Mindfulness
DOI 10.1007/s12671-013-0213-y
ORIGINAL PAPER
Trait Mindfulness in Relation to Emotional Self-Regulation
and Executive Function
Michael Lyvers & Chloe Makin & Evan Toms &
Fred Arne Thorberg & Christina Samios
# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract The present study examined relationships of trait
mindfulness to indices of mood, executive functions, and
emotion regulation in 153 university students of both genders
aged 18–30 years. Participants completed a questionnaire
battery consisting of the Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale (MAAS), Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales
(DASS-21), Negative Mood Regulation (NMR) scale, Frontal
Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe), Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS-11), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), and the
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test. As predicted,
MAAS mindfulness scores were significantly positively relat-
ed to NMR expectancies and negatively related to DASS
Depression, Anxiety and Stress scores, all three FrSBe indices
of prefrontal cortex dysfunction, BIS-11 impulsivity, and
TAS-20 alexithymia. Findings are consistent with the notion
that trait mindfulness reflects aspects of executive function
and emotion regulation, processes dependent on the functional
integrity of the prefrontal cortex. Such higher-order processes
may underlie the widely reported associations between mind-
fulness and subjective well-being.
Keywords Trait mindfulness . Subjective well-being .
Negative mood regulation expectancies . Frontal lobe
dysfunction . Impulsivity . Alexithymia
M. Lyvers (*) : C. Makin : E. Toms : C. Samios
Department of Psychology, Bond University, Gold Coast,
QLD 4229, Australia
e-mail: mlyvers@bond.edu.au
F. A. Thorberg
Centre for Addiction Issues, Department of Substance Abuse,
Innlandet Hospital Trust, Oslo, Norway
F. A. Thorberg
Department of Behavioural Sciences in Medicine,
Institute of Basic Medical Sciences, Faculty of Medicine
University of Oslo, Innlandet Hospital Trust, Oslo, Norway
Introduction
In the context of modern Western psychology, the ancient
Buddhist notion of mindfulness has become a “hot” topic as
measures of mindfulness are reported to be positively asso-
ciated with subjective well-being, self-awareness, impulse
control, and self-regulation of emotions (e.g., Brown and
Ryan 2003; Chambers et al. 2009; Lee and Chao 2012;
Pakenham and Samios 2012). There are varying definitions
of mindfulness. Nevertheless, most include reference to
focusing attention and awareness on the present. For exam-
ple, the widely cited definition by Brown and Ryan (2003,
p. 824) describes mindfulness as “awareness and attention to
present events and experiences” including emotional states.
Mindfulness has been examined as a naturally occurring
attribute, although much of the literature has focused on
the enhancement of mindfulness, such as through medita-
tion training (Brown and Ryan 2003). Meditation-oriented
interventions, such as Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction
(Kabat-Zinn 2003), as well as interventions that teach mind-
fulness using less meditation-oriented techniques, such as Ac-
ceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes et al. 1999), are
becoming increasingly well regarded in Western psychology.
Highly mindful individuals are said to be “in tune” with
their emotions and highly capable of regulating them
(Brown and Ryan 2003, p. 832). Mindfulness has consis-
tently been found to be related to better psychological well-
being across a broad range of indices, such as lower scores
on depression and anxiety and higher scores on positive
affect and life satisfaction (see reviews by Brown and Ryan
2003; Chambers et al. 2009; Keng et al. 2011). In their
seminal paper on trait conceptions of mindfulness and the
development of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
(MAAS), Brown and Ryan framed such findings in terms
of the “impact [of mindfulness] on psychological well-
being” (p. 833). However, alternative interpretations are
plausible.

