Subjet and Sfsaf

The Person: Subject and Community
Author(s): Karol Wojtyla

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Dec., 1979), pp. 273-308
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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THE PERSON: SUBJECT AND COMMUNITY*
KAROL WOJTYLA
1 HIS ESSAY will examine the connection between the subjectivity

of man as a person and the structure of the human community. That
relationship was tentatively explored in The Acting Person, especially
in the chapter entitled "Participation." The present study is an at
tempt to develop insights initially introduced there.
In the field of experience man appears both as a specific subject and

as a concrete "I" that is nonrecurrent and unique. The phrase "the
experience of man" has a double sense; for he who experiences is man,
and he, whom the subject of the experience experiences, is also man; he
is both the subject and the object. His subjectivity belongs to the
essence of experience, which is always an experiencing of "something*
or "someone." The tendency to withdraw in the direction of "pure
subjectivity, however, is characteristic of the philosophy of conscious
ness and will be considered later. In fact, objectivity too pertains to the
essence of experience, and for this reason man, the subject, is also given
in experience in an objective manner. Experience, so to speak, in the
process of human cognition puts aside the conception of "pure con
sciousness," or rather reduces all that it contributed to our knowledgeof
man to the dimensions of objective reality.
In experience man is given to us as he who exists and acts. All
men, and "I" among them, participate in the experience of existing
and acting; at the same time all the "others," along with myself, are
the object of that experience. This occurs in different ways, since
"I" experience myself as existing and being in a different way from
that in which I experience all others, and we may say the same of
each "other" man as a concrete self. It is clear, however, that the
whole process of understanding man must embrace both the others
and my own self and that I may start from either. A special consid
eration of this self is important for the full understanding of the
*This article was accepted in July 1976, with the editor agreeing not to
publish it until the appearance of the English translation of the author's The
Acting Person. That book has now been published as Vol. 10, Analecta
Husserliana, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Company) and is reviewed in this issue. Ed.
274 KAROL WOJTYLA
subjectivity of man, since in no other object of man's experience are

the constituting elements of subjectivity given in such a direct and
visible way as in one's own self.
In constructing the image of a person as subject on the basis of
man's experience, I especially draw on the experience of my own self,
but never in abstraction from, or in contradistinction to, them. All
the analyses which try to explain human subjectivity have their
"categorial" limits, which we may neither transgress nor ignore, for
they are closely connected with the objectivity of experience, which
allows us to understand fully and to explain the subjectivity of man.
At the moment when we begin to accept "pure consciousness" or the
"pure subject," we no longer are interpreting the real subjectivity of
man.
Nor are we interpreting it when we treat the particular f
tions of man or even some chosen structural totalities in man
simply "phenomenal" or "behavioristic" way. This is done in
various sciences which treat of man under many different asp
They collect more and more material for the understanding of m
person and his subjectivity, but this is not yet the understanding
is required. Taking into consideration the constant increase of
empirical knowledge of man, it is important to stress the cont
need for a philosophical renewal and to some extent "reinter
tion" of the image of man as person. This need stems also from
growing wealth of phenomenological analyses which in view o
objectivity of experience must be transferred from the level of
sciousness and integrated into the full reality of the person.
analyses are exceptionally valuable and especially fertile for u
standing and explaining the subjectivity of the person.
This state of research on man, especially that regarding his m
tifaceted experience, enables us to accept integrally, while at
same time understanding in a new way, the ancient concept of
ject" (supposition).* In saying that man?whether others or m
?is given in experience as a subject we are stating that the wh
experience of man, which reveals him as one who is, exists, and a
forces us to think of man as the subject of his own existenc
* Throughout the article the author has employed consistently the

"suppositum," literally "supposit." In keeping with English usage th
been translated by the term "subject." (ed.)
THE PERSON: SUBJECT AND COMMUNITY 275
action. This is precisely the meaning of the concept "subject," which

states man's subjectivity in its metaphysical sense. By "metaphysi
cal," I understand not so much "extraphenomenal" as "transpheno
menal," since we must perceive the subject of existence and action
through all the phenomena or manifestations which are the factors of
experience and which constitute the totality of man as he exists and
acts.
We perceive that man is and must be "subject," for otherwise all
his existence and action, which are given in experience as "his" (or, in
my case, "my") existence and action, could not be "his" (or "my")
existence and action. The metaphysical subjectivity or the subject
as the transphenomenal, and therefore fundamental, expression of
man's experience is at the same time the guarantee of man's identity
in existence and in action.
In saying that the subject constitutes the fundamental expres
sion of all man's experience, I wish to say at the same time that it is,
first, an inviolable expression, for experience cannot be detached
from it. Second, it is open to everything that man's experience,
especially that of one's own self, may introduce into the understand
ing of the subjectivity of the person. Although I acknowledge the
specificity and distinctness of metaphysical cognition, I deny that it
can be separated from the rest of human cognition, for all cognition is
metaphysical through its roots inasmuch as it reaches being. This,
of course, does not diminish the meaning of the particular aspects of
being which are necessary to understand its full richness.
The discovery of the human subject, or man's subjectivity in the
metaphysical sense, opens at the same time a fundamental approach
to the relation between existence and action. This relation is ex
pressed by the philosophical adage: "to act follows upon being"
(operari sequitur esse). Although its formulation seems to indicate a
unilaterial relation of causal dependence of action on existence, it
contains also an opposite gnoseological relation between the two.
Since "to act" results from being, it must at the same time provide
the most correct approach to knowledge of that being. In this way,
from human action we derive knowledge not only of the fact that man
is its "sub-ject," but also of who man is as the subject of his own
action. Action, as man's dynamics understood in their totality, per
mits us to understand better and more closely the subjectivity of
man. We are concerned here with the supposit, not exclusively as
subject in the metaphysical sense, but, on the basis of the supposit
276 KAROL WOJTYLA
thus conceived, with everything that makes man an individual and

personal subject.
The dynamics proper to man are complex and differentiated.
Abstracting for the time being from other distinctions, we must rec
ognize that the totality of human dynamics, or action in the broadest
sense of the word, is composed both of everything which merely
"occurs" in man and of what man "does" or, strictly speaking,
"makes." This is a distinct form of human action in and through
which man reveals himself above all as a person. A full analysis of
man's dynamics, including not only his acts but everything that "oc
curs" in him (the somatic and psychic, the somato-reactive and the
psycho-emotional dimensions discussed in The Acting Person1) leads
one to the full picture of human subjectivity. Without doubt, man's
subjectivity corresponds to the complexity of his nature and is, so to
speak, multistratified.
An analysis based on the relation of action to being and on the
human subject or on metaphysical subjectivity, would help to show
both that in which somatic and psychic subjectivity consist, and how
man?the person?is a subject through his body and psyche. It is
impossible not to mention at least the outstanding importance of the
entire range of man's emotivity in the formation of both concrete
human objectivity and the quality of the subject, who is a concrete
man, an individual, and a person.
I refrain from carrying out this whole set of analyses because of
the conviction that for knowledge of the subjectivity of man as a
person what is of essential and fundamental importance is that form
of human action which is conscious and which both expresses and
makes concrete the liberty proper to the human person. Remaining
continually within the scope of the human subject, or, in other words,
of subjectivity in the metaphysical and fundamental sense, we may
apprehend and explain subjectivity in the personal sense proper to
man. Everything that exists and acts in any way has the metaphysi
cal subjectivity of a subject according to the analogy of pro
portionality. The subjectivity proper to man or personal subjectivity,
however, should be defined more precisely on the basis of the totality
of human dynamics. Above all, we must determine more exactly the
activity of man as person, that is, his action.
To begin with this action, the personal subjectivity of man is a
^f. Wojtyla, The Acting Person, pp. 189-258.
uniquely rich structure which can be revealed only by a complete

