Name: Victoria Ashley P.

Pepito
Subject: PALE
Teacher: Atty. Romeo Reyes

Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS

CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Illustrative Case : Manalang v. Angeles A.C. No. 1558, March 10,

2003
Ponente: J. Quisumbing

Facts: Manalang and Cirilo (petitioners) filed a case against their

employer, Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, for their overtime and
separation pay before the NLRC and Francisco Angeles (respondent) was
their counsel. They obtained a favorable judgment and their employer was
asked to pay Php 6,500. However, Atty. Angeles compromised and was
only able to collect Php 5,500 and it was allegedly obtained without the
consulting his clients. OSG conducted several hearings but respondent
only appeared 3 times. It was then transferred to the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. Neither party appeared despite prior due notice. The
Committee issued a resolution recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.

Issue: W/N Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the

practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his clients’ funds.

Ruling:YES. A lawyer must possess standards for honesty, integrity and

fair dealing. Also, the respondent exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to
the interest of his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and
defense of their rights (violating Canon 17). Moreover, he consistently
failed to appear at the hearings and more importantly, failed to deliver
upon the demand of Php 4,550 (minus fees) intended for his clients. This
demonstrated lack of integrity and propriety. o The Court thereby
suspends Atty. Angeles from practice of law for a period of 6 months and
orders the respondent to pay the sum of Key words: overtime and
separation pay, Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, Atty. Angeles | 1C
Constitutional Law I 2 Php 2,275.00 each to complainants Honorio
Manalang and Florencio Cirillo, with interest of 6% per annum from the
time of filing this complaint until fully paid.

Doctrine: A lawyer must possess standards for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. Atty. Angeles’ conduct of lack of devotion to the interest of his
clients and as well as zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights
are clear signs of breach of his duty as an officer of the Court

CANON 18
Illustrative Case : Tejano vs. Atty.Baterina
Facts :Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of
the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court against his counsel, Atty.
Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his] cause”, and Judge Dominador
Arquelada of acting in conspiracy to take possession of his property, which
was the subject matter of litigation in the judge’s court.
The Court required Atty. Baterina  to file a Comment on the complaint to
which he explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney
transplant when he received a copy of the complaint.
The Court,found Atty.Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory” and
admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s directives” and
referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation,
which found sufficient ground for disciplinary action against Atty. Baterina.

Issue: w/n Atty Baterina liable for gross negligence in his duty as counsel
to his client
RULING:The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with
modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers
states:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a
commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.
Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his
client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence,
care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.”25 A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a
case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory.”

CANON 20
Illustrative Case : Cortez vs. Atty. Cortez

Facts: Eugenio Cortez engaged the services of atty. Cortez as his counsel
in an illegal dismissal case against the Philippine Explosives Corporation.
He further alleged that he and Atty. Cortez had a handshake agreement
on the 12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney’s fees.
The case was decided in favor of complainant.PEC was ordered to pay
complainant the total amount of One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos
in three staggered payments.PEC then issued checks all payable in the
name of complainant, as payment.
Atty.Cortez however claimed that the 50% of the total awarded claims
belongs to him as attorney’s fees.Complainant then offered to pay Php
200 000 and when Atty.Cortez rejected it , he offered the third check
amounting PHP 275 000.But Atty. Cortez still insisted on the 50% of the
total award.
A complaint was filed by Eugenio against respondent Atty. Cortez for
misconduct, and violation for Lawyer’s oath and the Code for Professional
Responsibility.The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the six
month suspension of Atty. Cortez.

Issue: Whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on

the part of Atty. Cortez, which would subject him to disciplinary action.

Ruling: The court ruled on the affirmative. We have held that a

contingent free arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction.It is generally
recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in, an express
contract.
Invoking the case of Rayos vs. Atty. Hernandez : A contingent free
arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as
valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract.The
amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the
stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or
litigation prospers.
In this case ,we note that the parties did not have an express contract as
regards the payment of fees.Complainant alleges that the contingency fee
was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement,while Atty. Cortez counters
that the agreement was 50%.
The IBP Commission on discipline pointed out that since what respondent
handled was merely a labor case, his attorney’s fees should not exceed
10% limitation provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.
Generally, the amount of Attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the
Retainer Agreement which is conclusive as to amount of lawyers
compensation.
In the absence thereof, the amount of Attorneys fee is fixed on the basis of
quantum meruit, the reasonable worth of the attorney’s fees are found to
be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances.
Respondent was found guilty of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional responsibility and is hereby suspended in the practice of law
for three months and is ordered to return the complainant Eugenio Cortez
the amount he received in excess of the 12% allowable attorneys fees.