One possibility is that mindfulness levels as indexed by
measures such as the MAAS reflect higher-order meta-
cognitive and meta-emotional processes related to executive
cognitive functioning and associated behavioral and emo-
tional self-regulation (Chambers et al. 2009; Lee and Chao
2012)—processes which themselves promote psychological
well-being. In other words, the correlations reported be-
tween indices of mindfulness and well-being may to some
extent reflect the successful operation of other functions that
underlie both. For example, a superior ability to identify and
regulate one’s emotions should mean that, all other factors
being equal, negative moods are experienced less often or
less intensely compared to someone who has low levels of
that ability. Indeed, people with alexithymia—defined as
difficulties identifying and describing one’s feelings, a pau-
city of fantasy life and an externally oriented thinking style
(Nemiah et al. 1976)—frequently suffer from anxiety and
depression (Thorberg et al. 2009), presumably due to their
difficulties with emotional self-awareness and self-regulation.
Furthermore, and in line with predictions, alexithymia has
been found to be significantly negatively correlated with
various aspects of mindfulness (Baer et al. 2006; Stasiewicz
et al. 2012).
In their review integrating notions of mindfulness and
emotion regulation, Chambers et al. (2009) noted that self-
awareness and self-regulation of emotions are both linked to
activity within the prefrontal cortex, a brain region essential
for normal executive cognitive functioning. Recent research
has indicated that alexithymia is associated with elevated
indices of frontal lobe dysfunction (Lyvers et al. 2012b),
which in turn are negatively related to mood self-regulation
expectancies (Lyvers et al. 2010); low confidence in one’s
ability to self-regulate negative affect is consistently associ-
ated with negative moods such as depression and anxiety
(Thorberg and Lyvers 2006). In an attempt to tie these recent
findings together with the concept of mindfulness, the present
study examined the MAAS index of trait mindfulness in a
young adult sample in relation to self-report indices of mood,
emotion regulation, everyday frontal lobe related functioning,
and alexithymia, i.e., the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
(DASS-21; Lovibond and Lovibond 1995), which assess
levels of the corresponding negative mood states; the Negative
Mood Regulation expectancies (NMR) scale (Catanzaro and
Mearns 1990), which measures the degree to which individ-
uals feel they can self-regulate their own negative mood states;
the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe; Grace and
Malloy 2001), which assesses problems with motivation,
emotional self-control, and executive cognition in everyday
life; the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al.
1995), an index of self-reported impulsivity—which can per-
haps be construed as a manifestation of “mindlessness”
(Brown and Ryan 2003); and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale,
or TAS-20 (Bagby et al. 1994a), which assesses difficulties
Mindfulness
with identifying and describing one’s feelings as well as an
externally oriented style of thinking. The Alcohol Use Disor-
ders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor et al. 1992) was also
administered as it has previously shown consistent relation-
ships with the FrSBe and BIS-11 scales in young adult sam-
ples (e.g., Lyvers et al. 2012a), and mindfulness has been
reported to be negatively related to risky or problematic drink-
ing (Fernandez et al. 2010). Based on the considerations
described above, in young adults MAAS scores were
expected to be negatively related to DASS Depression,
Anxiety, and Stress scores as well as the FrSBe indices
of frontal lobe dysfunction, BIS-11 impulsivity, risky
drinking as assessed by AUDIT, and TAS-20 alexithymia,
and positively related to NMR expectancies. In other words,
we expected that mindfulness as a trait would be linked to
both executive function and emotion regulation, in line with
the theoretical and neuroscience-based arguments of
Chambers et al. (2009).
Method
Participants
The 153 participants consisted of 87 female and 66 male Bond
University students aged between 18 and 30 years (M=
21.29 years, SD=3.11). The sample included 50 psychology
undergraduates recruited via the psychology participant pool
who participated for course credit in their undergraduate psy-
chology class, and 103 students from the general university
population who were given the opportunity to enter a draw to
win a gift voucher.
Materials
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown and Ryan
2003) is a 15-item self-report measure of trait mindfulness.
The MAAS captures individual differences in present-
moment and temporal frequencies of attention and awareness
(Jermann et al. 2009). Items are negatively worded as Brown
and Ryan (2003) felt statements reflecting states of “mindless-
ness” are “more accessible to most individuals, given that
mindless states are much more common than mindful states”
(p. 826). Answers are given on a six-point Likert scale, where
1=almost always and 6=almost never. Questions ask about
awareness and attention, and include items such as: “I find it
difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present,”
and “I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of
what I’m doing.” Higher scores indicate greater characteristics
of mindfulness. A single factor solution with loadings ranging
.43 to .78 was yielded from a sample of 727 university
students (MacKillop and Anderson 2007), which supports
Mindfulness
Brown and Ryan’s (2003) original claim for student and
general adult samples. Interestingly, MAAS scores have
shown a positive association with prefrontal cortex activation
and a negative relationship with amygdala activation