analysis of human action. Man as a person is constituted metaphysi
cally as a being through lois own subject. He is the one who exists
and acts from the beginning, although due to the complexity of his
nature, fully human action (actus humanus) or the conscious act
appears only at a stage in his development. The spiritual elements of
cognition, consciousness, freedom, and self-determination, slowly
begin to dominate the somatic and primitive psychic layers of human
ity. The whole development of the individual is clearly directed
toward revealing the person and the subjectivity proper to him as a
human subject. Thus, on the basis of the subject the concrete human
self is slowly revealed and at the same time constituted: it reveals
itself by constituting itself.
The self constitutes itself precisely through the acts proper to
man as a person. It also constitutes itself through the totality of
psychosomatic dynamics or acts which only "occur" in the subject,
but nonetheless in some fashion form the subjectivity of the individual.
The human self constitutes itself through all this owing to the fact of
having been and of being fundamentally and in principle constituted
as a subject. The human subject (suppositum humanum) must re
veal itself to some extent as the human self; metaphysical subjectiv
ity must appear as personal subjectivity.
This "must" is the strongest argument for the metaphysical con
ception of nature. Man is a person "by nature," by which he is
entitled to the subjectivity proper to a person. The fact that in some
cases the human subject or metaphysical subjectivity does not man
ifest the characteristics of personal subjectivity (as in the case of
psychosomatic or purely psychical deficiencies in which the normal
human self fails to develop or becomes deformed) does not authorize
doubts concerning the foundations of this subjectivity, since they are
inherent in the essentially human subject. The following studies the
normally formed human self, since it reveals the regular traits of the
subjectivity proper to the person.
While indicating human action as the form of dynamics proper to
man which above all permits us to recognize man as a personal sub
ject, we must immediately note that this is conscious action. In
attempting to understand the subjectivity of a person precisely
through this act we must at the same time realize the specific im
portance of consciousness for subjectivity. This aspect was not
much developed in the scholastic tradition, in which the human act
278 KAROL WOJTYLA
was analyzed in detail above all from the viewpoint of its character as
free (voluntarium). It is evident that this character of freedom
could arise only on the basis of understanding, especially regarding
the good and the goal, since will (voluntas) is the intellectual appetite
(appetitus intellectivus) expressed in free choice (liberum arbitrium).
Consciousness, however, is not ordinary understanding which directs
the will and the activity. On the contrary, since the time of Des
cartes consciousness has been absolutized, as is reflected in our
times in phenomenology through Husserl. In philosophy the
gnoseological attitude has superseded the metaphysical; being is con
stituted in, and to a certain degree through, consciousness. Espe
cially, the reality of the person demands a return to the concept of
conscious being. This being is not constituted in and by conscious
ness; quite the contrary, it constitutes both consciousness and the
reality of human action as conscious.
The person and act, that is, my own self existing and acting is
constituted in consciousness which consequently reflects the exis
tence and the action of the self. Thus, one's experience, especially
that of one's own self, indicates that consciousness is always rooted in
the human subject. Consciousness is not an independent subject,
although by a process of exclusion, which in Husserl's terminology is
called epoch?, it may be treated as if it were a subject.
This manner of treating consciousness is at the base of the whole
so-called "transcendental philosophy." This examines acts of cogni
tion as intentional acts of consciousness directed to trans-subjective
matter and, therefore, to what is objective or to phenomena. As
long as this type of analysis of consciousness possesses the character
of a cognitive method, it can and does bear excellent fruit. How
ever, the method should not be considered to be a philosophy of
reality itself. Above all it should not be considered a philosophy of
the reality of man or of the human person, since the basis of this
method consists in the exclusion (epoch?) of consciousness from real
ity or from actually existing being. Despite this, it is undoubtedly
necessary to make wider use of this method in the philosophy of man.
Consciousness is not an independent subject, but is central for
understanding personal subjectivity. One cannot grasp and objec
tivize the relation between the human subject and the human self
without considering consciousness and its function. This function is
not exclusively cognitive in the same sense as are acts of human
knowledge or self-knowledge. We may accept with Husserl that

these acts appear in consciousness, but it is quite another thing to
state that they are proper to consciousness or correspond to it genet
ically. Although consciousness undoubtedly reflects what has been
cognitively objectivized by man, primarily it constitutes the subjec
tive dimension which is proper to man precisely because he is sub
ject. Consciousness interiorizes everything man recognizes, to
gether with what he knows by acts of self-knowledge; it makes all
this the content of the subject's experience.2
To be a subject and "to live one's own self as a subject" (se vivre
soi-m?me) are quite different. Only in the latter do we touch upon
the true reality of the human self. Consciousness possesses the key
and constitutive meaning for the second of these dimensions of man's
personal subjectivity. We may also say that the human subject be
comes a human self and reveals itself to itself by consciousness. This
does not mean, however, that the human self is entirely reducible to
consciousness or self-consciousness. It is constituted by the self
consciousness in the human subject only by means of all the existence
and action proper to the subject. This should not be understood as
pertaining to particular acts or moments of consciousness. Admit
tedly, consciousness manifests itself dynamically and in an inter
mittent and fluctuating manner, as periods of sleep sufficiently
demonstrate. It is also connected in various ways with the so-called
subconscious.
Taking all this into consideration, we conclude that man is a
subject only when he experiences or lives his own self as a subject; he
is, then, in some respect a subject fully in act (in actu). This is
precisely what consciousness presupposes. This conception enriches
and to some degree modifies the meaning of the subject and of sub
jectivity. A specific interiority of action and existence in oneself
("in-selfness" or inseitas) enter the concept of subjectivity. Man
exists "in himself," and his activities also have this "in-self" or in
transitive dimension. This interiority of man's existence and action
and their being in themselves are a more precise philosophical ex
plication of what is virtually contained in the concept of the human
subject. To develop the image of the person as concrete self and to
elicit thereby the full meaning of man's personal subjectivity, it is
2Ibid., pp. 25-59.
280 KAROL WOJTYLA
necessary to elaborate as fully as possible what is contained in the

human subject. An analysis of man's human consciousness and ex
perience will help to achieve this.
Some would say that by such an analysis we detach ourselves
from metaphysical subjectivity and pass to a level of purely psycho
logical subjectivity, which is essentially different from that of
metaphysics. This view appeals ultimately to human experience and
to the manner of methodically exploiting it. Nothing, however,
would appear to prevent the analysis of man's consciousness and
experience from contributing to a more complete understanding of
the human subject itself, especially as a concrete and unique self or
person, for the reality of the person is not "extraphenomenal," but
only "transphenomenal." In other words, we must enter deeply and
integrally into the "phenomenon" of man in order fully to understand
and objectivize the reality of the person.
These considerations allow us to return to the conscious action of
man as the form of human action. Having considered consciousness,
which is essential for this action, we are better prepared to under
stand the specific connection between act and the personal subjectiv
ity in man. The act, which was defined traditionally as human act
(actus humanus), should be called "act of the person" (actus per
sonae) because the causality on which it is based is precisely that of
the person.
Between the concrete human act and the particular self there
exists a close causal and efficient connection. On the strength of this
connection the act cannot be detached from the given self and as
cribed to another as its author. The connection is quite different in
kind from that between the human self and all that merely happens to
it. We attribute the act, and hence conscious action, to this self as its
conscious author. In such agency there appears the factor of will,
and therefore of liberty, and hence that of moral responsibility. This
brings us to what is essential in man's personal subjectivity.3
We must analyze this dimension step by step, for it integrates
and to a certain extent accumulates such a wealth of specifically
human reality that it is impossible simultaneously to consider all its
essential elements. Although the analysis of moral responsibility
leads us still more deeply into the problems of will and liberty proper
3Cf. Roman Ingarden, ?ber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontische Fund

amente (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1970).
to man as person, and so makes the intellectual vision more precise, it

is expedient to begin with the analysis of personal causality itself.
Though firmly based in the experience of man, here the concept
of agency or efficiency is not quite precise, for it may indicate the
dependence upon cause had by an external effect which remains be
yond the efficient subject. In such a case, the action itself possesses
a transitive character, which occurs often in man's activities.
Through his activity, man is the author of many effects beyond him
self and forms the surrounding reality by his activity.
This type of efficient dependence is contained also in the concept
of act. The most fundamental type, however, is another type of
efficient dependence, connecting the conscious action of man with its
own subject. This second or intransitive type of efficient depend
ence is open in each particular case only to introspection or interior
experience. That is perhaps why our linguistic habits do not connect
the concept of act with this most fundamental of its dimensions to the
degree that is in fact the case. It is necessary to complete the
external experience with the internal in order to regain the full sense
of the reality of this dimension, as is essential for the intuition of the
personal subjectivity of man.
Once the full sense of the reality of the interior dimension of
man has been established, the agency irrefutably evident in the ex
perience of the act proves to have also the character of self
determination. Acting consciously, not only am I the author of the
act and of its transitive and intransitive effects, but I determine
myself. Self-determination is the deeper and more fundamental di
mension of the causality of the human self. Agency itself, the effi
cient dependence of the act on one's own self, does not yet tell us
everything about this subjectivity. It might be understood through
analogy to other subjects of existence and action in the world, to
whom we also ascribe agency and the effects of agency in proportion
to the nature and faculties at their disposal. That agency results
from the subject, but it does not, so to speak, enter it, return to
itself, or refer to itself in the first place. Further, it does not man
ifest that particular subjective structure which is revealed through
the act and causality of the person contained in it. Agency which is
simultaneously self-determination reveals the person totally as a sub
jective structure of self-domination and self-possession.4
4Wojtyla, The Acting Person, pp. 105-48.
282 KAROL WOJTYLA
Human action or act has various aims, objects, and values to

