HANEP For 11th FDC Congress (Draft)

Working Draft for FDC 11th Congress (as of August 17, 2010)
Holistic Alternative
National Economic Platform
HANEP2020
Kaginhawaan para sa Pilipino
A Project of the Freedom from Debt Coalition

11 Matimpiin St. Barangay Pinyahan Quezon City. 1100.
Telephone (02) 9211985. Telefax (02) 9246399.
mail@fdc.ph. www.fdc.ph.
Working Draft as of August 17, 2010.
Table of Contents
New Economics for a New Administration.......................................................................................................3
Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................11
Chapter 1:...................................................................................................................................................22
Towards Modernity and Prosperity. Next Stop: Philippines 2020...............................................................23
1. Activist Developmental State............................................................................................................24
2. Equitable and Strategic Land Ownership and Use for Sustainable Development and Livability of
Communities..............................................................................................................................................26
3. Domestic Capital-driven Development..............................................................................................29
4. Integrated, Modernized, and Ecologically-sound Industry focused on developing Sustainable Local
Economies and Domestic Markets............................................................................................................32
5. Empowered Labor Sector...................................................................................................................35
6. Ecologically Sustainable and Climate-adaptive Economy.................................................................37
7. Strong Social Support and Safety Net System for Households and the Reproductive Economy......40
8. Food Sovereignty...............................................................................................................................42
9. Active State Participation towards an Integrated, Sustainable and Humane Management and
Development of the Water Sector.............................................................................................................45
10. Strong State Participation towards a Rational and Participatory Power System.........................48
Chapter 2:...................................................................................................................................................51
Why are we poor? Going Beyond the Corruption Discourse.......................................................................52
1. Weak, Elite-Captured State................................................................................................................58
2. Inequitable Land Ownership and Lack of Social and Strategic Outlook on Land Use and
Management..............................................................................................................................................62
3. Foreign Capital-dominated Open Economy.......................................................................................65
4. Fragmented Industry designed for Low Value Added Exports..........................................................68
5. Repressive Labor Environment..........................................................................................................71
6. Ecologically destructive Economy vulnerable to Climate Disasters..................................................75
7. Unrecognized and Neglected Reproductive and Care Economy.......................................................78
8. Crops and Fishes for the Global Supermarket...................................................................................81
9. Grossly Neglected, Fragmented, and Ill-Governed Water Sector.....................................................84
10. Abandoned Power Sector and Industry.........................................................................................87
The National Economic Platform. c/o the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC). www.fdc.ph. 11 Matimpiin 2
St. Barangay Pinyahan Quezon City. 1100. Telephone (02) 9211985. Telefax (02) 9246399. mail@fdc.ph.
1 New Economics for a New Administration

2By Rep. Walden Bello, President of the Freedom from Debt Coalition (2008-2010)*
3
4 The dominant feature of the Arroyo administration was pervasive corruption, but its most
5destructive legacy in the long term will probably be its policy failures. The ascent to power of a new
6president, backed by a new Congress, provides the opportunity for a fundamental shift in policy in order
7to end poverty and re-launch the Philippines on the road to development.
8
9 The policy paradigm of the administration was one it inherited from previous administrations. This
10was a pro-market, neoliberal approach the key prongs of which were accelerated trade and financial
11liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. In addition, Arroyo continued her predecessors’ policy of
12fully servicing the foreign debt, dealt with the ever-widening budget deficit by imposing a 12 per cent value-
13added tax that hit mainly the middle class and the poor, and left it to the market to address poverty and
14income inequality.
15
16 With its pro-market orientation, the Arroyo presidency followed the lead of previous administrations
17in refusing to pursue an industrial policy, reducing budget support for agriculture to a minimum, and
18radically bringing down tariffs on both agricultural and manufacturing imports. Abandoned to global
19market forces as the administration embraced the ideology of globalization, the economy was channeled to
20the massive export of labor, export-oriented low-value-added manufacturing, particularly of electronic
21components, and providing personnel for the outsourced operations of transnational corporations like call
22centers.
23
24Failure of a Paradigm
25
26 Not surprisingly, the country’s GDP growth rate was consistently significantly below those of its Asian
27neighbors, the radical reduction of tariffs decimated manufacturing, the country was turned from a net
28food exporter to a net food importer, the poverty rate stubbornly refused to go below 30 per cent of the
29population, and income distribution worsened. In addition, the ecological crisis intensified, owing to
30desultory environmental management and failure to promote a reproductive health policy for fear of
31offending the Catholic Church hierarchy.
32
33 The country’s plight under the lash of wrong policies over the last four administrations becomes
34clearer in a comparative perspective. According to the United Nations Development Program’s Human
1Development Report, the Philippines registered the second lowest average yearly growth rate, 1.6 per cent,
2in Southeast Asia in the period 1990-2005—lower than Vietnam (5.9 per cent), Cambodia (5.5 per cent),
3and Burma (6.6 per cent). The only country registering average growth below that of the Philippines was
4Brunei, which, being an oil-rich, high-income country, could not afford not to grow.
5
6 Except perhaps for allowing the passage of the law extending the period for the redistribution of
7land under land reform and providing funding for much needed support services, it is difficult to find bright
8spots in Arroyo’s economic record. The only mitigating factor in this dismal performance is that it cannot
9be separated from that of the previous three administrations.
10
11 In the last two years, the seemingly unending crisis of the domestic economy has been exacerbated
12by the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, a development that is a product of the
13same principles of deregulation and trade and financial liberalization. This dual crisis coincides with the
14arrival of a new president and provides an unparalleled opportunity to break with the paradigm that has
15condemned this country to stagnation for nearly three decades.
16
17A Pro-active State
18
19 First and foremost among the necessary changes is the transformation of the Philippine state from a
20passive actor into an proactive agent of development. The role of the state is not simply to regulate or
21discipline the market and the private sector, though this is an important function. More important, this
22state must lead in developing and implementing a strategic program for Philippine development, one that
23harnesses the energies of the public sector, civil society, and the market to achieve development targets.
24Planning, which has become a dirty word in recent years, must again take pride of place among the
25instruments of economic development, with the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) ceasing
26to be simply a statistical collection agency and becoming the planning agency it was originally meant to be.
27
28 The revival of an economy with a solid industrial and agricultural base must be among the key aims
29of the activist state since industry and agriculture are the main sources of solid growth in the economy.
30This means engaging in industrial policy, or the strategic deployment use of tariffs and other mechanisms
31not only to protect domestic manufacturing from unfair competition but, more important, to give it depth,
32diversity, coherence and complementarity. It also means making agriculture again a centerpiece of the
33economy through the strategic management of tariffs, quotas, subsidies for farmers, and sustainable agro-
34technology. The long-awaited completion of agrarian reform is, of course, a central element in the
35agricultural policy package, and the president’s electoral campaign promise to distribute Hacienda Luisita to
36its tenants would give the green light for this.
1Income and Asset Redistribution

2
3 Market-driven export-oriented industrialization and export-oriented agriculture were the main
4prongs of the old, discredited paradigm. It is time to make the domestic market again the driver of growth.
5This can only be done, however, by increasing the purchasing power of Filipinos in the lower income
6groups. This will inevitably involve income and asset redistribution, including a deepening of the land
7reform program. Higher wages for workers, income subsidies for the poor, and strengthened support
8services for peasant farmers are also mechanisms to achieve this goal of activating a vibrant domestic
9market that will be the locomotive of growth. In the current global economic crisis, the Philippines and
10other countries, via stimulus programs. have fallen back on the domestic market to make up for the
11shortfall in foreign markets. This reorientation must be made permanent, a prescription that is underlined
12by the poor prospects of recovery by export markets in the next few years.
13
14 Asserting the role of an activist developmental state does not mean a return to the old
15developmental paradigm of the 1960’s and 1970’s. The old paradigm focused on achieving high growth
16rates, prioritized industrial development, made equity a secondary consideration, and paid little attention
17to environmental damage.
18
19 The New Economic Policy, in contrast, stresses the quality of development, with a strong emphasis
20on equity and ecological stability. A lower rate of growth that would meet the needs of development and
21poverty reduction without destabilizing the environment is not a utopian dream, but it can only be brought
22about on the basis of a more equitable sharing of the fruits of growth. Thus, equity in the distribution of
23income, assets, and resources fulfills simultaneously the needs of demand-driven growth, environmental
24sustainability, and social justice.
25
26Democracy and Development
27
28 The New Economic Policy is not out to create an authoritarian state. Indeed it sees democratic
29governance as central to creating consent and thus giving legitimacy to the state’s economic initiatives.
30This means fundamental economic decisions, such as which industries should be promoted owing to their
31disproportionately positive impact on development and employment, must be arrived at democratically. It
32means the establishment of mechanisms of accountability of government agencies to civil society bodies
33such as peasant and workers’ production councils and consumer associations. Democracy strengthens
34government, not weaken it.
35
36 The New Economic Policy must acknowledge the value of woman’s work. For too long, woman’s
37central role in the reproduction of the economy has not been acknowledged, leading to the devaluation of
1woman’s work and generating systemic inequality in income distribution between the sexes. That the
2majority of the poor are women is not an accident. Addressing the inequality created by gender will involve
3coming up with a set of complementary mechanisms including income support, affirmative action in
4employment, and promotion of women-friendly methods of family planning.
5
6 Production, consumption, equity, and ownership of the means of production are closely linked. In
7contrast to a system where one form of property subjugates others, an equity-oriented system of
8production combines various forms of ownership including state ownership, private property, cooperatives,
9and ancestral domain or communal property.
10
11 Full recognition and protection of ancestral domain or communal forms of ownership as enshrined
12in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 is the best guarantee for enhancing the economic welfare of
13indigenous peoples. Their well being can also be promoted through the establishment of and effective
14maintenance of protected areas where environmental management will be in the hands of indigenous
15communities. Such sanctuaries must be created not only in forest and mountain areas but also in the seas
16and lakes. Fishing in waters at a designated distance from the shore must be reserved for artisanal fishing
17communities.
18
19Sustainable Development and Provision of Public Goods
20
21 Mining for natural resources is an important economic activity. Yet government policies have
22supported foreign corporations that have brought little of their profits to the country and left mainly
23environmental disasters like the Marinduque mining disaster in 1992. Constitutional restrictions on the
24nationality of owners of mining firms must be fully respected, mining policy must favor mainly small
25operators, tight environmental restrictions must be instituted, and profits from mining operations must
26flow mainly to mining communities. Repeal of the 1995 Mining Act will be necessary to bring about such a
27pro-people mining regime.
28
29 In all areas of the economy, there must be a concerted shift to green technology. In agriculture, for
30instance, land reform and a reversal of destructive trade liberalization is not enough. To be sustainable,
31agricultural technology must be made less dependent on the chemical-intensive technology that has
32proven so ruinous to the environment and public health. At the same time, it must avoid the illusion of a
33new “Green Revolution” based on genetically engineered seeds that are owned by transnational
34corporations. Organic agricultural methods suitable to small-scale farming must be developed and
35promoted with the aid of the state and our local scientific community.
36
37 The last three decades have witnessed a disastrous experiment in the privatization of power, water,
38and other public goods. Privatization has resulted in higher profits for the private sector but it has not
1brought about more efficient management and lower costs of power and water. People have a basic right
2to power and to water, and production and delivery of these goods by public or cooperative enterprises is
3the best guarantee that their price remains within the reach of all citizens. Making public goods affordable
4will sometimes involve some form of subsidization in which richer classes and organizations assist, through
5transfer payments, the poorer sectors of the community.
6
7The Fiscal Challenge and the Debt
8
9 Taxation is an indispensable mechanism for government to raise the resources to spend for the
10public welfare. The problem in the Philippines is a system that is regressive, where owing to reliance on the
11value added tax and other forms of indirect tax, the burden of taxation falls principally on the poor and
12middle classes. The key to raising resources is to shift the burden of taxation to the rich through higher
13marginal tax rates for those in the upper income brackets, more efficient collection of income taxes and
14corporate taxes, and increasing taxes on socially unhealthy activities such as gambling, drinking, smoking,
15and carbon emissions. This mix of measures will yield a significant part of the resources to cover the now
16gargantuan budget deficit.
17
18 Fiscal balance will not, however, be achieved without addressing the debt problem. 22 to 25 per
19cent of the budget now goes yearly to servicing the national debt, a far greater proportion than in most of
20our Asian neighbors. Debt servicing has become the most important single item contributing to the
21government deficit, especially since the government is now borrowing at higher and higher rates of interest
22mainly to repay debt coming due. Servicing the debt has become the top national priority, and this has had
23not only fiscal consequences but also developmental ones. This practice has contributed to the massive
24reduction in public capital expenditures, which has in turn caused a decline in the rate of investment since
25government is the biggest investor in the economy. And this, in turn, has translated into a depressed rate
26of economic growth.
27
28 Without a radical change in our debt management policy along the lines of a debt moratorium or a
29negotiated or unilateral reduction of the government’s debt burden, successfully implementing a new
30economic policy that will launch the Philippines anew on the road to development will not be possible. A
31fundamental change in debt management similar to Argentina’s decision in 2002 to pay only 25 cents to
32every dollar it owed to foreign creditors is the sine qua non of a change in the direction of economic policy.
33The president himself recognizes the need for bold action in this area when he spoke about the need for
34debt repudiation during the electoral campaign.
35
36 In sum, a golden opportunity awaits the administration of President Benigno Aquino III. A break
37with past policy, however, is necessary. The contours of a new strategy that will relaunch the country on an
38ecologically and socially benign developmental path are discernible: an activist state, industrial policy,
1reinvigorating agriculture through a reversal of trade liberalization, domestic market-driven growth made
2possible by more equitable income distribution, environmentally benign production processes in industry
3and agriculture, affirmative action policies for women and indigenous peoples, a mixed property regime,
4state provision of public goods and services, and an aggressive progressive tax regime.
5
6 Instituting such an alternative comprehensive program will take a great deal of courage and
7determination, especially at the beginning. A Chinese proverb says that every journey of a thousand li
8begins with a first step. That first step is to take the bold measures necessary to tackle the biggest problem
9weighing down the country: the foreign debt.
10
11*Walden Bello is the president of the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), a member of the House of
12Representatives representing Akbayan, and senior analyst of Focus on the Global South. For most of the
13ideas expressed here, the author is indebted to Milo Tanchuling, secretary general of the FDC, and James
14Matthew Miraflor, who headed up FDC’s New Economic Policy Project.
15
16
17The article appeared in:
18
19
20Perspective, Business Mirror - July 30, 2010
21
22Viewpoints/Columns, Inquirer.net (under Bello's column Afterthoughts) - July 29, 2010
1 FDC’s SONA 2010 Statement

2 On President Benigno Aquino’s First State of the Nation Address (SONA)
3
4
5PRESS STATEMENT
6Freedom from Debt Coalition
711 Matimpiin St., Pinyahan, Quezon City 1100, Philippines
8Phone: +63.2.921.1985 | Telefax: +63.2.924.6399 | Website: www.fdc.ph
9
10Please refer to:
11Milo Tanchuling, FDC secretary-general, +63.920.901.8711
12
13FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
1425 July 2010
15
16Keeping an eye on Aquino’s commitment to change
17
18The new administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III begins with an extremely high trust rating of 88
19percent – higher than any of the post-dictatorship presidents. This is a measure of people’s belief in the
20commitment of the Aquino administration to reverse the anti-poor policies implemented during the regime
21of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
22
23We in the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) submitted to the President an Agenda outlining demands for
24changes in the debt and public finance policy, the power industry, the water sector, and government’s
25stance on climate negotiations and responses to climate crisis. This is in the context of a looming fiscal crisis
26due to the record-breaking deficit and empty public coffers left by the Arroyo administration, electricity
27prices soaring past major Asian cities save Tokyo, a water crisis that is pushing Filipinos to desperate
28extremes, and a looming La Niña that might bring us another devastating Ondoy.
29
30This, for we believe that the Aquino administration should stop Arroyo’s practice of using band-aid
31solutions to the country’s chronic problems. A business-as-usual approach will only delay the inevitable
32descent of the economy to oblivion, but it will not change its course. Conditional cash transfers to the
33extremely marginalized, or emergency employment, or may sound like valid ambulatory actions, but at
34best, they can only provide breathing space. These measures can never serve as platform in strategically
35resolving the problem of poverty and under-development.
36
37The Aquino administration should not hesitate to be more strategic in its approaches. It is with this belief
38that FDC’s Agenda is part of an alternative National Economic Platform or New Economic Policy (NEP), a
39summary of which we also submitted to Aquino. NEP is a set policy framework statements which outlines a
40vision towards a sustainable and modern Philippine economy to be achieved by 2020. We hope that the
41elements of our NEP would be integrated and used in the drafting of the 2011-2016 Medium-term
42Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP). This, for the MTPDP outlines the strategy and governance
43framework of the Aquino administration for its entire term.
44
1NEP incorporates elements of an alternative paradigm that sharply diverges from the mainstream market
2fundamentalist framework imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the
3International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB):
4
5 1. Instead of merely a “Strong Republic,” NEP centers on the need to establish a “Strong
6 Developmental State” that mobilizes government’s regulatory and procurement powers to
7 discipline the market and direct resources towards national development and social welfare;
8
9 2. Instead of creating “Super-Regions” which has as its prime purpose spurring economic growth in
10 the countryside but ignores equity and environmental issues, NEP pushes for a National Land and
11 Water Use Act taking off from the completion of urban and rural land reform and with a sustainable
12 development perspective;
13
14 3. Instead of capital accounts liberalization championed by IMF, NEP insists on the need for controls
15 on capital flow and management of the domestic capital structure;
16
17 4. Instead of export-oriented industry focused on exports of raw material and low-value services,
18 NEP advocates for an integrated industry focused on developing local economies and servicing the
19 needs of a strengthened domestic market;
20
21 5. Instead of “cheap labor policy”, NEP champions a high-wage, high-income regime in order to build
22 a strong national consumption, savings, and revenue base;
23
24 6. Instead of city-centric development that harms the environment through wastage and pollution,
25 NEP takes it as primary advocacy the prioritization of adaptation needs and low-carbon
26 development;
27
28 7. Instead of delegating “reproductive” tasks to households, NEP champions the provisioning of free
29 public universal healthcare and valuation of unpaid labor by women;
30
31 8. Instead of an import-dependent “food security” approach championed by ADB, NEP recommends
32 a “Food Sovereignty” model which seeks food self-sufficiency not just on the national but up to the
33 community level.
34
35 9. Instead of encouraging private sector participation (PSP) in bulk water supply and local water
36 utilities, NEP explores Public-Public Partnerships (PPP) in small-scale water systems that involves
37 local government units and cooperatives
38
39 10. Instead of a privatized and deregulated industry outlined by the Electric Power Industry Reform
40 Act (EPIRA) of 2001, NEP insists on strong government intervention that facilitates the
41 strengthening of community-based power systems and rural electric cooperatives.
42
43This SONA is merely a start of a challenging six-year rule for the Aquino administration, starting with
44exposing the current national situation after Arroyo. We in FDC hope that the inputs coming from the
45people itself will be heard and sincerely incorporated by the new government. FDC will be watching the
46Aquino administration closely as it wields government power towards its promised reforms. (30)
HA NEP 2020
Executive Summary
I. Economic Governance
1. State
Critique Alternative
1. Weak, Elite-Captured State 1. Activist Developmental State

