating German and
American insights. ARTHUR TATOSSIAN spearheaded this
development in Marseille. An emerging figure in this
school today is JEAN NAUDIN, also in Marseille. In
order to explicate the subjective experiences of pa-
tients, these writers draw on the ideas of Binswanger,
Blankenburg, Kraus, and other German psychiatrists.
Their recent work connects Binswanger's conception
of inner life history with a narrative model of mental
illness derived from John Strauss and Larry Davidson.
For a broader understanding of the relationship be-
tween story and personal identity Naudin draws on
the work of WILHELM SCHAPP, a student of Husserl.
Other members ofthis new French school include JEAN-
MICHEL AZORIN, S. GIUDICELLI, D. J. PRINGUEY, MARC GER-
AUD, MARIE-CLAUDE LAMBOTTE, and YVES PELICIER.
If we turn to imagining directions of collaboration
between phenomenology and psychiatry in the future,
we can conceive ofat least three. Two ofthese are con-
tributions phenomenology can make to psychiatry: ( 1)
a PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY through which mental
disorders can be comprehended and (2) methods for
explicating human existence in great detail. Both of
these contributions should include detailed investiga-
tions of the healthy human being as well as the ill,
in contrast to the preoccupation of mainstream psy-
chiatry with illness alone. In addition, psychiatry can
contribute to phenomenology by (3) furnishing exam-
ples of unusual human experiences that can stimulate
and inform phenomenological investigations.
( 1) Elements of a philosophical anthropology can be
gleaned from Husserlian and Schelerian phenomenolo-
gies and from the philosophies of existence- namely,
those of Jaspers, Heidegger, GABRIEL MARCEL, Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, and Ricreur. From a psychiatric point
of view, however, the limitations that pervade pheno-
menology and existentialism consist in the fact that
they remain too idealistic: either they put aside or ig-
nore the physico-biological dimensions ofhuman life,
or, as in the case of Heidegger, they scorn approaches
that ascribe centrality to biology. Scheler remains the
 PSYCHIATRY
sole exception to this criticism. Jaspers and Merleau-
Ponty appear at first glance to provide exceptions to it.
But while Jaspers does allot a place for biology, he also
insists on a rigid dualism that separates the biologica!
from the existential. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of
the lived body should definitely be accorded a primary
place in psychiatric anthropology, but ultimately even
he attributes too little importance to the human body
as explained by biology and neurophysiology for his
position to prove adequate. The potential relevance of
philosophical biologists and philosophical anthropol-
ogists, including Hans Jonas (1903-1993), HELMUTH
PLESSNER, Adolph Portmann, Arnold Gehlen, and Mar-
jorie Grene, has not been sufficiently appreciated. Their
importance !ies in the centrality that they accord tohu-
man biology and in their opposition to traditional mind-
body dualism. Furthermore, these thinkers analyze the
interaction between society and biology in ways that
ha ve yet tobe incorporated into either phenomenology
or psychiatry.
It should also be recognized that while Jonas,
Gehlen, Plessner, Grene, and Portmann provide the
larger organic context, this context must be filled in
with contemporary neuroanatomy and neuroscience.
Kenneth Schaffner and other philosophers of biology
are relevant to this task.
(2) Methods for explicating human existence in
great detail are needed in order to apprehend suffi.-
ciently the complexity of mental disorders. A pheno-
menological method that is scientifically rigorous, nu-
anced, and securely based on EVIDENCE could provide
the basic concepts for psychopathology: such meth-
ods could specify the differences, for example, among
delusions present in schizophrenia, mania, and delir-
iuru. In addition, a carefully developed hermeneutica!
method is needed to explore the life histories of indi-
vidual patients. Here the narrative structure and tem-
porality ofhuman existence as studied by Paul Ricceur
and DAVID CARR would prove crucial.
(3) Psychiatry and other disciplines within MEDICINE
can furnish examples of unusual human experi-
ences that can stimulate, inform, broaden, and
challenge phenomenological investigations. Merleau-
Ponty's and Gurwitsch's uses of Goldstein's stud-
ies provide instructive illustrations of how pheno-
menology benefits. Oliver Sacks and Alexander Ro-
manovich Luria (1902-1977) show how richly expli-
567
cated clinica! case histories deepen our appreciation of
what it means to be human.
Severa! joumals regularly publish articles from
phenomenological, existential, or anthropological per-
spectives. Among them are PPP-Philosophy. Psychia-
try, and Psychology (United States ); Journal ofPheno-
menological Psychology (United Sates); Journal of
Humanistic Psychology (United States ); Review ofEx-
istential Psychology and Psychiatry (United States);
Zeitschrift fur klinische Psychologie und Psychother-
apie (Germany); Der Nervenarzt (Germany); and Da-
seinsanalyse. Phanomenologische Anthropologie und
Psychotherapie (Switzerland).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bosch, Gerhard. Der friihkindliche Autismus. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1962; Infantile Autism: A Clinica/ and
Phenomenological-Anthropological Investigation Taking
Language as the Guide. Trans. D. and 1. Jordan. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1970.
Boss, Medard. Grundriss der Medizin und der Psychologie.
Bem: Verlag Hans Huber, 1971; Existential F oundations
of Medicine and Psychology. Trans. Stephen Comay and
Anne Cleaves. New York: Jason Aronson, 1979.
De Koning, AndreJ. J., and F. A. Jenner, eds. Phenomenology
and Psychiatry. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1982.
Ey, Henri. La conscience. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1963; Consciousness: A Phenomenological Study
ofBeing Conscious and Becoming Conscious. Trans. John
H. Flodstrom. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1978.
Heidegger, Martin. Zollikoner Seminare. Ed. Medard Boss.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987.
Kraus, Alfred. Sozialverhalten und Psychose Manisch-
Depressiver. Eine existenz- und rollenanalytische Unter-
suchung. Stuttgart: Enke, 1977.
- . "Methodological Problems with the Classification ofPer-
sonality Disorders: The Significance ofExistential Types."
Journal of Personality Disorders 5 ( 1991 ), 82-92.
May, Rollo, Ernest Angel, and Henri F. Ellenberger, eds. Ex-
istence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958.
McHugh, Paul R., and Phillip R. Slavney. The Perspectives
ofPsychiatry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986.
Psychiatry and Phenomeno/ogy (papers by Gion Condrau,
Alfred Kraus, Jan Hendrik van den Berg, and Dieter Wyss;
introduction by Edward L. Murray), The Fourth Annual
Symposium ofthe Simon Silverman Phenomenology Cen-
ter [ 1986]. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1987.
Ricreur, Paul. De 1'interpretation: Essai sur Freud. Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1965; Freud and Philosophy: An Essay
in Interpretation. Trans. Denis Savage. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1970.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. Phenomenology in Psychology and
568 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Psychiatry. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
I972.
Spitzer, Manfred, Friedrich Uehlein, Michael A. Schwartz,
and Christoph Mundt, eds. Phenomenology, Language,
and Schizophrenia. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992.
Tellenbach, Hubertus. Melancholie. Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1961; Melancholy. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 1980.
van den Berg, Jan Hendrik. A Different Existence: Princi-
ples of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1972.
Wiggins, Osborne P., Michael A. Schwartz, and Georg
Northoff. "Toward a Husserlian Phenomenology of the
Initial Stages of Schizophrenia." In Philosophy and Psy-
chopathology. Ed. Manfred Spitzer and Brendan A. Ma-
her. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990, 21-34.
Yalom, Irvin D. Existential Psychotherapy. New York: Basic
Books, 1980.
0SBORNE P. WIGGINS
University of Louisville
MICHAEL ALAN SCHWARTZ
Case Western University
PSYCHOANALYSIS Psychoanalysis is a psy-
chological school that appeared at the same time
as phenomenology. The two determining researchers
are EDMUND HUSSERL in phenomenology and Sigmund
Freud ( 1856-1939) in psychoanalysis. Both devel-
oped extensive frameworks for a psychology that was
deemed "scientific." Although these two frameworks
are fundamentally different, in the course of time,
phenomenology and psychoanalysis met through PSY-
CHOLOGY.
The fundamental works at the beginning of pheno-
menological psychology are FRANZ BRENTANo's Psy-
chologie vom empirischen Standpunkt ( 18 74 ), HENRI
BERGSON's Essai sur les donnees immediates de la con-
science (Essay on the immediate givens of conscious-
ness, 1889), WILLIAM JAMES 's Principles of Psychol-
ogy ( 1890), and Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen
(1900-1901).
Brentano especially examined the EVIDENCE of in-
ner perception, in comparison with which the evidence
of outer reality remains questionable in principle. He
defined the basic character ofpsychologicallife as the
performance of intentiona! acts: every psychic phe-
nomenon is distinguished by its relation to a content.
The acts are always given as a unity; the inner conti-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner ( eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
nuity of intentiona! consciousness is thus established.
Brentano distinguished between genetic and descrip-
tive psychology: the task of descriptive psychology
or descriptive phenomenology is to understand con-
sciousness by analyzing it. Bergson also wanted to
describe immediate data of consciousness. He particu-
larly analyzed the duration of experienced time, which
can only be differentiated qualitatively and can only
be experienced by intuition. The continuous stream of
duration carries the psychological acts and the concrete
ego, which as such is free, because it is not under the
control of o uter material conditions.
According to James, ali events of consciousness
can be explained by physical processes, but they them-
selves are about the choice of means to reach an end.
They therefore ha ve a special function within the pro-
cesses oflife: thinking is a "stream ofthought" that only
belongs to one individual and that constantly changes.
It is oriented toward objects that exist outside of it; it
establishes a selective activity that is guided by interest.
James's theory of instinct includes a complex number
of vital motivational structures, which are inherent and
which cannot be reduced to a few.
Husserl, for his part, put emphasis on the intentiona!
character of consciousness, which includes the entire
stock of the EGO. With the anaJysis of INTENTIONALITY,
consciousness is the central theme: with constitution it
actively creates and passive1y experiences the mean-
ing of objects in the world as well as its own unity.
Thus consciousness lives as an active and passive syn-
thesis, which it can e1ucidate empirically, eidetically,
and transcendentally. The empirica! task goes to de-
scriptive phenomenological psychology, which is in
the service of the self-enlightenment of the teleology
ofREASON. Transcendental-phenomenological rational-
ism is therefore a philosophy of mind that embraces
ali being, including nature and the nature of the hu-
man being. Husserl 's phenomeno1ogical psycho1ogy is
a psychology of consciousness with universal tasks. It
is not psychology of the drives and has, because of its
task and method, no access to the drives.
Psychoanalysis is the work of a single man: Sig-
mund Freud. His most important works are Die
Traumdeutung (The interpretation of dreams, 1900),
Vorlesungen zur Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse (In-
troductory lectures in psychoanalysis, 1917), and Das
Ich und das Es (The ego and the id, 1923 ). Freud un-
 PSYCHOANALYSIS
derstood psychoanalysis (a) as a method to discover
so-called repressions, (b) as a theory of neurotic disor-
ders based on this method, and (c) as a universal theory
of human beings, especially their sublimation and de-
structive tendencies. The main parts ofpsychoanalyti-
cal teaching are concemed with repression, inhibition,
childhood experience, sexuallife, and the unconscious.
Freud saw in his psychoanalysis the basis for an entire
psychology; as "depth psychology" it was furthermore
essential for ali sciences. Freud worked ali his life with
neurotic people. After having treated hysteric neurotics
and after having published his interpretation ofthe eti-
ology of this illness, he extended psychoanalysis to
dreams, slips of the tongue, perversions, psychosis,
artistic production, psychological theory of personal-
ity, aggression, and the origin of religion.
Freud thought of psychoanalysis as a NATURAL scr-
ENCE, because the mind to him was an epiphenomenon.
In the course of his life as a researcher, however,
he transformed psychoanalysis into a universal theory
of understanding. From 1874 to 1876 Freud attended
Brentano's lectures in Vienna, but was hardly influ-
enced by him. Thinkers with a strong influence on him
were Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887), Arthur
Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Friedrich Wilhelm Niet-
zsche ( 1844-1900), and Theodor Lipps (1851-1914).
He thus shared his philosophical opinions with the
atheistic, evolutionary positivism of the late 19th cen-
tury. His metapsychological writings claim tobe philo-
sophical, although he himself despised philosophy-
systematic philosophical thinking he saw as close to
paranoid mania. He explicated philosophical thoughts
psychogenetically: to him the categorica! imperative,
for example, was an heir to the Oedipus complex.
In the field of psychology he thought the research
of unconscious drives to be more important than the
description of phenomena of consciousness. The term
"phenomenon" he used very rarely, and only with re-
gard to the li nes of processes of consciousness, which
according to him were incomplete and which had tobe
completed from the point of view of drive dynamism.
Thus he clearly rejected the equal status ofpsychologi-
cal processes and consciousness as well as the assump-
tion of the evidence of in ner perception.
Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are divergent.
(a) The research topic ofphenomenology is conscious-
ness, that of psychoanalysis is the subconscious. (b)
569
Intentionality works teleologically and creates objec-
tive meaning, while drives have a causal effect and
create factuallife history. (c) From a phenomenologi-
cal point of view, the task of reason is the universal
elucidation of the world and the self, and this task is
thought tobe soluble. From a psychoanalytical point of
view, consciousness is the victim of "rationalization,"
which comes from the tendencies in the superego of
the so-called psychological apparatus.
According to Freud's psychoanalysis a theory of
autonomous subjectivity is not possible. ( 1) The unity
of consciousness and primordiality of the individual
are rejected. Repression is a more original process
than the synthesis of consciousness. The main aim
is not self-knowledge, but dissociation from the plea-
sure principle and acceptance of the reality principle.
(2) A transcendental subject as the creator of mean-
ing is fictional. Human beings are govemed by their
subconscious and by the laws of the id. Reason is a de-
rived condition balancing between ego and superego.
(3) There is no autonomy of practica! reason, and the
ego is not morally independent; the entire psycholog-
ical apparatus can only be preserved with difficulties
against the desires ofthe drives.
Husserl did not comment on psychoanalysis. His
phenomenology is research into consciousness. He and
Brentano are skeptical and disapproving of the sub-
conscious. If formerly unconscious processes appear
in consciousness, though, they can be examined phe-
nomenologically- psychologically and transcenden-
tally. Within the development of Husserl 's phenomen-
ology there are different stages of distance from psy-
choanalysis. The EIDETIC METHOD examines essences
by a procedure that is not historical, and therefore it
is without a connection to the history of drives. Tran-
scendental phenomenology, on the other hand, has sev-
era! approaches open to it, among others the historical
approach of GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY. So the differ-
ence between phenomenology and psychoanalysis is
reduced.
In contrast to the moderate openness of pheno-
menology that follows as a consequence, orthodox
psychoanalysis remains hostile to philosophy: Freud's
metapsychological approach leaves humanity in a
closed system of forces, which displace, shift, and fix
each other as ifthey were under the laws ofnature. Hu-
mans are not autonomous subjects, but are carried by a
570 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
psychological apparatus that has tobe examined scien-
tifically. The human being remains a "human animal";
the evolution ofhumankind needs no other explanation
than the evolution of animals.
Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are compared
in the literature for the first time in 1911. Arthur Kro-
nfeld criticized the concept of symbol in psychoanal-
ysis and saw the most important task of phenomen-
ological psychology in the psychology of emotions.
He thought Brentano 's psychology to be more pro-
ductive than Husserl 's approach. In 1927 Heinz Hart-
mann (1894-1970) again compared both schools of
thought and he examined the method of psychoanaly-
sis: it wants to give reasons for the qualitative diversity
ofthe psyche by reducing it to simpler confrontations
of drives. Compared with that, phenomenological psy-
chology tries to understand this qualitative richness as
a whole and in its own right, without trying to deduce it
from causes. Causal and historical interrelations stand
in contrast to static connections of essence.
The anthropological phenomenologist MAX SCHELER
dealt with psychoanalysis intensively; he acknowl-
edged repression and saw in it a source of deception
for inner perception. For him EMOTIONs were of cen-
tral significance. As a phenomenologist of essence he
acknowledged actual emotions as what they are. They
must not be deduced psychogenetically and hypothet-
ically from supposed assumptions of drives.
Representatives of the depth psychological school
of thought are Alfred Adler (1870-1937), who ex-
amined feelings of inferiority, and Cari Gustav Jung
(1875-1961 ), who put forward the hypothesis of the
collective unconscious. Neither dealt with phenomen-
ology. From psychoanalysis there also emerged the
neo-analytical branch: Harald Schultz-Hencke ( 1892-
1953) focused on the inhibition ofhuman beings as a
central theme. He described INTENTIONALITY as the ba-
sic structure of inquisitiveness and regarded the entire
organization of experience of drives as shaped by it.
Phenomenology was altered by MARTIN HEIDEGGER's
Sein und Zeit ( 1927). It here became the hermeneutics
ofthe state (constitution) ofthe being ofthe human be-
ing, i.e., the being-there, DASEIN. Yet the phenomenon
remains that which "shows-itself-in-itself, the obvi-
ous" within its horizon. Dasein as "being-in-the-world"
is existent especially in the existentials of original
"world-openness," ofTIME and SPACE, of mood, of care,
and of"being-toward-death."With this, in other words,
the psycho1ogica1 characteristics of anxiety, guilt, and
conscience are named, which are a ma in topic of psy-
choanalysis. Heidegger knew psychonanalysis, but he
rejected it absolutely. He thought of a psychoanalytical
life history as a constructed naturalistic causal chain.
There are no philosophical similarities between
Freud and Heidegger. Both, however, emphasize death
as no thinkers did before them. In his late years Freud
put forward the death drive, which, he thought, belongs
to every cell and it drives back to the beginning ofthe
past. Heidegger's Dasein is characterized as "being-
toward-death"; it is an existential of human being; it
makes an enormous future possible.
"Daseinsanalyse," a school of thought in German
and Swiss PSYCHIATRY, is based on Freud and on pheno-
menology. Its main representatives are LUDWIG BIN-
SWANGER and MEDARD BOSS. Using psychoanaJysis, this
school is based in part on Husserl but mainly on Hei-
degger. It translates Heidegger's ontologica! approach
into a conception of psychiatry that is aimed at con-
crete courses oflife. Freud and Binswanger exchanged
thoughts intensively, and Boss and Heidegger worked
together. Binswanger's intention was to decipher the
uniqueness of a life history, not its drive-genetical
organization. According to Boss the phenomena of
human existence can only be understood adequately
when they are not traced back causally to other pro-
cesses. A psychoanalytically interpretable history of
drives might happen in human beings; the openness of
existence, though, remains foreign to such a history.
It is the significance of neuroses and perversions that
has an effect on life history, not the genesis, which
is externa! to its contents. Daseinsanalyse especially
deals with endogenous psychoses, neuroses, perver-
sions, and dreams. Its therapeutic successes are con-
troversial.
The method of VIKTOR VON GEBSATTEL is similar to
that of Daseinsanalyse, without him being a repre-
sentative of this school. Beginning from Husserl and
Heidegger, as well as Freud and Jung, he pointed to
the "worlds" that are characteristic of the sick person
-for example, the characteristic worlds of phobias, in
which anxiety works as an original phenomenon oflife,
even if it has been specified by individual accidents of
drive. Daseinsanalyse has been continued since 1955
in the UNITED STATES as "existential analysis."
 PSYCHOANALYSIS
In FRANCE, German phenomenology took effect
through the intluence of Scheler. The central figure
of phenomenological psychiatry in France, EUGENE
MINKOWSKI, was intluenced by Scheler and Bergson.
From Scheler he took the distinction between the psy-
chogenesis and the significance of psychological phe-
nomena. In the 1920s the teaching of Husserl was
spread by JEAN HERING and ALEXANDRE KOYRE. The
!ater version of French phenomenology was mainly
shaped by Georges Politzer ( 1903-1942). His Critique
desfondements de la psychologie ( 1928) had an effect
from MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE to
Jacques Lacan (190 1-1981 ). Politzer opposed the me-
chanics of the subconscious, but he emphasized the
linguistic hasis ofthe psychoanalytic dyad.
In the course of the 1930s the thinking of Husserl
carne to the fore, mainly because of his Paris lectures
and the works of ARON GURWITSCH, GASTON BERGER,
and Sartre. On the French psychoanalytical side AN-
GELO HESNARD began trying in the 1940s to develop
a phenomenological psychoanalysis. He called Freud
"un phenomenologue avant la lettre." According to
Hesnard the psychotherapeutically important problem
of the relation to the other can only be solved on the
basis of a phenomenoJogy of INTERSUBJECTIVITY.
In his early works Sartre examined the transcen-
dence of the EGO and the power of IMAGINATION. His
main ontologica! work, L 'etre et le neant ( 1943 ), is
a phenomenology of the being of phenomena and
consciousness without reference to a transcendental
grounding. The world of consciousness is extended by
the psychoanalytical themes ofthe BODY and intersub-
jective sexuality. The assumption of the unconscious,
however, is sharply rejected. The self-understanding
of the human being works before any explicit refiec-
tion. What is known provisionally can be clearly rec-
ognized by "existential psychoanalysis." Sartre calls
Freudian psychoanalysis "empirica! psychoanalysis."
With it Sartre's "existential psychoanalysis" shares the
opinion that there are no original conditions, that the
life of the subject has to be reconstructed from birth
- there "empirically," here "existentially." Thus he
develops the method "which shall bring the subjec-
tive choices out into the open, by which every indi-
vidual creates itself as an individual." Freud's psy-
choanalysis elucidates by using dreams, slips of the
tongue, and neuroses; Sartre 's psychoanalysis is con-
571
cemed with conscious thoughts, completed acts, and
the entire lifestyle.
The most extensive examination of German pheno-
menology in France was dane by MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY. Following Husserl 's taking up ofthe LIFEWORLD
and Heidegger's treatment ofDASEIN, he interpreted the
unity of existence and world in relation to the immedi-
ate performance of the lived life. This unity precedes
the differentiation between subject and refiection and
between abject and being. The lifeworld he analyzed
especially as a natural-historical world of PERCEPTION.
Humans understand their original being-in-the-world
by their bodies. The body in which we live opens
the world to us. The existence of humankind is au-
tonomous within itself, but also dependent on the body
and therefore ambiguous. By emphasizing the role of
the body Merleau-Ponty is nearer to psychoanalysis
than to the transcendental position. According to him,
phenomenology has to make use of the expansion of
experience that was made possible by psychoanalysis.
As long as this is dane critically, even the energetic
models of psychoanalysis can become a guide to un-
derstanding the history ofthe subject. At the end ofhis
life Merleau-Ponty emphasized that not even pheno-
menology explained clearly the facts that were told
confusedly by psychoanalysis.
The work of PAUL RICCEUR is also a lifelong exami-
nation of phenomenology. At first he set his EXISTEN-
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY against the transcendental point
ofview; in it a phenomenology ofwill takes the place of
constitution. After a so-called "ontologica!" phase he
reached a HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY. Jn it LAN-
GUAGE becomes the abject of phenomenological in-
terpretation. This hermeneutics of MEANING contrasts
with the Freudian energetics of drives. In his main
work, De l 'interpretation (1965), Ricreur undertook
the most extensive examination to date ofpsychoanal-
ysis. The parts he thought useable he incorporated in
his philosophical hermeneutics. His basic thesis is that
psychoanalysis is a mixed discourse - partly ener-
getic, partly hermeneutica!. Like a natural science, it
reduces psychological phenomena to forces, and like
the HUMAN SCIENCES, it uncovers their meaning.
Ricreur accepted only the conversation between pa-
tient and analyst as the psychoanalytical field of expe-
rience. The only abject ofhis psychoanalytical theory
is the definite experience in this dyadic transaction.
572 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
According to him, observable behavior does not cre-
ate facts that can be used for theory. In psychoanalysis
he therefore did not see a science of observation; its
research has to be restricted to the semantics of de-
sire, because desire wants to be expressed, it gradually
wants to become meaning. Accordingly, psychoanal-
ysis must seek the origin of the meaning of psycho-
logical phenomena not only in the archaisms of the
drives, but also in the progressively constituted te/os
ofmeaning.
In the end Ricreur strove for a metaphysical and
religious revelation of experience: he wanted to trans-
fer the genetic archaeology of psychoanalysis and the
hermeneutica! teleology of his phenomenology from
phenomenology of religion to that of the "absolutely
different."
Jacques Lacan is not a genuine phenomenologist,
but his school ofthought also fought against every cog-
ito-philosophy in psychoanalysis, American ego psy-
chology, and Sartre's existential psychoanalysis. By
frequently referring to linguistics, LOGIC, and cybernet-
ics he tried to show that psychoanalysis on the whole is
not psychology. Knowledge and intention are no longer
taken as individual processes. Lacan allocated the un-
conscious a structure analogous to that oflanguage; it is
"the speech ofthe different one." The Belgian philoso-
pher ALPHONSE DE WAELHENS has tried to construct a Jink
between phenomenology and Lacan's psychoanalysis.
In his version, the unconscious is "the chapter in the
history of humankind that has remained blank or that
remains occupied by a lie. It is censored, but its truth
can be regained."
The confrontation between phenomenology and
psychoanalysis has fascinated philosophers and the in-
telligentsia concemed with the human sciences and
the CULTURAL DISCIPLINES. The encounter between the
schools ofthought, however, had the insoluble task of
connecting the doctrine ofthe revelation ofpsycholog-
ical phenomena in consciousness and the doctrine of
the control of consciousness by the drives.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Binswanger, Ludwig. Grundformen und Erkenntnis men-
schlichen Daseins. Zurich: Niehaus, 1942.
Boss, Medard. Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik.
Stuttgart: Huber, 1957; Existential Foundations of
Medicine and Psychology. Trans. Stephen Conway and
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ann C1eares. New York: Jason Aronson, 1979.
Driie, Hermann. Edmund Husserls System der phiinomenolo-
gischen Psychologie. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963.
Gebsatte1, Viktor Emil. Prolegomena einer medizinischen
Anthropologie. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1954
Hartmann, Heinz. Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse.
Leipzig: Thieme, 1927
Kronfe1d, Arthur. "Uber die psycho1ogischen Theorien
Freuds und verwandte Anschauungen." Archiv .fiir die
gesamte Psychologie 12 ( 1911 ), 130-248.
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits. Paris: Editions du Seui1, 1966.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenologie de la perception.
Paris: Gallimard, 1945; Phenomenology of Perception.
Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1962.
Minkowski, Eugene. Le temps vecu. Paris: Aubier, 1933;
Lived Time. Trans. Nancy Metzel. Evanston, IL: North-
westem University Press, 1970.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "La transcendance de l'ego." Recherches
philosophiques 6 (1936--37), 85-123; The Transcendence
of the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirk-
patrick. New York: Noonday Press, 1957.
Sche1er, Max. Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Halle: Max
Niemeyer, 1913.
Schultz-Hencke, Harald. Der gehemmte Mensch. Stuttgart:
Thieme, 1940.
Wae1hens, Alphonse de. Existence et signification. Louvain:
Nauwe1aerts, 1958
HERMAN DROE
Universitiit zu Kăln
(Trans. by Wolfgang Wittenstein)
PSYCHOLOGISM Most generally, psycholo-
gism is the philosophical position that regards empir-
ica! psychology as the most basic philosophical disci-
pline: empirica! PSYCHOLOGY as first philosophy. That
means especially that normative and practica! branches
of phiJosophy, such as LOGIC, ETHICS, AESTHETICS, and
epistemology ha veto be grounded in empirica! psycho-
logical findings. This doctrine, enunciated originally by
two otherwise obscure German philosophers ofthe first
half ofthe nineteenth century, Jakob Fries ( 1783-1844)
(System der Metaphysik, 1824) and Friedrich Beneke
( 1798-1854) (Die Philosophie in ihrem Verhăltnis zur
Erfahrung, zur Spekulation, und zum Leben, [Philoso-
phy in its relation to experience, speculation, and life,
1833]), arose as an empirically oriented opposition to
the idealism of HEGEL as well as to KANT's transcen-
dental philosophy. The most prominent philosopher
to provide a thorough articulation and defense of the
psychologistic position was John Stuart Miii. By the
 PSYCHOLOGJSM
end of the 19th century, psychologism had become
widespread as an unquestioned presupposition in much
of German philosophy, incorporated even in standard
logic texts such as the Logik (1873-78) of Christoff
Sigwart (1830-1904).
Neo-Kantian philosophers, however, continued to
resist its acceptance and to pose a significant alternative
to it. For about the first half of the 20th century, psy-
chologism was known mainly as the target of devastat-
ing attacks leveled specifically against logica! psychol-
ogism by GOTTLOB FREGE and EDMUND HUSSERL. In recent
years, however, the long influential antipsychologism
ofFrege and Rudolph Carnap (1891-1970) has in turn
come to be challenged, especially by Willard V. O.
Quine, as based upon unwarranted dogmatic assump-
tions. Further, some followers of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
interpret logica! principles as conventional rules that
define the game called "thinking" (on analogy with,
say, the rules of chess, truth being an achievement
gained by permissible moves, as is checkmate). Hence
they are sometimes thought to be proposing a radical
sort ofbehavioral social psychologism.
CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OWeS many ofits dis-
tinctive traits to the fact that it originated in a form
of logica! psychologism and developed in opposition
to the most serious perceived flaws of psychologism,
but remained closer in spirit to psychologism than to
the most radical antipsychologism, which would insist
on eliminating ali reference to mental categories from
the analysis of logic and of scientific knowledge. The
development of Husserl's philosophy can be set into
five stages with respect to psychologism. The first,
psychologistic stage, embodied in his Philosophie der
Arithmetik ( 1891 ), precedes the development ofpheno-
menology. The second stage is that ofthe Prolegomena
zur reinen Logik ( 1900), the first volume of Logische
Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ). It presents a set of argu-
ments against logica! psychologism, as well as a sketch
of a phenomenological conception ofthe main features
of objective formal logic, liberated from ali psychol-
ogistic interpretation. The second volume of Logis-
che Untersuchungen ( 1901) introduces a philosophi-
cal clarification of logic and of scientific knowledge
in general that employs an approach termed, equiv-
alently, "phenomenology" and "descriptive psychol-
ogy." Hence it may be regarded as a third stage, one
that is thought by many not to be clearly differenti-
573
ated from epistemological psychologism. The fourth
broad phase is that of successive attempts to provide
and defend clear and definitive distinctions between the
method and subject matter ofpsychology and of pheno-
menological epistemology, so as to avoid ali suspicion
oflogical or epistemological psychologism. More fully
developed constitutive phenomenology may be taken
as presenting a fifth stage, in which some ofthe previ-
ous clear distinctions are somewhat blurred.
Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik was subtitled
Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen. In ac-
cordance with the approach favored by his teacher of
mathematics at the University of Berlin, Karl Weier-
strass ( 1815-1897), Husserl aimed to clarify the con-
cept of number by tracing it back to its psychological
origin in the experience of counting. In doing so, he
applied to the concept ofnumber the psychological dis-
tinction emphasized by FRANZ BRENTANO between au-
thentic (seeing, intuitive) presentations and inauthen-
tic (blindly symbolic) presentations. The aim was to
illuminate the nature and scope of the authentic con-
cept of number, that is, the extent to which one can
count in full awareness of what is involved in such
mental processes as denumerating, adding, and recog-
nizing equality. The further aim was to illuminate both
the need and the rational possibility of supplementing
authentic numbers with inauthentic, merely symbolic,
calculative techniques. For some time, it was widely
assumed that Husserl was converted from psycholo-
gism by the stern critique ofhis book written by Frege.
However, it has since been accepted that Husserl had
been dissatisfied with his own lack ofsufficiently clear
fundamental distinctions, such as the crucial one be-
tween the psychological event, presentation ofnumber,
and the nonpsychological object, number, even before
Frege published his criticism.
In his foreword to Prolegomena to Pure Logic,
Husserl recounted his experience of disillusionment
with logica! psychologism: "I began work on the pre-
vailing assumption that psychology was the science
from which logic in general, and the logic of the de-
ductive sciences, had to hope for philosophical clarifi-
cation ... There were, however, connections in which
such a psychological foundation never carne to sat-
isfy me . . . I became more and more disquieted by
doubts ofprinciple, as to how to reconcile the objectiv-
ity ofmathematics, and of ali science in general, with a
574 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
psychological foundation for logic. In this manner my
whole method, which 1 had taken over from the con-
victions ofthe reigning logic, that sought to illuminate
the given science through psychological analyses, be-
came shaken, and 1 felt myselfmore and more pushed
towards general critica! reflections on the essence of
logic, and on the relationship, in particular, between
the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the
content known."
Since Husserl had found himself at a theoretical
impasse, his arguments against logica! psychologism
focused upon its perceived interna! inconsistencies and
implicit skeptical consequences. Further, sin ce his con-
cern was with psychologism as a general and diffused
orientation toward logic, his arguments centered on sig-
nificant thematic points and referred to specific philo-
sophical writings mainly by way of occasional illus-
trations of those points. Some such illustrations are
relatively easy targets of his critique because they are
inherently confused; hence they probably serve as apt
symptoms of the state of psychologism in Germany at
the time.
Sigwart, for instance, held that logica! principles are
universal and necessary propositions. But he also main-
tained that they have to be grounded in empirica! psy-
chology. That position provided a clear illustration of
theoretical absurdity: logic, a deductive system of pre-
cise propositions derivable as necessary consequences
from axiomatic, universal, and necessary propositions,
cannot justifiably be grounded in an empirica! science
that can yield at best only highly probable generaliza-
tions, inherently vague in their reference to accompa-
nying circumstances. The position undermines itself,
implying an unwitting consequent skepticism. In an
effort to save the possibility of universal and neces-
sary propositions, Sigwart only made things worse by
appealing to a special feeling of necessity as provid-
ing their evidence, and then assigning to logic the task
of clarifying the psychological conditions under which
such a feeling emerges. Since strong feelings ofneces-
sity are more likely to accompany our most cherished
and unquestioned prejudices than unbiased assertions
of abstract logica! principles, the position is without
merit. But those defects do not necessarily establish
the inherent absurdity of logica! psychologism. Sig-
wart's position may well be merely a poor example
of psychologism, to be rejected by more careful psy-
chologistic thinkers as readily as by antipsychologistic
ones.
John Stuart Mill, for example, avoided the incon-
sistency illustrated by Sigwart's position. He held con-
sistently that ali inference yielding real knowledge is
inductive, including the knowledge of logica! princi-
ples, which therefore do not enjoy the status ofuncon-
ditioned necessity. He maintained that deductive syllo-
gistic arguments, rather then yielding real knowledge,
only apply empirically known general principles to the
interpretation of more particular cases. He refused to
grant any evidential status to feelings of necessity or
of inconceivability, which he regarded as contingent
facts to be explained by references to our past history
and mental habits. And, significantly for the psychol-
ogism controversy, Mill distinguished clearly between
beliefs, as states of mind, and propositions, as unities
ofmeaning that are not modifications ofthe mind. His
view oflogic rejected as mistaken the philosophical no-
tion prevalent since Descartes that propositions were
to be understood by reference to acts of judgment.
Antipsychologistic arguments directed against
Mill's position tend to beg the question. His psycholo-
gism is deemed deficient because it cannot account for
the unconditioned universality and necessity oflogical
principles. But that logica! principles enjoy that status
has to be shown, not simply asserted. His position is
rejected as a relativistic skepticism. Buton Mill's own
grounds, the recognition of the relativity of knowl-
edge to the psychological conditions ofthe knower is a
virtue, not a fault. His position is not a self-refuting or
self-defeating absolute skepticism, but it is a resolute
skepticism with regard to absolute knowledge claims.
The contrary position of logica! absolutism has to be
established, not assumed as an unquestioned premise.
The disagreement as to the status of logic as a sci-
ence is itself rooted in a basic epistemological opposi-
tion. The phenomenological position ofthe Prolegom-
ena maintains that logic articulates the objective unity
of theory that is grounded purely in the sense of such
objective concepts as "theory," "truth," "proposition,"
"relation"; that objective theoretical unity (the unity of
a deductive system) is a necessary characteristic of ide-
ally possible science; and that formal objective logic is
self-grounding since its principles are self-evident and
self-evidently universal and necessary.
When asked how one can possibly know, rather
 PSYCHOLOGISM
than merely assert, the details of that position, pheno-
menology appeals to the ideal possibility ofimmediate
insight into principles. That is, it appeals to a form of
knowledge of which empiricism is inherently suspi-
cious. Further, such insight into principles is character-
ized, phenomenologically, as not being a form of real,
or natural, knowledge.lt provides no knowledge of any
real fact, general or particular, about existing nature,
either physical or psychological nature. At that point,
the basic epistemological opposition is manifest. Psy-
chologism has to be rejected by the logica! absolutist
because psychology, as an empirica! NATURAL SCIENCE,
is unable to provide or to ground the ideal (nonreal,
non-natural) knowledge that characterizes the science
of objective formal logic. From the opposite perspec-
tive, naturalistic empiricism refuses to acknowledge
any form of scientific knowledge other than that form
that has proven its success in modern physical sciences
and promises to render the study of the mind equally
scientific, a form ofknowledge that rejects immediate
intuitions and relies upon the observation and causal
analysis of facts. It would seem safe to assume that
psychologism is likely to remain a live philosophical
option as long as NATURALISM does.
Ifthe logica! absolutist's quarrel is with the empiri-
cism and naturalism that characterize psychologism,
and if the logica! absolutist has to appeal to the lived
experience ofimmediate insight to justify the possibil-
ity oflogic as a form ofknowledge, should the remedy
be a new and improved psychologism, resting upon a
non-empirica!, non-natural psychology? That seemed
to be the rationale of the second volume of Logische
Untersuchungen, which presented the rudiments of a
descriptive psychology, or phenomenology, ofthe ele-
ments of knowing.
Instead of submitting the reflectively observed el-
ements of psychic life to a causal explanation, such
a phenomenology analyzes cognitive lived experience
in terms of non-natural, non-empirica!, directly intu-
itable categories, such as the intending of MEANING,
the fulfillment of meaning, rational motivation, and
intrinsic whole-part relations. Thus, for example, the
principle of noncontradiction can be analyzed as be-
ing necessarily true just in virtue ofwhat a proposition
is, what propositional truth is, and what contradiction
is, ali regarded purely as ideally possible and com-
possible unities of meaning. And the question of the
575
justification for knowledge of that principle is not re-
ferred to a causal analysis of any psychological condi-
tions, such as pertinent laws of association of ideas, by
which someone comes to believe it. Rather, the ques-
tion becomes one ofwhether such a beliefis rationally
motivated or not. And direct insight or evidence into
the appropriate relations of meanings to one another
is deemed a fully rational motivation for asserting, for
example, that two contradictory propositions cannot
possibly both be true.
Within that descriptive psychological approach, in-
trinsic aspects of cognition are subjected to ramified
distinctions crucial to maintaining the possibility of
objective knowledge, and the many often confused
senses of such terms as "act," "content," "presenta-
tion," and "object" are clarified. But at the same time,
essential relations between, for example, meanings and
intendings of meanings were articulated as ideal pos-
sibilities of intentiona! lived experience. The overall
project was to clarify both the (nonpsychological) ob-
jectivity ofmeanings, as the subject matter oflogic and
the discursive medium of science, and the relevance
of meanings to the subjective (psychological) possi-
bility ofknowledge. The result was such that WILHELM
DILTHEY, who had himselfproposed a reform movement
within psychology and epistemology to take advan-
tage methodologically of the difference between the
givenness ofpsychic life and the givenness ofphysical
nature, saw the Logische Untersuchungen as an epoch-
making achievement in the application of descriptive
psychology to epistemology.
The fourth stage of phenomenology's encounter
with psychologism was to surrender the title "descrip-
tive psychology" as a misleading way of characterizing
the phenomenological approach to epistemology. One
problem with comprehending psychologism is that it
involves what John Stuart Miii referred to as "logica!
and psychological speculations." That is, the issue does
not concern particular logica! axioms or rules of deriva-
tion, nor any particular psychologicallaws. Rather, the
questions re late to various interpretations of logic and
ofpsychology and oftheir relations to one another. But
equally at stake, whether explicitly recognized or not,
are epistemological questions concerning the nature of
knowledge, and then, stil! further, questions ofhow to
re late epistemology to logic and to psychology.
A fifth stage, involving further development in the
576 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
phenomenological discussion ofthose basic themes be-
yond the level represented in Husserl's Ideen zu einer
reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen
Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ), suggests a need to reconsider
the classic opposition to ali forms ofpsychologism.
More developed phenomenology continues to ac-
cept logic and mathematics as non-empirica!, a priori,
disciplines. But the original logica! absolutism of the
Prolegomena gets qualified eventually as one-sided,
dogmatic, and naive. It becomes balanced with the
recognition of the kemel of truth in psychologism:
numbers, despite their ideal character, are produced
in counting, and judicative propositions are produced
in judging activity.
At the same time, phenomenology transforms its
original situation by developing an eidetic, intentiona!
psychology that would not be disqualified, on the same
grounds as empirica!, naturalistic psychology, from be-
ing foundational for the clarification of a priori sci-
ences. Such a psychology is able to reflect eidetically
upon the intentiona! correlations holding among lived
experiences, the senses they intend, and the objects
to which such senses refer. It also includes within its
themes basic questions of motivation, as distinct from
natural causality, including the epistemic question of
the rational motivation of scientific knowledge pro-
cesses.
A further complication ofthe earlier black and white
opposition to psychologism stems from a double line
of sophistication in the phenomenological approach to
the constitution of scientific objectivity. On the one
hand, the consideration of abstractly intellectual sci-
ences gets integrated within the broader context oftheir
grounding in the prescientific LJFEWORLD. On the other
hand, transcendental consciousness becomes subject to
more concrete analysis, disclosing the essentially per-
sonal, INTERSUBJECTIVE, and HISTORICAL character ofthe
constitution of objectivity. Finally, tobe true to its sub-
ject matter, psychology also has to engage in the study
of the constitution of the personal surrounding world
from the perspective ofthe psychological subject.
The blurring of the original distinction serves to
highlight a more important hasis for the same differ-
entiation. Rather than the opposition between a priori
and empirica! sciences, what needs tobe emphasized is
a distinction in levels of reflection and discussion. On
the one hand, there is the level ofref!ection and discus-
sion within sciences directed toward domains that they
have to accept as given in some appropriately defined
mode of evidence. Philosophical reflection upon and
discussion of such sciences has to occur at a different
level, one that does not proceed upon the grounds of
acceptance of their domains as given to their appro-
priate modes ofEVIDENCE, but rather involves a critica!
analysis of those grounds.
From that perspective, psychology is an experiential
natural and HUMAN SCIENCE, even ifit succeeds in inter-
preting psychological data by way of categories based
upon eidetic, and even transcendental, phenomenologi-
cal reflection. Ultimately, its subject matter is psychic
or mental facts, objectified in factually existing forms
ofhuman and animal subjects, discoverable within the
larger horizon of the world as accessible to experi-
ence. It is responsible for discovering, by appropriately
formed experiential observation, facts and regularities
characteristic ofpsychological subjects in the contexts
ofactually existing natural and cultural conditions. Al-
though experience of objects existing in the world is
also a psychological fact to be observed, clarified, and
analyzed in its various types and conditions, psychol-
ogy cannot suspend the acceptance ofthe experience of
psychological subjects as existing within the world, so
as to submit such psychologically directed experience
to an epistemological critique, without undercutting its
own necessary ground.
Epistemology, on the contrary, includes within its
scope a rational critique of the possibility of contribu-
tions to knowledge ofthe world stemming from expe-
rience. To undertake that task, it does have to suspend
acceptance ofwhat such experience presents, including
ref!ective psychological experience. Consequently, the
transcendental approach to cognitive lived experience
is not directed toward analyzing the eidetic structures
of actually or possibly existing psychological subjects
that psychology has to assume as accessible to psycho-
logical experience. Rather, the epistemological con-
cern has to be with ideally possible intentiona! lived
experience, as intuitively implicated in ideally possible
constitution of objects of possible knowledge, includ-
ing experiential knowledge, i.e., the EIDETIC METHOD
is relied on. Methodologically this means that the in-
stances of relevant forms of cognitive lived experi-
ence may just as well be fictitious as factual. lf they
are factual, they are taken as presented to transcen-
 PSYCHOLOGY
dental rather than psychological reflection, that is, to
an experience that does not accept its data as belong-
ing to the natural or social world. Thus the approach
taken has to be both eidetic and transcendental. What
this implies, further, is that pure, epistemologically ori-
ented, phenomenologiucal reflection cannot establish
a single psychological fact, nor can it appeal to any.
Accordingly, epistemologically (transcendentally) ori-
ented phenomenology is not to be understood as itself
a form of psychology or as based upon o ne, not even
a radically reformed descriptive or phenomenological
psychology. In the phenomenological project, episte-
mological (transcendental) psychologism also has to
be supplanted, as well as logica! psychologism.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic. 2 vols. London: Long-
mans, Green, & Co., 1843.
-. Examination ofthe Philosophy o{ Sir William Hamilton.
London: W. V. Spencer, 1865.
Mohanty, J. N. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1982.
Nottumo, M. A., ed. Perspectives on Psychologism. New
York: Brill, 1989.
Sigwart, Christoff. Logik. 2 vols. Tiibingen, 1873~78; Logic.
2 vols. Trans. Helen Dendy. London: S. Sonnenschein,
1895.
Willard, Dallas. Logic and the Objectitivty of Knowledge.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984.
JOHN SCANLON
Duquesne University
PSYCHOLOGY (See also PHILOSOPHY OF
PSYCHOLOGY) AJthough EDMUND HUSSERL adamantly
warned against the pitfalls of PSYCHOLOGISM - REL-
ATIVISM and skepticism - he was convinced that a
nonpsychologistic descriptive psychology could be
carried out in a phenomenological attitude. The causal
theory of experience is the source of psychologism's
relativism. Although this theory pervades natural sci-
entific psychological approaches to experience, deter-
minism is not a necessary approach for psychology.
A phenomenological psychology could set aside the
objectivist-deterministic pair in order to study human
experience precisely as experienced and in its own
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, RichardM. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
577
right. Today the pervasiveness of objectivism, deter-
minism, and NATURALISM in psychology is no less ap-
parent than it was in Husserl's day. In fact, the model
has become strengthened and multiplied itself in a wide
variety ofnaturalistic approaches that were never imag-
ined by early positivistic psychology. Consequently,
phenomenological psychology has taken on the per-
sistent chore of continuing Husserl 's early criticisms,
amending them for a continually changing and diver-
sifying naturalistic psychological field.
In 1963 STEPHAN STRASSER pub]ished Fenomendo-
gie en empirische menskunde (Phenomenology and the
human sciences) aiming largely at the "objectivist" il-
lusion characterizing the behaviorist psychology that
dominated the day. AMEDEO GIORGI's Psychology as a
Human Science ( 1970) aimed phenomenological criti-
cism at the dispersion in psychology that has resulted
from objectivism's lack of a coherent and meaning-
ful understanding of human subjectivity as a totality,
continuing an argument initiated by early phenomenol-
ogists such as JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. In his introduction to
Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions (Outline of a the-
ory ofthe emotions, 1939), Sartre wondered about the
juxtaposition of topics typically found in introductory
psychology textbooks. What could be more different
than the stroboscopic illusion and the inferiority com-
plex, he asked, and how could one even hope to develop
a vision of the human psyche that would incorporate
the two in a coherent way?
More recent phenomenological critiques of natu-
ralistic psychology have shifted their focus as cog-
nitive appruaches have begun to dominate the field.
ROBERT ROMANYSHYN's Psychological Life: From Sci-
ence to Metaphor (1982) dialogued with structuralist
approaches, replacing objectivist notions of structure
with phenomenoJogicaJ ones. DONALD POLKINGHORNE's
Methodology.for the Human Sciences: Systems of In-
quiry (1983) returned to the ubiquitous causal fixation
and its correlative obsession with the past, utilizing
newer hermeneutica! trends and EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY to expand the notion ofpsychology beyond
causal explanation.
While phenomenological psychology is continu-
ally called to object to the enveloping naturalism
in psychology at large, it is also called to reunder-
stand the field in its own terms. Human being is not
like the being of an object; it is an intentiona! be-
578 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ing and therefore must be undcrstood teleologically,
in terms of its aimedness, rather than deterministi-
cally. The model for psychological intentiona! analysis
was provided in Husserl's Phanomenologische Psy-
chologie [1925]. Without any reference to transcen-
dental issues, which would have rendered the work
more philosophical than psychological, Husserl car-
ried out intentiona! investigations of perceptual con-
sciousness with the characteristic two-sided constitu-
tive anaJysis and thus CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. On the one hand, a noetic
inquiry unraveled the acts of consciousness intend-
ing the perceptual world; on the other hand, an anal-
ysis of the NOEMA revealed the structures of appear-
ance that unfold to present the perceptual world. In-
terestingly, these analyses do not differ much in sub-
stance when compared with perceptual analyses found
in his more strictly philosophical writings. In fact,
Husserl's 1930 "Nachwort" to the Ideen zu einer reinen
Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 ( 1913) suggested that the work can be read
either as transcendental philosophy or as descriptive
psychology. In other writings, such as Die Krisis
der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzenden-
tale Phanomenologie ( 1936), Husserl suggested that
the psychological-phenomenological reduction and the
transcendentalphenomenological reduction are sepa-
rate and distinct, with only the latter demundaniz-
ing consciousness. The wide variety of complexi-
ties and seeming contradictions engendered between
Husserl's versions ofthe psychological reduction were
outJined scrupulousJy in JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS' Ed-
s
mund Husserl Phenomenologica/Psychology ( 1967),
although they are not resolved by any means.
It is interesting to note that from the start, pheno-
menology as practiced in psychology and PSYCHIA-
TRY was not involved in ironing out the philosoph-
ical complexities in its own field. Whether or not
phenomenological-psychological reductions ought to
be adapted from transcendental conceptions, they are
nevertheless adapted. LUDWIG BINSWANGER, for exam-
ple, freely borrowed from Husserl 's constitutive the-
ory in accordance with criteria of usefulness, not
theoretical cohesion. For example, in Melancholie
und Manie. Phanomenologische Studien ( 1960), Bin-
swanger applied Husserl 's description of inner time-
consciousness, presumably a strictly transcendental
description, to empirica! investigations of manic-
depressive psychopathology. Binswanger similarly
borrowed from other phenomenologists. MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER's existentialist theories were as important as
Husserl's constitutive approach. From a Heideggerian
ground, Binswanger developed the ideas of Umwelt
(the biologica! and physical world), Mitwelt (the so-
cial world), and Eigenwelt (self-consciousness). Each
of these human worlds is govemed by its own prin-
ciples, even by its own time, he asserted. There is
an objective time flowing in the Umwelt; a less stan-
dardized phenomenal psychological time that charac-
terizes our life in the social world; and finally, a kind
oftimelessness to the Eigenwelt, with its transcenden-
tal dimension. Binswanger accused ali forms of deter-
ministic psychology, and especially Freudian PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS, of confusing the principles goveming those
separate worlds and of reducing them from highest to
lowest. Ultimately, Freudian psychoanalysis finds its
explanations in the biologica! (id) root causes, that is,
in the Umwelt. Psychological theories outside of psy-
choanalysis have been even more obviously rooted in
Umwelt explanations. Binswanger attributed the fix-
ation of psychology with the past to its reliance on
understanding the dynamics ofthe Umwelt. Past deter-
minants are less important in the psychological social
relations, where future possibilities permeate life and
expectation, and the past virtually loses itself in the
transcendental moment of the Eigenwelt. (The use of
HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY beginning with Hei-
degger has been urged in PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY.)
Since Binswanger's beginning, phenomenological
psychological theories ha ve become more and more en-
compassing, reunderstanding even biologica] embod-
iment in intentiona! rather than deterministic models.
Beginning with MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY'S La struc-
ture du comportement (1942), even seemingly auto-
matic reflex behavior is understood as a lived, though
not reflectively thematized, intentiona! response to a
meaningful situation. Merleau-Ponty spent much ofhis
analysis on Pavlov's classical conditioning, a leaming
theory that sti li occupies the first chapters of psychol-
ogy textbooks today. For Merleau-Ponty, the classical
conditioning process is manipulated so that the condi-
tioned subject must dissociate stimuli from the overall
environment, and must in turn give a partial response,
equally dissociated from the overall situation. Such
 PSYCHOLOGY
dissociation requires an act of intellectual effort if the
conditioned subject is human, or a psychotic splitting
if the conditioned subject is a dog. It is no wonder,
Merleau-Ponty speculated, that the poor dogs eventu-
ally suffered from what Pavlov termed "experimental
neurosis."
In Phenomenological Psychology: Selected Papers
(1966) ERWIN w. STRAUS, one ofthe young members of
Binswanger's circle, continued the attack on Pavlovian
reftexology, going so far as tocite Husserlian transcen-
dentalism as the necessary counterpoint that makes the
objectivist stance in reflexology possible. Both stances
are continuations of an impossible Cartesian dualism.
There is neither a purely mechanical body nor a purely
intentiona! consciousness, but rather an embodied lived
becoming that can be described as a whole but cannot
be unraveled in constitutive analyses, which would ul-
timately result in Cartesian splits. The subject who
experiences, Straus wrote in his book on the senses,
Vom Sinn der Sinne (Concerning the meaning of the
senses, 1935), is not consciousness. Rather, the subject
is embodied, involved, and "pathic." Even Heidegger's
existentialized phenomenology missed this truth, he
suggested, for Heidegger's "care" is too removed from
the "animalia" of human existence, the biologica! im-
perative.
In Der Menschliche (The human, 1958) FREDERIK
J. 1. BUYTENDIJK - a Dutch biologist influenced by
French phenomenologists, including Merleau-Ponty
and GABRIEL MARCEL (and aJso MAX SCHELER)- com-
pJemented Straus 's stress on the human animalia. Buy-
tendijk argued that human life must be understood as
a part of the larger kingdom of animal life, in contrast
to earlier phenomenologists more inclined to stress di-
mensions that distinguish human life from other life.
Where Husserl was interested in cognition and math-
ematics, Buytendijk was interested in the phenomen-
ology of play, pain, or gender differences, ali dimen-
sions oflife we share with the animal kingdom at large.
This is not to say that human gender differences mirror
those of other species, only that, as animals, we will
be expected to live those differences. For example, as
animal beings our gender differences are fixed and can
be described as fundamentally different structures of
embodied intentionality, as they can be described for
other members of the animal kingdom. In his book De
Vrouw (Woman, 1958), Buytendijk focused on specific
579
behaviors, such as styles ofwalking, to discern differ-
ences between male and female embodied intentiona!
modes. His essentialism - asserting that the female
gait is naturally less aggressive and more flowing than
the male gait, which aims to conquer- has won him
much criticism from contemporary FEMINISM.
Taking the intentiona! life of the subject to be real
(wirklich) and embodied, even at the same time that
it is constitutive of every real and embodied event,
puts phenomenological psychology in the paradoxi-
cal but interesting vantage point of focusing on em-
pirica! psychological research of people's intentiona!
lives. Husserl proposed this task for phenomenologi-
cal psychology in the Krisis. Through an "empathic
understanding," the psychologist grasps the intentions
of others, taking them as really occurring events in
the natural world, yet constitutive of those people's
worlds. The phenomenologically naive subjects under
investigation intend a natural world in the natural at-
titude; yet the psychologist does not "co-perform" the
"validity" of the acts, Husserl wrote, but neutralizes
the acts and brackets the real world, thus performing a
phenomenological reduction by way of empathy.
But how do others' intentiona! lives offer them-
selves for empirica! phenomenological research? De-
spite its stress on embodiment, phenomenological psy-
chology has not found descriptions of the behaviors
of others by other researchers to be sufficient. Often
comportments reveal general attitudes (a person looks
concerned, for example ), but noematic details ofthe ex-
perienced world are revealed mainly through what the
other expresses in language. Phenomenological ciini-
cal psychologists had carried out case studies based on
the remarks of patients in therapy, but it was not untii
ADRIAN VAN KAAM's Existential Foundations ofPsychol-
ogy ( 1966) that the informal technique was formalized
as an empirica! research method.
Duquesne University's psychology department,
whose graduate program was initiated by Van Kaam,
has continued to develop and diversify this method.
The technique differs from statistica! psychology's
"content analysis" of subjects' self-reports, where in-
stances ofword usages or categories ofword usages are
simply counted. In contrast, phenomenological anal-
ysis of experiential self-reports emphasizes implicit
meanings hidden in explicit expressions, emphasizes
the importance of gestalt relationships between parts
580 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
in determining meanings, and emphasizes the role of
researchers' own imaginary variations in making sense
out of the subjects' expressions. Although Husserl's
account of the "apperception" of others (in Cartesian-
ische Meditationen [ 1931]) has been roundly criticized,
his insistence that the intentionalities of others are
given through an "analogical pai ring" performed by an
observer has been supported by much phenomenologi-
cal psychological research. The role of a researcher's
imaginati ve activity has been stressed by a number of
recent researchers in phenomenological psychology.
Generaliy, clinica! studies on psychopathology and
psychotherapy have had more popular appeal in psy-
chology than have empirica! research studies, and
phenomenological psychology is no exception. Despite
Husserl 's original promotion of psychological theory,
phenomenology achieved from the start a greater ap-
peal in the clinica! arena. Because of its emphasis onan
empathic ratherthanjudgmental attitude in psychother-
apy, phenomenological approaches have had an espe-
cialiy profound inftuence on the variety ofhumanistic
approaches, including Cari Rogers' On Becoming a
Person ( 1961) and Abraham Maslow's Toward a Psy-
chology of Being ( 1968). Recently, Albert Margulies,
in his book The Empathic Imagination (1989), con-
sidered wonder as a clinica! stance and means toward
intersubjectivity and understanding of the essence of
another.
Binswanger must be credited with the initiation
of clinica! phenomenological theory and practice, al-
though previously KARL JASPERS had employed pheno-
menological concepts sparingly. Binswanger, a student
of Freud, was concerned with psychological dynam-
ics qua psychological, rejecting biologica! accounts of
psychopathology. Unlike Freud, however, Binswanger
equaliy rejected causal explanations involving uncon-
scious mechanics and energetics ~ psychoanalytical
dynamics said tobe transcendent to consciousness, and
therefore subject to the neutralization of the reduc-
tion. Instead, Binswanger understood the unconscious
to be a marginal mode of consciousness-ambiguous,
often confused, and difficult to reftect upon, but imma-
nent to consciousness nevertheless. Binswanger pro-
posed that even in this mysterious side, conscious-
ness is meaningful and makes a coherent whole that
can be uncovered. Even the "uninteliigible" aspects
of psychopathology that Jaspers had exempted from
phenomenological analysis are in fact inteliigible when
taken in the framework of the larger system of mean-
ings forming a patient's LIFEWORLD. In The Divided
Se/((1960), R. o. LAING continued and radicalized Bin-
swanger's claim, viewing psychopathology as an en-
tirely meaningful response to a chaotic life situation.
Binswanger's work on the unconscious was the first
of many phenomenological attempts to evaluate and
redefine psychoanalytical concepts. JAN HENDRIK VAN
DEN BERG (A Dif.ferent Existence [ 1972]) continued the
tradition, suggesting, first of ali, that we understand
the patient's unconscious as "for" the therapist's con-
sciousness since the therapist is the one claiming to ex-
perience it. In many ways this is true ofpsychopathol-
ogy itself. The patient "suffers" from the psychother-
apist's point ofview, van den Berg wrote. In addition,
he examined many psychoanalytical defense "mech-
anisms," de-mechanizing them by casting them in an
intentiona! light. For example, projection (in the psy-
choanalytical sense) can be understood as the inftuence
of a person's project (in the existential sense) on the
way the person constitutes the psychological meanings
forming the lifeworld. More recently, Richard Ches-
sick's What Constitutes the Patient in Psychotherapy
(1992) continues van den Berg's stress on empathy and
deftly weaves the works of severa! phenomenological
and post-Freudian thinkers together in order to question
the disparity between therapist as subject and patient
as object tobe known, in light ofthe fact that both are
human subjects.
Finaliy, the role of freedom and choice has been
central to clinica! phenomenological psychology. Inftu-
enced by Sartre's and Heidegger's ontologica! descrip-
tions, phenomenological psychotherapists have coun-
tered psychoanalytic and behavioristic determinisms
with an existential glorification of freedom. VIKTOR
FRANKL's "logotherapy," outlined in Ein Psycholog er-
lebt das Konzentrationslager (A psychologist lived
through the concentration camp, 1946), revolved
around the importance of human freedom to consti-
tute meaning with regard to ali aspects of life. With
dramatic illustrations taken from his own experience
as a prisoner, Frankl insisted that the will to live is,
phenomenologically, the will to invest positive mean-
ing in even the most chaotic or horrendous situations.
Positive values can be constituted in any and ali of
life 's circumstances, and the ro le of psychotherapy is
 PSYCHOLOGY
to open the way for patients to choose positive mean-
ingful values in their lives.
Following Heidegger's early work, Rollo May
(1909-1994) (The DiscoveryofBeing [1986] andFree-
dom and Destiny [ 1981]) also focused on human free-
dom in psychopathology and psychotherapy, relating
it to issues ofanxiety. For May, the goal ofpsychother-
apy is not necessarily to reduce anxiety. There is an
inauthentic anxiety arising from flights from freedom,
and such anxiety is indeed harmful to human growth.
But there is an authentic anxiety as well, arising from a
realization of personal freedom. It is not the task ofpsy-
chotherapy to tranquilize this latter anxiety because it
serves a positive ro le as the background against which
an energized human becoming is highlighted.
Overall, clinica! phenomenological psychology has
been an eclectic enterprise, beginning with Bin-
swanger, and becoming even more so today. Many
phenomenological clinicians take the phenomenologi-
cal reduction tobe an opening to a theory-free clinica!
approach; oddly, that attitude often results in an appre-
ciation for and absorption of a wide variety of clini-
ca! theories and approaches, always with the goal of
grounding those approaches in a lifeworldly descrip-
tion. It is ironic that out of Husserl 's concern with
developing a pure and self-consistent phenomenologi-
cal theory there has grown a clinica! approach that is
one of the most eclectic in ali of psychology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Binswanger, Ludwig. Melancholie und Manie. Phănomen­
ologische Studien. Neske: Pfullingen, 1960.
Buytendijk, Frederik Jacobus Johannes. Der Menschliche.
Stuttgart: Koehler, 1958.
~.De vrouw, haar natuur. verschijning en hestaan. Utrecht:
Spectrum, 1958; Woman: A Contemporary View. Trans.
Denis J. Barrett. Glen Rock, N.J.: Newman Press, 1968.
Chessick, Richard D. What Constitutes the Patient in Psy-
chotherapy: Alternative Approaches to Understanding
Humans. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1992.
Frankl, Viktor. Ein Psycholog erleht das Konzentra-
s
tionslager. Vienna: Jugend & Volk, 1946; Man Search
for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy. Trans. Ilse
Lasch. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962.
581
Kockelmans, Joseph J. Edmund Husserl:~ Phenomenologi-
cal Psychology: An Historico-Critical Study. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1967.
- , ed. Phenomenological Psychology: The Dutch School.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Laing, R. D. The Divided Self. Middlesex: Penguin, 1960.
Margulies, Alfred. The Empathic Imagination. New York:
W. W. Norton, 1989.
Maslow, Abraham. Toward a Psychology of Being. New
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1968.
May, Rollo. The Discovery of'Being. New York: W. W. Nor-
ton, 1983.
-. Freedom and Destiny. New York: Dell, 1981.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. La structure du comportment.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942; The Struc-
ture ofBehavior. Trans. Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1963.
Polkinghome, Donald. Methodology for the Human Sci-
ences: Systems of Inquiry. Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1983.
Rogers, Cari. On Becoming a Person: A Therapist s View of
Psychotherapy. Boston: Hougton Miffiin, 1961.
Romanyshyn, Robert D. Psychological Life: From Science
ta Metaphor. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982.
Strasser, Stephen. Fenomendogie en empirische menskunde;
hijdrage tot een nieuw ideaal wetenschappe!ijkheid. Am-
heim: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1962; Phenomenology and
the Human Sciences: A Contrihution to a New Scientific
Ideal. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1963.
Straus, Erwin. Vom Sinn der Sinne: Ein Beitrag zur grundle-
gender Psychologie. Berlin: Springer, 1935; The Primary
World ofthe Senses: A Vindication ofSensOJy Experience.
Trans. Jacob Needleman. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1963.
Van den Berg, Jan Hendrik. A Dif]erent Existence: Princi-
ples (){Psychopathology. Pittsburgh: Dusquesne Univer-
sity Press, 1972.
Van Kaam, Adrian. Existential Foundations ofPsychology.
Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1966.
PAUL RICHER
Duquesne University
PSYCHOLOGY, GESTALT See GESTALT PSYCHOL-
OGY.
PSYCHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF See PHILOSOPHY
OF PSYCHOLOGY.