ward which it is directed. Turning to these, one cannot fail in his
conscious action to direct himself toward his own self as a goal, for he
cannot refer to various objects of action and choose various values
without determining himself and his value, through which he be
comes an object for himself as subject. In this particular dimension
the structure of the human act is auto-teleological. It is not only
biological life and the instinct connected with it, nor is it merely
elementary attraction and repulsion subordinated to the differ
entiated spheres of pleasure or pain. Self-determination contained
in acts, that is, in authentic human agency, indicates a different
dimension of auto-teleology connected ultimately with truth and
goodness in their absolute and disinterested meaning (bonum hones
turn). That is why human acts reveal the transcendence which is to a
certain extent another name for the person. It is precisely this that
enhances the subjectivity proper to man. Subjectivity is revealed
through self-determination because self-determination expresses the
transcendental dimension of essentially human action. This remains
with the person as a subject and cannot transcend him since he is
above all the reason and sense of its existence. Ultimately, there
fore, the causality of the person enhances his proper subjectivity in
each and every act, choice, or decision. It draws this subjectivity
out of obscurity and makes it an expressive "phenomenon" of human
experience.
This introduces a further stage of this analysis which, as men
tioned above, cannot be carried out at once, but must be gradual and
successive. Nevertheless, it is not easy to separate its different
senses and seal them hermetically one against another. Before we
proceed, let us consider briefly the structure of the agency or effi
ciency which is self-determination. Through it the personal subjec
tivity of man is not only revealed to our cognition, but really consti
tuted in itself as a specific reality, essentially different from all other
subjects encountered in the surrounding world. We call this human
subject, thus constituted and constituting itself by acts of self
determination, a self. We say this first and properly of our own
subject, but also and indirectly of every other one.
As mentioned above, this self is irreducible to, though consti
tuted by, consciousness. Especially as self-consciousness it is an
indispensable condition for constituting the human self. The actual
constitution of the self on the base of the human subject is due princi
pally to acts of self-determination. In them is revealed the structure

proper to man and the profile of his self-possession and self
domination. It is revealed because that structure is to a certain
extent realized anew in every act of self-determination. The con
crete human self, which is a person, is really constituted precisely
in this realization of the structure of self-possession and self
domination. This makes the close connection between the subject
and the human self still more evident. Self is nothing other than the
concrete human subject. It is given to itself in an experience which
it "lives through"; therefore it is given through consciousness, espe
cially self-consciousness. In experiencing this act it identifies itself
with the self-possession and self-domination revealed in the dynamics
of the personal causality which is self-determination.
Thus, the self is not only self-consciousness, but self-possession
and self-domination which are proper to the concrete human subject
and revealed most of all by act. It was stated above that self cannot
be reduced to self-consciousness; now it is necessary to add that the
full dimension of the human self to which self-possession and self
domination belong is conditioned by self-consciousness. On this is
based the full relation of the self to the personal subjectivity proper
to man. Through its proper function of interiorization consciousness
is essential to constituting subjectivity. In The Acting Person this
was defined as the reflexive function. It is followed by the interior
ity and existence in its own right (in-itselfness) proper to the concrete
human being and action. As mentioned, these are meanings of the
subject and of subjectivity which are not revealed by the concept of
subject itself.
This interiority and existence in its own right as a full empirical
and experiential realization of the personal subjectivity of the human
self is realized simultaneously in self-possession and self-domination.
Man experiences himself as a personal subject if he is conscious that
he possesses and dominates himself. The self-consciousness con
nected with the act as agency conceived as self-determination, condi
tions this "experience as lived through." In this sense we may say
that with its help and through it are constituted both the concrete
human self and the corresponding concrete human subjectivity.
From the point of view of the person as a being who exists and
acts, and therefore from the point of view of the subject, there is no
essential lack or "hiatus" in this analysis. The experiencing of one's
own personal subjectivity is nothing other than a full actualization of
284 KAROL WOJTYLA
everything contained virtually in the human subject, in metaphysical

subjectivity. It is a full and fundamental revelation both of this and
of the being in this experience. This seems to be the philosophical
sense of the old adage: to act follows upon being. The human subject
and the human self are two poles of one and the same human experi
ence.
The picture of the personal subjectivity of man revealed to us in
experience would not be complete if we did not include the moment of
fulfillment. If the way to knowledge of a person is an act, for act
follows upon being, it is necessary to attend to the expression: "to
fulfill an act." This seems to correspond best, not only to the reality
of the act itself (actus humanus), but to the reality of man, the
subject, who accomplishes the act. The expression is not accidental;
when properly interpreted it expresses the tendency or drive to
move from what is incomplete to a plenitude which is proper to that
being. In the order of operation the act, as human, is that actual
plenitude. However, the person always remains in the field of his
fulfillment. Precisely because the deed, as a human act, reveals its
interiority and existence in itself and activates its structure of self
possession and self-domination, there arises a problem: To what de
gree is the fulfillment of an act a fulfillment of one's self, that is, of the
person who fulfills the act?5
This is the most profound and fundamental of the problems
which should be considered in the personal analysis of the subjectiv
ity of man. In the dynamic structure of this subjectivity the tend
ency to fulfill oneself, which is at the root of human action, especially
conscious acts, points both to contingency and to autoteleology. The
tendency to fulfill one's self shows the self to be incomplete. This
incompleteness is not the same as the contingency of the being,
though it may be reduced to that. At the same time this tendency
enhances autoteleology, for the aim of the being or subject which
experiences its own incompleteness is to fulfill itself. The discovery
of this tendency completes the image of the human self which consti
tutes itself through consciousness and self-consciousness in its own
acts. In these acts, through the moment of self-determination, the
human self is revealed to itself, not only as self-possession and self
domination, but also as tendency to self-fulfillment. This shows un
deniably that the personal subjectivity of man does not constitute a
?Ibid., pp. 149-86.
closed structure. Neither self-consciousness nor self-possession seal

off man, the human self, within his own subject: Quite the contrary.
Ultimately, the "turning in toward self" for which consciousness and
self-determination are working is the source of the most ample open
ing of the subject toward reality. In man as personal subject there is
a close connection between self-fulfillment and transcendence. As
noted above, in the modern mentality transcendence is, as it were, a
second name for person.
The philosophical meaning of transcendence is varied. In
metaphysics it signifies being as a reality transcending, and yet
founding, all categories, as well as truth or goodness as transcenden
tal characteristics of being. In philosophical anthropology transcen
dence, as indicated by its etymology, signifies surpassing or excel
ling, as the whole of man's experience reveals itself in the dynamic
whole consisting of his existence and action. The multiple man
ifestations of this transcendence ultimately rise from the one source,
which continually flows in man as subject and which in the final
analysis proves that the human subject is also of a spiritual nature.
Transcendence is the manifestation of man's spirituality.
I do not intend here to analyze this problem metaphysically, nor
shall I endeavor to elucidate in a general manner the transcendence
proper to the human person. I shall confine myself to stating only
one moment of transcendence, namely, that which is revealed by the
specific shape given to the acts of man by his conscience. The profile
of fulfillment of man's personal subjectivity is most obviously joined
to the moment of transcendence. We often speak of moral subjectiv
ity by analogy to psychological subjectivity when we take into con
sideration the aspect of consciousness and experience. These dis
tinctions must not shatter our awareness of the fundamental unity of
the personal subject. The personal subjectivity of man is what we
experience as our self in our acts. This appears to us in its proper
depth in the experience of the moment of conscience in human acts.
How does conscience in act reveal the transcendence of the per
son? The answer would demand several analyses, which I have
developed in The Acting Person* Here I can only state that in the
conscience truth makes itself heard as the source of moral duty, or, in
the language of Kant, of categorical duty. Truth makes itself heard
as the condition which constitutes the liberty proper to act, where
?Ibid., pp. 103-86.
286 KAROL WOJTYLA
liberty reveals itself as the self-determination of the person. To be

free means not only to will, but also to choose and to decide. All this
tells us of the transcendent subordination of good to truth in action
and in act. Conscience alone is, so to speak, the proper place for this
subordination. It is in conscience that the authentic transcendence
of the person in his act is realized; it is owing to conscience that the
human act is formed as the willing and the choosing of true good. In
this way, the moment of conscience reveals in the act and in its
efficient subject the transcendence of truth and liberty, for liberty is
realized precisely by willing, by the choice of true good.
"Do good and avoid evil" is the first principle of conscience as
synderesis and the elementary formula of all human praxis. To do
this, man must constantly transcend himself in conscience in the di
rection of true good. That is the fundamental direction of the trans
cendence which is the property or characteristic of the human person
(proprium personae). Without this transcendence, without as it
were outgrowing one's self in the direction of truth and good, willed
and chosen in the light of the truth, the personal subject would not be
entirely himself. That is why we do not enhance the personal prop
erties of man in analyzing his acts of knowledge or will and their
connected world of values unless in so doing we bring to the surface
the transcendence inherent in these acts. This is done through ref
erence to truth and good as the true or honest, that is, as willed and
chosen on the principle of truth. This is evident from the analysis of
conscience.
At the same time the analysis of conscience shows a close con
nection between transcendence and fulfillment. It is not only a ques
tion of the role of conscience in the dynamics of the committed act,
but also of the fulfillment of one's self in this act. In fulfilling an act,
I fulfill myself in it provided the act is good or in agreement with my
conscience, that is, done with a good or righteous conscience.
Through such an act I become, and am, good as a man. The moral
value reaches to the entire depth of the metaphysical structure of the
human subject. The opposite of this is a deed contrary to conscience;
in a morally evil deed I become an evil man and evil as man. Com
mitting such a deed does not bring self-fulfillment, but is rather a
"nonfulfillment" of self. This experience of nonfulfillment of self cor
responds to negative moral value; we might call it "anti-value," espe
cially from the point of view of the judgment of the conscience.
It would be expedient to analyze separately the two meanings of
fulfillment and nonfulfillment of self. The first is metaphysical: I
become and am good or bad as a man. The second is experiential and

