Ruiz v.

Drilon

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence
made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him
during the hearings of the investigating committees.

Facts:

 6 May 1991 - President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz
for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon State University ("CLSU").
 Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for
reconsideration therefrom,
o the first for lack of merit and
o the second for being pro forma.
 Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and executory
 Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. SP-21656)
o Petitioner there sought to annul, as products of grave abuse of discretion, President Aquino's order
 appointing Dr. Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President
o as well as DECS Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order
 directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad
o Court of Appeals issued the TRO
 Eight days later - petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the present petition (G.R. No. 101666) for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of
AO No. 218 as well as of the orders of the Executive Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom
o Court did not issue the TRO
o This petition made no mention of the petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO filed 8 days earlier with the
Court of Appeals
 Petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992, where for the first time, he disclosed to the
Supreme Court the other judicial proceedings which he had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO No.
218.
 January 28, 1992 – the Supreme Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to show cause why the petition in G.R.
No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an apparent case of forum shopping
 January 29, after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
o dismissing the petition for lack of merit and
o finding the same to be a case of forum shopping.
o Appeal to this is consolidated to the action with the SC
 Petitioner - denies having engaged in forum shopping and contends:
o his cause of action in CA-G.R. No. SP-26156 consists of the illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the
President and by the DECS in implementing AO No. 218, which may render moot the Court's review of the
intrinsic merits of AO No. 218, an entirely different cause of action in itself
o he never attempted to hide the fact, either before this Court or the Court of Appeals, that he had instituted
both actions "for separate reasons, apart though related from each other,"

ISSUE: WON there is forum shopping - YES

 It is evident that petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court (one suit for a single cause of action)
o had split a single cause of action consisting of the alleged illegality of his removal from office by the President
through AO No. 218, by seeking judicial review of
  (1) AO 218 with the Court and at the same time
 (2) having the enforcement aspect of the President's action and the filling up of the resulting
vacancy reviewed by the Court of Appeals
o It also appears to the Court that petitioner carried out these acts in order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a
limited twenty day lifetime) from the Court of Appeals, issued as a matter of course, in order to stop the
execution and implementation of AO No. 218, and afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an indefinite lifetime
from this Court for the same purpose, in case his petition in the main action of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 would
be dismissed on the merits by the Court of Appeals.
 petitioner created for himself a situation where he could hope to get (after the 20-day life of the Court of Appeals
TRO) a judicial order from either forum which could stop the execution of AO No. 218 with more permanency (i.e.,
either a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from the Supreme Court or the grant of his petition for prohibition by the
Court of Appeals).
 Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (relative to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129) –
o Granting CA equal original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, etc., whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provides that if such a petition is filed before the Court of Appeals
and is still pending therein, a similar petition cannot be filed in the Supreme Court.
o The Rule itself provides that a violation thereof constitutes:
 (1) cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions; and
 (2) contempt of court for which the party or counsel concerned may be held accountable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. -NO (ADMIN RELATED ISSUE)

 petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondents in rendering the assailed administrative orders.
 Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him.
 He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during the
hearings of the investigating committees.
o There is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.
 AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from office.
o Those findings included the facts that
 (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new academic courses,
undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in wastage of university property, all without the
necessary approval of the Board of Regents;
 (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school
purposes from a firm owned by him;
 (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a company where he
was holding a directorship; and
 (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions
of R.A. No. 5546.
o These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct. and furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public
service.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

Doctrine

 In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved
 Test of determining whether administrative body exercises judicial functions or merely investigatory functions:
o Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the
parties before it.
o Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts
and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
 Due process rights of notice and hearing may be invoked at evaluation stage of extradition proceedings
o This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or
treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-
performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration
o Sec. of Justice vs Lantion is an exemption because of its peculiarity
 We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality,"
may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements

Facts:

 January 13, 1977 - then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country."
 November 13, 1994, RP-US Extradition Treaty was signed by Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
o Senate expressed their concurrence
 The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522,
requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United
States.
o Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition
 Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States
 Attempt to evade or defeat tax
 Fraud by wire, radio, or television
 False statement or entries
 Election contributions in name of another
 The request was forwarded the following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
 Petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069
o panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in
support thereof.
o The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the
request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed"
 Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith;
 o that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the
meantime.
 Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the
United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his
request.
 His request was denied for being premature (in its letter July 13, 1999)
o Evaluation by DOJ of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
o That it is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents
 private respondent resorted to an action for
o mandamus
 to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him
access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition
request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively
o certiorari
 to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999
o prohibition
 to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition
in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing
any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States
o with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
 The trial court issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings, hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the rights of notice and hearing to be invoked at evaluation stage of extradition proceedings - YES