READING A phenomenological description
of the act of reading presupposes an EIDETIC METHOD,
including a bracketing of ali actual reading experiences
in order to grasp the patterns that structure the read-
ing process. Such an abstractive and self-restraining
attitude, as a basic requirement for phenomenologi-
cal investigation, allows us to delineate the operations
that occur in the reading process through which a text
is a NOEMA correlative to the reader's consciousness.
In contradistinction to given objects in our ordinary
world, which can generally be viewed or at least con-
ceived as a whole, a text of more than severa! words
can never be perceived at any one time in its entirety.
The "intended" object ofthe text can only be imagined
by way of different consecutive phases of reading. The
relation between text and reader is therefore quite dif-
ferent from that between object and observer: instead
of a subject-object relationship, it is a viewpoint that
moves along inside that which is to be apprehended.
The reader's wandering viewpoint is, at one and the
same time, caught up in and transcended by the in-
tended object to be apprehended. Apperception can
only take place in phases, each of which contains as-
pects ofthe intended object tobe constituted, but none
of which can claim to be representative of it. Thus
the object cannot be identified with any of its mani-
festations during the time-flow ofreading. The incom-
pleteness of each manifestation necessitates syntheses,
which occur in every phase ofthe journey ofthe wan-
dering viewpoint.
At the sentence level, what is known as the "eye-
voice span" designates that portion of the text which
can be encompassed during each phase of reading and
from which we anticipate the next one. The syntactic
units of sentences are residual "chunks" for perception
that join in diverse ways to form semantic units of a
higher order. The sentences themselves, as statements
and assertions, serve to point a way toward what is
to come, and this in turn is prestructured by the actual
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
content ofthe sentences. Thus a process is set in motion
that willlead to the formation ofthe intended object as
a correlative in the mind ofthe reader.
In describing the inner consciousness of time, ED-
MUND HUSSERL once wrote: "Every originally con-
stituent process is inspired by protentions, which con-
struct and collect the seed ofwhat is to come, as such,
and bring it to fruition." The semantic pointers of in-
dividual sentences always imply an EXPECTATION of
some kind ~ Husserl calls these immediate expec-
tations "protentions." This structure is inherent in ali
sentences, from which it follows that their interplay
willlead not so much to the fulfillment of expectations
as to their continuai modification. Since each sentence
aims at things to come, the prefigured horizon will of-
fer a view ~ however concrete it may be ~ that must
contain indeterminacies, and so arouse expectations as
to the manner in which these are to be resolved.
As far as the sequence of sentences is concerned,
there are two fundamentally different possibilities. If
the new sentence begins to confirm the expectations
aroused by its predecessor, the range of possible se-
mantic horizons will be correspondingly narrowed.
This is normally the case with expository texts that are
to describe a particular object, for their concern is to
narrow the range in order to bring out the individuality
ofthat object. In LITERATURE, however, the sequence of
sentences is structured in such a way that expectations
are either modified or frustrated. Consequently, they
have an automatically retroactive effect on what has
already been read, which now appears quite different.
Thus every moment ofreading is a dialectic ofproten-
tion and retention, conveying a future horizon yet to
be occupied along with a past (and continually fading)
horizon already filled; the wandering viewpoint carves
its passage through both at the same time and leaves
them to merge together in its wake. There is no escap-
ing this process, as the text cannot at any one moment
be grasped as a whole.
The sentences of a text are always situated within
a perspective, which is most easily observed in Iiter-
ary texts and depends on whether the utterances are
made by the author, the narrator, or the characters. Al-
though each text is perspectively organized, the wan-
dering viewpoint is not confined to any one of these
perspectives. On the contrary, it constantly switches
between these perspectives on the text, each of the
582
 READING
switches representing an articulate reading moment:
it simultaneously offsets and relates the perspectives.
But if the wandering viewpoint defines itself by way
of the changing perspectives, it follows that the past
perspectiva! segments must be retained in each present
moment throughout the reading. The new moment is
not isolated, but stands out against the old, and so the
past will remain as a background to the present, exert-
ing influence on it and, at the same time, being itself
modified by the present.
The wandering viewpoint permits the reader to
travel through a text, thus unfolding a multiplicity
of interconnecting perspectives that are offset when-
ever there is a switch from one to another. This gives
rise to a network of possible connections. These are
characterized by the fact that they do not join isolated
data from the different perspectives, but actually estab-
lish a relationship of reciproca! observation between
stimulant and stimulated perspectives. This network of
connections potentially encompasses the whole text,
but the potential can never be fully realized; instead
it forms the hasis for the many selections that have
to be made during the process and that, although in-
tersubjectively not identica!, remain nevertheless in-
tersubjectively comprehensible insofar as they are ali
attempts to optimize the same structure.
The wandering viewpoint is a means of describing
the way in which the reader is present in the text. This
presence is at a point where MEMORY and expectation
converge. The interaction between the two provokes
the reader into a synthesizing activity. These syntheses,
then, are primarily groupings that bring the interrelated
perspectives together into an equivalence that has the
character of a configurative MEANING. The wandering
viewpoint divides the text up into interacting structures
and these give rise to a grouping activity that is fun-
damental to the grasping of a text. The nature of this
process is shown clearly by a remark of E. H. Gom-
brich in Art and Illusion (1 962): "In the reading of
images, as in the hearing of speech, it is always hard
to distinguish what is given to us from what we sup-
plement in the process ofprojection which is triggered
off by recognition: ... it is the guess of the beholder
that tests the medley of forms and colors for coherent
meaning, crystallizing it into shape when a consistent
interpretation has been found."
The consistent gestalt endows the linguistic signs
583
with their significance, and this grows out ofthe recip-
roca! modifications to which the individual positions
are subjected due to the need for establishing equiva-
lences between the signs. The consistent gestalt might
be described, in terms used by ARON GURWITSCH, as the
perceptual noema of the text. This means that, since
each linguistic sign conveys more thanjust itselfto the
mind ofthe reader, it must be joined together in a single
unit with ali its referential contexts. The unit ofthe per-
ceptual noema comes about by way ofthe reader's acts
of apprehension: the reader identifies the connections
between the linguistic signs and thus concretizes the
references not explicitly manifested in those signs. The
perceptual noema therefore links up the signs, their im-
plications, their reciproca! influences, and the reader's
act of identification, and through it the text begins to
exist as a gestalt in the reader's consciousness.
Through gestalt-forming, we are caught up in the
very state of affairs we are produc ing. This is why we
often ha ve the impression, as we read, that we are living
another life. For Henry James, this "illusion of having
lived another life" was the most striking quality in
reading narrative prose. This entanglement, however,
is never total, because the gestalts remain at least po-
tentially under attack from those possibilities that they
ha ve excluded but dragged along in their wake. Indeed,
the latent disturbance ofthe reader's involvement pro-
duces a specific form of ten sion that leaves the reader
suspended, as it were, between total entanglement and
latent detachment. Such an involvement is a precondi-
tion for converting the text into an experience. MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY once remarked in Phimomenologie de
la perception ( 1945): "It is true that we should never
talk about anything if we are limited to talking about
those experiences with which we coincide."
Experiences arise only when the familiar is tran-
scended or undermined; they grow out ofthe alteration
or falsification ofwhat is already ours. G. B. Shaw once
wrote: "You have leamt something. That always feels
at first as if you had lost something." Reading shares
its structure with that of experience to the extent that
our entanglement has the effect of pushing our various
criteria of orientation back into the past, thus suspend-
ing their validity for the new present. This does not
mean, however, that our previous experiences disap-
pear altogether. On the contrary, our past sti li remains
our experience, but what happens now is that it begins
584 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
to interact with the as yet unfamiliar presence of the
text. This remains unfamiliar so long as our previous
experiences are precisely as they had been before we
began our reading. But in the course of the reading
these experiences will also change, for the acquisition
of experience is nota matter of adding on- it is rather
a restructuring of what we already possess. This can
be seen onan everyday level; we say, for instance, that
we have benefited from an experience when we mean
that we ha ve lost an illusion.
The acts of apprehension brought about by the wan-
dering viewpoint organize the transfer of the text into
the reader's conscious mind. This happens by the for-
mation of syntheses through which connections be-
tween signs are identified and their equivalences rep-
resented. These syntheses are of an unusual kind. They
are neither manifested in the printed text, nor produced
solely by the reader's IMAGINATION, and the projections
of which they consist are themselves of a dual na-
ture: they emerge from the reader, but they are also
guided by what the signals of the text stimulate. It is
extremely difficult to gauge where the signals leave
offand the reader's imagination begins in this process,
thus blurring the distinction between subject and object
out ofwhich a complex reality arises. This "reality" is
complex not just because the signals can only take
on their full significance through the projections of a
subject, but also because syntheses take place below
the threshold of consciousness. Since they are formed
quite independently of conscious observation, we shall
call them- in Husserl's terms- passive syntheses
in order to distinguish them from those resulting from
predications andjudgments. Passive syntheses are pre-
predicative and, because they are subconscious, we
continue to produce them throughout our reading.
The basic element ofthese passive syntheses is the
image, which MIKEL DUFRENNE describes as a "middle
term between the brute presence where the object is
experienced and the thought where it becomes idea"
so that "it allows the object to appear, to be present as
represented." Such an imagery is something that ac-
companies our reading and it is not itselfthe object of
our attention, even when these images link up into a
whole panorama. This panorama unfolds itselfthrough
a continuai change of imagery. Whenever new infor-
mation has to be accomodated, the image previously
formed is discarded and replaced by a new one. The se-
quence of ideation develops by dropping and building
ever new images, each of which, however, bears the
imprint of the one it has supplanted. In this peculiar
way the imagination "shows itself to be productive:
this is the only case where it creates something truly
new in ideation- namely, the temporal quality." Each
individual image therefore emerges against the back-
ground of a past image, which is thereby given its posi-
tion in the overall continuity. The time axis that is thus
produced basically conditions and arranges the overall
meaning by making each image recede into the past
and subjecting it to inevitable modifications which, in
turn, bring forth the new image.
Consequently, ali images cohere in the reader's
mind by a constant accumulation ofreferences, which
develop like a snowball. It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, to isolate individual phases ofthis process
and cali them the meaning or INTENTIONALITY of the text,
because meaning in fact stretches out over the whole
sequence of eide. Meaning itself, then, has a temporal
character, the peculiarity of which is revealed by the
fact that the articulation of the text into past, present,
and future by the wandering viewpoint does not result
in fading memories and arbitrary expectations, but in
an uninterrupted synthesis of ali the time-phases. As
the images take on their time dimension and are trans-
formed through ideation into transient objects, there
arises a tendency to relate these objects to one another
as and when they form along the time axis.
When we imagine, for instance, the hero of Henry
Fielding's Tom Jones during our reading ofthe novel,
we must put together various facets that were revealed
to us at different times. Such an interlinking, however,
is not additive. The different facets always contain ref-
erences to others, and each view of the character only
gains its significance through being related to other
views, which may overlap, restrict, or modify it. It fol-
lows that our image of Tom Jones cannot be pinned
down to one particular view, because each facet is sub-
ject to modification by others. Our imagery is therefore
constantly shifting, and every image we have is duly
restructured by each of its successors. We are most
aware of this process when the hero 's con duct is not
what we had expected; the facets appear to clash, but
we must incorporate the new circurnstances- which
means retrospectively to change our past images. In
imagining the character, we do not try to seize upon
 READING
one particular aspect, but we are made to view him
as a synthesis of ali aspects. The image produced is
therefore always more than the facet given in any one
particular reading moment. Obviously, then, the image
of Tom Jones cannot be identica! to any ofthese facets;
they only provide individual items ofknowledge given
along the time axis ofreading, out ofwhich an overall
image ofthe character has tobe formed.
Since meaning develops along the TIME axis, time it-
self cannot function as a frame of reference, and hen ce
it follows that each concretization ofmeaning results in
a highly individual experience ofthat meaning, which
can never be totally repeated in its identica! form. A
second reading ofthe text will never have the same ef-
fect as the first, for the simple reason that the originally
assembled meaning is bound to influence the second
reading. The sequence of image-building is overshad-
owed by what has been produced in the first instance,
which inevitably has repercussions on the way images
qualify and condition each other in the time-flow of
our reading. With each new reading, it is only the time
dimension that changes, but this alone is enough to
change the images, for it is their position along the
time axis that initiates processes of differentiation and
combination. This position endows them with ali their
references and enables them to establish their own in-
dividual stability. As Husserl once put it, the position in
time is the "fountainhead of individuality." Since the
time position is not in itself determinate, it provides
the foundation necessary for the individuality of each
meaning realized.
The temporal character of the reading process acts
as a kind of catalyst for the passive syntheses through
which the meaning of the text forms itself in the
reader's mind. Passive syntheses differ from predica-
tive ones in that they are not judgments. Unlike judg-
ments, which are independent oftime, passive synthe-
ses take place along the time axis of reading. The ex-
pression "passive synthesis" would be a contradiction
in terms if it merely denoted processes of acceptance
and composition that took place automatically below
the threshold of consciousness. The schematic descrip-
tion of the constitutive process reveals the extent to
which the reader is involved in composing images out
of the multifarious aspects of the text by unfolding
them into a sequence of ideation and by integrating the
resulting products along the time axis ofreading. Thus
585
text and reader are linked together, the one permeating
the other. We place our synthesizing faculties at the
disposal of an unfamiliar reality, produce the meaning
ofthat reality, and in so doing enter into situations that
we could not have created out of ourselves. Thus the
meaning ofthe text can only be fulfilled in the reading
subject and does not exist independently ofhim or her;
it is just as important, though, that the reader, in consti-
tuting the meaning, is him- or herself also constituted.
Herein !ies the full significance ofthe so-called passive
synthesis.
This experience is what underlies the reader's de-
sire to comprehend the significance of the meaning.
The inevitable quest for the significance shows that in
assembling the meaning, we ourselves become aware
that something has happened to us, and so we try to find
out its significance. Meaning and significance are not
the same thing, as GOTTLOB FREGE has pointed out: "The
fact that one has grasped a meaning does not yet makc it
certain that one has a significance." The significance of
meaning can only be ascertained when the meaning is
related to a particular reference, which makes it trans-
latable into familiar terms. As PAUL RICCEUR has stated
with regard to ideas advanced by Frege and Husserl:
"There are two distinct stages of comprehension: the
stage of 'meaning' ... and the stage of 'significance,'
which represents the active taking-over of the mean-
ing by the reader- i.e., the meaning taking effect in
existence." It follows that the intersubjective structure
of meaning-assembly can ha ve many forms of signif-
icance, depending on the social and cultural code or
the individual norms that underlie the formation ofthis
significance. Now subjective dispositions play a vital
ro le in each realization ofthis intersubjective structure,
but every subjective realization remains accessible to
INTERSUBJECTIYITY precisely because it shares the same
intersubjective structure as its basis; however, the sig-
nificance ascribed to the meaning, and the subsequent
absorption of the meaning into existence, can only be-
come open to intersubjective discussion if the codes
and conventions that ha ve guided the interpretati an of
the meaning are revealed. It is important, however,
that the distinction between meaning and significance
should be maintained, for these are two separate stages
of comprehension. Meaning is the referential totality
that is implied by the aspects contained in the text and
that must be assembled in the course of reading. Sig-
586 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
nificance is the reader's absorption ofthe meaning into
his or her own existence.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Barthes, Roland. SIZ: An Essay. Trans. Richard Miller. New
York: Hill & Wang, 1974.
Eco, Umberto. The Ro le of the Reader: Explorations in the
Semiotics of Texts. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1979.
Harding, D. W. "Psychological Processes in the Reading of
Fiction." In Aesthetics in the Modern World. Ed. Harold
Osborne. New York: Weybright & Tallcy, 1968,300-17.
Ingarden, Roman. The Cognition o{ the Literary Work of
Art. Trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
!ser, Wolfgang. Der Akt des Lesen~. Theorie des dsthetischen
Wirkung. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1976; The Act of Read-
ing: A Theory ofthe Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978.
de Man, Paul. "Allegory of Reading." In his Allegories of
Reading: Figura/ Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke,
and Proust. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979.
Poulet, George. "Phenomenology ofReading." New Literwy
History 1 ( 1969), 53-68.
Rosenblatt, Louise M. "On the Aesthetic as the Basic Model
ofthe Reading Process." In Theories o{Reading, Look-
ing, and Listening. Ed. Harry R. Garvin. Lewisburg, PA:
Bucknell University Press, 1981, 17-32.
Schlesinger, 1. M. Sentence Structure and the Reading Pro-
cess. The Hague: Mouton, 1968.
Smith, Frank. Understanding Reading: A Psycholinguistic
Analysis of Reading and Learning ta Read. New York:
Hoit, Rinehart & Winston, 1971.
Stierle, Karlheinz. "The Reading of Fictional Texts." In The
Reader in the Text: Essays an A udience and Interpretation.
Ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1980, 83-105.
Wardhaugh, Ronald. Reading: A Linguistic Perspective. New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969.
WOLFGANG !SER
Universitdt Konstanz
REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY This tradition
was founded in the first years ofthis century by a group
of students of the philosopher-psychologist Theodor
Lipps (1851-1914) in the University ofMunich. The
members of the group had been inspired to rebel against
their teacher Lipps, a proponent of PSYCHOLOGISM, by
a certain JOHANNES DAUBERT, a talented organizer who
had read EDMUND HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchungen
( 1900-1901) and had persuaded his fellow students to
accept this work as their philosophical bible. The term
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
"phenomenological movement" was in fact first used
by the group around Daubert to describe its activities,
and already in 1900 ALEXANDER PFĂNDER pubJished his
Phănomenologie des Wollens, a work written under
Lipps's direction that reveals many ofthe characteristic
features oflater works in realistic phenomenology.
To understand the phenomenology of the Munich
school it is useful to distinguish two strands within
Husserl's own thinking. On the one hand is the strand
- represented by the slogan "Back to the matters them-
selves!"- of "phenomenological description." This
yields an object-oriented phenomenology that holds
that we are in possession of a priori (which is to say:
non-inductive) knowledge relating to certain funda-
mental structures in a wide range of different spheres of
objects (for example, colors, tones, values, shapes ). On
the other hand is the strand of act-oriented phenomen-
ology presented most clearly in Jdeen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie I ( 191 3) and drawing to some degree on German
idealist sources. Both strands are already present in
the Logische Untersuchungen and both draw on work
in metaphysics and on the descriptive psychology of
FRANZ BRENTANO and his followers.
The Munich realists, now, remained faithful to the
descriptive strand of object-oriented phenomenology
and they rejected what they saw as the move to "tran-
scendental idealism" in Husserl's !ater writings. They
preserved an interest in the work of Brentano and his
school and in wider contemporary developments in
logic, linguistics, and empirica! and theoretical psy-
chology, and they also followed Brentanians such as
Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) in defending a realis-
tic theory of values and of our knowledge of values.
Realistic phenomenology thus has important roots in
AUSTRIA.
The historical importance ofthe Munich group can
be seen in the fact that phenomenology became impor-
tant in Gottingen only after members of the Munich
group, and especially ADOLF RFINACH, had moved to
join Husserl there, where they served to propagandize
the latter's ideas and to assist in making them accessi-
ble to new generations of students. (HERBERT SPIEGEL-
BERG refers in this connection to the "Munich invasion
of Gottingen.") Of the fi ve initial editors of Husserl 's
Jahrbuch, four- ALEXANDER PFĂNDER, MORITZ GEIGER,
MAX SCHELER, and ADOLF REINACH- derive from Mu-
 REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY
nich. Of these, Pfander ( 1870--1941) is most famil-
iar as the author of a phenomenological logic and of
work in descriptive psychology on willing, motivation,
etc. (Herbert Spiegelberg is the most prominent among
his students.) Geiger is the author of work on pheno-
menological AESTHETICS, on EMOTIONS, and on the a
priori foundations of geometry as a science of essen-
tial structures of space. Scheler is the author of Der
Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
(Formalism in ethics and nonformal ethics of value,
191311916), a defence of value realism and a critique
of Kantian "formalist" ethics that also includes a de-
tai led treatment of the aprioristic methodology of the
Munich school. Reinach was the author of a work en-
titled "Die apriorisichen Grundlagen des blirgerlichen
Rechts" (The a priori foundations of civillaw), a con-
tribution to the phenomenology of law and to the on-
tologica! foundations of the social sciences that was
published in the first volume of Husserl 's Jahrbuch
in 1913. The work presents in particular a theory of
promising and ofrelated "social acts," and offers a re-
markable anticipation of the !ater work on speech act
theory of John Austin ( 1911-1960) and John Searle.
Other first generation members ofthe Munich group
were THEODOR CON RAD, AUGUST GALLINGER, and WILHELM
SCHAPP. The second generation ofthe realist phenomen-
ological movement inciuded: THEODOR CELMS, HEDWIG
CONRAD-MARTIUS, ERICH HEINRICH, DIETRICH VON HILDE-
BRAND, AUREL KOLNAI, EDITH STEIN, and KURT STAVEN-
HAGEN, as well as the already mentioned Spiegelberg.
ROMAN INGARDEN, too, was allied with the Munich re-
alists and was responsible for some ofthe most impor-
tant criticisms of Husserl 's turn to idealism. Common
to ali of these thinkers is the attempt to describe in
painstaking fashion - in a way that is opposed to ali
reductionism - the fundamental ontologica! princi-
ples governing different spheres, whether in LANGUAGE,
LAW, ACTION, PERCEPTION, AESTHETICS, VALUE, POLITICS,
or Ingarden took realist phenomenology to
RELIGION.
POLAND, where it had an inftuence also on the philo-
sophical thinking of the young KAROL WOJTYLA and is
exemplified in the latter's work on Scheler.
Contemporary philosophers allied with realistic
phenomenology include Roderick Chisholm, J. N. FIND-
LAY, WLODZIMIERZ GALEWICZ, GUIDO KUNG, KEVIN MUL-
LIGAN, OI ETER MUNCH, ANDRZEJ POL TAWSKI, KARL SCHUH-
MANN (the historian of the movement), PETER SIMONS,
587
BARRY SMITH, ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, DALLAS WILLARD,
DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, and WOJCIECH ZELANIEC. As will
be clear, realistic phenomenology is set apart from !ater
phenomenological schools by its closeness to certain
tendencies in AngJo-American ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY.
This holds most conspicuously of Reinach's work on
speech act theory and on the foundations of logic. The
value realism ofthe Munich phenomenologists recalls
the ethical work ofG. E. Moore (1873-1958), and their
work on essences recalls more recent work in the ana-
lytic tradition on essentialism and natural kinds and on
the "universals" of language and cognition.
That Daubert's work is little known follows from
the fact that his many shorthand manuscripts, which re-
mained unpublished in his lifetime, ha ve only recently,
through a massive effort directed by Karl Schuhmann,
been brought into readable form. Daubert's critique of
Husserl's idealistic turn rests on the thesis that con-
sciousness functions in a normal way precisely when
it "hits" an object, above ali in veridical perception.
Consciousness is then- for Daubert as for JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE- exhausted in this relation to an object. It can
be substantivized as an EGO only by becoming deprived
of this, its original function- for example through a
special "phenomenological reduction": only when con-
sciousness withdraws from contact with reality does it
acquire a pseudo-being of its own.
This entanglement of consciousness with reality-
to the detailed elucidation ofwhich many ofDaubert's
manuscripts are dedicated- makes it impossible for
phenomenology to achieve any "pure" description of
an "absolute" consciousness. Husserl's (Cartesian) ar-
gument in Ideen 1 to the effect that where one thing
can turn out to be a hallucination, nothing will be safe
against this possibility, is countered by Daubert with
the thesis - since familiar from the work of MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY, Wittgenstein, and Austin- that
doubt, error, and hallucination make sense only when
seen against the general background of the veridical
awareness of reality. A single abject of consciousness
might turn out not to be real, "but only with regard to
the standard of reality itself."
Further contributions to our understanding of the
inextricable entanglement of consciousness and world
are to be found in the work of Daubert, Reinach,
Pfander, and Ingarden on facts and states ofaffairs. Al-
ready Husserl had seen in the Logische Untersuchun-
588 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
gen that genuine, veridical ("fulfilled") experience of
reality is possible not only via PERCEPTION but also via
judgment. The world itself (the realm of the "matters
themselves") is correspondingly organized not merely
in terms ofthe objects, qualities, events, and processes
that are given (for example) in perception, but also in
terms of the states of affairs that make our judgments
true. Pfander distinguishes in his Logik ( 1921) two va-
rieties of judgment-correlate: the intentiona! Sachver-
halt that is "projected" in dynamic fashion and simulta-
neously posited as real through the act ofjudgment; and
the "Selbstverhalten des Gegenstands" on the side of
the object itself- a segment of reality that is "thrown
into relief' through the given act. A judgment is true
precisely when its intentiona! state of affairs stands in
perfect coincidence with the corresponding "disposi-
tion of the things" on the side of the object. LOGIC,
accordingly, as scicnce oftruth and falsehood, must be
built on the theory of Sachverhalte as its basis, and a
conception of the laws of logic as "nothing other than
general principles expressing relations between states
of affairs" was worked out in detail by Reinach in his
essay "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils" of 1911.
It was against the background ofthis work on logic,
language, and intentiona! directedness that Reinach
put forward in 1913 the first systematic theory of
the phenomena of promis ing, questioning, requesting,
commanding, accusing, etc., phenomena that he him-
self collects together under the heading "social acts."
Reinach's work provides a rich taxonomy ofthe vari-
ous different speech act varieties and of their possible
modifications. It contains a detailed treatment of the
quasi-legal status of speech acts and of the relations
between legal and ethical obligations and also of the
relations between the a priori laws governing social
formations of different sorts and the enactments of
lawmakers. It also contains a discussion of one feature
of speech acts that seems hardly to ha ve been dealt with
in the !ater Anglo-American literature- that feature
whereby such actions may be performed by proxy, as
when an action of promis ing or commanding or invit-
ing is carried out by one person in the name of another.
Husserl had distinguished in the Logische Unter-
suchungen between the "quality" and "ideal content"
ofan act- thus, for example, between the quality of an
act ofjudgment and its ideal content (as a judgment to
the effect that snow is white, that Fritz is saluting, etc.).
.Such ideal contents or "propositions" can be abstractly
discriminated in contexts of quite different sorts. Thus
we canjudge that a given proposition is truc; but we
can also regret that it is true, and we can wish or doubt
or hypothesize that it be true, and so on. As Pfander
pointed out in his Logik, there is a veri table plethora of
"propositional formations" that result thereby. He men-
tions questions, assertions, reports, thankings, recom-
mendings, requests, warnings, aliowings, promisings,
invitings, summonings, incitements, prescribings, or-
ders, decrees, prohibitions, commands, laws - ali of
which share with judgments the fact that their ideal
contents are propositional in nature.
By developing a scientific taxonomy of such propo-
sitional formations, the Munich phenomenologists
were able to develop a theory of the communicative
aspects of language more sophisticated than that of
Husserl, who was to some degree blind to the phenom-
ena in question by virtue ofhis insistence that language
and linguistic meaning is present in unmodified form
even in silent speech.
Reinach's own work on speech act theory was inftu-
enced not only by the work of Husserl and his Munich
colieagues, but also by his background as a student of
LAW, which helped him to do justice to the legal and
normative aspects of the phenomenon of promising,
aspects that had been neglected in traditional accounts
(for example, ofHume and Lipps). The latter had seen
the action of promising either as the expression of an
act ofwili oras the declaration of an intention to act in
the interests ofthe party in whose fa vor this declaration
is made. The most obvious inadequacy ofthis account
is that it throws no light on the problem of how an
utterance of the given sort can give rise to a mutualiy
correlated obligation and claim on the part ofpromisor
and promisee. The bare intention to do something has,
after ali, no quasi-legal consequences of this sort, and
it is difficult to see why things should be different in
reftection of the fact that such an intention is brought
to expression in language.
Reinach's thesis, now, is that to do justice to phe-
nomena such as claim and obligation, it is necessary to
recognize that speech acts are not built up out of inde-
pendently existing (mental and linguistic) parts: they
are structures of a new sort, within which mental and
linguistic aspects can be distinguished only abstractly
(and not as separable elements). Such structures are
 REALISTIC PHENOMENLOGY
marked further by the fact that they demand an alien
subject toward whom they are directed and by the fact
that the utterance-aspect must of necessity be regis-
tered or grasped by the subject in question. A promise
ora command must be received and understood by the
one to whom it is addressed (something that does not
apply, for example, to an act ofblessing, forgiving, or
cursing).
A promise, then, cannot be identica! with the expres-
sion or intimation of an act of will or of an intention,
because some of the acts that underlie a promise are
such that they are simply not able to exist outside the
compass of a whole of just this sort. And similarly
there is no independent and self-contained mental ex-
perience that is somehow brought to expression in the
issuing of a command. Hen ce, a fortiori, social acts of
these kinds cannot be mere reports of such experiences.
Reinach's treatment of speech act phenomena thus
belongs neither to the province of logic or philoso-
phy of language nor to the philosophy of law or to the
theory of action. Rather, his work shows that speech
acts and related phenomena are structures of a tran-
scategorial sort, so that their proper treatment would
require a theory embracing within a single frame not
merely the linguistic and logica! aspects, but also the
psychological, legal, and action-theoretic dimensions
of the phenomena in question. There is, now, a com-
mon tendency within the history of philosophy to seek
to reduce transcategorial structures down to one single
dimension. It can be seen at work in the "methodologi-
cal soJipsism" of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY, which
seeks to reduce ali phenomena to the single dimension
of"constituting consciousness." But it is at work also in
the tendency among analytic philosophers to conceive
claims, obligations, values, etc., as mere reflections of
our ways of speaking. This tendency was resisted by
the Munich phenomenologists.
From the realistic perspective the world contains
promisings, commands, claims, obligations, etc., just
as it contains instances ofbiological and logica! species
such as !ion and tiger or judging and inferring. As
Husserl saw in the third ofhis Logische Untersuchun-
gen, the species that people the world can be divided
into two sorts. On the one hand are independent species
whose instances require specific instantiations of no
other species in order to exist. Lion might be taken as
an example of an independent species in this sense. On
589
the other hand are dependent species whose instances
donot exist in and ofthemselves but only in association
with instances of complementary species of determi-
nate sorts. And then, as Husserl emphasized, the rela-
tions of complementation here are not arbitrary; rather,
they reflect "firmly determined relations of necessity
... which vary with the species of dependent contents
and accordingly prescribe one sort of completion to
one ofthem, another sort of completion to another."
Judging is an example of a dependent species in
Husserl's sense: a judging exists only as the judging of
some specific subject (as a smile smiles only in a human
face). Promising, too, is an example of a dependent
species. Here, however, we see that the dependence
is multifold: a promise requires that there be also at
least the species claim, obligation, utterance, and reg-
istering act, reticulated together with language-using
subjects within the framework of a single whole of a
quite specific transcategorial sort. Moreover, the men-
tal acts that underlie a promise are themselves such that
they are not able to exist outside the compass of such
a whole. Hence we have to deal here with a relation
oftwo-sided dependence: the promise is as a matter of
necessity such that it cannot exist except in association
with an intending act, but this intending act is itself of a
special (promising) sort and is as a matter ofnecessity
of such a nature that it can exist only in the framework
of the given whole. It is only superficially similar to
an intending act of the sort that can exist outside the
framework of a promise.
Promising involves, then, a ccrtain sort of complex
structure in reality. Each such structure will consist of
instances of given species reticulated together in spe-
cific ways. Such structures can be understood on two
distinct levels. On the one hand they exist in re, i.e., to
the extent that their constituent species are instantiated
here and now in some region of empirica! reality. On
the other hand, however, they are from the structural
point of view always structures among the correspond-
ing species, and the latter may be realized, in principle,
at any time or place. In this respect they have the char-
acter of universals, and the dependence relations that
tie them together ha ve the character not of contingent
associations, but of necessary laws.
The structures in question are therefore both neces-
sary and universal. Now as is well known, KANT had
specified "necessity and strict universality" as "sure
590 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and certain marks" ofthe a priori that "belong together
inextricably." His remarks to this effect are of course
formulated within the wider context ofhis own episte-
mological theory ofthe a priori. The Munich phenome-
nologists, however, turn the tab les on Kant, exploiting
the features of necessity and strict universality as the
hasis of an ontologica! theory ofwhat they caii "a priori
structures" or "essential connections" (Wesenszusam-
menhănge or Wesensgesetze). Such structures do in-
deed have certain epistemological peculiarities. That
a promise cannot exist except in association with a
mutually correlated claim and obligation is something
we know not merely through experiment and induc-
tion ("aposteriori," in the usual epistemological sense
of this term), but rather because the relation in ques-
tion possesses an intrinsic intelligibility of its own: it
can be grasped immediately, in the way that we grasp,
for example, that a triangle is not a circle, that blue is
not a shape, or that nothing can be simultaneously red
and green ali over. This, however, is for realist phe-
nomenologists a consequence of their necessity and
universality as ontologically conceived.
At the core ofrealistic phenomenology,now, !ies the
thesis that such intelligible, universal, and necessary
structures may caii forth entire disciplines of an a priori
sort. The family of such disciplines includes much of
logic and mathematics, as well as Reinach 's a priori
theory of law. And it includes also what Husserl and
his Munich followers called "phenomenology."
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ave-Lallemant, Eberhard. Die Nachlăsse der Miinchener
Phănomenologen in der bayerischen Staatsbibliothek.
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1975.
Burkhardt, Armin, ed. Speech Acts, Meanings, and Inten-
tions: Critica! Approaches to the Philosophy of John R.
Searle. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990.
Mulligan, Kevin, ed. Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach
and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Pfander, Alexander, ed. Miinchener philosophische Abhand-
lungen (Festschrift for Theodor Lipps). Leipzig: Barth,
1911.
Reinach, Adolf. Sămtliche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit
Kommentar. Ed. Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith. 2 vols.
Munich: Philosophia, 1988; 'The Apriori Foundations of
Civil Law." Trans. J. F. Crosby. Aletheia 3 (1983), 1-142.
Schuhmann, Karl. "Die Entwicklung der Sprechakttheorie
in der Miinchener Phănomenologie." Phănomenologische
Forschungen 21 ( 1988), 133--66.
- , and Barry Smith. "Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
vs. Husserl's Ideas !." Review of Metaphysics 39 (1985),
763-93.
- , and Barry Smith. "Questions: An Essay in Daubertian
Phenomenology." Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 47 (1987), 353--84.
Sepp, Hans-Reiner, ed. Die Miinchener-Găttinger Phăno­
menologie. Freiburg: Karl Alber, forthcoming.
Smith, Barry, ed. Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and
Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia, 1982.
Willard, Dallas. Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984.
Zelaniec, Wojciech. "Fathers, Kings, and Promises: Husserl
and Reinach on the A Priori." Husserl Studies 9 ( 1992),
147-77.
BARRY SMITH
State University ofNew York, Buffalo
REASON Reason is an issue that leads to
the core of EDMUND HUSSERL'S CONSTITUTIVE PHENO-
MENOLOGY. His phenomenological analysis of reason
can be found in Part IV of the Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie I (1913) and in the third of the Cartesianische
Meditationen [ 1931]. The place of these parts in both
books indicates that the phenomenology of reason is
the final stage of the analysis of intentiona! acts and
of active synthesis. In the Third Meditation Husserl in
addition points out that essential parts of the pheno-
menology of reason had to be used naively in the
considerations preparing the first exposition of the
transcendental-phenomenological reduction. A correct
and complete understanding ofthe concepts used in the
development of the transcendental-phenomenological
reduction is possible only with the aid ofthe corrobo-
rated phenomenology of reason. This is not a vicious
circle.lt is possible to developa phenomenology ofrea-
son in phenomenological PSYCHOLOGY, i.e., in the natu-
ral or mundane attitude. The phenomenology of reason
is also presupposed in the idea of a telos of humanity
in the Die Krisis des europăischen Wissenschaflen und
die transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936). A pheno-
menology ofreason is, therefore, of central significance
in phenomenology. lfphenomenology is understood as
the replacement of traditional first philosophy and if it
is understood as transcendental phenomenology, then
a phenomenology of reason is of central significance
in phenomenology.
Reason is not a name for a specific faculty of the
 REASON
mind that can be distinguished from other faculties,
e.g., intuition and understanding. Reason is also not a
name for certain types of intentiona! acts and active
syntheses. Reason is the striving for possible verifica-
tion. This striving is present in ali intentiona! acts. Con-
sciousness is intentiona! and as such strives toward the
self-givenness of its object and the fulfillment of empty
or partially empty intentions. From this broad concep-
tion ofreason it follows that each type of intentiona! act
has its own rules of reason guiding verification. They
will be considered below and refer to the specific inten-
tiona! objects and the types of evidence. Verification,
therefore, has different structures in different realms
of intentiona! objects. Perception and feei ing, i.e., the
subjective bodily aspects of perceptions and the emo-
tional reactions inside the body like pleasure and pain,
to the extent that they involve active synthesis, already
have their own rules ofreason guiding the striving for
the self-givenness of objects of perception and feei ing.
Striving for verification in intentiona! acts and in con-
sciousness in general have a goal, a telos. As such the
striving requires rules. The rule can ha ve the character
of a "Kantian idea" ifthe goal of complete verification
and fulfillment cannot be reached according to the very
nature of the corresponding intentiona! objects. It has
tobe kept in mind, however, that the system ofideas of
reason in KANT is restricted to very few types of striving
and does not cover the scope ofthe phenomenological
conception ofreason and ali possible ideas ofreason.
Seen from this viewpoint, the phenomenology of
reason is the final step of intentiona! analysis and thus
a part of intentiona! analysis itself. From the very be-
ginning the search for the rules of active synthesis is a
search for the rules ofthe givenness and possible self-
givenness ofthe corresponding intentiona! objects. The
ideas ofTRUTH, true being, and actuality (Wirklichkeit)
are the necessary correlates ofreason considered from
the aspect ofthe NOEMA and the aspect ofthe intentiona!
objects as guiding threads of intentiona! analysis. The
different rules and ideas of reason can therefore be
specified according to the different realms of FORMAL
AND MATERIAL ONTOLOGY. Such reaJms are the reaJm of
doxic givenness, of VALUEs, and of ACTIONS. The rules
of formal LOGIC and formal ontology belong to rea-
son in general. The rules guiding the givenness of pure
doxa belong to the material region ofthe natural things.
The rules for the self-givenness of values are the
591
rules of formal and material axiology. Formal axiol-
ogy presupposes judgmental activity like formal on-
tology. Formal axiology investigates the axiologica!
forms of value judgments. Value judgments in turn
presuppose the immediate pre-predicative experience
ofvalues. The rules offormal ontology are valid in for-
mal axiology, but formal ontology adds formal view-
points belonging only to the realm of values. Value
judgments have, for instance, three semantic values:
objects with positive values, value-free objects, and
objects with negative values. Values are, in addition,
not concrete objects, i.e., self-subsisting entities. They
are properties, abstract moments, given with and in ob-
jects belonging to the realm of doxic givenness. Values
in general belong to the realm of culture, INTERSUB-
JECTIVITY, and the givenness of others and myself as
persons in this realm. Objects belonging to the mate-
rial realms ofphysical and ofliving beings have value
only to the extent to which they occur in cultural ob-
jects. Two mai'n classes of values here are the utility
values and the aesthetic values. Vital values - orig-
inally experienced in sensible feelings, and therefore
belonging to the realm of animality- are values in the
proper sense only if they are given as the vital values
of persons. Personal values are the values given in the
character, i.e., the system of habits. Practica! values
are the values of actions, i.e., the moral values in the
narrower sense.
Formal axiology has, like formal ontology, a the-
oretical and a normative aspect. The idea of reason
guiding formal ontology is perfect evidence and truth
and the idea of reason' guiding formal axiology is the
idea of the highest good, the summum bonum. It is
misleading, given Husserl 's narrow definition of the
practica!, to speak about a priority of practica! reason
in his philosophy. The additional normative aspect that
can be found in reason in general and, closely con-
nected with it, the teleological character ofreason and
its striving for absolute self-responsibility represent an
ought of a higher order for rational beings. It is imme-
diately connected with the spontaneity and activity of
transcendental subjectivity.
The concepts of verification, self-givenness, and
fulfillment are ambiguous, because they are different in
different regions. A general clarification ofthese ambi-
guities is possible in the phenomenology of EVIDENCE.
The phenomenology of evidence is of essential signif-
592 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
icance not only for the project of the logic of TRUTH
sketched out in Formale und transzendentale Logik
(1929), but also for the proper understanding of the
transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In Ideen
I Husserl says that striving for verification is striving
for evidence. Evidence is thus nota specific property of
certain representations indicating truth without qualifi-
cations. As a consequence of this terminological stip-
ulation, whoever says that verificati an or falsification,
i.e., in Husserl 's terms "verified negation," are mean-
ingful concepts has to accept his specific concept of
evidence. Reason as the striving for verification is the
striving for perfect evidence transcending ali imper-
fect evidence. The second aspect of phenomenology
of reason is therefore the phenomenological analysis
of evidence. The difference between perfect and im-
perfect evidence can be determined in a preliminary
description. Perfect evidence is self-givenness oftruth
without implying empty, non-fulfilled intentiona! acts
and without admixture of modalizing doubt, i.e., as true
or false in strict disjunction without a third in between.
What is given with such admixtures is given in imper-
fect evidence. Reason, therefore, is the sum total ofthe
rules in which consciousness strives from imperfect to
perfect evidence, i.e., to the givenness oftruth.
The further development of the phenomenology of
reason as a phenomenology of evidence is one of the
most diffi.cult tasks of transcendental phenomenology.
The distinctions introduced by Husserl in the Ideen
I and elsewhere are not clear. In the Cartesianische
Meditationen he introduced serious changes in the def-
initions ofthe meanings ofhis terms for different types
of evidence without indicating that such changes ha ve
been made. There are three kinds of imperfect evi-
dence vs. perfect evidence and these distinctions can
also serve to clarify his earlier usage.
(1) Original evidence, i.e., the bodily self-givenness
ofthe abject in the present, is perfect evidence. Given-
ness in signitive intentions and empty intentions in
general is imperfect. (2) There is perfect evidence as
adequate evidence, i.e., the original givenness ofthe in-
tentiona! abject in ali of its aspects and adumbrations.
Imperfect evidence in this sense is inadequate. (3) Per-
fect evidence can also be understood as apodictic ev-
idence, i.e., an evidence accompanied with the con-
sciousness of the impossibility of negation and doubt.
Imperfect evidence in this sense is an evidence with an
admixture of modalizing doubt. (4) The distinction of
the Ideen lbetween assertoric evidence and evidence of
eidetic intuition is explained in terms ofthe other types
of evidence. Evidence in eidetic intuition is an original
and apodictic evidence. In addition, it can be adequate.
Assertoric evidence, i.e., the evidence of real objects, is
original only in the immediately given adumbrations.
It is never adequate and apodictic. (5) The distinction
in Formale und transzendentale Logik of perfect evi-
dence as clear and distinct and imperfect evidence as
obscure and confused is restricted to the specific type
of evidence belonging to judgmental predicative evi-
dence. (6) The distinction between pre-predicative vs.
predicative evidence is introduced in the Cartesianis-
che Meditationen. The basic distinctions are thus the
distinctions between original, adequate, and apodictic
evidence and their imperfect counterparts. According
to the Ideen I apodictic evidence is adequate evidence
but not vice versa. The thesis that apodicticity implies
adequacy can still be found !ater in Erste Philosophie
[1923/24].
The distinctions in the First and the Third Medita-
tions are different. Apodictic evidence is indubitable
because the doubt itself implies the assertion of the
abject of doubt. Apodictic evidence in this sense is
therefore restricted to the self-givenness of the ex-
istence of the subject and to certain aspects of its
essence, e.g., temporality. Apodictic essence in this
sense is original, but it is not adequate. It follows that
an adequate evidence can be original evidence only
in case of very basic eidetic intuitions. The distinc-
tions of the Cartesianische Meditationen have seri-
ous consequences for the proper understanding of the
transcendental-phenomenological reduction. NATURAL
SCIENCE and HUMAN SCIENCES are interested in adequate
evidence, but this adequacy is not given in original evi-
dence. Only one part of a scientific theory can be given
in original evidence in the present. The other parts of
the theory are given in the horizon in empty intentions
and expectations. Science is not interested in apodictic
evidence, but philosophy is and has been because only
apodictic evidence can be used for the purpose of the
ultimate grounding of ali knowledge in first philoso-
phy. The transcendental-phenomenological reduction
is therefore a reduction to an apodictic and original
evidence and the only evidence ofthis kind is the evi-
dence ofthe self-givenness ofthe subject. According to
 RELATIVISM
the Krisis the telos ofhumankind is the self-realization
of reason in both directions: the final grounding in an
apodictic evidence in transcendental phenomenology
as first philosophy, and the infinite task ofthe extension
of scientific knowledge striving for adequate evidence.
Reason is understood in MARTIN HEIDEGGER's Sein
und Zeit ( 192 7) in terms of the Greek understanding of
logos, noe in, and an. As such, it is the place oftruth, the
awareness ( Vernehmenlassen) of the being of beings.
The modern conception of reason as ratia is one of the
central issues in Heidegger's critique of metaphysics
and with it the teleology belonging to reason in Husserl
and the tradition, e.g., Kant. The essay "Der Satz vom
Grund" ( 1956), one ofthe works ofHeidegger in which
the Kehre is prepared, opposes two readings of the
principle of sufficient reason. The first is the reading
of the metaphysical tradition, leading in the end to
the reckoning of modern logic and technology. In the
second reading, the Satz vom Grund, the principle of
the ground, is understood as a Satz in den Grund, a leap
into a ground that is the un-ground, i.e., into being.
Reason is nota topic for MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY.
Husserl's interest in reason presupposes a critica! but
neverthe1ess positive evaluation of objective science
and an understanding ofphenomenology itself as a rig-
orous science with rigid methodological norms. Pheno-
menology in Merleau-Ponty's sense is strictly opposed
to objective science and the ideal of a scientific first
philosophy with strict methodo1ogical norms. There-
fore, reason cannot be of significance for his pheno-
menology ofperception and his ontology ofwild pre-
reflective being.
JACQUES DERRIDA radicalizes Heidegger's critique of
reason. Reason, logos as awareness of being in Hei-
degger's sense, is included in his critique of the lo-
gocentrism of the Western metaphysics of presence.
He deconstructs Kant's conception ofreason, claiming
that reason is, in the last instance, essentially unknow-
able, and uses this type of deconstruction in his critique
of other philosophers for whom reason remained the
core and the goal ofphilosophy. His critique ofreason
is immediately connected with the development ofthe
concept of differance.
Thus reason is of significance only for phenome-
nologists belonging in addition to the tradition of the
rationalism of Kantianism and German idealism such
as GERHARD FUNKE. Reason in its different aspects is of
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
593
crucial significance in his Phănomenologie- Meta-
physik ader Methode? ( 1966).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Funke, Gerhard. Phănomenologie - Metaphysik ader Meth-
ode? Bonn: Bouvier, 1966; Phenomenology- Metaphyics
or Method? Trans. David J. Parent. Athens, OH: Ohio
University Press, 1987.
Harvey, 1rene E. "Introduction." In her Derrida and the Econ-
omy of Difjerance. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1986.
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen. Ed. Stephan
Strasser. Husserliana 1. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1950.
Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Husserliana 3. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
Langan, Thomas. Merleau-Ponty :~ Critique of Reason. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.
Orth, Emst Wolfgang, ed. Vernunft und Kontingenz. Realităt
und Ethos in der Phănomenologie. Freiburg: Karl Alber,
1986.
Seebohm, Thomas M. "Considerations on Der Satz vom
Grund." In The Question ofHermeneutics. Ed. Timothy J.
Stapleton. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, I 994,
237-55.
Tugendhat, Emst. Der Wahrheitsbegriffin Husserl und Hei-
degger. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967.
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM
Universităt Mainz
REDUCTION See EPOCHE AND REDUCTION.
REGIONAL ONTOLOGY See FORMAL & MATERIAL
ONTOLOGY.
RELATIVISM The view that TRUTH is not abso-
lutely the same for everyone, but varies with the indi-
vidual person or group is relativism. The most radical
relativism denies that there are any universally valid
truths; more limited versions assert relativity only in
a specific domain. For example, ethical and aesthetic
relativism relativize moral and aesthetic values, but
not the principJes of MATHEMATICS or of the NATURAL
or HUMAN SCIENCES. Epistemic relativism holds that
knowledge varies with the subject, rather than truth
594 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
itself. Forms of relativism are also distinguished ac-
cording to the features ofthe subject held to condition
truth (or knowledge or values ). Common examples are
psychoiogicai make-up (PSYCHOLOGISM); HISTORY and
historical worldview (historicism, We!tanschauung-
reiativism); culture (cultural relativism); LANGUAGE
(linguistic relativism); conceptual scheme (conceptual
relativism); and interests and aims (pragmatic rela-
tivism).
Relativism and its aporias are perennial themes in
the history of philosophy. The pre-Socratics empha-
sized the relativity of sensations of color, taste, and
smell, in contrast to the conclusions of reason. The
extension of relativism to rational knowledge can be
traced back at least to the famous saying ofthe sophist
Protagoras, chronicled by Plato, that "man is the mea-
sure of ali things, of those which are, that they are;
of those which are not, that they are not'' (Theaete-
tus, 152a). Many modem versions of relativism are
derivatives of KANT's view that the phenomenal world
is structured by the subjective cognitive faculties. Rela-
tivism results when the Kantian thesis ofthe universal-
ity ofthe subjective structures is rejected in fa vor ofthe
view that these structures are historically, culturally, or
psychologically variable.
Certa in logica! objections to relativism are as peren-
nial as relativism itself. It is objected that to claim that
there is no absolute truth is to claim that there is one:
the thesis of relativism itself; thus a global relativism is
self-refuting. Relativism is also notorious for violating
the law ofnoncontradiction, asserting that ajudgment
can be true for one person but false for another, and
hence both true and false at the same time. However,
some philosophers find that these objections are incon-
clusive, or that they can be avoided through alternate
formulations ofthe position. There remains little con-
sensus as to whether relativism is defensible, and the
definition itself is increasingly under dispute.
Relativism is of special interest in phenomenology
for both historical and systematic reasons. Relativism
was a burning issue for EDMUND HUSSERL, the founder
ofphenomenology, whose development ofhis CONSTI-
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY was motivated in part by the
desire to overcome it. Much the same was the case for
MAX SCHELER in the ethical domain. However, !ater heirs
ofthe phenomenological tradition, such as MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER and HANS-GEORG GADAMER, are often thought to
have succumbed to relativism, and some believe this
was as a consequence of phenomenology itself. The
appearance of a systematic consonance between rel-
ativism and phenomenology arises primarily from its
rejection of metaphysical realism. According to meta-
physical realism, reality exists independently of any
actual or possible apprehension by subjects, and is es-
sentially subject-invariant. By contrast, for phenomen-
ology, reality is phenomenal reality, and essentially
related to subjectivity. The variation in what is ex-
perienced as reality by different persons seems to ren-
der phenomenology especially vulnerable to relativism
and its aporias. Thus a central issue for contemporary
phenomenologists is whether phenomenology is nec-
essarily committed to some form of relativism, and if
so, how to address the standard objections.
Husserl 's intense engagement with relativism was
sparked by his perception of the spiritual and moral
decline of Europe, and his identification of skepticism
and relativism as the root causes. He hoped that by
providing a secure, universalist foundation for knowl-
edge and values, phenomenology would restore confi-
dence in REASON and help to foster an age of spiritual
renewal. However, while Husserl is a virulent abso-
lutist in his early writings, in his !ater period he recog-
nizes that phenomenology itself gives rise to relativism
in a certain form, and attempts to accommodate this
within his overall foundationalist project. The extent
of Husserl 's !ater concessions to relativism remains a
matter of scholarly de bate.
Husserl 's first explicit treatment of relativism is in
the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik ( 1900). Here the
main opponent is PSYCHOLOGISM, the view that the prin-
ciples of LOGIC are valid only relative to the psycholog-
ical make-up ofthe human species. Husserl 's approach
in this early writing is largely formal. In addition to the
common self-refutation objections, he argues that rel-
ativism incoherently presupposes the absolute status
of the subjective conditioning structures themselves,
as that to which truth is relativized. He also brands
relativism inconsistent with the very meaning of the
term "true," which he alleges always means "true for
everyone and ali times."
The next confrontation is in "Philosophie als
strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ). Here the focus is shifted
from psychologism to historicism, epitomized by the
Weftanschauung phi!osophy of WILHELM DILTHEY, a
 RELATIVISM
shift reflecting Husserl's growing concern to estab-
Iish the irrelativity of philosophy (as opposed to mere
logic), and of phenomenology in particular. Formal-
logica! objections paralieling the Prolegomena are bol-
stered by a consideration of the moral implications of
the respective truth-ideals of phenomenology and his-
toricism. The historicist, Husserl charges, assimilates
truth to pragmatic values relative to the concerns and
aims of a specific historical community. This concept
oftruth is characteristic ofnaturallife, but when taken
as a goal-idea, it reinforces a pragmatic moral charac-
ter. By contrast, phenomenology pursues the ideal of
an ultimate and universaliy valid justification of each
"position-taking" on the hasis ofthe individual's own
rational insight. The pragmatic, historicist truth-ideal
has its place in ordinary living and moments requiring
an immediate decision, but the pursuit of the abso-
lute truth-ideal yields the ethicaliy highest and most
responsible life. The philosopher, as the functionary of
humankind, is charged with in fus ing this ethos through
society as a whole. A similar association between a uni-
versalist philosophical truth-ideal and the moral weli-
being of society is asserted in the Kaizo articles ( 1923-
24) and the Vienna Lecture (1935).
Husserl 's highly negative assessment of rela-
tivism is softened in light of the phenomenology of
the LIFEWORLD. As early as Jdeen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie II [1912-15], and continuing through the period
of Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936), Husserl em-
phasizes that the WORLD of lived experience is subject-
relative, varying with physical and cultural-historical
differences between persons and groups. In this con-
nection, Husserl develops a notion of situational, life-
worldly truth, set in contrast to the strictly subject-
irrelative truth sought by natural science. Lifeworldly
truths have only a limited degree of exactness, justi-
fication, and intersubjectivity, these limits being fixed
by the practica! interests governing typical situations
within a specific lifeworld. Reversing the claim of the
Prolegomena, Husserl maintains that at the level ofthe
lifeworld, when we hold a judgment to be true, we do
not mean that it is "true for everyone," but rather that
it is justifiable relative to certain interests and techno-
logical means, and a matter of possible consensus for
a limited intersubjective community.
595
Similarly, the phenomenological equation of reality
with concordant phenomenality leads to the affirma-
tion that the subject-relative objects of the lifeworld
are real, even if, as in the case of cultural and reli-
gious entities, they are experienced only by limited
groups. The !ater Husserl 's particular version of rela-
tivism circumvents the usuallogical paradoxes because
while it violates the principle of the excluded middle,
it respects the principle ofnoncontradiction. Within its
limited domain of application, a lifeworldly judgment
is either true or false, but never true for one person
and false for another; outside that domain, it makes no
claim, and has no truth-value at ali. This relativism is
also a limited rather than a global relativism, and hen ce
is not self-refuting.
Despite his concessions to relativism at the level
ofthe lifeworld, Husserl never abandons universal va-
lidity as the guiding truth-ideal for the sciences and
for phenomenology in particular. This defense is com-
plicated by the fact that the sciences, which are to
be subject-irrelative, are founded upon the lifeworld,
which is subject-relative. Husserl addresses this para-
dox in a twofold way. Problems of relativity due to
physical or other abnormalities in subjects (e.g., blind-
ness, insanity) are overcome by the natural develop-
ment at the level of the lifeworld of a concept of the
"normal" world, the world "there" for ali normal per-
sons. Cultural-historical relativity can be overcome,
according to Husserl, because ali concrete lifeworlds
(or at least ali "normal" ones) share common struc-
tures, and these shared structures can provide the foun-
dation for the universaliy intersubjective concepts and
evidence of science. Although the analysis of the uni-
versal lifeworldly structures was never fully worked
out, candidate structures proposed by Husserl include:
SPACE and TIME; the distinction between persons and
things; some type of causal order; and cognitive rea-
son in the form of the distinction between truth and
falsehood, or reality and illusion.
Husserl 's claim of universallifeworldly structures,
and with it the ultimate phenomenological overcoming
of relativism, remain highly controversial. A central
point of debate is whether the existence of universal
structures can be given a phenomenological demon-
stration, rather than merely being dogmatically pre-
supposed with a view to grounding science. Another
contentious issue is Husserl's assertion in the Krisis
596 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and the Kaizo articles that European rationality, and its
scientific conception of truth as universal validity in
particular, represent the spiritual te/os ofhumanity as
a whole. Here again there is the appearance that, mo-
tivated by urgent historical events and deep personal
conviction, Husserl's philosophizing speculatively ex-
ceeds what can be established in a rigorously pheno-
menological fashion.
A more detailed phenomenological defense of ab-
solutism in the ethical domain is developed by MAX
SCHELER, especially in Der Formalismus in der Ethik
and die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and
nonformal ethics of value, 1913/1916). According to
Scheler, phenomenological analysis of the givenness
of VALUES demonstrates that they are "objective," ir-
reducible to the subjective experiences in which they
appear. Their status is analogous to that ofthe essences
of sensuous objects: they are ideal objectivities exist-
ing in nature wholly independently of any real abject,
subject, or experience. The same is the case for the
system ofrankings among values.
Like any ethical absolutism, Scheler's view must
come to terms with the wide divergence of existing
moral beliefs and practices. Scheler argues that these
are due not to the relativity ofvalues themselves, but to
significant individual and historical differences in the
ability of people to feei the values existing indepen-
dently in nature. For example, some individuals and
groups are more sensitive to utilitarian values, others
to spiritual or religious values. He maintains that values
"exist" in the phenomenological sense and are valid for
persons so long as there is a propensity toward them.
While the propensity to lower types ofvalues (pleasure
values, use values, vital values) depends upon sensi-
bility, which is variable, the propensity to the higher
values (spiritual values, holy values) is independent of
sensibility and universally possessed by all persons.
According to Scheler, the ethical sensibility of hu-
manity gradually actualizes its propensity to the higher
values over the course of history, becoming ever more
perfect and sensitive to the true order of ranking. This
teleological development is brought about primarily
through the activity ofthe "moral genius," the individ-
ual with an extraordinary capacity for value-feeling,
far surpassing that of society in general. Yet while em-
phasizing the uniqueness of the ethical sensibility of
each group and even each individual, Scheler claims
that some de facto value-estimations are universally
shared. In these cases, any appearance of disagreement
is due to different definitions of things rather than to
differences in values. For example, theft, murder, and
adultery are always held evi!, although they are very
differently defined by different societies.
Scheler's combination of absolutism at the level
of values with historicism at the level of value-
consciousness could seem to lead to an epistemic para-
dox: if all knowledge of values is historically condi-
tioned, then knowledge of absolute values is impos-
sible. Scheler's own view, however, is that there are
some few individuals who are capable of rising above
the times to cognition of the objective, timeless or-
der of values. This distinguishes his view from that
of Husserl, who puts a greater emphasis on the funda-
mental cognitive similarity of human beings, and on
consensus as a criterion of universal validity. Scheler's
position is also open to the charge of being specula-
tively rather than phenomenologically grounded.
Another influential phenomenological approach to
relativism is COntained in the EXISTENTIAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY of the early MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Although Hei-
degger does not explicitly defend relativism, his po-
sitions in Sein und Zeit (1927) seem to have a quasi-
Kantian relativism of truth as their consequence. Ac-
cording to Heidegger, the true is what comes forth into
appearance, what is unconcealed to DASEIN. However,
Dasein always finds itself with a "pre-understanding"
of moods, interests, plans, and dispositional attitudes
that influence and make possible all understanding and
apprehension. In contrast to Husserl and Kant, Hei-
degger emphasizes the individuality and historicity
of these world-constituting features, as well as their
noncognitive character. Thus although Dasein cannot
arbitrarily choose what will appear and hence be true,
because what appears is conditioned by variable exis-
tential features of the individual, neither will truth be
the same for all persons.
The Heideggerian equation of truth with uncon-
cealedness is clearly phenomenological in inspiration,
for it correlates the true with the given, and not with
what "is" apart from its phenomenality. However, Hei-
degger's conception is freed of the requirement of in-
tersubjective validity, retained by Husserl at least for
the sciences. This is accompanied by a radically differ-
ent assessment ofthe phenomenologicallegitimacy of
 RELATIVISM
the scientific, universalist conception oftruth. In a pas-
sage of §44 of Sein und Zeit directed against Husserl,
Heidegger argues that there is truth only insofar as
there is Dasein, and that even Newton 's laws were not
true prior to their discovery by Newton. He charges
that the very concept of atemporal, universal truth is
a chimera, an unpurged remnant of dogmatic theology
in phenomenological analysis. The attainment of in-
tersubjective agreement and uniformity of opinion is
associated with inauthenticity and subordination to das
Man. The scientific conception of truth is "abkiinftig"
(derivative), which, in addition to meaning "founded"
in the Husserlian sense (i.e., on the relative truth ofthe
lifeworld), also bears the connotation ofinauthenticity.
Thus whereas for Husserl the quest for universality em-
bodied by science represents the highest ethical ideal,
for Heidegger it is a "fali ing" of the self away from its
true identity into a depersonalized, dominated form of
being.
A number of difficulties face the Heideggerian po-
sition. Even ifthe historicity ofDasein is granted, it is
not clear that phenomenological contingency is so per-
vasive as to exclude all universals. The argument that
universality can be achieved only by way of inauthen-
ticity is similarly questionable, for the phenomenologi-
cal content of the distinction between the "authentic"
and the "inauthentic" is left largely unclarified. Finally,
insofar as it is a global rather than partial relativism,
the Heideggerian view confronts the charges of in-
consistency and incoherence common to ali totalizing
relativisms.
An important elaboration ofthe early Heidegger's
quasi-Kantian position is presented in the philosoph-
ical hermeneutics of HANS-GEORG GADAMER. A\though
Gadamer is not always considered a phenomenologist,
his critique of traditional ideals of objectivity in the hu-
man sciences is based on Heidegger's phenomenologi-
cal analysis ofthe thrownness and historicity ofDasein.
In Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and method, 1960),
Gadamer characterizes his own method as pheno-
menological: unlike traditional HERMENEUTICS, which
prescribes methodological norms and ideals, philo-
sophical hermeneutics provides a phenomenological
description of what actually happens in interpreta-
tion. A central result of this analysis is that inter-
pretation is always affected and indeed made possi-
ble by "prejudices," or "prejudgments" ( Vorurteile):
597
the pre-thematic beliefs, interests, and perspective of
inquiry (Fragestellung) inherited by the interpreter
from tradition and history. The traditional hermeneu-
tica! ideal of methodical self-effacement is declared
by Gadamer to be unattainable, because effective-
historical consciousness ( wirkungsgeschichtliches Be-
wusstsein, consciousness imbued with the effects of
history) participates in constituting the object of inter-
pretation; without it, the "meaning of the text" would
ha ve no phenomenological being at ali.
Gadamer is generally perceived as a historical rel-
ativist by his critics, since he denies the possibility of
transhistorically valid interpretation, and consequently,
it would appear, the legitimacy of this ideal for the
hermeneutica! disciplines. However, he has consis-
tently rejected the relativist designation. On some oc-
casions this is due to his equation of relativism with
random arbitrariness in interpretation, a view he deci-
sively rejects on the basis ofthe constraining action of
the phenomena. On others this is because of his lim-
ited acceptance of transhistorical validity as an ideal,
despite its unattainability. In "Hermeneutik und His-
torismus" ( 1965), for example, he maintains that there
is no logica! contradiction in the unconditional asser-
tion that ali knowledge is historically conditioned, be-
cause there is a distinction between being held true
(which is always historically conditioned) and being
true (which is not). This suggests that Gadamer is a
historical relativist at the level ofbeliefs, but unlike the
early Heidegger, he remains an absolutist at the level
of truth. However, as in the case of Scheler, the com-
bination of epistemic relativism and truth-absolutism
is problematic, because it undermines the possibility
of the justification of claims to truth. Yet in contrast to
Scheler, Gadamer strongly denies that any individual
could rise above local historical context to uncondi-
tioned knowledge. Thus his position remains entrapped
in an epistemic aporia.
Many areas of inquiry remain open for further re-
search. Assuming that the basic Husserlian theory of
universal lifeworldly structures is sound, a detailed
specification and description ofthese structures is still
outstanding for numerous important domains, such
as ETHICS, AESTHETICS, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, REASON,
and EMOTION, to name just a few. The relative (non-
universal) structures ofthese domains are also in need
of additional specification and concrete analysis. The
598 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
general problem of typologies of relative and univer-
sallifeworldly structures raises a significant theoretical
issue for further investigation as well: the relation of
phenomenology to the empirica! sciences. According
to Husserl, in the most fundamental type ofphenomen-
ological analysis, the results of empirica! science are
to be "bracketed" (together with the existence of the
world itselt). Following this methodology, universal
Iifeworldly structures are derived solely from EIDETIC
METHOD (free variation) and performed on the lifeworld
as such, and are ali eidetic necessities. However, this
method yields a quite reduced, if especially certain,
specification of universal structures (e.g., space and
time); and, as even Husserl seems to concede, some
highly significant structures are universally shared by
aii human lifeworlds although they are only contin-
gently and not eidetically so (e.g., the practice ofmea-
suring). A fu li typology of universal structures needs to
be two-tiered, analyzing both necessary and contingent
features. Yet phenomenology of the contingent univer-
sal features is clearly on the border of PHILOSOPHICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY, and needs to take into account the re-
sults of empirica! sciences such as ETHNOLOGY, without
being wholly determined by these. Further inquiry into
the proper mode of appropriation of empirica! results
would solidify the theoretical foundations of pheno-
menological typologies ofuniversallifeworldly struc-
tures.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Carr, David. "Welt, Weltbild, Lebenswelt. Husserl und die
Vertreter des Begriffsrelativismus." In Lebenswelt und
Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls. Ed.
Elisabeth Stroker. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster-
mann, 1979, 32-44; "World, World-View, Lifeworld:
Husserl and the Conceptual Relativists." In his Interpret-
ing Husserl. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, 213~25.
- . "Phenomenology and Relativism." In Phenomenology in
Theory andPractice. Ed. William S. Hamrick. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, 19-34; rpt. in his lnterpreting
Husserl. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, 25-44.
Cobb-Stevens, Richard. "Herrneneutics Without Relativism:
Husserl's Theory of Mind." Research in Phenomenology
12 (1982), 127-48.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Grundziige
einer philosophische Hermeneutik. Tiibingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1960; 5th rev ed. in his Gesammelte Werke, voi.
1: Hermeneutik I. Tiibingen: 1. C. B. Mohr, 1986, Second
Part; Truth and Method. 2nd rev. ed. Trans. Joel Wein-
sheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Crossroads,
1989.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- . "Herrneneutik und Historizismus." Philosophische Rund-
schau 9 (1961 ), 241~76; rpt. in Gesammelte Werke, voi. 2:
Hermeneutik Il. Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986, 387-424.
Husserl, Edmund. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft"
[1911]; rpt. in his Auf~ătze und Vortrăge (1911~1921).
Ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp. Husserliana
25. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, 3-62.
- . "Fiinf Aufsătze iiber Emeuerung" [Kaizo articles]. In
his Aufsătze und Vortrăge (1922~1937). Ed. Thomas
Nenon and Hans Rai ner Sepp. Husserliana 27. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, 3~93.
Mohanty, J. N. "Phănomenologische Rationalităt und die
Oberwindung des Relativismus." In Vernun.ft und Kontin-
genz. Rationalităt und Ethos in der Phănomenologie. Ed.
Emst Wolfgang Orth. Phănomenologische Forschungen
19. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1986, 53~74.
Scheler, Max. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die ma-
teriale Wertethik. Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der
Ethik 1mmanuel Kants [ 191311 916]; rpt. in Gesammelte
Werke. Voi. 2. Ed. Maria Scheler. 4th ed. Bem: Francke,
1954; Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics o[Val-
ues: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical
Personalism. Trans. Manfred Frings and Roger L. Funk.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1973.
Soffer, Gail. Husserl and the Question of Relativism. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
- . "Gadamer, Herrneneutics, and Objectivity in Interpreta-
tion." Praxis lnternationa/12 (1992), 231-68.
Waldenfels, Bemhard. "Die Abgriindigkeit des Sinnes. Kritik
an Husserls Idee der Grundlegung." In his In den Netzen
der Lebenswelt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985, 15~
33; "Meaning without Ground: A Critique of Husserl's
!dea ofFoundation." Trans. Katharina Mai and Thomas R.
Thorp. Encyclopedia Moderna (Zagreb) 13 (1992), 375-
83.
GAIL SOFFER
New School for Social Research. New York
RELIGION The earliest writings on re-
ligion within the phenomenological movement are
MAX SCHELER's discussions of the holy in Der For-
malismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
(Formalism in ethics and nonformal ethics of value,
1913/1916) and the tantalizing §§51 and 58 of ED-
MUND HUSSERL 's Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913). Adolf
Reinach 's joumal entries on "The Absolute" shortly
before his death in 1916 may also be mentioned. But it
was Max Scheler's "Reue und Wiedergeburt" as well
as "Probleme der Religion" in Vom Ewigen im Men-
schen (The eterna! in humans, 1920) that may be said to
ha ve inaugurated the phenomenology of religion with
 RELIGION
an eidetic analysis of the religious act and its inten-
tiona! region and object, the absolute sphere and the
holy. The pioneering reflections of especially RUDOLF
OTTO in his Das Heilige (The holy, 1920) are acknowl-
edged by Scheler. Scheler's work spawned efforts on
the 1920s to study religion "phenomenologically" by
phiJosophers such as JEAN HERING, GERDA WALTHER, HED-
WIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, KURT STAVENHAGEN, ROBERT WIN-
KLER, and OTTO GRUNDLER.
Then carne the philosophically conversant students
of Religionswissenschaft, such as Gerardus Van der
Leeuw (1890--1950), Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade
(1867-1953), and William Brede Kristensen (1867-
1953) in the 1930s through the 1960s. Although these
writers had a somewhat loose grasp ofphenomenology
they were extremely learned, and at least one ofthem,
Mircea Eliade, was endowed with an intuitive poetic
genius.
Much of MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's discussions of Sein,
anxiety, the upsetting, the clearing, unconcealment, po-
etic dwelling, etc., are explicated in terms redolent of
religion. (The same can be said for the discussions of
KARL JASPERS and GABRIEL MARCEL on the encompass-
ing, mystery, etc.) Heidegger also addressed himself
to the topic of phenomenology and religion explicitly,
especially in his essay "Phănomenologie und Theolo-
gie" ( 1927), as well as in some other early lectures and
!ater shorter writings.
It was through Heidegger's work especially that
mid-20th century theology took on, first, the form of
a demythologizing analytic of DASEIN in Rudolf Bult-
mann (1884--1976) and PAUL TILLICH, and then, !ater,
in the last quarter of the 20th century an essentially
hermeneutica! cast, through the work of HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, and most recently JACQUES DERRIDA. While
sharing the caution and skepticism of HERMENEUTIC AL
PHENOMENOLOGY, PAUL RICCEUR'S study of the eidetics
and poetics of the will and the unconscious, as well as
his multi volume study of narrative, has been a monu-
mental accomplishment.
Finally, in the 1950s and 1960s, the elaborate neo-
Piatonic phenomenological philosophies ofreligion of
HENRY DUMERY and J. N. FINDLAY revived the original
aspirations of both Husserl and Scheler toward a full-
blown philosophical theology. We may now turn from
the history to the issues of a phenomenology of reli-
gion.
599
Religion is a term that can refer to matters that are
among the most basic of phenomenology, but in the
natural attitude it covers a variety ofbeliefs and prac-
tices that, within a cu! ture, enjoy a universality for the
cu1ture. Whether this universality dissolves into mere
"family resemblances" beyond the cultural borders or
whether there is a universal pattern, an archetype, or
an eidos that founds comparisons is much debated by
Eliade, Wach, Van derLeeuw, C. G. Jung (1875-1961 ),
and others, as well as by their critics.
Religion is lived, with a few exceptions- as per-
haps in the mysticism of Meister Eckhart, Vedăntists,
and Buddhists- in the natural attitude. Because of the
destructive rupture, there is a kind of impiety properly
associated with a concomitant second-order reflection
on the first-order spontaneous acts of worship, repen-
tance, thanksgiving, and stillness. Furthermore, there
is a kind of essential elusiveness because of the very
transcendence and rich implicit felt sense of religious
intentionality. For this reason, the phenomenology of
religion can intially surprise the unreflective believer
or, more importantly, it can easily be distorted by the
student who, succumbing to the need to have a de-
finable field of research, makes the theme of religion
commensurate with themes in other academic disci-
plines.
The study of religion while in the natural attitude
is similar to the study of a cultural phenomenon like
"marriage." Assuming my first-person experience ful-
fills basic preconditions, i.e., that I am not bereft of
a sensibility to eros and a capacity for and interest in
companionship, I can study "marriage" by empathic
perception and imaginative variation whether or not I
myself ha ve experienced marital lif1e. One ,may won-
der with Otto whether the religious NOEMA admits of
a kind of basic a priori deficiency analogous, e.g., to
color blindness and moral pathology. Similarly, I can
study by empathic perception and imaginative vari-
ation, e.g., animal sacrifice, regardless of whether I
think it is the sort of thing one ought to do or believe
that what it intends exists. And I can bring to bear the
results ofresearch in my culture on the seemingly sim-
ilar themes in strange cultures. Whether in the course
of such comparison the empirica! material explodes,
resists, or supplements the necessities of my imagina-
tive variation is an empirica!, contingent matter. Often
enough, "religious" beliefs and practices, especially
600 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
when they range away from the "limit situations" of
birth, death, sexuality, and illness, resist such a ho-
mologization - not only because of differences that
make practices and beliefs approach incommensurabil-
ity, but also because "religion" is nota special category
for some cultures (not even a word for "religion" is to
be found in these cultures), but seems to coincide with
ali of life.
For the philosophical phenomenology of religion or
phenomenological theology, there are additionalphilo-
sophical problems beyond the analysis of the religious
object as it is meant. Is there an EVIDENCE for its exis-
tence apart from the religious act- as in "proofs for
the existence ofGod" or Sophocles' claim that humans
are the most uncanny of ali beings- or is it knowable
properly only in and through religious INTENTIONALITY?
Are there moral preconditions for the disclosure ofthis
noema in its authentic forms? How, given the (typical)
sense of its noema, e.g., its infinite perfection and mys-
tery, does it lend itselfto being an object of an act? Do
themes in the transcendental attitude occasion religious
reflection? If so, would they not transform and be nor-
mative for the sense of religion in the natural attitude
upon which they would nevertheless be parasitic? We
address only some ofthese issues here.
Not only "religious" objects but ali perceptual ob-
jects tend to transcend themselves in ways that are
similar to and different from the manner of linguistic
MEANINGS. Clearly in presencing both religious objects
and linguistic signifiers the mind is carried beyond
them to what is not given, but frequently only pre-
sentable through them. The presence of another person
makes evident the clearest kind of chasmic transcen-
dence, i.e., one in which there is no hope for a filled
intention (EMMANUEL LEVINAS). Here, as with ali the
linchpins in phenomenology, the task of reason is not
undone simply because, as THOMAS PRUFER says, "it
can never be so completed that its sense is filled by
an achievement with nothing left stil! tobe achieved."
Two other examples are the prima! presencing of the
dati ve of manifestati an, i.e., transcendental subjectiv-
ity as that to which appears ali that appears, and an
infinite regulati ve idea as an ideal, e.g., of the WORLD
or a life of absolute perfection. Whereas the former
eludes by being essentially presupposed as the condi-
tion of wakefulness to anything whatsoever, the latter
eludes by being always further emptily intended in the
endless achieving of its approximation.
There is an abiding essential possibility of tempta-
tion to "idolatry," e.g., of collapsing the intentionality
of ideals to goals or of the world to what is within the
world, because the ideals and world as the horizon of
goals and things are immanent in their explication; this
possibility is intensified in the presence of an Other,
i.e., another lived body to whom the world is manifest.
The embodiment ofthe transcendent may be sacra-
mental in the sense that the signifier participates in
some of the qualities that are proper to the signified:
the patriot does not throw the flag out with the garbage
because the flag is a sacred thing (Paul Tillich). There
is a kind of dialectica! tension between the signification
and the signified inasmuch as the sense ofthe signifier,
even though bound to the first-order sense ofthe signi-
fied, typically eludes an explication that is commensu-
rate with the proper, first-order sense. The statue ofthe
mother holding the infant, the Father who is in Heaven,
the portly figure sitting in a lotus position, etc., ali
have proper, familiar, "first-order" references, e.g., the
familiar sense of motherhood and fatherhood and med-
itating person, but that which they signify affirms and
negates these and points beyond them to an analogous
referent whose full meaning indeterminately exceeds
any such first-order explications (Paul Ricceur). This
non-definability, indeed its peculiar "nothingness," is
demonstrated by the way, e.g., the Pauline text, "Eye
hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into
the heart of man," functions for religious conscious-
ness: the negation of determinations does not result in
a paucity of meaning; rather, a referent is evoked that
exceeds in richness ali determinations (Otto, Scheler,
Findlay).
"Horizon," "field," "ideal-pole," etc., are ways of
talking about how the transcendence of certain things
"within" the world, as well as of the intentionality
apprehending them, is manifest. We intend world anal-
ogously to the way we intend the ideal-pole of a spa-
tiotemporal "thing" in and through endless adumbra-
tions or profiles; that which we intend exceeds any
particular profile or any particular finite collection of
them. To say that things are within the world is to say
that they are within a unique transcendent horizon that
unifies and determines them not only as belonging to
a contextual unity of space and time, but also as ha v-
ing a cultural-historical determination as well as an
 RELIGION
essential-meaning topos (they are of some natural or
ideal kind within a network ofkinds).
Some people, things, and events "gather" and "cen-
ter" the world, i.e., embody in an urgent, impressive
way the whole endless meaning of a person 'sora com-
munity's world-life and/or transmarginal conscious-
ness. These loom as supremely important, the "one
thing necessary," and perhaps even become the "abso-
lute ought"(Husserl), because they condense ali ofthe
world and our life in the world, i.e., ali ofthe habitual
life-will, in their seemingly finite borders. Indeed, so
stirring can this embodiment ofworld and the life-will
be that it can unsettle, cause alarm, or defamiliarize us
with our customary settings.
World as constituted by beliefs, hopes, and pre-
sumptions has not only the facet of the promise of
positive value, but also the possibility of disappoint-
ment, rejection, and absurdity. Experiences may oc-
cur in which the essential contingency, fragility, and
surds loom most prominent; then in such moments of
anxiety, despair, and dread, another, negative, facet of
world is made present. In nightmarish and apocalyptic
circumstances the diabolica! and horrifying may be-
come themes. Here there is a "decentering," but not
that of a dissemination of centers of power- instead,
one that allows no hold and indeed menaces us in our
very attempt to take hold and orient ourselves.
The noetic achievement ofthe these centering, gath-
ering objects - e.g., myths, artworks, extraordinary
persons, great politica! events- is a gathering, center-
ing act that synthesizes the typically disjointed, discon-
nected themes and phases of one 's life. An example of
such acts is believing-in, which is tobe contrasted with
the merely cognitive and doxastic belief-that. "Belief-
in" is the act by which and through which a life may
be centered around an ideal that one counts on uncon-
ditionally and to which one's identity is inextricably
tied. In times of misfortune and irrationality it and the
accompanying beliefs in its postulated conditions are
ali the means one has in the agony ofholding the mind
together. Fidelity to these ideals and Others, is, as a
way of defying their absence, simultaneously a way to
secure their immortality. But insofar as they are essen-
tially inseparable from the divine, these have, in this
respect, a less precarious immortality.
Celebration, cult, liturgy, and rituals are ways in
which both the negative and positive aspects of the
601
world as such are made present and in which the belief-
in is explicated. Just as the constitution ofthe artwork
is not an achievement given cognitively prior to the
achieving but only comes for the first time to aware-
ness in the achievement, so the meaning ofbelief-in is
actualized both in responsibilities of agency to which
life calls as well as through participation in the ex-
emplary identifying narratives and rituals tied to one's
ideals.
An aspect of ritual may be elucidated by analyzing
the performative character of speech acts. The faithful
performance ofthe LANGUAGE in liturgy does not merely
inform or describe a state of affairs, but brings about,
effects, through the very saying ofthe ritual, the state
of affairs: "1, John, hereby take you, Mary ... ," "This
is my Body ... ," "1 baptize you ... "
Ifwe think ofthe world as that which transcends ali
that is "within" the world, may we think of the world
itself as being suffused with eros or in development, as
itselfhaving an ideal-pole? The Good as divine would
be transcendent of the world as the world is transcen-
dent of ali that comprises the world. As such, it would
be an ideal-pole of poles, which, from the viewpoint
of the myriad rational subjectivities, would be an in-
finite regulative ideal of a eutopian intersubjectivity
(Husserl). But as the Good, as the summum bonum, it
would be a "value" that would both summarize and
consummate ali the other goods, i.e., it would include
in itself the goodness of the world and the goods of
the world. Would it, however, as that for the sake of
which everything else might be sacrificed (Scheler), be
able to absorb other goods in the sense that no sacri-
ficed good is lost? Yet if tragedy is not spurious for
humans- if it is not possible to lay claim to a secret
that finds sweetness in ali bitterness and that enables
the will 's ratification of ali pain and suffering because
one believes that only by renouncing ali can one gain
the Ali- then the life of the world has an ingredient
of ananke even for the divine, and thus genuine goods
may perish.
But still, may we- motivated by the belief or hy-
pothesis that perhaps the cruelest contradictions will
reveal the basic meaning of the life-will and world-
horizon, and moved also by the eidetic variation to
conceive "that than which nothing greater can be con-
ceived" - think of the necessities of the world, the
world as a whole itself, and even its divine moments,
602 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
i.e., the "divine" as principle ofits Whence and Whither
(see below), as created and not ultimately necessary?
And may we, as Thomas Prufer and ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI
have proposed, then think of a sense in which "God,"
independent of the world, both encompasses and in-
finitely transcends the infinity of ali that exists, i.e.,
a sense of "God plus the world is not greater than
God alone"? In this case it might well be possible
that we could gain access to the divine transcendence
not through theory and reflection, but through a kind
of emptiness and self-abnegation. Then, as Maurice
Blondei (1861-1949) put it, mortification would be
the "true metaphysical experiment."
If it is evident that world, or that open space within
which beings come to presence, functions as the hidden
defining context for these beings, and ifthis context is
inseparable from the gathering and letting be present
ofthe prima! presencing in passive synthesis (Heideg-
ger and Husserl), then a kind of "stepping back" and
silence emerges to which we may be exhorted, one
that fi ies in the face of re gard ing Being as that which
is to be grasped, named, or manipulated, or as a re-
source at our disposal. This exhortation to what we
most fundamentally already do and are, urges that the
most basic kind of thinking is a "poetic dwelling," a
"gathering," or "letting go" that has affinities with pro-
posals of Meister Eckhart and some representatives of
BUDDHISM.
This stepping back and attentiveness to the anony-
mous functioning of the dati ve of manifestati an in the
world's appearing raises the basic issue of whether
the disclosure of the ultimate consideration can be in
any kind of objective form. That is, if objectivism or
unmindfulness of the functioning of mind in the dis-
closure of the world is the "original sin" of theoret-
ical reflection and a fortiori that of theology, is not
the appropriate procedure for phenomenological the-
ology one of reduction instead of demonstration and
objective-noematic horizon analysis? Ought the proper
reflection not be in the uncovering of the essentially
non-nameable, indeterminate, non-objectifiable meon-
tic Whence of ali objectifying acts (Dumery)? And
does not authentic living then aim at a silence and
rest the sense of which is the logos and striving that
preceded it on the way to the ultimate reduction? In
such a case, we would have to agree with Plotinus: the
Whence is the better and the Whither lacks the perfec-
tion ofthe Whence alone. In this case, the development
and eros pervading the world are rei ati vized, derogated,
and, if possible, suppressed. But such a view negates
the sense of the divine experienced in the authentic
striving to realize infinite ideals. Further, the "no" to
life implicit in this view, as essential as it is to the
emergence ofthe life of spirit and the capacity of spirit
to dwell in the realm of idealities, acknowledges the
equiprimordiality ofthe force (Drang) oflife (Scheler).
Coeval to the pervading "divine" ideas and ego logica!
principle is the unbegun and undying "creativity" or
"hyletic streaming" (Husserl) as an equal constitutive
moment of the prima! presencing of transcendental
subjectivity. Here the divine is not only the Whence
and more immanent to subjectivity than the I-center of
acts, and not only the Whither or ideal pole-i dea ofthe
world; it is also coeval with a principle of ebullience
and determinability: ananke, hyle, Drang. The divine
is thus bipolar, "entelechy," formal and final principle
of world-life and the nexus of intersubjectivities, and
therefore it is a constitutive moment ofthe whole. As
such the divine needs the world and the wakefulness
and authenticity of finite forms of consciousness in or-
der for the divine to realize itself, i.e., to realize the
eutopian godly person of a higher order. Humans are
immortal at least by reason oftheir participation in the
self-realization process of divinity and in the unbegun
and unending prima! hyletic stream.
The reflections that generate these kinds of claims
are not founded merely on given "religious" phenom-
ena or acts; they arise primarily out of the most ele-
mental and foundational issues within phenomenology,
foremost the teleology and facticity of REASON. Nev-
ertheless the claim's themselves are homologous with
some religious experiential claims, e.g., ofthe Buddha-
nature as the principle and origin of ali beings. The
claim that human struggle is the vehicle for the di-
vine self-realization, however, is one that is mediated
by the modem critique ofreligion, i.e., it is a form of
alienation.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Blondei, Maurice. L'action [1893]. Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1950; Action. Trans. Oliva Blanchette.
Notre Dame, IN: University ofNortre Dame Press, 1984.
Dumery, Henri. La probleme de Dieu en philosophie de la
religion. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1957.
 RE-PRESENTATION
Dupre, Louis. The Other Dimension. New York: Doubleday,
1972.
Eliade, Mircea. Le mythe de 1'eterne! retour: Archetypes et
repetition. Paris, Gallimard, 1949; Cosmos and History.
New York: Harper, 1959.
- . Traite · d'histoire comparee des religions. Paris: Payot,
1959; Patterns in Comparative Religion. Trans. Rosemary
Sheed. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958.
Findlay, J. N. The Discipline of the Cave. New York: Hu-
manities Press, 1966.
- . The Transcendence ofthe Cave. New York: Humanities
Press, 1967.
Heidegger, Martin. Holzwege. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1963.
- . The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger. Ed.
and trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo. Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976.
James, William. Varieties of' Religious Experience. New
York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902.
Laycock, Steven W., and James G. Hart, eds. Essays in
Phenomenological Theology. Albany, NY: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1986.
Otto, Rudolf. Das Heilige. Breslau: Trewendt & Granier,
1920; The !dea of' the Holy. Trans. John W. Harvey. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1958.
Prufer, Thomas. Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy.
Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
1993.
Ricreur, Paul. Le conflit des interpretations. Paris: Editions
du Seuil. 1969; The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in
Hermeneutics. Trans Don Ihde. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
em University Press, 1974.
Scheler, Max. Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik, Schriften aus
dem Nachlass. Voi. 2. Bem: Francke Verlag, 1979.
Stavenhagen, Kurt. Absolute Stellungnahmen. Erlangen: Ver-
lag der philosophischen Akademie, 1925.
JAMES G. HART
Indiana University
RE-PRESENTATION The term representation
is among the most ambiguous in philosophical and
psychological usage. Following "Husserl's suggestion
in conversation" - as reported by DORION CAIRNS in
his Guide for Translating Husserl (1973) under the
heading of the word Vorstellung- the term represen-
tation will be used to refer to those phenomena that
EDMUND HUSSERL designated by the terms Darstellung
and Vergegenwiirtigung and it will be explained how
Husserl took Darstellung to be one mode of Verge-
genwiirtigung, which itself will be translated as re-
presenta tion.
It may be helpful to recall that the word Vorstel-
lung was originally introduced into German philoso-
phy by Christian Wolff in the 18th century as equiv-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. C/aude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
603
alent for the Latin repraesentatio and that it is vari-
ously translated in English by presentation, represen-
tation, (mental) objectivation, etc. Here (mental) ob-
jectivation will be used to translate Vorstellung so as
to be able to save presentation for Gegenwiirtigung
and to use representation as indicated above. But it
should be kept in mind that in English Husserl 's term
Vergegenwiirtigung is sometimes, following Caims's
own proposal, translated by presentiation, along with
presentiating, non-original presentation (or intuition ),
and, as in the French presentification, by presentifica-
tion, but also by re-presentation (hyphenated), which
has the advantages that it can be clearly spoken and
heard in English as well as suggesting the repetition
that Husserl carne to consider important.
Husserl was interested in phenomena of re-
presentational consciousness at least since the 1890s,
and particularly in connection with the preparation of
his Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). In close
relation to that work he turned again and again, dur-
ing the Gottingen years, to the study ofthe individual
forms ofre-presentation, whereas in the !ater Freiburg
years the modes of re-presentational consciousness
were dealt with in the context ofthe phenomenological
theory of transcendental subjectivity.
Considering the philosophical significance of intu-
itive re-presentation for Husserl, it may be said that
the topic shifted somewhat from being part of a more
specific aim earlier to serving a broader function !ater.
First the aim of clarifying intuitive re-presentation as
such and with respect to each of its forms, especially
in contrast to perception, formed part of elaborating a
"critique of REASON" step by step from the bottom up.
In particular, it was to be one aspect of a systematic
phenomenological investigation of intuition. Husserl
thought such an investigation necessarily prior to a
study ofjudgment, sin ce intuitive acts of consciousness
form in his view the hasis of the specifically logica!,
conceptual, and categoria! acts involved in the higher-
level judgmental acts of cognition or theoretical reason.
The task of a "critique of reason" also involved a study
ofTIME, as Husserl carne to realize, and as will be seen,
his investigations of intuitive re-presentation reached
their perhaps most important results in connection with
his research into the nature and significance of inner
time-consciousness.
Later on - as, for example, discussed in the sec-
 604 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ond part of Husserl 's lecture course of 1923/24, ded-
icated to the theory of the phenomenological EPOCHE
AND REDUCTION - the studies of the diverse forms of
re-presentational consciousness proved tobe ofutmost
importance for Husserl 's mature theory of transcenden-
tal subjectivity. Along with analyzing acts of intuitive
re-presentation, for a single subjectivity as well as for
an INTERSUBJECTIVITY, Husserl showed how the phe-
nomenon of "intentiona! implication," as it occurs in
re-presentational consciousness, was crucial for dis-
closing the pure constituting transcendental subjectiv-
ity. Thus the at first rather speciallooking task allowed
him at last to catch sight ofunsuspected depths and in-
terconnections in the intentionallife of consciousness.
Still !ater in his career, the analyses of re-
presentation were no doubt also of particular signif-
icance for Husserl 's gradually developed view ofwhat
makes up the human person as a rational being. Espe-
cially in the 1930s, Husserl repeatedly addressed the
question ofwhat comprises the specifically human sub-
jectivity or consciousness and the specifically human
surrounding world, as against the animal world. As he
points out, the nonhuman animal li ves in a world of the
present and constitutes itself as a subject of presence
in a presently surrounding world. In contrast, the sur-
rounding world ofhumans, and in particular its charac-
ter ofbeing a cultural WORLD, requires a personality of
an essentially different kind that is able to li ve not only
in the present but throughout its whole life, the life of
its past and its future as well as the life of possibili-
ties, and through various forms of empathy- another
sort of re-presentation - the life of other minds. In
this context Husserl meditates on the transcendental
conditions of such possibilities of life, thereby putting
forward in outline the view that the human egological
structure is unique in that human beings are persons
for themselves and for each other. And persons, unlike
animals, have an ability ofrepetition (Wiederholung),
of an identifying repetition and reflection.
Now according to Husserl, ali re-presentation is
something like repetition; repetition has the character
ofre-presentation ( Vergegenwiirtigung). With re gard to
various forms of re-presentational consciousness such
as imagining, remembering, etc. - which nonhuman
animals allegedly lack, being confined, therefore, to
the surrounding world in its present- he says that hu-
mans ha ve reason ( Vernunft), and he asks whether what
he has said about those forms ofre-presentation desig-
nates the lowest level of rationality ( Verniinftigkeit).
It is characteristic for Husserl that he approached
the phenomena of re-presentation from the standpoint
of INTENTIONALITY. Consider our ordinary conscious
experiences. Prominent among them are such experi-
ences of re-presentation ( Vergegenwiirtigung) as IMAG-
INATION, MEMORY, or EXPECTATION with respect to an
event in which there is some "imagery," for example a
vi vid daydream or the "picturing" of a scene from our
pastor our future. Again, what Husserl calls "picture-
consciousness" (Bildbewusstsein) denotes experiences
in which we are aware of something by means of a
physically embodied representation (Darstellung) of
it, experiences such as seeing a photograph of a land-
scape or seeing a painting of a person. Such experiences
are unlike what he called purely signitive conscious-
ness where, as when we merely think of someone on
the occasion of hearing his or her name, the object we
have in mind does not appear in anything like a per-
ceptual manner. Now when we experience any ofthose
phenomena ofimagining, remembering, etc., we know
that we do not simply perceive something in the here
and now, but that we are aware that we somehow or
other relate to something that is not really here but is
only re-presented. As Husserl emphasized, in everyday
life we ali normally "know" what it is, e.g., to imagine
a flying elephant, or to remember a hike in the moun-
tains, to see a group of people in a painting, but we
know it only implicitly.
The phenomenologist's task is to explicate the dis-
tinctions among those conscious experiences of re-
presenting something, to describe the constituent parts
making up this or that variety ofre-presentational con-
sciousness, and to clarify its specific cognitive achieve-
ment. Thus, as Husserl would say, the phenomenologist
studies the phenomena of re-presentation as so many
distinctly different modes of consciousness, i.e., of in-
tentionally referring to something (an object, event,
etc.). The question Husserl pursued can be formulated
in this way: how is the re-presentational effect that
the diverse forms of re-presentation ha ve in common
achieved? How is consciousness structured and how
do the different components of its structure function
so that we can have experiences in which something
appears to us, yet is not integrated into the appearing
world ofthe actual perceptual present?
 RE-PRESENTATION
Quite generally, phenomena of re-presentation
( Vergegenwărtigung) are thus to be seen for Husserl
in close relation to, yet at the same time in
sharp contrast to, phenomena of simple presenta-
tion (Gegenwărtigung). In his mature account he will
generalize the concept of re-presentation, as alluded
to above. Translating both Vergegenwărtigung and
Darstellung with the same term "re-presentation" can
be taken to indicate that those Husserlian terms refer to
twofundamentalforms ofre-presentational conscious-
ness: ( 1) reproductive or purely mental re-presentation,
and (2) perceptual re-presentation, i.e., re-presentation
( Vergegenwărtigung) in a picture, in pictori al Darstel-
lung (re-presentation ).
Husserl was first inspired to concern himself with
the study of mental objectivations ( Vorstellungen) by
FRANZ BRENTANO. Like Brentano he contrasted intuitive
(or intuitional) objectivations with conceptual objec-
tivations belonging to the domain of MEANING (Bedeu-
tung, signification), which received his main attention
in the six investigations published as the second part of
the Logische Untersuchungen. Whereas an abject ora
state of affairs (Sachverhalt) is signified in conceptual
objectivation, it is generally characteristic of intuitive
objectivations that in them an abject appears, either
the abject itself or a picture (Bild) of the latter. One
of the main tasks for the analysis of intuitive objecti-
vations consists then in setting off the diverse forms
of intuitive re-presentation ( Vergegenwărtigung) from
the basic form of intuitive consciousness, namely per-
ception understood as presentation ( Gegenwărtigung).
Husserl mentions more than once Brentano's "un-
forgettable course oflectures on 'Selected Psychologi-
cal and Aesthetic Questions'" of 1885/86 at Vienna in
which, according to him, Brentano strove nearly exclu-
sively after an analytical clarification ofthe objectiva-
tion ofimagination or phantasy in comparison with per-
ceptual objectivations. He crucially relied on a distinc-
tion between proper (authentic) and improper (inau-
thentic) objectivations (eigentliche und uneigentliche
Vorstellungen) already elaborated earlier in lectures on
logic; he discussed the distinction between conceptual
and intuitive objectivations; and he examined the role
of sensation (Empjindungen) in relation to imagina-
tion. The important point for Brentano was that ordi-
nary objectivations ofphantasy are not intuitions (An-
schauungen), but rather concepts with an intuitional
605
nucleus. The core of his ideas of inauthenticity (Un-
eigentlichkeit) of objectivations was that they are me-
diated by relations or by concepts.
Husserl gradually elaborated his own descriptive-
eidetic account of mental objectivating (Vorstellen),
which permitted him to make fine-grained differenti-
ations by redefining the idea of inauthenticity within
the range of intuitive objectivations, while at the same
time, unlike Brentano, elaborating a sharp contrast be-
tween conceptual and intuitional objectivations. From
early on, Husserl rejected the attempt, often pursued
by philosophers, to account for the essential difference
between perception and intuitive re-presentation, espe-
cially phantasy, in terms of characteristics of the intu-
itive content ofthese experiences, characteristics such
as differences in liveliness, consistency, and elusive-
ness. Around the time of Logische Untersuchungen, he
first defined a contrast between improper and proper
objectivations obtaining within the range of the intu-
itive objectivations by distinguishing the act-character
of pictoricity or iconicity (Bildlichkeit) from the act-
character of the self-giving of the abject in properly
objectivating perception. Iconicity was seen to be an
essentially novel way of intention, an indirect or medi-
ate and hence an improper one, characteristic of intu-
itive re-presentations. As such it is distinct both from
Brentano's conceptual or relational inauthenticity and
from the directness or authenticity ofperceptual inten-
tions.
But Husserl was soon radically to question this ap-
proach to intuitive re-presentation. During an impor-
tant lecture course of 1904/05 he developed a new ac-
count ofthe matter. He carefully analyzed the relations
of coexistence and conflict between the field of percep-
tion constitutive ofthe present and the field ofphantasy,
showing that the latter, unlike what obtains in ordinary
pictorial objectivation, does not constitute any picto-
rial object (Bildobjekt) appearing within the perceptual
field of re gard. On this basis, he came to believe that
in phantasy and remembering we do not ha ve anything
present, that the relation to something present is totally
absent from the phantasy and memory appearance, and
he concluded that unlike the pictorial objectivation
proper, the phantasy objectivation in itself and as such
(and similarly for memory) does not contain a multi-
ple intention. Rather, he then thought, in phantasy (and
in memory) a pure consciousness of re-presentation is
606 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
performed, and what appears is immediately the non-
present. He considered phantasy, remembering, and
analogously expectation as proper objectivatings of
something, for these modes were seen as forms of re-
presenting something directly as it itself, comparable
to properly presenting something directly as it itself
in perception. Thus, for example, when we playfully
phantasize angels and devils, dwarfs and nymphs, or
when our memory carries us back into the past that
passes by in our mind in intuitive ways, the appearing
objects and events are not taken by us as pictorial ob-
jects (Bildobjekte), as mere representatives, analogies,
or pictures of other objects and events; instead, Husserl
then thought, these objects, etc., are re-presented di-
rectly as such, just as the perceived tree over there in
the meadow is presented directly as such. In contrast,
pictorial, symbolic, and signitive re-presentation were
said tobe improper forms, for they in different ways
ali objectivate something indirectly, while it itself is
not directly given.
This position, however, was not Husserl's last word
about the achievement of the re-presentational effect.
For the purpose of more deeply clarifying the pair
of opposites, presentation and re-presentation, Husserl
began, in the last part of the lectures of 1904/05, an
analysis of inner time-consciousness. He saw an in-
timate connection between intuitive acts and time-
consciousness and realized that analyses of perceiv-
ing, imagining, remembering, and expecting could not
be accomplished as long as the temporality of these
acts was not taken into account, just as an analysis
oftime-consciousness, on the other hand, presupposed
to a large extent the study of those acts. He realized
that only with the retum to the fundamental, tem-
porally interpreted distinction between impression or
presentation ( Gegenwiirtigung) and reproduction or re-
presentation ( Vergegenwiirtigung) could the distinction
between the immediate intuitability of what is bodily
present (in perception) and what is not bodily present
(in phantasy, memory, expectation) be made intelligi-
ble.
In the years following his lectures, Husserl elab-
orated ever more clearly the intentiona! structure of
re-presentation understood as reproductive modifica-
tion. He recognized that re-presentations "have a sec-
ond, differently structured intentionality, one which
is proper to them alone and not to ali experiences."
Briefly, this concems the fact that a re-presentation
is not merely consciousness of an object but is in it-
self, in "inner consciousness" or time-consciousness,
also a reproductive consciousness of the correspond-
ing impression, of the corresponding originary course
in which consciousness ofthe now re-presented object
was (will be) first constituted (in the past, in the future,
in phantasy, or as pure possibility). One or two years
before Jdeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie I (1913), he sums
up this universal structure or "eidetic law" concern ing
re-presentations in terms of intentiona! modification or
implication of consciousness, casting it in a perspicu-
ous formula: it is the case that R(Pa) = V3 • For ex-
ample, the re-presentation of a house Va and the repro-
duction of the perception of this house R( Pa) exhibit
the same phenomena. Normally, that is, whenever 1 do
not perform a reflection in phantasy or memory, my in-
tentionality is directed toward the re-presented abject.
However, it is not a matter here of a "simple" inten-
tionality but of a "peculiar mediacy." Importantly, this
mediacy is no Ion ger interpreted as iconicity, nor is the
re-presentational effect taken tobe a simple, direct in-
tentiona! reference to something re-presented. Rather,
the mediacy or more complex intentiona! structure is
now seen to rest on the fact that forme, for example, the
past event cannot "directly'' attain to givenness aga in,
but can do so only upon being mediated by a reproduc-
tive consciousness of the past experience of mine that
was constitutive of the remembered event itself, etc.
Husserl now understood the intentiona! structure ofre-
presentations in general to be a reproductive modifica-
tion of consciousness of something in such a way that a
"re-presented present" (vergegenwiirtigte Gegenwart),
with ali its modes of the flow of consciousness, can be
reflectively shown to be intentionally implied, be it a
past, fu ture, possible, or merely phantasized present-
or, as in the special case of empathy, an alien present.
Husserl's elaboration of the structure of the inner
reproduction of acts enabled him to deepen the anal-
ysis of re-presentational consciousness in severa! re-
spects. Within the domain ofreproductive modification
Husserl brought to bear the distinction between pasit-
ing (setzende) re-presentations, on the one hand, such
as, e.g., acts of remembering and expectation, and, on
the other hand, non-positing, inactual, or neutralized
re-presentations, such as in pure phantasy and in the
 RE-PRESENTATION
re-presentation ofpictorial objects. As regards positing
re-presentations, it is essential that the person performs
them in an awareness of the actuality of belief. In the
case of a memory, for example, the reproductively per-
formed experience of perceiving a landscape is given
in the consciousness of the "again," which is a "be-
lieving consciousness." Above ali, he argues, this also
means that forward-pointing and backward-pointing
intentions adhere inseparably to the re-presented per-
ception, and the intentions serve to arrange the recol-
lected experience in the total nexus of the stream of
the person's past consciousness. Analogous relation-
ships would hold for re-presentations relative to future
experience.
It is characteristic of positing re-presentations that,
for example, in cases of error correction and of doubts,
a person plays as it were one positing re-presentation
off against the other, i.e., that the person moves
throughout on the terrain of doxa (belieD and ali the
possible belief modalities. In contrast, Husserl under-
stood pure phantasy as a neutralizing modification of
the positing re-presentations. Stated quite generally, it
is accordingly the case in phantasy (or imagining) that
the person does not actually experience ali the expe-
riences, whichever they may be (cognitive, emotional,
etc.), but only re-presents them to him- or herself (in
imagination, einbildend), performs them only inactu-
ally in a neutralizing manner, i.e., without a positing
of belief. Thus, for instance, I phantasize a seeing of
a flying elephant (whether I thereby draw myself into
the phantasy-world or not); I feei as if I were see-
ing the animal in its surroundings, etc. It is similar
for other merely re-presented experiences; it is as if
1 were, say, speaking, doubting, questioning, willing,
desiring, and so on. According to Husserl, the whole
affair, be it a coherent phantasy-world, be it an incoher-
ent sequence of individual phantasy situations, is given
in the modification of the as if, without performing a
consciousness of belief or of positing - it is given
as unreality. Consequently, in the case of pure phan-
tasy - that is, phantasy free of the consciousness of
being mixed with a now or once actual experience-
a continuity of the re-presented experiences with the
presently actual now makes no sense. For the world
of phantasy is thoroughly a world of the as if without
an absolute spatial and temporal position in objective
space and time.
607
Moreover, Husserl carefully analyzed what he
called phenomena of overlapping ( Verdeckung) or con-
flict ofintuitions, which is connected with the fact that
in the stream of consciousness nothing is thinkable in
isolation from the rest ofthe stream. Whatever is given
seemingly in isolation, such as a phantasy, in truth
overlaps (verdeckt) something in the actually given
world. He argues that an intuitable "at the same time"
of presence ( Gegenwart) and absence or nonpresence
(Nichtgegenwart), say, something nonpresent posited
in the past, or the future, or something merely phan-
tasized, is impossible. Regarding these relationships,
he points out, in particular, that however much the
surrounding perceptual world may Iose its "actuality"
when a person is living in re-presentational conscious-
ness, the perceptual would does not vanish from his or
her consciousness altogether, or else the person world
no Ion ger be re-presenting but simply presenting anab-
ject or event by way of (day)dreaming, hallucinating,
suffering a trance, or undergoing a vision. What was
thus intuited would at once have the character of the
"itself-there," of bodily present actuality, and would
also be believed in and no longer merely be given in
the consciously experienced modification ofthe "as if'
or the "as it were again" and the like.
Husserl's analysis of the other fundamental form
of intuitive re-presentational consciousness- namely
re-presentation in a picture, usually called picture-
consciousness (Bildbewusstsein)- makes clear that
pictorial objectivation is in a way a combination of
presentation and re-presentation. The re-presentation
here involved is no longer purely mentally reproduc-
tive, as in phantasy and memory, but is rather perceptu-
ally founded. In the lecture course of 1904/05 Husserl
develops his views about the phenomena of iconicity
(Bildlichkeit) in close contrast to the consciousness of
phantasy. It was precisely in opposition to mental im-
ages or mental iconicity that he there speaks of physical
iconicity in the case of picture-consciousness proper.
More specifically, the re-presentational effect of a con-
sciousness of depiction or of a re-presentation in a
picture (in the sense of Vergegenwiirtigung as Darstel-
lung im Bild) can, according to Husserl, be achieved in
the following two essentially distinct modes: it can take
place as inner (or immanent) iconicity oras outer (or
transcendent) iconicity, the latter being subsumed un-
der a broader concept of symbolic re-presentation. As
608 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Husserl explains, inner iconicity is the basic, genuine
form of properly pictorial re-presentation.
To understand his distinction of these two modes,
it is important to appreciate his distinction of the
following three types of objects involved in picture-
consciousness: ( 1) the picture (Bild) as a physical thing
that is given perceptually, as hanging on the wall, etc.;
(2) the picture (Bild) qua pictarial abject (Bildabjekt)
-for example, the landscape that appears "perceptu-
ally" (on the canvas, the photograph, etc.), and yet is
not apprehended as actual reality; and (3) the picture-
subject (Bild-subjet), for example the landscape itself.
Now in inner iconicity we behold the subject in the
picture itself; as Husserl describes the experience, the
pictorial object itself intuitively makes objective the
subject, and this to a greater or lesser extent, according
to a greater or smaller number of iconifying moments,
such that what appears is meant, that we behold the
similar in the similar. By contrast, in outer iconicity
the picture shall, by means of similarity and by other
entwined relations, make objective something differ-
ent from what appears in the pictorial object itself; here
the similar only points to the similar as sign.
In the inner iconicity, the nonpresent, the depicted
object, does not appear yet a second time in addition
to the appearance ofthe pictorial object. For example,
when a person views a picture of a tree in an aware-
ness of inner iconicity, the depicted (real or fictional)
tree does not appear somehow separately from, or in
addition to, the tree's pictorially appearing in the pic-
ture in front of the person. Rather, the tree appears, it
is depicted (bildet sich ab) or re-presented (stellt sich
dar), in the "present" pictorial object. In the appearing
pictorial object, the person "views," in the modified
way of a neutralized re-presentational viewing, the
subject immanently. Husserl thus speaks of a dauble
abject (doppelte Gegenstăndlichkeit) or an object-pair
(Gegenstandspaar), namely, the unity of the depicted
object as it appears in the pictorial object in virtue of
two apprehensions penetrating (durchdringen) one an-
other in a foundational relationship within the pictorial
objectivation. The conscious relation to the subject,
as he argues, is consciousness of the re-presentation
(Vergegenwărtigung) of something that does not ap-
pear, within that which does appear, a consciousness
that arises on the basis of some similarity.
The appearing pictorial object, however, has the
character of unreality, of mere semblance (blosser
Schein) in the midst of the perceptually appearing
surroundings of the picture that, as a physical thing,
does itself belong to the perceptually given world.
But Husserl makes clear in numerous texts that in
the case of pictorial re-presentation, the conscious-
ness of semblance or unreality cannot be a matter of
fiction-consciousness in the sense of an illusion, for
properly speaking, the pictorial object does not ap-
pear within the unity of the perceptually real world,
but rather within a space of its own that in itself has
no direct relation to real space. Picture-consciousness,
then, is re-presentational consciousness, but it is not
purely reproductively, purely mentally re-presenting
consciousness like phantasy, etc. Rather, it is percep-
tual re-presentation, i.e., penetrating a founding per-
ceptual consciousness, not unlike, in this respect, sig-
nitive or symbolizing consciousness, where the symbol
appears for itselfbut is the bearer of a relation to some-
thing else that is designated therein.
As subsequent work by some !ater phenomenolog-
ically oriented philosophers shows, the topic of re-
presentation in the Husserlian acceptation received
further attention and elaboration. To mention a few
signposts, there is EUGEN FINK 's inaugural disserta-
tion of 1929, entitled Vergegenwărtigung und Bild.
Beitrăge zur Phănomenologie der Unwirklichkeit (Re-
presentation and image. Contribution to the phenomen-
ology of unreality), which the author elaborated un-
der Husserl 's guidance in close connection to, as Fink
put it, the problem horizons opened up by Husserl.
A fine study of re-presentational experiences, pub-
lished in 1968 under the title Zur Wesenslehre des
psychischen Lebens und Erlebens (On the essential
doctrine of psychic life and living), was written in
the 1940s by THEODOR coNRAD, a former student of
Theodor Lipps and !ater of Husserl. Of special interest
here is Conrad's elaboration of what he called expe-
riences of displacement ofthe EGo, or I-experiencing-
situations ( Vesetzungserlebnisse ), showing an unremit-
ing shift of being-here and being-elsewhere in one's
mind. Again in many ways close to Husserlian
themes, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's L 'imaginaire: Psycholo-
gie phimomenologique de l'imagination ( 1940) offers
nonetheless an original contribution ofhis own, already
prefiguring important metaphysical tenets of L 'etre et
le neant ( 1943) that transcend the properly phenomen-
 PAUL RIC<ER
o logica! methodology. More recently, 1so KERN, in Idee
und Methode der Philosophie (Idea and method ofphi-
losophy, 1975), has illuminatingly placed the Husser-
lian concept of re-presentation ( Vergegenwiirtigung)
at the center of a systematic treatise on the notion of
REASON, arguing forcefully for a fundamental differ-
ence between the constitutive achievements ofpresen-
tational and re-presentational consciousness, respec-
tively, and for a connection of the notion of the 1
with re-presentational consciousness only, and not with
consciousness in general. In a number of publications
over the last twenty years, ROBERT soKOLOWSKI has also
developed the theme of presence and absence as it
is involved in diverse forms of re-presentation, pay-
ing particular attention to the phenomenon of ego-
displacement and the achievement of identity in re-
presentational consciousness. LESTER EMBREE, too, has
made productive use of the Husserlian distinction be-
tween presentational and re-presentational awareness
in severa! papers, applying it, for example, to archae-
ological observation. Very recently, EDUARD MARBACH,
guided by Kem 's systematic clarification of Husserl 's
concept ofre-presentation, has proposed a phenomen-
ological notation in order to reveal clear-cut distinc-
tions among different forms of mentally re-presenting
and thereby intentionally referring to something.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Cairns, Dorion. "Perceiving, Remembering, Image Aware-
ness, Feigning Awareness." In Phenomenology: Contin-
uation and Criticism. Ed. Fred Kersten and Richard M.
Zaner, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973,251--62.
Conrad, Theodor. Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens
und Erlebens. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
Embree, Lester. "The Phenomenology of Representational
Awareness." Human Studies 15 (1992), 301-14.
~. "Phenomenology of a Change in Archaeological Obser-
vation." In Metaarchaeology. Ed. Lester Embree. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, 165-93.
Fink, Eugen. "Vergegenwărtigung und Bild, Beitrăge zur
Phănomenologie der Unwirklichkeit." In his Studien zur
Phănomenologie 1930-1939. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1966, 1-78.
Husserl, Edmund. Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erin-
nerung. Zur Phănomenologie der anschaulichen Verge-
genwărtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925).
Ed. Eduard Marbach. Husserliana 23. The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1980.
~. Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealo-
gie der Logik [ 1939]. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Hamburg:
Claassen, 1964; Experience and Judgment: 1nvestigations
in a Geneology o{Logic. Trans. James S. Churchill and
609
Karl Ameriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1973.
Kern, Iso. Idee und Methode der Philosophie. Leitgedanken
fur eine Theorie der Vernunft. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1975.
Marbach, Eduard. Mental Representation and Conscious-
ness. Towards a Phenomenological Theory o{ Represen-
tation and Re{erence. Dordrecht: K1uwer Academic Pub-
lishers, 1993.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. L 'imaginaire: Psychologie phenomimolo-
gique de f'imagination. Paris: Gallimard, 1940; Psycho/-
ogy of the 1magination. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. New
York: Philosophica1 Library, 1948.
Soko1owski, Robert. Pictures, Quotations. and Distinctions:
Fourteen Essays in Philosophy. Notre Dame, IN: Univer-
sity ofNotre Dame Press, 1992.
EDUARD MARBACH
Universităt Bern
PAUL RICffiUR Along with SIMONE DE BEAU-
VOIR, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE,
Ricreur was one of the first philosophers in France to
be influenced by EDMUND HUSSERL and to use a version
of the phenomenological method in his own works.
For many years, Ricreur has been seen as the principal
representative ofphenomenology in France, although,
as we will see, his views have shifted radically over
the years from a fairly orthodox phenomenology -
by French standards- to his most recent interest and
writing on narrative. The latter shares with Husserlian
phenomenology only its interest in understanding the
WORLD and human ACTION and its commitment to de-
scription and narration over scientific or philosophical
theorizing. From beginning to end, Ricreur remains a
"reflexive" philosopher concerned with understanding
ofthe self. His method or orientation has changed from
a Husserlian EIDETIC METHOD to an EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY, and then to a HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY, culminating in his elegant Soi-meme comme
un autre (Self as another, 1990), which calls on the
results of severa! philosophical methods, but always
with the aim of reflectively understanding the self and
its relation with others.
Paul Ricreur was born in 1913 in Valence in southern
France, where his father, originally from Normandy,
was a high-school teacher. His mother died when he
was only a few months old and his father was killed in
the battle of the Mame in 1915. He was rai sed in Brit-
610 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
tany by his paterna! grandparents. His education was at
the University ofRennes and the Sorbonne. In 1935, he
received his Agregation and began teaching in lycees.
During this period he was a devout pacifist, socialist,
and Protestant, strongly influenced by GABRIEL MARCEL
and Roland Dalbiez.
Ricreur was mobilized in the fali of 1939 as an in-
fantry officer with the 47th Infantry Regiment from
St. Malo. He was captured in June 1940 and spent
the next five years in a German prisoner ofwar camp
in north-eastern Germany. After the war, he went to
Chambon-sur-Lignon where he taught at the College
Cevanol. This town was famous for sheltering thou-
sands of French and foreign Jews and helping them
escape to Switzerland or Spain. It was here that his
prison camp notes and journals were turned into his
first books on Marcel and KARL JASPERS and into his
first major work on the phenomenology ofthe will.
In 1948, he was called to the chair of the history of
philosophy at Strasbourg, a successor to Jean Hyppo-
lite (1907-1968). Eight years !ater, he succeded Ray-
mond Bayer in the Chair of general philosophy at the
Sorbonne. During this period, he was attached to the
Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique as the di-
rector of the Husserl Archives in Paris. In 1966, he
left the Sorbonne to become one of the founding pro-
fessors at the new branch of the University of Paris at
Nanterre, a suburb west of Paris. He had written exten-
sively on reforming the university and believed that a
new university would be an occasion for seeing these
reforms put into practice. Unfortunately, this was not
to be the case. In 1969, Ricreur was elected principal
administratorofNanterre. By then, the famous "Events
of May 1968" began at Nanterre, were quickly trans-
posed to Paris, then returned to Nanterre. There were
daily battles between leftist and rightist students, an
invasion of the campus by petty criminals from the
neighborhood, and an atmosphere charged with unrest
and rebellion. This situation culminated with a three-
day battle between students and police that left the
new buildings severely damaged. Ricreur, having been
physically attacked once and his office occupied on
severa! occasions, resigned. He took a three-year leave
of absence from the French university.
This was the beginning of a twenty-year "exile" dur-
ing which he taught at the University of Chicago, suc-
ceeding Paul Tillich ( 1886-1965) in the John Nuveen
Chair. He also taught in Belgium at the University of
Leuven and lectured ali over Europe, Japan, and many
other countries. His writings from this period on reflect
the increasing influence of Anglo-American ORDINARY
LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY, and Ricreur brilliantly exp\oits
this tradition in a dialectic with the phenomenological
tradition ofhis early works. During much ofthis period
he still taught at Nanterre, until taking his retirement
in 1980. For the next ten years he continued to teach at
the University of Chicago and lecture extensively. In
1991, he retired from his chair at Chicago.
In the winter of 1986, Ricreur gave the Gifford Lec-
tures in Scotland. These lectures were revised and re-
fined over a four-year period and became his most
recent major work, Soi-meme comme un autre. What
is so remarkable is that after his 65th birthday, he has
written five major works and fifty or sixty articles.
Husserl had become known to French philosophers
during the late 1930s. His theories and views were
discussed, although his works had not yet been trans-
lated into French. Ricreur's chance to study Husserl 's
work thoroughly carne during his captivity in a Ger-
man prisoner of war camp from June 1940 until May
1945. During this period, he also read MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER and KARL JASPERS and wrote the outline and first
draft of his own first major work. In 1943, thanks to
the Swiss Red Cross, Ricreur obtained a copy of the
third edition ( 1928) of Husserl 's Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 and for the next year and a halfread and studied
it. He began translating it into French in the margins
of the book. After the war, he finished his translation,
notes, and commentary, and they were published in
1950.
In his first major work, Le volontaire et
l 'involontaire ( 1950), Ricreur follows the Husserlian
method partway. He used the EIDETIC METHOD to dis-
clase the fundamental structures of willing or of the
will. He says that in the first instance, phenomenology
is a description that uses an analytic method, asking
what does it mean to speak of willing, acting, desi r-
ing, and so forth. On Ricreur's reading, at this stage
of conceptual analysis the eidetic reduction "brackets"
or suspends acceptance ofthe actuality of examples of
individuals deciding and acting in the world, but rather
concentrates on the network of concepts or eide that
make up the field of willing, such as motive, project,
 PAUL RICCER
action, agent, cause, necessity, consent, and so forth.
From a methodological point of view, Ricceur says
phenomenology presupposes the fundamental discur-
sivity of every subjective process (vecu, Erlebnis), thus
opening it to reflection, description, and analysis. This
approach converges chiefly with REALISTIC PHENOMEN-
OLOGY.
In applying this method to the will, Ricceur claims
that there are three fundamental structures (Ricceur
calls them "moments") to willing: decision, voluntary
movement, and consent. Each of these meanings of
willing or of the voluntary is reciproca! with a corre-
sponding experience ofthe involuntary. Motives; effort
and resistance; and necessity represented by character,
the unconscious, and life form a reciproca! dialectic
with the voluntary. Each term or pole, the "voluntary''
and the "involuntary," is intelligible only in relation-
ship to the other. In terms of understanding, the vol-
untary aspects of the will have precedence over the
corresponding involuntary: needs and wants become
motives only when they are possible reasons for a
choice. Effort and resistance ofthe body and the world
gain their significance from voluntary action. Finally,
the absolute necessities of character, the unconscious,
and life take on their meaning in relation to the act of
consent in which the voluntary is reconciled with these
features ofthe involuntary.
As phenomenology developed in France, it moved
away from abstract descriptions of eide - and from
Husserl 's idealistic ambitions- and was increasingly
animated by certain "existential" themes originating in
the work of Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.
Three of the most important existential themes are
the "lived BODY," (le corps vecu), "freedom," and the
"other." The body-as-subject- the incamate self, as
Marcel puts i t - is a refusal to accept the dichotomy
of an incorporeal and anonymous epistemological sub-
ject on the one hand and the body as a physical object
among objects on the other. This dualism, inherited
from Descartes, was rejected and overcome by the
analyses of Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricceur. The
inftuence of existential phenomenology on Ricceur is
seen in the very choice of the will as object of pheno-
menological description. His discovery ofthe recipro-
ca! relation between the voluntary and the involuntary
reinserts the subject into a world of choice and respon-
sibility against a background of necessity. One thread
611
that unites ali ofRicceur's work is thus an abiding con-
cern with the "acting and suffering individual," i.e.,
with the individual who not only acts, but "lives" and
"undergoes."
The existential component of Ricceur's existential
phenomenology is also found in his bracketing the
"fault" and "transcendence" for the sake of his ei-
detic description of the fundamental structures of the
will. However, he treats the fault directly in Finitude
et culpabilite ( 1960). The first part, L 'hommefaillible
(Fallible man), is a transcendental study in the manner
of KANT ofthe conditions necessary for evi! or sin (the
fa uit) tobe possible. His answer, in the briefest terms, is
that there is a disproportion within humankind itselfbe-
tween our possibilities and our limitations that renders
us "fragile": when will we have enough possessions,
when will we have enough power, and when will other
people respect and esteem me? Ricceur moves from
the structural possibility of evi! to its actual avowal in
the second part, entitled La symbolique du mal (Sym-
bolism of evi!). His thesis is that evi! is never de-
scribed literally, but is always spoken of symbolically
or metaphorically, for example, in terms of sta in, bur-
den, errance, separation, or captivity. He explains the
importance of symbols or double-meaning terms and
the methods of their interpretation. The myths of cre-
ation or origin of the uni verse, including the Adamic
myth, are first-order explanations of the origin of evi!
in the world.
The other two existential themes of"freedom" and
the "other" are also constants in Ricceur's work, from
his first writings on the will to his most recent work
on the self and the other. His interests have been and
stil! are "existential," although his methods and ap-
proaches have changed from eidetic to hermeneutica!
phenomenology.
His interest in the symbolism of evilleads Ricceur to
an interest in symbolic Janguage and interpretation in
general. He broadens the scope of symbols to include
oneiric and cultural symbols and extends interpreta-
tion to include ali of the techniques of Freudian PSY-
CHOANALYSIS. In De 1'interpretation: Essai sur Freud
( 1965), he claims that Janguage is the crossroads of ali
philosophical approaches and provides a common in-
teres! for ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY as well as ORDINARY LAN-
GUAGE PHILOSOPHY. The underlying concern of Freud is
a semantics of desire: how do desires manifest them-
612 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
selves in speech; how are they expressed and how does
speech fail to express them? It is this rapport between
desi re and meaning that gives psychoanalysis a promi-
nent place in any philosophy ofLANGUAGE. Throughout
this book, he establishes a dialectic between symbolic
language that is a distortion or mask or promotes an il-
lusion, and symbolic language that can be a revelation
of the sacred.
The question of method here is how is HERMENEU-
Tics stiU a phenomenology. He says that hermeneutica!
phenomenology is a reflexive philosophy that remains
within the fundamental inspiration ofHusserl's pheno-
menology. From the very beginning, Ricc.eur has re-
jected Husserl 's attempt to establish a self-foundational
philosophy. He rejects any Cartesian - or Husser-
lian - attempt to found knowledge and the self on
immediate and transparent consciousness. The most
fundamental truth, the cogito, is as empty as it is cer-
tain. The self can only be understood by the "detour"
through works, actions, literature, and institutions. Ali
self-understanding requires a hermeneutics oftexts and
text-like structures. In turn, this is how hermeneuti-
ca! phenomenology frees itself from the idealism that
Husserl thought was essential to phenomenology.
But in what way is hermeneutics stil! a kind of
phenomenology? First of ali, it is phenomenology,
claims Ricc.eur, that did not remain faithful to its fun-
damental discovery of intentionality: the meaning of
consciousness !ies outside ofitself. In Logische Unter-
suchungen (1900--190 1), Husserl is interested in ex-
pression and the MEANING of consciousness and inten-
tionality. Consciousness is outside of itself, directed
toward meaning. This is what the central discovery of
phenomenology implies. Second, the most fundamen-
tal phenomenological presupposition of hermeneutics
is that every question about any sort of being is a
question about the meaning of that being. As a re-
suit, hermeneutica! phenomenology consists in the use
of ali the interpretative methods of hermeneutics to
accomplish the fundamental goal and inspiration of
phenomenology.
To say this slightly differently, Ricc.eur claims
that there is a continuity between phenomenology
and hermeneutics, as well as a discontinuity between
hermeneutics and CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. Both
phenomenology and hermeneutics are committed to an
understanding ofthe selfand both are reflexive meth-
ods that start in the middle of things, with both the
world and our intersubjective experiences as givens.
But Ricc.eur rejects Husserl 's idealistic interpretation,
which depends on intuitive and immediate grasping of
the essences of mental phenomena. He also rejects the
goal of a scientific phenomenology that could found
or establish the ultimate conceptual foundation of ali
thought. For Ricc.eur, there is never an absolute start-
ing point ora self-validating foundation. His continuai
concern for understanding human action and suffer-
ing requires the long detour through an interpretation
of the symbols, texts, monuments, works, and institu-
tions that mediate our understanding of the self and its
relation to others. Phenomenology opened up the field
ofthe "meaningful," while hermeneutics- rather than
an eidetic or transcendental reduction- is the appro-
priate method.
The hermeneutica! method is extended from the
interpretation of texts to the creation of poetic and
narrative meaning in Ricc.eur's next two books, La
Metaphore vive (The living metaphor, 1975) and Temps
et rixit !, Il, III (Time and narrative, 1983, 1984,
1985). Although they were published eight years apart,
Ricc.eur claims that they are "twins" sin ce they are both
devoted to semantic innovation. The thesis of the first
book is that the destruction of literal meaning in a
metaphor permits a new meaning to ari se. In the same
way, the reference of the literal sentence is replaced
by a second reference, that of the metaphor. The cre-
ative and poetic function of metaphor only appears to
ruin its referential function. Rather, Ricc.eur says that it
creates a new reference that allows us to describe or,
better, redescribe the woRLD, or part of the world, that
was inaccessible to direct and literal description. Po-
etic language makes a new "world" appear, the world
of the work. This world is "fu sed" with the everyday
world of action and represents a possible world forme,
a world in which I could live and act and suffer. In
short, the poetic creation of metaphor allows us to say
something new about the world of our experience.
In the three-volume work on time and narrative,
Ricc.eur patiently shows how narratives create new
meaning by the synthesis of heterogeneous elements
(purposes, intentions, causes, chance events, desires,
etc.). Through the activity of emplotment these dis-
parate elements are woven into a story and a new
order of congruence arises from apparently discon-
 PAUL RICG:R
nected happenings. The plot of a story is similar to
the metaphorical process in that it makes a new whole.
It integrates diverse events, chance occurrences, and
especially, human actions into a complete story.
The experience oftime is inextricably bound up with
narrative. Ali narratives are fundamentally temporal
and they serve as the privileged access to our confused,
unformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience.
The central thesis of this entire trilogy is that TIME
becomes human time to the extent that it is organized
into narratives and narratives are meaningful to the
extent that they represent our temporal existence.
Rica::ur begins his analysis of time and narrative
- and the extended test of his thesis - by a care fui
account of St. Augustine's struggle with the concept
oftime and Aristotle's explanation ofhow emplotment
creates a meaningful whole out of disparate elements,
a new order out of disorder, a coherent narrative out of
disconnected elements. Time and narrative are brought
together in mimesis praxeos, the creative imitation of
human action. Mimesis belongs to both the imaginary
world and the real world of action. It is at the center of
historical narratives and fictional narratives.
The remainder of this magisterial work is a long and
patient test ofhis thesis through a careful examination
of the epistemoJogy of HISTORY and LITERATURE. He
claims that if history breaks its bonds with the basic
competence we ha veto follow a story, then it loses its
distinctive character and is reduced to one ofthe other
HUMAN SCIENCES. In the second volume, he engages
current literary theorists on the function of narrative
and illustrates his thesis by a thorough analysis ofthree
famous novels dominated by time: Virginia Woolf's
Mrs. Dalloway, Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain,
and Marcel Proust's Rememberance ofThings Pas!.
In the final volume, Rica::ur reviews the aporias of
time and ali ofthe attempts to resolve them in the his-
tory of philosophy. He takes up the debate between
Kant and Husserl and between Heidegger and "meta-
physics" on the nature oftime. He examines the relation
between the experience of time and the time of na-
ture, and discusses the reality of the historical past. He
finishes this study with a discussion of the hermeneu-
tics of historical time. His conclusion is that ali of the
philosophical attempts have failed and only narratives
of time give us refl.ective access to the experience of
time.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
613
Each successive work deviates more from the orig-
inal eidetic phenomenology, yet retains a core of ei-
detic, existential, and hermeneutica! phenomenology.
The eidetic element is the concern to work out the
"constitution" of central concepts such as metaphor,
mimesis, and the whole conceptual network of action
and agent. The existential element is in Rica::ur's abid-
ing goal ofunderstanding human action and suffering,
and in understanding ourselves, our relations with oth-
ers, and our social and politica! institutions. Finally, his
work remains faithful to the demand of hermeneutica!
phenomenology that we can come to understand our-
selves only through the "long path" of understanding
our texts, actions, monuments, and institutions.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bourgeois, Patrick. Extension of Ricceur :5 Hermeneutic. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.
Clark, S. H. Paul Ricceur. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Ihde, Don. Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of
Paul Ricceur. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Univerity Press,
1971.
Philibert, Michel. Paul Ricceur ou la liherte selon
l 'esperance. Paris: Editions Seghers, 1971.
Reagan, Charles, ed. Studies in the Philosophy of Paul
Ricceur. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1979.
-.Paul Ricceur: His Life and His Work. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996 ..
Ricreur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology.
Ed. and trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1967.
- . "On Interpretation." In Philosophy in France Today. Ed.
Alan Montefiore. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press, 1983, 175--97.
- . Du texte a l'action: Essais d'hermeneutique II. Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1986; From Text to Action: Essays in
Hermeneutics, II. Trans. Kath1een Blamey and John B.
Thompson. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1991.
-.La metaphore vive. Paris: Le Seuil, 1975 ..
- . Temps et recit, Tomes I, II, III. Paris: Le Seuil, 1983-5.
Thompson, John B. Critica! Hermeneutics: A Study in the
Thought of Paul Ricceur and Jiirgen Hahermas. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Vansina, Frans, D. Paul Ricceur: A Primary and Secondary
Systematic Bibliography. Louvain-La-Neuve: Editions de
l'Institut superieur de philosophie, 1985.
Wood, David, ed. On Paul Ricceur: Narrative and Interpre-
tation. New York: Routledge, 1991.
CHARLES E. REAGAN
Kansas State University
614 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
RUSSIA The investigation of consciousness in
19th century Russian philosophy anticipated pheno-
menology in some respects and was an important
preparatory factor for its rapid and broad reception
early in the 20th century.
Already the fathers ofthe Slavophil school, Ivan V.
Kireyevsky (1806--1856) and Aleksei S. Khomyakov
( 1804-1860), conceived the problem of consciousness
as going beyond the theory of knowledge and related
it to the question of the integrity of human spiritual
life. For Kireyevsky, philosophy "is not just one of
the fields of science, nor is it faith. Rather, it is the
grand total of and general foundation for ali the fields
of science and a conductor of thought between them
and faith." The inner integri(v of the mind, the focus
of selfconsciousness, and the unity of the mental and
spiritual powers ali have for him an ontologica! sta-
tus and require an "inner consciousness" assumed to
accompany every mental process. And the peculiarity
ofthe thought process ofthe Greek Orthodox believer
consists, according to him, in a dual effort: "While
keeping track of the development of his understand-
ing, he, at the same time, keeps track of the mode of
his thinking, continually striving to elevate his mind
to a level on which he could feei in harmony with his
faith."
Khomyakov anticipates the Husserlian distinction
between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment
by differentiating the consciousness necessarily ac-
companying ali rational actions, "but not yet fully clear
about itself," from the consciousness that concludes a
given action and recognizes "an agreement of the ap-
pearance with the thought." Moreover, he holds that a
higher consciousness is inherent in humankind, albeit
in a rather slight degree, and it can comprehend the
relation of a particular appearance with the universal
law governing the appearance. This "higher conscious-
ness" is in fact consciousness o fan ideal abject. The de-
grees ofconsciousness are manifold, from mere aware-
ness to complete understanding. "The world ofthe sub-
jective consciousness with its space and time is as real
as the outer world." Khomyakov also differentiates be-
tween the logica! and the life-immersed consciousness
and sees the latter as centered in the will. Thanks to
the will, one can distinguish what has been made in the
world of things, the objective world, through creative
(subjective) activity from what has been produced in-
dependently of it. The intrinsic similarities between
the ear]y SJavophiJs and FRANZ BRENTANO and EDMUND
HUSSERL may furthermore be seen in how they ali con-
nect the being of consciousness with the search for
ways to rejuvenate humanity's spirituallife against the
background of crisis in Western cui ture.
Michail 1. Karinsky (1840-1917), professor at the
St. Petersburg Theological Academy beginning in
1867, may rightly be called the Russian Brentano. Like
Brentano and long before the latter's article on the
faur phases of philosophy, Karinsky had objected in
his Kriticheski obzor poslednego perioda germanskoi
.filosofii (Critica! review ofthe latest period in German
philosophy, 1873) to irrational tendencies traceable
back to KANT. In an article on appearance and reality, he
furthermore and quite independently ofBrentano made
the following fundamental phenomenological distinc-
tions. There is a distinction between the things of the
externa! world that "cannot squeeze themselves into
our consciousness," and representations as substitutes
for reality, the substitutes being essential for commu-
nication. This distinction rests on the observation that
each of us is not alone in the world. Like Brentano,
Karinsky denies any distinction between reality and
appearance in the inner world; "the states of percep-
tion, thought, or emotional agitation can be none other
than facts, than reality." He denies that the EGO is the
real basis of consciousness, which would ha ve led to
the understanding ofthe real subject and its mental pro-
cesses as appearances. Although he does not use the
term "inner perception," his descriptions of conscious-
ness are clase to those of Brentano: "Any ordinary
change of a given psychic state is followed at lightning
speed by the memory of it, which in turn gives place
to a new state ... we continually respond to the inner
states being experienced by us .... "
The outstanding Russian philosopher of the 19th
century, Vladimir Solovyov ( 1853-1900), developed
a concept of "philosophia prima" in Teoreticheskaya
.filosofia (Theoretical philosophy, 1897-99) that is es-
sentially similar to phenomenology. He reasons from
the assumption that philosophy strives for absolute cer-
tainty and truth and that it ought to be free from any
presuppositions; "theoretical philosophy should have
its starting point in itself, the process ofthinking has to
start from the very beginning." Unequivocally true is
the knowledge that we experience certain inner states
 RUSSIA
and inner actions, such as feelings, images, desires, res-
olutions, etc.; this is reflected in the words so-znanie,
con-scientia, Bewusstsein (the prefix "be" rei ating back
to "bei," Bei-wusstsein).
Pure consciousness (a term used by Solovyov) or
the knowledge of psychic processes has quite narrow
boundaries. "In the pure consciousness there is no dif-
ference between the imaginary and the real." On the
other hand, in pure consciousness things are given in
their definitiveness- for example, a fireplace as seen
in a dream, a hallucination, or normal perception is
always a fireplace and never a chessboard.
The other type of truth !ies in the realm of logi-
ca! thought. The very assertion that the psychic data
are self-evident is a thought going beyond any sin-
gle psychic act. The generalizing thinking "outgrows"
and transcends the present state of consciousness. Two
essentially different parts coexist necessarily in any
thought, i.e., "the single state of the subjective con-
sciousness and the thought which is formulated ... in
a general manner." Logica! thinking has as its "mate-
rial" the facts of the immediate consciousness, but it
is not directly inferred from them - it is conditiona!
upon the memory that retains various psychic states and
provides "timeproof' psychic material for making the
words that are the proper element of logica! thinking.
The word is a symbol, i.e., "a sign uniting in itself the
present singular and the universal meaning." Thus "the
memory is something supratemporal in consciousness,
and the word is both supratemporal and supraspatial."
But the logica! generality of thinking is not the truth
itself, but a route toward it and a means by which it
may be found.
In his reflections on the immediate presence ofpsy-
chic states, Solovyov is el o se to Brentano's understand-
ing ofiNTENTIONALITY, while what he says about logica!
thinking reminds o ne of the Husserlian concept of ab-
straction and ofthe latter's differentiation between the
physical and the sense-giving components of the ex-
pression ("the word as sound tums out to be a mobile
shell of the word as sense"). Analogous to Brentano
and the early Husserl and apparently under Karinsky's
influence, Solovyov objects to the conception of the
subject or ego as the real basis in which ali our expe-
riences and reactions are allegedly rooted and as the
"supreme principle of consciousness."
Solovyov argues that Descartes makes an incorrect
615
transition from the self-evident fact of thinking to the
metaphysical subject inherited from Scholasticism and
does not distinguish between, on the one hand, the pure
subject of thinking - which can be none other than
one phenomenological fact among many, even though
it differs from the psychic states in beingjust their link-
ing empty form or "a colorless channel through which
the stream ofpsychic being passes" -and, on the other
hand, the empirica! ego, which is not self-evident. Nei-
ther ego can provide the foundation for philosophical
thinking. The genuine philosophical subject is charac-
terized by his or her resolve to know TRUTH. And it is the
truth rather than our ego, be it even transcendentally
expanded, that is the starting point of philosophical
cognition.
In "O prirode chelovecheskogo soznaniya" (On the
nature of human consciousness, 1889-91) and in the
introduction to Metafizika drevnei Gretsii (The meta-
physics of ancient Greece, 1890), Prin ce Sergei N. Tru-
betskoi ( 1862-1905) develops a metaphysical theory
of consciousness, the theory of the supraindividual ba-
sis of consciousness, which also contains, as it were,
"phenomenological seeds." Consciousness is "a collec-
tive function ofhumankind ... , a li ve and concrete uni-
versal process." The real, the universal, the objective
may be achieved only on the condition that every indi-
vidual consciousness enters into the unity of ali indi-
vidual consciousnesses. Conci1iatoriness (sobornost ')
is in Trubetskoi a notion analogous to Husserl 's tran-
scendental INTERSUBJECTIVITY, which becomes realiz-
able thanks to the fact that in its acts the individual
consciousness goes beyond its own (psychological)
confines.
The primary condition for experience is the ability
to distinguish one state of consciousness from another.
This ability exists only in virtue of the inner TIME in-
herent in consciousness and passing inside it. Time
as a fact of consciousness secures the latter's extra-
empirical sta tus: the empirica! actuality of the present
is in reality the actuality of the past, and the present
is grasped by consciousness only in the future. Trubet-
skoi distinguishes the reality from its representation or
image in regard to both the externa! things and one's
own consciousness. The representation is a substitute
for reality (as with Karinsky), but reality is irreplace-
able: we do not cognize the reality of a thing; rather,
we become conscious of it in exactly the same way as
616 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
we become aware of our own existence.
The reception of Husserl 's phcnomenology in Rus-
sia dates from the beginning of the 20th century. The
assimilation of Brentano 's and Husserl 's ideas appears
to have begun in Russia earlier than elsewhere. David
Viktorov was o ne of the first to expound the antipsy-
chologistic position of Husserl in the light of the ob-
jections directed against Emst Mach's principle ofthe
economy of thinking.
NICOLAI LOSSKY was the first in Russian philosophy
to comment on the second volume of Husserl's Lo-
gische Untersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). In works such
as Obosnovanie intuitivizma (The foundation of intu-
itivism, 1906), he expounds his interesting views on
the universal and particular, views that amount to a
defense of realism (in medieval terms) and are typo-
logically close to phenomenology. Lossky reinforces
his arguments by invoking Husserl's ideas as applied
to the following points. ( 1) ldentity as an absolutely
indefinite concept is a presupposition for the equality
or similarity of objects. The general and the partic-
ular do not absorb one another; "thinking about the
universal is by no means always a thinking about a
class, in fact, it may be equally performed as a think-
ing about the general that is a self-contained element
('spezifische Einzelheit' as contrasted to 'individual
Einzelheit' in Husserl 's terminology)." And in his pa-
per "Transtcendentalno-fenomenologicheski idealizm
Gusserlya" (Husserl 's transcendental phenomenologi-
cal idealism, 1939), Lossky proceeds mainly from the
Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931]; using the French
translation, he subjects the Husserlian concepts of con-
stitutive intentionality and intersubjectivity to criti-
cisms, and drawing support from LUDWIG LANDGREBE's
"Husserls Phănomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer
Umbildung" ( 1939), he points out that Husserl had
shifted to a nea-Kantian position.
In "Edmund Gusserl i psichologisty nashikh dney"
(Edmund Husserl and contemporary defenders ofpsy-
chologism, 1908), GEORGI LANTS develops Husserl 's
anti-psychologism. The concept ofintentionality is re-
lated to the notion of truth and the ideal object and
follows Husserl. Emphasizing the affinity with Plato,
Lants suggest the following image: truth "is the realm
of pure science. The world ofbeing is reftected in ali its
details in this realm as in an immovable mirror. Each
abject, every tiny part ofthe abject, throws its shadow,
its ideal specter, there ... " Lanz !ater moved to the
UNITED STATES and taught at Stanford University.
The first two Russian translations of Husserl were
of the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen
in 1909 and "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft"
( 1911) in 1911. Boris Yakovenko ( 1884-1948) pub-
lished in Novye idei v filosofii ( 1913) an assessment of
the Logische Untersuchungen that was more detailed
and critica! than that ofLants. While noting the merits
of considering the logica! as an ontologica! category
and recognizing that supersensuous intuition is nec-
essary for the process of cognition, Yakovenko thinks
that the study ofthe sphere of experiences in the second
volume is in fact a retum to PSYCHOLOGISM. He doubts
that phenomenology and the method of pure descrip-
tion can be free of presuppositions; furthermore, he
raises the question ofthe way in which the unity ofthe
intending act, the intentiona! sense, and the intended
object is established.
Yakovenko published "Ed. Husserl und die russis-
che Philosophie" ( 1929~30) on the 70th anniversary
of Husserl's birth. This article outlines the reception
of phenomenology in Lossky, Yakovenko, Spet, and
Losev; discusses less obvious connections with Boris
Vysheslavtsev and lvan Ilyin; and mentions, among
others, Pavel Blonski, Vasily Zenkovski, SEM ION FRANK,
Dmitzy Chizhewsky, and GEORG GURVITCH. At the end,
he remarks that Husserl was motivated to philosophi-
cal research by an admirer and connoisseur of Russian
philosophy, Tomas Masaryk (1850--1937), and notes
that the first course in France on German phenomen-
o1ogica1 philosophy was by Georges Gurvitch in 1928.
One other review of professiona1 caliber was "Psi-
chologia myshleniya ... " (Psychology of thinking in
Franz Brentano, Goswin Uphues, Edmund Husserl,
and Cari Stumpf, 1914), written by A. 1. KUNZMAN. This
review measures teachings on consciousness using the
peripatetic and Scholastic traditions as a yardstick.
GUSTAV G. SPET - according to their letters, one
of Husserl's favorite and most highly regarded stu-
dents - was the first in Russia thoroughly to inter-
pret Husserl 's Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie
und phanomenologischen Philosophie I ( 1913 ). Spet
dedicated his Yavlenie i smysi. Fenomenologia kak
osnovnaya nauka i yeyo problemy (Appearance and
sense: Phenomenology as the fundamental science and
its problems, 1914) to Husserl.
 RUSSIA
Spet draws a methodological dividing line between
negative philosophy, which restricts itself to studying
the apprehending subject and the forms of cognition,
and positive or affirmative philosophy, the subject mat-
ter ofwhich is being, that ofthe subject included. Spet
holds that phenomenology is a "turn to a creative con-
struction ofthe foundation ofphilosophy"; it wants to
investigate "everything," but everything "essentially"
or "ideally," i.e., eidetically. The main point ofthe most
fundamental science is, for Spet, that "the physical
thing, the apprehended, in any possible consciousness
in general cannot be given as really immanent ... Be-
tween being as a mental process and being as a physical
thing there appears a basic and essential difference ...
between the two types of beings, namely conscious-
ness and reality, as well as between the ways in which
they are given to us, viz., in one case being as given
directly in its essence and in the other through adum-
brations in appearance." The immanent perception is
always the intuition of the essence, positing the "ab-
solute reality" of its object, i.e., of the mental process
itself, while the pure ego is the center of the absolute
being, transcendent in immanence. The pure ego can-
not be subjected to a phenomenological epoche; it is
not correlati ve with the stream of mental processes (ob-
jects are correlative). The ego is realized in the being
of consciousness, imparting absoluteness to it.
Later Spet changes his position on the ego as the
ontologica! center. In "Soznanie i yego sobstvennik"
(Consciousness and its proprietar, 1916), he criticizes
the subjectivism whose progenitors he sees not in
Descartes and Locke, but rather in Kant and Fichte.
The principal error ofthis subjectivism Iies in the ille-
gitimate reversal ofthe thesis that "the ego is the unity
of consciousness." By no means is every unity of con-
sciousness an ego for Spet; for example, the religious,
moral, or national unities are not. The ego is not the
foundation, but the object of consciousness, a social
"thing," the thingpar excellence: "Even though ego as
object maintains relations and connections with other
objects, it may still be called absolute, seeing that there
is no relationship from which it might be uniquely and
necessarily determined .... Ego as a social object bear-
ing a proper name is absolute in the sense that it is not
only a 'carrier' but also a 'source,' not only 'predestina-
tion' but 'freedom' as well." Spet returns to the notion
of Vladimir Solovyov that we are not proprietors of
617
consciousness. The question "whose consciousness?"
may be asked only within a social context and is an
indication of a certain objectification.
The differentiation between ego and unity of con-
sciousness is part of an attempt to represent the ego
as something unique, as a "thus-and-so" and as simul-
taneously contained in the unity of the "sobornoye"
(conciliar) consciousness, and is made by Spet within
the framework ofthe hermeneutica! turn, the main fea-
tures ofwhich were already evident in his book on ap-
pearance and sense. He finds for the di fference between
appearance and object a corresponding difference be-
tween acts of consciousness that posit the meaning
of the appearance (or a linguistic expression) and the
hermeneutica! acts through which the sense is grasped
as inherent in the objects themselves. The hermeneu-
tica! act proceeds from what he calls "urazumenie"
(comprehension ), and this is an intuition that, in his
view, underlies the empirica! and the ideal intuitions.
Spet remarks that Husserl singles out only two kinds
ofintuition and does not raise the question concerning
the social being and the means for its comprehension.
The social intuition, he claims, is penetration into the
entelechy of an object, understanding its predestina-
tion. When entelechy is viewed broadly enough, any
consciousness can, according to Spet, be regarded as
hermeneutica!. This is manifested in the communica-
tion in which the conveying of sense is not the con-
sciousness of ... but it is nevertheless an intentiona!
object that we not only grasp but also understand. We
grasp MEANING that may be manifold. However, un-
derstanding reveals the sense of the object and this
sense has, following Spet's logic, invariably one def-
inite social predestination. Every cognition is rooted,
he contends, in sociality, which he treats very broadly,
i.e., as the world oflife and history.
Others in Russia wrote on phenomenology. Alexan-
der Ognev's paper, "Idealnoe i realnoe v soznanii"
(The ideal and the real in consciousness, 1918),
Iikens phenomenology to panlogism and subjects
Husserl 's hypostatization of the ideal to criticism.
Fiodor Kurlarski devotes a part of his critica! anal-
ysis of contemporary philosophy in Kritika tvorch-
eskogo soznaniya: Obosnovanie antinomizma (Cri-
tique of creative consciousness: Substantiation of anti-
nomism, 1923) to Husserl 's concepts of intuition and
antipsychologism.
618 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Spet's
creative work, some ofhis students and followers pre-
pared a handwritten collection of materials entitled
Quartet devoted to problems ofphenomenology. These
may be sketched as follows.
ALEXANDER AKHMANOV's "Intellektualnaya intuitsiya
i esteticheskoye vospriyatie" (lntellectual intuition and
aesthetic perception) characterizes ideal being in accor-
dance with Husserl and defines the distinctive features
of aesthetic contemplation. ( 1) It is an intuition of ideal
being and is itself a kind of intellectual contemplation.
(2) It is a perception of an objectively given quality of
the realization of an idea or the quality ofthe interna!
structure ofthe thing. (3) It contains activity that trans-
forms the intuiting soul into an organ for the adequate
contemplation of ideas. And (4) it is an intuition that
restores the inner dynamics determining sense data of
the thing by means of an idea.
In "O suzhdenii" (On judgment), Nikolai Volkov
treats the doctrine of judgment in Brentano and Anton
Marty ( 1849-1914) and objects to the traditional view
that the judgment is a relation between two concepts.
Volkov maintains that "the judgment leads us to reality
. . . ." Through its sense, it is directed at concreteness
and the sense presupposes the act of comprehension
("uazumenie," a term from Spet).
Nikolai Zhinkin wrote "Veshch" (The thing) for the
Quartet. In it he claims that the cardinal antithesis in
metaphysical teachings is between thing and symbol.
from this angle and following WILHELM DILTHEY, he
examines various types of Weltanschauung as well as
different connotations ofthe word "thing" in logic and
ethics. He reviews the structural descriptions of the
thing in Husserl and in HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, and
arrives at the following conclusion: no description of
the outer appearance of a thing, even though indispens-
able for gaining an approach to it, produces conscious-
ness ofits reality. The essence of a thing !ies, according
to Zhinkin, in its use; each different quality ofthe use
creates a new thing and draws, as it were, a demarca-
tion line between them. The act itself of using a thing
(the deed) is always an event in the realm of culture.
"It is not the thing that renders culture understandable,
rather the culture makes the thing understandable." In
other words, a body becomes a thing only within acul-
tural context. A body in a certain sphere of its use is
defined by Zhinkin as the axiologica! inner form ofthe
thing on the analogy of the "inner form of the word"
in Spet.
"O stroyenii obshchestva" (On the structure ofsoci-
ety) by Alexander Sack seeks to construct a social the-
ory making use ofHusserl's ideas on part and whole in
the Logische Untersuchungen. The last contribution to
the Quartet is A. Zires's "Vozmozhnost" (Possibility),
which examines various interpretations of "possibil-
ity."
Finally, Aleksei Losev ( 1893-1988) published
Filosofia imeni (Philosophy of the name, 1927) and
Muzyka kak predmet logiki (Music as subject matter of
logic, 1927). In these, he works out his thought draw-
ing directly on the phenomenological method of pure
description of eide as well as on the antimetaphysi-
cal and antinaturalistic tendencies of phenomenology.
At the same time, Losev does not accept the alleged
total rejection by phenomenologists of the principle
of explanation, attempting to combine the phenomen-
ological method with the dialectica!.
From the 1930s to the early 1960s, phenomenology
was proclaimed in the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RE-
PUBLICS tobe a variety of reactionary bourgeois philos-
ophy.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Boris, Jakovenko. Filosofiia Ed. Gusserlia (The philosophy
of Edmund Husserl). In his Novye idei v tilos~fil (New
ideas in philosophy). St. Petersburg: Obzazovanie, 1913,
74-146.
Dahm, Helmut. Solov 'ev und Scheler. Ein Bei trag zur
Geschichte der Phănomenologie im Versuch einer vergle-
ichenden Inte1pretation. Munich: Pustet, 1971; Vladimir
Solovyev and Max Scheler: Attempt ata Comparative In-
terpretation. A Contribution ta the History of Phenomen-
ology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975.
Haardt, Alexander. Husserl in Russland. Phănomenologie
der Sprache und Kunst bei Gustav Spet und Aleksei Losev.
Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1992.
Karinsky, Michail I. "Yavenie i destvitelnost" (Appearance
and reality). Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie (Greek Orthodox
Review) 1 (1878), 659-704.
- . Ob istinach samoochevidnych (On self-evident truths).
St. Petersburg, 1893.
Kireevsky, lvan. Polnoe sobranie sochineny. pod red. M.
Gershenzona. (Complete works) voi. 1. Moscow: Put',
1911.
Khomyakov, Aleksei S. Polnoe sobranie sochineny. (Com-
plete works) voi. 1. Moscow: Univezsitetskaiatipografia,
1900.
Lants, Georgi. "Gusserl' i psikhologisty nashikh dnei"
(Husserl and the contemporary defenders of psycholo-
 RUSSIA
gism). Voprosyfilosofii i psikhologii 98 (1909), 393-443.
Lossky, Nikolai O. Obosnovanie intuitivisma. St. Petersburg,
1906; The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge: An Epistemo-
logical Inquiry. Trans. Natalie A. Duddington. London:
Macmillan, 1919; Die Grundlegung des Intuitivismus.
Trans. Johann Strauch. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1908.
Motroshilova, Nelli V. Printsipy i protivorechiia fenomeno-
logicheskoi filosofii (Principles and contradictions of
phenomenological philosophy). Moscow: Vysshajashck-
ola, 1968.
Quartet. Moscow, 1925, manuscript. In Department of
Manuscripts ofthe Russian State Library, Depository 718,
Carton 23, Storage Unit 10.
Shestov, Lev. "Memento Mori: Po povodu teorii poz-
naniia Edmunda Gusserlia" (Memento Mori: On Ed-
mund Husserl 's theory of knowledge ). Voprosy filosofii i
psikhologii 139-40 (1917), 1-68; "Memento mori: A pro-
pos de la theorie de la connaissance d'Edmund Husserl."
Revuephilosophique 1-2 (1926), 5-62.
Solovyov (Solov'ev), Solowjew Vladimir (Wladimir S.).
Teoreticheskaia filosofia (Theoretical philosophy). In So-
branie sochineny v dvuch tomach (Works in two volumes ),
voi. 1. Moscow: Mysl ', 1988; Theoretische Philosophie.
Trans. Wladimir Szylkarski. Deutsche Gesamtausgabe
der Werke van W. Solowjew, voi. 7. Freiburg: Erich Wewel,
1953,7-105.
619
- . Osnovy teoreticheskoi filosofii [ 1897-1899]. In Sobranie
sochineny, voi. 9. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: Prosveschenie,
1911-14, 87-166; partially translated as "Foundations of
Theoretical Philosophy." Trans. Vlada Tolley and James
P. Scanlan. In Russian Philosophy. Ed. James Edie et al.
Voi. 3. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1965; rpt. Knoxville, TN:
University ofTennessee Press, 1976, 99-134.
Spet, Gustav G. Yavlewnie i smysl: Fenomenologia kak os-
novnaia nauka i yeyo problemy. Moscow: Germes, 1914;
Appearance and Sense: Phenomenology as the Funda-
mental Science and its Problems. Trans. Thomas Nemeth.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
- . Germenevtika i yeyo problemy (Hermeneutics and its
problems). In Kontext. Moscow: Nauka, 1989, 234-
70; 1990, 219-59; 1991, 215-55; 1992, 251-282; Die
Hermeneutik und ihre Probleme. Trans. Erika Freiberger
and Alexander Haardt. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1994.
Trubetskoi, Sergei N. O prirode chelovecheskogo soznania
(On the nature of human consciousness). In Sobranie
sochineny. Voi. 2. Filosofskie stat 'i (Collected works, voi.
2: Philosophical papers). Moscow: G. Lissner & D. Sobko,
1908.
VICTOR MOLTCHANOV
Rostov an Dan