(Creswell et al. 2007), in line with theoretical expectations.
The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (Lovibond
and Lovibond 1995) is a 21-item self-report questionnaire
consisting of three scales (each with seven items) designed
to measure the emotional states of depression (e.g., “I felt
downhearted and blue”), anxiety (e.g., “I felt scared without
any good reason”), and stress (e.g., “I found it hard to wind
down”) upon reflection of the prior week. Items are rated on
a four-point Likert scale, ranging from 0=did not apply to
me at all, to 3=applied to me very much or most of the time.
Items are summed within each scale, with higher scores
indicating higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress.
The Negative Mood Regulation scale (Catanzaro and
Mearns 1990) is a 30-item questionnaire that measures the
extent to which individuals believe they can alter their states of
negative mood through their own efforts. People are asked to
report what they believe they can do regarding a negative
mood. Questions are stated both negatively (e.g., “Wallowing
in it is all I can do”) and positively (e.g., “I can do something to
feel better”). Answers are given on a five-point Likert scale
(1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). Summation of
item ratings yields a total score, where higher scores indicate
greater belief in one’s ability to alleviate negative mood
through their own efforts. NMR scores are considered to
reflect emotion regulation ability and have been found to be
negatively related to measures of frontal lobe dysfunction such
as the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (Lyvers et al. 2010).
The Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (Grace and Malloy
2001) is a 46-item questionnaire designed to measure
neurobehavioral traits related to dysfunction in three key
prefrontal systems: the anterior cingulate (Apathy subscale,
14 items; e.g., “Sit around doing nothing”), orbitofrontal
cortex (Disinhibition subscale, 15 items; e.g., “Do or say
embarrassing things”), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Ex-
ecutive Dysfunction subscale, 17 items; e.g., “Repeat certain
actions or get stuck on certain ideas”). As originally intended,
for brain-injured patients, the FrSBe is used to assess changes
in behavior by obtaining pre- and post-lesion ratings on a five-
point Likert scale (1=almost never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes,
4=frequently, 5=almost always). The first 32 items represent
deficits and are positively phrased, whereas the last 14 items
are negatively phrased and are reverse scored. Items are
summed with higher ratings indicating higher levels of im-
pairment for the subscales as well as the total score. In the
present study using a non-clinical sample, only self-ratings of
current behavioral functioning were obtained, as in previous
work conducted on non-brain-injured samples (e.g., Lyvers et
al. 2012a; Spinella 2003; Stout et al. 2003; Verdejo-Garcia et
al. 2006).
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al. 1995) is a
30-item self-report scale designed to measure trait im-
pulsivity. Answers are given on a four-point Likert scale
(1=rarely/never to 4=almost always/always). Items in-
clude those reflecting cognitive instability and inattention
(8 items, e.g., “I don’t pay attention”), motor impulsiveness
(11 items, e.g., “I do things without thinking”), and non-
planning impulsivity (11 items, e.g., “I plan tasks careful-
ly,” reverse scored). Items are summed to produce an
overall score, where higher scores indicate greater im-
pulsivity. Total scores can range from 30 to 120. Con-
vergent validity was established with neuropsychological
measures (the Go/No-Go Test r=.39 and the Antisaccade Test,
r=.48) that have shown sensitivity to prefrontal cortex dys-
function (Spinella 2004).
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (Bagby et al. 1994b) is
a 20-item self-report questionnaire used to assess trait levels
of alexithymia. Each item is rated on a five-point Likert
scale (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree). Items are
summed within each subscale and then overall to create total
scores that range from 20 to 100, with higher scores indi-
cating a greater level of alexithymia. Cutoff scores have
been empirically derived for the TAS-20, whereby ≥61=
alexithymia and ≤51=no alexithymia (Bagby et al. 1994b).
The TAS-20 has a confirmed three-factor structure
supported in clinical (Swift et al. 2006) as well as non-
clinical (O’Brien et al. 2008; Parker et al. 2003) samples:
difficulty identifying feelings (DIF; e.g., “I have feelings
that I can’t quite identify”), difficulty describing feelings
(DDF; e.g., “People tell me to describe my feelings more”),
and externally-oriented thinking (EOT; e.g., “I feel close to
someone, even in moments of silence,” reverse-scored).
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (Babor et
al. 1992) is a widely used ten-item self-report screening tool
for hazardous, harmful, or dependent patterns of alcohol
use. Items 1–3 refer to alcohol consumption (e.g., “How
often do you have a drink containing alcohol?”), items 4–6
are related to alcohol dependence (e.g., “How often during
the last year have you found that you were not able to stop
drinking once you had started?”), and items 7–10 inquire
about alcohol-related harm or consequences (e.g., “Have
you or someone else been injured because of your drink-
ing?”). All items on the AUDIT are scored from 0 to 4 and
can be summed to yield a total score ranging from 0 (non-
drinkers) to 40. Two demographic questions asked partici-
pants to indicate their age and gender.
Procedure
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Bond University
Human Research Ethics Committee. Undergraduate psy-
chology students were recruited via a sign-up sheet that
 Mindfulness