The current Philippine State, because of its Mobilize state’s regulatory and procurement
weakness, is captured by the interests of a powers for national development and
cynical and opportunistic elite class. This equitable redistribution of ensuing risks and
results to the incapacity of the state to act create conditions for further growth via
objectively for economic development and provision of basic welfare, infrastructure
risk redistribution. Instead, the state becomes improvements, and support for local
the primary conduit for translating private entrepreneurship.
interests of elite class into binding public
1.A. Strong, Sovereign, and
policies.
Developmental Orientation
1.A. Pro-market Economic Management,
1.B. Caring Mandate
Limited Government Role in
Development and Welfare 1.C. Assets Reform towards a
Democratized and Equitable
1.B. Malfunctioning Regulation
Ownership Structure
1.C. Unmitigated widening of Income and
1.D. Good Governance
Asset Distribution Gap
1.D. Political Patronage, Rent-Seeking, in
the Public Sector
1.E. Technocracy-dominated, Manila- 1.E. Participatory and Democratic

centric Economic Management Economic Management
II. Macroeconomic Fundamentals towards National Development
2. Land
2. Inequitable Land Ownership 2. Equitable and Strategic Land

and Lack of Social Outlook and and Land-based Assets Use
Strategic Vision on Land Use and Management for
and Management Sustainable Development and
Because our land is under the private
Livability of Communities
property regime, land use is oriented towards Restructure the ownership of land and land-
private profit, not public gain. This promotes based assets and enterprises according to
non-agricultural land use conversion and new ownership instrumentalities and
inhibits land reform, leading to poorly regulatory environments that, in rural areas,
planned and vulnerable societies and encourages agricultural development and
unstable food production. For the land that is aligned with a rational and sustainable
converted to urban areas, there is lack of land and water use plan, and urban areas,
deliberate design leading to increased risk for intelligent urban design and planning.
residences and businesses.
2.A. Restructuring of Ownership of Land
2.A. Land under the Private Property- and Land-based Assets and
Regime Enterprises
2.B. Lack of Rational Planning on Regional 2.B. Sustainable Rural Land Use and
Zoning, Land Use and Management Regional Planning geared to
strengthening agriculture
2.C. Lack of Effective Development
Planning on Urban Land Use and 2.C. Strategic and Intelligent Urban
Management Development Planning
2.D. Development strategy centered on 2.D. Using the Bioregion-approach in

growth-oriented Super-regions Creating and Maintaining
Communities
3. Capital
3. Foreign Capital-dominated 3. Domestic Capital-driven

Open Economy Development
Our economy is rendered open to foreign Accelerate the shift from a foreign capital-led
capital competition, leading to the industry to a domestic-driven one by
destruction of our productivity and inevitably, instituting capital management instruments,
dependence and foreign capital domination. strengthening domestic financial base by
socially re-embedding the central bank and
3.A. Current Accounts (Financial)
monetary policy, and ending the resource gap
Liberalization
problem of public finance by resolving the
3.B. Weak Banking and Financial Sector debt problem.
detached from the Industrial Base
3.A. Strategically-managed Capital
3.C. Foreign-financing Dependence Structure and Flows
3.B. Development-oriented and Socially-
embedded Central Bank, Banking
Sector, and Monetary Policy
3.C. Policies towards Fiscal Freedom
3.D. Lack of capacity and propensity to 3.D. Public Grassroots Savings Program
save in the grassroots
4. Industry and Trade

4. Fragmented Industry designed 4. Integrated, Modernized, and

for Low Value Added Exports Ecologically-sound Industry
Our industries are integrated individually to
focused on developing
foreign markets, not to each other, relegating Sustainable Local Economies
us to low-value added production (i.e. low- and Domestic Markets
end products/services, extracted raw Pursue an industrialization strategy that
materials) and export-dependence. This is synergistically links an integrated domestic
due to the lack of a trade-industrial strategy, industry that scales the entire value chain
neglect of domestic market and local with a strengthened domestic market for
economies, and lack of state support for demand and sustainable local economies for
increasing competitiveness. supply, and one that facilitates technological
4.A. Incoherent Trade-Industrial Policy due leapfrogging and creates uncontested market
to lack of Industrial Strategy spaces.
4.B. Neglect of the Domestic Market 4.A. Strategic, Coherent and Activist Trade
and Industrial Policy
4.C. Weak and Uncompetitive Domestic
Firms 4.B. Tapping the Domestic Market Supply
of Capital and Demand for Goods and
Services
4.C. Facilitating Leapfrogging towards a
Modernized and Sustainable Industry
that is able to create uncontested
market spaces
4.D. Underdeveloped Community 4.D. Empowering Local Enterprises

Industries and Sources of Local through institutional support and
Employment creation of community and national
trade linkages
5. Labor
5. Repressive Labor 5. Empowered Labor Sector

Environment Empower the workers economically and
Society’s creator and determinant of values, politically to ensure that that the sector that
the labor sector, have been relegated to low primarily creates (through production) and
competency and low purchasing power due determines (through consumption) value
to the politically and economically repressive remain to be dynamic, productive, and
cheap labor policy. The lack of regulation, capable. Increase and improve the existing
political agency in the status quo, and labor force by continuous search for tasks
recognition of the large part of the labor that contribute to national development and
sector leads to further repression. continuous training and capacitating new sets
of workers.
5.A. Low-wage, Low-benefits Labor Policy
5.A. Economically-capacitated Workforce
5.B. Lack state protection for workers amid towards a Strong Consumption,
repression of democratic space Savings, Investments, and Tax Base
5.C. Marginalized Informal Employment 5.B. Political Empowerment of the Labor
Sector Sector to prevent Labor Income
Distortion
5.C. Transition Program for the Marginally
Employed
5.D. Widespread Unemployment and 5.D. Employment Program according to

Underemployment in Agrarian the agro-industrial development plan
Communities and Urban Areas
6. Ecology
6. Ecologically destructive 6. Ecologically Sustainable and

Economy vulnerable to Climate-adaptive Economy
Climate Disasters Adoption of an economic program that is
The environment is seen more not as an geared towards a sustainable and
endowment to be conserved, but a resource ecologically-sound development. Ownership
that can and must be inexhaustibly exploited. instruments, and demand-supply circuits
The absorptive capacity and recuperating should operate on the framework of
mechanism of the environment vis-à-vis the conservation, rather than maximum
externalities of our economic activities are utilization, of natural resources. Knowledge
also overestimated, resulting to on biological and ecological systems should
destabilization of ecology and decreased be protected and enhanced, not
livability of communities. commercialized.
6.A. Incoherent, Incomprehensive and 6.A. Pass Comprehensive Environment

Fragmented Environmental Paradigm Code
6.B. Environmentally-destructive Economic 6.B. Rebuilding Terrestrial Carbon Sinks to

Sectors increase GHG Sequestration
6.C. Ecologically-destabilizing Provision of 6.C. Low-emission and Sustainable

Public Services Provision of Essential Services
6.D. Waste-intensive production- 6.D. Demand management in all aspects of

consumption system consumption and production
6.E. Lack of Adaptation Planning for 6.E. Climate Adaptation measures to

Climate Disasters ameliorate socio-economic effects of
extreme weather events
6.F. Economic development biased against 6.F. Protecting Ecologically Sustainable

indigenous communities and Practices of Indigenous Communities
environmental preservation
III. Essential Services towards Full Social and Human Development
7. Reproductive Economy
7. Unrecognized and Neglected 7. Strong Social Support and

Reproductive and Care Safety Net System for
Economy Households and the
The household is only seen as a consumer of
Reproductive Economy
goods and public services rather than a Establish components of strong social welfare
producer of valuable inputs and resources. and social security, take back privatized public
Thus, with women being the primary goods and essential services, and transfer
dispenser of domestic work, women’s components of unpaid care economy to the
contribution to the economy is largely in this community domain in order to relieve
hidden area of production that includes care households and women of undue burden.
work, voluntary or civil society activity,
subsistence production and work in the 7.A. Social Compensation System for all
informal sector. Citizens, Valuation of Unpaid
Reproductive Labor
7.A. Non-compensation of Non-market or
Domestic Labor 7.B. State Reclamation of Public Goods
and Essential Services externalized to
7.B. Externalization of Public Good Costs to Households
Families through Commodification
7.C. Effective implementation of an
7.C. Absence of an institutional institutional reproductive healthcare
reproductive healthcare program program.
7.D. Unfair distribution of work among 7.D. Integrating components of the

genders in households Household and Care Economy into the
Public and Community Domain
8. Food
8. Crops and Fishes for the 8. Food Sovereignty

Global Supermarket Shift from an export-oriented Food Security
The focus of our crop production is the global model to Food Sovereignty approach.
market, not domestic need, thus causing Production-consumption circuits must be as
hunger and environmental destruction. close to the community as possible.
Agricultural activities are also not in line with Agriculture must be based on principles of
sustainability principles, particularly because inclusive decision-making, participatory
it interferes with the profit motive of central planning, sound demand-
corporate and industrial agriculture. management, cultural integrity, and
environmental stewardship, in consideration
8.A. Corporate-driven Agriculture and Food of a national economic plan for land use,
consumption agriculture, and food.
8.B. Stagnating Agricultural Sector due to 8.A. Recognition and Realization of Food
low social priority, lack of government Producer and Consumer Rights
support
8.B. Government-led, Community-
8.C. Ecologically-unsound Agricultural and facilitated Food Self-Sufficiency and
Food Production System Agricultural Modernization Program
8.D. Conflict-ridden and Contested 8.C. Supporting and Practicing Sustainable
Agricultural Lands and Ecologically-friendly Agriculture
8.D. Increasing Livability and Democracy in
Communities
8.E. Liberalized and Deregulated, Food 8.E. Reorganizing Food Trade based on
Security-based National Food System citizen’s need and not corporate
dictates
9. Water
9. Grossly Neglected, 9. Active State Participation

Fragmented, and Ill-Governed Towards an Integrated,
Water Sector Sustainable, and Humane
National policies on water were introduced
Management and
on piecemeal basis as a response to peculiar Development of the Water
challenges of the times. This resulted in Sector
numerous government authorities being Water is essential to life. While water is a
mandated to deal with various aspects of finite resource and surely has an economic
water management, regulation and value, the human right to water must be
development. The complex web of water- made the cornerstone of a national water
related institutions, coupled with an policy. The human right to water calls for
economic policy of privatization, created a prioritization of the right of the people to a
fragmented water sector that is both continued supply of clean, safe, adequate and
unresponsive to the needs of the people and affordable water. This necessarily involves a
not cognizant of their human right to water. comprehensive, holistic and integrated
The resultant effect: water resource approach to water resources protection,
mismanagement, water quality crisis, and management and development. It also entails
seasonal water quantity crisis. the effective supervision, regulation and
9.A. Treatment of water as primarily an control of water provision service.
economic good 9.A. State recognition and full
9.B. Non-commitment to actual protection, implementation of the human right to
management and development water water
resources 9.B. Effective regulation of water
9.C. Numerous yet ineffective and resources towards security in water
uncoordinated water authorities supply and quality
resulting in a weak institutional 9.C. Rationalization and integration of
framework water-related institutions within a
participatory framework
9.D. Increasing privatization of water 9.D. Public-Public Partnerships in small-

provision service focused on bulk scale water systems to ensure equity
water supply and responsiveness
10. Power
10. Abandoned Power Sector and 10. Strong State Participation

Industry towards a Rational and
As mandated by the Electric Power Industry
Participatory Power System
Reform Act (EPIRA), the energy sector is The backbone of economic development has
thoroughly abandoned to the private sector, always been the energy sector – as such, its
with generation and transmission firms development as a sector is indispensable to
privatized, the industry liberalized and economic and social success. Since much of
opened up to foreign competition, and pricing the power industry can be classified as
deregulated. Demand-management is also natural monopolies, the state should
lacking. intervene so as to remove inefficiencies and
corruption, mitigate market failures, ensure
10.A. Privatized and Private Sector-driven
accessible and inexpensive energy to
Power Industry
households and businesses, manage
10.B. Liberalized Ownership and electricity demand, and facilitate citizen’s
Investments in the Energy Sector participation in energy supply and demand
planning.
10.C. Politically-compromised, Incompetent,
and Socioeconomically-detached 10.A. Regaining strong state presence in the
Regulation power industry
10.B. Regulation and Redesigning an
Appropriate, Efficient, and
Sustainable Power System that
incorporates “intelligent”
technologies
10.C. Competent, Independent, and Multi-
sector Regulatory Bodies Re-
embedded to Socioeconomic and
Development Goals
10.D. Undemocratic and private sector- 10.D. Facilitation of community modes of

centric/ -dependent power sector in power utilities ownership,
the LGUs Participatory planning and Demand-
side management
IV. The Local Economic Alternative Program (LEAP)

Community Democratization towards Local Development and Empowerment
1. Technocracy-dominated, Manila-centric 1. Participatory and Democratic Economic

Economic Management [from 1.E] Management [from 1.E]
2. Development strategy centered on 2. Using the Bioregion-approach in Creating

specialized Super-regions [from 2.D] and Maintaining Communities [from 2.D]
3. Lack of capacity and propensity to save in 3. Public Grassroots Savings Program [from
the grassroots [from 3.D] 3.D]
4. Underdeveloped Community Industries 4. Empowering Local Enterprises through

and Sources of Local Employment [from institutional support and creation of
4.D] community and national trade linkages
[from 4.D]
5. Widespread Unemployment and 5. Employment Program according to the

Underemployment in Agrarian agro-industrial development plan [from
Communities and Urban Areas [from 5.D] 5.D]
6. Economic development biased against 6. Protecting Ecologically Sustainable

indigenous communities and Practices of Indigenous Communities
environmental preservation [from 6.F] [from 6.F]
7. Unfair distribution of work among 7. Integrating components of the Household

genders in households [from 7.D] and Care Economy into the Public and
Community Domain [from 7.D]
8. Liberalized and Deregulated, Food 8. Reorganizing Food Trade based on

Security-based National Food System citizen’s need and not corporate dictates
[from 8.E] [from 8.E]
9. Increasing privatization of water provision 9. Public-Public Partnerships in small-scale

service focused on bulk water supply water systems to ensure equity and
[from 9.D] responsiveness [from 9.D]
10.Undemocratic and private sector-centric/ 10.Facilitation of community modes of

-dependent power sector in the LGUs power utilities ownership, Participatory
[from 10.D] planning and Demand-side management
[from 10.D]
Chapter 1:
New School Economics

A Comprehensive Alternative Economic Policy
For the Philippines
HA NEP 2020
1 Towards Modernity and Prosperity. Next Stop: Philippines 2020.

2The neoliberal paradigm, as we know, relegated the country to the backwaters of the global
3economy, while throwing millions of Filipinos to poverty and misery for several decades. Now, we
4begin to explore the alternatives to neoliberal model – pillars of a new, cutting-edge, radical
5economic paradigm that will bring the Philippines to modernity and prosperity.
6The speed with which our neighbors have leapfrogged from poverty to development is proof that
7progress, while it will entail difficulties and sacrifices, is not necessarily a long and protracted
8process. Thus, the alternative economic paradigm offered is one that promises in less than a
9generation to lay the foundation of a different economy – an economy that is by 2020 already
10facilitates the transition towards a sustainable, gender-equitable, poverty-free, and modernized
11Filipino society.
12At this point, the Philippines having been exposed to the failure and bankruptcy of the succession
13of the old development models employed by its leaders, a new vision is in order – a vision that is
14inspirational and unifying in form and revolutionary in substance, a vision that can capture the
15imagination of the mainstream economic community and propel it towards fulfilling a
16transformative project to achieve a modern and prosperous Philippines.
17It is on this context that we use HANEP! as the main name for our campaign on a new economic
18platform. In Filipino slang, “Hanep!” is an expression that shows amazement, equivalent to the
19English expression “Wow!”. We intend that the alternative economy this paper puts forward
20evoke the same emotion – an emotion of hope that the Philippines can zoom forward towards an
21amazing and impressive economic and human development.
22While the alternative may not necessarily follow the development path and model of Northern
23industrialized nations and/or their current features, it provides a vision of a future society that is
24sustainable, gender-responsive, and socially just, and at the same time technologically-developed,
25efficient, and productive.
26Clearly, it is time that our economy graduate from “high school” – the old-school laissez-faire
27economy that threw us to poverty and low-development path to an economy of the future. It’s
28time to go one step further and commence our path towards a better way of development.
11. Activist Developmental State

2
3Alternative to: Weak, Elite- Captured State
4
5Mobilize state’s regulatory and procurement powers for national development and
6equitable redistribution of ensuing risks and create conditions for further growth via
7provision of basic welfare, infrastructure improvements, and support for local
8entrepreneurship.
9
10
111.A. Strong, Sovereign, and Developmental Orientation
12
13The state must have a large role in the management of the markets, and must determine the
14boundaries of market competition. It must facilitate conversion of privatized essential services into
15public modes of ownership, and facilitate the nationalization of strategic raw-material industries.
16For this purpose, the state should endeavor to capacitate and make more efficient the corporate
17government sector so it can engage in these endeavors.
18
19 1.A.1. Developmentalist, Strategic, Sovereign, and Sustainable Economic Planning
20 1.A.2. State Ownership of Vital Services and Resources and State Management of Strategic
21 Industries and Assets and Natural Monopolies
22 1.A.3. Competitive, Productive and Socially Necessary State Operated Enterprises (SOE)
23 engaged in Public Goods Provision, Industrial Pace-setting, and Global Competition
24
251.B. Caring Mandate
26
27The state must use its regulatory powers to protect its citizens and ensure economic security for
28all, necessitating large government role in risk redistribution and welfare.
29
30 1.B.1. Large government role in providing welfare, including essential services, healthcare
31 [see 7.B], and unemployment subsidy [see 5.D.1]
32 1.B.2. Rights-based Governance that is gender-responsive, culturally-sensitive and
33 respective of right to self-determination
34 1.B.3. Regulation of economic activity with huge negative externalities (e.g. pollution)
35 1.B.4. Regulation of pricing in prime commodities or services markets which lack
36 competitive pricing (e.g. oil, electricity)
37
381.C. Assets Reform towards a Democratized and Equitable Ownership Structure
39
40The state must democratize the economy by ensuring that the citizens equitably own, manage,
41and benefit from domestic resources, and that citizens are themselves involved in economic
42governance not as mere clientele of the government but also as stakeholders and implementers.
1Assets reform and redistribution must be completed, and ownership instruments must be revised,
2in order to ensure the most equitable and optimal distribution and management of resources.
3
4 1.C.1. Facilitating transition to Public modes of Equitable Ownership and Management of
5 Essential Services and major sources of grassroots employment
6 1.C.2. State-implemented Urban and Rural Land Reform, Land-based Assets Reform [see
7 Error: Reference source not found]
8 1.C.3. Reformed Taxation on Idle Assets and Inheritance, Discouraging Unproductive
9 Economic Activities through Taxation
10 1.C.4. Redistributive and Progressive Fiscal and Monetary Policy
11
121.D. Good Governance
13
14For the government to be effective in carrying out its mandate, it should be professional, governed
15by rules, and composed of civil servants that are competent and decent. The government must
16also possess the means of propagating its values via an education system that is geared towards
17economic patriotism and a subsidized independent media apparatus.
18
19 1.D.1. Strong and Coherent Democratic Institutions under the rule of law
20 1.D.2. Competent Civil Service and Independent Bureaucracy
21 1.D.3. Public Education System geared towards national development and economic
22 patriotism
23 1.D.4. State-subsidized media that is disembodied from the state apparatus and the market
24
251.E. Participatory and Democratic Economic Management
26
27There should be a reengineering of government’s developmental planning and implementation
28systems towards participatory democracy. The bureaucracy should not be the prime determinant
29of development decisions, but more of an enabler of citizens and conduit of people's consensus.
30
31 1.E.1. Recognition of Citizens as part “Owners” and shareholders of society
32 1.E.2. Participatory Governance Structures accessible to local government and territorial
33 constituencies and sectors
34 1.E.3. Decentralized Economic Governance (vis-à-vis central planning mechanisms) and
35 Participatory Budgeting (ala Porto Alegre)
36 1.E.4. Consensus-based and Culturally-sensitive Community Development Planning
37 1.E.5. Ensuring local and national participatory mechanisms in crafting development
38 strategies
39 1.E.6. Including participatory decision-making in enterprises as a part of the agenda towards
40 political empowerment of workers [see 5.B]
41 1.E.7. Practicing more democratic forms of Collaborative Strategic Goal Oriented
42 Programming (CoSGOP) in long-term infrastructure projects
1 2. Equitable and Strategic Land Ownership and Use for