is given in the consciousness and experience of the moral value of
good or of evil. If I do not carry out these analyses here, I must at
least state the close proximity of both meanings. This is one more
proof that the human subject and the human self are only poles of
one and the same experience of man. Evidently, the fulfillment of
self cannot be identified solely with fulfilling the act, but depends on
the moral value of the act. I do not fulfill myself because I accom
plish an act, but only because I become good when the act is morally
good. As we have seen, the fulfillment of a person is connected with
the transcendental dimension of the act objectivized in the consci
ence. I fulfill myself through good; evil brings me nonfulfillment. It
is also evident that self-fulfillment is a distinct structure of the per
sonal subject, different from both self-possession and self-determi
nation. This structure is actualized in the act by its moral value, that
is, through good which occurs only in the act as such (per modum
actus). The experience of morality indicates further possibilities of
grounding and consolidating in the subject both good as a moral value
and evil. The ethics of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, as well as
modern studies of character, speak of habits which are moral abilities
which may be either virtues or vices. In all this there are the man
ifold forms of self-fulfillment or, on the contrary, of nonfulfillment of
the self.
What is essential is that fulfillment, as a subjective reality given
to us in the experience of conscience, though not limited or reduced to
that experience, is clearly connected with transcendence. Man ful
fills himself, he realizes the autoteleology of his personal self
through the transcendent dimension of his action. The transcen
dence of truth and of good has a decisive influence on forming the
personal subject, as is evident in the analysis of conscience and
morality. The same analysis allows one to penetrate more pro
foundly the contingency of man, elucidating how essential is his striv
ing for self-fulfillment, how in this striving he is constantly torn
between good and evil, between self-fulfillment and nonfulfillment,
and with what perseverance he must conquer the forces against self
fulfillment operating both from without and from within.
Though only partial, this self-fulfillment achieved in the moral
good of the act reveals for us also the moment of peace and happiness
which is essential for the experience of conscience. Moral evil re
veals itself in conscience together with depression and despair. All
this points to transcendence as the common perspective, as it were,
288 KAROL WOJTYLA
of self-fulfillment and happiness. I do not intend, however, to con

sider this matter in more detail, but limit myself merely to indicating
it.
II
The conjunction of subject and of community in the title of this

paper does not determine in advance the manner in which both
themes will be connected in our analysis. The examination of this
connection in The Acting Person1 was by no means exhaustive; here I
shall attempt to add some additional thoughts.
The Acting Person does not contain a theory of community. It
considers only the elementary condition which allows the existence
and action of man as a person "together with others" to strive toward
self-fulfillment or at least not to hinder it. Certain negative facts,
known to us from the history of man and of human societies, ought to
be kept in mind while considering the problem of the personal subject
in the community. The last chapter of The Acting Person does not
sufficiently elaborate the theory of community, although it contains
implicitly some elements of this theory. One principal element is the
concept of participation, understood in a double sense. It is con
ceived first as the property of the person which is expressed in the
capacity to stamp as personal one's own existence and action when
existing and acting together with many people. Participation is con
ceived in The Acting Person as a positive relation to the humanity of
other people. "Humanity" is understood not as an abstract idea of
man, but, according to the vision of man in this study, as a personal
self which in each occasion is unique and nonrecurrent. Humanity is
not an abstraction or a generality, but possesses the specific gravity
of the personal being in each man. In this case the "specific gravity"
does not proceed from what is "specific" alone. To participate in the
humanity of another man means to continue in a living relation to the
fact that he is precisely this man, and not merely to what, in
abstracto, makes him a man. The first meaning of "participation,"
then, indicates not only this positive relation to the humanity of an
other man, but the property of the person in virtue of which, while
existing and acting together with others, one is able nevertheless in
this action and existence to fulfill oneself.
7Ibid., pp. 261-99.
This points to the indispensable priority of the personal subject

in regard to the community. It is a metaphysical priority, and there
fore a factual and a methodological one. This means not only that
people do exist and act together as a plurality of personal subjects,
but also that we are not able to say anything essential about this
coexistence and cooperation in the personalistic sense, that is, by
way of community, if we do not begin with man precisely as a per
sonal subject.
In my opinion that is precisely the essence of the problem of
alienation. It is important in regard to man not as an individual of
the species "man," but as a personal subject. Man as an individual of
the species is and never ceases to be a man, regardless of any config
urations of interhuman or social conditions; but man as a personal
subject may in these circumstances be alienated or to some extent
dehumanized. That is why participation is conceived in The Acting
Person first of all as a property in virtue of which man, while existing
and acting together with others and thus in various configurations of
interhuman and social relations, is able to be himself and to fulfill
himself. Participation is to some extent the antithesis of alienation.
When The Acting Person mentions participation as proper to man as
person, this means that man tends to participation and defends him
self against alienation. The basis of both is not his specific nature,
but his personal subjectivity.
That is why, in considering community, one must not attribute
basic meaning to the given or "material" fact that man exists and acts
"in common" with others. This fact says nothing of community, but
only of the plurality of beings, of the acting subjects who are people.
The "material" fact alone of the common existence and action of many
men or of man with others, is not yet a community. By community I
understand not the plurality of subjects, but always the specific unity
of that plurality. This unity is accidental to each and all. It arises as
a relation or a sum of relations existing among them. These rela
tions may be considered as an objective reality which qualifies all,
and each one as well, in the definite plurality of people. We speak
then of a society or of social groups. Particular people, the personal
subjects who are the members of this society, are substantial sub
jects each by himself and separately; the society in itself is exclu
sively a complex of relations, and therefore an accidental being.
This accidental being, however, becomes manifest in the conception
of society and is the basis for the predication of man as a subject
290 KAROL WOJTYLA
belonging to it. We speak then from the point of view of social

membership, e.g., a Pole, a Christian, a member of the middle class,
a laborer, etc.
This relation or complex of relations which constitutes the defi
nite plurality of personal subjects as a social unity may be considered
not so much as an objective reality which qualifies all and every one
in this plurality, but rather on the basis of the consciousness and
experience of all its members and to some degree of each of them. It
is only in this latter mode that we treat the reality of community and
touch upon its proper meaning. It is evident, both from the point of
view of fact, and hence of metaphysics, and from that of method, that
there exists a close connection, correspondence, and adequation be
tween the community and the personal subjectivity of man, as was
presented above. Analyzing exclusively the plurality of human sub
jects and the unity of the corresponding objective relations of an
interhuman or social character, we obtain one picture. A slightly
different one arises when considering the personal subjectivity, and
therefore the consciousness and experience of an interhuman or so
cial type of relation in a definite human plurality. It would seem that
only the second picture corresponds to the concept of community.
In fact, we often use interchangeably the terms "community" and
"society." This is justified, even in the light of what we have said
above, but it indicates also the reason for certain distinctions.
Community is not simply a society, and society is not simply a com
munity. Although the one and the other reality are constituted to a
large degree by the same elements, yet we are considering them from
different angles, and that creates an important difference. We may
even say that society or social groups achieve their reality or become
themselves through the community of their members. As a result, the
community seems to be something more essential, at least from the
point of view of the personal subjectivity of all the members of the
given society or social group. Thus, it becomes evident that the social
relations in a given society may become a source of alienation in the
measure to which there is a weakening of the community or, in other
words, the social bond and unity consciously experienced by each
subject of this relation.
The concept of community possesses, therefore, as we may con
clude from what has been said up to now, both a real and an ideal
sense; it is a question both of a certain reality and of an idea or
principle. This meaning is ontological and axiological, and therefore
normative as well. It is impossible fully to elucidate here all the

meanings of community; we can only indicate them. The previous
analysis of the personalistic meaning of subjectivity may lead us to
some degree of understanding of these different meanings of commu
nity and may help to explain it. The community is both a reality
essential to human coexistence and cooperation, and also a funda
mental norm. It is therefore clear that there does exist another
special value of the community, which we may not simply identify
with the so-called common good. This value is discovered through
observing the coexistence and cooperation of people from the point of
view of the personal subjectivity of each of them. The common good
seems to be rather an axiological objectivization of the sense of each
society, environment, or social group. When speaking of the so
called social nature of man, the discovery of the value of community is
a direct argument in favor of this thesis.
Precisely in this context we encounter the problem of the rela
tion and value of community to the autoteleology of man. There is no
doubt that man fulfills himself through this community. Does this
signify that one may reduce the self-fulfillment of the person to the
community, the autoteleology to the teleology of the community or of
many communities? I shall attempt to consider these matters fur
ther, giving an outline of two seemingly irreducible profiles or di
mensions of the human community. One of them is that of the in
terhuman or interpersonal references; this may be symbolized by the
pattern "I-you." The second dimension, which may be symbolized
by the pattern "we," seems to be of a character which is less in
terhuman than social. In both these patterns the personal reality of
man analyzed above must be an element, not only of further analysis,
but of gradual and, so to speak, retrospective testing.
In this and the following section of this analysis it might be
possible to speak of the profile of community, but it seems better to
consider it as a dimension, for in each of the patterns to be analyzed
community is not merely a different fact. In addition to its actual
structure indicated by the term "profile," it possesses an axiological
and normative sense, and thus a different standard. In the analysis
I shall try to discover and to a certain degree also to determine the
measure of the "I - you" patterns and subsequently of the "we" pat
terns. These patterns arise owing to the fact of the coexistence and
cooperation of people. They belong both to the experience of man
and to the fundamental, prescientific, and even to some extent pre
292 KAROL WOJTYLA
reflective understanding of these experiences. The coming of man