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE Sartre was bom in
Paris on June 21, 1905. He studied philosophy and
passed his agregation examination at the Ecole Nor-
male Superieure in 1929. After eighteen months of
military service as a meteorologist he taught ata lycee
in Le Havre from 1930 to 1936. During this time he
became greatly inftuenced by phenomenology, partic-
ularly by the writings of EDMUND HUSSERL and MAR-
TIN HEIDEGGER. Although precise details of when and
how Sartre was exposed to their writings are still be-
ing chronicled, what is clear is his strong attraction,
which led him to study Husserl 's writings in Berlin
from November 1933 to July 1934 on a grant from the
French Institute. It was during this period that he wrote
La nausee ( 1938), arguably a phenomenological novel,
and began La transcendance de 1'ego ( 1936), his first
sustained treatment of Husserl 's work.
From then on phenomenology, as Sartre developed,
modified, and extended it, played a prominent role
in his work, even as he seemed to reject it !ater in
his career. In his earliest work he cites, and clearly
has studied, Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen (2nd
ed., 1913 ), ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 ( 1913 ), Vorlesun-
gen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
(1928), Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929),
and Meditations cartesiennes ( 1931 ). In addition, he
seems to have read widely in other of Husserl 's writ-
ings and some ofhis commentators such as EUGEN FINK.
Sartre 's version of phenomenology has its roots in Hei-
degger's writings as well; his working from Sein und
Zeit ( 1927) and Was ist Metaphysik? ( 1929) is espe-
cially clear in his L 'etre et le neant ( 1943 ).
Severa! of Sartre's earlier writings, including the
previously mentioned works as well as L 'imagination
(1936) and L 'imaginaire (1940), are direct responses
to themes in the writings of Husserl and Heidegger.
Chief among these are the · INTENTIONALITY of con-
sciousness; the distinction between consciousness and
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
@ 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
that of which there is consciousness; IMAGINATION vs.
PERCEPTION; EMOTION; the status of the EGO; and the
roJe of EIDETIC METHOD and FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY.
As many of Sartre's commentators have tried to sort
out, his versions ofhow Husserl and Heidegger devel-
oped these themes may be based on some misunder-
standings, yet his own descriptions can be appreciated
in their own right.
Fundamental to Sartre's method was his notion of
reflection as focusing on conscious intentionallife. He
characterized phenomenology as proceeding through
intuition, by which he meant putting oneself, in reflec-
tion, in the presence of the object being described as
it is presented, as a NOEMA. This was Sartre 's way of
characterizing Husserl 's phenomenological reduction.
He very early described the intentionality of conscious-
ness as putting us in direct contact with objects and he
effusively praised Husserl, as early as 1939, for the
move to seeing objects as not being immanent in con-
sciousness. The object ofreflection could be either the
consciousness ofwhatever, or that ofwhich conscious-
ness was conscious ~ the latter being a particular fac-
tual object, a previous or expected consciousness of
whatever, or an essence. This meant the resulting de-
scriptions could be either factual or eidetic. Although
Sartre called this method a transcendental o ne, he used
the term "transcendental" to apply to the present phase
of consciousness whether it is reflecting or not. What is
meant by "intuition," "reflection," and "transcenden-
tal" can be seen particularly well in his description of
consciousness as nonegological.
In La transcendance de !'ego, Sartre described the
ego, or self, as a "relative" existent, like the objects
ofthe world, that is, an object for consciousness; con-
sciousness itself is non-egological. According to him,
every time I reflect on my conscious life an ego ap-
pears as the one who was doing the thinking. This
ego appears, however, only in a reftective operation
wherein consciousness looks upon itself as an object.
In other words, the reflecting conscious process directs
itself to the reflected-upon conscious process, which
did not reflect upon itself previously but was, instead,
a straightforward consciousness ofwhatever. It is only
in this further act that an ego appears. The ego observed
at the reflective level is given as transcendent and per-
manent apart from the individual conscious process
through which it is presented; it does not appear as the
620
 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
reflected-upon consciousness, but rather as apart from,
or behind, the particular consciousness through which
it appears. The ego is seen as having a real existence
that is transcendent to the object being confronted, in
this case, the activity of viewing. Consequently, the
ego is like ali objects and can be given in intuition,
i.e., the direct seeing of the object, "in person." Ini-
tially and most fundamentally consciousness is none-
gological. This fundamental level of consciousness is
termed by Sartre transcendental consciousness. This
is the for-itself (le pour-soi), the impersonal sponta-
neous consciousness. It is impersonal because there is
no person, ego, or self at this level and it is sponta-
neous because there is no-thing determining or even
motivating a necessary course of action or project.
With this description of consciousness Sartre clearly
followed Husserl 's method and descriptions to the
point of accepting without question the correlation of
consciousness and its intended object as intended, both
ofwhich are given at one stroke. The object is relative
to consciousness and yet is not a part or piece of it.
From his earliest writings on, Sartre continued to praise
Husserl 's method and results for restoring to things
their reality while preserving the role consciousness
plays. The application of this method was displayed
extremely well in his work on the imagination in the
books mentioned above.
Sartre wanted to claim that the way an image, or
feigned object, appears is analogous to PERCEPTION,
rather than an image being a copy of a perceptual ob-
ject. Both an act of perception and an act of imagina-
tion aim at their objects, which are not parts of con-
sciousness. The difference between them is partly on
the si de of the conscious act; imagination is a kind of
quasi-observation in which the object is characterized
as lacking certain positive existential characters. Yet
ali intentiona! objects have transcendence. Basically
this means, as it did in the case of the ego, that ali
objects give rise to the "ontologica! proof." As Sartre
develops it in L 'etre et le neant, this is the move from
seeing that the phenomenon ofbeing- being as it dis-
closes itself in a particular phenomenon, which is the
intentiona! object- requires in its essence that what
exists for consciousness must exist not only insofar as
it appears.
Consciousness itself is not sufficient to account for
what appears and the being ofthis appearance, because
621
consciousness always and of necessity aims not only
at, but beyond, its object, which is the totality ofits ap-
pearances. This totality of appearances cannot exist, be
given to consciousness, aliat the same time. Instead it is
essential to what it means tobe a series of appearances
that they are ali absent except for the one to which
attention is now directed. It is their absence coupled
with their presence through the past appearings that
gives them objectivity. The being of the appearances,
Sartre argues, is defined as a lack, as that which is not
consciousness. Their being is revealed as a being that
is not consciousness and as already existing when con-
sciousness reveals it. This is part of Sartre's contention
that consciousness is not something that confers being;
rather, it is nothing apart from that of which it is con-
scious. Thus the essence ofwhat appears includes that
its existence does not depend on the consciousness of
it for its being.
This transphenomenal being is not a noumenal be-
ing hidden behind the appearings, the phenomena. By
"transphenomenal" Sartre means that the being of the
phenomenon presents itself as not reducible to either
the consciousness of it - otherwise there would be
no objectivity- nor to a transcendent object- then
there would be no appearing distinct from this object.
Each appearance is itself a transcendent being, and
consciousness of it can be defined only in terms of
this something that is transcendent and whose being is
transphenomenal. Consciousness is consciousness of
itself in a nonobjectivating awareness of itself as that
which is supported and defined by this phenomenon
whose being is transphenomenal. The picture is of con-
sciousness aware of itself as that which 1s supported in
its being by a being that is not itself.
Severa! important points emerge from these analy-
ses of the ego and intentiona! objects yielding further
insight into the relation of Sartre's phenomenology to
that of Husserl and Heidegger. Although Sartre tried to
distance himself significantly from Husserl, especially
with respect to the ego and the reality ofthe intentiona!
objects, there is hardly any difference in the result-
ing descriptions, as the preceding analyses show. The
correlation conception of consciousness, with the at-
tendant status of the ego and objects as constituted
through the workings of consciousness, is very much
the same in both Husserl and the early work of Sartre.
The primary difference is Sartre's articulation of the
622 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ro le of nothingness, or lack, at the fundamental level
of consciousness, which results in a dualism of an im-
personal spontaneous consciousness and its object.
However, both Sartre and Husserl did ontology in
the same way. As experienced, reality is not tobe com-
pared with some unexperienced or "true" reality, nor
is it to be questioned about its origin. Instead, to para-
phrase Sartre, experienced reality just is. In this way
they challenged the assumption and did not enter into
the controversy about whether they have made a cor-
rect description of some unavailable transcendent real-
ity, or whether such a description is possible. This shift
of attitude, which is the phenomenological reduction,
moves from the necessity of an answer to the ques-
tion "what is the nature of reality?" to a description
of how the various worlds including the "real" one,
as well as this question, arise in and from our experi-
ence. Most importantly, the description of being as it
is meant in our experience is explicated and found to
be the answer desired. This kind of concern eventuated
in Sartre 's ontologica! "proof' that the essence of the
being of the phenomenon includes its transphenom-
enality. Consequently, Sartre developed a phenomen-
ological ontology but without a prejudice about what
the answer must look like or that it must answer the
traditional questions.
Sartre 's relation to Heidegger is much more difficult
to track because it is an interactive one. Sartre said he
learned about historicity and authenticity from Heideg-
ger as he turned from Husserl 's idealism toward Hei-
degger, around 193 7. Fundamental to this turn, which
was not a complete one because Sartre throughout re-
tained his notion of consciousness as described above,
was a perceived need to ground his analyses in the
concrete, in human reality as situated in the historical
world. In Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions (Sketch
of a theory ofthe emotions, 1939), Sartre praised Hei-
degger for giving us a view of human reality and the
need to question ourselves-a view that is phenomen-
ological, yet with a shift in focus. As he wrote in Les
carnets de la drâle de guerre: Novembre 1939-Mars
1940 (War diaries, 1983), Sartre thought that Heideg-
ger had given him the tools to understand his history
and situation. However, Heidegger's own assessment
was quite different: he claimed Sartre had vulgarized
his ideas in L "etre et le neant.
At this stage in his development Sartre basically
conflated the Husserlian consciousness with Heideg-
gerian DASEIN while emphasizing the voluntaristic na-
ture of consciousness set over against ali objects; the
for-itself and the in-itself are heterogeneous. Pure re-
flection should reveal consciousness freely constituting
its projects and the world such that being-in-the-world
is only a characterization of the reflected-upon con-
sciousness ofthe world.
In his !ater writings, Sartre seemed to think pheno-
menology was inadequate to cope with the experience
of social conditioning and that concrete situated free-
dom was at odds with the empty spontaneous con-
sciousness of his previous work. lnterestingly, how-
ever, one can see him still using phenomenology even
in "Question de methode" and Critique de la raison
dialectique ( 1960), wherein he promoted the dialecti-
ca! progressive-regressive method, which moves back
and forth from an awareness of the social and his-
torical conditioning - the cultural context - to the
historical particularity of the individual. This dialec-
tic is still based on a phenomenological appreciation
and description of human experience as the starting
point of the analysis. The emphasis on the role of
lived experience in his !ater writings can be seen as
retaining the need for a phenomenological explication
of experience but with an increasing commitment to
contextualizing phenomenological descriptions by co-
ordinating the ro le of interior and exterior experience,
as well as acknowledging the force of circumstances.
In Cahiers pour une morale (Notebooks for an ethics,
1983), which was finished around 1945, Sartre goes
even further and explicitly says that Husserl and Hei-
degger are minor philosophers, and HEGEL and MARX
are seen by him as having a major influence on his
ideas.
Severa! other phenomenologists played a role on
Sartre's development. His earlier reading of MAX
SCHELER helped convince him that as part of each of
our personal fundamental projects there exists VALUEs
that help to regulate our acts and judgments. These are,
in effect, part of our lived experience and not derived
from some universal value system. WILHELM DILTHEY's
influence is particularly evident in Sartre's explication
of lived experience as including an understanding of
how individual projects are enabled in their interaction
with the historical system. Sartre's long association and
collaboration with SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR and MAURICE
 SCANDINAVIA
MERLEAU-PONTY resulted in an extensive crossfertiliza-
tion of each oftheir works. A full appreciation ofhow
their individual works interpenetrated and inftuenced
each other is stil! underway.
Many of the themes in Sartre's philosophizing
are further evident and developed in his numerous
contributions to LITERATURE, THEATER, and POLITICS.
Throughout these works, as his various concems
emerged, matured, and were modified, there remained
a consistent appraisal and reappraisal of how con-
sciousness/freedom interacts with the historical con-
ditions/conditioning.
Sartre seems to further decenter the primacy ofthe
individual consciousness in the very last period ofhis
life and speaks of individuals as always already ob-
ligated toward the Other and as given within a so-
cial and historical set of conditions. However, what
remains clear throughout his work is a strong com-
mitment to describing human experience as experi-
enced. Whether or not a full and adequate description
oflived experience will reveal and uphold Sartre 's orig-
inal views about the primacy of individual spontaneous
consciousness and the independent ro le of objects re-
mains an open question. What is clear, however, is his
continuous attempts until his death on April 15, 1980
to legitimate his insights about how human beings are
both free and products of themselves and their situa-
tions.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Busch, Thomas W. The Power of Consciousness and the
Force of Circumstances in Sartre :S Philosophy. Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Cumming, Robert. Phenomenology and Deconstruction. 2
vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991-93.
Embree, Lester. "The Natural-Scientific Constitutive Pheno-
menological Psychology of Humans in the Earliest
Sartre." Research in Phenomenology il ( 1981 ), 41-61.
Ho1mes, Richard. The Transcendence ofthe World. Waterloo,
Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995.
Howells, Christina, ed. The Cambridge Companion ta Sartre.
Cambridge: Cambridge Universtty Press, 1992.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "La transcendance de l'ego: Es-
quisse d'une description phcnomenologique." Recherches
philosophiques 6 (1936--37), 85-123; rpt. as La
transcandence de !'ego: Esquisse d 'une description
phimomenologique. Paris: Vrin, 1965; The Transcendence
of the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirk-
patrick. New York: Noonday Press. 1957.
- . L 'imagination. Paris: Alcan, 1936; lmagination. Trans.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
623
Forrest Williams. Ann Arbor. MI: University of Michigan
Press, 1962.
--·. L 'imaginaire. Pans: Gallimard, 1940; Psychology ofthe
Imagina/ion. Trans. Bemard Frcchtman. New York: Philo-
sophical Librarv, 1948.
--. Esquisse d 'une theorie des emotions. Paris: Hermann,
1939; Sketchfor a Themy ofthe Emotions. Trans. Philip
Mairet. London: Methuen, 1962.
-.La nausee. Paris: Gallimard, 1938; Nausea. Trans. Lloyd
Alexander. New York: New Directions, 1964.
-.Les carnets de la dr6le de guerre: Novembre 1939--Mars
1940. Paris: Gallimard, 1983; The War Diaries. Trans.
Quintin Hoare. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
- . L 'etre el neant. Paris: Gallimard, 1943; Being and Noth-
ingness. Trans. Hazel Bames. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956.
- . Qu 'est-ce que la literature? Paris: Gallimard, 1948; What
is Litera ture. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1988.
--. "Question de methodc." In his Critique de la raison
dialectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1960; Searchfor a Method.
Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
- . Critique de la raison dialectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1960;
Critique of Dialectica! Reason. Trans. Alan Sheridan-
Smith. London: New Left Books, 1976.
-. Cahiers pour une morale. Paris: Gallimard, 1983; Note-
hooks for an Ethics. Trans. David Pellauer. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1992.
Schlipp, Paul, ed. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.
LaSallc, IL: Open Court, 1981 ).
Spiegelbcrg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A
Historical Introduc/ion. 3rd rev. and cnl. ed., with the
collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. The Haguc: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982.
RICHARD HOLMES
University of Waterloo
SCANDINAVIA Sweden, Denmark, and Nor-
way make up Scandinavia. Often, however, Finland
and Iceland are added to make the five Nordic Coun-
tries. The five countries will be discussed in the order
in which they got their first universities, which coin-
cides with the order in which phenomenology carne
into these countries. In Sweden phenomenology was
taken up in 1911, while in the other four countries sig-
nificant developments did not start until after World
War II. The survey includes main contributions, pri-
marily by those who write in major languages. It does
not include the many PSYCHOLOG!STS and HUMAN SC!EN-
TISTS who have been inftuenced by phenomenology.
Sweden has the oldest and the fourth oldest Nordic
universities: Uppsala, founded in 1477, coming be-
624 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
fore Copenhagen by two years, and Lund, founded in
1668, twenty-eight years after Fin1and's first university.
Stockholm was, for a short time, the residence of the
most illustrious philosopher ever to work in the Nordic
countries (rivalled only by S0ren Kierkegaard and by
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, who spent Jong periods ofhis Jife
in Norway). In 1649 Rene Descartes carne to Stock-
holm as Queen Christina's teacher. The following year
he died from pneumonia. Not un tii three centuries !ater,
in 1937, did Stockholm get its first regular professor of
philosophy, at what was then Stockholm 's Hogskola.
In 1960 Stockholm 's Hogskola was made into a univer-
sity. Sweden bas a large number ofphilosophers work-
ing within ali main areas of philosophy. Uppsala and
Lund have the most positions. The other universities
have fewer positions, but Stockholm and Gothenburg
(Gotenborg) have very active departments and produce
many doctoral candidates. The University ofUmeâ in
the north has focused on the philosophy of science and
the University of Linkoping has focused on medical
ethics and action theory.
The first philosopher in Scandinavia to write on
phenomenology was Adolf Phalen (1884-1931) in
1911. Phalen, who carne back to EDMUND HUSSERL sev-
era! times, became professor of theoretical philoso-
phy in Uppsala in 1916, and together with his col-
league, Axei Hagerstrom (1868-1939), founded the
so-called Uppsala school of philosophy. Their suc-
cessors at Uppsala went in other directions. However,
the Flemish-born Andries MacLeod ( 1891-1977), who
studied with Phalen, wrote severa! penetrating stud-
ies of the contents of consciousness, reality, and
negation that show affinities with the early Husserl.
Also, Thorild Dahlquist includes Husserl and pheno-
menology in his broad philosophical repertoire. The
main publications in the phenomenological tradition
at Uppsala since Phalen have come from the De-
partment of Literature, where THURE STENSTROM has
written severa! major works on EXISTENTIAL!SM, par-
ticularly JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. In theology, Eberhard Her-
rmann wrote his dissertation on Bolzano, Der religion-
sphilosophische Standpunkt Bernard Bolzanos unter
Beriicksichtigung seiner Semantik, Wissenschaflstheo-
rie und Moralphilosophie (1977).
It was, however, at Gothenburg more than at Up-
psala that the phenomenological tradition found a
home. Inspired by Phalen, IVAR SEGELBERG wrote sev-
erai phenomenological studies from 1945 on. He be-
came professor of philosophy in Gothenburg in 1951
and bas engendered a general awareness of pheno-
menology among his students. His successor, MATS
FURBERG, bas written extensively on speech act the-
ory, and bas in recent work attempted a reconciliation
between speech act theory and HERMENEUT!CS. Furberg
bas also written engaging books on death and the mean-
ing oflife.
One of Segerberg's students, DICK HAGLUND, now
professor of the philosophy of religion in Lund, is
the main contributor to phenomenology in Sweden
today. Haglund received his doctorate in Gothenburg
on Perception, Time, and the Unity of Mind ( 1977).
More recently, he bas published Phenomenological
Studies 1 (1979) and On the Nature of Hyletic Data
(1984). Unfortunately, much ofHaglund's careful and
interesting work is unpublished or published only in
mimeographed form.
Another of Segelberg's students, HELGE MALMGREN,
wrote his unpublished dissertation on intentionality
and knowledge ( 1971) and bas published on the early
Wittgenstein and his affinity with phenomenology.
Also at Gothenburg, Thomas Wetterstrom published
an expanded version of his 1973 dissertation, Inten-
tion and Communication: An Essay in the Phenomen-
ology ofLanguage ( 1977). He combines impulses from
Segelberg and Furberg and exploits Husserl 's distinc-
tion between the matter and quality of acts to throw
light on Austin's distinction between locutionary and
illocutionary acts. In Towards a Theory ofBasic Ethics
( 1986), he presents a normative ethical theory based
onan intuitionistic VALUE THEORY, "mental quality he-
donism," explained in terms of Husserl 's "intentiona!
moods." Wetterstrom has also written on AESTHETICS
and on "Consciousness from a Quality-Instance Point
ofView" (1974).
One of Wetterstrom's students, ĂKE SANDER, has
written a two-volume dissertation ( 1988) using Husser-
lian phenomenology to study the ro le played by RELI-
GION in the constitution of the LIFEWORLD. One of his
points is that religious belief is a kind of practica! com-
petence rather than an intellectual attitude of holding
something true. Sander is now engaged in a pheno-
menological study ofthe way Moslem immigrants en-
counter the Swedish society.
JAN BENGTSSON has written on the reception and in-
 SCANDINAVIA
fluence of phenomenology in Scandinavia, culminat-
ing in his dissertation on the phenomenological move-
ment in Sweden ( 1991 ). This book collects a wealth of
material on references to Husserl, possible influences
from Husserl, etc. in Swedish philosophy. It is, how-
ever, seriously marred by the author's crusade against
philosophers who do not share his views.
STAFFAN CARLSHAMRE has written a remarkably lu-
cid and well-argued dissertation, Language and Time:
An Attempt to Arrest the Thought of Jacques Derrida
( 1986) and is now working in Stockholm.
At Lund there is not much phenomenology, except
for that which is do ne by Dick Haglund. However, LARS
FROSTROM discussed various theories ofjudgments and
propositions, including those of Husserl and Meinong,
in his 1983 dissertation.
Recently, the center of phenomenological activity
in Sweden has gravitated from Gothenburg to Stock-
holm, largely due to a major project on phenomen-
ology and related subjects supported by the Axei och
Margaret Axelson Johnsons Foundation. The initia-
tive for this project was taken by DAG PRAWITZ, pro-
fessor of theoretical philosophy in Stockholm. Work-
ing with him are ALEXANDER ORLOWSKI, PER MARTIN-LOF,
STAFFAN CARLSHAMRE, HANS RUIN, DANIEL BIRNBAUM, and
SVEN-OLOV WALLENSTEIN and DICK HAGLUND from Lund
and DAGFINN F0LLESDAL from Oslo. Their themes are
connected with Husserl, FRANZ BRENTANO, MARTIN HEI-
DEGGER, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ROMAN INGARDEN, MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PAUL RICCEUR,
and JACQUES DERRIDA, and also on the influence of
phenomenology in LITERATURE and the arts.
A key person in the development of phenomen-
ology in Stockholm has been ALEXANDER ORLOWSKI,
who carne from Poland in 1971 after having taken his
doctorate at Lodz with a dissertation on Schelling. Or-
lowski has worked extensively on Husserl, Kazimierz
Twardowski (1866--1938), Sartre, and Heidegger, and
on the reception of German philosophy in Central and
Eastern Europe.
PER MARTIN-LOF, research professor in logic at Stock-
holm, has taken a strong interest in Husserl's pheno-
menology, both in his study ofMFANING and in his work
on MATHEMATICS.
STAFFAN CARLSHAMRE is working on the reception of
phenomenology in FRANCE and how it is merged with
modern text theory and aesthetics. HANS RUIN wrote
625
his dissertation entitled Heidegger and Historicity:
Enigmatic Origins-Tracing the Theme of Historicity
Through Heidegger 's Works (1994) and is now con-
tinuing his work in phenomenology and hermeneutics.
He is also active as a translator, editor, and contrib-
utor to cultural journals. DANIEL BIRNBAUM is writing
on Husserl 's late philosophy, while SVEN-OLOV WAL-
LENSTEIN is working on Heidegger's way ofwriting the
history of philosophy.
Also at Stockholm, HANS-JORGEN ULFSTEDT has writ-
ten a dissertation on Brentano 's views of existence and
judgment, and JENS CAVALLIN obtained his doctorate in
1990 with a dissertation entiled Content and Object,
Twardowski and Psychologism. E. PEREZ-BFRCOFF has
written Para una lectura hermeneutica de Sartre (For
a hermeneutica! reading of Sartre).
At Umeâ in the north of Sweden, INGVAR JOHANS-
soN, who studied with Segelberg, wrote his disserta-
tion on Karl Popper ( 1902-1994) and has !ater turned
to phenomenology. His main work so far is Ontolog-
ica! Investigations: An Inquiry into the Categories of
Nature, Man, and Society (1989), where he tries to find
an adequate set of categories for those matters.
In Denmark, Soren Kierkegaard anticipated aspects
of phenomenology through his descriptions of human
experience and through his conception of the now
(oyeblikket). When Kierkegaard was fighting against
the dominance of HEGEL 's thought at the University
of Copenhagen, the university was already old. It was
founded in 1479 and remained the only university in
Denmark until the University of Aarhus (Arhus) was
established in 1928. This was followed by the Univer-
sity of Odense (1966) and the "University Centers" in
Roskilde ( 1970) and Aalborg (Alborg) ( 1971 ).
One may distinguish two main phases in the de-
velopment of phenomenology in Denmark, one start-
ing with the Aarhus theologian Kund Ejler Logstrup
( 1905-1981 ), and one beginning to develop among
some young philosophers who are oriented toward
Husserl and the problems with which he was grap-
pling.
Inspired by Kierkegaard and the phenomenologi-
cal tradition, severa! Danish theologians have been
working on phenomenology, mainly at the Institute
for Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at Aarhus.
Logstrup has been a source of inspiration for most of
them, particularly through Den etiske fordring (The
626 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ethical claim, 1956), but also through his many other
infiuential works. Logstrup 's phenomenological ap-
proach to the philosophy of religion is central for the
dissertation ofhis successor, SVEND ANDERSEN, Sprog og
skabelse (Language and creation, 1989). The book dis-
cusses religious language drawing both on phenomen-
ology and ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. Andersen has pub-
Jished severa! other books and articles and is now ac-
tive in Denmark's council of medical ethics. Another
main follower of Logstrup at Aarhus is the theologian
H. c. WIND, who wrote his dissertation on historicity
and ontology in Heidegger (1974), and has also writ-
ten a general presentation of Heidegger's philosophy
and articles on phenomenology.
The most infiuential of Logstrup 's students was
JORGEN K. BUKDAHL, who during his short Jife wrote
a number of articles on philosophical movements in
Germany and France that inspired many ofthe younger
philosophers in Denmark.
Aarhus has also had an Institute of the History of
Ideas for some years. It was founded by Johannes Slok,
who has written a large number ofbooks, including an
introduction to Kierkegaard ( 1990). His successors at
the Institute have largely been infiuenced by MARX-
ISM. Hans Jorgen Schanz wrote his dissertation on the
relations between metaphysics and modernity ( 1981 ),
and is now working largely on Heidegger, Adorno, and
Wittgenstein.
Also at Aarhus, Soren Gosvig Olesen has writ-
ten the yet to be published Wissen und Phănomen.
Eine Untersuchung der ontologischen Klărung der
Wissenschaft bei Edmund Husserl, Alexander Koyre,
und Gaston Bachelard (Cognition and phenomenon.
An investigation ofthe ontologica! clarification of sci-
ence in Edmund Husserl, Alexandre Koyre, and Gaston
Bachelard).
At the young university at Roskilde, NIELS OLE
BERNSEN is working on the borderline between pheno-
menology and COGNITIVE SCIENCE. In Know/edge: A
Treatise of Our Cognitive Situation ( 1978), he argues
that epistemological positions presuppose assumptions
belonging to what is nowadays called "cognitive sci-
ence." His concept of a "cognitive situation" is an at-
tempt to capture this interdependence, including the
unique epistemological sta tus ofvarious commonsense
beliefs. He has pursued these ideas further in Heideg-
s
ger Theory of Intentionality ( 1986) and has written
over a hundred articles and books; he has been Re-
search Professor of Cognitive Science at Roskilde Uni-
versity since 1989, where he established the Centre of
Cognitive Science in 1990.
Work on the borderline between cognitive science
and phenomenology is also done in Copenhagen by
Ole Fogh Kirkeby, who teaches at Copenhagen Busi-
ness School. He took his doctorate at the Univer-
sity of Aarhus with Event and Body-Mind, where he
presents a theory of consciousness that draws on MAU-
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY's discussions ofthe BODY, on Hei-
degger, and on Wittgenstein and philosophy of lan-
guage. Kirkeby has earlier written on Marx and artifi-
cial intelligence.
Also in Copenhagen PETER KEMP has a very large
production in French, much of it relating to the work of
PAUL RICCEUR. He has also, together with David M. Ras-
mussen, edited The Narrative Path: The Later Works
of Paul Rica!ur ( 1989), in which he has an article,
"Toward a narrative ethics," that refiects his turn to-
ward ethics, particularly medical ethics. POUL LOBCKE
has also written extensively, mainly on Kierkegaard,
Husserl, and Heidegger, but also on TIME, on personal
identity, and on medical ethics. He has coedited and
contributed large parts of the two-volume survey Die
Philosophie unserer Zeit. ARNE GRON has also written
on French philosophy.
The last few years have seen the emergence of a
group of young Danish philosophers who are com-
bining careful Husserl scholarship with an awareness
of the contemporary discussion of the central issues
dealt with in phenomenology. DAN ZAHAVI has been re-
markably productive. After a Master's A. thesis on
Intentionalităt und Konstitution ( 1992), he went to
Leuven to write his dissertation with RUDOLF BER-
NET: Husserl und die transzendentale lntersubjek-
tivităt. Eine Antwort aufdie sprachpragmatische Kritik
(Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: An an-
swer to the criticism of linguistic pragmatism, 1996).
Zahavi has also written articles in Husserl Studies, Man
and World, Etudes Phenomenologiques, and other jour-
nals, and edited a volume on subjectivity and lifeworld.
He now has a research fellowship in Copenhagen.
SOREN HARNOW KLAUSEN in Qdense has a similar
combined interest in phenomenology and philosophy
of language. He studied for his doctorate in Ttibingen,
writing a dissertation on Zur Sinnfrage in der Philoso-
 SCANDINAVIA
phie des 20. Jahrhunderts (The question of meaning
in 20th century philosophy, 1996), and is now working
on Husserl, Heidegger, FREGE, and Wittgenstein.
Finland's first university was founded in Turku
(Abo) in 1640 and moved to Helsinki (Helsingfors)
in 1828. Turku got a Swedish university in 1918 and
two years !ater also a Finnish one. These two cities are
the main centers for philosophy in Finland, the other
four universities where philosophy is offered ha ve very
small departments, but in Jyvăskyla and Tampere there
are people working on phenomenology.
Together with Georg Henrik von Wright and Erik
Stenius, JAAKKO HINTIKKA at Helsinki has been a lead-
ing figure in Finnish philosophy during the past thirty
years. Ali three have had wide interests, and those of
Hintikka include phenomenology. He has written sev-
era! studies relating to phenomenology, in particular
The Intentions of Intentionality ( 1975) and "Degrees
and Dimensions oflntentionality" in The Logic ofEpis-
temology and the Epistemology ofLogic ( 1989). He has
also written on applications of phenomenology to art.
Among his students, MARTIN KUSCH has been particu-
larly productive. He carne to Finland from Germany in
1981, but has now moved to England. In his disserta-
tion, Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal
Medium: A Study in Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer
(1989), he uses Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka's gen-
eralization of Jean van Heijenoort's 1967 distinction
between "logic as calculus" and "logic as language"
to throw light on Husserl, Heidegger, and HANS-GEORG
GADAMER.
A preeminent contributor to phenomenology in Fin-
laud is LEI LA HAAPARANTA. Her dissertation is Frege s
Doctrine ofBeing ( 1985), but she has since published a
1arge number of articles on Husserl, including her own
contributions to her editions of Language, Knowledge,
and Intentionality: Perspectives on the Philosophy of
Jaakko Hintikka ( 1990); Mind, Meaning, and Mathe-
matics: Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl
and Frege ( 1994 ), and Mind and Cognition: Philosoph-
ical Perspectives on Cognitive Science and Artificial
Intelligence (1995).
Lilli Alanen is a leading Descartes scholar, but has
also written on intentionality and is directing a research
group on intentionality and the foundations of cogni-
tive science.
Maria Johanna Sara is writing a dissertation on the
627
phenomenology of the body and has also written arti-
cles Oll Merleau-Ponty, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, and re]ated
topics.
At Turku, SVEN KROHN showed an interest in pheno-
menology in the 1950s. LAUR! ROUTILA, who wrote
his dissertation on Die aristotelische Idee der ersten
Philosophie (The Aristotelian idea offirst philosophy,
1969) and taught in Turku for a while, is now teach-
ing at Jyvăskylă in central Finland. Routila has written
on Husserl, Heidegger and hermeneutics. His interests
in meaning, interpretation, and Husserl come together
in Wahrnehmung und lnterpretation (Perccption and
interpretation, 1974).
At Tampere, between Jyvăskylă and Turku, ERNA
OESCH has written Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle-
A Treatise in the Borderland of Two Traditions ( 1985)
and has also written articles on related subjects. Also
at Tampere, JAANA PARVIAINEN has written her Mas-
ter's thesis on phenomenology ofthe body and modern
DANCE and written related articles.
An early admirer of Husserl in Finland was YRJ6
REENPĂĂ, professor of physiology in Helsinki, who
wrote a number of studies of perception using Husser-
lian ideas, in particular Wahrnehmen, Beobachten,
Konstituieren (Perception, observation, constitution,
1967).
The first positions in philosophy in Norway carne
with the establishment of the University of Oslo in
1811. Until then, Norwegian academics had received
their education abroad, mainly in Copenhagen. Ali stu-
dents at Norwegian universities have to study philos-
ophy for one half semester when they enter the uni-
versity. Due to this, Norwegian universities have large
philosophy departments, the department in Oslo hav-
ing presently forty-five full time faculty members in a
variety of fields.
In Norway, the study of phenomenology started at
Oslo in the 1950s and then spread to the other univer-
sities. Arne Na:ss showed some interest in phenomen-
ology at that time and in 1965 wrote the Norwegian
version of what !ater became Faur Modern Philoso-
phers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre ( 1968)
and is well known for his DEEP ECOLOGY. In 1956,
DAGFINN F0LLESDAL Wrote the first major study in
phenomenology in Norway, his Master's thesis entitled
Husserl und Frege (1958), and has !ater written more
on Husserl, and also on Heidegger and Sartre. HANS
628 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
SKJERVHEIM, who was professor at Roskilde in 1968-69
and professor at Bergen until he retired, received his
M.A. in Oslo in 1957 with Objectivism and the Study
of Man ( 1959). Basing himself largely on Husserl 's
phenomenology, in it he criticized various tendencies
to "objectivize" mental and social phenomena and not
recognize their intentionality.
ELLING SCHWABE-HANSEN received his doctorate in
1987 with Das Verhăltnis zwischen transzendentaler
und konkreter Subjektivităt in der Phănomenologie Ed-
mund Husserls (The relation between transcendental
and concrete subjectivity in Edmund Husserl 's pheno-
menology, 1991 ), in which he presents and critically
discusses Husserl 's theory of the two egos: the em-
pirica! and the transcendental. Schwabe-Hansen has
also written severa! articles on intentiona! systems, the
body, and the lifeworld. EINAR 0VERENGET has just re-
ceived his doctorate from Boston College with a dis-
sertation entitled Heidegger: A Phenomenological Jn-
terpretation of Subjectivity, and has published severa!
articles on related topics. Among the other members of
the faculty at Oslo who ha ve written within phenomen-
ology are ARNE TUV, who wrote his Master's thesis on
Concepts ofErlebnis, Bewusstsein and Jch in Husserl s
Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen (Concepts of ex-
perience, consciousness, and I in Husserl's Logische
Untersuchungen and Ideen ).
A!so in Oslo GUTTORM FL0ISTAD, since 1975 profes-
sor of the history of ideas, has written on Heidegger,
on Verstehen, and on many other topics. DAG 0STER-
BERG has written a book on forms of understanding
(1960), a major study of Sartre (1993), and a number
of other works. BERNT VESTRE has worked on contem-
porary French philosophy, as has ASBJ0RN AARNES, pro-
fessor ofFrench literature, who has lately concentrated
on EMMANUEL LEVINAS.
Bergen got its university in 1948; before then some
research and higher education had taken place at the
Bergen Museum, which dates from 1825, and at the
Christian Michelsen Institute, established in 1930. At
Bergen, the main figures in phenomenology besides
HANS SKJERYHEIM have been KNUT VENNESLAN, who has
written Der Wissenschaftsbegriff bei Edmund Husserl
(The concept of science in Edmund Husserl, 1962),
and GUNNAR SKIRBEKK who wrote his dissertation on
Heidegger's theory oftruth (1969), but has !ater tumed
more toward POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY and phiJosophy of
NATURAL SCIENCE, and in 1993 published a volume on
the relationship between rationality and modemity.
KONRAD ROKSTAD wrote his Master's thesis on the !ater
Husserl.
Trondheim has a long and venerable academic tra-
dition, much of it connected with the oldest high school
in Norway, the Cathedral School, which recently cel-
ebrated its 800th anniversary, and the oldest scien-
tific society in Norway, the Royal Norwegian Soci-
ety of Sciences and Letters, founded in 1760 by Johan
Ernst Gunnerus, who was a professor ofphilosophy in
Copenhagen before becoming bishop in Trondheim. In
1837 the Society gave Schopenhauer one ofhis first of-
ficial recognitions, for a prize essay Ober die Freiheit
des menschlichen Willens.
The Society's Museum was one of the three insti-
tutions that in 1968 joined to form the University of
Trondheim, the other two being Trondheim Institute
of Technology, founded 191 O, and the College of Arts
and Science, founded 1922. In 1962 the University
got its first faculty member in philosophy, Ingemund
Gullvăg. Gullvâg and most of the other philosophers
who now make up the department combine a concern
with Continental trends in philosophy with an inter-
est in analytic tendencies. Gullvâg has written some
unpublished work on phenomenology. Severa! contri-
butions by the other members of the department that
relate most closely to phenomenology should be men-
tioned.
MAGNE DYBVIG has mainly been working within epis-
temology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of sci-
ence. The Husserlian notion of "lifeworld" recurs in
severa! ofthem, for example in a study of geometry and
the lifeworld. AUDUN 0FSTI started out in mathematics,
but most of his philosophical work has been devoted
to various aspects of a transcendental approach to phi-
losophy, particularly to issues connected with "objec-
tivism" and with the use oflanguage. He comes closest
to phenomenology in a recent note on INTENTIONALITY
(1994). HELGE H01BRAATEN is the latest arrival in Trond-
heim. His interests, like those of0fsti, are mainly prag-
matics conjoined with transcendental philosophy, with
applications in the social sciences and the humanities.
Hoibraaten is also working in politica! philosophy and
is currently engaged in a project on modernity. KARl OP-
DAHL wrote a Master's thesis entitled Phenomenology
-A Semantic-Ontologica! Synthesis.
 MAX SCHELER
Tromso has the world's northernmost university,
founded in 1968. JON HELLESNES, in studies of self-
knowledge and other minds and of socialization
and technocracy, brings in phenomenologica1 anti-
objectivist elements, partly in criticism of Wittgen-
stein. In addition to severa] books on these themes
in Norwegian, he has written an article that relates
to phenomenology entitled "Die Transzendentalprob-
lematik und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens"
(The transcendental problematic and the question of
the meaning oflife, 1993 ). Hellesnes has also published
novels and collections of widely read essays. Pheno-
menology also has inspired ATLE MĂSEIDE, who in "How
to do things with words- Notizen zum Verhăltnis
zwischen Phănomenologie und Pragmatik" ( 1986) and
other articles has argued for the importance of tacit
knowledge in various areas. ELIN SVENNEBY has written
a Master 's thesis in which she makes use of Heideg-
ger's Sein und Zeit ( 1927) to throw light on the notion
oftoo] in ETHNOLOGY.
Iceland, with a population of merely 250,000, has
two universities, Hask6li Islands at Reykjavik, founded
in 1911, and a small university, established in 1987, in
Akureyri in the north. At both universities the com-
pulsory "philosophicum" is taught, but only Reykjavik
has permanent positions for philosophers. Two ofthem,
in particular, have been working on phenomenology.
ARNOR HANNIBALSSON wrote his dissertation on ROMAN
INGARDEN's ontology (1973) and has also been working
on Husserl and on Meinong and Brentano. His main in-
terests are epistemology and aesthetics. PĂLL SKULASON
wrote his (unpublished) dissertation on Heidegger and
Ricoeur and has mainly been working on Hegel and
Heidegger. He also has done some work on Husserl,
but his philosophical orientation is closer to Heidegger
than it is to Husserl. Skulason is an active and produc-
tive philosopher, but is primarily writing in Icelandic.
DAGFINN F0LLESDAL
University of Oslo
MAX SCHELER Scheler was born in Munich,
Germany, on August 22, 1874. His mother was of Jew-
ish extraction, his father was Lutheran. He joined the
Catholic religion early in his life but !ater he became
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
629
noncommittal in favor ofmetaphysical attempts to ex-
plain the divine as becoming together with humankind
and world in absolute time. He received his doctorate at
Jena University in 1887 and finished his Habilitations-
schrift there in 1899. After teaching at Jena until 1906,
he joined the University of Munich. In 191 O he lost
his position there because of a divorce, alienating the
predominantly Catholic administration. It was only in
1919 that he received a professorship in philosophy
and sociology from the University ofKoln. He was en-
gaged in the politica\ situation in Europe and by 1927
had repeatedly warned the public of the rising Nazi
movement in Germany and Fascism in Italy. His work
was suppressed in Germany during the Nazi regime
from 1933 to 1945.
From 1909 on, Scheler was an avid reader of
WILLIAM JAMES and Charles Sanders Peirce and is the
on1y European phenomenologist who entertained a
lifelong interest in American pragmatism. In English,
Scheler's name is mentioned first in a favorable review
ofhis book Zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Sym-
pathiegefuhle und van Liebe und Hass, in Mind (To-
wards the phenomenology and theory of the feeling
of sympathy and of love and hate, 1914). Among his
early American admirers were Howard Becker ( 1889-
1960), Paul Arthur Schilpp (1897-1993), and the so-
ciologist Alb ion Small ( 1854-1926). Toward the end
ofhis life he received invitations to lecture extensively
in Japan, Russia, and the United States, but followed
hesitatingly his physician 's advice not to embark on the
trip. A rapidly deteriorating heart condition caused his
death in Frankfurt am Main on May 19, 1928, shortly
after he hadjoined the university there. He is buried in
Koln.
Scheler made a number of references in his works
to the fledgling phenomenologica\ movement early this
century and to the part he played in it. His first discus-
sion with EDMUND HUSSERL occurred in 190\. It centered
on the concepts of intuition and PERCEPTION. Scheler,
who was fifteen years younger than Husserl, outlined
his novel concept of intuition. He explained its scope
as much wider than either sensible components or log-
ica! forms. Husserl remarked that he too had come up
with an analogous extension of the concept, probably
referring to the categoria! intuition ofhis Logische Un-
tersuchungen ( 1900--1901 ). Between 191 O and 1916,
Husserl recommended Scheler highly for various ca-
630 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
reer opportunities, but the relationship had cooled by
the end of World War 1. As a freelance writer from
191 Oto 1919, Scheler had an almost incredible record
ofpublications spreading his name fast throughout Eu-
rope, prompted also by addressing politica! issues of
the time, such as war, the feminist movement, resent-
ment, the causes of hatred of Germans, the future of
capitalism, the psychology of social security expecta-
tions, and global overpopulation, among many others.
Like other phenomenologists in Germany at
the time, Scheler was not only critica! of
Husserl 's Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913 ), charging
him with ego logica! Cartesianism and methodological
shortcomings, but also of his Logische Untersuchun-
gen. The critique of the latter was formulated by 1904
and is contained in his posthumous Logik I. It provides
incontrovertible evidence ofhis early independence in
matters phenomenological and from what he called the
"loose circle" ofphenomenologists he knew in person,
such as MORITZ GEIGER, DIETR!CH VON H!LDEBRAND, JO-
HANNES DAUBERT, THEODOR L!PPS, ALEXANDER PFĂNDER,
and ADOLF REINACH. He charged Husserl with "platoniz-
ing" phenomenology in the Logische Untersuchungen
with the notion oftruth in itself as separate from objects
and thinking, and as existing prior to judgment-making.
This was, of course, incompatible with Scheler's con-
tention- anticipating as early as 1904 his subsequent
interest in American pragmatism- that thinking must
be conceived as functional (Denkfunktion) with states
of affairs and things.
His independence from the early phenomenological
movement carne fully to light, however, in lectures held
in 1908-9 on the foundations of biology. They con-
tained the central themes of his emerging phenomen-
ology of time. These lectures and the treatises Lehre
van den drei Tatsachen (The theory of the three facts)
and Phănomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Pheno-
menology and the theory of cognition, 1911-14), are
his only works dealing exclusively with phenomen-
ology. The remainder ofhis phenomenological contri-
butions are unfortunately dispersed in his works, in-
cluding his first magnum opus: Der Formalismus in
der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch
der Grundlegung ei nes ethischen Personalismus (For-
malism in ethics and nonformal ethics ofvalues: New
attempt at the foundation of an ethical personalism).
Its two parts were completed by 1913 and published
in 1913 and 1916 respectively in Husserl 's famous
Jahrbuch. There is clear evidence of Scheler's inftu-
ence on ARON GURW!TSCH's Phănomenologie der The-
matik und des reinen lch (Phenomenology of the the-
matic and of the pure I, 1929) and Die mitmenschliche
Begegnung in der sozialen Welt [Human encounters
in the social wor]d, 1931); MAUR!CE MERLEAU-PONTY'S
"Christianisme et ressentiment" ( 1936), and JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE's Les carnets de la drâle de guerre: Novembre
1939-Mars /940 (War diaries, 1983), ALFRED SCHUTz's
Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Ein-
leitung in die verstehende Soziologie (The meaning-
structure ofthe social world, 1932) and Collected Pa-
pers ( 1962, 1964, 1966), and other figures.
Scheler's phenomenology has remained in the back-
ground of the post-World War II phenomenological
movement for severa! reasons. The German collected
edition began only in 1954 while the growing pheno-
menological movement centered on Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, Husserl, and also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, largely be-
cause ofthe international availability oftheir writings
and promoters ]ike HERMAN LEO VAN BREDA, HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, ARON GURW!TSCH, HERBERT SP!EGELBERG, LUD-
WIG LANDGREBE, ERW!N W. STRAUS, and others who had
known some of the first generation of phenomenolo-
gists in person.
The phenomenology of Scheler is distinct from
those of other phenomenologists in severa! respects:
phenomenology is not tobe based in a method; pheno-
menology must suspend sensory data in intuition; time
originates in the center ofthe self-activity oflife; con-
sciousness presupposes the being of the person; emo-
tive intentionality is pregiven to ali other acts; the ego
is an object of interna! perception; and reality is resis-
tance.
Method. It must first be pointed out that the noetic-
noematic bipolarity of act-consciousness and the con-
sciousness of noematic meaning-contents conjoined
with the former allows two approaches to lay bare
the structure of consciousness: it is possible to investi-
gate its noetic INTENTIONALITY or to make the meaning-
contents of the NOEMA conjoined with it subject to
investigation. The noetic approach is referred to by
Scheler as act phenomenology, the noematic one as
phenomenologyoffacts. The former shows "how" phe-
nomena are given, the latter "that" they are given. How-
 MAX SCHELER
ever, while using either approach it is not possible to
exclude its correlative opposite entirely.
At the basis ofScheler's project !ies the phenomen-
ological tenet "that" Being, as ultimate background
of all meaning-contents, is pregiven to the cognition
(Erkenntnis) ofthem. There is no cognition, including
phenomenological cognition, without the pregivenness
of the meaning of Being, including the meaning of its
ultimate incomprehensibility. The pregivenness to cog-
nition must not be understood as sequential but as in
the order offoundation. From this it follows that a phe-
nomenon is a fact of consciousness or consciousness
is "of'' facts. A fact is given as the content of an iru-
mediate intuition. Such phenomena are, for instance,
spatiality, temporality, materiality, relationality, thing-
ness, aliveness, the divine, or the absolute.
Methods, observations, and definitions, says
Scheler, presuppose that which is to be found or clari-
fied by them. This is why "that" something is spatial,
temporal, material, or alive is neither observable nor
definable as "something" to be uncovered by a method.
Phenomena are therefore "pure" facts. The fact of spa-
tiality would allow an observation ora method only to
the extent that a particular extended configuration of
a thing- say, something triangular- is in question.
But the "fact" of the spatiality of something triangu-
lar or the "fact" of the aliveness of something alive
are already intuited, a priori meaning-contents devoid
of sense experience. They are, as Scheler also put it,
"there" (da). This does not exclude the thereness of
illusions occurring in the field of intuition, on which
Scheler focused agreat deal. An illusion occurs, for ex-
ample, when something is apprehended as displaying
the phenomenon of aliveness when in reality it is not
ali ve. Such illusions are distinct from logica! errors.
Descriptions of intuited facts are always found early
in his numerous treatises, such as those of shame, the
tragic, repentance, and resentment. Concern ing the fact
of the divine in consciousness, he developed an entire
Wesensphiinomenologie der Religion. Ali pure facts
not only have in common that they can neither be
observed nor subjected to methods, but also - con-
trary to facts of the LIFEWORLD and facts in science
- they are indifferent to truth and falsity. This is be-
cause intuited facts are pre-logical. They are only in-
tuitable or "seen" in a phenomenological attitude or
"Bewusstseinseinstellung." Scheler was aware that in
631
this respect his phenomenology was akin to psychic
techniques in BUDDHISM. Granted that phenomena are
pure facts in the inception of intuition rather than the
result of a method, the question of whether or not the
senses play any part in intuition must be addressed.
Sensibility. Scheler's independence of the early
phenomenological movement is further substantiated
by the role that he assigns to sense data. Since intu-
ition is much richer than sense experience, it cannot
be maintained that the latter is primordial, let alone
that it is the only experience a person can have. The
structure of the lifeworld conceptualized first, albeit
not in a phenomenological sense, in 1885 by Scheler's
teacher RudolfEucken (1846-1926), who called it the
"workaday world" (die Arbeitswelt), and renamed in
1908 by Scheler as the natural world view (niiturliche
Weltanschauung), is given prior to the functions ofthe
senses. Only those sensory data come into play that the
structure ofthe lifeworld "allows." This also pertains to
the "milieux" of animals. The ro le of sense data is said
to be a vehicle of an organism 's reactions to preserve
its life. Showing this to be the case, sense experience
is no conditionat all for facts of intuition. On the con-
trary, assigning sense experience a foundational role
for intuition resists a scrupulously phenomenological
approach.
Time. The phenomena of spatiality and temporality
must not be confined to human beings alone. Rather,
they are generated in two powers of any living be-
ing: self-movement and selfalteration. Spatiality and
temporality take their root neither from the lived body
nor from consciousness and intuition. They stern, like
reality itself, from a four-dimensional manifold of vi-
tal energy, called "Drang," meaning "impulsion," in
which they are not yet separated. The state of impul-
sion is pure, ftuctuating variation (Wechsel). There is
no substance as a bearer of it and it may be compared to
wave patterns of atomic physical energy whose reality,
according to Scheler, also rests on impulsion. Four-
dimensional impulsion suffuses ali entities. It reaches
also into the visual field of humans where parallels,
as in four-dimensional geometry, do not exist. In the
visual field itself, for instance, parallel railroad tracks
"meet" at the horizon.
lmpulsion is both individual and universal. In every
one of its phases of ftuctuating variations, it is simul-
taneously "becoming and un-becoming" (Werden und
632 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Entwerden), a character translucent in the continuous
simultaneous decline and growth ofliving beings. The
following two laws obtain: al! movement issues from
impulsion and is, in principle, reversible, even if only
in thought; ali alteration issuesfi·om impulsion and is,
in principle, irreversible. This allows any fluctuating
variation in practice to be interpretable as either re-
versible movement or as irreversible alteration. Seen
as reversible, it turns into spatiality and, in the end,
objective SPACE. Seen as irreversible alteration it turns
into temporality and, in the end, objective TIME. For
instance, one can interpret the fluctuating variation of
lights and shadows under a tree exposed to sun and
varia bie winds as either reversible movement of specks
of shadows and light, oras irreversible alterations of a
particular surface.
Granted that impulsion propels life into a continu-
ous becoming-unbecomingprocess in any ofits phases
and that space and time are not separated in it, the
phenomenological constitution of time-consciousness
must take its root in impulsion. This may be condensed
in the following way. Impulsion breaks up into three
main drives: propagation, growth (power), and nutri-
tion. Its fluctuating variation divides the drives into
reversible movement (spatiality) and irreversible al-
teration (temporality): what in drive-life is more "ur-
gent" becomes "near" and "first"; what is less urgent
becomes "distant" and "!ater." The main drives are
conjoined with three germ layers of vertebrate organ-
isms (ectoderm, mesoderm, endoderm) in the gasto-
cele stages of an embryo. By dint of complex rami-
fications with other drives, this plays a basic role in
the temporalization of passions, needs, and interests,
as well as perception, which is, accordingly, always
drive-conditioned.
The first phenomenological experience of spatial-
ization as detached from temporalization is a vague
about-awareness (das Herumbewusstsein), while the
first phenomenological experience of temporaliza-
tion as detached from spatialization consists in pre-
conscious runoffs of phases "filled" with phantasmic
images in impulsion and drives. Scheler stresses that
living beings do not li ve "in" objective space and time.
First and foremost, they spatialize and temporalize
themselves out of the vital energy of impulsion.
The passage of impulsion into alteration reaches
consciousness in the form of"absolute," not objective,
time. Absolute time is characterized by three qualities:
( 1) simultaneous congruence of meanings and their
phases, (2) continuous becoming-unbecoming, and (3)
the runoff of absolute time "in" transitions between
any A turning into a B; the latter implies the transition
between one meaning and another in consciousness, or
between potency and actualization. The absolute time
oftransitions also applies to protentions turning into re-
tentions. Timeconsciousness may be described, there-
fore, as absolute self-temporalization of transitions in
the flux ofbecoming and unbecoming meanings locked
in their phases, ali propelled by impulsion.
Absolute time is also latent in the continuous tran-
sitions from aging toward death. This holds, a fortiori,
forthe shifting in consciousness ofthe horizons ofpast,
present, and future. In its early stages, consciousness
has before it an endless future horizon. A small hori-
zon of the past begins to grow and grow until both
horizons are in relative balance in midlife phases and
increasingly squeeze the present between them. From
this stage on, the future horizon retracts by closing in
on the present, while the horizon ofthe past gets wider
and wider, pressing against both the present and future
until their resistance collapses. The shifting dynamics
of the three transient time horizons is a fact of time-
consciousness. Aging runs off in absolute time. Dying
is absolute ending "in" absolute time and not in ob-
jective time. Aging and dying are not to be seen in
an empirica! experience of objective time. In contrast
to absolute time, in objective time, MEANINGS and their
phases are separable. Everyday meaning-contents such
as plans are as open to schedule changes as physical
events can be assigned new time frames in the sciences.
Objective time, says Scheler, may be an enormous il-
lusion in the human species. StiU, measurable time is
indispensable for human progress.
Person. Scheler tells us in the 1913 Jahrbuch that
the being of the person is the foundation of ali inten-
tiona! acts. This implies that the sphere of the person
is subject neither to absolute time-consciousness nor
to objective time. Rather, person is "supratemporal."
As such, "person" is the form of consciousness. Each
act of consciousness is different in essence from any
other act. He declares that especially feelings as well
as volitions and religious acts must not fali victim to
the traditional privileging of rational acts and reason
in the wake ofthe Cartesian cogito. For this and other
 MAX SCHELER
reasons he branded the concepts of a consciousness
in general and a transcendental ego as "evident non-
sense." Both concepts overlook the being and the self-
value ofthe person permeating ali acts. More precisely,
what is called person exists solely in the "execution"
ofany and ali possible acts. The person is no substance
of acts. The execution of acts, however, is different in
each person by virtue ofthe "qualitative direction" acts
take in each different person. The individual person ex-
ecutes his or her own existence, a point foreshadowing
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S idea of existence.
Emotive intentionality. Ali perception, willing, and
thinking are based on the experience ofvalues, a tenet
ofScheler's value-ethics. That every act is suffused by
the person and that the person varies in each different
act by virtue of said qualitative direction encompasses,
a fortiori, emotive intentionality, that is, acts of EMO-
TION or feeling and their correlates: values. VALUE is
the pre-rational, intentiona! referent or the noema of
emotive intentionality. It hinges on the act of loving.
Like colors, values are independent of their substrates.
The value of beauty may pertain to a landscape or a
musical work of art, just as the sky or a cloth can be
blue. Ali values are ordered in a spectrum of fi ve as-
cending ranks: the values ofwhat is bodily agreeable or
not; pragmatic values of what is useful or not; the life
values ranging from noble (edel) to faulty (schlecht);
the rank of the mental values of beauty, justice, and
cognition oftruth; and the rank ofthe holy and unholy.
Emotive intentionality consists in the act of prefer-
ring higher (or lower) values to given ones. Preferring
them is nota rational act of choosing them; rather, it is a
spontaneous leaning toward something. This "leaning
toward" has no rational reasons. lts seat is the heart, the
"ordo amoris" whose "reasons" ha ve a logic of their
own. In this, Scheler followed "le coeur a ses raisons"
of Pascal. Good and evi! do not belong to the above
five value-ranks. They are not intentiona! referents of
emotive intentionality. They emerge during the realiza-
tions of preferring higher (lower) values and "ride on
the back" ofthese acts. They are purely temporal and,
phenomenologically, an emotive instance of passive
synthesis. As such, they are not objects.
Ego. Since a phenomenology of consciousness-of
presupposes for Scheler the being ofthe person, it fol-
lows that ali consciousness, be it human, divine, or
fictional, must be in person. The EGO is no founda-
633
tion in the make-up of the human being, nor is it a
point of departure of acts. This Schelerian assessment
ofthe ego, also made in the 1913 Jahrbuch, appears to
be the very opposite of the foundational ro le the ego
has for Husserl in the same Jahrbuch. Scheler locates
the ego in terms of fi ve descending steps. ( 1) The ego
is shown in the book on sympathy to emerge around
the age of two and against "pregiven" alter egos. (2)
Pure intuition in the sphere ofthe person alone encom-
passes interna! and externa! intuition. Pure intuition is
not linked to the presence of a lived body. (3) In real-
ity, however, the ego belongs to a lived BODY, which
spawns three separate act-qualities: sense perception,
remembering, and expecting, ali encompassed by pure
intuition. (4) The three act-qualities ha ve as intentiona!
referents "being-present" (hic et nunc), "being-past,"
and "being-future." Like protentions, retentions, and
the fleeting present between them, these referents do
not occur in objective time. The being-present as in-
tertwined with retentions and protentions yields the
division between externa! and interna! perception. (5)
The ego is constituted in interna! perception as its "ob-
ject." But this object appears neither as extended nor
as sequential because past and present experiences as
well as future expectations are "intercontained." The
ego 's intercontainment (das lneinandersein) is the ulti-
mate object of the acts of interna! perception, whereas
those of externa! perception is "pure expanse" (das
A useinandersein ).
The traditional Cartesian dualism between non-
extension and extension does not hold. While the ego
can be pure, as in states of personal ingatheredness or
self-communion, and while in such cases the lived body
becomes less important, it can also "spread" through-
out the lived body and undergo the transition from pure
ego to a lived body-ego. This occurs in many human
conditions such as in extreme physical exhaustion, in-
toxication, and gluttony. It may be, says Scheler, that
in a dreamless sleep the ego disappears altogether un tii
it begins to resuffuse the lived body during waking up.
Reality. While the concept of reality weighs heav-
ily on Sche]er's ]ater PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, it
must be mentioned that it is, in part, a result of a cri-
tique of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. This
reduction must not center in a method, but in a "tech-
nique" of nullifying (aufheben) the factor of reality
in the lifeworld so that pure phenomena can appear
634 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
in consciousness. As Scheler sees it, Husserl's under-
standing ofthe reduction is not radical enough. Instead,
he proposes to eliminate the very root that posits real-
ity. This root is the capacity to posit reality: impulsion.
While consciousness can only posit whatness, it or the
mind is "impotent" (ohnmachtig) to posit reality. A
temporary nullification of impulsion can be achieved
only by the technique of the "phenomenological atti-
tude" mentioned above. It alone promises a momentary
access to "pure intuition" offacts severed from the re-
ality oflifeworld and the world of science. Scheler also
envisioned a reversal ofsaid technique by momentarily
suspending the sphere of the person instead of impul-
sion in order to "see" the essence of impulsion. He
called this technique "dionysian reduction."
Throughout his work, Scheler developed his own
phenomenology of intuition, which was not an appli-
cation of Husserl 's method. As increasing attention is
devoted to his work, he is increasingly recognized for
his many brilliant insights into the nature ofthe human
person as a whole.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Barber, Michael. D. Guardian of Dialogue: Max Scheler s
Phenomenology, Sociology ofKnowledge, and Philosophy
ofLove. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1993.
Bershshady, Harold J., ed. Max Scheler on Feeling, Knowing,
and Valuing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Blosser, Philip. Scheler s Critique of Kant s Ethics. Athens,
OH: Ohio University Press, 1995.
Frings, Manfred S. "Der Ordo Amoris bei Max Scheler."
Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 20 ( 1966), 57-
76.
- . Person und Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wert-
seins. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
- . "Max Scheler: Rarely Seen Complexities of Phenomen-
ology." In Phenomenology in Perspective. Ed. F. Joseph
Smith. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, 32-53.
- . "Drang und Geist." In Grundprobleme der grossen
Philosophen. Ed. Josef Speck. Gottingen: UTB Vanden-
hoeck, 1973, 9-42.
- . Zur Phănomenologie der Lebensgemeinschaft. Ein Ver-
such mit Max Scheler. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain,
1971.
- . "Toward the Constitution of the Unity of the Human
Person." In Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology. Ed.
Wolfe Mays and S. C. Brown. London: Macmillan, 1972,
68-80; 110-13.
- . "Husserl and Scheler: Two Views on lntersubjectiv-
ity." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
9 (1978), 143-9.
- . "Time Structure in Social Communality." In Phenomen-
ology and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. Ed.
Kah Kyung Cho. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 85-
93.
Gabel, Michael. Intentionalităt des Geistes. Der phănomen­
ologische Denkansatz bei Max Scheler. Leipzig: Benno,
1991.
Good, Paul, ed. Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen der
Philosophie. Bem: Francke, 1975.
Kelly, Eugene. "Ordo Amoris: The Moral Vision of Max
Scheler." Listening 21 ( 1986), 226-42.
Leonardy, Heinz. Liebe und Person. Max Schelers Versuch
eines "phănomenologischen "Personalismus. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
Luther, Arthur R. Persons in Love: A Study ofMax Scheler s
"Wesen und Formen der Sympathie." The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1972.
Ranly, Emest W. Scheler s Phenomenology of Community.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Scheler, Max. Gesammelte Werke. Ed. Maria Scheler and
Manfred S. Frings. Bem: Francke, 1954-86; Bonn: Bou-
vier, 1986.
- , English translations ofworks by Max Scheler are listed in
Max Scheler on Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing. Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1992.
Schutz, Alfred. "Scheler's Theory oflntersubjectivity and the
General Thesis ofthe Alter Ego." In his Collected Papers
!: The Problem of Social Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 150-79.
- . "Max Scheler's Philosophy." In his Collected Papers III:
Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy. Ed. Ilse Schutz.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.
Shimonisse, Eiichi. Die Phănomenologie und das Problem
der Grundlegung der Ethik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1971.
Spader, Peter H. "The Primacy ofthe Heart: Scheler's Chal-
lenge to Phenomenology." Philosophy Today 29 (1985),
223-9.
-."A Change ofHeart: Scheler 's Ordo Amoris, Repentance,
and Rebirth." Listening 21 ( 1986), 188-96.
Stikkers, Kenneth. "Phenomenology as Psychic Technique
of Non-Resistance." In Phenomenology in Practice and
Theory: Essays for Herbert Spiegelberg. Ed. William S.
Hamrick. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Vacek, Edward, S.J. "Personal Development and the Ordo
Amoris." Listening 21 (1986), 197-209.
- . "Scheler's Evolving Methodologies." Analecta Husser-
liana 20. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1987
Wojtyla, Karol [Pope John Paul II]. Primat des Geistes:
Philosophische Schriften. Ed. Juliusz Stroynowski. Intro-
duction by Manfred S. Frings. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1980.
MANFRED FRINGS
DePaul University
FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING
(1775--1854) Schelling does not engage in "pheno-
menology" in the senses of either HEGEL or EDMUND
HUSSERL, but he encounters problems !ater confronted
 FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING
by MARTIN HEIDEGGER as the latter tums away from the
"phenomenology" he had earlier embraced.
Hegel's Phănomenologie des Geistes (Phenomen-
ology of spirit, 1807) is an investigation that purports
to lead the reader along a path compellingly ordered
by dialectica! logic, from a presuppositionless and
immediately available natural standpoint to sophisti-
cated positions from which an "absolute knowing" is
possible. This "absolute knowing" is then articulated
through the unfolding of the Hegelian system in Wis-
senschafi der Logik (Science of logic, 1812-16) and
the philosophies of nature and spirit (Enzyklopiidie
der philosophischen Wissenschafien [Encyclopedia of
philosophical sciences, 3rd. ed., 1830]). Hegel intro-
duces his Phanomenologie des Geistes in part as a
reaction to Schelling's attempts, in such early works
as System des transzendentalen Idealismus (System of
transcendental idealism, 1800) and Darstellung meines
Systems der Philosophie (Exhibition of my system of
philosophy, 1801 ), simply to begin from an absolute
standpoint, without showing how that standpoint is at-
tained. In Hegel 's view, Schelling's absolute appears
"as though from a pistol."
From as early as 1795, in his Philosophische Briefe
iiber Dogmatimus und Kriticismus (Philosophicallet-
ters concerning dogmatism and skepticism), Schelling
insists that there could be no need for any preliminary
discipline of the sort Hegelian phenomenology was
supposed to be, arguing that problems arise not with
attaining the absolute, but only with escaping it: "we
would all agree concern ing the absolute ifwe never left
its sphere." Even following the appearance of Hegel's
Phănomenologie, Schelling never acknowledges the
need for a discipline serving its purpose.
Husserlian phenomenology differs most strongly
from other philosophical endeavors in its reliance
on description of experiences rather than on abstract
or theoretical argument. Schelling, however, engages
throughout his career in what the young Heidegger
- still in his own "phenomenological" days- calls
"theory without phenomenology," i.e., rational con-
structions not grounded in descriptions of human ex-
periences.
Unlike both Hegel and Husserl, Schelling is con-
cerned not with experiences that human beings do or
could have, but instead with experiences attributed hy-
pothetically to an absolute spirit attempting to come to
635
know itself. In displacing human experiences from the
heart ofhis system, Schelling opposes phenomenology
in both the Hegelian and Husserlian senses.
If there is a positive connection between Schelling
and a form of phenomenology, it is with the form
projected by the young Heidegger. Just as Schelling,
throughout his career, attempts to reconcile the con-
fiicting demands of freedom and system- to develop
a system that would be comprehensive without denying
the latitude and fiexibility required by human freedom
- the young Heidegger envisages a phenomenology
that would reconcile the conflict ing demands of tem-
porality and foundationalism- an account that would
be strictly scientific without denying or distorting what
THEODORE KISIEL has called "the evasive immediacy of
the human condition."
Heidegger looks positively to Schelling only af-
ter he abandons his "scientific" project, and with
it his description of his own work as "phenomen-
ological." Although he alludes to a Schelling ti-
tie - Philosophische Untersuchungen iiber das We-
sen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusam-
menhăngenden Gegenstănde (Philosophical investiga-
tions into the essence of human freedom, 1809)- in
naming his 1930 lecture course "On the Essence of
Human Freedom," Schelling is not considered in that
course. In 1936 and 1941, however, he devotes courses
explicitly to the work recalled by his earlier title, de-
scribing that work as "the peak of the metaphysics
of German idealism" and its author as "the genuinely
creative and most broadly provocative (am weitesten
ausgreifende) thinker of this entire epoch of German
philosophy."
Schelling's central contribution, according to Hei-
degger, is his completion ofthe transformation of"the
idealism ofthe 'I think (ich stelle vor)' of Descartes to
the higher idealism of 'I am free,' to the idealism of
freedom," a transformation stimulated by KANT's Kritik
der praktischen Vernunfi (Critique of practica! reason,
1788), but also retarded by the problematic relation,
in Kant's thought, between the practica! employment
of reason and the theoretical. Schelling does not rec-
ognize that this transformation entails ( 1) a shift of
attention from the absolute sought by the German ide-
alists ·to the finitude that is "the essence of all being"
(das Wesen a/les Seyns), and thus (2) the abandon-
ment of metaphysics (and !ater of "phenomenology,"
636 ENCYCLOPEDJA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
as foundational science). Nevertheless, that Schelling's
thought was "shattered" by his own work is, in Heideg-
ger's view, evidence ofhis decisive importance within
the history ofWestern philosophy.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bowie, Andrew. Schelling and Modern Philosophy: An In-
troduction. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Holz, Harald. Spekulation und Faktizităt. Zum Freiheits-
Begriffdes mittleren und Spăten Schelling. Bonn: Bouvier,
1970.
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger s Being and
Time. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Schulz, Wa1ter. Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus
in der Spătphilosophie Schellings. 2nd ed. Pfullingen:
Neske, 1972.
Tilliette, Xavier. Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir. 2
vols. Paris: J. Vrin, 1970.
White, Alan. Schelling: An lntroduction ta the System of
Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.
ALANWHITE
Williams College
ALFRED SCHUTZ Schutz was horn in Vienna
on April 13, 1899 and, after service in the Austrian
army in World War I, he attended the University of
Vienna where he received a doctorate in law in 1921,
concentrating chiefly in international law. Upon re-
ceiving his degree he became executive secretary of
the Austrian Banker's Association, joining the private
bank of Reitler and Company in 1929 - remaining
with the company when he emigrated with his family
to France in 1938 and to the United States in 1940. In
1943 he received a part-time teaching position at the
newly formed Graduate Faculty of Politica] and Social
Science at the New School for Social Research. It was
not until 1956, however, that he was able to devote
himself to the responsibilities of a full-time academic
position.
Schutz's intellectual interests and studies were mul-
tifarious, as can be seen in the collection of early
writings edited by ILJA SRUBAR under the title Theo-
rie der Lebensformen ( 1981, subsequently translated
under the title Life Forms and Meaning Strucures).
Between 1921 and 1929, however, he developed the
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
central focus for his many interests in the sciences and
the humanities. There are numerous factors that con-
tribute to that focus, outstanding among them being
the inftuence ofhis teachers Hans Kelsen (1881-1973)
and Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) in LAW and ECO-
NOMICS. Study of the former suggested to Schutz the
need to find a way from the normative discipline of
law to its application and underpinnings in the HUMAN
SCIENCES and then to the underlying "subjective" inter-
pretations of social, legal, and economic phenomena;
study of the latter, especially with respect to the anal-
ysis of impersonal economic and legal mechanisms,
suggested to Schutz the need to revise and develop
anew and more broadly the ideas of subjectivity and
understanding, and, after intensive study of the work
ofMAX WEBER, the way in which mutual understanding
among human beings comes about in the first place.
This focus ofSchutz's studies, guiding him throughout
his life, was first formally developed in Der sinnhafte
Aujbau der sozialen Welt (The meaningful strucure of
the social world, 1932) and still significantly informs
the project and plan of his last, uncompleted book,
Strukturen der Lebenswelt (The structures of the life-
world, posthumously completed by his student THOMAS
LUCKMANN in 1979/1984 ).
Schutz soon realized that Weber's work, important
as it was, could not adequately account for how the
self-understanding and self-interpretation that proceed
in common sense can be made into the subject matter of
the social sciences and amenable to theoretical inves-
tigation. To develop this problem Schutz sought inspi-
ration in HENRI BERGSON's examination of the duree or
inner duration characterizing the life of consciousness.
Here he found the means for bypassing the difficulty of
having to begin with concepts to disc! o se the basic na-
ture ofthe relationship ofl and Thou and its typifying
(otherwise taken for granted by social scientists such
as Weber), which, while not the domain of the social
sciences, nonetheless defines the very daily world in
which they locate their problems.
In short, how is legitimate scientific knowledge pos-
sible of the world defined by everyday, nonscientific
life in the natural attitude? The solution for Schutz was
to find a way to proceed from the inner duration to the
common, typifying I-Thou world ofthings and events
that comprises the foundations of everyday working
life. Schutz's first attempt to deal with the problem
 ALFRED SCHUTZ
was in terms of"life forms," a concept derived as much
from WILHELM DILTHEY as from MAX SCHELER and Berg-
son. It was also in this connection, in the late 1920s,
that Schutz first began to formulate the problem ofrel-
evance, which was inaccessible from the standpoint
of the concept of life forms, and his own ideas about
the sociality ofthe I-Thou relationship. These were to
become the central themes of Der sinnhafte Aujbau,
which required a more reliable foundation than that
provided by Bergson. That foundation was found in
the work of EDMUND HUSSERL.
Quite early on, possibly in his university days,
Schutz had been encouraged to read Husserl by FE-
LIX KAUFMANN. However, it was only from about 1928
on that Schutz turned to the intensive study of Husserl:
Husserl's lectures on the consciousness of inner time
( Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeit-
bewusstseins, 1928), then the newly published book
on transcendental logic (Formale und transzenden-
tale Logik, 1929), afterwards Ideen zu einer reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologische Philosophie
1 ( 1913 ), and finally the early Logische Untersuchun-
gen (1900---190 1) - all of which he read and dis-
cussed, section by section, with Felix Kaufmann. In
a very short time Schutz had thoroughly mastered the
phenomenology of Husserl, which can be seen in his
mid-1930s reviews of Formale und transzendentale
Logik and Meditations cartesiennes ( 1931) and his de-
tai led review of Grundlegung der Lehre vom sozialen
Verband (Foundations ofthe theory of social organiza-
tion, of 1932) by his friend from Japan TOMOO OTAKA.
Because the latter work was largely based only on
Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen, Schutz severely
criticized it by showing that it is rather in the context
of Husserl's !ater transcendental phenomenology that
the necessary philosophical underpinning for clarify-
ing the constituting of social organizations with respect
to legal, economic and politica! theory may be found.
To be sure, Schutz had already suggested this in his
extensive analyses ofthe components and structures of
sociality in Der sinnhafte Aufbau, published the same
year as Otaka's book, and in which Schutz either sup-
planted or reinforced Bergson 's insights with Husserl 's
in coming to grips with the phenomena of I and Thou
and the constituting of subjective and objective MEAN-
ING in a rich diversity of situations in the intersubjective
everyday world of working.
637
Alfred Schutz had as many criticisms of Husserl
as of Weber, but as the review of Otaka shows, he
strongly held the belief that Husserl was right about
the transcendental dimension of human experience in
the social world. To be sure, his interests were often
different, and he limited himself to certain problems,
as did his friend Felix Kaufmann, and as Kaufmann
noted, deliberately to limit oneselfto certain problems
does not mean to be limited. Thus, for example, in
Der sinnhafte Aufbau Schutz limited himselfto certain
problems in the psychology and sociology of the ev-
eryday world ofworking, but always within the frame-
work of transcendenta[ CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY.
This strategy persisted throughout his last writings.
Thus Schutz writes that the aim of his book, "to
analyze the meaning-phenomena in mundane social-
ity, does not require the acquisition of transcenden-
tal experience beyond [mundane sociality] and there-
fore a further remaining in the transcendental pheno-
menological reduction." Referring to Husserl 's "Nach-
wort zu meinen 'Ideenlldots "' ( 1930), Schutz explains
what he means by saying that he is not concerned
with the phenomena of constitution in the transcen-
dentally reduced sphere, but instead with their "corre-
sponding correlates in the natural attitude"- "corre-
lates" because for every proposition in transcendental
phenomenology there is a correlative one in psychol-
ogy and sociology, but the converse need not be the
case. He then proceeds to formulate a transcendental-
phenomenological eidetic account of the conscious-
ness of inner time, applying the results to the clar-
ification of the natural attitude not as transcenden-
tallyphenomenologically reduced, but as p~ychologi­
cally-phenomenogically reduced. Schutz then devel-
ops a psychological, and by extension, a sociologica!
phenomenology of great originality consistent with a
transcendental phenomenology, but actually a CONSTI-
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE.
Moreover, because not every proposition in a tran-
scendental phenomenology is included in phenomen-
ological psychology or sociology, it is possible to pro-
ceed without having to maintain the transcendental
phenomenological attitude. In this context, too, Schutz
locates much of his criticism of Husserl: namely, that
not every proposition about intersubjectivity and the
ego, about behavior and action in the taken-for-granted
world of working and its systems of relevance and
638 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
typifying, is included in the transcendental phenomen-
ology.
At the same time, this signifies that some method-
ological procedures in the social sciences must be de-
veloped that have their own warrant and legitimacy
because they deal with "correlates in the natural atti-
tude" of subjective and objective meanings of action,
even though set in the context of transcendental pheno-
menology. Like the natural scientist, the social scientist
deals with theoretical constructs, but rather "ofthe sec-
ond degree," for in contriving them the social scientist
must make allowance for the interpretations that social
actors ha ve ofthemselves and of each other in the daily
world ofworking. Schutz was able then to further cir-
cumscribe the limits of transcendental phenomenology
especially in "The Problem of Transcendental Inter-
subjectivity in Husserl" ( 1957), as well as in essays
concerning methodology.
Schutz sent a copy of Der sinnhafte Aujbau to
Husserl, who responded enthusiastically. Through the
auspices of Felix Kaufmann, Schutz met Husserl for
the first time in 1932, and he continued to visit Husserl
three or four times a year up to Christmas of 193 7,
shortly before Husserl 's death. It was at Husserl 's re-
quest that Schutz wrote his reviews of Meditations
cartesiennes and Formale und transzendentale Logik.
He also heard Husserllecture in Vienna in May of 1935
and again in Prague in November of 1935, when he
watched Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschqften
und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie ( 1936) take
shape, supplying new impetus and ideas for the focus
of his work on the lifeworld. We may say with ARON
GURWJTSCH that Schutz's work is truly re1ated to this
last phase of Husserl 's thought.
With his emigration to the United States and in-
troduction to academic life at the Graduate Facu1ty,
Schutz increased his knowledge ofthe works of Amer-
ican sociologists and anthropologists, finding a shared
concern for basic social theory as well as important
ideas for its philosophical underpinnings. At the same
time he became acquainted with the work of WILLIAM
JAMES, John Dewey (1859-1952), Alfred North White-
head (1861-1947), and George Herbert Mead (1863-
1931) among many others; and at the instigation of
MARVIN FARBER, he became an editor and contributor
to the newly foundedjournal, Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research. Atthis time Schutz commenced
to address the academic communty in lectures, first at
Harvard and then elsewhere, as he steadily gained a
wider audience in philosophy and sociology. By the
mid-1940s Schutz had begun to develop in detail some
ofthe ideas he had already spawned in the !ater 1930s
on the social person; the lifeworld as the working world
of everyday life with its empirica! and pure typifyings;
and onfinite provinces ofmeaning and their correlative
"multiple realities," which, along with his concepts of
sign and symbol, provided him with the conceptual
means to unify his focus with respect to law, eco-
nomics, LITERATURE, painting, MUSIC, phantasms, and
dreams.
While his essays "The Stranger" ( 1944) and "The
Homecomer" (1945) deepened the connections be-
tween American sociOLOGY and his own attempts at the
phenomenological grounding of sociology, in the late
1940s and early 1950s Schutz extended and enlarged
his investigations into the problems of intersubjectiv-
ity and relevance in both sociology- e.g., in "Making
Music Together" ( 1951) and "Mozart and the Philoso-
phers" (1956)-and philosophy, e.g., in "Equality and
the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1957),
"Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics" ( 1957-58),
and 'Tiresias or Our Knowledge of Future Events"
( 1959).
By the late 1950s Schutz decided to puii together
in three volumes of Collected Papers some thirty pub-
lished essays displaying various approaches to his fo-
cus of thought achieved from the late 1930s. He also
realized that the focus required a systematic presenta-
tion impossible in essay form. Shortly before his death,
he began planning a large work. However, the precari-
ous state ofhis health prevented him from carrying out
this task, leaving only outlines and plans for analysis of
both old and new themes, working papers, and instruc-
tions for completion of the work; as mentioned, the
task was eventually completed by Thomas Luckmann.
Alfred Schutz died on May 20, 1959.
Alfred Schutz was a remarkable and powerful, at
times mesmerizing, teacher who brought out the best
in his students, some ofwhom were able to become his
collaborators and explore in original ways the frontiers
of social and philosophical thought that he opened up.
In his teaching as well as in his scientific research he
sought to produce a systematic phenomenology and so-
ciology ofthe lifeworld, detailing and analyzing its spe-
 ALFRED SCHUTZ
cific structures and interna! workings (with the "epoche
of the natural attitude"), its various principles of orga-
nization; and its shifts of accents of reality in various
provinces of meaning with respect to the "paramount
reality" of the working world of daily life. Moreover,
he provided a large body of supporting and substan-
tiating phenomenological analyses with his "method
of ideal types" reconstructing the typifications of daily
life by exploring the typifying intentionalities of the
lifeworld, revealing their phenomenological genesis
from pre-predicative grounds to self-conscious gener-
alizations and formalizations grounding what MAURICE
NATANSON has termed an "epistemology of the social
world" that is of great importance for the various so-
cial and cultural sciences.
Schutz's critica! studies revised Bergson's idea of
dud:e in light ofHusserl's idea ofinnertime; Bergson's
notion of memory and shifting accents of reality was
broadened and redeveloped in terms of James 's subuni-
verses ofreality; and both Weber's notion ofsubjective
and objective meaning and Mead's notion of the ma-
nipulatory sphere of action as core of the paramount
reality of daily life were carried to their radical extreme
when redeveloped in terms of the typicality of social
ro les, the stock of knowledge at hand, and the moti-
vations of actions. Schutz's published correspondence
with Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), ARON GURWJTSCH,
and Eric Voegelin ( 190 1-1985) is especially important
for new insights into sociology and phenomenology as
well as for revealing the bearing ofhis criticism.
In brief, if Aron Gurwitsch may be said to have
sought the principles of organization of the noematic
characterization of the sociocultural world, Alfred
Schutz sought the principles of organization of its
correlative, constituting noetic characterization. At his
death, his work was not just incomplete in a negative
sense, but also in the positive sense ofproviding a pro-
gram for furture work. The focus of his life's work
included tasks that he realized were still unfulfilled,
such as developing in the spirit of Leibniz a "logic of
everyday thinking" that sti li remains a major requisite
for establishing the foundations of the phenomenology
and sociology of the lifeworld. Yet it is as much in
the accomplished work as in clear sight of the unful-
filled tasks that his greatness and continuing inftuence
in many different fields lie.
639
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Algarra, Martin Manuel. Materiales para el estudio de Alfred
Schutz. Navarra: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Univer-
sidad de Navarra, 1991.
Embree, Lester, ed. Worldly Phenomenology: The Continu-
ing Infiuence ofAlfred Schutz on North American Human
Science. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced research in
Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1988
- , ed. Alfred Schutz :5 '"Sociologica! Aspects of Litera ture··:
Text Construction and Complementary Essays. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming.
Gurwitsch, Aran. The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1964.
List, Elisabeth, and Ilja Srubar, eds. Alfred Schutz. Neue
Beitrăge zur rezeption seines Werkes. Studien zur Oester-
reichischen Philosophie, Voi. XII ( 1988).
Natanson, Maurice, ed. Phenomenology and Social Reality.
Essays in Memory ofAlfred Schutz. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1970.
- . Anonymity: A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986.
Schutz, Alfred. Der sinnhajie Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine
Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie. Vienna: Julius
Springer, 1932 (2nd ed. 1960; rpt. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1974; The Phenomenology o{the Social World.
Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1967
- . Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. Ed.
Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
- . Collected Papers 1/: Studies in Social Theory. Ed. Arvid
Broadersen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
- . Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Phi-
losophy. Ed. 1. Schutz.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
- . Refiections an the Problem ofRelevance. Ed. Richard M.
Zaner. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970.
- . On Phenomenology and Social Relations.Ed. Helmut R.
Wagner. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- . Alfred Schiitz/Talcott Parsons. Zur Theorie sozialen Han-
delns. Ein Briefwechsel. Ed. and trans. Walter M. Spron-
del. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977; The Theory o{
Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and
Talcott Parsons. Ed. Richard Grathoff. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1978.
- , and Thorrias Luckmann. Strukturen der Lebenswelt. 2
vals. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979--84; The Struc-
tures of the Life-World. Voi. 1 trans. Richard M. Zaner
and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. Evanston, IL: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1973; Voi. 2 trans. Richard M. Zaner
and David J. Parent. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1983.
- . Theorie der Lebensformen. Ed. and trans. Ilja Srubar.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981; Life Forms and
Meaning Structure. Trans. Helmut R. Wagner. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.
- . Alfred Schiitz. Aron Gurwitsch. Briefwechsel 1939-
1959. Ed. RichardGrathoff. Munich: WilhelmFink, 1985;
Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred
Schutz and Aran Gurwitsch, 1939-1959. Trans. J. Claude
Evans. Bloomington, IL: Indiana University Press, 1989.
- . Collected Papers IV. Ed. Helmut Wagner and George
640 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Psathas in collaboration with Fred Kersten. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv Konstanz. Alfred-Schiitz-
Gedăchtnis Archiv. Universităt Konstanz. Tătigkeits­
bericht. 1988-1992.
Sprondel, Walter M., and Richard Grathoff, eds. Alfred
Schiitz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwis-
senschaften. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1979.
Srubar, Ilja. Kosmion. Die Genese der pragmatischen
Lebenswelttheorie von Alfred Schiitz und ihr anthropol-
ogischer Hintergrund. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1988.
Wagner, Helmut R. Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Schutz's papers are held at Yale's Beineke Library, with
copies in the Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv at the Uni-
versity of Konstanz, Germany, and the Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. at Florida At-
lantic University.
FRED KERSTEN
University of Wisconsin, Green Bay
See NATURAL
SCIENCE, NATURAL SCIENCE IN
PERSPECTIVE and NATURAL SCIENCE IN
CONSTITUTIVE
HERMENEUTICAL PERSPECTIVE
SCIENCE, POLITICAL See POLITICAL SCIENCE.
SCIENCES, HUMAN See HUMAN SCIENCES.
GEORG SIMMEL The German sociologist-
philosopher Georg Simmel is generally remembered,
along with his contemporaries Emile Durkheim ( 1858-
1917), Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936), and MAX WE-
BER (1864-1920), as a founder of modern sociOLOGY
and a major impetus to sociology's elevation to scien-
tific status. Even today's more empirically trained soci-
ologists possess at least a general familiarity with Sim-
mel's theoretical writings on the philosophical foun-
dations of sociology and other matters sociologica!.
The same cannot be said, however, of philosophers.
Even philosophers whose interests lie in contemporary
Continental philosophy have generally failed system-
atically to study Simmel's work. Consequently, highly
interesting and provocative points of contact between
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnlce, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Koclcelmans, William R. McKenTUJ,
Algis Miclcunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
C 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Simmel's philosophy of history and Lebensphiloso-
phie and the phenomenological philosophies of ED-
MUND HUSSERL and MARTIN HEIDEGGER have llOt been
recognized.
Born in Berlin on March 1, 1858, Simmel pur-
sued his university studies and spent most of his pro-
fessional life there. He began his studies in history,
Vălkerpsychologie, and philosophy at Berlin in 1876
and remained there until the completion of his Ha-
bilitationsschrift in 1884. Shortly thereafter he began
teaching as a Privatdozent at the university, and in 1901
he received an appointment as Extraordinarius profes-
sor. Despite his success as a lecturer and an impressive
record ofpublications, Simmel was never promoted to
Ordinarius or fu li professorship at Berlin. He also twice
failed- in 1908 and again in 1915 - to secure a full
professorship at Heidelberg. In 1914, Simme1 accepted
what he considered to be a 1ess desirab1e appointment
to Ordinarius professor at Strasbourg where, after just
four years, he died on September 28, 1918.
Simmel's disappointing academic journey from
Berlin to Strasbourg was perhaps portended in his
student days. His first dissertation - Psychologisch-
ethnographische Studien iiber die Anfiinge der Musik
(Psychological-ethnographic studies concerning the
origin of music)- was rejected by his readers, Her-
mann Ludwig von Helmholtz ( 1821-1894) and Eduard
Zeller (1814-1908), and in order to complete his doc-
toral studies, Simmel submitted a second dissertation,
Das Wesen der Materie nach Kants physiker Mon-
adologie (The essence of matter according to Kant's
physical monadology, 1881 ). Simmel returned to Kant
for his Habilitationsschrift but once again found him-
self beset with difficulties that would delay the com-
pletion of his habilitation until 1884. The problem this
time was Zeller's "unsatisfactory" (ungeniigend)judg-
ment ofSimmel 's Probevorlesung, ajudgment that was
ostensibly based as much on the tone as the substance
of Simmel's response to Zeller's question regarding
the precise location ofthe soul.
It is difficult to explain why a thinker such as
Simmel, whose work shows genuine creativity and
originality, would experience such difficulties in gaiu-
ing acceptance. Some oft-cited reasons are that anti-
Semitism within the German academic community
hampered his efforts to secure an academic position
commensurate with his accomplishments; concerns
 GEORG SIMMEL
over his alleged relativism and aestheticism made it
generally difficult to accept his thought; reservations
about the new field of sociology within philosophical
circles extended by association to Simmel himself for
his involvement in it; and Simmel's "lively and versa-
tile" intellect, as R. G. Collingwood once described it,
was insufficient to overcome questions about the con-
tent and unsystematic character of his philosophical
writings.
Of course, Simmel did not help his own cause when
he intentionally eschewed the scholarly convention of
scrupulously citing the works of contemporaries and
predecessors to whom he might be indebted; deliber-
ately approached objects of study in interdisciplinary
fashion, at times obfuscating the lines of demarcation
between sociology, psychology, and philosophy; and
steadfastly refused to engage in textual exegesis as
an end in itself. Simmel was much less inclined to-
ward scholarship in the strict sense than he was toward
philosophizing about the matters themselves. His goal
was to philosophize not "vis-a-vis books, but vis-a-vis
life," and this effort alone is reason enough to sug-
gest, as MICHAEL LANDMANN has, that SimmeJ fuJfilJed
in his own fashion the injunction issued by Husserlian
phenomenology- "zuriick zu den Sachen selbst."
The matters themselves that carne under Simmel's
gaze represent the broadest conceivable range of cul-
tural phenomena and philosophical issues and included
such "unphilosophical," quotidian topics as coquetry,
music, money, society, FEMINISM, and fashion, as well
as the more traditional philosophical themes of AES-
THETrcs, HISTORY, TIME, and ETHICS. GeneralJy speak-
ing, though, Simmel's philosophical interest was more
focused than it first appears because each investiga-
tion probes the same basic philosophical question, viz.,
what is the precise nature of the relationship between
subjective experiential life and the objective cultural
forms that it engenders and encounters? Objective
forms are rooted in life; they arise from our mental ac-
tivities, yet they bear the sense of autonomous entities
because, once created, they follow their own indepen-
dent logic and momentum, which means we can, and
often do, experience them as opposing life and block-
ing its development. For Simmel, this tension between
life and its creations is the source ofwhat he calls the
"tragedy of eul ture."
The importance Simmel attaches to the objective
641
content or MEANING (Sinn) belonging to expressions of
life defuses any attempt to explain the phenomenon
of cu! ture in terms of NATURALISM and PSYCHOLOGISM,
and at the same time, it provides an unmistakable
bridge connecting him to the phenomenological tradi-
tion. Even though Simmel 's connection with that tradi-
tion has received little attention, it has been noted that
Simmel's sociocultural studies should have a certain
appea1 for phenomenologists, that his approach to so-
cial phenomena is "phenomenological in method and
spirit" (GEORGE PSATHAS), and that there is a possible
direct link between Simmel and phenomenology via
his influence on Husserl and ALFRED SCHUTZ. There is
good reason to believe that Simmel influenced not just
Husserl, but also Heidegger, and any consideration of
Simmel's relevance to the development ofphenomen-
o1ogy needs to look in both directions.
As regards Heidegger, an observation by his former
student, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, provides the essential
clue as to where we should begin looking for Sim-
melian traces in Heidegger's thought. Gadamer men-
tions in a note in his Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and
method, 1960) that as early as 1923, Heidegger spoke
to him "with admiration" of Simmel 's !ater writings.
He goes on to identify Simmel's temporal conception
of life as "truly past and future," a conception that
Simmel articulates in his Lebensanschauung (View of
life, 1918), as the source of Heidegger's admiration.
Gadamer obviously takes this matter quite seriously,
since he underscores the fact that Heidegger's remark
was "not just a general acknowledgement of Simmel
as a phi1osopher."
A cursory study of §72 of Heidegger's Sein und
Zeit (1927) against the backdrop of Simmel's Leben-
sanschauung will uncover enough suggestive and
provocative parallels between Heidegger 's analysis
and Simmel 's thoughts on life and death to support
Gadamer's contention. For Heidegger, the "connect-
edness of life" derives from the manner in which DA-
SEIN "stretches along between birth and death." In or-
der fully to appreciate the way this "connectedness"
is lived, Dasein's orientation toward the future, its
being-toward-death, as Heidegger would say, must be
comp1emented by looking back at the other end of
the temporal arc, the beginning, and thus at Dasein 's
"being-toward-the-beginning." From this new perspec-
tive, one can understand why the "question" ofhow life
642 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
forms a unity as it passes through successive moments
of time is, in fact, a pseudoproblem that only arises
when life is viewed from the outside, as a mere en-
tity having the continuity of a thing in objective time.
Here only the experience that is present-at-hand in the
"now" is thought to be real, and "those experiences
which have passed away or are only coming along,
either are no Ion ger orare not yet 'actual'."
With Heidegger's observations in mind, we turn
to Simmel's Lebensanschauung, where, especially in
Chapter 1, we tind him covering much the same ground
as Heidegger. When Simmel wrote this work he was
aware of his own impending death, yet he also recog-
nized that the moment was really no different from any
other during his life except perhaps for a heightened
awareness of death, because it was evident that "death
is imminent in Iife from the outset .... " For Simmel,
an individual 's death is not just another predictable
event, something that undoubtedly occurs one day and
establishes the Iimit of the individual 's Iife but has no
bearing on the present. On the contrary, death is an es-
sential part oflife as it is being lived, and for that reason
it has a bearing on the individual 's life from beginning
to end. AII this follows from Simmel 's conception of
the temporality of Iife.
Simmel anticipates Heidegger's characterization of
life as stretching out in the twofold directions ofbirth
and death, because for him birth and death are not mere
appendages to Iife, as though life were nothing more
than the content filling the temporal space between
these two poles. Rather, Iife embraces both poles be-
cause "life is truly past and future .... " As Simmel
expresses it, "The mode of existence which does not
restrict its reality to the present moment, thereby plac-
ing past and future in the realm of the unreal, is what
we calllife. "
As with Heidegger, Simmel finds any conception of
life that reduces Iife to a thing among things, i.e., to an
entity like any other that is in time, tobe a misconcep-
tion. Nonetheless, even on this mistaken view, Iife is
assigned a type of temporality, but only to the extent
that it is thought to traverse a succession of"nows," and
this is at best a secondary and derivative notion oftime
and one that is incompatible with life as experienced.
The reality of Iife cannot be confined to the present
simply because its past is thought to be no longer and
its future not yet, because to do so would render Iife
atemporal. From the perspective oflife itself, its being
is time. "Time is Iife," remarks Simmel, "because life
alone transcends the atemporal present of every other
kind of reality in both directions and thereby realizes
... the temporal dimension, that is, time."
For Simmel, the temporal structure of Iife is the
condition for the possibility of HISTORY as a science,
or, as Heidegger notes, "historiology, as the science
of Dasein s history, must 'presuppose' as its 'object'
the entity which is primordially historical." Although
they see the past, present, and future as inextricably
intertwined in Iife - or Dasein, as Heidegger would
say- they nonetheless both accord a certain priority
to the future insofar as it is the source from which the
past and the present derive their significance for us.
Simmel emphatically makes this point in one of his
last works dealing with the problem of history, "Die
historische Formung" (1917-18), where he notes that
the "historical moment" must be understood in terms
of the future, i.e., its possibilities and consequences.
Human events and creations are authentic objects of
"history only ifthey fali under the form oflife." In fact,
a distinguishing characteristic of HISTORY as a HUMAN
SCIENCE is its connection with Iife. History, of course,
is not life, but neither "does it cut the umbilical cord
that connects it to the bloodstream ofhuman Iife as it is
actually Iived. The inner dynamic that is derived from
life itself also vibrates within the structure of history."
Perhaps, as Heidegger observes, Simmel's philosophy
of history is primari1y concerned with setting forth an
epistemology of historiography, but his insights ha ve
deeper significance, as Heidegger himself no doubt
recognized.
Heidegger's encounter with Simmel's work is not
the only occasion to caii for a consideration of Sim-
mel's impact on phenomenological philosophy, for
Husserl too apparently consulted Simmel 's phi1osophy
of history and was probably influenced by it. Interest-
ingly, Husserl's attention seems to have focused pri-
marily on those works in which the issues pertaining
to history, including questions of historiography, are
directly confronted. What makes the Husseri-Simmel
connection particularly noteworthy is the likelihood
that the Iines of influence ran in both directions with
Husserl influencing Simmel and Simmel influencing
Husserl. There are a dozen letters from Simmel to
Husserl in the Husserl Briefwechsel.
 GEORG SJMMEL
It is widely accepted that the problem of history
gains prominence in Husserl's phenomenology during
the last phase ofhis philosophical development,just as
it is widely accepted that Husserl 's concern for history
and the historical world owes much to his familiar-
ity with WILHELM DILTHEY's philosophy of the human
sciences. What is less recognized is the mention by
LUDWIG LANDGREBE in a Selbstdarstelfung that Husserl
presented the 1905 second edition of Simmel 's Die
Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (The problem of
the philosophy ofhistory) as a seminar topic in the sum-
mer semester of 1924. Unfortunately, there appear tobe
no lecture notes in Husserl's Nachlass corresponding
to Die Probleme. Nonetheless, Husserl 's copy of this
work, along with his copies of Simmel's Hauptprob-
leme der Philosophie (Major problems ofphilosophy,
191 O) and Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens (On
the essence ofhistorical understanding, 1918), are part
of his personal library now preserved at the Husserl
Archives in Leuven. Each text contains sufficient un-
derlinings and marginal notes to offer a glimpse of
where, from Husserl's point of view, there is agree-
ment and disagreement between the two men. More
importantly, these textual notations provide evidence
that Husserl took Simmel 's contributions to the philos-
ophy ofhistory seriously.
Three points of convergence stand out: ( 1) their
criticism ofhistoricism, (2) their rejection ofpsychol-
ogism, and (3) their acceptance of"motives" as some-
how central to the process of historical understanding.
At Ieast six years before Husserl 1aunched his own
weli-known attack on historicism in the Logos article,
"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ), Sim-
mel had already set out to extricate philosophy from
its grip. Simmel 's strategy was not to transform phi-
losophy into a rigorous science as it was with Husserl.
In fact, in a certain sense, Simmel's approach more
closely resembled Dilthey's inasmuch as he consid-
ered philosophy itself a Weltanschauung that flows
from and reflects a particular type of human spiritu-
ality. That said, however, Simmel clearly has no in-
tention ofyielding ground to the forces ofhistoricism,
especialiy when philosophy itself is at stake. Antici-
pating Husserl, he Iaments that the "concept ofhistory
has become an idol," and that historicism tends to draw
at least two erroneous conclusions regarding philoso-
phy: ( 1) that the history of philosophy comprises the
643
legitimate subject matter of philosophizing in general
and (2) that philosophical theories and the philosophers
that proffered them can only be understood historically,
i.e., in terms of the place they occupy in a historical
sequence.
Simmel takes issue with both points. He rejects
historicism's first claim because it rests on the false
assumption that the realm of philosophy can be ac-
cessed without actually philosophizing. What results
is a mode of reductionism that conflates philosophi-
cal reflection and purely historical reflection, if indeed
there is such a thing for Simmel. The mark of philos-
ophy is not mere receptivity, but productivity, which
is why he describes genuine philosophizing as "abso-
Iutely ahistorical." What renders it ahistorical is not
the epistemic value of its content, and certainly not if
this were to imply the miraculous discovery and ex-
pression of immutable truths beyond history. Nothing
could be more foreign to Simmel 's thought than such
a conception of philosophy. On the contrary, if philos-
ophy is ahistorical, it is so only insofar as ali genuine
philosophizing brings forth something new, something
that cannot be accounted for if a particular philoso-
phy is viewed as nothing more than an effect in a long
causal series. For Simmel, ali genuine philosophizing
arises from a fresh perspective on the "matters them-
selves," although such a perspective will sti li be shaped
by an intimate awareness of antecedent perspectives.
The history ofphilosophy is not simply a kaleidoscope
of disparate and inchoate philosophical perspectives,
but a nexus of such perspectives that is held together,
however fragile1y, by their logica! content and by the
fact that for those who seek to philosophize, the his-
tory of philosophy is their history, their past, and, as
such, be1ongs to their present. This is the reason why
the philosopher needs history, as Husserl himse1f rec-
ognized as early as the Logos article even though he
failed fully to capitalize on the insight until his his-
torical reflections of Die Krisis der europăischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phănomenologie
(1936).
AII of this brings us to Simmel 's reason for reject-
ing historicism's second claim that philosophies and
phi1osophers must be understood historically, which,
in turn, will shed light on his efforts to distance him-
self from the psychologistic orientation of the first
edition of his Die Probleme. Even his early piece,
644 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
"Uber Geschichte der Philosophie" ( 1904), reveals his
attempt to void his theory of interpretation ofpsychol-
ogism and his last writings on the question of history
- including Das Problem der historischen Zeit (The
problem ofhistorical time, 1916), "Die historische For-
mung" ( 1917-18), and Vom Wesen des historischen
Verstehens ( 1918)- continue the effort with renewed
vigor and conviction.
As with Husserl, Simmel argues in Vom Wesen that
even the "sort of interpretati an that seems to be purely
historical regularly employs a form of trans-historical
or superhistorical interpretation." Indeed, we could not
even "understand the what or essence of things by ref-
erence to their historical development unless we al-
ready had some sort of independent understanding of
this essence." Put another way, every historically ex-
isting philosophy expresses an objective content that
is independent of the time and place in which it hap-
pens to appear, as well as of the psychic acts of the
particular philosopher responsible for its articulation.
For this reason, the author's intention has no bearing
upon, and no role to play in, the objective interpre-
tation inasmuch as the sale aim is to understand the
meaning of the work. To stress this point and at the
same time to underscore his rejection of the histori-
cist's claim that we understand a philosophy when we
understand the philosopher who elaborated it, Simmel
reverses the matter and suggests instead that "we un-
derstand the philosopher insofar as we understand his
[or her] philosophy."
Of course, one might argue that Simmel 's abandon-
ment of his early psychologistic stance owes at least
as much to Dilthey as it does to Husserl, but one needs
to recall that Dilthey himself credits Husserl's Logis-
che Untersuchungen (1900--190 1) with providing the
necessary conceptual tools to deal with the problem
of psychologism. What these critiques of psycholo-
gism share- especially Simmel's and Husserl's-
is the acute awareness that to overcome or reject psy-
chologism is not a license to ignore the subjective or
noetic si de of the intentiona] equation. Of course, any
investigation ofthe mental acts necessary to constitute
mental creations runs the risk of being interpreted by
others as a relapse into psychologism, as was the case
when Husserl tumed his attention in that direction in
the sixth ofhis Logische Untersuchungen. Such inter-
pretations rest on a failure to recognize that what is at
issue for Husserl and, of course, for Simmel, are not the
real psychic acts of particular persons but the essential
structures manifested in them and accessible via what
Husserl calls EIDETIC METHOD.
Just how successful Simmel is at overcoming psy-
chologism will undoubtedly remain open to discussion
and debate, if for no other reason than his refusal to
abandon his commitment to the idea of reconstructing
or re-creating the mental activities that engender the
sociohistorical phenomena one wishes to understand.
However, "recreation" (Nachbildung) is nota question
of achieving some sort of numerica! identity with an
author, artist, or historical personality, for as Simmel
himself observes, one need not become a Caesar in
order to understand Caesar. What is of concern in the
process ofre-creation pertains to the "trans-subjectivity
or super-subjectivity of psychological structures them-
selves, structures which are only independent of their
realization in any given mind." To paraphrase Sim-
mel, one could assert that the mental acts necessary
for the accomplishments of objective culture are im-
manent to subjective life, and yet independent of the
name ofthe individual who performs them. Simmel is
not far from Husserl on this score, for the latter also
maintains in Phănomenologische Psychologie [ 1925]
that whenever numbers, propositions, or theories, for
example, become objects of consciousness, the correla-
tive lived experiences must ha ve "essentially necessary
and everywhere identica! structures." What is more
significant, especially in light of Simmel 's remarks, is
that Husserl 's observati an extends beyond the realm of
purely theoretical accomplishments to include "psy-
chic correlations referring to objects of every region
and category."
It is also noteworthy that Simmel cautions against
naturalistically conceiving the relations between men-
tal performances and then between these performances
and their objects. Mental activities may legitimately be
viewed psychophysically, but not when it is a matter
ofunderstanding human behavior or sociocultural cre-
ations. What Simmel has in mind in Die Probleme is
precisely what Husserl develops in considerable detail
in §56 of Jdeen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie und
phănomenologischen Philosophie II [ 1912-15] under
the rubric of motivati an as the type of lawfulness that
obtains in the spiritual realm. Husserl 's articulation
and elaboration ofthe "law ofmotivation" would ha ve
 GEORG SIMMEL
helped Simmel clearly to distinguish the type of regu-
larity and necessary connections relevant in the sphere
of life from the "nomological necessity" applicable in
the domain of nature. As for Husserl, we should at
least mention in this context that the importance that
his conception of the human sciences attaches to mo-
tives and motivations has considerably more affinity
with the principal tenets ofSimmel's thought than with
Dilthey's theory of historical understanding.
Naturally, there is still much that needs to be in-
vestigated regarding Simmel's relation to Husserl and
Heidegger beyond the interna! connections and conver-
gences that have been mentioned. Although not dis-
cussed here, it is noteworthy that MAX SCHELER also
held that money economies tend to ignore the quali-
tative dimension of reality and thus function hand in
hand with the mechanistic conception of nature. Fur-
thermore, it is not surprising that Simmel's thoughts
on time invite comparison with HENRI BERGSON's in-
fluential work on the same topic, given the fact that
Simmel 's Lebensphilosophie was developed in part un-
der Bergson's influence. But even if one ignores these
historical connections and especially the question of
Simmel 's inftuence on Husserl and Heidegger, there
are reasons to consider his treatment of temporality
as phenomenological inasmuch as he does not simply
give an account of TIME per se but, more precisely,
attempts to describe the lived experience oftime. Fur-
thermore, even though his phenomenology of time is
not explicitly articulated until the Lebensanschauung,
it evidently already informs his philosophy ofhistory,
and particularly his expression of it in his last writings.
The true import ofhistorical understanding is not real-
ized if one thinks that it pertains merely to that which
is "no longer." The "past as it really was," even if we
could recreate it, would have neither significance nor
relevance for us because it would be located outside
the temporal structure of life. Here again the accent
is on lived experience. Simmel 's work deserves to be
considered a part of the complex web of inftuences at
work in the formation and development of phenomen-
ological philosophy.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Aron, Raymond. Essai sur la thi'orie de 1'historie dans
1'Alfemagne contemporaine: La philosophie critique de
645
1'historie. Chapter 3: "Philosophie de la vie et logique de
l'histoire (Simmel)." Paris: J. Vrin, 1938, 159-218.
Dahme, Heinz-Jiirgen, and Otthein Rammstedt, eds. Georg
Simmel und die Moderne. Neue Interpretationen und Ma-
terialien. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984.
Frisby, David. Sociologica! Impressionism: A Reassessment
of Georg Simmel s Social Theory. London: Heinemann,
1981.
Gassen, Kurt, and Michael Landmann, eds. Buch des Dankes
an Georg Simmel. Briefe, Errinerungen. Bibliographie.
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958.
Simmel, Georg. Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie.
Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie. Leipzig: Duncker &
Humblot, 1892; The Prob!ems of the Philosophy o{ His-
tory: An Epistemological Essay. Trans. and ed. Guy
Oakes. New York: The Free Press, 1977.
~-. Philosophie des Geldes. Leipzig: Duncker&Humblot,
1900; The Philosophy of Money. Trans. Tom Bottomore,
David Frisby. London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1978.
- . "Uber die Geschichte der Philosophie (aus einer einlei-
tenden Vorlesung)." Die Zeit No. 34 (1904 ), 504; "On
the History ofPhilosophy (from an introductory lecture)."
In his Essays on Interpreta/ion in Social Science. Trans.
Gary Oakes. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980,
198-204.
--. Schopenhauer und Nietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus.
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1907; Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche. Trans. Helmut Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein,
and Michael Weinstein. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press, 1991.
- . Das Problem der historischen Zeit. Berlin: Reuther, 1916;
"The Problem of Historical Time." In his Essays in Inter-
pretation in Social Science, 127-44.
-. "Die historische Formung." Logos 7 (1917-18), 113-
52; rpt. in his Fragmente und Auf.~ătze. Aus dem Nachlass
und Verojfentlichungen der lezten Jahre. Ed. Gertrud Kan-
torowicz. Hi1desheim: Georg Olms, 1967, 147-209; "The
Constitutive Concepts ofHistory." In his Essays on lnter-
pretation in Social Science, 145-97.
- . Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur. Ein Vortrag. Munich:
Duncker & Humblot, 1918; The Conflict in Modern Cul-
tureand OtherEssays. Trans. Peter K. Etzkom. New '{ork:
Columbia University Teachers College Press, 196R.
- . Vom Wesen des historischen Verstehens. Berlin: Mittler,
1918; "On the Nature ofHistorical Understanding." In his
Essays on Interpretation in Social Science, 97-126.
- . Lebensanschauung. Vîer metaphysische Kapitel. 2nd ed.
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922; chapter 1 trans. in
On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings.
Ed. Donald N. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1971, 353-74.
- . Brucke und Tur. Essays des Philosuphen zur Geschichte.
Religion, Kunst, und Gesel/schaji. Ed. Michael Landmann
with Margarete Susman. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957.
- . Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European. Ed. Peter A.
Lawrence. Sunbury-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons,
1976.
Weingartner, Rudolph H. Experience and Cu/ture: The Phi-
losophy of Georg Simmel. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 1960.
JOHN E. JALBERT
Sacred Heart Universi(Y
646 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY The expression
"ge6graphie sociale" was coined by the French sociol-
ogist Paul de Rousiers ( 1857-1934) in a review of the
first volume of Elisee Reclus's Nouvelle ge6graphie
universelle: La terre et les hommes (New universal ge-
ography: The earth and human beings, 1876). This is
one of the most comprehensive works in the history
of geography since the publications of Alexander von
Humboldt (1769-1859) and Cari Ritter ( 1779-1859).
Reclus ( 1830-1905) was inspired by George P. Marsh 's
Man and Nature: Physical Geography as Modified by
Human Action ( 1864 ), which is one of the founding
texts of modern ECOLOGY, and was opposed to natural
or environmental determinism, which was the domi-
nant geographical view ofhis time.
In describing geographical conditions, Reclus and
members of the Le Play school recognized the emer-
gence of new social formations produced by industrial-
ization. Everyday life went through dramatic transfor-
mations. Actors were confronted with labor and land
markets and with competition for positions in the pro-
duction process and subsequently with competition for
social positions. Furthermore, they had to deal with the
bureaucratic order of sociallife through the radicalized
territorial control mechanisms ofthe nation state. Thus
the traditional "society"-"space" nexus changed from
a religiously and culturally dominated one to a ratio-
nally constructed market and an institutionally con-
trolled bureaucracy. "Society" could then appear as a
spatial mosaic, patterned in correspondence with social
differences that are economically based- i.e., slums,
business districts, fine residential areas- and norma-
tive or legally defined territories, i.e., counties, nation
states, etc.
In its beginning, social geography was first of ali
and understood by most geographers as the geogra-
phy of the social. The aim of this subdiscipline of
geography and/or sociOLOGY was to analyze the spatial
patterning of the social facts. Guided by the ideal of
natural sciences, the theoretical target for many social
geographers was to discover the spatial (causal) laws
of the social world. In the French tradition, the social
geography of the Reclus and Le Play schools could
not succeed. Paul Henri Vida! de la Blaches's (1845-
1918) "geographie humaine" dominated the discipline,
defined not as HUMAN SCIENCE or social science but as
science of places. Only in the late 1940s could Pierre
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Koclcelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Miclcunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
C 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
George and Max Sorre establish social geography at
French universities. They were interested in the social
aspects, the regionallife forms, and the spatial pattern-
ing and regional differences of social classes.
In the English-speaking world, the Chicago school
of sociology pioneered this field of research by the turn
ofthe 20th century. The models ofplant ecology ofthe
Danish biologist Johannes E. Warming (1841-1924)
had been applied to the study of regularities in the
social patterning in cities. This starting point, strength-
ened by the scientific spatial approach pioneered by
William Bunge and Brian J. L. Berry, had a strong
infiuence on British and Anglo-American social ge-
ography until recently. On the one hand, the current
orientations are linked to David Harvey's integration
of MARXISM into the geographical discipline and to the
application ofHenri Lefebvre's ( 1901-1991) theory of
the production of space. On the other hand, strong ef-
forts are made, mainly by Derek Gregory and Nigel
Thrift, to establish social geography as a discipline of
critica! social science drawing on social theory and
cultural studies.
In the early 1920s, Sebald R. Steinmetz ( 1862-
1940) claimed for the Dutch tradition that "sociogra-
phie" should provide a knowledge of villages, cities,
counties, and countries in their "concreteness" and pre-
ciseness, as the natural sciences do for the physical
world. This knowledge should promote regional and
urban planning, the most important application of so-
cial geography, especially in Continental Europe af-
ter World War II. In the 1950s Wolfgang Hartke for-
mulated a research program for the German "Sozial-
geographie" that was oriented toward the delimitation
ofthe space established by the same social geographi-
cal behavior, meaning spaces of homogeneous values,
and norms of behavior. Dietrich Bartels (1931-1983)
brought this together with the claims of the Chicago
school to discover spatiallaws in the pattern ing of so-
cial formations, settlements or urban systems, and the
determinants of human actions, such as social norms
and cultural values. The German and English-speaking
debates merged in the 1970s and early 1980s into the
scientific spatial approach.
The humanistic critique of behavioral geography
in the 1970s is focused on this combination of the
spatial dimension, everyday life, and the scientific at-
titude. On the basis of EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY,
 SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY
ANNE BUTTIMER, EDWARD RELPH, and DAVID SEAMON ob-
jected to the Cartesian idea of rationalistic, objective
sciences that are alienated from the LIFEWORLD and
- at least implicitly - from the Western project of
reason. Instead of searching for spatiallaws and expla-
nations, human geography should be interested in the
subjective meaning of places, the subjective percep-
tion of geographic spaces (mental maps) and objects,
as well as in the subjective evaluation of natural haz-
ard and risk. The underlying hypothesis is that these
aspects play an important role for environmental be-
havior and behavior in space. To make such knowledge
available is seen as behavioral geography's contribu-
tion to a better understanding of human behavior.
But for behavioral geography "space" is still the
center of the geographer's attention and is still taken
for granted. "Behavior" happens "in space" and "en-
vironment" is "perceived." What is not asked is if
"behavior" and "perception" are concepts compatible
with phenomenological thought. Neither are "space"
nor "environment" seen as constituted by the know-
ing and acting subject. Therefore, this first reference to
phenomenology is an adaptation from the perspective
of traditional geographical concepts and frameworks.
It is not an adaptation of phenomenological principles
as such to the field of geographical research, including
the task of questioning everyday realities.
Based on phenomenological ground beyond psy-
chological categories, DAVID LEY questions some as-
pects of the "taken-for-granted world." Referring to
ALFRED SCHUTZ'S CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE
NATURAL ATTITUDE, he emphasizes the constitutive and
meaningful character of INTERSUBJECTIVITY by moving
from behavior to ACTION as the focus of research. He
ca Ils on geographers to pay more attention to the sub-
jective meanings of actions produced in the natural
attitude. They should not, consequently, be interested
merely in the subjective perception ofplaces, but also
in the subjective constitution ofthe meaning of"place."
The city is no longer seen as a special pattern of social
acts, but rather as a "mosaic of social worlds" with
specific meanings of particular places.
Torsten Hăgerstrand and the time geography ofthe
LunJ school look at the paths of the agent's social
actions through TIME and SPACE. The agent's BODY is
recognized as an indivisible unit. Accordingly, action
in space is always time consuming, and urban and re-
647
gional planning includes time planning. Schutz's con-
cept of"reach," and COURTICE ROSE's interpretation of it,
are used in this context for the reconstruction of space-
time action pattems in the everyday world as well as
for their optimization through urban and regional plan-
ning. SOLVEIG MĂRTESSON's studies of the "formation
of biographies" and subjects' stocks of knowledge in
space-time categories open a new research perspec-
tive for the analysis of children's socialization pro-
cesses. The influence of the rhythms and conflicts of
parents with institutional space-time patterns become
more transparent.
For more encompassing social geographical studies,
the BODY can be seen-in Schutz's terms-as a func-
tional link between inner processes and movements
directed toward the outer world. On the one hand, the
body in the physical world becomes a medium of ex-
pression for intentiona! consciousness. On the other
hand, the spatial dimension is mediated and incorpo-
rated via the body, especially in face-to-face situations.
Thus the physical or geographicallocation ofthe body
affects the nature of pure duration experiences and
thereby this location affects, as Schutz puts it in re-
ferring to HENRI BERGSON, memory-endowed duration.
Therefore, the function of the body is to mediate be-
tween duration and the homogeneous space-time world
of extension.
Furthermore, the body is crucial for the constituting
process and intersubjectivity. If a subject is learning
intersubjectively valid rules of interpretati an that exist
within a certain sociocultural world, then it is necessary
for this subject to verify his or her interpretations and
evaluations. This means that the constitution and ap-
plication of intersubjective meaning-contexts depend
on the possibilities oftesting the validity ofallocations
of MEANING. The attainment of certainty about inter-
subjectively valid constitutions of meaning is possible
above ali in the immediate face-to-face situation. Here
the bodies of the actors face each other directly as
fields of expression for the ego and alter ego. This
makes it possible to support communication through
subtle symbolic bodily gestures, thus li miting the num-
ber of misinterpretations. Accordingly, co-presence is
the prerequisite condition of ontologica! and interpre-
ti ve security, on which both the more abstract and the
more anonymous allocations of meaning are based.
For social geography this is oftwofold significance.
648 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
First of ali, in the context of urban theory, this helps us
to understand how face-to-face communication is still
important for decisions in modern business worlds,
even if telecommunication is largely available. In ur-
ban planning, this helps to make clear the social sig-
nificance of public spaces. Second, the significance of
co-presence makes possible a deeper insight into con-
ditions ofthe everyday social worlds. The corporeality
of human actors is thus central for an understanding
ofthe so-called "society"-"space" nexus. In traditional
societies highly tied to face-to-face situations, mean-
ing worlds have therefore much more thoroughgoing
regional limits and are internally less segregated than
in modern societies.
To grasp these regionally differentiated worlds in an
appropriate way is one of the premises of intercultural
understanding as mutual understanding of actors living
in different (regional) sociocultural worlds. Tradition-
ally, social and cultural geography play a crucial part
in producing the knowledge of these regionally dif-
ferent worlds. This needs empirica! research in a sub-
jective perspective. In traditional human geography,
"subjective" rarely refers to the subjective standpoint
of the analyzed actor or action in the natural attitude.
It rather refers to the subjective standpoint of the re-
searcher. This naive subjectivism can be overcome by
a genuine adaptation of phenomenological methodol-
ogy, whereby Schutz's postulates of subjective inter-
pretation and adequacy are maintained.
"Space" and "place" were and still are the unques-
tioned given key "objects" for most geographers and
many "geographical investigations" ofthe world. JOHN
PICKLES criticizes the objectivation of "space" and un-
derstands phenomenology as a method that seeks to
clarify these concepts. On the basis of the existential
phenomenology of MARTIN HEIDEGGER he elaborates a
perspective in which "space" cannot be the abject of
theoretization and empirica! research, but "spatiality"
can. For him, an "ontology of spatiality" is needed
to determine what must be the case if there can be
anything like spatial and environmental behavior. The
aim of social geography would then be the appropriate
interpretation of "human spatiality."
Starting from Heidegger's premise that the spatial
ordering of entities occurs through human activities,
we can understand that the spatiality of "ready-to-
hand" entities always belongs to a place within the
"equipmental" context of a particular activity. It is im-
portant to point out that according to Heidegger, space
and time do not serve merely as parameters. Both are
rather foundational for DASEIN. "Space" (Raum) is the
result of răumen (clearing away) and therefore has an
existence of its own. However, neither is "space" part
of the subject, nor does the subject observe the world
"as if'' the world !ies in a Newtonian or container space.
Rather, the subject for Heidegger is spatial and "spa-
tializes" the world through his or her mode of being.
Consequently, in geography the assertion was made
that human spatiality has to be part of a spatial theory.
The fu ture of social and human geography will depend
- that was and sti li is largely the argument- on the
nature ofthe research program that develops from this
incorporation. Therefore, human geography should be
understood as a human science of human spatiality.
But is empirica! investigation of "spatiality" possible
in spatial categories and can "spatiality" be the "abject"
of spatial theory? Would it not be more accurate to link
"spatiality" methodologically to human activities and
actions instead of "space"? Nevertheless, spatial the-
ory would not be the core of the geographer's interest
anymore.
The constitutive phenomenology of EDMUND
HUSSERL and Schutz makes it possible to start from
the hypothesis that what geographers describe as spa-
tial problems are in fact problems of certain types of
actions, actions in which corporeal involvement and
material things are fundamental parts. The fact that the
self experiences the body primarily in movement also
means that it experiences the body only in, and not as,
a functional context. The experience of movement is
necessarily reinterpreted as an experience of space and
opens up access to the world of extension. With the ex-
perience ofthe spatial character of one 's own body, the
spatiality of things is discovered. The constitution of
the material world and of"space" is thus bound up with
the experiencing, moving, and acting "1." Apart from
the experience ofthe spatiality ofthe physical-material
world, the subject also experiences the qualities ofthe
various objects in relation to his or her own body, veri-
fying them with corresponding meanings for her or his
actions.
With a radical integration of phenomenological
thinking into social geography and the adaptation of
action theory, the project of social geography changes
 SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY
its focus. The center of interest is no longer "space" or
"spatiality." In accordancewith Schutz's idea ofthe so-
cial sciences, the aim of social geographical research
is then the scientific reconstruction of the everyday
making of geographies in the natural attitude. We cer-
tainly need precise theoretical categories to grasp the
different types of everyday geographies.
Schutz and THOMAS LUCKMANN offer a body-centered
view of geographies in the natural attitude. This view
begins from the distinction between the "world within
immediate reach" and the "world within potential
reach." The "immediate reach" encompasses a "pri-
mary" and a "secondary zone ofinftuence." The first is
the zone of direct manipulation, the area that offers the
fundamental text of ali reality. The "secondary zone of
inftuence" is defined as that part of the world that the
agent can only affect through the use of technological
aids. Developments in technology offer a qualitative
leap in the range of experience and an enlargement
of the zone of operation. The areas within "potential
reach" are divided into the world "within restorable
reach" and "within accessible reach." The former was
at one time the agent's core ofreality. Chances ofreach-
ing the latter depend, first, on physical and technolog-
ical capacities in a particular time and society and,
second, on the access a particular agent has to such
means.
To analyze everyday geographies in a phenomen-
ological perspective indicates that scientific investi-
gation has to put subjects and not primarily spaces,
regions, or spatiality at its center. Then the question
is how subjects produce geographies by placing ob-
jects for particular activities and how they maintain
a certain order of objects by consumption. As Schutz
and Luckmann show, this can happen and does happen
in the "secondary zone of inftuence" and with differ-
ent degrees of probabilities "within accessible reach."
Therefore social geographical research is not just in-
terested in the geography of objects and the subjects in
the world, but also in how the subjects tie the "world"
to themselves through their actions of production and
consumption.
A seconddomain of everyday social geography con-
cerns the normative-politica! interpretations of zones
of actions, of territories. Starting points are the body-
centered regionalizations of the front-regions of social
presentation, i.e., stage, performance, etc., and back-
649
regions of social hiding, i.e., intimacy, shame, etc., with
their differentiation with respect to age, sex, sta tus, and
role. Another form concerns the territorial regulations
of inclusion and exclusion of actors through property
rights, politica! or legal definitions ofnation states, and
citizen rights. These forms of everyday social geogra-
phies are linked to the authoritative control of people
through territorial means, as "geographies ofpolicing"
and the specific types of control of the means of vio-
lence. A very important form of making everyday ge-
ographies are the activities of regional and nationalistic
movements aiming for a new politica! geography, and
all different forms of regional and national identities
they are based on.
Finaliy, a third research area of everyday geography
is asking how the constitution process of the actor's
stock ofknowledge is linked to global telecommunica-
tion and how this affects symbolization processes. This
kind of informational-significational social geography
is first of ali interested in the conditions of coMMUNICA-
TION, networks, and the "access particular agents have
to such means." This geography of the distribution of
in formation has to be differentiated by different means
and channels of communication (books, newspapers,
radio, television, data highways, etc.). But this form
of constitution of the stock of knowledge has to be
linked to the constitution ofmeaning-content and sym-
bolization processes of different areas of the everyday
world.
In this way, a phenomenologicaliy informed and
action-based social geography reconstructs the every-
day regionalizations ofthe lifeworld and the taken-for-
granted geographical representations of the world by
subjects.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Buttimer, Anne. "Grasping the Dynamism of Lifeworld."
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66
( 1976), 277-92.
Gregory, Derek. Geographical Imaginations. Oxford: Basi1
81ackwell, 1994.
Hagerstrand, Torsten. "Time-Geography: Focus on the Cor-
porea1ity of Man, Society, and Environment." Papers of
the Regional Science Association 31 ( 1984), 193-216.
Heidegger, Martin. "Der Wesen der Sprachc." In his Un-
terwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Ncske, 1959, 147-225;
"The Nature of Language." In his On the Way to Lan-
guage. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row,
1971,57-108.
650 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Husserl, Edmund. Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. Ed.
Ulrich Claesges. Husserliana 16. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973.
Jackson, Pcter, and Susan J. Smith. Exploring Social Geog-
raphy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1984.
Ley, David. "Social Geography and the Taken-For-Granted
World." Transactions of the Institute of British Geogra-
phers, n.s. 2 (1977), 498--512.
Livingston, David N. The Geographical Tradition. Oxford:
Basi1 B1ackwell, 1992.
Marsh, Geroge P. Man and Nature: Physical Geography as
Modified by Human Action. New York: Charles Scribner,
1864.
Mârtesson, Solveig. On the Formation of Biographies. Lund
1979.
Park, Robert E. "The Urban Community as a Spatial Pattern
and Moral Order." Publications of the American Socio-
logica/ Association 20 (1925), 1-14.
Pickles, John. Phenomenology, Science, and Geography:
Spatiality and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1985.
Relph. Edward. Place and Placelessness. London: Pion,
1976.
Rose, Courtice. The Notion of Reach and its Relevance ta
Social Geography. Ph.D. dissertation, C1arke University,
1977.
Schutz, Alfred. Life Forms and Meaning Structures. Trans.
Helmut R. Wagner. London: Routledge, 1982.
- , and Thomas Luckmann. Structures of the Life World.
Trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr.
London: Heinemann, 1974.
Seamon, David. A Geography of the Lifeworld. New York:
St. Martins Press, 1979.
Werlen, Benno. Gesellschaft, Hand/ung und Raum. Grundla-
gen handlungstheoretischer Sozialgeographie. Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner, 1987; Society, Action, and Space: An Alter-
native Human Geography. Trans. Gayna Walls. London:
Routledge, 1993.
- . Sozialgeographie alltăglicher Regionalisierungen.
2 vols. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995.
BENNO WERLEN
University ofZiirich
SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY It was via
the UNITED STATES that a so-called "phenomenologi-
cal sociology" as an independent theoretical paradigm
within the social sciences emerged in postwar Ger-
many. Two factors were of major importance. The first
was the German translation of ALFRED scHuTz's Col-
lected Papers in the early 1970s and the renewal of
an action-oriented and hermeneutica! tradition also as-
sisted by the German translations of studies like Peter
Winch's The Jdea ofa Social Science ( 1966); Aaron Ci-
courel 's Method and Measurement in Sociology ( 1970)
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
and Cognitive Sociology ( 1976); and some articles by
Harold Garfinkel, as well as Richard J. Bemstein's
Praxis and Action (1975).
The second and decisive factor was the transla-
tion ofPETER BERGER and THOMAS LUCKMANN'S The So-
cial Construction of Reality (1966) in 1969. Berger
and Luckmann inaugurated a synthesis of the sym-
bolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead ( 1863-
1931) and Schutz's phenomenological approach that
also emerged a little !ater in the United States. In ad-
dition, they referred to the tradition of German PHILO-
SOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY that dominated the intellectua1
scene between World Wars I and II and featured such
authors as MAX SCHELER, HELMUTH PLESSNER, Pau] Lud-
wig Landsberg ( 1901-1944 ), ERNST CASSIRER and, ]ater,
Arnold Gehlen.
The first independent reception of these develop-
ments can be found in Jurgen Habermas's essay "Zur
Logik der Sozialwissenschaften" ( 1967), which fo-
cuses on the "problem of understanding meaning in
the empirical-analytical sciences of action." Under this
heading Habermas dealt with the phenomenological
approach exemplified by the works of Abraham Erving
Kaplan, Cicourel, Schutz, Garfinkel, and Erving Goff-
man, even though he looked with outspoken skepticism
upon the project of"phenomenological sociology." Out
ofthis context Ulrich Oevermann and his group devel-
oped the project of a so-called structural or objective
hermeneutica! approach.
A second line of reception combined phenomen-
ological and interactionist aspects into a new the-
oretical perspective. This was initiated through two
textbooks edited by Walter L. Buhl ( Verstehende
Soziologie, [Interpretive sociology, 1972]) and Heinz
Steinert (Symbolische Interaktion, 1973) as well as
through the documentation edited by the research
group of sociologists at Bielefeld around Joachim
Matthes and Fritz Schutze. In Alltagswissen, lnter-
aktion, und gesellschaflliche Wirklichkeit (Everyday
knowledge, interaction, and social reality, 1973) this
group introduced texts by Garfinkel, Cicourel, and
GEORGE PSATHAS to a German-speaking audience for
the first time and thus laid the foundations for the de-
velopment of ethnomethodo1ogical and conversation-
analytical research in Germany. A following volume
on Kommunikative Sozialforschung (Communicative
social research, 1976) by the same group gave addi-
 SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY
tional impetus to research. A 1978 supplement to the
Kălner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsycholo-
gie with the ti tie Materialien zur Soziologie des Alltags
(Materials for a sociology ofthe everyday) and the an-
thology Alfred Schiitz und die Idee des Alltags in den
Sozialwissenschaften (Alfred Schutz and the idea of
the everyday in the social sciences, 1979), edited by
WALTER SPRONDEL and RICHARD GRATHOFF, documented
the beginning ofthe professional institutionalization of
these research perspectives.
In Germany as well as in the United States the in-
terest in phenomenological research developed in con-
nection with a systematic critique of the general sys-
tems theory ofTalcott Parsons ( 1902-1979). The need
for new theoretical orientations emerged not only in
action theory but also in the CRITICAL THEORY of the
Frankfurt school and in German system theory itself.
The ongoing development ofNiklas Luhmann 's theory
of social systems and Habermas's efforts to continue
the project of a critica! theory of modem societies rely
implicitly or explicitly on phenomenological concepts,
e.g., the concepts of TIME and MEANING in Luhmann 's
Soziale Systeme ( 1984) and the concept of LIFEWORLD
in Habermas's Theorie des kommunikative Handeln
(Theory of communicative action, 1981 ).
The beginning of phenomenologically infiuenced
studies in German sociology could also rely on a broad
stream fiowing from PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY and
phenomenology of sociality between World Wars I and
Il. These include Theodor Litt, EDITH STEIN, and GERDA
WALTHER, who developed a phenomenology of soci-
ety in the sense of an ontology of community; Al-
fred Vierkandt, who introduced a phenomenological
approach as a counter to positivism, and especially
Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner.
The basic motives were defined by the problems of
classical German sociology. Even though MAX WEBER
and GEORG SIMMEL understood social reality as an al-
ready meaningfully ordered sociocultural reality and
declared meaningful actions to be the central topic of
the social sciences, they did not answer the question
ofthe social constitution ofmeaning itself. Within this
basic orientation related to the analysis of- as Max
Scheler puts it- the "relatively natural attitude" of ev-
eryday life, the socio-phenomenological approaches of
Scheler, Plessner, and Schutz find their specific profite.
Max Scheler's philosophical anthropoiogy concen-
651
trates on the question of the development of social
identity, on the constitution of social milieus, and on
the connection of pragmatic and cognitive moments
in human access to the world. With analytical stress
on the pre-refiective, emotional, animate, and norma-
tively accentuated constitutive elements of experience
and the definition of the situation of pragmatic world
access, his epoch-making contribution illuminated the
autogenesis of social reality through the plasticity of
human beings and their world.
Helmuth Plessner's natural-philosophical and so-
cioanthropological studies presented a constitutive the-
ory of life focusing on the conception of positionality,
i.e., the relationship ofthe BODY to its confines, which
leads to an anthropology of sociology on the basis of
the fundamental axiom of ex-centric positionality. The
importance of Plessner's writings for the project of
what is often called "phenomenological sociology of
everyday life" is illustrated by his preface to the Ger-
man translation ofBerger and Luckmann's The Social
Construction of Reality.
Finally, the first major work of the inaugurator
of a phenomenological foundation of sociology, Al-
fred Schutz's Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt
(The meaning-structure ofthe social world, 1932), was
reprinted in Germany in 1960 and 1974. This led to a
rediscovery of his earlier manuscripts and the dozens
of essays ofhis American period. The works ofSchutz,
who can be called the founder of "phenomenological
sociology," have become most influential in Germany
within this context ofthe actionist turn in sociologica!
theory in the 1970s. Subsequent to Max Weber's con-
ception of"understanding" or "interpreti ve" sociology
and the inclusion ofphilosophical motives of Leibniz,
HENRI BERGSON, EDMUND HUSSERL, MAX SCHELER, and
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Schutz developed an independent
phenomenological approach to sociologica[ theory.
Schutz starts from the basic assumption of Husserl 's
philosophy, according to which every worldview is
constituted by the way the world is given in the inten-
tiona! acts of consciousness. lf, according to Husserl,
the meaning of the world, i.e., the constitution of re-
ality, constitutes itself in the intentiona! acts of con-
sciousness, then the constitution of social reality as a
meaningful interactive context has tobe understood as
emerging from individual acting. For Schutz this means
that one has to examine the constitution ofmeaning in
652 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the realm of mundane sociality. Thus the reception
of phenomenological motives in sociologica! research
leads to processes in which rules of social action are
brought forth by social acting itself. The systematic ex-
amination of everyday reality, considered a meaningful
result of social action, also ca lis for the development of
a new sociologica! type oftheory. A constitutive theory
of social reality has to be conceived by which the au-
togenesis ofbasic processes and structures ofthe life-
world can be grasped. A theory of action has tobe at the
same time a theory of the lifeworld as well as a theory
of its action-orienting and action-regulating meaning-
structures, which are produced and reproduced in con-
crete actions.
The further development of German "phenomen-
ological sociology" owes much to Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction ofReal-
ity, which can aptly be called a classic. They attempted
to elaborate Schutz's theory of the pragmatic consti-
tution of the lifeworld in the sense of a sociology of
knowledge leading to a general theory of social reality
and society. They applied Schutz's "proto-sociological
studies" concern ing the structures of the lifeworld to
the level of everyday life and analyzed the mechanisms
and forms ofinstitutionalization of social action as well
as of the legitimation of finite provinces of meaning,
and were thus able to relate Schutz's basic theoretical
perspective to central concepts of modern sociologi-
cal theory, such as identity, socialization, social dif-
ferentiation, social roles, language, and knowledge. In
general, they aimed at an alternative to established so-
ciologica! theories of action. If Schutz's assumption
that social reality is a product of meaningful and self-
regulated social acting is correct, then it must follow
that in every given part of any given social interaction
there are mechanisms identifiable, and in their formal
aspects describable, by which this self-constitution and
self-regulation are achieved. The description of these
mechanisms and their contexts lead to a general theory
of action that proceeds constitutive-genetically and is
thus a sociologica! theory ofthe autogenesis ofthe so-
cial world. The common ground ofphenomenological-
sociological approaches is found in stressing both sub-
jective and intersubjective experiencing and acting as
processes by which meaning is established.
From a developmental point of view two lines of a
specifically phenomenological approach can be differ-
entiated. A first line goes back to the works ofThomas
Luckmann, while a second line, influenced mostly by
Harold Garfinkel, initiated research in ethnomethodol-
ogy and speech analysis. These stimuli led to a complex
field of theory and research, which can be roughly di-
vided into two groups: ( 1) studies of theoretical and
methodological problems and conceptions of theory
and research in "phenomenological sociology," and (2)
empirica! fields ofresearch built on a phenomenologi-
cal foundation and concentrating on ethnomethodolog-
ical and ethnographical studies, conversational analy-
sis, biographical research, family sociology, cpistemol-
ogy, and the sociologica! analysis ofreligion.
(1) Thomas Luckmann, who completed Schutz's
unfinished last work on the Structures ofthe Life World
( 1973 and 1984 ), in his own writings develops a pheno-
menological conception of "proto-sociology." He in-
terprets the structures of the lifeworld as a universal
"matrix," as a mathesis universalis, which serves as
guide to sociologica! typology and research. This ma-
trix allows a comparison and verification of sociolog-
ica! statements concerning different aspects of the so-
cial world. His empirica! research concentrates on the
sociology of RELIGION and mainly on the sociology of
LANGUAGE, in which he examines the structures of ev-
eryday communication and its genres, i.e., structured
communicative actions as components of the societal
stock of knowledge (instructions, moral communica-
tion, etc.). Other important studies focus on the prob-
lems of personal identity.
In contrast to Luckmann, Richard Grathoff attempts
to find a direct phenomenological access to social real-
ity, developing socio-phenomenology as a phenomen-
ological social theory. It was the edition ofthe Schutz-
Gurwitsch correspondence ( 1985) that triggered his
approach. Influenced by Schutz's conceptions of typi-
fication and relevance as well as by ARON GURWITSCH's
concept of miii eu, Grathoff interprets the lifeworld as
a milieu-world, the meaning-structures of which he
finds in concrete phenomena like generations or neigh-
borhoods. Thus according to Grathoff, the concept of
lifeworld includes a dynamic dimension and cannot
be seen as a formal matrix only, as Luckmann does.
Grathoff's approach establishes the concept of life-
world as a central sociologica! category, similar to the
concept of ro le in the 1950s and 1960s.
The works of Luckmann and of Grathoff mark the
 SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY
two poles ofthe relation between phenomenology and
sociology in Germany. Severa! other authors concen-
trate on its clarification and on methodological ques-
tions within this field. The emphasis ofHANSFRIED KELL-
NER's research is on the constitution of social orders.
On the philosophical level, Husserl's transcendental
approach serves him as analytical access to the con-
cept of rule. On the sociologica! Jevel, he is guided
by Schutz's methodological concepts. He analyzes, for
example, POSTMODERN constructions of lifestyles and
the changing cultural dimensions of economic actions
in late capitalist societies.
ILJA SRUBAR starts with a reconstruction of Schutz's
oeuvre on the basis of the unpublished material of his
estate. He shows that the anthropological dimensions
of sociality, temporality, and reflexivity and their prag-
matic molding are essential for the constitution of ac-
cess to the human world. On these foundations he at-
tempts to analyze how human acting and interacting
regulate themselves.
ULF MATTHIESEN pleads for cooperation between
phenomenology and Habermas's critica! theory for
an analysis of the crisis of modern lifeworlds and
discusses the difference and common grounds of
socio-phenomenological conceptions ofhermeneutics,
on the one hand, and Ulrich Oevermann's objective
hermeneutics, on the other hand, in order to state more
precisely the methodological conception of what is
called "Deutungsmusteranalysen."
THOMAS EBER LE (Switzerland) is the author of a crit-
ica! study on the formation of phenomenological ap-
proaches in sociology. He especially concentrates on
the further development of Schutz's methodological
conception and on the examination ofthe influence of
the Austrian school of ECONOMICS on his methodologi-
cal thinking.
BURKHARD LEHMANN points OUt the eminent impor-
tance ofthe principle of adequacy of everyday and sci-
entific typifications for the methodology of interpreti ve
sociology, with critica! reflections on ethnomethod-
ological research strategies.
The theoretical and empirica! works of HANS-GEORG
SOEFFNER are devoted to the conception of a social sci-
entific hermeneutics of everyday lifeworlds. His main
field of research is the conscious and mundane mark-
ings of the meaning-structures of the lifeworld. Thus
he refers to Husserl 's philosophy, to Schutz's and Gur-
653
witsch 's sociophenomenological approaches, and to
Scheler's and Plessner's traditions of PHILOSOPHICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY. He focuses primarily on symbolic or-
ders in different social milieus, where his works meet
with the tradition of symbolic interactionism.
(2) Recent empirica! sociologica] studies in some
way related to phenomenological foundations are, as
mentioned, more or less influenced by the works of
Luckmann and Garfinkel. At least six fields ofresearch
can be differentiated.
(a) Conversational analysis and research on so-
cial structures of knowledge and communication. The
works ofFRITZ SCHUTZE and JORG BERGMANN derive from
Garfinkel 's impulses as they were taken up by the
aforementioned research group at Bielefeld. Schtitze
discusses the philosophical implications of a sociolog-
ica! account of language, and his research is especially
on the analysis of everyday narratives and on the devel-
opment and application of the technique of "narrative
interviews." Some ofhis recent empirica! studies focus
on biographical research.
Jorg Bergmann, together with Luckmann, studies
the structure of everyday communication. He views
the ethnomethodological and conversation-analytical
methods as instruments by which Schutz's theoreti-
cal outlines, especially his theory of everyday life-
typifications, can be transformed for empirica! re-
search. An example ofhis procedure is Klatsch (Gos-
sip, 1987), a study of gossip as a communicative genre
of social control.
Also starting from Luckmann's conception of ev-
eryday communicative structures, Angela Keppler ex-
amines different kinds of talk in contemporary soci-
eties. In her study on Tischgesprăche (Table talk, 1994)
she draws attention to the sociology of communication
and offamily sociology. By examples of table talk she
illustrates the community-building role of everyday
communications and analyzes the principal communi-
cational forms and mechanisms that play an important
ro le in the development of the social milieu within a
family. In this context she makes special reference to
the ro le of the mass media as "social occasions" for
the contents of speech and the construction of reality.
The discussion ofthese occasions in families leads to a
specific interpretation ofthe families' biographies and
their everyday lives.
HUBERT KNOBLAUCH dea]s systematically with the
654 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
symbolic communicative structures that transform the
lifeworld into a culturc world, i.e., a "communcative
lifeworld." With reference to Luckmann's studies of
communication he tries to show on an empirica] level
the connection between action and structure within
structure forming and changing processes of human
communication, thus supplying the basis for a "the-
ory ofthe communicative construction of cultural con-
texts."
(b) Sociologica! analysis of religion. In the tradi-
tion of Luckmann's Die Unsichtbare Religion (Invisi-
ble religion, 1967) and with the help of Schutz's con-
cept oftranscendence, Knoblauch approaches a "social
ethnography" by studying the social milieus of eso-
teric and new religious movements. Walter Sprondel's
contribution within this field goes back to his Ger-
man edition of the Schutz-Parsons correspondence in
1977. Focusing especially on institutionalization pro-
cesses of social reality, Sprondel discusses religious
conversion as a mechanism of social control of in-
dividual experience and thus as the crucial factor in
defining religious phenomena, and he pays attention
to structural effects of cultural modernization through
such antimodernist protest movements as the German
"Lebensreform" movement.
Also to be mentioned are WOLFRAM FISCHER (-
ROSENTHAL)'s earlier studies on problems of profes-
sional identities and institutional career patterns, in-
ftuenced theoretically by Berger and Luckmann and
methodologically by Fritz Schutze.
(c) Biographical research. Wolfram Fischer (-
Rosenthal)'s recent interest is in theoretical and
methodological questions of biographical research-
in the context of which he intends to overcome the
micro-macro polarity in sociologica] theory- and in
empirica] studies, some ofwhich are especially located
in the intersection of biographical research and medi-
cal sociology inftuenced by Anselm Strauss. Here he
concentrates on examining the constitution of nonlin-
ear biographical time structures in relation to viewing
chronic illness as a crucial point between everyday rau-
tine and lifespan-projects. His wife Gabriele Rosenthal
concentrates on the field of historical biographical re-
search and on the analysis of intergenerational relations
following the tradition of oral history. The principal in-
terest ofbiographical research in times of personal and
social crises becomes highly visible in her studies of
German National Socialism, World War Il, and the re-
sulting problems.
(d) Ethnomethodology and ethnography. In 1980,
CHRISTA and THOMAS FENGLER presented one ofthe first
German empirica! ethnomethodological studies, A lltag
in der Anstalt (Everyday in the institution), in which
they analyzed the practice of psychiatric treatment in
order to explain the emergence of the idea of a norma-
tively correct psychiatric therapy within the everyday
life-processes of its normalization. On the hasis of a
nineteen month stay in a psychiatric hospital they re-
constructed the processes in which the members of
this social organization are continuously constituting
its social order by describing and explaining it.
Similarly, STEPHAN WOLFF's research centers on the
question of the rhetorical constitution of social or-
ders. A study under this title in 1976 was based on
Cicourel 's concept of cognitive sociology and the con-
cept of ethnomethodological analysis, and gave both
a transcendental turn in order to reach a "theory of
a priori fundamental mechanisms" of the constitution
of social experience to sol ve the ethnomethodological
problems of application and indexicality. A subsequent
study, Die Produktion von Fiirsorglichkeit (The pro-
duction ofthoughtfulness), concentrated on the scenic
practices of the construction of social reality with an
empirica! analysis of the everyday routines of a social
welfare oftice and the acting of its clients. His mostre-
cent study is about the rhetoric of psychatric experti se
in court.
ELISABETH usT works on methodological problems
of ethnomethodology and on the formulation of a FE:vi-
INIST theory and research on socio-phenomenological
grounds. She concentrates on showing the implicit but
always actually present horizon of selfevidences of
the "mtellectuallandscape ofthe male-stream" and on
defining the outline of a feminist pattern of conscious
dissent.
Jo Reichertz concentrates in his theoretical writings
on aspects of developmental and conceptual problems
of the so-called structural or objective hermeneutics.
In his research he focuses on the question whether
there is a logica! procedure by which it is possible to
acquire knowiedge and whether this procedure can be
methodized. He illustrates these problems by empirica!
studies done dunng a six month stay with a criminal
investigation dcpartment.
 SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN
In this context the ethnographic and lifeworld-
analytical studies of RONALD HITZLER and ANNE HONER
can also be taken into account. In the tradition ofBENITA
LUCKMANN's analysis of The Small Li(e- Worlds ofMod-
ern Man ( 1970), Honer, fac ing the plurality and com-
plexity of modern acting perspectives and quests for
meaning, searches for the possibilities and problems
of withdrawal into very small and extremely closed
provinces of meaning. In his recent studies Hitzler pays
attention to the conceptualization of a "proto-theory"
of politica! action.
(e) With the starting point in the phenomenological
conception ofmilieu worked out by Scheler and Gur-
witsch, BRUNO HILDENBRAND works on the genesis of
familial lifeworlds over severa! generations. He is in-
terested in pathological developments, that is, the gen-
esis of and the coping with physical il! ness in the pat-
terns of familial communication and interaction. The
author refers to studies on phenomenologically ori-
ented PSYCHOLOGY and PSYCHIATRY, especialiy to those
of LUDWIG BINSWANGER and WOLFGANG BLANKENBURG.
Another central point of his research is the analysis
of the consequences of modernization processes in the
mi !ieu of farmer families.
Inftuenced by Anselm Strauss and Fritz Schiitze,
CHRISTA HOFFMANN-RIEM has studied the structural dif-
ferences of everyday processes of reality construction
and normalization in families with double parenthood.
She also pays attention to the consequences oftechno-
logical developments for the organization of modern
family life.
(f) With reference to Schutz's methodological re-
ftections, KARIN KNORR-CETINA concentrates on empir-
ica! studies of cognitive operations in laboratory sci-
ences, pointing out the transepistemological compo-
nents and transversive alignments of scientific work.
Some of her recent studies apply to the methodology
of the variants of constructivism in sociology.
It needs to be mentioned, finally, that the pheno-
menological approach in German sociology owes other
important impulses to phenomenological work in psy-
chology and psychiatry (CARL F. GRAUMANN as well as
BJankenburg) and EDUCATION (KĂTE MEYER-DRAWE).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Băumer, Angelica, and Michael Benedikt, eds. Gelehrtenre-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
655
publik- Lebenswelt. Edmund Husserl und Alfred Schutz
in der Krisis der phănomenologischen Bewegung. Wien:
Passagen 199 3.
Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Con-
struction o( Realitv: A Treatise in the Sociology of"
Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966; Die
gesellschaft/iche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine The-
orie der Wissenssoziologie. Trans. Moniko Plessner.
Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1969.
Grathoff, Richard, and Bernhard Waldenfels, eds. Sozialităt
und Intersubjektivităt. Phănomenologische Perspektiven
der Sozialwissenschaften im Umkreis van Aran Gurwitsch
und Alf'red Schiitz. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1983.
Hammerich, Kurt, and Michael Klein, eds. Materialien zur
Soziologie des Alltags. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1978.
Herzog, Max, and Cari Friederich Graumann, eds. Sinn und
Etjahrung. Phănomenologische Methoden in den Human-
wissenschaften. Heidelberg: R. Asanger, 1991.
List, Elisabeth, and Ilja Srubar, eds. Al("red Schiitz. Neue
Beitrăge zur Rezeption seines Werkes. Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1988.
Luckmann, Benita. "The Small Life Worlds of Modem Man."
Social Research 37 (1970), 580-96.
Patzelt, Werner J. Grundlagen der Ethnomethodologie. The-
orie, Empirie und politikwissenschaftlicher Nutzen ei ner
Soziologie des Alltags. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1987.
Sprondel, Walter M., ed. Die Objektivităt der Ordnungen
und ihre kommunikative Konstruktion. Fiir Thomas Luck-
mann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994.
Sprondel, Walter M., and Richard Grathoff, eds. Alfi·ed
Schiitz und die Idee des Alltags in den Soziahvis-
senschaften. Stuttgart: Enke, 1979.
MARTIN ENDRESS
Universităt Erlangen-Niirnberg
lLJA SRUBAR
Universităt Erlangen-Niirnberg
SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN There are various
stances in what is broadly called phenomenological so-
ciology. For example, the reflexive sociology of Alvin
W. Gouldner, the symbolic interactionism of Herbert
Blumer, and the dramaturgical approach of Erving
Goffman are sometimes called phenomenological soci-
ology. This is also true in Japan. The term "phenomen-
ological sociology'' will be restricted here to sociology
that consciously attempts to found itself on insights
found in phenomenological philosophy.
There are two eminent sociologists who tried
to found their work on phenomenology and
thereby launched Japanese phenomenological sociol-
ogy: KAZUTA KURAUCHI and JISHO USUI. Kurauchi 's soei-
656 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ology began from the ideas that the social was an expe-
rienced fact and that the essence of society could only
be approached through the given in experience. Crit-
icizing the position of GEORG SIMMEL, which searched
for the fundamental structure of society in mental in-
teraction (die seelische Wechselwirkung), he instead
posited the "reciprocity ofperspectives" and the "con-
tact circle" as fundamental for society. He analyzed the
experience of SPACE and TIME from that standpoint and,
drawing on theoretical insights in THEODOR LITT, con-
structed a theory of social relationship, social group,
and the whole of society.
Jisho Usui also sought a firm foundation for so-
ciology in phenomenology. He studied under KITARO
NISHIDA, the philosopher who introduced phenomen-
ology into JAPAN, and after completing his university
studies, visited Freiburg and studied under EDMUND
HUSSERL and MARTIN HEIDEGGER during 1930-32. He
did this along with GOICHI MIYAKE, a leader of pheno-
menology in Japan, and TOMOO OTAKA, who was AL-
FRED scHuTz's Japanese friend. Usui's main concern
was with how sociology as a rigorous science is possi-
ble. He began with MAX WEBER's work and in particular
his notion of ideal type. He was disappointed because
the criteria of validity for ideal types were rather rel-
ative and ambiguous. He hoped that essences in the
sense of the EIDETIC METHOD might serve in sociologi-
cal cognition. Taking hints from Heidegger's ontology
in Sein und Zeit ( 1927), he posited concrete sociohis-
torical beings as the theme of sociology. His accounts
of social reality in terms of meaning-configurations
(Sinnzusammenhănge) and the understanding of oth-
ers (Fremdverstehen) drew on works of Husserl and
can be called phenomenological.
These early phenomenological sociologies did not
have far-reaching influence in Japan. Indeed, from the
beginning of the 1960s through the mid-1970s, most
leading Japanese sociologists tended to equate socio-
logica! theory with the structural functionalism ofTal-
cott Parsons ( 1902-1979) and oriented almost ali of
their theoretical concern toward it.
But a change in theoretical sociology appeared
in Japan in the mid-1970s. Some sociologists be-
gan to consider phenomenological sociology. For ex-
ample, a symposium entitled, to translate it, "New
Trends in Contemporary Sociology'' was included in
the forty-seventh annual meeting of the Japan Socio-
logica! Society in 1974. One of the four presentations
was "Amerika shakaigaku no doko ~ Genshogaku-
teki shakaigaku wo chushin ni" (The trend in Amer-
ica around phenomenological sociology) by Yasuhiro
Aoki. The next year a symposium ofthe same title in-
cluded a paper entitled "Rikai-shakaigaku no seiritsu-
tenkai to genshogaku" (The origin and development
of verstehende Soziologie and phenomenology) by
Teruyoshi U gai. Both of these presentations sketched
aspects of Alfred Schutz. Since then, phenomenologi-
cal sociology has been almost entirely identified with
the Schutzian perspective of CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. "New trends" con-
noted altematives to Parsonian structural functional-
ism, and phenomenological sociology in Japan, as in
SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES, was one such trend.
From that time, the number of papers referring to
works of Schutz read at the annual meetings of the
Japan Sociologica! Society has gradually increased.
The first Schutz session was held at the fiftieth an-
nual meeting in 1977 and one or two have been held
every year, except 1982, until 1987. Then for severa!
years there were Schutzian approaches presented in
sessions on such topics as communication, discrim-
ination, and FEMINISM, and then Schutz sessions each
year since 1992. As regards publications, many articles
were published between the mid-1970s and the early
1980s by those who had been presenting papers and
became the leaders ofthe phenomenological sociology
movement in Japan: YUMIKO EHARA, HIDEO HAMA, MASA-
TATAKA KATAG!Rl, HISASHI NASU, KAZUHISA NISHIHARA, HI-
ROSHI OGAWA, HIROSHI SAKURAI, and YOSHIKUNI YATANI.
They may be called Schutzian sociologists of the first
generation. Other sociologists, who had begun in other
theoretical perspectives, e.g., those of Parsons, We-
ber, or CRITICAL THEORY, also wrote about Schutzian
SOcioJogy: YOSHIKAZU SATO, YOSHIYUKI SATO, NAOHARU
SHIMODA, TAKESHI YAMAGISHI, and SETSUO YAMAGUC'HI.
Their topics included rationality, understanding,
motivation, ACTION, objective and subjective meaning,
and the everyday intersubjective lifeworld. The works
ofSchutz were used to establish one ofthe bridgeheads
for a "paradigm revolution" in which the sociologica!
enterprise seeks to break through the "over-socialized"
conception ofhumanity (Denis Wrong), the "static and
conservative conception of society," and "methodolog-
ical dualism" (Alvin Gouldner), which were consid-
 SOCIOLOGY IN JAPAN
ered inherent in Parsonian structural functionalism. A
new phase in Japanese sociology was ushered in.
Scholars who were not sociologists also became in-
terested in phenomenological sociology. A book by an
eminent ETHNOLOGIST, MASAO YAMAGUCHI, discussed the
relationship between centrality and marginality from
the perspective ofSchutz's multiple realities; an article
by the POLITICAL SCIENTIST KAZUHIKU OKUDA surveyed
the new trends in North American sociology in detail;
an article by an EDUCATION theorist, TAKESHI ISHIGURO,
examined Schutz's methodology ofthe social sciences;
and a book by an ethicist, ISAMU NAGAMI, dealt, on the
basis of Schutz, with the relationship between soci-
ety and knowledge. These publications brought more
attention to Schutz.
There is no doubt that translations ha ve contributed
to the spread ofphenomenological sociology in Japan.
Part two of Schutz's Collected Papers l (1962) was
translated by SHOZO FUKATANI in 1974 and "Concept
and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" and
"The Problem of Rationality in the Social Sciences"
were translated in anthologies by Kiyoshi Matsui the
same year. "The Stranger" was trans1ated by Shizuya
Okazawa in 1977. In 1980 part two of Schutz's Col-
lected Papers Il ( 1964) was trans1ated by Atsushi Saku-
rai and HELMUT WAGNER's anthology of Schutz texts,
On Phenomenology and Social Relations ( 1970), was
translated by Makio Morikawa and HIDEO HAMA. The
Theory of Social Action and Der sinnhafie Aufbau
der sozialen Welt (The meaning-structure of the so-
cial world, 1932) were translated by YOSHIKAZU SATO
in 1980 and 1982. Re.fiections on the Problem of Rele-
van ce was translated by HISASHI NASU, HIDEO HAMA, CHIE
!MAI, and MASAKATSU IRIE in 1995. finally, the project
of a complete translation of the Collected Papers by
HIKARU WATABE, HISASHI NASU, and KAZUHISA NISHIHARA
produced volumes one and two in 1983, 1985, and
1991.
Against this background, the Genshogaku-teki
Shakaigaku Kenkyu-kai (The Society for Research in
Phenomenological Sociology), organized by younger
sociologists, held its first meeting in 1980 and has
met to discuss members' research once or twice a
year since. In December 1983 Nihon genshogaku
shakaikagaku-kai (The Japan Society for Phenomen-
ology and the Social Sciences) was organized so that
philosophers and social scientists of the older and
657
younger generations with a common standpoint might
meet to discuss topics of common interest. The annual
meeting has held multidisciplinary symposia on inter-
subjectivity ( 1984 ), everydayness ( 1985), manners and
customs (1986), symbols (1987), rationality (1988),
power ( 1989), communality ( 1990), system ( 1991 ),
discrimination ( 1992), information ( 1993), relativism
(1994), and sound (1995).
There are various developments in the current situ-
ation of phenomenological sociology in Japan. Some
Japanese scholars ha ve visited GERMANY, the UNITED
STATES, and CANADA for discussions or study under lead-
ing scholars: RICHARD GRATHOFF (Bielefeld), lUA SRUBAR
(Konstanz), LESTER EMBREE (Fiorida Atlantic Univer-
sity), MAURICE NATANSON (Yale University), GEORGE
PSATHAS (Boston University), JOHN o'NEILL (York Uni-
versity), and JOSE HUERTAS-JOURDA (Wilfred Laurier
University). The number of sociologists interested
in it is also increasing, largely because the above-
mentioned Schutzian sociologists of the first genera-
tion have taught phenomenological sociology at vari-
ous universities and interested graduate students in it.
The developments ha ve taken, generally speaking, four
directions.
(1) Schutz's works are being closely examined, his
perspectives are being elaborated and philosophical
and sociologica! possibilities are being pursued. Top-
ics here include action, choosing among projects, in-
order-to- and because-motives, multiple realities, typi-
fication, reification, relevance, the everyday lifeworld,
and the relationship between subjectivity and objectiv-
ity.
(2) Schutz's perspectives are being introduced into
wider contexts by philosophers and sociologists and
related to the perspectives of Weber, Husserl, Jiirgen
Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, symbolic interactionism,
ethnomethodology, and HERMENEUTICS and also the his-
torical circumstances in the Vienna of the 1920s and
the sociologica! trends in the United States in the 1960s
and 1970s.
(3) Some sociologists are trying to introduce
Schutzian perspectives for rather empirica! topics such
as anonymity, discrimination, privatization, organi-
zations, social movements, and so forth. These at-
tempts concern themselves with phenomena that were
long taken for granted before being considered from
Schutzian viewpoints.
658 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
(4) Finally, many studies in ethnomethodology
should be mentioned. It attracted the attention of
Japanese sociologists in the mid-1970s. It was ini-
tially spoken of together with Schutzian phenomen-
ology, symbolic interactionism, and the Goffmanian
perspective, i.e., as one of the new complex trends
in American sociology, and the connections between
ethnomethodology and Schutz were emphasized.
From about the middle ofthe 1980s, however, some
younger sociologists have gradually come to focus
on the phases of ethnomethodology as a perspective
sui generis, especially the perspective called conver-
sational analysis, and to emphasize the differences
as well as the similarities of Schutzian phenomen-
ological sociology and ethnomethodology. Articles and
books have been written and translated. Empirica! re-
search has been conducted into sexism, discrimina-
tion, wheelchair users, psychotherapy activities, daily
conversation, television news, space cognition, etc.
The following sociologists belong to this group: Yu-
taka Kitazawa, Aug Nishizaka, Nobuo Shiino, Tomiaki
Yamada, Keiichi Yamazaki, and Hiroaki Yoshii. The
Esunomesodoroji-Kaiwa Bunseki Kenkyuakai (Soci-
ety for Research in Ethnomethodology and Conversa-
tional Analysis) includes not only social scientists but
also natural scientists, and has met since 1993.
Currently, most ethnomethodologists are not inter-
ested in phenomenology. But if their interest in the
taken-for-granted assumptions of everyday activities
and their emphasis on reflexivity in accounting for
practices are considered, ethnomethodology is stil! a
practice inspired by phenomenology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Ehara, Yumiko. Seikatsu-sekai 110 shakaigaku (Sociology of
the everyday lifeworld). Tokyo: Kciso-shobo, 1985.
, and Takeshi Yumagishi, eds.
Ge11shogaku-teki shakaigaku (Phenomenological sociol-
ogy). Tokyo: Sanwa-shobo, 1985.
Hama, Hideo. "Pygmalion to Medusa" (Between Pygmalion
and Medusa). Japa11ese Sociologica! Review 33 (1982),
64--77.
Hiromatsu, Wataru. Genshogaku-teki shakaigaku 110 sokei
(The archetype of phenomenological sociology). Tokyo:
Seido-sha, 1991.
Ishiguro, Takeshi. "Shakaigaku to genshogaku" (Sociology
and Phenomenology). In Koza Ge11shogaku (Lectures on
phenomenology). Voi. 4. Ed. Hajime Kida. Tokyo: Kobun-
do, 1980, 101-52.
Katagiri, Masataka. Nichijo-sekai 110 kosei to Schutz
shakaigaku (The construction of the everyday world and
Schutz's sociology). Tokyo: Jicho-sha, 1982.
- . Schutz 110 shakaigaku (Schutz's sociology). Tokyo:
Inaho-shobo, 1993.
Kurauchi, Kazuta. Kurauchi Kazuta Chosaku-shu (The col-
lected papers of Kazuta Kurauchi). 5 vols. ED. Kurauchi
Kazuta Chosaku-shu Kanko-kai (The Board for Publica-
tion of The Collected Papers of Kazuta Kurauchi). Nishi-
nomiya: Kansei-gakuin University Cooperation Publisher,
1976-1984.
Maruyama, Takashi. Ni11ge11-kagaku 110 11oho-Ro11so (The
methodological controversies in the human sciences).
Tokyo: Keiso-shobo, 1985.
Maruyama, Tokuji. "Nichijo no higan to shigan" (The in-
side and outside of the everyday). In Ge11shogaku to
kaishakugaku (Phenomenology and hermeneutics). Voi. 2.
Ed. Genshogaku Kaishakugaku Kenkyu-kai (The research
society for phenomenology and henneneutics). Tokyo:
Sekai-shoin, 1988, 183-222.
Mori, Mototaka. Alfred Schutz 110 Wie11 (Alfred Schutz in
Vienna). Tokyo: Shin-hyoron, 1995.
Nagami, Isamu. Ryokai to kachi 110 shakaigaku (Sociology of
understanding and value). Tokyo: Idemitsu-shoten, 1983.
Nasu, Hisashi. "Schutz to Amerika shakaigaku tono deal"
(Encounters between Alfred Schutz and American sociol-
ogy). Studies ofthe HistoryofSociology 13 ( 1991 ), 15-34.
- . "Genshogaku to shakaigaku" (Phenomenology and soci-
ology). Jokyo 25 ( 1992), 86-l 03.
Nishihara, Kazuhisa, ed. Ge11shogaku-teki shakaigaku 110
te11kai (The development of phenomenological sociol-
ogy). Tokyo: Seido-sha, 1991.
Nitta, Yoshihiro, et al., eds. Ge11shogaku u11do (The pheno-
menologica1 movement). Tokyo: lwanami-shoten, 1993.
Ogawa, Hiroshi. "Tokumei-sei to shakai no sonritsu"
(Anonymity and the genesis of society). Japa11ese Socio-
logica! Review 31 ( 1980), 17-30.
Okuda, Kazuhiko. "Amerika shakaigaku no genzai" (The
present state of American social sciences). Ge11dai Shiso
3 ( 1975), 190--203.
Psathas, George, and Kazuhiko Okuda, eds. [Phenomenology
and thc Human Sciences in Japan]. Huma11 Studies 15
( 1992).
Sakurai, Hiroshi. "Kachi to jiyu" (Value and freedom).
Japa11ese Sociologica/ Review 41 (1990), 2-16.
Sato, Yoshiyuki. Asosiesho11 110 shakaigaku (The sociology
of association). Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1982.
- , and Hisashi Nasu, eds. Kiki to saisei 110 shakai-riro11
(Social theory in crisis and renewal). Tokyo: Marju-sha,
1993.
Shimoda, Naoharu. Shakaigaku-teki shiko 110 kiso (The
foundation of sociologica! thinking). Tokyo: Shinsen-sha,
1978.
Usui, Jisho. Shakaigaku-ro11shu (Collected papers of sociol-
ogy). Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1964.
Washida, Kiyokazu. "Phănomenologie und Sozialwis-
senschaften in Japan." In Sozialităt u11d l11tersuhjektivităt.
Ed. Richard Grathoff and Bemhard Waldenfels. Munich:
Wilhelm Fink, 1983,381-94.
Yamagishi, Takeshi. Shakai-teki sekai 110 ta11kyu (Inquiry into
the social world). Tokyo: Keio-tushin, 1977.
Yamaguchi, Masao. Bu11ka to ryogi-sei (Culture and ambi-
guity). Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1975.
 SOCJOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Yamaguchi, Setsuo. Shakai to imi (Sociality and meaning).
Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1982.
Yatani, Yoshikuni. Seikatsu-sekai to tagen-teki riariti (Life-
world and multiple realities ). Nishinomiya: Kansei-gakuin
University Cooperation Publisher, 1989.
HISASHI NASU
Waseda University
SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES The
influence of phenomenology on sociology in CANADA
and the UNITED STATES has been extensive, although its
effects are not always readily apparent. (Phenomen-
ological sociology is ied in GREAT BRITAIN by MAURICE
ROCHE, MICHAEL PHILLIPSON, and DAVID SILVERMAN). Ma-
jor postpositivist currents in the development of so-
ciology in the latter half of this century have been
influenced by EDMUND HUSSERL (via ALFRED SCHUTZ),
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and MARTIN HEIDEGGER.
Important precedents to these developments may be
found in the work of European sociologists and Ameri-
can philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. MAX
WEBER, whose influence on sociology has been exten-
sive and pervasive, had defined the disciplinary enter-
prise as concemed with the interpreti ve understanding
of social action. His interest in the subjective dimen-
sion, his use of the method of ideal types, and his con-
tinued focus on understanding (verstehen) provided a
strong sociologica! underpinning for !ater scholars such
as Schutz, who sought more explicitly to incorporate
the phenomenological insights of Husserl. GEORG SIM-
MEL developed a "formal sociology'' focused on the
study of forms of sociation and examined the partic-
ulars of situations and their contents in order to dis-
ceru those structures that underlay the particularities,
a quest that parallels the EIDETIC METHOD ofphenomen-
ology. Karl Mannheim ( 1893-194 7), a former student
of Husserl, contributed much to the development of
a sociology of knowledge. He not only showed the
significance of the subjective dimension of sociallife
- the ways in which institutions and social structures
provide frameworks for intellectual life and activity
- but also focused on individual activities as these
are part of and comprise group, class, or collectively
expressed thought.
MAX SCHELER contributed important phenomen-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
659
ological insights in such areas as the sociology of
knowledge, EMOTIONS, VALUE THEORY, and RELIGION. His
studies of the nature of sympathy and ressentiment are
among the most widely known ofhis works. However,
despite his significant contributions, his ideas and ap-
proaches have not affected or been incorporated into
phenomenological sociology in the United States.
In the United States and under the influence of
WILLIAM JAMES among others, Charles Cooley (1864-
1929), W. I. Thomas (1863-1947), and George Her-
bert Mead ( 1863-1931) ali saw society as a process,
the individual and society as closely interrelated, and
the subjective aspect of human behavior as a neces-
sary part of the process of the formation and dynamic
maintenance of the social self and the social group.
Mead's theorizings in particular contributed to a view
of the self as a reflexive process and of the human be-
ing as an active, interpreting, symbol-using, and self-
interacting socialized being. Since ACTION is ongoingly
constructed by persons, their meanings and ideas must
be understood since these are actively involved in so-
cial interaction. Society was also conceptualized as a
process by Mead, group life being constructed from the
meaningful actions of individuals. Institutions, roles,
statuses, organizations, norms, and values were consid-
ered as developing and reciprocally influencing those
engaged in their construction and maintenance. The
methodological significance of these views was that
the actor's perspective, meanings, and ideas were to
be considered seriously in order to understand human
action.
Alfred Schutz, a philosopher and social scientist
trained in Austria and familiar with Husserl's pheno-
menology, was the central figure in the development
and influence of phenomenology on sociology. He
sought to clarify the significance of Husserl 's thought
for sociology and for the philosophy of the social or
HUMAN SCIENCES. His Der sinnhafle Aujbau der sozialen
Welt (The meaning-structure ofthe social world, 1932)
represented an effort phenomenologically to expand
and clarify Weber's interest in the subjective dimen-
sion. Schutz's most important contributions focused
on the description and analysis of the essential fea-
tures of the WORLD of everyday life; on discovering
the presuppositions, structures, and significations of
that world; and on the realization of a CONSTITUTIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. Among his
660 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
many interests, besides the theory of action, were the
study ofthe intersubjective world of everyday life (the
lifeworld), the study of commonsense knowledge, the
significance ofLANGUAGE in the sedimentation ofmean-
ings and in the processes oftypification, the problems
of multiple realities, and the methodological problems
of the human sciences.
Those whom Schutz infiuenced in sociology during
his teaching at the New School for Social Research
include PETER BERGER, THOMAS LUCKMANN, and HELMUT
R. WAGNER. KURT WOLFF a[so advanced Schutz's ideas,
particularly in the sociology of knowledge. Wagner
became a major American expositor as well as biogra-
pher of Schutz. He wrote extensively on themes from
Schutz and undertook to elaborate the Schutzian per-
spective. His own work sets out in lucid fashion the
major points in phenomenology and their relation to
psychology and sociology while drawing extensively
on Schutz's conceptualizations.
Schutz's dominant influence on American sociol-
ogy was mediated by the incorporation of many of
his key ideas in Berger and Luckmann 's The Social
Construction of Reality ( 1966). Berger's own promi-
nence as a sociologist of religion as well as a social
theorist with a broad humanistic perspective attracted
many younger sociologists to his ideas as well as to
those of Schutz. In Germany Luckmann continued to
advance Schutz's ideas in his subsequent writings and
completed the final Schutz manuscript.
A major approach in American social science
known as "social constructionism" has taken its name
from the Berger and Luckmann volume, although most
of its practitioners do not see themselves either as phe-
nomenologists oras Schutz scholars. Nevertheless, as
an approach, it is oriented to the subjective dimen-
sion of human activities by considering the ways in
which human actors construct MEANINGs in everyday
situations. Its practitioners use qualitative methodolo-
gies such as interviews, field studies, case studies, and
narrative analysis as well as developing interpretive
analyses of the meaning( s) of social actions, situations,
and organizations. In fact, the approach has gained a
major foothold in the study of social problems and so-
cial problems theory, replacing the "labelling theory"
perspective, although derivative from it to some de-
gree. "Social constructionism" has also affected some
theorists associated with symbolic interactionism (the
sociologica! approach most directly related to Cooley,
Thomas, and Mead). Some of its most recent inter-
preters have borrowed from Heidegger, HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, and PAUL RICCEUR in the effort to introduce the
perspectives of HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY into
sociology.
Kurt Wolff, who was trained in Europe but has
taught in the United States since the 1940s, has made
many original contributions to phenomenological the-
ory and method as well as to the sociology of knowl-
edge. Infiuenced by Mannheim as well as Schutz, he
developed the phenomenological approach of"surren-
der" (total involvement, suspension of received no-
tions, pertinence of everything, identification, and risk
of being hurt) and "catch" (the cognitive or existen-
tial result, yield, or harvest of surrender, the begin-
ning, new conceiving, or new conceptualizing that it
is). Wolff's field research has provided insights into
the ways in which this theoretical and methodologi-
cal approach can be incorporated in descriptions and
reflections about lived experience. His !ater writings
have added a concern for the crisis of Western cu !ture,
a macropolitical, economic, ecologica!, and cultural
crisis, a concern that is penetrated by his own recall
of the horrific Nazi years. The recovery of meaning
and concern is possible through such means as surren-
der and catch and the direct confrontation of our lived
circumstances in their historical moments.
GEORGE PSATHAS actively relates Schutz's pheno-
menological sociology to developments in eth-
nomethodology. Since his first edited volume, Pheno-
menological Sociology ( 1973 ), which introduced many
American sociologists to the work of severa! Schutzian
scholars (RICHARD M. ZANER, Wagner, Wo!ff, and EGON
BITTNER, among others ), he has continued to teach and
publish in phenomenology, to organize conferences in
ethnomethodology, to co-found the Society for Pheno-
menology and the Human Sciences in 1981, and also to
found, in 1979, an international quarterly journal, Hu-
man Studies, which is devoted to phenomenological
approaches in the human sciences. Psathas's approach,
influenced by Mead, Schutz, and Garfinkel, has been
to focus on questions ofhow the lifeworld is organized
and how social order is ongoingly produced, and to ad-
dress these interests in empirica! studies oflifeworldly
phenomena ranging from social psychological exper-
iments in the laboratory and observations of mobility
 SOC!OLOGY IN THE UN!TED STATES
and orientation among blind travelers to interaction-
ally produced sets of travel directions. His critiques
of Schutz ha ve focused on the static and nontemporal
character of Schutz's studies, on his emphasis on sed-
imented meanings rather than on the ongoing emer-
gence of meaning in interaction, and on his concern
with the description of structures in the lifeworld rather
than with the production ofthe sense of social structure
for persons operating in the natural attitude.
At Boston University, Psathas (with VICTOR KESTEN-
BAUM and ERAZIM KOHĂK in phiJosophy) and JeffCouJ-
ter (and Michael Lynch in recent years) in sociology
have influenced a number of students who have con-
tinued to teach and research in both phenomenologi-
cal sociology and ethnomethodology; these include
FRANCES WAKSLER, JAMES OSTROW, ANN RAWLS, DAVID
BOGEN, and DUSAN BJELIC. The International Institute
for Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysism
begun at Boston University by Psathas and Coulter,
has sponsored conferences since 1975 and developed
a publishing program in 1990.
Ethnomethodology is frequently cited as one of
the post-Schutzian evolutions of phenomenology. Its
founder, HAROLD GARFINKEL, can be shown to have
retained a phenomenological foundation, evolving
from an interest in Husserlian phenomenology and
ARON GURWITSCH's phenomenoJogicaJ PSYCHOLOGY to
Schutz's phenomenology ofthe lifeworld, to Merleau-
Ponty's studies of the lived BODY, and to Heidegger's
HERMENEUTics. His penetrating analyses of the signif-
icance of the taken-for-granted assumptions operative
in the world of everyday life and the natural attitude,
together with the use of "breaching experiments" for
their discovery, and his explication of the methodical
practices of participants in everyday life have shown
how phenomenologically oriented research on practi-
ca! reasoning and practica! actions can be conducted.
As Garfinkel states in Studies in Ethnomethodol-
ogy ( 1967), the aims of ethnomethodology are to dis-
cover, describe, and analyze "the how it [society] gets
put together; the how it is getting done; the how to
do it; the social structures of everyday activities ...
studying how persons, as parties to ordinary arrange-
ments, use the features of the arrangement to make
for members the visibly organized characteristics hap-
pen." These would include ali methods of practica!
reasoning, methods of interpreting, methods of corn-
661
municating, methods of interacting, and methods of
accomplishing ali manner of practica! activities in the
world of everyday life. Since many of these practices
are repeated and patterned, their methodical charac-
ter, their orderliness and their organization, can be
discovered and described. Garfinkel's writings have
combined critica! refiections on sociologica! theories
and methods; the formulation of program policies to
guide ethnomethodological studies; and the con duct of
a variety of empirica! studies ranging from how jurors
decide on the "correctness" of a verdict; how a trans-
sexual, born male, passed as female and convinced
others of the necessity of a sex change operation; to
the discovering practices of astrophysicists.
Among the major concepts of ethnomethodology
are indexicality and refiexivity. Indexicality refers to
the fact that for members of a group, the meaning
of what they say and do is dependent on the context
in which their doing and saying occurs and, signifi-
cantly for the human sciences, such indexicality cannot
be remedied by developing standardized or idealized
conceptualizations. Refiexivity refers to the fact that
for members, the features of society are produced by
persons' motivated compliance with background ex-
pectancies, i.e., with commonsense knowledge of the
features of society. There is thus a reflexive relation
between the "facts" about society and the ways that
members use practica! reasoning and commonsense
knowledge to depict society.
In contrast to Schutz, ethnomethodology makes
commonsense knowledge and commonsense under-
standings topics for study in order to learn how these
may be used in the accomplishment of everyday ac-
tivities. For ethnomethodology, knowledge and under-
standing can be studied directly, considered not as men-
talistic phenomena and inaccessible, but as practically
demonstrated in the ongoing actions and accomplish-
ments of members, in the ways that they are produced
and achieve their recognition and visibility for mem-
bers. Garfinkel's starting point is not consciousness,
but practica! action in the lifeworld.
The works of Garfinkel himself and his closest stu-
dents and associates, e.g., Harvey Sacks, EGON BIT-
TNER, David Sudnow, D. Laurence Wieder, Kenneth
Liberman, Eric Livingston, Mic haei Lynch, and David
Goode demonstrate the breadth and depth of pheno-
menological and ethnomethodological ideas and per-
662 ENCYCLOPEDJA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
spectives. Sudnow, drawing on Merleau-Ponty's ap-
proach to the lived body, has produced a remarkable
study of embodied actions in the work of the hands at
the keyboards of the piano and the typewriter. Liber-
man has studied "understanding" as an interactional
achievement, examining Australian aborigines' rea-
soning practices as well as those of Tibetan monks.
Goode has studied the lived experience of deaf-blind
children and the ways in which they achieve com-
munication in contexted relations with others. Lynch
has studied the discovering practices of astrophysicists
and the laboratory practices of microbiologists. He
has contributed to the development of a research per-
spective characterized as "social studies of science,"
an approach heavily influenced by ethnomethodology.
Coulter has traced the relevance of the philosophy of
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN for ethnomethodo]ogy, an inter-
est that Lynch has also pursued. Wieder has contributed
studies ofthe reasoning practices ofmembers in every-
day situations ranging from the residents of a halfway
house and their telling of the code (i.e., the uses of
"norms" in the organization of accounts of action) to
the artful practices of magicians and to the interac-
tional production and interpretation ofthe meaning of
the behavior of chimpanzees by their trainers and by
animal researchers.
Other sociologists influenced by ethnomethodology
and by phenomenology include MELVIN POLLNER (who
studied practica! reasoning in theoretical and applied
work), EGON BITTNER (with theoretical work and ap-
plied studies ofthe po]ice), DOROTHY SMITH, and JAMES
HEAP, among others. Smith moved from her early read-
ings of Schutz and Merleau-Ponty to an active en-
gagement with elements of Marxist and ethnomethod-
ological perspectives. She developed what she calls a
sociology for women, which is grounded in women's
experience and which begins with the study of concrete
actions of persons engaged in concerted social rela-
tions. Her early dissatisfaction with Schutz's greater
emphasis on the cognitive and her active incorpora-
tion of feeling and lived experience has resulted in
a feminist perspective that is, in large part, grounded
in phenomenology. Her work shows the importance
of connecting the experientiallevel to extended social
re]ations at the macro-]evel. LOUISE LEVESQUE-LOPMAN
also relates Schutz's thought to FEMINISM.
JAMES HEAP has combined interests in phenomen-
ology and ethnomethodology to focus on the meaning
of action as constrained by what language makes pos-
sible. He has also developed ethnomethodology in an
applied direction in empirica! studies of READING and
writing in instructional settings in education. His in-
terest is in the study of culturally possible ways in
which activities can be done and with how actions are
organizable such that they can be recognizable and in-
telligible.
EDWARD ROSE represents another sociologica! blend-
ing ofphenomenological and ethnomethodological in-
terests. His studies and !ater writings, including The
Werald (1992), demonstrate a unique and perceptive
approach that is historical, etymological, textual, and
analytic with a focus on the study ofworldly order, the
everyday lifeworldly actions ofpersons.
JOHN o'NEILL has been a major contributor for over
two decades to a variety of phenomenologically in-
formed studies and writings in sociology. He at first
devoted his attention to the philosophy of the so-
cial sciences and pursued both the Frankfurt school
of CRITICAL THEORY and phenomenology in their fo-
cus on the problem of the complementarity between
causal and hermeneutica! explanations. Both as trans-
lator and expositor of his views on politics, history,
Janguage, and art he has specialized in the work of
Merleau-Ponty. He has also concentrated on interdis-
ciplinary studies in MARXISM, phenomenology, and eth-
nomethodology. In more recent years his research has
explored problems in politica! economy and the semi-
ology of embodiment, and, following the linguistic turn
and Wittgensteinian philosophy, he has also studied
the theory oftextuality and discourse production, con-
sidering phenomenological, STRUCTURALIST, and POST-
MODERN theories of discourse production and intertex-
tuality. In his position at York University O'Neill co-
founded a graduate program that has continued to focus
on, among other approaches, Continental thought; he
has been instrumental in the formation of the journal
Philosophy of the Social Sciences; and he has edited
a book series, the International Library of Phenomen-
ology and Moral Sciences. In these va:rious activities he
has contributed to advances in phenomenological ap-
proaches in sociology and his wide-ranging scholarship
and intellectual vigor has influenced many students.
A number of other scholars ha ve produced a corpus
of works that reflects ongoing interest in phenomen-
 SOMATICS
ological themes. These include PETER MANNING in his
fieldwork studies ofthe police and in his effort to link
semiotics and fieldwork; MARIANNE PA GET for studies of
communicative practices ofphysicians as well as fem-
inist studies ofwomen artists; RON SILVERS and VIVIAN
DARROCH-LOZOWSKI, whose visual and reflexive studies
are phenomenoJogicaJ; KENNETH MORRISON and PETER
EGLIN, who have engaged in textual studies; JACK KATZ
in methodology and criminology; and GISELA HINKLE,
BURKHARDT HOLZNER, and MARY ROGERS who ha ve made
various theoretical contributions.
The issues confronting sociologists who continue
to retain a connection to phenomenology are how to
pursue their studies of social phenomena and connect to
the broader and larger-scale interests ofthe sociologica!
mainstream. The development of ethnomethodology
has attracted a number of researchers as an approach
that offers both rigor and theoretical acumen in the
pursuit of studies of Iifeworldly actions by members
of society. However, the interweaving of the various
themes raised by phenomenology into the fabric of
empirica! sociology in the United States has not as
yet produced coherent "schools" of thought based on
phenomenology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Con-
struction of Reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966.
Denzin, Norman. Interpreti ve Interactionism. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage, 1989.
Garfinkel, Harold. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- , and Harvey Sacks. "On Formal Structures of Practica!
Actions." In Theoretical Sociology. Ed. John C. McKinney
and Edward A. Tiryakian. New York: Appleton Century-
Crofts, 1970, 33 7--66.
Garfinkel, Harold, Michael Lynch, and Eric Livingston. "The
Work of a Discovering Science Construed from Materials
from the Optically Discovered Pulsar." Philosophy ofthe
Social Sciences Il (1981), 131-58
Garfinkel, Harold, and D. Laurence Wieder. "Two Incom-
mensurable, Asymmetrically Alternate Technologies of
Social Analysis." In Text in Context: Contributions to
Ethnomethodology. Ed. Graham Watson and Robert M.
Seiler. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992, 175-206.
Goode, David. "On Understanding Without Words: Commu-
nication Between a Deaf-Blind Child and Her Parents."
Human Studies 13 ( 1990), 1-38.
Heap, James. "Applied Ethnomethodology: Looking for the
Local Rationality of Reading Activities." Human Studies
13 (1990), 39-72.
Levesque-Lopman, Louise. Claiming Reality: Phenomen-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
663
ology and Women s Experience. Lanham, MD: Rowan &
Littlefield, 1988.
Liberman, Kenneth. Understanding Interaction in Central
Australia: An Ethnomethodological Study of Australian
Ahoriginal People. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1985.
Lynch, Michael. Art and Artifact in Lahoratory Science: A
Study ofShop Work and Shop Talk in a Research Lahora-
tmy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
O'Neill, John. Sociology as a Skin Trade: Essays Towards a
Reflexive Sociology. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- . The Communicative Body: Studies in Communicative
Philosophy, Politic~. and Sociology. Evanston, IL: North-
westem University Press, 1989.
Psathas, George, ed. Phenomenological Sociology: Issues
and Applications. New York: J. Wiley, 1973.
- , ed. Phenomenology and Sociology: Theory and Research.
Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Pheno-
menology/University Press of America, 1990.
Rose, Edward. The Werald. Boulder, CO: Waiting Room
Press, 1992.
Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. The Structures ofthe
Life-World. 2 vols. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1973-83.
Smith, Dorothy. The Everyday World as Problematic.
Boston: Northeastem University Press, 1987.
Srubar, Ilja. "On the Origin of 'Phenomenological' Sociol-
ogy." Human Studies 7 (1984), 163-89.
Sudnow, David. Talk s Body: A Meditation Between Two Key-
boards. New York: Knopf, 1979.
Wagner, Helmut R. Phenomenology of Consciousness and
Sociology of the Lifeworld: An Introductory Study. Ed-
monton: University of Alberta Press, 1983.
- . Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1983.
Wieder, D. Laurence. Language and Social Reality. The
Hague: Mouton, 1974; rpt. Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of
America, 1988.
Wolff, Kurt. Surrender and Catch. Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
1976.
- . Survival and Sociology: Vindicating the Human Suhject.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991.
GEORGE PSATHAS
Boston University
SOMATICS Encounters between phenomenology
and the body- and movement-centered approaches col-
lectively known as "somatics" can best be understood
by recognizing that phenomenology and somatics are
contemporaries within a broader historical and cultural
context characterized by a new type of focus on the
BODY appearing in the !ater 19th and early 20th cen-
turies in Europe and North America. Here the body is
no longer exclusively conceived as a physical object
664 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
opposed to a disembodied mind, but is increasingly rec-
ognized as subjective, expressive, and primordial. For
example, while EDMUND HUSSERL emphasized the fun-
damental role ofkinaesthesis as early as 1907 in a !ee-
ture course concerning the perception ofthings in space
(now published under the ti tie Ding und Raum ), educa-
tors such as Emile Jaques Dalcroze (1865-1950) and
Rudolf Laban ( 1879-1958) as well as modern dancers
such as Isadora Dune an ( 1878-1927) and Mary Wig-
man (1886-1973) were pursuing novel movement ex-
plorations of their own during the same period. That
early phenomenologists were not altogether isolated
from new trends in the DANCE, PHYSICAL EDUCATION,
and general physical cu !ture movement of their time
is suggested by MORITZ GEIGER 's use of the notion of
"Eurhythmie" in one of the essays in his Zugănge zur
Asthetik (Approaches to aesthetics, 1928), where eu-
rhythmy is presented as the foundation for ali artistic
form; the word is perhaps most closely associated with
Dalcroze, who was already working out his principles
of eurhythmics as applied to music and movement by
the turn ofthe century at the Geneva Conservatory (and
whose college of eurhythmy was established at the ex-
perimental community ofHellerau, outside Dresden, in
191 0), but the term was also used by Laban during the
1920s with reference to dance movement and appears
in the works of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925) as well.
In fact, as cultural historian Hillel Schwartz has sug-
gested, the 20th century itself has been characterized
by a new appreciation for the kinaesthetic dimension
in many areas oflife, notjust in specific disciplines ad-
dressing it directly. Thus phenomenology is not only
- as HERBERT SPIEGELBERG has pointed OUt - part of
a larger historical turn to immediate experience, in its
full range and richness, but is also situated in a cultural
milieu in which new experientially-grounded bodily
practices (as well as new ways oftheorizing about the
living, moving body) have emerged.
The field of somatics embraces a great number of
such bodily based educational and therapeutic prac-
tices, including various "body work" and "body aware-
ness" approaches. Though its full history has yet to be
written - especially regarding its 19th century roots
- it is often associated with the names of such pi-
oneers as Frederick Mathias Alexander ( 1869-1955),
Elsa Gindler (1885-1961 ), Ida Rolf (1896-1979), and
Moshe Feldenkrais ( 1904-1984); it also includes body-
centered practices developed in the 20th century by
many other individuals, along with such approaches as
biofeedback, sensory integration, and dan ce and move-
ment therapy. Moreover, it embraces such traditions as
yoga, martial arts, and massage, each of which has a
Jengthy history of its own. Yet somatics owes its rela-
tively recent emergence as a field or discipline (rather
than a mere collection of competing "marginal" or "al-
ternative" practices) to the work in EXISTENTIAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY ofTHOMAS HANNA, and phenomenoJogy not
only played a key ro le in its inception, but continues to
contribute to its development, offering critica! reflec-
tions on its assumptions as well as eidetic descriptions,
and constitutive and genetic analyses, concerning the
"matters themselves" proper to the field.
Hanna's establishment of the field may be seen as
comprising two phases. (1) In articles published in the
late 1960s and the early 1970s, and in Bodies in Re-
voit ( 1970), he retrieves the old term "somatology" as
a title for a new HUMAN SCIENTIFIC multidiscipline that
would draw on the one hand from such fields as evo-
lutionary biology, ethology, and developmental psy-
chology, while on the other hand also incorporating
the phenomenological notion ofbodily subjectivity, as
well as an existential concern for human freedom. Al-
though he was not aware of it at the time, his project
echoes Husserl 's own proposal, in Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie und phănomenologischen Philoso-
phie III [ 1912], for a "somatology" that would combine
research in such natural sciences as physiology with the
direct somatie perception that each researcher has, ex-
perientially, only with regard to his or her own lived
body. Hanna's somatology is nondualistic in severa!
ways: it explicitly accomodates both scientific, third-
person knowledge and experiential, first-person knowl-
edge without requiring either ofthese tobe assimilated
to the other; it takes into account both the evolution-
ary adaptation of an organism to its environment and
the existential adaptations roade possible by human
awareness, autonomy, and Jearning; and it moves res-
olutely beyond mind-body dualisms by focusing upon
the soma, which in earlier formulations is defined as
an organic whole or process comprising many inter-
articulating "mental" and "physical" functions. In that
Hanna's somatology is concerned not only with habit-
ual, "acquired" kinaesthetic patterns but also with an
instinctual substratum of somatie life, it also converges
 SOMATICS
with the !ater Husserl 's investigations of Triebinten-
tionalităt, as well as with MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's
analyses of an anonymous, pre-personal "motor inten-
tionality" in Phenomimologie de la perception ( 1945).
And Hanna 's detailed treatment of upright posture in
The Body of Life ( 1980)- including its frontal orien-
tation, its possibilites of lateral manipulation, and its
temporal coordination - is reminiscent of ERWIN w.
STRAUS 's work on similar themes in, for instance, "Die
aufrechte Haltung" ( 1949).
(2) Though Hanna's earlier works made use ofthe
adjective "somatie" (a term also found in Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty, and ARON ouRwnscH), he coined the
noun "somatics" in a 1976 essay, "The Field of Somat-
ies," appearing in the first issue ofajoumal ofthe same
name. By including essays and book reviews devoted to
the many body-centered practices making up the field,
this joumal brought diverse approaches together in a
common context or forum, and although not all prac-
titioners necessarily agreed with Hanna's own project
of somatology, they rapidly carne to see themselves
as members of a common field called somatics. Dur-
ing Hanna's years as editor of Somatics (1976-90), not
only did the joumal publish a number of essays in or
referring to phenomenology, but Hanna himself grad-
ually refined the notion of the soma to emphasize the
phenomenological roots of the concept, culminating
in a definition of the soma as "the body experienced
from within" - which recalls the phenomenological
concept of"lived body" (Leib).
Though some somatie practices rely on metaphysi-
cal frameworks from various world traditions and oth-
ers are associated with various schools of psychother-
apy, the most common framework is NATURALISM; for
instance, practices may be explained and justified in
terms ofthe way neurological activity controls muscu-
lar activity. There is also a tendency toward what Don
H. Johnson terms "somatie Platonism"- comparing
all individual bodies to some abstract ideal image or
model of the body and seeing bodies only through the
grid of assumptions that this paradigm entails. Never-
theless, some somatie practitioners have become ac-
tively interested in phenomenological discourse as a
way of giving voi ce to the rich nuances oflived bodily
experience their work elicits, while others tind eidetic
phenomenology a useful tool in exploring similarities
and differences among various somatie approaches.
665
Still others make use of phenomenological concepts in
their theoretical writings and/or cite phenomenological
works among their sources. In addition, ELIZABETH A.
BEHNKE is conducting a series of phenomenological in-
vestigations of somatie practice. Thus phenomenologi-
cal work continues to contribute to theory and research
in the field of somatics. Furthermore, in addition to his
important contributions to somatie theory, EUGENE T.
GENDLIN 's development of the notion of a bodily "felt
sense" in Focusing (1978; rev. ed. 1981) and other
works is a classic example of an outstanding contribu-
tion by a phenomenologist to practica! somatie educa-
tion. Another indication of interchange between these
fields is found in the fact that on severa! occasions, per-
sons trained in or familiar with phenomenology have
left the world of academic philosophy to become full-
time somatie practitioners. And during the 1980s, two
graduate programs in somatics emerged, one directed
by SEYMOUR KLEINMAN at The Ohio State University and
the other by Don Hanlon Johnson, whose program is
currently located at the California Institute of Integral
Studies in San Francisco; both programs draw upon
the phenomenological tradition in various ways.
However, in addition to the influences ofphenomen-
ology upon somatics, it is also possible to see somatics
as contributing to phenomenology- in part because
in some respects, they are kindred movements or tra-
ditions. For example, many phenomenologists have
pointed out that as we go about our daily life, we are
caught up with things, tasks, and others, and seldom no-
tice our own bodily comportment itself; as Husserl ac-
knowledges, a special "asking back into" (Riickfrage)
is necessary to thematize the operative kinaestheses
and make them available for phenomenological de-
scription. Similarly, F. Mathias Alexander character-
izes everyday life in terms of "end-gaining," and caUs
for a turn to the usually unnoticed "means whereby,"
bringing to light the ongoing "how" of somatie life,
including its deeply sedimented habits. With transfor-
mative somatie practice, however, what is taken for
granted in the everyday attitude is not merely disc! o sed
as a theme for possible theoretical reflection, but is ac-
tually changed: habitual tensions and restrictions are
released, movement becomes easier, bodily alignment
becomes more optimal, and so on. And in the process,
somatie practice allows one to appreciate many nu-
ances ofkinaesthetic and somaesthetic experience that
666 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
were previously vague (or out of awareness altogether).
Thus somatie practice can help phenomenologists de-
velop what ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI refers to in Husserlian
Meditations ( 1974) as "appropriate sensibility" for cer-
tain sorts ofphenomena. This in turn recalls Husserl's
emphasis in "Entwurfeiner 'Vorrede' zudenLogischen
Untersuchungen" [ 1913] on phenomenological "see-
ing" as a ski li that can be developed, so that phenomen-
ological research depends on the evidence available
to an experienced observer and is not identica! with
what can be garnered through naive "seeing." More-
over, somatie work suggests a further methodological
refinement. In The Context of Self ( 1981 ), RICHARD M.
ZANER demonstrates the use of what he terms "promi-
nence by absence"- i.e., a key feature ofthe matters
themselves under investigation can become conspicu-
ous precisely by considering cases where this feature
is lacking- as an additional strategy complementing
the free phantasy variation that is a part of the EIDE-
nc METHOD. What the richness of distinctions evoked
by practica! somatie work suggests is the parallel pos-
sibility of "prominence through heightened optimal-
ity," i.e., the use of striking "plus" variations (rather
than "minus" variations where a key feature is miss-
ing) in elucidating the usually tacit structures of the
type of experience in question. Thus while phenomen-
ology enriches somatics by providing a language and a
framework within which to articulate its assumptions
and achievements, somatics enriches phenomenology
- especially, but not exclusively, phenomenology of
the body - by opening up a realm of hitherto unno-
ticed phenomena and specifying attitudes and styles of
comportment that allow these phenomena tobe thema-
tized and explored in great detail.
This is of particular importance in ensuring that
certain themes pertaining to CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
OLOGY and GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY - e.g., passive
synthesis (Husserl), kinaesthetic consciousness (uL-
RICH CLAESGES), and the distinction between the body as
constituted and the body as constituting (LUDWIG LAND-
GREBE) - are not merely taken up conceptually, but
can be worked out by subsequent phenomenologists
on the basis of the appropriate experiential EVIDENCE.
Such investigations are in turn crucial to demonstrating
that the Husserlian conception of transcendental "con-
sciousness," "subjectivity," or "person" cannot be con-
fused with a Cartesian ego radically sundered from a
thing called a "body," but already includes a corporeal-
kinaesthetic stratum (as JITENDRA NATH MOHANTY has
indeed suggested in severa! essays).
Yet another area of convergence between pheno-
menology and somatics can be indicated by borrowing
(and extending) the notion of a "critique of corporeal
experience" mentioned by ENZO PACI in Funzione delle
scienze e significato dell 'uomo (Function of the sci-
ences and signification ofthe human, 1963). Like FEM-
INISM, somatics is often critica! both ofthe objectified,
commodified body endlessly measured up against ex-
ternally imposed ideals and ofthe ruthless domination
of a "naturalized" body by medical authorities. For
example, in Body (1983 ), Don Hanlon Johnson uses
the notion of "techniques ofthe body" introduced in a
1934lecture by Marcel Mauss ( 1872-1950) to contrast
"techniques of alienation"- bodily practices that dis-
empower us by disconnecting us from our own somatie
experience and foster authoritarian control of bodies
- and "techniques of authenticity," which take lived
experience seriously (Johnson explicitly credits pheno-
menology with helping to develop this as a historical
possibility) and foster embodied self-responsibility as
the hasis for true community, as well as honoring bodily
diversity rather than positing some sort of"ideal" body
as standard or goal. Here and elsewhere, somatie theory
recognizes not only that bodies are in general socially
shaped, but that- as MICHEL FOUCAULT has pointed out
- our own history in particular has been geared in
many ways toward molding "docile bodies." Yet many
somatie practitioners and theorists see somatie prac-
tices as providing a genuinely liberatory alternative
whose effects need not be confined to isolated individ-
uals, but are increasingly seen as having the potential
to change bodily practices, and embodied power re-
lations, within the intersubjective/intercorporeal field.
In other words, somatie practice cannot be reduced
to a narcissistic focus on the "self," but elicits styles
of bodily comportment and action that challenge or
shift current social patterns by responding to a situ-
ation in an innovative and productive way, thus en-
abling new kinds of social order to emerge (a theme
emphasized in Gendlin, resonating in certain respects
with recent work independently pursued by BERNHARD
WALDENFELS).
Finally, we may point to some emerging links be-
tween somatics and a phenomenologically grounded
 SOUTH AFRICA
ETHICS. Like other practica! disciplines, somatics finds
a variety of concrete ethical issues arising during, for
instance, a session between an individual client and a
practitioner. But at a deeper level, there is a core theme
in both Hanna's !ater work and Gendlin's recent work
that has to do with being able to experience oneself
as being addressed by the Other rather than solely as
addressing the other, oras being looked at by the Other
rather than solely as observing the other, a theme rem-
iniscent of the work of EMMANUEL LEYINAS. for both
Gendlin and Hanna, however, there is a fundamental
fellowship not only among human somas, but among
humans and animals and plants, which recalls Merleau-
Ponty's notions of reversibility and flesh ofthe world.
Thus the somatie philosophy of Hanna and Gendlin
moves toward an embodied ethics with implications
for ECOLOGY.
Somatics is a field that is still in the process of cre-
ating a disciplinary identity, retrieving the threads of
its history, and searching out an appropriate language
for its theory and practice. Yet its own historical roots
and "proto-phenomenological" elements have already
fostered significant relationships with the phenomen-
ological tradition, based largely on the fact that for
both fields, the body is no Ion ger relegated to the sta tus
of a thing among things, but is an active, expressive,
responsive, and transformative lived body that is im-
plicated in ali our experience. Though the interaction
between phenomenology and somatics is still in its
early stages, we may expect an increasingly fruitful
collaboration between these disciplines in the years to
come.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Behnke, Elizabeth A. "The Philosopher's Body." Somatics
3:4 (1982), 44-46.
- . "Matching." Somatics 6:4 ( 1988), 24--32; rpt. in
Bone. Breath, and Gesture: Practices of Embodiment.
Ed. Don Hanlon Johnson. Berkeley: North Atlantic
Books/Califomia Institute of Integral Studies, 1995, 317-
37.
- . "Sensory Awareness and Phenomenology: A Conver-
gence ofTraditions." Study Project in Phenomenology of
the Body Newsletter 2: 1 ( 1989), 27-42.
Gendlin, Eu gene T. "A Philosophical Critique ofthe Concept
of Narcissism: The Significance of the Awareness Move-
ment." In Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern
Studies. Ed. David Michael Levin. New York: New York
University Press, 1987, 251-304.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
667
- . "Three Assertions About the Body." The Foii o: A Journal
for Focusing and Experiential Therapy 12 (1993), 21-33.
Hanna, Thomas. "What is Somatics?" Somatics 5:4 (1986),
4--8: rpt. in Bone, Breath, and Gesture: Practices ofEm-
bodiment. Ed. Don Hanlon Johnson. Berkeley: North At-
lantic Books/Califomia Institute oflntegral Studies, 1995,
314--52.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Reflexionen zu Husserls Konstitution-
slehre." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 36 (1974 ), 466-82; "The
Problem ofPassive Constitution." Trans. Donn Welton. In
his The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six Essays.
Ed. Donn Welton. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1981, 50-65.
Schwartz, Hillel. "Torque: The New Kinaesthetic of the
Twentieth Century." In Incorporations. Ed. Jonathan
Crary and Sanford Kwinter. New York: Urzone, 1992,
70-126.
Spicker, Stuart F. "Terra Firma and Infirma Species: From
Medical Philosophical Anthropology to Philosophy of
Medicine." Journal ofMedicine and Philosophy 1 ( 1976),
104--35.
Straus, Erwin W. "Die aufrechte Haltung. Eine anthropolo-
gische Studie." Monatsschrift fur Psychiatrie und Neu-
rologie 117 ( 1949); rpt in his Psychologie der men-
schlichen Welt. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1960, 224--35;
rev. and enl. as "The Upright Posture." Psychiatric Quar-
terly 26 ( 1952), 529--61; rpt. in his Phenomenological Psy-
chology: The Selected Papers of Erwin W Straus. Trans.,
in part, Erling Eng. New York: Basic Books, 1966, 137-
65.
ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE
Study Project on Phenomenology ofthe Body
SOUTH AFRICA Phenomenology in South
Africa carne into full swing in 1948 with the appoint-
ment of CAREL KRUGEL OBERHOLZER to the chair of phi-
Josophy at the University of Pretoria. That university
remained the center for phenomenology un tii recently,
when the center shifted to the University of South
Africa (Pretoria), especially to the faculty of education.
In 1950 PETRUS SECUNDUS DREYER returned from Eu-
rope, having studied PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY un-
der HELMUTH PLESSNER and EXISTENTIALISM under KARL
JASPERS. In 1952 Dreyer was appointed lecturer at the
University ofPretoria. Right from the beginning, Ober-
holzer taught the principles of phenomenology and EX-
ISTENTIALISM. By that time Europe and the UNITED STATES
had been working in this direction for practically half a
century. As a result, phenomenologists in South Africa
tried to start at the level of European and American
phenomenology and they could manage this only by
taking the study ofthe phenomenological classics, in-
668 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
cluding EDMUND HUSSERL, for granted. On the one hand,
they tried to move on the European level; on the other
hand, they tried to apply phenomenological principles
to the problems- scientific and otherwise - of the
South African situation. Beginning at this level had its
advantages, but also disadvantages.
Right from the beginning the South African pheno-
menological movement was greatly inftuenced by Eu-
ropean philosophical anthropology, especially Hel-
muth Plessner, Amold Gehlen, FREDERIK J. J. BUY-
TENDIJK, Martin Buber, Erich Rothacker, MAX SCHELER,
NICOLAI HARTMANN, Adolph Portmann, and, indirectly,
Baron Jakob von Uexkiill, the teacher of many ofthese
philosophers. Of equal importance was the inftuence of
existentialism, especially Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich
Nietzsche, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Karl Jaspers, and to a
much lesser extent JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Fundamental,
however, was the influence of Husserl, most of ali his
view of knowledge and science, and his phenomen-
ological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION and EIDETIC METHOD.
The undisputed leader ofphenomenology in South
Africa was Oberholzer, professor of philosophy and
fundamental pedagogics at Pretoria. He was primar-
ily interested in EDUCATION, and published ali his most
important work in this field. According to Oberholzer,
however, every science has an ontic base, a field of
reality that is the primary object of study of the partic-
ular science, and that at the same time determines the
parameters and the basic principles ofthe science. The
educational reality must be based on the anthropolog-
ical reality, because the phenomenon of education can
only be understood as a human activity. The ontic foun-
dation ofpedagogics is the human being. Pedagogics as
a science must necessarily be based on a valid view of
the human being. Such a view ofthe human Oberholzer
found by way of Husserl 's method of Wesensschau. He
was absolutely convinced of the view of the human
being that he developed inside the phenomenological
horizon through phenomenological analysis; the philo-
sophical anthropology of the school of von Uexkiill
(especially Buytendijk, Portmann, and some medi-
cal anthropologists; the psychology ofviKTOR FRANKL,
and existential philosophy, especially Heidegger and
Jaspers. This view of the human was the foundation,
on the one hand, ofhis most important work, in partic-
ular Prolegomena van 'n prinsipiele pedagogiek (Pro-
legomena to pedgogic principles, 1968) - and, on
the other hand, an untiring struggle against ali forms
of perspectivism, RELATIVISM, reductionism, PSYCHOLO-
GISM, NATURALISM, scientism, etc.
Oberholzer's view ofthe human can be summarized
as follows: the primeva! (in the sense of original, basic,
not further to be reduced, that which makes something
what it is, essential) qualities ofbeing human are open-
ness, possibility, being qualified by norms, freedom,
responsibility, accountability, and existentiality. Only
when these qualities determine our view ofhumankind
is it possible to understand human beings in their be-
ing and actions. A child is a human being growing up,
a human being becoming mature. Being on the way
to maturity does not make the child less of a human
being, but it does imply a not yet, a movement to the
future of maturity. This phase of being human is a
phase of needing help, especially in the form of pro-
tection and guidance. Being a child is a mode ofbeing
human that essentially appeals to a responsible human
being to respond by giving protection and guidance
on the way. The essence of education is the relation-
ship of an adult human being giving protection and
guidance to an immature human being on his or her
way to maturity, an adult human being responding to
the appeal of an immature human being. This response
is always guided by values and norms. This is essen-
tially the meaning of the word "pedagogic," which is
derived from the Greekpaidos (child), and agein (to
lead). An implication of this view of education is that
terms like adult education, reeducation programs, dis-
tance education, in-service education, etc., can only
have analogical meaning. Education in the true sense
of the word is a direct relationship between an adult
and a child.
A result of Oberholzer's approach of ontologica!
analysis was an extraordinary emphasis on the impor-
tance of ontologica! categories to describe the phe-
nomenon of education. This was strongly influenced
by Heidegger's "analytic ofDASEIN." The discovery of
categories makes the formulation ofnorms for educa-
tional practice possible. For some students of Ober-
holzer this became a somewhat one-sided activity.
Under Oberholzer's influence a strong phenomen-
ological movement arose (and is still going strong) in
education at the Universities of Pretoria, South Africa
(Pretoria), Port Elizabeth, and the Rand Afrikaans Uni-
versity (Johannesburg), with leading figures WILLEM A.
 SOUTH AFRICA
LANDMANN, STEPHANUS J. SCHOEMAN, JACOBUS J. PIENAAR,
PIET VAN ZYL, DANIEL J. GREYLING, MAURITS OTTO OBER-
HOLZER, PH!LIP HIGGS, and CHRISTIAN GUNTER (Univer-
sity of Stellenbosch). Common to this movement is
the conviction that a radical reflection on the educa-
tional situation is required in order to understand the
phenomenon of education. Such a radical reflection
will lead to a description of the essence of the edu-
cational situation in terms of pedagogica! categories
and corresponding criteria derived from them. In pen-
etrating the essence of the phenomenon of education as
it occurs universally, the phenomenologist is required
to suspend provisionally his or her extrinsic aims and
beliefs.
Dreyer joined and supported Oberholzer enthusias-
tically in his struggle against psychologism, natural-
ism, and scientism, and especially against ideologica!
thinking. Primarily he was interested in the fundamen-
tal epistemological problems of the HUMAN SCIENCES
( Geisteswissenschaften ). His field of speciality was the
theory of HISTORY, especially the historian 's concept of
time, the problem of subjectivity and objectivity, the
truth and validity ofhistorical propositions, and the ap-
plicability ofKANT's Zur Natur des Menschen gehOrige
Metaphysik (Metphysics belonging essentially to hu-
man nature) to history. Related to this field ofstudywas
his interest in culture as an essential human character-
istic. Basic problems that arose time and again were the
problems of the relation and communication between
persons separated from each other by space, time, and
culture, as well as the methodological problems ofthe
phenomenological approach to a phenomenon that be-
longs to past history.
In his Inleiding tot diefilosofie van die geskiedenis
(Introduction to the philosophy of history, 197 4) and
a number of papers published in journals, Dreyer em-
phasizes that history is the science that has its field of
study in the reality ofhumans in their LIFEWORLD exist-
ing in the past. The universal essence of the human is
openness; the human being is completely part ofhis or
her lifeworld, and yet able to transcend the lifeworld
to stand on its periphery in order to change it; thus the
human is a normative being that is constantly active
in consciously knowing, evaluating, and changing his
or her self and lifeworld. Human beings are funda-
mentally and essentially cultural beings. Culture is the
nature of humankind.
669
This view of the human is the pivot for the ap-
proach of history. It enables the historian- a unique
human being in his or her own unique life world- to
look back from one point intime (the present) to other
unique human beings in their unique lifeworlds and
their points in time (the past), in such a way that they
can be understood. In this way the past becomes a !iv-
ing, meaningful past into which we of the present can
enter and that we can grasp nearly as well (and often
better) than we can grasp our own world or the people
of the past theirs. Only on the basis of this view of the
human is it possible to know history in the true sense of
the word. It is the guide of the historian 's approach to
the epistemological problems ofhistorical study; ofthe
constructions a historian has to make to bridge gaps in
his or her knowledge ofthe past and to give a coherent
narrative ofthe past; ofthe evaluation ofthe so-called
laws of history; of the search for meaning in history;
and so on.
As an illustration, a short summary ofDreyer's ap-
proach to the problem ofthe TRUTH ofhistorical inter-
pretation can be offered: the intention ofthe historian is
to teli the truth about the past, but the past is notat hand.
We must penetra te the past by way of the memory of
people, documents, and monuments. We must establish
facts ofthe past. Facts according to the realist-positivist
approach are statements that correspond to events of
the past. These events, however, do not lie around like
stones on a beach. They must be reconstructed and
evaluated in the historical narrative, which compels the
historian to discover and evaluate facts in the context
of a coherent whole. This is the source of the never-
ending difference between realists-positivists, on the
one hand, and idealists, on the other hand, between
adherents of correspondence or coherence. Neither a
catalogue of facts nor an abstract system of coherent
pronouncements can give a meaningful and compre-
hensive narrative ofthe past. Without facts, knowledge
ofhistory is impossible; without coherence, the impor-
tance, meaning, and even the factuality offacts are in-
conceivable. A simple combination of correspondence
and coherence does not solve the problem. Only when
the historian remembers that the objects of history are
humans, who are the makers of history, therefore also
the subjects of history; that humans are never things
among other things; that the human story can never
be told, except when the human essence- that which
670 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
makes us human beings- is fully expressed; only, in
other words, when historians remember that humans
of the past are subjects even as the historian is him-
or herself, subjects only to be approached through in-
tersubjective communication, only then can a true and
meaningful narrative ofthe past be told.
The influence ofphenomenology was disseminated
by Dreyer's students. Students of the history of eul-
ture, ARCHITECTURE, and history - some to the level
of magister - attended his lectures and seminars. In
philosophy a number ofhis students played an impor-
tant role, although each had his own special field of
interest.
FREDERIK J. ENGELBRECHT wrote his doctoral disser-
tation on the phenomenon of the threshold. He was
greatly interested in and influenced by the metabletika
of J. H. van den Berg. Before he retired, Engelbrecht
was head ofthe department ofphilosophy and dean of
arts at the University ofthe North.
GERRIT VAN wvK's doctoral dissertation was on the
ethics of Nicolai Hartmann, and he became head of
the philosophy department at the University of Zul-
uland. ERSMUS D. PRINSLOO doctor's thesis was on the
phenomenological approach. His special field is infor-
mallogic and he is head ofthe philosophy department
at the University of South Africa (Pretoria).
c. s. DE BEER's doctor's thesis was on meaning in
history. He is Professor of Communication Sciences at
the University of South Africa. His special field is the
philosophy of PAUL RICCEUR.
JENS KROGER's doctor's thesis was on the concept
of horde in the philosophies of Nietzsche, ORTEGA Y
GASSET, and Heidegger. He is a senior lecturer at the
University of South Africa.
ANDRIES P. DU TOIT's doctor's thesis was on
Kierkegaard. His special field is logic and he is the
head ofthe philosophy department at the University of
Pretoria.
Indirectly the influence of phenomenology can be
seen in other sciences, e.g., the PSYCHOLOGY ofREX VAN
vuuREN, currently at the University of Pretoria.
In ETHNOLOGY at the University of Pretoria the fun-
damental approach has changed from evolutionary,
naturalistic principles to phenomenological principles.
Terms from the phenomenological sphere, like life-
world, horizon, scale of values, cultural values and
norms, the uniqueness of the human being, etc., ha ve
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
become part of everyday language, even outside scien-
tific circles, in South Africa.
P. S. DREYER
University ()[Pretoria
SPACE As early as the preface to Philoso-
phie der Arithmetik ( 189\ ), EDMUND HUSSERL spoke of
another volume devoted to studying additional con-
cepts belonging to mathematical analysis and to fash-
ioning a new philosophical theory of Euclidean and
non-Euclidean geometries as well as their relation to
arithmetical analysis. This volume was never com-
pleted, although manuscripts treating these issues dat-
ing from 1886 to 1901 ha ve been published as Studien
zur Arithmetik und Geometrie. These texts distinguish
faur senses in which we ordinarily employ the word
"space": (l) the space of everyday living, i.e., the in-
tuitive space that is both before and beyond science;
(2) the space of pure geometry or MATHEMATics; (3) the
space of applied geometry, i.e., the space of the NAT-
URAL SCIENCEs; and (4) the space of metaphysics. The
texts devote themselves, however, primarily to the first
two senses.
The early studies of intuitive space in these
manuscripts are not as developed or extensive as those
of the 1907 Dingvorlesung published as Ding und
Raum ( 1973). By 1907 Husserl had begun to clarify
his conception of the phenomenological EPOCHE AND
REDUCTION and method. In the earlier texts he is al-
ready aware of an important distinction that is easily
overlooked and that continues to operate in the 1907
text, viz., the distinction between the conceptual con-
tent of the description of intuited space and intuited
space itself. We must be careful not to ascribe the con-
ceptual properties used in the description of intuited
space to intuited space as such. In other words, even
though our philosophical description of intuited space
and ofvisual fields might employ mathematical terms
and structures, it does not follow that we intuit or im-
mediately experience space as mathematically struc-
tured. Indeed, a careful reflection on this distinction
shows that we must distinguish different senses ofthe
intuitive experience and of intuited spaces, for if the
geometric presentation of space depends on the ideal-
izing of intuited space, as Husserl says it does, and if
 SPACE
in our everyday perception of space we use analogues
ofmathematical concepts, as Husserl says we do, then
there must be a more fundamental or immediate ex-
perience of space already contained within this ordi-
nary perceptual experience. One implication of such a
distinction, as JOHN DRUMMOND argues, is that immedi-
ately experienced space in and of itself does not ha ve
a particular mathematical structure, although PARTRICK
HEELAN argues a contrary position in his detailed study
of the relations between the perceptual experience and
the scientific understanding of space.
Husserl 's differentiation in the 1907 text of the
"phantom"- i.e., the purely sensible object, within the
ordinary, concrete material object ofperception with ali
its ca usa!, functional, and value-properties- permits
him to speak ofthe immediate experience ofspace and
the sensible experience of the phantom as they occur
within ordinary, perceptual experience. Within PERCEP-
TION our investigation of the sensible properties of an
object can never be complete; our experience can never
exhaust the object's sensible appearances. In ordinary
experience, the tendency toward a more complete and
precise determination of an object is limited by the
practica! interest momentarily governing our percep-
tual life. This interest calls forth certain qualities for
attention and demands that the object be given so that
we can best experience those qualities. In the case of
vision, for example, the possibility o fan optimal given-
ness of an object relative to our practica! interest in the
object requires, among other things, that the object be
( 1) given in the center of the vi sua! field rather than at
its margins, (2) presented at a suitable distance from
the perceiver (not too ne ar and not too far), and (3) sus-
ceptible to careful and comprehensive scrutiny by the
perceiver.
The key to understanding the satisfaction of each
part of this requirement is what Husserl calls "kinaes-
thesis," by which he means ( 1) the capability of per-
ceiving subjects to move their sense organs and BODY
such that the position ofthe sense organs relative to the
object changes and (2) the appertinent awareness in ki-
naesthetic sensations ofbodily movements and bodily
attitudes. Husserl describes the motivational connec-
tion between a particular course ofkinaesthetic sensa-
tions and the sensations (hyletic data) that present the
objective determinations ofthe object existing in space,
although Drummond argues that the motivational con-
671
nection properly exists between the bodily activities
themselves and the objective qualities as intended. The
awareness ofspace, then, is achieved by virtue ofthose
kinaesthetic activities that produce the satisfaction of
the requirement for optimal appearances. The first part
ofthe requirement deals with an appearance's position
within the visual field, whereas the second and third
parts deal with an object's position in space relative
to the percipient. The satisfaction ofthe first part does
not require that the whole body move, whereas, at least
with respect to vi sion, the satisfaction ofthe second and
third parts do.
Husserl identifies levels in the awareness of space,
levels in the sense that a more complex experience
presupposes a less complex one even when the less
complex cannot concretely and independently exist.
As ULRICH CLAESGES has shown, the visual fields that
present space can properly be conceived as correlates
of kinaesthetic systems. Starting with the artificial ki-
naesthetic situation in which the perceiver is perfectly
at rest, Husserl identifies the visual field simpliciter,
the field consisting entirely of aflat expanse of areas of
contrasting apparent qualities filling delimited parts of
the field. He then begins systematically to add different
kinaesthetic systems, beginning with the system of eye
movements. The resultant oculomotoric field differs
from the previous field insofar as objects newly appear
and disappear at the margins ofthe field and ali objects
continuously change their orientation in the field as the
eyes are moved. The oculomotoric field, then, is the
quadridirectional (up and down, left and right) widen-
ing ofthe visual field simpliciter generated by moving
the eyes both left and right and up and down.
Different kinaesthetic systems can up to a point sub-
stitute for or extend one another. The changes found in
the oculomotoric field, for example, can be duplicated
if the eyes are kept still but the head moves. More
importantly, the changes introduced by eye movement
can be extended by additional movements ofthe head
to the left and right and up and down. The result is
the cephalomotoric field, the correlate of eye and head
movements; it is a field that forms a closed, cyclical
unity in the left-right dimension, but remains limited
in the up-down dimension. The movements ofthe eyes
and the head enable the object to which our interest
and perceptual attention are directed to be brought to
the center ofthe visual field. But we do not yet experi-
672 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ence objective, three-dimensional space; the fields are
two-dimensional presentations of space, and no third
dimension is available within the field itself.
The kinaesthetic activities necessary for the consti-
tution of three-dimensional space involve the move-
ment ofthe whole body; they are two, viz., distancing
and orbiting. Distancing is the movement ofthe body
toward or away from the object such that its apparent
size expands or contracts, as does the apparent size of
the other appearances forming the background against
which the object appears. It allows us to ensure that
the object is at a suitable distance for optimal view-
ing. Orbiting is the movement ofthe body around the
object such that there results an apparent tuming mo-
tion of the object, specifically an axial rotation of its
appearances and of the field presenting the thing in
space. This allows us to become aware of the bodily
enclosedness ofthe object and to inspect the object in
its various dimensions and aspects.
Husserl identifies vision and touch as the two forms
ofperception that bring an identica!, objective space to
presence. There are two important differences between
the kinaesthetic activities involved in touch and vi sion.
The first is that a single tactual system, that of the
hand with its fingers, is sufficient for the constitution
of tactual space. The systems of the lower arm, upper
arm, and whole body are merely extensions ofthis basic
system and are brought into play because ofthe size of
the object or for convenience and comfort. The second
difference is that in tactile perception, distancing does
not present a continuous third dimension. Although it
still does indicate the object's own position in space
relative to the moving body parts, distancing in touch
is a simple binary system: the object is distant and not
touched or it is near and in contact with the tactual
organs.
Husserl rejects both a priori and empiricistic ac-
counts of the origin of our geometric experience of
space. He claims instead that this presentation is
grounded in an idealizing abstraction of empirica!, in-
tuited spatial structures and in the asymptotic approxi-
mation of a li mit. The idealizing presentation of shape
has three aspects: ( 1) the limitation of a general concern
with objects to a theoretical concern with their shapes
simply as measurable; (2) the focusing of attention on
a side or appearance of an object in abstraction both
(a) from the field and its horizons in which the side or
object is presented and (b) from other si des and views
of the object; and (3) the limitation of attention to the
two-dimensionality ofthe presentation ofthe object or
its side. We perceptually attend to the side or appear-
ance ofthe object as measurable, focus on its surface,
and then idealize this edge, and this idealization con-
sists precisely of the approximating approach to pure
two-dimensionality, to the two-dimensional limiting
surface, e.g., a square ora rectangle. This process can
be repeated to yield the awareness ofthe line and then
the point. With similar starting points and a similar
process we can arrive at other geometric notions, such
as continuity, congruence, distance, direction, and po-
sition.
The point is the intersection ofthe geometrica! con-
cern with shapes and volumes - a concern that ide-
ally postulates the point as the li mit of one-dimensional
magnitudes and that fully developed itselfin Euclidean
plane and solid geometry- and the geometrica! con-
cern with position, which developed itself most fully
in analytic, coordinate geometry. The introduction of
number and of algebraic techniques in the coordinate
geometry is a significant step beyond the idealization
found in Euclidean geometry, for numbers are achieved
in formalizing abstraction. As such, numbers are purely
formal concepts, applicable to anything whatsoever.
The significance ofthis arithmetization of geometry is
that the coordinate pairs or triads used to indicate points
in either two- or three-dimensional space are no Ion ger
limited to a spatial interpretation. The formalization of
geometry breaks the essential connection between the
idealized geometries and the shapes ofbodies.
The further significance ofthe formalization of ge-
ometry is that the algebraic functions used to describe
the relations between those things designated by pairs
or triads of numbers can be complicated in a variety
ofways through the exercise ofmathematical "choice"
with its conventions. One way is to introduce a greater
number of variables into the formulas. This produces
"geometries" that are n-dimensional (n > 3) wherein
"points" are identified by n-tuples. The development
of such hyperspaces is crucial for the development of
a faur-dimensional space-time continuum in Einstein 's
theory of relativity.
Husserl's development of multiplicity or manifold
theory allows him to distinguish between geometry
as an idealization of intuited structures and geometry
 SPACE
as an instance of manifold theory. In the case of Eu-
clidean geometry, the abstraction of the theory-form
from the idealized geometry yields a Euclidean man-
ifold of three dimensions. Other n-dimensional Eu-
clidean and non-Euclidean manifolds can then be con-
structed by mathematical "choice." For Husserl, then,
the Euclidean manifold and the Euclidean space for
which it is the pure categoria! form are prior to the
non-Euclidean manifolds and spaces. Indeed, the the-
ory of non-Euclidean manifolds is for Husserl a logica!
consequence ofthe theory ofEuclidean manifolds.
The clarification ofthe distinction between regional
ontologies and FORMAL ONTOLOGY and of that between
idealization and formalization allows us to view the
Euclidean idealizations as a regional ontology and the
Euclidean manifold as a formal ontology, which, while
normally applied to space, is applicable to any object or
region ofbeing at ali. Since the three-dimensional Eu-
clidean manifold is the formalization (via abstraction of
the theory-form) of idealized geometry it can safely be
applied in a physical geometry. Once free mathemati-
cal constructions are introduced into the manifolds and
these manifolds are interpreted as "geometries" and ap-
plied to spatial objects of experience, however, "false"
regional ontologies might result. In the case of space,
this means that a mathematically derived manifold is
applicable as a physical geometry only if it is consis-
tent with the Euclidean idealizations ofthe local space
in which we li ve. Since Husserl was writing before the
publication ofEinstein 's papers on the theory ofrelativ-
ity, we can obtain from these texts no indication ofwhat
he would have thought about this theory. We can point
out, however, that even though relativity theory in-
volves the application of a faur-dimensional manifold,
it satisfies this condition. And we can also point out
that Husserl apparently approved OSKAR BECKER's dis-
cussion of the philosophical significance of relativity
theory. As Becker points out, however, one reason for
the successful application of Einstein 's theories is that
the four coordinates of space-time cannot be arbitrar-
ily interchanged; every point in the faur-dimensional
continuum involves a splitting apart of three spatial
dimensions and a time dimension.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER's phenomenology of space in
Sein und Zeit( 1927), sharply distinguishes the immedi-
ate experience of spatiality from the cognitive and for-
mal intuition of an objective and homogeneous space.
673
Heidegger stresses the need to ground analyses of space
in the comportment of DASEIN toward the world rather
than in the subject's cognitive awareness of space. This
difference is manifest in his discussion of distancing.
For Heidegger, distancing is not essentially related to
objective distance; instead, the activity of distancing is
the overcoming of a state of distance by bringing close,
making ready-to-hand, what was formerly remote from
our practica! concems. For the analysis ofthe cognitive
and formal awareness of higher-order space, Heideg-
ger simply refers to Becker's study. Similarly, MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, who is primarily concerned with an
account of how space comes to presence in a bodily
relation to the world, refers to Becker for detailed anal-
yses of the bodily activity involved in our awareness
ofspace.
Becker, to whom the texts of Ding und Raum and
Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie were not avail-
able, provides a slightly different account of the lev-
els in the constitution of space: ( 1) the pre-spatial
or quasi-spatial fields, further distinguished into the
sense field (corresponding to the sense field simpliciter)
and the kinaesthetic field (corresponding to the ki-
naesthetic sensations themselves and the oculomotoric
and cephalomotoric fields they motivate); (2) oriented
space, wherein the perceiving body is considered a
body in the world and the absolute "here," i.e., the
absolute point of orientation for ali other objects; and
(3) homogeneous space, which (a) is essentially char-
acterized by the relativization of the "here" and by
intersubjectivity and (b) is the space of concern to
mathematical and scientific investigation. Becker's no-
tion of homogeneous space leads beyond the space of
immediate and perceptual awareness to the space con-
stituted in the mathematical and physical sciences. He
characterizes the approximating approach to the limit
as the contraction ofthe visual fields to the line and to
the ideal vanishing point. Since Becker is concerned
to show how geometric axioms are grounded in the
original experience of space, he tends to disclose these
perceptual foundations in the same order required by
the axiomatic system in which they are mathemati-
cally presented. From this starting point, Becker can
then clarify the awareness of the definite mathemati-
cal manifold and the mathematical continuum, both of
which are important not only in geometry itself, but
in its physical applications. Becker indicates how Eu-
674 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
clidean geometry is the categoria! form for the space of
everyday experience and how non-Euclidean geometry
is the categoria! form for the space of NATURAL SCIENCE.
ELJSABETH STROKER also develops a comprehensive
view of different levels of the experience of space.
Whereas Becker's study is more Husserlian in char-
acter, limiting itself to the discussion of the experien-
tial foundations of geometry in our intuitive experi-
ence and to the discussion of geometric and physical
spaces; Stroker's develops Heideggerian insights. She
more fully explores the ordinary, lived experience of
space as manifested in our comportmenttoward things;
she then proceeds to a discussion of mathematical
spaces, but ignores issues raised by their application
in physics. Stroker discusses the foundations of our
geometric experience of space in lived space, within
which she distinguishes (1) "attuned" space, (2) the
space of ACTION, and (3) intuitive space. The distinction
between these spaces is fundamentally a distinction
between three different spatial structures correlated to
three different styles of bodily comportment in which
the body is viewed as ( 1) the carrier of expressive con-
tent, (2) the physical aspect of practica!, goal-oriented
activity, and (3) the center of perception. Within ge-
ometric or mathematical spaces Stroker distinguishes
(1) Euclidean and (2) non-Euclidean spaces, and un-
der (2) she distinguishes (a) hyperbolic and (b) Rie-
mannian geometries. Stroker identifies the elements in
the pre-theoretical experiences of space that contribute
to the grounding and understanding ofthe various ge-
ometries, and thereby avoids discussing non-Euclidean
geometries solely in terms ofthe mathematical propen-
sities that led to their development, although she, like
Husserl, maintains the priority of Euclidean geome-
try over non-Euclidean geometries. She also discusses
intuitability and the pictorial symbolism of analytic
and formalized geometries, as well as the relationship
between mathematical demonstration and the constitu-
tion of mathematical idealities.
Discussions of the perceptual and affective experi-
ences of space can also be joined together in a con-
sideration ofthe aesthetic experience ofspace. Stroker
has in another context discussed problems of perspec-
tive in pictorial art, and Heelan has tied his discussion
of the mathematical features of perceptual space to a
discussion of our experience of pictori al space in art.
In addition, Gaston Bachelard ( 1884---1962) explores in
detail the affective dimensions of the various kinds of
space and spatially characterized objects that capture
the attention ofpoets. Finally, EDWARD s. CASEY inves-
tigates the richly articulated phenomenon of "place,"
in contrast to mere "sites" in homogeneous, isotropic
"space."
Reftection on the nature of space has traditionally
been central to philosophical reftection. This centrality
stems from the fact that space, again along with TIME,
is a form governing the objects of the physical world
in which we live. As such, space becomes central to
ali our experiences of those objects, from our most
immediate encounters with individual things to our
most detached, theoretical explanations ofthe physical
world as a whole. Space is experienced in multiple
ways in these various experiences, and these ways need
tobe carefully distinguished, but care fu! attention must
also be paid also to their interrelationships, indeed to
their unity, for it is one space we experience. Reftection
on the experiences of space is thus necessarily complex
and varied; indeed, this complexity makes it difficult
to provide a truly comprehensive account of ali the
varied modes in which space might be experienced
and present itself to us.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bachelard, Gaston. La poetique de l"espace. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1958; The Poetics of Space.
Trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
Becker, Oskar. "Beitrăge zur phănomenologischen Begriin-
dung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwen-
dungen." Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phănomenologi­
sche Forschung 6 (1923), 385-560.
Casey, Edward S. Getting Back into Place: Toward a Re-
newed Understanding ofthe Place-World. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Claesges, Ulrich. Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkon-
stitution. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Drummond, John J. "On Seeing a Material Thing in Space:
The Ro le of Kinaesthesis in Vis ual Perception." Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research 40 ( 1978-79), 19~
32.
- . "Objects' Optimal Appearances and the Immediate
Awareness of Space in Vision." Man and World 16 ( 1983 ),
177~205.
- . "The Perceptual Roots of Geometric Idealization." The
Review of Metaphysics 3 7 ( 1984 ), 785-81 O.
Heelan, Patrick A. Space-Perception and the Philosophy of
Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
Husserl, Edmund. Studien zur Arithmetik und Geome-
trie: Texte aus dem Nachlass 1886--1901. Ed. Ingeborg
 SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA
Strohmeyer. Husserliana 21. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1983.
~. "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie a1s
intentiona1-historisches Prob1em." Ed. Eugen Fink. Re-
vue Internationale de Philosophie 1 ( 1939), 203-25; rpt.
in his Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und
die transzendentale Phănomenologie. Eine Einleitung in
die phănomenologische Philosophie. Ed. Walter Biemel.
Husserliana 6 [1954]. 2nd ed. The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1962, 365-86; "The Origin ofGeometry." In his The
Crisis o/European Sciences and Transcendental Pheno-
menology: An lntroduction to Phenomenological Philos-
ophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1970, 353-78.
~. "Grund1egende Untersuchungen zum phănomeno1ogi­
schen Ursprung der Răum1ichkeit der Natur." In Philo-
sophical Essays in Mem01y of Edmund Husserl. Ed. Mar-
vin Farber. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1940, 307-25; "Foundationa1 Investigations ofthe Pheno-
meno1ogica1 Origin of the Spatiality of Nature." Trans.
Fred Kcrsten. In Husserl: Shorter Works. Ed. Peter Mc-
Cormick and Frederick A. Elliston. Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity ofNotre Dame Press, 1981, 222-33.
~. "Notizcn zur Raumkonstitution." Ed. A1fred Schutz. Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 1 ( 1940), 21-3 7,
217-26.
Stroker, Elisabeth. Philosophische Untersuchungen zum
Raum [ 1965]. 2nd. ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
K1ostermann, 1977; lnvestigations in Philosophyoj"Space.
Trans. A1gis Mickunas. Athens, OH: Ohio University
Press, 1987.
~. "Die Perspektive in der bi1denden Kunst. Versuch einer
phi1osophischen Deutung." Jahrbuch fiir Asthetik und all-
gemeine Kunstwissenschaft 4 (1958-59), 140-231.
JOHN J. DRUMMOND
Mount Saint Mary s Ca/lege
SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA Phenomen-
ology was introduced into Spain by JOSE ORTEGA Y GAS-
SET, whose first book, Meditaciones de! Quijote (Medi-
tations on Quixote, 1914 ), contains phenomeno1ogical
themes- the condition ofbeing latent or patent, mean-
ing as a correlative notion to interpretation, flesh as the
depth dimension ofthings-along with the first formu-
lation ofthe thesis that "I am 1 and my circumstances."
In a course given in 1915/16, published as Investiga-
ciones psicol6gicas ( 1982), Ortega went on to develop
a pure descriptive science ofnoetic phenomena, draw-
ing heavily on EDMUND HUSSERL 's ldeen zu ei ner reinen
Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philoso-
phie 1 (1913). The issue of Ortega's relationship to
phenomenology has long been debated, particularly in
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. ZLlner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
675
view of his statement that he abandoned phenomen-
ology at the very moment in which he received it. But
he also made clear that it is necessary to go through
phenomenology and its method of intuition and de-
scription as opposed to abstract conceptual thought in
order to situate philosophy in a dimension of system-
atic thought grounded on a phenomenon that by itself
is a system, i.e., the life in each one ofus.
Life is described as the radical reality in which ali
other realities are grounded. It should be understood
as the coexistence and interaction with circumstances
or the world. Neither 1 nor my circumstances can be
conceived of separately because they are rooted in the
ultimate reality that is life. Change, development, and
hence history are distinctive traits of life insofar as it
unfolds as a problem, a being occupied with things, a
preoccupation with oneself, a life project or vocation
based on choice, and a radical insecurity as ifwe were
shipwrecked in the midst ofthings.
This presentation oflife resembles in some respects
MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S characterization of DASEIN. Ortega
acknowledges this connection, yet claims precedence
for himself, arguing that it forms the core of his own
work since his first book. On the other hand, Or-
tega's notion oflife exhibits similarities with Husserl 's
"worldexperiencing life" in that it entails the simul-
taneity of subject and object in a singular event and
is the presupposition on which alone it makes sense
to assert any other reality whatsoever. In El tema de
nuestro tiempo (The theme of our time, 1923 ), Ortega
states that each life is a point ofview upon the uni verse,
and analyzes the divergence and complementarity of
perspectives between persons, peoples, and epochs. A
reduction ofthe world must be accomplished, i.e., its
transformation into the horizon of a living subject or
the life course that runs through peoples, generations,
and individuals. It must be noted that he speaks of
the "world of our life" as an encompassing unity or
immense circumstance.
Ortega's influence was exerted not only through
teaching and writing, but also as the editor of a jour-
nal and a series of books. After 1923 they were
the chief channel through which phenomenology was
made known to the Spanish-language world. The group
that gathered around Ortega included MANUEL GARciA
MORENTE; JOSE GAOS, whose translation of Husserl 's Lo-
gische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901) was decisive for
676 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the dissemination of phenomenology; and JOAQUiN Xl-
RAU, author of Lafilosojia de Husserl ( 1942), the first
comprehensive presentation of Husserl in Spanish.
XAVIER ZUBIRI received his doctorate in philosophy
under Ortega with a dissertation in which Husserl's
theory of judgment is examined in terms of both sub-
jective acceptance and objective intention. Having !ater
attended Husserl's and Heidegger's courses, he carne
to emphasize the double function of phenomenology
for his generation in the sense that it made possible the
apprehension of the content of things and laid open a
free domain for philosophy against the constraints of
psychology and science. But he objects that reality is
not the problematic arrival point, but ratherthe point of
departure. Intentionality must be understood not only
as "going toward" but also as "starting from." lts dou-
ble movement is grounded on that primordial sentient
intellection of the real as such that characterizes the
human being. Being prior to the subjective and objec-
tive pole of intentionality, this intellection breaks up
into them and so establishes them as related terms.
lnftuenced by Ortega and Zubiri, PEDRO LAiN EN-
TRALGO has dealt with phenomenological standpoints
on the knowledge of others. Important also for his
efforts to keep phenomenology on the scene is SERGIO
RĂBADE ROMEO. In Experiencia, cuerpo, y conocimiento
(Experience, body, and cognition, 1985), he examines
the relationship holding between the lived BODY and
knowledge and provides a careful historical and sys-
tematic account ofthis problem. But the foremost rep-
resentative ofphenomenology in this transition period
is FERNANDO MONTERO MOLINER, who argues both for an
expansion in order to include subjects closely related to
those ofHERMENEUTICS and ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALY-
SIS, and for a retum to the historical forerunners who in
the past ha ve contributed to the unveiling of genuine
phenomena. For instance, Husserl's phenomenology
of time should be complemented with an analysis of
objective time inspired by Aristotle.
JAVIER SAN MARTIN has Jaid emphasis On the oppo-
sition between a descriptive and a critica! project in
Husserl 's phenomenology. He contends that the task of
explication is incompatible with the initial motivation
that seeks for absolute assurance. Nevertheless, in the
practice of phenomenological analysis there emerges
a different critica! project that belongs to the sphere
of practica! REASON. Another significant philosophi-
cal contribution is to be found in the differentiation
of structure, function, and principle within phenomen-
ology.
San Martin has been, since its foundation in 1989,
president of the Spanish Society of Phenomenology,
which has organized annual conferences and a seminar
devoted successively to the phenomenology ofOrtega,
the lifeworld, and cultural pluralism. A bulletin has
been issued regularly and will henceforth be expanded
into the joumal lnvestigaciones Fenomenol6gicas.
Prominent members are interested in a variety of top-
ics. MIGUEL GARCiA-BAR6 is best known for his studies
of Husserl 's concept oflogical reason and the relation-
ship holding between transcendental phenomenology
and rational theology. JEsus CONILL stresses the pheno-
menological motives in Ortega and Zubiri and the
metaphysica] significance of HERMENEUTICAL PHENO-
MENOLOGY. JOSE GOMEZ HERAS is concemed with the
phenomenological foundations for an ETHICS of NATU-
RAL SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY. CESAR MORENO MARQUEZ
offers in La intersubjetividad en Husserl ( 1989) an
analysis ofhow the intentiona! openness of experience
to a manifold of perspectives requires the implication
of othemess in egological subjectivity. AGUSTiN SER-
RANO DE HARO has attempted to show the significance
of the ontologica! framework supplied by the theory
of parts and wholes. NEL RODRIGUEZ RIAL deaJs in 0
planeta ferido (The wounded planet, 1991) with the
contribution of phenomenology to ECOLOGY.
Remaining to be mentioned are ANTONIO PINTOR
RAMOS, author of El humanismo de Max Scheler
(1979) and studies on Zubiri and LEVINAS, and MIGUEL
OLASAGASTI, who, in Introducci6n a Heidegger (1967)
has provided an accurate presentation of this philoso-
pher with an appraisal ofthe possibilities ofhis thought.
Ortega has also played an outstanding role in the
introduction of phenomenology into Latin America
because of his visits to Argentina in 1916, 1928,
and 1939. A key figure there was FRANCISCO ROMERO,
who was consulting foreign editor for Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research from its foundation. He
developed a "theory of man" under the inftuence of
Husserl, Sche]er, and NICOLAI HARTMANN. His most im-
portant thesis is that a movement oftranscendence runs
through reality and increases as it gradually advances
from inorganic reality through life, pre-intentional psy-
chism, and intentiona! psychism to the realm of spirit.
 SPAIN ANO LATIN AMERICA
Reality as a whole is permeated by the general tendency
of entities to go beyond themselves. This universal im-
petus increases its rhythm as we ascend in the scale and
provides the ground out ofwhich intentionality stems.
The re-encounter of reality with itselfthrough an inten-
tiona! duplication implies an abrupt and revolutionary
change in the sense that reality not only continues to
be what it is, but is also its reflection in consciousness.
Along with the essential intentionality of the human
being, Romero holds that the basic intentiona! struc-
ture is cognitive.
In applying Husserl 's phenomenology to the philos-
ophy of law, CARLOS coss1o has propounded an "ego·
logica! theory" structured according to a formal logic
ofLAW consisting in an analysis oflegal norms and sys-
tems (logic of parts and wholes) and a transcendental
legal logic or theory of! egal knowledge. Following the
Ii nes laid down by Heidegger, CARLOS AS TRADA empha-
sizes in El juego existencial (Experiential play, 1932)
that play is the metaphysical essence ofthe human be-
ing and tries to take into account the historical elements
in the constitution ofDasein. Influenced to some extent
by Romero, EUGEN! O PUCCIARELLI advocates a hierarchi-
cal theory oftime that takes account ofthe stratification
ofhuman reality in order to harmonize the plurality of
temporalities that occur in different levels. Also con-
cerned with Heidegger, ADOLFO P. CARPIOargues in favor
ofthe resolvability ofphilosophical problems once we
transcend beings toward a comprehension of Being. As
this leap cannot be but each one's event, metaphysics
shows a "pluranimous" character.
Another type of Heideggerian interpretation is es-
poused by HECTOR MANDRIONI, who has also written on
MAX SCHELER. His point is that in view of the human
situation in the technological world, a disclosure ofthe
ways in which poetic and conceptual discourse emerge
in the articulation of silence and language is essential
to unveil the originary sense of experience. Whereas RI-
CARDO MALIANDI has undertaken a revision ofScheler's
and Hartmann's material-value ethics from the stand-
point of Karl Otto Apel's transcendental pragmatics,
and MARIO A. PRESAS has written on the hermeneutica!
transformation of phenomenology, ROBERTO WALTON at-
tempts to show that the notion of horizonality has en-
abled Husserl not only to foreshadow new versions
of phenomenology, but also to point toward cognitive
sources for other forms of transcendental philosophy.
677
Also influenced by Husserlian phenomenology are JU-
LIA IRIBARNE, who, in La intersubjetividad en Husserl
( 1987), provides a characterization of monadology ac-
cording to the levels of intersubjectivity, and ALCIRA
BONILLA, who, in Mundo de la vida (Lifeworld, 1985),
examines the a priori structure ofthe Iifeworld. The Ar-
gentine Society for Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
was founded in 1992.
An interest for phenomenology in Mexico goes back
to Antonio Caso- who, although not tobe counted as a
phenomenologist, wrote Lafilosofia de Husserl ( 1934)
and summarized the antagonism between phenomen-
ology and positivism- and EDUARDO GARclA MĂ YNEZ,
who, influenced by Hartmann and ALEXANDER PFĂNDER,
attempted to develop a theory of VALUE that would
provide the foundations for positive law. Exiled from
Spain after the Civil War, JOSE GAOS continued his ex-
tensive work as translator of Husserl, Heidegger, and
Hartmann in Mexico. A personal student ofGaos, FER-
NANDO SALMERON, wrote his doctoral dissertation on
the theory of ideal being and has also written on the
problem of meaning and language in Heidegger. LUIS
VILLORO has published a collection of articles bearing
the title Estudios sobre Husserl (Studies on Husserl,
1975) in which he expounds the main themes along
with the relationship between phenomenology and AN-
ALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, i.e., a position to which he as well
as Salmer6n were !ater drawn. Other philosophers in-
terested in phenomenology have been EDUARDO NICOL,
who discusses the Heideggerian notion of concealment
and advocates a metaphysics based upon the evidence
that Being is in sight, and MANUEL CABRERA, who has
elaborated a criticism of Husserl from the standpoint
of the sociology of knowledge with considerable debt
to Scheler. Relevant work today includes a project that
will lead to a guide for translating Husserl under the
direction of ANTONIO ZIRION, with the participation of
other Spanish and Latin American translators, and an
examination of problems in the field of phenomen-
ological hermeneutics by MAURICIO BEAUCHOT.
In Venezuela two prominent phenomenologists
have to be mentioned. ERNESTO MAYZ VALLENILLA first
surveyed the development of phenomenology from
Husserl to Heidegger in two books dealing with the
phenomenology and ontology ofknowledge. Ata !ater
stage he developed personal insights on reason and
technology inspired in phenomenology. Important is
678 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the examination ofthe instruments that technology af-
fords in order to extend our power beyond the frontiers
imposed by bodily and psychologicallimitations. In his
Fundamentos de la meta-tecnica ( 1990), he unfolds the
implications of the replacement of an anthropological
or geocentric conception oftechnology by a new tech-
nological project that brings forth a nonhuman logos.
The other leading figure is ALBERTO ROSALES, author
of Transzendenz und Differenz ( 1970). Attempting to
stimulate a critica! discussion of Heidegger 's philoso-
phy, he argues that the endeavor to lay bare the foun-
dations of consciousness fails because expressions like
"Dasein" or "transcendence" are subject first to a pro-
cess offormalization in order to deprive them oftheir
primary spatial connotations, and then to a process
of deformalization in order that they may attain an
adequate significant content. It is because the second
operation must evoke the phenomenon of conscious-
ness that such expressions do not outline what human
beings are but rather how they are.
In Colombia, DANILO CRUZ VELEZ has dealt with the
ideal of a lack of presuppositions in philosophy by
linking the antagonism between objectivism and sub-
jectivism in Husserl with the overcoming ofthe meta-
physics of subjectivity in Heidegger. This leads him to
an analysis ofthe nature ofphilosophy and its relation-
ship with science and theology. He also contends that
the basic problems ofPHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY are
to be illuminated in the process of disclosing the ori-
gin offreedom. GUILLERMO HOYOS VASQUEZ undertakes
a study ofthe teleology pertaining to intentionality and
HISTORY in his Intentionalitiit als Verantwortung (ln-
tentionality as responsibility, 1976) and recently em-
phasizes that the contributions of a theory of action and
of the social conditions of scientific production must
be combined with Husserl 's criticism of the positivist
idea of science.
Phenomenology gained a foothold in Peru through
the contributions ofthree influential thinkers. ALBERTO
WAGNER DE REYNA had a phenomenological training
under Heidegger and was one of the first to make
him known through a monograph on fundamental on-
tology in 1939. FRANCISCO MI RO QUESADA has writ-
ten on a wide variety of topics, and an early inter-
est in phenomenology is reflected in his Sentido de!
movimiento fenomenol6gico (Meaning of the pheno-
menological movement, 1940). Inspired by Hartmann,
AUGUSTO SALAZAR BONDI offers an investigation of ideal
being in Irrealidad e idealidad (Irreality and ideality,
1958). When these thinkers shifted their concern to
other trends of thought, phenomenology tended to be
neglected. Important today is the ro le of the Catholic
University of Lima, where a German-Peruvian Collo-
quium on Phenomenological Philosophy with the par-
ticipation of leading German phenomenologists was
organized in 1993 by ROSEMARY RIZO-PATRON, who has
written on the development of intentionality in early
Husserlian texts.
The outstanding representative of phenomenology
in Chile has been FELIX SCHWARTZMANN, who contends
that the phenomenon of expression goes beyond what
is externalized by sensuous signs. When we express
ourselves and communicate with others, we not only
bring forth meaning, but also let the peculiarity of our
existential condition be seen. Both EMOTION in its sin-
gularity and an undefinable expressive infinitude are
disclosed. This amounts to a symbolization ofthe mys-
tery of existence. Also tobe mentioned is RAUL VELOZO
FARiAs, who has examined the meaning of the pheno-
menological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION with an empha-
sis on its motives. Uruguay is represented by JUAN
LLAMBJAS DE AZEVEDO, who, in his Max Sche/er ( 1966),
has offered a full-scale analytic treatment ofthis pheno-
menologist.
In Brazii, phenomenology can be found in the phi-
losophy of law advanced by MIGUEL REALE, who has
studied how legal models as normative structures are
involved in social praxis, emphasizing that they must
be differentiated from hermeneutica! models that either
contribute to clarifying their significance or demand
their abrogation when they do not meet the general
interests dominant in the lifeworld. In addition, GUIDO
ANTONIO DE ALMEIDA, author of Sinn und fnhaft in der
genetichen Phiinomenologie E. Husserls (Sense and
content in Husserl's genetic phenomenology, 1972),
shows that Husserl 's GENETIC PIIENOMENOLOGY does not
allow for the unbuilding of complexes of sense or a
given content into ultimate entities. Rather they must
be traced back to the world as an allembracing horizon
of understanding or to a totality of time structures in
the temporal process of sens ing.
We have sketched above the main lines of devel-
opment country by country because although interna-
tional collaboration is improving today, work in the
 EDITH STEJN
region has been done more separately than in coor-
dination. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that
phenomenology in the Latin American world can be
characterized by the variations and refinements at-
tempted on the theses advanced by leading European
phenomenologists. Despite the widespread acceptance
commanded by Ortega, there has been a profusion of
trends rather than a recognizable developing unity.
Whatever the shortcomings in other respects, schol-
arly research on Husserl and Heidegger has been pub-
lished in Phaenomenologica (two titles ha ve been men-
tioned). Deserving of mention in the first period is the
strong interest aroused by Scheler and Hartmann and
the attempts to develop a philosophy of law with a
phenomenological outlook. Even if the promotion of
Thomism in Spain (particularly in the 1940s), and of
analytic philosophy after the 1960s, have caused set-
backs, phenomenology has shown deep roots which
must be measured by the success with which it has
been able to meet these challenges. Over the past
decade, along with the in crease in Husserlian research,
recent developments such as the analysis oftechnology
and PAUL RICCEUR'S HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY are
gaining a hearing, and perhaps the most important fu-
ture contributions will be made in these areas.
ROBERTO WALTON
Universidad de Buenos Aires
EDITH STEIN EDMUND HUSSERL 's first assistant,
Edith Stein, was born into an Orthodox Jewish family
in Breslau on October 12, 1891. She was a member
of the Carmelite order when she was put to death at
Auschwitz in 1942. Unique among phenomenologists,
she was beatified by Pope John Paul II in 1987 at a
ceremony in Koln attended by 70,000 people. On this
occasion he referred to her as "Jew, philosopher, nun,
martyr." Like Edith Stein a student of ROMAN INGARDEN
and MAX SCHELER, the pope, KAROL WOJTYLA, wrote his
first work on St. John of the Cross; Stein left her final
work, also on St. John of the Cross, unfinished at her
martyrdom. This pope commends her for her practice
ofthe phenomenological virtues: "In keeping with her
intellectual abilities, she did not want to accept any-
thing without careful examination, not even the faith
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph 1. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
679
ofher fathers. She wanted to get to the bottom ofthings
herself. As such, she was engaged in a constant search
for the truth."
Stein began her studies in literature and German
at the University of Breslau where she became inter-
ested in empirica! psychology, but soon became dis-
satisfied with this science stil! in its "infancy." An
early encounter with Husserl 's Logische Untersuchun-
gen ( 1900-1901) led her to study with the master at
Gottingen ( 1913-16). Stein then worked as Husserl 's
assistant at Freiburg ( 1917-18), teaching his new stu-
dents and editing his manuscripts. She was initially
attracted to Husserl's phenomenology because it took
up the task of conceptual clarification so Jacking in the
psychology ofher day. In addition, along with the other
REALISTIC PIIENOMENOLOGISTS at Gi:ittingen, she saw in
Husserl possibilities of moving beyond the dominant
psychologism ofthe day into essential analyses condi-
tioned by the "intuitive self-givenness" ofthe "matters
themselves."
The golden age of Gottingen was over when
Stein arrived in 1913, although figures such as ADOLF
REINACH, FRITZ KAUFMANN, and HANS LIPPS exerted strong
inftuences on her. MAX SCHELER 's lectures caused her to
entertain the philosophical possibility of Christianity.
Adolf Reinach 's character and conversion touched her
deeply, as did his widow's courage and acceptance of
his death in World War I. Phenomenology, for Stein,
as well as for many others, provided an access to reli-
gion. Her actual conversion to Christianity took place
in 1921 while she was staying with her friend HEDWIG
CONRAD-MARTIUS. After a night spent reading St. Teresa
of Avila's autobiography, Stein was convinced that the
saint's life of experiential faith was "the truth."
It was, however, patriotism and solidarity with the
war effort and her fellow students rather than religios-
ity that induced Stein to serve as a nurse to Austrian
soldiers for six months in 1914-15. She returned to her
studies to complete her dissertation, Zum Problem der
Einfuhlung, at Freîburg in 1916. After completing her
studies, she worked for Husserl on Ideen zu einer reinen
Phănomenologie undphănomenologishen Philosophie
II [1912-15] and on his manuscripts on tîme. ROMAN
INGARDEN reports that Husserl, with hîs typîcallack of
concern for publishîng hîs manuscripts, failed to keep
his end ofthe bargain by neglecting to review her tran-
scriptions and editorial changes. Recent scholarship
680 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
may suggest that her revisions were significant. Her
frustration ultimately caused her to seek other work.
Stein 's strictly phenomenological work from
this period includes Beitriige zur philosophis-
chen Begrundung der Psychologie und der Geis-
teswissenschaften (Contributions to the philosophi-
cal groundng of psychology and the human sciences,
1922) and Eine Untersuchung uber den Staat (An in-
vestigation conceming the state, 1925). Yet her best
recognized legacy to phenomenology must be the work
with Husserl on empathy, which determined the course
of her lifelong preoccupation with the human as psy-
chophysical being. Although the topic of empathy was
given to her by Husserl, her early interest in the na-
ture of the human person was already observable in
her initial interest in psychology as a course of study in
Breslau. While Husserl 's major emphasis was the epis-
temological and systematic functions of empathy and
INTERSUBJECTIVITY, Stein 's analysis features empathy as
a lived experience, an existential phenomenon.
Husserl referred to Stein as his "best pupi!." De-
spite HERBERT SPIEGELBERG's verdict that Stein aban-
dons phenomenology for Thomism, many contempo-
rary scholars find her entire corpus tobe shaped by her
phenomenological training. She explicitly practices the
EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION in her 1916 dissertation with a
suspension of the ordinary opinions about empathy,
criticizing Lipps's view among others. She argues that
empathic imitation of the other is not a confusion of
self and other. Lived experiences of separate primor-
dialities ensure that the two members of an empathic
pair are still separate selves.
Stein distinguishes between primordial and non-
primordial experience within a single unitary con-
sciousness in order to make an analogy between the
EGO or self and the other. Ali experience takes place in
the present moment; even acts ofremembering are pri-
mordial. Nevertheless, the 1 can ha ve MEMORY or IMAGI-
NATION about that which is non-primordial. That which
is no longer immediately present can be made present
memorially (RE-PRESENTATION). The unity ofthe person
constitutes itself in acts that link "the present 1 and the
past 1." "As my own person is constituted in primor-
dial mental acts, so the foreign person is constituted in
empathically experienced acts." The other can be in-
tentionally present to the empathizing consciousness,
but, like memories, in principle never primordially.
In empathic intuition, the I can experience the
other's every action as proceeding from a will mo-
tivated by feelings. Simultaneously, 1 am given the
range of VALUES that the other can experience, which
leads to expectations about the other's future volitions
and actions. A single unitary consciousness can intend
another ego stream that it constitutes as other than it-
self although never possibly present in the fullness of
givenness.
Another point to bear in mind concerning Stein 's
work on empathy is that for her, as for Husserl and
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, recognition of the other is
founded on perceptual, i.e., bodily experience. One
lives one's own soov from the "inside" and sees one-
selfimaginatively from the "outside" as an object-other
in a world of others. It is possible to see the other from
the "outside" as well. My sensuous intuitions of the
other's body and bodily incarnations in words and ges-
tures allow a kind of sui generis empathic cognition,
based on perception, but not reducible to perceptual
intuitions alone. My experience of the other's joy is
non-primordial, albeit triggered by his or her primor-
dial experience. 1 may experience primordial j oy at my
friend's success, i.e., 1 may rejoice with my friend, but
according to the intentions evoked by my own motiva-
tions.
Although Stein endorsed Scheler's criticism of
THEODOR UPPS's theory of empathy, she was more crit-
ica! of Zur Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Sym-
pathiege.fuhle (On the phenomenology and theory of
the feeling of sympathy, 1913) than she had been of
Scheler's religious views. Her critique of this work
caused Scheler, in his preface to the fourth edition, to
credit Stein's criticism with leading him to distinguish
between feelingin-common and fellow-feeling. This
distinction establishes limits to shared experience so
that the ethical principle ofthe inviolability ofpersons
can be justified. Scheler spoke highly of Stein many
times in his finallectures at Koln on empathy.
As already mentioned, Stein worked on the
manuscript to Ideen II and she and Husserl understood
the constitutive function of empathy as demanding, in
its basic structure, an incipient other whose otherness
may be overtaken by empathy. Yet empathic connec-
tion must never be mistaken for identification with the
other so that two ego streams fuse into an ontologically
higher unity. Empathy can take the other's conscious-
 EDITH STEIN
ness into its own only as a separate ego stream. After
ali, ifthe other is but an extension ofmyself, neither is
empathy required nor can a coherent account be made
of its everyday experience.
Constitutively, empathy functions to reveal not only
the in ner life of the other, but also the self as other to
its others. Thus empathy provides a means to self-
knowledge vis-a-vis real differences between the self
and the other, and such real differences circumscribe
the arena of human freedom. The basic structure of
empathic intentionality is such that the correlate ofany
act may be strictly objective, focusing on an "exter-
na!" constitution, such as when I perceive the room
as warm. On the other hand, when I take myself, the
subject, as an object, I constitute myself as, e.g., un-
comfortable. Likewise, for a subject who empathizes
with another, this other may become an individual with
a character and a personality: one who feels injustices,
enjoys children and riddles, loves truth, and so forth;
the other can be constituted as a substrate of his or
her acts through a focus of regard in which I intend to
constitute the other as, like myself, a self constituted in
its own motivations, habitualities, and sedimentations.
My self-experience is a prerequisite for empathetically
knowing the other; the degree to which I have engaged
in self-constitution determines the refinement of my
potential understanding of the other. In her autobiog-
raphy Aus dem Leben einer jiidischen Familie (Life in
a jewish family, 1965) Stein reftects on her early work
on empathy, which led her "to something which was
personally el o se to my heart and which continually oc-
cupied me anew in ali !ater work: the constitution of
the human person."
Although she was one of the earliest women stu-
dents in German universities, she was denied a uni-
versity post because of her gender despite her summa
cum laude dissertation directed by Husserl. She sub-
sequently campaigned for and won a landmark ruling
that women could not be denied habilitation on the ba-
sis of gender. She was given an opportunity to work
as Dozent at the German Institute for Scientific Ped-
agogy in Mi.inster in 1932, but her appointment was
not renewed the following year because of the rise
of National Socialism. Her lifelong insistence on the
equality of ali people and her refusal to acknowledge
distinctions of caste or class stand in sharp contrast to
her own experiences.
681
After her initial inability to habilitate at the univer-
sity level, she worked as a secondary school teacher at
a convent school for girls in Speyer from 1922 to 1932.
Although she felt a religious calling at the time ofher
baptism, her spiritual advisor believed that she had
work to do in the world. Her teaching situation caused
her to think about women 's education as well as larger
feminist concerns. Her strong sense of social responsi-
bility led her to an active participation in the struggle
for women's suffrage as well as feminist theorizing in
lectures and writings. She became the most important
feminist in Germany, speaking to the Catholic intelli-
gentsia in German-speaking Europe between the wars.
By 1932 Edith Stein was recognized as the intellectual
leader of Catholic FEMINISM in Europe.
Stein 's tripartite analysis ofwoman follows the gen-
eral structure she employs in her theory ofthe constitu-
tion ofthe person. The person is an individual essence.
Persons may be grouped according to types, but each
human being embodies the human essence in her own
particular being. Also, the individual human essence is
developed in freely chosen acts. No vocations can be
closed to women since women and men may share the
same talents.
Her conviction that woman 's vocation included citi-
zenship inspired her to some guarded but unmistakable
criticism for the condition of her country and Europe.
In her semipopular speeches and writings for women
educators and women students, collected as Die Frau
(Woman, 1959), she encouraged ali women to follow
their feminine nature and reject the depreciation ofthe
value ofthe person.
Edith Stein became a Carmelite only when it was
no longer possible for her to publish or to work af-
ter Adolf Hilter became Reichskanzler on January 30,
1933. After Erich Przwara, S.J. suggested that she write
her autobiography, her early work on empathy began
to suggest to her that writing about ordinary Jewish
life might motivate fellow-feeling for the Jews among
the Germans. It was this project that spawned Aus dem
Leben einer jiidischen Familie, which she left unfin-
ished in favor of her philosophical study, Endliches
und ewiges Sein (Finite and eterna! being, 1950), as
well as her work on St. John ofthe Cross.
Edith Stein was forty-two years old when she be-
came Sister Teresa Benedicta a Cruce, O.C.D. in 1934.
Despite the widely held view that Stein's !ater theolog-
682 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ical work repudiates her earlier studies with Husserl,
themes pertaining to REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY and
even to EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY strongly influ-
ence her version ofSt. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy.
Her early translation of Aquinas's Disputed Questions
on Truth into German proved to be quite controver-
sial. Her contribution to the Festschrift in honor of
Husserl's seventieth birthday attempted a reconcili-
ation of Thomism and realistic phenomenology. In
Endliches und ewiges Sein, completed in 1937, she
defines finite being as "that which does not possess
its being, but needs time in which to reach being,"
whereas infinite being "cannot end, because it is not
given its being, but is in possession ofbeing, the mas-
ter ofbeing, even being itself." Thomistic teaching on
act and potency may provide the starting point for this
work, but its main concern is the search for the mean-
ing of being in a synthesis of medieval thought and
phenomenology.
The experience ofbeing supported by the supernat-
uralleads Stein to take issue with MARTIN HEIDEGGER 's
emphasis on Angst (she refers to his work as the philos-
ophy of a bad conscience). Examining her own lived
experience, she finds that anxiety is not the typical
human experience; the normally dominant feeling is
security, "as if our being was a certain possession."
This sense of feeling oneself supported by being can-
not be accounted for by the uncertainties of life or the
indubitability of death, but rather suggests a Being be-
yond beings that grounds beings: "in my being I meet
another, which is not mine, but is support and ground
ofmy unsupported and groundless being."
In the same work, her analysis ofthe authentic life
of the soul relies on phenomenological description of
its "layers." This interest in the human person and its
proper fulfillment which had initially shown itself in
her earliest studies ofliterature and psychology, moved
her to seek in Husserl 's phenomenology a science capa-
ble of grounding its system in conceptual clarity. Nev-
ertheless, her attraction to phenomenology began with
and continued tobe her appreciation ofthe objectivity
latent in it, which was for her- as for other Gottingen
phenomenologists- their escape from Kantian sub-
jectivism and the German idealistic tradition. Despite
their real and/or perceived philosophical differences,
Husserl and Stein remained in contact over the years.
He telegraphed his best wishes to her on the day of
her investiture at the Koln Carmel. On hearing an ac-
count of her clothing ceremony (the Carmelite novice
takes the habit of the order and can no Ion ger be seen
except behind a grille), Husserl said, "Ido not believe
that the Church has any neo-Scholastic ofEdith Stein 's
quality." He regretted not having travelled to KOln and
remarked to Sister Adelgunis, O.S.B., also one of his
pupils, "I should have been the bride's father." "Every-
thing in her is utterly genuine, otherwise I should say
that this step was romanticism. But - down in Jews
there is radicalism and love faithful unto martyrdom."
Her superiors determined that she should continue
her writing and assigned her various projects, includ-
ing her last major work, the Kreuzeswissenschaft (The
science ofthe cross, 1960), which shows how her think-
ing was molded by her training in phenomenology. One
learns the "science" ofthe Cross through personal ex-
perience of "the Cross," i.e., by accepting human suf-
fering and baptizing it with divine meaning. In some
of her instructive works from the final period of her
life, she describes the aim ofthe religious life as self-
forgetfulness in favor ofwhat might be seen as a kind
of empathy with God Himself, taking on the "love of
the divine heart" that "mourns with those who mourn,
rejoices with the joyful, and puts itself at the service of
every creature so that each creature becomes what the
Father wishes it to be ... " Here also is an expression
ofwomanly fulfillment in materna! nurturing.
The experience ofGod's presence in the innermost
being of the soul is the essence of the mystical expe-
rience of"meeting God as one person meets another."
Stein could not complete the third part of the work
commissioned to honorthe four hundredth anniversary
of St. John of the Cross. She had fled the Carmelite
convent in Koln-Lindenthal in 1938 into exile in a
Carmelite community in Echt, The Nethcrlands. Her
sanctuary in the Carmel at Echt was violated as part of
a reprisal for the Catholic bishops' pastoralletter con-
demning the Nazi deportation ofthe Jews. Ali Catholic
Jews were rounded up and sent east to Poland. On Au-
gust 9, 1942, one week about being removed from the
Carmel, she died in the gas chambers at Auschwitz.
Eye witness reports te li of Sister Benedicta 's own tran-
quility at this time and her concern for the bereaved
women and their children. John Nota, S.J., who at-
tempted to get her manuscript Endliches und ewiges
Sein published in The Netherlands after a typeset ver-
 STRUCTURALISM
sion could not be printed in Germany in 1936 due
to an anti-Semitic publishing ban, reported that "the
fascinating thing about Edith Stein was that truth did
not exist as an abstraction for her, but as something
incamated in persons ... "For Edith Stein, philosophy
and life were one. Like the earlier Carmelite mystic, St.
John ofthe Cross, Edith Stein exemplifies herwritings.
FOR FURŢHER STUDY
Baseheart, Mary Catherine, and Linda Lopez McAlister, with
Waltraut Stein. "Edith Stein." In A Hist01y of Women
Philosophers. Ed. Mary Ellen Waithe. Voi. 4. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, 157-87.
Fetz, Reto, Mathias Rath, and Peter Schulz, eds. Studies zur
Philosophie von Edith Stein Symposion (1991 Eichstatt,
Germany) Frieburg: Alber, 1993.
Graef, Hilda C. The Scholar and the Cross. Westminster,
MD: The Newman Press, 1955.
Herbstrith, Waltraud. Edith Stein. Trans. Bernard Bonowitz.
San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985.
O ben, Freda Mary. Edith Stein: Se holar, Feminist, Saint. New
York: Alba House, 1988.
Poselt, Teresa Renala. Edith Stein. Trans. C. Hastings and D.
Nicholl. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1952.
Secretan, Philibert. "Edith Stein On Thc 'Order and Chain of
Being."' Analecta Husserliana 11. Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
1981,113--23.
Stein, Edith. Zum Problem der Einfiihlung. Dio., Halle, 1917;
On the Problem ofEmpathy. Trans. Waltraut Stein. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
- . "Beitrage zur philosophischen Begrundung der Psy-
chologie und der Geisteswissenschaften." Jahrhuch fiir
Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 5 ( 1922),
1-284; rpt. Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1970.
- . "Eine Untersuchung iiber den Staat." Jahrhuch fiir
Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 7 ( 1925),
1-124.
- . "Husserls Phănomenologie und die Philosophie des
Thomas von Aquino. Versuch einer Gegeniiberstellung."
Festschrift Edmund Husserl (zum Gehurtstag gewidmet),
Supplement-hand, Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phăno­
menologische Forschung. Halle: Max Niemeyer,l929,
315-38; rpt. In Husserl. Ed. H. Noack. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973, 61-86.
- . Kreuzeswissenschafi. The Science of the Cross. Trans.
Hilda Graef. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960.
--. Endliches und ewiges Sein. Edith Steins Werke 2. Ed.
L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven. Louvain: Nauwelaerts,
1950.
--. Die Frau. Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade. On Woman.
Trans. Freda Mary Oben. Washington, DC: ICS Publica-
tions, 1987.
- . Aus dem Lehen ei ner jiidischen Familie. Life in a Jewish
Family. Trans. Joesphine Koeppel. Washington, DC: ICS
Publications, 1986.
- . Edith Steins Werke. Ed. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven.
Freiburg: 1950 ff.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
683
Writings of Edith Stein. Ed. and trans. Hilda
Graef.Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1986.
Stein, Waltraut. "Edith Stein, Twenty-Five Years Later." Spir-
itual Life 13 (1967), 244--51.
Sullivan, John, ed. Edith Stein Symposium. Washington, DC:
ICS Publications, 1987.
Stein 's Nachlass is held in the Archivum Carmelitanum Edith
Stein, Leuven.
KATHLEEN HANEY
University of Houston
STRUCTURALISM Like phenomenology,
structuralism is more a method of analysis than a
subject matter. Because of its origins in the HUMAN
scJENCES, structuralism is usually considered a sci-
entific method that studies systems, relations, and
forms, i.e., structures, or, in the more current des-
ignation, cades. Systems are phenomena that inter-
relate with one another according to a discover-
able logic usually expressed as a key relation and
its transformations through deduction, induction, ab-
duction, adduction, etc. As a "here and now" phe-
nomenon, a system is usually contrasted with HIS-
TORY as "there and then." Familiar systemic re-
lations are similarity/difference (metaphor), oppo-
sition/apposition (simile; irony), part/whole (synec-
doche), substance/attribute (metonymy), self/other/-
world, cause/effect, space/time, quatitative/quantita-
tive, and form/content. Note that most relations are
binary or trinary as a result of the system logic be-
ing used. In this structural context, eidetic phenomena
are referred to as mentifacts or contents, while empiri-
ca! phenomena are specified as artifacts or forms. The
structural method is closely associated with coMMUNI-
COLOGY, LANGUAGE, and sign systems, alt of which are
viewed as systemcodes and are grouped together under
the general name of semiotics (or semiology) in current
usage.
While semiotics now has an international scope,
structuralism as a doctrine is popularly known because
its French origins in the 1960s. As Vincent Descombes
suggested in 1980, there are basically three histori-
cal and philosophical progressions of "structuralism":
structural analysis, structuralism per se, and semiotics.
 684 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Given current developments, two more categories need following formula:

