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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, originally a Eurasian security organization led by China, four
Central Asian countries, and Russia, has expanded its remit as well. India and Pakistan both applied to
upgrade their status from observers to members, and were accepted in 2015. They will need to complete a
process of accession, but they appear poised for full membership. This marks another security-focused
forum in which the United States has interests but plays no role.
With a clear shift toward new institutions that countries of the region see as more responsive to their own
needs, Washington makes a mistake by standing apart. Given the country’s deep involvement in South Asia,
including the continued U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, concerns about terrorism and regional stability,
and hopes for more vibrant regional economic growth, it does not make sense to forego the opportunity to be
present as these regional organizations develop. New regional stresses pose heightened risks of conflict and
instability in Asia. And since this part of Asia lacks the intensity of the institutional diplomatic calendar that
exists for East Asia, more institutionalization in the region would be a net boon.
Although the United States has observer status with CICA, it has not sought observership in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. It has balked at the AIIB—although it is supportive of joint projects with the
Asian Development Bank and World Bank—and does not have a relationship with the New Development
Bank. In a world in which the U.S. financial contribution to regional connectivity is going to be outmatched
by China’s and by that of the newer development banks, Washington should indicate its interest in
participating in these institutions as an observer and offer U.S. views.
TENSE TRIANGLE
Across South Asia, the traditional strategic triangle of China, India, and Pakistan is tense enough. But
another emerging and equally challenging regional strategic triangle is emerging: the United States, China,
and India.
The historic enmity between India and Pakistan—four wars since 1947—has tended to capture the
headlines, but India and China are no friends either. They went to war in 1962 over their still-undemarcated
border. Routine border scuffles keep this Cold War–era standoff alive, and both sides are expanding and
modernizing their forces devoted to this territory. By playing host to a large community of Tibetan exiles,
New Delhi finds itself at odds with Beijing on a major point of Chinese sensitivity. China has asserted
claims to territory across the Sino-Indian border, including by redrawing maps in passports and on the Web.
From time to time, including last month, China checks Indian membership ambitions for select global
institutions, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India worries that China’s submarine fleet and new
overseas port in Djibouti, combined with its port access in Sri Lanka, will come with even more extensive
visions of territorial reach. India is expanding its own navy, and has begun developing its Andaman
command as a counterbalance.
China’s alliance with Pakistan fuels India’s concerns, as have China’s greatly expanded political and
economic ties across all of South and Central Asia, which New Delhi sees as an effort to limit India’s
strategic options. Desperate to access the energy resources of Central Asia and the Middle East, India fears a
tightening Chinese noose enabled by access through Pakistan to ports along the Arabian Sea. The Indian
government has registered official objections to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor plans involving disputed
territory, and the Indian press is markedly suspicious about China’s designs once the corridor and One Belt,
One Road are complete.
In addition, leading foreign policy strategists in India increasingly voice concern that Washington seeks
Indian support for U.S. strategic goals for East Asia but has not been willing to support Indian goals in
South Asia. Framed as “convergence to the east, divergence to the west,” Indian strategists question how the
United States can see China as aggressive in East Asia and yet remain all too eager to coordinate with
Beijing in the other direction, for instance in the Quadrilateral talks in Afghanistan. New Delhi worries that
the United States does not appreciate the threat posed by a China-Pakistan axis, and worse, continues to
assist Pakistan with financial and military support despite Pakistan’s own sponsorship of terrorism that
targets India.
Such concerns have never been easy for Washington to address. That said, if China can be held to an
inclusive agenda with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, one that encourages outside (non-Chinese)
participants and literally paves the way for an eventual opening of Pakistani trade to India, New Delhi could
finally achieve a breakthrough in its diplomatic efforts. Over time, India would have a better chance of
building business constituencies that favor peace on both sides of the border.
Washington’s relations with Beijing and New Delhi have raised other suspicions as well. China fears that
U.S. efforts to assist India’s rise are designed to contain its own, particularly as India increases its role in
China’s maritime backyard in the South China Sea and the United States and India enhance their defense
partnership. Yet despite their suspicions, all three countries benefit from expanding trade and economic ties.
China has become India’s largest trading partner in goods, just as it has for so many other countries around
the world. India and China have also found ways to bridge their divides when it comes to partnering on the
world stage to achieve greater representation for their interests as rising powers, as illustrated by their
cooperation in creating new institutions and on climate change.