2 Sustainable Development and Livability of
3 Communities
4
5Alternative to: Inequitable Land Ownership and Lack of Social Outlook and Strategic Vision on Land Use
6and Management
7
8Restructure the ownership of land and land-based assets and enterprises according to
9new ownership instrumentalities and regulatory environments that, in rural areas,
10encourages agricultural development and that is aligned with a rational and sustainable
11land and water use plan, and in urban areas, intelligent urban design and planning.
12
13
141.A. Restructuring of Ownership of Land and Land-based Assets and Enterprises
15Tenure instruments, which should go beyond agrarian reform to include coastal areas owned by
16fisher-folks and uplands managed indigenous communities, should serve the dual purpose of
17equity/social welfare, and agricultural-industrial development. Land reform that encourages land
18stewardship through institutional support must be fully implemented.
19
20 2.A.1. Completion of the long-overdue Land and Assets Reform Project
21  Culturally-Sensitive and Gender-responsive Agrarian Reform i.e. the right to self-
22 determination and the right of women to own land
23  Land ownership rights should be on the form of land stewardship with government
24 support.
25  Creation of Land Tenural Instruments for Indigenous People, Fisherfolks and Peri-
26 urban communities
27  Urban Land Reform in order to resolve settlement problems in the cities
28 2.A.2. Public ownership and management modes of Agricultural Enterprises
29  Similar to China’s Township and Village Enterprises (TVE)
30
31
321.B. Sustainable Rural Land Use and Regional Planning geared to Strengthening
33 Agriculture All
34aspects of rural land ownership, use and conversion, and investment must be aligned with the
35goals of a National Land Use Plan. This entails stringent regulation on the land market and land
36converting industries such as extractive industries. The state will actively promote agriculture in
37land use and regional planning.
38
39 2.A.3. Enact a National Land and Water Use Plan
40  Equitable, just, culturally-sensitive
1  In line an environmentally sustainable national development strategy,

2 environmental mapping, and renewable energy sources mapping
3 2.A.4. More stringent Land Market Regulation that is based on the Land Use Plan and more
4 stringent regulation on all extractive industries (e.g. mining, quarrying)
5  Pricing regulation on land and land-based assets
6 2.A.5. Encouraging agriculture as primary economic activity in rural areas in order to make
7 full use of the land’s potential and siphon unemployment in accordance to a public
8 employment program [see 5.D]
9  Institutional support and massive agricultural subsidies, especially those focused on
10 calibrated modernization
11
12
132.B. Strategic and Intelligent Urban Development Planning
14
15Apply the Principles of Intelligent Urbanism (PIU) as a framework in reengineering key services and
16commercial hubs like Metro Manila, Metro Cebu, Metro Davao, and Subic-Clark. This means
17engineering cities with the following considerations: balance with ecology, balance with cultural
18tradition, the use of appropriate technology, ensuring conviviality, social interaction, and human-
19scale design, efficiency, opportunity, ease in regional integration, balanced movement, and
20institutional integrity.
21
22 2.B.1. Ensure safe, healthy, and economical human settlements for all city residents which
23 the residents will gradually own and maintain, and that which is proximate to
24 workplaces, schools, and places for social functions
25 2.B.2. Decongest megacities like Metro Manila by facilitating development in the rural areas
26 and in other cities and regulating in-migration
27 2.B.3. Integrate demand management and efficient technologies in provision of essential
28 services like water and power in cities
29 2.B.4. Implement a Long-term Strategic Framework for the Transportation Industry
30  Streamlining and regulation of the road-based transportation industry in order to
31 manage petroleum consumption
32  Ensuring of a Modernized and Efficient Centralized Intra-urban and Rural-to-Urban
33 Mass Transit Systems
34 2.B.5. Implement climate-adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) plans [see 6.D]
35
36
372.C. Using the Bioregion-approach in Creating and Maintaining Communities
38
39Communities must be redesigned so as to re-embed human activity into region-scale ecosystems,
40according to the principles of sustainable development.
41
1 2.C.1. Reorganization of political boundaries in order to match them with ecological

2 boundaries, create “bio-districts” and assure rational stewardship of ecological and
3 biological resources
4  Tap “watershed districts” that highlight the unique ecology of bioregions.
5  Design local economies that encourage consumption of local foods and use of local
6 materials where possible.
7  Encourage the cultivation of native plants of the region.
8 2.C.2. Replicate sustainable system practices, e.g. Maximo T. Kalaw’s Institute for
9 Sustainable Development’s Ecosystem-based Community-centered Sustainable
10 Development Organization and Management (ECSOM) approach
13. Domestic Capital-driven Development

2
3Alternative to: Foreign Capital-dominated Open Economy
4
5Accelerate the shift from a foreign capital-led industry to a domestic-driven one by
6instituting capital management instruments, s domestic financial base by socially re-
7embedding the central bank and monetary policy, and ending the resource gap problem
8of public finance by resolving the debt problem.
9
10
113.A. Strategically-managed Capital Structure and Flows
12
13Private investments and its instrumentalities must be strongly regulated and coordinated for
14desired developmental objectives – specifically, the strengthening rather than the weakening, of
15domestic industry, agriculture, and capital base.
16
17 3.A.1. Setting up an effective Capital Flows Management System
18  Graduated, Transparent, and Vulnerability-activated system
19  Discouraging Foreign Loans as source of Finance and Portfolio Investments (PI)
20 Regulation
21 3.A.2. Tying up Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) Planning with an Agricultural and Industrial
22 Development Plan that facilitates long-term advantages
23  Similar to Singapore’s Local Industries Upgrading Program that encourage MNCs to
24 source from domestic firms
25 3.A.3. Regulation of importation of consumer goods, with saved foreign currency channeled
26 to import capital goods for industry [see 4.B.1]
27
28
293.B. Development-oriented and Socially-embedded Central Bank, Banking Sector, and
30 Monetary Policy
31
32Central bank and monetary policy must be shifted from mere inflation-targeting to one that links
33the domestic financial sector with the agriculture and industries. Capital investments should be
34seen as instruments for job creation.
35
36 3.B.1. Shift Philippine Central Bank and Monetary Policy to promote Agricultural and
37 Industrial Development and to create a Industrially-oriented Financial Sector
38  Shift away from Inflation-targeting as Central Bank Objective
39  Capitalization must be biased to labor-intensive and labor-enhancing industries.
40 3.B.2. Implementing foreign currency exchange regulation in order to maximize benefits of
41 the inflow of foreign exchange from OFWs
42  Similar to Malaysia and China’s crawling peg to a basket of currencies
1 3.B.3. Creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to manage the foreign exchange sterilized
2 by the central bank and direct foreign exchange to growth areas
3  Singapore’s Temasek can serve as a good model of an SWF
4 3.B.4. Central bank must facilitate the formation of dedicated linkages between financial
5 institutions and agriculture and industrial clusters [the formation of which is according to
6 an industrial plan discussed in 4.A.1]
7  Similar to Japan’s post-WWII keiretsu policy of having a bank or a chain of banks
8 support vertically and horizontally integrated firms
9 3.B.5. Create financial instruments that is accessible and profitable for the labor sector
10 [empowered by 5.A.1] and households [capacitated by 7.A.1]
11  Should ensure gender-responsive provision of credit, which means income
12 requirements should be relaxed for those who belong in the unpaid reproductive
13 economic sphere [see 7.A.2]
14
15
163.C. Policies towards Fiscal Freedom
17
18The government must finally free public finance from constraints and fiscal hemorrhage by
19strategically resolving the debt and debt service problem, and by accelerating the shift to a
20treasury policy that is biased on domestic savings rather than the global credit market.
21
22 3.C.1. Accelerate Shift to Peso Borrowings, National Treasury Policy that is biased on
23 Domestic Financing, Savings
24  The treasury can tap the huge dollar reserves managed in a proposed Migrants
25 Bank [see 3.D.4]
26 3.C.2. Establish a Government Expenditure Program that is biased on tapping Domestic
27 Capital
28 3.C.3. Resolution of the Public Sector Debt Problem and the consequent Resource-Gap by
29 conducting a comprehensive audit of foreign debts and subsequent repudiation of
30 illegitimate ones
31 3.C.4. Adopt for the purposes of evaluating existing and future loans, and register
32 international support for, the sovereign, democratic and responsible (SDR) financing
33 framework
34
35
363.D. Public Grassroots Savings Program
37
38Savings provide the vehicle with which 1) the consumers can access goods and services they
39cannot afford due to lack of purchasing power [see 5.A], and 2) domestic firms can gain capital by
40borrowing from banks [see 4.B.2]. Thus, the state should be able to mobilize grassroots capital
41towards developmental needs by providing the avenue for savings.
42
43 3.D.1. Set up a Progressive Tax Regime that encourages Savings
1 3.D.2. Strengthening the Postal Savings Bank (PSB) to encourage savings among the workers
2  Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) for wages [5.A.1] or unemployment subsidy [5.D.2,
3 second bullet] can instead be deposited in a PSB rather than handed out
4 3.D.3. Bring back the Small Investors Program (SIP) initiated by Former National Treasurer
5 and FDC President Leonor Briones
6 3.D.4. Provide migrant workers a savings venue by creating a Migrants Workers Bank
7 managed by their families in a cooperative modality.
8 3.D.5. Encourage self-organized savings and loans cooperatives
1 4. Integrated, Modernized, and Ecologically-sound

2 Industry focused on developing Sustainable Local
3 Economies and Domestic Markets
4
5Alternative to: Fragmented Industry designed for Low Value Added Exports
6
7Pursue an industrialization strategy that synergistically links an integrated domestic
8industry that scales the entire value chain with a strengthened domestic market for
9demand and sustainable local economies for supply, and one that facilitates
10technological leapfrogging and creates uncontested market spaces.
11
12
134.A. Strategic, Coherent and Activist Trade and Industrial Policy
14
15The government must establish an industrial development blueprint that vertically integrates
16industries engaged in raw material extraction with those engaged in the production of finished
17consumer goods in order to scale the entire value chain, that horizontally integrates firms into
18strong industrial clusters, and that pragmatically maximizes trade opportunities. This is vis-à-vis a
19trade policy that serves as an instrument to promote more markets, strengthen national
20industries, and create more jobs and welfare.
21
22 4.A.1. State-implemented Selective Industrial Policy and Strategic Development Vision
23  Overall strategic development vision, in consideration of what the nation has
24 (supply/resources), and what the people need (demand/market)
25  Labor restructuring and support plan for phase-out industries (retooling, re-skilling,
26 adequate compensation)
27  Facilitate industrial evolution from Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) to
28 Original Design Manufacturing (ODM) to Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM)
29 4.A.2. State-driven Vertical and Horizontal Integration of Industries via SOEs or supported
30 Industry Players
31  Scaling the entire value chain
32  Assisted by a “Keiretsu” policy in capital financing [see 3.B.4]
33 4.A.3. Trade as Industrialization Instrument. Protection for Industrialization, Selective
34 Liberalization towards Modernization
35  Protective trade barriers
36  Selective liberalization of industries controlled by rent-seeking and incompetent
37 entrepreneurs (excluding essential services and strategic resources/industries)
38
14.B. Tapping the Domestic Market Supply of Capital and Demand for Goods and
2 Services
3
4With a capacitated domestic market in a high-wage labor regime [see 5.A.1], industry must begin
5to tap into 1) the burgeoning capital base due to increased workers savings and increased capacity
6to invest by workers, 2) the growing consumption by workers themselves
7
8 4.B.1. Tapping the Domestic Market for commodities by state support on industries which
9 cater to local demand
10 4.B.2. Facilitate the utilization of domestic assets base (grassroots savings and investments)
11 [see 3.D.5] as primary investments and capital for local firms
12 4.B.3. Instill a sense of industrial values of public- and, ecology-centeredness and rejecting
13 profit-centeredness, with firms willing to internalize cost
14
15
164.C. Facilitating Leapfrogging towards a Modernized and Sustainable Industry that is
17 able to create uncontested market spaces
18
19As traditional smokestack industrialization strategy may be inadequate in an era of stiff global
20competition, climate crises, and declining hydrocarbon supply, the government must resort to a
21flanking strategy that facilitates technological leapfrogging and creates uncontested market
22spaces, or “blue oceans”, in the global economy.
23
24 4.C.1. State-facilitated Knowledge Management (KM) systems and accelerated technological
25 transfers to boost Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
26  State-supported Research and Development (R&D)
27  Knowledge-transfer Conditions for Liberalized Industries [see 3.A.2]
28  Strong public technical and scientific education system for knowledge reproduction
29 4.C.2. Relaxing recognition of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) for foreign technology, but
30 ensuring maximum protection for domestic innovators
31 4.C.3. Increase competitiveness by setting up clear but realistic performance targets for
32 supported industries and even SOEs and the accompanying incentives system.
33 4.C.4. Establishment and maintenance of cost-effective value engineering procedures and
34 processes in SOEs engaged in industry
35 4.C.5. Creation of a niche export industries, composed of globally-competitive homegrown
36 firms, that will also serve domestic need
37  “Blue ocean” strategy – making competition irrelevant by creating uncontested
38 market spaces
39  Specialize in the Renewable Energy (RE) technology industry and eco-industries as
40 comparative advantage.
41  Focus on light-manufacturing and consumer goods manufacturing, industrial rather
42 than agricultural exports
43
1
24.D. Empowering Local Enterprises through institutional support and creation of
3 community and national trade linkages
4
5Strengthen capacity of local economies to produce industrial inputs while connecting them to the
6community market and the national industrial champions. Ensure that the educational system is
7geared for the purpose of modernizing local enterprises.
8
9 4.D.1. Investing on the development of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) by
10 providing institutional support
11  Research and development subsidies [see 4.C.1] for small agricultural enterprises
12  Support in obtaining resource and capital inputs (e.g. fertilizers, equipments)
13  Connecting grassroots savings bank [see 3.D.5] to local enterprises
14 4.D.2. Facilitate direct trade between the community market and the local enterprises
15  Dismantling big-time traders through creation of grassroots markets
16  Government-facilitated “Fair Trade” mechanisms in the rural areas
17 4.D.3. Link up local, social cooperative enterprises, and MSMEs which focus on tapping
18 community resources and labor, to national industrial champions
19  Integrate domestic MSMEs – which are more labor-intensive than large firms – to
20 growth areas (South Korea)
21  Engage domestic MSMEs for support production services (Japan)
22  Establish strong linkage between the agricultural sector and labor-intensive
23 industries, for example, in food production (India)
24 4.D.4. Strengthening Regional Return-of-Service Programs for Public Higher Education
25 Institutions (HEIs) (includes SUCs and LUCs)
1 5. Empowered Labor Sector

2
3 Alternative to: Repressive Labor Environment
4
5Empower the workers economically and politically to ensure that that the sector that
6primarily creates (through production) and determines (through consumption) value
7remain to be dynamic, productive, and capable. Increase and improve the existing labor
8force by continuous search for tasks that contribute to national development and
9continuous training and capacitating new sets of workers.
10
11
125.A. Economically-capacitated Workforce towards a Strong Consumption, Savings,
13 Investments, and Tax Base
14
15The government must facilitate the creation of a strong domestic market and savings base by
16ensuring that workers are paid well, free to spend on non-basic commodities, and save for their
17future. Public goods for human development should thus be provided.
18
19 5.A.1. High wage Labor Regime to induce demand and increase marginal labor productivity
20  High Wage (beyond the “living wage”), Benefits and Wage Extenders, and Social
21 Security [see 7.A.1]
22  Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) for MSME workers to fill the gap between actual
23 wage and living wage
24  Ending the contractualization and flexi-work schemes
25
26
275.B. Political Empowerment of the Labor Sector to prevent Labor Income Distortion
28
29The cheap labor policy of the government is further enforced by high demand for work,
30particularly because of the relatively high unemployment rate in the Philippines. This incentivizes
31corporate impunity on violating a high-wage labor policy regime [see 5.A.1]. In order to prevent
32this, side by side with the policy to mandate increase in income must be a program towards the
33political empowerment of the labor sector.
34
35 5.B.1. Enact a progressive labor code and standard that provides for:
36  Meaningful Representation and Participation in Government [see 1.E.2] and
37 Management [see 1.E.6]
38  Proactive State protection of Labor Rights and Regulation of Corporate Activity
39 5.B.2. Instituting state-enforced mechanisms for Workplace Democracy
40 5.B.3. Strengthening corporate democracy via mandated regular transfer of shares to
41 qualified employees, on top of wage and wage extenders
42  Building and democratizing capital base [see 3.B.5]
1
2
35.C. Transition Program for the Marginally Employed
4
5Facilitate the transition of the informally employed sector via provision of universal social
6protection, reconstituting them as local cooperative enterprises, and supporting the transition of
7MSMEs to reach core labor standards.
8
9 5.C.1. Tracking down labor abuse in the informal labor sector, facilitating transition of
10 MSMEs to reach international core labor standards through government support
11 5.C.2. Formalization of informally-employed workers and granting them universal social
12 protection and insurance
13 5.C.3. Increasing available institutional, financial, and educational support to create
14 cooperative-mode MSMEs amongst informal workers
15
16
175.D. Employment Program according to the agro-industrial development plan
18
19The country’s huge population has at least one advantage – a huge potential supply of labor force.
20The government must intervene in order to tap this labor force, directly create employment or
21facilitate the creation and growth of labor-intensive industries, and reduce the burden of the
22existing labor force. However, employment policy should not just be for job creation, but should
23serve national development ends.
24
25 5.D.1. Public Employment Program towards Maximum Local-level Employment
26  Small-scale, Labor-based, equipment supported (LBES) Public Employment Program
27 according to a social-needs analysis and to boost infrastructure projects in the
28 communities
29  For rural areas, implement a National Rural Employment Guarantee Program
30 (similar to India’s MGNREGA) with unemployment subsidy
31 5.D.2. Spurring job-creation through facilitating the growth of labor-intensive agricultural
32 industries in the rural areas
1 6. Ecologically Sustainable and Climate-adaptive