AUDIT

MAAS Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale, Dep Depression, Anx Anxiety, NMR Negative Mood Regulation Scale, Disin Disinhibition, ExeDys Executive Dysfunction, BIS-11 Barratt
described the study and stated its incentive of one credit

1
point for participation. Additionally, a wider population of
students was sampled from the university library, where
students were approached and asked if they would like to

Impulsiveness Scale, DIF Difficulty Identifying Feelings, DDF Difficulty Describing Feelings, EOT Externally Oriented Thinking, AUDIT Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test
EOT

.15
1
participate for the chance to win one of three $20 gift
vouchers. All participants first read an explanatory state-
ment that briefly outlined the purpose of the study as well

.32***
.01
as the voluntary and anonymous nature of their participa-

DIF

1
tion. Participants were instructed to not provide any identi-
fying information on the surveys in order to maintain

.58***
anonymity. They were asked to complete the demographic

.27**
DDF

.00
questions, the MAAS, DASS-21, NMR, FrSBe, BIS-11,

1
TAS-20, and AUDIT, which were presented in a uniquely
random order to each participant. Completion of these took

.33***
BIS-11

.27**

.22**
about 30 min. Upon completing these questionnaires at the

.17*
testing venue on campus, participants handed them back to

1
the researchers in a sealed envelope. Participants were then
thanked and either given a signed credit-point form as proof

.63***
.39***
.42***
.31***
ExeDys
of their participation for psychology course credit, or else

.09
1
they wrote their name and email on a list for a draw to
possibly win a $20 gift voucher. Three vouchers were
awarded following a random drawing after the study was

.67***
.58***

.28***
.24**

.21**
.21**
Disin
completed.

1
.38***
.67***

.39***
.33***
Results
Apathy

.26**

.20*
−.10
1
The final dataset of 153 cases was derived from an original
set of 160 cases that was reduced after identification and −.52***

−.42***

−.32***
−.36***
−.27**

−.21**

−.21**
removal of 5 multivariate outliers and 2 cases with missing
NMR

.06
data. Intercorrelations were calculated among all continuous
1

variables, and these results are shown in Table 1. As can be

seen in the table, trait mindfulness as indexed by MAAS
−.40***
.36***

.37***
.28***
.38***
.41***
.27**
Stress

scores was significantly positively correlated with age and

.07
−.01
1

NMR expectancies, and significantly negatively correlated

with all three FrSBe indices of frontal lobe dysfunction, all
three DASS scales of negative moods, the BIS-11 measure
.61***