What is missing, however, is a structure for consultation that encompasses the United States, China, and
India together, one that could build transparency, provide a forum for concerns, and help assuage the fears
that China and India each have about the United States’ ties with the other.
A high-level trilateral arrangement would provide scope to coordinate on major global issues, but it would
also serve to create a platform in which concerns of any of the three countries could be addressed. Although
no dialogue can prevent conflict in and of itself, the absence of one can worsen already tense relationships.
Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington are obviously capable of sharing intelligence and communicating
bilaterally, but a trilateral institution with a permanent headquarters and staff would structure and focus their
diplomatic efforts under normal conditions and facilitate communication at times of tension. Naturally, all
three members of the trilateral are likely to have concerns about the possibility that it would be used for
coercive—two against one—diplomatic maneuvers, so the institution should be structured and staffed in
ways that support confidence building and communications efforts, not binding negotiations. And because
all three states would also aim to avoid replicating their work in other forums such as the United Nations or
upsetting friends and allies not included in the trilateral, they should keep the institution’s agenda narrowly
focused on matters of trilateral significance and as transparent as possible.
COOPERATIVE CHANNEL
Southern Asia’s flashpoints are well known. Less remarked upon is the fact that South Asia is uniquely
vulnerable to natural disasters like tsunamis and earthquakes as well. Add to that the increased prospects for
disasters, such as flooding and droughts, due to climate change and related extreme weather. Each of these
holds the potential to cause catastrophic harm when layered on top of the numerous political, economic, and
environmental stresses already present.
In the case of the December 2004 tsunami and Nepal’s April 2015 earthquake, international assistance and
relief also created new opportunities for cooperation. China and India even opened up their own
communication channel with each other to coordinate relief in Nepal—a country where their own
competition has intensified in recent years. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is the one arena that
requires close civil-military cooperation, and can, as a result, bring together militaries that might ordinarily
never have a shared objective.
In the humanitarian world, experts have identified how planning for prevention and for the fastest and most
skilled deployment of assistance can directly prevent greater harm and limit damage from disasters. For this
reason, “disaster risk reduction” has become a UN watchword. Given the likelihood of future earthquakes,
floods, and cyclones across southern Asia, developing disaster risk reduction as a continued line of
cooperation makes a lot of sense. And it would surely save lives as it supports shared planning across
civilian and military lines of communication.
The South Asian Area of Regional Cooperation has a disaster management center located in New Delhi, and
in November of 2015—for the very first time—it convened South Asia–wide disaster relief exercises, called
the South Asian Annual Disaster Management Exercise, or SAADMEx. The United States has particular
experience in advance planning for immediate relief and in developing risk reduction measures. Whether
through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a relatively weak organization but one to
which China and the United States are both observers, or via bilateral cooperation with each country,
Washington can proactively offer its expertise to China, India, and Pakistan to develop shared plans for the
known contingencies of major earthquakes, floods, and coastal extreme weather. The Lower Mekong
Initiative is a highly successful model for developing a regionally shared approach to environmental
challenges and public health; the urgency of disaster risk reduction suggests the need to replicate a similar
cooperative effort in South Asia.
POWER PLAY
U.S. diplomats and policymakers need to think creatively about how best to harness the United States’
inherent advantages in South and Central Asia and thereby offset China’s overwhelming financial
investments and diplomatic initiatives. Strategies should include enhancing commercial diplomacy and
capacity-building efforts through U.S. institutions, such as Ex-Im Bank and Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, as well as advancing cooperative development projects between China-led development banks
and the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.
The United States remains the most important guarantor of security in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet the
region is fraught with tension. Establishing a trilateral Indian-Chinese-U.S. security dialogue to enhance
transparency and build confidence is essential; eventually, it may also provide new opportunities for security
burden-sharing.
Although the United States is not as central to maintaining regional order in South Asia as it has been in the
Asia-Pacific, that limitation offers its own opportunity. Without predetermined obligations in South Asia,
Washington can play a more focused role, taking the initiative in select issues and seizing opportunities to
influence the region’s unfolding geopolitics. If it manages these relationships effectively, the United States
can utilize even a relatively limited presence to achieve outsized geopolitical gains—should Washington
choose to do so.
Courtesy of the Foreign Affairs Magazine