2 Economy
3
4Alternative to: Externalities-intensive and Ecologically Destructive Production and Reproduction.
5
6Adopt an economic program that is geared towards a sustainable and ecologically-sound
7development. Ownership instruments and demand-supply circuits should operate on the
8framework of conservation, rather than maximum utilization, of natural resources.
9Knowledge on biological and ecological systems should be protected and enhanced, not
10commercialized.
11
12
136.A. Pass Comprehensive Environment Code
14
15The government needs a coherent and comprehensive environmental legislation so that it can
16substantively responds to the climate crisis and it can effectively link its development model to
17environmental considerations. Such legislation should set principles and guidelines for
18implementing sectoral laws together, and for rationally and consistently determination of how
19laws might be jointly applied.
20
21 6.A.1. Rationalization of Mixed Resource Uses: (e.g., determination of “Best Resource Uses”
22 in areas of multiple and exclusionary land uses; need for comparative valuation system)
23 6.A.2. Principle of universal accountability: (e.g., of multi-sector bodies, investors and the
24 government)
25 6.A.3. Principle of equity among stakeholders of different and mutually exclusionary
26 resource users (e.g. cross-subsidies among competing resource users)
27 6.A.4. Rationalization of Conflict Resolution among competing & mutually exclusionary
28 resource users especially in complex resource regimes like uplands, foreshores, coastal
29 waters, watersheds, lakes
30 6.A.5. Standardization of good environmental governance by NGAs, LGUs, regulated
31 industries, SMEs
32
33
346.B. Rebuilding Terrestrial Carbon Sinks to increase GHG Sequestration
35
36While the Philippines reserve for itself development space which it needs to industrialize, climate
37change requires the need for mitigation measures around the world. The government, through
38financing and support secured from reparations from developed countries, must embark on
39rebuilding our carbon sinks through reforestation in order to better sequester Greenhouse Gases
40(GHG).
41
42 6.B.1. Forest restoration through total log ban
1 6.B.2. Selective and partial moratorium and/or extractive and forest-destructive industries
2 such as mining and quarrying
3 6.B.3. Delineation of lands (coherent with a land use plan [see 2.A.3])
4
5
66.C. Low-emission and Sustainable Provision of Essential Services
7
8The provisioning essential services should be regulated and managed by the state as these are the
9services which should be the most massively produced and provisioned by society for itself, and
10thus potentially the most ecologically destabilizing and unsustainable among the socio-economic
11activities. Low-emission and sustainability standards should be incorporated in the management of
12these essential services as our contribution to global emissions reduction effort.
13
14 6.C.1. Reversal of privatization in essential services, and regulation of further private sector
15 initiatives such as those in the form of Build-Operate-Transfers (BOT) and Joint Venture
16 Agreements (JVA)
17 6.C.2. Democratize power generation sector that can provide us with an affordable, clean,
18 sustainable and renewable energy.
19  Minimum-emissions, which means the conversion of existing coal and diesel-fired
20 power plants to renewable energy plants such as geothermal and hydropower
21  Moratorium in indigenous coal-for-power mining
22 6.C.3. Decentralized and scattered small-scale water sources development
23  Micro-dam system incorporating efficient rainwater catchment technology
24 6.C.4. Reducing food transportation costs by closing production-consumption circuits [see
25 8.E.1]
26
27
286.D. Climate Adaptation measures to ameliorate socio-economic effects of extreme
29 weather events
30
31Global warming is leading to extreme weather patterns which our current economic design (or lack
32thereof) is unprepared for. The state should thus facilitate the reengineering of the economy
33through integrating elements of climate adaptation in order to prevent loss of lives and properties
34associated with climate disasters.
35
36 6.D.1. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) should be integrated in local development planning and
37 national economic strategy
38 6.D.2. Economic strategy should assume the existence of climate disasters and should be
39 able to minimize dangers and maximize opportunities they bring – creating industries
40 along the way
41  Agriculture sector should assume extreme weather conditions of longer droughts
42 and heavier rains
1  Services sector must cater to climate disaster demands, especially on emergency

2 healthcare and grassroots telecommunications
3  Manufacturing should be able to produce goods needed by communities for
4 preparation and survival
5
6
76.E. Demand management in all aspects of consumption and production
8
9Citizens and firms must now take responsibility for and limit what they consume and produce,
10understanding that current modern life is intrinsically ecologically destabilizing. Thus, demand
11management must be put in all aspects of modern life.
12
13 6.E.1. Implementing Multi-sector Participatory Water and Energy Planning and Conservation
14 6.E.2. Regulation of importation of Petroleum and other high-emission products
15 6.E.3. Regulation of foodstuffs bought by Transnational and Multinational Corporations
16 engaged in food services
17 6.E.4. Regulation of the importation, production, and use of polymer and other plastic
18 products in consumer goods packaging
19
20
216.F. Protecting Ecologically Sustainable Practices of Indigenous Communities
22
23Local governments should empower members of indigenous communities to practice, replicate,
24and propagate use of sustainable technology and lifestyle. The state should protect this
25technology from being commercially utilized for profit by transnational and multinational
26corporations.
27
28 6.F.1. Protecting indigenous groups and supporting/replicating their practices and
29 technology in preserving the environment
30 6.F.2. Facilitating not just technology transfer, but also financial support for further
31 developing and replicating eco-friendly indigenous climate adaptive techniques
32  R&D on ethno-ecological refuge and indigenous settlements
33  Learning from sustainable community models of IPs
34 6.F.3. Exclusion of indigenous knowledge from TRIPS or copyright laws
1 7. Strong Social Support and Safety Net System for

2 Households and the Reproductive Economy
3
4Alternative to: Marginalized and Neglected Non-market Sector
5
6Establish components of strong social welfare and social security, take back privatized
7public goods and essential services, and transfer components of unpaid care economy to
8the community domain in order to relieve households and women of undue burden.
9
10
117.A. Social Compensation System for all Citizens, Valuation of Unpaid Reproductive
12 Labor
13
14The state must recognize the intrinsic contribution of each member of society, even if only for the
15function of consumption, through the provision of a social wage even for the unemployed. This
16has an added benefit of ensuring that women in households, which have no formal market work,
17will have purchasing power – the absence of which perpetuates imbalanced relations in the
18household level.
19
20 7.A.1. Guaranteed minimum income (GMI) system –
21  The government fills up the difference between minimum/actual wage and living
22 wage via Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) mechanisms
23  GMI must be deposited in a strengthened postal savings bank [see 3.D.2] under the
24 beneficiaries name
25  Primarily sources funds from strengthened corporate income tax, progressive
26 consumption, and property taxes
27 7.A.2. Conducting a thorough valuation of and accounting for reproductive work in the
28 assessment of the general economy
29  Gender-disaggregated data is compiled for all economic activity
30  Setting out a “Social Accounting Matrix”
31  Comprehensive review of institutional frameworks and policies related to care
32 services
33
34
357.B. State Reclamation of Public Goods and Essential Services externalized to
36 Households
37
38Essential services externalized to household translate to further exploitation of women, which, in
39traditional societies, have to discharge these services. The government must take back these
40services in order to eliminate this form of exploitation.
41
1 7.B.1. Complete and Free Provision of Public Goods that will result to Net Savings/Income
2 for Households and/or less burden to women
3  Universal Healthcare Insurance Coverage (insures all Filipinos expanded coverage
4 under PhilHealth)
5  Completion of Education for All (EFA) Targets (6% of GNP allocation to education)
6 7.B.2. Subsidized Provision of Essential Services (e.g. Water and Power) for Households via
7 Public Utilities [see 1.A.2, 1.B.1]
8 7.B.3. Socialized housing and settlement programs
9  With climate-adaptive features [see 6.D], and in line with industrial [see 4.B],
10 employment [see 5.D.1], and urban [see 2.B] and rural [see Error: Reference source
11 not found] development plan
12
13
147.C. Effective implementation of an institutional reproductive healthcare program.
15
16Households shall have access to reproductive healthcare and family planning information and
17services. These services should be subsidized and implemented by the government.
18
19 7.C.1. Setting up of reproductive healthcare systems that would provide services such as:
20  Maternal and infant care
21  Family planning reproductive health information dissemination
22 7.C.2. Prevention and treatment of diseases and complications related to reproduction
23 which includes breast cancer, sexually transmitted diseases and birth complications
24
25
267.D. Integrating components of the Household and Care Economy into the Public and
27 Community Domain
28
29Domestic duties like ensuring food and water supply, subsistence farming (rural areas), and other
30household work must be collectively discharged and not relegated to households, where gender-
31exploitation is present. Thus, the state must facilitate the transferring of these components of
32unpaid reproductive labor from domestic to public-economic sphere.
33
34 7.D.1. Setting-up Public and Community Enterprises or LGU-level Services to provide for
35 previously family-level domestic work in a more efficient manner and with economies of
36 scale:
37  Public/Community laundry
38  Community-level Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) services,
39  Public restaurants/eateries
40 7.D.2. Subsistence agricultural work that is usually relegated to households must be
41 converted into collective work by rural communities under a food sovereignty model [see
42 8]
18. Food Sovereignty

2
3Alternative to: Crops and Fishes for Global Market
4
5Shift from an export-oriented Food Security model to Food Sovereignty approach.
6Production-consumption circuits must be as close to the community as possible.
7Agriculture must be based on principles of inclusive decision-making, participatory
8central planning, sound demand-management, cultural integrity, and environmental
9stewardship, in consideration of a national economic plan for land use, agriculture, and
10food.
11
12
138.A. Recognition and Realization of Food Producer and Consumer Rights
14
15The assurance that food production – an essential human endeavor – will not compromise the
16rights of both the producers and the consumers, is the greatest assurance that food will be
17produced at adequate levels.
18
19 8.A.1. Recognizing the Right of Individuals, Communities, Peoples, and Nations to Adequate,
20 Nutritious, and Culturally-appropriate Food, and creating a “national food system” which
21 provides it
22 8.A.2. Realizing the right of farmers to own the land they till via a land reform which has
23 strong land stewardship character, adequate government subsidies
24  Intensive financing for agricultural inputs (e.g. fertilizers, etc.)
25 8.A.3. Production and consumption of food should be guided by the welfare of farmers and
26 consumers, not the needs of transnational agribusiness
27
28
298.B. Government-led, Community-facilitated Food Self-Sufficiency and Agricultural
30 Modernization Program
31
32The government should begin a programme towards food self-sufficiency by raising agricultural
33activity and productivity, attracting labor and capital towards the sector, and facilitating the
34development of agricultural technology. This programme should be facilitated and implemented
35by the rural and urban communities. The long-term objective would be to develop a capital-
36intensive modern but sustainable rural agricultural sector while decreasing urban dependence on
37food trade.
38
39 8.B.1. Heavily investing in Agricultural Research and Development in order to optimize
40 limited agricultural inputs
41  Increase support to Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice)
1 8.B.2. Agricultural modernization through government procurement and distribution (to

2 LGUs) of capital-saving and labor-saving equipments
3 8.B.3. Facilitating urban-to-rural migration by increasing agricultural income
4  Elimination of price distortions by discouraging food trading and facilitating direct
5 trade between farmers and food consumers
6  Focusing at first on labor-intensive processes to
7  Rural Employment Guarantee [see 5.C, 5.D.1] and rural social welfare [see 7]
8 8.B.4. Facilitating urban agriculture/horticulture to stem food shortages in urban
9 communities
10  Possible Models: Organopónicos system of urban organic gardens in Havana, Cuba,
11 Periurban Agriculture Development in China (Modern Agricultural Science
12 Demonstration Park in Xiaotangshan)
13
14
158.C. Supporting and Practicing Sustainable and Ecologically-friendly Agriculture
16
17The state’s support to agricultural development [see 2.A.5, 8.B] must be framed towards the
18facilitation and adoption of agricultural practices that protects the ecological balance, conserves
19natural resources, and ensures the production of safe and nutritious food for the health and
20productivity of its citizens.
21
22 8.C.1. Gearing Rural development support towards the promotion of organic farming
23 8.C.2. Regulating the use of Genetically Modified Organisms and other genetic technology in
24 farming
25
26
278.D. Increasing Livability and Democracy in Communities
28
29With the view that agricultural abundance is impossible if the security and democratic rights
30farmland communities are compromised, the state should ensure peace, order, and participation
31in agricultural areas.
32
33 8.D.1. Social peace and resolution of armed conflicts in peasant lands
34 8.D.2. Prevention of trade agreements-driven land lease which violates the spirit of land
35 reform
36 8.D.3. Provide democratic space for economic decision making in agrarian reform
37 communities (ARCs)
38
39
408.E. Reorganizing Food Trade based on citizen’s need and not corporate dictates
41
1Food trade should serve the purpose of mitigating hunger in society, and not ensuring the profits
2of those which engage in the business of providing food. For this purpose, food trade must be
3reorganized, with sustainability and sovereignty considered.
4
5 8.E.1. Closing Food Production and Consumption Circuits
6  Maximum food self-sufficiency at the local/regional level taking into consideration
7 “rural and productive diversity” in order to reduce carbon footprint [see 6.C.4] of
8 food transportation
9 8.E.2. Ending unregulated international agricultural trade via trade protection instruments,
10 and pulling out of trade agreements such as the WTO AoA (agreement on agriculture)
1 9. Active State Participation towards an Integrated,

2 Sustainable and Humane Management and
3 Development of the Water Sector
4
5Alternative to: Grossly Neglected, Fragmented and Ill-governed Water Sector
6
7Water is essential to life. While water is a finite resource and surely has an economic
8value, the human right to water must be made the cornerstone of a national water
9policy. The human right to water calls for prioritization of the right of the people to a
10continued supply of clean, safe, adequate and affordable water. This necessarily involves
11a comprehensive, holistic and integrated approach to water resources protection,
12management and development. It also entails the effective supervision, regulation and
13control of water provision service.
14
15
169.A. State recognition and full implementation of the human right to water
17
18Considering that water is one of the most basic human necessities for existence and survival, the
19State should ensure that everyone has continued access to clean, safe and affordable water. The
20State should recognize the human right to water to finally clarify the existence of the right in the
21country’s legal system. Legal recognition should be backed up by a strong political will to
22implement the right, which entails public expenditure on water-related infrastructure and
23establishment of a mechanism to enforce the human right to water
24
25 9.A.1. Enactment of a new Water Code that will comprehensively deal with the various
26 aspects of the water sector (i.e., use, conservation, protection, management,
27 development, regulation and control of water resources and water supply services) with
28 a right-based approach
29 9.A.2. Declare as a positive right everyone’s daily access to at least 20 liters of clean and safe
30 water at no cost
31 9.A.3. Make the non-provision of at least 20 liters of clean, safe and free water a quasi-
32 delict on the part of the LGUs, making the latter responsible for compensation
33 9.A.4. Institutionalize the enforceability of the right through the first level courts
34 9.A.5. Assist the LGUs in localizing the full implementation of the human right to water
35
36
379.B. Effective regulation of water resources towards security in water supply and
38 quality
39
40The State should actively protect and manage the water resources in order to secure not only
41dependable and adequate supply of water but, more importantly, clean and safe water. Protection
1and management of the resources will dramatically decrease the cost of water treatment and
2hospitalization due to waterborne diseases, thereby freeing public funds which can be used for
3expansion of water provision service. The State should likewise mainstream water resources
4protection and management in its climate-adaptation plan considering that the water sector
5stands to be one of the most gravely affected by climate change
6
7 9.B.1. Strict implementation of the Clean Water Act of 2004, seeing to it that water polluters
8 are prosecuted and convicted
9 9.B.2. Establishment of a yearly performance target for each water-related institution, with
10 non-performance resulting in automatic removal of the head of office
11 9.B.3. Immediate reforestation to rehabilitate the watersheds
12 9.B.4. Comprehensive review and evaluation of existing water permits, suspending and
13 revoking the permits of those who violate its terms and conditions
14 9.B.5. Apprehension of those who appropriate water without the corresponding water
15 permit
16 9.B.6. Establish a national agency that will provide sewerage services, given that it is very
17 clear that the private sector is not interested in venturing into sewerage business.
18
19
209.C. Rationalization and integration of water-related institutions within a participatory
21 framework
22
23Instead of mandating various agencies to deal with the different aspects of the water sector, the
24State should rather strengthen the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) as the lead agency in
25the formation, integration and implementation of all water-related policies. Water-related
26institutions whose mandates duplicate or conflict with another should be abolished. Water-related
27institutions attached to other agencies should be made directly responsible to the NWRB as well.
28Moreover, stakeholders, especially domestic water users, must be represented in all levels of
29policy and decision-making processes in the water sector
30
31 9.C.1. Further strengthen the mandate of the NWRB as the national agency primarily
32 responsible for the management, development and regulation of the water sector
33  Establish regional, provincial and municipal NWRB offices
34  Other water-related institutions should either be transferred to the NWRB as an
35 attached bureau or, in case of impracticality, at least made directly responsible to
36 NWRB as well
37  Competence and integrity must be the main criteria for the selection of the
38 members of the NWRB
39  Professionalize the NWRB through continuing education, training and capacity-
40 building of NWRB officers and employees
41 9.C.2. Establish clear lines of responsibilities and mechanisms of exacting accountability in
42 the water sector and its sub-sectors
1 9.C.3. Remove the mandate of NAPOCOR and other power generation entities in managing
2 water resources within sites of operation
3 9.C.4. Ensure multi-stakeholder representation in the NWRB and other water-related
4 institutions
5
6
79.D. Public-Public Partnerships in small-scale water systems to ensure equity and
8 responsiveness
9
10The State, with the framework of fulfilling the human right to water, should reverse the policy of
11privatization and instead seek to transfer to local organizations and cooperatives the ownership
12and management of small-scale water services and resources. Where they are not yet capable, the
13State must make itself competent in the efficient operation of water provision with the end view
14of capacitating communities in integrated water resources management.
15
16 9.D.1. Terminate the concessions contract with Maynilad and Manila Water on account of
17 grave and blatant violations of the performance targets spelled out in the agreement and
18 make them judicially liable
19 9.D.2. Review all Public-Private partnership ventures in the water supply sector, terminate
20 partnerships that violate their own terms, and penalize those accountable for non-
21 performance
22 9.D.3. Strong and active regulation of water districts by Local Water Utilities Administration
23 (LWUA), establish water systems in partnership with the LGUs
24 9.D.4. Capacitate communities in protecting water resources from which they source their
25 domestic water
26 9.D.5. Ensure that all stakeholders, especially domestic water users, are represented in the
27 governing bodies of water provision service providers
1 10. Strong State Participation towards a Rational and