into existence, the beginning of his life, and the comparatively long
period of his development are realized both in the "I - you" and in the
"we" patterns. Man, existing in these patterns of community, does
not reflect upon their meaning and structure. Much light may be
thrown upon the subject by genetic psychology. There is no doubt,
however, that the "I - you" and "we" patterns, as facts which are
"lived through" and therefore given in man's experience, are much
older in each of us than any attempts?especially methodic ones?at
their reflexive objectivization.
While fully appreciating this fact or, rather, this rich and very
influential set of facts, I wish to base this analysis on a subsequent
situation which permits me to speak of a sufficient stage of develop
ment of the personal subjectivity of man. Throughout, this study
treats not only the human subject, but also the human self. It seems
that it is possible to analyze fully the pattern "I - you," and in turn the
pattern "we," as regards the communal reality contained in them,
only from the position of the sufficiently formed personal subjectivity
of man. It seems also that the profile or dimension of the community
contained in each of these patterns, when submitted to an analysis at
the stage of sufficiently formed personal subjectivities, should act
retrospectively. That is, it explains these patterns in earlier stages,
and not conversely. Let us refer in the first place to the pattern
"I - you," in which we perceive above all the interhuman or interper
sonal dimension of community, and do so to a certain degree differ
ently than in the pattern "we."
It is sometimes maintained that "I" is, so to speak, constituted
by "you." This capital brachylogy requires development and exten
sion. The fundamental fact is that the "you" is always, like "me,"
someone or some other "I." Owing to this fact about the starting
point of the relation "I - you," there is a certain plurality of personal
subjects, namely, the minimal plurality of one plus one. Neverthe
less, we must base the analysis of the unity essential for the concept
of community on the ascertainment of this plurality. The "you" is
another "I," different from my "I." Thinking and saying "you," I
express at the same time the relation which, so to speak, extends
beyond me but at the same time returns to me. "You" is not only a
term of separateness, it is also a term of contact. In this expression
there is always a very distinct choice, isolated from many others.
This choice does not necessarily have to be formal, but may be vir
tual; it does not have to be the "text" itself of the relation, but may be
"written between the lines." Nevertheless, while thinking and say
ing "you," I always have the consciousness that the concrete man
whom I thus define is one of the many whom I may define in this way.
I may also define and experience various other people in other
moments and situations in the same way; I may even define everyone
thus. The relation "I - you," therefore, is potentially directed from
one to all people; actually, however, it always connects me with one.
If it connects me in fact with many it is a relation, not to "you" in the
singular, but to "you" in the plural, although it may be easily resolved
into a set of relations to "you" in the singular.
This reveals the peculiar reflexivity of this relation. The rela
tion to "you" is in its essential structure always a relation to the
other. But, because "I" is in this pattern, the relation is able to
return to the "I" from which it had proceeded. This is not a question
of a counterrelation for, as an "I," the other person may be referred
to me (to my "I") in the same way as to a "you"; "I" am then a "you" to
him. We are considering the same relation which passes from my "I"
to the "you" as it possesses a complementary function which consists
in returning to the "I" from which it had proceeded. Of course,
everything under consideration here has its total sense only in terms
of consciousness and experience in which "I" and "you" are consti
tuted as "another I." It does not possess here the full sense proper
to it as the metaphysical category of relation. Speaking of experi
encing relations and references presupposes the "I" and "you" as
distinct personal subjectivities, rather than as accidents whose sub
jects are distinct subjects. This does not imply any doubt regarding
this fundamental reality; both "I" and "you" as distinct personal sub
jects, together with everything that constitutes the personal subjec
tivity of each of them, are indispensable in carrying out this analysis.
If the relation directed from the "I" to the "you" returns to the
"I" from whom it had proceeded there is a reflexivity of the relation
which is not yet necessarily the reciprocity or, in other words, the
counterrelation "you - I." This reflexivity contains the moment of
specific constitution of the human "I" through the relation to the
"you." This moment does not yet constitute community; its signifi
cance is rather in its more complete experience of one's self or "I" by
testing it to some extent "in the light of another I." The process of
imitating personal examples, so important in education and self
education, may develop on the basis of this relation. It is important
294 KAROL WOJTYLA
finally for the fulfillment of self, whose original dynamics are rooted
in every personal subjectivity, as stated above. Without reaching so
far, however, we must accept the fact that in the normal state of
affairs "you" help me to more amply ascertain and affirm my own "I."
In its basic shape the relation "I - you" does not lead me out of my
subjectivity; on the contrary, it establishes me in it more firmly.
The structure of the relation is to a certain degree the confirmation of
the structure of the subject and of his priority in regard to the rela
tion.
The relation of the "I" to the "you" thus considered is already a
real experience of the interpersonal pattern. Its full experience,
however, takes place only when the relation "I - you" has a reciprocal
character. This occurs when the "you," whom a definite other per
son has become for my "I," makes me his or her "you," that is, when
two people become for each other reciprocally "I" and "you," and thus
experience their mutual reference. It seems that only then may we
find the full specificity of the community which is proper to the inter
personal pattern "I - you." Nevertheless, and this must be stressed
once again, even without such a reciprocity the relation "I - you" is a
real experience of the interpersonal pattern. On this basis we may
also analyze participation, which in The Acting Person was defined as
the participation in the very humanity of another man. It seems that
the reciprocity of the relation "I - you" is not necessary for this
participation. This enables one to state that it is precisely participa
tion and nothing else that, in the case of a fully reciprocal relation
"I - you," is the essential constitutive of community which as such
possesses an interhuman, interpersonal character.
This study will not undertake an analysis of the particular shapes
and variants of the interpersonal reference "I - you," or of the com
munity formed within them and through which these references are
formed, for the community, as noted above, is an essential element of
these reciprocal references. It is well known that some shapes of
these interpersonal references "I - you," above all friendship and
love, have been elucidated and elaborated many times and in many
ways; they continue to be the privileged topic of human reflection.
Omitting the analysis and specification of the references "I - you"
themselves, this study will emphasize what is essential for the com
munion which is contained in them. It will do so from the point of
view of the subjects themselves or, more strictly, from the point of
view of the concrete reciprocal reference of the "I" and of the "you" in
their personal subjectivity. It will attempt to point out that which in

an analogous fashion appears with a certain regularity in all these
references in which two people are related to each other as an "I"
and a "you." The detailed character of these references will not be
noted as this is a study only of that interpersonal dimension of com
munity which is proper to all "I - you" patterns, irrespective of their
formation. In this analysis there is room both for the "I - you" of the
married couple and of the bride and bridegroom, of the mother and
child and also of two people even quite unknown to each other who
unexpectedly find themselves within this pattern.
Apart from the details of the relations themselves, we must
realize and emphasize one fact. Man, both as the "I" and the "you,"
is a subject who not only exists but also acts. In this action the
"you" becomes at every step an object for the "I," and this objectivity
relates back to the "I" by virtue of a peculiar interaction: the "I"
becomes in a special way an object for itself in the action directed
objectively to the "you." This, of course, belongs organically, as it
were, to the process of constitution of the "I" through the "you." If
the "I," as noted above, constitutes its own self through its acts, and
in the same way the "you" is also constituted as another "I," then the
relation "I - you" and the relative effects of this pattern in both its
subjects are similarly constituted. The subject "I" experiences the
relation to the "you" in the action whose object is "you," and vice
versa. Through the action directed objectively toward the "you,"
the subject "I" not only experiences himself in the relation to the
"you," but also experiences his own self in a new way in his own
subjectivity. The objectivity of both action and interaction is the
source of the confirmation of the subjectivity of the agent, probably
simply because the subject is a subject in itself and represents a
personal subjectivity peculiar to himself.
Limiting ourselves to the pattern "I - you" in its elementary
form without any detailed specification of the reciprocal reference of
both persons, but considering that in this pattern the "I" is an object
of action objectively directed to the "you" and vice versa, we may
define the principal dimension of interhuman community. This is
both a fact and a postulate; according to what already has been said
about the concept of community it has both a metaphysical and nor
mative (or ethical) meaning. This dimension may be reduced to
treating and actually experiencing "the other one" as one's own self.
To make more exact the dimension of the community proper to
296 KAROL WOJTYLA
the interpersonal relations "I - you" it must be observed that pre