.43***
.38***
−.26**
.21**

.26**
.26**
.20*

of impulsiveness, and the TAS-20 alexithymia subscales

.09
−.01
Anx

DIF and DDF. There was no relationship between trait

mindfulness and the AUDIT index of alcohol use. The only
variables that were significantly correlated with AUDIT
.53***
.69***
−.47***
.42***

.28***

.34***
.40***
.25**
Table 1 Correlations among study variables

.03
−.06
.11
Dep

were the FrSBe Disinhibition scale and the BIS-11, as con-

1

sistently found in previous work with young adult samples

(Lyvers et al. 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a).
−.29***

−.44***

−.38***
−.36***
−.45***
−.30***
−.36***
−.46***

A sequential hierarchical regression was employed with

MAAS

−.22**

.23**

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

−.14
.03

MAAS scores as the criterion. The goal was to identify

1

unique predictors of trait mindfulness among the measures

that were correlated with MAAS scores. Predictor variables
.18*

−.19*
−.00
−.03
.09
.14
−.10

−.08
−.10
−.07
−.01
−.04
−.11
Age

were entered in the order of demographic variables age and

1

gender (step 1); the three DASS negative mood scales (step
2); NMR mood regulation expectancy scores (step 3); BIS-
ExeDys

AUDIT
Apathy
MAAS

BIS-11

11 impulsivity and FrSBe frontal lobe dysfunction total

Stress
NMR

Disin

DDF

EOT
Anx
Age

Dep

DIF

scores (step 4); and TAS-20 total alexithymia scores at the

Mindfulness

last step. At step 1, the model was significant, F(2, 150)= and the R2 change for all variables at each step to dem-
4.10, p =.02. Age and gender accounted for 5 % of the onstrate the additional proportion of the variance in
variance in MAAS, R=.23, R2 =.05. At step 2, DASS signif- MAAS uniquely explained by each set of variables at their
icantly improved prediction, explaining an additional 21 % of point of entry. In the final model TAS-20 alexithymia scores,
the variance, R=.51, R2 =.26, F change (3, 147)=13.77, DASS Stress scores, FrSBe total frontal lobe dysfunction
p<.0001. At step 3, the addition of NMR scores did not explain scores, gender, and age contributed to trait mindfulness scores,
additional variance in MAAS scores, R=.51, R2 =.26, F change in descending order of importance.
(1, 146)=.11, p=.74. At step 4, BIS-11 and FrSBe scores A final analysis compared TAS-20-defined alexithymia
significantly improved prediction of MAAS scores, explaining groups on the variables of interest including the MAAS index
an additional 9.5 % of variance, R=.60, R2 =.36, F change of trait mindfulness, as a follow-up to previous work on traits
(2, 144)=10.60, p<.0001. At the last step, addition of TAS-20 associated with alexithymia (Lyvers et al. 2012b; Thorberg et
total scores further improved prediction explaining a further al. 2009). Initially, a 3 (alexithymia, borderline alexithymia,
5.5 % of variance, R=.64, R2 =.41, F change (1, 143)=13.28, no alexithymia, as defined by TAS-20 cutoff scores)×2
p<.0001. Table 2 displays the unstandardised regression co- (gender) between groups multivariate analysis of covariance
efficients (B), standardised regression coefficients (β), t scores, (MANCOVA) was conducted on MAAS scores, the three