 Due process rights of notice and hearing may be invoked at evaluation stage of extradition proceedings
o This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or
treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-
performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given
paramount consideration
 Although the Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a
special proceeding, it nevertheless provides the applicability of the Rules of Court in the hearing of the petition insofar
as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings.
 The prospective extraditee under Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 faces the threat of arrest, not only after
the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional
arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. Thus, the evaluation process, in essence, partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation making available certain constitutional rights to the prospective extraditee.
 The Court noted that there is a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty regarding the basic due process
rights available to a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of the proceedings. The Court was constrained to
apply the rules of fair play, the due process rights of notice and hearing. Hence, petitioner was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Pefianco v. Moral

Doctrine
There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report.
On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be
informed of the 4ndings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against
him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
Respondent's assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be appropriate to
take under the circumstances," hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an
internal communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for the
perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. More importantly, the DECS resolution
is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient 4ndings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation
report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be
prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report.

Facts:
 July 26, 1994 - former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral,
then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library
o for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
o charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana
and Asian Division (FAD)
o keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justi4cation, some forty-one (41) items of historical
documents
 DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint.
 September 25, 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty
o She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all
her retirement bene4ts and other remunerations
 October 1, 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors found on the first resolution
(Sept. 30,1996).
o Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
 October 2, 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report
purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances.
o Denied
 Respondent instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria
praying
o that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and
o that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the
said report
 Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action,
o the trial court denied his motion.
 o Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial
court.
o the appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Gloria's petition for lack of merit
 That Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having 4led any motion for reconsideration
 That denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to the respondent judge. Such order is
interlocutory and thus not appealable.
 His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January 1998
o Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review.
 Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pe4anco who was thereafter substituted in the case for
Secretary Gloria

Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss, - Yes

and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss

 Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefore
o the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss "for lack of
merit."
o The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court's jurisdiction over the
rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioner's motion to dismiss
was being denied.

ADMIN Related issue: W/N Respondent entitled to be informed of the findings & recommendations of investigating committee

 It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
main objective.
o It does not lie to require anyone to ful4ll a discretionary duty
o petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required.
 The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
o The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
 Respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
 There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation
report.
 In Ruiz v. Drilon
o a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations
of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.
o He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of
the investigation committee.
 Respondent's assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be
appropriate to take under the circumstances," hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed
investigation report is an internal communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee
o it is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter, except the
DECS Secretary
  DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains
sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded.
o This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent
might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the
investigation report.

Camara v Municipal Court

Facts:

 November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of
Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of
the city's Housing Code.
 The building's manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the
rear of his leasehold as a personal residence.
 Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the
inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises.
o Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.
o inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again refused to allow
an inspection.
 Two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was required
by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code
o Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant.
 Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing, after three efforts by city
housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters
which he leased and residential use of which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit.
o Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search
warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein.
 Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial on a criminal
charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his
residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance
authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face.
o The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of
California denied a petition for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had considered by the
California courts the federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court.
o Claiming the inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections,
appellant while awaiting criminal trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of prohibition,
which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and similar cases, the District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
State Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing.
 Court of Appeal held that section 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it
 o "is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil, rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as
that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under
unreasonable conditions."
 Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.
o "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
 With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of private property is
"unreasonable

ISSUE: whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth
Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

 Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently
been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.
 But in Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless
inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance.
Although Frank can arguably be distinguished from this case on its facts,
o the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the
rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
ISSUE: May the law require warrantless inspections of property?

HOLDING: No

DISCUSSION: While the Court held that allowing such warrantless inspections to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court agreed
that the needs of the community for safety might outweigh the blanket prohibition on such searches. The Court agreed that “area
inspections” might be appropriate, and defined that search as designating an area in need of inspection services and requesting a blanket
warrant for that area. The appropriate standard may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building or the condition of the
entire area. The Court stated that:

“The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental
interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable
cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal
investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and
private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purposes behind the consituational right to be free from unreasonable
government invasions of privacy.”
Salazar v. Achacoso
Doctrine:

 Under the new Constitution, which states: . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. It is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search.
 The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
 Art. 38 of the Labor Code which grants the Secretary of Labor authority to issue orders of arrest, search and seizure,
is unconstitutional because the Secretary is not a judge
o Probable cause must be determined personally by the Judge