to be added: poststructuralism and phenomenological
structuralism. These types of "structuralism" are dis- Sr
S = Sd.
tinguished by their ontologica! (systemic) and episte-
mological (relational) orientations toward cultural phe-
Further, he argued that the systemic operation of signs
nomena in consciousness (contents or mentifacts) and
was both (a) arbitrary and (b) conventional in the so-
in experience (forms or artifacts).
cial use oflanguage (langue). Thus the study ofspeak-
( 1) Structural analysis refers to the various schools
ing (parole) was condemned as diachronic and of sec-
of anthropology and especially linguistics that rejected
ondary importance.
a diachronic (historical) approach to analyzing speech
Among the important contributors to the Saussurian
(parole) as a series of events, in fa vor of a synchronic
model are the members of the Moscow linguistic cir-
approach to language (langue) as a present moment in
ele (1915-21), ineluding ROMAN JAKOBSON, WhO wrote
a system. The diachronic relation is temporal and sig-
no major book, but left an extensive research corpus.
nifies a linear progression of change over time that is
The cirele also ineluded Husserl 's student, GUSTAV SPET.
historical, whereas the synchronic relation is an atem-
This Moscow group set the interdisciplinary tone for
poral relation that signifies a reflexive moment existing
the birth of structuralism by combining the study of
at the present time. In short, the diachronic expresses
linguistics with that of poetics, metrics, and folklore,
a "then" relation, while the synchronic expresses a
along with logic and philosophy.
"now" relation. The parallel spatial system expresses
Also important to the Saussurian tradition was
a syntagmatic relation of "there," whereas a paradig-
the Prague Linguistic Circle founded in 1926 by Jan
matic relation expresses a position of"here."
Mukarosky (1891-1975) and others, ineluding the no-
Having made these distinctions, we must take ac-
table French members Emile Benveniste (1902-1976)
count of a disciplinary anomaly in linguistics, i.e.,
and Andre Martinet, and again Roman Jakobson, a
the diachronic approach is called American structural-
Russian emigre. Finally, the Copenhagen Linguistic
ism (the Bloomfieldian school) and the synchronic
Cirele marked its beginning with the publication of
approach is known as European structuralism (the
the first issue of Acta Linguistica in 1939. It contained
Moscow, Prague, and Copenhagen Cireles). The Amer-
a manifesta by Viggo Brondal (1887-1942) entitled
ican tradition is grounded in the work of Franz Boas
"Structural Linguistics." It is important to note that
( 1858-1942), especially as discussed in his major work
Brondal's artiele advocated a phenomenological cor-
Race, Language, and Cu/ture (1940). In addition, it
rection to the dominant formalist theory of the cir-
was Boas who founded The International Journal of
ele !ater articulated in Omkring sprogteoriens grund-
American Linguistics, which brought together the par-
loeggelse (Prolegomena to a theory oflanguage, 1943)
allel work of Edward Sapir ( 1884--1939) and Leonard
by Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) as glossematics, i.e.,
Bloomfield ( 1887-1939). Contemporary work in this
a formal homology between expression and content in
context is best illustrated by Noam Chomsky's many
Ianguage. Hjelmslev's theory may be formalized as an
publications on the place of syntax in language-use.
extension ofthe Saussure model:
The European tradition follows the work of Fer-
dinand de Saussure (1857-1913), who is commonly S = Sr/Sd/ /Sr/Sd
held to be the undisputed founder of modern linguis-
tics. The principal formulation in Cours de linguistique with these definitions:
generale ( 1916), for which Saussure is most famous,
is his system definition ofthe sign (S) as a synchronic Expression-Substance
relation composed of two elements: (a) the signifier Expression-Form
(Sr) or signţfYing eidetic element that we understand
Sign =
Content-Form
as the linguistic concept (content), and (b) the signi- Content-Substance
fied (Sd) or empirica! element that we comprehend as
the linguistic sound-image (form). Saussure offered the In this formulation, the signifier is renamed expres-
 STRUCTURALISM
sion and divides itself semiotically into an eidetic Sr
form and Sd substance. The signified is now called
the content and semiotically divides into an empirica!
Sr .form and Sd substance. Hjelmslev's key relation
is the notion of dependence/independence that occurs
between phenomena. It is in this context that Brondal
suggested, against Hjelmslev's deductive formalism,
that "Husserl's penetrating meditations on phenomen-
ology will in this case be a source of inspiration for
every logician of language."
It must be noted that as Brondal suspected, Hjelm-
slev's Prolegomena was a failure as a deductive sys-
tem for language, but viewed as an abduction, it has
provided the standard vocabulary and model used in
communicology to describe the operation of animal,
human, and machine communication systems. In this
respect, Hjelmslev's greatest inftuence has been on the
semiotic theories of Algirdas J. Greimas ( 1917-1991)
and the Paris school of semiotics and, in part, on the
theory of Umberto Eco; both theorists have had an es-
pecially notable international impact on the study of
aesthetic texts in the mass media.
(2) Structuralism per se refers to the theory of signs
as a specification of structural analysis in the human
sciences where there is an emphasis on the description
ofwhole systems. The goal is a new theory ofmeaning
based on significations generated by various system-
codes including language and discourse, kinship, and
economic exchange. A major intellectual confrontation
developed inasmuch as structuralism in the tradition of
Saussure opposed the tradition of Husserl as it was
taken up and transformed in French phenomenology.
In particular, structuralism offered itself as a major al-
ternative on the French scene to the post-World War
II popularity ofEXISTENTIALISM, especially that of JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE. The failure of existentialism as social and
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY encouraged the scientific expli-
cations of structural analysis. The ensuing intellectual
debate was a straightforward opposition between the
"new" structuralist concept of difference embodied in
language as a system defining society - a text-code
(i.e., grammatology) perspective-and the "old" EXIS-
TENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL concept of identity embod-
ied in speaking as a system defining the person - an
embodied discourse perspective. The period of struc-
turalism 's popularity roughly began with the publica-
tion of Andre Martinet's La linguistique synchronique
685
in 1949 and climaxed with the appearance of Claude
Levi-Strauss's Anthropologie structurale (1958) and
La pensee sauvage (The savage mind, 1962), the 1at-
ter dedicated to MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY. Rather than
a mere gesture, the dedication and the preface to La
pensee sauvage remind us ofthe influential phenomen-
ological critique and revision ofSaussure that Merleau-
Ponty offers in his essays of this period, published as
Signes ( 1960).
(3) Semiotics or semiology refers to the theory of
signs as a linguistic specification of structural analysis
in philosophy and the human sciences where there is
an emphasis on relations. In this modified version of
structuralism, the revised goal is a theory of meaning
based on signification generated in the first instance by
discourse. While Saussure had argued that semiotics
was the whole and linguistics o ne of the parts, semi-
oticians contended that linguistics was the origin and
semiotics was the derived science. French semiotics
carne into focus with the publication of Elements de
semiologie in 1964 by Roland Barthes (1915-1980)
and &mantique structurale: Recherche de methode
in 1966 by Greimas. Barthes essentially adapted the
Hjelmslevian model of structural analysis to literary
and cultural criticism by discounting problems ofform
in fa vor of relations and systems. He at once moved
away from the inftuence of empirica! science and to-
ward philosophical issues of concern by making semi-
ology a "creative activity" in literary science. His stud-
ies of mythology, rhetoric, and ideology ha ve been a
major force in the popularity of structuralism both in-
side and outside the academic world. The toute Paris
popularity of structuralism thus carne to displace that
of existentialism in public discourse.
As a counterbalance to the Barthes model, Grei mas
constructed a model that he called the semiotic square.
The model articulated in his book Semiotique ( 1979)
uses relations of contradiction, contrariety, and com-
plementarity to specify a generational category of
meaning at one ofthree levels of semantic signification.
In more familiar usage, Barthes names these levels con-
notation, denotation, and the real, while Jacques Lacan
in the psychoanalytical context refers to them as the
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. Greimas argues
that at a third (reality) level of semantic generation,
a combinatory "both/and" relation between contrary
terms creates MEANING, and, coincidentally, confirms
686 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
the work of Brăndal in bridging the logic of pheno-
menology with that of structuralism.
The most extensive expression of the connection
between phenomenology and structuralism is Roman
Jakobson 's theory of communication and his model
of the human sciences, which incorporates much of
Husserl 's phenomenology in the explication of lin-
guistics as a complex eidetic and empirica! science.
For the moment, suffice it to say that Jakobson also
advocates a hierarchical model of the human sciences
grounded in 1inguistics- remembering that for Jakob-
son, spoken language is an inherently existential and
embodied human capacity. The graphic model begins
with linguistics as the study of verbal messages at the
center with a second circle containing semiotics as a
contextual extension for the study of any messages.
A third circle contains the anthropological science of
communication, which is the domain of implied mes-
sages in social anthropology and economics. A fourth
circle specifying the message systems of living or-
ganisms as the biologica! science of communication
completes the model. Jakobson's model became quite
popular in France, then in the United Kingdom and
the United States, with the explication of his theory
in the "Que sais-je?" book series publication of La
semiologie ( 1971) by Pierre Guiraud. This book cov-
ers the full range of semiotic concems from language
and sign systems to logica! and aesthetic codes as well
as the mass media and social practices.
There is also an American school of semiotics based
on the work ofthe philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839-1914), but Peirce's work is neither related to
American structural linguistics nor to the European
tradition of structuralism. Nonetheless, Peirce has had
a major impact on contemporary semiotics, especially
the work ofUmberto Eco. A major connection between
semiotics and phenomenology exists in Peirce's work
and has been studied in recent years by Karl-Otto Apel.
(4) Poststructuralism also refers to the theory of
signs as a discursive specification of structural analy-
sis in philosophy and the human sciences where there
is an emphasis on contents andforms. As such, post-
structuralism is largely a critique of classical pheno-
menology and semiology. A fundamental distinction is
made between discourse (parole; langue), which is the
verbal utterance or stating (MI CHEL FOUCAULT's enonce)
of a message-as-code, and language (langage), which
is the empirica! manifestation of a code-as-message
or enonciation. In both cases, note that the simplis-
tic hypostatization of a message or code gives way to
the realistic notion that both messages and codes are
interconnected (Jakobson 's poetic function) and mutu-
ally motivated (Martinet's double articulation) as one
phenomenon. In short, the phenomena of discourse are
simultaneously eidetic in content (i.e., codes), while
those of language are empirica!, hen ce a form of mes-
sage. While this distinction may at first seem illogical,
recall the Hjelmselvian model where we can view dis-
course as an Sr relation of expression containing its
own substance and form. In turn, language is an Sd
relation of content available to perception as another
substance and form. Thus the combination of discourse
and language is the actual phenomenon (a) ofwhich we
are noetically conscious and (b) that we noematically
experience in the "here and now" moment of human
communication.
In the medieval sense of the trivium, we might il-
lustrate the distinction by saying that for discourse, ex-
pression (message-code) is a combination of rhetoric
or stating as the substance and the statement or speak-
ing as the actual form, just as grammar is expressed in
the text or writing, and logic is expressed in the propo-
sition or thinking. While rhetoric, grammar, and logic
have basically the same eidetic substance (persuasion,
information, reflection, etc., as expression), they are
different empirica! forms of expression.
In turn, for perception in language (code-message),
content is a combination of listening as the form and
rhetoric as the substance, i.e., narratology. In parallel
fashion, READING offers a sense of grammar as gram-
matology, while judging constructs a logic or semiotic.
The method of structural analysis for this poststruc-
turalist approach to research is called deconstruction.
While largely an applied method in literary criticism,
especially in the United States, deconstruction as a
theory in the human sciences oras a philosophical po-
sition is usually associated with the French theorists
in a number of CULTURAL DISCIPLINES. Among others,
these include Louis Althusser (Marxism), Michel Fou-
cault (systems ofthought; history), Gilles Deleuze and
Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis), and JACQUES DERRIDA
(philosophy). Recalling the Saussurian definition of
the sign as the combination ofboth a signifier (expres-
sion) and a signified (perception), deconstructionists
 STRUCTURALISM
focus their analysis exclusively on the signifier as a
content or form, while dismissing the relevance ofthe
signified as a socially determined referent in a sign
system. Hence the emphasis is upon discourse to the
exclusion of language. The synchronic ("now") and
paradigmatic ("here") interplay of contents and forms
as a vehicle of expression is pushed to its outer limits
so that the politically and socially dominant language
(langage) is critiqued and ruptured by the discourse in
the emergent text or practice. Simply put, the opposi-
tion between a message-as-code (parole) and a code-
as-message (langue) is transformed into an apposition.
That is to say, an opposition counterpoises one thing
against another as different (e.g., a binary relation of
expression versus perception), which is the diacritical
function of language as information, i.e., an either/or
choice in a pregiven context. But an apposition coun-
terpoises two parallel, but similar, phenomena (e.g.,
both expression and perception) to a third referent
phenomenon (e.g., a triadic relation of embodiment
as perception and expression), which is the combina-
tory function of discourse as communication, i.e., a
both/and choice of a new context.
Unlike other approaches to discourse analysis, de-
construction aims to articulate a space for this apposi-
tion in such a way that any existential or social refer-
ence point is lost to the auditor ofthe text or practice. In
this sense, deconstruction utilizes the rhetorical, gram-
matological, or tropic logic of relations to confront
systems with their own constituent contents and forms.
However, the poststructuralist dislocation and decen-
tering of the speaking subject, the writing author, and
the thinking philosopher as a result ofthe deconstruc-
tionist method has in itself provoked a structuralist
response by phenomenologists.
(5) Phenomenological structuralism refers in the
first instance to Roman Jakobson 's phenomenological
revisions of structuralist linguistics and semiotics in
the European tradition. The same theoretical point has
been made by the linguist-psychoanalystJulia Kristeva
and the semiotician Umberto Eco. Jakobson's theory
of discourse and language is based upon two basic
concepts about the eidetic and empirica! features of
human communication as a semiotic practice.
First, the concept of distinctive features is a phono-
logical description of how sounds combine paradig-
matically (vertical substitution) with one another tobe
687
recognizable in communication. There are the inher-
ent sound features of sonority, protensity, and tonality,
together with the prosodic features of force, quantity,
and tone. Distinctive features in a generalized sense
function to manifest certain paradigmatic relations of
conjunction such that when we compare or contrast two
phenomena, we do so with a both/and analogue logic of
inclusi an. As Jakobson suggests, a metaphoric relation
is created in which selection, substitution, and simi-
larity determine a meaningful unit that is synchronic
(existential). Simply put, distinctive features combine
two phenomena so as to display the positive opposition
(distinction) that each phenomenon possesses when
placed in conjunction. Similarity (both/and relation)
in expression causes a difference (either/or relation)
in perception. Our ability to change any noun for any
other noun in a sentence and understand the difference
between the two forms of the sentences based on the
similarity of their content illustrates this relationship.
The process also occurs when a speaker's meaning
and a listener's understanding are linked by the same
cognitive proposition.
Second, the concept of redundancy features is a
phonological description of how sounds join syntag-
matically (horizontal combination) with one another
to become recognizable in communication. In this
case, an either/or digital logic of exclusion creates a
metonymic relation of combination, contexture, and
contiguity that is diachronic (historical). In short, re-
dundancy features combine two phenomena so as to
display the apposition (redundancy) that each phe-
nomenon possesses with reference to a third phe-
nomenon. Difference (either/or relation) in expression
causes similarity (both/and relation) in perception. For
example, our ability to change any statement into a
question and understand the difference between the
two forms of the sentences based on the similarity of
their content illustrates this relationship. The process
also occurs when a speaker's meaning and a listener's
understanding are linked by the difference between the
utterance as spoken and as heard, or as intended versus
spoken (e.g., Freud's "slip ofthe tongue").
Last, it is important to note the poeticfunction built
into ali messages, namely that the paradigmatic and
syntagmatic features are reversible. That is to say,
a cade or metalinguistic function operates such that
distinctive and redundancy features are the context
688 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
of choice for each other. In this sense, system-codes
are always motivated and constitutive. Or put another
way that is important both to a poststructuralist and
phenomenological structuralist perspective, a choice-
of-context apposition as a transformation always mo-
tivates (occurs first) a context-of-choice opposition as
a constitution or formation (occurs second). One of
the best examples of this type of analysis that applies
and extends Jakobson 's phenomenological structural-
ism in a contemporary context is the theory of auto-
communication suggested by Yuri M. Lotman. This
theory 1inks the existential perception of the person to
the universal expression of cultural values in the prac-
tice ofhuman communication. Chaim Perelman and L.
Olbechts-Tyteca offer a parallel model of rhetoric as
the universal practice of discourse.
Phenomenological structuralism in a more general
sense refers to various modifications of Husserlian
phenomenology, most notably by MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY and MI CHEL FOUCAULT, as existential and semiotic
phenomenology. The theory suggested by Merleau-
Ponty in his essays on speech and language paral-
lels that of Roman Jakobson, namely that signs are
(a) motivated rather than arbitrary and (b) constitu-
tive rather than conventional or regulati ve. These signs
in their multiplicity are the embodiment of human
expression and perception that Merleau-Ponty des-
ignates and illustrates with the conscious experience
of human speaking and gesture in his major work,
Phenomenologie de la perception (1945). A similar
approach is the focused study of communication in
GEORGES GUSDORF's La parole (Speaking, 1953) and
more recently in FRANCIS JACQUEs' Difference et sub-
jectivite: Anthropologie d 'un point de vue relationnel
(1982).
Following his teacher Merleau-Ponty, the theme of
semiotic phenomenology also emerges in Michel Fou-
cault's famous quadrilateral model of le meme et l 'autre
that translates as both self/other and same/different.
Foucault's corpus should be viewed as (a) a pheno-
menological examination of subject matter contextual-
ized by (b) a structural view of that subject matter that
progresses from (i) contents and forms to (ii) relations
and on to (c) system-codes. Foucault views discourse
as a contest (agon) between subject and abject, and
between power and desire in language and other so-
cial practices. The conscious experience of stating or
speaking ( enonce) discourse is the contest between
the subject/object phenomenon and yet the practice of
articulating or uttering (enonciation) language is the
contest between the power/desire phenomenon. Such
discourse/language is the problematic that is studied by
the method of archaeology, a concept borrowed from
Merleau-Ponty. As a first level of analysis (i.e., con-
tents and forms in a system-code ), archaeology com-
pares and contrasts the subject/object expression over
against the power/desire perception. The method is
discussed most notably in Foucault's Les mots et les
choses (Words and things, 1966 [translated as The Or-
der of Things]) and his L 'archeologie du savior (The
archaeology ofknowledge, 1969).
Foucault further developed his method of analysis
by suggesting a second level of investigation (i.e., re-
lations in a system-code) that he called the method
of genealogy, a concept taken from Nietzsche. In this
context, the subject/power relation is explored as the
concept ofunderstanding or "know-how" (savoir), and
then the objectldesire relation is examined as the no-
tion ofknowledge or "knowing about" ( connaissance ).
While this genealogical method is most apparent in
Foucault's many studies of institutional practice in such
areas as medical diagnosis, the penal system, and so-
cial deviance, the theoretical discussion ofthe method
is best articulated in his three volume L 'historie de la
sexualite (1976--84).
As a third methodological level of analysis (i.e.,
the system in the system-code), Foucault suggests in
L 'ordre du discourse ( 1971) that the methods of ar-
chaeology (diachronic and syntagmatic) and geneal-
ogy (synchronic and paradigmatic) are reversible as a
context for one another, thus establishing a method of
criticism. Hence Foucault adopts the poetic function
principle suggested by Roman Jakobson.
As a clarification ofthe many crossovers and coun-
terinfluences that characterize structuralism, semiotics,
and phenomenology, the following summary may be
helpful. In the discussion, keep in mind that a com-
munication medium is discourse or practice, while a
communication channel is a language or performance
in the conscious experience ofpeople.
First, structuralism is the general view that the pro-
cess of communication is a practice (system) in which
a human group (society) is the medium of communica-
tion for any given channel, such as language, kinship,
 STRUCTURALISM
commerce, etc. Individual performance is a represen-
tation of practice (relation), while group performance
is a relationship that is signification per se (contents
and forms).
Second, semiotics maintains the view that the pro-
cess of communication is a performance in which
an individual person is the medium of communica-
tion (system), e.g., speaker/listener, writer/reader, sub-
ject/object, etc., for culture as the channel of commu-
nication (relation), as suggested by Kristeva. Here the
group practice is a representation of individual per-
formance (content) and practice is a relationship that
signifies (form).
Third, phenomenology is the perspective that the
process of communication, as meaning, is a presen-
tation of performance in which the person (system)
is the embodied channel of communication (relation)
for given practices (content) ofrepresentation such as
speaking, interacting, sharing, etc., that are the media
of communication (forms). For the phenomenologist,
performance is the practice of human being, i.e., the
performance comprises the embodied practice of ex-
istential meaning, e.g., Merleau-Ponty's explication of
gesture.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Barthes, Roland. Elements de semiologie. Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 1964; Elements ()[Semiology. Trans. Annette Lavers
and Colin Smith. New York: Hill & Wang, 1968.
Benveniste, Emite. "Communication." In his Problemes de
linguistique generale. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1966;
"Communication." In his Problems in General Linguis-
tics. Trans. Mary E. Meek. Coral Gables, FL: University
ofMiami Press, 1971,41-75.
Descombes, Vincent. Le meme et l'autre. Paris: Editions de
Minuit, 1979; Modern French Philosophy. Trans. L. Scott-
Fox and J. M. Harding. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1980.
Eco, Umberto. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, IN: In-
diana University Press, 1976.
Greimas, Algirdas Julien. The Social Sciences: A Semiotic
Vzew. Trans. Paul J. Perron and Frank H. Collins. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, [selec-
tions from his Du Sens I ( 1970), Du Sens II ( 1983), and
Semiotique et sciences sociales ( 1976), Paris: Editions du
Seuil].
689
- , and Joseph Courtes. Semiotique. Paris: Librairie Ha-
chette, 1979; Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dic-
tionary. Trans. Larry Crist and Daniel Patte, with James
Lee, Edward McMahon Il, Gary Phillips, and Michael
Rengstorf. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1982.
Guiraud, Pierre. La semiologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1971; Semiology. Trans. George Gross. Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
Holenstein, Elmar. Jakobson ou le structuralisme
phenomenologique. Paris: Editions Seghers, 1974; Ro-
man Jakobson :S Approach to Language: Phenomenologi-
cal Structuralism. Trans. Catherine and Tarcisius Schel-
bert. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- . "The Structure of Understanding: Structuralism Versus
Hermeneutics." PTL: A Journal of Descriptive Poetics
and Theory of Literature 1 (1976), 223-38.
Jakobson, Roman. Selected Writings, Voi. II: Word and Lan-
guage. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.
Kristeva, Julia. The System and the Speaking Subject. Semi-
otic Theory: I. Lisse: Peter De Ridder Press, 1975.
- . Le langage, cet inconnu. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981;
Language, the Unknown: An Initiation into Linguistics.
Trans. Anne M. Menke. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1989.
Lanigan, Richard L. Speaking and Semiology: Maurice
Merleau-Ponty s Phenomenological Theory of Existen-
tial Communication [ 1972]. 2nd ed. Berlin: Mouton de
Gruyter, 1991.
- . The Human Science ofCommunicology: The Phenomen-
ology of Discourse in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1992.
Leach, Edmund. Cu/ture and Communication: The Logic
by which Symbols Are Connected; An Introduction to the
Use ofStructuralist Analysis in Social Anthropology. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Lotman, Yuri (Iurrii) M. Uni verse ()[Mind: A Semiotic Theory
ofCulture. Trans. Ann Shukrnan. Bloomington, IN: Indi-
ana University Press, 1990 [simultaneous Russian publi-
cation by 1. B. Tauris, 1990].
Noth, Winfried. Handbook of Semiotics. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1990.
O'Sullivan, Tim, et al., eds. Key Concepts in Communication
and Cultural Studies. 2nd. ed. New York: Routledge, 1994.
Perelman, Chaim, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. La nouvel!e
rhetorique: Trai te de l 'argumentation. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1958; The New Rhetoric: A Trea-
tise on Argumentation. Trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell
Weaver. Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press,
1969.
Wilden, Anthony. The Rules Are No Game: The Strategy
ofCommunication. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1987.
RICHARD LEO LANIGAN
Southern Illinois University