2 Participatory Power System
3
4Alternative to: Abandoned Power Sector and Industry
5
6The backbone of economic development has always been the power sector – as such, its
7development as a sector is indispensable to economic and social success. Since much of
8the energy industry can be classified as natural monopolies, the state should intervene so
9as to remove inefficiencies and corruption, mitigate market failures, ensure accessible
10and inexpensive energy to households and businesses, manage electricity demand, and
11facilitate citizen’s participation in energy supply and demand planning.
12
13
1410.A. Regaining strong state presence in the power industry towards reliability of access
15 and sustainability
16
17The state should be a strong player in the energy sector in order to set the pace and direction of
18private sector initiatives [see 1.A.2, 1.A.3]. It should heavily invest in the power sector, especially
19in renewable energy, to ensure reliable and inexpensive access to electricity and sustainability.
20
21 10.A.1. Rebuilding the State Energy Complex to ensure reliable and inexpensive access to
22 power of households and industry
23  Renationalization of key Generation Companies (GENCOs) and power generations
24 assets they control towards a mixed ownership energy regime
25  Reversing the privatization of Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) subsidiaries
26 such as PNOC-Exploration Corporation, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation,
27 Petron, among others; strategic vertical integration, of the domestic Upstream,
28 midstream, and downstream fuel industries
29 10.A.2. Reversal of the TransCo (Transmission Corporation) privatization to ensure an
30 intelligent grid system [see 10.B]
31 10.A.3. Allowing for SOE participation and cross-ownership in multiple power subsectors in
32 order to ensure reliability in electricity supply to households and industries
33 10.A.4. Facilitating a transition plan to move away from emission-intensive power generation
34 systems by investing heavily in Renewable Energy (RE), preferably through climate
35 reparation negotiations [see 6.D]
36
37
3810.B. Regulation and Redesigning an Appropriate, Efficient, and Sustainable Power
39 System that utilizes “intelligent” technologies
40
41Liberalization should be reversed and the state should intervene [see 10.A] in order to develop an
42appropriate power system conducive to economic and social development. The new power system
1should be able to align sustainable and ecologically sound power supply with the needs of the
2industry, households, and agriculture. To better facilitate management, the government must
3utilize existing “intelligent” technologies.
4
5 10.B.1. Redesigning the National Grid and Power Generation System (requires 10.A.1 and
6 10.A.2) to ensure optimal generation mix and optimal levels of interconnectedness
7  Includes enabling the expansion in the amount of offshore wind and marine power
8 through construction of new networks of submarine cables
9 10.B.2. Stopping the operation of Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) and re-orienting
10 Philippine Electricity Market Corporation (PEMC) WESM which disconnects the
11 consumers from the producers of electricity
12 10.B.3. Removal of direct transmission access for Distribution Utilities (DU) and transfer all
13 existing Power Supply Contracts to a Single Buyer (SB), which will:
14  Optimize the schedule of power plant to achieve the least cost/economic dispatch
15  Prepare a least cost capacity development plan (for future requirements to avoid
16 deficiency)
17  Pursue competitive bidding process for new capacity
18 10.B.4. Incorporating a system of ‘feed in tariffs’ for electricity generation to multiply
19 electricity production from micro-generation from small-scale low carbon energy
20 production – or micro-generation
21 10.B.5. Voluntary participation in an interactive, intelligent management of load via the
22 ‘smart grid’, electricity networks that uses ‘smart meter’ technology so that electricity
23 demand can be tailored automatically to match the supply of electricity
24
25
2610.C. Competent, Independent, and Multi-sector Regulatory Bodies Re-embedded to
27 Socioeconomic and Development Goals
28
29The regulatory bodies, while part of the government, should be immune from political and
30economic pressure from the power sector capitalists. To be able to exercise their respective
31mandates, the regulatory body should be technically competent and composed of members from
32different sectors, including the consumers themselves.
33
34 10.C.1. Depoliticizing the ERC. Competence and integrity must be the main criteria for the
35 selection of ERC commissioners, most especially its Chairperson.
36 10.C.2. Democratizing the ERC. ERC as an institution, while retaining its quasi-judicial nature,
37 should proactively re-focus itself from merely answering legal questions of rate increases
38 towards meeting more substantive public concerns, such as the question of consumers’
39 capacity-to-pay.
40 10.C.3. Broadening the ERC. Ensure multi-stakeholder representation in the energy sector’s
41 main regulatory agency [see 1.E]. In the immediate, the ERC must accord full
42 representation for consumers by giving them at least one seat.
1 10.C.4. Re-embedding Regulation to Society. Regulation must be pegged on a social and

2 economic plan that ensures socialized forms of pricing that at the same encourages
3 demand management.
4
5
610.D. Facilitation of community modes of power utilities ownership, Participatory
7 planning and Demand-side management
8
9The state must facilitate the transition of privatized energy subsectors, particularly as those in
10generation and distribution, to public modes of ownership [see 1.C.1] such as cooperatives. The
11consumers in communities themselves must be able to guide the energy planning and
12management process, including managing its own demand.
13
14 10.D.1. Strong State Support on Rural Electric Cooperatives (REC), facilitation of increasing
15 democratic participation and dispersal of ownership of RECs, enable RECs to own power
16 plants and engage effectively in the generation sector
17 10.D.2. Replicating the processes and methods of Panay Multi-Sectoral Development Planning
18 (MSPDP) in all major regions with Regional Development Councils (RDC)
19 10.D.3. Promotion of community-based power systems which focuses on off-grid (stand-
20 alone), renewable energy sources
21 10.D.4. Transfer the assets of Small Power Utility Group (SPUG) to the community members
22 organized as cooperatives
23 10.D.5. Equitable consumer ownership of Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)
Chapter 2:
Why are we Poor?

A Comprehensive Critique of
Economic Policy in the Philippines
HA NEP 2020
1 Why are we poor? Going Beyond the Corruption Discourse

2Data on poverty remains to be distressing. According to the monitoring of the National Statistical
3Coordination Board (NSCB), poverty incidence among families rose from 24.4% in 2003 to 26.9% in 2006,
4which means that the number of poor families rose by as much as 654,610. This is while subsistence
5incidence among families rose from 10.2% to 11%. Ironically, 2006 is a period in which the average
6economic growth was 5.4%.
7 That Filipinos are poor are felt by Filipinos themselves. The SWS March 2010 Pre-Election Survey,
8conducted from March 19-22, 2010, showed that 43% (est. 8.1 million) of the families rate themselves as
9Mahirap or Poor. Ironically, this matches the record-low Self-Rated Poverty set in March 1987, which was
10short-lived. The proportion of families experiencing involuntary hunger at least once in the past three
11months went to 21.2%, or an estimated 4.0 million households.
12The huge discrepancy between those who were reportedly poor

13and those who perceive themselves as poor only demonstrates
14that some sectors are indeed invisible from the government eye,
15which makes the poverty reality much more disturbing. To
16quote Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. President of AnthroWatch, an
17organization working with indigenous peoples and a member of
18the GCAP-Philippines Coordinating Committee, “poverty may be
19far worse than what the government wants us to believe since
20there are Filipinos who are not included in the surveys, such as
21the ambulant and transient poor, as well as the Indigenous
22People”.
23Is the Philippines Poor?
24The question we should first ask ourselves is, is our country

25poor? Can’t the Philippines provide wealth and prosperity for
26Filipinos?
27The answer to this is, no. The Philippines as a habitat is

28actually rich – richness that can be transformed to wealth for
29people’s wellbeing. The country’s land is known to be
30fertile, with arable lands, diverse flora and fauna,
31extensive coastlines, and rich mineral deposits. The
32Philippines is known to engage in major crop
33production of rice, corn, sugarcane, coconut,
34abaca and tobacco. Our metal and non-metal
35deposits are estimated at 21.5 and 19.3 billion
36metric tons respectively. We are also known
37to be rich in copper, nickel, iron, cobalt,
38silver, and gold. Covering as much as 1.67
39million square kilometers of territorial
40waters the Philippines is home to 2,400 fish
1species of marine life, 65 of which have good commercial value. If these resources are utilized (not
2necessarily monetized) properly, we simply are far ahead of countries which denied of such endowments,
3in opportunity and in potential.
4But despite this, we are known to lag behind our Southeast Asian neighbors, most of which started way
5worse than we are. Singapore's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (in PPP, international dollars) is
6$51,142, while Malaysia's is at $14,072 and Thailand’s is at $8,225. Our GDP per capita, on the other hand,
7is pegged at meager $3,546. The human development index (HDI) of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand is
80.918, 0.823, and 0.786 respectively, while ours is at 0.745.
9The paradox of why such naturally endowed country as the Philippines is known to lag behind its neighbors
10in Southeast Asia was a long subject of academic and practical discourses which results had already been
11incorporated into various theories and applied policies. Yet, even after decades of number and variable-
12crunching, and countless sessions and regimes of economic planning, prosperity and development remains
13to be evasive.
14Economic development is indeed important to discuss when we talk about poverty because indeed, a
15country’s prosperity is an indicator of how much resources a country has at its disposal to improve the lives
16and wellbeing of its citizens, with the end goal of mitigating or even eradicating poverty. Thus poorer
17countries have fewer resources to provide for social services aimed for welfare. Economist like Michael
18Alba of the De La Salle University, believes that the living standard of the Philippines relative to that of the
19U.S. not risen unlike its Asian neighbors because the country has been stuck in a low-growth trajectory.
20But of course, that a country is developed or prosperous doesn’t translate that majority are indeed
21prosperous and their communities are really developed. This brings us to the issue of equality.
22Are all Filipinos poor?
23We presented Philippine poverty in the last section – a report from the Forbes magazine may give us a look
24at the other side of the coin. Forbes reported that as of 2010, the Philippines, incidentally, is also home of
25some of the world's billionaires. The Forbes 2010 survey specifically mentioned Henry “The Retail King” Sy,
26with networth of $5 billion from $3.8 billion a year earlier as the richest man in the Philippines, ranking
27201st in the 2010 list of 1,011 billionaires of the world, that according to Forbes dropped from 1,125 in
282008. Lucio Tan, owner of Philippine National Bank, Asia Brewery, Tanduay Holdings, Fortune Tobacco and
29Philippine Airlines Inc. ranked second with a net worth of $4 million.
30Tan was followed by first-time billionaire John Gokongwei Jr. with
31$1.5billion, Jaime Zobel de Ayala with $1.4 billion [Gavin & Faustino,
“The Philippines as a
322010].
habitat is actually rich
33So clearly, while the Philippines is home of the poor, it is also the
34home of the super-rich. The combined wealth of the top 40 Filipinos – richness that can be
35amounts to $22.4 billion or P1.008 trillion, representing 13.13% of the transformed to
36Gross Domestic Product (pegged at P7.68 trillion, end-2009).
wealth for people’s
37The NSCB said the government’s latest Family Income and wellbeing.”
38Expenditure Survey (FIES) showed that income inequality, as
1measured by the Gini coefficient1, was at 0.46. Comparing this with other countries, the Gini coefficient in
2Thailand was at 0.43, while in Indonesia, it is 0.34. For richer countries such as Japan, the Gini coefficient is
3pegged at 0.31, while the United States has a Gini of 0.36. This means that “the rich are much richer than
4the poor in the Philippines compared to all the countries mentioned” NSCB Secretary-General Dr. Virola
5said [Virola for NSCB, 2005].
6According to 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the income of richest 10% is 20 times the
7income of the poorest 10%. The net worth of the country’s 10 richest individuals and families in 2006 was
8equivalent to the combined income of the country’s poorest 9.8 million households, or 49 million Filipinos.
9According to an ADB study conducted by Ernesto Pernia and Arsenio Balisacan [2002], despite economic
10growth from 1985 to 1997, the poorest 20% of the population only improved their income 0.5% for every
111% growth in average income.
12Poverty and Inequality
13Qualitatively, much of the link between inequality and poverty can be explained by what can be called as
14the “property regime” of an economy and its
15effect on economic rationality. According to
16the mainstream economic thought, resources
17should go where they will be optimally used –
18and, according to the same theory, only
19through an economic regime of private
20property can such optimality be achieved 2.
21As the theory goes, redistribution mechanisms

22to reduce inequality but violate private
23property are thus inefficient and un-optimal.
24What the mainstream thus forward is an
25economic and regulatory regime that protects
26private property, even at the expense of
27equity or justice.
28This is crucial because inevitably, the

29economic decision-making process in our
30current society is a function of property. Those
31who own a particular asset or income streams
32are given the decision-making on how to
11 The Gini coefficient is basically a measure of inequality of income distribution – starting from zero, the closer to one the coefficient
2is, the more unequal distribution. Technically, the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve (graphical representation of the
3cumulative distribution function of the empirical probability distribution of wealth, often used to represent income distribution,
4where it shows for the bottom x% of households, what percentage y% of the total income they have) and the diagonal (the line of
5perfect equality) to the area below.
62 Some economists even posit that high inequality is a necessary conditions for generating rapid growth. Examples include Walter
7Galenson and Harvey Leibenstein (“Investment criteria, productivity, and economic development”, August 1955) and Gustav Ranis
8(“Development and the distribution of income: Some counter-evidence”, September-October 1977). Development economists
9Michael Todaro proceeded to debunk the claims of these economists [Todaro, 1997].
1utilize those assets and income and who benefits from such use. The “private property regime” assumes
2that individuals are rational, and the aggregated decisions of individuals (not necessarily made collectively)
3result in economic rationality – one of the primary factors in development.
4The importance of the “property regime” for development cannot be more emphasized, because in the
5end, only three prevailing questions remain: Who decides who gets what? By what means and goals are
6such decisions made? Do the decisions induce progress and ensure decent life for all or not? These
7questions bring home the point: Inequality, being inseparable from poverty, is also inseparable from the
8question of property.
10“Kung Walang Korap, Walang Mahirap”?
11Philippine poverty and inequality was explained as an effect of many things, including the unabated
12population growth, colonial mentality, and lack of labor total factor productivity, among a plethora of
13others. These items are more commonly presented in their forms of vicious cycles: population growth for
14example, strains limited resources – such as those which can be channeled for reproductive education,
15which is a factor in unmitigated population increase. Productivity is low, translating to low national output
16and thus, low public and private expenditure for human capital formation. And a host of other
17explanations.
18But the most common explanation invoked, especially the politicians themselves, is corruption. Corruption,
19as it is popularly defined, is simply the use of official power for the benefit of oneself, regardless of whether
20it is beneficial or detrimental to the rest of the populace. As the corruption discourse goes, it is this capture
21of our government institution by corrupt elements that is the reason why the Philippines is poor compared
22to its neighbors, and why many Filipinos are poor despite a number of Filipinos being super-rich.
23This explanation is very sensible. Public sector corruption indeed takes away resources which would have
24been used for developmental purposes. In November 1998, Philippine Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
25claimed the government lost P1.4 trillion (estimated at
26US$100 billion, varying exchange rate over 11 years) since
271988 when the Office began investigating government “Inequality and poverty, for
28corruption, and continues to lose P100 million daily, or P36.5
29billion (roughly US$940 million) annually. example, may be an effect, by
design or by consequence, of
30Private sector corruption further erodes public funds.
31According to the National Tax Research Center (NTRC), tax corrupt governance. Then again,
32evasion among corporations is estimated at 38% (P142 billion the systematic and systemic
33collectible as against P88 million collected). It is biggest denial of opportunities and
34among professionals and individual business at 69% (P39
35billion as against P12 billion). upward mobility for the poor
because of the way our economy
36But if we are to look at what drains the Philippine resources,
37we might as well look at all its manifestations, illegal or legal. itself is structured is, in itself, a
38For example, the billions of pesos wasted in corruption pales potent explanation.”
39in comparison to what is lost because of our automatic debt
40service policy. In 2008 alone, out of the P1.227-trillion
1proposed budget program, P295.75-billion is earmarked for Interest Payments of National Government
2(NG) Debts. Meanwhile, the government will be incurring P328.34-billion off-budget expense for Principal
3Amortization of these NG debts.
4And that is official government policy, same as the official government liberalization policy which could cost
5us as much as P600 million annually in foregone revenues if tariffs on dairy products are removed under the
6Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). Billions of
7foregone revenues are also caused by huge tax exemptions offered to corporations, just so to induce
8investments. This proves that the lack of development can be explained as a result of wrong policies as
9much as it can be explained to be a result of intended corruption.
10Inequality and poverty, for example, may be an effect, by design or by consequence, of corrupt governance.
11Then again, the systematic and systemic denial of opportunities and upward mobility for the poor because
12of the way our economy itself is structured is, in itself, a potent explanation. While such denial may still be
13in the realm of the corrupt, or the concept of corruption, we can say that it is a corruption of another type,
14a corruption not of any individual predisposition induced by a national lack of moral cogency (as corruption
15is usually defined in the mainstream), but an economic structure that induces relationships between
16economic and social actors that are fundamentally corrupt, if only for their consequences.
17Let us take a look, for example, at the policy of privatization of public utilities. The mainstream belief was
18that since government is intrinsically inefficient (because of lack of competition) and corrupt (because it is
19also the regulator) in handling the public utilities, it should transfer the control of these utilities to the
20private sector. A particular example for this, the privatization of the country’s power system, only facilitated
21a transfer of ownership from a corrupt government to a corrupt oligopoly of a few families, leading to
22private control over prices and skyrocketing power prices, now the second in Asia. Clearly, while the intent
23on privatization may be moral for some, the consequences are criminally corrupt.
24In the end, the inequality induced by economic governance failure is one of the primary hindrances to
25development. Attesting to this is the fact that, while almost three-fourths of our economy is Public
26Consumption, we have maintained a low-wage, cheap labor policy – a policy which will surely keep at the
27minimum people’s purchasing power. While our greatest asset is our arable land, we refuse to conduct a
28comprehensive agrarian reform which would have raised income of farmers and encouraged agriculture.
29Such a policy- induced inequality is not only because of elite capture by the government, but the stern
30belief that cheap labor would induce investments and private ownership of land optimizes asset utilization.
31The “battle against corruption” launched by well-meaning politicians and public crusaders may be the first
32step towards resolving the question of poverty, but we must elevate from there into more substantial and
33fundamental arguments that tackle the government policies. This, if we are resolve the problem of poverty
34and inequality.
1Why are many Filipinos poor really: A Different Story
2We in Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) believe that the problem of poverty and inequality is intricately
3linked to how the components of the economy, specifically the state and the market, failed to realize their
4social functions. The state failed to provide the public goods necessary for social welfare and to ensure
5social and economic justice, while the market failed to induce development and ensure the optimum
6distribution and utilization of assets and income. Both have been captured by individual interests, and were
7transformed from instruments of collective progress to engines of continuing undue profit by a small group
8of people.
9Thus, corruption, beyond its moral ramifications, must be explained as a “system question”. What forces in
10the current system that induced the state and the market into failing and predisposed them into being
11what they are right now? What government policies and institutions contributed to determining the
12relationships between societal and economic actors?
13We take a look into ten of such policies, which FDC believes to be the primary causes of our mal-
14development. These ten policies describe the fundamental relationship between the government, the
15public, the global market for capital and goods, the land ownership regime and agriculture, and the
16industrial structure. In the end, the objective would be to understand, with the end goal of redefining, the
17relationships between societal and economic actors in order to induce development and ensure justice.
18
19Sources
20Balisacan, Arsenio M. and Ernesto M. Pernia (2002, February). What Else Besides Growth Matters to Poverty
21Reduction? - Philippines. ERD Policy Brief Series. Number 5. Economics and Research Department, Asian Development
22Bank (ADB). Accessed: http://www.adb.org/Documents/EDRC/Policy_Briefs/PB005.pdf.
23Gavin MR, Pia Faustino et al. (2010, July 7). Forbes Magazine names 40 richest Filipinos. GMANews.TV. Accessed:
24http://www.gmanews.tv/story/195437/forbes-magazine-names-40-richest-filipinos.
25Jimeno, Jaileen F. (2007, December 10). Uncounted and underserved. The Daily PCIJ. Philippine Center for
26Investigative Journalism. Accessed: http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=2079.
27Social Weather Stations (2010, 19 April). SWS March 2010 Pre-Election Survey: Hunger drops slightly to 21.2% of
28families; Self-rated poverty matches record-low 43%. Accessed: http://www.sws.org.ph/pr20100419.htm.
29Todaro, Michael P. (1997). Economic Development. New York University. Addison-Wesley Reading, Massachusetts.
30United Nations Development Programme. (2009). Table G: Human development and index trends, Table I1: Human
31and income poverty. Human Development Report 2009 - Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development
32(Palgrave MacMillan).
33Virola, Romulo A. (2005, December 12). The FIES of the Rich: Truth or Consequence? National Statistical Coordination
34Board (NSCB). Accessed: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/headlines/StatsSpeak/121205_rav_fies.asp.
1 1. Weak, Elite-Captured State