cisely in these relations the reciprocal revelation of man in his subjec
tivity comes into existence. The "you" faces the "I" as the true and
full "other I," determined, as in the case of my "I," not only by
self-consciousness, but by self-possession and self-domination. In
this subjective structure the "you" as the "other I" represents its
own transcendence and tendency to self-fulfillment. This entire
structure of personal subjectivity proper to the "I" and to the "you"
as "another I" is reciprocally revealed, for owing to the reciprocity of
the relation the "I" is at the same time the "you" for the other "I,"
which is my "you." In this way the relation "I - you" not only
acquires importance, but becomes an authentic subjective commu
nity. When we say that in such a community man is reciprocally
revealed in his personal subjectivity, we indicate the actual meaning
of the communion proper to the interpersonal relation "I - you." One
must not forget that this communion possesses also a normative
meaning.
From this point of view it is important that the dimension of
community proper to the interpersonal relation "I - you" should re
veal man reciprocally. It should reveal man to man in his personal
subjectivity and in everything that determines it. Through the rela
tion "I - you" man should reveal himself to man in his deepest struc
ture of self-possession and self-domination. Especially, it should
reveal his tendency to self-fulfillment which, culminating in the acts
of conscience, witnesses to the transcendence proper to man as a
person. In this truth of his personal reality, not only should man be
revealed in the interpersonal relation "I - you," but he should be
accepted and confirmed. Such an acceptance and confirmation is the
moral or ethical expression of the sense of the interpersonal commu
nity.
This sense both shapes and, in another respect, tests the inter
personal community in its particular realizations and in the particular
varieties of the reciprocal references of the human "I" and "you,"
such as friendship and love. The deeper, more integral, and more
intensive the tie of these reciprocal references between the "I" and
the "you," the stronger the confiding and giving of one's self, the
more necessary the acceptance peculiar to the relation and mutual
confirmation of the "I" by the "you." This obtains in their personal
subjectivity, in the whole structure of self-possession, and in all the
personal transcendence expressed in the acts of conscience. Thus, in

the relation "I - you," by virtue of interpersonal communion there
arises the mutual responsibility of the person for the person. This
responsibility is the reflection of conscience and transcendence
which, both on the side of the "I" and of the "you," accompanies the
self-fulfillment and conditions the correct or authentically personal
dimension of the community.
"Community" means "that which unites." In the relation "I -
you" there is formed an authentic interpersonal community in some
shape or variety only if "I" and "you" remain in the mutual confirma
tion of the transcendent value of the person?also understood as
"dignity"?and confirm this by their acts. It seems that only such a
pattern deserves the name of a communion of persons (communio
personarum).
It is most important to distinguish the interhuman or interper
sonal from the social dimension of the community. The different
profiles of community which are expressed symbolically and precisely
by the very pronouns "I - you" and "we" indicate only indirectly the
plurality of persons connected with this relation?one plus one?
while directly they indicate these persons themselves. The pronoun
"we," however, directly indicates the plurality, while pointing only
indirectly to the persons belonging to that plurality. "We" signifies
first of all a set; this set is, of course, composed of people or persons.
The set, which we may call a society or a social group, does not of
itself possess a substantial being. However, as mentioned above, it
brings to the fore that which results from the accidental relation
between people as persons; hence, it provides a basis for predication
firstly regarding all, and only secondly regarding each one in the set.
This is precisely what is contained in the pronoun "we."
It is clear therefore that "we" introduces us to the world of
human references and indicates a different dimension of community.
It is a social dimension which differs from the prior interhuman di
mension of community in the relation "I - you." Analyzing in turn
this social dimension of community, I maintain that the community
possesses a peculiar adequacy in regard to the person as subject, the
personal subjectivity of man. This relates to the fact that every man
is an "I" or "you," and not merely a "he." "He" as well as "they"
seem first of all to signify man as object. Parallel to the previous
analysis this study concerns the social dimension of community from
298 KAROL WOJTYLA
the point of view, not so much of the "he" or "they," as of the "I" and
"you." It will speak not of society, but only of the social dimension of
the human community indicated by the pronoun "we."
It must be noted at the beginning that this pronoun points, not
only to many subjects or "I's," but also to the peculiar subjectivity of
this plurality; and in this "we" differs from "they." When we say
that "we" signifies many human "I's" we try to grasp this plurality
and understand it through action, as we have tried to understand "I"
itself. "We" signifies many people, many subjects, who in some
fashion exist and act together. It is not a question, however, of the
plurality of actions which take place, as it were, next to one another.
"In common" means that action, and together with it the existence of
those many "I's" as well, is in relation to some value. This therefore
deserves the name of "common good," though in speaking thus I do
not intend to use the concepts "value" and "good" interchangeably or
to confuse these concepts.
The relation of the many "I's" to the common good seems to be
the very core of the social community. Thanks to this relation, people
who experience their personal subjectivity, and therefore the actual
plurality of human "I's," realize that they are a definite "we"
and experience themselves in this new dimension. Although the
person remains himself, this is a social dimension. It differs from
that of the "I - you," for the direction of the dimension is changed and
is indicated by the common good. In this relation the "I" and "you"
find their reciprocal reference in a new dimension: they discover their
"I - you" through the common good which constitutes a new unity
among them.
The best example is provided by matrimony in which the clearly
outlined relation "I - you" as an interpersonal relation receives a
social dimension. This occurs when the husband and wife accept that
complex of values which may be defined as the common good of
marriage and, potentially at least, the common good of the family.
In relation to this good their community is revealed in action and
existence in a new profile ("we") and in a new social dimension. In
this social dimension they constitute a married couple, and not
merely "one plus one," though they do not stop being "I" and "you."
They also do not cease their interpersonal relation "I - you"; on the
contrary, this relation draws on the relation "we" in its own way and
is enriched by it. This, of course, means that the new social relation
imposes new duties and demands essential to the interpersonal rela

tion "I - you."
Having achieved this elementary outline of the relation "we," we
may ask, by analogy to the previous analysis, to what extent and in
what sense does the peculiar process of constituting each "I" by the
"we" take place, as it did in the interpersonal relation where the "I"
was constituted by the "you." Of course, this consideration of the
constitution of the human "I" will take account of all that has been
said above about the personal subjectivity of man. It is not a ques
tion of being constituted in the metaphysical sense, for in that sense
every "I" is constituted in its own subject. The constitution of the
concrete "I" in its personal subjectivity takes place in a distinctive
manner through action and existence "together with the others" in a
social community, in the dimension of the different "we's." This
differs from the dimension "I - you," for here the relation to the
common good is of decisive significance. Through this relation the
concrete "I" finds a different confirmation of his personal subjectivity
than that found through an interpersonal relation. Nevertheless,
this confirmation of the subject "I" in the community of "we" agrees
fundamentally with the nature of the subject. Perhaps this verifica
tion is at the basis of everything that was ever said of the social
nature of man.
In its essence "we" does not signify any minimalization or defor
mation of the "I." If in fact that does take place, as noted in The
Acting Person, the reason should be sought within the relation to the
common good. This relation may be faulty in many ways, from the
point of view both of the human "I" or many human "I's," and of what
is being accepted as the common good for the many "I's."
There is an extensive field of philosophy, including most of social
ethics, which I do not intend to enter into here substantively. As in
the case of the analysis of the interpersonal relations ("I - you"), I do
not wish to introduce here the many different shapes and varieties of
the social reality in which man exists, e.g., society, social groups,
environment, etc. In this analysis I intend principally to elucidate
the importance of the social dimension of community in terms of the
adequacy of man's personal subjectivity. In this aspect, in which as
a matter of course the autoteleology of man comes to the fore, all the
problems of self-fulfillment and of community must be considered,
not only in their factual, ontological, and therefore metaphysical
300 KAROL WOJTYLA
meaning, but also in their normative and, therefore, ethical meaning.