TECHNOLOGY Philosophy of technology,
as distinct from philosophy of NATURAL SCIENCE, is a
relatively new arrival within contemporary philosoph-
ical subspecializations. Its historical roots, also distinct
from those in the philosophy of science, are largely de-
rived from severa! European traditions including neo-
HEGELIANISM, MARXISM, CRITICAL THEORY, and EXISTEN-
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY, as well as HERMENEUTIC AL PHENO-
MENOLOGY and American pragmatism. Philosophy of
science, in contrast, became dominated early by LOGI-
CAL EMPIRICIST and ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHICAL traditions,
particularly in English-speaking countries.
CARL MITCHAM, the most thorough historian and bib-
Iiographer of the philosophy of technology, contends
in Thinking Through Technology (1994) that there are
two dominant directions in the philosophy oftechnol-
ogy: the engineering and the humanities directions.
The oldest work actually bearing the title Grundlinien
einer Philosophie der Technik was authored by a neo-
Hegelian, Emst Kapp, in 1877. But it was not un tii the
interstice between the world wars that philosophy of
technology in its contemporary sense could be said to
ha ve begun, and then the two most prominent ancestors
were MARTIN HEIDEGGER in Europe and John Dewey in
the United States. It was primarily through Heidegger
that philosophy oftechnology received its phenomen-
ological rootage.
Although it was clearly Heidegger who brought
technology to the forefront as a philosophical theme,
some intimations are also traceable to the founder
of phenomenology in its technical sense, EDMUND
HUSSERL. But intimations are ali that can be claimed.
Husserl's own concems map much more closely upon
traditions that are consonant with the theory prefer-
ences of classical philosophy of science. And although
CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY can aJso be termed "ex-
istential" with its emphasis upon PERCEPTION and even
more thoroughly upon BODY with respect to the consti-
tution ofknowledge, Husserl himselfpays little direct
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
attention to the incorporation oftechnologies into per-
ceptual and bodily schemata. The most notable excep-
tion, and certainly a pregnant one, is the recognition of
the ro le of writing in the constitution of a progressively
layered LIFEWORLD. Yet for the most part, and even in
the Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenscha.ften und
die transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936), Husserl 's
major focus remains fixed upon the movement from
very simple practices toward increasing idealizations
in the construction of natural science. His treatment of
Galileo, for example, focuses almost exclusively upon
the way Galileo mathematizes science and hen ce drives
early modern science in an abstractive and idealizing
trajectory away from embodied perception. He thus
misses the equally important ro le that instrumentation
(technology) plays in the Galilean praxis. The use of
equipment is seldom mentioned in ARON GURWITSCH's
work and that there are some thoughts about technol-
ogy in ALFRED SCHUTz's work has only recently been
noticed.
Even earlier than the Krisis, there had been severa!
simultaneous movements in German philosophy that
foreshadowed the !ater philosophy of technology. In
1927, for example, the neo-Kantian Friedrich Dessauer
(1881-1963) published Philosophie der Technik, an
early work in the engineering tradition, which nev-
ertheless still maintained the primacy of theory over
practice. It was in marked contrast to both Dessauer
and Husserl that Martin Heidegger's early Sein und
Zeit ( 1927) could be noted as paradigmatically revolu-
tionary in initiating contemporary philosophy oftech-
nology in its phenomenological sense.
The model for what was !ater to develop into a more
full-blown philosophy of technology was the analy-
sis of tool use in his discussion of entities encoun-
tered in the environment. First, Heidegger argued that
readiness-to-hand experientially precedes the kind Of
objectification that becomes presence-at-hand, which
is equivalent to placing praxis as prior to theory. This
pre-theoretical experience is precisely what occurs in
tool use, and under this mode of experience the tool is
not experienced as an object, but as a means by which
some praxical ACTION within the environment is under-
taken. Then, in a model ofphenomenological analysis,
Heidegger shows not only how the tool "withdraws" in
experience, but also how it belongs to a context of in-
volvements. The praxical experience of tools, then, is
690
 TECHNOLOGY
a kind of tacit knowledge, not necessarily conceptual,
but bodily engaged with an environment.
The !ater Heidegger subsequently went on to make
technology a central theme ofhis philosophy. Modem
scientific technology, indeed, was the outcome of the
Westem metaphysical tradition. The !ater interpreta-
tiau of technology- for example, in "Die Frage nach
dem Technik" (The question concerning technology,
1954) - was one that argued ( 1) for the ontologica!
priority oftechno1ogy over science; (2) for technology
tobe seen as a way of revealing rather than some mere
collection of artifacts used by subjects; and (3) for the
totality oftechnology tobe seen as a way of enframing
Nature itself as a type of"standing reserve" (Bestand).
Ali of these themes had already occurred in the tool
analysis insofar as praxis precedes theory, tools relate
Dasein to a world, and in the process the tool "with-
draws" or ceases to be an abject- and, one can say,
the engagement is one that presupposes what is acted
upon as a kind of use-reserve for Dasein. But only in
the !ater Heidegger is modern technology totalized as
a metaphysical view.
In another context, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY cou]d
be said to have followed a similar trajectory with
respect to human embodiment and tool use. In his
Phimomenologie de la perception ( 1945), Merleau-
Ponty argued that tools such as the blind man's cane
are experienced as the extensions of the sooY. The
embodied subject's experience of embodiment is ex-
tended through the cane and engages the environment
through the artifact, a position held by MAX SCHELER
in Uber Ressentiment (On ressentiment, 1912), the
French translation ofwhich was reviewed by the young
Merleau-Ponty. Again the artifact becomes partially
transparent and taken into the "body-subject." But un-
like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty did not go on to make
such incorporated artifactual experiences into an appli-
cation to technologies as such. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's con-
tributions to the philosophy oftechnology are marginal
but not uninteresting.
Technology was of serious philosophical interest
to many philosophers in the years before and after
World War Il, and virtually every major Continen-
tal thinker had something to say about it. Nicolas
Berdyaev (1874-1948), ORTEGA YGASSET, Ernst Junger
( 1895-1984 ), KARL JASPERS, and Jacques Ellul ali wrote
about the technologization of contemporary life, but
691
Heidegger remained the primary phenomenologically
oriented and most systematic ofthese thinkers.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of
North American philosophers began to adapt pheno-
menological themes in the analysis oftechnology. Us-
ing published books as a benchmark, one ofthe earliest
thematic and serious attempts to apply phenomenology
to techno]ogy was HUBERT DREYFUS's What Comput-
ers Can 't Do: A Critique of Artţficial Reason ( 1972).
He applied insights of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and
Heidegger to the then burgeoning "ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
LIGENCE" programs that began with radical extrapola-
tions ofwhat such programs could do. Dreyfus showed
that the weaknesses of such programs revolved around
(!) the computer program's failure to recognize pat-
terns and gestalts, common perceptual achievements
in humans and animals; (2) the failure to deal with
open contexts, again a characteristic of any LIFEWORLD
in contrast to any closed system; and (3) the failure
tobe motile. In short, he argued, in Merleau-Pontyan
style, that computers cannot "think" because they do
not have (Jived) bodies. Here was a direct application
of the phenomenological primacy of PERCEPTION, em-
bodiment, and motile action as the hasis ofknowledge
to an important aspect of contemporary technology.
Dreyfus bas continued this work into the present with
a series of publications and has spawned, indirectly,
a whole generation of computer designers who have
taken his critiques seriously.
The first book that explicitly identified itself as a
philosophy oftechnology and appeared in a major phi-
Josophy of science series was DON IHDE 's Technics and
Praxis: A Philosophy ofTechnology ( 1979). That work
opens with a four-chapter sequence in a "phenomen-
ology of instrumentation." Here a phenomenological
analysis, based upon both a Husserlian and a Heideg-
gerian version of INTENTIONALITY, undertakes to differ-
entiate different structural modes ofhuman-technology
relations. lhde shows that embodiment relations - a
term that he uses to capture the previous analyses of
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for tool uses as noted
above- are relations in which embodied human per-
ception symbiotically takes into itselfthe artifact used.
But in addition to such relations, Ihde describes
other types of human-technology relations, includ-
ing hermeneutica! relations that are more LANGUAGE-
oriented or quantitatively designed and less perceptu-
692 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
ally direct (such as those found in the use of instru-
ment panels or other types of display instrumentation)
and background relations that are environmental and
taken-for-granted technological contexts not explictly
brought to the foreground in experience (such as living
in the presence of automatic heating or lighting ma-
chinery). Ihde has continued this development through
a series of subsequent books, the most systematic of
which is Technology and the Lifeworld (1990).
PATRICK HEELAN's Space Perception and the Philos-
ophy of Science (1983) comes more directly from the
philosophy of science. But although this work is more
focused upon the construction ofscientific knowledge,
it incorporates significant phenomenological analysis
of instrument uses as well. His variant upon the bod-
ily, perceptual, and praxis emphasis therein consists
in hermeneuticizing the process more fully. He argues
that instruments are "readable technologies" that in-
corporate and become equivalent to the perceivable,
thus yielding a horizonal and hermeneutica! realism to
scientific knowledge.
From the 1980s into the present, there has begun
to appear a rather wide range of studies of tech-
nology drawing upon phenomenological resources.
These studies are notably Heideggerian for the most
part. For example, the work most directly descended
from this tradition is Technology and the Character
of Contemporary Life ( 1984 ), by ALBERT BORGMANN.
This analysis of contemporary life is one in which
Borgmann draws a strong distinction between a "de-
vice paradigm" and "foca! activities." Technological
devices, Borgmann argues, may often disrupt previ-
ous human engagements with an environment and thus
disengage humans. Automatic heating machinery dis-
places the hearth, while the latter technology engages
a whole series ofactivities that caii upon direct human
engagement. Borgmann argues for a reform of tech-
nologies that would introduce more foca! activities to
reengage basic human actions.
MICHAEL HEIM analyzes word processing in his Elec-
tric Language: A Philosophical Study ofWord Process-
ing (1987). Again, often Heideggerian in tone, Heim
takes account of the way word processing has altered
the process ofwriting. And while he cites Heidegger's
distinct dislike for even typewriters (which degrade
the "hand") and argues in part for word processing po-
tentially being destructive of "books," it is apparent
that Heim 's own stance is more one of a love/hate re-
Jationship with computers. He subsequently takes his
technological inquiry into virtual reality as well with
The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality ( 1993 ).
ROBERT CREASE, again related to philosophy of sci-
ence concerns, nevertheless takes a phenomenologi-
cally oriented inquiry into the ro le of experiment. His
The Play of Nature (1993) examines the primacy of
praxis in large-scale experiments in the recent history
ofscience.
At present, the philosophy oftechnology is rapidly
becoming recognized as a serious subspecialization
within philosophy. It is pluralist in approach, but
within its pluralism the strands of phenomenological
approaches are more obvious and dominant than in
cognate areas, such as the philosophy of science.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958.
Ballard, Edward. Man and Technology: Toward the Measure-
ment of a Cu/ture. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University
Press, 1978.
Blumenberg, Hans. Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter As-
pekte der Phănomenologie. Turin: Edizione di Filosofia,
1963.
Borgmann, Albert. Technology and the Character of Con-
temporary Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984.
Crease, Robert. The Play ofNature. Bloomington, IN: Indi-
ana University Press, 1993.
Dreyfus, Hubert. What Computers Can 't Do. New York:
Harper & Row, 1972.
- . Mind Over Machine. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1985.
Embree, Lester. "Schutz's Phenomonology of the Practica!
World." In Alfred Schiitz. Neue Beitrăge zur Rezeption
seines Werkes. Ed. Elisabeth List and llja Srubar. Amster-
dam: Rodopi, 1988, 121-44.
Flynn, Thomas R. "Sartre and Technological Being-in-the-
World." In Lifeworld and Technology. Ed. Timothy Casey
and Lester Embree. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America,
1990, 271-87.
Heidegger, Martin. Die Technik und die Kehre. Pfullingen:
Neske, 1962; [selections translated in] The Question Con-
cerning Technology. Trans. William Lovitt. New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1977.
Heim, Michael. Electric Language: A Philosophical Study of
Word Processing. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1987.
- . The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1993.
Ihde, Don. Technics and Praxis. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979.
- . Existential Technics. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1983.
 THEATER
- . Technology and the Lifeworld. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1990.
-.Instrumental Realism. Bl0omington, IN: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1991.
Jonas, Hans. Philosophical Essays from Ancient Creed to
Technological Man. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hali,
1974.
Scheler, Max. "Uber Ressentiment und Moralisches Wert."
Zeitschriftfiir Pathopsychologie 1 (1912); extended form
in Vom Umsturz der Werte ( 1915). 4th rev. ed. Gesammelte
Werke 3. Bem: Franke, 1955.
Wa1denfe1s, Bernhard. "Reichweite der Technik." In his Der
Stache! des Fremden. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1990, 137-50.
Zimmerman, Michael. Heidegger:~ Confrontation with
Modernity: Technology, Politic.~. Art. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1990.
DON IHDE
State University of New York, Stony Brook
THEATER In order for any extremely com-
plex, multilayered, and multifaceted higherorder ex-
perience, such as AESTHETIC experience, experience of
RELIGION, or experience of POLITICS, to be examined
phenomenologically, the more basic phenomenologies
of PERCEPTION, the IMAGINATION, MEMORY, and EMOTION
will already have to have been accomplished. This is
because higher-order experiences bring into play ali of
the powers, ali ofthe expectancies and resources ofthe
individual at once, ali together, in very complex ways.
Just as the power of speech uses bodily organs, each
with its own specific function distinct from LANGUAGE,
for the purposes of linguistic expression, so also re-
ligious experience, for instance, brings into play not
just one or two emotions, one or two human needs
and powers, but ali of them at once. This is certainly
nowhere more complicated than in what goes under
the name of aesthetic experience. So it comes as no
surprise that extensive phenomenologies of aesthetic
experience in general, of literary experience, or ofthe-
atrical experience are hard to achieve and few have
been undertaken.
A great playwright, like a great novelist, creates
different imaginary worlds, situated in different frame-
works oftime and space, ali with their own consistency
and coherence as possible worlds, which we can enter
and leave at will, to which we can retum, from which
Lester Embree, E/izabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
693
we can leam more and more, which we can reenact
again and again in real time and space without ever be-
ing able to exhaust them. These worlds of experience
fumish us with endless possibilities for the phenomen-
ological examination of experience.
But the phenomenological literature on these sub-
jects is up to now very restricted. As regards the pheno-
menology of the theater even ROMAN INGARDEN, in his
two magisterial tomes on Das literarische Kuntswerk
( 1931) and Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerk
(Cognition of the literary work of art, 1968), mentions
the theater only incidentally, as being "a borderline
case of the literary work of art'' precisely because it
involves, over and above the language of the text of
the theatrical play itself, the actual peiformance ofthe
text, a matter he does not address.
Only JEAN-PAUL SARTRE among the major phenome-
nologists has written systematically on the theater. This
is in a series of scattered and occasional articles that
provide us with the outline of his theory. He was an
authentic disciple of EDMUND HUSSERL in his extremely
nuanced understanding ofthe phenomenologies of per-
ception and imagination that he took from Husserl's
chef-d' oeuvre, Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologische Philosophie I (1913 ), and
these play a central role in ali his major philosoph-
ical and theatrical writings. Sartre is one of the few
major philosophers in history to write short stories,
novels, and plays as well as technical works of philo-
sophical argument. Moreover, like only a handful of
playwrights, including Pirandello and Brecht, Sartre
held a theory of acting, which he exemplifies in his
own plays. He focuses on the phenomenological prob-
lem ofthe enactment of a text.
Sartre bases his theory of the theater on a theory of
acting, of role-playing in everyday life and in the the-
ater. To begin on the commonsense level, any specifi-
cally human act has moral and even legal implications;
it is an act for which a person is responsible, for which
he or she is held accountable, for praise or for blame. It
is an act deliberately and freely done with some knowl-
edge ofthe consequences. In everyday life we have no
script according which to act; each choice is irrevoca-
ble; each action sets our course for the future without
any fixed or fated plan, without any guarantee as to
the outcome. We are subject to the laws of irreversible
time, contingency, uncertainty. There can be no science
694 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
of a particular, individual life. It is precisely because
there can be no science of particulars, no science of
contingent facts, no science of HISTORY, that Aristotle
held dramatic poetry tobe higher than, ofmuch graver
import than, and much closer to philosophy than his-
tory. Dramatic poetry gives us the typical, not the story
of what actually happened but of what could happen,
what ought ta happen, of what is instructive, of what
repeats through time; even ifwe were to put Herodotus
into verse, he says, we would not get poetry.
Here we enter the literary text as opposed to history
or biography: unlike history, a text can be repeated; it
is not for one time only; it is allographic. While the
text of a play depends for its existence on the imagi-
nation and on the work of a really existing, historical
playwright, it is itself an ideal entity capable of be-
ing repeated in its ideal meaning again and again. The
"idea" of a play, its philosophical and "typical" im-
port, is an eidetic and nota real object; it always eludes
our present grasp; it is a Polidee, Husserl would say,
a limit-concept that teleologically transcends and rules
ali its possible versions and interpretations. True, it can
only be enacted by these actors, under this director, in
this theater, for this audience, here and now, but a given
performance never exhausts the meaning of the play.
As HERMENEUTICS and STRUCTURALISM have taught US,
the meaning of the text of a play always exceeds the
real psychological intentions ofthe author, and authors
are in no privileged position to interpret the meaning of
their own work. Writers as diverse as Dostoyevsky and
Pirandello ha ve testified that an author leams the story
from the characters in the novel or play, who emerge
with their own independent lives and motivations in
the author's own imaginary and literary creation as he
or she writes. They, as much as anyone, teach the au-
thor what to write. Once one has conceived them in
imagination, one no longer writes as one wills but as
one can; there is an inner logic to each literary text that
requires that the characters, once given life in imag-
ination, teach the author and the audience their own
story.
Sartre first focused on the phenomenological impor-
tance of role-playing, or "acting," in his "phenomen-
ological ontology," L 'etre et le neant ( 1943 ). There, in
isolating the "existential-ontologica!" structure of"bad
faith" he uncovered a necessary, eidetic structure ofhu-
man existence. On the behaviorallevel, "bad faith" is
not opposed to "good faith." One can never escape bad
faith; everyone is always in bad faith; the opposite of
bad faith is not "good faith" but authenticity, namely,
the recognition that everyone is always in "bad faith,"
that every consciousness is forever "not what it is but
is what it is not."
At first sight, the distinction between acting in ev-
eryday life and play-acting seems unbreachable. No
matter who plays the role of Hamlet, the character in
its ideal independence is not affected. The character of
Hamlet is as fixed as a Platonic idea; his acts, thoughts,
destiny are fixed by the idea ofthe play. But the actor,
as actor, has other purposes and more knowledge than
the character in the play (because he has already read
the script and is living in the real, nonimaginary world
of human freedom and responsibility). No one- not
even the actor- can enter the time and place of the
play from the outside without disrupting it as play.
But what about role-playing from a moral point of
view in everyday life? What Sartre calls "bad faith"
holds an essential place both in his metaphysics and in
his theory ofhuman reaJity, his PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY. In L 'etre et le neant he gives usa plethora of
examples: the grocer, the student, the soldier, the gam-
bler, the flirt, the waiter, and others who show that no
performance of any ro le in everyday life is ever wholly
what it seems, that in numerous instances we have to
pretend to "be ourselves," that there is only a difference
of degree between the real, "sincere," unselfconscious
performances in which we act ourselves, and the "dis-
honest," calculating, fully conscious staging of a scene
for a given public, in short, that it is impossible ever
fully tobe oneself. And this playing of ro les is essential
to society: "A grocer who dreams is offensive to the
buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer.
There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man
in what he is, as if we lived in perpetua! fear that he
might escape from it, that he might break away and
suddenly elude his condition." In his radical theory of
a transcendental, non-ego logica!, operating conscious-
ness that experiences both the world and itselfprior to
reftection, Sartre ejects ali "objects" from conscious-
ness. Not only does consciousness objectify and give
MEANING and VALUE to things, but it is also capable of
objectifying itself, its own acts, states, emotions, and
dispositions. Even these are "essences" or "objects" of
consciousness and I am myself cut off from my own
 THEATER
essence "by the nothingness that I am."
The noetic attitudes of interrogation such as ab-
stracting, isolating, imagining, doubting, and denying
ground the possibility of experiencing the WORLD oth-
erwise than as it is, as composed not only of positive
bits of being but also of absences and otherness, of
possibilities and potentialities, of the unreal and the
imaginary, of the "ideal" reality of the objects of in-
ference and demonstration, even of moral and physical
evi!, of psychophysical limitations and contingency.
The experience of an absence is not the absence of an
experience; on the contrary, it is a very intense experi-
ence. When Pierre does not arrive for a rendezvous at
the Cafe Bonaparte as he promised, I experience his ab-
sence, not from some particular spot but from the whole
cafe. I do not conjure up some image or "species" of
Pierre distinct from Pierre himself; rather, I "perceive"
his absence as a possible presence by "nihilating" the
actual cafe as the ground upon which he appears as
not-being-there. Consciousness adds nothing to being
except the "unreal."
It is of the essence of consciousness to be able to
reftect on its own acts, to objectify itself, to be able
to take itself as an object. "Phenomenology," writes
Sartre, "has taught us that states are objects, that an
emotion as such (a love ora hatred) is a transcendent
object and cannot shrink into the interior unity of a
'consciousness.' Consequently if Paul and Peter both
speak of Peter 's !o ve, for example, it is no longer true
that the one speaks blindly and by analogy ofwhat the
other apprehends in fui!. They speak ofthe same thing.
Doubtless they apprehend it by different procedures,
but these procedures are equally intuitional. And Pe-
ter's emotion is no more certain for Peter than for Paul
... Doubt, remorse, the so-called 'mental crises of con-
sciousness,' etc.- in short ali the content of intimate
diaries- becomes sheer performance."
It is impossible to discuss Sartre 's theory of acting,
and therefore his theory of the theater, except on the
basis ofhis ethical philosophy ofthe "free act." There
are two existential facts about human reality- namely,
( 1) that it is situated, determined, in a place, contingent,
not necessary, factical, limited, and particular, and (2)
that it is, in this situation, absolutely free, its own basis,
its own source.
Since it is always easier to discuss Sartre's theories
on the basis of his examples, let us take the exam-
695
ple of the story of Abraham, on the basis of which
Kierkegaard established his notion of religious faith
as "the teleological suspension of the ethical." We ali
know the story: God appears to Abraham in his sleep
and orders him to take his only son up Mount Moriah
and offer him up as a human holocaust to the divinity.
Abraham, being a "man of faith," does not hesitate to
obey this command. This can be called the "Abraham
complex." But Sartre asks: how did Abraham know
the vision he had was from God and not that of a ly-
ing demon from Egypt? Only Abraham, alone, could
decide this for himself. Even if there are signs, di-
vine commands, even if there are moral laws written
on tablets of stone, only humans can interpret them.
Sartre is Kantian without being Lutheran. Like KANT,
he holds that even in accepting the divinely sanctioned
morallaw, it is the individual human being who must
recognize it as the voice of God, alone, and on their
own authority. That is not an act that God can do for
them. Humankind is isolated in its own subjectivity
and must choose and invent, find a path for itself.
A given person's subjective aloneness in recogniz-
ing the voi ce of God is even more accentuated by an-
other Kantian moral principle: each moral choice has
a legislative dimension. By performing a moral act we
are, in effect, saying "go thou and do likewise." This
legislative burden is the source of our "ethical anx-
iety." We cannot not choose; we are condemned to
be free. Not to choose is itself a choice. At each in-
stance we are capable of being forced to make moral
decisions, choices, and we always have to make these
choices without full knowledge ofthe consequences of
our actions, assuming a responsibility for choices that
may turn out to have been wrong. There is an even
more fundamental sense of freedom in Sartre than the
freedom and the necessity to choose: it is the "noetic
freedom" to become "unstuck" from the things that
make up our world and to which consciousness alone
gives structure, meaning, and value; it is our permanent
possibility "of dissociating ourselves from the causal
series which constitutes being and which can produce
only being."
Thus there can be no ETHICS built up of self-evident
or universal laws. There can be no generalized exis-
tential ethics at ali; there are only right choices. The
Biblica! injunction to "do unto others as thou wouldst
be done by," or the Kantian moral imperative never to
696 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
treat another human freedom as a means to an end but
only as an end in itself, are true but empty. Whenever
we are faced with applying these laws in any concrete,
actual case of moral choice they are of no help at ali.
Every ethical choice is situational, always a "particular
nihilation."
In order to develop his ethics Sartre wrote both his
existential PSYCHOANALYSIS and his philosophy of the
theater. It is precisely because of the imperatives of
individual freedom and the impossibility of an ethics
based on universal principles that Sartre gives us his
most important ethical insights in his existential psy-
choanalyses of individual cases and in the "myths" he
forged in his plays, elevating examples of individual
choices to the level of "the typical," "the mythical,"
just as the ancient tragedians did.
Sartre's existential psychoanalysis was not meant
to be a therapeutic method, but rather an exercise in
philosophical anthropology, a series of studies that ap-
proaches a theory of humankind through the investi-
galion ofinstructive individual cases: Baudelaire, Tin-
toretto, Flaubert, Jean Genet. Most of his case studies
deal with historical personages; only Genet was a "li ve
subject," and even there, much ofthe evidence exam-
ined was taken from Genet's published short stories
and plays.
His theory begins with a negative criticism ofFreud.
He rejects the "materialistic mythology" of Freud both
because of its mechanistic conception of human be-
ings and because it makes the ego into a weak play-
thing of subliminal "causal" forces, ali the while sur-
reptitiously reintroducing into the "unconscious" the
structures of consciousness as such. The "censor" or
"superego" knows, for instance, which libidinal desires
to suppress. Stated positively, his method replaces the
search into the causal origins of present behavior with
an examination of the meaning of present behavior
in terms of its future-oriented intent and implications.
Sartre approaches the life of a given, mature adult-
who lives this life (sometimes barely) within the limits
of normality- as a unified whole, not as a "bundle
of drives" haphazardly juxtaposed. Person and world
comprise a unified, structured whole. He writes: "The
principle ofthis psychoanalysis is that man is a totality
and not a collection. Consequently he expresses him-
self as a whole in even his most insignificant and his
most superficial behavior."
But Sartre's rejection of Freud's conception of the
unconscious does not rule out unconscious or precon-
scious intentionalities, because the meaning of surface
behavior is not immediately intelligible; it must be
interpreted. There is a large realm of pre-reflcctive.
pre-logical, pre-predicative behavior that primarily de-
fines our individual choices of lifestyles, our ways of
being-in-the-world. One ofthe reasons Genet (the sub-
ject of Sartre's most successful "existential psycho-
analysis") is so interesting is that he does not write
"about" thieves, homosexuals, and deserters, but as a
thief, as a homosexual, as a traitor who deserts in the
face of the enemy. The behaviors examined arc just
those that would be examined in any theory of indi-
vidual psychotherapy: sexuality, eating, interpersonal
relationships, ways ofpossessing and using things and
persons. Sartre's aim is to discover those free (but fre-
quently pre-reflective) individual choices ofbeing that
are unique in each life, that pattern of action that will
reveal the meaning of an individual life in its total,
complex, existential density. This is the "fundamental
project" or primary choice of a way of being-in-the-
world. And ali a person 's individual choices reveal his
or her "fundamental choice," if only we know how to
"decipher" them.
Sartre believes in going down to the most minute
details, usque ad minima. If a given man "is what he
prefers," ifhis way ofbeing-in-the-world is revealed in
the way he possesses "the world through any particular
object," ali his behaviors of "having" or of possession
reveal the particular concretization of his "fundamen-
tal choice." "To eat," he writes, "is to appropriate by
destruction: it is at the same time to be filled up with
a certain being ... It is not a matter of indifference
whether we like oysters or clams, snails or shrimp,
if only we know how to unravel the existential sig-
nificance of these foods." Moreover, to appropriate,
in whatever fashion, is never "innocent." If I climb a
mountain, I affix my flag to it; if I seduce this woman
she becomes mine. In appropriating 1 necessarily al-
ter and transform ("digest") what I possess, and at the
same time there is always the "surreptitious appropri-
ation ofthe possessor by the possessed." Knowledge,
like exploration, is a "rape ofthe world."
To summarize, the "three big categories of con-
crete human existence," writes Sartre, are ta be, to
have, ta do. And since we "are what we do," since we
 THEATER
secrete our essence by our actions while our actions
are revealed in our ways of "having" (i.e., possessing,
appropriating, absorbing, digesting, assimilating, de-
stroying) the objects that make up our world, we will
find that each person 's fundamental choice of a way of
being-in-the-world is revealed by the categories of pos-
session and these are, in turn, revealed by the categories
of acting. And action brings us to moral categories: to
freedom and responsibility.
The importance of an existential analysis is to hold
up to us, on the basis of an individuallife, a mirror in
which we can see ourselves more clearly. As there is the
"reversibility ofmerits" in which we ali take the credit
for the work of the great heroes, inventors, prophets
among us, so there is a "reversibility of crime" accord-
ing to which even the analysis of Genet's misdeeds
reveals not just another case history, but the descrip-
tion of our own "human possibility." The story of the
martyrdom of "Saint Genet" is as edifying as that of
Saint Sebastian.
Sartre's essays in existential psychoanalysis lead
necessarily to his theory ofthe theater as the final cul-
mination of an ethics ofthe free act. Sartre calls himself
a "forger of myths." His theater is a theater of situa-
tions opposed to the psychological theater that has held
sway in Europe since the great tragedians of the 16th
and 17th centuries and is typical of Anglo-American
theater at the present time.
Sartre does not believe in a ready-made "human na-
ture." Existence precedes essence: as individuals, we
create our own essence as we go along, by our acts.
A theater of situations will present a free human being
in a particular social environment in which he or she
makes an irrevocable choice. Sartre's theater presents
us with " ... a free being, entirely indeterminate, who
must choose his own being when confronted with cer-
tain necessities, such as being already committed in
a world fu li of both threatening and favorable factors
among other men who have made their choices be-
fore him, who ha ve decided in advance the meaning of
those factors. He is faced with the necessity ofhaving
to work and die, of being hurled into a life already
complete which is sti li his own enterprise and in which
he can never ha ve a second chance; where he must play
his cards and take risks no matter what the cost. ... We
put on stage certain situations which throw light on
the main aspects ofthe condition ofman ... and have
697
the spectator participate in the free choice which man
makes in these situations."
We are living in the second half ofthe 20th century;
God is dead, or absent; the human race is certainly not
at the center ofthe uni verse; human nature is no longer
fixed and stable, and the situation of the individual is
uncertain and difficult to think through. In this con-
dition people need "myths" of freedom in their effort
to understand the nature of the human situation in the
present. Each of Sartre's plays, including his rewriting
ofthe Greek myths, presents an individual in a partic-
ular situation in which one must make an ethical com-
mitment without full knowledge of the consequences
of one's actions, but which is nevertheless an authentic
free choice, one way of understanding, and "dominat-
ing," making sense of, giving a specific meaning and
value to that situation by this decision to act.
His plays are often written for the sake of a single
scene. As in classic tragedy, we enter upon the ACTION,
the agon, at the very moment it is headed for catas-
trophe. "Our plays are violent and brief," he writes,
"centered around one single event; there are few play-
ers and the story is compressed within a short space
of time, sometimes only a few hours. As a result they
obey a kind of'rule ofthe three unities,' which has been
only a little bit rejuvenated and modified. A single set,
a few entrances, a few exits, intense arguments among
the characters who defend their individual rights with
passion ... "
There is, therefore, passion; however, it is not
merely or even primarily induced by psychological
conflicts and opposition, but by moral dilemmas, con-
flicts ofrights. The three unities oftime, place, and plot
are observed; Huis elos and Les sequestres d 'A/tona,
plays of final judgment, human not divine, take place in
very confined spaces. Le diable et le bon dieu, Sartre's
only "epic," while stretched out in time and location,
still takes place within the Faustian time of "one year
and a day" and is actually focused on just two juxta-
posed scenes, the wager and the final accounting.
Sartre's theater is "austere, moral, mythic, and cere-
monia! in aspect," focused on great social and religious
questions. It deals with the great themes of death, exile,
and !o ve. It is nota theater of symbols or ofthe natural-
istic presentation of psychological rivalries and exag-
gerated emotions. It is rather a matter of "the rights of
citizenship, the rights of the family, individual ethics,
 698 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
collective ethics, the right to kill, the right to reveal
to human beings their pitiable condition .... We do
not reject psychology," he says, "but integrate it into
a struggle over opposing moral claims." In Les mains
sales the drama is not exhausted by the question of
whether or not Hoerderer has seduced Jessica, though
the psychological duel between Hugo and Hoerderer
over Jessica and Hoerderer's love is central to the play;
the chief source of drama !ies in answering the question
of who, Hugo or Hoerderer, is ultimately in the right,
the Stalinist or the Trotskyite.
The theater must will tobe moral (which does not
at ali mean "didactic" in the Brechtian sense). "It was
not," he wrote, "a question of the opposition of char-
acter between a Stalinist and a Trotskyite; it was not in
their characters that an anti-Nazi of 1933 clashed with
an S.S. guard; the difficulties in international politics
do not derive from the characters of the men leading
us; the strikes in the United States do not reveal con-
flicts of character between industrialists and workers.
In each case it is, in the final analysis and in spite of
divergent interests, the system ofvalues, of ethics and
of concepts of man which are lined up against each
other."
What is essentiaJ in Sartre's EXISTENTIAL PHENOMEN-
OLOGY ofthe theater is the meaning of a free, individual
human act in a situation that gives it a dramatic, instruc-
tive, "mythical" import. He distinguishes the three lev-
els ofpsychological, social, and philosophical meaning
in each individual choice not to write a general ethics
of principles, but to give insight into the true human
situation in the 20th century in ali its precarious ethical
contingency.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Edie, James M. "Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existen-
tial Psychoanalyst." In Phenomenology and Existential-
ism. Ed. Edward Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum. Balti-
more, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967, 139--
78.
- . "The Problem of Enactment." Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism (1971), 303-18.
- . "Appearance and Reality: An Essay on the Philosophy
of the Theater." Phi/osophy and Literature ( 1980), 3-17.
- . "The Question of the Transcendental Ego: Sartre's Cri-
tique ofHusserl." Journal ofthe British Society for Pheno-
menology 24 (1993), 104-20.
- . "The Philosophical Framework ofSartre's Philosophy of
the Theater." Man and World 27 (1994), 415-44.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Ca", J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ingarden, Roman. Das literarische Kuntswerk. Tiibingen:
Max Niemeyer, 1965; The Literary Work of Art. Trans.
George G. Grabowicz. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1965.
- . Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks. Tiibingen:
Max Niemeyer, 1968; The Cognition of the Literary Work
of Art. Trans. Ruth Ann Crowly and Kenneth R. Olson.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. "La transcendance de !'ego: Es-
quisse d'une description phenomenologique." Recherches
philosophiques 6 (1936-37), 85-123; The Transcendence
of the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirk-
patrick. New York: Noonday, 1957.
- . L 'imaginaire: Psychologie phenomenologique de
l'imagination. Paris: Gallimard, 1940; The Psychology of
the Imagination. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1948.
- . Saint Genet. comedien et martyr. Paris: Gallimard, 1952;
Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr. Trans. Bernard Frechtman.
New York: Braziller, 1963.
- . Qu 'est-ce que la litterature? Paris: Gallimard, 1964;
What is Literature. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. New York:
Harper & Row, 1965.
-. Un theatre des situations. Paris: Gallimard, 1973; Sartre
on Theater. Trans. Frank Jellinek. New York: Random
House, 1976.
Smith, Jadmiga S. 'The Theory of Drama and Theater:
A Continuing Investigation of the Aesthetics of Roman
Ingarden." Analecta Husserliana 33. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991, 3--62.
Wilshire, Bruce W. Role Playing and Identity. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1982.
JAMES M. EDIE
Northwestern University
TIME Time and the consciousness of time
are central themes in Husserlian phenomenology. They
also figure prominently in the thought of MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, and MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, who were familiar with Husserl's writings on
time and whose own reflections often show Husserl 's
influence, even when they take a different course.
Husserl understands the consciousness of time to
be a uniquely important form of INTENTIONALITY, that
defining feature of conscious life according to which it
is always the consciousness of something. Time enters
into everything ofwhich we are aware, and every inten-
tiona! experience presupposes time-consciousness as a
necessary condition of its constitution. Husserl reflects
on temporality within the boundaries ofthe phenomen-
ological EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION, which means that he
is interested in time and temporal objects just as they
 TIME
appear in the experiences that intend them, and in the
essential structures of those experiences precisely in-
sofar as they are instances of time-consciousness. He
does not investigate time as a matter of psychologi-
cal or empirica! fact subject to scientific calculation
and measurement, but rather directs a refiective EIDETIC
METHOD toward it. Because he does not view temporal-
ity as a simple phenomenon, Husserl offers no single
definition of time. In their complexity, his refiections
mirror the mosaic of problems, issues, and levels that
make up temporality as we experience it.
Temporal objects form the most obvious of these
levels. What concerns Husserl is not the specific con-
tent of the object- the fact that it is a train rushing
into a station, for example - but what characterizes
it as a temporal object. Temporal objects endure, and
some of them, such as melodies, display an interna!
succession of phases. They are concrete, individual,
unitary, changing or unchanging, and appear as simul-
taneous or in succession. They may be transcendent to
consciousness, as the train is, or immanent to it, as is
the act ofperceiving the train. Although not all objects
are temporal objects, even those that are not, such as
theorems in mathematics, presume time as the back-
ground against which their timeless character stands
out.
Temporal objects are experienced with these fea-
tures because one is aware of them as now, past, and
future. Now, past, and future are the specifically tem-
poral modes of appearance. They are not things, con-
tainers for things, or parts of the objects presented in
them. Nor are they points making up objective time.
They are rather the ways in which temporal objects
appear, analogous to the spatial perspectives in which
objects appear in SPACE. The past, for example, is no
more part of the temporal object than an aerial view
of a town is part of the town; both are simply ways in
which something appears.
Among the temporal modes, the now enjoys a priv-
ileged sta tus. It is the absolute point of orientation for
the life of consciousness: past and future are always
oriented toward it and constantly change in relation to
it. It is also the living source-point of new temporal
objects and new temporal positions. As the source of
temporal positions, it is a continuous moment of in-
dividuation. Something can become individuated only
by appearing ata particular point oftime, which it first
699
does in the mode of the now. Of course, what appears
as now will immediately sink into the past, but it will
remain identified with the temporal location at which
it first appeared. The now is also characterized by its
hospitality. Because it is not itself a thing or part of a
thing, it can play host to many temporal objects at once.
Indeed, simultaneity, understood as many objects ex-
isting at the same time, is originally "same nowness."
Despite its privileged status, the now does not exist
independently ofthe other temporal modes. It is never
without its horizon of past and fu ture, the larger whole
of temporal appearance formed by the modes in their
continuous mediation with one another. Now, past, and
future maintain their identities within this whole, how-
ever, neither dissolving into one another nor appearing
apart from one another. Husserl therefore avoids the
prejudice ofthe now, according to which one is imme-
diately aware only ofwhat is now. He also rejects the
opposing view that what is now escapes before one can
experience it as now. He insists that the now is indeed
experienced, but always with its horizon of past and
future, and always as fieeting.
That the temporal object is the object-in-its-
temporal-position appearing in ever-changing tempo-
ral modes explains Husserl 's observati an that time is
both fixed and fiowing. Time is fixed in the sense that
the object's temporal position remains the same as it
recedes into the past; the object, glued to its place, pre-
serves a rigid relationship to what carne before it and
what followed after it. Objective time is precisely this
sequence of temporal positions in which experienced
temporal objects find their fixed locations. Time fiows
in the sense that the object-in-position, as it runs offfor
consciousness, appears in continually different tempo-
ral modes in relation to the living now. Time as fixed is
measured by the objective relationships of before and
after; time as fiowing appears in the always shifting
modes ofnow, past, future. The fixed relationships are
experienced only in the changing modes.
Experienced time and temporal objects form one
of the dimensions of temporality that Husserl in-
vestigates. He also asks what the structure of time-
consciousness must be if it is to intend time. Husserl
first addressed this question primarily through the ex-
ample of perception. An act of PERCEPT!ON has phases,
only one of which will be actual at a given moment.
Ifthe perception is tobe aware of an object as tempo-
700 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
rai, the actual phase of the perception must intend the
object as now. But since the object is extended intime
and not simply now, the actual phase ofthe perception
must also "reach out beyond" the now, that is, intend
elapsed phases of the object and phases yet to come.
Each actual phase of a perception, therefore, refers in-
tentionally to an extended section of a temporal object
and not merely to its now-point.
But reaching out beyond the now, while necessary, is
not sufficient to account for time consciousness. If, for
example, one remained conscious of the just elapsed
notes of a melody in precisely the way in which one
is conscious of the present note - as now - one
would hear a crash of simultaneous sounds, not the
melody. The actual phase of consciousness must there-
fore intend elapsed phases ofthe object and phases yet
to come in a modified way, specifically, in appropri-
ate modes of past and future. Only then can one be
aware of the phases as elapsed or yet to come, and of
the object as extended in time. Ali of this is possible,
Husserl claims, because each phase of consciousness
possesses a triple intentionality: "prima! impression"
intends what is actually present as now; "retention"
or "primary memory" intends what has just elapsed as
past in varying degrees; and "protention" intends what
is yet to come as future. Prima! impression, retention,
and protention, although distinguishable, are not self-
sufficient acts. They are dependent moments of a phase
oftime-constituting consciousness, no more capable of
independent existence than now, past, and future, the
temporal modes of appearance correlated with them.
Husserl characterizes prima! impression as the ab-
solutely original consciousness, the prima! source for
ali consciousness and being. It is the wellspring ofthe
new on the side of intending consciousness, just as
its correlate, the now, is the mode of appearance of
the new on the si de of intended objects. Retention and
protention are also forms of original consciousness, for
it is in them that the senses ofpast and future first be-
come constituted. Retention is the original conscious-
ness of the past in severa! senses. It is the moment
of consciousness in which we initially become aware
of something as past. It is also original in the way in
which it gives the past. Retention or primary memory
"sees" the past, "presents" it, as opposed to ordinary
recollection or secondary memory, which gives the past
again, "re-presenting" rather than presenting it. More
precisely, retention is the direct and immediate con-
sciousness of what is just past as it slips away from
the now. It occurs "automatically" in the sense that it
is neither freely undertaken nor free to change what it
is aware of. Ordinary MEMORY, on the other hand, is a
self-sufficient act of consciousness that one can begin
or end at will. Rather than simply presenting the con-
tinuai flowing away of what is past, it re-presents the
whole experience again, as if it were running off for
consciousness anew. Furthermore, as RE-PRESENTATION
rather than original presentation, ordinary memory is
free to speed up the remembered event, lea ve out parts,
perhaps even tinkerwith their order-possibilities not
open to retention as the original consciousness of the
past.
Protention, the original consciousness ofwhat is to
come, presents its correlate in the mode of the fu ture,
but without the fulfillment that characterizes prima!
impression and retention. What is future is precisely
what has not yet made its appearance "in person" by
presenting itself in the mode of the now. Protention
is therefore the perpetua! and immediate openness to
more experience that marks conscious life. Whatever
content it has will conform to what one is presently
experiencing. If one is in the midst of listening to a
symphony by Mozart, the content of one's protentions
will be the continued hearing of just this symphony.
Thanks to protention, one would be surprised if the
music suddenly died or were interrupted by a scream.
Protention 's possession of some content or other does
not mean that it is equivalent to expectation. EXPECTA-
TION, in which one anticipates the fu ture as if one were
perceiving it, is a full and independent act, just like
secondary memory.
Around 191 O, Husserl carried his investigation to a
deeper level by introducing a final dimension of tempo-
ral awareness, "the absolute time-constituting flow of
consciousness." Husserl's earlier analyses had focused
on the way in which temporal objects, particularly per-
ceived objects, appear, and on the structure ofthe acts
that intend them. The latter are themselves temporal
objects- immanent rather than transcendent- and
one is aware of them as temporal. The absolute flow
accounts for the consciousness of such immanent uni-
ties as they run off in interna! time. This awareness, in
contrast to the thematizing consciousness one has of
a perceived or remembered object, is implicit or non-
 TIME
thetic. In Husserl 's technical language, one perceives
an event unfolding in the world, while one experiences
( erlebt) the temporally extended act that intends it. The
absolute flow is precisely the experiencing or consti-
tuting of such immanent temporal unities.
The metaphor of "flow" conveys the dynamic and
continuous character of this ultimate level of con-
sciousness. Phases ofthe flow ceaselessly well up and
pass away, dovetailing with one another without gaps
or breaks. One phase of this flux will be actual at any
moment, while others will ha ve elapsed or not yet oc-
curred. According to Husserl, the flow possesses a dou-
ble intentionality: it is conscious of itself in its flow-
ing and, through its self-awareness, also conscious of
immanent temporal objects. One may plausibly inter-
pret this dual intentionality as follows. The three inten-
tiona! moments of impression, retention, and proten-
tion, which Husserl originally introduced in connection
with perception, he now takes tobe the essential struc-
ture of each phase of the absolute flow. The moment
of prima! impression belonging to the actual phase of
the flow is the consciousness of the now-phase of the
immanent object. The retentional moment ofthe actual
phase directly intends, not the just elapsed phase ofthe
object, but the just elapsed phase of the jlow. Since
the latter originally intended a phase of the immanent
object as now through its prima! impression, by re-
taining the elapsed phase of the flow one also retains
the just elapsed phase of the object correlated with it.
This pattern of retention retaining elapsed phases of
the flow and thereby elapsed phases of the immanent
object repeats itself as far as retention extends.
In the other direction, protention is open to phases
of the flow yet to come and to immanent objects cor-
related with them. If the immanent object constituted
by the flow is an act directed toward a transcendent
temporal abject, then the awareness of the transcen-
dent abject becomes constituted as well. The flow's
two intentionalities are therefore inseparable aspects
of a single consciousness. They require one another
like two si des of one and the same thing, for the flow
intends immanent objects only by bringing itself to
appearance.
Husserl says that we lack appropriate names for the
absolute flow. Ordinary temporal predicates - now,
past, future- ha ve already been bestowed on the tem-
poral objects that the flow intends. To apply them to the
701
flow itself would risk con fus ing the flow with what it
constitutes. Husserl does say that the flow possesses a
"quasi-temporal" character insofar as it flows and has
an actual phase and post-actual and pre-actual phases.
As the universal and necessary condition of our tempo-
ral awareness, however, its temporality remains unique
and irreducible to that of its objects. It is important to
note that Husserl ca lis the flow "absolute" because it is
the founding level oftime-consciousness, not because
it is any kind of mystical or metaphysical absolute.
Furthermore, while it may be distinct from the imma-
nent objects it founds or constitutes, the flow is neither
separate nor separable from them in its existence and
self-appearance. It simply is the experiencing of tem-
poral unities in immanent time.
The conception of the absolute flow opens up in-
teresting possibilities for phenomenological reflection.
The flow's double intentionality, for example, enables
Husserl to account for the sense in which the succession
of consciousness is the consciousness of succession. It
is precisely because the succeeding phases of the ab-
solute flow are intentionally related to one another that
the flow itself can be experienced in its succession
of phases and temporal objects can be experienced in
their successive moments. The flow of consciousness,
far from rendering problematic the awareness oftem-
porally extended objects, makes it possible.
The absolute flow illuminates the hospitality of con-
sciousness as well. As sheer experiential conscious-
ness, the flow is not any particular act or content and
is therefore open to the myriad conscious experiences
that one lives through in the course of one's life. The
flow makes possible, for example, one's experiencing
of memory and perception and joy simultaneously as
well as in succession. But if the flow opens one up
to the multiplicity of experience, it also provides the
ground for the abiding unity and identity of one's con-
scious life in the face of that multiplicity. Particular
experiences come and go; the flow abides, supporting
the interplay of unity and multiplicity, of identity and
difference that marks the life of consciousness intime.
Finally, if the absolute flow is seen as the first stage
in the constitution of the transcendental EGO, then the
ego, at least in Husserl's conception of it, can hardly
be seen as a nontemporal monad sealed up in eterna!
self-presence: it is openness and transcendence at the
very point of its genesis, and its being is inseparable
 702 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
from temporality. This is a theme Husserl develops in
his !ater reflections, in the unpublished C manuscripts,
on what he calls the "living present."
Later figures in the phenomenological movement,
such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, share
certain fundamental positions with Husserl, even if
they are sometimes blind to the fact. They agree, for
example, that temporal awareness depends on the ca-
pacity to reach out beyond the now, that consciousness
or the human being gathers itself together into a total-
ity out of its temporal diaspora, and that the time one
experiences is not a sequence of isolated now-points,
but an ever-changing synthetic structure of now, past,
and future. These shared positions are developed in
different settings.
Husserl investigates temporality as a complex in-
stance of intentiona! consciousness. MARTIN HEIDEGGER
approaches it from the radically different perspective
of the meaning of Being. Specifically, he addresses
the question ofbeing by interpreting DASEIN, the being
whose Being is an issue for it, in terms of its tempo-
rality. Since Dasein is practica! human being-in-the-
world rather than the Husserlian transcendental con-
sciousness, Heidegger analyzes, not the consciousness
of temporal objectivity, but the everyday temporality
ofDasein as it pursues its projects in the world.
Heidegger distinguishes authentic or primordial
temporality from inauthentic temporality. Inauthentic
temporality - time as it is ordinarily understood -
-is conceived as an infinite sequence ofnow-points ar-
ranged in relations of before and after. "Past" refers
to points that are no longer actual, "future" to points
that are not yet actual. Inauthentic time presents it-
self as an autonomous system involving human reality
only as occurring in it factually or as something that
occasionally takes its measure through acts of mem-
ory, expectation, and perception. Authentic temporal-
ity, on the other hand, is identica! with the structure
of Dasein itself. Heidegger describes this temporality
as "ee-static," in the original etymological sense of
the term - that is, Dasein, in the process of "tem-
poralization," always "stands outside" or transcends
itself. Dasein is outside itself in its past as what it
has been; it is outside itself in the present by making-
present entities in the world; and it is outside itself
in the future that "comes toward" it. Past, present, and
fu ture, as "ec-stases" oftemporality, are neither succes-
si ve time-points nor temporal modes of appearance nor
the intentiona! correlates of memory, perception, and
expectation. They are Dasein's ways of being-in-the-
world. Among the ecstasies, the future enjoys priority.
The activities in which Dasein engages are not oriented
around the now, but around the ends toward which they
project. Dasein is always ahead ofitself; it is "futural."
Dasein's projecting into the future grounds authentic
past and present by making them the past and present
of the project in which Dasein is engaged. The tem-
poral ecstases therefore form a unity in Dasein, which
exists as futural being that makes things present in the
very process ofhaving been.
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's investigation of temporality
owes much to Heidegger, from whom he borrows the
notions of ee-static temporality and authentic and in-
authentic time, and to Husserl. He commends Husserl
for not resorting, in his published writings on time
consciousness, to the transcendental ego in order to ac-
count for the unity of consciousness. Husserl 's absolute
flow, by intending itself in its flowing, hand les the task.
Sartre nonetheless thinks that Husserl 's mature position
is thoroughly ego logica! and that consciousness-as-ego
precludes the reaching out beyond the now that is es-
sential to the awareness of time. Imprisoned by the
ego in the now, retention and protention- in Sartre 's
vi vid image- batter in vain against the windowpanes
ofthe present. That the absolute flow may be the orig-
inal moment of the Husserlian ego 's self-constitution
and that its windows are wide open to past and future
does not seem to have occurred to Sartre. His under-
standing of the temporal ec-stases is determined by
the division in his ontology between being-for-itself
and being-in-itself. The for-itself or consciousness is
defined as not being what it is conscious of, that is,
being-in-itself. Past, present, and future, as modes of
being ofthe for-itself, are therefore ways in which the
for-itself surpasses itself toward what it is not. The
past is the for-itselfbehind itself as what it was but no
Ion ger is; the future is the for-itselfbefore itself as what
it will be but is not; the present is the presence of the
for-itselfto what it is not. Sartre describes the for-itself
in its temporal structure as a flight- specifically, "a
flight outside of co-present being and from the being
that it was towards the being that it will be."
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY Jinks Heidegger's tempo-
ral ec-stases with the triple intentionality of Husserlian
 TRAN DUC THAO
time-consciousness. He focuses on the conscious sub-
ject rather than Dasein, but this is an embodied sub-
ject engaged in the world. Time is a dimension of the
subject's being and not an object ofknowledge consti-
tuted by an ego standing outside time. The subject is
time. To elucidate this claim, Merleau-Ponty draws on
Husserl's conception ofthe absolute fiow. The subject
is a network of intentionalities, at once manifesting
itself and the world in its temporality. Presence en-
joys a privilege in this process because it is there that
our ee-static temporalization is centered. In !ater texts
Merleau-Ponty expresses reservations about whether
Husserl adequately recognized the transcendence that
exists at the heart of presence. JACQUES DERRIDA, more
recently, would agree with these reservations, seeing
in Husserl a late representative of the "metaphysics of
presence." One might argue, however, that Husserl 's
phenomenology oftemporality is, in fact, a careful ex-
amination of absence, offering grounds for a defense
ofthe view that absence can finally be understood only
in terms of its intimate intentiona! relationship with
presence.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bemet, Rudolf. "Einleitung" [Introduction]. In Edmund
Husserl. Texte zur Phănomenologie des inneren Zeitbe-
wusstseins (1893-1917). Ed. Rudolf Bemet. Hamburg:
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985, xi-xvii.
Brand, Gerd. Welt, Ich und Zeit. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1955.
Brough, John B. "The Emergence of an Absolute Conscious-
ness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness."
Man and World 5 (1972), 298--326; rpt. in Husserl: Ex-
positions and Appraisals. Ed. Frederick A. Elliston and
Peter McCormick. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1977, 83-100.
- . "Husserl 's Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness." In
Husserl s Phenomenology: A Textbook. Ed. J. N. Mohanty
and William R. McKenna. Lanham, MD: Center for Ad-
vanced Research in Phenomenology/University Press of
America, 1989, 249--89.
Evans, J. Claude. "The Myth of the Absolute Conscious-
ness." In Crises of Continental Philosophy. Ed. Arleen
Dallery and Charles E. Scott, with P. Holley Roberts. Al-
bany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990, 35--
43.
Heidegger, Martin. Die Grundprobleme der Phi:inomenologie
[ 1927]. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Gesam-
tausgabe 24. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
1975; The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans.
Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1982.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 K luwer Academic Publishers.
703
Held, Klaus. Lebendige Gegenwart. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1966.
Husserl, Edmund. Zur Phănomenologie des inneren Zeitbe-
wusstseins (1893-1917). Ed. RudolfBoehm. Husserliana
10. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; On the Pheno-
menology ofthe Consciousness of Interna! Time (1893-
1917). Trans. John Bamett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991.
- . Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Ed. Margot Fleischer.
Husserliana 11. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Mclnemey, Peter K. Time and Experience. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1991.
Miller, Izchak. Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Aware-
ness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984.
Minkowski, Eugene. Le temps vecu: Etudes phenomenolo-
giques et psychopathologiques. Paris: J. L. L. D' Artey,
1933; Lived Time. Trans. Nancy Metzel. Evanston, IL:
Northwestem University Press, 1970.
Seebohm, Thomas. Die Bedingungen der Măglichkeit der
Tranzendental Philosophie. Bonn: Bouvier, 1962.
Sokolowski, Robert. Husserlian Meditations. Evanston, IL:
Northwestem University Press, 1974.
Wood, David. The Deconstruction of Time. Atlantic High-
lands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989.
JOHN B. BROUGH
Georgetown University
TRAN DUC THAO Thao was bom September
16, 1917, in Thai Binh, in what would !ater become
North Vietnam. He left for FRANCE in 1936 where he
pursued his philosophical studies. It was then and there
that he met JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, MAUR! CE MERLEAU-PONTY,
and JEAN CAVAILLES, who introduced him to the phi-
losophy of EDMUND HUSSERL. In 1941-42, under the
direction of Cavailles, Thao wrote his doctoral disser-
tation on the Husserlian method, and under the strong
infiuence of Merleau-Ponty, tumed from common in-
terpretations that made of Husserlian phenomenology
a doctrine of eterna! essences to a philosophy ofTIME,
ofhistorical subjectivity, and of universal HISTORY. For
as Husserl used to say, "atemporality is an omnitem-
porality, which is itselfbut a mode oftemporality."
It was then that lengthy dialogues took place be-
tween Sartre and Thao. These conversations were taken
down in shorthand with the aim of publishing them.
Thao gave his own version ofthem when he stated that
Sartre's invitation was for the purpose of proving that
EXISTENTIALISM couJd peacefully coexist with MARXISM
on the doctrina! plane. Sartre minimized the role of
Marxism insofar as he recognized its value solely in
704 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
terms ofpolitics and social history. The sphereofinfiu-
ence would be shared by both Marxism and existential-
ism, the former being competent with respect to social
problems. Thao tried to point out to Sartre that quite to
the contrary, Marxist philosophy was tobe taken seri-
ously since it grappled with the fundamental problem
of the relation of consciousness to matter. These dia-
logues with Sartre, along with the destruction of Ger-
man Fascism, necessitated a radical choice between
either existentialism or Marxism, Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty having already opted for the former. Owing to
his phenomenological orientation, Thao broke with ex-
istentialism, first with the publication ofhis article "La
phenomenologie de 1'esprit et son contenu reel" ( 1948)
and !ater with Phenomenologie et materialisme dialec-
tique ( 1951 ). Owing to this same orientation, the choice
of Marxism created for Tran Duc Thao a need to rid
the dual Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenologies of
their idealistic form and metaphysical elements in or-
der to salvage whatever else was left valid and place it
at the service of dialectica! materialism for a scientific
solution of the problem of subjectivity.
Tran Duc Thao's analysis of Husserlian phenomen-
ology - especially the !ater writings, Die Krisis der
europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phănomenologie (1936) and "Die Frage nach dem
Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches
Problem" ( 1939) - led him to a complete rejection
ofphenomenology altogether. The practica/ results of
Husserl 's analyses are incompatible with the theoreti-
cal framework in which they originated. MEANING that
originates at the pre-predicative level cannot be the
work of a transcendental ego who constitutes the mean-
ing ofthe world outside of space and time, but is, rather,
the work of a consciousness immersed in a histori-
cal becoming. Husserl's transcendental EGO turns out
to be the actual consciousness of each human being,
within their own actual experience. At this juncture,
Thao points out, Husserl falls into a total relativism:
"the merchant at the market has his own market truth."
Husserl 's theory of the constitution of the world with
the contemplation of eterna! essences turns out to be
a nihilism; therein consists the crisis of Western hu-
manity, which in turn gave birth to irrational humanity,
the existential human being whose claim is that the
only sense of life is the lack of any sense, or MARTIN
HEIDEGGER 's "being-toward-death."
The solution to the crisis of Western humanity and
others !ies for Thao in dialectica! materialism, thus the
second part of the book: "The dialectic of real move-
ment." What Thao stresses here is Husserl 's investi-
galion turned right side up, by ridding it of idealistic
formalism and thereby constructing a new rationality,
a stress on the concrete contents of experience. The
relationship between consciousness and its intentiona!
object is explicated by reference to the pre-predicative
level of conscious experience mediated by human la-
hor. "The notion of production takes into full account
the enigma of consciousness inasmuch as the object
that is worked on takes its meaning for man as a hu-
man product." The realizing of meaning is precisely
nothing but the symbolic transposition of the material
operations of production into a system of intentiona!
operations in which the subject appropriates the object
ideally, in reproducing it in his or her own conscious-
ness. "This is true reason for man, who, as being in
the world, constitutes the world in the intensity of his
lived experience." And the truth of any constitution
such as this is measured only by the actual power ofthe
mode ofproduction from which it takes its model. The
humanization of nature through labor is how Thao ac-
counts for how matters become life and, consequently,
assumes human value.
Tran Duc Thao !ater frankly admits that an interpre-
tation ofMarxism subject to the conditions of a person-
ality cult engulfed Phenomenologie et materialisme di-
alectique in a hopeless metaphysical juxtaposition of
phenomenological content to material content which
paved the way for the return of an idealistic dualism.
In his studies between 1960 and 1970, Thao found
that in order to avoid this danger, he had to minimize
phenomenology, without thereby overcoming the jux-
taposition. These essays form his second major work:
Recherches sur l 'origine du langage et de la conscience
(Investigations into the origin of language and con-
sciousness, 1973). His analyses are divided into three
parts: ( 1) the origin of consciousness by means of the
indicative gesture, (2) the birth of LANGUAGE and the
making of tools, and (3) Marxism and PSYCHOANALY-
srs. We will briefiy outline the first two investigations,
for they truly present Thao's original contribution to
the fields of anthropology, linguistics, and, of course,
philosophy.
Thao's investigation into the genesis of conscious-
 TRAN DUC THAO
ness finds it tobe due to the development oflanguage,
which, in turn, is generated by human activity in the
development of material conditions that precisely com-
prises human labor as social labor. The transition from
animal psychism to human consciousness is effected
by the prehominid. What distinguishes the prehominid
from the animal is the indicative sign, which consti-
tutes the original form of consciousness. The indica-
tive sign consists in pointing to a "relatively" distant
object and thus establishing a relationship between the
subject (prehominid) and an object that is externa! and
independent. The reader will recognize here Thao's
vers ion ofphenomenology's thesis ofthe INTENTIONAL-
ITY of consciousness, which states that consciousness
is always consciousness of an object. Animals are in-
capable of pointing or indicating anything whatsoever
as a distant or externa! object. At the prehominid stage,
however, indicative gestures - pointing to the game
to be chased - serve to coordinate group movement
in hunting expeditions. As yet the indicative gesture
remains a natural and unconscious gesture as it occurs
only in an immediate biologica! situation. This uncon-
scious gesture will become conscious when the mem-
bers of the hunting expedition will not only indicate
game to other members, but to themselves individu-
ally, which means that the material gesture advances
from a linear form (indicating the object to others) to
a circular one (signifying back to oneselfas a member
of the group ). The reciprocity of the indicati ve ges-
ture is thus essential not only for consciousness, but
more importantly, for self-consciousness. Humanity's
objective material relationship with the environment
entails a meaning experienced immediately, before it
emerges on the conscious level as language. Thus there
is a language ofreallife that develops for the material
conditions of sociallife. Language is not arbitrary; it is
a foundational moment of consciousness. Conscious-
ness is language, pre-thematic or subconscious at first
insofar as it is immersed in action, and thematic or fully
conscious when the lived experience of material con-
ditions is interrupted, providing thereby a pause- the
pause that is precisely what occasions consciousness
to take a look at or reftect upon that experience.
For Tran Duc Thao the origin of humanity, i.e.,
the moment when prehominid became hominid, co-
incides with the elaboration of the instrument into a
tool. The most intelligent of the higher apes, such as
705
chimpanzees, can only use their hands, and when they
manipulate objects they do so only to satisfy their iru-
mediate biologica! needs. Here Thao makes an enor-
mously vital distinction between the instrument and
the tool. The instrument as a separate or externa! ob-
ject tobe manipulated by the organism is never viewed
as separate or externa!. The animal works only under
the compulsion of a situation of biologica! need, and
thus can never abstract the moment of labor for the
satisfaction of a need to introduce a mediating element
between itself and the object of need. The object of
biologica! need always occupies a central position to
the animal's perceptual field. Hence it cannot go be-
yond the stage of immediate and direct manipulation,
since the total dynamic field does not allow for the
introduction of a second object, in other words, does
not allow for mediation, which is precisely what com-
prises thinking. With humans, however, the needed
object is transformed through the mediation ofthe tool
into an object of labor. Thus productive labor, which
marks the beginning of human activity, and the tran-
sition from nature to culture, becomes possible only
when prehominids have gone beyond simple pointing.
At this stage they are already capable of an idealizing
representation of the absent object to themselves, but
they can also create the ideal and typical form to be
actualized in the tool.
Hence the transition from the presentative indica-
tive sign of the absent this is the first form of reftec-
tion and the manifestation of that "liberation of the
brain" whereby humans transcend the limitations of
the present situation, which always imprisons the ani-
mal. After a certain dialectica! development, however,
it also permits them to escape reality and confine them-
selves to symbolic construction by denying the reality
of human life. Idealism is born from the transforma-
tion ofthese symbolic constructions into principles and
therefore the negation of objective reality. Thus ideal-
ism, according to Thao, must once aga in be turned right
side up.
When years !ater Tran Duc Thao carne to reftect
upon this investigation, he confessed to having become
stagnated on the pure formalism ofthe threefold com-
bination ofthe (here or absent) "this" (T) in the motion
(M) ofthe form (F). At the same time, the development
ofthese figures should have been able to account forthe
development of the various semiotic structures of lan-
706 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
guages as they originate in both humanity and the child.
But a purely mechanistic combination done almost en-
tirely within the horizon of dialectica! materialism was
expected to bridge the gap between the animal and the
human. Thus Thao concluded that he had confused two
entirely different semiotic formations - the gestures
of the prehominid and language properly so-called, or
verbal language which is specific to humans - in a
single confused representation of language. In short,
from the years 1960-70 to the early 1980s, Thao was
confusing the gestures ofthe prehominid with the lan-
guage of early humans so that, on the semiotic plane,
he was suppressing the essential difference between
the most evolved animal and the most primitive hu-
man by reducing the specificity ofhuman language to
the development of a simple combination of emotions
and gestural signs. This reduction, Thao admits, was
due to the mechanistic metaphysics, a metaphysics that
denies the dialectica! unity of human history, thereby
depriving humanity of its real meaning.
Thao confesses that the third investigation, "Marx-
ism and Psychoanalysis," was written primarily as
a concession to the times. The events of 1968 had
profoundly influenced inteliectual Communists who
naively thought that PSYCHOANALYSIS was promising
the world by shedding light upon the mystery of lan-
guage. It did not take long for Thao to realize that
psychoanalysis would be ofno help with regard to the
problem of sentence formation.
Mention has already been made that in his
Recherches sur l 'origine du langage et de la conscience
Tran Duc Thao had tried to correct Phimomenologie
et materialisme dialectique by minimizing or even
neglecting phenomenology in order to undertake an
entirely materialistic approach to the genesis of con-
sciousness, one rid ofphenomenological subjectivism.
This neglect, confesses Thao, was not so much a matter
of choice as a response to the dictates of the politica!
dogmatic deformation of Marxism engendered by the
"proletarian cultural revolution." Today, Thao could
rid himself of ali philosophical taboos by developing
a knowledge of humanity thereby restoring the dialec-
tica! unity of both theory and practice in a globalistic
comprehension of world history.
Tran Duc Thao retumed to France in September
1991, taking up residence in Paris in order to renew
his, by now, enthusiastic research with the aim of elab-
orating the project of the unification of science and
philosophy starting with the origins of consciousness
and its development with the historicity of the world.
Enriched now by the contributions of Husserlian stud-
ies ofhis third period, Thao began to write feverishly,
intuiting correctly that he had little time left in which
to author what would be his last book. It was not to
be completed, for Thao died tragicaliy as a result of an
accidental fali on April24, 1993. He was seventy six.
Tran Duc Thao and DANIEL HERMAN, his major En-
glish translator, became very active correspondents for
about a year before his sudden death. Herman was
translating his unpublished French manuscripts as soon
as he would receive them from Thao, who hoped that
his forthcoming book would somehow alieviate his
dire financial situation as weli as leave to posterity his
final philosophical testament. This testament now con-
sists ofthree essays with two appendices. One ofthese
essays with the appendices was published by Analecta
Husserliana in 1995.
The first essay "Pour une logique formelie et dialec-
tique," sets up dialectica! logic in stark opposition to
formal LOGIC that, at first impression, would lead one
to think that the former logic is very much in opposi-
tion to the customary way of thinking. Formal logic,
with the "three laws of thought" comprising its back-
bone, considers the present instant to be immobile, so
that movement would constitute a passage from one
immobile instant to the next, with the net result that
formal logic could not possibly be faithful to reality,
as movement would turn out tobe a succession ofjux-
taposed instants. Such a metaphysical conception of
things that thinks in terms of strong disjunctions -
eitherlor, yeslno- is a thought that thinks outside of
time, outside of the temporal flow. Against this false
metaphysics according to which something either ex-
ists or not, Heraclitus avers to the contrary, "everything
is and at the same time is not, for it flows." ·
This formal logic with its successive instants was
also refuted by HEGEL when he rejected the excluded
middle term. Formal logic says that something is ei-
ther A or "'A; there is no middle term, to which Hegel
replies that there is a third term in that very same the-
sis. A is itself that third term, for A can either A+ or
"'A. Thus A is itself the third term that o ne wants to ex-
el ude. The formula ofHeraclitus, taken up by Hegel-
"everything is and equally is not'' - was abbreviated
 TRAN DUC THAO
in such a way as to give rise to regrettable confusions,
for one was led to think that for dialectica! logic being
itself is not, which is contrary to common sense. Thus
both logics, opposed to each other as they were, had
to be synthesized, sin ce both did justice to reality and
common sense.
According to Thao, in "La dialectique comme dy-
namique de la temporalization," this task was left to
Husserl, and was accomplished by means of the tem-
poralization in the living present. Real time, according
to Husserl, is not clock time as Aristotle conceived
of it in his famous definition, "time is the measure of
motion, according to a before and an after," a defini-
tion that until Husserl had never been challenged. Thao
seems to forget Bergson here, since his famous distinc-
tion between clock time and real duration undoubtedly
influenced Husserl. Be that as it may, Aristotle's con-
ception of time makes the instant an immobile instant,
and motion is once again made incomprehensible, for
how can it be reconstructed given its immobility? For
Husserl, on the other hand, "the present that flows (i.e.,
the living present) is the present of the movement of
flowing, of having flowed, and of having yet to flow.
The now, the continuity of the past, and the living
horizon ofthe future outlined in protention occur con-
sciously 'at the same time' in an 'at the same time'
that flows." With phenomenological time, time is no
longer considered as a fourth dimension of space, says
Thao, and we are now able effectively to reconstruct
history as the measuring ofhumanity with its wealth of
real relations instead of as the abstraction of recipro-
ca! relations. Thus Thao applies the theory ofthe living
present in "La theorie du present vivant comme theorie
de l'individualite" as a theory that alone can account
for individuality in the sciences, especially biology.
Thao once again finds fault with Aristotle when he
maintained that "science concerns only the general,
existence concerns only the singular." For over two
thousand years this Aristotelian motto went unchal-
lenged, or a science of singular existence was never
fully considered, even though in its practica! applica-
tion science had to deal with that existence. Those very
dealings, however, only amounted to meeting points.
Science would never grasp existence in itself or the
singular individual as such with the individuality of
the existence being reduced as it was to an abstract
point. The living present, continues Thao, is first of ali
707
and essentially the concrete individuality of singular
existence constituting itself at each instant in the tem-
poralization or intrinsic movement ofthat very instant,
in its interval ofbecoming- the completion of which
is accomplished by itself in its passage to the following
instant.
The evidence of the interna! dialectic of the !iv-
ing present can be found in the analysis of biologica!
temporalization. Suffice it to say, in Thao's own words,
that "at each instant biologica! individuality surges as a
system offunctions inherited from the past, that which
has been sedimented in its past and yet remains actu-
ally present in retention which blends with the actual
now, which provoked tension in the metabolism ofthe
functioning ofthese functions, or inprotention into the
imminent future."
It is sincerely hoped that Tran Duc Thao, emi-
nent Marxist and phenomenologist, will finally tind
his rightful place in the global history of meaning.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Caveing, Maurice. "Review of Tran Duc Thao, Recherches
sur 1'origine du langage et de la conscience." Raison
Presente 3 (1974), 118-24.
Lyotard, Jean Fran~;ois. La phenomenologie. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1992.
Ricceur, Paul. "Phenomenology." Trans. Daniel J. Herman
and D. V. Morano. Southwestern Journa/ of Phi/osophy
(1974), 149--68.
Rousset, B. "Tran duc Thao." Dictionnaire des philosophes.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984, 2528-30.
Thao, Tran Duc. "Marxisme et phenomenologie." Revue In-
ternationale (1946).
- . "La phenomenologie de 1'esprit et son contenu reel." Les
temps modernes 3 ( 1948).
- . Triet iy dă di den dău? (What is the state ofphilosophy?).
Minh Tan, 1950.
- . Phenomeno/ogie et materia/isme dialectique. Minh
Tan, 1951; rpt. New York: Gordon & Breach, 1971;
Fenomenologia e materialismo dialettico. Trans. R.
Tomassini. Milan: Lampugnani Nigri, 1970; Phenomen-
ology and Dialectica/ Materialism. Trans. Daniel J. Her-
man and D. V. Morano. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986.
- . "Le noyau rationel dans la dialectique hegelienne." La
Pensee 19 ( 1965).
-."Le movement de l'indication comme forme originaire
de la conscience." La Pensee 128 ( 1966).
-."Du geste de !'index a l'image typique." La Pensee 147-
49 (1969-70).
- . Recherches sur 1'origine du langage et de la conscience.
Paris: Editions Sociales, 1973; Investigations into the Ori-
gin ofLanguage and Consciousness. Trans. Daniel J. Her-
man and R. L. Armstrong. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984.
708 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
~. "La naissance du premier homme." La Pensee 254
(1986).
~. Laformation de l'homme (1986]. Unpublished.
~."La double phenomenologie Hegelienne et Husserlienne"
[1992]. Unpublished in French; "The Dual Hegelian and
Husserlian Phenomenologies." In Analecta Husserliana
46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, 160--
3.
~. "La dialectique de la societe primitive." Unpublished in
French; "The Dialectic of Ancient Society." In Analecta
Husserliana 46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1995, 163--6.
~. "Pour une logique formelle et dialectique" [1993]. Un-
published.
~. "La dialectique logique comme dialectique generale de
la temporalisation." Unpublished in French; "Dialect-
cal Logic as the General Logic of Temporalization." In
Analecta Husserliana 46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1995, 155--9.
~. "La theorie du present vivant comme theorie de
l 'individualite" [ 1993]. Unpublished.
DANIEL J. HERMAN
University of West Florida
TRUTH In the Logische Untersuchungen
( 1900-1901) EDMUND HUSSERL gives an account oftruth
that in ali its variants is based on EVIDENCE. He does
not share the traditional view thatjudgment is the only
place of truth. Even simple objects - e.g., sensuous
objects- can be intuitively (evidently) given and in
this sense be "true." Nor can Husserl 's concept oftruth
be reduced to the traditional idea of a correspondence
or adequatio between thought and object, despite his
use on severa! occasions ofthe term "correspondence."
Transcendental philosophy inquires after the mode
and the conditions of possibility in which an object
and beliefs are constituted in consciousness. We be-
lieve that objects exist and that they ha ve certain qual-
ities. But in the transcendental perspective we cannot
presuppose the existence of real objects that are pre-
given independently of our consciousness ofthem and
to which our consciousness has only to adjust. (We
tind this notion objected to already in KANT's Kritik
der reinen Vernunft.) In the Logische Untersuchun-
gen Husserl avoids the model of a correspondence of
thought and object. Rather, he searches for the condi-
tions of possibility of the correspondence among dif-
ferent subjective acts that refer to the same object.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
He recognizes the correspondence ofmy judging with
the judging of others as weli as the coherence of my
own intendings in their referring to the same object
as conditions of objectivity and objective truth. Both
are founded on the possibility of having intuitions of
objects and state of affairs. The idea of objectivity
implies that the intended object is valid at ali times
and for everyone, and is thus communicable. We ha ve
to make clear how it is possible to express states of
affairs in an appropriate form of communication and
conversely, how by understanding this expression, we
can relate it back to an act, possibly even an intuitive
one. This means that everyone (including myself) can
actualize the very same meaning, whether emptily in-
tended or intuitively given. Objectivity and objective
truth are founded on the possibility ofhaving identica!
MEANING.
Truth for Husserl is connected with evidence, i.e.,
where objects and states ofaffairs are given intuitively
as they themselves are oras given in person. Evidence
always has degrees and levels. The levels of evidence
are connected to the modes of apprehension. The low-
est degree of evidence is formed by signitive ( or sym-
bolic) acts. Signitive acts intend their object by asso-
ciation, i.e., by using a sign. Pictorial acts represent
their objects by means of an image, i.e., analogically.
Among pictorial acts there are differences of intuitive-
ness, depending on the number of details represented
and the degree of similarity. The maximum intuitive-
ness in pictorial acts is achieved by the representa-
tion of ali individual elements in the greatest possible
similarity to what is intended. Intuitive acts, however,
present the object itself, even if only by perspectiva!
adumbrations, e.g., in the intuition of real things. The
ideal aim ofthis gradualiy increasing fulfillment of an
intuitive intention is termed adequate evidence. In ad-
equate evidence every perspective of an object would
be presented at once in the most intuitive way.
Evidence is not a feeling that guarantees beyond
doubt the truth of a judgment. Evidence is not a cri-
terion of an absolute and unchangeable truth. Husserl
characterizes evidence as the experience of truth, i.e.,
as an intentiona! act in which the intended object is
presented intuitively, though in different degrees of
fulfiliment. Evidence always has degrees. The possi-
bility of increasing the degree of evidence sometimes
(though not in every case) leads to the ideal aim ofad-
 TRUTH
equate evidence in which the object is given just as it
is intended. In adequate evidence each partial intention
is perfectly fulfilled.
Husserl 's first concept of truth (T 1) is grounded in
the concept of adequate evidence. In §39 of the sixth
ofthe Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl characterizes
subjective (noetic) truth as an act in which there is a
perfect coincidence ofthe intended and the intuitively
given. TI can be described objectively (noematicalty)
as the objective correlate of this act of adequate evi-
dence. Truth is the objective correlate ofan act that both
identifies the object and at the same time intuitively and
completely fulfills its intention. Thus Husserl can speak
oftruth as an identity. In adequate evidence we experi-
ence the complete coincidence ofthe emptily intended
and the intuitively given.
Sensuous perception of real objects is never com-
pletely adequate. Objects in time and space always
have a non-visible side and change through time.
Propositions conceming the real world can only be
valid presumptively. They are valid only until they
are "invatidated" by new experience. In contrast, the
achievement in adequation of an unchangeable "truth
in itself' (established once and for alt) is an ideal that
can only be realized in LOGIC and MATHEMATICS. Husserl
uses the concept of a "truth in itself," derived from
Bolzano, in his search in the Logische Untersuchungen
for a foundation of pure logic. Later on he recognized
that his concept was to close to Leibniz's verites de
raison.
But every truth, even that which presents itself as
valid "in itself," has to legitimate itself in acts of our
consciousness and, from a transcendental perspective,
it thus contains an unavoidable relation to its consti-
tution in subjective acts. In the use of adequate evi-
dence as the foundation of his concept of truth there
!ies hidden (at least in the Logische Untersuchun-
gen) another presupposition: I cannot doubt adequate
evidence. Adequacy impties apodicticity. In the first
book of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie ( 1913) Husserl
loosens this connection by pointing out that evidence
is bound up with a concordant and continuous synthe-
sis. Thus even evidence presumed to be adequate can
be disappointed in further experience. Adequate evi-
dence is no longer presupposed as an achievable aim.
Now adequation is characterized as a regulative idea
709
in Kant's sense. In his !ater work Husserl recognizes
that even apodictic evidence can be disappointed, but
only by means of another apodictic evidence. Truth re-
mains the correlate of originary evidence, which is the
"source of alt justification." In Cartesianische Med-
itationen [ 1931] Husserl points out that there can be
apodictic evidences of objects, e.g., the ego cogito, that
are not adequately given.
In §39 of the Sixth Investigation, Husserl presents
three supplementary concepts oftruth. They appear to
point back to the first concept oftruth (TI) and expli-
cate individual aspects of the coincidence of intention
and intuition by reformulating them in the form of sep-
arate concepts oftruth.
While TI is directed to the provisional empirica!
experience of evidence, the fult concept of truth goes
beyond the experience of an individual act. The objec-
tivity of truth implies validity for everyone and at alt
times. The second concept of truth (T2) is character-
ized as the relation of complete fulfiltment on the level
of eidetic laws, i.e., as an idea. The ideal relationship
of total coincidence of an intending act with a fulfilt-
ing act is taken as the idea of absolute adequacy. Its
correlate is the idea of truth.
The third concept oftruth (T3) is oriented to the ful-
filting, intuitive act and is characterized as the evidence
ofthe intuitively given object. The given object is ex-
perienced as the fulfilting or "truth-making" object of
an intention. Even in the Logische Untersuchungen this
concept (T3) maintains priority in regard to the other
concepts oftruth. As a designation ofthe truth-making
intuition it sustains TI and thus also its ideatized ver-
sion T2. Hen ce as the truth-making evidence, T3 has to
be the foundation of every traditional concept of truth
as "coincidence." In Ideen !Husserl mentions only T3,
although with the qualification that adequate evidence
is only a regulati ve idea. In Formale und transzenden-
tale Logik ( 1929) he mentions that T3 is "in itself' the
first concept of truth.
Thefourth concept oftruth (T4) is characterized as
correctness of judging. The judgment (and its expres-
sion in language) has to adjust itself with re gard to
the intuitively given object. The proposition "corrects"
itself with respect to the intuitive state of affairs. In
Formale und transzendentale Logik Husserl points out
that T4 is the concept of critically justified truth which
is the aim of science.
710 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
In the Logische Untersuchungen, the contrary con-
cept of falsehood is presented (analogously with the
concept of truth) as a negative ideal of ultimate dis-
appointment. In the case of falsehood, disappointment
and conflict do not simply indicate the mere lack of ev-
idence, but rather rest on the intuition of a conflicting
intention. Thus falsehood is dependent on the intuition
of an opposed state ofaffairs. The first conviction is an-
nulled by the intuition ofthe opposite case. The priority
of T3 manifests itself in the fact that truth and false-
hood can only be grounded in evidence. Thus truth in
the sense of T3 can ha ve no counterconcept of false-
hood. The mere lack of evidence is not an evidence for
the opposite fact. T3 is the foundation ofpropositional
truth because it allows a correspondence (in the sense
of T4) of the proposition with the intuitively given
state of affairs (in the sense of T3). Thus the compli-
cated problem of propositional truth can only become
intelligible when the process of categoria! intuition is
elucidated.
Each of the concepts T2-T4 thematizes a certain
aspect of T 1: T2 characterizes the idea of truth, while
T3 refers to the basic concept of fulfilling evidence.
And in T4 we see that T3 is the primary starting point
ofHusserl's theory of evidence and truth. The concept
T4 stresses that the intention has to adjust itselfto the
intuitively given object. As the proposition "corrects"
itself it "moves" el o ser to the intuitive state of affairs.
When we tie truth and especially propositional truth
to evidence, we need to extend the concept ofintuition.
Not only can there be intuition of real concrete sensu-
ous objects, there can also be intuition of states of af-
fairs. Husserl ca lis the latter categoria! intuition. Propo-
sitional truth is grounded in the intuition of a state of
affairs. But we should not forget that intuitively given
sensuous objects can be "true" in the sense offulfilling
evidence.
In his !ater work Husserl examines the foundation
and the sense ofthe modern sciences. They understand
the concept of truth as correctness (T4) as a critica!
approximation to "the" truth. Formal logic (with the
logica! principle ofthe excluded middle) and the exact
sciences understand truth and falsehood as a quality
that belongs to the ideal judgment once and for ali.
In this idealized view every proposition is "in itself'
true or false. Husserl inquires after the justification
ofthese idealized principles in his genetic phenomen-
ology by tracing their evidence back to the originary
evidence of individual objects. In this respect logic
needs a theory of experience. Husserl carries out this
recourse to the experience of individual objects as the
substrate of the most basic type of evidence in Er-
fahrung und Urteil (1939). In this work his interest is
the realm of pre-predicative experience and its trans-
formation in predicative judgment. He is searching in
the realm of pre-predicative experience for the origin
ofthe basic logica! categories that are given in nucleo
in pre-predicative experience and that are transformed
into their complete form in predicative activity. Thus
we find a renewed interest in the problem of the ful-
fillment of categoria! intuition from the perspective of
GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY.
From the point of view of a sense-critique of sci-
ence, the problem of the justification of idealizations
leads to an extension of the phenomenology to the
realm ofuFEWORLD. The idealizations (the principle of
the excluded middle, the idea of an unextended center
ofgravity) in the context oflogic and the exact sciences
are self-evident presuppositions. If we are aiming at a
critique of idealizations we must leave the judgments
of experience in full concreteness, and therefore we
have to investigate them outside of the scientific con-
text in the prescientific lifeworld. Methodologically, it
is reasonable that an idealization can only be justified in
a realm in which it is not valid in a self-evident way. In
the lifeworld there are only truths that are subjectively
and historically relative to the situation. How is it pos-
sible against this background to show the justification
ofthe idealized exact scientific truth? We cannot claim
that the lifeworld in which we live every day is presci-
entific. The insights of the idealizing modern sciences
are constantly "flowing into" our concrete Iifeworld.
In Die Krisis der europăischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phănomenologie ( 1936) Husserl uses
the EIDETIC METHOD to find the nonrelative structures
that remain the same in every concrete surrounding
world. These nonrelative structures he will call "the"
lifeworld and he believes them to be an appropriate
justification for scientific idealities.
In his existential ontology, MARTIN HEIDEGGER
searches in a completely different way for an origi-
nary dimension of truth that can be the basis for an
understanding of propositional truth and the traditional
concept of truth as correspondence. He criticizes the
 TRUTH
traditional concept of adaequatio intellectus et rei. He
asks for the sense ofthe correspondence, which seems
to him to be very general and empty. In which sense
do thought and abject correspond (Sein und Zei!, §44
[ 1927])? Intellectus cannot refer to the judgment as
a real event but only to the ideal contents of judg-
ment. Yet how can we conceive of truth as a relation
between the ideal contents of a proposition and the
real abject ontologically? For Heidegger the attempt
to clarify truth as correspondence is misleading. The
positing of the members of the relation of correspon-
dence in two different regions of being does not suit
the problem.
Heidegger's way of understanding the originary
phenomenon oftruth is to "make clear the mode ofbe-
ing ofthe cognition itself." His starting point is apropo-
sition that is not based on intuition. Someone says with
his or her back to the wall: this picture hangs askew.
The proposition embodies the claim to ha ve discovered
the picture (as a being) in the "how" (the mode) ofits
being. The proposition displays this "how" of being
in LANGUAGE. In the attempt to verify the proposition
by sensuous experience, the recognition, according to
Heidegger, is directed only to the intended being (the
picture) and not to the proposition. It is directed to the
being itself (which is to be verified by perception) in
its mode of uncoveredness (Entdeckt-heit), i.e., in its
showing-itself. Confirmation (Bewahrung) means this
showing-itself of the being in the same way in which
it is intended in the proposition.
A true proposition shows the being in its mode of
uncoveredness. The phenomenon of "originary truth"
does not have the character of correspondence. It is
the ground of the concept of truth in the sense of cor-
respondence and propositional truth. By unfolding the
meaning of aletheia Heidegger shows us a more orig-
inary sense of truth as unconcealment ( Unverborgen-
heit). He wants to show that this concept coincides
with the first and originary concept of truth in Greek
thinking. In this primary sense only the discovering hu-
man DASEIN can be "true" while it is Being-discovering
(Entdeckend-Sein). On the other hand, beings (Seien-
des) that we can find in the world can only "be" in a
secondary mode, i.e., as being-discovered (Entdeckt-
sein). They can only make a claim to uncoveredness.
Their fundament is the Being-discovering of the hu-
man Dasein. The being-true of a discovered being is
711
only possible as being discovered by human Dasein as
being-in-the-world.
The authentic Being of Dasein, the being-in-the-
truth, presupposes disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of
the world in states-of-mind (Befindlichkeiten), under-
standing, and discourse, i.e., the constitution ofthe be-
ing (Seinsverfassung) of human Dasein as thrownness
(Geworfenheit) and project (Entwurf). The mode ofbe-
ing ofDasein is characterized equiprimordially (gleich-
urspriinglich) by the possibility of both authenticity
(being-in-the-truth) and the deficient mode (Verfalls-
form) ofinauthenticity. In the mode ofthe "they" (das
Man ), of obstruction ( Verstelltheit), of gossip ( Gerede ),
Dasein is in untruth. Thus the being-in-the-world of
human Dasein is determined at the same time by truth
and untruth. We must always fight anew for the truth
of Dasein (Being-discovering). Following Heidegger,
the negative expression "a-letheia" expresses the fact
that hiding itself is a main characteristic of Being. In
the hiding-itself of Being, human Dasein is hidden for
itself in the mode ofuntruth.
Heidegger wants to make evident how the transi-
tion from the originary concept of truth as aletheia to
"correspondence" came about. He wants to make clear
that correspondence is only a derived form oftruth: in
a proposition Being should be displayed in the mode
of its uncoveredness. In the inauthentic forms of mere
reproducing and hearsay, the proposition becomes it-
self something ready-to-hand (Zuhandenes). Thus we
have to engage in the demonstration of the uncov-
eredness that is preserved in the proposition. In this
way the relation between proposition and discovered
being then itself becomes something present-at-hand
(Vorhandenes) and can be understood as a correspon-
dence of proposition and being (intellectus and res).
The fact that we are used to disregarding the originary
dimension of truth is an aspect of our forgetfulness of
Being (Seinsvergessenheit).
The originary dimension of truth in human Dasein
"is given" (gibt es) only as long as there is Dasein. Ali
truth is relative to the being of Dasein. Thus the claim
that there could be "eterna! truth" seems to Heidegger
to be "fantastic." Against the background of this rela-
tivity of truth to the being of Dasein, Heidegger asks
anew: why must we presuppose that truth "is given"?
His answer is that the possibility oftruth (authenticity)
and untruth (inauthenticity) belongs to the facticity of
712 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
human Dasein. From the point of view of existential
ontology, the being of human Dasein (its disclosed-
ness) and truth are synonyms.
Heidegger's "Kehre" in his !ater philosophy- e.g.,
in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" ( 1929) and "Vom Wesen
der Wahrheit" ( 1930)- includes a modified approach
to the problem oftruth. In the Kehre Heidegger defini-
tively lays asi de the idea of a final foundation (oftruth)
in subjectivity. He determines the essence of truth as
"freedom," i.e., as "Freisein zum Offenbaren eines Of-
fenen" or, otherwise put, as "Seinlassen des Seienden."
In opposition to Sein und Zeit, where he understands
freedom as a project from out of the situation into
which Dasein is thrown, freedom is now characterized
as the revealing (Entbergung) of Being. This event
(Geschehen) occurs (ereignet sich) in human Dasein,
but it is hubris (Vermessenheit) if humans take them-
selves as the measure of ali beings. Ek-sistent, reveal-
ing Dasein owns humankind, so that the appropriate
attitude towards the originary truth of Being (as such
in totality) is no longer a decisive project, but rather
releasement ( Gelassenheit).
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Dupre, Louis. "The Concept of Truth in Husserl's Logica!
lnvestigations." Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 24 (1964), 345--54.
Farber, Marvin. "Heidegger on the Essence ofTruth." Philos-
ophy and Phenomenological Research 18 ( 1958), 523-32.
Heuer, Jung-Sun. Die Struktur der Wahrheitserlehnisse und
die Wahrheitsauffasuungen in Edmund HusserL~ "Logis-
chen Untersuchungen." Amersbek: Verlag an den Lott-
beck, 1989.
Oleson, Soren Gosvig. "La verite dans les 'Recherches
logique' d'Edmund Husserl." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
49 ( 1987), 452-65.
Pietersma, Henry. "Truth and the Evident." In Husserl s
Phenomenology: A Textbook. Ed. J. N. Mohanty and
William R. McKenna. Lanham, MD: Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology/University Press of America,
1989,213--47.
Tugendhat, Ernst. Der Wahrheitshegriffbei Husserl und Hei-
degger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970.
Waelhens, Alphonse de. Phenomenologie et verite: Essais
sur l 'evolution de l 'idee de veri te chez Husserl et Heideg-
ger. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953.
DIETER LOHMAR
Husserl-Archiv, Universităt zu Kăln