CANON 22

Illustrative Case: Orcino vs. Atty. Gaspar

Facts: Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute

a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying
of her husband. Complainant paid respondent his fees as stipulated.
Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties and performed them
religiously from the preliminary investigation with the office of the
prosecutor until the case was thereafter filed with the RTC of Baloc, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

Respondent however failed to attend the bail hearing scheduled in August

1991. It was at this nearing that the court, over complainant's objections,
granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant
immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his
absence. Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of
the hearing. Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of
jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent said that her suspicions
were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives.
Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked
for the records of the case saying that she could refer them to
another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records.

Subsequently, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel" but it did not bear the consent of complainant. The
court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's
consent to the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall
continue until he has secured this consent." Complainant refused to sign
her conformity to respondent's withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in
the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings
nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to
engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, this complaint.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer is excused from his duty to represent his

client if said client refuses to give his consent to the lawyer’s motion to
withdraw his appearance.

Held: No. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special

proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy
thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his
consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on
notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought
to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a
good cause. In the instant case, respondent did not file an application with
the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.

Corollary Issue: Granting that the Motion to withdraw appearance filed

by respondent is sufficient as to form, is it based upon a good cause?

No. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides: ”A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the
following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral
conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the
client has two or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get
along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical
condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case
effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees
agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office;
(g) other similar cases”.

Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer

exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between them and that there had been
"serious differences between them relating to the manner of private
prosecution." This circumstance is neither one of the foregoing instances
nor can it be said that it is analogous thereof.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

CANON 1

Illustrative Case: SPS Decena vs. Malanyaon

FACTS: A session was conducted wherein revocation of two previous

resolutions granting authority to operate a cockpit in the locale was being
deliberated. Respondent, whose nephew-in-law was one of the cockpit
operators, heckled and interrupted the session by hurling various
accusatory remarks and insults (such as “lies, they are lies”, “Lies! Can
you do that even if they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?”) at the
council members. Municipal officials later filed a joint affidavit-complaint
for Respondent’s dismissal and disbarment. Respondent admitted his
presence during the council session, but contended that he was not drunk
and that he was there merely in his private capacity as a taxpayer.
RULING: Respondent FINED P20,000 for conduct unbecoming of a judge
in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; with STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or a
similar act or omission in the future will be dealt with more severely. His
actuations constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
that, “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities (Canon 2)”, “a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary (Rule 2.01)”; “a judge shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge (Rule 2.03)”.
Respondent needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not
terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes.  Even
when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains
the air of authority and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside
the sala. 
A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 in
particular, mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaon’s
suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer or ordinary
citizen and not as that of a judge. In fact, his utterances were not made
under a cloak of anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as
some of the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge.  It is
highly probable that his invectives took on a greater imperative on the
listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all the authority
attendant to the office.
CANON 2
Illustrative Case: Perfecto vs. Judge Esidera
Facts: In support of the charges, the complainant alleges that he filed a
Petition to Cite for Contempt against one Dalmacio Grafil and a Ven S.
Labro. The complainant laments that the case has since been gathering
dust in the court of the respondent. He maintains that the respondent
should be made administratively liable for her failure to act on the case
within a reasonable period of time.

On the second cause of action, the complainant claims that he is the

publisher and Editor-in-Chief of the Catarman Weekly Tribune (CWT), the
only accredited newspaper in Northern Samar. He claims that in Special
Proceedings Nos. C-346 (for adoption and change of name) and C-352 (for
adoption), the respondent directed the petitioners to have her orders
published in a newspaper of national circulation. Through these directives,
the complainant posits, the respondent betrayed her ignorance of the law,
considering that all judicial notices and orders emanating from the courts
of Catarman, Northern Samar should be published only in the CWT,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1079.

The Court issued a Resolution re-docketing the case as a formal

administrative complaint against the respondent.

Respondent advises the Court that she is of the firm belief that the second
cause of action for ignorance of the law (non-publication of court
orders/notices in CWT) had already been passed upon by the Court (Third
Division) in its Decision in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of ignorance of the law?

HELD:

Indeed, the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross ignorance of

the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed her
unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic procedural rules such as what
was involved in the contempt proceedings before her court. She should
have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to move ex
parte to have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the court
(through the branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case for
pre-trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the motion.

The respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the
case to her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding
judge, she should account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed
their answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had not
moved in the respondent's court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the
standards of competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of
the law in her handling of the petition for contempt. As in Magpali v.
Pardo, she should be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is found LIABLE for gross
ignorance of the law.