It is necessary first of all to state that the "common" reference of
the many "I's" to the common good, through which this plurality of
subjects is revealed to itself and others as a definite "we," is a par
ticular expression of the transcendence proper to man as a person.
The relation to the common good realizes this transcendence in a
special way. Here I refer to what has been said above on the subject
of transcendence and its close connection with the self-fulfillment of
the subjective "I." Conscience, as the key point of the self-fulfillment
of the personal subject, indicates this transcendence and is, so to
speak, at the very center of the subject. Objectively, transcendence
is realized in the relation to truth and to good, as to the "true" or
"honest" good. This relation to the common good, which unites
many subjects into one "we," should also be founded on the relation
to truth and to "true" or "honest" good, for only then does the right
standard of the common good appear. In its essence the common
good is the good of many; in its fullest dimension it is the good of all.
This plurality may be numerically different: a couple, rather than
merely one plus one, in the case of matrimony; several in the case of a
family; millions in the case of nations; and billions in the case of
humanity. The concept of common good is therefore analogous, for
the reality itself of this good is differentiated and subject to the
analogy of proportionality. The common good consists in something
different for a married couple, for a family, for a nation, for human
ity, or within the bounds of a definite society or social group in which
the human "we" is also realized in an analogous fashion. Neverthe
less, in all these realizations the common good corresponds to the
transcendence of the persons, being the objective basis for constitut
ing them in a social community as "we."
The reality of the common good with all the wealth of the
analogies pertaining to it determines the direction of the transcen
dence which is at the root of the human "we." Not only is this
transcendence not essentially contrary to the personal subjectivity of
man, but it belongs essentially to the structure of the human "I."
This does not mean that the sphere of social life is a sphere without con
flicts; experience proves the opposite. In The Acting Person, I have
tried to indicate some of their varieties by sketching their multiple
shapes and range.8 Nevertheless, the social dimension of commu
?Ibid., esp. pp. 271-76, 283-91.
nity generally enters adequately into the tendency to self-fulfillment

proper to the human subject. The common good, as an objective
basis of this dimension, has greater value than the individual good of
each separate "I" of the definite community. Therefore, it possesses
a superior character, and as such corresponds to the subjective
transcendence of the person. The greater value which is the basis
for this superior character consists ultimately in the more complete
expression and realization of the good of each of the subjects of this
community, which defines itself as "we" in this common good. Thus,
through the common good the human "I" finds itself more fully and
fundamentally precisely in the human "we."
The common good is often difficult, and probably is so in princi
ple. The measure of effort put into the realization of the common
good, the measure of individual sacrifices, including exile, prison, and
death, has and continues to witness to the magnitude ofthat good, to
its superiority. These situations, especially the extreme ones, con
vince us of the truth that the common good is in itself a condition of
the individual good of the particular members of the community, of
the human "we." In extreme situations it appears as if this in
dividual good were deprived of its reason for existence in the absence
of the common good. In no way, however, does this mean that per
sonal sacrifice or the offering of one's life for the common good is
reduced to a simple "shifting of values" between the common good
and the individual good in this or that community.
The common good is superior, and as such corresponds to the
transcendence of the person. It confronts his conscience, appeals to
it, or provokes conflicts. For precisely this reason the problem of
the common good must be the central question of social ethics. The
history of societies, as well as the evolution of social systems, man
ifests constant endeavors to attain the "true" common good which
corresponds to the very essence of the social community proper to
the human "we," and to the transcendence proper to the human "I."
Despite this, history also reports the constant appearance of differ
ent sorts of utilitarianism, totalitarianism, or social egoism. All
sorts of deviations are encountered in the smallest and most funda
mental human "we," the married couple and the family. These de
viations are, of course, proportionate to this community and its
specificity. The greater the plurality of the human "I's" the more
difficult in a certain respect it is to achieve the social community, the
unity proper to the human "we." As noted above, the common good is
difficult.
302 KAROL WOJTYLA
The reason for the superiority of the common to the individual

good is that the good of each of the subjects in the community who
define and experience themselves as "we" is expressed and realized
to a greater degree in this good. This explains also the constitution
of the "social community" by many human "I's." In itself this fact is
generally free from utilitarianism; it remains within the scope of an
objective and at the same time authentically experienced truth of the
good, as well as the truth of conscience. In the name of this truth
members of the community undertake efforts connected with the
realization of the common good, sometimes reaching to the above
mentioned extremes. In the name of the same truth of the common
good, however, they also achieve all those values which are the real
and inviolable good of the person. The community of the human "I's" in
their many dimensions expresses that configuration of the human plu
rality in which the person as subject is realized to the maximum. This is
the sense of the common good in its various analogies and the reason for
the superiority it manifests, at times dramatically, but always in a
fundamentally ethical manner, in the experience of the personal subject.
"We" signifies not only the simple fact of human multi-subjectiv
ity, but the peculiar subjectivity of this plurality, or at least points to
a decided tendency to achieve it. This is, of course, a many-sided
tendency, which must be understood and realized in proportion to the
different "we's," and according to the communal specificity proper to
each of them. This tendency, and consequently the realization of the
subjectivity of many, differs in the case of "we" as a married couple
or family, a definite environment, society or social group, a nation,
state, or finally humanity as a whole. The expression "The Family of
Man" is most eloquent in this respect.
The human "I's" in these different dimensions have a disposition,
not only to think of themselves in the category "we," but to realize
what is essential for the "we," and therefore for the social commu
nity. Within this community as human, this implies a readiness to
realize the subjectivity of many in a universal dimension, and there
fore the subjectivity of all. This is signified by the full realization of
the human "we." Only on the principle of the social community thus
understood, in which the actual multi-subjectivity develops in the
direction of the subjectivity of many, may we perceive in the human
"we" an authentic communion of persons.
The many obstacles and counterdispositions which oppose this
readiness to realize the subjectivity of many and overgrow it on all

sides are well known. To a very great extent we are continually on
the way to the realization of the human "we" in various spheres, and
this involves both advancing and retreating at many stages. What is
really important is what prevails at the various stages and how the
realization of the different "we's," and ultimately of the universal
one, is balanced.
In any case, the analysis of the social community proves at this
point the essential homogeneity of the personal subject and of the
human community. What emerges from the formation of the differ
ent "we's" in all the wealth of analogy proper to them is a distinct
reflection of the human "I," of the personal subjectivity of man. This
is not in contradiction to that personal subjectivity; man as subject
would have to introduce a correction if it were to be so. The social
community "we" is not only given to man, but is imposed continually
as a task. All this confirms the thesis of the peculiar priority of the
subject as person in regard to the community. Without it, it is
impossible to defend, not only the autoteleology of the human "I," but
the very teleology of man.
It seems that the analysis carried out here of the interhuman and
social community may not be employed univocally, for it indicates
different realities. The reality of the social community cannot be
fully reduced to the reality of the interhuman or interpersonal com
munity or vice versa. There is a radical distinction of profiles be
tween the different patterns of "I - you" and "we." The pattern "I -
you" exists in the different patterns of "we." The latter do not, and
decidedly should not, liquidate the former; quite the contrary, they
should facilitate and liberate it. Similarly, the various types of the
patterns "we" suffuse the pattern "I - you." The social dimension of
the community and the interpersonal one penetrate, contain, and
even condition each other in many different ways. The profiles of
these patterns, however, remain generally different and distinct.
From the normative point of view one ought to endeavor to form,
maintain, and develop the "I - you" and the "we" pattern in their
authentic shape. This implies the possibility of a full complementarity
of community and personal life indicated by the principle of subsidi
arity.
In this way the meaning of participation and of alienation as its
antithesis may emerge from the previous analyses and be outlined
304 KAROL WOJTYLA
more fully. Man as person is the basis of the analogy between the
interhuman and social community implied in the relations "I - you"
and "we." Moreover, it seems that the analysis of community from
the point of view of the personal subjectivity of man, as sketched
above, makes it possible to determine the principal theses on com
munity or, in other words, to discover the very framework of its
reality. To reverse this order would appear to be, not merely
dangerous for the truth of the picture under consideration, but sim
ply impossible. Community may be considered reasonably only in
the world of persons, and therefore only in terms of person as the
proper subject of existence and action, both personal and communal.
This, moreover, must be seen in relation to the personal subjectivity
of man; this alone permits the grasp of the essential properties of the
human "I" and the interpersonal and social relations between them.
It is for this reason that the level of the subject, which from the
epistemological and methodological point of view is an object, makes
possible a more complete understanding of both participation and
alienation.
In conceiving alienation as the opposite or antithesis of participa
tion, we envisage the person and both the "we" and the "I - you"
dimension of community. In each, participation is connected with
transcendence. It is, therefore, rooted in the person as a subject and
in the properly personal tendency towards self-realization and self
fulfillment. Man as a person fulfills himself through "I - you" inter
personal relations and through the relation to the common good,
which permit him to exist and act together with the others as "we."
These two varieties of the relation and of the corresponding dimen
sions of community imply two different profiles of participation, out
lined in part in The Acting Person.
The position that participation should be conceived as an attri
bute of man corresponding to his personal subjectivity is on the whole
convincing. This subjectivity does not close man within himself and
make of him an impermeable monad; quite the contrary, it opens him
toward others in a manner that is distinctive of a person. Participa
tion is the authentic expression of personal transcendence and its
objective confirmation in the person, both in the interpersonal di
mension of the "I - you" community and in the social dimension "we."
It might appear that transcendence toward an erroneous goal that at
times is presented as the common good diverts man, so to speak,
from himself, or more broadly diverts all the others from man. A
thorough analysis of that good, however, leads to the conviction that