2
3The current Philippine State, because of its weakness, is captured by the interests of a
4cynical and opportunistic elite class. This results to the incapacity of the state to act
5objectively for economic development and risk redistribution. Instead, the state becomes
6the primary conduit for translating private interests of elite class into binding public
7policies.
8
91.A. Pro-market Economic Management, Limited Government Role in Development and
10 Welfare
11
12The government, which is ideologically captured by a market fundamentalist framework and
13biased to providing opportunities for private-sector profit-making, refuses to take part and
14responsibility in ensuring welfare and national development.
15
161.A.1. Privatization of Essential Services and Strategic Industries
171.A.2. Development via Private Sector means, e.g. Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Other
18 Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP)
191.A.3. Market-oriented Economic Development Planning by the National Economic
20 Development Authority (NEDA)
21Consequences
22The purpose of government is transformed from generating public goods into to producing private
23goods for officials, their families, and their cronies. This leads to:
24 Inaccessible essential services, decline in welfare.
25 From public monopoly to enhanced elite monopoly and/or oligarchy
26 Upholding the interests of entrenched rent-seekers
27 National vulnerability from foreign entities seeking capture of strategic industries and services
28Palliatives
29 Private sector initiatives. Market (Corporate Social Responsibility) and non-market (CSO-
30 initiated, or charity-based) initiatives like Gawad Kalinga, Caritas Manila, initiatives by the
31 Corporate Media, and others compensate for compromised state role.
32 Devolution. Services that cannot be privatized due to intense opposition are devolved to local
33 governments.
34 Patronage. Services that cannot be provided for are extended via patron-client linkages
35 between traditional politicians and their constituencies.
11.B. Malfunctioning Regulation

2
3The government fails to exercise its duty to protect the citizens from, and to correct, market
4failures. In fact, market failures that are profitable for a select few are sometimes encouraged in
5patron-client modalities.
6
71.B.1. Deregulation
81.B.2. Regulatory Failure
91.B.3. Regulatory Capture
101.B.4. Abusive and corrupt government agencies
11Consequences
12Regulation is now for the purpose of resolving intra-elite intramurals and scrambling on meager
13national resources, excluding the rest of the people. Thus, people are no longer protected from:
14
15 Decline in welfare to due citizens’ absorption of externalized costs [see 7.B]
16 Economic dynamism is dampened and siphoned by the costs of market failures
17Palliatives
18 Citizen’s Vigilance. Citizens would have to continuously keep watch on costs externalized to
19 them, from added costs to products they buy, to the noise at smoke created from nearby
20 factories, to undue profiteering by companies.
21 Corporate Media as Fiscalizers. Citizens have become dependent on the corporate media in
22 order to fiscalize the abusive
23
241.C. Unmitigated widening of Income and Asset Distribution Gap

25
26With state policies focusing on distribution of assets to assure more profitability, the state fails to
27arrest the widening of income and asset distribution gap. With the ownership of assets and
28resources being limited to an elite few, the much poorer majority is excluded from meaningful
29economic decision-making. It is because of this marginalization that the majority is excluded also
30from reaping the benefits of societal development.
31
321.C.1. Lack of asset reform
331.C.2. Cheap labor policy [see 5.A], lax government regulation on wages and benefits
341.C.3. Focus on growth- rather than equity-based economic measurements
1Consequences
2The fact that a small segment of the population in control of economic resources combines with
3the fact that this small segment is motivated mostly by greed and desire for more accumulation.
4This leads to:
5 Wide income disparity (High Gini index)
6 Stratification of consumption and skewed investment structure
7 Un-optimal use of resources and labor, as the concentration of resources leads to the creation
8 of a leisure class
9 Growth of the services and leisure sector despite the need of labor and resources to more
10 productive endeavors
11Palliatives
12 Ensuring accessibility of cheap microcredit for consumption and small businesses.
13 “Sin” Taxation and other Consumption Taxation to discourage conspicuous luxury.
14 “Encouraging” investments to productive sectors through government-induced market signals.
15 Shift to consumption taxes as a way to mitigate loss due to tax evasion and tax concessions for
16 corporations
17
181.D. Political Patronage, Rent-Seeking, in the Public Sector

19
20With the capture of public institutions by corrupt parties, the purpose of government has become
21not to generate public goods, but to produce private goods for officials, their families, and their
22cronies. The elite-capture of government leads to corruption, patronage, and poor government
23service.
24
251.D.1. Bloated, redundant bureaucracy, leading to demoralization of government workers
261.D.2. Poor quality and inefficient civil service, leading to distrust of citizens to the
27 government
281.D.3. Elite capture of government departments and offices
291.D.4. High-level corruption
30Consequences
31 Wastage in national resources, leakages in public programs

32 Ineffectiveness of economic and welfare programs, distortion of impacts
33 Increasing inequality, especially between government officials (and their private-sector
34 networks) and the public
35 Failed regulation, regulatory capture [see 1.B]
36 Distrust and cynicism of people of the government, leading some to engage in patron-client
37 relationship with corrupt officials
1Palliatives
2 Existence of Anti-corruption and transparency measures and accountability institutions and

3 such as the Ombudsman, Sandiganbayan, and other anti-graft and corruption bodies in order
4 to prevent government abuse
5 Checks and balance and oversight among government offices, dispersing power and utilizing
6 antagonism among government employees and elected officials as guard against abuse. This
7 fails, however, if a particular interest is able to penetrate multiple levels and sections of the
8 government.
9 Performance Evaluations and Civil Service Exams that ascertain capacity and performance
10 Automated government transactions to minimize possibilities of discretion, and thus,
11 corruption
12
131.E. Technocracy-dominated, Manila-centric Economic Management

14
15The people who have the most stake in policies are excluded from the decision-making, which is
16mostly centered on Metro Manila-based offices – excluding effective participation from the other
17regions. Thus, there is a lack of economic democracy and widespread public apathy.
18
191.E.1. Centralized economic decision-making and development planning
201.E.2. Lack of genuine participation and consultation processes leading to constituency-
21 blind economic decisions
22Consequences
23Because decision-making is concentrated, it is natural for the following to occur:

24 Unexpected social ramifications
25 Failed appointments, leading to incompetent governance and thus, lack of development and
26 failure of regulation [see 1.B]
27 Elite capture of public offices, leading to predatory corruption and abuse [see 1.D]
28Palliatives
29 Token multi-sector consultations for development projects

30 Formation of City and Provincial Leagues to provide interaction between LGU units in Metro
31 Manila and the provinces
1 2. Inequitable Land Ownership and Lack of Social and

2 Strategic Outlook on Land Use and Management
3
4Because our land is under the private property regime, land use is oriented towards
5private profit, not public gain. This promotes non-agricultural land use conversion and
6inhibits land reform, leading to poorly planned and vulnerable societies and unstable
7food production. For the land converted to urban areas, there is lack of deliberate design
8leading to increased risk for residences and businesses.
9
102.A. Land under the Private Property-Regime

11
12Land is seen not as a social good that can and must be used for collective development, but as a
13private property the individual ownership of which should be protected or attained. This is
14supposedly because the private sector is more efficient user of assets like land than the
15government, which represents society.
16
172.A.1. Monopolistic Land Ownership
182.A.2. Unequal Land distribution
192.A.3. Land Valuation biased on commercial functions, primarily services
20Consequences
21Since land is under a private property complex, land is fought over by individuals in a market, with
22its use determined not by intrinsic value of the land (for production, agriculture, etc.) but its
23market valuation which is biased to commercial activities.
24
25 Lack of Land Reform leading to Inequality (due to lack of democratized control over the income
26 of land and land-based assets)
27 Rampant Land Use Conversion biased on commercial use of land [see 2.B.1]
28 Development aggression leading to community destruction
29Palliatives
30 Market-Assisted Land Reform (MALR). Characterized by a “willing seller - willing buyer”
31 framework, it encourages land transfer through manipulating the supply-demand on the rural
32 land market, reducing landowner opposition through negotiated land transfer.
33 Corporate Redistribution of Land like the Stock Distribution Option (SDO) and Joint-Venture
34 Agreement (JVA) model which seeks to corporatize agrarian reform by vertically integrating
35 management of the lands through converting land ownership into shares of stock.
36
1
22.B. Lack of Rational Planning on Regional Zoning, Land Use and Management
3
4The private sector-led land development (which is a consequent of 2.A) resulted to the apparent
5absence of state intervention in land use determination, including use and management. No
6national-level regional zoning plan which would have determined land should go to agricultural
7production, manufacturing industries, and services [given a lack of industrial planning, 4.A].
8
92.B.1. Commercial and Urban land use bias (biased to services industry, not to
10 manufacturing and agriculture, due to 4.A)
112.B.2. Local Government Unit-determined economic strategy and land use
122.B.3. Lack of Land and Water Use Act
132.B.4. Lack of Financial and Institutional Support for Agriculture
14Consequences
15Regional planning and zoning would have prevented the growth of urban areas and the retreat of
16agro-rural areas. This leads to:
17
18 Ineffective land reform program, as distributed land revert back to the original landlords which
19 engage in land use conversion
20 Collapsing Agricultural Sector [see 8.B] due to lack of agricultural lands
21 Degradation of Forest Areas and Carbon Sinks [see 6.B.2] as they are converted to farmlands
22 (through the usual slash-and-burn)
23Palliatives
24 Increasing importation of food and agricultural products for domestic consumption
25 “Corrective” actions on forest areas such as tree planting, forest area protection, selective log
26 ban, and those actions as mandated by NIPAS
27
282.C. Lack of Effective Development Planning on Urban Land Use and Management
29
30Because urban areas had largely sprouted from land use conversion at the initiative of the private
31land owners (caused by the lack of regional zoning [see 2.B]), there was no deliberate plan on how
32the urban areas are to be designed and for what purpose.
33
342.C.1. Ad hoc Horizontal Urbanization
352.C.2. Land Use Conversion in Peri-urban and Rural areas at the metropolitan fringes
362.C.3. Lack of Universal Settlement Plans
372.C.4. Local Government-based Initiatives for Commercial Development
1Consequences
2Poor Urban Planning, which goes hand-in-hand with lack of industrial [see 4.A] and employment
3[see 5.B.1] planning, leads to:
4
5 Congested roads due to lack of analysis of common areas of destination
6 Gap between settlement and employment areas
7 Health risk in residential areas near industrial and commercial areas (factories, airports,
8 commercial centers, etc.)
9 Lack of disaster preparedness due to lack of disaster risk reduction (DRR) planning which
10 should have been embedded in urban design
11Palliatives
12 Displacements of either residences or businesses when palliative and “corrective” solutions are
13 sought to chronic urban problems (e.g. displacement order vs. Pandacan Depot, informal
14 settlers in Manggahan floodway)
15 Palliatives like flood control, waste management, etc. in a time of climate crises or health
16 problems
17
182.D. Development strategy centered on growth-oriented Super-regions

19
20Former President Arroyo unveiled in her 6th SONA a new development planning strategy in
21partnership with LGUs to divide the country and pour resources into “super-regions” to spur
22economic growth and create markets for investments in the countryside, in order to eventually
23lead the Philippines to achieving First World status in the next two decades.
24
252.D.1. Creation of a North Luzon Agribusiness Quadrangle
262.D.2. Creation of a Metro Luzon Urban Beltway
272.D.3. Central Philippines Tourism Super Region
282.D.4. Creation of an Agribusiness Mindanao Super Region
292.D.5. Creation of a Philippine Cyberservices Corridor that transverses the four Super-
30 regions
31Consequences
32The promotion of a homogeneous economy and consumer culture with its lack of stewardship
33towards the environment led to:
34
35 For Central Philippines, land-use conversion of previously agricultural lands for tourism or
36 services use made have converted several regions net food importers
1 The Cyberservices Corridor plan may have pushed for the creation of a redundant and
2 anomaly-ridden National Broadband Network (NBN) deal with Zhong Xing
3 Telecommunications, Inc.
1 3. Foreign Capital-dominated Open Economy

2
3Our economy is rendered open to foreign capital competition, leading to the destruction
4of our productivity and inevitably, dependence and foreign capital domination.
5
63.A. Current Accounts (Financial) Liberalization

7
8Controls on the ingress and egress of capital and currency are consciously weakened towards the
9direction of total dismantling, as the government adopts a policy of openness.
10
113.A.1. Foreign exchange liberalization
123.A.2. Sustained Interest Differentials when foreign credit is relatively cheaper to siphon
13 foreign currency
14Consequences
15Massive but volatile inflow of short-term investments compromise the stability of the country’s
16financial system and national security:
17 Portfolio investment-driven stock market, dependence on “hot money”
18 Financial instability, vulnerability to exogenous currency and other financial shocks
19 Compromised national security consequent on foreign investments on privatized strategic
20 industries
21Palliatives
22 High foreign reserves. This policy, fueled mainly by OFW remittances, is maintained to protect
23 the country from sudden reversal of capital flows.
24 This is usually accomplished through the strategy of monetary sterilization in which the central
25 bank attempts to counteract the effects of a changing monetary base through via open market
26 operations in the forex market.
27
283.B. Weak Banking and Financial Sector detached from the Industrial Base
29
30The banking and financial sector, already weak due to a small savings base [see 5.A.2], is detached
31from the industry and agriculture by a profitable services sector.
32
333.B.1. Inflation-targeting as primary Central Bank preoccupation
343.B.2. Interest Rate Liberalization
353.B.3. Bank Liberalization
1Consequences
2Domestic industry and finance both went down in a downward spiral as the vicious cycle of weak
3industry not being attractive to private investments causes the decline of private investments,
4weakening the industry further – compromising employment, and thus, domestic savings base.
5
6 Weak industry [see 4.C] due to weak Capital Formation
7 National treasury biased to low-interest rate foreign bonds
8 Lack of access to credit of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), especially those engaged in
9 agricultural activity
10Palliatives
11 Low Interest Rates, Credit Creation. In order to compensate to lack of targeted financing,
12 central bank resorts to low interest rates in order to provide general support to enterprises
13 especially in times of crises (contradicting 3.A.2).
14 Micro-financing as a way to mitigate capital scarcity in the rural, peri-urban, and sub-urban
15 areas is becoming popular among cooperatives, small and medium enterprises, etc.
16
173.C. Foreign-financing Dependence

18
19Due to lack of mobilizable domestic savings (due in turn to a policy of low-interest rates, and small
20savings base [see 5.A.2]), and poor revenue-generation (due in turn to small industry [see 4] and
21consumption-income base [see 5.A.1]), the government is dependent on foreign financing and
22debt.
23
243.C.1. Credit-rating consciousness
253.C.2. Supply-driven and development plan and initiates
26Consequences
27The need to secure foreign financing for public sector activities compels the government to pay
28the debt unequivocally, eventually resulting to lack of resources from the public sector, and thus,
29the need to secure financing for these services. This results though to:
30
31 Debt-dependence, lender-driven public sector activities and development program leading to
32 ineffective, market-biased development strategies [see 1.A.3]
33 Lack of social spending and institutional support leading to compromised households [see
34 gender-differentiated effects of this in 7.B]
35 Lack of spending on economic services leading to weak industries [see 4.C.1] and collapsing
36 agricultural base [see 2.B.4]
1
2Palliatives
3 Fiscal austerity, Spending compression. Debt sustainability, which necessitates the cutting back
4 on spending in order to pay debt, is maintained in order to protect credit rating.
5 Foreign-Assisted Projects Programming. The government attempts to coordinate Foreign
6 Assisted Projects (FAPs) through Official Development Assistance (ODA) programming, like
7 FOURmula One of the Department of Health. In most cases, however, the plan was also
8 according to a policy compelled by earlier loan conditionalities.
9
103.D. Lack of capacity and propensity to save in the grassroots

11
12The cheap labor regime [see 5.A] limits the capacity of the worker to save part of his and her
13income for future use. This had the effect of weakening grassroots capital base which would have
14been mobilized by domestic industries and community enterprises.
15
163.D.1. Weak provincial and rural banks that can’t compete with large banking
17 conglomerates
183.D.2. Dependence on Government Financial Institutions (GFI) for credit in the agricultural
19 sector and rural areas
20Consequences
21Lack of savings lead to:

22
23 Due to lack of social welfare [see 7.B], the inaccessibility of abrupt health and education (which
24 requires huge affront payments)
25 Weak domestic capital formation due to weak financial system [see 3.B] caused by low savings
26 rate
27Palliatives
28 Forced savings on employees that is blind on current household expenditure realities.
29 Growth in private banking sector of banks with direct links to particular domestic firms and
30 capitalists (mostly in services [see 4.A palliatives]) in order to compensate for the lack of large
31 industrial banks
1 4. Fragmented Industry designed for Low Value Added

2 Exports
3
4Our industries are integrated individually to foreign markets, not to each other,
5relegating us to low-value added production (i.e. low-end products/services, extracted
6raw materials) and export-dependence. This is due to the lack of a trade-industrial
7strategy, neglect of domestic market and local economies, and lack of state support for
8increasing competitiveness.
9
104.A. Incoherent Trade-Industrial Policy due to lack of Industrial Strategy