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Interest in phenomenology existed in RUSSIA as far
back as the beginning of the 20th century, yet direct
inheritance and continuation was precluded. The of-
ficial ruling ideology in the USSR (1922-1991) was
MARXISM and developments independent of Marxism
were impossible. However, with the weakening of the
totalitarian system, the 1960s witnessed the beginning
ofthe study ofphenomenology. The studies ofpheno-
menology in the USSR will be shown by naming the
authors and works discussing phenomenology under
the rubric ofthe critique of modern bourgeois philoso-
phy and by naming the outstanding phi1osophers who
have thought in the phenomenological way.
The Georgian phi1osopher KOTE BAKRADZE was the
first to bring up phenomenology in the 1960s. He had
heard EDMUND HUSSERL 's lectures at Gi:ittingen during
1922-25 and had written books about HEGEL 's method
and system, existentialism, pragmatism, and logic. He
published Psichologizm i chistaya logika (Gusserl)
(Psychologism and pure logic [Husserl]) in Ocherki po
istorii noveischei i sovremennoi Burzhuaznoi Filosofii
(Outlines of the new history of contemporary bourgeois
phi1osophy, 1960, republished in Izbranniefilosofskie
trudi. Tom. 3 [Selected philosophical works, Voi. 3,
1973]).
Bakradze analysed Husserl 's Logische Unter-
suchungen ( 1900--1901) and fully agreed with the ar-
guments against psychologism, but claimed that while
fighting against psychologizing TRUTH, Husserl goes
to the other extreme and ontologizes truth and sepa-
rates it from the process of cognition. He criticized
Husserl from the materialist standpoint at the end of
the 1920s when he, like the other outstanding Geor-
gian philosophers SHALBA NUTSUBIDZE, SERGI DANELIA,
and DMITREY UZNADZE, accepted Marxism. Truth can
be an adequate reflection of the objective state of af-
fairs (Sachverhalt) in consciousness and does not de-
pend on the structures of consciousness. That is why
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bakradze discarded Husserl 's theory of intuition and
replaced the relation of epistemological evidence with
the Marxian concept of practice. The principles of tran-
scendental phenomenology and egological solipsism,
according to Bakradze, are inherent in the standpoint of
the Untersuchungen. It is also not explained there what
phenomenology as descriptive psychology is, what the
relations among meaning and the object, truth, and ev-
idence are, and how intention is realized. Thus pheno-
menology cannot be developed as a unitary trend.
Bakradze's disciple ZURAB KAKABADZE, continued
the study of phenomenology in Georgia with Prob-
lema ekzistentsialnovo krizitsa i transtsendentalnaya
fenomenologiya Edmunda Gusserla (The problem
of existential crises and the transcendental pheno-
menology of Edmund Husserl, 1966). The influence
of phenomenologica1 thinking is manifested also in
his Chelovek kak filosofskaiya problema (The Hu-
man as philosopohical problem, 1970), Khelovneba,
pilosopia da sitzotzkhle (Art, philosophy, and life,
1979), Fenomen iskusstva (Art phenomenon, 1980),
and Problema chelovecheskovo bytiya (The problem
ofthe human being, 1985). Husserl 's maxim: "Back to
the matters themselves" was concretized in the Kak-
abadzean maxim "back to man himself." He criticized
Husserl for his underestimation of genuine subjectiv-
ity and wrote that transcendental subjectivity turned
out to be "ideal" a la objective idealism. The subject
is thus "objectified," and loses its "self," individual-
ity, and freedom. The superior mode of being is for
Kakabadze the being ofthe subject, a personality. The
human being experiences his or her ethical duty in a
universally valid tendency of being and in a deep de-
sire for the subject 's inner cal! ing. Human freedom and
creativity can be regarded as the highest stage of the
general tendencies ofbeing.
Kakabadze 's thesis of the free and creative person-
ality corresponded to the spiritual demands ofthe post-
Stalinist time. Nevertheless, he was strongly criticized
for abstract humanism and for negating the Marxist
view of social and class values. His humanistic philos-
ophy had a great influence on the younger generation
ofphilosophers in Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine, Moscow,
and Leningrad. His last works were devoted to harmo-
nious relationships between human beings and nature.
The defence of human being means "going back to
nature itself." The roots ofthe ECOLOGICAL crisis lie in
713
714 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
taking nature for an inert object that serves human will.
Humankind and nature must be understood as perme-
ated by the common universal tendencies ofbeing.
The Georgian phiJosopher A.T. BOCORISHVILI aJso
turned to phenomenology. In Problema nachala poz-
naniya v B. Rassela i E. Gusserlya (The problem
of the origins of knowledge in B. Russell and E.
Husserl, 1969), V. ARCHIL BEGIASHVILI compared posi-
tions on the process of cognition. GIVI MARGVELASHVILI
reflected on the relationships of phenomenology with
EXISTENTIALISM and LITERATURE in Syuhetnoe vremya
i vremya exzistentsii (Time of the plot and the time
of existence, 1976). His Aksiologicheskoe znachenie
razlichiya mezhdu ekzistentsialnim i kategorialnim v
Haidegerovskom ontologicheskom uchenii (The axio-
logica! meaning of the difference between the exis-
tential and the categorica! in Heidegger's ontology,
1979) shows axiologica! aspects in Heidegger's phi-
losophy. GEORGI TSINTSADZE contrasted existentialism
(MARTIN HEIDEGGER and KARL JASPERS) with the concep-
tion of personality as existing only within the dialogue
of I and Thou. These views are summarized in his
Metod ponimaniya v filosofii i problema lichnosti (The
method of understanding in philosophy and the prob-
lem ofthe person, 1975) andPirovneba, dro, gantzkoba
(Human being, personality, and time, 1982). In Geor-
gia GEORGI SHUSHANASHVILI a1so worked in phenomen-
oJogicaJ ethics.
In the mid-J960s in Moscow, NELU MOTROSHILOVA
became the leading specialist in phenomenology. In
Printsipi i protivorechiya fenomenologicheskoi filosofii
(Principles and contradictions in phenomenological
philosophy, 1968) she described the principal concepts
ofHusserl's phenomenology and paved the way for an
officially acknow1edged interest in phenomenology in
the USSR. Motroshilova had many disciples, both in
Moscow and in the republics of the union, who stud-
ied phenomenology under the rubric of the critique of
bourgeois philosophy. She has published articles on the
way ofphenomenology from an idea to a strict science,
Husserl and ROMAN INGARDEN, the understanding ofthe
history of philosophy in Husserl, phenomenological
method, the Logische Untersuchungen, and other top-
ics. She also specialized in the Western philosophy of
17th and 18th centuries and Hegel.
Articles on phenomenology in Soviet enyclopedias
and dictionaries in the 1970s and 1980s were written
by ALEXANDR OGURTSOV. His articJe on phenomenoJogy
in the Bolshaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Great So-
viet encyclopedia, Voi. 27, 1972) mentions not only
the shortcomings of phenomenology from the Marx-
ist point of view - i.e., subjectivism, disconnected-
ness from the methodology of the natural sciences,
and scholasticism- but also the positive features: the
critique of scientism, positivism, and NATURALISM; the
understanding of the crisis of Western cu! ture; and a
thorough analysis of consciousness. In the entry on
"Phenomeno1ogy" in the five-volume Filosofoskaya
entsiklopediya (Philosophical encyclopedia, 1960--70),
he emphasized the evolution of Husserl 's idea of a
descriptive, transcendental, and absolute phenomen-
ology, meaning the !ater Husserl 's turning toward abso-
lute experience as a universal field for a different kind
of practice, and offered not a single critica! remark
about phenomenology, which proves that the official
attitude in late 1960s was rather liberal. Nevertheless,
nota single monograph devoted specifically to pheno-
menology was published in the 1970s, although dis-
sertations were written on the subject and articles were
pub1ished injournals and collective works. Phenomen-
ology was also described in textbooks, which showed
again that the official ideology had acknowledged the
necessity of assessing phenomenology from the Marx-
ist point ofview.
The collection by Moscow professors called
Sovremennaya burzhuaznaya filoso_fiya (Contempo-
rary bourgeois philosophy, 1972) was the first serious
textbook for students of contemporary Western philos-
ophy in the USSR. The author ofthe article on pheno-
menology was Nelli Motroshilova. PIAMA GAIDENKO
and ALEXI BOGOMOLOV acquainted the readers with ex-
istentialism and regarded phenomenology as a forerun-
ner of existentia1ism. The relationship of phenomen-
ology with existentialism and the problem ofthe sub-
ject was a1so pointed out by TAMARA KUZMINA. Husserl 's
teaching is shown as superrationalism ( Uberrationa-
lismus) by MIHAIL KISSEL in Sudba staroi dilemmi (The
Fate of old dilemmas, 1974). Kissel studied the influ-
ence of phenomenoJogy on FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY,
and investigated the relationship between Husserl 's and
HEGEL's philosophies. LEONID IONIN focused on pheno-
menological SOCIOLOGY in his Ponimayuschchaya sot-
siologiya (Sociology of understanding, 1979). This
work gives an account of understanding in the social
 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
sciences of WILHELM DILTHEY, Husserl, ALFRED SCHUTZ,
Harold Garfinkel, Karl Popper, Kari-Otto Apel, Jurgen
Habermas, and Peter Winch.
The Riga Group ofPhenomenologists was founded
in the early 1980s. Nelli Motroshilova was its initiator
and unremitting supporter. In Celsh saprashanas labir-
intos (The path in the haze of understanding, 1989),
MAIJA KOLE wrote about understanding and cognition,
LANGUAGE, HISTORY, and COMMUNICATION in HERMENEU-
TICS. Furthermore, she clarified the differences and
similarities between phenomenology and hermeneu-
tics, and the problem of the genesis of sense. MARA
RUBENE has published articles on time in phenomen-
ology; ELLA BUCENIECE investigates teleology and the
problem ofthe LIFEWORLD; RICHARD KULIS is developing
a cultural phenomenology; ANDRIS RUBENIS busies him-
self with phenomenological axiology and ETHICS and
has published Fenomenologija (1983); JURIS ROZEN-
VALDS works on the Munchen-Gottingen school and
the Latvian philosopher Theodor Celms (1893-1988),
who is a critic of Husserl's philosophy; and LAR-
ISA CHUHINA has written articles about MAX SCHELER's
phenomenology, axiology, and PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY and published Chelovek i ievo tsennostni mir v
religioznoifilosofii (The human and the world ofvalue
in religious philosophy, 1980). The Group has clase
ties with Lithuanian philosophers: THOMAS SODEIKA has
published works about Ingarden's philosophy; ARUNAS
SVERDIOLAS has discussed PAUL RIC<EUR's views; and
ARVIDAS SCHLIOGERIS has investigated existentialism
and Kierkegaard 's philosophy. He also recognizes that
the immanent and transcendent have a special unity
that is characteristic for existentialism and phenomen-
ology. In Estonia ULO MATYusshas analyzed lngarden's,
Husserl 's, and Heidegger's philosophies.
The first collective work ofLatvian, Lithuanian, and
Russian philosophers, Kritika fenomenologicheskovo
napravleniya v sovremennoi burzhuaznoifilosofii (Cri-
tique of the phenomenological trend in contemporary
bourgeois philosophy, 1981 ), deals with the specificity
of the phenomenological method, Husserl's teaching
about TIME, and the relationships of phenomenology
with the thought of Heidegger, NICOLAI HARTMANN, and
lngarden.
The second book put out by the Riga Group of
phenomenologists, Problemi ontologii v sovremennoi
burzhuaznoifilosofii (Problems of ontology in con tem-
715
porary bourgeois philosophy, 1988), shows the con-
temporary understanding of ontology in phenomen-
ology, existentialism, and philosophy oflanguage. The
book provides translations of extracts from the second
volume of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, MAX
SCHELER's Vom Umsturz der Werte, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE's
Situations, and HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS's "Die trans-
zendentale und die ontologische Phănomenologie"
(1959). Previously, only SEMION FRANK's 1909 trans-
lation ofthe first volume ofHusserl's Logische Unter-
suchungen was available in Russian.
The third most significant book from the Riga Group
is Fenomenologiya v sovremennom mire (Phenomen-
ology in the contemporary world, 1991 ), which de-
scribes the significance of Husserl 's Logische Unter-
suchungen for our time, the methodological aspects of
phenomenology, phenomenological ETHICS, and the un-
derstanding ofthe human being, history, and creativity
in phenomenology. Since 1990 Riga has been the seat
of faur international phenomenological conferences in
collaboration with the World Institute for Advanced
Phenomenological Research and Learning. The Baltic
Society for Phenomenology was founded in 1990, with
Maija Kiile as head ofthe society.
Studies of phenomenology in the USSR were re-
tarded by the fact that Husserl 's works and foreign
literature were not available. That is why the Insti-
tute ofScientific Information of Social Sciences ofthe
USSR Academy of Sciences published A filosofiya E.
Gusserlya i ee kritika (The philosophy of Husserl and
its critique, 1983 ), in which all of Husserl 's princi-
pal works were summarized, but this selection could
not have great inftuence because it was classified for
"special use" (every exemplar was registered) and its
distribution was restricted.
A number of monographs on phenomenology were
published in the USSR during the 1980s. VLADIMIR
BABUSHKIN wrote Fenomenologicheskoye poznanie
nauki: Kriticheskii ana/iz (Phenomenological philoso-
phy ofscience: critica! analysis, 1985), in which he ex-
amined the theory of consciousness, phenomenological
methods, and the possibility of the use of phenomen-
ology in the NATURAL and HUMAN SCIENCES.
In Fenomenologicheskoe poznanie: Propedevtika
i kritika (Phenomenological epistemology: Propedeu-
tic and critique, 1987), KAREN SVASYAN dealt with the
problem of the unity of discursive and intuitive cog-
 716 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
nition. He presented the main concepts of phenomen-
ology: horizon, UFEWORLD, EIDETIC METHOD, immanent
time, INTENTIONAUTY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, constitution,
NOEMA, EVIDENCE, regional ontologies, EPOCHE AND RE-
DUCTION, reflection, transcendentality, phenomena, ei-
dos, etc. He also wrote books about Goethe, HENRI
BERGSON, and ERNST CASSIRER. Ana!yzing Cassirer's
philosophy, he drew attention to the phenomenology
of symbolic forms in the shape of speculations about
language, mythic thinking, and phenomenology of cog-
nition. The first public de bate about phenomenology in
the USSR was organized in 1988 by Motroshilova, and
the leading philosophical journal, A Voprosi Filosofii
(Questions of philosophy), published the roundtable
discussion about the importance ofphenomenology in
contemporary life.
VIKTOR MOLCHANOV has long been engaged in pheno-
menology. In Vremya i soznanie: Kritika fenomeno-
logicheskoifilosofii (Time and consciousness: critique
ofphenomenological philosophy, 1988) he showed the
similarity of KANT's and Husserl's philosophical ap-
proaches in dealing with the relationships of time,
consciousness, and reflection, and he criticized Hei-
degger's interpretation of Kant's Kritik der reinen
Vernunfl, which forces the problems of fundamen-
tal ontology on Kant's philosophy. He also published
works about the transcendental subject, the a priori, the
similarities and differences of Husserl 's and Hegel's
philosophies, and other problems. He authored the en-
try on phenomenology for Sovremennaya zapadnaya
filoso,fiya siovar (Dictionary of contemporary Western
philosophy, 1991 ), in which he affirmed the ideas of in-
tentionality and time tobe the core ofphenomenology.
In further working out the phenomenological theory
of consciousness, he defined consciousness as the ex-
perience of distinction, ascribing a priori distinctions
to the initial experience of consciousness. Molchanov
has played a major role in the translation ofHusserl's
works into Russian and has collaborated with the Riga
Group since the 1980s.
The unfinished task of making "philosophy con-
crete," which was initiated by The International Mag-
azine of the Philosophy of Cu/ture, is being resumed
by the revival of the journal Logos, edited by Valeri
Anashvili. Logos was first published in Russia in 1910-
14 and 1925, and its resumption in Moscow in 1991
aims at the restoration ofthe lost traditions ofRussian
academic philosophy. The first step in this endeavor is
to clarify, through creative study, the principles ofthe
phenomenological tradition. Logos combines the trans-
lation of extracts from the classics of phenomenology
(Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others) with the
early 20th century Russian phenomenological studies
and original articles about contemporary philosophy.
The publication of Husserl 's collected works in Rus-
si an began in the early 1990s.
Interest in Western philosophy increased after the
collapse of the USSR. There are hundreds of pub-
lications mainly pertaining to phenomenology. Work
is done in Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia, Ukraine, Be-
lorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Rus-
sia (in St. Petersburg, Vladimir, Saratov, Rostov-on-
the-Don, Kaliningrad, etc., besides Moscow). The in-
terest is in Western thinking that would help understand
the new cultural-historical realities and replace Marx-
ism.
Despite the strict control of philosophy while the
USSR lasted, there were outstanding personalities who
developed their own variants ofphilosophy in relation
to phenomenology. A most significant underground fig-
ure in the Soviet philosophy of the 1970s and 1980s
was the Georgian MERAB MAMARDASHVILI. He was def-
initeiy a thinker of the Socratic type who could make
one see how an idea was born in an oral discourse. He
considered philosophy to be consciousness aloud. His
lectures on ancient philosophy, Descartes, Kant, etc.,
were unofficially circulated on audio tapes throughout
the USSR. In Formi i soderzhanie mischlenie: K kritike
Gegelevskovo ucheniya o formach poznaniya (Forms
and limits ofthinking: Hegelian theory ofthe forms of
knowledge, 1969), he analyzed Hegel 's teaching about
the forms of cognition. He also developed a theory of
"converted forms," based on the works of Marx. Ac-
cording to Mamardashvili, converted forms could be
applied beyond the sphere of politica! economy to so-
cial life, the subconscious, culture and ideology, etc.
Appearances of quasi-objects exist objectively, dis-
cretely, and independently. The converted form not
only separates itself from the content of those rela-
tionships the form itself represents, but also becomes
a prerequisite for the above-mentioned relationships.
Appearance itself dictates certain rules. According to
Mamardashvili, the process ofphenomenological sub-
stitution takes place. He considered phenomenological
 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
problems in his philosophy independently ofHusserl's
phenomenology. It was Marx who led him to turn to the
theme of"soov" in a broad sense. After studying Marx,
Mamardashvili carne to a philosophical intuition about
the body, by which he means objectively-operating
structures or objectivities ofthought as the outer men-
tal reality of soul. In the 1970s he delivered an original
course of lectures on social philosophy entitled "Opit
fizicheskoi metafiziki" (Experience of physical meta-
physics) describing the way ideology functions. Con-
sciousness is not transparent; it cannot be described
by means of simple reflection, because there are ob-
scure dependencies within consciousness. Conscious-
ness cannot exert direct control over them. To have
access to the above mentioned dependencies pheno-
menological purification (or reduction) is required.
The problem discussed by Mamardashvili was sim-
ilar to the way the representatives of hermeneutics
reproached classical phenomenology for the idea of
pure consciousness and called for considering his-
tory and situationally conditioned consciousness. Ma-
mardashvili 's philosophy, which advanced the idea of
phenomenological purification of consciousness, had
a wider reception in the USSR than Western philoso-
phy. In a mediated form it stressed the possibility of
spiritual opposition. That was one ofthe reasons for its
popularity.
Mamardashvili understood phenomenology as a
method and technique for investigating consciousness.
In Klassicheskii i neklassicheskii ideali ratsialnosti
(Classical and nonclassical ideals of rationality, 1984 ),
he used the difference between phenomenon and ap-
pearance to describe the difference between classical
and nonclassical theories of REASON. Classical ratio-
nality cannot conceptualize the subjective adequately;
the latter must be examined anew. The basis for com-
prehending the subjective is determining its founding
possibilities. Founding results from the fact that the
subjective can be discerned through aktivnost pred-
metnoi deyatelnosti (activity as objective); senses are
formed from operating with things and not just oper-
ating with words that symbolize things. To understand
the subjective it is necessary to determine the practi-
cally operating parameters of its existence.
Mamardashvili dealt with consciousness, symbols,
and understanding in Simbol i Soznanie (Symbol and
consciousness, coauthored with ALEXANDR PYATIGORSKI,
717
1982). He worked on the ontology of cui ture and wrote
about the "anthropological catastrophe." He paid great
attention to freedom. He focused on individuality and
the inimitability of the occurrence of being, situation,
and the uniqueness ofthe experience of consciousness.
This made him turn to literature as a special manifes-
tation of the spirit. Mamardashvili analyzed works by
Proust, Kafka, and other authors.
In the Soviet era, ALEXEI LOSEV was a patriarch of
Russian philosophy. He published about four hundred
works, including thirty-five monographs dealing with
the ancient cosmos and contemporary science, MUSIC
as an object of logic, philosophy of the name, the
dialectics of myth, the symbol, the structure of lan-
guage, and Hellenic, Roman, and Renaissance aesthet-
ics. The inftuence of phenomenology is most appar-
ent in Filosofiya imeni (Philosophy of names, 1927),
where he developed the "dialectica! phenomenology
of thought." This original understanding of pheno-
menology has no counterpart in Western philosophy.
It combines phenomenology and dialectics, lays the
foundation for the ontology of language, and devel-
ops the theory of eidos and observation. Keeping up
the tradition ofRussian philosophy, Losev spoke about
the sophistic (Sofiinoe) construing of eide achieved by
art on the basis of the purely eidetic and essentially
expressive energetic construction of ei de.
Losev accepted phenomenology and especially the
teaching about ei dos and pure description as a success-
ful opposition to metaphysics and naturalism. How-
ever, he considered the view that explanation is natu-
ralistic unacceptable. That is why he chooses dialec-
tics, which he called "explanation of senses (mean-
ings)." According to him, phenomenology remains in
the sphere ofthe description ofseparately given senses,
while dialectics can uncover the relationships and
geneses of senses. Dialectics not only grasps things, it
is within the evolution ofthe things and their meanings.
Analyzing the word in its pre-objective and objective
structure, Losev carne to the conclusion that pheno-
menology is the pre-theoretical description of ali kinds
and levels of senses, a description that is based on ad-
equate perception, i.e., on the perception of eide. This
is why phenomenology is not science, for science re-
quires explanation. Phenomenology, according to Lo-
sev, is a picture of the sense of the object; it refuses
to place this object in a system on the basis of prin-
 718 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
cip1es outside the object. Therefore phenomenology is
also of no value as a method. Mythology, dialectics,
arithmology (about an eidetic scheme or an ideal num-
ber), and topology (about ideal space) are the main
sciences that are necessary for the general phenomen-
ology of thought and word and are based on the logos
of eidetic being. Losev's "dialectica! phenomenology
ofthought" has unfortunately not found further devel-
opment.
A specialist in literature, MIKHAIL BAHKTIN has
worked out a broad conception ofhumanitarian think-
ing. The search includes culturology, philology, PHILO-
SOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, ]iterary criticism, texto]ogy,
and philosophy. He strove to work out the "poetics of
eul ture" and could be called a philosopher of eul ture de-
veloping his own dialogical phenomenologyofperson-
ality. He was the first to begin working out HERMENEU-
ncs in the 1920s and 1930s, yet it remained unnoticed
in Europe because totalitarian rule precluded exchang-
ing information with Western phi1osophers. Originally
he was inftuenced by neo-Kantianism, Herman Cohen
( 1842-1918) in particular. In the early 1920s, Bahktin
and MOISE! KAGAN organised a Kant seminar in which,
among other things, Husserl 's phenomenology and Bu-
ber's dialogical theory ofl and Thou were discussed.
In Problemi tvorchestva Dostoyevskovo (Problems of
creativity in Dostoyevsky, 1929, reprinted in 1963 as
Problemi poetiki Dostoyevskovo [Problems of poet-
ies in Dostoievski]) and in Voprosi literaturi i estetiki
(Questions of literature and aesthetics, 1975), he de-
velops the idea of dialogue, showing it within the
microcosm of the text or work of art. Bahktin also
viewed phenomenology of personality as the meet-
ing and dialogue of two consciousnesses. In Estetika
slovesnovo tvorchestva (Aesthetics of verbal creativ-
ity, 1979), Bahktin writes that no human occurrence
ever takes place or is settled within one consciousness
alone. One consciousness is a contradictia in adjecto.
Consciousness is in its essence pluralia tantum. Thus
neither the subconscious nor the superconscious, nei-
ther mystery nor the mysticism of the fusion of con-
sciousnesses, but consciousnesses reduced, driven to
the very utmost (like the idea of dialogue) in their
coexistence in the human being, is the true phenomen-
ology of personality. Similarly, Bahktin speaks about
the dialogue of different cultures, in which historical
ages come together. Sense is never completely gone;
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
it can always be reawakened when cultures meet. He
regards cultures as phenomena that are open and ex-
ist only on the frontier line, i.e., in the context of an
intercultural dialogue. In this encounter Bahktin advo-
cates a phenomenology of humanitarian thinking that
manifests itself as dialectica! reason. Since the time his
earlier works were reprinted in the 1970s, he has had
a great inftuence on the thinking intelligentsia of the
USSR.
Ali things considered, phenomenology in what was
the USSR is well begun in a wide, deep, and rich resur-
gence.
MAIJA KOLE
Latvian Academy of Sciences
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA American
phenomenology was anticipated by the early WILLIAM
JAMES, but began when William Ernest Hocking ( 1873-
1966) became friends with EDMUND HUSSERL in 1902
and !ater sent the Harvard students DORION CAIRNS and
MARVIN FARBER to freiburg during the J920s. The expe-
rience ofstudying with Husserl is indicated in Cairns's
Conversations with Husserl and Fink [ 1926--1931].
Husserl's student WINTHROP BELL taught phenomen-
ological VALUE THEORY at Harvard early in the 1920s,
but went on to a career in CANADA. MORITZ GEIGER spent
1907 chiefty at Harvard and was a visiting professor
at Stanford University in 1926 and 1935. The attempt
to publish a translation of the Logische Untersuchun-
gen (1900-1901) before World War I was frustrated
by James. Albert R. Chandler's "Professor Husserl's
Program of Philosophical Reform" (1917) is the first
publication, but seems to have had no inftuence. Thus
Farber's published dissertation, Phenomenology as a
Method and a Philosophical Discipline (1928) is the
first effective work. Husserl was offered a position at
the University of Southern California when he was
seventy-four years old, but declined when he could not
have Cairns and EUGEN FINK as his assistants.
There were some articles pertaining to phenomen-
ology during the 1930s, including a set of 1939 in
The Journal of Philosophy in Husserl 's memory. Then
the refugees ARON GURWITSCH, FELIX KAUFMANN, FRITZ
KAUFMANN, ALFRED SCHUTZ, and HERBERT SPIEGELBERG,
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and also MORITZ GEIGER and KURT GOLDSTEIN,joined with
the Americans HARMON CHAPMAN, and JOHN WILD, under
Caims and Farber's dynamic leadership to found the In-
ternational Phenomenological Society, which counted
23 1 members in 1942, and its journal, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, which hoped to continue
Husserl 's Jahrbuch and included ANTONIO BAFI, GASTON
BERGER, EUGEN FINK, JEAN HERING, GERHART HUSSERL, and
LUDWIG LANDGREBE on its original board. Farber edited
the best manifestation ofthis first cohort, Philosophical
Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl ( 1940) and also
authored The Foundation of Phenomenology (1943),
an analysis chiefly ofHusserl 's Logische Untersuchun-
gen. In addition, Farber held a copy ofHusserl's Nach-
lass at Buffalo for some years during and after the war.
In the first postwar decades, Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research flourished, but the international
society ceased meeting. Other pre- and postwar Aus-
trian and English imports, i.e., LOGICAL POSITIVISM
and ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY, and then Anglo-
American ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY carne to replace the
earlier pragmatism in dominating American philos-
ophy. Caims !ater said that the phenomenologists in
the United States around 1950 could be seated in his
parlor. But then, with the postwar prosperity and a
new flowering of phenomenology on the Continent, a
new cohort, including EDWARD G. BALLARD, JOHN COMP-
TON, HUBERT DREYFUS, JAMES M. EDIE, DON IHDE, EUGENE
KAELIN, WILLIAM RICHARDSON, CALVIN O. SCHRAG, and
ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI became committed to it.
By the 1970s there would be many Ph.D. pro-
grams in which phenomenology cou1d be studied in
the United States, but at first there was only one. Do-
rion Caims joined Schutz at the New School for So-
cial Research in 19 54 and Gurwitsch succeeded Schutz
there in 1959. During the 1950s THOMAS LUCKMANN
and HELMUT WAGNER received doctorates in SOCIOLOGY
and WERNER MARX and MAUR! CE NATANSON received sec-
ond doctorates in philosophy there. A Husserl archive
in memory of Schutz was established at the New
School in 1969. After Caims and Gurwitsch died, HAN-
NAH ARENDT and then J.N. MOHANTY, OSBORNE WIGGINS,
and REINER scHORMANN continued the tradition into the
1980s.
The first ofthe four successively emerging tenden-
cies now discemible in the worldwide phenomenologi-
cal movement is REALISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY, which
719
was long represented in America solely by Herbert
Spiegelberg, whose The Phenomenological Movement
(1960) was dedicated to Schutz's memory. The sec-
ond tendency- which initially found broader support
- is CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. Stemming from
Husserl 's 1deen zu ei ner reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1 91 3), it re !ies on
reflective observation and analysis, EIDETIC METHOD,
and transcendental EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION in the at-
tempt to ground ETHICS, HUMAN SCIENCE and NATURAL
SCIENCE, LOGIC, MATHEMATICS, and VALUE THEORY. Gur-
witsch's The Field of Consciousness (1964), which
integrated results of GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY into pheno-
meno1ogy, is especially original, as is the coNSTITUTIVE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE emphasized
by Schutz in his Collected Papers ( 1962, 1964, 1966,
and 1996) for the philosophy of the social or, more
broadly, cultural sciences.
The teaching of Husserl in America suffered long
from the difficulties of the 1931 Boyce Gibson trans-
1ation of 1deen 1 (Logische Untersuchungen was fi-
nally trans1ated in 1970) and, in addition to that, the
weakness of American foreign language instruction.
Husserl then tended to be understood through the crit-
ica! remarks in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and
their postwar European followers. Cairns's translations
of Husserl 's Cartesianische Meditationen [ 1931] and
Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929) in 1960
and 1969 were then significant, as was FRED KERSTEN's
of 1deen 1 in 1983. Furthermore, reliable interpre-
tive works, those of JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS in particu-
lar, he1ped enormously. Northwestern University Press
pub1ished a veritable library oftranslated sources, and
facility in German and/or French became increasingly
de rigeur.
Constitutive phenomenology has continued, much
stimulated by Americans who have studied at various
European Husserl Archives and by the steady flow of
Husserliana volumes; ANTHONY J. STEINBOCK's Home
and Beyond: Generative Phenomenologyafter Husserl
(1995) is a fine recent manifestation, but there have
been contributions since the 1960s, especially by J. N.
MOHANTY and ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI. Besides the Husserl
Circle, founded in 1968, the Society for the Study of
Husserl 's Phenomenology was established in 1990.
But a different European tendency, EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGY, began being imported in the 1950s,
720 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
and carne to dominate during the great expansion of
American phenomenology during the 1960s. In the
background, govemmental support for higher educa-
tion increased after the 1957 Soviet launch ofthe Sput-
nik satellite and the postwar demographic surge be-
gan to reach college age. Students were studying EXIS-
TENTIALISM in THEATER and LITERATURE using JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE's Huis clos (English trans. 1948) and ALBERT
CAMus's Le mythe de Sisyphe (English trans. 1955) and
learning ofMARTIN HEIDEGGER as well as Husserl as their
sources. The young professors versed in the philoso-
phy ofpostwar FRANCE, GERMANY, and THE NETHERLANOS
ANO FLANDERS found positions.
Existential phenomenology tends to view Husserl
as a subjective idealist to be transcended and its claim
that Husserl took an existential turn in late works
such as Die Krisis der europtiischen Wissenschaften
und die transzendentale Phănomenologie (1936) has
had an extensive influence. The positive inspiration
for existential phenomenology in America carne im-
mediately from MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY as we!l as
Sartre and also GABRIEL MARCEL and, much !ater, SI-
MONE DE BEAUVOIR, but more deepJy from the FUNDA-
MENTAL ONTOLOGY as we!l as the anaJytics ofOASEIN in
Heidegger's Sein und Zeit ( 1927). KARL JASPERS, Soren
Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche were in the back-
ground. Sartre's L'etre et le neant (1943) was trans-
lated in 1956 and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenologie
de la perception (1945) was translated in 1962. HAN-
NAH ARENDT was widely read but was not yet generally
recognized to be an existential phenomenologist.
This third phenomenological tendency emphasizes
such previously at best peripheral issues on the pheno-
menological agenda as embodiment, freedom, and so-
cial conflict in such areas as AESTHETICS, HISTORY, and
rouncs. The meaning of human existence became the
central philosophical problem, while Husserl was un-
derstood to have bracketed existence by the transcen-
dental epoche. The emphasis also shifted from an intel-
lectualist preoccupation to a focus on concrete, embod-
ied, and situated ACTION. The ambiguity, contingency,
and facticity of historical consciousness replaced the
preoccupation with universal essences.
Where Ph.D. programs are concemed, existential
phenomenology was brought first to the departments of
philosophy and also psychology at Duquesne Univer-
sity by HENRY KOREN in the 1950s. WILLIAM A. LUIJPEN's
Existential Phenomenology ( 1960) seems the charac-
teristic expression for that. Constitutive as well as ex-
istential phenomenology were taught in the 1960s by
MANFREO FRINGS and ALPHONSO LINGIS and in the 1970s
and 80s by LESTER EMBREE, JOHN SALLIS, JOHN SCAN-
LON, and ANDRE SCHUWER in philosophy and AMEDEO
GIORGI, WILLIAM FISHER, and PAUL RICHER in psychoJogy.
Moreover, book series in philosophy and psycho1ogy
and The Journal ofPhenomenological Psychology and
Research in Phenomenology were begun at Duquesne
University Press. The Simon Silverman Phenomen-
ology Center was founded in 1980; it holds the pa-
pers ofGurwitsch and ERWIN STRAUS, a third American
Husserl Archive, and a splendid collection of pheno-
menologicalliterature.
The existential phenomenology predominating in
the 1960s was furthermore fostered by John Wild, a
member ofthe first American group who, after postwar
visits to France, published The Challenge of Existen-
tialism (1955). The theologian PAUL TILLICH, Wild's col-
league at Harvard, did much to set the existentialist tone
of this time. Wild left Harvard for Northwestern Uni-
versity in 1961 and then went on to Yale in 1963. Some
spoke in this era of a "Northwestern-Yale axis." CALVIN
O. SCHRAG, GEORGE SCHRADER, and Wild helped JAMES
M. EDIE to found the Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy in 1962, which has always been
the largest organization for phenomenology, and then
to found the Studies in Phenomenology and Existen-
tial Philosophy, also long lead by Edie, at Northwestem
University Press. These and other institutions were al-
ternatives to those ofthe Anglo-American mainstream,
which were rather unreceptive.
Besides the book series at Northwestern, the two
Duquesne series, and also the venerable Phaenomen-
ologica series sponsored since 1958 by the Louvain
Husserl Archives at Martinus Nijhoff and more re-
cently at Kluwer Academic Publishers, which has al-
ways been open to work in English, further series were
established in the 1970s and 1980s at Ohio University
Press, the State University ofNew York Press, Indiana
University Press, and Humanities Press. A second se-
ries, entitled "Contributions to Phenomenology," was
established at Kluwer in 1989 and is now led by JOHN
DRUMMOND. "Perspectives in Continental Philosophy"
was begun by JOHN CAPUTO at Fordham University Press
in 1996.
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
As for joumals, besides the two founded at
Duquesne, there are The Review of Existential Psy-
chiatry, Philosophy Today, Man and World, Husserl
Studies, Heidegger Studies, andPhenomenology lnfor-
mation Bulletin cum Phenomenologicallnquiry. Then
aga in, beyond philosophy, there are Human Studies, the
Phenomenology and Social Science Newsletter, and
Phenomenological Psychology as well as increasing
acceptance in traditionaljournals. The quantity of new
publishing outlets is indicative of mainstream resis-
tance to as well as the expanding energy of American
phenomenology.
During the 1960s, further doctoral programs
emerged at Northwestern, where phenomenology
COU]d be studied with WILLIAM EARLE and SAMUEL TODES
as well as Edie after Wild left, and at Yale Uni-
versity with DAVID CARR, EDWARD S. CASEY, WILLIAM
MCBRIDE, GEORGE SCHRADER, and ]ater MAURICE NATAN-
SON; then Kockelmans and ALPHONSO LINGIS were joined
by TIIOMAS M. SEEBOHM at The Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity and DePaul University had MANFRED FRINGS and
]ater MARY JEANNE LARRABEE. McBride joined Schrag at
Purdue University in 1973 and DOROTHY LELAND, MAR-
TIN MATUSTIK, and LEWIS GORDON carne ]ater; Vanderbi]t
University has had JOHN COMPTON, JOHN SALLIS, CHARLES
SCOTT, DAVID WOOD, and RICHARD M. ZANER, Boston Col-
lege has had RICHARD COBB-STEVENS and JOHN MURPHY
and also, as regular visitors, HANS-GEORG GADAMER and
JACQUES TAMINIAUX, and Boston University has had ER-
AZIM KOHĂK and VICTOR KESTENBAUM. In the 1970s DON
IHDE led the formation ofthe exceptionally strong and
enduring programat the State University of New York
at Stony Brook that carne to include EDWARD s. CASEY,
ROBERT CREASE, PATRICK HEELAN, MARY RAWLINSON, HUGH
J. SILVERMAN, and DONN WELTON. Then again there has
been Tulane University with EDWARD G. BALLARD and
now MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN; Catho]ic University with
ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI and THOMAS PRUFER; Georgetown
University with JOHN BROUGH; the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley with HUBERT DREYFUS; and the Uni-
versity of Southern California with DALLAS WILLARD.
More recently there are Emory University with DAVID
CARR, THOMAS FLYNN, and RUDOLF MAKKREEL, Bingham-
ton University with JEFFNER ALLEN, MARTIN DILLON, and
STEPHEN DAVID ROSS; The University of Memphis with
ROBERT BERNASCONI, TINA CHANTER, LEONARD LAWLOR,
and THOMAS NENON; and Vil!anova University with JOHN
721
CAPUTO, THOMAS BUSCH, and DENNIS SCHMIDT.
American phenomenology has spread beyond phi-
1osophy into the HUMAN SCIENCEs. Phenomenological
PSYCHOLOGY could be studied at Duquesne and also
at the University of Chicago with EUGENE T. GENDLIN,
at the University of Dallas with ROBERT ROMANYSHYN
and SCOTT CHURCHILL, and at Seattle University with
KEITH HOELLER and STEEN HOLLING; COMMUNICOLOGY
could be studied at Southern Illinois University with
RICHARD LANIGAN and LENORE LANGSDORF; and, recentJy,
a hermeneutica! phenomenological ECONOMICS could
be studied at George Mason University with DON
LAVOIE. Phenomenological PSYCHIATRY was introduced
with the volume Existence edited by Rollo May et al.
in 1958 and a Society for Phenomenology and Psychi-
atry was founded in 1978. The Society for Phenomen-
ology and Existential Philosophy originally included
phenomenologists in psychiatry, psychology, sociol-
ogy, etc., but eventually an independent sister society,
the "Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sci-
ences," was established and meets concurrently with it.
The constitutive and existential tendencies have
continued within the ever larger and better established
American movement. Examples include work in the
phenomenoJogy of the BODY by DREW LEDER and IRIS
MARION YOUNG, whiJe ELIZABETH A. BEHNKE pursuses
phenomenology ofthe body within the frameworks of
constitutive, genetic, and generative phenomenology.
Neverthe]ess, HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY is the
third phenomenological tendency to predominate in
the United States. It curiously objected to constitutive
phenomenology for a doctrine of bare sensations that
than required recognition of much that was due to in-
terpretation. Despite its greater emphasis on language
and with the possible exception of gender, heremeneu-
tical phenomenology explores al! ofthe issues already
placed on the agenda by constitutive, realistic, and ex-
istential phenomenology.
Hermenutical phenomenology began its ascent late
in the 1960s. Heidegger was again the chief source,
but more for his methodology than for his analytics
of Dasein. The emphasis on language within this ten-
dency responded to the concerns also indicated by ORDI-
NARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS in the American mainstream.
The contributions OfHANS-GEORG GADAMER and the ]ater
thought of PAUL RICCEUR were added to the newer ap-
preciation of Heidegger.
722 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
There were early artieles and WERNER BROCK's Ex-
istence and Being ( 1949), but the founding events for
American Heidegger studies were the translation of
Sein und Zeit in 1962 and WILLIAM RICHARDSON's Hei-
degger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963).
J. GLENN GRAY led the translating of a series of works
of Heidegger at Harper & Row publishers in the 1970s
and new translations began appearing from State Uni-
versity of New York Press by JOAN STAMBAUGH in the
1990s. Kockelmans again helped with volumes of in-
terpretation. The high quality ofthis scholarship is per-
haps epitomized by THEODORE KISIEL's The Genesis of
Martin Heidegger 's "Being and Time" (1993). Hei-
degger's thought carne to dominate scholarship within
American phenomenology by 1980, with ambivalent
relations with POSTMODERNISM developing more re-
cently.
After Heidegger, the second leading European
source for hermeneutica! phenomenology in the United
States is HANS-GEORG GADAMER, whose Wahrheit und
Methode (Truth and method, 1960) was translated in
1975 and who was repeatedly visiting professor in the
United States beginning in the late 1960s, where a half
dozen more of his books ha ve also been subsequently
translated. Gadamer scholarship begins with RICHARD
PALMER's Hermeneutics (1969). DAVID HOY'S The Criti-
ca! Circle (1978) is one ofthe more outstanding recent
contributions.
The third European source for this tendency is PAUL
RICCEUR, whose late emerging interest in hermeneu-
tics can be discemed in De l 'interpretation: Essai sur
Freud ( 1968; English trans. 1970) and Le conflit des in-
terpretations: Essais d 'hermeneutique ( 1969; English
trans. 1974). Severa! other works have been translated.
Ricreur visited various North American universities
and then became the John Nuveen Professor of the
History of Philosophy at the University of Chicago in
1970. DON IHDE's Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The
Philosophy of Paul RicG!ur ( 1971) is the first study.
Ricreur's impact has been especially multidisciplinary,
his work being taken quite seriously by historians, lit-
erary theorists, politica! scientists, psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, and theologians.
Hermeneutica! phenomenology is focused on
HERMENEUTICS or the theory of interpretation, which it
extends beyond texts to include Being as well as other
matters, as one ofRicreur's subtitles, "Meaningful Ac-
tion Considered as a Text" ( 1971 ), indicates. Heideg-
ger is appreciated for his work in the phenomenology
of LANGUAGE AFTER HUSSERL. Exemp]ary hermeneuti-
ca! phenomenology has been pursued by ALBERT HOFS-
TADTER in aesthetics; BERNARD BOELEN and JOHN CAPUTO
in ethics; by CALVIN O. SCHRAG and JOHN O'NEILL in phi-
Josophy ofthe human sciences; JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS,
PATRICK HEELAN, THEODORE J. KISIEL, and HANS SEIGFRIED
in philosophy of natural science; by BERNARD DAUEN-
HAUER, FRED DALLMAYR, and REINER SCHURMANN in po-
litica] phi]osophy; by ALBERT BORGMANN and DON IHDE
in philosophy oftechnology; and by JOHN MACQUARRIE
in the phiJosophy ofRELIGION.
By the 1990s, most American publishing houses,
joumals, and main-stream professional organizations
had become somewhat receptive to phenomenology,
yet the small societies that began being established
during the 1960s continued to meet annually and apart
from, but complementary to, the Society for Pheno-
menology and Existential Philosophy: the Husserl Cir-
ele, the Heidegger Conference, the Merleau-Ponty Cir-
ele, the Sartre Cirele, the Simone de Beauvoir Cirele,
and The Society for the Study of Husserl 's Philoso-
phy. Most recently a multidisciplinary "Back-to-the-
Things-Themselves" annual conference has even been
founded.
Two independent institutions ha ve been active: The
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology,
Inc., was begun in 1971 and established an archival
repository; the Collegium Phaenomenologicum (now
an independent entity); book series at Ohio University
Press, University Press of America, and Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers; a lecture tour; a summer program,
the Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz memorial lec-
tureships; and the Edwin Goodwin Ballard book prize.
The center has held at least one conference a year in the
United States, plus international meetings in India and
Japan. Its headquarters is at Florida Atlantic Univer-
sity and its directors are also the editors of the present
encyclopedia.
Beginning in 1976 The World Institute for Ad-
vanced Phenomenological Research and Leaming un-
der the vigorous leadership of ANNA-TERESA TYMIE-
NIECKA began organizing symposia and lecture series in
the Boston area, sponsoring programs in conjunction
with the American Philosophical Association, and also
many phenomenology conferences abroad that have
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
been published as volumes in Analecta Husserliana at
Reidel, and !ater Kluwer Academic Publishers, in the
Netherlands. Especially relevant for the present entry
is the volume American Phenomenology: Origins and
Developments ( 1989).
The Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Philosophy has always also been a venue for various
non-phenomenological postwar European tendencies,
SUCh as CRITICAL THEORY, STRUCTURALISM, and POSTMOD-
ERNISM. The resultant diversity became so great that
the title "Phenomenology and Existentialism" became
inadequate, and Embree and Ihde independently be-
gan, late in the 1970s, to apply the more encompass-
ing qualifier "Continental." With its four interacting
tendencies, phenomenology is plainly the oldest and
centermost movement within Continental thought in
the United States. And Continental thought is now the
main challenger to the Anglo-American mainstream.
The rise of what is sometimes called "California
phenomenology" or "Analytical phenomenology" also
needs to be mentioned. This comes from the Anglo-
American rather than the Continental tradition. It ini-
tially focused on Husserl 's work in philosophy oflogic
and epistemology, but then began considering more
and more of the phenomenological tradition. DAVID
SMITH, RONALD MCINTYRE, and DAGFINN F0LLESDAL have
been the leading contributors, but HUBERT DREYFUS and
also John Searle at Berkeley and, more recently, BARRY
SMITH at the University ofBuffalo, are also supportive.
American phenomenology has sometimes been
challenged in the early 1990s from the standpoint of
POSTMODERNISM. Devotees of deconstruction in partic-
ular often deny or at least ignore the connection with
the phenomenological tradition, which is not unlike
the way some existentialists and hermeneuticists, also
under the influence ofliterary theory, ignored their ori-
gins. However, JACQUES DERRIDA has recently claimed
that he is part ofthe phenomenological movement, ali
ofhis work being under the sign ofthe phenomenologi-
cal reduction.
It is not characteristic of American cu!ture to el eva te
one or a few figures over ali others. At the time of
writing, however, there are dozens of accomplished
phenomenologists in a senior generation born around
World War II and many score more quite active in
two younger generations. Indeed, given the hundreds
ofpeople in myriad disciplines, the many institutions,
723
and the numerous publications, it appears appropriate
to speak of an American period succeeding the German
and then French periods in the history of the century-
old international movement called phenomenology.
Editing, translating, and other scholarship reiat-
ing to European phenomenology is continuing in the
United States and comparison with non-European
traditions, especially BUDDHISM, is being advanced
through contact with phenomenologists in CHINA, IN-
DIA, JAPAN, and KOREA, but research basically continues
in traditional philosophical areas, such as aesthetics,
ethics, the philosophies of mathematics, human and
natural science, literature, theater, logic, value theory,
etc., and also in relation to new issues, such as ECOLOGY,
ETHNICITY, FILM, FEMINISM, MEDICINE, and TECHNOLOGY.
Much new insight into the matters themselves can be
expected from American phenomenology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Edie, James M. "Recent Work in Phenomenology." American
Phenomenological Quarterly (1964), 1-14.
- . Phenomenology in America. Chicago: Quadranglc
Books, 1967.
- . "Phenomenology in the United States ( 1974)." Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology ( 1974), 199--211.
- . "Phenomenology in American 1984." Research in Pheno-
menology ( 1984 ), 233-46.
Embree, Lester. "The Legacy of Dorion Caims and Aron
Gurwitsch: A Letter to Future Historians." In American
Phenomenology: Origins and Developments, 115--46.
Ihde, Don. "Phenomenology in America (1964-1984)." In
his Consequences of Phenomenology. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1986, 1-26.
Kaelin, Eugene F., and Calvin O. Schrag, eds. American
Phenomenology: Origins and Developments. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
Spiege1berg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement. 3rd
ed., with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Pub1ishers, 1982.
LESTER EMBREE
Florida Atlantic University
JAMES M. EDIE
Northwestern University
DoNIHDE
State University of New York, Stony Brook
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS
The Pennsylvania State University
CALVIN 0. SCHRAG
Purdue University