DASS scales, NMR scores, FrSBe total scores, and BIS-11
total scores. The results showed significant differences on all
Table 2 Regression coefficients of trait and mood measures on MAAS dependent measures such that the alexithymia and borderline
mindfulness alexithymia groups both differed from the no-alexithymia
Variable B β t R2 change
group but not from each other as indicated by Tukey post
hoc comparisons at p<.05. Given the relatively small cell
Step 1 Age 0.69 .18 2.26* .05 sizes for the borderline (n=27) and alexithymia (n=19)
Gender −3.19 -.13 −1.69 groups, and the absence of significant differences between
Step 2 Age 0.89 .23 3.22** .21 them by post hoc tests, for ease of interpretation these two
Gender −2.39 -.10 −1.39
groups were combined into one alexithymia/borderline group
Depression 0.04 .03 0.28
(n=46) and compared with the no-alexithymia group (n=107)
Anxiety 0.13 .08 0.85
using MANCOVA with gender as the second independent
Stress −0.70 -.52 −4.77***
variable and age as the covariate (because it was weakly
Step 3 Age 0.87 .23 3.10** .00
Gender −2.40 -.10 −1.39
related to FrSBe Disinhibition and MAAS mindfulness as
Depression 0.06 .04 0.36
shown in Table 1). Gender was included as a factor because
a chi-square test revealed that the gender composition of the
Anxiety 0.12 .08 0.83
two alexithymia groups was significantly different, χ2 (1)=
Stress −0.69 -.52 −4.66***
7.08, p<.01, such that the alexithymia/borderline group had
NMR 0.02 .03 0.33
27 males out of 46 (or 59 %) compared to 38 males out of 107
Step 4 Age 0.67 .18 2.50* .10
Gender −3.32 −.14 −2.02 (or 36 %) in the no-alexithymia group. After square root
Depression 0.02 .01 0.14 transforms were applied to DASS Anxiety and Depression
Anxiety 0.12 .08 0.85 scores, and log 10 transforms were applied to FrSBe and BIS-
Stress −0.54 -.40 −3.74*** 11 total scores, Box’s M test was not significant (p=.19), nor
NMR −0.08 -.10 −1.18
was Levene’s test significant for any dependent variable
FrSBe −0.23 -.36 −3.77***
(all p>.15); all assumptions were thus met after transforma-
BIS-11 −0.01 -.01 −0.11
tion of skewed variables. The overall multivariate effect of
alexithymia group was significant according to Pillai’s Trace,
Step 5 Age 0.66 .17 2.54* .06
Gender −4.63 -.20 −2.87** F(7, 142)=8.84, p<.0001, partial η2 =.30, observed power=
Depression 0.02 .01 0.14 1.00. The multivariate effect of gender was not significant,
Anxiety 0.21 .13 1.51 p=.09, nor was the interaction of alexithymia group with
Stress −0.50 -.38 −3.64*** gender, p=.31. Univariate effects of alexithymia group were
NMR −0.12 -.15 −1.87 significant for all dependent measures: MAAS mindfulness,
FrSBe −0.18 -.29 −3.11** F(1, 148) = 27.05, p < .0001, partial η 2 = .16, observed
BIS-11 0.03 .02 0.25 power=1.00; DASS Stress, F(1, 148)=27.43, p<.0001, par-
TAS-20 −1.31 -.29 −3.64***
tial η2 =.16, observed power=1.00; transformed DASS Anx-
iety, F(1, 148)=23.85, p<.0001, partial η2 =.14, observed
Gender coded 1(male), 2 (female) power=1.00; transformed DASS Depression, F(1, 148)=
*
p<.05; **
p<.01; ***
p<.001 24.00, p < .0001, partial η2 = .14, observed power = 1.00;
 Mindfulness