11
12Trade policy in place has been successful in wiping out many industries and jobs, in eroding
13nation’s industrial base, agricultural base, and in setting back economic growth.
14
154.A.1. Unilateral and Advanced Tariff Reduction
164.A.2. Proactive negotiation for Bilateral and Multilateral Free Trade Agreements
174.A.3. Unregulated importation, and thus, unregulated egress of foreign currency
18 available for industry
19Consequences
20Liberalization’s primary goal is to destroy uncompetitive firms, and given the country’s weak
21industries [see 4.C] liberalization ate away our industrial base as consumers find cheaper products.
22This resulted to:
23
24 Internal industrial disintegration as manufacturing and agriculture sectors are decimated
25 Widespread unemployment leading to small savings base [5.A.1] and low purchasing power
26 [5.A.2] of citizens
27 Lack of foreign currency which would have been used to purchase capital goods for industrial
28 development
29 Weak revenue performance due to low tariff rates
30Palliatives
31 Services-oriented growth. Instead of the usual industrial and agricultural bases, the
32 government encouraged foreign capital to go where it is already going – the service industries.
33 This serves as the primary buffer of the unemployed sector. This is especially through for
34 Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) firms, most of which are contact centers.
1 Lack of revenues earned from trade leads the government to rely on consumption taxes, given
2 importation-driven consumption due to lack of indigenous capacity to produce consumer
3 goods [see 4.B.2] and availability of foreign currency due to remittances [see 5.A.3]
4
54.B. Neglect of the Domestic Market

6
7The export-orientation of our domestic industry compelled it to compete against the tight and
8cutthroat global market, without having the vision to develop a strong domestic market that will
9assure sustainable returns.
10
114.B.1. Lack of policy addressing the market’s lack of purchasing power [see 5.A.1] (e.g.
12 low wages policy, high prices)
134.B.2. No state support for the development of the consumer goods industry
14Consequences
15The lack of incentive and capacity to locally produce consumer goods for the domestic market
16leads to domestic producers’ constant search for global markets with relatively higher purchasing
17power, even if there is potential domestic demand
18Palliatives
19 Importation of industrial consumer goods. A large part of the consumer goods the country’s
20 consumer procures are manufactured abroad. This necessitates liberalization of ingress and
21 egress of these goods to lift the burden of tariff from the consumers, but this cause
22 unregulated egress of foreign currency [see 3.A.1]
23 Retail-driven Services Sector as local consumers cannot afford to buy wholesale services.
24
254.C. Weak and Uncompetitive Domestic Firms

26
27Our industry itself is incapable of producing goods which can serve as adequate and cheap
28substitutes to those which are produced abroad, and this is because our industries operate at
29more costs.
30
314.C.1. Weak institutional and financial support for agriculture and industry
32 modernization, expansion, and development
334.C.2. Decreasing state protection of industries against globalization forces (e.g.
34 Unilateral Tariff Reduction)
354.C.3. High Cost of Entrepreneurship (e.g. Fees, Electricity costs)
36Consequences.
1In a liberalized industrial regime [see 4.A], a weak industrial sector is likely to vanish leading to:
2
3 Premature Deindustrialization resulting to:
4 o High unemployment rate and/or lack of quality employment
5 o Lack of job security
6 o Lack of domestic production for consumer goods/services, making us dependent on the
7 global market for access
8
9 Trade and Balance of Payments deficit (excluding net factor income from abroad – which is
10 high due to OFW remittances)
11Palliatives
12 Dependence on extractive industries like mining and forestry in order to augment foreign
13 currency reserves used to purchase industrial inputs.
14 Labor-exportation. The lack of labor-intensiveness of the existing industrial structure forces our
15 economic managers to find external sources of employment for the growing working class
16 population and obtain foreign currency reserves.
17
184.D. Underdeveloped Community Industries and Sources of Local Employment

19
20Because of lack of institutional support, local (especially agricultural) enterprises failed to
21modernize and be competitive. Thus, community markets tend to source out its commodities from
22foreign markets, and national industries tend to source out its inputs from foreign suppliers.
23
244.D.1. Lack of state, institutional and financial support to develop local enterprises and
25 increase their competitiveness
264.D.2. Communities patronize cheaper imported commodities
274.D.3. Local enterprises tend to disintegrate with the presence of larger firms
284.D.4. Lack of highly skilled personnel necessary in the modernization of local economies
29Consequences
30Lack of incentives and capacity to source inputs and commodities from local enterprises leads to:
31
32 Dominance of retail and wholesale traders and “middle-mans” over direct producers
33 Domestic producers’ dependence on foreign sources for manufacturing inputs, because
34 existing small suppliers are expensive
35 Widespread unemployment in the local [see ], leading to exportation of skilled and educated
36 labor from the communities
37Palliatives
1 Smuggling, Intensive importation for industrial inputs especially from large manufacturing
2 countries like China or Vietnam.
3 Rural to Urban migration of workers because of stagnating incomes [see 5.D.1]
1 5. Repressive Labor Environment

2
3Society’s creator and determinant of values, the labor sector, have been relegated to low
4competency and low purchasing power due to the politically and economically repressive
5cheap labor policy. The lack of regulation, political agency in the status quo, and
6recognition of the large part of the labor sector leads to further repression.
7
85.A. Low-wage, Low-benefits Labor Policy

9
10Because of our cheap labor policy, we tend to end up with poverty, low savings rate, and a
11remittance-driven consumption economy. This leads to undesirable labor developments such as
12contractualization, unjust retrenchment, etc. due to an industry which needs to be competitive
13[see 4.C] despite lack of government support [see 4.A].
14
155.A.1. Low, or at times, relative absent, purchasing power of citizens
165.A.2. Low capacity to save
17Consequences
18Since much of the physical and social needs of Filipinos are provided via the market, low
19purchasing power generally results to:
20 Poverty and social misery due to inability to afford basic commodities and needs
21 Stratification of consumption, as lower-end consumers cannot afford the new products
22 enjoyed by the high-end consumers
23 Dependence on credit by small consumers, leading to personal indebtedness and further
24 incapacity to consume
25Palliatives
26 Targeted and Conditional Cash Transfers are welfare programs, in the form of cash subsidies,
27 conditional upon the receivers’ actions. Implemented successfully by Brazil.
28 Growth in informal economy. Lack of purchasing power leads the consuming populace to rely
29 on the underground market actors for commodities, maintaining the nation’s high
30 consumption rate despite lacking the middle class that serves consumption base in most
31 countries.
32
335.A.3. Remittance-fueled Consumption
34Consequences
1A remittance-based economy requires that much of the potential manpower should be converted
2into Overseas Contract Workers (OCW). This leads to:
3 Small base of skilled domestic labor necessary for development,
4 Compromising reproductive work
5 Stagnation of hometown municipalities
6 Dehumanization and alienation of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)
7Palliatives
8 Return of service (ROS) projects to address The dissonance between the policy of producing
9 too many healthcare workers for abroad and the apparent lack of health personnel for
10 domestic needs
11 Glorification of labor migrancy or the intense government appreciation of, and support for
12 (although support seems lacking still) OFWs
13 Encouraging the formation of Filipino communities abroad, and providing assistance as a
14 social and psychological safety net for the migrant workers abroad
15
165.B. Lack state protection for workers amid repression of democratic space
17
18Despite the existence of a labor code with progressive provisions, and the adequate protection
19stipulated in the constitution, there exists lack of mechanisms for the comprehensive protection of
20the worker and malfunctioning regulation, resulting in labor abuse. Worse, the workers are
21removed of their political capacities to fight these abuses.
22
235.B.1. Poor and indecent working conditions
245.B.2. Lack of protection in bilateral agreements
255.B.3. Lack of social security
265.B.4. Gender and age discrimination
275.B.5. Violation of right to organize, union-busting
285.B.6. No Collective bargaining
29Consequences
30Lack of regulation, worsened by political repression, dismantles all the safety nets the labor sector
31would have had under an industrial setup which is focused on productivity (due to the need to be
32competitive [see 4.C]). This leads to:
33
34 Decline in labor productivity
35 Erosion of workers’ purchasing power leading to depressed consumption, savings, and
36 government revenue generation
37 Distorted labor pricing, resulting to less than optimal personal consumption
1Palliatives
2 Arbitration mechanisms such as the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which is
3 supposed to receive the grievances of workers
4 Reliance on corporate media to expose labor abuses
5 Productivity-based approach to management such as government-sponsored Total Quality
6 Management (TQM) in the shop level (DOLE)
7 Conciliation and Mediation Mechanisms for Resolving Labor Disputes
8
95.C. Marginalized Informal Employment Sector

10
11There is a continuing lack of social support for the informal, labor sector. This includes vendors,
12home-based workers, piece-rate etc.), women workers, and those which are inadequately
13supported by existing labor regulation structures.
14
155.C.1. Lack of recognition of the informal sector, resulting to depressed income, lack of
16 rights protection and social security
175.C.2. Lack of access to credit facility
18Consequences
19The informally employed represents one of the largest sub-sector in the labor sector. Thus, the
20further growth of the informal employment leads to:
21
22 Depressed revenue collection on consumption
23 Breeds “underground” and corrupt practices, putting stress on government regulation
24 (prevalence of child labor despite existing laws, human trafficking, etc.)
25 Induced labor migration
26Palliatives
27 Making micro-credit facilities available for the poorest workers, especially those engaged in
28 agricultural work.
29 Providing temporary and seasonal employment to absorb section of the informal sector like
30 various ad hoc programs.
31 Redefinition of labor categories (employed, unemployed, underemployed) and manipulation of
32 labor statistics.
33 Relaxation of labor and labor migration policies and regulation resulting to labor abuse
34
35
36
15.D. Widespread Unemployment and Underemployment in Agrarian Communities and

2 Urban Areas
3
4The classic theory of development says that labor would transfer from the agricultural sector,
5which is transitioning from a labor- to capital-intensive sector, to the bourgeoning urban growth
6areas. In the Philippines, agricultural workers suffering from stagnating income due to lack of
7agricultural productivity migrate to urban centers which cannot and refuse to accommodate new
8labor entrants.
9
105.D.1. Rural-to-Urban migration due to stagnating income, unemployment in agricultural
11 sectors
125.D.2. Lack of employment opportunities in the urban areas due to lack of jobs available,
13 or job mismatch
145.D.3. Industries in the urban areas concentrate on labor-saving processes, equipments
15Consequences
16 Urban congestion, as new entrants strain government welfare and resources in the cities
17 Decreasing agricultural production [see 8.B]
18 Land use conversion [see 2.B] due to agricultural sector’s lack of profitability
19Palliatives
20 Commercialization of agricultural land in order to create jobs in the rural centers, mostly in the
21 services sector
22 Emergency employment programs, and other low-paying public sector jobs
1 6. Ecologically destructive Economy vulnerable to

2 Climate Disasters
3
4The environment is seen more not as an endowment to be conserved, but a resource that
5can and must be inexhaustibly exploited. The absorptive capacity and recuperating
6mechanism of the environment vis-à-vis the externalities of our economic activities are
7also overestimated, resulting to destabilization of ecology and decreased livability of
8communities.
9
106.A. Incoherent, Incomprehensive and Fragmented Environmental Paradigm

11
12The government’s incoherent, incomprehensive and fragmented environmental policies are
13impotent in substantively responding to the climate crisis and in linking development and the
14environment.
15
166.A.1. Higly sectoralized development and environmental legislation:
17
18 on forests [PD705], fisheries [RA8550], minerals [RA7942; PD1899; RA7976], biodiversity
19 [RA7586, RA9147 (wildlife), RA9072 (caves)]; solid wastes [RA9003], & air & water quality
20 [RA8749 & RA9275, respectively]; EIA [PD1586]
21
226.A.2. Highly differentiated social policies on people and environment:
23
24 eg., IPRA [RA8371]; kaingineros [PD705]; fisherfolk [RA8550]; farmers [RA8435]; small miners
25 [RA7076]
26Consequences
27The government’s incoherent, incomprehensive and fragmented environmental policies are

28impotent in substantively responding to the climate crisis and in linking development and the
29environment.
30
316.B. Environmentally-destructive Economic Sectors

32
33Protection of the natural resources and sustainability in not part of the overarching economic
34development strategy, thus the destructive nature of economic activities.
35
366.B.1. Promotion of extractive industries
376.B.2. Large-scale and massive forest degradation
16.B.3. Ecologically unsound agricultural practices

26.B.4. Export-oriented Industrial Fishing
3Consequences
4Protection of the natural resources and sustainability in not part of the overarching economic
5development strategy, thus the destructive nature of economic activities.
6
76.C. Ecologically-destabilizing Provision of Public Services

8
9While provisioning of essential services like water and power is important, the privatized nature
10[see 1.A.2] with which they are being provisioned resulted it being delivered in an unsustainable
11and ecologically-destabilizing manner, lacking as they are of environmental considerations and
12demand management.
13
146.C.1. Climate change inducing energy production and industries (coal, diesel) as a
15 consequence of privatized and liberalized power sector [see 10]
166.C.2. Large dam systems for water supply (e.g. San Roque, Angat, Casecnan,
17 Pantabangan and Laiban)
18Consequences
19While provisioning of essential services like water and power is important, the privatized nature
20[see 1.A.2] with which they are being provisioned resulted it being delivered in an unsustainable
21and ecologically-destabilizing manner, lacking as they are of environmental considerations and
22demand management.
23
246.D. Waste-intensive production-consumption system

25
26The absorptive capacity and recuperating mechanism of the environment vis-à-vis the externalities
27of our economic activities are also overestimated. This is demonstrated by the lack of demand and
28emissions management in industries and services.
29
306.D.1. Services sectors are not designed based on a demand-management plan
316.D.2. Manufacturing industries do not consider use of eco-friendly packaging technology
326.D.3. Continuous importation (because we lack the industrial base for producing
33 consumer goods [see 4.B.2]) of waste-intensive consumer products
34Consequences
1The absorptive capacity and recuperating mechanism of the environment vis-à-vis the externalities
2of our economic activities are also overestimated. This is demonstrated by the lack of demand and
3emissions management in industries and services.
4
56.E. Prioritized mitigation actions despite the high vulnerability of the country to
6 climate change
7
8This is despite perennial climate disasters and worsening climate conditions and extreme weather
9patterns due to climate change, the government has prioritized mitigation regardless of the
10countries miniscule contribution to climate change.
11
126.E.1. National Climate change policies are focused on mitigation
136.E.2. Substantial allocation of funds to mitigation by the government through domestic
14 and international sources.
156.E.3. Influx of investment for mitigating climate change
16Consequences
17This is despite perennial climate disasters and worsening climate conditions and extreme weather
18patterns due to climate change, the government has prioritized mitigation regardless of the
19countries miniscule contribution to climate change.
20
216.F. Economic development biased against indigenous communities and environmental

22 preservation
23
24The economic model dictates a development strategy that is naturally biased for urban
25communities and commercial activities, sidelining cultures and communities which was able to
26develop environmentally sound lifestyles.
27
286.F.1. Unsustainable communities due to unequal distribution of essential resources
296.F.2. Encroachment in ancestral lands and property
306.F.3. Development aggression against IPs
316.F.4. Commercialization of indigenous knowledge and Biopiracy (e.g. TRIPS)
32Consequences
33The removal of IPs in a particular biodiversity area may lead to lost of a constituency which roots
34its cultural meaning and livelihood in environment protection
1 7. Unrecognized and Neglected Reproductive and Care

2 Economy
3
4The household is only seen as a consumer of goods and public services rather than a
5producer of valuable inputs and resources. Thus, with women being the primary
6dispenser of domestic work, women’s contribution to the economy is largely in this
7hidden area of production that includes care work, voluntary or civil society activity,
8subsistence production and work in the informal sector.
9
107.A. Non-compensation of Non-market or Domestic Labor

11
12Since there is a lack of recognition of the reproductive economy and its contribution to society,
13there is no adjusted compensation for domestic labor, leading to marginalization of women in the
14households.
15
167.A.1. Lack of purchasing power of women and the unemployed
17Consequences
18As most of the social goods and services can only be availed in the market, lack of purchasing
19power of the unemployed and household members engaged in domestic work generally leads to
20their:
21
22 Dependence on “breadwinners” for sustenance
23 Marginalization and disempowerment, since who “produces” have the most decision-making
24 powers in the household or the community
25Palliatives
26 Health benefits of women as dependents of their husbands.

27
287.B. Externalization of Public Good Costs to Families through Commodification

29
30The government, because of fiscal austerity measures, slowly delegates to the households the
31provision of public goods and services, putting further pressure to women which are unjustly
32assumed by society to deliver those.
33
347.B.1. Privatization of water [see 9.D.1, 9.D.3] and power [see 10.A] services.
357.B.2. Deteriorating public healthcare and under-budgeted education sector
1Consequences
2The delegation to the households of goods and services that are previously subsidized by the state
3adds pressure for the household to earn additional income. This leads to:
4
5 Women having to take on extra work if expenses go beyond their budget.
6 Household members refraining from seeking medical care.
7 Increase of drop-out rates in the education sector.
8Palliatives
9 Programs that ease some households of education expenses, such as the Socialized Tuition and
10 Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) of the University of the Philippines and the Government
11 Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education (GASTPE).
12 Medical Insurance like PhilHealth as an attempt to establish universal healthcare
13 Lifeline Rate for electricity consumers.
14
157.C. Absence of an institutional reproductive healthcare program

16
17Misconceptions on reproductive health derail the passage of the reproductive health bill in
18Congress which consequences are suffered by the mothers, the infants and the society in general.
19
207.C.1. Lack of information regarding family planning and reproductive health
217.C.2. Lack of reproductive healthcare services especially among the poor
22Consequences. The absence of an institutional reproductive healthcare program results to:
23 High maternal and infant mortality rates

24 High healthcare costs related to unwanted pregnancies
25Palliatives
26 Limited reproductive healthcare programs by the Department of Health.