FACTS:

 October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar
o For non-redeployment for 9 months after he got back from Japan and
o not returning his PECC upon demand after he transferred to a different agency
 November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez
o Directing Petitioner to appear before him
 On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205
o and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment
 January 26, 1988 - a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205
o There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team
served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into
the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development
o when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced
upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside.
The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and
witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
 January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA a letter
o request that the personal properties seized last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground
that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof.
 On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA
filed a criminal complaint against her
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? - NO

 Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees
o The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest
and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.
 Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign
against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers
 Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well
o The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause
the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined
that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation
of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.
 Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
 the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the
nature of a general warrant
o warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
 The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case,
governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We
have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a Anal decision of deportation is valid.
o It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs.
Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations

Doctrine:

Documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of most solid character as to whether or not there was
failure to comply with mandates of the law.

Accounts, Records, Reports, or Statements may be required to be delivered & deposited with administrative body
at the hearing.

FACTS:

 a complaint against Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association
o under Section 17 6led by the prosecution division of respondent Court, the principal complainants
being now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten
percent of the entire membership of such labor organization
o that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were
responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various
occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all
6nancial transactions of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of the
6nancial activities of the union open to inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal
on their part to comply
 compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for
the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success.
 December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members, as petitioners in the above
complaint before respondent Court,
o sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again elected
as President in an election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his
alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his
refusal to make a full and detailed report of all 6nancial transactions of the union
 December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction
sought, limited itself to
o requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and
treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association,
to deliver and
 o deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union
funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the 6nances of the said labor union at
the hearing of this petition
 Petitioner’s contention
o that such a power to issue the challenged order cannot be deemed as possessed by respondent
Court which moreover did not accord petitioners procedural due process.

ISSUE: whether respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance with the
internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, can require a labor
organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
documents related to [its] 6nances" be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation
in accordance with a complaint duly 6led without the officials of such labor organization, therein named as
respondents and petitioners before us, being heard prior to the issuance of such order.

 Petitioners’ contention cannot prevail

 in paragraphs (b), (h), and (1) of the aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act.
o The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of
all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization."
o "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than those
expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of the
majority of the member."
o the books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor organization
shall be open to inspection by any official or member thereof."
 If it were to be beyond the powers conferred, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be
effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could
be held as having acted contrary to law.
 Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an
inquiry into existing facts and conditions.
o The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to
whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law
o The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and
effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as
to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority.

 it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a
defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party
having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard
Evangelista v. Jarencio
Doctrine:

Subpoena is within legal competence of PARGO to issue pursuant to EO4(5) which empowered it to “summon witnesses...
relevant to the investigation”

It is common for statute to confer such powers on Administrative Agencies

The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO), created to forestall and erode nefarious activities
and anomalies in the civil service, draws its subpoena power from the Executive Order creating it. Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the agency and is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable in its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. To hold that the subpoena power of the agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function would imperil or inactive its investigatory functions. More than that, the enabling authority itself fixes no distinction
when and in what function should be subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, there is no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved,
and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of
a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is
enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.

Facts:

 President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under
Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966
 charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities
o "b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling
(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
o "e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and
gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth
o "h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts,
conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency."
 the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum ( to
require the production of documents), administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
  June 7, 1968 - petitioner Quirico Evangelista (Undersecretary of the Agency) issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila
o a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the O:ce of the PRESIDENTIAL
AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
 Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila
o an Amended Petition for prohibition,
o certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction
o and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and
o assailed its legality
 respondent Judge issued an order restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding
investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner
[private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code."
 petitioners elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental
submission that the Order is a patent nullity.

ISSUE: whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.