VALUE THEORY Phenomenological theories
of value ha ve been based very largely on the work of
EDMUND HUSSERL and, through him, FRANZ BRENTANO,
despite the fact that Husserl did not publish in these
fields during his lifetime and despite very important
divergences between his work and that of subsequent
phenomenologists. The path they have tended toward,
differentiating the subject matter of ethics from that of
value theory, was predelineated by Husserl's departure
from Brentano 's classification of mental phenomena.
Brentano had conceived volition as a form ofEMOTION
and subsumed both under a genus he called "feelings."
Instead, Husserl orders mental phenomena under three
mutually exclusive basic classes: the doxic (cognitive),
the affective (emotional), and the conative (volitional).
In the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1900)-the first
volume ofhis Logische Untersuchungen (1900--1901)
- Husserl proposed a corresponding classification of
theoretical, normative, and practica! disciplines.
The general theory ofvolition would include a sub-
discipline establishing norms for correct and for veridi-
cal (evidently correct) volitions, and a practica! one
establishing procedures for promoting correct striv-
ing (volition). The general theory of affects would
include subdisciplines establishing norms for correct
and veridical emotions and establishing procedures for
promoting correct emotions. Since Husserl's consid-
ered opinion was that ali emotional mental processes
are valuings at Jeast implicitly, the general theory of
affects would coincide with the general theory of val-
uations and would include the theory of what can be
correctly valued, disvalued, preferred, etc. (axiology).
Subdisciplines ofthe general theory of cognition would
differentiate correct or veridical cognitions from their
opposites and establish norms for cognitions and pro-
cedures for promoting correct cognitions. What might
be called ETHrcs would unite the severa! practica! sub-
disciplines.
Although Husserl published no works on value the-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna, 724
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia ofPhenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
ory or ethics, he lectured repeatedly on these topics.
Very extensive notes on the earlier lecture courses -
Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-1914)
- ha ve been published ( 1988) and another volume
of lectures from the Nachlass has been announced for
the near future. The earlier Jectures present a view
of axiology and ethics that remains remarkably close
to Brentano's strict ideal consequentialism. The vol-
ume's editor reports that the !ater lectures (1915-23)
present a quite different approach largely under the in-
fluence ofJOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, perhaps the most ex-
treme of deontological theorists. Subsequently, pheno-
menological axiologies (such as those of DIETRICH voN
HILDEBRAND, MAX SCHELER, NlCOLAl HARTMANN, and HANS
REINER) have tended to acknowledge that strivings do
indeed have distinctively moral value characteristics
that are independent oftheir factual consequences, but
few would go so far as Fichte to declare it morally
wrong, sinful, and blasphemous to weigh the utility of
morally good strivings.
Ways of using the crucial word value vary widely
even within the phenomenological literature. Husserl
used "value" for the goodness belonging solely to some
particular bearer ofvalue, and in his use, what the word
denotes could only be an individual object (never an
eidetic object) when the bearer is itself an individual
object. Although Max Scheler uses it with the same
denotation, he conceives what it denotes to be both
a quality and a specific material axiologica] universal
(hen ce an ei dos accessible through EIDETIC METHOD ).
Although Hartmann, on the other hand, agrees with
Husserl about what the word connotes when it denotes
a property, he often applies it to the axiologica] laws
that objects must satisfy in order to have a given kind
of axiologica! property. Thus it sometimes does and
sometimes does not denote, in his use, something uni-
versal and eidetic. When such ambiguities threaten,
the more awkward terms value-characteristic, axiotic
trait, axiologica! predicate, or value-predicate can be
employed. Phenomenological literature on value and
valuing tends, following Husserl, to insist that original
acquaintance with values and disvalues is acquired.
Axiologica! predicates of objects - their goodness,
their badness, or their lack of either- can be given,
but can only be given through affective, that is, emo-
tional mental processes. The severa! figures mentioned
could agree with most ofwhat follows.
 VALUE THEORY
Phenomenological value theories are both antina-
tivist and intuitionist. Affective consciousness as such
is receptive to axiologica! predicates so that "impres-
sions" of valuecharacteristics such as goodness, bad-
ness, indifference, etc., are strictly affective. This is
a major deviation from Brentano 's position that only
experiences that are perceptual- and so cognitive or,
in Husserl 's terms, doxic - and not affective could
be receptive and that only the interna! perception of
itse(( that is implicit in every veridical emotion can
give rise to the concept that the object of the emo-
tion is good or bad and so is worthy of love or of
hate, respectively. Thus Brentano's view had held that
the impressional consciousness of value is necessar-
ily a direct consciousness of something mental and
only indirectly a consciousness of something about the
emotion's object.
Instead, Husserl maintains that an evidently correct
positive emotion, for example, is implicitly an intuition
that what it approves of ought tobe, much as an evident
belief is evidence for the being of what is believed in
(since perceiving is an intuition that the object is actual
and clearly imagined perceiving is an intuition that its
object is possible). The ontic states of affairs toward
which affects or feelings are directed are always coin-
tended in some cognitive (doxic) manner-perceived,
remembered, imagined, anticipated,judged, etc. How-
ever, an approving of something can be EVIDENCE that
what is approved ought tobe regardless ofwhether the
founding doxic consciousness is evident with regard
to the existence or possibility of the object as doxi-
cally intended. This suggests strongly that valuings as
such are infallible and that disagreements injudgments
about values and axiotic traits are reducible to disagree-
ments regarding the founding ontic characeristics for
which the relevant objects are valued - a thesis in
which phenomenological axiology would concur with
noncognitivist theories. Even if valuing as such is in-
fallible, incorrect valuings would still occur when the
beliefs through which the valuing is founded are them-
selves incorrect. That their founding doxa be correct is
a necessary condition for fully correct valuing, whether
simple or preferential.
As a valuing, an atTective process may be intentive
to its object either positively (loving, approving, liking,
etc.) as something that ought tobe, negatively (hating,
disapproving, disliking, etc.) as something that ought
725
not to be, or in an affectively neutra! way (indiffer-
ence, which is a feeling) as something that is neither
good nor bad. Thus affects or feelings and their noe-
matic correlates have "qualities" analogous to those of
judging and other doxic phenomena.
Besides simple affects such as loving, hating, ap-
proving, disapproving, liking, and disliking there are
comparative affects that are intentive to something not
just as being of value, disvalue, or indifferent but also
as better than, worse than, or neither better than nor
worse than something else. Preferential affects are ba-
sic to the conative phenomena that are a principle theme
of ethics as the theory of correct striving, sin ce striving-
for or, in any event, any veridical striving-for would
be founded on a preferring of the existence of what
is striven for to its nonexistence, as striving-against
would be founded on preferring the nonexistence of
what is striven against to its existence.
There is a foundedness of the intentiona! object of
valuing as such that parallels - in many respects,
though not in all - the foundedness of valuing on
doxic or cognitive consciousness. Feelings, as intu-
itions of value-predicates, cannot occur except insofar
as they entail doxa intentive to non-axiotic, ontic pred-
icates, and these are there for consciousness through
non-affective, doxic mental processes intentive to the
valued entity as having characteristics whose manner
of original givenness is not affective and whose be-
ing or nonbeing might be truly affirmed or denied or
might be questioned, doubted, etc. As it is emotionally
intuited, any axiologica! characteristic of an object-
that this particular object ought to be, for example
- is founded upon and conditioned by certain ontic
properties intended by doxa implicit in the emotional
intuition. The utility and perhaps the aesthetic value of
a certain stuff as a food might, for example, be founded
on properties involving its chemical composition and
involving in turn some organism's digestive organs,
metabolic processes, and sensory organs.
However, the distinction between axiotic and ontic
characteristics is a distinction among the constituents
of the bearer's objective meaning. Thus an object as
valued is a synthetic unity intended to in at least two
ways: doxically and affectively. Mental processes of
both sorts are here intentive to the selfsame noematic
object, but to entirely distinct features of the object.
What each discloses about the object is different from
726 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
what the other discloses, yet the object is synthetically
identified, is a single polar unity to which both sets
of features are intended as belonging. That what pos-
sesses the doxically intended characteristics possesses
the affectively intended characteristics is not formally
or analytically true.
Each valuing is founded on a definite set of doxic
mental processes, and each member of that set be-
longs to one or more particular doxic species. Other
mental processes of the selfsame doxic species could
occur without founding any mental process ofthe same
affective species as the one that this set of doxic men-
tal processes has made possible. The occurrence of a
doxic mental process of the relevant species is only a
necessary, not a sufficient condition for the occurrence
of feelings of the relevant type. The thesis of noetic-
noematic foundedness seems quite defensible so long
as it is not misunderstood as if the logica! priority
of the founding (conditioning) doxic-ontic predicates
entailed temporal priority as well. Husserl does not al-
ways pronounce the separati an emphatically and seems
at least once to have proclaimed the mesalliance.
Properly understood, however, the thesis does not
in the least imply that any objects could occur that
would ha ve doxically intuitable features of the same
species as those that found the goodness of a correctly
valued abject X and yet Iack a value-predicate of the
type correlative to correct valuing of X. Having ontic
properties of the kind that found the relevant value-
predicate is a sufficient condition for having the same
type of value predicate even though doxic conscious-
ness of the object's having the relevant kind of ontic
predicate is only a necessary condition for feelings of
the appropriate kind. The theory of noetic-noematic
foundedness is entirely compatible with that ofthe ob-
jectivity of value.
The foundedness of valuing on doxic phenomena
and the corresponding grounding of correctly valued
axiologica! characters in the ontic characteristics in-
tended by the founding doxa entails an implicit abstrac-
tion. If an object X is correctly approved simply on the
basis of a set of ontic predicates that X is correctly
believed to have and through which X exemplifies a
certain set of antic universals, then ali examples ofthe
same set of ontic universals must have the selfsame
type of goodness for which this particular thing is ap-
proved. If, nevertheless, anything be correctly loved
simply for having a doxically intuitable trait of a cer-
tain sort, then everything having a trait ofthe same sort
can be correctly loved and is good.
The distinction between antic and axiologica! pred-
icates is misconceived ifthe antic properties are repre-
sented as objective while the axiologica! ones are repre-
sented as being in some sense subjective. It would be no
less a misrepresentation if axiologica! characteristics
were represented noncognitivistically as if they could
not be truly predicated of the abject. The distinction
may be the genuine one that is misrepresented in tra-
ditional fact-value distinctions, but it has otherwise no
clear relation to them. Nevertheless, it is far from obvi-
ous to what category value-predicates such as good. il!,
better, and worse belong. Metaethical issues ofthis sort
are important themes for further thinking, and thinking
about them seems most likely to occur among phe-
nomenologically oriented thinkers, if at ali. The very
great dangers involved in misinterpreting them seem
to have been involved in MARTJN HEIDEGGER's effort to
discuss them without using the traditional vocabulary
of ethics and value theory.
Even Scheler's conception of material values may
carry, as Heidegger points out, very questionable ele-
ments of the fact-value differentiation. Scheler argues
against the dependence of value-characteristics upon
ontic properties. As eidetic objects, values would be
qualities that are entirely independent of and indif-
ferent to the antic characteristics of what is valued;
its antic traits would be valueless, absolutely without
value. His conception thus completely separates the
antic properties ofx from what, in Heidegger's terms,
would make x worthy of care, concern, etc. In "Brief
iiber den Humanismus" ( 194 7), Heidegger condemns
this way of thinking in terms of values as the grea test
conceivable blasphemy against Being. In the same pas-
sage, he repeatedly asserts that to think against "val-
ues" in Scheler's sense is not to champion nihilism
regarding values. Scheler's thesis was based on the
fact that something may be pleasant or agreeable to us
without our being able to say what makes it so. Hei-
degger would surely counter that failure successfully
to explicate what makes X agreeable has no relevance
to the question whether what makes X agreeable has
or has not been understood. According to Hartmann's
Ethik ( 1926), explicating which things are indeed val-
ued and for which antic traits they are correctly val-
 VALUE THEORY
ued is a complex hermeneutica! undertaking. There
seems little doubt that Heidegger considered affective
being-in-the-world (Befindlichkeit) to be grounded in
the being of what is understood through affects. If his
position on this point is indeed closer to that of Husserl
and Hartmann, then what he calls dread (Angst) shows
that the potentialities that are threatened by death are
worth caring about, since that whose nonbeing is tobe
dreaded ought to be: the appropriate affective attitude
toward the nonbeing ofwhat ought tobe is necessarily
negative.
As belief-phenomena underlie and are implicit in
ali valuings, so valuings underlie and are implicit in ali
strivings. And as there are norms for correct believing,
so there are norms for correct feeling and for correct
volition. As correctness of its implicit beliefs would be
a necessary condition for correctness of a valuation, so
correctness ofits implicit valuations would bea neces-
sary condition for correctness of a volition. Norms for
correct volition are a theme for ethics. The position of
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE regarding the relation between val-
ues and ethics illustrates quite well the differentiation
between axiology and ethics.
In L 'etre et le neant (1943) Sartre holds that actions
ha ve meaning only by reference to a hierarchy of ideal
values. Such a hierarchy entails laws regarding kinds of
entities that are related as better and worse. Thus there
would be eidetic laws to the effect that entities of one
kind are better than entities of some other particular
kind(s) so that entities ofthe one kind are, other things
being equal, to be preferred to entities of those other
specific kind(s). Yet Sartre insists in L'existentialisme
est un humanisme ( 1946) that an aprioristic ethics is
out ofthe question. The two theses are altogether com-
patible if axiology and ethics are entirely distinct dis-
ciplines, especially so ifthe theory of correct volitions
must take into account necessarily a posteriori beliefs
concern ing the likely results of actions.
Not until Scheler's Der Formalismus in der Ethik
und die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in ethics and
nonformal ethics of value, 1913/1916) were strivings
and the personal and character traits that condition
strivings acknowledged in phenomenological writings
to have primary or intrinsic moral value that is -
as KANT insisted - altogether independent of their
real utitility (real instrumental value). The utility of
a striving is a function of the axiologica! characteris-
727
tics of whatever factual outcomes are conditioned by
that striving. Every volition necessarily is intentive,
however vaguely, to itself, through its founding affects
and doxa, as having utility. Following Kant, Scheler
calls the occurrences that the agent anticipates may be
affected by the action its material or content. Whatever
axiologica! characteristics the agent intends this con-
tent as bearing are the action's material value. Kant's
formalistic ethics asserts that the moral value of any
striving must be entirely independent of its material
value. Against this formalism, Scheler insists that a
striving's moral value cannot be entirely independent
ofits material value, although the latter is certainly not
a sufficient condition for the former. The end of every
correct action must be some anticipated utility or ben-
efit that is the material value ofthe striving. Moreover,
Scheler adds, no correct striving could have its own
moral goodness (its own conformity to the morallaw)
as its intended end (subjective end in Kant's sense).
Thus Scheler rejects the most basic thesis ofKant's
formalism. But the same thesis about value-predicates
leads him to reject as well Kant's cosmopolitan concep-
tion ofmorality and ofthe teleology ofhuman history,
the very conception that was assimilated -much more
than any thesis from HEGEL 's conception ofmorality-
into the anthropology of Feuerbach and MARX. Since
no morally right action can have its own moral good-
ness as an end, and since Scheler is convinced that the
moral value-predicate of an action is the eidos moral
goodness, he concludes that moral goodness cannot be
the end of any correct striving at ali, that moral good-
ness can never bea material value. Striving to promote
moral goodness in the world could in that case never be
morally correct. The alternative conception of value-
predicates that is shared by Husserl and Hartmann (and
seemingly Heidegger) allows for the preservation of
Kant's view ofteleology and ofthe highest good.
Moreover, Hartmann also rejects Scheler's inter-
pretation of the hierarchy of values and its relation to
moral goodness. Scheler proposed to determine moral
rightness just by the rightness of the action's under-
lying preference, which must give priority, if it is to
be correct, to the highest of the values accessible to
the agent that can be realized in the given situation.
Hartmann maintains that values in the hierarchy have
what he calls "strength" as well as "height," and their
strength is inversely related to their height. There is
728 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
indeed higher moral goodness in striving to.fu!fill the
requirements of superior material values. To violate
lower order values is, however, a more grievous of
fense than to violate the higher ones. Right preference
must involve the greater weight ofthe lower values. It is
not enough to consider only that the fine arts are much
greater in height when deciding how to allocate public
resources between them and public health if choices
must be made that will promote one at the expense of
the other. Such issues are topics in the theory of correct
preference and conation, even ifthey also differentiate
a Husserlian "left" from a Husserlian "right."
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Brentano, Franz. Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik. Ed.
Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand [from the lectures on "Prac-
tica! Philosophy" in the literary remains]. Bem: Francke,
1952; The Foundation and Construction of Ethics. Ed.
and trans. Elizabeth H. Schneewind. New York: Humani-
ties Press, 1973.
~. Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Ed. Oskar Kraus.
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969; The Origin ofour Knowl-
edge of Right and Wrong. Trans. Roderick M. Chisholm
and E1izabeth H. Schneewind. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1969.
Hartmann, Nicolai. Ethik. 4th ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1962; Ethics. Trans. Stanton Coit. London: George Allen
& Unwin and New York: Humanities Press, 1932.
Heidegger, Martin. "Brief iiber den Humanismus." In
Gesamtausgabe 9. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, 313-64;
"Letter on Humanism." Trans. Frank A. Cappuzzi. In his
Basic Writings. Eds. David Farrell Krell and J. Glenn Gray.
New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 193-242.
Hildebrand, Dietrich von. Christian Ethics. New York: D.
McKay, 1953.
~. "Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis." In Jahrbuch
fur Philosophie und phănomenologische Forschung 5
( 1922), 462--602.
Husserl, Edmund. Vorlesungen uber Ethik und Wertlehre
(1908-1914). Ed. Ullrich Melle Husserliana 28. Dor-
drecht: K1uwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
Ingarden, Roman. Man and Value. Munich: Philosophia,
1983.
Jordan, Robert We1sh. "Review of Edmund Husserl's Vor-
lesungen uber Ethik and Wertlehre 1908---1914." Husserl
Studies 8 (1992), 221-32.
~. "Das transzendentale Ich a1s Seiendes in der Welt." Per-
spektiven der Philosophie 5. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979,
189-205.
~. "Unnatural Kinds: Beyond Dignity and Price." Man and
World 20 (1987), 283-303.
Kocke1mans, Joseph J. "Phenomenology." In Encyclopedia
of Ethics. Ed. Lawrence C. Becker. Voi. 2. New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992, 960--3.
Reiner, Hans. Pflicht und Neigung. Die Grundlagen der Sit-
tlichkeit erărtert und neu bestimmt mit besonderem Bezug
auf Kant und Schiller. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain,
1951; Duty and Inclination: The Fundamental~ of Moral-
ity Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant
and Schiller. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.
~. Grundlagen. Grundsătze und Einzelnormen des Natur-
rechts. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1964.
Scheler, Max. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materi-
ale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegungeines ethis-
chen Personalismus. 4th ed. Ed. Maria Scheler. Gesam-
melte Werke 2. Bem: Francke, 1954; Formalism in Ethics
and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward
the Foundation ofan Ethical Personalism. Trans. Manfred
S. Frings and Roger L. Funk. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1973.
ROBERT WELSH JORDAN
Colorado State University

MAX WEBER Born on April 12, 1864, in
Erfurt, Germany, Weber was raised in Berlin and stud-
ied 1aw and economics at Heide1berg and Berlin. He
became professor at Freiburg in 1894 and professor of
HUMAN SCIENCES ( Geisteswissenschaften) at Heidelberg
in 1896. After 1897, recurrent and serious problems
with his physica1 and psycho1ogica1 health prevented
him from teaching regularly. He resumed teaching at
Berlin in 1919 and died on June 14, 1920, in Berlin.
The re1ationship between Max Weber and the first
generation of phenomenologists was for the most part
indirect. Weber's basic methodological tenets were
formed independently ofhis acquaintance with EDMUND
HUSSERL, and, though in contact with GEORG SIMMEL,
Husserl seems to have taken practically no notice of
Weber. Other prominent figures from the first genera-
tion ofphenomenologists, such as MAX SCHELER, ADOLF
REINACH, and ALEXANDER PFĂNDER, are not mentioned
in Weber's methodological writings. It is nonetheless
important to note that both Husserl and Weber can be
seen as responses to and in many cases extensions ofthe
work of common sources that include FRANZ BRENTANO,
WILHELM DILTHEY, Wilhelm WindeJband (1848-1915),
and most especially Heinrich Rickert ( 1863-1936).
Moreover, for at least two of the second generation of
phenomenologists in the broadest sense, Weber's work
was a crucial source of inspiration, namely ALFRED
SCHUTZ and KARL JASPERS. ln the former case, the influ-
ence concerns questions ofmethodology, since Schutz
sees the methodological tenets advanced by Weber and
CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY not onJy as compatibJe,
but even as complementing one another and as provid-
ing in their combination the proper foundation for a
phenomenological human science. For Jaspers, on the
other hand, it was primarily the personal example of
his close friend and mentor Weber that, according to
Jaspers' own account, provided inspiration for his own
work concerning the proper kind of Existenz in today's
world.
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Weber's reflections on the methodology of the hu-
man and expecially the social sciences appeared for the
most part in essays during the first decade ofthe 20th
century, i.e., in the period following the publication
of Husserl 's Logische Untersuchungen (1900-190 1),
but preceding Husserl 's move to transcendental pheno-
menology in the Ideen zu ei ner reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie I (1913 ). The
exceptions are two essays written for the journal Lo-
gos, on whose advisory board Husserl was a mem-
ber, and the first few paragraphs of the posthumously
published Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economics and
society, 1922), which are entitled "Basic Categories in
Social Science." These were published !ater, but do not
seem tobe affected by any developments in Husserl's
thinking.
There are important parallels between Husserl's
work and the methodological reflections in Weber's
essays. Both were seeking a new model for their re-
spective sciences, in Husserl's case for a pure LOGIC
that could hold for ali sciences, and in Weber's case,
for the HUMAN SCIENCES. Neither was satisfied with the
predominant and overwhelming influence ofthe model
of NATURAL SCIENCE, i.e., NATURALISM, nor- for very
different reasons - was either of them satisfied with
the model of HISTORY as the alternative that had been
proposed by Dilthey, Winde1band, and Rickert. Both
objected to the idea of science as a strictly nomoth-
etic discipline, restricted to discovering the unchanging
patterns, the universal 1aws, of externally observable
phenenoma. Husserl's rejection of PSYCHOLOGISM and
an epistemology oriented only toward the empirica!
classification and explanation of natural events is cited
by Weber with approval.
For Weber, the social sciences have as their subject
matter not merely externally observable patterns ofbe-
havior, but rather social "ACTION," human behavior that
involves a subjective "MEANING" that is inaccessible to
the methods of the natural sciences. Social science has
"understanding" ( Verstehen) as its aim, for it is directed
at what is "meaningful," at that which is given only in
interna! experience, e.g., human motivations, beliefs,
and EMOTIONS. The attempt to uncover the "meaning-
ful" component in human behavior, Weber terms, in
"Soziologische Grundbegriffe," "interpretation" (Deu-
tung); "understanding" is the result of successful inter-
pretation. A point often overlooked in the literature is
72 9
730 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
that Weber, following Rickert, does not limit the non-
physical objects ofunderstanding to the psychological,
but also includes, in accord with Husserl, ideal objects
such as VALUEs and mathematical or logica! relation-
ships that are not themselves interna! states, but are
nonetheless given only in what Weber calls "interna!
experience."
Thus, for example, intellectual understanding at-
tributes a person 's correct answer to a mathematical
problem to an insight into the mathematical relation-
ship that provides the answer. This is a species of un-
derstanding something "meaningful" since the person
who is seeking the meaning must ha ve insight into this
relationship him- or herself in order truly to "under-
stand" the behavior, yet this insight is not primarily
an insight into a psychological state, but rather into an
ideal, mathematical state of affairs that we assume the
other understands as well. Weber himself, however,
does not make the distinction between the meaning-
ful qua psychological states such as emotions and the
meaningful qua ideal states of affairs (including the va-
lidity ofvalues) as clearly as does Rickert (or Husserl),
and this failure has led to a grea! deal of controversy
and misunderstanding in subsequent literature on We-
ber.
Husserl rejects the historical method as a basis for
philosophy because it too is oriented upon "facts" that
can never provide the kind of necessity Husserl seeks
for philosophical knowledge by means of his EIDETIC
METHOD. By contrast, Weber's repudiation of histori-
cal method amounts to a rejection of the nea-Kantian
view of history as a model for ali the HUMAN SCIENCES.
The latter distinguish themselves from the natural sci-
ences because, like history, they are "idiographic," i.e.,
they seek to understand the individual case instead of
searching for universallaws. But Weber does not wish
to restrict the domain of social scientific knowledge
to understanding individual instances. He wants rather
to leave the possibility open that the social sciences
could come to discern general regularities and patterns
in human actions, and he believes that a recognition of
such patterns and regularities will be an essential com-
ponent ofunderstanding even the concrete and individ-
ual social institution or event. Nor does he think that
the interes! in the individual is necessarily restricted
to the historical or cultural disciplines. For example,
the astronomer might want to understand the causes
of the specific solar system in which we live, or a
geologist might want to understand how a specific ge-
ological formation such as the Alps arose. Thus the
difference between the natural and the social sciences
cannot be made simply along the lines of the nomo-
thetic/idiographic distinction. What distinguishes the
two kinds of science is that the natural sciences do
not consider their phenomena in terms of categories of
"meaning," and the social sciences, along with other
disciplines in the human sciences, such as certain kinds
ofpsychology, do.
Two other features of Weber's methodology of the
social sciences parallel aspects of phenomenology.
First of ali, Weber sharply distinguishes empirica! re-
search from, on the one hand, the conscious method
of constructing meaningful concepts and types and
from a priori foundations of values and other ideal
entitities on the other. This is quite consistent with
the phenomenological distinction between facts and
essences and with phenomenology's insistence that
questions ofvalidity cannot be solved through empiri-
ca! research or through any science that has empirica!
foundations. But different consequences of these dis-
tinctions are stressed in Husserl and Weber. In the first
place, Husserl's concern with philosophy as an abso-
lute science of ref!ection excludes questions of em-
pirica! fact, which contrasts with Weber's interes! in
founding social science as an empirica! science of con-
crete actuality. Thus Weber will insist upon empirically
verifying the actuality of any conceptual possibility by
empirica! means, since his interes! is not in a priori
possibilities, but in actual social realities.
Furthermore, since the social sciences are tobe em-
pirica!, no decision about the validity of ideal enti-
ties, including values, can be grounded through the so-
cial sciences as such. The distinctions between facts
and essences and between the constitution of con-
cepts and empirica! research leads Husserl as an ei-
detic phenomenologist to suspend judgment on mat-
ters of fact, while it leads Weber as a social scientist
to suspend judgment on matters of ideal validity. For
Weber, one's values may, and indeed necessarily do,
determine which phenomena one finds interesting and
which questions one will consider worth pursuing, but
the answers have tobe obtained "objectively," and it is
impossible for the social scientist to provide a sufficient
empirica! justification as a social scientist for the val-
 MAX WEBER
ues that influence his or her work. Neither Husserl nor
Weber rules out the possibility of the kind of science
envisaged by the other, but each is careful to distin-
guish what he is doing from that which is the primary
interest of the other o ne.
Second, although consciously constructed concepts
cannot substitute for empirica! research in Weber's
eyes, empirica! research cannot do without certain
guiding concepts that govern the interpretati an of the
data and in terms of which any kind of actual social
institutions, relationships, or actions are understood.
Thus the notion of "ideal types" as guiding notions
for empirica! social research plays an important role
for him. The primary difference here is that Weber em-
phasizes the practica! ends for which such concepts are
constructed, and thus stresses the fact that they can be
revised in light of the findings of historical and other
empirica! research. Phenomenology, by contrast, is in-
terested in the identification of essential relationships
that can be ascertained through eidetic variati an in pure
reflection. Hence one important point of difference be-
tween phenomenology and Weber's treatment of ideal
types turns on the question of the mutability of the
concepts that guide the scientist in his or her work.
Alfred Schutz explicitly borrows from both We-
ber and phenomenology in his methodological reflec-
tions. With direct reference to the opening passages of
Wirtschafi und Gesellschafi, he follows Weber in de-
scribing his own project as "verstehende Soziologie"
(a sociology directed at understanding) and declares
in the foreword to Der sinnhafie Aujbau der sozialen
Welt (The meaning-structure ofthe social world, 1932)
that "in the course of these studies the conviction was
strengthened in me that Max Weber's basic question is
indeed the point of departure for any genuine theory of
the social sciences, but that his analyses were not traced
back to that deeper level from which one can master the
tasks that ari se out of the procedure of the human sci-
ences themselves." From Schutz's perspective, Weber
has provided the proper goal for a social science, ECO-
NOMICS as well as sociOLOGY, but failed to trace human
motivation back to the foundations of consciousness
that are revea\ed by a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. Weber fai\ed to achicve this
goal as thoroughly as he might have done. Thus pheno-
menology provides the underpinnings for the genuine
understanding of those phenomena that Weber secs as
731
thc proper object for social sciences, namely human
actions. For Schutz, then, phenomenology and We-
ber's methodology are by no means mutually exclu-
sive. Rather, phenomenology provides the foundation
for the work that Weber had correctly identified as that
of the social scientist.
For Karl Jaspers also, the identification of mean-
ing is the goal of the non-natural scicnces, including
a PSYCHOLOGY oriented toward understanding human
beings. However, this general view had already been
articulated by Dilthey and others in addition to Weber.
It is also truc that especially in his earlier work, Jaspers'
studies are oricnted toward psychological phenomena
and consist to a great extent in the description of ideal
types in terms of which the actual practices of those
treating the mcntally i1l can bc organized. However,
what most captivated Jaspers about Wcber was thc !iv-
ing model of an individual facing his own torments,
ideals, shortcomings, and strengths honestly and reso-
lutely. Thus for him, any theoretical contributions that
Weber made are much less significant than the exam-
ple that Weber provided in his life. In Jaspers' eyes
this life was devoted to the ideals of unfliching dcvo-
tion to truth in the face of unjustified dogmas and thc
willingess always to begin in this search, idcals that for
Husserl were also associated with the original project
of phenomenology.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Burger, Thomas. Max Weber s Theory ofConcept Formation.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976.
Jaspers, Karl. Max Weber. Munich: Piper, 1988; On Max
Weber. Trans. Robert Whelan. New York: Paragon House
1989.
-. Allgemeine Psychopathologie. 4th ed. Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1946.
Kasler, Dirk. Max Weber: An Introduction to His Life and
Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "La crise de 1'entendement." In his
Les aventures de la dialectique. Paris: Gallimard, 1955,
15-42; "The Crisis of Understanding." In his The Adven-
tures of the Dialectic. Trans. Joseph Bien. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1973, 9-29.
Schutz, Alfred. Collected Papers !: The Problem of So-
cial Reality. Ed. Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962.
-. Col/ected Papers li: Studies in Social Theory. Ed. Avrid
Brodersen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
-. The Phenomenology ofthe Social World. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1967.
732 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Wagner, Helmut. Alfred Schutz. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
Weber, Max. Gesammelte Aufsătze zur Wissenschaftslehre.
Tiibingen: Mohr, 1985; The Methodology of the Social
Sciences. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1949.
- . Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 6th ed. Tiibingen: Mohr,
1985; Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press,
1968.
- . "Roscher und Knies." In his Gesammelte Aujsătze zur
Wissenschaftslehre, 1-145; Roscher and Knies: The Log-
ica/ Problems of Historical Econom ies, New York: Knies
1975.
- . "R. Stammlers 'Uberwindung' der materialistischen
Geschichtsauffassung." and "Nachtrag zu dem Aufsatz
iiber R. Stammlers 'Uberwindung' der materialistischen
Geschichtsauffassung." In his Gesammelte Auj.~ătze zur
Wissenschaftslehre, 291-359, 360-83; Critique ofStamm-
ler. New York: The Free Press, 1977.
- . Die protestanische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus.
Weinheim: Beltz Athenăum, 1993; The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Scribner, 1958.
Willame, Robert. Les fondements phenomenologiques de la
sociologie comprehensive: Alfred Schutz et Max Weber.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
THOMAS NENON
University ofMemphis
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN Born in Vienna in
1889, Wittgenstein was the son of a wealthy steel mag-
nate. He had four brothers and three sisters, and ali the
children were gifted with intellectual and artistic tal-
ent. After studying mechanical engineering in Berlin,
he went to England, where he studied engineering at
the University of Manchester. His interest gradually
shifted toward pure mathematics and the philosophical
foundations of mathematics, in part due to his read-
ing of Bertrand Russell 's Principles of Mathematics
(1903). In 1912 he moved to Cambridge to study with
Russell at Trinity College. Under Russell's supervi-
sion, Wittgenstein made great progress, beginning the
research that would !ater be published as the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus ( 1921 ). Wittgenstein 's nervous
and depressed temperament led him to go to Norway
in 1913, to li ve in seclusion in order to do his logica!
researches free from distractions. (In fact, his personal-
ity was so striking that many memoirs and biographies
have been written about him, and there is even a film
about his life.)
When World War I broke out, he entered the Aus-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Iose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
trian army as a volunteer. He continued to work on
the Tractatus while in the army, carrying notebooks
along with him and writing when he had the chance.
He was taken prisoner ofwar in November 1918, ha v-
ing finished the book in August of that year. From the
prison camp Wittgenstein corresponded with Russell,
and managed to have the completed Tractatus trans-
ported to him. It was published in 1921. After the war
Wittgenstein taught at an elementary school in Austria
for severa! years, then returned to Cambridge, where
he submitted the Tractatus as a dissertation and re-
ceived his doctorate. He began lecturing in philosophy
at Cambridge, and succeeded G. E. Moore to the Chair
of Philosophy in 1939. The only works he published
during his lifetime were the Tractatus and a paper enti-
tled "Some Remarks on Logica! Form" (1929). During
World War II he served as a volunteer in hospitals,
working in the laboratory and making some significant
contributions to the treatment ofwounded soldiers. He
returned to his lectures at Cambridge in 1944. Aca-
demic life did not suit Wittgenstein, and he retired
from Cambridge in 1947 to seek an isolated life and
work on another book, the Philosophical Investiga-
tions, which was published posthumously in 1953. He
died of cancer in 1951.
Wittgenstein's philosophy is generally considered
to be divided into two (or three) different phases,
the "early" Wittgenstein represented by the Tractatus
and the Notebooks: 1914-1916, the "middle" Wittgen-
stein ( 1929-33) represented primarily by the Blue
and Brown Books, and the "late" Wittgenstein rep-
resented by the Philosophical1nvestigations, Remarks
on the Foundations ofMathematics, On Certainty, and
Zettel. Two other works, the Philosophical Remarks
and Philosophical Grammar, are placed by some in
the middle period and by others in the !ater period.
(It should be noted that there are many unpublished
manuscripts in the process of being edited and pub-
lished. As these works appear it is inevitable that di-
visions of Wittgenstein 's thought into "periods" will
need tobe re-evaluated.)
In his middle and late periods Wittgenstein claims
that the job of philosophy is to describe and not to
explain; thus at one level there is obvious reason to
compare his philosophy with phenomenology. Many
ha ve compared Wittgenstein 's thought with pheno-
menology, and these comparisons ha ve reached a rather
 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
bewildering range of conclusions. Hence anything that
is tobe said about "Wittgenstein and phenomenology"
is likely to be both debatable and debated.
Wittgenstein 's philosophy has been compared to
those of EDMUND HUSSERL, ALFRED SCHUTZ, MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, and MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY. There are many interesting parallels between
the philosophies ofWittgenstein and Husserl. Both dis-
cussed important foundational issues in the philosophy
of mathematics, as well as broader philosophical ques-
tions. Both claimed to be describing, in some way,
features ofhuman living. Both gave rise to a large and
variegated following, with many philosophers build-
ing upon their work and many arguing for changes and
developing in different directions from the "masters."
Before comparing the philosophy of Wittgenstein
with phenomenology, one must distinguish between
two separate claims: (a) that Wittgenstein was, at some
time or other, actually do ing phenomenology; and (b)
that Wittgenstein 's thought, while not actually pheno-
menology, can be fruitfully compared with, or used in
philosophical dialogue with, phenomenology. By now,
a number of philosophers from both the Continental
and analytic traditions have argued that thesis (b) is
true, and some suggestions concern ing the significance
ofthis claim will be offered below. Whether thesis (a)
is true or not is an issue about which there is very much
disagreement. The published arguments for thesis (a)
exhibit a number of seemingly incompatible claims,
e.g.: ( 1) the views ofthe early, but not the late, Wittgen-
stein are akin to phenomenology, and Wittgenstein has
no "middle period" (Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka); (2)
the middle-period Wittgenstein is "phenomenological"
in the wider sense of the term (HERBERT SPIEGELBERG);
(3) the middle and late Wittgenstein are thoroughly
phenomenological (Nicholas Gier); and (4) Wittgen-
stein 's entire philosophical career is phenomenological
( GERD BRAND ).
On the other hand, it has been argued that Husserl's
method amounts to entering into just the sort of "pri-
vate language" the possibility of which Wittgenstein
denied (SUZANNE CUNNINGHAM), and that for method-
o[ogica) reasons, thesis (a) is not supported by Wittgen-
stein 's writings (HARRY RE EDER). The arguments for and
against thesis (a) stern from differing interpretations of
both Wittgenstein 's philosophical method and the na-
ture ofphenomenological reduction and description.
733
How can one compare Wittgenstein's thought to
phenomenology in the face of such diverse interpreta-
tion? One way is to "accentuate the positive," that is, to
outline some interesting parallels between the pheno-
menological movement and Wittgenstein 's thought. At
least in Wittgenstein 's middle and late periods, he says
that the job of philosophy is to describe and not to
explain. His descriptions of language-use are often
couched in terms of"language-games," either invented
by Wittgenstein to compare and contrast with ordi-
nary language (and, as such, are at best very indirect
"descriptions"), or descriptions ofvarious parts ofthe
actual use of ordinary language. Some have likened
Wittgenstein 's use of imaginary language-games to
Husserl 's use offree variation in phantasy in the EIDETIC
METHOD, although Wittgenstein's rejection ofphenom-
ena universal to ali language-games makes this claim
somewhat problematic. Wittgenstein views LANGUAGE
as made up of a "family" of language-games; the re-
lations between the various language-games are left
rather vague in Wittgenstein, except for the overarch-
ing fact that each language-game is part of the overall
natural language, which is too rich to be "reduced"
or "explained" by any sort of formal logica! represen-
tation. Although his early Tractatus seems to many to
suggest just such a formal representation, his !ater work
- avowedly written to overturn his earlier thought-
rejects such a project.
The middle and late Wittgenstein goes to great
lengths to avoid theorizing, and yet there are some quite
general points that characterize his thought. Through-
out ali the stages ofhis philosophical thought Wittgen-
stein is preoccupied by the ro le and limits of language
in human life. The early Wittgenstein develops an elab-
orate logica! model to explain the fit between Ianguage
and reality. His Tractatus was thought by Russell, by
members of the Vienna Circle, and by many others, to
be closely related to logica! positivism and Russell's
logica! atomism. However, there is evidence, published
in the form ofsome ofWittgenstein's correspondence,
that Wittgenstein regarded this to be a grave misinter-
pretation of the Tractatus. One important part of that
work is the view that some things cannot be said in lan-
guage (philosophical or otherwise), although they can
be "shown." This aspect of his early thought seems
to have remained a part of his view throughout his
philosophicallife.
734 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
According to the Tractatus, language "pictures" the
world by dividing it into logically distinct simple parts.
This is one part ofhis early philosophical thought that
he !ater rejects, suggesting instead that the link be-
tween language and the world is much more com-
plex and intertwined. One may insightfully compare
the Tractatus with Husserl 's Logische Untersuchun-
gen ( 1900--190 1), since both deal with the nature of
language and the founding of true propositions about
language and the world. However, one must be care-
fully mindful of the methodological contexts of these
discussions and to distinguish between claims (a) and
(b) above. For example, whereas Wittgenstein claims
that " ... every sentence 'is in order as it is,'" Husserl
notes that proper phenomenological descriptions must
begin with meanings taken from ordinary language
(and from the philosophical tradition), but then modifY
them to reflect new insights resulting from phenomen-
ological descriptions.
Wittgenstein 's thought - in ali periods - can be
said to reject many traditional elements ofphilosophy.
He thinks that the purpose of philosophy is to settle
theoretical disputes not by solving problems, but by
"dissolving" them - usually by suggesting ways in
which wrong-headed views about language and how it
functions sow the seeds for a misunderstanding, or as
he says, "philosophical problems arise when language
goes on holiday." (Compare with this his statement
in the preface to the Tractatus that this book, which
attempts "to set a limit to thought, or rather - not
to thought, but to the expression of thoughts," and
which achieves "the final solution of the problems,"
nonetheless "shows how little is achieved when these
problems are solved.") Attempts at philosophical ex-
planation arise because philosophers are bewitched by
language. This contrasts widely with Husserl's more
traditional interpretation of the ro le and scope of phi-
losophy and its problems. Above ali, Wittgenstein's
rejection of philosophical explanation seems at odds
with Husserl 's declared interest in the Logische Unter-
suchungen to establish- in a methodologically defen-
sible manner- LOGIC as a theory ofscience, as well as
with the usual interpretations ofthe "phenomenologi-
cal movement" as a coherent and ongoing, concrete
body of philosophical knowledge and practice. (Thus
it would seem that those that wish to argue for thesis
(a), above, are interpreting the results ofWittgenstein 's
investigations in a way quite different from Wittgen-
stein 's own self-interpretation.)
Connected to Wittgenstein 's rejection ofphilosoph-
ical explanation is his rejection of the concept of
"essence." Traditional accounts ofthe "essential" fea-
tures oflanguage are rejected, tobe replaced by care fu!
attention to how language is used, and to the ubiqui-
tous but self-concealing nature of"grammar" - a term
that acquired a unique sense in Wittgenstein 's work,
again one that has been widely interpreted. In fact,
Wittgenstein claims that it is grammar that provides
the closest thing to essential or universal elements of
language-games. He claims that there are no essential
features of language-games, features that are present
in ali instances of language-use; rather, the features
oflanguage blend together in interlocking strands that
he compares to fibers in a rope and to "family resem-
blances." This view would appear to rule out elements
central to the methods employed in Husserl 's, Hei-
degger's, and many other phenomenologists' work, in-
cluding such universal features of human experience
as protention and retention, historicity, horizonality, the
lived BODY, the gaze ofthe alter ego, and other central
elements ofthe LIFEWORLD, although here too, some in-
terpreters find more similarities between Wittgenstein
and phenomenology than this would seem to suggest, in
part due to Wittgenstein 's insistence that explanations
must come to an end, leaving us not with full explana-
tions, but with careful attention to actual praxis.
Wittgenstein 's descriptions oflanguage-use contain
much that should be of interest to phenomenologists,
regardless of whether or not they think that Wittgen-
stein is actually do ing phenomenology. How much use
phenomenologists can make ofWittgenstein's descrip-
tions depends both upon how they view his philosoph-
ical method and upon how they see this method in
relation with phenomenological method (and there is
a wide span of opinions as to just what the phenomen-
ological method is and entails). Some, like Reeder and
the Hintikkas, argue that Wittgenstein 's methodology
is not one of full description, but one of reduction-
istic description, reducing philosophical problems to
purely linguistic issues in a way foreign to phenomen-
ology. Others, like Gier and Brand, find in Wittgen-
stein's works brilliant phenomenological descriptions
of the LIFEWORLD. This difference of opinion tends to
divide over the question of whether or not there is
 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
in Wittgenstein something like EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION.
Gier, PAUL RICCEUR, and to some extent Brand find some
analogue of the epoche in Wittgenstein, while others,
like Spiegelberg and Reeder, are much more conser-
vative in their assessment ofthis issue, finding no true
epoche in Wittgenstein 's works. In large part, these
disagreements stern from differing judgments about
key concepts of Wittgenstein 's philosophy, especially
those of"grammar," "forms oflife," and the nature and
method of his descriptions. After all, not all descrip-
tions are phenomenological, and the key methodolog-
ical difference between phenomenological and non-
phenomenological descriptions stems from the status
ofthose descriptions as determined by a methodolog-
ical framework that is based in some form of epoche,
whether in Husserl 's sense or in the various other forms
it takes in other phenomenologists. To be sure, the
epoche has been revised and reinterpreted by both phe-
nomenologists of the "narrow" sort and phenomenol-
ogists in the "wider sense" established by Spiegelberg
in his important and thorough The Phenomenological
Movement (3rd ed., 1982).
Phenomenologists can use Wittgenstein's descrip-
tions of language-games and their interrelations as
guides in sorting out the complex intersubjective hori-
zons of that form of life called language. His subtle
descriptions of following rules, of how we learn lan-
guage games, of the complexities of ostensive defini-
tions, and ofthe ever flexible relations ofthe meanings
ofwords in their diverse uses provide a wealth of detail
that can be clarified phenomenologically, if one notes
the methodological differences between Wittgenstein 's
descriptions and those ofthe unqualifiedly recognized
phenomenologists. For instance, Wittgenstein's holis-
tic account of the interrelated yet distinct language-
games in some ways parallels Husserl's and Heideg-
ger's view of the primacy of the lived phenomen-
ological unity of many-horizoned experience, prior to
any analysis, description, or explanation. Certainly his
stress upon the public and social elements oflanguage-
games can help phenomenologists to identify and ex-
plore various significant features ofthe intersubjective
constitution of discourse. In this respect, such contem-
porary continental thinkers as Karl-Otto Apel, Jtirgen
Habermas, and Paul Ricceur ha ve carried out just such
researches, and have explored the common ground
between Wittgenstein and HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMEN-
735
OLOGY, in ways beneficia! to the further development
of phenomenology and to the ongoing influence of
Wittgenstein 's thought.
All in all, despite the differing interpretations ofthe
relationship between Wittgenstein 's philosophy and
phenomenology, there is room for much more to be
said on the issue. Certainly one can find rich and accu-
rate descriptions of many linguistic "phenomena" (in
the wide sense of the term) in Wittgenstein 's works.
Scholars have already developed fruitful comparisons
between Wittgenstein's thought and that of various
phenomenologists, and there is good reason to believe
that a great deal of further such work will be enlight-
ening. The focus upon public criteria of MEANING and
the intersubjective nature of Wittgenstein 's language-
games offers a counterbalance to Husserl 's so-called
idealistic tendencies, stemming from his focus upon
the constituting transcendental EGO. The participants
in Wittgenstein's language-games are indeed dwellers
in the lifeworld, in ways that will continue tobe worked
out at greater depth.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Bindeman, Steven L. Heidegger and Wittgenstein: The Poet-
ies ofSilence. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1981.
Brand, Gerd. Die grundlegenden Texte von Ludwig Wittgen-
stein. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1975; The Essential
Wittgenstein. Trans. Robert Innis. New York: Basic Books,
1979.
Cunningham, Suzanne. Language and the Phenomenologi-
cal Reductions of Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1976.
Durfee, Harold A., ed. Analytic Philosophy and Phenomen-
ology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
Erickson, Stephen A. Language and Being: An Analytic
Phenomenology. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1970.
Gier, Nicholas. "Never say 'Never': A Response to Reeder's
'Wittgenstein Never Was a Phenomenologist."' Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology 20 ( 1991 ), 80-83.
- . Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study
of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1981.
Hintikka, Merrill, and Jaakko Hintikka. Investiga/ing
Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Reeder, Harry P. Language and Experience: Descriptions
of Living Language in Husserl and Wittgenstein. Lan-
ham, MD: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen-
ology/University Press of America, 1984.
- . "Wittgenstein Never Was a Phenomenologist." Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology 20 ( 1989), 49-68.
736 ENCYCLOPED!A OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Spiegelberg, Herbert. "The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's
Phiinomenologie ( 1929- ?)." In his The Context of the
Phenomenological Movement. The Hague: Martinus Nij-
hoff, 1981, 202-18.
- . "Wittgenstein Calls His Philosophy "Phenomenology":
One More Supplement to 'The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's
Phănomenologie."' Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 13 (1982), 296-99.
HARRY P. REEDER
University of Texas at Arlington
WORLD Of ali the basic ideas that pheno-
menology developed, perhaps none is better known or
more widely appropriated across a number of disci-
plines than the concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt).
What is not generally recognized, however, is that the
notion ofthe lifeworld is itself derived from the prob-
lematics of a prior notion, that of the world. In fact,
EDMUND HUSSERL had developed the notion ofworld in
a transcendental register before he enriched it with his
notion of the lifeworld. And MARTIN IIEIDEGGER's Sein
und Zeit (1927) as well as his other writings contain
extensive analyses ofthe concept ofthe world but resist
introducing the term "lifeworld," lest it be construed
as a regional rather than a transcendental concept. One
could even go on to argue that for ali the variations
in the approach to the question of subjectivity among
phenomenological thinkers as diverse as Husserl, Hei-
degger, GABRIEL MARCEL, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, and
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (and also Jilrgen Habermas) there is a
surprising consistency in their characterizations of the
notion ofthe world. The differences we do find, which
we will look atin the analysis that follows, are possible
because so much is shared. Perhaps it is this concept
that provides them with their deepest connection to
each other.
Any philosophical analysis ofthe world is intemally
connected to the position from which one approaches
it. Phenomenology takes its starting point in our ev-
eryday experience of things. An object of experience
is always present through multiple modes ofgivenness,
each of which forms a profite of the object. The inter-
play of object and profile transpires according to the
sense (Sinn) of the whole both determin ing and deter-
mined by the sense of the profiles. Without senses the
object would lack its experiential qualities. But senses
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. "hzner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
exist not in the object or its profiles but in the relation-
ship between them and the one to whom they appear.
Profiles are also perspectives, which means that an ob-
ject is always present as situated in space and time.
Initially we can say that the spatial place of the object
and its temporal presence do not exist in the object or
its profiles but in the relationship between them and
the one to whom they appear.
The interna! connection between profiles and ob-
jects is a clue to the conscious events in or through
which they are experienced. Since these are events that
are always directed to the object through its modes of
givenness, they are acts that ha ve an ee-static structure;
since sense is constitutive of that transcendence, they
have INTENTIONALITY. And this means that they are not
directed to themselves as events or achievements, but
to the objects with which they are concemed.
The experience of profiles (Abschattungen, some-
times also called adumbrations) and objects in a given
situation transpires in such a way that the coming pro-
file is already anticipated and prefigured by the profile
in focus. Profiles, by virtue of their sense, point to or
indicate yet other profiles in such a way that we find
things situated in a field of possible appearances, i.e.,
in a determinate horizon. The horizon is not itself an
appearance but is always "pregiven," i.e., it mediates
the relationship between what is given and the anticipa-
tions that it solicits. The horizon is a complex ofsenses,
themselves connected by what we can caii differential
implications, that structure the indications in play with
any given profile. Jndication is the horizon at play in the
relationship between profiles and then between profile
and object. Dif.ferential implication is the horizon at
play within itself. Bringing these two strands together,
we can describe the horizon as a nexus of indications
( Verweisungszusammenhang ).
Horizons are tied to yet other horizons also by differ-
ential implication. The nexus of these interconnected
horizons is what constitutes the world. In Husserl 's
terminology, it is the horizon of ali horizons.
Perhaps the best way to understand Husserl's de-
veloped notion of the lifeworld is to isolate his char-
acterization of it as horizon and then examine how it
figures in his assessment of modern NATURAL SCIENCE,
i.e., the science ofmedium-sized objects begun in the
17th century and extending up to recent developments
in quantum and astrophysical theory. (Others of his
 WORLD
studies relate the HUMAN SCIENCES and also LOGIC and
MATHEMATICS to the lifeworld.) He undertakes both a
critica! account, in which science precipitates a crisis
for Western thought by valorizing the "objectivistic"
image ofthe world, setting it in opposition to the life-
world and then devaluing the latter as world of mere
belief, and a genetic account, in which science regains
its moorings as we come to understand the scope of its
legitimacy by seeing how it does arise from the life-
world and how it can be connected to essential, human
interests.
In his effort to overthrow the positivistic, objec-
tivistic or NATURALISTIC self-understanding of modern
science, in the hope of then repositioning it on its
proper philosophical ground and bringing it under the
direction of rationally justifiable human ends, Husserl
directly challenges the identification of the world it
projects- roughly, the mathematized world of New-
tonian physics consisting only of quantitative determi-
nations- with the only true world-in-itself. The world
in which we li ve and with which we are most familiar,
day in and day out, is not the one projected by scien-
tific thought. Rather the things we "first" see belong to
the world ofwhat Husserl calls Anschauung, intuition,
a term he uses to describe our direct perceptual and
experiential acquaintance with the everyday things of
our environment "before" they, wrapped in interpreta-
tion, stand forth as data. Here we tind the lush green of
a field in an early morning haze, not light waves 512
nanometers in length, refracted by vaporized H2 0 as
the axis ofthe earth turns.
The intuitive world should be defined not as a core
ofpre-cultural, primitive perceptions, but as the world
in which things appear in terms of their experiential
qualities, values, and uses, and are integrated into our
larger concerns on the basis of their integrity. This is
the world that stands over against the quantified world
of modem science. But Husserl, in addition, argues that
the lifeworld is also the world from which the world
projected in the natural sciences arises. He does this
by showing that the world under a scientific descrip-
tion is a construction that takes its starting point from
and arises through methodologically guided transfor-
mations of the lifeworld. As he first put it in lectures
in 1919 (Manuscript signature F I 35), the objects of
the immediately intuited world already have a sense-
content that functions as a substrate for scientific work.
737
The intuition of an object or event involves the in-
terlocking of PERCEPTION and apperception, of presen-
tation and appresentation. As an intentiona! experience
ofthe whole object, it is drawn beyond what analysis
would describe as the directly given, for each profile
is situated in a series of anticipated, possible profiles,
predelineated by the horizon in play, and each intuition
transcends the profile in its apprehension ofthe whole.
The interplay between actual profile and anticipated
profiles is not a random but a structured series, as they
tend to converge on an optimum that ongoing experi-
ence exhibits as it approaches. Through the "and so on"
of profiles and an attending subordination ofprofiles to
the wholes they indicate, senses become stable types
and objects take up their familiar presence for us. The
natural attitude relies on this constitution of a familiar
world, yet without being able to thematize it as such.
Born of wonder, philosophy and science, not yet
distinguished in ancient Greece, were efforts at dis-
covering and articulating the logos of this unthema-
tized world. They broke with, but not through, the nat-
ural attitude in the sense that they transcend the endless
iteration produced by the horizon in order to grasp seg-
ments of it as wholes. This required a reflection that
temporarily suspends the interests that sustain the func-
tioning of differential implications, deliberately varies
the appearances of a gi ven field in such a way that their
optima are allowed to exhibit a limiting ideal or point
of unity; and finally, articulates the rules that govern
the series ofphenomena that now show themselves as
instances of or approximations to the eidos. The value
ofthis method is that it produces a theoretical or crit-
ica! mastery of the objectifiable features or properties
of a given region, which yields a practica! or technical
mastery allowing us to build and rebuild our environ-
ments.
Various disciplines arose as they concentrated on
different regions ofthe world and submitted them to a
process of classification and explanation. While break-
ing with it, they were originally rooted in the lifeworld,
in the sense that they depended upon a wider, pre-
given yet unthematized horizon distributing the differ-
ent regions; in the sense that the processes of ideation
and idealization were continuous with the project of
rendering the type-bound perceptual optima we ex-
perience exact; in the sense that the "sciences" were
largely practica! arts whose explanatory schemes were
738 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
designed to produce changes in the world; and in the
sense that their theoretical component, at Ieast up to
Aristotle, belonged to the same uni verse of discourse
as ordinary Ianguage.
The introduction of modem natural science brought
about a fundamental paradigm shift. By transforming
idealization into mathematization, by identifying the
world as a totality covering aii that exists and then
characterizing it in terms of a mathematized notion of
infinity, the world and the things in it become inter-
preted as mathematizable manifolds, i.e., reduced to
the intersection of sets of features that can be mea-
sured, plotted, and submitted to statistica! description
and verification. The method is designed to eliminate
the perceptual background and establish the theoreti-
cal field of quantifiable predicates and causally Iinked
relations as the sole context in which things, facts, or
events can show themselves. While this yields even
greater theoretical understanding and technical mas-
tery over the things ofnature, it results in science !os ing
any recognizable bond to the Iifeworld.
Building on the double forgetting constitutive of
the natural attitude, modern science is twice free yet
twice blind: free from the relativity of subjectivity and
free from the relativity ofthe Iifeworld; blind to those
epistemic practices by means of which it is produced
and blind to the transformations of background that
allows phenomena to stand forth as data.
But the deperspectivization ofthe world by modem
science is never complete, because its content comes
forth from a field that, while universal, is constituted
by theoretically sustained practices it must acknowl-
edge as such when there is a breakdown or paradox
generated in a given field of study (e.g., particle vs.
wave theory), and because its method relies on activ-
ities that involve ordinary intuitions and experimental
operations that require nonformalizable acts of inter-
pretation (e.g., reading marks on instruments). Since
even the science that has rid the world of subjectivity
can only be understood as the "correlate" of subjectiv-
ity, the phenomenological critique of science already
points the way to an understanding of how its legit-
imacy can be established: the project of developing
the theoretical and practica! knowledge that allows for
a mastery of nature must be blended into a broader
range of human interests and the Iarger project of hu-
man emancipation.
Husserl undertook studies ofthe relationship ofthe
Iifeworld not only to the natural sciences, but also to
logic and cultural formations. These studies carne in
the early 1920s, just as he was developing his notion
of GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY. The treatment of logic, in
both his Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929)
and Eifahrung und Urteil ( 1939), attempts to trace its
semantics back to a pregiven perceptual world and an
interest in TRUTH that transforms ordinary into propo-
sitional discourse. Logica! REASON, he was convinced,
never Ioses its roots in practica! reason. The treatment
of cultural formations as constructions that both pre-
suppose and yet arise out of the Iifeworld reflects his
debt to WILHELM DILTHEY. While there are studies in
this area that go back as far as 19 1O, the first indica-
tion of this in his published writings are three articles
that appeared in 1923 and 1924 in the Japariese peri-
odica!, Kaizo, reprinted in in 1989 in his Aufsătze und
Vortrăge [ 1922-193 7] along with two other essays that
never appeared. His basic approach is to see the devel-
opment of humanity toward its rationally defined true
end as a progressive historcal transformation ofvarious
cultural forms within the Iifeworld.
There are clear tensions in Husserl 's characteri-
zation of the Iifeworld, which Die Krisis der eu-
ropăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phănomenologie (1936) struggles to resolve. They
arise because while he was the first to characterize
the world as horizon, he tends to superimpose upon it
features that arise ifwe think of it as totality. The wor1d
is treated both as the experiential world of intuition that
underlies and grounds the world of practica! and the-
oretical goals, and as a concrete whole that- due to
the "flowing in" and "sedimentation" of practica! and
cultural achievements-encompasses the multiplicity
of particular worlds.
The two notions of Iifeworld, world as experien-
tial whole and world as concrete universal, are easier
to place together if we think of the world as horizon,
break with Husserl's tendency to reduce LANGUAGE to
its expressive function, and require him to supplement
the notion of background with that of context. Par-
ticular worlds are forged through intersubjective, so-
cial achievements and thus necessarily rely on differ-
ent types of discursive interaction for the construction
of their domains, for the dynamics of communication
within them, and for the regulation of their activities.
 WORLD
Language comes into play and, along with it, concep-
tual networks without which we would not have partic-
ular spheres. These networks are contexts. In contrast
to backgrounds, which are complexes of senses de-
ployed across the relationship of our BODY to things,
contexts can be described as socially constructed and
inscribed matrices of meaning (Bedeutung). The rela-
tionship between elements in a matrix is o ne of differ-
ential entailment. The relationship between facts and
affair-complexes constituted in contexts can be char-
acterized as referential entailment.
We gain purchase on the notion of the lifeworld
only if we characterize the horizon in terms of the
interplay of context and background. In that ali re-
gions are situated within differential blends of context
and background, which they also (re )structure through
sedimentation, the horizon is a concrete universal.
In that ali contexts presuppose and thus rest upon a
(back)ground of embodied perceptual experience (in-
tuition) and practica! involvements (know-how), the
description of the horizon as experiential matrix can
be turned into a point about the interna! organization
ofthe horizon itself.
In Sein und Zeit (1927) MARTIN HEIDEGGER observes
that our basic sense ofthings comes from our practica!
involvement with them as implements or equipment
(Zeug), not as items of detached perceptual cognition.
In his terms, the objects that we are related to "proxi-
mally and for the most part" should not be character-
ized as present-at-hand (vorhanden), not as the sheer
things we look at and cognitively register (Sicht), but
as ready-to-hand (zuhanden), as objects that, in our
looking around, we view as appropriate for certain
practica! tasks ( Umsicht). This means that equipment,
as what we use to reach a certain end, is defined by its
functional involvement (Bewandtnis) in a task or situ-
ation in which we are also caught up. And this entails
that the basic sense that we have of ourselves is not
as a cognizing subject who is related to things, but as
an engaged agent who is involved with them and who
finds what he or she is in what he or she does. Because
the dyads of inner and outer, passive and active, and
subject and object are inadequate to cover the recip-
roca! determination and circulation we find between
actions, systems of involvement, and objects, Heideg-
ger replaced Husserl 's notion of subjectivity with the
concept ofDASEIN (human existence).
739
When something is an object in use, its being as
equipment is not thematic. It is lost in the goal or the
task at hand, i.e., it indicates or points not to itself but
the nail to be struck, the board to be sawed, the shed to
be built. But if the hammer or saw breaks, if it is not
sui table for the task at hand, or if it is just plain miss-
ing, we are immediately redirected back upon the item
in terms of its instrumentality and its relation to yet
other equipment. When indication is disturbed, indica-
tion becomes explicit. What the object is is understood
in terms of just its differential relationship to yet other
items in the shop. Thereby, the workshop with its total-
ity of equipment comes into view. And with this whole,
the world announces itself.
This preliminary "ontic" presencing of the world
as environing world ( Umwelt) becomes the guiding
thread to Heidegger's FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL char-
acterization of the worldliness ( Weltlichkeit) of the
world, i.e., the world as it belongs to the transcen-
dental structure ofDasein. Each tool points to a whole
of equipment in which what is ready-tohand shows
itself as such. That whole, however, is a system of in-
volvements that can exist only by virtue of an interna!
relation to what allows for such involvement. Involve-
ments are established for the sake of Dasein and its
projects. But this happens in such a way that Dasein
is necessarily referred to the nexus of involvements as
that in which it comes to realize and understand itself.
Heidegger's study of instrumental objects allows him
to uncover a structure that applies to ali regions and
thus belongs to Dasein itself: the world, to which ali
human action is referred and in which it is situated.
He characterized it ontologically as the nexus of indi-
cations that is constitutive of the involvement of self,
objects, and others in various situations.
Husserl had clearly developed basic elements of
his theory of the lifeworld in course lectures and
manuscripts before the publication of Sein und Zeit,
and there are indications that Heidegger was famil-
iar with some of them. Still, Heidegger's approach
through a study of instrumental backgrounds is orig-
inal and sparkles with a precision missing even from
Husserl 's )ater accounts in the Krisis. We might set his
account of the world over against Husserl 's in roughly
three ways.
(1) Though Husserl carne to broaden his notion of
intuition, that mode in which the world is disclosed,
740 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
it still yields only a derivative notion of objects and,
as a consequence, of world, not the one that is in fact
operative in the originally practica! natural attitude.
Because looking-at or looking-onto (An-schauen) al-
ready effects a separation between the look and the
use of things, Husserl gives at best a phenomenologi-
cal account of the background constitutive of what is
present-at-hand. At worst, he makes the mistake of
attempting to derive the ready-to-hand (the world of
practica! objects) from the present-athand (the world
of intuited objects ).
(2) The tension that we find in Husserl's charac-
terization of the world as uni verse of intuition and as
concrete universal is clearly resolved by Heidegger's
rejection ofthe first and his modification ofthe second.
While he does think of world as covering all regions
of existence in the sense that as concrete, it is "modifi-
able" into the structural wholes ofwhatever particular
worlds we ha ve at the time and in the sense that its a pri-
ori structure is operative in each ofthem, he institutes a
mode of analysis that does not require tuming the world
into an object, and thus preserves its integrity as a struc-
ture of meaning. Husserl argued against KANT that the
world is an object. Heidegger sides with Kant. The
problem is that in his effort to articulate the "subjec-
tive achievements" in and through which the world as
world is constituted, Husserl 's first Cartesian program
necessarily construes it as a world "for" consciousness
and thus as "outside" its being. Because Heidegger
understands achievements as based in our practica! in-
teraction with things, which is itself caught up in a
nexus of involvement, he develops a HERMENEUTICS of
world that moves to it as a whole from within. As a re-
suit, he can do justice to Dasein's facticity (Faktizităt),
the sense in which Dasein is in the world and not just
related to the world. Perhaps this is the reason why Part
One of Sein und Zeit does not directly employ Husserl 's
notion of horizon in its characterization of the world.
Heidegger worries that even with the broader notion of
lifeworld that covers ali regions of existence, not just
the intuitive, Husserl 's account is sti li mixed and still
bound to a "pre-ontological existentiell meaning."
(3) While both Husserl and Heidegger use the notion
of indication as the key to the notion of world, there
are important and subtle differences. For Husserl, indi-
cation (Anzeige) operates by a movement of one item
pointing (hinweisen) to yet another in such a way that
an item that is lifted out or prominent establishes an-
ticipations of what is similar. Identity is primary; dif-
ference is derived. The unlike, as he says, comes to
prominence on the hasis of the common. As a result,
horizons are build up by unifying syntheses and should
be described as webs with nodes having a sense-content
that establishes relations of opposition and difference
to yet other nodes, i.e., as nexuses of identificational
schemata. For Heidegger, indication (Verweisung) is
a constant movement of deferring such that the sim-
ilarity between objects and then their identity results
from their place in a web of functional oppositions
and contrasts. Accordingly, the horizons are nexuses
of differential schemata.
But Heidegger also struggled with the limits of his
own analysis. From the perspective of his !ater work
the developed ontologica! notion ofworld (and Dasein
itself) in Sein und Zeit was but a preliminary study
that opens the way to the question ofBeing. In "Bauen
Wohnen Denken" (1951) it seems that the in-structure
ofDasein, which was first understood in terms (Befind-
lichkeit and Verstehen) that paralleled the traditional
concepts of sensibility and understanding, is reinter-
preted in terms of the notion of dwelling (Wohnen).
Dwelling allows objects and others the type of involve-
ment they have as it serves as the hasis for building
(Bauen), that primary activity ofthose who dwell and,
we can add, the activity that framed the whole account
of the ready-to-hand in Sein und Zeit. However, in-
volvement is defined here not by the notion of world,
but by that ofthe "fourfold" (das Geviert): by dwelling
being on the earth, under the heavens, called forth by
the divinity, in relation to mortals. If dwelling is the
hasis of building, that project of founding and joining
lived spaces, and building is essential to the worldli-
ness ofthe world in which we dwell, as Sein und Zeit
might lead us to believe, then we can see the late Hei-
degger reaching for a notion, the fourfold, on which
the world is based and from which it is derived.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY had access to the Husserl
manuscripts of Ideen zu einer reinen Phănomenologie
und phănomenologischen Philosophie II [ 1912-15]
and much of the Krisis as he was writing his ground-
breaking Phimomenologie de la perception ( 1945). He
realized that over against the published account in
Ideen I ( 1913) of intentionality as a mental structure
belonging to "absolute" consciousness, there was a sec-
 WORLD
ond account in play that re! ied on the notion of lived
BODY (Leib) to explain the dependence of perceptual
acts on ACTION, the spatiality of perceptual fields, and
those "passive syntheses" that accord things their per-
ceptual senses. At the same time, the categoria! account
of the notion of Dasein in Heidegger seemed to Iose
the particular concreteness that is true of our existence
and that was required by his own notion of facticity.
Merleau-Ponty's solution was not only to character-
ize the subject in terms being-in/to-the world (etre-
aumonde), but also to introduce the lived body and
corporeal existence - an idea Heidegger would have
considered pre-ontological- as the primary mode of
that being. Giving prominence to the lived body al-
lowed Merleau-Ponty to root perceptual experience in
something deeper than mental acts (Ideen /) or struc-
tural features of conscious fields (Sein und Zeit); to sta-
bilize the difference between non-epistemic and cultur-
ally and linguistically mediated epistemic perception;
and finally, to develop a notion of perceptual horizon
in which senses are located in the interna! connection
between perception and the actions ofthe body.
Husserl 's strong notion of EVIDENCE required re-
course to presentations and intuitions as means through
which the structure of different fields of phenomena
could be established. His Cartesianische Meditationen
[ 1931] drew out the consequence of this approach for
an understanding of our relations with others and left
US with a theory of INTERSUBJECTIVITY that required a
starting point in the intuitive experience ofthe isolated
subject and a notion of empathy to explain how we
cross the abyss between my consciousness and that of
the other. While clearly there are other approaches to
the question of intersubjectivity and the social world
at play from 191 O through the Krisis- and while one
could argue that the Meditationen text was not intended
as an account ofthe constitution of our primary cohab-
itation with others, but a transcendental reconstruction
designed to secure in evidence the presence of others-
it was and stil! is taken as Husserl's definitive account
of social existence. The inadequacies of this account
were made ali the more evident by the ease with which
Sein und Zeit moved from Dasein to Mitsein and, in
fact, accounted for its priority: our involvement with
equipment is such that it is ready-to-hand for others
also, not as others who stand over against me, but as
others from whom 1 do not distinguish myself. The
741
world ofDasein is essentially the world in which 1 am
with others (Mitwelt).
Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological ap-
proaches to the question of the world opened the way
for the work of ALFRED scHUTZ and many others who
attempted to connect a phenomenology of the social
world with the notion of the world as used in so-
CIOLOGY and the cultura] or HUMAN SCIENCES. While
Der sinnhafle Aujbau der sozialen Welt (The meaning-
structure of the social world, 1932) stil! moves out
from the experiential world of the solitary ego to an
account ofmy understanding of others, Schutz quickly
distinguishes between taking the other as an object and
taking the other as a "Thou." When the I-Thou re-
lation becomes reciproca! we have a we-relationship.
The face-to-face situation, he argues, is basic to ali
other types of other-orientation, but is in itself empty.
Ali it does is secure the (recognition of) the presence
of the other as Thou. In order for the we-relationship
to acquire specificity and content, the social world in
which the we-relationship is grounded and from which
it unfolds must become part of the analysis. The so-
cial world, spatially and temporally extended from the
world of direct social experience to the distant worlds
of our predecessors and successors, he characterizes
as a nexus of significance (Sinnzusammenhang). In
Strukturen der Lebenswelt (Structures ofthe lifeworld,
1973, 1983), his work in progress when he died in
1959, Schutz continues to argue for the thoroughly so-
cial character of the everyday lifeworld but expands
his initial notion of nexus of significance through a
stronger theory of action.
Drawing upon hints in Husserl, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty and yet responding to the surprising
lack of any developed theory of technology in the
thinkers considered thus far, DON IHDE's major work,
Technology and the Lifeworld ( 1990), looks to pheno-
menological and hermeneutica! dimensions oftechno-
logically mediated experience as the key to what we
mean by lifeworld. The excessively "cognitive" ap-
proach to the transformation ofthe lifeworld, stressing
the impact of scientific theory or cultural interpreta-
tions on how we see things, is replaced with a rich
account of the way the instruments we build and the
devices we use concretely transform not just the things
in our environment, but the style of our embodied rela-
tionship to them. Because technologies "enframe," the
742 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
lifeworld assumes a variety of "shapes" that can best
be studied through an account of the transformative
effects of the devices and systems of instruments that
we develop.
Ifwe can situate Ihde's account in terms ofSchutz's
neglect ofthe material transformations ofthe lifeworld
produced by technology, we can find Jtirgen Haber-
mas's theory of the lifeworld attempting simultane-
ously to expand upon the culturally abridged concept of
the world in Schutz by distinguishing cultural, social,
and personality structures and mechanisms of repro-
duction, and to dislodge the primacy ofthe sociologica!
notion of system in Talcott Parsons ( 1902-1979) and
Niklas Luhmann by seeing it as a theoretical concept
whose application depends upon an account of forms
of action and integration as viewed from the perspec-
tive of participants in a lifeworld. Habermas expands
and corrects Husserl 's "correlational a priori": one way
to view his monumental Theorie des kommunikativen
Handelns (Theory of communicative action, 1981) is
to see the notion of intersubjective communicative dis-
course (Voi. 1) as a noetics of communicative action
(his corrected and developed vers ion of Husserl 's un-
derlying structure of intentionality), and to view his
multifaceted notion of lifeworld (Voi. 2) as its NOEMAT-
tcs.
Because he relies even more heavily than in ear-
lier theory upon relations across structural components
of the lifeworld, and because he stresses the histor-
ical transformation of the lifeworld from earlier to
modem societies, Habermas takes horizon as a notion
that allows coordination between the different types
of communication and action. Concretely this requires
a shared situation, which is itself a "cut" out of the
lifeworld. Actiona! situations rely upon the world as a
stock ofwhat is pre-understood and taken for granted.
In characterizing this horizon Habermas reaches for
the now familiar notion of Verweisungszusammenhang
(nexus of indications). But since he understands this
stock as a linguistically organized reserve of knowl-
edge, as it must be for concrete social interaction, we
should characterize his notion ofhorizon as a nexus of
referential entailments. Habermas 's gloss on the dif-
ference between Husserl and Heidegger is to view the
lifeworld as it functions in human action as a nexus of
interpretative schemata, linguistically structured and
culturally mediated, but one that develops through the
consolidation of difference into settled background be-
liefs, and thus consists primarily of identţficational
schemata that shape the qualities of social complexes
and situations.
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Carr, David. Phenomenology and the Problem of History.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1974.
Gurwitsch, Aron. Phenomenology and the Theory ofScience.
Ed. Lester Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestem Univer-
sity Press, 1974.
Habermas, Jiirgen. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
Voi. 1, Handlungsrationalitdt und gesellschafiliche Ratio-
nalisierung, Voi. 2, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Ver-
nunft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981; The Theory of
Communicative Action, Vo/1, Reason and the Rationaliza-
tion ofSociety, Voi. 2, Li.feworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1984-87.
Heidegger, Martin. "Bauen Wohnen Denken" [ 1951]. In his
Vortrdge und Az,ţf.~dtze, Pfullingen: Neske, 1954, 145--62;
"Building Dwelling Thinking." In his Poetry, Language,
Thought. Ed. and trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York:
Harper & Row, 1971, 145--61.
Ihde, Don. Technology and the Li.feworld: From Garden to
Earth. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Janssen, Paul. Geschichte und Lebenswelt. The Hague: Mar-
linus Nijhoff, 1970.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Welt als phănomenologisches Prob-
lem." In his Der Weg der Phdnomenologie. Giitersloh:
Gerd Mohn, 1963, 41--{;2; "The World as a Phenomen-
ological Problem." Trans. Dorion Caims and Donn Wel-
ton. In his The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six
Essays. Ed. Donn Welton. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1981, 122-48.
~. "Seinsregionen und regionale Ontologien in Husserls
Phănomenologie." In his Der Weg der Phdnomenologie.
Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963, 143--{;2; "Regions ofBeing
and Regional Ontologies in Husserl's Phenomenology."
Trans. Richard Cote. In his The Phenomenology of Ed-
mund Husserl, 149-75.
~. "Das Problem der transzendentalen Wissenschaft vom
lebensweltlichen Apriori." In his Phdnomenologie und
Geschichte. Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1967, 148-66; "The
Problem of the Transcendental Science of the A Priori of
the Lifeworld." Trans. Donn Welton. In his The Pheno-
menology of Edmund Husserl, 176-200.
Schutz, Alfred. Der sinnhafte Aujbau der sozialen Welt.
Vienna: Springer, 1932; The Phenomenology of the So-
cial Wortd. Trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert.
Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1967.
~, and Thomas Luckmann. Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt,
Vot. 1. Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1975; The Structures ofthe
Li.fe-Wortd, Vot. 1. Trans. Richard Zaner and Tristram En-
gelhardt Jr. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press,
1973; Die Strukturen der Lebenswett, Voi. 2. Frankfurt am
Main: Surhkamp, 1983; The Structures of the Li.fe- Wortd,
 WORLD 743

Voi. 2. Trans. Richard Zaner and David Parent. Evanston, WORLDS, POSSIBLE See POSSIBLE WORLDS.
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989.