27
287.D. Unfair distribution of work among genders in households

29
30The privatization of social services and the rising cost of living increase the pressure for more
31household income which increases the pressure for women to work but the expectation for them
32to perform their domestic “duties” does not change.
33
347.D.1. “Multiple burden” for working women
357.D.2. Lack of community/public services for needs such as child-rearing
1Consequences
2The need to work in the productive sector to augment household income and the need to deliver
3unpaid reproductive labor results to:
4
5 Work status inequality among genders
6 Undue social, psychological, and professional stress on women
7Palliatives
8 Rise of paid domestic work (“kasambahay”) sector in well-to-do households in order to free
9 some women individuals of domestic tasks. Then again, many of these workers are women,
10 which are forced to be dislocated from their families.
11 Few mandated benefits for the employed women such as maternity leave.
1 8. Crops and Fishes for the Global Supermarket

2
3The focus of our crop production is the global market, not domestic need, thus causing
4hunger and environmental destruction. Agricultural activities are also not in line with
5sustainability principles, particularly because it interferes with the profit motive of
6corporate and industrial agriculture.
7
88.A. Corporate-driven Agriculture and Food consumption

9
10Huge corporations dictate the price and quality of food to be produced, and also the price of
11agricultural foodstuffs they buy from small farmers.
12
138.A.1. Lack of land reform, and institutional support of agricultural reform communities
148.A.2. Transnational and Multinational corporation-controlled food services sector
15Consequences
16The lack of control of both producers and consumers on the production and distribution of food
17leads to:
18
19 Agrarian unrest and disincentives to agricultural production
20 Land use conversion since valuation of land is biased against agriculture [see 2.B.1]
21 Proliferation of standardized, globalized “junk food”
22Palliatives
23Limited support on Organic Farming. The government, through the Department of Agricultural, is
24providing token support for the development of sustainable farming techniques.
25
268.B. Stagnating Agricultural Sector due to low social priority, lack of government
27 support
28
29Agricultural activity is not a socially valued activity, as reflected by low rural incomes and low
30government priority. This leads to an exodus of rural citizens to the cities, causing agricultural
31stagnation and overpopulation in the cities.
32
338.B.1. Low productivity in the agricultural sector
348.B.2. Low income of agricultural workers and peasants leading to rural-to-urban
35 migration
18.B.3. Complete dependence of urban areas to food stuff overseas or domestic

2 importation
1Consequences
2 Domestic agro-industry, forcibly made to compete in the global market [see 8.E] fail to match
3 food imports due to high-cost of production
4 Migration to the cities cause congestion and widespread urban unemployment as businesses
5 fail to absorb increasing labor supply
6 High food prices afflict urban citizens, vulnerable as they are from radical price changes in the
7 global food market [see 8.E]
8Palliatives
9 Programs to respond to widespread hunger such as the Accelerated Hunger Mitigation

10 program in cooperation of DA and NFA are in place.
11 The existence of National Food Authority sells agricultural products at a lost in order to
12 counter-act the market, but at the cost of indebtedness as it continuously conducts bond
13 flotation for this.
14
158.C. Ecologically-unsound Agricultural and Food Production System

16
17Primarily because of corporate agriculture [see 8.A], agricultural practices run counter to
18sustainable ends, particularly as forest lands are converted to agricultural lands as urban areas
19grow [see 2.B.1].
20
218.C.1. Monoculture
228.C.2. Use of Genetic and Hybrid Technologies to produce crops for profit
23Consequences
24 Environmental and ecological destruction in agricultural areas, including those which are
25 responsible of giving farmers sources of income and livelihood
26Palliatives
27 Support to Sustainable Development. Philippine Agenda 21 states policies to counteract

28 environmental degradation, not just from agricultural practices.
29
308.D. Conflict-ridden and Contested Agricultural Lands

31
32Because of agricultural land’s potential for profit-making in the global food supermarket, conflicts
33on land ownership remain prevalent. This is worsened by the fact that feudal social relations
34largely remain intact even with the conversion of landlords to capitalist land owners. This causes
35conflict and agrarian unrest on the one hand, and warlordism on the other.
1
28.D.1. Unresolved insurgency and separatist problems in agricultural areas
38.D.2. Landlordism and Warlordism endemic in rural areas
4Consequences
5 Disincentivization of agricultural production as security issues are not yet resolved

6 Out-migration to safer areas, even those which are non-agricultural, leaving agricultural lands
7 either untended or free to be converted to commercial lands by land-grabbers
8Palliatives
9 Peace negotiations with armed insurgents and separatists. Limited concessions to economic
10 and political demands.
11 Land reform-related land ownership settlements [see 2.A, palliatives]
12
138.E. Liberalized and Deregulated, Food Security-based National Food System

14
15Food security paradigm argues that it is more fruitful for a country to engage in the exportation of
16food that is demanded by the global market and to use the foreign currency exchange gained by
17buying cheaper food stuff sold by rich industrial nations. This leads to the decimation of the
18agricultural base and widespread hunger.
19
208.E.1. Increased exportation
218.E.2. Import-dependent commodities policy
228.E.3. Agricultural liberalization
23Consequences
24The liberalized setup at food leads to the exposure of small farmers, which is the main producer of
25food in the country, to foreign competition. This leads to:
26
27 Agriculture trade decline as domestic agricultural base is decimated by foreign competition
28 [see 4.A], relatively more profit due to higher price valuation on non-agricultural activities [see
29 2.B.1]
30 Food insecurity, widespread and chronic hunger
1 9. Grossly Neglected, Fragmented, and Ill-Governed

2 Water Sector
3
4National policies on water were introduced on piecemeal basis as a response to peculiar

5challenges of the times. This resulted in numerous government authorities being
6mandated to deal with various aspects of water management, regulation and
7development. The complex web of water-related institutions, coupled with an economic
8policy of privatization, created a fragmented water sector that is both unresponsive to
9the needs of the people and not cognizant of their human right to water. The resultant
10effect: water resource mismanagement, water quality crisis, and seasonal water
11quantity crisis.
12
139.A. Treatment of water as primarily an economic good

14
15While the Constitution declares all waters as part of the national patrimony and, as such,
16necessarily public good in nature, the government treats it as any other private economic good
17that must be subjected to the dictates of market forces. This implicit attitude towards water is
18betrayed by the government’s long-standing neglect of the immediate concerns of the water
19sector while it relies on the entry private investment to solve the sector’s problems. Water is
20allowed to be used on more ‘productive’ activities at the expense of the basic human needs of
21millions of people
22
239.A.1. Lack of public investment in the protection and development of water resources
249.A.2. Steady decline in overall support for public water provision service system
259.A.3. Proliferation of small-scale independent providers of water
26Consequences
27 Water systems are not geared towards meeting basic human needs, especially of the poor
28 Water is made available to recreational purposes such as swimming pools, golf courses and
29 other leisure and amusement uses while there are still many in the nearby areas who lack
30 access to water
31 Water provision is made a business more than a service
32Palliatives
33 About 32 agencies are mandated to regulate water sector but they remain largely ineffective
34 in carrying their mandates out
35 Enactment of the Clean Water Act of 2004 ( R.A. 9275) which signals a reaffirmation that
36 water is a public good, but the law is yet to be strictly implemented
1
29.B. Non-commitment to actual protection, management and development water

3 resources
4
5The government pays but lip-service to protection, management and development of water
6resources. The government is not even aware of the grave effects of climate change on water
7resources and supply. Accordingly, it does not have a comprehensive adaptation plan and program
8addressing climate change-related water problems
9
109.B.1. Unabated de-forestation resulting in the diminishing holding capacity of
11 watersheds
129.B.2. Existing Framework and Plans on water resources protection, management and
13 development are not implemented
14Consequences
15 90% of the official watersheds of the country are considered hydrologically critical
16 Only one-third of the country’s river systems are fit for water supply provision
17 58% of groundwater resources are found to be contaminated by untreated domestic and
18 industrial wastewater
19 Waterborne diseases continue to be one of the main causes of death in the country, causing
20 billions of pesos in lost income opportunity and hospitalization expenses
21Palliatives
22 The NEDA came up with “The Water Sector Roadmap” in 2008 but there are now talks of
23 revising the Roadmap even before it is actually implemented
24 Enactment of the Indigenous People’s Rights Act which, however, is more honored in its
25 violation than its observance
26
279.C. Numerous yet ineffective and uncoordinated water authorities resulting in a weak
28 institutional framework
29
30There are at least 32 water-related agencies that have overlapping and sometimes conflicting
31functions. The sheer number makes it difficult to have a comprehensive, coordinated and
32integrated approach to the water sector. It also makes for a breeding ground for red tape and
33corruption.
34
359.C.1. Difficulty in establishing an updated and accurate baseline of the water sector
369.C.2. Lack of monitoring capacity of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) and
37 the Local water Utilities Administration (LWUA)
1
2Consequences
3 Highly fragmented institutional framework

4 Difficulty in exacting accountability
5Palliatives
6 NWRB’s mandate is broadened to include formation, coordination and integration of all sub-
7 sectoral water policies, but the agency remains incapacitated to perform its enlarged functions
8
99.D. Increasing privatization of water provision service focused on bulk water supply
10
11Privatization is viewed as the primary solution to the concerns of the water sector. The policy of
12privatization is pushed by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian
13Development Bank and made a condition for the approval and release of loans. However, it seems
14that many of the technocrats are no longer just acceding to such imposed conditions, but have
15already bought the idea that privatization actually leads to greater efficiency, improved
16management, and private investment expansion.
17
189.D.1. Privatization of the MWSS through concessions with Manila Water and Maynilad
199.D.2. Large-scale public-private partnerships in Tagbilaran City, Bohol and in Subic,
20 Zambales
219.D.3. NEDA Resolution No. 4 series of 1994 and its IRR urging the LGUs to adopt varying
22 degrees of privatization of LGU-controlled water utilities
239.D.4. Encouraging private sector participation (PSP) in bulk water supply and local water
24 utilities, through BOT, JVA modalities
25Consequences
26 Continued increase in rates contrary to the promise of privatization will necessarily lead to
27 decrease in rates
28 The poorer sectors of the communities are not provided with water service simply because
29 they cannot afford its price
30 Those who are not serviced either dig wells to tap groundwater (which most of the time leads
31 to depletion, saltwater intrusion and ground sinking) or make illegal connections to the private
32 providers’ pipelines (which are largely pointed as the cause of leak and wastage or non-
33 revenue water)
34Palliatives
1 Regulatory bodies are established to control private providers but these are either captured by
2 the private interests or simply incapable performing their functions
1 10. Abandoned Power Sector and Industry

2
3As mandated by the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), the power sector is
4thoroughly abandoned to the private sector, with generation and transmission firms
5privatized, the industry liberalized and opened up to foreign competition, and pricing
6deregulated. Demand-management is also lacking.
7
810.A. Privatized and Private Sector-driven Power Industry

9
10From the power crisis of the 90’s forcing the government to give concessions to the new private
11sector players Independent Power Producers (IPP), after EPIRA, even the plants owned by the
12National Power Corporation (NPC) are now being privatized. This is with the view that the private
13sector knows better where and when to supply electricity [see 1.A.2].
14
1510.A.1. Privatization of NPC Plants to Generation Companies (GENCOs), IPP contracts to IPP
16 Administrators (IPPA)
1710.A.2. Sale of Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) to State Grid of China and Monte Oro
1810.A.3. Oligarchic control of Manila Electricity Corporation (MERALCO)
19Consequences
20Since the private sector is operating on the basis of profit, and because of the huge influence
21business titans have on government policy, a private sector-led power sector leads to:
22
23 Conversion of state monopoly in power to oligarchic control of few family-owned companies
24 [see 1.A.2 consequences].
25 Private sector-led, foreign capital-driven financing [see 3.C] leads to debt accumulation. This is
26 not mentioning the ballooning contingent liabilities by the national government due to
27 sovereign guarantees.
28 Capital-intensiveness and huge affront costs of Renewable Energy (RE) preventing its
29 development despite Philippine government’s responsibility as a signatory to the Kyoto
30 protocol to fight against climate crisis [see 6.E.1]
31Palliatives
32 Attempts at energy planning through the Philippine Energy Plan as drafted and implemented
33 by the Energy Family (DoE, NPC, PNOC, ERC, NEA, PSALM, TRANSCO, WESM), but this can only
34 be implemented via an investment-attraction strategy
35 Performance Rate Based (PBR) replaces Return on Rate Based (RORB) Pricing Methodology
36 supposedly to discourage inefficiency even in a lack of competition, but this has mostly been
1 an excuse to recover investments because it allows full cost recovery plus an allowable return
2 of investment of up to 12%
3
410.B. Liberalized Ownership, Investments, and Management in the Power Sector

5
6The power crisis of the 90s forced the government to liberalized investments in the power sector.
7This policy is completed by EPIRA, which mandates the complete liberalization of industry, leading
8to the creation of new markets for each of the unbundled power subsector. This led to ineffective
9energy projections and management, with power supply swinging wildly from oversupply to
10under-capacity and vice versa. The state then fails to provide adequate, reliable, and cheap energy
11supply to industry [see 4.C.1], households [see 7.B.1], agriculture [see 8.A.1 and 2.B.4], etc.
12
1310.B.1. Unbundling of Generation with Distribution, Transmission, and Supply and
14 dispersal of ownership among the subsectors
1510.B.2. Granting Distribution Utilities (DU) direct transmission access to IPPs, some of
16 which are crossly-owned
1710.B.3. Lack of regulation on bilateral contracts between GENCOs and DUs
1810.B.4. Lack of demand-side management due to growth-based economic models
19Consequences
20The erosion of state capacity for central and coordination planning on power with liberalization led
21to:
22
23 Due to the absence of state participation in the power sector despite lackluster private
24 investments, the power sector has been characterized by failed power supply and demand
25 projection:
26 o Overpriced excess capacity from the contracts with IPPs that the Ramos administration
27 entered into during the energy crisis in the early 1990
28 o Under-capacity in a period of climate crisis, with El Niño compromising our hydroelectric
29 and hydropower multi-purpose dams [see also 6.C.2]
30 Lack of economies of scale – which is a barrier to entry – due to the erosion of NPC’s vertical
31 and horizontal integration
32Palliatives
33 Huge private sector concessions to promote a risk-free investment climate , like sovereign
34 guarantees and take-or-pay provisions, in order to attract energy investors (Ramos period)
35 Cross-ownership of generation and distribution, which is a form of vertical integration, but it is
36 for profit instead of welfare maximization.
37 Creation of a Supply Market, or the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM), which is to act
38 as a balancing system between the excess capacity not contracted by GENCOs to DUs in order
1 to ensure efficient linking of demand supply. This may have been the reason why WESM is not
2 encouraged to replace bilateral contracts under EPIRA
3
410.C. Politically-compromised, Incompetent, and Socioeconomically-detached Regulation

5
6The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) is supposed to be the primary check against corporate
7pricing abuses in a privatized power industry, but because it is politically appointed, its capacity to
8do so is compromised. Moreover, those who are appointed lack the competence to do their job.
9But even its very mandate is detached to social and economic goals, which are absent to begin
10with.
11
1210.C.1. Regulators are appointed by the President irrespective of regulation experience
13 [1.D]
1410.C.2. Lack of stated social and economic development goals [see 1.A.1] with which
15 regulation is supposed to be anchored on and biased to
16Consequences
17 Regulatory capture, as regulators are usually political appointees of elected officials vulnerable
18 to pressure from power capitalists [see 1.B]
19 Erosion of social welfare, as regulation does not consider consumers’ general capacity to
20 purchase electricity [5.A.1]
21 Electricity pricing is biased against households (and thus against women, because the role is
22 ensuring essential services devolves to them [see 7.B]), because they are the ones which
23 cannot pass the cost to other social entities, unlike firms which can pass the cost to consumers
24Palliatives
25 The granting of fiscal autonomy to the ERC ensures that it is not that politically dependent on
26 the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the House of Representatives (HoR)
27 for its operational budget
28 IFI-financed Capacity Building and training for the ERC, especially ones financed by the Asian
29 Development Bank (ADB)
30
3110.D. Undemocratic and private sector-centric/ -dependent power sector in the LGUs
32
33Power services in the grassroots are delivered undemocratically, are heavily influenced by, and are
34heavily dependent to, private sector activities. This provides opportunities for rent-seeking
35opportunities, while increasing prices and costs of electrification.
36
3710.D.1. Privatization of Rural Electric Cooperatives (REC) through Investment Management
38 Contracts (IMC)
110.D.2. Undemocratic management of existing RECs

210.D.3. Slow pace of National Electricity Administration (NEA) in rural and barangay
3 electrification
410.D.4. Allowing Third Parties, instead of DUs/RECs to provide missionary electrification
510.D.5. Private distribution utility for Metro Manila (MERALCO)
6Consequences
7 Low rural productivity due to lack of electrification [see 8.B.1]

8 High electricity prices in the rural areas due to lack of regulation
9 Costly and profit-oriented missionary electrification
10 Presence of rent-seeking activities in the rural electric public utilities, even those controlled by
11 cooperatives and the local government

HANEP For 11th FDC Congress (Draft)

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

HANEP For 11th FDC Congress (Draft)

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Working Draft for FDC 11th Congress (as of August 17, 2010)

A Project of the Freedom from Debt Coalition

1 New Economics for a New Administration

1Income and Asset Redistribution

17The article appeared in:

1 FDC’s SONA 2010 Statement

1. Weak, Elite-Captured State 1. Activist Developmental State

1.E. Technocracy-dominated, Manila- 1.E. Participatory and Democratic

II. Macroeconomic Fundamentals towards National Development

2. Inequitable Land Ownership 2. Equitable and Strategic Land

2.D. Development strategy centered on 2.D. Using the Bioregion-approach in

3. Foreign Capital-dominated 3. Domestic Capital-driven

4. Industry and Trade

4. Fragmented Industry designed 4. Integrated, Modernized, and

4.D. Underdeveloped Community 4.D. Empowering Local Enterprises

5. Repressive Labor 5. Empowered Labor Sector

5.D. Widespread Unemployment and 5.D. Employment Program according to

6. Ecologically destructive 6. Ecologically Sustainable and

6.A. Incoherent, Incomprehensive and 6.A. Pass Comprehensive Environment

6.B. Environmentally-destructive Economic 6.B. Rebuilding Terrestrial Carbon Sinks to

6.C. Ecologically-destabilizing Provision of 6.C. Low-emission and Sustainable

6.D. Waste-intensive production- 6.D. Demand management in all aspects of

6.E. Lack of Adaptation Planning for 6.E. Climate Adaptation measures to

6.F. Economic development biased against 6.F. Protecting Ecologically Sustainable

III. Essential Services towards Full Social and Human Development

7. Unrecognized and Neglected 7. Strong Social Support and

7.D. Unfair distribution of work among 7.D. Integrating components of the

8. Crops and Fishes for the 8. Food Sovereignty

9. Grossly Neglected, 9. Active State Participation

9.D. Increasing privatization of water 9.D. Public-Public Partnerships in small-

10. Abandoned Power Sector and 10. Strong State Participation

10.D. Undemocratic and private sector- 10.D. Facilitation of community modes of

IV. The Local Economic Alternative Program (LEAP)

1. Technocracy-dominated, Manila-centric 1. Participatory and Democratic Economic

2. Development strategy centered on 2. Using the Bioregion-approach in Creating

4. Underdeveloped Community Industries 4. Empowering Local Enterprises through

5. Widespread Unemployment and 5. Employment Program according to the

6. Economic development biased against 6. Protecting Ecologically Sustainable

7. Unfair distribution of work among 7. Integrating components of the Household

8. Liberalized and Deregulated, Food 8. Reorganizing Food Trade based on

9. Increasing privatization of water provision 9. Public-Public Partnerships in small-scale

10.Undemocratic and private sector-centric/ 10.Facilitation of community modes of

New School Economics

1 Towards Modernity and Prosperity. Next Stop: Philippines 2020.

11. Activist Developmental State

1 2. Equitable and Strategic Land Ownership and Use for

1  In line an environmentally sustainable national development strategy,

1 2.C.1. Reorganization of political boundaries in order to match them with ecological

13. Domestic Capital-driven Development

1 4. Integrated, Modernized, and Ecologically-sound

1 5. Empowered Labor Sector

1 6. Ecologically Sustainable and Climate-adaptive

1  Services sector must cater to climate disaster demands, especially on emergency

1 7. Strong Social Support and Safety Net System for

18. Food Sovereignty

1 8.B.2. Agricultural modernization through government procurement and distribution (to

1 9. Active State Participation towards an Integrated,

1 10. Strong State Participation towards a Rational and

1 10.C.4. Re-embedding Regulation to Society. Regulation must be pegged on a social and

Why are we Poor?

1 Why are we poor? Going Beyond the Corruption Discourse

12The huge discrepancy between those who were reportedly poor

23Is the Philippines Poor?