man, not only in his specific definition but precisely as person and
subject, is deeply inscribed in the true sense of the common good.
For this reason the true sense of the common good, its full "honesty,"
is and must be a central theme of social ethics in research, and the
object of the strictest responsibility in practice.
Although the profiles of the communities "I - you" and "we" are
distinct and irreducible one to another, they must mutually penetrate
and condition each other in the experience and shaping of community
life. Man in his full genuineness, as a person whose personal identity
is revealed by "I - you" relations which possess the profile of a com
munion of persons, is and must constantly be inscribed into the true
sense of the common good if that good is to fulfill its definition and,
therefore, its nature. That is why it seems that it was possible to
define participation in the social profile in The Acting Person as a
property in virtue of which man tends also to self-fulfillment and
fulfills himself, acting and existing in common with others. This
definition begins with the person as subject or "I," and not with the
community or "we"; therefore, it appears to reflect only an aspect
rather than the whole. Nevertheless, participation enables one to
reach the social aspect of community just as well, for it conditions the
whole authenticity of the human "we." The "we" is objectively
formed in virtue of the relation to the common good; simultaneously,
as shown above, and in virtue of the same relation it tends to form the
true subjectivity of all who enter the social community. The passage
from multi-subjectivity to the subjectivity of all is the proper and full
sense of the human "we." Participation conceived as the attribute of
each "I," on the strength of which that "I" fulfills itself by existing
and acting "in common," is not contrary to this meaning of the social
community. In fact, it seems that only participation which is thus
conceived can assure both the meaning and realization of the social
community, the human "we" in all its authenticity as the true subjec
tivity of all.
Participation conceived as "the property of the person, on the
strength of which he is and remains himself in the social community,"
seems to condition the authentic communion of persons in the "we"
relations and in the interpersonal "I - you" relations. Both relations
consist in an opening: both are formed within the transcendence
proper to man. The relation "I - you" opens man directly to man.
"To participate" means in this case to turn to another "I" on the basis
306 KAROL WOJTYLA
of personal transcendence, to turn therefore to the full truth of that

man, and in this sense to his humanity. This humanity is given in the
relation "I - you," not as an abstract idea of man, but as an "I" to
"you." Participation in such a pattern is equivalent to the realization
of the interpersonal community, whose personal subjectivity "you" is
revealed by the "I"?to some extent in a reciprocal manner.
Above all, in this community the personal subjectivity of the one and
the other is founded, safeguarded, and grows.
Alienation is the opposite and antithesis of participation. It was
applied in Marxist philosophy, but is independently one of the ele
ments of modern anthropology, or contemporary thought on man.
Irrespective of all that has been said on the subject of what alienation
essentially or apparently was or is, it is fundamental constantly to
inquire into what alienation is in itself. On that basis alone is it
possible to legitimate our propositions as to the actual varieties of
alienation in the past, present, or future.
As an antithesis of participation, alienation is connected with the
above formulation of the state of the question of part 2 of this paper.
The problem of alienation cannot be considered in terms of man as an
individual of the species or of his specific definition, but only from the
point of view of man as a personal subject. I maintain that alienation
is essentially a problem of the person and, in this sense, both
humanistic and ethical.
As the antithesis of participation, alienation contributes or, de
pending on the alienating factor, gives occasion to depriving man to
some extent of the possibility of fulfilling himself in community,
whether the social community "we," or the interhuman community
"I - you." Alienation occurs in many ways in both these dimensions.
In the social dimension the presence of alienating factors is revealed
in the fact that the plurality of human subjects, of which each is a
definite "I," cannot develop correctly in the direction of an authentic
"we." The social processes, which should lead to a true subjectivity
of all, are then checked or even turned back, for man cannot retrieve
himself as subject in this process. The social life is, so to speak,
beyond him; it is not only against him, but even "at his expense."
Existing and acting "together with others," he does not fulfill him
self, either because he alone has alienated himself, or because the
society, owing to some faculty structures, does not give him the
necessary basis for self-fulfillment or even refuses to grant the rights
he possessed before.
This, of course, is not a full and exhaustive picture, but only an

outline, leading to an understanding of alienation as the antithesis of
participation in the social sense. Depending on its dimensions, alie
nation of this type limits or even annihilates the human "we." It
does so, not only in the aspect of this or that "I" as in the case of
estrangement, but, as history and our modern times teach us, in the
dimension of whole social groups, environments, social classes, or
even entire nations.
An analysis of this social phenomenon is not intended here but
only an outline which will make possible a more precise definition of
the nature of alienation. In an analogous manner, preserving the
distinctness of the pattern to which we have called attention in the
previous analyses, we may discover this outline in the interpersonal
dimension of community, in the relations "I - you." Although numer
ically interpersonal alienation is not to be compared with that of the
social community, in quality it is at times more painful. Human life
evolves perhaps still more in the dimensions "I - you" than in the
dimensions "we." Alienation, as the antithesis of participation,
signifies in this dimension the limits or annihilation of all that makes
man another "I" for man. This undermines the experience of the
truth of humanity and of the essential value of the person in the
human "you." The "I" remains cut off, without contact, and con
sequently not fully revealed to its own self. In such interhuman
relations the "neighbor" vanishes, and there remains the "other one,"
a "stranger," or perhaps even an outright "enemy."
This is only an outline or sketch of the meaning of alienation in its
interhuman dimensions. There community becomes deformed and
disappears in proportion to the decay of experiencing humanity,
which if authentic would have brought people closer and united them.
Concerning both these dimensions of community, the development of
the position that alienation is the antithesis of participation serves to
enhance, from the negative point of view, the content of this analysis.
That is, the reality of human community in both its "I - you" and "we"
dimensions is shaped on the basis of the personal subjectivity of man,
in relation to it, and above all for it. Alienation, as the antithesis and
thus the opposite or negation of participation, does not so much "de
humanize" man as an individual of the species, as strike at the person
as subject. Participation, however, as the antithesis of alienation
confirms and enhances the person as a subject. In this sense, it may
be accepted as a peculiar "property" of the person; it serves his
308 KAROL WOJTYLA
self-fulfillment both in the interhuman and social relations, in each of

which it safeguards the transcendence proper to the person.
The framework of this article does not carry out the analysis of
alienation itself. The above is neither a description of the phenome
non nor an attempt at its systematization. Though much has been
written on the subject and the concept of alienation has become one of
the important, if not fundamental, categories of modern thought
about man, there is no fixed view about what alienation is or in what
its nature consists.
The real subject of the present analysis, "Person: Subject and
Community," was the examination of the connection between the
interhuman and social community and the personal subjectivity of
man. On that basis, there appears the possibility of proposing the
reduction of various actual descriptions of alienation, in which there
is only a statement and suggestion that it takes place in given situa
tions, to the sphere of the person as subject and community. By way
of such a reduction, for which the present analysis may serve as a
tool, the nature of alienation can be more fully revealed. Only a
more complete understanding of its real nature can provide the basis
for determining what in given cases or situations alienation is and
why it exists.
In the second part of this article it was noted that one cannot
speak of alienation solely on the basis of the specific concept "man,"
but only by reference to the personal subjectivity of this man. That
was an initial statement, and to some extent is still intuitive. It ex
pressed, however, the conviction that the analysis of the personal
subjectivity of man, carried out here in the context of subject and
community and with the help of their intuition, can be of service in
analyzing the nature of alienation.
Krakow.

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The Person: Subject and Community

Author(s): Karol Wojtyla

1 HIS ESSAY will examine the connection between the subjectivity

In the field of experience man appears both as a specific subject and

subjectivity of man, since in no other object of man's experience are

* Throughout the article the author has employed consistently the

action. This is precisely the meaning of the concept "subject," which

thus conceived, with everything that makes man an individual and

^f. Wojtyla, The Acting Person, pp. 189-258.

uniquely rich structure which can be revealed only by a complete

knowledge or self-knowledge. We may accept with Husserl that

2Ibid., pp. 25-59.

necessary to elaborate as fully as possible what is contained in the

3Cf. Roman Ingarden, ?ber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontische Fund

to man as person, and so makes the intellectual vision more precise, it

4Wojtyla, The Acting Person, pp. 105-48.

Human action or act has various aims, objects, and values to

pally to acts of self-determination. In them is revealed the structure

everything contained virtually in the human subject, in metaphysical

?Ibid., pp. 149-86.

closed structure. Neither self-consciousness nor self-possession seal

?Ibid., pp. 103-86.

liberty reveals itself as the self-determination of the person. To be

become and am good or bad as a man. The second is experiential and

of self-fulfillment and happiness. I do not intend, however, to con

The conjunction of subject and of community in the title of this

7Ibid., pp. 261-99.

This points to the indispensable priority of the personal subject

belonging to it. We speak then from the point of view of social

normative as well. It is impossible fully to elucidate here all the

reflective understanding of these experiences. The coming of man

their personal subjectivity. It will attempt to point out that which in

the interpersonal relations "I - you" it must be observed that pre

personal transcendence expressed in the acts of conscience. Thus, in

imposes new duties and demands essential to the interpersonal rela

meaning, but also in their normative and, therefore, ethical meaning.

?Ibid., esp. pp. 271-76, 283-91.

nity generally enters adequately into the tendency to self-fulfillment

The reason for the superiority of the common to the individual

readiness to realize the subjectivity of many and overgrow it on all

thorough analysis of that good, however, leads to the conviction that

of personal transcendence, to turn therefore to the full truth of that

This, of course, is not a full and exhaustive picture, but only an

self-fulfillment both in the interhuman and social relations, in each of

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