NMR, F(1, 148)=12.60, p<.001, partial η2 =.08, observed levels of frontal lobe related executive and behavioral dys-
power=.94; transformed FrSBe total scores, F(1, 148)= function, impulsivity, and negative moods compared to the
28.55, p<.0001, partial η2 =.16, observed power=1.00; and non-alexithymia group. Associations of alexithymia with neg-
transformed BIS-11 total scores, F(1, 148)=9.35, p=.003, ative moods, impulsivity, frontal lobe dysfunction and low
partial η2 =.06, observed power=.86. As shown in Table 3, NMR were entirely consistent with previous work (Lyvers et
the alexithymia/borderline group scored significantly lower al. 2012b) as well as theoretical expectations (Thorberg et al.
on MAAS mindfulness and NMR, and significantly higher on 2009). The association of alexithymia with low mindfulness is
DASS Stress, Anxiety and Depression as well as FrSBe and in line with previous research in student and alcohol-
BIS-11 total scores, compared to the no-alexithymia group dependent samples (Baer et al. 2006; Stasiewicz et al. 2012)
(only untransformed values are shown in the table for ease of and was expected given that mindfulness is said to involve
interpretation). awareness of one’s feelings in the present moment (Brown
and Ryan 2003), whereas alexithymia is defined by difficulty
in identifying and describing one’s feelings (Nemiah et al.
Discussion 1976) and thus must be the inverse of mindfulness where
emotional feelings are concerned. Taken together, the present
As predicted based on the notion that mindfulness reflects results support Chambers et al.’s conceptualization of mind-
aspects of both executive function and emotion regulation fulness as an outcome of the executive functions of self-
(Chambers et al. 2009), MAAS mindfulness scores were regulation of attention and emotion, processes linked to the
significantly positively related to the NMR scale index of functional integrity of the prefrontal cortex. In other words,
mood regulation expectancies and significantly negatively current results suggest that trait mindfulness may reflect the
related to DASS Depression, Anxiety and Stress scores, all operation of higher-order processes that themselves facilitate
three FrSBe indices of frontal lobe dysfunction, BIS-11 im- improved everyday functioning and subjective well-being—
pulsivity, and TAS-20 alexithymia (particularly the DIF and processes which appear to be deficient in alexithymia as well
DDF subscales). In the final hierarchical regression model as in highly impulsive or compulsive behaviors (Dawe and
TAS-20, DASS Stress, and FrSBe total scores were the stron- Loxton 2004).
gest predictors of MAAS scores. Further, MANCOVA com- Limitations of the current study include the non-
paring TAS-20-defined alexithymia groups as a follow-up to random sampling, which somewhat restricts the general-
previous work on the traits associated with alexithymia izability of the findings; the cross-sectional design,
showed that the alexithymia/borderline group was character- which cannot reveal the nature and causal direction of
ized by lower levels of mindfulness and NMR and higher the relationships of mindfulness with executive function,
impulsivity, mood regulation, and failure to recognize
and regulate emotion (as in alexithymia); and the
Table 3 Untransformed means for alexithymia/borderline alexithymia operationalization of psychological well-being as lower
group versus no-alexithymia group on trait and mood indices (see text scores on DASS indices of negative moods, which may
for definitions of measures) limit inferences regarding positive indicators of well-being.
Such indicators to potentially examine in future work should
Measure Group M SD
include measures of positive affect and life satisfaction, which
MAAS** Alexithymia 52.46 10.26 have been found to not only co-occur with negative indicators
Control 61.36 11.41 (Folkman and Moskowitz 2000) but have different relation-
Depression** Alexithymia 11.83 9.25 ships with mindfulness in some samples (e.g., Pakenham and
Control 5.33 6.56 Samios 2012).
Anxiety** Alexithymia 12.52 9.10 Despite the above limitations, this study provides further
Control 5.48 5.46 support for the association between trait mindfulness and
Stress** Alexithymia 16.52 9.04 psychological well-being, particularly for lower scores on
Control 9.50 7.81 stress, and suggests a potential framework for understanding
NMR** Alexithymia 102.39 11.84 mindfulness and its relationship to mood in terms of higher-
Control 111.35 15.55 order functions such as executive function and emotion
FrSBe** Alexithymia 110.48 18.84 regulation as originally proposed by Chambers et al.
Control 93.25 16.20 (2009). Longitudinal research would be required to provide
BIS-11* Alexithymia 66.43 9.79
a sound basis upon which to make practice recommenda-
Control 61.00 9.21
tions. Nevertheless, considering trait mindfulness in relation
to executive function and emotion regulation may prove
*p<.01; **p<.001 informative for practitioners who employ mindfulness-
Mindfulness
based therapies (Kabat-Zinn 2003), especially when
supporting clients who are highly impulsive or alexithymic.
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