Meralo v.

Secretary of Labor

197 SCRA 275

As will be noted, the second sentence of Art. 245 embodies an amendment disqualifying
supervisory employees from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.
It does not include security guards in the disqualification. The implementing rules of RA 6715,
therefore, insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization are
null and void, for being not germane to the object and purposes of EO 111 and RA 6715 upon
which such rules purportedly derive statutory moorings.

While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor
organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization
of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating
supervisory employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to
security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and
file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization.

Bulletin Publishing v. Sanchez

144 SCRA 628

In the light of the factual background of this case, We are constrained to hold that the
supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a supervisors union,
separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file
employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most of the private
respondents are considered managerial employees. Also, it is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule
II, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently no
longer recognized nor allowed to exist and operate as such.

Article 246 of the Labor Code explicitly excludes managerial employees from the right of self-
organization, the right to form, join and assist labor organizations. A perusal of the job
descriptions corresponding to the private respondents as outlined in the petition, clearly reveals
the private respondents to be managers, purchasing officers, personnel officers, property officers,
supervisors, cashiers, heads of various sections and the like. The nature of their duties gives rise
to the irresistible conclusion that most of the herein private respondents are performing
managerial functions. Their responsibilities inherently require the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment as supervisors. They possess the power and authority to lay down or
exercise management policies. Managerial employees are those vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such
managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank-and-file
employees (Article 212 (k), Labor Code). We further find very plainly stressed in Section 11,
Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the same Labor Code, that “All existing
supervisory unions and unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to
operate as such and their registration certificates shall be deemed automatically cancelled. xxx.
Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees
shall become eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file labor organization, and if none exists, to
form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file organizations.”

SMC Supervisors and Exempt Employees Union v. Laguesma

277 SCRA 370

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties,
become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought
to be accomplished by the “confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is
that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests.
“Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who
are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the company’s position with
regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.”

NATU v. Torres

239 SCRA 546

A managerial employee is (a) one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees; or (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives. A supervisory
employee is different from a managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory employee, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommends such managerial actions, if the exercise of
such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment.

Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough examination of the evidence submitted by
both parties, we arrive at a contrary conclusion. Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of
respondent Bank are not managerial employees but supervisory employees. The finding of public
respondent that bank policies are laid down and/or executed through the collective action of
these employees is simply erroneous. His discussion on the division of their duties and
responsibilities does not logically lead to the conclusion that they are managerial employees, as
the term is defined in Art. 212, par.(m).

SAJELCO v. Ministry of Labor

173 SCRA 697

In this petition, San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. (SAJELCO) claims that its
employees are also members of the cooperative. It cited Section 17 (18) of its By-laws which
declares that: “The Board shall also create positions for subordinate employees and fix their
duties and remunera-tions. Only member-consumers or members of their immediate family shall
be employed by the cooperative” (Italics supplied). The above-cited provision, however,
mentions two types of employees, namely: the members-consumers and the members of their
immediate families. As regards employees of SAJELCO who are members-consumers, the rule
is settled that they are not qualified to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining. The reason for withholding from employees of a cooperative who are
members-co-owners the right to collective bargaining is clear: an owner cannot bargain with
himself.

However, employees who are not members-consumers may form, join or assist labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining notwithstanding the fact that employees of
SAJELCO who are not members-consumers were employed ONLY because they are members
of the immediate family of members-consumers. The fact remains that they are not themselves
members-consumers, and as such, they are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to
organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in Section 8, Article
III and Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, Labor Code of the Philippines and other
related laws (Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc., supra, p. 10).

Acedera v. ICTSI

G.R. No. 146073

January 13, 2003

A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of the
Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the
purpose of collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for
the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative
capacity “for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees similarly situated,” the
title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiter’s Office so expressly states.

Liana’s Supermarket v. NLRC

G.R. No. 111014

May 31, 1996

One of the rights granted by Art. 242 of the Labor Code to a legitimate labor organization, like
respondent Union, is to sue and be sued in its registered name. In Liberty Manufacturing
Workers Union v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, citing National Brewery and Allied
Industries Labor Union of the Philippines v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., and Itogon-Suyoc Mines,
Inc. v. Sañgilo-Itogon Workers’ Union, the Court held that the aforementioned provision
authorizes a union to file a “representative suit” for the benefit of its members in the interest of
avoiding an otherwise cumbersome procedure of joining all union members in the complaint,
even if they number by the hundreds.

Catatista v. NLRC

247 SCRA 46

The rule is well-settled that labor laws discourage interference with an employer’s judgment in
the conduct of his business. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must
also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As
long as the company’s exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid
agreements, such exercise will be upheld.

University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan

127 SCRA 691

This Court is not guilty of usurpation of legislative functions as claimed by the respondents. We
expressed the opinion in the University of the East case that benefits mandated by law and
collective bargaining may be charged to the 12% return on investments within the 40%
incremental proceeds of tuition increase. As admitted by respondent, we merely made this
statement as a suggestion in answer to the respondent’s query as to where then, under the law,
can such benefits be charged. We were merely interpreting the meaning of the law within the
confines of its provisions. The law provides that 60% should go to wage increases and 40% to
institutional developments, student assistance, extension services, and return on investments
(ROI). Under the law. the, last item ROI has flexibility sufficient to accommodate other purposes
of the law and the needs of the university. ROI is not set aside for any one purpose of the
university such as profits or returns on investments. The amount may be used to comply with
other duties and obligations imposed by law which the university exercising managerial
prerogatives finds cannot under present circumstances, be funded by other revenue sources. It
may be applied to any other collateral purpose of the university or invested elsewhere. Hence,
the framers of the law intended this portion of the increases in tuition fees to be a general fund to
cover up for the university’s miscellaneous expenses and, precisely, for this reason, it was not so
delimited. Besides, ROI is a return or profit over and above the operating expenditures of the
university, and still, over and above the profits it may have had prior to the tuition increase. The
earning capacities of private educational institutions are not dependent on the increases in tuition
fees allowed by P.D. 451. Accommodation of the allowances required by law require wise and
prudent management of all the university resources together with the incremental proceeds of
tuition increases. Cognizance should be taken of the fact that the private respondent had, before
PD 451, managed to grant all allowances required by law. It cannot now claim that it could not
afford the same, considering that additional funds are even granted them by the law in question.
We find no compelling reason, therefore, to deviate from our previous ruling in the University of
the East case even as we take the second hard look at the decision requested by the private
respondent. This case was decided in 1982 when PDs 1614, 1634, 1678, and 1713 which are also
the various Presidential Decrees on ECOLA were already in force. PD 451 was interpreted in the
light of these subsequent legislations which bear upon, but do not modify nor amend, the same.
We need not go beyond the ruling in the University of the East case.

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises

118 SCRA 422

The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indisputably show that a legitimate
representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face of these facts and
in conformity with the existing jurisprudence, We hold that there existed no duty to bargain
collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of said companies. And proceeding from
this basis, it follows that all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the
Notice of Strike on June 13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the two strikes of September 4,
1967 and November 7, 1967 were calculated, designed and intended to compel the respondent
Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it was an uncertified
union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it
despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro was already certified as the sole bargaining
agent in said respondent company. These concerted activities executed and carried into effect at
the instigation and motivation of LAKAS are all illegal and violative of the employer’s basic
right to bargain collectively only with the representative supported by the majority of its
employees in each of the bargaining units. This Court is not unaware of the present predicament
of the employees involved but much as We sympathize with those who have been misled and so
lost then-jobs through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule that the facts neither
substantiate nor support the finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair
labor practice.