DONN WELTON
State University of New York, Stony Brook

YUGOSLAVIA A glance at the "Bibliogra-
phy of Phenomenology in Yugoslavia" in Analecta
Husserliana 27 (1988) shows that there is hardly a
philosophical author in the country who has not writ-
ten one or more articles on phenomenology and that
there ha ve been a large number of books and articles
on phenomenology in the last six decades. It is also not
by chance that severa! world conferences on pheno-
menology have been held in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and
Dubrovnik and that the most important representatives
ofthis philosophy have attended.
The influence ofphenomenological philosophy be-
gan to be felt in Yugoslavia during the mid-1930s.
EDMUND HUSSERL 's Die Krisis der europiiischen Wis-
senschaften und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie
( 1936) appeared in the Bel grade joumal Philosophia,
which was founded and edited by Arthur Lieberth,
the former editor of Kant-Studien. This followed the
first extensive review of phenomenological philoso-
phy, Fenomenologija u savremeno nemackoj jilosofiji
(Phenomenology in contemporary German philosophy,
1933), by ZAGORKA MICIC who was a student at Freiburg
under Husserl.
This work is based on Husserl's Ideen zu einer
reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen
Philosophie 1 (1913) and Formale und transzenden-
tale Logik ( 1929), and begins from the premise that as
the most influential orientation in philosophy, pheno-
menology is, above ali, a method that by delving
deep into the immediately given, reaches transcen-
dental consciousness as the field of phenomenologi-
cal investigation. Ali phenomenologies, she claims,
are connected by the application of the method and
a common ethos, i.e., a strict objectivity that is incon-
ceivable without absolutely scientific consciousness.
The results of Husserl 's phenomenology are reftected
in (a) the restoration of the notion of strictly scien-
tific knowledge, (b) the criticism of anthropological
relativism (skepticism), (c) the focus on the matters
themselves, and (d) the discovery of the field of tran-
Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
scendental consciousness as a correlate in which the
matters themselves can be observed.
Four years !ater, Micic published Fenomenologija
Edmunda Husserla (The phenomenology of Ed-
mund Husserl, 1934), her doctoral dissertation writ-
ten at Freiburg under Husserl. This study motivated
the philosopher and German scholar Momcilo Se-
leskovic ( 1890--1950) to publish his own evaluation of
phenomenological philosophy, Husserlove tri zablude:
Povodom jednog prikaza njegove fenomenologije
(Three errors ofHusserl: On the occasion of a review of
his phenomenology, 1938), and to conci ude that "what
Husserl presents as his philosophy are perhaps only a
collection of purely verbal constructions conditioned,
for the most part, by the structure of the German lan-
guage." The three errors he finds in Husserl originate
in a misreading ofthe philosophies of KANT, Descartes,
and the philosophical foundations ofmathematics.
Starting from Kant's error that knowledge can be
explained psychologically, Husserl (a) identifies psy-
chology with the psychology of feeling and draws the
erroneous conclusion that knowledge cannot be ex-
amined psychologically. (b) Regarding Descartes, Se-
leskovic holds that Husserl erroneously believed that
there is no epistemologically certain way that leads
from consciousness to the world, and thus deprived
human knowledge of ali real content. And (c) due to
a misunderstanding of mathematics and an incomplete
criticism of mathematical facts, Husserl deduced cer-
tain logicisms and confused them with the immediate
givens of consciousness. Seleskovic considers these
errors to be the result of Husserl's struggle against
psychologism, and concludes that the philosopher, al-
though he has not revealed new truths, is among those
who try to think honestly and that his ethos and honesty
have drawn ali the best philosophical minds to him.
Although Seleskovic's criticism is mostly a polemic
with the founder of phenomenology and not with the
study ofMicic, she felt called upon to reply withKritika
i saznanje (Criticism and knowledge, 1938), pointing
to the undeniable positive results of phenomenology.
(a) Husserl did not claim that psychology cannot ex-
amine and explain knowledge, but that psychological
explanation and examination of knowledge does not
solve the question of logic and theory of knowledge.
(b) Descartes's fundamental position does not mean
being enclosed in consciousness, and it cannot be said
744
 YUGOSLAVIA
that phenomenology closes itself up in consciousness
or that it loses the content of consciousness: conscious-
ness is not a res cogito, but an immediately given fiow
of awareness of the world. In other words, phenomen-
ology does not remove the content of consciousness
but takes it as immediately given in experience. (c)
Seleskovic's third objection, which concems the ex-
istence of numbers, is the consequence of the out-
dated literature he uses ( or a misunderstanding which
is cleared up when one bears in mind the indefinite-
ness ofthe term "concept" [Begrif/1 in Husserl, whose
primary intention was to show that the ideal objectiv-
ity of numbers is independent both of counting as a
psychological function and of our real subjectivity).
If one had to point out the authors most noted for
the infiuence of phenomenology in Yugoslavia and the
forming of an indigenous philosophy in its wake, one
would have to mention, above ali, the names of ANTE
PAZANIN and MILAN DAMNYANOVIC. fol!owing his stud-
ies of philosophy at Zagreb, Pazanin went on to study
at Munster with Joachim Ritter and received his doc-
torate at Ko!n under LUDWIG LANDGREBE with a dis-
sertation entitled Wissenschaft und Geschichte in der
Phănomenologie Edmund Husserls (Science and his-
tory in the phenomenology ofEdmund Husserl, 1972).
As a professor for many years and the dean of the
Faculty of Politica! Sciences at Zagreb for severa!
terms, Pazanin is largely responsible for phenomen-
ological philosophy becoming deeply rooted there. His
above-mentioned study ofphenomenology emphasizes
the transcendentalphenomenological idea of science as
Husserl established it in "Philosophie als strenge Wis-
senschaft" ( 1911 ). In order to show the possibility of a
historical foundation of philosophy, Pazanin followed
this with a presentation of the ways philosophy re-
alizes itself as a science in the form of transcenden-
tal phenomenology. Starting out from severa! already
charted roads into phenomenology (the Cartesian way,
the way that leads from ontology, the way from pheno-
menological psychology), he focuses on the notion of
HISTORY that he finds in Husserl's Krisis. He considers
this work the high point ofphenomenology, because it
opens up new fields for philosophy. Pazanin addresses
the problems ofhistorical totality and how philosophy
belongs to the world. In this way, he opens the question
of the "third dimension," i.e., the matter of dialectics,
which remained alien to Husserl, but emerged despite
745
his intention. If, in keeping with EUGEN FINK, Husserl's
interpretation ofhistory does not differ from that which
we find in the great "idealist" philosophers of classical
German philosophy, then it is possible to establish a
dialogue between HEGEL and Husserl, which led him
to focus his attention on Husserl 's Vorlesungen zur
Phănomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [ 1905).
At the IVth Colloquium on Phenomenology held
in Schwăbish-Hall in 1969, Pazanin spoke on "Istina i
svet zivota kod poznog Husserla" (Truth and the life-
world in the late Husserl), contending that ali the prob-
lems of phenomenology continue tobe current and that
this either points to solutions or to a level below which
philosophical thought should not descend. He agrees
with MARTIN HEIDEGGER that phenomenology should be
understood not in its actuality, but in its possibility. Our
task is the historical understanding ofthe being (Sein)
of TRUTH in the late Husserl, and the realization that
the Lebenswelt is constantly founded as the basis and
being of ali truths. It is necessary, he thinks, to answer
the question of how theoretical truths are founded in
various forms of human practice. Pazanin furthermore
insists on a new conception of science. He is conscious
that phenomenology is a universal science of being;
that before Husserl there is no such thematization; and
that it is therefore necessary that each being should be
encompassed in its truth.
In this way phenomenology has to pose the question
on its own about the being ofthe Lebenswelt. The LIFE-
WORLD is understood as an assumption and sphere of its
own truth. In search of objective knowledge, modern
science exceeds its mark by following the mathemat-
ical method. It is important to point out that Pazanin
finds a link between Husserl's criticism of modern ob-
jectivism and Vico's criticism of the Cartesian postu-
lates ofthe world. Husserl's criticism of"physicalistic
reality" corresponds to Vico's criticism of the one-
sidedness of the modern method that mathematizes
everything. Both cal! for a study of humanity's histor-
ical world. Thus Pazanin sees Husserl as a thinker of
human ACTION and finds him as radical as he is revolu-
tionary. Theory assumes a "practice ofhuman survival"
and Husserl advises human beings to find a way out
of the crisis in which they finds themselves. It is in
this re gard that one can understand Pazanin 's growing
interest in the problems of practica! philosophy and his
subsequent retum to Aristotle.
746 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
As the translator of severa! of Husserl 's studies and
editor of a collection of essays - Fenomenologija
( 1975), which presents the writings ofthe most impor-
tant representatives of the phenomenological move-
ment - as well as the author of a number of intro-
ductions, Mi lan Damnjanovic is certainly among those
who have done the most to make phenomenological
philosophy one of the strongest orientations in Yu-
goslavia.
At first, in his introduction to Husserl's "Philoso-
phie als strenge Wissenschaft," which, inspired by
Landgrebe, he translated into Serbian with his wife,
Damnjanouvic contends that Husserl abandoned the
idea of scientificity and departed from Cartesianism.
Severa! years later, in a 1970 review article on pheno-
menology that is under the direct influence of a new
reading ofthe Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ),
he places an emphasis on EIDETIC METHOD and so he in-
terprets Husserl's phenomenology as a philosophy of
essence. It is only in 1975, in his introduction to a col-
lection of essays by the most prominent representatives
of phenomenology ever published in Yugoslavia, that
Damnjanouvic stresses the transcendental dimension
of phenomenology. He points out that although there
is a great interest and a large number of studies, the
situation is still an open one, and that after HERBERT
SPIEGELBERG, it is impossib1e to make a new historical
survey of phenomenology because Husserl 's students
and followers are so divergent in their thinking, and
also because many of Husserl's writings have still to
be published. According to Damnjanouvic, phenomen-
ology is not only a method, but also a transcenden-
tal phi1osophy. Damnjanouvic's position is influenced
by Husserl 's Die Idee der Phiinomenologie (1907) in
which, he holds, one can perceive certain elements that
then become evident in Husserl's subsequent work.
Following this, Damnjanovic emphasizes examining
the question of the unity of philosophy and specific
sciences in our time. In this way, the question of the
origin of the sciences and their foundation in the life-
world and the entire problematics of the late Husserl
are brought to the fore. On the basis of what Husserl
developed in the Krisis, the basic task of the future
interpretation of phenomenology would be to establish
the true meaning of his return to subjectivity and the
pre-categorial experience ofthe Lebenswelt.
Along the lines of Husserl and also of Heidegger,
with the intention of rethinking a philosophy for their
own time, are DAVOR RODIN and MILADIN ZIVOTIC. Di-
jafektika ifenomenologija (Dialectics and phenomen-
ology, 1979) by Rodin, a professor on the Faculty of
Politica! Sciences at Zagreb, relates to studies that the-
matize the questions of things and the world in or-
der to arrive, under the influence of Husserl as well
as Heidegger and through the concept of alienation,
at the question of the foundation of modern NATURAL
SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY. Rodin asks if it is possibJe
to establish a dialogue between speculative dialectics
and phenomenology, i.e., on the one hand, HEGEL and
MARX and, on the other hand, Husserl. Rodin considers
this dialogue to be made possible by the very course
of historical events but hampered by different kinds
of philosophical speech, and he concludes that such
a dialogue requires a "new world." Husserl's CONSTI-
TUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY and Heidegger's anaJytics of
DASEIN find themselves in the same position when they
attempt "to understand and shed light on the human
situation in the process of the disintegration of tradi-
tional bourgeois subjectivity,"while Marx and Husserl
ha ve a common point in determin ing the crisis of tradi-
tional bourgeois society. Phenomenology poses some
very specific questions and gives some quite different
answers to some traditional philosophical ones. This
is reflected in the fact that phenomenology now ques-
tions in a new way the MEANING of things, the ori-
gin ofthe world, and the criticism ofpositive science.
Rodin holds that phenomenology is essentia1 to think-
ing about modernism. To establish a dialogue, a practi-
ca! and a poetica! aspect (and these, accordingto Rodin,
are lacking in Husserl) are necessary in addition to a
theoretica! aspect. In this context one should consider
Miladin Zivotic 's Hajdegerovo shvatanje bica i bitno
misljenje (Heidegger's conception ofBeing and essen-
tial thinking, 1970), where the criticism ofmetaphysics
is demonstrated by presenting the complexity of Hei-
degger 's thought before and after the 1949lecture "Die
Kehre." The results ofthese analyses are tobe found in
his Egzistencija, realnost i sloboda (Existence, reality,
and freedom, 1973 ).
During the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the phi-
losophy of Martin Heidegger had a dominant influ-
ence in Yugoslavia and phenomenological philosophy
continued to have its effect through his work. One
of the most important and influential philosophers in
 YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavia in the post-World War II period was GAJO
PETROVIC, whose series of writings, especially on Hei-
degger, were !ater included in the fourth volume of
his collected papers, Prolegomena za kritiku Heideg-
gera (Prolegomena to a criticism of Heidegger, 1986).
These have had a crucial effect on the reception of
Heidegger's philosophy in Yugoslavia, and on the pro-
ductive encounter between Marx and Heidegger. The
same direction is taken by DANILO BASTA, who, in the
early 1980s, points to examples of Heidegger's inter-
pretations of Marx and to the criticism of Heidegger
by Gyorgy Lukacs (1885-1971 ). Meanwhile, as early
as the late 1950s, a philosopher from Zagreb, DANILO
PEJOVIC published a translation ofHeidegger's Der Ur-
sprung des Kunstwerkes (1937), along with severa!
articles on his philosophy, focusing on the problems
existential ontology in Realni svet: Temelji ontologije
Nikolaja Hartmana (The real world: The foundations
of Nicolai Hartmann 's ontology, 1960). These contri-
butions were especially important for the philosophical
climate in Yugoslavia over the last severa! decades. He
is interested in the who\e fieJd of MODERN PHILOSOPHY
and seeks support in philosophers with a phenomen-
ological and existential orientation. Gajo Pejovic of-
fers critica! remarks on the philosophy of Heidegger,
on which he is a world authority. With respect to the
late Heidegger, he points out that there is a distrust
in the real forces of historical reversals and that the
search for Being (Sein) cannot succeed if the search
for measure and the limit ofhumanity's survival in the
world are disregarded. Heidegger sees no way out of
the alienation of our time and in this !ies his lack of
success in thinking ofBeing. In regard to Heidegger's
attitude toward National Socialism, a subject on which
discussions flared up again in the late 1980s, Pejovic
writes as early as 1957 that one cannot deduce ontic
prescriptions from ontologica! premises and thereby
points out that the misunderstandings derive from the
wrong use ofthe terrn "FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY" on the
level of the natural attitude. In the case of Heidegger
himself, problems arise when he attempts to consider
art through poetry. Pejovic then contends that other
roads must be taken away from Heidegger, since our
age already holds the possibility of its own transcen-
dence.
In his !ater work Pejovic opens the way to ideas
from phenomenology in FRANCE, especially MAU-
747
RICE MERLEAU-PONTY, whose work, though unfinished,
stands before us in its entirety and is therefore unavoid-
ably on the way toward new thinking. MIRKO ZUROVAC
is also close to Merleau-Ponty in this respect. Heideg-
ger's philosophical work has perhaps had its greatest
resonance through his radically new relation toward the
history ofphilosophy. The most critica! attitude toward
him is manifested by MIHAJLO DJURIC in his analysis of
Heidegger's interpretations of Nietzsche. Not under
Djuric 's direct influence, but close to him in his ideas,
is SLOBODAN ZUNJIC, who is essentially inspired by Hei-
degger to continue a critica! reading ofthe pre-Socratic
thinkers and Plato.
It should not be concluded that in this way the in-
fluence of Husserl has been completely eclipsed in
Yugoslavia. The effect of his thought is particularly
evident in the fieJds of AESTHETICS and LITERATURE,
where the phenomenological approach has long led
other approaches. Hence after the studies of Damn-
janouvic, already mentioned, one should point out the
German scholar and literary critic ZORAN KONSTANTI-
NOVIC and his important study, Fenomenoloski pristup
knjiievnom delu (The phenomenological approach to
the literary work of art, 1969), which has had great in-
fluence. After a consideration ofthe phenomenological
orientation on the subject and language, and after an
analysis ofthe idea ofiNTENTIONALITY, this study makes
a thorough analysis of the beginnings of phenomen-
ology in the Study of art in WALDEMAR CONRAD and
in the phenomenological contribution to the theory
of literature in ROMAN INGARDEN. This latter has in-
fluenced DRAGAN STOJANOVIC, who, in Fenomenologija
i viseznacnost knjiievnog dela: Ingardenova teorija
opalizacija (Phenomenology and the many-sidedness
of the literary work: Ingarden's theory of concretiza-
tion, 1976), presents Ingarden's position in order to
demonstrate the way aesthetic works are concretized
by analyzing poetic works of Serbian and German lit-
erature. One of the most important Serbian aestheti-
cians, Mirko Zurovac, was under the influence ofboth
French philosophy (JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, Merleau-Ponty)
and German (Heidegger, KARL JASPERS). His first two
books need tobe mentioned: Umjetnost i egzistencija:
Vrednost i granice Sartrove estetike (Art and exis-
tence: The value and limitations of Sartre's aesthet-
ics, 1978) and Umjetnost kao istina i lai bica (Art as
the truth and falsehood of being, 1986). In the for-
748 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY
mer, Zurovac sets out from the problem of the begin-
ning of thought and finds a starting point in Husserl 's
teaching on EVIDENCE. This explains why Husserl sees
philosophy as an "archaeology ofhuman experience."
Zurovac sees the road that phenomenology opens up
and that leads toward the philosophy of existence in
the fact that phenomenology bears the motives for
humans to rely on themselves through the transcen-
dental and to make them responsible for their own
destiny. Taking over from Husserl the notion of the
intentionality of consciousness and ridding it of sub-
stantialization, Sartre made this notion the basis ofhis
philosophy. In this way, according to Zurovac, Sartre
continues Husserl by opposing him. He points out that
Husserl 's !deen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und
phiinomenologischen Philosophie 1 (1913) in particu-
lar shaped Sartre's position and tends, along the li nes of
Husserl, to dissolve the real substance ofthe world into
ontology. In his !ater works, Zurovac emphasizes the
aesthetic problems in the work of Heidegger, Jaspers,
and Merleau-Ponty, which he follows by a study ofthe
relation between art and psychoanalysis in Djetinjstvo
i zrelost umjetnosti (The childhood and maturity of art,
1994).
A return to Husserl's original writings began in the
mid-1980s. The recently deceased Belgrade philoso-
pher MI ODRAG CEKIC published severa! studies ofpheno-
menology. In Husserlova fenomenoloska methoda
(Husserl 's phenomenological method, 1985), he ex-
amines the limits ofphenomenologyby thematizing its
method and points out the importance ofits cognitive-
theoretical dimension. Placing Husserl in the context
of the European philosophical tradition (Plato, Kant,
Nietzsche, the neo-Kantians), Cekic emphasizes the
re]ation between EPOCHE ANO REDUCTION and constitu-
tion and focuses on !deen !. By emphasizing Land-
grebe 's and MAX SCHELER 's reception of Husserl, Cekic
furthermore reveals the difficulties encountered by an
immanent critique of the theory of INTERSUBJECTIVITY
( KLAUS HELD) and concludes that the phenomenological
way ofreduction and constitution is the road ofhuman
creation and interpretation ofthe WORLD. The 1ifeworld
seen from the perspective ofthe development ofmath-
ematical natural science from Galileo to our times is the
subject of Cekic 's Kriza nauka i svet ii vota (The crisis
of science and the lifeworld, 1985). The crisis of phi-
losophy as an expression of the crisis of metaphysics
and modern science, and, thereby, the crisis ofthe idea
of European humanism, reveals itself as a reftection of
the division between the worlds of science and of life.
Philosophy sets out from the age-old subjectivity ofthe
world of life and is thus made capable of preserving
its truth; the lifeworld is in this respect the jumping-off
point for radical self-awareness. Cekic sees transcen-
dental phenomenology as a circular motion from the
world of life to the world of science and cu! ture and
back. He concludes that the world oflife and the world
of science should be considered as one world in which
these two alternatives oppose and complement each
other. In Kriticki osvrt na Husserlovufenomenologiju
(A critica! review of Husserl 's phenomenology, 1986),
Cekic defines Husserl 's phenomenology as a demon-
stration of the part the subject of knowledge has in
experiencing and knowing the world. Ifwe find an os-
cillation between ontology and transcendental idealism
in Husserl, we can see it as a weakness, because the au-
thor does not opt either for the subject or the object, but
also as a virtue because he does not fali into the trap of
one-sidedness. The vision of essences (Wesensschau)
is perhaps the weak point ofphenomenology since it is
unprovable, but every philosophy has one such point:
Cekic does not accept Husserl 's ideas about the speci-
ficity of philosophy, which are linked to the fate of
NATURALISM. In the case of the crisis of cui ture, Cekic
correctly observes that it is a matter of a crisis of the
very social foundations of culture, and that the crisis is,
in fact, an expression of phenomenological thinking.
He concludes his analysis of Husserl by contending
that phenomenology is a way ofthinking that appears
at a time of crisis of culture, science, and humanity,
and that it should therefore be understood as a return
to a real, pre-crisis time; in this sense, phenomenology
is a philosophy oriented toward the past.
Advocating a return to Husserl in order to find a
way into new areas ofthought, MILAN UZELAC holds the
opposite opinion and sees phenomenology as a philos-
ophy oriented toward the future. Starting from Eugen
Fink's demand that a transition is necessary from on-
tology to cosmology - and after ali the experience
contributed by both Heidegger's philosophy and ali
the thinking that terms itself POSTMODERNISM, as well
as what comes after the postmodern - Uzelac is of
the opinion that a new reading ofHusserl's phenomen-
ology is required. He holds that in Husserl 's writings
 YUGOSLAVIA 749

there are many places that unambiguously point to the lines, to make explicit the basics of a transcendental
possibility of restructuring a new phenomenological cosmology that !ies immanently in the foundations of
aesthetics. phenomenology.
Therefore, following a fundamental examination
of Husserl 's philosophical work and its reception by MILAN UZELAC
modern philosophers, Uzelac attempts, along Husserl 's University ofNovi Sad
 INDEX 751

A Bartky, Sandra Lee, 70, 221

Baseheart, Mary Catherine, 221
Aarnes, Asbjorn, 628 Bast, Rainer, 4 77
Abbagnano, Nicola, 359 Basta, Danilo, 747
Abrams, Erika, 128 Baugh, Bruce, 94
action, 4, Il ff, 24, 30, 54, 57, 67, 114, 123, 146, 160, 172, Bayerova, Marie, 126
206, 217, 271, 291, 293, 400, 414, 419, 428, 467, 471, Bazin, Andre, 228
483, 543, 546, 549, 587, 591, 609, 647, 656, 659, 674, Beauchot, Mauricio, 677
690,697,720,729,741,745 Beauvoir, Simone de, 4, 40, 49ff, 70, 94, 123, 185, 197, 205,
Adamczewski, Zygmunt, 93 209, 219, 220, 249, 280, 314, 419, 435, 457, 466, 483,
aesthetics, 3, 16ff, 93, 118, 129, 172, 187, 230, 276, 307, 545,558,609,622,627,720
316, 323, 343, 348, 355, 361, 369, 426, 444, 459, 468, Becke~Oskar,3, 17,113,272,329,367,369,392,421,442,
47~ 480, 481, 538, 554, 558, 572, 587, 59~ 62~ 641,
673
693, 720, 747 Bednaf, Miloslav, 128
Agel, Henri, 227 Beekman, Ton, 160
Aguirre, Antonio, 275 Begiashvili, V. Archil, 714
Akhmanov, Alexander, 618 Beguin, Albert, 250
Alcoff, Linda, 222 behavioral geography, 53ff, 270
Alderman, Harold, 477 Behnke, Elizabeth A., 69, 70,470, 665, 721
Allen, Barry, 92 Beii, Linda, 221
Allen, David, 501 Beii, Winthrop, 91, 718
Allen, Jeffner, 209, 222, 721 Bellenetti, 41
Amselek, Paul, 408 Bello, Angela Ales, 362
Amstutz, Jakob, 92 Belton, John, 230
analytic philosophy, 6, 7, 12, 20ff, 39, 80, 84, 91, 127, 275, Bengtsson, Jan, 624
282, 317, 355, 399, 444, 480, 487, 495, 503, 525, 546, Benner, Patricia, 500
587,611,626,677,690,719 Benson, Bruce, 4 70
Anceschi, Luciano, 361 Benyovszky, Ladislav, 128
Andersen, Svend, 626 Berger, Gaston, 3, 233, 247, 329, 571, 719
Andrew, J. Dudley, 230 Berger, Peter, 650, 660
anthropology, cultural see ethnology Bergmann, Jorg, 653
anthropology, philosophical see philosophical anthropology Bergson, Henri, 1, 39, 56ff, 68, 114,230,247,289,322,368,
architecture, 1, 3, 16, 20, 25ff, 53, 122, 126, 129,315,481, 391,431,481,490,539,565,568,636,645,647,651,716
670 Berleant, Arnold, 132
Arendt, Hannah, 4, 14, 28, 29ff, 93, 123, 127, 160, 197, 209, Berlinger, Rudolf, 275
219,272,540,544,549,719,720 Bemasconi, Robert, 721
Aron, Laszl6, 324 Bemet, Rudolf, 488, 626
artificial intelligence, 23, 34ff, 41, 101, 208, 280, 456, 481, Bemsen, Niels Ole, 626
691 Byers, Damien, 43
Astrada, Carlos, 477, 677 Bhattacharya, K. C., 347
Australia, 1, 39ff Bielawka, Maria, 542
Austria, 43ff, 76, 270, 277, 284, 586 Bieme1, Marly, 489
Ave-Lallemant, Eberhart, 274 Bieme1, Walter, 17, 126,274,486
Ayfre, Amedee, 227 Bilimoria, Purushottama , 41
Azorin, Jean-Michel, 566 Binswanger, Ludwig, 62ff, 242,250,271,315,360,563,570,
578,655
Bimbaum, Daniel, 625
B Biro, Yvette, 230
Babushkin, Vladimir, 715 Bishop, Anne 500
Bachelard, Suzanne, 219, 248 Bittner, Egon, 660-662
Bati, Antonio, 719 Bjelic, Dusan, 661
Bahktin, Mikhail, 718 Blankenburg, Wolfgang, 564, 655
Bakan, Mildred, 93 Blaustein, Leopold, 46, 537
Bakker, Reinout, 486 Blecha, Ivan, 128
Bakradze, Kote, 713 Bleeker, Hans, 70, 160
Ballard, Edward G., 719,721 Bobbio, Norberto, 359
Ballauff, Theodor, 158 Bocorishvili, A.T., 714
Balslev, Anindita, 347 body, 3, 4, Il, 18, 26, 33, 41, 51, 54, 58, 63, 66ff, 73, 87,
Banchetti, Marina Paola, 222 96,102,104,129,156,158,161,163,173,199,205,216,
Banfi, Antonio, 359 221' 231' 239, 262, 269, 279, 280, 284, 285, 292, 293,
Barison, Ferdinando, 361 31~ 31~ 347, 355, 35~ 360, 36~ 37~ 381, 39~ 41~
Barnes, Hazel, 221 424, 432, 437, 446, 456, 458, 467, 469, 476, 483, 487,
752 INDEX

491, 493, 500, 506, 516, 521, 527, 535, 560, 564, 571, Cavailles, Jean, 3, 141, 242, 248, 703
611, 626, 633, 647, 651, 661, 663, 671, 676, 680, 690, Cavallin, Jens, 625
691,717,721,734,739,741 Cekic, Miodrag, 748
Boehm, Rudo1f, 486, 553 Ce1ms, Theodor, 587
Boe1en, Bemard, 722 Cemy, Jifi, 126
Boettke, Peter, 154 Cha, In-Suk, 388, 389
Bogen, David, 661 Chanter, Tina, 222, 721
Bogomo1ov, A1exi, 714 Chapman, Harmon, 719
Bokhove, Nie1s W., 276 Charlesworth, Max, 40
Bollnow, Otto Friedrich, 54, 158 Chatterjee, Margaret, 347
Bondi, Augusto Sa1azar, 678 Chattopadhyaya, D.P., 347
Bonilla, Alcira, 677 Chen, Jiaying, 100
Borgmann, A1bert, 547, 692, 722 Chen, Xuan1iang, 100
Bosch, Gerhard, 564 Cheung, Chan-Fai, 100
Boss, Medard, 63, 70, 250, 565, 570 Chida, Yoshiteru, 69
Boundas, Constantin, 94 China, 1, 99ff, 723
Boyce Gibson, William Ra1ph, 39,251 Chiodi, Pietro, 477
Brand, Gerd, 126, 274, 360, 733 Chisholm, Roderick, 74, 355
Brentano, Franz, 1, 22, 39, 44, 71ff, 76, 84, 98, 105, 123,
Cho, Jeong-Ok, 389
191, 23~ 270, 281, 321, 324, 32~ 34~ 34~ 351, 368,
Cho, Kah Kyung, 388, 390
456, 462, 490, 495, 529, 537, 568, 573, 586, 605, 614,
Cho, Kwan-Sung, 389
625, 724, 729
Choi, Zae-Shick, 389
British empiricism, 3, 44, 75ff, 177, 270, 326, 363, 388,426,
Chojna, Wojciech, 541
484
British moral theory, 81 ff, 180, 190 Chuhina, Larisa, 715
Brock, Wemer, 722 Churchill, Scott, 721
Broekhoff, Jan, 536 Chvatik, !van, 127
Broekman,Jan,487 Cibulka, Josef, 126
Brough, John, 721 C1aesges, U1rich, 66, 68, 225, 274, 666, 671
Bn!e, Germaine, 219 Clark, Mary Evelyn, 219
Brăuer, Gottfried, 161 C1ifton, Thomas, 469
Briick, Maria, 219 Cobb-Stevens, Richard, 721
Buceniece, Elia, 715 Coenen, Herrnan, 69
Buck, Giinther, 161 cognitive science, 14, 20, 22, 101ff, 280,456,481,626
Buckley, R. Phillip, 93 Collins, C1inton, 159
Buczynska-Garewicz, Hanna, 541 Comay, Rebecca, 92
Buddhism, 85ff, 100, 139,346,490,602,631, 723 communication, philosophy of see phi1osophy of communi-
Bukdahl, J0rgen K., 626 cation
Busch, Thomas, 721 communico1ogy, 104ff, 115, 142, 194,315,433,447,481,
Buttimer, Anne, 647 649, 683, 715, 721
Buytendijk, Frederik J. J., 12, 70, 132, 159, 176, 222, 487, Compton, John, 5, 477,484, 719, 721
535,579,668 Condrau, Gion, 565
Belohradsky, Vâclav, 127 Conill, Jesus, 676
Connolly, Maureen, 70, 94, 132, 536
c Conrad, Theodor, 271, 327, 587, 608
Conrad, Wa1demar, 16, 747
Cabrera, Manuel, 677 Conrad-Martius, Hedwig, 113,218,219,248,271,327,392,
Caillois, Roland, 249 484,587,599,618,679,715
Caims, Dorion, 91, 110, 113, 123,272,286,329,603,718 constitutive phenomenology, 2, 3, 19, 24, 35, 53, 68, 78,
Calvi, Lorenzo, 361 110ff, 114, 133, 141, 149, 168, 171, 205, 229, 247, 254,
Campbell, Richard, 41 259, 264, 267, 272, 280, 285, 296, 300, 317, 328, 334,
Camus, A1bert, 219, 720 345, 390, 409, 419, 439, 443, 458, 475, 483, 495, 518,
Canada, 1, 70, 91f~ 160,657,659,718 522, 554, 558, 573, 589, 590, 594, 612, 637, 666, 690,
Caputo, John, 546, 720-722 719, 729, 746
Carcano, Fi1iasi, 360 constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, 3, 113,
Cargnello, Dani1o, 361 114ff, 122,221,286,317,484,522,578,637,647,656,
Carlshamre, Staffan, 625 659,719,731
Carpio, Adolfo P., 677 constitutive phi1osophy, 75
Carr, David, 93, 567, 721 Cook, Deborah, 93
Casebier, Alian, 230 Corbin, Henri, 248
Casey, Edward S., 55, 70, 208, 342, 456, 674, 721 Cossio, Cari os, 407, 677
Cassirer, Emst, 6, 95ff, 285, 316, 398, 412, 523, 650, 716 Crease, Robert, 4 70, 692, 721
 INDEX 753

critica! theory, 19, 93, 116ff, 156, 275, 282, 317, 420, 435, Dumery, Henry, 599
484,487,501,544,651,656,662,690,723 Dunphy, Jocelyn, 40
Crittenden, Paul, 42 Dunphy-Blomfield, 40
Cruz Velez, Danilo, 678 Duxbury, Neil, 41 O
Csordas, Thomas 1., 70, 201 Dwyer, Philip, 94
cultural anthropology see ethnology Dybvig, Magne, 628
cultural disciplines, 115, 121ff, 182, 194,279,315,471,572, Dorr-Zegers, Otto, 566
686
Cunningham, Suzanne, 733
Curtis, Bernhard, 161 E
Czechoslovakia, 1, 70, 123ff, 272, 325, 360,435 Earle, William, 455, 721
Eberle, Thomas, 653
D ecology, 1, 53, 70, 128, 148ff, 157, 209, 315, 482, 558, 646,
667, 676, 713, 723
Dallmayr, Fred, 33, 546, 722 ecology, deep see deep ecology
Damnyanovic, Milan, 745 economics, 109, 114, 115, 152ff, 194,309,315,382,480,
dance, 1, 20, 109, 129ff, 315,535,627,664 481,636,653,721,731
Danelia, Sergi, 713 Edie, James M., 287,364,542,719,720
Dardel, Eric, 54 education, 1, 28, 115, 126, 132, 157ff, 284, 315, 438,477,
Darroch-Lozowski, Vivian, 93, 663 487,655,657,668
Dasein, 4, 14, 17, 22, 28, 33, 63, 89, 133ff, 137, 144, 158, Eglin, Peter, 663
174, 191, 201, 206, 209, 245, 250, 253, 269, 272, 295, ego, 24, 41, 58, 78, 85, 112, 114, 118, 133, 145, 163ff, 172,
300, 305, 314, 335, 379, 386, 387, 394, 445, 455, 493, 173, 185, 205, 223, 225, 229, 245, 248, 263, 267, 272,
514, 523, 533, 549, 554, 561, 563, 570, 571, 596, 599, 28~ 285, 313, 334, 34~ 353, 357, 365, 37~ 39~ 41~
622,641,648,668,673,675,702,711,720,739,746 432, 443, 463, 506, 511, 515, 527, 531, 548, 568, 571,
Dasilva, Fabio, 471 587,608,614,620,633,680,701,704,735
Daubert, Johannes, 2,45,271, 327,497,586,630 Ehara, Yumiko, 656
Dauenhauer, Bernard, 209, 722 eidetic method, 2, 27, 57, 62, 77, 82, 105, 111, 114, 158,
De Almeida, Guido Antonio, 678 168ff, 172, 182, 184, 191, 204, 205, 220, 226,238, 243,
De Beer, C.S., 670 261, 266, 271, 288, 300, 309, 312, 316, 324, 333, 336,
De Boer, Theodor, 166, 488 341, 349, 35~ 372, 41~ 422, 428, 431, 442, 453, 46~
De Carvalho, Joaquim, 552 474, 482, 489, 531, 555, 563, 569, 576, 582, 598, 609,
De Fraga, Gustavo, 553 610, 620, 644, 656, 659, 666, 668, 699, 710, 716, 719,
De Moncada, Luis Cabral, 552 724, 730, 733, 746
De Muralt, Andre, 248 Eley, Lothar, 274
De Waelhens, Alphonse, 199,249,486, 572 Embree, Lester, 123, 221, 286, 319, 483, 542, 609, 657, 720
deep ecology, 137ff, 149, 152, 627 emotion, 4, 17, 69, 74, 115, 171ff, 264, 271, 349, 366, 370,
Denton, David E., 159 533,570,587,597,620,633,659,678,693,724,729
Depraz, Nathalie, 250 empiricism, British see British empiricism
Derrida, Jacques, 19, 28, 41, 92, 120, 127, 140, 141ff, 212, empiricism, logica! see logica! positivism
249, 26~ 265,283,295,311,325, 33~ 34~ 36~ 398, Enes, Jose, 554
445, 454, 488, 516, 521, 526, 540, 546, 558, 593, 599, Engelbrecht, Frederik J., 670
625,686,703,723 Entralgo, Pedro Lain, 566, 676
Desanti, Jean, 249 Enyvvari, Jenii, 321
Deutscher, Max, 41 epoche and reduction, 2, 3, 51, 58, 77, 85, 110, 114, 150,
Devine, Heather, 536 168, 172, 177ff, 183, 185, 191, 205,220,228,235,267,
Diekelmann, Nancy, 500, 501 272, 27~ 285, 30~ 305, 324, 328, 345, 350, 355, 361,
Diemer, Alwin, 126, 275 368, 373, 377, 429, 434, 452, 459, 463, 475, 491, 495,
Dillon, Martin, 70, 208, 721 497, 508, 513, 518, 525, 531, 593, 604, 668, 670, 678,
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1, 7, 17, 121, 125, 143ff, 153, 158,247, 680,698,716,719,735,748
258, 262, 271, 289, 309, 312, 316, 334, 337, 372, 385, ethics, 3, 13, 74, 84, 94, 171, 177, 197,210,217,225,255,
523,563,575,594,618,622,637,643,715,729,738 269, 271, 275, 307, 316, 325, 328, 355, 356, 366, 369,
Djuric, Mihaljo, 747 414, 426, 433, 472, 481, 489, 501, 530, 558, 572, 597,
Doniela, William V., 40 641,667,676,695,715,719,724
Dreyer, Petrus Secundus, 667 ethics in Husserl, 180ff
Dreyfus, Hubert, 14, 22, 23, 37,208,500,691,719,721,723 ethics in Sartre, 184ff, 221
Drummond, John, 498,671,720 ethics in Scheler, 189ff
Du Toit, Andries P., 670 ethnic studies, 1, 4, 70, 115, 123, 132, 194ff, 315,390,472,
Du, Xiaozhen, 100 482, 723
Dubsky, Ivan, 126 ethnology, 1, 25, 70, 109, 121, 132, 152, 194, 198ff, 262,
Dufrenne, Mike1, 19, 27, 129, 250, 343, 469, 554, 584 315,369,472,481,523,598,629,657,670
Dumas, Denis, 93 Evans, J. Claude, 143
754 INDEX

evidence, 1, 66, 72, 86, 117, 168, 173, 179, 185, 202ff, 226, Franzini, Elio, 362
269, 300, 310, 315, 335, 352, 369, 374, 384, 421, 441, Frege, Gottlob, 8, 21, 41, 46, 251ff, 271,281,296,364,399,
452, 462, 514, 518, 554, 567, 568, 591, 600, 666, 708, 402,421,425,440,443,497,556,573,585,627
716, 725, 741, 748 Freire, Paulo, 159
existential phenomenology, 2, 4, 29, 38, 39, 49, 53, 61, 68, Frings, Manfred, 192, 274, 720, 721
115, 123, 130, 155, 156, 158, 171, 185, 201, 205ff, 220, Frostrom, Lars, 625
227, 248, 272, 280, 286, 296, 317, 329, 355, 360, 369, Fukatani, Shozo, 657
410, 411, 418, 419, 432, 434, 448, 459, 471, 483, 485, fundamental ontology, 4, 130, 133, 137, 174, 253ff, 274, 295,
500, 512, 522, 531, 539, 548, 554, 558, 564, 571, 577, 300,306,309,322,349,380,418,472,493,503,523,558,
596,609,646,664,682,685,690,698,719 620,714, 720, 739,747
existentialism, 49, 53, 93, 99, 115, 118, 125, 131, 133, 176, Funke, Gerhard, 275, 379, 593
186, 205, 209ff, 249, 273, 281, 293, 294, 314,359,413, Furberg, Mats, 624
459,539,624,667,685,703,714,720
expectation, 2, 165, 203, 213ff, 297, 341, 453, 498, 514, 517,
529,582,604,700 G
Ey, Henri, 65, 250, 541, 565 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 5, 17, 26, 65, 93, 113, 123, 146, 152,
258ff, 273, 306, 309,317, 325, 329,361, 394,398,418,
F 433, 469, 484, 501, 529, 539, 540, 544, 553, 558, 566,
594,597,599,625,627,630,641,660,721,722
Fan, Mingsheng, 99 Gadow, Sally, 500
Farber, Marvin, 91,272, 329, 392, 638, 718 Gaidenko, Piama, 714
Farias, Raul Velozo, 678 Galewicz, W1odzimierz, 48, 587
Fedida, Pierre, 251 Gallinger, August, 587
Feher, Istvan M., 324 Gaos, Jose, 675, 677
feminism, 1, 4, 40, 49, 70, 131, 195, 209, 218ff, 229, 250, Garcia Maynez, Eduardo, 677
271, 315, 482, 499, 546, 560, 579, 641, 654, 656, 662, Garcia-Bar6, Miguel, 676
666, 681, 723 Garelli, Jacques, 250
Fengler, Thomas, 654 Garfinkel, Harold, 661
Ferrara, Lawrence, 469 Gehlen, Amold, 523
Ferreira, Virgilio, 555 Geiger, Moritz, 3, 16, 173,219,271,285,288,324,327,586,
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, Il, 43, 50, 223ff, 244, 276, 289, 630,664,718,719
328,484,724 Gendlin, Eugene T., 70, 176, 665, 721
film, 1, 3, 16, 20, 105, 109, 115, 129,222, 226ff, 250,315, generative phenomenology, 112, 220, 261 ff, 269, 273, 317,
541, 723 471, 522
Findlay, J. N., 39, 587, 599 genetic phenomenology, 63, 78, 112, 141, 220, 225, 261,
Fink, Eugen, 3, 16, 113, 124, 158, 166, 232ff, 249,252, 272, 266ff, 273, 310, 313, 328, 334, 360,423, 442, 444, 465,
329, 342, 360, 367, 382, 435, 490, 509, 532, 535, 553, 475,522,569,666,678,710,738
608,620,718,719,745 geography, 1, 70, 115,200,315,481
Fischer(-Rosenthal), Wolfram, 654 geography, behavioral see behavioral geography
Fischer, Aloys, 157 geography, social see social geography
Fisette, Denis, 94 Geraets, Theodore, 93
Fisher, Linda, 94, 221 Geraud, Mare, 566
Fisher, William, 720 Germany, 1, 68, 218, 270ff, 282, 284, 286, 306, 317, 376,
Flynn, Thomas, 209, 546, 721 387,435,483,486,531,657,720
Floistad, Guttorm, 628 gestalt psycho1ogy, 4, 12, 45, 47, 98, 116, 121, 247, 272,
Follesdal, Dagfinn, 22, 497, 625, 627, 723 276ff, 284,457,483, 515, 541,565,581,719
Formaggio, Dino, 361 Giaccon, Carlo, 553
formal and material ontology, 46, 74, 77, III, 168, 181, Ginnane, William, 40, 41
237ff, 254, 261, 266, 280, 283, 310, 335,421,442, 503, Giorgi, Amedeo, 43, 577, 720
593, 591, 673 Giudicelli, S., 566
Foucault, Michel, 15, 41, 65, 70, 92, 108, 120, 131, 161, Giuliani-Tagmann, Regula, 222
242ff, 250,265, 283, 317, 319,477, 546,561,666,686, G6de1, Kurt, 442
688 Goicoechea, David, 93
Fragata, Julio, 553 Goldstein, Kurt, 12,719
Fraleigh, Sondra Horton, 131 Good, Paul, 274
France, !, 4, 18, 49, 60, 68, 98, 116, 125, 128,227, 233,242, Gordon, Lewis R., 70, 209, 721
247f~ 270, 274, 280, 282-285, 292, 315, 317, 325, 360, Goyard-Fabre, Simone, 409
376, 392, 412, 435, 483, 486, 546, 565, 571, 625, 703, Golaszewska, Maria, 538
720,747 G6miak-Kocikowska, Krystyna, 540
Franck, Didier, 250 Griindler, Otto, 598, 599
Frank, Semion, 616, 715 Granel, Gerard, 249
Frankl, Viktor, 159, 580, 668 Grathoff, Richard, 276, 651, 657
 INDEX 755

Graumann, Cari F., 655 673, 675, 682, 690, 698, 702, 704, 710, 714, 720, 726,
Gray, J. Glenn, 722 733, 736, 739, 745
Great Britain, 1, 281 ff, 426, 563, 659 Heim, Michael, 692
Green, Karen, 43 Heinrich, Erich, 587
Greene, Maxine, 159 Held, Klaus, 166, 274, 748
Grene, Marjorie, 219 Hellemans, Mariette, 160
Greyling, Daniel J., 669 Hellesnes, Jon, 629
Grondin, Jean, 93 Henry, Michel, 5, 249
Grosz, Elizabeth, 43 Heras, Jose G6mez, 676
Gruhle, Hans, 563 Hering, Jean, 113,247, 571, 599,719
Griinder, Karlfrid, 477 Herman, Daniel, 706
Gron, Arne, 626 hermeneutica! phenomenology, 2, 5, 17, 24, 28, 70, 96, 113,
Gunter, Christian, 669 115, 123, 130, 134, 152, 154, 171, 206, 259, 262, 272,
Gurvitch, Georg, 616 304ff, 309,317, 334, 362,369,410,448,471,477,484,
Gurwitsch, Aron, 3, 13, 70, 80, 98, 102, 113, 114, 116, 121, 50~ 505, 522, 532, 544, 555, 558, 571, 578, 599, 60~
166, 185, 197,219,247,272,277, 284ff, 311,317,329, 660,676,679,690,721,735
355, 366, 378, 379, 442, 443, 483, 496, 521, 565, 571, hermeneutics, 5, 11, 17, 40, 53, 93, 135, 145, 153,201, 243,
583,630,638,639,652,661,665,690,718 254,258,259,275,294,300,304, 308f~317, 319,325,
Gusdorf, Georges, 108, 317, 529, 688 329, 334, 347, 369, 398, 418, 447, 482, 488, 489, 534,
555, 565, 59~ 612, 62~ 657, 661, 67~ 69~ 715, 71~
722, 740
H Herschong, Lisa, 54
Hesnard, Angelo, 571
Ha, Ki-Rak, 387 Heufelder, Katharina, 219
Haaparanta, Leila, 627 Higgs, Philip, 669
Haering, Theadore, 65 Hildenbrand, Bruno, 655
Hafkesbruck, Hanna, 219 Hinkle, Gisela, 663
Hăfner, Heinz, 564 Hintikka, Jaakko, 556, 627
Haglund, Dick, 624, 625 Hiromatsu, Wataru, 370
Hahn, Jeon Sook, 388, 389 history, 3, 18, 26, 51, 95, 122, 127, 135, 143, 194,206,242,
Halik, Tomas, 127 262,263,267,273, 293, 302, 309, 312f~ 315,317,329,
Hama, Hideo, 656, 657 341, 414, 438, 444, 459, 481, 487, 538, 544, 549, 553,
Hamrick, William S., 411 558, 563, 594, 613, 641, 642, 669, 678, 683, 694, 703,
Hanna, Thomas, 70, 664 715, 720, 729, 745
Hannibalsson, Arn6r, 629 Hitzler, Ronald, 655
Harney, Maurita, 41 Hoche, Hans Ulrich, 274
Harries, Karsten, 27 Hoeller, Keith, 721
Hart, James G., 184 Hoffmann-Riem, Christa, 654, 655
Hart, Kevin, 43 Hofstadter, Albert, 722
Hartmann, Nicolai, 6, 39, 180, 190, 247, 258, 271, 288ff, Hoibraaten, Helge, 628
407,509,540,552,668,676,715,724 Holenstein, Elmar, 105
Harvey, Charles, 80, 556 Holling, Steen, 721
Haugeland, John, 38 Ho1mes, Richard, 92, 94, 497
Hauser, Arnold, 322 Holzner, Burkhardt, 663
Havel, Vaclav, 128 Honer, Anne, 655
Heap, James, 662 Hong, Qian, 99
Heelan, Patrick, 5, 307,477,484,671,692, 721,722 Horwitz, Steven, 154
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 4, 43, 50, 95, 117, 126, Hoy, David, 722
136, 143, 205, 224, 244, 247, 259, 275, 283, 291, 292ff, Huertas-Jourda, Jose, 92, 657
314, 325, 339, 345, 388, 412, 435, 509, 544, 559, 572, human sciences, 3, 17, 22, 31, 62, 70, 76, 95, 104, 114, 121,
622,625,634,690,706,713,714,727,745,746 143, 149, 152, 171, 182, 194, 198, 226, 242, 244, 260,
Heidegger, Martin, 3, 4, 12, 17, 20, 26, 29, 34, 39, 43, 51, 272, 273, 279, 284-286, 309, 312, 315ff, 330, 356, 361,
53, 63, 70, 89, 92, 98, 99, 105, 113, 116, 124, 129, 133, 369, 372, 382, 447, 457, 471, 481, 487, 499, 518, 523,
137, 141, 144, 149, 158, 174, 178, 179, 185, 189, 199, 533, 535, 549, 558, 571, 576, 592, 593, 613, 623, 636,
201, 205, 209, 212, 213, 224, 232, 244, 247, 253, 258, 640, 642, 646, 659, 664, 669, 683, 715, 719, 721, 729,
262, 266, 272, 281, 285, 288, 292, 295, 298f~ 299, 304, 730, 737, 741
309, 314, 317, 322, 328, 329, 333, 345, 349, 355, 359, Hungary, 1, 321ff, 360, 435
366-368, 375, 377, 385, 387, 392, 394, 410, 412, 418, Husserl and Heidegger, 333ff
421, 431, 435, 445, 453, 458, 466, 469, 477, 483, 485, Husserl, Edmund, 1, Il, 16, 20, 25, 34, 39, 44, 51, 56, 62,
490, 506, 512, 514, 523, 526, 528, 531, 538, 53~ 543, 66, 71, 75, 81, 84, 85, 91, 99, 102, 105, 110, 114, 116,
548, 552, 554, 558, 563, 570, 578, 593, 594, 596, 599, 122, 123, 129, 133, 137, 141, 144, 148, 152, 157, 159,
610, 620, 625, 630, 635, 640, 648, 651, 656, 659, 668, 163, 171, 173, 177, 180, 189,202, 205,213, 218,224,
756 INDEX

229, 232, 237, 242, 247, 251, 258, 261, 266, 270, 277, Jin, Xiping, 100
281, 284, 288, 292, 296, 298, 299, 304, 309, 312, 316, Johansson, Ingvar, 625
321, 326ff, 329, 333, 340, 345, 348, 350, 355, 363, 366, Johns, David P., 536
367, 372, 377, 382, 386, 387, 391, 394, 401, 407, 412, Johnson, Ann, 221
416,421,428,435, 439,443,452,457,461,467,474, Joos, Emest, 93
483, 490, 494, 500, 506, 507, 513, 517, 524, 526, 531, Jopling, David, 93
537, 543, 548, 552, 555, 558, 562, 568, 573, 577, 582, Jordan, Robert, 286
586, 590, 594, 598, 603, 609, 614, 620, 624, 629, 634, Joy, Momy, 94
637, 640, 648, 651, 656, 659, 664, 668, 670, 675, 679, Judge, Brenda, 43
690,693,703,708,713,718,724,729,733,736,744 Judycki, Stanislaw, 542
Husserl, Gerhart, 408, 719 Jung, Hwa Yol, 33, 390, 546

1 K
lbor, J. J. Lopez, 566 Kaelin, Eugene, 209, 719
Ichikawa, Hiroshi, 69, 370 Kagan, Moisei, 718
Ihde,Don,5, 14,42, 123,317,469,484,542,691,719,721, Kakabadze, Zurab, 713
722, 741 Kang, Hak-Soon, 389
IJsseling, Samuel, 488 Kant, Immanuel, 3, 43, 63, 75, 95, 113, 116, 136, 144, 180,
imagination, 2, 4, 16, 18, 60, 63, 115, 146, 169, 172, 205, 189, 223, 240, 244, 255, 259, 269, 272, 289, 305, 313,
243, 281, 284, 297, 304, 340ff, 349, 370, 372,417,422, 321, 336, 352, 368, 377ff, 386, 388, 391, 412, 424, 440,
442,453,498,514,517,545,571,584,604,620,680,693 458, 461, 464, 480, 484, 498, 513, 522, 543, 572, 589,
Imai, Chie, 657 591, 594, 611, 614, 635, 669, 695, 708, 716, 727, 740,
Imboden, Roberta, 94 744
India, 1, 344ff, 723 Karfik, Filip, 128
Ingarden, Roman, 3, 16, 26, 46, 56, 93, 113, 129, 174, 219, Katagiri, Masatataka, 656
271, 282, 284, 323, 325, 337, 343, 348ff, 355,416,435, Katz, Jack, 663
468,469,490,537,554,587,625,629,679,693,714,747 Kaufmann, Felix, 47, 152, 272, 286, 382ff, 385, 442, 637,
intentionality, 8, Il, 20, 34, 40, 44, 54, 71, 74, 76, 84, 97, 718
108, 111, 114, 117, 145, 170, 172-174, 184, 190, 202, Kaufmann, Fritz Leopold, 17,272,317, 329, 334, 385ff, 679,
205, 217, 236, 250, 253, 254, 266, 271, 294, 301, 307, 718
322, 327, 334, 345, 350ff, 359, 363, 377, 383, 412, 429, Kelkel, Arion, 250
435, 440, 462, 474, 486, 491, 494, 508, 514, 518, 525, Kellner, Hansfried, 653
533, 540, 548, 553, 556, 564, 568, 570, 584, 600, 604, Kemp, Peter, 626
615,620,628,630,691,698,705,716,736,747 Kem, Iso, 99, 113, 167, 274, 379, 609
intersubjectivity, 4, 68, 115, 119, 126, 145, 167, 205, 218, Kersten, Fred, 286,719
264, 267, 273, 276, 285, 292, 297, 310, 317, 329, 355f~ Kestenbaum, Victor, 661, 721
360, 370, 419, 424, 433, 449, 459, 476, 525, 553, 566, Kim, Hyong-Hio, 388, 389
571,576,585,591,604,615,647,680,716,741,748 Kim, Kyu-Young, 389
Ionin, Leonid, 714 Kim, Yer-Su, 388, 389
Iribame, Julia, 677 Kimura, Bin, 371, 566
Irie, Masakatsu, 657 Kisiel, Theodore, 307, 477, 635, 722
Iser, Wolfgang, 17, 344, 420 Kisker, Karl P., 564
Ishiguro, Takeshi, 657 Kissel, Mihail, 714
Italy, 1, 5, 69, 359ff, 435 Klausen, Soren Harnow, 626
Kleinman, Seymour, 535, 665
Klockenbusch, Reinald, 276
J Kluszynski, R.W., 541
Jacques, Francis, 688 Knoblauch, Hubert, 653
Jaecker, Friedrich, 470 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, 655
Jakobson, Roman, 45, 105, 684 Kobylinska, Ewa, 540
James, William, 1, 11, 76, 163, 202, 285, 289, 291, 363ff, Koch, Gertrud, 230
368,453,481,490,568,629,638,659,718 Kockelmans, Joseph J., 5, 123, 287, 307, 317,477, 484, 486,
Janicaud, Dominique, 251 578, 719, 722
Janssen, Paul, 276 Kocukalic, Zija, 470
Janzarik, Wemer, 564 Koh, Hyong-Kon, 387
Japan, 1,69,270,367ff,387,490,656, 723 Kohout, Jaroslav, 126
Jaspers, Karl, 4, 29, 62, 126, 133, 205, 212,258,271,289, Kohâk, Erazim, 126, 128, 661, 721
315, 334, 371ff, 388, 538, 544, 563, 580, 599,610, 667, Kojima, Hiroshi, 69
691, 714, 720, 729, 747 Kojeve, Alexandre, 248
Jauss, Hans Robert, 17 Kolnai, Aurel, 587
Jeanson, Francis, 209 Konstantinovic, Zoran, 747
 INDEX 757

Korea, 1, 387ff, 723 1aw, 1, 250, 271, 307, 309, 315, 382, 407ff, 587, 588, 636,
Koren, Henry, 720 677
Kortian, Garbis, 93 Law1or, Leonard, 143, 721
Kosik, Karel, 125, 360, 435 Lawrence, Nathaniel, 209
Kouba, Pavel, 127 Leder, Drew, 70, 721
Koyre, Alexandre, 57, 247, 271, 327, 39lff, 571 Lee, Keel-Woo, 389
Kratochvil, Zdenek, 127 Lee, Nam-In, 389
Kraus, Alfred, 564 Lee, Young-Ho, 388
Krohn,Sven,627 Lefort, Claude, 546
Kroupa, Daniel, 127 Legros, Robert, 250
Kruks, Sonia, 209, 546 Lehmann, Burkhard, 653
Kriigel Oberholzer, Carei, 159, 667 Leininger, Madeleine, 499
Kriiger, Jens, 670 Leland, Dorothy, 721
Kuhn, Helmut, 258 Lembeck, Karl-Heinz, 275, 276
Kuhn, Roland, 564 Levesque-Lopman, Louise, 70, 221, 662
Kuki, Shuzo, 329, 490 Levin, David Michael, 70, 80, 130, 176, 208
Kule, Maija, 715 Levinas, Emmanue1, 4, 12, 39, 50, 69, 93, 118, 127, 135, 160,
Kulis, Richard, 715 247,265,283,325,329,392,394, 397,412f~433,471,
Kung, Guido, 47, 587 488,526,530,540,546,555,558,60 0,628,667,676
Kunz, Hans, 64 Lewis, Aubrey, 564
Kunzman, A. I., 616 Lewis, Brian, 230
Kurauchi, Kazuta, 655 Ley, David, 647
Kusch, Martin, 627 Li, Boye, 100
Kuypers, Karel, 525 Li, Guiliang, 99
Kuzmina, Tamara, 714 Li, Youzheng, 99
Kwan, Tze-Wan, 100 lifeworld see world
Kwant, Remigius, 486 Lin, Ke, 100
Lingis, Alphonso, 70, 208, 535, 720, 721
Linschoten, Johannes, 70, 487
L Lippitz, Wilfried, 160
Lacan,Jacques,65 Lipps, Hans, 113, 271, 679
Lachmann, Ludwig M., 153, 154 Lipps, Theodor, 630, 680
Laing, R. D., 564, 580 List, Elisabeth, 654
Lambotte, Marie-Claude, 566 1iterature, 1, 3, 4, 18, 20, 94, 121, 125, 142, 242, 250, 275,
Landgrebe, Ludwig, 3, 9, 45, 68, 70, 105, 113, 124, 147, 284, 315, 325, 341, 361, 416ff, 469, 480, 554, 555, 582,
225, 232, 249, 272, 313, 317, 329, 352, 360, 382, 388, 613,623,625,638,714,720,747
435,553,616,630,643,666,719,74 5 Litt, Theodor, 656
Landmann, Michael, 641 Liu, Fangtong, 99
Landmann, Willem A., 669 Liu, Xiaofeng, 100
Landsberg, Paul-Louis, 247, 329 Llambias De Azevedo, Juan, 678
Lane, Belden, 54 Lloyd, Genevieve, 41
Langan, Thomas, 92 Loch, Wemer, 160
Langer, Monika, 94 Lochhead, Judith, 470
Langeveld, Martinus J., 159, 487, 536 Lochner, Rudolf, 157
Langsdorf, Lenore, 497, 721 logic, 2, 20, 40, 45, 57, 74, 76, 84, 122, 142, 149, 168, 181,
language, 2, Il, 12, 18, 20, 28, 45, 63, 95, 101, 104, 109, 237, 248, 252, 254, 271, 296, 327, 330, 347, 355, 382,
119, 137, 141, 146, 156, 158, 176,200,207,217,229, 405, 421ff,426,439,462,481, 490,572,588,591,594,
245, 252, 259, 271, 276, 297, 302, 304, 307, 317, 330, 706, 709, 719, 729, 734, 737
344, 349, 356, 414, 416, 424, 437, 444, 459, 467, 477, logica! empiricism see logica! positivism
485, 504, 544, 558, 571, 587, 594, 597, 601, 612, 652, logica! positivism, 8, 21, 47, 177, 319, 425ff, 480, 503, 552,
660,683,691,693,704,711,715,73 3,738 690,719
1anguage after Husserl, 303, 394ff, 401, 722 Lohmar, Dieter, 275
1anguage ana1ysis, ordinary see ordinary language ana1ysis Loraux, Patrice, 250
language in Husserl, 264, 394, 401ff Lorback, Colin, 536
Lanigan, Richard, 109,319,721 Losev, Alexei, 717
Lanteri-Laura, Georges, 250 Lossky, Nicolai, 616
Lants, Georgi, 616 Louzil, Jaromir, 126
Larrabee, Mary Jeanne, 498, 721 Lowith, Karl, 136, 139, 329, 335, 392
Laskey, Dallas, 93 Li.i, Xiang, 100
Lau, Kwok-Ying, 101 Li.ibbe,Herrnann,274
Lautman, Albert, 248 Li.ibcke, Poul, 626
Lavoie, Don, 154, 721 Lubowieczki, Tomasz, 48
758 INDEX

Luckmann, Benita, 655 383, 394, 398, 403, 410, 416, 417, 422, 426, 435, 440,
Luckmann, Thomas, 119, 636, 649, 650, 660, 719 443ff, 458, 462, 483, 492, 495, 505, 514, 520, 527, 528,
Lugones, Maria, 222 531, 548, 54~ 55~ 571, 575, 583, 600, 605, 612, 617,
Luijpen, Nico Wim, 486 625, 632, 637, 641, 647, 651, 660, 685, 694, 704, 708,
Luijpen, William A., 410, 720 729, 735, 746
Lukacs, Gyorgy, 321-323 medicine, 70, 121, 123,242,315,371, 446ff, 481, 500,567,
Luo, Keding, 99 723
Lycos, Kim, 41 Mehta, J. L., 347
Lyotard, Jean-Fran~;ois, 325, 558 Melandri, Enzo, 360
Melich, Joan-Carles, 159
Melle, Ullrich, 489
M memory,2,58, 165,168, 172,203,217,297,304,340,452f~
Macquarrie, John, 212, 722 467,498,514,517,545,583,604,680,693,700
Madison, Gary, 91 Mensch, James, 94, 166
Maihofer, Wemer, 407 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 3, 4, 12, 18, 26, 33, 38, 40, 49, 53,
Major, Ladislav, 126 60, 65, 68, 87, 92, 96, 99, 102, 106, 108, 113, 118, 121,
Makkreel, Rudolf, 319, 721 123, 126, 129, 141, 149, 152, 156, 160, 173, 178, 179,
Makota, Janina, 541 185, 199, 205, 212, 217, 221, 227, 233, 244, 247, 270,
Maldiney, Henri, 250 273,277,282,285,292,311,314,317,325,331, 341,
Maliandi, Ricardo, 677 355, 360, 369, 381, 389, 394, 396, 402, 407, 411, 419,
Mall, Ram A., 80 432, 435, 443, 445, 456, 457ff, 466, 469, 477, 483, 485,
Malmgren, Helge, 624 506, 515, 521, 525-527, 532, 535, 539, 545, 548, 558,
Mamardashvili, Merab, 716 565, 571, 578, 583, 587, 593, 609, 623, 625, 626, 630,
Mandrioni, Hector, 677 659, 665, 673, 680, 685, 688, 691, 698, 702, 703, 720,
Manning, Peter, 663 733, 736, 740, 747
Marbach, Eduard, 609 Metzger, Amold, 329
Marcel, Gabriel, 4, 40, 68, 126, 135,205,212,227,248,392, Meunier, Jean Pierre, 229
412, 431ff, 450,458,471,483,485, 535, 539,540,555, Meyer-Drawe, Kăte, 69, 161, 655
566,579,599,610,720,736 Mezei, Balazs M., 325
Margvelashvili, Givi, 714 Michalski, Krzysztof, 539
Marini, Alfredo, 362 Michelson, Annette, 230
Marion, Jean-Luc, 250 Michalek, Jifi, 127
Marquez, Cesar Moreno, 676 Michiuik, Karel, 126
Mârtesson, Solveig, 647 Mickunas, Algis, 132
Martin, Diamantino, 553 Minkowski, Eugene, 61,247,564,565, 571
Martin-Lof, Per, 442, 625 Misch, Georg, 147,313,316,334
Marx, Karl, 4, Il, 41, 116, 117, 294, 314, 361,622,727, 746 Misgeld, Dieter, 93
Marx, Wemer, 275,719 Mishara, Aaron, 65
Marxism, 6, 8, 50, 70, 100, 125, 188, 195, 210, 250, 320, Mitcham, Cari, 690
324, 325, 361, 435ff, 460, 480, 538, 544, 549, 550, 559, Mitry, Jean, 229
626,646,662,690,703,713 Mitscherling, Jeff, 93
Mâseide, Atle, 629 Miyake, Goichi, 369,490, 491, 656
Masschelein, Jan, 160 Micic, Zagorka, 744
mathematics, 2, 20, 27, 76, 122, 149, 237, 248, 252, 271, modem philosophy, 3, 76, 115, 439, 461ff, 484, 498, 513,
296,326,355,382,421,424,426, 439ff,462,481, 490, 525, 747
593,625,670,709,719,737 Mohanty, J. N., 3, 22, 42,347,498, 541,556,666,719
Matthiesen, Ulf, 653 Mokrejs, Antonin, 126
Matustik, Martin, 721 Molchanov, Viktor, 716
Matyuss, Ulo, 715 Moliner, Femando Montero, 676
Maurer, Friedmann, 158 Moneta, Giuseppina, 286
Mayer-Gross, Willy, 563 Morente, Manuel Garcia, 675
Mays, Wolfe, 161, 283 Morrison, Kenneth, 663
Mazis, Glen, 176 Motroshilova, Nelli, 714
McAlister, Linda Lopez, 221 Moural, Josef, 128
McBride, William, 546, 721 Mulderij, Karel J., 70, 160
McCormick, Peter, 93 Muldoon, Mark, 93
McHugh, Paul R., 564 Miiller, Wolfgang Herrnann, 275
Mclntyre, Ronald, 22, 49, 556, 723 Mulligan, Kevin, 587
McKenna, William R., 286 Miinch, Dieter, 587
meaning, 7, Il, 16, 26, 31, 34, 44, 57, 84, 96, 107, 115, 119, Mundt, Christoph, 564
122, 142, 144, 149, 156, 168, 215, 242, 252, 261, 267, Munier, Roger, 227
283, 292, 304, 308, 345, 349, 351, 361, 364, 377, 382, Murojâo, Alexandre, 553
 INDEX 759

~urphy,John, 721 Ogawa, Hiroshi, 656

~urphy, Julien, 222 Ogawa, Tadashi, 69
~urphy, Richard T., 80 Ogurtsov, Alexandr, 714
music, 1, 3, 16, 20, 129,215,230,286,315,361, 467ff, 638, Okuda, Kazuhiku, 657
717 Olasagasti, ~iguel, 676
~utai, Risaku, 491 ontology, formal and material see formal and material onto-
~uth, Jakob, 158 logy
ontology, fundamental see fundamental ontology
Opdahl, Kari, 628
N ordinary language analysis, 21, 307, 394, 399, 480, 488,
Nagami, Isamu, 657 503ff, 676, 721
Nagatomo, Shigenori, 70 ordinary language philosophy, 14, 283, 610, 611, 719
Nasu, Hisashi, 656, 657 Orlowski, Alexander, 625
Natanson, ~aurice, 5, 19,317,419,639,657,719,721 Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 222, 507ff, 566, 670,675, 691
natural, 356, 518, 593 Orth, Ernst Wolfgang, 274
natural science, 1, 3, 20, 62, 66, 76, 95, 105, 122, 127, 138, Osadnik, Waclaw ~., 541
142, 143, 149, 161, 182, 204, 220, 272, 275, 279, 286, 0sterberg, Dag, 628
300, 307, 309, 312, 315, 322, 330, 372, 377, 382, 393, Ostrow, James, 661
42~ 44~ 45~ 462, 48~ 481, 487, 548, 558, 56~ 575, Otaka, Tomoo, 637, 656
592, 628, 640, 670, 674, 676, 690, 715, 719, 729, 736, 0verenget, Einar, 628
746 Ozdowski, Pawel, 540
natural science in constitutive perspective, 474ff, 640
natural science in hermeneutica! perspective, 477ff, 640 p
naturalism, 1,23,26,50,68, 115,117,138,146,149,153,
169, 173, 182, 188, 220, 259, 279, 318, 328, 330, 361, Paci,Enzo,8,69,359,360,435,468, 525,666
421,428,436,441,457, 480ff, 503, 518, 543, 548,575, Paek, Chong-Hyon, 389
577,641,665,668,714,729,737,748 Paget, Marianne, 663
Naudin, Jean, 566 painting, 20
Nellen, Klaus, 128 Paisana, Joiw, 555
Nenon, Thomas, 721 Palmer, Richard, 722
Netherlands and Flanders, 1, 159, 274, 426, 485, 531, 535, Palmer, Tony, 40
720 Palous, Martin, 127
Neubauer, Zdenek, 127 Pa1ous, Radim, 127
Ni, Liangkang, 100 Pan, Peiqing, 100
Nicholson, Graeme, 5, 92, 307 Pareyson, Luigi, 359
Nicol, Eduardo, 677 Park, Chong Hong, 387
Nishida, Kitaro, 69, 367, 490ff, 656 Park, Yinhui, 390
Nishihara, Kazuhisa, 656, 657 Parker, Peter, 43
Nishitani, Keiji, 490 Parviainen, Jaana, 627
Nissim-Sabat, ~arilyn, 222 Paterson, Josephine, 500
Nitta, Yoshihiro, 69 Patocka, Jan, 70, 124, 159, 325, 329,435
noema, 34, 83, 107, III, 117, 122, 180, 184, 191, 253, 261, Pavlik, Jan, 48, 128
266,279,287,288,328,334,345, 350,423,443,494ff, Pazanin, Ante, 435, 745
511,520,552,556,578,582,591,599,620,630,716,742 Pearson, C1ive, 39
Norberg-Schulz, Christian, 29, 55 Pedroli, Guido, 360
Null, Gilbert T., 286 Pejovic, Dani1o, 747
nursing, !, 115, 122,315,481, 499ff, 537 Pe1icier, Yves, 566
Nutsubidze, Shalba, 713 Peng,Fuchun, 100
Nyiri, Janos Krist6f, 324 Peperzak, Adriaan, 488
Nemec, Jifi, 126, 127 perception, 2, 11, 24, 57, 64, 68, 168, 172, 179, 203, 227,
243, 25~ 26~ 26~ 271, 278, 281, 293, 297, 304, 33~
o 340, 355, 363, 370, 378, 414, 424, 444, 458,
498, 541, 545, 554, 571, 587, 588, 620, 621,
462, 478,
629, 671,
O'Connor, Daniel, 209 690,691,693,699,737
O'Connor, Dennis, 93 perception after Husserl, 513ff
O'Dwyer, Luciana, 41 perception in Husserl, 517ff
O'Neill, John, 70, 93, 657, 662, 722 Perez-Bercoff, E., 625
Oakley, Hilda, 219 Perez-Gomez, A1berto, 26
Oberholzer, ~aurits Otto, 669 Pesek, Jifi, 126, 127
objectivism see naturalism Peskova, Jaros1ava, 126
Oesch, Ema, 627 PetroviC, 747
0fsti, Audun, 628 Petficek Jr., Miros1av, 127
760 INDEX

Pfander, Alexander, 2, Il, 62, 113,271,288, 327,338,421, psychoanalysis, 6, 9, 12, 40, 50, 62, 69, 117, 186, 222, 226,
586,630,677,729 242, 292, 294, 309, 320, 459, 480, 554, 565, 568ff, 578,
Pfeffer, Wilhelm, 161 611, 696, 704, 706
Pfiaum, K. B., 39 psychologism, 2, 57, 75, 76, 84, 114, 252, 271, 297, 321,
phenomenological psychology, 531 327, 333, 364, 383, 421, 439, 443, 468, 483, 492, 518,
phenomenology see constitutive phenomenology, consti- 572f~577,586,594,616,641,668, 729
tutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, existen- psychology, 1, Il, 40, 46, 53, 70, 73, 93, 94, 114, 127, 130,
tial phenomenology, generative phenomenology, genetic 144, 152, 171, 174, 175, 194, 200, 221, 242, 250, 252,
phenomenology, hermeneutica! phenomenology, realistic 265, 278, 285, 309, 315, 329, 336, 447, 457, 480, 481,
phenomenology 487, 531, 535, 541, 568, 572, 577ff, 590,623, 655, 661,
Phillipson, Michael, 659 670,721,731
philosophical anthropology, 3, 25, 62, 70, 115, 133, 159, 176, psychology, gestalt see gestalt psychology
189,212,254,271, 316, 329,338,369,484, 522ff, 535, psychology, philosophy of see philosophy ofpsychology
538,566,598,633,650,651,653,667 ,678,694,715,718 Pucciarelli, Eugenio, 677
philosophy of communication, 104, 526ff Pyatigorski, Alexandr, 717
philosophy ofpsychology, 285, 531ff, 577, 578, 581
philosophy, politica! see politica! philosophy
philosophy, modem see modern philosophy Q
physical education, 70, 94, 132, 161, 315, 535ff, 664 Quesada, Francisco Mir6, 678
Piana, Giovanni, 362, 470
Picard, Yvonne, 219, 249
Piche, Claude, 93 R
Pick1es, John, 53, 648
Rabb, J. Douglas, 80
Piecuch, Czeslawa, 540
Ramos, Antonio Pintor, 676
Pienaar, Jacobus J., 669
Rau, Catherine, 219
Pietersma, Henry, 92, 208
Rawlinson, Mary, 721
Pinc, Zdenek, 127
Rawls, Ann, 661
Pires, Celestino, 554
Ray, Marilyn D., 500
Plesnar, Lukasz A., 540, 541
Rayrnond, Marcel, 250
Plessner, Helmuth, 176, 346, 392, 487, 523, 567, 650, 667
re-presentation, 2, 16, 97, 142, 172,214, 340, 356, 372,453,
Pliigge, Herbert, 564
482,517,554,603,680,700
Poggeler, Otto, 17, 275 reading, 217, 259, 344, 400, 420, 582ff, 662, 686
Poland, 1, 74, 426,435, 537ff, 587 Reale, Miguel, 678
politica! philosophy, 30, 120, 127, 460, 534, 543ff, 628, 685 realistic phenomenology, 2, 45, 76, 113, 115, 123, 171, 221,
politica! science, 31, 115, 194,309,315,390,480,481, 548ff, 271, 280, 288, 324, 325, 327, 348, 408, 410, 416, 421,
640,657 468, 484, 497, 522, 558, 586ff, 611, 679, 682, 719
politics, 1,4,28, 119,127,197,242,481,558,587,623 ,693, reason,4,6, 14,120,139,142,149,158,170,181 ,205,224,
720 242, 243, 255, 328, 330, 366, 369, 424, 429, 442, 479,
Polkinghorne, Donald, 577 511,518,568, 590ff, 594,597,602,603,609,676,717,
Pollner, Melvin, 662 738
Polivka, Jifi, 128 Rector, Ralf, 154
P6ltawski, Andrezej, 538, 541 Redeker, Bruno, 161
Portugal, 1, 552ff reduction see epoche and reduction
Pos, Hendrik J., 105, 485 Reeder, Fran, 500
positivism see logica! positivism Reeder, Harry, 733
possible worlds, 8, 421, 555ff, 743 Reenpăă, Yrjo, 627
postmodernism, 19, 27, 55, 91, 92, 131, 137, 143,209,212, regional ontology see formal and material ontology
221,231,260,283, 315,411,420,498, 510,516, 544, Rehorick, David, 94
558ff,653,662, 722,723,748 Reinach, Adolf, 2, 12, 45, 84,271,327, 333, 391,408, 586,
Poltawski, Andrzej, 48, 587 630, 679, 729
Prawitz, Dag, 625 Reiner, Hans, 113, 272, 273, 724
Presas, Mario A., 677 relativism, 76, 197,259, 316, 320, 330, 384,421,428,441,
Pringuey, D. J., 566 482, 577, 593ff, 668
Prinsloo, Ersmus D., 670 religion, 1, 3, 41, 51, 54, 95, 127, 146, 181, 209, 269, 271,
Prucha, Milan, 126 294, 307, 315, 344, 366, 393, 415, 426, 444, 477, 558,
Prufer, Thomas, 600, 721 587, 597,598f~624,652,659,693, 722
Prychitko, David, 154 Relph, Edward C., 53, 647
Psathas, George, 641,650,657,660 Renaud, Michel, 555
psychiatry, 1, Il, 61, 62, 69, 94, 115, 122, 159, 174, 175, Rezek, Petr, 127
209, 242, 250, 265, 271, 283, 284, 315, 361, 371, 376, Richardson, William, 338, 719, 722
481, 487, 562ff, 570, 578, 655, 721 Richer, Paul, 720
 INDEX 761

Richir, Mare, 250 608, 609, 620ff, 624, 625, 630, 633, 668, 685, 691, 693,
Richter, Vaclav, 126 698, 702, 703, 715, 720, 727, 733, 736, 747
Ricreur, Paul, 5, Il, 17, 40, 69, 92, 93, 106, 152, 166, 175, Sato, Yoshikazu, 656, 657
209, 249, 270, 293, 307, 309, 314, 317, 325, 360, 361' Sato, Yoshiyuki, 656
379, 394, 398, 418, 431, 469, 484, 488, 540, 546, 555, Scandinavia, 1, 284, 426, 623
558, 565, 571' 585, 599, 609ff, 625, 626, 660, 670, 679, Scan1on, John, 720
715,721,722,735 Schafer, R. Murray, 54
Rie, Jyong-Bok, 390 Schaller, Klaus, 159
Rioux, Bertrand, 93 Schapp, Wilhelm, 271, 566, 587
Rizo-Patr6n, Rosemary, 678 Scheler, Max, 3, Il, 18, 50, 61, 62, 66, 74, 84,98--100, 102,
Robert, Jean-Dominique, 525 117, 123, 126, 149, 172, 180, 185, 189, 197,205,218,
Roche, Maurice, 659 247, 264, 265, 271, 284, 288, 317, 321, 328, 346, 355,
Rodin, Davor, 746 381, 38~ 38~ 391, 407, 455, 459, 483, 48~ 487, 523,
Rodriguez Rial, Ne!, 676 552, 564, 570, 579, 586, 594, 596, 598, 622, 629ff, 637,
Rogers, Mary, 663 645,650,651,659,668,677,679,691 ,715,724,729,748
Rognoni, Luigi, 361, 468 Schelling, 43,224,296,431,509, 634ff
Roj szczach, Artur, 48 Scherer, Rene, 250
Rokstad, Konrad, 628 Schliogeris, Arvidas, 715
Romanyshyn, Robert, 577, 721 Schliipmann, Heidi, 228, 230
Rombach, Heinrich, 158, 275,492, 525 Schmidt, Dennis, 721
Romeo, Sergio Rabade, 676 Schmit, Roger, 275
Romero, Francisco, 676 Schneider, Kurt, 563
Rosales, Alberto, 678 Schoeman, Stephanus J., 669
Rose, Courtice, 64 7 Schotte, Jacques, 251
Rose, Edward, 662 Schrader, George, 720, 721
Ross, Stephen David, 721 Schrag, Calvin 0., 5, 307, 535, 562, 719, 720, 722
Roth, Alois, 275 Schuhmann, Karl, 2, 274, 347, 489, 587
Rothfield, Philipa, 131 Schiirmann, Reiner, 719, 722
Rouse, Joseph, 477 Schutz, Alfred, 3, 12, 19, 61, 67, 113, 114, 119, 123, 128,
Rousset, Jean, 250 132, 152, 159, 166, 177, 197, 200, 217, 221, 272, 285,
Routi1a, Lauri, 627 311, 316, 329, 355, 365,382,407,419,448,468,469,
Rovatti, Pier Aldo, 362 483, 540, 558, 630, 636ff, 641, 647, 650, 656, 659, 690,
Rovighi, Sofia Vanni, 359 715, 718, 729, 733, 741
Roy, Krishna, 347 Schiitz, Antal, 321, 324
Rozenvalds, Juris, 715 Schiitz, Egon, 158
Rubene, Mara, 715 Schiitze, Fritz, 653
Rubenis, Andris, 715 Schuwer, Andre, 720
Ruin, Hans, 625 Schwabe-Hansen, Elling, 628
Riimke, Henricus, 487, 565 Schwartzmann, Felix, 678
Rumpf, Horst, 161 science, natural see natural science
Russell Grigg, 43 science, politica! see politica! science
Russia, 1, 270, 325, 614ff, 713 sciences, human see human sciences
Scott, Charles, 721
Scudder, John, 500
s Seaman, David, 70, 647
Seebohm, Thomas M., 4, 123, 167,275,317,319,379,483,
Sadai, Yizhak, 470 557, 721
Sakurai, Hiroshi, 656 Segelberg, Ivar, 624
Sallis, John, 720, 721 Seigfried, Hans, 477, 722
Salmer6n, Femando, 677 Semerari, Giuseppe, 360
Salter, Michae1, 410 Seo, Gwang-Il, 388
San Martin, Javier, 676 Serrano De Haro, Agustin, 676
Sander, Âke, 624 Sesonske, Alexander, 230
Santos, Delfim, 552 Sharma, Renuka, 43
Saraiva, Manuela, 553 Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine, 130, 222
Sarr6, Ramon, 566 Shen, Youding, 99
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 4, 12, 18, 24, 40, 49, 60, 68, 93, 99, 113, Shimoda, Naoharu, 656
115, 123, 125, 129, 135, 141, 159, 166, 174, 177, 180, Shin, Oh-Hyun, 389
184, 189, 197, 205, 209, 217, 219, 227, 248, 270, 273, Shurdlu, 37
280, 282, 285, 294, 314, 342, 355, 360, 369, 389, 392, Shushanashvi1i, Georgi, 714
410, 412, 419, 435, 457, 466, 483, 485, 512, 515, 532, Siches, Luis Recasens, 407
535, 539, 545, 548, 550, 554, 558, 564, 571, 577, 587, Sidorek, Janusz, 542
762 INDEX

Sik, Sandor, 324 Stinkes, Ursula, 161

Silverman, David, 659 Stojanovic, Dragan, 747
Silverman, Hugh J ., 542, 721 Stroker, Elisabeth, 3, 4, 219, 275, 484, 674
Silvers, Ronald, 93, 663 Strasser, Stephan, 159, 176,274,487,501,532,577
Simmel, Georg, 61, 95,247,315,372, 640ff, 651,656,659, Straus, Erwin W., 12, 63, 70, 129, 175, 248, 535, 560, 565,
729 579,630,665,720
Simons, Peter, 587 structuralism, 19, 105, 124, 155, 188, 200, 226, 242, 250,
Singh, Raj, 93 284, 285, 317, 319,361, 399,420,434,484,487, 560,
Sinha, Debabrata, 93, 347 662, 683ff, 694, 723
Sini, Carlo, 5, 360, 361 Struyker Boudier, Kees, 487
Sivak, Jozef, 128 Str6zewski, Wladyslaw, 538
Skirbekk, Gunnar, 628 Studlar, Gaylyn, 222
Skjervheim, Hans, 628 Styczen, Tadeusz, 538
Skulason, Pali, 629 Sudnow, David, 470
Slavney, Phillip R., 564 Sumares, Manuel, 555
Small, Robin, 41 Sun, Zhouxing, 100
Smith, Barry, 2, 74, 276, 587, 723 Svasyan, Karen, 715
Smith, Colin, 283 Svenneby, Elin, 629
Smith, David Woodruff, 22, 497, 556, 587, 723 Sverdiolas, Arunas, 715
Smith, Dorothy, 662 Swiecimski, Jerzy, 541
Smith, F. Joseph, 469 Szilasi, Vilmos (Wilhelm), 64,321,322, 564
Sobchack, Vivian, 230 Szulczewski, G., 541
Sobotka, Milan, 126
social geography, 53, 270, 646ff
sociology, 11,53,93, 114,128,152,171,194,221,242,265, T
275, 283, 284, 309, 315, 382, 447, 480, 481, 541, 558,
638,640,646,714,719,731,741 Takahashi, Satomi, 367, 368
sociology in Gerrnany, 650ff Taminiaux, Jacques, 249, 250, 721
sociology in Japan, 655ff Tanabe, Hajime, 329, 367, 368, 490
sociology in the United States, 656, 659ff Tang, Yongkuan, 100
Sodeika, Thomas, 715 Tani, Toru, 69
Soeffner, Hans-Georg, 653 Tapper, Marion, 43
Soh, Kwang-Hie, 389 Tatarkiewicz, Wladyslaw, 537
S6jka, Jacek, 540 Tatematsu, Hirotaka, 69
Sokol, Jan, 127 Tatossian, Arthur, 251, 566
Sokolowski, Robert, 4, 497, 539, 542, 587, 602, 609, 666, Tavares, Severiano, 553
719,721 Taylor, Charles, 12, 93
somatics, 70, 132, 535, 663ff technology, 1, 5, 14, 28, 33, 42, 51, 67, 95, 104, 122, 149,
Souche-Dagues, Denise, 250 315, 317, 370, 433, 439, 446, 477, 480, 500, 548, 558,
South Africa, 1, 159,531, 667ff 676, 690ff, 723, 746
space, 6, 26, 53, 54, 60, 63, 76, 158, 163, 236, 267, 274,293, Tellenbach, Hubertus, 65, 250, 564
352, 356, 387, 423, 436, 440, 458, 469, 535, 570, 595, temporality, 170, 553
632, 647, 656, 670ff, 699 Tengelyi, Laszl6, 325
Spain and Latin America, 1, 159, 507, 566, 675ff Thao, Tran Duc, 125, 141, 233, 249, 703ff
Spet, Gustav G., 616, 684 theater, 1, 4, 19, 20, 109, 122,315,419,623, 693ff, 720
Spicker, Stuart F., 70 Theunissen, Michael, 65, 265
Spiegelberg, Herbert, 2, 65, 271, 281, 287, 329, 333, 392, Thompson, Janice, 501
410,431,542,565,586,630,664,680,718,733,746 Tietjen, Herrnann, 276
Spranger, Eduard, 65 Tillich, Paul, 39, 599, 720
Sprondel, Walter, 651 time, 26, 54, 59, 97, 112, 125, 135, 137, 145, 158, 164,201,
Srubar, Ilja, 128, 636, 653, 657 215, 225, 22~ 230, 233, 24~ 254, 267, 273, 280, 293,
Srzednicki, Jan, 40 305,310, 313, 317, 329, 345, 351, 352, 356, 363, 368,
Staiger, Emil, 325 369, 379, 387, 413, 423, 429, 436, 453, 459, 467, 469,
Stambaugh, Joan, 722 475, 519, 535, 542, 546, 570, 585, 595, 603, 613, 615,
Starobinski, Jean, 250 626,632,641,645,647,651,656,674, 698ff, 703, 715
Stavenhagen, Kurt, 587, 599 Tischner, J6zef, 538
Stein, Edith, 3, 66,218,248, 271, 317, 327, 329,337,391, Todes, Samuel, 721
453,540, 587,651, 679ff Tomasulo, Frank, 230
Steinbock, Anthony J ., 719 Toombs, S. Kay, 70, 53 7
Stenstrom, Thure, 624 Toulemont, Rene, 249
Stern, Giinther, 334 truth, 27, 44, 120, 142, 202, 253, 258, 275, 297, 303, 305,
Stewart, J. McKellar, 39 307, 313, 369, 382, 386, 389, 421, 426, 428, 441, 444,
 INDEX 763

452, 474, 477, 492, 591-593, 615, 669, 708ff, 713, 738, w
745
Tschizewskij, Dmitrj, 105 Wagenschein, Martin, 161
Tsintsadze, Georgi, 714 Wagner De Reyna, Alberto, 678
Wagner, Helmut, 657,660, 719
Tuan, Yi-Fu, 54
Wahl, Jean, 248, 392, 431
Tugendhat, Emst, 275
Waksler, Frances, 661
Tuv, Ame, 628
Waldenfels, Bernhard, 5, 69, 159, 265, 275, 276, 435, 471,
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 92, 219, 538, 722
666
Wallenstein, Sven-01ov, 625
Wa1ther, Gerda, 219, 317, 355, 599, 651
V Walton, Roberto, 677
Ulfstedt, Hans-Jorgen, 625 Wang, Bingwen, 99
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 5, 196, 325, 436, 618, Wang, Qingjie, 100
713ff Washida, Kiyokazu, 69
United States of America, 1, 70, 91, 106, 143, 159, 194,208, Watabe, Hikaru, 657
218, 226, 233, 247, 270, 284, 286, 317, 360, 363, 376, Watson, Jean, 500, 501
382, 390, 393, 422, 426, 483, 531, 539, 541' 546, 548, Watsuji, Tetsuro, 69, 367, 368
570,616,650,657,659,667, 718ff Weber, Max, 12, 62, 114, 153, 190,315,372,559,563,636,
Usui, Jisho, 655 640, 651, 656, 659, 729ff
W~grzecki, Adam, 538, 540
Uzelac, Milan, 748
Uznadze, Dmitrey, 713 Weiner, James, 201
Weis, Helene, 219
Welton, Donn, 498, 721
V Werlen, Benno, 53
Wey1, Hermann, 442
Vajda, Gyorgy Mihâly, 324 Wiggins, Osborne, 286, 719
Valdes, Mario, 94 Wild, John, 719
Vallenilla, Emesto Mayz, 677 Willard, Dallas, 80, 587, 721
value, 44, 68, 123, 181, 212, 271,279,291,349, 361,414, Wilshire, Bruce, 344, 363
428, 450, 483, 549, 587, 591, 596, 622, 633, 677, 680, Wind, H. C., 626
694, 730 Winkler, Robert, 599
value theory, 3, 14, 84, 171, 193, 197, 317, 355, 538, 624, Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 47,282, 399,426, 503, 573, 624, 662,
659, 718,719, 724ff 732ff
valuing, 498 Wojtyla, Karol, 127, 538, 587, 679
Van Breda, Herman Leo, 99, 125,249, 273, 327, 331, 360, Wolenski, Jan, 48
488,552,630 Wolff, Kurt, 660
Van de Pitte, Margaret, 94 Wolff, Stephan, 654
Van den Berg, Jan Hendrik, 70, 159, 487, 536, 565, 580 Wood, David, 283, 721
Van den Hengel, John, 94 world,3,17,22,26,31,36,42,44,51,55, 78,97,111, 117,
Van den Hoven, Adrian, 94 121, 133, 134, 144, 149, 158, 159, 168, 174, 179, 198,
Van Hooft, Stan, 42 205, 206, 215, 227, 228, 235, 262, 267, 272, 273, 279,
Van Kaam, Adrian, 579 283, 285, 292, 31 o, 313, 314, 317, 329, 334, 342, 345,
Van Lennep, David J., 70, 487 352, 356, 360, 361, 378, 389, 406, 414, 416, 419, 435,
Van Manen, Max, 94, 160, 536 441, 455, 458, 472, 475, 477, 481, 485, 493, 498, 508,
Van Peursen, Comelius, 487, 525 516, 518, 527, 532, 543, 545, 558, 571, 576, 580, 595,
600, 604, 609, 612, 624, 631, 647, 651, 659, 669, 690,
Van Vuuren, Rex, 670
691,695,710,715,716,734, 736ff, 745,748
Van Wyk, Gerrit, 670
worlds, possible see possible worlds
Van Zyl, Piet, 669
Wyss, Dieter, 275
Vâsquez, Guillermo Hoyos, 678
Vattimo, Gianni, 5, 361, 558
Venneslan, Knut, 628 X
Vestre, Bernt, 628
Villoro, Luis, 677 Xiao, Shiyi, 99
Vitello, Vincenzo, 477 Xiong, Wei, 99
Volkmann-Schluck, Karl-Heinz, 274, 435, 553 Xirau, Joaquin, 676
Von Gebsattel, Viktor, 564, 570
Von Hermann, Friedrich-Wilhelm, 17 y
Von Hildebr~nd, Dietrich, 176,327,540,587,630,724
Von Pauler, Akos, 324 Yamagishi, Takeshi, 656
Von Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 634 Yamaguchi, lchiro, 69
Von Weizsăcker, Viktor, 12 Yamaguchi, Masao, 657
764 INDEX

Yamaguchi, Setsuo, 656 Zaner, Richard~., 69, 70, 123,209,286,483, 660, 666, 721
Yamauchi, TokuryU, 490 Zderad, Loretta, 500
Yatani, Yoshikuni, 656 Zelaniec, Woyciech, 48, 587
Yoon,~yong-Ro, 388,389 Zhang, Qingxiong, 100
Young, Iris ~arion, 70, 209, 221, 535, 546, 721 Zhou, Xuliang, 100
Yuasa, Shin'ichi, 69 Zimmerman, ~ichael, 477,721
Yuasa, Yasuo, 69 Zirion, Antonio, 677
Yugoslavia, 1, 272, 360,435, 744ff Zivotic, ~iladin, 746
Zubiri, Xavier, 676

z Zunjic, Slobodan, 747

Zurovac, ~irko, 747
Zahavi, Dan, 626 Zutt, Jiirg, 564
Zalai, Bela, 322
 Contributions to Phenomenology
IN COOPERATION WITH
THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY

1. F. Kersten: Phenomenological Method. Theory and Practice. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0094-7

2. E. G. Ballard: Philosophy and the Liberal Arts. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0241-9
3. H. A. Durfee and D.F.T. Rodier (eds.): Phenomenology and Beyond. The Self and Its Language. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0511-6
4. J. J. Drummond: Husserlian lntentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Noema and Object. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0651-1
5. A. Gurwitsch: Kants Theorie des Verstandes. Herausgegeben von T.M. Seebohm. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0696-1
6. D. Jervolino: The Cogito and Hermeneutics. The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0824-7
7. B.P. Dauenhauer: Elements ofResponsible Politics. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1329-1
8. T.M. Seebohm, D. F01Iesdal and J.N. Mohanty (eds.): Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1499-9
9. L. Hardy and L. Embree (eds.): Phenomenology ofNatural Science. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1541-3
10. J.J. Drummond and L. Embree (eds.): The Phenomenology ofthe Noema. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1980-X
11. B. C. Hopkins: lntentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. The Problem of the Original Method and
Phenomenon of Phenomenology. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-207 4-3
12. P. Blosser, E. Shimomisse, L. Embree and H. Kojima (eds.): Japanese and Western Phenomenology. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2075-1
13. F. M. Kirkland and P.D. Chattopadhyaya (eds.): Phenomenology: East and West. Essays in Honor of J. N.
Mohanty. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2087-5
14. E. Marbach: Mental Representation and Consciousness. Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Representa-
tion and Reference. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2101-4
15. J .J. Kockelmans: 1de as for a Hermeneutic P henomenology of the Natural Sciences. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2364-5
16. M. Daniel and L. Embree (eds.): Phenomenology ofthe Cultural Disciplines. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2792-6
17. T.J. Stapleton (ed.): The Question of Hermeneutics. Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2911-2; Pb 0-7923-2964-3
18. L. Embree, E. Behnke, D. Carr, J.C. Evans, J. Huertas-Jourda, J.J. Kockelmans, W.R. McKenna, A.
Mickunas, J.N. Mohanty, T.M. Seebohm and R.M. Zaner (eds.): Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-2956-2
19. S.G. Crowell (ed.): The Prism ofthe Self. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Maurice Natanson. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3546-5
20. W.R. McKenna and J.C. Evans (eds.): Derrida andPhenomenology. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3730-1
21. S.B. Mallin: Art Line Thought. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3774-3
22. R.D. Ellis: Eros in a Narcissistic Culture. An Analysis Anchored in the Life-World. 1996
ISBN 0-7923-3982-7
23. J.J. Drummond and J.G. Hart (eds.): The Truthful and The Good. Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski.
1996 ISBN 0-7923-4134-1
24. T. Nenon and L. Embree (eds.): lssues in Husserl's Ideas IL 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4216-X
25. J.C. Evans and R.S. Stufflebeam (eds.): To Work at the Foundations. Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch.
1997 ISBN 0-7923-4317-4

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