 To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would
therefore imperil or inactivate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h).
 More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what
function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule
that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
 Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code
o a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the
hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions
 It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly,
what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an
administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the
subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.
 Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.
o It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose
o The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make
one if the discovered evidence so justifies.
 The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to
get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not
 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is
o (1) within the authority of the agency;
o (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and
o (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
 We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness
in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with
the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges.
 o privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings.
o But he is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v SYLVIA CANQUE

Doctrine: In Administrative Agencies, formal/trial type hearing is not required

FACTS:

 The instant case stemmed from the Investigation Report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Region VII on
the entrapment operation on Sylvia R. Canque
 The Investigation Report showed that on June 1, 2004, Marissa Y. Ypanto of Barangay Polo, Alcantara, Cebu filed a
letter-complaint before the NBI alleging that Canque asked from her the amount of Forty Thousand (₱40,000.00)
Pesos
o in exchange for the release of the former’s common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the dismissal of his
criminal cases in court.
 NBI operatives conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at about 9:30 A.M. in the sala of Judge Teves.
They arrested Canque after she received the amount of ₱40,000.00, previously marked with invisible ink and dusted
with fluorescent powder
o laboratory examination, Forensic Chemist Rommel D. Paglinawan, in his Physics Report, found that the right
and left hands of Canque were positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
 NBI report further stated that prior to the entrapment, Patoc’s mother had already given the amount of Twenty
Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos to Canque in the presence of Ypanto for the dismissal of Patoc’s first case for possession
of "shabu" on November 30, 2003
 Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Acting Regional Director, NBI-Region VII, endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas the case of Canque for immediate inquest.
o Informations for direct bribery and violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, were filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu
 Auditors from Region VII, Cebu City, conducted the periodic audit on the cash and accounts of accountable officers of
the provinces of Cebu, Bohol and Negros Oriental. After the audit of the cash and accounts of Canque, the Auditors
found that she had a cash shortage of ₱304,985
 June 29, 2004, the Court treated the NBI entrapment on Canque as an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
and directed her to comment thereon. She was immediately placed under suspension until further orders by the
Court. The case was referred to a Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
 the OCA recommended that the Investigation Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and the complaint
be investigated anew upon finding that Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel
o during the investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right to due process;
 o and for the Audit Report of Shortage in the amount of ₱304,985.00 and other actuations and deficiencies of
respondent Canque to be set in the next En Banc Agenda.
 Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Comment, within a non-extendible period of ten days from
notice, on the Audit Report of the COA finding a shortage in her cash collection amounting to ₱304,985.00.
Respondent failed to comment.
 Office of the Court Administrator found Canque liable for gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave
misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any government office or instrumentality, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. It further recommended that she be ordered to restitute the amount
of ₱304,985.00 representing the shortage in the collection of court funds

ISSUE: WOn in Administrative Agencies, a formal/trial type hearing is not required - yes

 the Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator in its first Report dated June 13,
2006 recommending that the Investigation Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and that the
complaint be investigated anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel
during the investigation – an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due process.
o The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present
any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal or trial-type hearing is not required.
In re Carmelo v. Ramos
DOCTRINE

Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt
committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code

Power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to Administrative Body

FACTS:

 February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee
o "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection
Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the
Mayor)."
o named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.
 the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba,
requiring him to appear before it
o in connection with an administrative case against Crisanto but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were
duly served, refused to appear
 Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt.
o trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created
by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held that to
compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.
o The trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain
employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used
against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party.
o From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: WON the committee has the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of
refusal – NO

 The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) 1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case,
 o unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as in done in
paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
 Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
o "Powers incidental to taking of testimony. — When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred
upon an administrative officer or upon any non-judicial person, committee. or other body, such authority
shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summon witnesses and shall include
authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in
all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
o "Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without lawful excuse, fails
to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before
any individual or body exercising the power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or
produce documents or inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case
of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be
dealt with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law."
 One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take the testimony or
evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
o there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of
power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city
employees
 We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigate implies also a delegation of the
power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory process of
subpoena
 Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the
City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government .

Masangcay v. Commission on Elections

Doctrine: The Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its ministerial functions, such as the distribution of ballots
and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities, has no power to punish for contempt,
because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
FACTS:

 Benjamin Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission to take charge of the
receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the
different municipalities of the province.
 October 14, 1957 - Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was charged before the Commission on Elections with
contempt for having opened three boxes containing oCcial and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of
Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution
o Inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of
 the division superintendent of schools of Aklan,
 the provincial auditor, and
 the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party,
 the Liberal Party and
 the Citizens' Party
o which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
 they all appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty
o evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the defense
 December 16, 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as
charged
o sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency
 Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the
Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of
contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court
o it is contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null
and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the
principle of separation of powers.
 the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section
30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
o Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections.
 when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because
such power is inherently judicial in nature
o it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
o Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such
power is inherently judicial in nature.
o Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony (Opening of ballot box lang kasi dito, an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among
the different municipalities.)
o And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has
been held invalid
 the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing Masangcay for contempt, and so its decision is null and
void.