CANON 3
Illustrative Case: Edao vs. Judge Asdala
FACTS:
Carmen Edaño (complainant) filed an administrative complaint for
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, misconduct, rendering an
erroneous decision, and rendering a decision beyond the 90-day
reglementary period against Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent judge).
The complainant claimed that the respondent judge made it appear that
Civil Case No. Q-97-30576 was decided on March 22, 2005, although the
records show that she (respondent judge) still ruled on several motions
relating to this case even after that date. The complainant further alleged
that the respondent judge erred in denying her notice of appeal.
The OCA, in its report dated April 18, 2006, recommended that the
respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for undue delay in
rendering a decision, with a stern warning that a commission of similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the judge constitutes a violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics, misconduct, rendering an erroneous decision, and
rendering a decision beyond the 90-day reglementary period.

RULING:
We agree with the finding of the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of
undue delay in rendering a decision. Section 15, Article VIII of the
Constitution requires judges to decide all cases within three (3) months
from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule
1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge
should administer justice impartially and without delay; and Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

CANON 4
Illustrative Case: Galang vs. Judge Santos

Facts: S was a judge and the publisher/columnist for a tabloid; he was

also a writer for another paper. G charges him with using his columns to
ventilate his views. He has repeatedly used insulting and inflammatory
language against the governor and the provincial prosecutor and legal
adviser. 

Held: JUDGE DISMISSED. While S has the right to free speech, his writing
of vicious editorials compromise his duties as judge in the impartial
administration of justice. They reflect both on his office and on the officers
he ridicules. The personal behavior of a judge in his professional and
everyday life should be free from the appearance of impropriety. Improper
conduct erodes the public confidence in the judiciary.

Canon 5
Illustrative Case:Atty. Correa vs. Judge Belen
Facts: Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators
appointed by the court in Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled
Intestate Estate of Hector Tan. He revealed that during the hearing of the
case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the
Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report covering the
said estate, and immediately ruled that they should be disallowed.
Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant,
branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the
regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen is guilty of conduct unbecoming a

judge?
Ruling: Yes, Judge Belen is guilty of unbecoming a judge.
Pursuant to canon 4 which states that:

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to

the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the

appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom

of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all
before the courts. More specifically, Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality
provides

SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate

consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties.
Here, the Judge scolded accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and
threatened to sue her.

Therefor, Judge Belen is guilty of unbecoming a judge and fine him

P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely

Canon 6
Illustrative Case: Pantilo vs. Judge Canoy
Facts: Pantilo filed an administrative complaint against Judge Canoy of
RTC Surigao for several counts of ignorance of the law and/or procedures,
grave abuse of authority, and appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code
of Judicial Conduct). He is praying for Judge Canoy’s disbarment in relation
to a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (People v.
Melgazo). Petitioner Pantilo was the brother of the homicide-victim.
Melgazo, the accused, was released from detention upon the order of
Judge Canoy after he posted bail (P30,000). Pantilo found out from the
office of the clerk of court that no Information had been filed in Court that
would serve as the basis for the approval of bail. Likewise, he also learned
from the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been
issued, but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release
Melgazo from his detention cell. One of the police officers even said that
Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release would be
available the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the Information
is filed in Court. Judge Canoy filed his comment, arguing that the facts in
this case were exceptional. Hadmitted that the inquest proceedings of
Melgazo before Prosecutor Gonzaga concluded around 5:00 p.m. on
September 3, 2008, after which, Melgazo, with his counsel, Atty. Azarcon,
went to his office to post bail for Melgazos provisional liberty. He noted
that because of the time, most of the clerks in his office and the Office of
the Clerk of Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no longer possible
to process the posting of bail and all the necessary papers needed for the
release of Melgazo.

The SC ruled that Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in
court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality
where he is held. In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or
petition for the grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite
the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted
bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in
Sec. 17 of Rule 114. Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not
deposit the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy
instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of
the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official
receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. Worse,
respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking
containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied
with by Melgazo. Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit
of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the police escorts to
release Melgazo without any written order of release. In sum, there was no
written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector
or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by
Melgazo, and no written release order.
 
DOCTRINE:
 SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail
fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper
certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance
with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered
as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the
excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made
the deposit.

 SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. All kinds of bail are

subject to the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless

cancelled, shall remain in form at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed
to it;

(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
required by the court or these Rules;

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without

justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his
right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in
absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for
execution of the final execution.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the
accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required
by this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six
(6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused
must be attached to the bail.